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gao_RCED-95-242 | gao_RCED-95-242_0 | Agencies’ Policies and Procedures Do Not Differentiate Between Rural and Urban Counties
Neither SBA’s nor FEMA’s disaster declaration policies and procedures differ with respect to whether the affected area is considered rural or urban. The extent to which the damage is covered by insurance. As shown in figure 1, the median number of days that elapsed during both intervals was greater for rural and very rural counties than for urban and very urban counties. As noted above, neither FEMA’s nor SBA’s factors for assessing requests for disaster declarations and helping determine whether or not to grant assistance include any measure of population density. SBA, on the other hand, denied a greater proportion of requests for rural and very rural counties than for urban and very urban counties. Period Between Incident and Gubernatorial Request
One factor affecting the length of time between a disaster incident and a gubernatorial request for a declaration was how quickly a preliminary damage assessment could be made. Period Between Gubernatorial Request and Declaration Decision
The factors that affected the length of time between a gubernatorial request and a declaration decision included (1) the extent of documentation in the governor’s request and (2) in the case of requests for SBA’s assistance, whether or not the request was included in a request for a presidential declaration. Disaster Declaration Processes
Although the two agencies operate under separate authorities, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) follow similar processes for federal disaster declarations. Processing Times for Disaster Declaration Requests
With some exceptions, the times taken for governors to request a presidential or SBA disaster declaration and the times taken for the President or SBA Administrator to reach a decision were longer for rural and very rural counties. Very rural (1)
Rural (30)
Urban (13)
Very urban (11)
All (55)
Very rural (15)
Rural (22)
Urban (53)
Very urban (34)
All (124)
Factors Affecting Timing of Declaration Process
To identify factors that may influence the time that elapses during the disaster declaration process, we reviewed selected cases of disaster declaration requests at FEMA and SBA. On August 3, the governor requested SBA assistance. The time from the governor’s request to the presidential decision was shorter than average for all 18 requests received. 2. 3. 4. To compare the length of time each agency took to respond to requests for rural and urban areas and to compare the proportion of requests for rural areas that were granted with the corresponding proportion for urban areas, we developed a database using FEMA’s and SBA’s disaster declaration request records and Bureau of the Census’ county and state information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the federal disaster declaration process, focusing on: (1) whether the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) and the Small Business Administration's (SBA) disaster declaration policies differ for rural and urban areas; (2) the length of time taken to respond to disaster declaration requests for rural and urban areas; (3) the proportion of requests granted for rural areas, as compared with the corresponding proportion for urban areas; and (4) factors that influence disaster declaration processing time.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) neither FEMA's nor SBA's disaster declaration policies differ with respect to whether the affected area is rural or urban; (2) both agencies use criteria such as measures of damage to homes, businesses, and public facilities to assess requests for disaster declarations and to help determine whether or not to grant assistance; (3) neither agency's criteria include a measure of population density; (4) for requests received in calendar 1993 and 1994, the time that elapsed between the governors' requests and the declaration decisions by the President or SBA was longer for rural and very rural counties than for urban or very urban counties; (5) for example, the median processing time for requests to FEMA for very rural counties was 11 days, and for very urban counties, it was 7 days; (6) similarly, the time that elapsed between the occurrence of a "disaster incident" and the governor's request for a disaster declaration was longest for very rural counties and shortest for very urban counties (medians of 10 days and 4 days, respectively, for requests made to the President); (7) in disasters declared by the President, FEMA made a greater proportion of very rural counties (93 percent) eligible for assistance than any other type of county; (8) in contrast, SBA declared a greater proportion of urban and very urban counties (58 percent and 70 percent, respectively) eligible for assistance than rural and very rural counties; (9) in the cases GAO reviewed, various factors affected the time required for the declaration process; one factor affecting the length of time between a disaster incident and a gubernatorial request for a declaration was how quickly damage assessments could be made; and (10) among the factors that affected the length of time between a gubernatorial request and a declaration decision was the extent to which the damage was documented in the governor's request. |
gao_GAO-05-150 | gao_GAO-05-150_0 | However, 18 agencies have self-reported that they obligated almost $2.9 billion for trade capacity building activities in over 100 countries from fiscal years 2001 through 2004. USAID reported providing 71 percent of the trade capacity building assistance. United States Categorizes a Range of Assistance as Trade Capacity Building
The U.S. government survey administered by USAID defined trade capacity building as activities meant to help countries become aware of and accede to the WTO; implement WTO agreements; and build the physical, human, and institutional capacity to benefit more broadly from a rules-based trading system. While some of the agencies we reviewed have set program goals for building trade capacity, generally, most have neither developed performance indicators related to trade capacity building, nor have they compiled performance data and analyzed the results in terms of building trade capacity. USDA’s trade capacity building strategy does not include performance indicators. Although USAID officials have called developing trade capacity building performance indicators difficult, they are working toward that end independently and with other donors. Without evaluating the effectiveness of its trade capacity building assistance, the United States cannot ensure the reasonable use of resources devoted to such assistance, determine whether the assistance is helping countries participate in and benefit from trade, and credibly demonstrate that trade capacity building is a useful U.S. trade and development policy. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide more objective information on the progress of U.S. trade capacity building efforts and allow the United States to assess their effectiveness, we make the following two recommendations: The Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Trade Representative, as co-chairs of the trade capacity building interagency group, in consultation with other agencies that fund and implement trade capacity building assistance, should develop a cost- effective strategy to systematically monitor and measure program results and to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. trade capacity building assistance. This report (1) identifies the nature and extent of U.S. trade capacity building; (2) describes how agencies implement such assistance, including coordination; and (3) assesses whether agencies evaluate its effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many developing countries have expressed concern about their inability to take advantage of global trading opportunities. The United States considers this ability a key factor in reducing poverty, achieving economic growth, raising income levels, and promoting stability. U.S. trade capacity building assistance is designed to address these concerns. GAO (1) identified the nature and extent of U.S. trade capacity building; (2) described how agencies implement such assistance, including coordination; and (3) assessed whether agencies evaluate its effectiveness.
What GAO Found
U.S. trade capacity building is primarily a collection of existing trade and development activities placed under the umbrella of trade capacity building. The U.S. government initiated an annual governmentwide survey in 2001 to identify U.S. trade capacity building efforts, which it defined as assistance meant to help countries become aware of and accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO); implement WTO agreements; and build the physical, human, and institutional capacity to benefit from trade. U.S. agencies self-reported that they had provided almost $2.9 billion in trade capacity building assistance to over 100 countries from fiscal years 2001 through 2004. The Agency for International Development (USAID) reported providing about 71 percent of the trade capacity building funding. Agencies are coordinating their assistance through the trade capacity building interagency group formed in 2002 to help countries negotiate and implement U.S. free trade agreements. Most of the U.S. agencies we reviewed are not systematically measuring the results of their trade capacity building assistance or evaluating its effectiveness. Although some agencies have set program goals for building trade capacity, they have not generally developed performance indicators, compiled data, or analyzed the results in terms of building trade capacity. USAID's March 2003 strategy for building trade capacity includes a limited number of performance indicators. USAID officials have stated that developing such indicators is difficult but have begun work independently and with other international donors toward that end. Without a strategy for evaluating the effectiveness of its trade capacity building assistance, the United States cannot identify what works and what does not work to ensure the reasonable use of resources for these efforts. |
gao_GAO-07-355 | gao_GAO-07-355_0 | Background
Many U.S. workers participate in employer-sponsored health benefit and retirement pension programs and the costs of these benefits in recent years have risen faster than wages. Health and retirement benefits help employers attract and retain skilled workers; however, the costs of these benefits have accounted for an increasingly larger share of workers’ total compensation. To contain rising health care costs, employers have made several changes to health benefits. While managed care relies primarily on health care providers to control rising costs, more recently employers have also looked to workers to assume greater responsibility for controlling these costs, such as by offering consumer-directed health plans (CDHP). Some of these changes may particularly affect low-wage or less healthy workers. Fewer Small Employers Offered Health Benefits
In recent years, the share of employers offering health benefits has declined, due largely to a decrease in the share of small employers offering coverage, and the share of individuals covered by these benefits has also declined. Employers Continued to Offer Retiree Health Benefits, but Shifted More of the Costs to Retirees, and Some Employers Eliminated Health Benefits for Future Retirees
The extent to which employers offered health benefits to retired workers and the extent to which retired workers enrolled in these benefits has remained relatively steady for the last several years. Similarly, experts are concerned that further cost-shifting of retiree health benefits may eventually lead some retirees—particularly those with lower retirement incomes—to drop this coverage, though the implications of this for some Medicare-eligible retirees might be mitigated by the recent introduction of Medicare Part D. Less healthy workers may be more affected by increased cost-shifting than others, because those who are high utilizers of health care may spend a greater share of their income on the care they receive, and if they are unable to afford it, they may forgo needed care. In addition, some labor and consumer advocacy groups are concerned that mini-medical plans will lead to reduced benefits for some workers, such as those whose comprehensive benefits are fully replaced by mini-medical plans. The Ongoing Shift to Different Types of Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans Continues to Affect Both Employers’ and Workers’ Roles in Retirement Planning
The trends in employer-sponsored pension benefits that have emerged over the last several decades have continued. Participation in DB plans continues to fall as employers continue to terminate existing plans or freeze benefits for active workers. Conversely, participation in DC plans continues to rise as employers increase their offerings of these plans. Benefits experts stated that employers’ decisions regarding the retirement plans they offer reflect their attempts to control retirement benefit costs and make them more predictable. With DC plans, workers assume the responsibilities and risks for managing their retirement accounts; however, a growing number of employers are attempting to increase participation rates and retirement savings in DC plans by automatically enrolling workers, escalating worker contributions and offering investment funds that require less worker management. A survey of employers found that 82 percent of employers who froze or terminated their DB plans cited cost volatility as a significant factor. Workforce Restructuring Can Result in Different Benefit Arrangements for Workers and May Affect Employer Benefit Costs
Workforce restructuring through the use of contingent workers may affect workers’ benefits. The use of contingent workers can reduce the costs associated with providing these benefits for employers; however, benefits experts presented mixed views on whether employers have been changing the composition of their workforces for this reason. To reduce benefit costs, some employers are employing only a core of full-time workers in key positions to whom they provide benefits, while other work is outsourced or done by workers who are not included in the employers’ benefit plans. The challenges workers face in assuming greater cost, risk, and control of their health and retirement benefits can make it more difficult for low-wage earners to afford health care coverage and save for retirement. Although these challenges may weigh most heavily on the less wealthy and less healthy segments of the workforce, they affect a broad spectrum of the American workforce and could prove challenging to many. Employers, individuals, and government share the responsibility of finding long-term solutions with the goal of ensuring that individuals of varying economic and health backgrounds are prepared for their health and retirement needs. DOL did not provide written comments, but did provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO-07-21. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many U.S. workers receive health and pension benefits from employers, and the cost of these benefits represents a growing share of workers' total compensation. Employers have made changes to control these rising costs, contending that these changes will allow them to remain competitive, particularly in an increasingly global market. Some advocacy groups are concerned that workers may receive reduced benefits or incur additional costs as a result of employers' cost-control strategies. Moreover, they contend that these changes may disadvantage certain groups of workers, such as sicker, older, or low-wage workers. GAO was asked to examine the practices employers are using to control the costs of benefits. To evaluate changing employer benefit practices and their potential implications, GAO examined: (1) current and emerging practices employers are using to control the costs of health care benefits; (2) current and emerging practices employers are using to control the costs of retirement benefits; and (3) employers' workforce restructuring changes. GAO reviewed studies of employer benefit trends; interviewed representatives of business, government, labor, and consumer advocacy and research organizations; and reviewed and analyzed data from surveys of employee benefits. The Department of Labor provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Many employers have recently changed health benefits, often to control costs. The share of employers offering health benefits has declined from 2001 to 2006, due mostly to an 8-percentage point drop in the share of small employers offering benefits. Many employers that offer health benefits have required workers to pay a higher share of out-of-pocket costs and some have recently introduced consumer-directed health plans, which trade lower premiums for significantly higher deductibles. Also, some employers now offer mini-medical plans that provide more limited coverage at lower premiums. Similar to coverage for active workers, an increasing share of retiree health benefits costs is being shifted to retirees and many employers have terminated benefits for future retirees--a trend that experts believe will continue. Some of these recent changes may affect some workers more than others, such as low-wage workers who are less able to afford higher out-of-pocket costs and less healthy workers who use more health care. The trends in retirement benefits that have emerged over the last several decades are continuing. Active participation in defined benefit plans fell from 29 million in 1985 to 21 million in 2003 as employers terminated existing plans or froze benefits for active employees. At the same time, active participation in defined contribution plans rose from 33 million in 1985 to 52 million in 2003 as employers increased their offerings of these plans. Benefits experts stated that employers' decisions on what type of retirement plans to offer reflects their preference for benefit cost control and predictability in funding and accounting. Employers' decisions to offer defined contribution plans requires workers to assume more responsibility for their retirement planning; however, a growing number of employers are attempting to increase retirement savings by automatically enrolling workers and offering investment advice, for which recent legislation provides additional flexibilities. Workforce restructuring through the use of contingent workers--workers who are not employed full-time and year round with an employer--may affect workers' access to and participation in benefit programs. Benefits experts presented mixed views on whether employers have been changing the composition of their workforces to reduce benefit costs. Employers, individuals, and government share the responsibility for providing a U.S. benefits system that addresses the health and retirement needs of individuals of varying economic and health backgrounds, while allowing employers to remain competitive in a global market environment. The challenges workers face in assuming greater cost, risk, and control of their health and retirement benefits make it more difficult for low-wage earners to afford health care coverage and save for retirement. Although these challenges may weigh most heavily on the less wealthy and less healthy segments of the workforce, they affect a broad spectrum of the American workforce and could prove challenging to many over time. |
gao_GAO-13-635 | gao_GAO-13-635_0 | To help ensure that SSA does not pay benefits to persons who do not have long-term disabilities, a DI program statute requires individuals to serve a 5-month waiting period prior to receiving DI benefits. SSA Made $1.29 Billion in Benefit Payments That Were Potentially Improper as of January 2013, Mostly as a Result of Work Activity during the 5-Month Waiting Period
SSA Made $1.29 Billion in DI Benefit Payments That Were Potentially Improper
On the basis of our analysis of SSA data on individuals who were DI beneficiaries as of December 2010 and earnings data from the NDNH, we estimate that SSA made $1.29 billion in DI benefit payments that were potentially improper to about 36,000 individuals as of January 2013. As shown in figure 3, the estimated 36,000 DI beneficiaries receiving potential overpayments represent about 0.4 percent of all primary DI beneficiaries at that time. The exact number of individuals who received improper disability payments and the exact amount of improper payments made to those individuals cannot be determined without detailed case investigations by SSA. However, after completing the 9-month trial work period and entering the reentitlement period, beneficiaries who have substantial earnings from work beyond the 3-month grace period are generally no longer entitled to benefits. Specifically, we found that SSA’s enforcement operation will not generate an alert for earnings during the waiting period if the earnings occur in a year when the beneficiary does not receive a benefit payment. In two of the three examples we randomly selected from our sample of beneficiaries with work activity during the waiting period, SSA’s enforcement operation did not generate alerts for SGA-level earnings during the waiting period because their waiting periods occurred in the year prior to their first benefit payment. For the third beneficiary we reviewed, SSA’s enforcement operation generated an alert for earnings during the waiting period because the individual also received benefit payments in that year. SSA officials acknowledged that the systemic limitation to their enforcement operation allows potentially disqualifying work activity to remain undetected, but SSA expressed concern that modifying its existing enforcement operation may be costly. Without reliable and timely earnings information on the work activity of individuals applying for DI benefits, SSA risks making overpayments to individuals whose work activity indicates they are not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability benefits. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve SSA’s ability to detect and prevent potential DI cash benefit overpayments due to work activity during the 5-month waiting period, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security take the following action: assess the costs and feasibility of establishing a mechanism to detect potentially disqualifying earnings during all months of the waiting period, including those months of earnings that the agency’s enforcement operation does not currently detect and implement this mechanism, to the extent that an analysis determines it is cost- effective and feasible. To do this, we used wage data to identify two populations of individuals with earnings beyond program limits; we then drew a random, generalizable sample of individuals from each population and compared wage information from their employers to DI program information from SSA to develop estimates of potential overpayments in each population. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) estimates the extent to which individuals received disability insurance (DI) benefit payments that were potentially improper due to work activity performed during the 5-month waiting period or beyond the 9-month trial work period; and (2) assesses the extent to which the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) enforcement operation detects potentially disqualifying work activity during the waiting period. We plan to assess the extent to which the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) indicates potential overpayments in SSA’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in future work, which will be available this year. Wait Period Overpayments
Our analysis of the NDNH match file identified individuals who were in current pay status in the DI program as of December 2010 and had computed monthly earnings that exceeded the corresponding monthly SGA threshold for any of the 5 months prior to the individual’s DI date of We included individuals who received potential entitlement to disability.overpayments due to work activity during the waiting period on the basis of the following criteria: 1. monthly computed earnings were greater than the corresponding SGA threshold during any month of the individual’s 5-month waiting period, and 2. Trial Work Period Overpayment Examples
To provide examples of the circumstances under which SSA made potential overpayments to individuals with work activity beyond their trial work period, we randomly selected three beneficiaries from our trial work period sample who were among those beneficiaries receiving potential overpayments for at least 36 months (3 years). | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA's DI program is the nation's largest cash assistance program for workers with disabilities. Though program rules allow limited work activity, some work activity indicates beneficiaries are not disabled and therefore not entitled to DI benefits. Consequently, SSA might overpay beneficiaries if the agency does not detect disqualifying work activity and suspend benefits appropriately.
GAO was asked to study potential DI overpayments. GAO examined the extent to which (1) the NDNH indicates that individuals received potential DI overpayments; and (2) SSA's enforcement operation detects potentially disqualifying work activity during the waiting period. GAO drew random, generalizable samples of individuals from those whose earnings on the NDNH were beyond program limits and compared wages from their employers to DI program data to identify potential overpayments. To illustrate the circumstances in which SSA made potential DI overpayments, GAO reviewed case files for a nongeneralizable selection of six individuals--three who worked during their waiting period, and three who received potential overpayments for at least 3 years.
What GAO Found
On the basis of analyzing Social Security Administration (SSA) data on individuals who were Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries as of December 2010 and earnings data from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH), GAO estimates that SSA made $1.29 billion in potential cash benefit overpayments to about 36,000 individuals as of January 2013. The exact number of individuals who received improper disability payments and the exact amount of improper payments made to those individuals cannot be determined without detailed case investigations by SSA. These DI beneficiaries represent an estimated 0.4 percent of all primary DI beneficiaries as of December 2010. Using a different methodology that includes additional causes of overpayments not considered in GAO's analysis, SSA estimated its DI overpayments in fiscal year 2011 were $1.62 billion, or 1.27 percent of all DI benefits in that fiscal year. GAO estimated DI program overpayments on the basis of work activity performed by two populations of individuals. The first population received potential overpayments due to work activity during the DI program's mandatory 5-month waiting period--a statutory program requirement to help ensure that SSA does not pay benefits to individuals who do not have long-term disabilities. Prior to receiving benefits, individuals must complete a 5-month waiting period, in which the individual cannot exceed a certain level of earnings, known as substantial gainful activity, during any month in order to be eligible for DI benefits. Earnings that exceed program limits during the waiting period indicate that individuals might not have long-term disabilities. The second population received potential overpayments due to work activity beyond the program's trial work period--the trial work period consists of up to 9 months in which a DI beneficiary may return to work without affecting her or his benefits. However, beneficiaries whose earnings consistently exceed program limits after completing a trial work period are generally no longer entitled to benefits.
SSA uses its enforcement operation to generate alerts for potentially disqualifying earnings, but the agency's enforcement operation does not generate alerts for earnings that occur in all months of the waiting period, which allows potentially disqualifying work activity to remain undetected. Specifically, GAO found that SSA's enforcement operation will not generate an alert for earnings during the waiting period if the earnings occur in a year when the beneficiary does not receive a benefit payment. For example, in two of the nongeneralizable case studies GAO reviewed, SSA's enforcement operation did not generate an alert for potentially disqualifying work activity during the waiting period because these individuals' waiting periods occurred in the year prior to their first benefit payment. GAO obtained earnings records from these individuals' employers that show they worked continually both during and after their waiting periods at a level of work that would normally result in a denial of benefits. GAO also reviewed information for individuals who worked beyond their trial work period and found that SSA had identified and established overpayments for these individuals. SSA officials stated that modifying its enforcement operation could be costly, but the agency has not assessed the costs of doing so. To the extent that it is cost-effective and feasible, establishing a mechanism to detect earnings during all months of the waiting period would strengthen SSA's enforcement operation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SSA assess the costs and feasibility of establishing a mechanism to detect potentially disqualifying earnings during all months of the waiting period and implement the mechanism as appropriate. SSA concurred, but raised concerns about GAO's estimates. GAO believes its estimates are valid as discussed in this report. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-43 | gao_T-HEHS-98-43_0 | Increases in payroll taxes were always anticipated to keep up with the benefit payments as the system “matured” and more retirees received benefits. 1.) Although the baby-boom generation will greatly contribute to the growth of the elderly population, other demographic trends are also important. Increasing life expectancy and falling fertility rates in combination mean that fewer workers will be contributing to Social Security for each aged, disabled, dependent, or surviving beneficiary. 2). These demographic trends have fundamental implications for Social Security, other forms of retirement income, and our economy as a whole. Social Security revenues are expected to be about 14 percent less than expenditures over the next 75 years, and demographic trends suggest that this imbalance will grow over time. In 2029, the Social Security trust funds are projected to be depleted. 3). In effect, Treasury borrows Social Security’s excess revenues and uses them to help reduce the amount it must borrow from the public. In other words, Social Security’s excess revenues help reduce the overall, or unified, federal budget deficit. In just 15 years, Social Security’s expenditures are expected to exceed its cash revenues, and the government’s general fund will have to make up the difference, in effect repaying Social Security. As a result, Social Security’s cash flow will no longer help efforts to balance the budget but will start to hinder them. A variety of options is available within the current structure of the program. However, some proposals would go beyond restoring financial balance and fundamentally alter the program structure. Acting sooner rather than later also would mean that the funding shortfall could be addressed over a longer period at a lower annual cost. The effect of reforms on other retirement income sources and on various groups within the aged population should be well understood when making reforms. While Social Security’s financing is projected to pay full benefits until 2029, it will start to pose challenges for the federal budget much earlier—only 10 years from now. Social Security: The Trust Fund Reserve Accumulation, the Economy, and the Federal Budget (GAO/HRD-89-44, Jan. 19, 1989). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the demographic trends contributing to the social security financing problem; (2) when the problem will begin to confront the federal government; (3) the alternatives for addressing the problem; and (4) the implications of these alternatives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) increasing life expectancy and declining fertility rates pose serious challenges not just for the social security system but also for Medicare, Medicaid, the federal budget, and the economy as a whole; (2) the aging of the baby-boom generation will simply accelerate this trend; (3) social security receives more from payroll taxes than it pays out in benefits; (4) this excess revenue is helping build substantial trust fund reserves that are projected to help pay full benefits until 2029, according to social security's intermediate projections; (5) at the same time, this excess revenue helps reduce the overall federal budget deficit but will start to taper off after 2008; (6) in 2012, social security benefit payments are projected to exceed cash revenues, and the federal budget will start to come under considerable strain as the general fund starts to repay funds borrowed from the trust funds; (7) although social security's revenues currently exceed its expenditures, revenues are expected to be about 14 percent less than total projected expenditures over the next 75 years, according to Social Security Administration projections; (8) a variety of benefit reductions and revenue increases within the current program structure could be combined to restore financial balance; (9) some observers believe that the program structure should be reevaluated; (10) reform is necessary, and the sooner it is addressed, the less severe the necessary adjustments will be; (11) any economic growth and improvements in living standards achieved will also mitigate the strains that reform will impose; (12) any course taken will substantially affect both workers and retirees, other sources of retirement income, the income distribution, the federal budget, and even the economy as a whole; and (13) such effects should be well understood in making reforms. |
gao_GGD-97-10 | gao_GGD-97-10_0 | As a result of general downsizing in the Department of Commerce, the Corps was reduced to 332 officers as of July 1, 1996. According to a Corps official, the ultimate downsizing goal was to reduce the number of officers to 285 by the year 2000. NOAA Corps’ Similarity to and Differences From the Military
Corps members’ entitlement to military ranks and military-like compensation, including eligibility for retirement at any age after 20 years of service, was an outgrowth of their temporary service with the armed forces during World Wars I and II. The NOAA Corps has not been incorporated into the armed forces since World War II, and DOD’s war mobilization plans envision no role for the Corps in the future. The NOAA Corps is not considered an armed service, and Corps officers are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which underlies how military personnel are managed. (2) What resources would be required to recruit, train, and retain civilian employees that might be needed to replace Corps officers who opt to leave federal service. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report is to provide information on the operations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Corps. To gather the information on the continuing need for the Corps, we reviewed NOAA Corps historical material and interviewed and obtained documentation from officials of NOAA, including the Office of NOAA Corps Operations; the Department of Defense (DOD), including the Department of the Army and the Navy; Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute; the National Science Foundation; the National Transportation Safety Board; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and the Environmental Protection Agency. Neither did we examine the possibility of contracting with private companies, rather than using civilian employees, to carry out the Corps’ current functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Commissioned Corps, focusing on: (1) whether there continues to be a need for a commissioned corps with military-like pay, allowances, and benefits; and (2) what the costs would be if federal civilian employees performed the Corps' functions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the NOAA Corps carries out civilian, rather than military, functions; (2) Corps officers operate and manage NOAA research and survey ships that collect the data needed to support fishery management plans, oceanographic and climate research, and hydrographic surveys; (3) Corps officers' entitlement to military ranks and military-like compensation was an outgrowth of their temporary assignments to the armed forces during World Wars I and II; (4) the Department of Defense's war mobilization plans envision no role for the Corps in the future; (5) Corps officers are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice; (6) the government would realize estimated net savings of $661,000 by converting the Corps to civilian status; and (7) a general downsizing in the Department of Commerce reduced the number of Corps officers to 332 as of July 1996, with a goal of 285 officers by 2000. |
gao_GAO-17-644 | gao_GAO-17-644_0 | These products are the focus of this report because they are often produced by companies that do not work regularly with DOD (non-traditional companies). However, available industry data, as well as DOD studies, indicate that it may be difficult for the department to attract non-traditional companies to sell or further develop their products for DOD’s own use. As shown in table 1, one reason for this is that DOD is not a significant customer for top innovative companies. Together, these challenges create an environment wherein the selected non-traditional companies told us that their resources might be better spent pursuing commercial business where the cost to compete is lower and selection decisions are faster. Two of the 12 non-traditional companies in our review are currently not pursuing business with DOD as a result of these challenges. For example, one of the 12 companies GAO spoke to conducted a cost comparison study and found that it took 25 full time employees, 12 months and millions of dollars to prepare a proposal for a DOD contract. In contrast, the study found that the company used 3 part time employees, 2 months, and only thousands of dollars to prepare a commercial contract for a similar product. This official said the company is no longer doing business with DOD. Commercial cloud service providers price their services based on the amount of services a customer uses every month, which could vary based on changing needs In addition, in response to a DOD request for information, officials from a non-traditional company that provides data integration and analytics products stated that DOD issued a request for proposals to develop a military-unique solution for a requirement that could be met with existing commercial products. § 2377, which requires DOD to determine whether commercial items exist that can satisfy its needs, in whole or in part. DOD Is Taking Some Actions to Address the Challenges Faced by Non-Traditional Companies
Congress and DOD recognize that changes to laws, regulations, and DOD’s implementation practices are needed to address the challenges cited by companies and are taking steps to address them. DOD is in the process of implementing some of the provisions. In addition, DOD established an 18 person advisory panel of current and former DOD executives, referred to as the 809 Panel, to identify opportunities to streamline the acquisition process. The panel will then issue a final report in 2018. Military Services Are Taking Steps to Reduce Contracting Cycle Times
The military services have also initiated efforts to streamline or standardize their contracting processes, one of the major challenges identified by non-traditional companies. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. We sent a draft of this report to DOD for advance review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes (1) key challenges identified by non-traditional companies when trying to do business with Department of Defense (DOD) and (2) actions DOD is taking to address them. Private sector investment could include funding from DOD. We selected these 12 companies based on several factors, including the extent to which the company had conducted business with DOD, company size, and the types of technologies they have developed. We then grouped these into six overarching challenges that nearly all of the non-traditional companies said they faced when trying to doing business with DOD. Third, we met with senior DOD personnel and acquisition professionals from across the three military service departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to identify military-specific initiatives focused on addressing some of the cited challenges and collected pertinent documentation on these efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Private industry investments in research and development have significantly outpaced DOD's own spending in this area over the past three decades. Recognizing that this situation is likely to continue, Congress has passed legislation aimed at enabling DOD to leverage technologies made by companies that do not typically do business with it, referred to in this report as non-traditional companies.
A Senate report included a provision for GAO to review DOD efforts to attract non-traditional companies that could potentially develop their commercial products for DOD's use. This report describes (1) key challenges identified by non-traditional companies when trying to do business with DOD and (2) actions DOD is taking to address them.
To perform this work, GAO conducted interviews with 12 non-traditional companies. Companies were selected based on size, the amount of business they had with DOD, and the type of technology they produce. GAO discussed the nature of the challenges identified with the companies. In addition, GAO obtained information from DOD on steps it is taking to mitigate identified challenges through document reviews and interviews with military service and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials.
What GAO Found
According to representatives from 12 innovative companies that do not typically do business with the Department of Defense (DOD), there are several challenges that deter them from selling their products and services to DOD or further developing their products and services for military use. These challenges can be grouped into the six areas shown in the table below.
According to these company representatives, collectively these challenges have created an environment where companies choose to either not pursue DOD business or believe that their resources could be better spent pursuing commercial business where the cost to compete is lower and selection decisions are made faster. For example, 1 of the 12 companies GAO spoke with conducted a cost comparison study and found that it took 25 full time employees, 12 months and millions of dollars to prepare a proposal for a DOD contract. In contrast, the study found that the company used 3 part time employees, 2 months, and only thousands of dollars to prepare a commercial contract for a similar product.
DOD is taking steps to implement some of the requirements that Congress mandated in recent legislation to address some of these challenges, as well as implementing other innovative solutions. For example, as required by Congress, DOD established an advisory panel to identify opportunities to streamline the acquisition process, including recommending regulations that should be eliminated. The panel, which consists of 18 current and former DOD executives, expects to issue a final report in 2018. Each of the military services also has efforts underway to shorten their contracting process. In addition, DOD established an innovation unit in April 2015 to reach out to companies that do not typically do business with the department and facilitate business agreements within a desired period of 60 days using the process below.
Because many of the steps and initiatives that DOD is undertaking are in the early stages of implementation, it is too early at this time to determine whether they will address all of the challenges identified by companies that normally do not do business with the department.
What GAO Recommends
Although GAO is not making recommendations, DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments. |
gao_GAO-17-461 | gao_GAO-17-461_0 | The Military Services Have Used Alternative Financing for Hundreds of Energy Projects since 2005, but Have Not Collected and Provided Complete and Accurate Data to DOD
Since 2005, the military services have used alternative financing arrangements for hundreds of energy projects to improve energy efficiency, save money, and meet energy goals; however, the military services have not collected and provided DOD complete and accurate data to aid DOD and congressional oversight of alternatively financed energy projects. However, we were unable to identify and the military services could not provide complete data on the range of their alternatively financed projects, to include data on total contract cost for 196 of 446 ESPC and UESC projects. Furthermore, some of the data provided by the Army and Navy on their alternatively financed energy projects did not include the level of accuracy needed for better or improved planning and budgeting purposes. During the course of this review, military service and DOD officials stated that one reason that the military departments and DOD headquarters levels did not always have complete and accurate data is because the military services have decentralized authority for entering into alternatively financed projects and for maintaining associated data. Without more consistent verification of performance for all alternatively financed projects, DOD cannot be certain that all projects are achieving their estimated savings. In addition, DOD uses guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget. Additionally, DOD’s interpretation of this guidance has resulted in the military departments developing varying approaches for verifying savings of their UESC projects. The Military Services Identified Benefits and Disadvantages, as Well as Potential Other Costs, of Using Alternative Financing for Selected Energy Projects
Officials Have Identified Benefits and Disadvantages of Using Alternative Financing Arrangements Instead of Up-front Appropriations for Energy Projects
Alternative financing arrangements provide the military services the opportunity to partner with the private sector to finance energy projects; however, there are benefits and disadvantages to these projects. However, we found some potential costs that may add to the overall cost of a project or may not always be included in total contract payments. In our review of the life-cycle cost analyses and contract documentation for the selected ESPCs and UESCs in our sample, we found that contracts varied in how they funded other potential costs associated with the projects, such as operation and maintenance and the repair and replacement of installed equipment, as well as some other energy project costs that may or may not be included in the payment to contractors. These accounts are included in the total contract costs. Conclusions
DOD has taken various actions to meet its needs as the largest energy consumer in the federal government, including diversifying power sources, implementing conservation and other efficiency actions to reduce demand, and relying on private-sector contracts through alternative financing arrangements in lieu of using up-front appropriations to fund energy projects. If DOD does not require the military services to provide DOD with complete and accurate data on all alternatively financed energy projects, decision makers within the department and Congress may not have all information needed for effective oversight of these projects, which represent long-term budgetary commitments for periods of up to 25 years. Without updated and clear guidance on how the military departments should be taking steps to verify savings associated with UESC projects to validate project performance, the military services will likely continue to interpret DOD guidance differently and are likely to take inconsistent approaches to assuring the performance of UESC projects, which could limit DOD’s visibility over projects that commit the departments to long-term payments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist DOD and Congress in their oversight of DOD’s alternatively financed energy projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to collect complete and accurate data on their alternatively financed energy projects, including data on the services’ financial obligations and cost savings, and provide the data to DOD at least annually to aid departmental oversight. In written comments, DOD concurred with our first recommendation and nonconcurred with our second recommendation. Rather, we recommended that DOD clarify and update its guidance for verifying savings for these projects to help the military services appropriately budget for the projects over the contract’s life. To assess the extent to which the military services reported achieving expected savings and verified the reported performance of selected projects, we reviewed agency-level guidance on the different levels of measurement and verification or performance assurance that are required for alternatively financed energy projects, such as DOD’s instruction on installation energy management and the Department of Energy’s most recent guidelines for measurement and verification and performance assurance, to determine requirements for measuring savings for the different types of projects. GAO-13-337. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD, the largest energy consumer in the federal government, has been addressing its power needs by diversifying its power resources, reducing demand, and implementing conservation projects. To address its goals for energy projects, DOD also has been using alternative financing from private-sector contracts rather than relying solely on annual federal appropriations to fund projects upfront.
The House and Senate reports accompanying their respective bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for 2017 included provisions that GAO review DOD's alternatively financed energy projects. This report (1) evaluates the military services' use of alternative financing arrangements since 2005 and data collected and provided to DOD on those projects; (2) assesses reported project savings and verification of reported performance, and (3) describes benefits and disadvantages and potential other costs of using alternative financing rather than up-front appropriations. GAO analyzed and reviewed DOD data, relevant guidance, and project documentation; interviewed cognizant officials; and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of projects.
What GAO Found
The military services have used alternative financing arrangements—entering into about 38 private-sector contracts annually from 2005 through 2016—to improve energy efficiency, save money, and meet energy goals. However, the military services have not collected and provided the Department of Defense (DOD) complete and accurate data, such as total contract costs and savings. For example, GAO was unable to identify and the military services could not provide total contract costs for 196 of the 446 alternatively financed energy projects since 2005. Furthermore, some data provided on select projects did not include the level of accuracy needed for planning and budgeting purposes. According to officials, the military services did not always have complete and accurate data because authority for entering into these projects has been decentralized and data have not been consistently maintained. As such, neither the military departments, which include the military services, nor DOD have complete and accurate data on the universe of these projects. Without complete and accurate data on all alternatively financed energy projects, decision makers will not have the information needed for effective project oversight or insight into future budgetary implications of the projects, including impacts on utility budgets.
DOD's alternatively financed energy projects that GAO reviewed reported achieving expected savings. Specifically, GAO's review of 13 operational alternatively financed energy projects found that all 13 projects reported achieving their expected savings. However, the military services have varying approaches for verifying whether projected savings were achieved for all utility energy service contracts (UESC)—an arrangement in which a utility arranges financing to cover the project's costs, which are then repaid by the agency over the contract term. DOD guidance requires the military services to track estimated and verified savings and measurement and verification information for all energy projects, but DOD's guidance is inconsistent with more recent Office of Management and Budget guidance. This inconsistency and DOD's interpretation of Office of Management and Budget guidance have resulted in the military departments developing varying approaches for verifying savings of UESC projects. Without clear guidance from DOD on how the military services should be taking steps to verify savings associated with UESC projects, the military services will continue to interpret guidance differently and are likely to take inconsistent approaches to verifying the savings of UESC projects spanning potentially a 25-year duration.
DOD and military service officials identified benefits and disadvantages, as well as other potential costs, of using alternative arrangements to finance energy projects rather than using up-front appropriations. According to officials, benefits include the ability to fund projects that would not otherwise be funded due to budgetary constraints, to complete projects more quickly, and to have expert personnel available to implement and manage such projects. However, officials also identified disadvantages, including higher costs and the risks associated with long-term financial obligations. In addition, GAO found that some potential costs for these alternatively financed energy projects, such as costs associated with operation and maintenance and repair and replacement of equipment, add to overall project costs and may not be included in the total contract payments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the military services collect and provide DOD complete and accurate data on all alternatively financed energy projects and that DOD update its guidance to clarify requirements for verifying UESC savings. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and nonconcurred with the second. GAO continues to believe its recommendation is valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-10-187 | gao_GAO-10-187_0 | In July 2008, DOD, State, and USAID signed an MOU in which they agreed the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) would be the system of record for the statutorily-required contract and contractor personnel information. Contractor and Contractor Personnel Information Can Help Agencies Address Management and Oversight Challenges
The need for information on contracts and contractor personnel to inform decisions and oversee contractors is critical given DOD, State, and USAID’s extensive reliance on contractors to support and carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The agencies’ lack of complete and accurate information on contractors supporting contingency operations may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk, as illustrated in the following examples: Limited visibility over contractors obscures how extensively agencies rely on contractors to support operations and help carry out missions. Without incorporating information on contractors into planning efforts, agencies risk making uninformed programmatic decisions. A lack of accurate financial information on contracts impedes agencies’ ability to create realistic budgets. Lack of insight into the contract services being performed increases the risk of paying for duplicative services. Costs can increase due to a lack of visibility over where contractors are deployed and what government support they are entitled to. However, as we reported last month, DOD, State, and USAID’s on-going implementation of SPOT currently falls short of providing agencies with information that would help facilitate oversight and inform decision making, as well as fulfill statutory requirements. Tracking Information on Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
DOD, State, and USAID have been phasing in the MOU requirement to use SPOT to track information on contracts and the personnel working on them in Iraq and Afghanistan. State reported 8,971 contractor personnel were working on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first half of fiscal year 2009. USAID relied entirely on contractor surveys to determine the number of contractor personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior Recommendation for Executive Action and Concluding Observations
To address the shortcomings we identified in the agencies’ implementation of SPOT, we recommended in our October 2009 report that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008 requirements, specifically ensuring that the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008 and with the agencies’ respective information needs for overseeing contracts and contractor personnel; revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill statutory requirements and agency information needs; and establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU. | Why GAO Did This Study
This statement discusses ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to track information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reliable, meaningful data on contractors and the services they provide are necessary to inform agency decisions on when and how to effectively use contractors, provide support services to contractors, and ensure that contractors are properly managed and overseen. The importance of such data is heightened by the unprecedented reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan and the evolving U.S. presence in the two countries. The statement focuses on (1) how information on contractor personnel and contracts can assist agencies in managing and overseeing their use of contractors and (2) the status of DOD, State, and USAID's efforts to track statutorily-required information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our recent recommendations to address the shortcomings we identified in their efforts. This statement is drawn from our October 2009 report on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was mandated by section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008), and a related April 2009 testimony. Our prior work was prepared in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
What GAO Found
The need for information on contracts and contractor personnel to inform decisions and oversee contractors is critical given DOD, State, and USAID's extensive reliance on contractors to support and carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The agencies' lack of complete and accurate information on contractors supporting contingency operations may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk, as illustrated in the following examples: (1) Limited visibility over contractors obscures how extensively agencies rely on contractors to support operations and help carry out missions; (2) Without incorporating information on contractors into planning efforts, agencies risk making uninformed programmatic decisions; (3) A lack of accurate financial information on contracts impedes agencies' ability to create realistic budgets; (4) Lack of insight into the contract services being performed increases the risk of paying for duplicative services; and (5) Costs can increase due to a lack of visibility over where contractors are deployed and what government support they are entitled to. DOD, State, and USAID have made progress in implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). However, as we reported last month, DOD, State, and USAID's on-going implementation of SPOT currently falls short of providing agencies with information that would help facilitate oversight and inform decision making, as well as fulfill statutory requirements. |
gao_GAO-04-815T | gao_GAO-04-815T_0 | The Secretary of VA is required to submit an annual report on the results, status, and priorities of federal research activities related to the health consequences of military service in the Gulf War to the Senate and House Veterans’ Affairs Committees. Federal Research on Gulf War Illnesses Has Decreased, and VA Has Not Collectively Analyzed Research Findings to Determine Research Needs
As of September 2003, about 80 percent of the 240 federally funded research projects on Gulf War illnesses have been completed. Additionally, funding for Gulf War-specific research has decreased, federal research priorities have been expanded to incorporate the long-term health effects of all hazardous deployments, and interagency coordination of Gulf War illnesses research has diminished. Most Federal Gulf War Illnesses Research Projects Are Complete, and Funding Is Decreasing as Research Priorities Evolve
Since 1991, 240 federally funded research projects have been initiated by VA, DOD, and HHS to address the health concerns of individuals who served in the Gulf War. VA’s Coordination of Federal Gulf War Illnesses Research Has Lapsed, and VA Has Not Determined Whether Key Research Questions Have Been Answered
VA’s coordination of federal Gulf War illnesses research has gradually lapsed. Starting in 1993, VA carried out its responsibility for coordinating all Gulf War health-related activities, including research, through interagency committees, which evolved over time to reflect changing needs and priorities. Additionally, VA has not reassessed the extent to which the collective findings of completed Gulf War Illnesses research projects have addressed the 21 key research questions developed by the RWG. The only assessment of progress in answering these research questions was published in 2001, when findings from only about half of all funded Gulf War illnesses research were available. Moreover, the summary did not identify whether there were gaps in existing Gulf War illnesses research or promising areas for future research. In 2000, we reported that without such an assessment, many underlying questions about causes, course of development, and treatments for Gulf War illnesses may remain unanswered. However, VA and RAC are exploring ways to improve information sharing, including VA’s hiring of a senior scientist who would both guide the agency’s Gulf War illnesses research and serve as the agency’s liaison to provide routine updates to RAC. RAC Officials Cite VA’s Poor Information Sharing and Limited Collaboration as Impediments in Meeting Its Mission
According to RAC officials, VA senior administrators’ poor information sharing and limited collaboration with the committee about Gulf War illnesses research initiatives and program planning may have hindered RAC’s ability to achieve its mission of providing research advice to the Secretary of VA. RAC is required by its charter to provide advice and make recommendations to the Secretary of VA on proposed research studies, research plans, and research strategies relating to the health consequences of service during the Gulf War. Without a comprehensive reassessment of Gulf War illnesses research, underlying questions about the unexplained illnesses suffered by Gulf War veterans may remain unanswered. However, at the time of our review most of these changes had not been formalized. Appendix II: Charter For the VA Research Advisory Committee On Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses (RAC)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than a decade after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, there is continued interest in the federal response to the health concerns of Gulf War veterans. Gulf War veterans' reports of illnesses and possible exposures to various health hazards have prompted numerous federal research projects on Gulf War illnesses. This research has been funded primarily by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In 1993, the President named the Secretary of VA as the responsible party for coordinating research activities undertaken or funded by the executive branch of the federal government on the health consequences of service in the Gulf War. In 2002, a congressionally mandated federal advisory committee--the VA Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses (RAC)--was established to provide advice on federal Gulf War illnesses research needs and priorities to the Secretary of VA. This statement is based on GAO's report entitled Department of Veterans Affairs: Federal Gulf War Illnesses Research Strategy Needs Reassessment (GAO-04-767). The testimony presents findings about the status of research on Gulf War illnesses and VA's communication and collaboration with RAC.
What GAO Found
The federal focus on Gulf War-specific research has waned, but VA has not yet analyzed the latest research findings to identify whether there were gaps in research or to identify promising areas for future research. As of September 2003, about 80 percent of the 240 federally funded medical research projects for Gulf War illnesses had been completed. In recent years, VA and DOD have decreased their expenditures on Gulf War illnesses research and have expanded the scope of their medical research programs to incorporate the long-term health effects of all hazardous deployments. Interagency committees formed by VA to coordinate federal Gulf War illnesses research have evolved to reflect these changing priorities, but over time these entities have been dissolved or have become inactive. In addition, VA has not reassessed the extent to which the collective findings of completed Gulf War illnesses research projects have addressed key research questions or whether the questions remain relevant. The only assessment of progress in answering these research questions was published in 2001, when findings from only about half of all funded Gulf War illnesses research were available. Moreover, it did not identify whether there were gaps in existing Gulf War illnesses research or promising areas for future research. This lack of a comprehensive analysis of research findings leaves VA at greater risk of failing to answer unresolved questions about causes, course of development, and treatments for Gulf War illnesses. RAC's efforts to provide advice and make recommendations to the Secretary of VA on Gulf War illnesses research may have been hampered by VA senior administrators' poor information sharing and limited collaboration on research initiatives and program planning. For example, VA failed to inform RAC about its 2002 major research program announcement that included Gulf War illnesses research. VA and RAC are exploring ways to improve information sharing and collaboration, including VA's hiring of a senior scientist who would both guide VA's Gulf War illnesses research and serve as the agency's liaison for routine updates to the advisory committee. However, most of these changes had not been finalized at the time of GAO's review. |
gao_GAO-08-748 | gao_GAO-08-748_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2007 and 2006 CFS, we evaluated the federal government’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control, and we followed up on the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address open recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the CFS that were in our previous reports. In our audit report on the fiscal year 2007 CFS, which is included in the fiscal year 2007 Financial Report of the United States Government, we discussed the material weaknesses related to the federal government’s processes used to prepare the CFS. These material weaknesses contributed to our disclaimer of opinion on the accrual basis consolidated financial statements and also contributed to our adverse opinion on internal control. This report provides the details of the material weaknesses we identified in performing our fiscal year 2007 audit procedures related to the processes used to prepare the CFS and our recommendations to correct these weaknesses, as well as the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address recommendations in our previous reports. Conformity with GAAP
For many years, we have reported that Treasury had not established a formal process to ensure that the financial statements, related notes, stewardship information and supplemental information in the CFS were presented in conformity with GAAP. Reconciling Distributed Offsetting Receipts
The federal government reports a unified budget deficit (budget deficit) in the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and the Unified Budget Deficit and in the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities. Treasury did not maintain adequate control over the spreadsheets used to summarize and array financial data for presentation in the CFS. Monitoring Internal Control over the CFS Preparation Process
Treasury, in coordination with OMB, has not established processes for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of internal control over the processes used to prepare the CFS. Appendix I: Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS
This appendix includes recommendations that were open at the beginning of our fiscal year 2007 audit from five of our previous reports: Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Improvement, GAO-04-45 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2003); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Further Improvement, GAO-04- 866 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Continues to Need Improvement, GAO-05-407 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2005); Financial Audit: Significant Internal Control Weaknesses Remain in Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government, GAO-06-415 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. Of the 81 recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS) that are listed in this appendix, 35 were closed and 46 remained open as of December 10, 2007, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2007 CFS. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 11 years, since GAO's first audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and financial reporting practices have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS. GAO has consistently reported that the U.S. government did not have adequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare the CFS. GAO's December 2007 disclaimer of opinion on the fiscal year 2007 accrual basis consolidated financial statements included a discussion of continuing control deficiencies related to the preparation of the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details of continuing material weaknesses, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions taken to address the 81 open recommendations related to the preparation of the CFS that GAO reported in July 2007.
What GAO Found
GAO identified continuing and new control deficiencies during its audit of the fiscal year 2007 CFS that relate to the federal government's processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contribute to material weaknesses in internal control regarding the U.S. government's inability to (1) adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies; (2) ensure that the CFS was consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and (3) identify and either resolve or explain material differences that exist between certain components of the budget deficit reported in the Department of the Treasury's records, used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and related amounts reported in federal agencies' financial statements and underlying financial information and records. The control deficiencies GAO identified during its tests of the processes used to prepare the fiscal year 2007 CFS involved the following areas: documenting a key standard operating procedure for preparing the CFS, reporting in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, reconciling distributed offsetting receipts, maintaining adequate control over spreadsheets used in preparing the CFS, monitoring internal control over the processes used to prepare the CFS, using interim financial information in the CFS preparation process, and various other control deficiencies that were identified in previous years' audits but remained in fiscal year 2007. Of the 81 open recommendations GAO reported in July 2007 regarding the processes used to prepare the CFS, 35 were closed and 46 remained open as of December 10, 2007, the date of our report on our audit of the fiscal year 2007 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 10 new recommendations and the new remaining balance of 56 open recommendations during its fiscal year 2008 audit of the CFS. |
gao_GAO-15-783 | gao_GAO-15-783_0 | Figure 1 shows the number of major disasters declared in the United States since Hurricane Katrina, from fiscal years 2005 through 2014. FEMA Has Expanded Its Contracting Workforce since 2005 but Does Not Have Sufficient Processes to Prioritize Disaster Workloads or Cohesively Manage Contracting Officers
FEMA’s contracting officer workforce has grown significantly since Hurricane Katrina, but the agency has struggled with attrition at times. FEMA’s workforce increases are due in part to the creation of the Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART) in 2010, headquarters staff charged with supporting disasters. DART has gradually assumed responsibility for administering the majority of FEMA’s disaster contract spending, but FEMA does not have a process for how the team will prioritize its work when they are deployed during a disaster. Further, in 2011, FEMA established an agreement between the regions and headquarters to revise regional contracting staff reporting responsibilities; however, we found challenges with how the agreement is being implemented, particularly in that it heightens the potential for an environment of competing interests for the regional contracting officers. FEMA Created a Team of Disaster Contracting Officers to Provide Increased Oversight, but Has Not Established a Process for Prioritizing Workload
In a 2010 business case to justify hiring additional contracting staff, OCPO officials said it had substantially added to the size of its contracting workforce in the years since Hurricane Katrina, but that it did not have enough specialized contracting staff to manage the contract administration and oversight requirements of several simultaneous large- scale disasters or a catastrophic event. As a result, the agreement does not address the concerns identified above, and has not been updated in the more than 4 years since its creation to reflect good practices or lessons learned. Additionally, inconsistent contract management practices during disaster deployments—such as incomplete contract files and reviews— create oversight challenges. FEMA Has Not Fully Implemented Required Contracting Reforms Following Hurricane Katrina
Based on our review of 27 disaster support contracts from fiscal years 2013 and 2014, FEMA has made progress in addressing some aspects of the contracting reforms required by PKEMRA, including the use of contracts established prior to a disaster for goods and services that are typically needed during a disaster response—known as advance contracts. To improve coordination and communication between FEMA OCPO and region mission support officials, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator direct OCPO and the regional administrators to revisit the 2011 service level agreement to: add details about the extent of operational control headquarters and regional supervisors should exercise to minimize potential competing interests experienced by regional contracting officers; further detail headquarters and regional supervisors’ roles and responsibilities for managing regional contracting officers to improve coordination and communication; and ensure that the agreement reflects any new requirements, including recent changes in training that may require travel funds, and establish a plan to ensure that the agreement is reviewed on an annual basis as intended. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to build and manage its contracting workforce and structure, we reviewed and analyzed data on FEMA’s workforce since Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in 2005, to identify staff size, rates of attrition, and years of experience. | Why GAO Did This Study
FEMA obligated $2.1 billion in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 for products and services, which included almost $770 million from offices responsible for disaster contracting. Providing disaster relief in a timely manner is essential, while adhering to contracting laws and regulations helps safeguard taxpayer dollars. Following Hurricane Katrina, Congress passed PKEMRA to improve FEMA's disaster contracting.
GAO was asked to review FEMA's disaster contracting practices. This report assesses the extent to which FEMA (1) made efforts to build and manage its contracting workforce and structure since PKEMRA, and (2) adopted PKEMRA reforms and demonstrated good management practices for disaster contracting.
GAO analyzed data on FEMA's workforce from fiscal years 2005 through 2014, reviewed workforce guidance, and reviewed 27 contracts—including 16 selected through a random sample and 11 through a nonprobability sample based on factors including high cost—to determine the extent to which PKEMRA provisions were met. GAO also met with contracting officials.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has more than tripled the number of contracting officers it employs since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, but it does not have a sufficient process in place to prioritize disaster workload and cohesively manage its workforce. Some of the workforce growth is attributed to the establishment of the Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART) in 2010, which has the primary mission of deploying to provide disaster contracting support, such as contracting for blankets or debris removal. DART has gradually assumed responsibility for administering the majority of disaster contract spending, but FEMA does not have a process for prioritizing the team's work during disasters. Without such a process, FEMA is at risk of developing gaps in contract oversight during major disasters. Further, in 2011, FEMA established an agreement that regional contracting officers would report to headquarters supervisors for technical oversight while continuing to respond to regional supervisors—who have responsibility for administrative duties—for everyday operations. This agreement has led to challenges for FEMA in cohesively managing its workforce, including heightening the potential for an environment of competing interests for the regional contracting officers. Further, FEMA has not revisited this agreement on annual basis as called for in the agreement. As a result, it does not incorporate lessons learned since its creation 4 years ago.
FEMA has not fully implemented 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) contracting reforms due in part to incomplete guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the FEMA Administrator establish procedures to prioritize DART's workload, revisit the agreement for oversight of regional contracting officers, and improve guidance on PKEMRA requirements. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-95-213 | gao_GGD-95-213_0 | As shown in table 1, the percentages varied among the practitioner groups. Although headquarters met its guideline less often than the regional offices met theirs, its processing time had been improving until fiscal year 1994. MSPB has established an EEO policy and has taken various actions to implement it. Despite the provisions MSPB has made to protect its employees against workplace discrimination, mismanagement, abuse, and improper personnel practices, a sizeable portion of survey respondents indicated concerns about becoming involved in the processes established for handling EEO complaints and for reporting wrongdoing. Twenty-nine percent of survey respondents expressed the belief that MSPB has been very successful or generally successful in fostering an environment of trust, respect, and fairness. Nearly half (45 percent) of MSPB employees responding to our survey—including many who felt that MSPB has been successful in promoting an environment of trust, respect, and fairness—suggested actions for MSPB top management to take in this regard. Merit Systems Protection Board
The questionnaire can be completed in about 20 minutes. 4. Regional level (120 days) b. N=5 4. 7. 29. Scope and Methodology
MSPB’s Appeals Process
To assess whether MSPB is accomplishing its statutory mission through the appeals process in a fair and timely manner, we (1) developed a questionnaire and mailed it in April 1994 to individuals who had experience as practitioners with MSPB’s process for adjudicating federal employees’ appeals of agency personnel actions during the 2-year period ending September 1993; (2) analyzed its case processing performance reports to determine whether MSPB abided by its own guidelines in processing cases during fiscal years 1991 through 1994 at the regional and headquarters levels; and (3) analyzed data on the extent to which MSPB’s final decisions were appealed to and affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit during fiscal years 1991 through 1994. MSPB’s Accountability Mechanisms
To determine what accountability mechanisms MSPB had in place to provide its employees the merit system protections that MSPB was created to uphold, we reviewed the agency’s EEO and internal oversight activities designed to protect its employees against workplace discrimination, mismanagement, abuse, and improper personnel practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Merit Systems Protection Board's (MSPB) performance, management, and operations, focusing on: (1) whether the MSPB appeals process is effectively protecting federal employees against improper personnel practices; (2) the accountability mechanisms MSPB has in place to provide its employees with merit system protections; and (3) the actions MSPB has taken to foster an environment of trust, respect, and fairness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the practitioner groups surveyed generally felt that MSPB has been fair in processing employee appeals of agency personnel actions and MSPB is accomplishing its statutory mission; (2) during the 4-year period ending September 1994, 91 percent of the final MSPB decisions appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals were upheld; (3) MSPB regional offices met their 120-day case processing guideline 96 percent of the time during the same period, while MSPB headquarters met its 110-day guideline 61 percent of the time; (4) the differences in the timeliness in processing appeals has been due to the complexity of headquarters' cases; (5) MSPB has established accountability mechanisms and an equal employment opportunity (EEO) policy to protect its employees against workplace discrimination, mismanagement, abuse, and improper personnel practices; (6) two-fifths of MSPB employees surveyed said they would be reluctant to become involved in the processing of EEO complaints; and (7) although MSPB has taken a variety of actions to foster an environment of trust, respect, and fairness, only 29 percent of survey respondents felt that MSPB has been successful. |
gao_GAO-10-630 | gao_GAO-10-630_0 | As of April 30, 2010, GSA had obligated just over $4.0 billion. According to GSA officials, GSA remains on track to achieve its overall Recovery Act obligation deadlines. GSA Makes Overall Information on Its Recovery Act Program Publicly Available but Has Not Provided Key Information about Its Projects to the Public
While GSA has provided information on the goals of its Recovery Act program, the projects selected to receive Recovery Act funding, and its own progress in obligating and expending Recovery Act funding, it has not included details on the nature of the work being conducted on individual projects or clearly identified or explained why it has added or removed projects from its program in GSA’s project plan revisions. GSA Recovery Act Projects Are Likely to Vary Greatly in the Extent of Their Energy and Water Conservation Improvements
According to GSA officials, all buildings receiving Recovery Act funds are expected to move toward becoming high-performance green buildings. To obtain more complete and reliable data, GSA is rolling out a new centralized system for collecting data on Recovery Act projects’ energy and water conservation performance. Similarly, an agency may need to hire additional staff in order to respond to an emergency, which would unexpectedly increase energy use. GSA Identifies Risks to Its Program and Risk Mitigation Strategies, but Some Project-Level Risk Plans Are Not Complete
GSA has identified risks to its Recovery Act program and risk mitigation strategies. GSA’s approach to risk management is generally consistent with best practices we have developed. Although GSA has developed a systematic process for identifying and planning for risks for its Recovery Act program, GSA officials said that to address project-level risks, such as those we have previously discussed, they rely on informal communication between headquarters and project management staff in the regions. During our review, we found that 9 of our 12 case study projects had not fully completed the required risk planning documents. While GSA has made progress in moving buildings modernized under the Recovery Act toward high-performance green buildings, by not including criteria for reducing transportation’s energy and environmental impacts for Recovery Act projects, GSA’s minimum performance criteria for projects are not in alignment with the definition of a high-performance green building called for by the Recovery Act. To reduce the environmental and energy impacts of transportation through site designs that support a full range of transportation choices for users of buildings, revise the MPC to require that project managers consider transportation-related improvements for Recovery Act projects, as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the steps the General Services Administration (GSA) has taken to implement the program and make its Recovery Act projects transparent to the public, we collected publicly available supporting documentation, including GSA’s Recovery Act program plans, spending plans, weekly financial activity reports, and recipient reported data on the number of jobs created or retained and funded. To determine the extent to which GSA’s Recovery Act projects will help the agency convert buildings to high-performance green buildings and meet federal energy and water conservation requirements and goals from statutes and executive orders, we compared GSA’s minimum performance criteria with the elements of a high-performance green building as set forth in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. To determine the extent to which GSA has taken steps to identify potential risks to its Recovery Act program and and developed strategies to mitigate those risks, we reviewed supporting documentation, including GSA’s risk management plan, risk mitigation plan, assessments of identified risks and mitigation strategies, and GSA’s project management guide for the Public Buildings Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided the General Services Administration (GSA) with $5.55 billion to invest in federal buildings and promote economic recovery. This funding includes $4.5 billion to convert buildings to high-performance green buildings (HPGB), which seek to reduce energy and water use, among other goals. GAO was asked to address the (1) steps GSA has taken to implement the program and make its Recovery Act projects transparent to the public, (2) extent to which GSA's Recovery Act projects are helping the agency convert buildings to HPGB and addressing federal energy and water conservation requirements and goals, and (3) extent to which GSA has identified potential risks to its Recovery Act program and developed strategies to mitigate those risks. GAO reviewed GSA documents and relevant laws and executive orders, and interviewed GSA officials at headquarters and staff for 12 projects, which varied in type, size, and location.
What GAO Found
GSA has put an organizational structure in place to implement its Recovery Act program and, as of April 30, 2010, had obligated just over $4 billion of its $5.55 billion appropriation, and is on track to meet the act's obligation deadlines. GSA also has published information on its Recovery Act program, such as agencywide plans for spending funds and lists of projects, but this information does not identify the nature of the work being conducted or describe the 263 projects GSA has selected for Recovery Act funding. Without this information, the program is less than fully transparent--a key GSA Recovery Act goal--because the public cannot readily discern what individual projects entail or are expected to achieve with Recovery Act funding. GSA's Recovery Act projects will enhance energy and water conservation performance in the 263 projects to varying degrees. GSA has begun collecting the data it would need to measure the likely extent of improvement. GSA set minimum performance criteria for its projects, which include reducing energy use by 30 percent. The criteria do not, however, include reducing the energy and environmental impacts of transportation through building location and site design, although this is part of the statutory definition of a HPGB. Under the Recovery Act, GSA is to use this definition when converting existing buildings. According to GSA, some managers are designing transportation-related improvements into their projects. However, because it is not part of GSA's criteria, other managers may not be systematically considering such improvements. According to GSA, the agency has begun to roll out a new centralized data system to collect and report on specific information for Recovery Act projects' green improvements and performance. GSA has identified risks to its Recovery Act program, such as the risk that Recovery Act reporting is inaccurate or incomplete, and risk mitigation strategies. In addition, GSA's approach to risk management is generally consistent with best practices we have developed. However, GSA relies on informal communication to identify project-level risks and has not taken steps to ensure the completion of project-level risk planning documents required by GSA. GAO found that the required documents, which are intended to help plan for project-level risks, had not been fully completed for 9 of the 12 projects reviewed. Unidentified risks to GSA's Recovery Act projects could potentially limit GSA's ability to achieve Recovery Act goals. |
gao_T-RCED-97-81 | gao_T-RCED-97-81_0 | As a result, deficiencies within the decision-making process that have been known to the agency for a decade or more have not been corrected. Conversely, environmental statutes and regulations require the agencies to analyze environmental issues and concerns along the boundaries of natural systems, such as watersheds and vegetative and animal communities. For example, regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act require the agencies to assess the cumulative impact of federal and nonfederal activities on the environment. Addressing issues that transcend the administrative boundaries and jurisdictions of the Forest Service and of other federal agencies will, at a minimum, require unparalleled coordination and cooperation among federal agencies. Differences in Laws Affect the Forest Service’s Decision-Making
Finally, differences in the requirements of numerous planning and environmental laws, enacted primarily during the 1960s and 1970s, produce inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the Forest Service’s decision-making. Differences among their requirements and differing judicial interpretations of their requirements have caused some issues to be analyzed or reanalyzed at various stages in the Forest Service’s decision-making process, as well as in the decision-making processes of other federal agencies, without their timely resolution, increasing the costs and time of decision-making and reducing the ability of the Forest Service and other land management agencies to achieve the objectives in their plans. In addition, environmental laws generally address individual resources, such as endangered and threatened species, water, and air. The Forest Service Needs Guidance on How to Resolve Conflicts Among Competing Uses
On the basis of our work to date, we believe that statutory changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Forest Service’s decision-making process cannot be identified until after agreement is reached on which uses the agency is to emphasize under its broad multiple-use and sustained-yield mandate and how it is to resolve conflicts or make choices among competing uses on its lands. Disagreement over the Forest Service’s priorities, both inside and outside the agency, has not only hampered efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its decision-making but also inhibited it in establishing the goals and performance measures needed to ensure its accountability. Differences among the requirements of planning and environmental laws also need to be addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the preliminary results of its work on the decisionmaking process used by the Forest Service in carrying out its mission, focusing on the underlying causes of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the Forest Service's decisionmaking process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its ongoing work has identified three underlying causes of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the Forest Service's decisionmaking process; (2) first, the agency has not given adequate attention to improving its decisionmaking process, including improving its accountability for expenditures and performance; (3) as a result, long-standing deficiencies within its decisionmaking process that have contributed to increased costs and time and/or the inability to achieve planned objectives have not been corrected; (4) second, issues that transcend the agency's administrative boundaries and jurisdiction have not been adequately addressed; (5) in particular, the Forest Service and other federal agencies have had difficulty reconciling the administrative boundaries of national forests, parks, and other federal land management units with the boundaries of natural systems, such as watersheds and vegetative and animal communities, both in planning and in assessing the cumulative impact of federal and nonfederal activities on the environment; (6) third, the requirements of numerous planning and environmental laws, enacted during the 1960s and 1970s, have not been harmonized; (7) as a result, differences among the requirements of different laws and their differing judicial interpretations require some issues to be analyzed or reanalyzed at different stages in the different decisionmaking processes of the Forest Service and other federal agencies without any clear sequence leading to their timely resolution; (8) additional differences among the statutory requirements for protecting resources, such as endangered and threatened species, water, air, diverse plant and animal communities, and wilderness, have also sometimes been difficult to reconcile; (9) however, on the basis of its work to date, GAO believes that statutory changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Forest Service's decisionmaking process cannot be identified until agreement is first reached on which uses the agency is to emphasize under its broad multiple-use and sustained-yield mandate and how it is to resolve conflicts or make choices among competing uses on its lands; and (10) disagreement over which uses should receive priority, both inside and outside the agency, has also inhibited the Forest Service in establishing the goals and performance measures needed to ensure its accountability. |
gao_GAO-14-556T | gao_GAO-14-556T_0 | Financial literacy encompasses financial education—the process by which individuals improve their knowledge and understanding of financial products, services, and concepts. Overview of Federal Programs or Activities on Financial Literacy and Agency Roles
In our 2012 report, we identified 16 significant financial literacy programs or activities administered by the federal government in fiscal year 2010. As shown in table 1, there were 16 programs or activities among 14 federal agencies and 4 housing counseling programs (which can include elements of financial education) among 2 federal agencies and a federally chartered nonprofit corporation. While we have not done a comprehensive update of this federal program summary since 2012, representatives of Treasury and CFPB—which represent the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, respectively—told us that as of April 2014, 3 of the 16 financial literacy programs and 1 of the 4 housing counseling programs either no longer existed or no longer received funding, and no new federal programs had been added since fiscal year 2010. Also among Commission charges are developing a national strategy for improving financial literacy and proposing means of eliminating overlap and duplication among federal financial literacy activities. Furthermore, since 2008, three Presidential advisory councils related to financial literacy have been tasked, in part, with creating partnerships among federal, state and local, nonprofit, and private entities. Federal Agencies Addressed Several GAO Recommendations, but More Progress Needed on Determining the Best Allocation of Resources
Our reviews of federal financial literacy efforts in recent years have examined, among other things, issues of fragmentation and overlap; the effectiveness of programs; coordination across multiple agencies and between federal, state, local, and nonprofit entities; the potential consolidation of programs or activities; and the need to improve the The following Commission’s national strategy for financial literacy. summarizes progress in four areas in which we have observed improvements or successes—coordination, partnerships, CFPB’s role, and evaluation tools—and one major area in which we believe significant work remains to be done—determining the most effective and efficient allocation of federal resources. These have included an internal web portal to allow federal agencies involved in financial literacy efforts to share information and resources; publication of 2012 Research Priorities and Research Questions to help coordinate federal research efforts; a clearinghouse of federal research and data on financial literacy; an initiative for coordinating among federal agencies’ activities and resources to help parents and teachers prepare children and young adults for financial success; and support to the Office of Personnel Management in promoting agency strategic plans for employee retirement readiness. Partnerships
The Commission has continued to build on its progress in promoting partnerships among federal and nonfederal sectors. Delineation of CFPB’s Role
CFPB has taken steps to delineate and distinguish its role in financial literacy from that of other federal agencies. Furthermore, CFPB’s Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans finalized a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Trade Commission in January 2012 to help cooperation on consumer education efforts and promote consistent messages. Evaluation Tools
We suggested in 2011 that the Commission and CFPB take steps to develop and disseminate a standard set of evaluation tools or benchmarks to help assess the outcomes and effectiveness of financial literacy programs.2012, CFPB signed a contract with the Corporation for Enterprise Development to develop a set of metrics and outcome measures for assessing the success of financial literacy programs. Allocation of Federal Resources
We continue to believe that further progress is needed in one area— helping to ensure that the most effective and efficient allocation of federal financial literacy resources occurs and avoids unneeded overlap. The creation of CFPB added a new player to the mix. In particular, some consolidation of these efforts could help ensure the most efficient and effective use of federal resources. As a result, in July 2012 we recommended to Treasury and CFPB that the Commission identify for federal agencies and Congress options for consolidating federal financial literacy efforts into the agencies and activities that are best suited or most effective.draft of that report, Treasury agreed with the recommendation, and subsequently CFPB noted its agreement as well, but the recommendation has not been implemented. The Commission’s national strategy could serve as one mechanism for determining how federal resources might best be allocated among programs and agencies, but it does not yet do so. And without recommendations on resource allocations, policymakers lack information to avoid overlap and help ensure the most efficient and effective use of federal funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Giving Americans the information they need to make effective financial decisions is key to their financial well-being. The federal government plays a role in promoting financial literacy, which encompasses financial education—the process by which individuals improve their knowledge and understanding of financial products, services, and concepts. The federal role evolved with the creation of the Commission in 2003 and CFPB in 2010.
This testimony provides an (1) overview of federal financial literacy activities and agency roles, and (2) update on the progress made in addressing GAO's recommendations in this area. This testimony is largely based on and partially updates a July 2012 report ( GAO-12-588 ) and relevant portions of GAO's annual duplication reports ( GAO-11-318SP and GAO-12-342SP ). For those reports, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant reports, plans, and websites related to federal financial literacy efforts, and interviewed staff of 17 federal agencies and of nonprofit organizations. To update selected information, GAO spoke with staff and reviewed materials from CFPB and the Department of the Treasury.
What GAO Found
In its July 2012 report, GAO identified 16 significant financial literacy programs or activities among 14 federal agencies in fiscal year 2010, and 4 housing counseling programs among 2 agencies and a federally chartered entity. As of April 2014, 3 of the financial literacy programs and 1 housing counseling program no longer existed or no longer received funding, and no new federal programs had been added, according to staff representing the Financial Literacy and Education Commission (Commission). The creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (known as CFPB) in 2010 added a significant new player, with offices devoted to financial education broadly and to educating servicemembers, older Americans, and students specifically. The multiagency Commission, created in 2003, coordinates among federal agencies and between federal agencies and state, local, nonprofit, and private entities. Commission responsibilities also include developing national strategies for improving financial literacy and proposing means of eliminating overlap and duplication among federal activities. Finally, since 2008 three Presidential advisory councils related to financial literacy have had charges that include fostering partnerships among private, nonprofit, and government entities.
GAO has observed improvements or successes in four areas—coordination, partnerships, delineating CFPB's role, and evaluation tools—but significant work remains to be done in one major area—determining the most effective and efficient allocation of federal resources.
Coordination . Coordination among federal agencies has improved in recent years, largely due to the role of the Commission. Recent efforts include a research clearinghouse and a coordinated initiative on youth education.
Partnerships. The Commission has continued to build and promote partnerships. Several initiatives have partnered with academics, nonprofits, and other entities.
Delineating CFPB's role. To help avoid unnecessary overlap, CFPB has further delineated its role in financial literacy efforts, discussing respective roles with federal agencies that have overlapping responsibilities and signing agreements on cooperation and areas of focus.
Evaluation tools. The Commission and CFPB have helped develop and disseminate evaluation tools to assess outcomes and effectiveness of financial literacy programs. CFPB also contracted with a company to develop metrics and outcome measures and with a nonprofit to evaluate and report on financial education programs and activities.
However, further progress is needed to help ensure effective allocation of federal financial literacy resources and avoid unneeded overlap. In 2012, GAO concluded the Commission was best placed to consider consolidating federal efforts, which could help ensure the most efficient and effective use of federal resources. The Commission's national strategy could serve as a mechanism to identify those resources and how they might be allocated, but has not yet done so. Without recommendations on resource allocations, policymakers lack information to avoid overlap and help ensure the most efficient and effective use of federal funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no new recommendations in this testimony, but reiterates its July 2012 recommendations for the Commission to identify options for consolidating federal financial literacy efforts and address the allocation of federal resources in its national strategy. The Commission agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-862 | gao_GAO-12-862_0 | Various In-Country Factors Affect USAID and Implementing Partners’ Ability to Target Food Assistance Effectively to Vulnerable Groups
USAID and its implementing partners face a range of in-country factors that, to varying degrees, affect their ability to effectively target food assistance to vulnerable groups. These factors include (1) the quality of data used to identify and reach recipients, (2) host government policies, and (3) sharing of rations among recipients and community members. Targeting effectiveness is reduced when data quality is poor, host government policies cause distortions in program design and implementation, and sharing prevents food rations from being consumed by the intended recipients in the intended amounts. USAID and its implementing partners take steps to mitigate such challenges by, for example, employing technology to improve data quality, coordinating closely with government officials to foster better relationships, and educating recipients about proper food usage to reduce sharing. In some cases, host governments have facilitated targeting efforts by, for example, establishing national targeting guidelines that set a common standard, or national statistical offices that assist in collecting data. Nevertheless, ensuring that food assistance reaches intended recipients remains difficult. In the design phase of the targeting process, USAID does not provide sufficient guidance on whether and how to target specialized food products. Furthermore, its evaluations do not systematically address targeting effectiveness. Without adequate guidance, monitoring, and evaluations, USAID cannot ensure targeting effectiveness in its food assistance programs. USAID is taking some steps to improve both guidance and monitoring. For example, USAID has a contract with Tufts University to develop updated guidance, and the agency is taking steps to improve monitoring by planning to track indicators such as detailed age breakdowns that are key to better understanding targeting effectiveness. However, these steps do not fully address the weaknesses in USAID’s targeting process. USAID Does Not Provide Sufficient Guidance in the Design Phase on Whether and How to Target Specialized Food Products, Although the Agency Is Starting to Make Improvements
USAID’s Guidance for Targeting Is Neither Up-to-Date Nor Complete, Hindering Decision Making
We found that USAID’s guidance for targeting is neither up-to-date nor complete for both emergency and development programs, which reduces the ability of implementing partners to make informed decisions in the design phase. Weaknesses in USAID’s Monitoring and Evaluation Efforts Related to Targeting Could Limit Targeting Effectiveness and Hinder Decision Making, but the Agency Is Starting to Take Steps to Improve Monitoring
USAID Does Not Monitor Key Indicators of Targeting Effectiveness, but Is Initiating Improvements in This Area
USAID does not require monitoring of key indicators needed to determine the level of targeting effectiveness, although it is beginning to make improvements in this area. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve USAID’s targeting of specialized food products to vulnerable groups, such as children under 2 and pregnant women, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following two actions:
As USAID continues to purchase new specialized food products without updated guidance, it should issue, as appropriate, improved interim guidance to assist implementing partners in deciding whether and how to target specialized food products. USAID agreed with our recommendation on establishing and reporting program-specific indicators to allow USAID to assess its programs’ effectiveness in reaching targeted groups. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe in-country factors that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners face in targeting vulnerable groups, and (2) examine the extent to which USAID’s targeting process supports effective targeting. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2011, USAID spent approximately $1.7 billion on food assistance reaching over 46 million people in 48 countries. USAID targets food assistance so that benefits accrue selectively to only a portion of the overall population, typically the most vulnerable. Effective targeting is important to maximize the impact of limited resources, especially as USAID begins to use more nutritious but more costly specialized food products to address hunger and malnutrition among vulnerable groups. GAO was asked to (1) describe in-country factors that USAID and its implementing partners face in targeting vulnerable groups, and (2) examine the extent to which USAID's targeting process supports effective targeting. GAO analyzed program data and documents; interviewed relevant officials; convened a roundtable of food assistance experts and practitioners; and conducted fieldwork in Ethiopia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
What GAO Found
In-country, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners face a range of factors that, to varying degrees, affect their ability to target food assistance effectively to vulnerable groups. These factors include (1) the quality of data used to identify and reach recipients, (2) host government policies, and (3) sharing of rations among recipients and community members. Targeting effectiveness is reduced when data quality is poor, host government policies cause distortions in program design and implementation, and sharing prevents food rations from being consumed by the intended recipients in the intended amounts. USAID and its implementing partners try to mitigate such challenges by, for example, employing technology to improve data quality, coordinating closely with government officials to foster better relationships, and educating recipients about proper food usage to reduce sharing. In some cases, host governments have facilitated targeting efforts by, for example, establishing national targeting guidelines that set a common standard, or national statistical offices that assist in collecting data. Nevertheless, ensuring that food assistance reaches intended recipients remains difficult.
Weaknesses in the design, monitoring, and evaluation phases of USAID's targeting process hinder targeting effectiveness, although the agency is taking actions to make improvements. In the design phase of the targeting process, USAID does not provide sufficient guidance on whether and how to target specialized food products. Specifically, USAID's guidance on design currently is neither up-to-date nor complete, and does not adequately address key benefits and risks that inform decisions on whether and how to target specialized food products. In USAID's monitoring and evaluation phases, weaknesses limit targeting effectiveness and hinder decision making. USAID currently does not require monitoring of key indicators needed to determine the level of targeting effectiveness. For example, during implementation USAID does not monitor actual recipients in its emergency programs. Furthermore, its evaluations do not systematically address targeting effectiveness. Without adequate guidance, monitoring, and evaluations, USAID cannot ensure targeting effectiveness in its food assistance programs. USAID is taking some steps to improve both guidance and monitoring. For example, USAID is updating guidance and plans to track indicators such as detailed age breakdowns that are key to better understanding targeting effectiveness. However, these steps do not fully address the weaknesses in USAID's targeting process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID improve USAID's targeting of specialized food products to vulnerable groups by (1) issuing, as appropriate, improved interim guidance to assist implementing partners in deciding whether and how to target specialized food products; and (2) establishing and reporting program-specific indicators related to targeted vulnerable groups, to assess effectiveness in reaching such groups. USAID agreed with the recommendations and provided examples of recent efforts to address them. |
gao_GAO-14-148 | gao_GAO-14-148_0 | Payments to MA Organizations
Payments to MA organizations and the additional benefits that MA organizations offer are based in part on the relationship between the MA organizations’ bids—their projection of the revenue required to provide beneficiaries with services that are covered under Medicare FFS—and a benchmark. CMS adjusts for differences in projected and actual enrollment through its method for paying MA organizations. Specifically, MA organizations are able to negotiate specific benefit packages and cost-sharing amounts with employers after the MA organizations submit their bid for an employer group plan. Changes under PPACA
PPACA changed how the benchmark is calculated beginning in 2011. This change resulted in decreased rebate amounts starting in 2012. MA Plans with Specific Eligibility Requirements
SNPs and employer group plans have specific eligibility requirements. Employer group plans are MA plans offered by employers or unions to their Medicare-eligible retirees and Medicare- eligible active employees, as well as to Medicare-eligible spouses and dependants of participants in such a plan. For Plans Available to All Beneficiaries in 2011, Expenses and Profits Represented Similar Percentages of Total Revenue Compared to Projections
As a percentage of 2011 total revenue, MA organizations’ actual medical expenses, nonmedical expenses, and profits were, on average, similar to projected values for plans available to all beneficiaries. Also, as a percentage of revenue, all three categories were within 0.3 percentage points of what MA organizations had projected (see table 1). Because of the higher total revenue, medical expenses as a percentage of revenue were 0.2 percentage points lower than projected, despite MA organizations’ spending more dollars on medical expenses than projected. The percentage of revenue spent on medical expenses and profits varied substantially between MA contracts. For example, while MA organizations spent an average of 86.3 percent of revenue on medical expenses, approximately 39 percent of beneficiaries were covered by contracts where less than 85 percent of revenue was spent on medical expenses, and 13 percent of beneficiaries were covered by contracts where less than 80 percent of revenue was spent on medical expenses (see table 2). In addition, MA organizations with high benchmarks had higher profit margins compared to those with low benchmarks. The accuracy of MA organizations’ projections varied on the basis of the type of plan they offered under each contract. For Plans with Specific Eligibility Requirements in 2011, Expenses Were Lower and Profits Were Higher as a Percentage of Total Revenue Compared to Projections
SNPs’ profits were higher than projected both in terms of a percentage of total revenue and in dollars. As a result of the higher-than-projected revenue and spending a lower percentage of revenue on expenses, SNPs reported an average profit per beneficiary of $1,115, which was 44 percent higher than projected ($777) and 149 percent higher than the profit per beneficiary for plans available to all Medicare beneficiaries ($447). In addition, employer group plans spent 86.3 and 6.1 percent of total revenue on medical expenses and nonmedical expenses, respectively, compared to a projected 89.5 and 6.3 percent, and these plans also had an actual profit margin of 7.6 percent compared to a 4.2 percent projected profit margin. The combined effects of higher revenue and a higher profit margin translated into average profits per beneficiary of $861, which was 108 percent higher than projected ($413) and 93 percent higher than the profit per beneficiary for plans available to all Medicare beneficiaries ($447). Agency Comments
We requested comments from CMS, but none were provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
MA organizations are entities that contract with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to offer one or more private plans as an alternative to the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program. These MA plans are generally available to all Medicare beneficiaries, although certain types of plans, such as employer group plans, have specific eligibility requirements. Payments to MA organizations are based, in part, on the projected expenses and profits that MA organizations submit to CMS. These projections also affect (1) the extent to which MA beneficiaries receive additional benefits not provided under FFS and (2) beneficiary cost-sharing and premium amounts. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) required that, starting in 2014, MA organizations have a minimum medical loss ratio of 85 percent--that is, they must spend 85 percent of revenue on medical expenses, quality-improving activities, and reduced premiums.
This report examines how MA organizations' actual expenses and profits for 2011 as a percentage of revenue and in dollars compared to projections for the same year, both for plans available to all Medicare beneficiaries and for plans with specific eligibility requirements. GAO analyzed data on MA organizations' projected and actual allocation of revenue to expenses and profits. The percentage of revenue spent on medical expenses reported in GAO's study is not directly comparable to the PPACA medical loss ratio calculation, as the final rule defining the calculation was issued after actual 2011 data were submitted.
What GAO Found
Medicare Advantage (MA) organizations' actual medical expenses, nonmedical expenses (such as marketing, sales, and administration) and profits as a percentage of total revenue were, on average, similar to projected values for plans available to all beneficiaries in 2011, the most recent year for which data were available at the time of the request for this work. MA organizations' actual medical expenses, nonmedical expenses, and profits were 86.3 percent, 9.1 percent, and 4.5 percent of total revenue, respectively. As a percentage of revenue, all three categories were within 0.3 percentage points of what MA organizations had projected. In addition, MA organizations received, on average, $9,893 in total revenue per beneficiary, slightly higher than the projected amount of $9,635.
The percentage of revenue spent on medical expenses and profits varied between MA contracts. For example, while MA organizations spent an average of 86.3 percent of revenue on medical expenses, 39 percent of beneficiaries were covered under contracts where less than 85 percent of revenue was spent on medical expenses. In addition, the accuracy of MA organizations' projections varied on the basis of the type of plans offered under the contract. For example, contracts for private fee-for-service plans--a plan type with new provider network requirements in 2011--had average profit margins that were 4 percentage points lower than projected.
In 2011, plans offered by MA organizations with specific eligibility requirements had higher-than-projected profits. Special needs plans (SNP), which serve specific populations, such as those with specific chronic conditions, had an 8.6 percent profit margin, but had projected 6.2 percent. This higher percentage, combined with higher-than-projected revenue, resulted in SNPs reporting an average profit per beneficiary of $1,115, or 44 percent higher than projected ($777). Employer group plans, which are offered by employers or unions to their employees or retirees, as well as to Medicare-eligible spouses and dependants of participants in such plans, had a 7.6 percent profit margin, but had projected 4.2 percent. The higher profit margin, combined with higher-than-projected revenue, resulted in employer plans receiving an average profit per beneficiary of $861, or 108 percent higher than projected ($413).
GAO requested comments from CMS, but none were provided. |
gao_GAO-12-226T | gao_GAO-12-226T_0 | Background
As the central human resources agency for the federal government, OPM is tasked with ensuring that the government has an effective civilian workforce. To carry out this mission, OPM delivers human resources products and services including policies and procedures for recruiting and hiring, provides health and training benefit programs, and administers the retirement program for federal employees. Specifically, OPM noted that: current processes are paper-based and manually intensive, resulting in a higher number of errors and delays in providing benefit payments; the high costs, limited capabilities, and other problems with the existing information systems and processes pose increasing risks to the accuracy of benefit payments; current manual capabilities restrict customer service; federal employees have limited access to retirement records, making planning for retirement difficult; and attracting qualified personnel to operate and maintain the antiquated retirement systems, which have about 3 million lines of custom programming, is challenging. In mid-1996, OPM terminated the program. IT Management Weaknesses Have Repeatedly Hindered OPM’s Retirement Modernization Efforts
OPM’s efforts to modernize its retirement system have been hindered by weaknesses in several key project management disciplines. However, we found that many of the capabilities in these areas were not sufficiently developed. For example, in reporting on RSM in February 2005, we noted weaknesses in key management capabilities, such as project management, risk management, and organizational change management. Although OPM had defined major retirement modernization project components, it had not defined the dependencies among them. By not identifying critical dependencies among retirement modernization components, OPM increased the risk that unforeseen delays in one activity could hinder progress in other activities. OPM officials acknowledged that they did not have a process for identifying and tracking retirement modernization project risks and mitigation strategies on a regular basis but stated that the agency’s project management consultant would assist it in implementing a risk management process. Without such a process, OPM did not have a mechanism to address potential problems that could adversely impact the cost, schedule, and quality of the retirement modernization project. Although OPM officials stated that change management posed a substantial challenge to the success of retirement modernization, they had not developed a detailed plan to help users transition to different job responsibilities. We again reported on OPM’s retirement modernization in January 2008, as the agency was on the verge of deploying a new automated retirement processing system. At the time of our review, 1 month before OPM planned to deploy a major system component, test results showed that the component had not performed as intended. Without a reliable cost estimate, OPM did not have a sound basis for formulating retirement modernization budgets or for developing the cost baseline that is necessary for measuring and predicting project performance. Earned value management (EVM) is a tool for measuring program progress by comparing the value of work accomplished with the amount of work expected to be accomplished. However, this view of project performance was not reliable because the baseline on which it was based did not reflect the full scope of the project, had not been validated, and was unstable (i.e., subject to frequent changes). We recommended that the Director of OPM address these deficiencies by, among other things, conducting effective system tests prior to system deployment, in addition to improving program cost estimation and progress reporting. In response to our report, OPM stated that it concurred with our recommendations and stated that it would take steps to address the weakness we identified. Our April 2009 report made new recommendations that OPM address the weaknesses in the retirement modernization project that we identified. Rather, the officials said the agency intends to take targeted steps to improve retirement processing that will include hiring and training approximately 100 new staff to help improve the timeliness of processing retirement applications and responding to retirement claims; demonstrating the capability to automate retirement applications; working with other agencies to improve the quality of electronic data they transmit to OPM for use in retirement processing; and improving OPM’s retirement services website to allow enhanced communication. Even though the agency is now considering only modest efforts to improve retirement processing, the development and institutionalization of these management capabilities is key to the success of any future retirement modernization or other IT initiative that OPM undertakes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the central human resources agency for the federal government and, as such, is tasked with ensuring the government has an effective civilian workforce. As part of its mission, OPM defines recruiting and hiring processes and procedures; provides federal employees with various benefits, such as health benefits; and administers the retirement program for federal employees. The use of information technology (IT) is crucial in helping OPM to carry out its responsibilities, and in fiscal year 2011 the agency invested $79 million in IT systems and services. For over 2 decades, OPM has been attempting to modernize its federal employee retirement process by automating paper-based processes and replacing antiquated information systems. However, these efforts have been unsuccessful, and OPM canceled its most recent retirement modernization effort in February 2011. GAO was asked to provide a statement summarizing its work on challenges OPM has faced in managing its efforts to modernize federal employee retirement processing. To do this, GAO relied on previously published work as well as a limited review of more recent documentation on OPM's retirement modernization activities.
What GAO Found
In a series of reviews, GAO found that OPM's efforts to modernize its retirement system have been hindered by weaknesses in several important management disciplines that are essential to successful IT modernization efforts. For example, in 2005, GAO made recommendations to address weaknesses in the following areas: (1) Project management. While OPM had defined major retirement modernization components, it had not identified the dependencies among them, increasing the risk that delays in one activity could hinder progress in others. (2) Risk management. OPM did not have a process for identifying and tracking project risks and mitigation strategies on a regular basis. This meant that OPM lacked a mechanism to address potential problems that could adversely impact the retirement modernization effort's cost, schedule, and quality. (3) Organizational change management. OPM had not developed a detailed plan to help users transition to different job responsibilities in response to the deployment of the new system, which could lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities, hindering effective system implementation. In 2008, as OPM was on the verge of deploying its automated retirement processing system, GAO reported deficiencies and made recommendations to improve key management capabilities in additional areas: (1) Testing. Test results 1 month prior to the deployment of a major system component showed that it had not performed as intended. The defects, along with a compressed testing schedule, increased the risk that the deployed system would not work as intended. (2) Cost estimating. The cost estimate OPM had developed was not supported by documentation necessary to its reliability. This meant that OPM did not have a sound basis for formulating budgets or developing a cost baseline for the program. (3) Earned value management, which is a tool for measuring program progress. The baseline against which OPM was measuring program progress did not reflect the full scope of the project, meaning that variances from planned performance would not be identified. In 2009, GAO reported that OPM continued to face challenges in cost estimating, earned value management, and testing and made recommendations to address these deficiencies as well as additional weaknesses in planning and overseeing the retirement modernization effort. Although OPM agreed with GAO's recommendations and had begun to address them, the agency terminated the retirement modernization effort in February 2011. The agency has since stated that it does not plan to undertake another large-scale retirement modernization, but instead plans targeted steps to improve retirement processing, such as hiring new staff and working to improve data quality. Nonetheless, the development and institutionalization of the capabilities GAO recommended to address these weaknesses remains key to the success of any future IT initiatives that OPM undertakes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations at this time. As noted, GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to address the challenges OPM has faced in carrying out its retirement modernization efforts. |
gao_GAO-10-784 | gao_GAO-10-784_0 | For Recovery Act Funding, DOE Generally Selected “Shovel-Ready” Projects Whose Cost and Schedule Targets Had Been Developed and Needed Minimal Work to Finalize
DOE generally chose to use Recovery Act funds for cleanup projects that could be quickly started and finished. The majority of the projects selected also had existing contracts, which allowed the department to update and validate new cost and schedule targets within a short time frame. In all, DOE selected 84 projects at 17 DOE sites in 12 states for Recovery Act funding (see fig.1) with the majority of the money going to four sites— Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, the Oak Ridge Reservation, and Savannah River (see app. Removing contamination from soil and groundwater: for example, removing and disposing of radioactive and hazardous contaminants from soil and groundwater at the Mound Site, a former production site for explosives and other weapons’ components. 3.) DOE Has Begun Work on All Projects, Most Appear to Be Meeting Cost and Schedule Targets, and Spending Overall Has Been Slower Than Planned
DOE has begun work on all of its Recovery Act projects, spent over $1.9 billion of its $6 billion in Recovery Act funding, and created more than 5,600 jobs at the 17 cleanup sites selected for funding. DOE reported that the majority of Recovery Act projects were achieving cost and schedule targets, although about one-third were not. The number of full-time jobs created varied from site to site. As of May 2010, a little over a year into the program, DOE had obligated about $5.5 billion (92 percent) of the $6 billion in Recovery Act cleanup funding and had spent about $1.9 billion of those funds—slightly less than the $2.3 billion DOE had expected to spend through May 2010. 4). In addition, it is unclear how Recovery Act funding has affected job creation and the department’s environmental cleanup goals or, in particular, to what degree this additional funding will reduce DOE’s footprint, related environmental risks, and future cleanup costs. DOE Has Taken Steps to Help Projects Achieve Cost and Schedule Targets, Although Some Project Management Issues Remain
To help Recovery Act projects achieve their cost and schedule targets, DOE has taken steps to strengthen project management and oversight, such as adding federal oversight staff, increasing project reporting requirements, and placing tighter controls on when and how funds are disbursed to cleanup sites. Officials attributed these difficulties to technical, regulatory, safety, and contracting problems—some of the same issues that have challenged DOE’s project management in the past. Determining Impact of Recovery Act Spending on Job Creation Is Problematic Because DOE Calculates Jobs Created Using Three Different Methodologies
DOE has wrestled with calculating and reporting jobs created—a requirement of the Recovery Act—publicly reporting three vastly different figures. The Impact of Recovery Act Spending on Cleanup and Other Goals Remains Unclear
In addition to inconsistencies in how the department measures job creation, DOE has no clear means of determining how cleanup work funded by the act will reduce environmental risk, if at all. Without a clearly defined and consistent measure of its footprint, it will be difficult for DOE to report whether or how Recovery Act funding has affected progress toward this key DOE cleanup goal. GAO has previously taken issue with DOE’s method of calculating savings in life-cycle costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure successful completion of Recovery Act projects and apply lessons learned to DOE’s larger cleanup effort, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary of Environmental Management to take the following four actions: Determine whether additional project management and oversight steps adopted for Recovery Act projects, such as more frequent reporting, have proven beneficial and whether these steps would be effective and appropriate for DOE’s cleanup projects funded under annual appropriations. Develop clear, quantifiable, and consistent measures for determining the impact of Recovery Act funding on environmental risk. Ensure that savings estimates over the life of the cleanup projects are calculated according to OMB and DOE guidance, so that these estimates accurately represent potential savings and reflect costs adjusted for both inflation and the time value of money. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the Department of Energy (DOE) selected projects for funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) and developed cost, schedule, and performance targets, we reviewed key provisions of the Recovery Act and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance regarding the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Reinvestment Act of 2009 aims to stimulate the economy, including funding for environmental cleanup projects. The Department of Energy (DOE) receives annual appropriations of $6 billion to support the cleanup of radioactive and hazardous wastes resulting from decades of nuclear weapons research and production. GAO was asked to examine (1) how DOE selected projects for funding and developed cost and schedule targets, (2) project status and extent to which projects are achieving these targets, and (3) key challenges faced and efforts to address them. GAO reviewed Recovery Act project documentation, including cost, schedule, and performance data for 84 projects at 17 sites; visited the 4 sites receiving most of the funding; and interviewed headquarters and site officials.
What GAO Found
DOE's Office of Environmental Management generally chose to use Recovery Act funds for cleanup projects that could be quickly started and finished. Most projects also had existing contracts, which allowed DOE to update and validate cost and schedule targets within a short time. DOE generally funded four types of projects: decontaminating or demolishing facilities, removing contamination from soil and groundwater, packaging and disposing of transuranic and other wastes, and supporting the maintenance and treatment of liquid tank wastes. In all, DOE selected 84 projects at 17 DOE sites in 12 states for Recovery Act funding, with 4 sites receiving most of the money. As of May 2010, DOE had begun work on all Recovery Act projects and reported creating about 5,600 full-time equivalent jobs at the 17 sites during the first quarter of 2010. Spending on Recovery Act projects has been slower than planned. DOE had obligated about $5.5 billion of the $6 billion in Recovery Act cleanup funding and spent about $1.9 billion of those funds. This sum is less than the $2.3 billion DOE had expected to spend by that time. DOE reported that most Recovery Act projects were achieving cost and schedule targets, although a third of projects were not. DOE has faced familiar challenges in both managing Recovery Act projects and measuring how Recovery Act funding has affected cleanup and other goals. According to DOE officials, a third of projects did not meet cost and schedule targets for some of the same reasons that have plagued DOE in the past: technical, regulatory, safety, and contracting issues. DOE has taken steps aimed at strengthening project management and oversight for Recovery Act projects, such as increasing project reporting requirements and placing tighter controls on when funds are disbursed to sites, but it is uncertain how these steps will ultimately affect Recovery Act project performance, or whether they hold the potential to be useful for cleanup work funded under annual appropriations. Measuring the impact of Recovery Act funding on job creation and DOE's cleanup goals has also been a challenge for DOE, in particular, providing an accurate assessment of the act's impact on jobs, environmental risk reduction, and the life-cycle costs of its cleanup program. DOE has used three different methodologies to assess and report jobs created, which provide very different and potentially misleading, pictures of jobs created. For example, the calculations ranged from about 5,700 jobs to 20,200, depending on the methodology used. Also, DOE has not developed a clear means of measuring how cleanup work funded by the act will affect environmental risk or reduce its footprint--the land and facilities requiring DOE cleanup. Further, it is unclear to what extent Recovery Act funding will reduce the costs of cleaning up the DOE complex over the long term. DOE's estimate of $4 billion in life cycle cost savings resulting from Recovery Act funding was not calculated in accordance with federal guidance. GAO's analysis indicates that those savings could be 80 percent less than DOE estimated. Without clear and consistent measures, it will be difficult to say whether or how Recovery Act funding has affected DOE's cleanup goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends four actions for DOE to improve project management and reporting: (1) determine whether project management and oversight steps adopted for Recovery Act projects would benefit other cleanup projects, (2) clarify the methodology used to calculate jobs created, (3) develop clear and quantifiable measures for determining the impact of Recovery Act funding, and (4) ensure that cost savings are calculated according to federal guidance. DOE agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1016T | gao_GAO-08-1016T_0 | Although oversight of the LTCI industry is largely the responsibility of states, the federal government also plays a role in the oversight of LTCI. States Have Made Efforts to Improve Oversight of Rate Setting, Though Some Consumers Remain More Likely to Experience Rate Increases Than Others
In recent years, many states have made efforts to improve oversight of rate setting, though some consumers remain more likely to experience rate increases than others. While regulators in most of the 10 states we reviewed told us that they expect these more comprehensive standards will be successful, they noted that more time is needed to know how well the standards will work. Regulators from the states in our review also use other standards or practices to oversee rate setting, several of which are intended to keep premium rates more stable. Specifically, consumers may face more risk of a rate increase depending on when they purchased their policy, from which company their policy was purchased, and which state is reviewing a proposed rate increase on their policy. Many States Adopted More Comprehensive Rate Setting Standards since 2000, but It Is Too Soon to Determine the Effectiveness of the Standards
Since 2000, NAIC estimates that more than half of states nationwide have adopted new rate setting standards for LTCI. States that adopted new standards generally moved from the use of a single standard designed to ensure that premiums were not set too high to the use of more comprehensive standards designed to enhance rate stability and provide other protections for consumers. Although a growing number of consumers will be protected by the more comprehensive standards going forward, as of 2006 many consumers had policies that were not protected by these standards. Some Consumers May Remain More Likely to Experience Rate Increases Than Others
Although some states are working to improve oversight of rate setting and to help ensure LTCI rate stability by adopting the more comprehensive standards and through other efforts, there are other reasons why some consumers may remain more likely to experience rate increases than others. States may implement the standards differently, and other oversight efforts, such as the extent to which states work with companies, also affect approval of increases. States in Our Review Oversee Claims Settlement Practices Using Consumer Complaints and Examinations, and Several States Are Considering Additional Protections
The 10 states in our review have standards established by law and regulations for governing claims settlement practices. Specifically, the standards are designed to ensure the timely investigation and payment of claims and prompt communication with consumers about claims. One way the states monitor compliance is by reviewing consumer complaints on a case-by-case basis and in the aggregate to identify trends in company practices. Three of these states review these data as part of broader analyses of the LTCI market during which they also review, for example, financial data and information on companies’ claims settlement practices. The second way that states monitor company compliance with claims settlement standards is by using market conduct examinations. In addition to their efforts to monitor compliance with claims settlement standards, regulators from six of the states in our review reported that their state is considering or may consider adopting additional consumer protections related to claims settlement. Also, a group of representatives from NAIC member states was formed in March 2008 to consider whether to recommend developing provisions to include an independent review process in the NAIC LTCI models. Such an addition may be useful, as regulators from three states told us that they lack the authority to resolve complaints involving a question of fact, for example, when the consumer and company disagree on a factual matter regarding a consumer’s eligibility for benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the baby boom generation ages, the demand for long-term care services is likely to grow and could strain state and federal resources. The increased use of long-term care insurance (LTCI) may be a way of reducing the share of long-term care paid by state and federal governments. Oversight of LTCI is primarily the responsibility of states, but over the past 12 years, there have been federal efforts to increase the use of LTCI while also ensuring that consumers purchasing LTCI are adequately protected. Despite this oversight, concerns have been raised about both premium increases and denials of claims that may leave consumers without LTCI coverage when they begin needing care. This statement focuses on oversight of the LTCI industry's (1) rate setting practices and (2) claims settlement practices. This statement is based on findings from GAO's June 2008 report entitled Long-Term Care Insurance: Oversight of Rate Setting and Claims Settlement Practices (GAO-08-712). For that report, GAO reviewed information from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) on all states' rate setting standards. GAO also completed 10 state case studies on oversight of rate setting and claims settlement practices, which included structured reviews of state laws and regulations, interviews with state regulators, and reviews of state complaint information. GAO also reviewed national data on rate increases implemented by companies.
What GAO Found
Many states have made efforts to improve oversight of rate setting, though some consumers remain more likely to experience rate increases than others. NAIC estimates that since 2000 more than half of states nationwide have adopted new rate setting standards. States that adopted new standards generally moved from a single standard that was intended to prevent premium rates from being set too high to more comprehensive standards intended to enhance rate stability and provide other protections for consumers. Although a growing number of consumers will be protected by the more comprehensive standards going forward, as of 2006 many consumers had policies not protected by these standards. Regulators in most of the 10 states GAO reviewed said that they think the more comprehensive standards will be effective, but that more time is needed to know how well the standards will work. State regulators in GAO's review also use other standards or practices to oversee rate setting, several of which are intended to keep premium rates more stable. Despite state oversight efforts, some consumers remain more likely to experience rate increases than others. Specifically, consumers may face more risk of a rate increase depending on when they purchased their policy, from which company their policy was purchased, and which state is reviewing a proposed rate increase on their policy. Regulators in the 10 states GAO reviewed oversee claims settlement practices by monitoring consumer complaints and conducting examinations in an effort to ensure that companies are complying with standards. Claims settlement standards in these states largely focus on timely investigation and payment of claims and prompt communication with consumers, but the standards adopted and how states define timeliness vary notably across the states. Regulators told GAO that reviewing consumer complaints is one of the primary methods for monitoring companies' compliance with state standards. In addition to monitoring complaints, these regulators also said that they use examinations of company practices to identify any violations in standards that may require further action. Finally, state regulators in 6 of the 10 states in GAO's review reported that their states are considering additional protections related to claims settlement. For example, regulators in several states said that their states were considering an independent review process for consumers appealing claims denials. Such an addition may be useful as some regulators said that they lack authority to resolve complaints where, for example, the company and consumer disagree on a factual matter, such as a consumer's eligibility for benefits. In commenting on a draft of GAO's report issued on June 30, 2008, NAIC compiled comments from its member states. Member states said that the report was accurate but seemed to critique certain aspects of state regulation, including differences among states, and make an argument for certain reforms. The draft reported differences in states' oversight without making any conclusions or recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-51 | gao_NSIAD-97-51_0 | Since the adoption of the CPA, more than 120,000 Vietnamese asylum seekers have been screened for refugee status. In Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, UNHCR reviewed hundreds of cases under its family reunification initiative. Most were rejected for failing to meet UNHCR’s established criteria, but UNHCR believed a small number had valid claims and forwarded them to various resettlement countries for consideration. As a result of this, the United States accepted 23 cases involving 35 persons. The cases were subsequently mandated by UNHCR and resettled in the United States. UNHCR officials in Indonesia and the Philippines effectively stopped submitting cases for consideration to the U.S. embassies due to the lack of response from the United States to review cases informally prior to a declaration of mandate status. In one case in Indonesia, UNHCR approved a family unity claim after examining numerous correspondence between the asylum seekers and their respective families, which indicated that the marriage was recognized by the families in Vietnam through a formal ceremony prior to the refugee status determination. Criteria for Adjudicating Victims of Violence Cases
UNHCR first developed guidelines for handling survivors of violence cases as an internal memorandum in June 1990 and formalized them in its November 1992 “Guidelines on Special Procedures under the Comprehensive Plan of Action.” These two documents outlined the criteria and rationale for including victim of violence cases in a process known as “Special Procedures.” Special Procedures was designed as a separate process to deal with unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable persons such as victims of violence. An important principle underlying the establishment and implementation of Special Procedures is the assessment of “best interest” of persons who are vulnerable and of humanitarian concern. Process Used for Reviewing Cases
When asylum seekers arrived at a first asylum camp and identified themselves as victims of violence, or in cases where UNHCR initiated the identification of the victim, a UNHCR social service counselor would first examine the individuals to determine whether they could articulate their claim to refugee status. The assessments discussed the individual’s current mental state, situation in camp, and ability to understand and articulate a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. However, in some cases we identified issues that pointed to possible differences and inconsistencies in the way screening procedures may have been implemented. Although many of the case files were well-documented and contained detailed case histories with clear and logical explanations for the refugee status decisions, others were less complete and decisions did not appear to be well-supported by the recorded facts. We assessed cases from the perspective of the CPA criteria, reviewed factual information in the case files, and sought to examine how the screening process was implemented. We were unable to validate these assertions. Review of Merit Cases Highlights Difficulties in Interpreting Refugee Criteria
Of the 33 screened-out cases we reviewed, most did not appear to have strong claims based on the evidence contained in the files. In general, the team found that many of the screening decisions presented limited information about the asylum seeker’s claim for refugee status. Cases 5 and 6
These two cases involve the credibility of the applicants’ claims for refugee status. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation and outcomes of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Vietnamese asylum seekers in Southeast Asia, focusing on how the refugee status determination process worked for family unit, victim of violence, and general merit cases by: (1) reviewing factual information about such cases from the perspective of international refugee criteria used under the CPA; and (2) examining how the screening process was implemented.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) family unity has been an important principle throughout CPA implementation, yet advocacy groups, asylum seekers, and others have raised concerns that some families were unfairly separated during the refugee screening process; (2) the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reviewed hundreds of screened-out cases to determine whether asylum seekers would qualify for resettlement according to established family unity criteria, but found most failed to meet the program criteria; (3) however, UNHCR identified a small number of cases in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines that met the criteria prior to UNHCR mandating the asylum seekers as refugees and forwarded 72 of these cases to U.S. embassies for resettlement consideration; (4) the United States initially accepted 23 of 36 cases for resettlement in Malaysia, but embassies in Indonesia and the Philippines refused to review 36 similar cases, since they were not first mandated by UNHCR; (5) victim of violence cases involved individuals who were physically assaulted on the way to, or upon arriving in, one of the first asylum countries, and according to UNHCR officials, many victims were unable to articulate their claim for refugee status, and UNHCR established special procedures to determine a durable solution in their best interest; (6) GAO's review of cases in Indonesia and Malaysia indicated that UNHCR and these governments followed established procedures for processing victim of violence cases; (7) GAO could not evaluate the quality of social service counselors' assessments of victims' ability to articulate a claim for refugee status, although the assessments described in some detail the individuals' mental condition, situation in camp, and ability to understand and present their claim for refugee status; (8) of the 74 merit cases GAO reviewed, it appears that most did not present strong refugee claims based on evidence contained in the files; (9) many case files were well-documented and presented detailed facts and logical explanations for decisions that were made, while others contained documents that pointed to differences and inconsistencies in the way claims may have been handled, such as incomplete documentation, poorly translated information, different interpretations of screening criteria, lack of legal assistance, and what appeared to be an overemphasis on nonessential points in assessing the credibility of an asylum seeker's claim; and (10) as a result, in some cases, GAO could not determine how well the case files reflected the presentation of the asylum seekers' claims. |
gao_GAO-12-834 | gao_GAO-12-834_0 | Concern for Iraq’s minority groups led Congress to issue a series of directives beginning in June 2007 to provide assistance to these groups. These directives are as follows:
2008 directive: In December 2007, for fiscal year 2008, the House Committee on Appropriations directed that not less than $10 million of unobligated Economic Support Fund (ESF) account funds provided in prior fiscal years for Iraq should be used to assist religious minorities in the Ninewa plain region of Iraq. As of November 2011, USAID and State reported to Congress that they had provided about $40 million in assistance for minority groups in Iraq in response to these directives. First, USAID documents—specifically, the list of projects the agency submitted to Congress—linked only 26 percent of the $14.8 million in assistance directly to the Ninewa plain region. Second, USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects included minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and, specifically, whether $8 million of assistance was provided for internally displaced families. Third, USAID officials and documents did not demonstrate that the agency used unobligated prior year ESF funds to initiate projects in response to the 2008 directive. USAID Could Not Demonstrate How It Met the Provisions of the 2008 Directive
Our analysis of USAID documents found that USAID could not demonstrate that it met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of three weaknesses. USAID and State Generally Could Demonstrate How They Met the 2008 Supplemental and 2010 Directives
USAID and State Approved $26.9 Million in Assistance for Minority Groups
According to USAID and State documents, the agencies approved $26.9 million in assistance for minority groups, primarily through the QRF program.million in response to the 2008 supplemental directive and State approved $16.5 million of assistance in response to the 2010 directive. State Designated Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to Meet a Provision in the 2008 Supplemental Directive
State met the provision of the 2008 supplemental directive to designate staff at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to oversee and coordinate assistance to minority groups. USAID and State Took Five Steps That Generally Demonstrated How They Met the 2008 Supplemental and 2010 Directives
USAID and State could generally demonstrate how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives through their use of the QRF program, which served as the primary mechanism for the agencies to categorize, track, monitor, and report on minority directive projects, among others. As directed by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, the Office of Provincial Affairs made support of minority groups one of the thematic goals of the QRF program in 2008. USAID and State officials categorized projects in the agencies’ respective QRF program databases by thematic goal. Conducted outreach to identify potential beneficiaries. According to USAID and State officials, PRTs or the QRF program implementing partner conducted final site visits and prepared project close-out reports. Both USAID and State conducted third-party assessments at the close of their respective components of the QRF program. USAID and State Continue to Provide and Track Assistance to Iraq’s Minority Groups
According to USAID and State officials, the two agencies have continued to assist Iraq’s minority groups through the obligation of an additional $28 million in reprogrammed ESF funds from prior fiscal years. Both agencies submitted technical comments on the draft that were incorporated, as appropriate. State did not submit an agency comment letter in response to the draft. In its agency comment letter, USAID remarked that despite GAO’s findings, USAID met the needs of internally displaced persons and religious minorities to a greater extent than is presented in this report (see app. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) demonstrated that the assistance it reported to Congress met the 2008 directive and (2) USAID and the Department of State (State) demonstrated that the assistance they reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. This report is a publicly releasable version of a prior GAO report, issued in May 2012, that State and USAID had designated Sensitive But Unclassified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, minority groups in Iraq have experienced religiously and ethnically motivated attacks, killings, and forced displacements. Concern for Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities led various congressional committees and Congress as a whole to issue a series of directives to provide assistance to these groups.
The 2008 directive directed that $10 million of unobligated ESF funds from prior years be provided to assist religious minorities in the Ninewa plain region of Iraq. The 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives directed that up to $10 million be provided to assist religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq for each directive. USAID and State reported to Congress that they met the provisions of these three directives by providing $40 million in assistance to Iraqi minority groups.
Congressional requesters asked GAO to examine the extent to which (1) USAID demonstrated that the assistance it reported to Congress met the 2008 directive and (2) USAID and State demonstrated that the assistance they reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State and USAID in Washington, D.C., and Iraq. This report is a public version of a Sensitive But Unclassified report issued in May 2012.
GAO is not making recommendations. Both agencies provided technical comments on the draft that were incorporated, as appropriate. State did not submit an agency comment letter in response to the draft. In its agency comment letter, USAID stated that it met minority groups needs to a greater extent than is presented in the report. GAO continues to believe that USAID could not demonstrate how its reported assistance met the provisions of the 2008 directive.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) could not demonstrate how the projects that it reported to Congress met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of three weaknesses. First, USAID documentsspecifically, the list of projects the agency submitted to Congress linked only $3.8 million of the $14.8 million in assistance (26 percent) directly to the Ninewa plain region. Second, USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects included minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and specifically whether $8 million of assistance was provided for internally displaced families. Third, USAID officials and documents did not demonstrate that the agency used unobligated prior year Economic Support Fund (ESF) funds to initiate projects in response to the 2008 directive.
USAID and the Department of State (State) generally could demonstrate how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. According to USAID and State documents, the agencies approved $26.9 million in assistanceprimarily in essential services and humanitarian assistanceto meet the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives provisions to spend up to $10 million for each directive to assist religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq (see figure below). In addition, as directed by Congress, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad designated staff at the embassy to oversee and coordinate assistance to minority groups in 2008.
Using the Quick Response Fund (QRF) program, USAID and State took five steps that generally demonstrated how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. First, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad directed that support of minority groups be made one of the thematic goals of the QRF program in 2008. Second, USAID and State categorized projects in their respective QRF databases by thematic goal. Third, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) conducted outreach to inform potential beneficiaries of the availability of assistance through the QRF program. Fourth, PRTs or the QRF implementing partner conducted final site visits and prepared project close-out reports. Fifth, both USAID and State conducted third-party assessments at the close of their respective components of the QRF program. The QRF program closed and the PRTs ceased their operations by the end of 2011, as planned. According to USAID and State officials, the two agencies continue to assist minority groups through the obligation of an additional $28 million in reprogrammed ESF funds from previous years. |
gao_GAO-14-23 | gao_GAO-14-23_0 | Potential Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources Can Be Addressed through Adaptation Planning
According to the U.S. Adaptation—defined by the National Research Council as adjustments in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment that exploits beneficial opportunities or moderates negative effects—is an element of the proposed responses to climate change that is gaining more attention. Federal Agencies Have Been Directed to Address Climate Change Adaptation
In 2009, Congress passed the SECURE Water Act, requiring Reclamation to establish a climate change adaptation program to (1) assess the effect of and risk resulting from global climate change on the quantity of water resources and (2) develop strategies to address potential water shortages and other impacts. Efforts Under Way by the Corps and Reclamation to Assess Water Resource and Infrastructure Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Develop Adaptation Strategies
Since 2009, as directed by executive order or required by law, the Corps and Reclamation have taken steps to assess water resource and infrastructure vulnerabilities and develop guidance and strategies for adapting to climate change, as shown in table 2. Since 2009, the Corps has broadly assessed how climate change could affect its missions. The Corps has completed 5 of these studies and 10 others are ongoing. The studies, known as West-Wide Climate Risk Assessments (WWCRA), are high-level, baseline assessments of the potential impacts of climate change on future water supplies—including impacts on Reclamation’s ability to deliver water and hydropower—for each of the major river basins where Reclamation owns and operates water management infrastructure. Through the Basin Studies, Reclamation intends to identify basin-wide water supply vulnerabilities, project climate change’s impacts on the performance of water infrastructure, and develop adaptation strategies—such as operational or physical changes to existing water infrastructure or development of new facilities—to address these impacts. Reclamation officials told us that they next intend to initiate feasibility studies for adaptation strategies identified in completed Basin Studies by making funds available to nonfederal partners, beginning with an initial feasibility study in 2013. Both agencies have also begun integrating what they have learned into their policies and program guidance. Both agencies have already initiated cost-sharing and resource-leveraging measures. The agencies plan to continue such collaborative approaches going forward. The Corps and Reclamation Face Several Challenges in Assessing and Responding to the Effects of Climate Change and Are Working Collaboratively to Address Them
In 2009, the Corps and Reclamation—with its CCAWWG partners NOAA and USGS—published a study, (referred to in this report as the CCAWWG study). This study identified several challenges that climate change poses for water resource managers, including (1) identifying the data and tools needed by water managers to address climate change, (2) ensuring the sustained collection of climate data, (3) incorporating climate science into water management tools, and (4) educating water managers to use climate data and tools. The Corps and Reclamation Are Addressing Several Challenges to Climate Adaptation
The CCAWWG study identified a number of challenges faced by the Corps and Reclamation in adapting to climate change, and the agencies have taken a variety of actions to address these challenges. Reclamation officials told us that the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives, which are partnerships of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, will focus on developing and communicating science to inform climate adaptation strategies for ecological regions, or “landscapes.” In collaboration with academia, other federal agencies, local and state partners, and the public, the Landscape Conservation Cooperatives will provide products and services, such as climate change computer models and vulnerability assessments, coordinate with Interior’s regional Climate Science Centers to synthesize existing climate change impact data and management strategies, and help resource managers put them into action on the ground. The Corps’ and Reclamation’s Collaborative Efforts Are Generally Consistent with the Best Practices for Enhanced and Sustained Collaboration
The Corps and Reclamation have collaborated with each other and other agencies in a manner that is generally consistent with practices that we have previously identified as important to helping enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. The Corps and Reclamation have made collaboration a key element of their adaptation policies and plans and have reinforced accountability for collaboration through agency performance management systems. Appendix II: Locations and Initial Results of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer’s Pilot Studies and Bureau of Reclamation’s Basin Studies
The Corps is conducting pilot studies nationwide to support the development of adaptation guidance and a portfolio of adaptation approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
The effects of climate change on water resources have already been observed and are expected to continue. The Corps and Reclamation own and operate key water resource management infrastructure, such as dams and reservoirs. Adaptation-- adjustments in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment that exploits beneficial opportunities or moderates negative effects--can be used to help manage the risks to vulnerable resources. In 2009, a law--commonly referred to as the SECURE Water Act--and a presidential executive order directed federal agencies to address the potential impacts of climate change.
GAO was asked to review agency actions to address climate change impacts on water infrastructure. This report examines (1) actions taken by the Corps and Reclamation since 2009 to assess and respond to the potential effects of climate change on water infrastructure and (2) challenges, if any, faced by the Corps and Reclamation in assessing and responding to the potential effects of climate change on water infrastructure, and the steps the agencies are taking to address them. GAO analyzed the agencies' climate change adaptation guidance and planning documents and interviewed agency officials and other key stakeholders, including water users, environmental groups, and researchers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) have assessed water resource and infrastructure vulnerabilities and taken steps to develop guidance and strategies to adapt to the effects of climate change. Specifically, since 2009, the Corps has completed a high-level assessment of the vulnerabilities to climate change of various agency missions. The assessment found, for example, that the effects of increasing air temperatures on glaciers could negatively impact mission areas including navigation and flood damage reduction. The Corps has also conducted pilot studies to help identify adaptation guidance and strategies; it has completed 5 of the 15 pilot studies initiated and plans to start another study in 2013. Similarly, Reclamation has completed baseline assessments of the potential impacts of climate change on future water supplies for the major river basins where it owns and operates water management infrastructure. Reclamation, in collaboration with nonfederal entities, is now conducting more focused assessments, known as Basin Studies, through which Reclamation seeks to identify water supply vulnerabilities and project future climate change impacts on the performance of water infrastructure. According to agency officials, these studies will also help Reclamation develop adaptation strategies to address these impacts, such as operational or physical changes to existing water infrastructure or development of new facilities. Three Basin Studies have been completed, an additional 14 are under way, and 2 more are planned. Reclamation next plans to initiate feasibility studies for adaptation strategies identified in completed Basin Studies. Both agencies are incorporating what they have learned from their efforts into agency policies, planning, and guidance, according to agency officials.
In 2009, the Corps, Reclamation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), jointly published a study that identified several challenges that climate change poses for water resource managers, and the Corp and Reclamation are collaboratively addressing these challenges. Specifically, these agencies are
identifying the data and tools needed by water managers to address climate change, which will help guide federal research efforts;
obtaining needed climate data by collaborating with other agencies to help ensure that the data are collected, such as by sharing some costs associated with maintaining USGS's stream flow measurement activities, which are valuable to Corps water planning and management;
integrating climate science into water resource management decision making through activities such as developing and communicating science to inform climate adaptation strategies; and
collaborating in the development of a climate change science training program for federal and nonfederal water resources managers.
The Corps and Reclamation have collaborated together and with others in a manner that is generally consistent with practices that GAO has identified as important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration among agencies. The Corps and Reclamation have made collaboration a key element of their policy and plans for adapting to the effects of climate change and have reinforced accountability for collaboration through agency performance management systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-186T | gao_GAO-10-186T_0 | JIEDDO and DOD Have Taken Steps to Improve the Management of Counter-IED Efforts
Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management and operation of counter-IED efforts in response to our past work as well as to address congressional concerns. For example, in our ongoing work, we have noted that JIEDDO has been improving its strategic planning. In response, JIEDDO, in November 2007, issued a strategic plan that provided an overarching framework for departmentwide counter-IED efforts. Additionally, as we note in our report being issued today, JIEDDO and the services have taken some steps to improve visibility over their counter- IED efforts. Several Challenges Affect DOD’s Ability to Oversee the Management of JIEDDO
While JIEDDO has taken some steps toward improving its management of counter-IED efforts, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD’s ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in the report we are issuing today and include a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD, difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services once counter-IED solutions have been developed, and a lack of clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. Additionally, our ongoing work has identified other challenges including a lack of a means to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts, a lack of consistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, and a lack of adequate internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is achieving its objectives. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. JIEDDO is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat IEDs. Without incorporating service and other DOD components’ counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO’s efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative database will not capture all efforts to defeat IEDs throughout DOD. JIEDDO Faces Difficulties Coordinating the Transition of Funding Responsibility for Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services
Although JIEDDO has recently taken several steps to improve its process to transition IED defeat initiatives to the military services following the development of new capabilities, JIEDDO still faces difficulties in this area. JIEDDO’s transitions of initiatives to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s budget cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO’s acquisition process. In response to these recommendations, DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan and noted steps to be taken to address this issue. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers. Our ongoing work has identified three areas in which the data JIEDDO uses to measure effectiveness and progress is unreliable or is inconsistently collected. However, the data collected contradicted the intended result because the number of IED incidents increased in areas where the initiative was implemented. We expect to provide further information and recommendations, if appropriate, on JIEDDO’s efforts to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts—including issues involving data collection and reliability—in the report we will be issuing in early 2010. OMB defines a material weakness as a deficiency or combination of deficiencies that could adversely affect the organization’s ability to meet its objectives and that the agency head determines to be significant enough to be reported outside the agency. For example, in our ongoing work we have identified, and JIEDDO officials have confirmed, that JIEDDO’s internal controls system has not: (1) provided for the identification and analysis of the risks JIEDDO faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources; and (2) assessed its performance over time and ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort--which does not include $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken.
What GAO Found
Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management of counter-IED efforts. For instance, GAO's ongoing work has found that JIEDDO has been improving the management of its efforts to defeat IEDs, including developing and implementing a strategic plan that provides an overarching framework for departmentwide efforts to defeat IEDs, as well as a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan. Also, as noted in the report GAO is issuing today, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts, and JIEDDO has taken several steps to support the ability of the services and defense agencies to program and fund counter-IED initiatives. However, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in GAO's report being released today along with recommendations to address them. For example, one challenge is a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. In addition, JIEDDO faces difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint counter-IED initiatives to the services, due to gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. JIEDDO's initiative transitions also are hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO also lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund and, as a result, has funded training activities that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. Additionally, GAO's ongoing work has identified other oversight challenges. For example, JIEDDO lacks a means as well as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts. GAO's work has identified several areas in which data on the effectiveness and progress of IED-defeat initiatives are unreliable or inconsistently collected. In some cases, data are not collected in-theater because the initiatives may not be designed with adequate data-collection procedures. Another challenge facing JIEDDO is its inconsistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process's key review and approval steps. Further, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls to ensure DOD that it is achieving its objectives. For example, in July 2009, JIEDDO reported that its internal controls system had a combination of deficiencies that constituted a material weakness. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's ability to meet its objectives. Finally, JIEDDO has not developed a process for identification and analysis of the risks it faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources, and it has not assessed its performance over time or ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. As GAO completes its ongoing work it expects to issue a report with recommendations to address these issues. |
gao_GAO-06-116 | gao_GAO-06-116_0 | A Significant Gap Exists between U.S. and Indian Trade-in- Services Data
U.S. data show a significantly smaller volume of trade in BPT services between India and the United States than Indian data show. For 2003, the total unaffiliated U.S. imports of BPT services from India increased to about $420 million. India reports exports to the United States of similar services of about $6.5 billion for 2002 and $8.7 billion for 2003. These factors relate to (1) the treatment of services provided by foreign temporary workers in the United States; (2) the definition of some services, such as computer programs embedded in goods and certain information technology-enabled services; (3) the treatment of transactions between firms in India and the overseas offices of U.S. firms; (4) the reporting of country-specific data on trade in affiliated services; and (5) the sources of data and other methodological differences in the collection of services trade data. For example, Indian data on trade in services include software embedded on computer hardware, which the United States classifies as trade in goods. Unlike the United States, India counts the sales of services from firms in India to U.S.-owned firms outside the United States as exports to the United States. BEA reports country-specific data only for unaffiliated U.S. imports of BPT services, while Indian data include both affiliated and unaffiliated trade in services but do not separate the two. BEA has taken action to improve survey coverage and responses through outreach to survey respondents and by attempting to collaborate with other federal agencies, but it has not been able to access data that could assist in identifying the universe of firms importing services. In the case of BPT services, both the United States and India have reported a rapid increase of exports to the United States and BEA may be undercounting U.S. firms importing such services from India due to this growth. Test of Firms Importing from India Confirms Challenges to Collecting Services Data
To test for potential undercounting of U.S. imports, we provided BEA with lists of firms that we identified through publicly available sources as likely to be importing BPT services from India. This is because BEA has concerns over the quality of responses it receives from firms when they allocate affiliated imports to detailed types of services. Scope and Methodology
This report discusses (1) the extent of the difference between U.S. and Indian data on trade in business, professional, and technical (BPT) services, (2) the factors that explain the difference between U.S. data on imports of BPT services and India’s data on exports of those same services, and (3) the challenges that the United States has faced in collecting services data. To obtain information on the extent of the difference between U.S. and Indian services trade data, we analyzed and compared U.S. and Indian data and interviewed U.S. and Indian government officials from the relevant agencies, including the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). We discussed the results of this review with BEA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Trade in business, professional, and technical (BPT) services associated with offshoring needs to be accurately tracked, but a gap exists between U.S. and Indian data. The extent of and reasons for this gap are important to understand in order to address questions about the magnitude of offshoring and to analyze its future development. Under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States, and as part of a body of GAO work on the issue of offshoring of services, this report (1) describes the extent of the gap between U.S. and Indian data, (2) identifies factors that contribute to the difference between the two countries' data, and (3) examines the challenges the United States has faced in collecting services trade data. GAO has addressed this report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction.
What GAO Found
The gap between U.S. and Indian data on trade in BPT services is significant. For example, data show that for 2003, the United States reported $420 million in unaffiliated imports of BPT services from India, while India reported approximately $8.7 billion in exports of affiliated and unaffiliated BPT services to the United States. At least five definitional and methodological factors contribute to the difference between U.S. and Indian data on BPT services. First, India and the United States follow different practices in accounting for the earnings of temporary Indian workers residing in the United States. Second, India defines certain services, such as software embedded on computer hardware, differently than the United States. Third, India and the United States follow different practices for counting sales by India to U.S.-owned firms located outside of the United States. The United States follows International Monetary Fund standards for each of these factors. Fourth, BEA does not report country-specific data for particular types of services due to concerns about the quality of responses it receives from firms when they allocate their affiliated imports to detailed types of services. As a result, U.S. data on BPT services include only unaffiliated imports from India, while Indian data include both affiliated and unaffiliated exports. Fifth, other differences, such as identifying all services importers, may also contribute to the data gap. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has experienced challenges in identifying all U.S. services importers and obtaining quality survey data from importers. To test BEA's survey coverage, GAO provided BEA with lists of firms identified from public sources as likely importers of BPT services from India. The results of this test showed that some services importers were not included in BEA's mailing lists. However, BEA has taken action to address these challenges, including collaborating with other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service, to better identify firms to survey. However, data-sharing restrictions hamper BEA's efforts. |
gao_GAO-01-490 | gao_GAO-01-490_0 | NTIS Provides a Variety of Services in Addition to Its Statutory Function of Collecting and Disseminating Research Reports
In addition to NTIS’ basic statutory function of collecting and disseminating technical reports, NTIS also provides various other fee- based services for agencies. Brokerage services. Distribution services. Demand for products was primarily from business and industry sources. Fewer Than One in Ten Reports in Repository Has Sold Since 1995
Since 1995, we estimate that NTIS has sold one or more copies of about 187,000 (8 percent) of its 2.46 million reports. Of the 1.8 million reports over 12 years old (pre-1989), we estimate that only about 1 percent has sold since 1995. Nineteen Percent of the Reports in NTIS’ Repository Were Available From Other Public Sources
We estimate that about 470,000 of NTIS’ 2.46 million reports (19 percent) could be readily obtained through one or more of the four sources at the time that we searched. Agencies Did Not Always Send Their Reports to NTIS, as Required by Law
Executive branch agencies are required by 15 U.S.C. NTIS harvested 10 or more of the 1,127 reports from each of the following agencies’ Web sites: Federal Reserve System (169 reports) International Trade Commission (151) Office of National Drug Control Policy (108) Commerce’s International Trade Administration (95) Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (61) Commerce’s Bureau of the Census (52) Department of Justice (41) Federal Emergency Management Agency (24) Federal Communications Commission (20) Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (18) Agency for International Development (18) The White House (13) Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (11) Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service (10)
Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (10) Federal Trade Commission (10)
The seven agencies with the most harvested reports had one or more of three general reasons for not sending their reports to NTIS: they were not aware of the law (2 agencies); they would incur additional costs and duplication of effort to format and transfer the information to NTIS that is free on the agency’s Web site (4 agencies); and/or they thought that a few of the reports harvested by NTIS were not scientific, technical, or engineering reports and, thus, did not fall within the law’s scope (3 agencies). This information suggests that it may be useful to consider whether all scientific, technical, and engineering information should be retained permanently. In NTIS’ permanent repository of about 2.5 million reports, the number being added has been declining in recent years, and about 75 percent of the reports are now over 12 years old. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service (NTIS), which is a permanent repository and principal disseminator of scientific, technical, engineering, and business-related information. NTIS acquires research reports primarily from federal agencies and their contractors and grantees as well as from international sources. GAO discusses (1) the various functions of NTIS; (2) the quantity, age, and demand trends of reports in NTIS' repository; (3) the extent to which the reports in NTIS' repository are readily available from other public sources; and (4) whether federal agencies are sending their reports to NTIS for sale to the public, as required by law.
What GAO Found
GAO found that NTIS provides its basic statutory clearinghouse repository function of collecting and disseminating full-text paper reports and various other fee-based services for agencies. These include brokerage services, distribution services, and Web services. NTIS has about 2.5 million reports in its repository that are to be retained permanently. About 75 percent of the reports are more than 12 years old, and NTIS has sold one or more copies of about eight percent of its 2.5 million reports. Of the 1.8 million reports more than 12 years old, only about one percent has sold since 1995. About 19 percent of NTIS reports were readily available from one or more of the four sources at the time GAO searched. Agencies often did not send their reports to NTIS as required by law. The reasons agencies cited for not sending their reports were that they (1) were unaware of the law; (2) would incur additional costs and duplication of effort to format and transfer information to NTIS that is free on the agency's Web site; or (3) did not believe their reports were covered because, in their view, their reports did not contain scientific, technical, or engineering information. |
gao_RCED-96-81 | gao_RCED-96-81_0 | FDA and FSIS are still primarily responsible for regulating food safety. FDA’s inspection frequency continues to be constrained by resources—in 1989, the agency inspected each plant, on average, once every 3 to 5 years. Currently, FDA plans to inspect food-processing plants once every 8 years, on average. While the agencies’ structures and approaches to food safety have remained essentially the same over the last 5 years, new congressional mandates and the growth of the food sector have resulted in increased budgets and greater workloads. FDA and FSIS were both involved in developing and overseeing these new requirements. New Initiatives Would Fundamentally Alter the Existing Food Safety System
Three federal food safety agencies are embracing HACCP programs, which will fundamentally alter the federal food safety system and industry operations for ensuring meat, poultry, and seafood safety. NMFS has adopted a voluntary HACCP-based inspection program for seafood. We believe that taken in context, the HACCP-related changes being implemented by FSIS, FDA, and NMFS do represent a fundamental shift in the federal government’s approach to food safety. In addition, we examined other reports and studies on meat, poultry, and seafood inspection and used prior GAO studies. (2) A list of the critical control points for each identified hazard. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the federal food safety system, focusing on recent federal initiatives to improve meat, poultry, and seafood safety.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) are primarily responsible for regulating food safety; (2) both agencies inspect meat, poultry, and seafood plants, but are constrained by resource limitations; (3) FDA plans to inspect each food processing plant once every 8 years, or once every 5 years when it can use state inspection resources; (4) Congress has increased the mandates of both agencies since 1989, including requiring FDA and FSIS to help develop and oversee new food labelling requirements; (5) while the agencies' budgets have increased, their staffing remained constant; (6) FDA, FSIS, and the National Marine Fisheries Service, which maintains a voluntary seafood inspection program, are implementing hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) programs, which emphasize the detection and prevention of microbial contamination and increase the role of industry in ensuring food safety; and (7) HACCP initiatives represent a fundamental shift in the government's approach to ensuring food safety. |
gao_GAO-11-150 | gao_GAO-11-150_0 | Background
DON is a major component of the Department of Defense (DOD), consisting of the Navy and the Marine Corps. It is to be developed incrementally, with the first increment to provide comparable NMCI capabilities, additional information assurance, and increased government control of the network. The program’s preliminary life cycle cost estimate (through fiscal year 2025) for the first increment is about $50 billion. The NGEN AOA contained key weaknesses in its cost estimates and operational effectiveness analysis that impaired its ability to inform investment decision making. Further, none of the alternatives in this analysis match the current acquisition approach, and these differences have not been analyzed to determine the breadth of risk that exists. While the AOA identified limitations in the cost analysis, such as the use of NMCI data that did not reflect prices of other service providers, and evaluated the impact on costs of using different transition timeline scenarios, it did not include a sensitivity analysis of the key cost driver (i.e., the number of personnel needed to manage NGEN), despite concerns that the Navy’s estimates of these numbers were not stabilized at the time of the AOA. Rather, it simply states that it was a qualitative assessment. However, these measures alone do not provide insight into how they would influence the operational effectiveness of each alternative because they were not linked to NGEN capabilities and goals, and they did not provide sufficient insight for selecting a preferred alternative. However, the segmented approach currently being pursued by DON was not one of the alternatives assessed in the AOA. Without a reliable schedule, it is likely that established program milestones will slip. Our work has identified nine best practices associated with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. However, the most current version of this schedule (May 2010) that was available at the time we began our review was not reliable because only two of the four subschedules that we analyzed substantially met any of the nine practices. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the program was approved to proceed. Nevertheless, the program was approved to proceed. Further, according to the assessment, the Test and Evaluation Master Plan was not complete because the requirements were not defined. According to DON officials, the decisions to pass the gates and proceed were based on their view that they had sufficiently mitigated known risks and issues. Most notably, while DON produced substantially well-documented cost estimates, the NGEN acquisition approach currently being followed is not grounded in a reliable analysis of alternative approaches, and the selected approach was not even assessed and is about $4.7 billion costlier and introduces more risk than the alternatives that were assessed. Exacerbating this is an equally troubling pattern of missed milestones and delays in key program documentation, as well as gate review decisions that have allowed the program to proceed in the face of significant performance shortfalls and risks. It is thus imperative, given the scope and nature of the program’s problems, that swift and immediate action be taken to ensure that the most cost-effective acquisition approach is pursued and that a reliable schedule and performance- and risk-based decision making are employed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that NGEN capabilities are acquired in the most cost-effective manner, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct an interim NGEN milestone review, and direct the Secretary of the Navy to immediately limit further investment in NGEN until this review has been conducted and a decision on how best to proceed has been reported to the Secretary of Defense and congressional defense committees. To facilitate implementation of the acquisition approach resulting from the above review, we further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following two actions: ensure that the NGEN integrated master schedule substantially reflects the key schedule estimating practices discussed in this report, and ensure that future NGEN gate reviews and decisions fully reflect the state of the program’s performance and its exposure to risks. By not evaluating all viable acquisition approaches before proceeding with further investment in NGEN, the department cannot be assured that it is pursuing the most cost-effective approach. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the Department of the Navy (DON) sufficiently analyzed alternative approaches for acquiring its Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN), (2) DON has a reliable program schedule for executing NGEN, and (3) acquisition decisions have been performance- and risk-based. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Navy (DON), a major component of the Department of Defense (DOD), has launched its Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) program to replace the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) program. NGEN capabilities, such as secure transport of voice and data, data storage, and e-mail, are to be incrementally acquired through multiple providers. As planned, the first increment is expected to provide comparable NMCI capabilities, additional information assurance, and greater DON network control, at a cost of about $50 billion through fiscal year 2025. Given the size, importance, and complexity of NGEN, GAO was asked to determine whether DON has sufficiently analyzed alternative acquisition approaches and has a reliable schedule for executing the program, and whether program acquisition decisions have been performance- and risk-based. To do this, GAO reviewed the NGEN analysis of alternatives, integrated master schedule, and key milestone decisions.
What GAO Found
DON did not sufficiently analyze alternative acquisition approaches for NGEN because the alternatives analysis contained key weaknesses, and none of the alternatives assessed match the current acquisition approach. Specifically, the cost estimates for the respective alternatives were not reliable because they were not substantially accurate, and they were neither comprehensive nor credible. Further, the operational effectiveness analysis, the other key aspect of an analysis of alternatives, did not establish and analyze sufficient measures for assessing each alternative's ability to achieve program goals and deliver program capabilities. Moreover, the acquisition approach that DON is actually pursuing was not one of the alternatives assessed in the analysis, and it is riskier and potentially costlier than the alternatives analyzed because it includes a higher number of contractual relationships. According to program officials, the analysis reflects the most that could be done in the time that was available to complete it, and they do not view the alternative selected as materially different from the assessed alternatives, even though it is about $4.7 billion more costly. DON does not have a reliable schedule for executing NGEN. Only two of the four subschedules that GAO reviewed, each of which help form the master schedule, adequately satisfied any of the nine practices that are associated with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. These weaknesses have contributed to delays in key program milestones. During the course of GAO's review, DON stated that action was taken to address some, but not all, of these weaknesses. According to program officials, schedule estimating was constrained by staffing limitations. NGEN acquisition decisions were not always performance- and risk-based. In particular, the program was approved in the face of known performance shortfalls and risks. For example, the program was approved at a key acquisition review despite the lack of defined requirements, which was recognized as a risk that would impact the completion of other key documents, such as the test plan. This risk was later realized as a critical issue. According to program officials, the decisions to proceed were based on their view that they had sufficiently mitigated known risks and issues. Collectively, these weaknesses mean that DON does not have a sufficient basis for knowing that it is pursuing the best approach for acquiring NGEN capabilities and the program's cost and schedule performance is unlikely to track to estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD limit further investment in NGEN until it conducts an interim review to reconsider the selected acquisition approach and addresses issues discussed in this report. In its comments, DOD stated that it did not concur with the recommendation to reconsider its acquisition approach; GAO maintains that without doing so, DOD cannot be sure it is pursuing the most cost-effective approach. |
gao_GGD-95-204 | gao_GGD-95-204_0 | Agency officials in the GSA regional and field offices also said that they had experienced more frequent and serious performance problems with contracted maintenance activities than with other types of activities. In general, the case files for the sample activities we reviewed provided evidence that GSA made efforts to oversee those activities and take appropriate corrective action when necessary. Thirty-nine of the sample activities (about 72 percent) continued to be delivered by the sector originally selected by the agency. No Clear Assessment of Whether GSA Realized Expected Savings
While GSA’s original decisions appeared to be sound, we could not conclusively demonstrate that they generated the estimated level of savings or improved the cost-effectiveness of GSA’s services. Private Sector Approaches Emphasized Use of Performance Measures and Benchmarking
To support its reinvention efforts, GSA collected information on private sector practices. This information indicated that real estate organizations commonly used performance measurement to evaluate their activities and to decide whether to contract out. Benchmarking and performance measures also assisted organizations in deciding which services to retain in-house or contract out. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this assignment were to review (1) the cost-effectiveness and performance of both in-house and contracted real property management services in GSA to determine whether its contracting decisions were sound and (2) evaluation approaches used by private sector real property management organizations to determine whether any practices could improve the oversight and evaluation of the effectiveness of GSA’s real property management services. The activity was contracted out (May 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the cost-effectiveness and performance of the General Services Administration's (GSA) real property management services to determine whether GSA contracting decisions were sound; and (2) private sector real property management approaches to determine whether GSA management services could be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) cost, performance, and historical data showed that GSA decisions to retain property management services in-house or contract them out were sound; (2) in general, GSA retained and contracted-out activities at lower actual costs than estimated; (3) GSA continued to use the sector originally selected for about 72 percent of the sampled activities, since only 11 of the 54 activities had serious performance problems; (4) GSA experienced more frequent and serious performance problems with contracted maintenance activities than with other types of activities; (5) GSA oversight of the activities was generally sound and GSA took appropriate corrective actions when necessary; (6) although GSA contracting decisions appeared to be sound, GAO could not conclusively demonstrate that the selected alternatives generated the expected savings estimated; (7) private sector real estate management organizations commonly use such practices as performance measurement and benchmarking to manage and evaluate their operations and to decide whether to contract out certain services; (8) GSA could improve its oversight and evaluation of its services by adopting key private sector performance measures; and (9) GSA is still developing the specific performance measurements it will use after its reorganization. |
gao_GAO-05-461 | gao_GAO-05-461_0 | Reported Federal Climate Change Funding Increased for Three of the Four Funding Categories, but Data May Not Be Comparable Over Time
Federal climate change funding, as reported by OMB, increased from $2.35 billion in 1993 to $5.09 billion in 2004 (116 percent), or from $3.28 billion to $5.09 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation and also increased for technology, science, and international assistance between 1993 and 2004, as shown in table 1. Second, OMB reported that it expanded the definitions of some accounts to include more activities, but did not specify how the definitions were changed. CCSP used several ways of categorizing data on science funding in its reports, but the data were difficult to compare over the entire time period because CCSP periodically introduced new categorization methods without explaining how the new methods could be compared with the ones they replaced. International Assistance
From 1993 through 2004, international assistance funding decreased from 9 percent to 5 percent of total federal funding on climate change, as reported by OMB. For example, OMB reported climate change funding of $2 million in 2003 and $3 million in 2004 by USAID on the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, but OMB did not report funding for this account in previous years. Tax Expenditures
Although not required to provide information on tax expenditures related to climate change, OMB reported certain information related to climate- related tax expenditures for each year. OMB officials said that they consistently reported proposed tax expenditures where a key purpose was specifically to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Reported Funding for Most Agencies Increased, but Unexplained Changes in Report Content Limit the Comparability of Data Over Time
OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies that received funding for climate change programs in 2004 received more funding in that year than they had in 1993. Unexplained changes in the content of OMB reports limit the comparability of agencies’ funding data, and therefore it is unclear whether funding changed as much as was reported by OMB. Similarly, OMB reported funding for other agencies in some years but not in others, without explanation. We also recommend that OMB include information on existing climate-related tax expenditures in its use the same criteria for determining which tax expenditures to include as it uses for determining which accounts to include; request that the Congress clarify whether future reports should be presented in terms of expenditures and obligations or in terms of budget authority, and if the Congress prefers the former, OMB should request the necessary time to prepare reports on that basis; and if it continues to report budget authority rather than expenditures and obligations, clearly identify the information reported as budget authority throughout the report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines federal climate change funding from 1993 through 2004, as reported by OMB and CCSP to determine (1) how total funding and funding by category changed and the extent to which data on such funding are comparable over time and (2) how funding by agency changed and the extent to which data on such funding are comparable over time. The term “funding” in this report reflects discretionary budget authority, or the authority provided in law to incur financial obligations that will result in outlays, as reported by OMB and CCSP in their reports. CCSP reports already presented climate change science funding by agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress has required the administration to report annually on federal spending on climate change. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports funding in four categories: technology (to reduce greenhouse gas emissions), science (to better understand the climate), international assistance (to help developing countries), and tax expenditures (to encourage reductions in emissions). The Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which coordinates many agencies' activities, reports only on science. To measure funding, OMB and CCSP use budget authority, the authority provided in law to enter into financial obligations that will result in government outlays. GAO was asked to examine federal climate change funding for 1993 through 2004, as reported by both agencies, including (1) how total funding and funding by category changed and whether funding data are comparable over time and (2) how funding by agency changed and whether funding data are comparable over time.
What GAO Found
Federal funding for climate change increased from $2.4 billion in 1993 to $5.1 billion in 2004 (116 percent), as reported by OMB, or from $3.3 billion to $5.1 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. During this period, inflation-adjusted funding increased for technology and science, but decreased for international assistance. The share for technology increased (36 to 56 percent), while the shares for science and international assistance decreased (56 to 39 percent and 9 to 5 percent, respectively). However, it is unclear whether funding changed as much as reported because modifications in the format and content of OMB reports limit the comparability of funding data over time. For example, OMB reported that it expanded the definitions of some accounts to include more activities, but did not specify how it changed the definitions. Also, while OMB's totals for science funding were generally comparable to CCSP's totals, the more detailed data in CCSP reports were difficult to compare over time because CCSP introduced new categorization methods without explaining how they related to the previous methods. OMB officials stated that changes in their reports were due, in part, to the short timeline for completing them, and that it has not been required to follow a consistent reporting format from one year to the next. The Director of CCSP said that its reports changed as the program evolved. GAO was unable to compare climate-related tax expenditures over time because OMB reported data on proposed, but not on existing tax expenditures. For example, while OMB reported no funding for existing climate-related tax expenditures in 2004, GAO identified four such tax expenditures in 2004, including revenue loss estimates of $330 million to develop certain renewable energy sources. OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies that funded climate change programs in 2004 increased such funding between 1993 and 2004, but unexplained changes in the reports' contents limit the comparability of data on funding by agency. GAO found that OMB reported funding for certain agencies in some years but not in others, without explanation. For example, OMB reported funding of $83 million for the Department of Defense in 2003, but did not list any such funding in prior reports. OMB told GAO that it relied on agency budget offices to submit accurate data. |
gao_GAO-08-486 | gao_GAO-08-486_0 | Grants Are Intended to Change the Workforce System, but Labor Will Be Challenged to Evaluate Their Impact
According to Labor officials, the grant initiatives are designed to change the focus of the public workforce system to emphasize the employment and training needs of high-growth, high-demand industries, but Labor will be challenged in assessing their impact. From 2001 through 2007, Labor awarded 349 grants totaling almost $900 million for these initiatives (see table 1). For a list of these grants, see appendix II. High Growth and WIRED—the two initiatives where Labor spent the most money⎯are mentioned in the strategic plan, but not specifically linked to a performance goal; therefore, it is unclear what criteria Labor will use to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, it may lack data that will allow it to compare outcomes for individuals served by grant- funded programs with those served by employment and training programs offered through the one-stop system. The Initial Noncompetitive Process Was Not Adequately Documented and Did Not Include Key Players
While Labor now awards grants under all three grant initiatives competitively, initially almost all High Growth grants were awarded without competition. All Three Types of Grants Are Now Awarded Competitively, but the Vast Majority of High Growth Grants Were Awarded Without Competition
The Community Based and the WIRED grants have always been awarded through a competitive process, but until 2005, Labor did not award High Growth grants competitively even though federal law and Labor’s internal procedures recommend competition. Congress required that High Growth grants funded by H-1B fees be awarded competitively for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Labor Did Not Document the Criteria for Selecting Noncompetitive High Growth Grants or Whether They Met Labor’s Internal Requirements or Requirements of the Law
Because the initial High Growth process was noncompetitive, documenting the decision steps was all the more important to ensure transparency. In response to the inspector general’s report, Labor has taken steps to strengthen the noncompetitive process. However, the newly developed procedures do not explicitly identify the statutory program requirements for which compliance should be documented. Labor’s Process for Identifying Industry Workforce Challenges Did Not Include the Majority of Workforce Investment Boards
The vast majority of workforce boards—which oversee the workforce investment system—were not included in the meetings that served as incubators for grant proposals. Labor Uses a Risk- Based Monitoring Approach for High Growth and Community Based Grants but Not for WIRED Grants
For all three grant initiatives, Labor has a process to resolve findings found in single audits, collects quarterly performance information, and provides technical assistance as a part of monitoring. In addition, Labor officials said they trained national and regional office staff to address grantees’ questions and help High Growth and Community Based grantees obtain assistance from experts at Labor and other grantees. Labor has spent $16 million on contracts to provide technical assistance, improve grant management, administration, and monitoring, and to assist Labor with tasks such as holding grantee training conferences. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the intent of the grant initiatives and the extent to which Labor will be able to assess their effects; (2) the extent to which the process used competition, was adequately documented, and included key players; and (3) what Labor is doing to monitor individual grantee compliance with grant requirements. Veterans’ Employment and Training Service: Labor Could Improve Information on Reemployment Services, Outcomes, and Program Impact. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Labor has spent nearly $900 million on three workforce employment and training grant initiatives: High Growth Job Training Initiative (High Growth), Community-Based Job Training Initiative (Community Based), and the Workforce Innovation in Regional Economic Development (WIRED). GAO was asked to examine (1) the intent of the grant initiatives and the extent to which Labor will be able to assess their effects, (2) the extent to which the process used competition, was adequately documented, and included key players, and (3) what Labor is doing to monitor individual grantee compliance with grant requirements. To answer these questions, GAO obtained from Labor a list of grants for fiscal years 2001 through 2007, and reviewed relevant laws and Labor's internal grant award procedures. GAO interviewed grantees, and state and local workforce officials in seven states where grantees were located, Labor officials, and subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
According to Labor officials, the grant initiatives were designed to shift the focus of the public workforce system toward the training and employment needs of high-growth, in-demand industries, but Labor will be challenged to assess their impact. Under the initiatives, Labor awarded 349 grants totaling almost $900 million to foster this change. However, the grant initiatives were not fully integrated into Labor's strategic plan or overall research agenda; therefore, it is unclear what criteria Labor will use to evaluate their effectiveness. Labor lacks data that will allow it to compare outcomes for grant-funded services to those of other federally funded employment and training services. While grants under all three initiatives are now awarded competitively, the initial noncompetitive process for High Growth grants was not adequately documented and did not include key players. Community Based and WIRED grants have always been awarded competitively, but more than 80 percent of High Growth grants were awarded without competition. Labor began awarding some High Growth grants competitively in 2005 and Congress required Labor to award certain grants competitively in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. This requirement applies only to those years. Labor could not document criteria used to select the noncompetitive High Growth grants or whether these grants met internal or statutory requirements. Labor has taken steps to strengthen the noncompetitive process, but these procedures do not explicitly require documentation of compliance with statutory program requirements. Labor's process for identifying solutions for industry workforce challenges did not include the vast majority of local workforce investment boards, which oversee local employment and training services. Labor provides some monitoring for grantees under all three initiatives and uses a risk-based monitoring approach for the High Growth and Community Based grants, but not for WIRED. Labor has a process to address findings from single audit reports, but its inspector general found problems with Labor's follow up on the completion of these audits for its grantees in general and recommended that Labor put procedures in place to do so. Labor provides technical assistance for the three initiatives and spent $16 million on contracts to help offer this support. |
gao_GAO-11-103 | gao_GAO-11-103_0 | UPF Project Design Costs Have Already Increased
NNSA’s current estimate, which was prepared in 2007 at critical decision 1, indicates that the UPF will cost between $1.4 and $3.5 billion to construct. This is more than double NNSA’s initial 2004 estimate that was prepared at critical decision 0 of between $600 million and $1.1 billion. Cost estimates for project engineering and design, which are less than halfway completed, have already increased by about 42 percent—from $297 to $421 million. According to UPF project officials, these increases are the result of, among other things, changes in engineering and design pricing rates. Estimated Savings from the New Facility May Not Begin to Be Realized until Several Years after the UPF Is Built
According to NNSA officials, efficiency gains resulting from consolidating facilities at the Y-12 plant are likely to result in a savings of about $200 million annually in operations, maintenance, security, and other costs. Although NNSA Currently Estimates UPF Construction Will Be Completed between 2018 and 2022, Funding Shortfalls Could Result in Delays
NNSA’s current estimate prepared in 2007 at critical decision 1 indicates that the UPF construction will be completed as early as 2018 and as late as 2022. However, NNSA officials currently expect the UPF will not be completed before 2020 due to funding shortfalls. NNSA Is Developing Several New Technologies for the UPF and Is Assessing Their Maturity but Cannot Be Certain That All Technologies Will Work as Intended
NNSA is developing 10 new technologies to install in the UPF and is using a systematic approach to gauge their maturity; however, NNSA may lack assurance that all technologies will work as intended before making key project decisions in accordance with best practices and our prior recommendations. This technology consists of a system that combines multiple machining operations into a single, automated process. However, NNSA does not expect to achieve the required levels of readiness for another key technology. Specifically, based on discussions with NNSA and contractor officials and our analysis of NNSA documents, NNSA does not expect one critical technology it is developing—agile machining—to reach TRL 6 until 18 months after approval of the project’s cost and schedule performance baseline. DOE’s guidance on the use of TRLs is inconsistent with best practices used by DOD and with our previous recommendations with regard to technology readiness at another critical decision—start of construction. Six of the 10 technologies NNSA is developing are not expected to reach TRL 7 before UPF construction begins. This could force the project to revert to existing or alternate technologies, which could result in design changes, higher costs, and schedule delays. Emerging Changes in the Composition and Size of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile May Only Have a Minor Effect on the UPF
According to NNSA officials and an independent study commissioned by NNSA, emerging changes in the composition and size of the nuclear weapons stockpile as a result of changes in the nation’s nuclear strategy or a proposed arms treaty with Russia should have relatively minor effects on the UPF project. In addition, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) signed in April 2010 by the leaders of the United States and Russia would, if ratified, reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads from about 2,200 to 1,550. Moreover, NNSA’s decision to approve an initial project cost range immediately after a 2007 technical review warned of a disconnect between the UPF project’s funding requirements and NNSA’s future years’ spending plan, and then requesting $200 million less in fiscal year 2011 than the UPF project estimated it needed, raises concerns that NNSA is not placing sufficient high-level management focus on ensuring that UPF’s cost and schedule estimates, and the associated funding plans these estimates are based upon, are consistent with NNSA’s broader plans for funding the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. In the event technologies being developed for the UPF project do not reach levels of maturity called for by best practices, inform the appropriate committees and Members of Congress of any NNSA decision to approve a cost and schedule performance baseline or to begin construction of UPF without first having ensured that project technologies are sufficiently mature. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) estimated cost and schedule for constructing the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; (2) determine the extent to which the UPF will use new, experimental technologies and any risks to the project’s cost and schedule of replacing the existing, proven technologies; and (3) determine the extent to which emerging changes in the stockpile could affect the UPF project. In addition, we toured enriched uranium processing and nuclear weapons component facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Built in the 1940s and 1950s, the Y-12 National Security Complex, located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) primary site for enriched uranium activities. Because Y-12 facilities are outdated and deteriorating, NNSA is building a more modern facility--known as the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). NNSA estimates that the UPF will cost up to $3.5 billion and save over $200 million annually in operations, security, and maintenance costs. NNSA also plans to include more advanced technologies in the UPF to make uranium processing and component production safer. GAO was asked to (1) assess NNSA's estimated cost and schedule for constructing the UPF; (2) determine the extent to which UPF will use new, experimental technologies, and identify resultant risks, if any; and (3) determine the extent to which emerging changes in the nuclear weapons stockpile could affect the UPF project. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed NNSA technology development and planning documents and met with officials from NNSA and the Y-12 plant.
What GAO Found
The UPF project costs have increased since NNSA's initial estimates in 2004 and construction may be delayed due to funding shortfalls. NNSA's current estimate prepared in 2007 indicates that the UPF will cost between $1.4 and $3.5 billion to construct--more than double NNSA's 2004 estimate of between $600 million and $1.1 billion. In addition, costs for project engineering and design, which are less than halfway completed, have increased by about 42 percent--from $297 to $421 million--due in part to changes in engineering and design pricing rates. With regard to the project's schedule, NNSA currently estimates that UPF construction will be completed as early as 2018 and as late as 2022. However, because of a funding shortfall of nearly $200 million in fiscal year 2011, NNSA officials expect that the UPF will not be completed before 2020, which could also result in additional costs. NNSA is developing 10 new technologies for use in the UPF and is using a systematic approach--Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)--to gauge the extent to which technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended. Industry best practices and Department of Energy (DOE) guidance recommend achieving specific TRLs at critical project decision points--such as establishing a cost and schedule performance baseline or beginning construction--to give optimal assurance that technologies are sufficiently ready. However, NNSA does not expect all 10 new technologies to achieve the level of maturity called for by best practices before making critical decisions. For example, NNSA is developing a technology that combines multiple machining operations into a single, automated process--known as agile machining--but does not expect it to reach an optimal TRL until 18 months after one of UPF's critical decisions--approval of a formal cost and schedule performance baseline--is made. In addition, DOE's guidance for establishing optimal TRLs prior to beginning construction is not consistent with best practices or with our previous recommendations. As a result, 6 of 10 technologies NNSA is developing are not expected to reach optimum TRLs consistent with best practices by the time UPF construction begins. If critical technologies fail to work as intended, NNSA may need to revert to existing or alternate technologies, possibly resulting in changes to design plans and space requirements that could delay the project and increase costs. Changes in the composition and size of the nuclear weapons stockpile could occur as a result of changes in the nation's nuclear strategy, but NNSA officials and a key study said that the impact of these changes on the project should be minor. For example, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in April 2010 by the leaders of the United States and Russia would, if ratified, reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads from about 2,200 to 1,550. According to NNSA officials, NNSA and DOD have cooperated closely and incorporated key nuclear weapons stockpile changes into UPF's design. Also, an independent study found that most of the UPF's planned space and equipment is dedicated to establishing basic uranium processing capabilities that are not likely to change, while only a minimal amount--about 10 percent--is for meeting current stockpile size requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations for, among other things, improving the UPF's cost and funding plans, ensuring that new UPF technologies reach optimal levels of maturity prior to critical project decisions, and for improving DOE guidance. NNSA generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-1 | gao_GAO-13-1_0 | Background
BOP is responsible for approximately 219,600 inmates in federal custody. Mental Health Services Costs Have Increased in BOP- Operated Institutions since Fiscal Year 2008 and Are Expected to Continue to Increase
During the 5-year period starting in fiscal year 2008 and ending in fiscal year 2012, costs for inmate mental health services in BOP-operated institutions rose in absolute dollar amount, as well as on an annual per capita—or per inmate—basis. As shown in table 3, when aggregating these costs, we found that total costs increased annually from $123 million in fiscal year 2008 to nearly $146 million in fiscal year 2012. These increases were due in part to a concurrent population increase of more than 11,000 inmates during the period. BOP Assesses Compliance with Its Policies for Inmate Mental Health Services, but Reviews Are Not Always Timely; BOP Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Most Treatment Programs or Updated Most Policies
BOP conducts various internal reviews to assess BOP-operated institutions’ compliance with its policies related to mental health services, and BOP policy also requires institutions to obtain external accreditations. Additionally, BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of most of its treatment programs and has not developed a plan to do so. Finally, BOP’s program statements related to mental health services, which formally document BOP’s policies and procedures, contain outdated information. BOP Conducts Internal Reviews That Assess Compliance with Policies for Mental Health Services, but Most Reviews Do Not Occur on Time
BOP’s psychology and health services program reviews identify the extent to which institutions are complying with BOP policies. VII for additional information on the elements of a MTC.) As part a statutory requirement, BOP is to provide an annual report containing statistics demonstrating the relative reductions in recidivism associated with major inmate programs (including residential drug treatment, vocational training, and prison industries programs).BOP officials told us they have begun to develop an approach to complete the first report, which they plan to submit to Congress in 2016. With a plan, BOP could have greater assurance that the activities necessary to conduct the evaluations of the psychology treatment programs, as well as any needed program changes that may be identified during those evaluations, would be completed in a timely manner. The performance-based,operation of BOP’s privately managed facilities give flexibility to the contractors to decide how to provide mental health services. BOP Does Not Track Contractors’ Cost of Providing Inmate Mental Health Services in Contract Facilities
BOP tracks the overall daily cost for housing the 13 percent of federal inmates—who are generally designated as mental health care level 1—in its 15 contract facilities, but BOP does not track the specific costs of providing mental health services to these inmates. This is because the BOP contracts that govern the operation of these privately managed facilities are performance-based, fixed-price contracts that only require the contractors to provide BOP with their costs on a per inmate per day basis. However, when reviews are postponed, the delays can be lengthy—sometimes over a year—even for those institutions with the lowest ratings. By updating and implementing mental health care-related program statements, BOP would better ensure that its policies reflect currently accepted treatment practices and standards. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve BOP’s ability to oversee BOP-operated institutions’ compliance with inmate mental health policies and monitor the effectiveness of treatment programs for mentally ill inmates, we recommend that the Director of BOP take the following two actions: when program reviews are delayed, ensure institutions with the lowest ratings receive the highest priority for the completion of reviews; and develop a plan to carry out future evaluations of BOP’s psychology treatment programs, within available resources; the plan should include the identification of necessary resources and target time frames. However, in an e-mail received on June 27, 2013, a BOP audit liaison official stated that BOP concurred with the first and third recommendations and partially concurred with the second recommendation, which called for the Director of BOP to assess which psychology treatment programs could be evaluated within the agency’s existing resources and develop a plan to conduct future evaluations. 2. 3. To address the question on the BOP’s costs over the past 5 fiscal years and projected costs to provide inmate mental health services in BOP- operated institutions, we interviewed officials from BOP’s Administrative Division, Psychology Services Branch, and Health Services Division to understand what constitutes mental health services, what costs are relevant to providing these services, what factors drive changes in cost, and BOP’s current practices for developing budgets and expenditure plans in these areas. provided to inmates and oversight of staff working at the institutional level. To address the question about the extent to which BOP tracks the costs of providing mental health services to BOP inmates in contract facilities, and the extent to which BOP assesses whether these facilities meet contract requirements and established accreditation standards for inmate mental health services, we reviewed the contracts for all of the 15 contract facilities that housed BOP inmates during the course of our review to see what cost information they included. The Habilitation Program was discontinued in fiscal year 2012. We reviewed the most recent psychology services and health services internal program review reports for the 47 BOP institutions in our sample. | Why GAO Did This Study
BOP is responsible for the care and custody--including mental health care--of more than 219,600 federal inmates. BOP identifies and treats inmates' mental health disorders, and has procedures in place to assess the provision of mental health services in its 119 facilities, and 15 private prisons operating under contract. GAO was requested to provide information on BOP's costs and oversight of inmate mental health services. This report addresses: (1) BOP's costs to provide these services; (2) the extent to which BOP assesses whether its institutions comply with BOP policies for providing services; and (3) the extent to which BOP tracks the costs of providing mental health services to inmates in contract facilities, and assesses compliance with contract requirements.
GAO analyzed obligated funds for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 for the two BOP divisions responsible for mental health services at BOP institutions, examined the most recent review reports for a random sample of 47 BOP institutions and all 15 contract facilities, examined BOP's policies, and interviewed BOP officials.
What GAO Found
During a 5-year period--fiscal years 2008 through 2012--costs for inmate mental health services in institutions run by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) rose in absolute dollar amount, as well as on an annual per capita basis. Specifically, mental health services costs rose from $123 million in fiscal year 2008 to $146 million in fiscal year 2012, with increases generally due to three factors--inmate population increases, general inflationary increases, and increased participation rates in psychology treatment programs such as drug abuse treatment programs. Additionally, the per capita cost rose from $741 in fiscal year 2008 to $821 in fiscal year 2012. It is projected that these costs will continue to increase with an estimated per capita cost of $876 in fiscal year 2015, due, in part, to increased program funding and inflation.
BOP conducts various internal reviews that assess institutions' compliance with its policies related to mental health services, and it also requires institutions to obtain external accreditations. BOP's internal program reviews are on-site audits of a specific program, including two that are relevant to mental health services--psychology and health services. Most institutions in GAO's sample received good or superior ratings on their psychology and health services program reviews, but these reviews did not always occur within BOP-established time frames, generally due to lack of staff availability. When reviews were postponed, delays could be lengthy, sometimes exceeding a year, even for those institutions with the lowest ratings in previous reviews. Moreover, BOP has not evaluated whether most of its psychology treatment programs are meeting their established goals and has not developed a plan to do so. BOP is developing an approach for reporting on the relative reduction in recidivism associated with major inmate programs, which may include some psychology treatment programs. Using this opportunity to develop a plan for evaluating its psychology treatment programs would help ensure that the necessary evaluation activities, as well as any needed program changes, are completed in a timely manner. Further, BOP's program statements--its formal policies--related to mental health services contain outdated information. Policy changes are instead communicated to staff through memos. By periodically updating its program statements, BOP would be better assured that staff have a consistent understanding of its policies, and that these policies reflect current mental health care practices.
BOP collects information on the daily cost to house the 13 percent of federal inmates in contract facilities, but it does not track the specific contractor costs of providing mental health services. The performance-based, fixed-price contracts that govern the operation of BOP's contract facilities give flexibility to the contractors to decide how to provide mental health services and do not require that they report their costs for doing so to BOP. BOP uses several methods to assess the contractors' compliance with contract requirements and standards of care. BOP conducts on-site reviews to assess the services provided to inmates in contract facilities, including those for mental health. BOP uses results from these reviews, as well as reports from external accrediting organizations, the presence of on-site monitors, and internal reviews conducted by the contract facility, to assess contractor compliance and to ensure that the contractor is consistently assessing the quality of its operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP (1) take steps to prioritize the completion of postponed program reviews, (2) develop a plan to evaluate treatment programs, and (3) develop and implement updated program statements. BOP concurred with the first and third recommendations and partially concurred with the second. GAO considered additional information provided by BOP about its plan to conduct evaluations and modified this recommendation accordingly. |
gao_GAO-06-757 | gao_GAO-06-757_0 | in Washington, D.C. (the V Street Operation). The Skyline Complex incident occurred later that day when an alarm sounded on the biosafety cabinet that employees took as a sign that contaminated mail had been passed from the Pentagon to the Skyline Complex. Finally, at 2:09 p.m., a Skyline employee called the Fairfax County 911 emergency line. Thus, by Monday evening, the Postal Service had suspended operations at its V Street Operation and had immediately begun dispensing antibiotics to its employees. In total, over 160 Postal Service employees were treated for their possible exposure to anthrax. Mail-screening contractor did not quarantine mail until it received negative test results from the laboratory. DOD Did Not Fully Follow the Federal Framework for Coordinating Responses at the Pentagon
DOD did not fully follow the federal framework for coordinating a response to the potential anthrax incident at the Pentagon; instead, it chose to make decisions on its own. CDC recommended antibiotics for employees of the V Street Operation because (1) of the confluence of the two incidents, which, at the time, were viewed as involving the presence of anthrax; (2) DOD had already started its employees on antibiotics; and (3) the employees could have been exposed to anthrax several days earlier because they process mail to the Pentagon. DOD Took Numerous Actions That Address Problems Related to the Incidents
DOD took numerous actions that address problems related to the Pentagon and Skyline Complex incidents. Other actions, including selecting a new mail-screening contractor and improving procedures for releasing quarantined mail, were a direct response to what occurred. At the Skyline Complex, DOD’s actions included prohibiting the use of equipment for screening mail unless the equipment is being operated within the context of a comprehensive mail-screening program. DOD’s Actions Do Not Fully Resolve Identified Problems
DOD’s actions resolve many of the problems that arose in the March 2005 incidents but not all. In April 2006—more than 1 year after the incident— another senior health official reiterated that DOD has the authority to make final decisions on medical treatment at the Pentagon without collaboration or consultation with other agencies, including HHS. DOD Still Has Not Ensured That Its Mail Facilities Have Reviewed Mail Security Plans, As Required
TMA did not have a mail security plan for the Skyline Complex at the time of the incidents, and although federal mail management regulation and DOD’s mail manual require such a plan, it has not subsequently developed one. DOD Has Not Ensured That Its Facilities in the National Capital Region Are Appropriately Using Biosafety Cabinets
Gaps remain in the actions DOD has taken to ensure the appropriate use of biosafety cabinets for mail screening in DOD-leased mail facilities in the national capital region. Two of these agencies—DOD and GSA—provided written comments. Furthermore, while DOD is developing a new policy to define the roles and responsibilities of senior DOD leadership―including those involved in making medical treatment decisions―during incidents at the Pentagon, it only partially agreed with our remaining recommendation, related to the need for DOD to make future medical decisions within the participatory decision-making framework specified in the NRP and NIMS. To determine what problems occurred and why they occurred, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed, among other documents, (1) all available timelines and after-action reports prepared by federal, state, and local agencies that were involved in the response; (2) the Pentagon’s mail- screening contract and procedures; (3) TMA’s mail procedures; (4) federal mail management and other applicable regulations related to occupant emergency plans; (5) DOD requirements, including its mail manual; (6) applicable guidance on the coordination of incidents with appropriate organizations, including the National Response Plan (NRP) and its Biological Incident Annex and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and; (7) CDC guidance related to the provision of medical services to potentially affected employees, including its guidance on the timing of antibiotics to affected individuals. To determine the extent to which the actions taken address the problems that arose at the two mail facilities during the March 2005 incidents, we reviewed and analyzed, among other things, the Pentagon’s new mail- screening contract and its draft (1) mail-screening operating procedures, (2) laboratory procedures, (3) notification procedures, and (4) procedures for communicating information to the public. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2005, two well-publicized and nearly simultaneous incidents involving the suspicion of anthrax took place in the Washington, D.C., area. The incidents occurred at Department of Defense (DOD) mail facilities at the Pentagon and at a commercial office complex (Skyline Complex). While these incidents were false alarms, DOD and other federal and local agencies responded. The Postal Service suspended operations at two of its facilities and over a thousand DOD and Postal Service employees were given antibiotics as a precaution against their possible exposure to anthrax. This report describes (1) what occurred at the Pentagon and Skyline Complex mail facilities, (2) the problems we identified in detecting and responding to the incidents, (3) the actions taken by DOD that address the problems that occurred, and (4) the extent to which DOD's actions address the problems.
What GAO Found
Events leading up to the Pentagon incident began when a laboratory that tested samples from the Pentagon's mail-screening equipment informed DOD's mail-screening contractor that test results indicated the presence of anthrax in the mail. By the time the contractor notified DOD 3 days later, suspect mail had already been released and distributed throughout the Pentagon. DOD evacuated its mail-screening and remote delivery facilities, notified federal and local agencies, and dispensed antibiotics to hundreds of employees. The Skyline Complex incident began the same day when Fairfax County, Virginia, emergency personnel responded to a 911 call placed by a Skyline employee that an alarm had sounded on a biosafety cabinet used to screen mail. Local responders closed the complex and decontaminated potentially exposed employees, and DOD dispensed antibiotics to the employees. Similarly, the Postal Service suspended operations at two facilities and dispensed antibiotics to its employees. Laboratory testing later indicated that the incidents were false alarms. Analysis of these incidents reveals numerous problems related to the detection and response to anthrax in the mail. At the Pentagon, DOD's mail-screening contractor did not follow key requirements, such as immediately notifying DOD after receiving evidence of contamination. At the Skyline Complex, DOD did not ensure that the complex had a mail security plan or that it had been reviewed, as required. The lack of a plan hampered the response. DOD also did not fully follow the federal framework--including the National Response Plan, which was developed to ensure effective, participatory decision making. Instead of coordinating with other agencies that have the lead in bioterrorism incidents, DOD unilaterally dispensed antibiotics to its employees. DOD has taken numerous actions that address problems related to the two incidents. At the Pentagon, DOD's actions included selecting a new mail-screening contractor and defining the roles and responsibilities of senior leadership, including those involved in making medical decisions. Related to Skyline, DOD prohibited its mail facilities in leased space within the Washington, D.C., area from using biosafety cabinets to screen mail unless the equipment is being operated within the context of a comprehensive mail-screening program. While DOD has made significant progress in addressing the problems that occurred, its actions do not fully resolve the issues. One remaining concern is whether DOD will adhere to the interagency coordination protocols specified in the national plan for future bioterrorism incidents involving the Pentagon. This concern arises because, more than 1 year after the incident, DOD reiterated that it has the authority to make medical decisions without collaborating or consulting with other agencies. DOD also has not ensured, among other things, that its mail facilities (1) have the required mail security plans and (2) are appropriately using biosafety cabinets for screening mail. |
gao_GGD-98-153 | gao_GGD-98-153_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To help Congress and others better understand current regulatory capital requirements, developments in those requirements, and regulatory issues these developments raise, the objectives of this report are to describe, for the banking, securities, futures, and life insurance sectors of the financial services industry, (1) regulatory views of the purpose of capital and current regulatory requirements; (2) the approaches of some large, diversified financial firms to risk measurement and capital allocation; and (3) issues in capital regulation and initiatives being considered for changes to regulatory capital requirements. The differences in regulatory purpose are reflected in the regulators’ views of the purpose of regulatory capital. Securities and Futures Regulatory Capital Requirements Emphasize Liquid Capital to Meet Customer Obligations in the Event of Firm Failure
As discussed earlier, regulators of securities broker-dealers and FCMs seek to protect customers of the firms they oversee as well as to protect the integrity of their markets. Some Large, Diversified Financial Firms Are Measuring Risks With Mathematical Models
Unlike regulators, whose focus on the capital levels of firms is driven by regulatory public purposes, firms analyze their use of capital to help ensure that they can achieve their business objective—maximizing the value of the capital provided by stockholders. Therefore, the ability to set limits on trading activity or manage risks is especially important to large financial firms. 3. As competition within and among different financial sectors has increased and as large, diversified firms have improved their ability to measure and manage risks and capital, financial regulators are responding by exploring possible changes to capital requirements. Financial Regulators and SROs Are Exploring Ways to Make Capital Requirements More Sensitive to Risk
Regulatory agencies and SROs are exploring or have proposed a number of initiatives for modifying or changing current capital requirements in banking, securities, futures, and life insurance that would make the requirements more sensitive to the actual risks in firm activities. 2. 4. 5. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed: (1) the regulatory views on the purpose of capital and current regulatory requirements; (2) the approaches of some large financial firms to risk measurement and capital allocation; and (3) issues in capital regulation and initiatives being considered for changes to regulatory capital requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) capital requirements differ by financial regulator due to differences in the regulators' purpose; (2) historically, regulators based capital regulation on the traditional risks in each financial sector; (3) within the past decade, both the banking and life insurance sectors adopted new capital requirements that are specifically designed to be more sensitive to exposure to multiple risks; (4) securities broker-dealers and futures commission merchants continue to operate under net capital rules that the Securities Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission use in order to protect customers and other market participants in the financial markets from losses due to firm failures, not from bad investments; (5) unlike regulators, firms analyze their use of capital to help ensure that they can achieve their business objectives; (6) although many large firms GAO spoke with use the results of their risk measurements to set limits on trading activities, some go farther and use them to allocate capital within the firm; (7) these techniques have limitations; however, firms and regulators believe they significantly improve firms' ability to measure and manage their risks; (8) the three principal issues pertaining to regulatory capital requirements that are important when considering possible future changes include: (a) the competitive implications for firms stemming from differences in capital rules of different financial regulators; (b) whether regulatory capital requirements create incentives to manage risks inappropriately; and (c) the administration of regulatory capital rules; and (9) regulatory agencies and self-regulatory organizations are exploring or have proposed a number of initiatives for modifying or changing current capital requirements in the banking, securities, futures, and life insurance sectors. |
gao_GAO-14-695T | gao_GAO-14-695T_0 | Background
NEDCTP’s mission is to deter and detect the introduction of explosive devices into the transportation system. TSA Has Taken Steps to Analyze Canine Team Data to Identify Program Trends
Since our January 2013 report, TSA has taken steps to analyze key data on the performance of its canine teams to better identify program trends, as we recommended. Specifically, field canine coordinators reviewed CWS data to determine how many training and utilization minutes canine teams conducted on a monthly basis. Short notice assessments (covert tests): We found that when TSA was performing short notice assessments (prior to their suspension in May 2012), it was not analyzing the results beyond the pass and fail rates. We concluded that without conducting the assessments and analyzing the results of these tests to determine if there were any search areas or type of explosives in which canine teams were more effective compared with others, and what, if any, training may have been needed to mitigate deficiencies, TSA was missing an opportunity to fully utilize the results. In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred with our recommendation and has taken actions to address it. TSA also reinstated short notice assessments in July 2013, and in the event a team fails, the FCC completes a report that includes an analysis of the team’s training records to identify an explanation for the failure. We believe that these actions address the intent of our recommendation and could better position TSA to identify program trends to better target resources and activities based on what is working well and what may be in need of corrective action. TSA Has Conducted Additional PSC Team Effectiveness Assessments and Deployed Some Teams to Highest- Risk Airports, but Additional Actions Are Needed
TSA Has Conducted Additional PSC Team Effectiveness Assessments, but Has Not Compared PSC Teams with Conventional Canine Teams
In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness. We recommended that TSA expand and complete testing, in conjunction with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making additional PSC deployments to help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within airports. TSA concurred and has taken some actions to address our recommendation, but further action is needed to fully address it. TSA Deployed Some PSC Teams to Highest-Risk Airports
In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of TSA’s response resolution protocols for these teams resulted in PSC teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports. We recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced security benefit, TSA should coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with its statutory authority to provide for the screening of passengers and their property. Specifically, as of June 2014, the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time our report was issued have been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA has implemented a multilayered system composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the nation's transportation system. One of TSA's security layers is NEDCTP, composed of over 800 deployed explosives detection canine teams, including PSC teams trained to detect explosives on passengers.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA has (1) regularly analyzed data to identify program trends and areas working well or in need of corrective action, and (2) comprehensively assessed the effectiveness of PSCs, and coordinated with stakeholders to deploy PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and utilize them as intended. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in January 2013 and selected updates obtained from October 2013 through June 2014. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed TSA documentation, including the results of PSC effectiveness assessments, and interviewed agency officials on the status of implementing GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
In January 2013, GAO reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected and used key canine program data in support of its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP), but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. For example, GAO found that in reviewing short notice assessments (covert tests), TSA did not analyze the results beyond the pass and fail rates. Therefore, TSA was missing an opportunity to determine if there were any search areas or types of explosives in which canine teams were more effective compared with others, and what, if any, training may be needed to mitigate deficiencies. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred and has taken actions that address the intent of our recommendation. For example, in the event a team fails a short notice assessment, TSA now requires that canine team supervisors complete an analysis of the team's training records to identify an explanation for the failure.
In January 2013, GAO found that TSA began deploying passenger screening canine (PSC) teams—teams of canines trained to detect explosives being carried or worn on a person—in April 2011 prior to determining the teams' operational effectiveness and where within an airport PSC teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in stationary objects) in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making additional PSC deployments. This would help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams. TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the recommendation, but additional action is needed. Specifically, TSA launched a PSC training and assessment initiative and determined PSCs to be most effective when working at the airport checkpoint, but TSA does not plan to conduct a comparison of PSC teams with conventional canine teams as GAO recommended. In January 2013, GAO also found that TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns related to the composition and capabilities of PSC teams resulted in the teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports. GAO recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced security benefit compared with conventional canine teams, TSA should coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports. TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the recommendation. Specifically, the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time GAO's report was issued have been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk airports.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. |
gao_GAO-13-796T | gao_GAO-13-796T_0 | Agencies Have Spent Billions on Failed and Poorly Performing Investments
To assist agencies in managing their IT investments, Congress enacted the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which requires OMB to establish processes to analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital investments in information systems made by federal agencies and report to Congress on the net program performance benefits achieved as a result of these investments. In addition to these projects, the IT Dashboard identifies other at-risk investments. OMB generally agreed with this recommendation and has since taken action to implement it. Given the importance of transparency, oversight, and management of the government’s IT investments, in June 2009 OMB established a public website, referred to as the IT Dashboard, that provides detailed information on approximately 700 major IT investments at 27 federal agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. OMB believes that the PortfolioStat effort has the potential to save the government $2.5 billion over the next 3 years by, for example, consolidating duplicative systems. OMB and Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve the Acquisition and Management of IT Investments, but Additional Actions Are Needed
Over the past several years, we have highlighted OMB and agency efforts to improve the transparency into and oversight of underperforming federal IT investments, more effectively manage IT, and address duplicative investments. Notably, we issued a series of reports on: the IT Dashboard; OMB and agency efforts to address troubled projects through TechStat reviews; critical factors underlying successful acquisitions; and OMB and agency efforts to improve the management of IT through federal data center consolidation efforts, as well as address duplication through PortfolioStat. OMB has taken significant steps to enhance the oversight, transparency, and accountability of federal IT investments by creating its IT Dashboard, and by improving the accuracy of investment ratings. However, we found weaknesses with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data, and we recommended steps that OMB should take to improve these data. However, the number of at-risk TechStats held to date was relatively small compared to the current number of medium- and high-risk IT investments. In addition, we reported that OMB and selected agencies had tracked and reported positive results from TechStats, with most resulting in improved governance. Agencies also reported projects with accelerated delivery, reduced scope, or termination. We also found that OMB reported in 2011 that federal agencies achieved almost $4 billion in life-cycle cost savings as a result of TechStat sessions. However, we were unable to validate OMB’s reported results because OMB did not provide artifacts showing that it ensured the results were valid. We therefore recommended that OMB validate the resulting cost savings from TechStats that it reports to Congress and require agencies to conduct TechStats for each IT investment rated with a moderately high- or high-risk CIO rating on the IT Dashboard. More recently, we reported and testified that the 24 FDCCI agencies made progress towards OMB’s goal to close 40 percent, or 1,253 of the 3,133 total federal data centers, by the end of 2015, but OMB had not measured agencies’ progress against its other goal of $3 billion in cost savings by the end of 2015. We therefore recommended that OMB’s Federal CIO track and report on key performance measures, extend the time frame for achieving planned cost savings, and improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities. However, our April 2013 report noted that key data-center-related performance metrics of the combined initiative were not yet fully defined. As a result, we recommended that OMB track and annually report on key data center consolidation performance measures, such as the size of data centers being closed and cost savings to date. OMB agreed with our recommendation. We have ongoing work looking at OMB’s PortfolioStat initiative, including determining whether agencies completed key required PortfolioStat actions, evaluating selected agencies' plans for making portfolio improvements and achieving associated cost savings, and describing OMB's plans to improve the PortfolioStat process. The federal government can also build on the momentum of progress on agencies’ data center closures as the federal data center consolidation effort is integrated with PortfolioStat. Appendix I: Examples of IT Project Failures and Challenges
The federal government continues to spend billions of dollars on troubled IT investments. Failed Investments
Since 2003, a number of major IT projects at federal agencies have failed. We have ongoing recommendation follow-up work regarding this issue. As of January 2013, IRS reported that there have been no significant problems with the system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government reportedly plans to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014. Given the scale of such planned outlays and the criticality of many of these systems to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that OMB and federal agencies provide appropriate oversight and adequate transparency into these programs. Nevertheless, IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, and result in duplicate systems while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Additionally, projects sometimes fail or operate inefficiently, at the cost of billions of dollars.
GAO was asked to testify on the results and recommendations from its selected reports that focused on key aspects of the federal government's management of IT investments. To prepare this statement, GAO drew on previously published work, as well as ongoing follow-up on prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO has issued a number of key reports on the federal government's efforts to efficiently acquire and manage information technology (IT). While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to address underperforming IT projects and more effectively manage IT through a number of major initiatives, additional actions are needed. For example, OMB has taken significant steps to enhance the oversight accountability of federal investments by creating the IT Dashboard, an OMB public website which provides detailed information on federal agencies' major investments. However, GAO previously found there were issues with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data in the Dashboard and recommended steps that OMB and agencies should take to improve these data--this is important since the Dashboard currently reports 154 investments totaling almost $10.4 billion being at risk. OMB agreed with the recommendations.
GAO recently reported that OMB and selected agencies have held multiple reviews--known as TechStats--of selected investments that are failing or are not producing results. Positive outcomes have been tracked and reported from these reviews, with most producing improved governance, as well as projects with accelerated delivery, reduced scope, and termination. However, for the selected agencies, GAO found that the number of at-risk TechStats held to date was only about 33 percent of the current number of medium- and high-risk investments. GAO was also unable to validate OMB's reported results of almost $4 billion in life-cycle cost savings. GAO therefore recommended that OMB validate the resulting cost savings and require agencies to conduct TechStats for each investment rated with a moderately high- or high-risk rating on the IT Dashboard. OMB generally agreed with the recommendations.
GAO has also issued several reports on the federal government's progress towards consolidating its growing number of data centers. Most recently, in April 2013, GAO reported that agencies closed 420 data centers by the end of December 2012; however, OMB had not tracked and reported on other key performance measures, such as progress against the initiative's cost savings goal of $3 billion by the end of 2015. In addition, GAO identified weaknesses that existed in the oversight of the data center consolidation initiative, including not ensuring the completeness of agencies' data center inventories and consolidation plans. GAO recommended that OMB track and report on key performance measures and improve the execution of important oversight responsibilities. OMB agreed with these recommendations.
In March 2012, OMB launched PortfolioStat, which requires agencies to conduct annual reviews of its IT investments and make decisions on eliminating duplication, among other things. OMB believes this effort has the potential to save $2.5 billion over the next 3 years. OMB has since made significant changes to PortfolioStat in March 2013, including integrating it with its data center consolidation initiative and establishing new reporting requirements. However, GAO recently reported that OMB had not yet established revised data center metrics and goals for the combined initiative. GAO has ongoing work looking at PortfolioStat, including determining whether agencies are completing key actions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has issued numerous recommendations to OMB and agencies on key aspects of IT management, including OMB's public website, known as the IT Dashboard, which provides detailed information on federal agencies' major investments; reviews of underperforming projects, known as TechStats; and efforts to consolidate federal data centers. |
gao_AIMD-98-248 | gao_AIMD-98-248_0 | In addition, we reviewed correspondence FRS sent to its examiners and to the institutions it supervises. Addressing the Year 2000 problem in time will be a tremendous challenge for financial institutions and FRS. FRS Is Taking Positive Actions to Assess Financial Institutions’ Year 2000 Readiness
FRS has taken important steps to alert financial institutions to the risks associated with the Year 2000 problem and to assess what these institutions are doing to mitigate the risks. In February 1997, FRS began devoting a full-time effort to the Year 2000 problem, and in May 1997, issued a second, more detailed awareness letter in conjunction with the other FFIEC members. These examinations were completed in June 1998. Challenges Confronting FRS’ Efforts to Ensure That Financial Institutions Are Year 2000 Ready
With less than 16 months remaining before the millennium, FRS must continue to vigorously oversee the Year 2000 correction efforts of more than 1,600 financial institutions, service providers, and vendors. The training, however, was not initiated until January 29, 1998—well after detailed examinations were underway. Lastly, FRS and the other regulators were late in issuing key guidance on business continuity and contingency planning, corporate borrowers, and software and service vendors. FRS currently has 73 information systems examiners—31 full time and 42 part time; it does not yet know whether this number is sufficient to complete technically complex examinations in 1,618 institutions by March 1999. Conclusions
FRS has a good appreciation for the Year 2000 problem, has made significant progress in assessing the readiness of member institutions, and is preparing itself for the work that needs to be done over the next 16 months to ensure that the institutions it supervises are ready for the Year 2000. Recommendations
We recommend that the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System direct the reserve banks to revise their supervisory review plans by October 1, 1998, to include (1) a determination of how many technical and other examiners they need to adequately oversee the Year 2000 efforts of member banks, data processing servicers, and software vendors and (2) a strategy for obtaining these resources and maintaining their availability. Copies will also be made available to others upon request. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Federal Reserve System's (FRS) efforts to oversee that the 1,618 financial institutions it supervises successfully address the year 2000 computer problem.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FRS has been taking the year 2000 problem very seriously, devoting considerable resources and effort to ensure that the institutions it oversees mitigate year 2000 risks; (2) it also has been emphatic in alerting these institutions to the problem and has recently completed a detailed assessment of the industry's readiness and issued important year 2000 guidance in conjunction with other financial institution regulators; (3) further, FRS is planning to conduct additional readiness examinations between now and March 1999; (4) however, FRS, like the other regulators, still faces significant challenges in providing a high level of assurance that individual institutions will be ready for the year 2000; (5) the primary challenge is time; (6) with less than 16 months remaining until January 1, 2000, FRS, with a small number of examiners, must carefully track remediation efforts being carried out by 1,618 financial institutions, service providers, and vendors; (7) this time pressure is compounded by the fact that FRS was late in initiating its detailed assessments of the industry's year 2000 status and in issuing key guidance documents to banks to assist them in mitigating their year 2000 risks; (8) to alleviate this pressure and to better ensure its readiness to address upcoming challenges, it will be important for FRS to complete the development of its supervision plans to define in detail the tasks it must complete in the 16 months remaining; and (9) it will also be essential for FRS to develop a higher level of assurance that it has enough technically qualified staff, trained in a timely manner, to carry out its supervisory and evaluation responsibilities through the year 2000. |
gao_GAO-13-629 | gao_GAO-13-629_0 | Implementing these programs is a shared responsibility among multiple TSA offices, including the OIA Program Management Division which manages the programs, and the Adjudication Center within OLE/FAMS, which serves as the primary operational component for conducting security threat assessments for 12 of TSA’s 17 aviation, maritime, and surface transportation credentialing programs—with the TWIC, HME and Aviation Worker programs accounting for a reported 95 percent of the Adjudication Center’s workload. Adjudication Center Performance Data Show Mixed Results, Accuracy Measures Are Limited, and Performance Measurement Practices Are Not Fully Documented
TSA has evaluated the Adjudication Center largely based on contractor performance in meeting established metrics and data shows mixed performance since 2011; however the Adjudication Center’s performance measures and practices are limited. We found that the Adjudication Center contractor met two of its three performance measures—for timeliness and accuracy—but did not do so for its caseload size measure. Timeliness. However, according to officials, this calculation generally does not include those cases where adjudicators had approved applicants, but reviewers found they should have been disqualified (i.e., incorrectly approved). By developing and documenting an accuracy rate measure that includes data on both types of incorrectly adjudicated cases (approved and disqualified), the Adjudication Center can determine an accuracy rate that comprehensively captures accuracy performance and enables Adjudication Center management to more effectively identify and address performance issues among its workforce. While officials with the two offices coordinate on a routine basis to share information on workload completion, they do not have a process in place to ensure that information in the Adjudication Center’s staffing plan—such as caseload projections and associated staffing needs—reflects the mutual understanding of both Adjudication Center and credentialing program management officials. In this way, ensuring these components have access to respective workforce planning documents by establishing a mechanism for OIA Program Management Division and Adjudication Center officials to share and reconcile information included in the Adjudication Center’s staffing plan updates, such as timelines for anticipated workload growth, will help ensure TSA is using accurate workload projections to guide the Adjudication Center’s workforce planning. TSA Has Made Limited Progress in Addressing Risks Posed by Using Contract Employees to Adjudicate Security Threat Assessments
TSA Assessment Identified Risks in the Adjudication Center’s Use of Contractors
Between January 2011 and September 2011, TSA conducted and completed its DHS required BWS assessment for the Adjudication Center contract and determined that the adjudicator position represented work that is “closely associated with inherently governmental functions” and that an excessive risk exists by allowing contractors to make security credential approvals without sufficient federal oversight. TSA Has Not Updated and Approved the Conversion Plan and Key Plan Elements are Unclear
TSA’s delay in acting on the recommendations of Adjudication Center conversion has rendered the implementation timelines and key hiring level and cost information in its May 2012 conversion plan outdated or unclear and TSA has not updated the plan to reflect these changes. TSA officials responsible for managing the conversion effort acknowledged that the timelines for implementing its plan had been delayed, and that TSA would not complete its workforce conversion by the end of calendar year 2013 as proposed in its plan. Completing this review, determining this information, and updating the conversion plan to ensure the plan reflects current conditions and an estimation of cost savings will help TSA and DHS decision makers by providing a roadmap for moving forward. Conclusions
TSA’s Adjudication Center plays a critical role by conducting security threat assessments to ensure individuals posing security threats are identified and are not granted TSA-related credentials for, among other things, unescorted access to secure areas of the nation’s transportation systems. Finally, providing this plan to TSA and DHS leadership for review are important steps to help ensure TSA addresses the risks identified in the 2011 BWS assessment and has an appropriate workforce to make the decisions that may ultimately deny or allow individuals credentials for unescorted access to the nation’s critical transportation infrastructure. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA Administrator to take the following 5 actions:
To ensure that the Adjudication Center accuracy rate effectively captures the center’s accuracy in completing security threat assessments, the Adjudication Center should develop an accuracy rate measure that includes accuracy data for cases where adjudicators both approved and disqualified applicants, document this methodology, and implement the process. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In its comments, DHS stated that OIA is working with the DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer to address any potential issues posed by using a mix of government employees and contractors. Within the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, the Adjudication Center is responsible for providing security threat assessment adjudication services to meet the workload needs of TSA programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA implements programs that, for example, ensure individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of the nation's critical transportation infrastructure do not pose a security threat. Key to these programs are security threat assessments that screen individuals for links to terrorism, criminal history, and immigration status. TSA's Adjudication Center serves as the primary operational component in this process. GAO was asked to examine the performance and staffing strategy of the center. This report addresses the extent to which 1) TSA has measured performance for the center and what the data show; 2) TSA offices have coordinated to meet security threat assessment workload; and 3) TSA addressed potential risks posed by using a mix of government employees and contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments. GAO analyzed TSA data describing the center's performance since October 2010; reviewed documentation, including staffing plans; and interviewed TSA officials about data measurement and staffing practices.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Adjudication Center performance data show mixed results, and the center's performance measurement practices have limitations. The Adjudication Center relies on contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments and uses three primary measures to evaluate their performance--timeliness for completing adjudication, adjudication accuracy, and caseload status. GAO found that the Adjudication Center contractor met its timeliness and accuracy measures, but faced challenges in meeting its caseload measure. The Adjudication Center's timeliness and accuracy measures did not capture key data. According to TSA officials, the Adjudication Center's accuracy rate is based on a review of all cases where adjudicators had disqualified an applicant. However, this calculation generally does not include the accuracy rate for those applicants adjudicators had approved--which account for roughly 90 percent of the Adjudication Center's caseload. In this way, the accuracy rate provides a limited assessment of adjudicator performance. By developing an accuracy rate that includes data on both incorrectly disqualified and incorrectly approved applicants, TSA can better identify and addresses performance issues among its workforce.
Two TSA offices that share responsibility for implementing security threat assessments--the Program Management Division in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Adjudication Center in the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service--can improve coordination on workforce planning. While the offices share information on workload completion, they do not have a process in place to ensure that information in the Adjudication Center's staffing plan--which the Adjudication Center periodically updates to reflect caseload projections and associated staffing needs--reflects the mutual understanding of both offices. For example, program managers in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis reported to GAO that they were unfamiliar with the staffing plan and they disagreed with workload projections in the plan. Establishing a mechanism for the offices to share and reconcile information in the plan can help better support the Adjudication Center's workforce planning.
TSA has been delayed in addressing risks posed by using contractors to adjudicate security threat assessments. In October 2011 TSA's Balanced Workforce Strategy Working Group completed its assessment for the Adjudication Center and determined that an excessive risk exists by allowing contractors to make security threat assessment approvals without sufficient federal oversight. The Working Group recommended that TSA convert to an all government workforce. According to a May 2012 implementation plan, TSA planned to convert this workforce by the end of calendar year 2013. However, delays have rendered the timelines and cost information in its plan outdated and TSA has not updated the plan or determined a revised implementation schedule. Completing this review and updating the plan would help TSA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) decision makers by providing a roadmap for moving forward. Finally, providing this plan to DHS for review will be important to help ensure TSA can begin its conversion and mitigate identified risks of using contract adjudicators to conduct security threat assessments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA, among other things: direct the Adjudication Center to calculate an accuracy rate that includes adjudicator performance for cases where applicants were both approved and disqualified; share adjudicator staffing plans among key program offices; and update its Adjudication Center workforce conversion plan and provide it to DHS for review and approval. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-486 | gao_GAO-13-486_0 | Background
Exchanges are online marketplaces where eligible individuals and small businesses can purchase health insurance. Under PPACA, an exchange must be operational in each state by January 1, 2014. States have some flexibility with respect to exchanges, by choosing to establish and operate an exchange themselves (referred to as a state-based exchange) or by ceding this authority to HHS (referred to as a federally facilitated exchange). According to HHS, a partnership exchange is a variation of a federally facilitated exchange, whereby HHS establishes and generally operates the exchange and the state assists HHS with operating various functions of the exchange. States’ Responsibilities for Establishing Exchanges Vary, Depending on the Type of Exchange
PPACA and HHS implementing regulations and guidance require states and exchanges to carry out a number of key functions, for which state responsibilities vary by exchange type. A state that chooses to run its own exchange is responsible for: establishing an operating and governance structure, ensuring QHPs are certified and available to qualified individuals, streamlining eligibility and enrollment systems, conducting consumer outreach and assistance, and ensuring the financial sustainability of the exchange. States that partner with HHS may assume some aspects of this function. Despite Some Challenges, Selected States Have Taken Action to Establish Exchanges and Report They Will Be Ready for Enrollment by October 2013
Nearly All Selected States Have Created an Operating and Governance Structure
Six of the seven states in our study were conditionally approved by HHS to create a state-based exchange. Iowa officials also reported that, by assuming responsibility over certain exchange activities, such as overseeing and certifying qualified health plans, partnering with HHS allows the state to maintain regulatory control over its insurance market. Two states have decided whether their exchanges will have the authority to actively select which QHPs may participate in the exchange. All seven states included in our review have taken steps to invite health insurers to participate in their exchanges. In addition to upgrading eligibility and enrollment systems, six of the seven states are in various stages of building the exchange IT infrastructure needed to integrate these systems and allow consumers to navigate among health programs and purchase QHPs through a variety of access points, using a single streamlined application. Despite the challenges associated with developing the IT systems, officials in six states reported their systems will be ready for enrollment by October 1, 2013. States are Developing Outreach and Assistance Programs to Help Consumers Enroll in the Exchange
Six of the seven states included in our review are in various stages of developing a consumer outreach and assistance program to reach out to potential consumers and help them enroll. As a partnership state, Iowa has not yet decided whether and to what extent it will assist HHS with aspects of this function. While states reported they are considering options to fund ongoing exchange costs, such as salaries and benefits, consulting services, outreach and marketing, and information technology, three states will charge fees to insurance carriers participating in the exchange. While the states in our review have developed financing options, some state officials identified challenges with developing these options, given uncertainties related to exchange enrollment. In response, HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To identify states’ responsibilities for establishing exchanges and the challenges they encountered, we reviewed selected Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provisions and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implementing regulations and guidance related to the following categories: establishing a governance and operating structure; ensuring exchanges will be capable of certifying qualified health ensuring the financial sustainability of the exchange. To identify actions selected states have taken to create exchanges and the challenges they encountered, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials in seven states: the District of Columbia, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island. The percentage of the uninsured population in states based on a 3- year average (2008 to 2010); 2. Geographic dispersion; and 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
A central provision of PPACA requires the establishment of exchanges in each state--online marketplaces through which eligible individuals and small business employers can compare and select health insurance coverage from participating health plans. Exchanges are to begin enrollment by October 1, 2013, with coverage to commence January 1, 2014. States have some flexibility with respect to exchanges by choosing to establish and operate an exchange themselves (i.e., state-based), or by ceding this authority to HHS (i.e., federally facilitated). States may also choose to enter into a partnership with HHS whereby HHS establishes the exchange and the state assists with operating various functions. According to HHS, 18 states will establish a statebased exchange, while 26 will have a federally facilitated exchange. Seven states will partner with HHS.
GAO was asked to report on (1) states' responsibilities for establishing exchanges, and (2) actions selected states have taken to establish exchanges and challenges they have encountered. To do this work, GAO reviewed PPACA provisions and HHS implementing regulations and guidance. GAO also conducted semistructured interviews with state officials in the District of Columbia, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island. For this review, GAO refers to the District of Columbia as a state. GAO selected these states based on several criteria, such as a 3-year average of states' uninsured population and geographic dispersion. HHS and the seven states in our review provided technical comments on this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations, supplemented by HHS guidance, require states and American Health Benefit Exchanges (exchanges) to carry out a number of key functions, for which state responsibilities vary by exchange type. A state that chooses to operate its exchange is responsible for: (1) establishing an operating and governance structure, (2) ensuring exchanges are capable of certifying qualified health plans and making them available to qualified individuals, (3) developing electronic, streamlined, and coordinated eligibility and enrollment systems, (4) conducting consumer outreach and assistance, and (5) ensuring the financial sustainability of the exchange. A state that partners with HHS may assist HHS with certain functions, such as making qualified health plan recommendations and conducting aspects of consumer outreach and assistance.
Despite some challenges, the seven selected states in GAO's review reported they have taken actions to create exchanges, which they expect will be ready for enrollment by the deadline of October 1, 2013. For example:
Six states will operate as a state-based exchange, with most choosing this option as a way to maintain control of their insurance markets and better meet the needs of their state's residents. The seventh state-- Iowa--will--partner with HHS.
All seven states have taken steps toward deciding which qualified health plans would be included in the exchange. Two states have decided that their exchanges will have the authority to actively select which qualified health plans may participate in the exchange, while the remaining five states will allow all qualified health plans to participate in the exchange.
All states are in various stages of developing an information technology (IT) infrastructure, including redesigning, upgrading, or replacing their outdated Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program eligibility and enrollment systems. Six states are also building the exchange IT infrastructure needed to integrate systems and allow consumers to navigate among health programs, but identified challenges with the complexity and magnitude of the IT projects, time constraints, and guidance for developing their systems.
Six of the seven states included in our review are in various stages of developing a consumer outreach and assistance program to reach out to and help enroll potential consumers. As a partnership state, Iowa has not yet decided whether and to what extent it will assume responsibility for aspects of this function.
Officials in the six state-based exchanges reported they are considering revenue options for financially sustaining their exchange. For example, three states plan to charge fees to insurance carriers participating in the exchange. However, some states reported challenges with developing these options, given uncertainties related to exchange enrollment, on which the fees are based. |
gao_GAO-09-966 | gao_GAO-09-966_0 | Background
SSA currently maintains over 800 agreements that support exchanges through which the agency provides data to state and federal partners (approximately 700 state and almost 100 federal agency partners). The request transactions are processed and the responses pro file or online, real-time processing. They agreed that SSA was responsive and quickly resolved problems when they did occur and stated that, as a result of SSA’s efforts, their ability to conduct business operations that depend on data provided by the agency had not been adversely affected by systems-related problems associated with SSA’s IT infrastructure. For example: AAMVA partners reported that the SSA system that supports their data exchange historically was fully available during the hours of system availability specified in their exchange agreement. SSA Is Taking Steps to Prepare for a Future Data Exchange Environment, but Has Not Effectively Planned for Increasing Demands for Outgoing Data
Although SSA’s existing IT infrastructure is sufficient to support current outgoing data exchanges, SSA officials and the agency’s partners anticipate that the number of these exchanges will continue to increase and become more complex, placing greater demands on the infrastructure and systems. To address overall agency needs for a more cost-effective and efficient computing environment, SSA is currently taking steps to modernize its IT infrastructure, including components that support its data exchange programs. However, the agency has not established and executed IT management practices needed to effectively guide and oversee the direction of its outgoing electronic data exchange programs, such as conducting the analyses required to project future workload needs and performance requirements—information that is essential to developing a target architecture that identifies business and technical requirements for a future data exchange environment. Officials from four of the state and federal agencies with whom we spoke stated that their needs for online access to SSA’s data exchange systems are expanding. Even as SSA proceeds with planned updates to its IT infrastructure, the agency has not fully implemented IT management practices that are essential to help guide its direction related to data exchanges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that SSA’s IT infrastructure effectively supports the anticipated increase in demand for electronic data exchange services, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security direct the Associate Commissioner, Office of Earnings, Enumeration and Administrative Systems to conduct detailed analyses to determine workload projections and define requirements for effectively and efficiently delivering data exchange services to the agency’s partners in the future and use the results of these analyses to update the agency’s target architecture to address business and technical requirements of a future data exchange environment. If these actions are taken, the agency should be better positioned to meet the growing needs of its data exchange partners. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) information technology (IT) infrastructure effectively and efficiently supports its current data exchange programs, and describe any systems-related problems affecting the agency’s data exchange partners and (2) describe SSA’s efforts to ensure that its IT infrastructure can support the agency’s and its partners’ future data exchange environment. To address both of these objectives, we focused our study on SSA’s data exchanges that provide information to support state and other federal agencies’ programs, and that affect partners’ abilities to provide services to individuals—that is, “outgoing” data exchanges. To do this, we obtained and analyzed agency documentation, such as internal management reports; spreadsheets describing data exchange programs, partners, and systems; descriptions of systems development and IT management processes; and descriptions of IT infrastructure components. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration (SSA) receives electronic data from other agencies to support its own programs, and provides electronic data to support more than 800 state and federal agency partners. This information aids in, among other things, the processing and distribution of beneficiary payments and the delivery of services such as driver's license issuance and voter registration. SSA relies on its information technology (IT) infrastructure--its databases, applications, networks, and IT management practices--to support its current and future needs for exchanging data with its state and federal partners. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which SSA's IT infrastructure effectively and efficiently supports current data exchanges, and any system-related problems affecting its exchange partners; and (2) describe SSA's efforts to ensure that its IT infrastructure can support the agency's and its partners' future data exchange environment. To do this, GAO analyzed agency documentation and interviewed SSA officials, as well as federal and state data exchange partners.
What GAO Found
Systems-related problems that affect SSA's ability to support outgoing data exchange programs have been few, and the agency has established effective procedures and mechanisms for addressing the problems that do occur. In this regard, SSA provides help-desk and on-site support to data exchange partners to help prevent or resolve problems, and uses procedures supported by a problem-identification and tracking system to facilitate problem resolution. State and federal partners with whom GAO held discussions stated that these efforts resulted in quick responses from SSA and effective resolution of problems that occurred. For example, a system that provides information for two data exchange programs that support driver's license issuance and voter registration in all 50 states was reported to have had almost 100 percent availability during the hours specified in the agreements governing these data exchanges. Further, all of the data exchange partners with whom GAO held discussions reported that the data that SSA provided were reliable. As a result, these partners stated that their ability to conduct business operations that depend on SSA data was not adversely affected by systems-related problems associated with SSA's IT infrastructure. SSA and its partners anticipate that the number of requests for outgoing data exchanges will continue to increase and that the exchanges will become more complex as agencies request that these exchanges take place through online, real-time transactions. However, SSA officials stated that the agency's existing IT infrastructure may not be able to support the increased demand that they and their partners anticipate. To address overall agency needs for a more cost-effective and efficient computing environment, the agency is taking steps to modernize its computing capabilities and supporting infrastructure. For example, the agency is in the process of implementing an updated database environment and upgrading its software applications--steps that are intended to enable expanded and more efficient IT service delivery, including the electronic exchange of data. However, the agency has not fully implemented IT management practices specifically related to its outgoing data exchange environment, such as conducting thorough analyses to project the expected increase in requests for data and online access. Conducting these analyses and using this information as input to the agency's target architecture (i.e., a formal description of the agency's future environment) are important practices to clearly define future requirements to guide the direction of the agency's data exchange programs. Implementing these management practices is essential to ensuring that the agency is well positioned to meet the growing needs of its data exchange partners. |
gao_GAO-15-793 | gao_GAO-15-793_0 | As defined in the NBIC Strategic Plan, biosurveillance integration is combining biosurveillance information from different sources and domains (e.g., human, animal, and plant health; food and environmental safety and security; and homeland security) to provide partners and stakeholders with a synthesized view of the information, and what it could mean. Building upon the National Strategy for Biosurveillance, the Roadmap identifies biosurveillance capability needs and key research and development priorities, including those related to integration. The NBIS community predated the enactment of the 9/11 Commission Act. NBIC analysts may also make requests for information to NBIS partners for additional information. Special Event Report: a report requested by government partners, such as state and local governments, to provide a public health assessment for a selected event. For example, as shown in figure 5, 10 NBIS partners stated that NBIC’s products and activities enhance their agencies’ ability to carry out their biosurveillance roles and responsibilities to little or no extent, 4 responded to a moderate extent, and 5 responded that they did not have a basis to judge. Data that NBIC could use to identify and characterize a biological event of national concern using statistical and analytical tools, as called for in the 9/11 Commission Act, are limited. NBIC and NBIS partners noted that there were several kinds of data that could be useful for this kind of biosurveillance integration, but these data may not exist or may not be in a usable form. NBIC Has Developed Procedures to Coordinate with Biosurveillance Partners, but Faces Limited Participation and Provision of Partner Personnel
To fulfill its Coordinator role, NBIC has established procedures that occur daily, weekly, and as emerging or significant biological event occur, but the center faces challenges related to participation of NBIS partners in the center’s activities, the provision of partner personnel to NBIC, and competing structures for convening NBIS partners. Jointly Developed Products: NBIC brings together its multidisciplinary partners to develop joint products that enhance understanding of new or potential biological events. NBIC Has Efforts Under Way to Develop New Biosurveillance Tools, but Faces Challenges Prioritizing Development Efforts in a Limited Resource Environment
To fulfill its Innovator role, NBIC has funded several pilot projects, sought new data sources, and made efforts to enhance its IT system, but faces challenges related to its limited resources and the varying needs of its partners. The most recent pilot, initiated in fiscal year 2012, funds the Department of Defense’s Naval Surface Warfare Center to develop analytical techniques to improve the use of social media data for biosurveillance. Further, NBIC has also funded three pilot projects examining the feasibility of using open-source data from various social media applications in order to identify possible health trends. From fiscal year 2012 through 2015, NBIC’s budget ranged from $10 million to $13 million annually. Related to its limited resources, NBIC also faces challenges prioritizing its innovation efforts because its partners have diverse, and sometimes conflicting, needs. Officials from another agency questioned the feasibility of NBIC’s mission because the data and technology that are currently available do not provide for the accurate projection of biological events or facilitate the provision of early warning. There Are a Range of Options for Addressing Biosurveillance Integration Challenges, and Each Has Associated Benefits and Limitations
The challenges previously described illustrate that NBIC faces significant obstacles in implementing its roles as a biosurveillance integrator as originally described in the 9/11 Commission Act. We identified these options and their benefits and limitations, on the basis of the roles of a federal-level biosurveillance integrator we identified in the 9/11 Commission Act, NBIC’s strategic plan, and the perspectives of the NBIS partners obtained during our structured interviews. These options are not exhaustive, and some options could be implemented together or in part. In developing these options, we did not evaluate the financial implications of implementing each option, to the extent it is knowable, but we acknowledge they are likely to result in an increase, decrease, or shifting of funding based on the changes described. Option 1: Reinforce NBIC’s Analyzer Role
Benefits
Developing meaningful information not otherwise available: This option would address some of the challenges NBIC faces in implementing its Analyzer role, such as access to data from the NBIS partners, and would better position the center to develop meaningful information that could not be gleaned in isolation, potentially leading to earlier warning of emerging events and shared situational awareness. Further, in recent years, NBIC has been able to obtain or partially fund liaisons from other agencies. It is unclear whether additional time or what additional actions will improve partners’ experience with NBIC’s overall value to the national biosurveillance capability. Limitations
Officials report that a federal integrator is important: Although federal partners generally thought that NBIC’s products and activities did not provide meaningful new information, they largely thought that the concept of having a federal entity to integrate biosurveillance information across the federal government was important. | Why GAO Did This Study
A biological event, such as a naturally occurring pandemic or a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction, could have catastrophic consequences for the nation. This potential threat underscores the importance of a national biosurveillance capability—that is, the ability to detect biological events of national significance to provide early warning and information to guide public health and emergency response. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 addresses this capability, in part, by creating NBIC within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); it was tasked with integrating information from human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems across the federal government, to improve the likelihood of identifying a biological event at an earlier stage. In recent years, NBIC's budget has ranged from $10 million to $13 million annually.
GAO was asked to evaluate NBIC. This report discusses the (1) extent to which NBIC is implementing its roles as a biosurveillance integrator, and (2) options for improving such integration. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed NBIC products and activities; conducted interviews and surveyed 19 federal partners, 11 of which have key roles in biosurveillance; interviewed NBIC officials; and analyzed the 9/11 Commission Act, NBIC Strategic Plan , and National Strategy for Biosurveillance .
What GAO Found
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) has activities that support its integration mission, but faces challenges that limit its ability to enhance the national biosurveillance capability. In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) and NBIC Strategic Plan , GAO identified three roles that NBIC must fulfill to meet its biosurveillance integration mission. The following describes actions and challenges in each role:
Analyzer: NBIC is to use technology and subject matter expertise, including using analytical tools, to meaningfully connect disparate datasets and information for earlier warning and better situational awareness of biological events. GAO found that NBIC produces reports on biological events using open-source data, but faces challenges obtaining data and creating meaningful new information. For example, most of the federal partners with key roles in biosurveillance (8 of 11) stated that NBIC's products help their agencies identify biological events to little or no extent, generally because they already obtain such information directly from other federal partners more quickly. In addition, data that could help to identify and characterize a biological event may not exist or are not in a usable form. Further, few federal partners (5 of 19) reported that they share the data they do have with NBIC, citing legal and regulatory restrictions, among other reasons..
Coordinator: NBIC is to bring together partners across the federal biosurveillance community to enhance understanding of biological events. NBIC has developed procedures and activities to coordinate with partners, such as daily and biweekly calls, but faces challenges related to the limited partner participation in the center's activities, lack of partner personnel detailed to NBIC, and competing structures for convening federal partners. For example, although NBIC would like to obtain liaisons from each of its federal partners, only 3 of 19 partners provided NBIC with dedicated liaisons.
Innovator: NBIC is to facilitate the development of new tools to address gaps in biosurveillance integration. GAO found that NBIC has efforts underway to develop some tools, such as pilot projects examining the use of social media data to identify health trends, but faces challenges prioritizing developmental efforts. For example, partners noted limitations in NBIC's ability to address gaps, like limited resources and the difficulty in prioritizing the center's innovation efforts because its partners have diverse needs.
GAO identified various options that could address these challenges, ranging from strengthening the center's ability to implement its current roles to repealing NBIC's statute. GAO also identified potential benefits and limitations with each option. For example, one option would be to provide NBIC with additional authorities to obtain data to better develop meaningful information; however this may also require additional investments. Another option is to not pursue national biosurveillance integration through NBIC and to consider designating one of the other federal partners with key roles in biosurveillance as the federal integrator. The options identified are not exhaustive, and some could be implemented together or in part. GAO did not evaluate the financial implications of each option, but acknowledges some options may require additional investment or shifting of resources or priorities to result in significant long lasting change.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. GAO provided this draft to DHS and its federal partners who provided technical comments which were incorporated, as applicable. |
gao_GAO-09-534T | gao_GAO-09-534T_0 | Federal, State, Local, and International Efforts to Adapt to a Changing Climate
Based on preliminary observations from our ongoing adaptation work for the Select Committee, certain federal, state, local, and international government authorities are beginning to consider and implement climate change adaptation measures. Certain federal programs are already helping officials make decisions in response to a changing climate. NOAA’s Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments program supports climate change research to meet the needs of decision makers and policy planners at the regional level. While adaptation is one of many competing priorities for decision makers, certain state, local, and international governments are nonetheless developing and implementing climate change adaptation plans. In August 2008, the state issued a comprehensive strategy for reducing its vulnerability to climate change, focusing on sea level rise and coastal storms. As part of our ongoing work for the Select Committee, we plan to further explore the Maryland example and examine additional international, federal, and local adaptation planning and implementation efforts through four more site visits, including the United Kingdom, a federal land management unit, the City of Chicago, and King County, Washington. Challenges in Adapting to Climate Change
Several of our recent reports on climate change illustrate a number of challenges faced by government officials when adapting to a changing climate. Among them, (1) climate change is one of many competing priorities for government officials, (2) a lack of guidance can constrain the ability of officials to consider climate change in management and planning decisions, (3) insufficient site-specific information can reduce the capability of officials to manage the effects of climate change on the resources they oversee, and (4) officials are struggling to make decisions based on projected future climate scenarios that may not reflect past conditions. Lack of guidance. Our report also demonstrated that resource managers did not have sufficient site-specific information to plan for and manage the effects of climate change on the federal resources they oversee. In particular, the managers lacked computational models for local projections of expected changes. Our continuing work will explore this issue further and seek to identify other challenges warranting the attention of policymakers by collecting information from diverse groups of knowledgeable federal, state, and local officials. Potential Adaptation Actions by the Congress and Federal Agencies
Some of our recent climate change-related reports offer clues on the types of actions federal agencies and the Congress could take to assist states and communities in their efforts to adapt to climate change. Our August 2007 report on federal land management, for example, recommended that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior develop guidance that advises resource managers on how to address climate change effects and gather the information needed to do so. Our May 2008 report on the economics of climate change also identified actions that could assist officials in their efforts to adapt to a changing climate. Some of the economists surveyed for this report suggested, for example, reforming insurance subsidy programs in areas vulnerable to natural disasters like hurricanes or flooding. Our current effort for the Select Committee, focused more directly on climate change adaptation than our prior reports, will provide additional information and insights on the types of actions federal agencies and the Congress could take to assist adaptation efforts. We plan to explore these observations in greater detail by obtaining information and perspectives from a wide range of knowledgeable officials on the front lines of the nation’s efforts to adapt to a changing climate. We expect to complete our ongoing work by late 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
Changes in the climate attributable to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases may have significant environmental and economic impacts in the United States. For example, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels, alter agricultural productivity, and increase the intensity and frequency of floods and storms. Federal, state, and local agencies are tasked with a wide array of responsibilities that will be affected by a changing climate, such as managing natural resources. Furthermore, climate change could increase the cost of federal programs, such as crop and flood insurance, and place new stresses on infrastructure. Greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. Today's testimony summarizes GAO's prior and ongoing work examining (1) actions that federal, state, local, and international authorities are taking to adapt to a changing climate, (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt, and (3) actions that the Congress and federal agencies could take to help address these challenges.
What GAO Found
Based on preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing adaptation work for the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, certain federal, state, local, and international government authorities are beginning to consider and implement climate change adaptation measures. Some federal programs are already helping officials make decisions in response to a changing climate. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (RISA) program supports climate change research to meet the adaptation-related information needs of decision makers and planners at the regional level. In addition, certain state, local, and international governments are developing and implementing climate change adaptation plans. For example, GAO's recent site visit to Maryland examined the state's comprehensive strategy for reducing vulnerability to climate change focused on sea level rise and coastal storms. As part of ongoing work for the Select Committee, GAO plans to conduct four additional site visits to learn from international, federal, and local adaptation efforts. Several of GAO's recent reports on climate change examined a number of challenges faced by government officials in their efforts to adapt. First, climate change is one of many priorities competing for attention and resources. Second, a lack of guidance can constrain the ability of officials to consider climate change in management and planning decisions. Third, insufficient site-specific data, including a lack of local projections of expected changes, can reduce the ability of officials to manage the effects of climate change on the resources they oversee. Fourth, officials are struggling to make decisions based on future climate scenarios that may not reflect past conditions. Our ongoing work seeks to identify other challenges warranting the attention of policymakers. Some of GAO's recent climate change-related reports offer clues on the types of actions federal agencies and the Congress could take to assist states and communities in their efforts to adapt. A recent GAO report on federal land management, for example, recommended that certain agencies develop guidance advising managers how to address the effects of climate change on the resources they manage. Furthermore, a recent GAO report on the economics of climate change identified actions the Congress and federal agencies could take, such as reforming insurance subsidy programs in areas vulnerable to hurricanes or flooding. GAO's current effort for the Select Committee, which focuses more directly on adaptation, will obtain information and perspectives from diverse groups of knowledgeable federal, state, and local officials, and in particular will seek to learn from the experience of practitioners on the front lines working to adapt to a changing climate. This work will be completed by late 2009. |
gao_GAO-06-998T | gao_GAO-06-998T_0 | RFA and Related Requirements Are Intended to Promote Attention to Regulations’ Effects on Small Entities
Federal regulation is one of the basic tools of government. In September 1980, RFA was enacted in response to concerns about the effect that federal regulations can have on “small entities,” defined by the Act as including small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations. RFA established the principle that agencies should endeavor, consistent with the objectives of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of these small entities. RFA requires regulatory agencies—including the independent regulatory agencies—to assess the potential impact of their rules on small entities. Under RFA, an agency must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis at the time a proposed rule is issued unless the head of the agency determines that the proposed rule would not have a “significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.” Further, agencies must consider alternatives to their proposed rules that will accomplish the agencies’ objectives while minimizing the impacts on small entities. The Act also requires agencies to ensure that small entities have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process and requires the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (Office of Advocacy) to monitor agencies’ compliance. Among other things, RFA also requires regulatory agencies to review, within 10 years of promulgation, existing rules that have or will have a significant impact on small entities to determine whether they should be continued without change or amended or rescinded to minimize their impact on small entities. GAO Reviews Found that Varying Interpretations of RFA Requirements Hampered Effective Implementation of the Act
In response to congressional requests, we have reviewed agencies’ implementation of RFA and related requirements on many occasions over the years, with topics ranging from specific statutory provisions to the overall implementation of RFA. Generally, we found that the Act’s overall results and effectiveness have been mixed. Our past reports illustrated both the promise and the problems associated with RFA. RFA and related requirements have clearly affected how federal agencies regulate, and we identified important benefits of these initiatives, such as increasing attention on the potential impacts of rules and raising expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules. However, a recurring theme in our findings was that uncertainties about RFA’s requirements and varying interpretations of those requirements by federal agencies limited the Act’s application and effectiveness. Some of the topics we reviewed, and our main findings regarding impediments to RFA’s implementation, are illustrated in the following examples: We examined 12 years of annual reports from the Office of Advocacy and concluded that the reports indicated variable compliance with RFA across agencies, within agencies, and over time—a conclusion that the Office of Advocacy also reached in subsequent reports on implementation of RFA (on the 20th and 25th anniversaries of RFA’s enactment). Key Terms and Provisions of RFA Should Be Revisited and Clarified
While RFA has helped to influence how agencies regulate small entities, we believe that the full promise of the Act has not been realized. The results from our past work suggest that the Subcommittee might wish to review the procedures, definitions, exemptions, and other provisions of RFA, and related statutory requirements, to determine whether changes are needed to better achieve the purposes Congress intended. Although more recent developments, such as the Office of Advocacy’s detailed guidance to agencies on RFA compliance, may help address some of these long-standing issues, current legislative proposals, such as H.R. We also believe it is important for Congress to reexamine, not just RFA, but how all of the various regulatory reform initiatives fit together and influence agencies’ regulatory actions. Regulatory Flexibility Act: Key Terms Still Need to Be Clarified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal regulation is one of the basic tools of government used to implement public policy. In 1980, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) was enacted in response to concerns about the effect that regulations can have on small entities, including small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations. Congress amended RFA in 1996, and the President issued Executive Order 13272 in 2002, to strengthen requirements for agencies to consider the impact of their proposed rules on small entities. However, concerns about the regulatory burden on small entities persist, prompting legislative proposals such as H.R. 682, the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, which would amend RFA. At the request of Congress, GAO has prepared many reports and testimonies reviewing the implementation of RFA and related policies. On the basis of that body of work, this testimony (1) provides an overview of the basic purpose and requirements of RFA, (2) highlights the main impediments to the Act's implementation that GAO's reports identified, and (3) suggests elements of RFA that Congress might consider amending to improve the effectiveness of the Act. GAO's prior reports and testimonies contain recommendations to improve the implementation of RFA and related regulatory process requirements.
What GAO Found
RFA established a principle that agencies should endeavor to fit their regulatory requirements to the scale of small entities. Among other things, RFA requires regulatory agencies to assess the impact of proposed rules on small entities, consider regulatory alternatives that will accomplish the agencies' objectives while minimizing the impacts on small entities, and ensure that small entities have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Further, RFA requires agencies to review existing rules within 10 years of promulgation that have or will have a significant impact on small entities to determine whether they should be continued without change or amended or rescinded to minimize their impact on small entities. RFA also requires the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (Office of Advocacy) to monitor agencies' compliance. In response to Executive Order 13272, the Office of Advocacy published guidance in 2003 on how to comply with RFA. In response to congressional requests, GAO reviewed agencies' implementation of RFA and related requirements on many occasions, with topics ranging from specific statutory provisions to the overall implementation of RFA. Generally, GAO found that the Act's results and effectiveness have been mixed; its reports illustrated both the promise and the problems associated with RFA. On one hand, RFA and related requirements clearly affected how federal agencies regulate and produced benefits, such as raising expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules. However, GAO also found that compliance with RFA varied across agencies, within agencies, and over time. A recurring finding was that uncertainties about RFA's requirements and key terms, and varying interpretations by federal agencies, limited the Act's application and effectiveness. GAO's past work suggests that Congress might wish to review the procedures, definitions, exemptions, and other provisions of RFA to determine whether changes are needed to better achieve the purposes Congress intended. In particular, GAO's reports indicate that the full promise of RFA may never be realized until Congress revisits and clarifies elements of the Act, especially its key terms, or provides an agency or office with the clear authority and responsibility to do so. Attention should also be paid to the domino effect that an agency's initial determination of whether RFA is applicable to a rulemaking has on other statutory requirements, such as preparing compliance guides for small entities and periodically reviewing existing regulations. GAO also believes that Congress should reexamine not just RFA but how all of the various regulatory reform initiatives fit together and influence agencies' regulatory actions. Recent developments, such as the Office of Advocacy's RFA guidance, may help address some of these long-standing issues and merit continued monitoring by Congress |
gao_GAO-10-202 | gao_GAO-10-202_0 | OMB Initiated FDCC and Provided Guidance for Agency Implementation
To help carry out its responsibilities for ensuring federal information security, OMB launched the FDCC initiative in March 2007. Submit FDCC compliance reports to NIST by March 31, 2008. Agencies Have Not Fully Implemented FDCC Settings, but Most Have Complied with Other Requirements
None of the agencies has fully implemented all FDCC configuration settings on all applicable workstations, although most have complied with other requirements. Table 1 shows how many agencies addressed each of the required actions in their FDCC implementation plans. Most Agencies Documented Deviations, but Eight Did Not Establish a Policy for Approving Them
Although OMB guidance indicates that agencies are to document and have a designated accrediting authority approve deviations from FDCC, several agencies did not do so. In addition, agencies continue to face significant challenges in meeting FDCC requirements, monitoring their implementation of the settings, and measuring benefits of the initiative, among other things. Implementing FDCC Can Enhance Security at Federal Agencies
FDCC has the potential both to increase agencies’ information security and to standardize their management of workstations. FDCC implementation enhances security by requiring stricter security settings on workstations than those that may have been previously in place at federal agencies. For example, a more secure enterprisewide Windows configuration and consistent workstation profile (i.e., the set of configuration settings and other software applied to a workstation) across the agency can not only improve security but can also make it easier to manage changes to the security features of workstation software, such as applying updates or patches. Lessons Learned
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the management and implementation of the FDCC initiative which, if considered, could improve the implementation of future versions of FDCC or other configuration efforts. Challenges Exist for Agencies in Fully Complying with FDCC Requirements
Agencies face several ongoing challenges to fully complying with FDCC requirements, including retrofitting their existing applications and systems to comply with the settings, assessing the risks associated with deviations, and monitoring workstations to ensure that the settings are applied and functioning properly. Specifically, many agencies have applied an agency-defined subset of the configuration settings to their Windows workstations; however, none of the 24 major agencies has fully applied all the FDCC settings. Unless agencies fulfill these requirements, OMB will not be able to ensure the effectiveness of the initiative. As OMB establishes additional versions of FDCC settings—or configuration settings for other applications or operating systems—understanding the lessons learned from implementation as well as the ongoing challenges agencies face will be essential to the initiative’s success in ensuring public confidence in the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of government information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Relative to the 24 major federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act, the objectives of our review were to (1) identify the goals, objectives, and requirements for the initiative; (2) determine the status of actions federal agencies have taken, or plan to take, to implement the initiative; and (3) identify the benefits, challenges, and lessons learned in implementing this initiative. To address our first objective, we reviewed applicable policies and memorandums issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and plans, artifacts, and other documentation provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Energy
To improve the department’s implementation of FDCC, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following five actions: complete implementation of the agency’s FDCC baseline, including establishing firm milestones for completion; document deviations to FDCC and have them approved by a designated ensure all components that are required to implement FDCC have acquired and deployed a NIST-validated SCAP tool to monitor compliance with FDCC; ensure all components that are required to implement FDCC develop, document, and implement a policy to monitor FDCC compliance using a NIST-validated SCAP tool; and ensure that language is included in contracts of those components that are required to implement FDCC to ensure new acquisitions include FDCC settings and products of information technology providers operate effectively using them. 4. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increase in security incidents and continuing weakness in security controls on information technology systems at federal agencies highlight the continuing need for improved information security. To standardize and strengthen agencies' security, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), launched the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) initiative in 2007. GAO was asked to (1) identify the goals, objectives, and requirements of the initiative; (2) determine the status of actions federal agencies have taken, or plan to take, to implement the initiative; and (3) identify the benefits, challenges, and lessons learned in implementing this initiative. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed policies, plans, and other documents at the 24 major executive branch agencies; reviewed OMB and NIST guidance and documentation; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The goals of FDCC are to improve information security and reduce overall information technology operating costs across the federal government by, among other things, providing a baseline level of security through the implementation of a set of standard configuration settings on government-owned desktop and laptop computers (i.e., workstations). To carry out the initiative, OMB required that executive branch agencies take several actions, including: (1) submit an implementation plan to OMB; (2) apply all configuration settings to all applicable workstations by February 2008; (3) document any deviations from the prescribed settings and have them approved by an accrediting authority; (4) acquire a specified NIST-validated tool for monitoring implementation of the settings; (5) ensure that future information technology acquisitions comply with the configuration settings; and (6) submit a status report to NIST. While agencies have taken actions to implement these requirements, none of the agencies has fully implemented all configuration settings on their applicable workstations. Specifically, most plans submitted to OMB did not address all key implementation activities; none of the agencies implemented all of the prescribed configuration settings on all applicable workstations, though several implemented agency-defined subsets of the settings; several agencies did not fully document their deviations from the settings or establish a process for approving them; six agencies did not acquire and make use of the required tool for monitoring FDCC compliance; many agencies did not incorporate language into contracts to ensure that future information technology acquisitions comply with FDCC; and many agencies did not describe plans for eliminating or mitigating their deviations in their compliance reports to NIST. Until agencies ensure that they are meeting these FDCC requirements, the effectiveness of the initiative will be limited. FDCC has the potential to increase agencies' information security by requiring stricter security settings on workstations than those that may have been previously in place and standardizing agencies' management of workstations, making it easier to manage changes such as applying updates or patches. In addition, a number of lessons can be learned from the management and implementation of the FDCC initiative which, if considered, could improve the implementation of future versions of FDCC or other configuration efforts. At the same time, agencies face several ongoing challenges in fully complying with FDCC requirements, including retrofitting applications and systems in their existing environments to comply with the settings, assessing the risks associated with deviations, and monitoring workstations to ensure that the settings are applied and functioning properly. As OMB moves forward with the initiative, understanding the lessons learned as well as the ongoing challenges agencies face will be essential in order to ensure the initiative is successful in ensuring public confidence in the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of government information. |
gao_GAO-13-790 | gao_GAO-13-790_0 | DOD’s Report Included Information on Each Required Element but Only Partially Addressed Some Elements
DOD provided some information on the each of the 12 reporting elements enumerated in section 2229a in its fiscal year 2012 annual report on prepositioned stocks. Specifically, we assessed that DOD addressed nine of the elements because the information provided in the report was responsive to the reporting requirements. We assessed three of the elements as being partially addressed because DOD’s report did not provide all of the required information:
Element seven requires DOD to provide a list of non-standard items slated for inclusion in the prepositioned stocks as well as a plan for funding the inclusion and sustainment of those items. Inconsistent Information Among the Military Services Limits Usefulness of DOD’s Report
Inconsistencies in some of the information provided by the military services limit the usefulness of the data presented in DOD’s report. Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need complete and relevant information to manage risks and achieve efficiency and effectiveness goals. This tasking document to the services also included a copy of the 12 reporting elements. While officials from each of the services and the Joint Staff stated that they employed their own internal controls to review their respective reporting for quality assurance, the inaccuracies and omissions we found in the services’ reporting indicate weaknesses in DOD’s overall quality assurance procedures for its annual prepositioning report. Until DOD provides complete, consistent, and accurate information on its prepositioned stocks, its report will be of limited use to Congress’s ability to oversee and make informed decisions about DOD’s use of its equipment and resources in this constrained fiscal environment. DOD Has Not Developed Strategic Guidance or a Coordinated Joint- Service Approach for Managing Prepositioning Programs
Since we last reported on this issue in September 2012, DOD has not made progress in addressing our prior recommendations to develop department-wide strategic guidance and implement a coordinated joint- service approach for managing its prepositioning programs, nor has it set a timeline for doing so. DOD Has Not Made Progress in Developing Overarching Strategic Guidance for Prepositioning Programs
In response to recommendations we have made in reports on DOD’s annual prepositioning programs, DOD has stated that it planned to develop department-wide strategic guidance for its prepositioning programs; however, DOD has made no progress in developing such guidance, nor has it set a timeline for doing so. As far back as 2005, we have reported that each of the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency were planning the future of their prepositioning programs without the benefit of an overall plan or joint doctrine to coordinate their efforts, which made it difficult to determine how the services’ different programs would fit together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Also, in January 2013, DOD issued a Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan, which provides guidance for directing, coordinating, and prioritizing DOD-wide development plans, initiatives, and activities for the period 2013-2020 in order to achieve the Comprehensive Materiel Response Strategy end state. In conducting our current review, we found that DOD had still not made progress in developing an overarching strategy for its prepositioning programs. Hence, the services’ individual prepositioning programs are still not linked to overarching strategic guidance, which could lead to inconsistencies and potential overlap and duplication among the services’ prepositioning strategies and between the service strategies and the new national defense strategy. DOD Has Not Improved Joint Oversight of its Prepositioning Programs
DOD has also not improved its joint oversight of its prepositioning programs because a working group that was expected to provide joint oversight has not been functioning as intended and other joint activities do not specifically address prepositioned stocks. Further, an increased emphasis on joint program management and oversight of prepositioned materiel and equipment would serve to unify DOD’s prepositioning efforts in support of defense priorities, identify and reduce any unnecessary overlap or duplication, and achieve cost savings and efficiencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s annual prepositioning report and more fully inform the congressional defense committees on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 1. develop guidance that clearly articulates the type and format of information the services should provide for the report to ensure consistency across DOD’s prepositioning programs, and 2. identify and correct weaknesses in DOD’s quality assurance procedures to minimize inaccuracies and omissions in the report. § 2229a, regarding prepositioned stocks, we analyzed DOD’s report on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment for fiscal year 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD prepositions stocks such as combat vehicles and repair parts worth billions of dollars at strategic locations around the world. These assets are used to prepare forces quickly for conflicts when needed. Over the years, GAO has made recommendations for DOD to develop overarching strategic guidance and improve joint oversight of the military services' prepositioning programs. Section 2229a of Title10 requires DOD to report annually on the status of its prepositioned stocks and for DOD's report to include 12 specific elements--for example, the material condition of the equipment. The law also mandates that GAO review DOD's report and provide any additional information to Congress that would be informative on issues relating to the status of prepositioned stocks. This is GAO's sixth report, and it assessed the extent to which (1) DOD's fiscal year 2012 prepositioning report addressed the 12 statutory reporting elements and (2) DOD has made progress in addressing GAO's prior recommendations on department-wide strategic guidance and a coordinated joint-military service approach for managing prepositioning. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD's prepositioning report, reviewed DOD's guidance, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) provided information on all 12 required reporting elements in its fiscal year 2012 prepositioning report; however, 3 of these elements were only partially addressed. For example, DOD provided a list of non-standard items slated for inclusion in its prepositioned stocks but did not include a specific plan for funding those items as required by the law. Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need complete and relevant information to manage risks and achieve efficiency and effectiveness goals. However, GAO found that DOD's report contained some inconsistencies in information across the services as well as several inaccuracies and omissions. For example, DOD's report included funding information for 6 or 7 fiscal years for most of the services but only 2 fiscal years for the Navy's stocks. Service information was also presented in different formats in the report, which makes it difficult to compare data. Because the Joint Staff did not provide specific guidance to the services to ensure consistency when requesting data, the services adopted separate approaches to reporting information to the Joint Staff for compilation in the report. In addition, although an agency should monitor the quality of information provided to Congress, GAO found several inaccuracies in the report, such as incorrect calculations and information that had been inadvertently omitted. While officials from the Joint Staff and each of the services stated that they have their own review processes, the errors found in the report indicate weaknesses in DOD's quality assurance procedures. Until DOD addresses these issues and provides complete, consistent, and accurate information on its prepositioned stocks, its report will be of limited use to Congress in making informed decisions about DOD's prepositioning programs.
DOD has not made progress in addressing GAO's prior recommendations to develop department-wide strategic guidance and implement a coordinated joint-service approach for managing its prepositioning programs, nor has it set a timeline for doing so. As far back as 2005, GAO has reported that each of the military services was planning the future of its prepositioning programs without the benefit of an overall plan or joint doctrine to coordinate their efforts, which made it difficult to determine how the services' different programs would fit together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Recently, DOD issued a strategy for materiel response to support the full range of military activities and an implementation plan for directing, coordinating, and prioritizing DOD-wide development plans, initiatives, and activities for the period 2013-2020 to achieve the strategy. However, neither provides guidance for DOD's prepositioning programs, and the plan specifically excludes prepositioning. Hence, the services' individual prepositioning programs are still not linked to overarching strategic guidance. DOD has also not improved joint oversight of its prepositioning programs because a working group that was expected to provide such oversight has not been functioning as intended, and other joint activities do not specifically address prepositioned stocks. An increased emphasis on joint oversight would help unify DOD's prepositioning efforts in support of defense priorities, reduce potential unnecessary duplication, and achieve cost savings and efficiencies. Congress is currently considering legislation that would direct DOD to develop an overarching strategy for its prepositioning programs and establish joint oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop guidance to ensure that it reports consistent information across the services and strengthens quality assurance procedures for its report. GAO also suggests that Congress require DOD to develop strategic guidance, including joint oversight, for its prepositioning programs. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-199 | gao_GAO-11-199_0 | The types of safety risks associated with each rail mode differ somewhat. Four experts stated that the extent of safety culture was generally low throughout the rail transit industry and needed to be improved. In response to NTSB’s recommendations to improve its safety culture, WMATA is taking a number of actions, including: the development of procedures to ensure clear communication and distribution of safety-related information and the monthly review of data and trend analyses, the establishment of a safety hotline and email for employees to report safety concerns, an updated whistleblower policy to encourage employee participation and upper management review of identified safety concerns, an amended mission statement to reflect the agency’s commitment to a newly formed committee of WMATA’s Board of Directors to make recommendations monthly on assuring safety at WMATA. Multiple Factors Have Made Staffing and Training a Challenge for Large Transit Agencies
In addition to instilling safety culture at transit agencies, maintaining an adequate level of skilled staff and ensuring that they receive needed safety training are also challenges the largest transit agencies face in ensuring safety. In addition, in five of the eight rail transit accident investigations conducted by the NTSB since 2004, employee errors, such as not following procedures, were identified as a probable cause of the accidents. 2). In a study of the seven largest rail transit systems completed in 2009, FTA determined that more than a third of these agencies’ assets were in poor or marginal condition, indicating that they were near or had already surpassed their expected useful life. According to FTA officials, the transit industry has been slow to adopt asset management practices that would allow transit agencies to efficiently manage state of good repair needs. Proposed legislation would give FTA the authority to set and enforce safety standards, which could also strengthen transit agencies’ safety culture through increased oversight, in addition to assistance. To help address transit agency safety training challenges, FTA has provided funding to support a variety of training classes. In 2009, the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure issued draft legislation to reauthorize surface transportation programs that would require FTA to form a national council to identify skill gaps in transit agency maintenance departments, develop programs to address the recruitment and retention of transit employees, and make recommendations to FTA and transit agencies on how to increase apprenticeship programs, among other things. Increase technical training. State of Good Repair
FTA’s assistance to transit agencies to help achieve a state of good repair—and therefore help ensure safe operations—has primarily consisted of providing grant funding, although FTA has also conducted studies and is taking steps to provide more guidance to agencies on asset management. The various proposals suggesting additional steps that FTA could take to provide safety-related assistance to transit agencies or strengthen their accountability for effectively managing their assets have the potential, if implemented, to enhance rail transit safety. DOT is currently developing a surface transportation reauthorization proposal. Leading Practices Could Help FTA Target and Track the Results of Its Safety Efforts
As FTA undertakes efforts to help transit agencies address their safety culture, staffing and training, and state of good repair challenges, setting performance goals and measures can help it target these efforts and track results. While FTA has created plans and other tools to help guide and manage its safety efforts, it has not fully adopted these practices. However, FTA has not identified specific performance goals that make clear the direct results its safety activities are trying to achieve and related measures that would enable the agency to track and demonstrate its progress in achieving those results. Without such specific goals and measures, it is not clear how FTA’s safety activities contribute toward DOT’s overall strategic goal of reducing transportation-related injuries and fatalities, including rail transit injuries and fatalities. While these leading practices are useful, problems with FTA’s rail transit safety data could hamper the agency’s ability to measure its safety performance. We are not recommending at this time that DOT take actions on proposals for improving rail transit safety, as the department is considering various options for improving transportation safety, including rail transit safety, in developing its reauthorization proposal. As FTA helps transit agencies ensure safety, setting clear performance goals and related measures for its safety efforts, based on leading practices, will be vital to improve FTA’s ability to set priorities and determine progress—both in overseeing transit agencies and in helping them maintain safety on their systems. Both provided technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOT agreed to consider our recommendation. For six of these eight accidents, contributing factors identified involved deficiencies in safety management or oversight, including weaknesses in transit agencies’ safety rules and procedures and in their processes for ensuring employees’ adherence to these rules and procedures, lack of a safety culture within the transit agency, and lack of adequate oversight by the transit agency’s state safety oversight agency and the Federal Transit Authority (FTA). We obtained documents from and interviewed officials at five large heavy rail transit systems and three large light rail transit systems operated by seven transit agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although transit service is generally safe, recent high-profile accidents on several large rail transit systems--notably the June 2009 collision in Washington, D.C., that resulted in nine fatalities and 52 injuries--have raised concerns. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) oversees state agencies that directly oversee rail transit agencies' safety practices. FTA also provides assistance to transit agencies, such as funding and training, to enhance safety. GAO was asked to determine (1) the challenges the largest rail transit systems face in ensuring safety and (2) the extent to which assistance provided by FTA addresses these challenges. GAO visited eight large rail transit systems and their respective state oversight agencies, reviewed pertinent documents, and interviewed rail transit safety experts and officials from FTA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
What GAO Found
The largest rail transit agencies face several challenges in trying to ensure safety on their systems. First, according to some experts we interviewed, the level of safety culture--awareness of and organizational commitment to the importance of safety--varies across the transit industry and is low in some agencies. NTSB found that the lack of a safety culture contributed to the June 2009 fatal transit accident in Washington, D.C. Second, with many employees nearing retirement age, large transit agencies have found it difficult to recruit and hire qualified staff. It is also challenging for them to ensure that employees receive needed safety training because of financial constraints and the limited availability of technical training. Training helps ensure safe operations; NTSB has identified employee errors, such as not following procedures, as a probable cause in some significant rail transit accidents. Third, more than a third of the largest agencies' assets are in poor or marginal condition. While agencies have prioritized investments to ensure safety, delays in repairing some assets, such as signal systems, can pose safety risks. The transit industry has been slow to adopt asset management practices that can help agencies set investment priorities and better ensure safety. FTA has provided various types of assistance to transit agencies to help them address these challenges, including researching how to instill a strong safety culture at transit agencies, supporting a variety of safety-related training classes for transit agency staff, and providing funding to help agencies achieve a state of good repair. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has proposed legislation that would give FTA the authority to set and enforce rail transit safety standards, which could help improve safety culture in the industry. FTA is also planning improvements to its training program and the development of asset management guidance for transit agencies, among other things. Some legislative proposals, studies, experts, and agency officials have identified further steps that FTA could take to address transit agencies' safety challenges, such as requiring transit agencies to implement asset management practices. Some of these suggested further steps may have the potential, if implemented, to enhance rail transit safety. DOT is currently developing a legislative proposal for reauthorizing surface transportation programs and may include new rail transit safety initiatives in this proposal. In addition, clear and specific performance goals and measures could help FTA target its efforts to improve transit safety and track results. GAO has identified leading practices to establish such performance goals and measures, but FTA has not fully adopted these practices. For example, FTA has not identified specific performance goals that make clear the direct results its safety activities are trying to achieve and related measures that would enable the agency to track and demonstrate its progress in achieving those results. Without such specific goals and measures, it is not clear how FTA's safety activities contribute toward DOT's strategic goal of reducing transportation-related injuries and fatalities, including rail transit injuries and fatalities. Furthermore, problems with FTA's rail transit safety data could hamper the agency's ability to track its performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations for improving these data in a separate report (GAO-11-217R). To guide and track the performance of FTA's rail transit safety efforts, DOT should direct FTA to use leading practices to set clear and specific goals and measures for these efforts. DOT and NTSB reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOT agreed to consider the recommendation. |
gao_RCED-97-38 | gao_RCED-97-38_0 | Specifically, EPA’s guidance stipulates that the level and precision of analyses in RIAs depend on the quality of the data, scientific understanding of the problem to be addressed through regulation, resource constraints, and the specific requirements of the authorizing legislation. Extent to Which Economic Assumptions Were Identified, Explained, and Subjected to Sensitivity Analysis
Eight of the RIAs that we examined did not clearly identify the values assigned for key economic assumptions, such as the discount rate and value of human life, used to assess the economic viability of the regulations. Furthermore, we found that in the RIAs that identified key economic assumptions the rationale for the values used was not always explained. While EPA’s guidance suggests that RIAs account for uncertainties in such values by conducting sensitivity analyses that show how benefit-cost estimates vary depending on what values are assumed, many RIAs used only a single value and did not always provide a clear explanation. Five of the 23 RIAs did not indicate whether the estimated future benefits and costs were discounted. The discount rate can have a significant effect on the estimated impact of an environmental regulation. For example, one RIA assumed a value of human life that ranged from $1.6 million to $8.5 million, and another, prepared in the same year, assumed a value of human life that ranged from $3 million to $12 million. Although some RIAs did not assign dollar values to benefits, all 23 of the RIAs we examined contained other quantitative or qualitative information on the benefits of the proposed regulations. When benefits cannot be assigned dollar values, quantifying the benefits, such as a reduced incidence of deaths and illnesses, helps clarify the impact of proposed regulations. While it was not always clear how many alternatives or what types of alternatives were considered, our examination of the 23 RIAs indicated that 6 of them compared a single alternative, which was the regulatory action being proposed, to the baseline, which was the situation likely to occur in the absence of the regulation—the status quo. All other RIAs compared two or more alternatives to the baseline. EPA officials acknowledged that some of the RIAs did not include executive summaries and agreed that executive summaries that include information such as descriptions of the difficulties in assigning dollar values to benefits, uncertainties of the data, and regulatory alternatives are useful. Recommendations
To help EPA decisionmakers and the Congress better understand the implications of proposed regulatory actions, we recommend that the EPA Administrator, ensure that RIAs identify the (1) value, or range of values, assigned to key assumptions, along with the rationale for the values selected; (2) sensitivity of benefit and cost estimates when there are major sources of uncertainty; and (3) alternatives considered, including those not subjected to benefit-cost analyses. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 23 regulatory impact analyses (RIA) supporting air quality regulations, focusing on whether the RIAs clearly describe: (1) key economic assumptions subject to uncertainty and the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions; (2) the extent to which benefits and costs were quantified for the proposed regulatory action; and (3) the extent to which alternative approaches were considered.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while certain key economic assumptions, such as the discount rate and the value of human life, can have a significant impact on the results of benefit-cost analyses and are important to the regulations being proposed, eight of the RIAs did not identify one or more of these assumptions; (2) furthermore, in the RIAs that identified key economic assumptions, the rationale for the values used was not always explained; (3) for example, one RIA assumed a value of life that ranged from $1.6 million to $8.5 million and another, prepared in the same year, assumed a value of life that ranged from $3 million to $12 million; (4) in neither instance did the RIAs provide a clear explanation of the rationale for the values that were selected; (5) even though EPA's guidance suggests that RIAs account for any uncertainties in the values of key assumptions by conducting sensitivity analyses, which show how benefit and cost estimates vary depending on what values are assumed, 13 RIAs used only a single discount rate; (6) all 23 RIAs assigned dollar values to the estimated costs of proposed regulations, however, 11 of the RIAs assigned dollar values to the estimated benefits; (7) according to EPA officials, assigning dollar values to potential benefits is difficult because of the uncertainty of scientific data and the lack of market data on some of these effects; (8) all of the RIAs contained some quantitative or qualitative information on the expected benefits, such as a reduced incidence of mortality and illness; (9) while the number and the types of alternatives considered in the 23 RIAs were not always clear, GAO's examination indicated that six of the RIAs compared a single alternative, which was the regulatory action being proposed, to the baseline, which was the situation likely to occur in the absence of regulation, the status quo; (10) the remainder compared two or more alternatives to the baseline; (11) resource constraints and the specific requirements of authorizing legislation, which sometimes limits EPA's options, were factors influencing the extent to which alternatives were considered; (12) ten of the RIAs GAO examined did not include executive summaries, even though these summaries can be a significant benefit to decisionmakers; and (13) EPA officials acknowledged that some of the RIAs did not include executive summaries and agreed that executive summaries, by providing easily accessible information, can be useful to decisionmakers. |
gao_AIMD-99-126 | gao_AIMD-99-126_0 | Corrective Actions That HUD Has Taken or Initiated
HUD has taken important steps to strengthen its internal controls and financial reporting, improve its information and financial management systems, consolidate its operations, and appropriately deploy and train its staff. HUD has improved its financial reporting and has strengthened its internal controls by conducting risk assessments for some of its programs . Our recent work indicates that these management deficiencies continue to exist or it is too soon to tell whether HUD’s reforms will resolve them. We reported in December 1998 that HUD has not finalized detailed project plans or cost and schedule estimates for its financial systems integration effort. We concluded that without such plans the Department is likely to continue to spend millions of dollars, miss milestones, and still not fully meet its objective of developing and fully deploying an integrated financial management system. Other problems with information and financial management systems were identified by us, the Inspector General, or HUD. These problems included (1) the effectiveness of HUD’s processes for taking unexpended balances into account when determining funding needs as part of its budget process; (2) a February 1998 determination by HUD that 38 of its 92 systems did not conform to the requirements of FMFIA and of the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-127; and (3) a March 1998 report by the Inspector General which continued to report material internal control weaknesses in financial management systems including insufficient information on the credit quality of individual multifamily loans and insufficient information on FHA’s operations by program, geographical area, or other relevant components. Further Action Needed
While HUD has initiated actions under the 2020 Management Reform Plan that could help to address its management deficiencies, the reforms are not fully implemented or it is too soon to assess their effectiveness. Nevertheless, with close oversight by the Congress, HUD is making significant changes and has made credible progress since 1997 in laying the framework for improving its management. This top management attention is critical and must be sustained in order to achieve real and lasting change. While major reforms are under way, several are in the early stages of implementation, and it is too soon to tell whether they will resolve the major deficiencies that we and others have identified. Therefore, in our opinion, the integrity and accountability of HUD’s programs remain at high risk. High-Risk Series: Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO/HR-97-12, Feb. 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its January 1999 report on the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) major management challenges and program risks, focusing on: (1) corrective actions that HUD has taken or initiated on its major management challenges; (2) major management challenges that remain and limit HUD's effectiveness in carrying out its mission; and (3) further actions that are needed to resolve these challenges.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD is making significant changes and has made credible progress in overhauling its operations to correct its management deficiencies; (2) among other things, it has improved its financial reporting and development risk assessments for its programs, developed and deployed components for its information and financial management systems, consolidated and centralized many of its operations, and reassigned and begun to retrain many of its staff; (3) a major contributor to this progress is HUD's June 1997 2020 Management Reform Plan, a set of proposals intended to, among other things, correct the management deficiencies that GAO and others identified; (4) however, it should be recognized that HUD's problems were years in the making and will take time and much effort to correct; (5) HUD management has placed high priority on removing HUD programs from the high-risk designation, but it will take continued and sustained efforts before meaningful and lasting results can be achieved; (6) while major reforms are under way, GAO's recent work indicates that internal control weaknesses and problems with information and financial management systems persist; (7) recently, GAO reported that HUD is likely to continue to spend millions of dollars, miss milestones, and still not meet its objective of developing and fully deploying an integrated financial management system because it has not yet finalized detailed project plans or cost and schedule estimates for this effort; (8) furthermore, recent reforms to address HUD's organizational and staffing problems are in the early stages of implementation, and it is too soon to tell whether the reforms will resolve the major deficiencies that GAO and others have identified; (9) therefore, pending the achievement of substantial results, the integrity and accountability of HUD's programs remain at high risk in GAO's opinion; and (10) GAO reached this conclusion using the same methodologies and criteria as it used for its 1995 and 1997 reports. |
gao_HEHS-95-25 | gao_HEHS-95-25_0 | In 1990, VA took steps to fundamentally change the way services are provided to veterans. I for a list of the panel’s recommendations.) VA Is Developing Guidance to Help and Encourage VAROs to Implement Initiatives
VA has developed several model claims processing structures that incorporate some key Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations. VA has mandated that VAROs choose one of the models for reorganizing staff as a basis for their new claims processing structures. This is especially critical because information currently available about the effectiveness of initiatives has been inconclusive. For example, analyses usually considered only the initiatives’ impact on overall processing time or backlog; they did not consider other possible impacts, such as improved communications with veterans. VA needs to know how well regional initiatives, in total, are working. However, if first efforts do not result in sufficient improvement, the VAROs and headquarters need to understand why and to have some basis for determining what other changes have a better chance of success. Recommendations
To better ensure improvement in VARO claims processing, we recommend that the VA Secretary direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to improve plans to evaluate the effectiveness of claims processing initiatives. Therefore, the plan should require VAROs to evaluate their major improvement initiatives and provide guidance on how to do so; identify which analytical methods and which data VA headquarters will use to evaluate the various initiatives and make judgments about what changes are most likely to improve claims processing under what circumstances; and describe how VA will disseminate to VAROs information on the experiences, good and bad, that VAROs have in implementing claims processing initiatives. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to improve its claims processing operations, focusing on the effectiveness of planned changes to veterans affairs regional offices' (VARO) claims processing structures and procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) VA has taken steps to ensure that VARO implement the changes necessary to improve overall service to veterans; (2) VA needs to implement the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations to improve disability claims processing; (3) VA has developed several model claims processing structures designed to reorganize staff so that fewer resources are devoted to clerical functions; (4) the models will serve as a framework for implementing other initiatives such as improving claims folder management and the use of evidence received by telephone or fax; (5) VA is also developing regulations and training materials to encourage VARO to adopt these improvement initiatives; (6) VARO have been given significant flexibility to implement initiatives in ways they believe are appropriate; (7) VA may not have a sound basis for determining what additional changes need to be made for guiding future improvements because it has not developed adequate plans for evaluating the merits of the various initiatives; and (8) VA does not have a formal mechanism to disseminate information about the effectiveness of regional initiatives and other VARO experiences with these initiatives. |
gao_GAO-14-487T | gao_GAO-14-487T_0 | Thus it is critical that federal agencies protect their systems and the information on them and respond to data breaches and cyber incidents when they occur. Data breaches at federal agencies have received considerable publicity and raised concerns about the protection of PII at those agencies. In addition to establishing responsibilities for agencies, FISMA assigns specific responsibilities to OMB, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and inspectors general:
OMB is to develop and oversee the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security in federal agencies (except with regard to national security systems). In particular, with regard to the eight components of an agency-wide security program,
18 agencies had fully implemented a program for managing information security risk, and 6 had partially implemented such a program;
10 agencies had fully documented security policies and procedures, while 12 had partially documented them;
18 agencies had selected security controls for their systems, but 6 had only partially implemented this practice;
22 agencies had established a security training program, and 2 had partially established such a program;
13 agencies were monitoring security controls on an ongoing basis, but 10 agencies had not fully implemented a continuous monitoring program;
19 agencies had established a program for remediating weaknesses in their security policies, practices, and procedures, while 5 had not fully implemented elements of a remediation program;
20 agencies had established an incident response and reporting program, but 3 agencies had not fully established such a program;and
18 agencies had fully established a program for ensuring continuity of operations in the event of a disruption or disaster, but 5 agencies partially implemented a continuity of operations program. We and agency inspectors general have continued to make numerous recommendations to agencies aimed at improving their information security posture. Fully implementing these recommendations will strengthen agencies’ ability to ensure that their information, including PII, is adequately protected. Accordingly, OMB and NIST have specified key practices for responding to PII data breaches.include management practices such as establishing a data breach response team and training employees on roles and responsibilities for breach response, and operational practices, such as preparing reports on These suspected data breaches and submitting them to appropriate internal and external entities, assessing the likely risk of harm and level of impact of a suspected breach, offering assistance to affected individuals (if appropriate), and analyzing the agency’s breach response and identifying lessons learned. Of the seven agencies we reviewed, only the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) consistently documented both an assigned risk level and how that level was determined for PII-related data breach incidents; only the Army and IRS documented the number of affected individuals for each incident; and only the Army and the Securities and Exchange Commission notified affected individuals for all high- risk breaches. The seven agencies did not consistently offer credit monitoring to individuals affected by PII-related breaches. Incomplete guidance from OMB contributed to this inconsistent implementation. For example, OMB’s guidance does not make clear how agencies should use risk levels in making a determination about notification to affected individuals. In addition, OMB guidance for reporting on data breaches involving PII may be too stringent. In our report, we recommended that OMB revise its guidance on federal agencies’ response to PII-related data breaches to include (1) guidance on notifying affected individuals based on a determination of the level of risk; (2) criteria for determining whether to offer assistance, such as credit monitoring, to affected individuals; and (3) revised requirements for reporting PII-related breaches to US-CERT. We also made a number of recommendations to the individual agencies in our review to improve their response to data breaches involving PII. As we and inspectors general have long pointed out, federal agencies continue to face challenges in effectively implementing all elements of their information security programs. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government collects large amounts of PII from the public, including taxpayer data, Social Security information, and patient health information. It is critical that federal agencies ensure that this information is adequately protected from data breaches, and that they respond swiftly and appropriately when breaches occur. Since 1997, GAO has designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area. Further, data breaches at federal agencies have raised concerns about the protection of PII. Federal laws and other guidance specify the responsibilities of agencies in securing their information and information systems and in responding to data breaches.
This testimony addresses federal agencies' efforts to secure their information and respond to data breaches. In preparing this statement, GAO relied primarily on previously published and ongoing work in this area.
What GAO Found
The number of reported information security incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) has more than doubled over the last several years (see figure).
As GAO has previously reported, major federal agencies continue to face challenges in fully implementing all components of an agency-wide information security program, which is essential for securing agency systems and the information they contain—including PII. Specifically, agencies have had mixed results in addressing the eight components of an information security program called for by law, and most agencies had weaknesses in implementing specific security controls. GAO and inspectors general have continued to make recommendations to strengthen agency policies and practices.
In December 2013, GAO reported on agencies' responses to PII data breaches and found that they were inconsistent and needed improvement. Although selected agencies had generally developed breach-response policies and procedures, their implementation of key practices called for by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance was inconsistent. For example,
only one of seven agencies reviewed had documented both an assigned risk level and how that level was determined for PII data breaches; two agencies documented the number of affected individuals for each incident; and two agencies notified affected individuals for all high-risk breaches.
the seven agencies did not consistently offer credit monitoring to affected individuals; and
none of the seven agencies consistently documented lessons learned from their breach responses.
Incomplete guidance from OMB contributed to this inconsistent implementation. For example, OMB's guidance does not make clear how agencies should use risk levels to determine whether affected individuals should be notified. In addition, the nature and timing of reporting requirements may be too stringent.
What GAO Recommends
In its December 2013 report, GAO made 22 recommendations to the agencies included in its review aimed at improving their data breach response activities. GAO also recommended that OMB update its guidance on federal agencies' responses to PII-related data breaches. Agency responses to GAO's recommendations varied. |
gao_GAO-11-909 | gao_GAO-11-909_0 | Exporters, Particularly to SMEs
The goals and activities of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service contribute to the National Export Initiative (NEI) goal of doubling the dollar value of U.S. exports from $1.57 trillion in 2009 to $3.14 trillion by the end of 2014. CS also advocates on behalf of U.S. companies interested in competing for government contracts in foreign countries. Supporting the NEI has not required CS to undertake any new activities; however, it has prompted CS to direct more of its efforts toward certain markets, specific kinds of activities, NEI-priority sectors such as services and clean-energy technology, and firms currently exporting to one or two markets but capable of expanding into additional markets. CS data indicate that the greatest number of CS export successes have come from firms that were increasing exports into markets where the firms were already exporting (increase-to-market firms). Commercial Service Is Modifying Performance Measures to Align More Closely with the NEI
In fiscal year 2012, CS will implement revised performance measures that align more closely with the NEI. Although CS did not meet four of six performance targets in fiscal year 2010, its efforts resulted in increases for most of its measures as it shifted to address NEI priorities. CS’s new revised set of performance measures for fiscal year 2012 addresses some past weaknesses; however, some weaknesses will remain—for example, underreporting of export successes, especially with regard to their dollar value. Compared with its 2010 performance measures, CS’s 2012 measures shift its emphasis in two ways that are consistent with the overarching NEI goal of doubling the total value of U.S. exports: First, the 2012 measures put new focus on the dollar value generated by CS’s export promotion activities and on helping firms already exporting to expand to new markets rather than on helping new-to-export clients. (See measures 2, 3, and 5 in table 2.) Commercial Service’s Resource Allocation Process Does Not Make Full Use of Relevant Information to Guide Its Decisions
Systematic use of economic, performance, and activity data can help CS allocate resources to achieve its goals more efficiently and effectively. In keeping with good management practices when making resource allocation decisions, CS is using a data-driven process to prioritize foreign markets (and domestic locations) and to help it allocate its staff and other resources to meet its performance goals and to support NEI objectives. Our analysis of the quantitative parts of the process found that there may be opportunities to reallocate overseas resources to better reflect NEI priorities and better achieve CS’s new performance goals. Furthermore, important available data related to some CS performance goals and activities are not systematically considered in the current process. Overseas model. 4). exports to a trading partner and total imports by the trading partner. While projections and indicators of the future economic performance of countries necessarily involve uncertainty, the Overseas Resource Allocation Model, though designed to reflect export potential, currently gives greater weight to historical variables that have a high degree of overlap with the other historical inputs in the resource allocation process. CS does not collect systematic information on how CS staff divide their time to carry out mission-critical activities. To improve program management and the information that CS resource allocation decisions are based upon, review the Overseas Resource Allocation Model to determine whether the variables and structure best incorporate available indicators of potential U.S. exports, include commercial diplomacy and advocacy data in evaluating cost-benefit ratios of CS locations, and systematically include program activity data in making resource allocation decisions. In its written comments, Commerce welcomed and generally agreed with our overall findings and recommendations. Information from the six posts is not generalizable but was used to understand how activity data are collected, input, and used at posts and in headquarters, as well as to identify potential problems with the data and to learn about data-audit procedures, topics also discussed in interviews with CS officials in Washington, D.C.
To determine if CS performance measures accurately reflect its activities and align with the NEI, we reviewed CS’s fiscal year 2010 performance measures and assessed its 2012 performance measures to see if they changed to align with the NEI. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recognizing the potential of increased exports to drive economic growth and create jobs, President Obama in 2010 launched the National Export Initiative (NEI), aimed at doubling the dollar value of U.S. exports by the end of 2014. As requested, GAO examined the extent to which (1) the goals and activities of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (CS) support the NEI, (2) CS performance measures accurately reflect its activities and align with the NEI, and (3) CS incorporates relevant data in allocating resources to help achieve its strategic goals. GAO interviewed Department of Commerce (Commerce) officials, particularly from CS, and CS staff and officials at six overseas posts. GAO analyzed the NEI's priorities, and documents and data related to CS activities and performance.
What GAO Found
CS's goals and activities generally support NEI priorities by, for example, arranging trade missions, assisting U.S. exporters with trade problems, and advocating on behalf of U.S. firms competing for foreign government contracts. The NEI has not required CS to undertake new activities; however, it has prompted CS to direct more of its efforts toward certain markets, activities, and sectors and to shift its focus from firms that are new to exporting to firms already exporting, as firms exporting to new markets or increasing exports to markets in which they are already active produce the greatest share of export successes. In fiscal year 2012, CS will implement revised performance measures that align more closely with the NEI. Although CS did not meet four of its six performance targets in 2010, it achieved increases in most of its measures as it shifted to address NEI priorities. CS's revised performance measures for fiscal year 2012 address some past weaknesses; however, some weaknesses will remain--for example, the lack of a measure for customer-service satisfaction and the clients' underreporting of export successes, especially with regard to dollar value. CS's new measures necessitate that export success data be complete and accurate; otherwise, CS's efforts to support the NEI goal will be undervalued and policymakers will not have an accurate picture of CS's performance. CS's resource allocation management process does not make full use of relevant information to guide its decisions. CS is using a data-driven process to prioritize foreign markets (and domestic locations) and to help it allocate staff and other resources to meet its performance goals and support NEI objectives. GAO's analysis of the quantitative parts of the process, however, found that there may be opportunities to reallocate overseas resources to better reflect NEI priorities and better achieve CS's new performance goals. The overseas model, designed to reflect export potential of partner countries, currently gives greater weight to historical variables that have a high degree of overlap with the other historical inputs in the resource allocation process. Also, the process does not systematically consider important available data on commercial diplomacy and advocacy, which are related to CS performance goals, and program activity data on how CS staff divide their time. Including such data in the process would help Commerce managers make decisions informed by the best available information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Commerce (1) take steps to improve the CS customer-service survey response rate and include customer-service-related data in its performance measures, (2) take further steps to achieve greater cooperation by CS clients in reporting the dollar value of export successes, (3) review CS's Overseas Resource Allocation Model to determine whether its variables and structure best incorporate available indicators of potential U.S. exports, (4) include commercial diplomacy and advocacy data in evaluating cost-benefit ratios of CS locations, and (5) systematically include activity data in making resource allocation decisions. Commerce welcomed and generally agreed with the overall findings and recommendations in the report. |
gao_GAO-16-719T | gao_GAO-16-719T_0 | Selected States Faced Challenges in Detecting Benefit Fraud, and FNS Lacked Reliable Data about State Efforts
To Detect Fraud, Selected States Employed Tools Such As Data Matching, Referrals, Analysis of Transaction Data, and Website Monitoring
In the selected states we reviewed in 2014, officials told us they were using well-known tools for detecting potential recipient eligibility fraud, such as data matching and referrals obtained through fraud reporting hotlines and websites. In 2014, Most Selected States Reported that Their Investigations’ Effectiveness was Hindered by Limited Staffing and Caseload Increases, but Some Leveraged Additional Resources
At the time of our 2014 report, most of the selected states reported difficulties in conducting fraud investigations due to either reduced or stagnant staff levels while SNAP recipient numbers greatly increased from fiscal year 2009 through 2013. At the time of our report, some state officials suggested changing the financial incentives structure to help support the costs of investigating potential SNAP fraud because some investigative agencies were not rewarded for cost-effective, anti-fraud efforts that could prevent ineligible people from receiving benefits. In 2014, Selected States Reported Limited Effectiveness in Using Automated Monitoring Tools for Detecting Online Fraud and Replacement Card Data as a Detection Tool
In our 2014 report, we found that, upon testing, FNS’s recommended approaches to detecting online fraud were of limited utility and selected states had limited success with using FNS’s required approach to replacement card monitoring. At the time of our review, FNS officials acknowledged that there were limitations to the monitoring tools, and stated that they provided these tools at the request of states to help with monitoring efforts. Specifically, out of 1,180 postings we reviewed manually, we detected 28 postings indicative of potential SNAP trafficking. However, we also considered the monthly benefit period of replacement card requests by focusing on SNAP households receiving replacement cards in four or more unique monthly benefit periods in a year. As a result, we determined that additional replacement card requests in the same benefit period may not indicate increased risk of trafficking. We identified 7,537 SNAP recipient households in these three selected states that both received replacement cards in four or more monthly benefit periods in fiscal year 2012, and made at least one transaction considered to be a potential sign of trafficking around the time of the replacement card issuance, as shown in the table below. For example, as shown in the figure below, while there were 4,935 SNAP households in Michigan that received an excessive number of replacement cards, we identified just 39 households that received excessive replacement cards and made transactions resulting in 10 or more trafficking flags. We concluded in 2014 that while state SNAP officials may not want to limit their investigations to such a small number of households, this type of analysis may help provide a starting point for identifying higher priority households for further review. Furthermore, we reported that our more targeted approach may also be particularly helpful given that states had limited resources for conducting investigations. Despite these efforts, at the time of our report, FNS did not have consistent and reliable data on states’ anti-fraud activities because its reporting guidance lacked specificity. According to state and federal officials we interviewed, this information did not clearly establish a definition for what action constitutes an investigation and should then be reported on this form. FNS Is Working to Address GAO Recommendations to Enhance Detection Tools and Reporting
As a result of our 2014 findings, we made several recommendations, and FNS officials agreed with all of these recommendations and are taking actions to address them. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FNS to: explore ways that federal financial incentives can better support cost- effective state anti-fraud activities; establish additional guidance to help states analyze SNAP transaction data to better identify SNAP recipient households receiving replacement cards that are potentially engaging in trafficking, and assess whether the use of replacement card benefit periods may better focus this analysis on high-risk households potentially engaged in trafficking; reassess the effectiveness of the current guidance and tools recommended to states for monitoring e-commerce and social media websites, and use this information to enhance the effectiveness of the current guidance and tools; and take steps, such as guidance and training, to enhance the consistency of what states report on their anti-fraud activities. As of May 2016, FNS officials have reported progress in studying current anti-fraud approaches and developing better data on them but are still in the process of developing the final tools and guidance for enhancing the integrity of the SNAP program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2015, SNAP, the nation's largest nutrition support program, provided about 46 million people with $70 billion in benefits. Fraud has been a long-standing concern in the program, and state agencies are responsible for addressing SNAP recipient fraud. In 2014, GAO reviewed state and federal efforts to combat SNAP recipient fraud.
This testimony summarizes: (1) findings from GAO's 2014 report and (2) the steps FNS has taken since then to address GAO's recommendations. For its 2014 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance, and documents; interviewed officials in 11 states; interviewed federal officials; tested fraud detection tools using fiscal year 2012 program data, the most recent available at the time of GAO's report; and monitored websites for potential trafficking online. Although GAO's results are not generalizable to all states, the selected states served about a third of SNAP recipient households. For this statement, GAO reviewed FNS's actions to date on its recommendations.
What GAO Found
In 2014, GAO found that selected states employed a range of tools to detect potential Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recipient fraud, but they faced challenges, including inadequate staffing levels, that limited the effectiveness of their actions, and the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) lacked data about the states' efforts. The 11 states GAO studied reported using detection tools required or recommended by FNS, among others, to combat SNAP recipient fraud. However, 8 of these states reported difficulties in conducting fraud investigations due to reduced or stagnant staff levels and funding despite program growth, and some state officials suggested changing the financial incentives structure to help support the costs of investigating potential fraud.
GAO also found limitations to the effectiveness of website monitoring tools and the analysis of card replacement data states used, under the direction of FNS, for fraud detection. Specifically, GAO found FNS's recommended website monitoring tools to be less effective than manual searches and impractical for detecting internet posts indicative of SNAP trafficking—the misuse of program benefits to obtain non-food items. Further, although FNS required states to monitor SNAP households that request at least four replaced electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards in a year, GAO found that multiple EBT card requests in the same benefit period may not indicate increased risk of trafficking. GAO found that, by adjusting the analysis to focus on SNAP households that both requested cards in at least four different monthly benefit periods and engaged in suspicious transactions, states could possibly detect potential fraud more accurately. For example, in 2014, GAO found that 4,935 SNAP households in Michigan received at least 4 replaced EBT cards in a year. However, out of these householders, GAO identified 39 households that both received multiple replacement cards in at least four different monthly benefit periods and engaged in suspicious transactions indicative of SNAP trafficking, resulting in 10 or more trafficking flags. GAO reported that this type of targeted analysis may help provide states with a starting point for identifying higher priority households for further review, which can be particularly helpful given that states had reported having limited resources for conducting investigations.
GAO also found that, despite FNS's increased oversight efforts at that time, it did not have consistent and reliable data on states' anti-fraud activities because its reporting guidance lacked specificity. For example, the FNS guidance did not define the kinds of activities that should be counted as investigations, resulting in inconsistent data across states.
In 2014, GAO recommended, among other things, that FNS reassess current financial incentives, detection tools, and guidance to help states better combat fraud. As of May 2016, FNS reported progress in studying current anti-fraud approaches and developing better data on them, and is in the process of developing the final tools and guidance states need to help enhance the integrity of the SNAP program.
What GAO Recommends
In 2014, GAO recommended that FNS reassess its financial incentives for state anti-fraud efforts and tools for website monitoring; establish additional guidance related to EBT replacement card data; and enhance the reliability of state reporting. FNS agreed with GAO's recommendations and has been taking steps to address them. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony statement. |
gao_RCED-95-76 | gao_RCED-95-76_0 | 2.) Most of the 102 million pounds of food salvaged from the fire was released to the public with little apparent controversy. First, FDA did not adequately share information with KDHE about past problems it had experienced with a food owner’s consultant and his laboratories. FDA Did Not Adequately Communicate Important Information About Consultant and Laboratories
KDHE allowed several million pounds of food salvaged from the Americold fire to be sent to Minnesota on the basis of laboratory results submitted by a consultant to one of the food owners. However, FDA did not provide this information in a timely manner either to its Kansas City District Office or to the KDHE investigators overseeing the salvaging of the food. In March 1992, FDA provided Kansas with its Laboratory Procedures Manual, which spells out recommended sampling controls that FDA uses in monitoring imported foods. Chronology of Events Surrounding Food Shipments to Minnesota Salvager
March 1992
The owner of 3.7 million pounds of food hired a consultant to sample and test the food to determine if it could be salvaged. August 1992 to Present
No illnesses have been attributed to the food shipped to the Minnesota salvager. Comments From the Food and Drug Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on the Food and Drug Administration’s letter dated January 12, 1995. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. The food was sold by the salvager before the tests were completed. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the events surrounding a fire at a food storage warehouse in Kansas, focusing on the: (1) disposition of food salvaged from the facility; and (2) lessons learned from the incident that could be used to improve regulation of the food salvaging industry.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over half of the affected food was destroyed and the remaining 102 million pounds of food was released to the public after Kansas determined its salvageability; (2) about 3.7 million pounds of food was shipped to a salvager on the basis of laboratory results furnished by a consultant who was under investigation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); (3) although no illnesses were attributed to the food salvaged from the Kansas fire, potential public health risks were increased by shortcomings in FDA regulation of salvaged food; (4) FDA did not share important information with Kansas regarding its past problems with the consultant and his laboratories; and (5) FDA did not provide Kansas with guidance on food sampling controls that would have been useful in its oversight of the salvaging. |
gao_GAO-13-33 | gao_GAO-13-33_0 | 2. This number declined by over half within the first 5 years of TANF, and averaged about 1.9 million families in fiscal year 2011. States Use Flexible Federal TANF Funds to Emphasize Job Preparation and Work Supports for Low- Income Families and Services for At-Risk Children
In fiscal year 2011, nationwide, the top areas of state spending of federal TANF funds for non-cash services were child welfare, emergency aid, and other services; job preparation and work activities; and work supports including child care.populations for services and delivery methods differed within and across these three spending areas. State decisions on how to allocate funding for non-cash services were influenced by state priorities and TANF’s funding structure, according to officials we interviewed. Among our selected states, federal TANF funds were used to support child welfare services, such as child abuse hotlines, investigative and legal services, child protection, and preventive services as well as emergency aid, such as clothing and shelter. Among our selected states, job preparation and work activities included job readiness training related to resume-writing and interview preparation, help with the job search process, skills training, and subsidized employment. Officials in one selected state noted that they also provided activities such as English as a Second Language courses that do not count toward meeting work participation requirements. Other states we reviewed said they provide certain non-cash services to low-income families regardless of whether they receive cash assistance. Meanwhile, Florida and Utah coordinate work-related services with those provided through the Workforce Investment Act one-stop center system, through which job seekers can access most federally-funded employment and training programs and services. Officials in three of our selected states cited tensions between the need to provide cash assistance and the need to provide other state services. TANF’S Accountability Framework Provides Incomplete Information on States’ Use of TANF Funds
Current Reporting Provides Limited Information on State’s Use of Funds for Non-Cash Services
Although the TANF block grant has evolved into a flexible funding stream that states use to support a broad range of allowable services while also serving as the nation’s major cash assistance program for low-income families with children, the accountability framework currently in place in federal law and regulations has not kept pace with this evolution. There are no reporting requirements mandating performance information specifically on families receiving non-cash services or their outcomes, or information related to TANF’s role in filling needs in other areas like child welfare, even though this has become a more prominent spending area for TANF funds in many states.reporting gaps limit the information available for oversight of TANF block grant funds by HHS and Congress. For example, the law states that plans are to outline how a state will “conduct a program…that provides assistance to needy families with (or expecting) children and provides parents with job preparation, work, and support services to enable them to leave the program and become self-sufficient.” Federal law does not require states to include descriptions in their state plans of how they intend to use TANF funds beyond the cash assistance population for non-cash services, and states have used their discretion in For example, a state determining how much detail to put in their plans. Improving Performance Information to Include TANF Non-Cash Services Is Challenging
Several features of TANF pose challenges to designing performance measures, as indicated by our previous work. Although in many situations HHS can revise its reporting form to make adjustments to the reporting categories, generally HHS has limited authority to impose new TANF reporting requirements on states unless directed by Congress, so many changes to the types of performance information that states are required to report would require congressional action. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To provide better information for making decisions regarding the TANF block grant and better ensure accountability for TANF funds, Congress should consider ways to improve reporting and performance information so that it encompasses the full breadth of states’ uses of TANF funds. Recommendation for Executive Action
As HHS takes steps to revise expenditure reporting for TANF to better understand how states use TANF funds, it should develop a detailed plan with specific timelines to assist in monitoring its progress for revising its financial reporting categories for expenditures of federal TANF and state MOE funds. These 10 states accounted for nearly half of all federal and state spending for TANF non-cash services in fiscal year 2010. GAO-10-525. GAO-10-164. Welfare Reform: States Provide TANF-Funded Work Support Services to Many Low-Income Families Who Do Not Receive Cash Assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The TANF block grant, created as part of the 1996 welfare reforms, gives states flexibility to make key decisions about how to allocate funds to provide services to low-income families. The number of families receiving cash assistance declined by over half within the first 5 years of TANF, and states shifted their TANF priorities to other forms of aid, or non-cash services. In fiscal year 2011, states spent about 64 percent of nearly $31 billion in federal and state funds for such services, with federal funds accounting for nearly $9 billion. GAO examined (1) how states have used TANF funds for non-cash services and (2) what information is available to assess TANF performance for non-cash services and what challenges are involved in doing so. GAO reviewed past reports and relevant federal laws and regulations; analyzed state TANF expenditure information; and interviewed HHS officials, TANF experts, and officials in 10 selected states through site visits and phone conferences. These 10 states accounted for nearly half of all TANF spending for non-cash services in fiscal year 2010.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, states have used Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds not only to provide cash assistance, but also to provide noncash services, such as job preparation and work supports for low-income families and aid for at-risk children. Among our 10 selected states, job preparation and work activities included help with the job search process, skills training, and subsidized employment. California generally provides such services to families receiving cash assistance while the other nine states extend some of them to other low-income families. Florida and Utah provide such services in coordination with the Workforce Investment Act one-stop center system. Work supports among these states mainly include child care subsidies for low-income working families. Services for at-risk children include child welfare activities, such as child abuse hotlines, investigative and legal services, child protection, and preventive services. TANF has allowed states to make funding decisions based on state priorities, particularly as cash assistance caseload declines freed up funds for non-cash services. However, according to officials in three states GAO reviewed, state decisions to fund a broad array of services can create tensions and tradeoffs between meeting cash assistance and other service needs.
TANF's accountability framework provides incomplete information on how states' non-cash services are contributing to TANF purposes. Plans that states submit to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) outlining how they intend to run their TANF programs provide limited information on goals and strategies for non-cash services. In addition, past HHS reports and selected states identified some weaknesses in TANF expenditure reporting. For example, officials in one selected state noted that the use of TANF funds for child welfare services is not clearly identifiable in HHS's reporting categories for TANF expenditures. HHS is working to revise reporting categories, with a goal of implementing them for fiscal year 2014. No reporting requirements currently mandate performance information specifically on families receiving non-cash services or TANF's role in filling needs in prominent spending areas for TANF funds, like child welfare. These reporting gaps limit the information available for oversight of TANF block grant funds by HHS and Congress. Generally, HHS has limited authority to impose new TANF reporting requirements on states unless directed by Congress. While GAO's previous work on grant design highlights several features of grants, such as broad and varied purposes, that pose challenges to the development of performance information and measures, it also lays out accountability principles that can help address these issues for TANF.
What GAO Recommends
Congress may wish to consider ways to improve reporting and performance information so that it encompasses the full breadth of states' uses of TANF funds. GAO recommends that HHS develop a detailed plan with timelines to revise reporting categories for TANF expenditures. In its response, HHS provided some timeframes that we added to the report, although we maintain a more detailed plan will help HHS monitor its progress in completing this effort. |
gao_AIMD-95-34 | gao_AIMD-95-34_0 | Both the Congress and the administration are considering budgeting alternatives to decrease the annual federal deficit while increasing long-term federal investment intended to enhance private sector growth. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine (1) whether federal agencies are depreciating transportation infrastructure, R&D, and human capital for accounting and budgeting purposes, and if so, the methods they use, (2) whether any state, local, or foreign governments are depreciating these investments, and (3) whether depreciation of these investments could be useful in budgeting. Depreciation of assets in federal accounting is often not done because it is difficult to do and often provides little relevant information. Depreciation in accounting can be a complex and technical subject and involves significant subjectivity concerning such key factors as the asset’s value, its useful life, and its salvage value. First, it is often difficult, and in some cases impossible, to link federal grant money to the value of a specific infrastructure asset. Depreciation for National Economic Wealth Estimates
Although federal investments in transportation infrastructure, R&D, and human capital are not depreciated for budgeting or accounting purposes, OMB and BEA depreciate infrastructure and R&D investments to make rough estimates of national wealth for analytical purposes. In these economywide analyses, the problems of determining ownership or control of assets are not relevant. Private businesses use depreciation primarily for two purposes: (1) to match revenues with expenses in a given period for the purposes of reporting profit or loss in financial statements and (2) for tax purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed whether: (1) federal agencies are depreciating transportation infrastructure, research and development (R&D), and human capital investments for accounting and budgeting purposes; and (2) depreciation of these investments could be useful in federal budgeting.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the federal government generally does not depreciate transportation infrastructure, R&D, and human capital investments for accounting or budgeting purposes; (2) Congress and the Administration are considering budgeting alternatives to decrease the annual federal deficit and increase long-term federal investments; (3) budget and accounting experts do not support depreciating these investments for budgeting purposes, since it is difficult to determine the value and useful life of such investments; (4) depreciation in accounting is complex and involves such key factors as the asset's value, its useful life, and its salvage value; (5) federal agencies do not depreciate assets they do not own because it is difficult to link federal grant money to the value of a specific asset; (6) although economists depreciate infrastructure and R&D investments to generate national economic wealth estimates, the problems of determining ownership or control of assets are not relevant in these analyses; and (7) private businesses use depreciation primarily to match revenues with expenses for a given period and for tax purposes. |
gao_GAO-14-595 | gao_GAO-14-595_0 | The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), estimates and sets a standard price for its fuel and other fuel- related commodities that endeavors to closely approximate the actual per barrel price during budget execution, which occurs almost a year later. DOD utilizes its Defense-wide Working Capital Fund to purchase bulk fuel for customers. The fund covers DLA’s costs for purchasing bulk fuel and is reimbursed through its sale of fuel to the military services and other customers at a standard price. Differences between Estimated and Actual Fuel Costs Were Largely Due to Fuel Price Fluctuations
We identified two primary factors that accounted for the difference between estimated and actual costs—(1) fluctuations in the market price of fuel and (2) differences between the services’ estimated and actual fuel consumption. Our analysis showed that from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the differences between the price DOD paid for fuel and the price it charged its fuel customers—the standard price—accounted for, on average, 74 percent of the difference between estimated and actual costs. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, differences in the price of crude oil accounted for most of the difference between the estimated and actual prices—in 2009 for 95 percent of the difference and in 2010 for 72 percent. In fiscal years 2009 through 2012, the military services’ estimated fuel requirements were within 5 percent of their actual consumption, as shown in figure 4. DOD Has Conducted Studies on Its Management of Working Capital Funds, but Has Not Reevaluated Its Approach or Documented Its Assumptions for Estimating Fuel Costs
DOD has studied various aspects of its bulk fuel program since 2004, but it has not updated its current approach for setting the standard price to reflect current market conditions or documented its rationale for the assumptions it uses in estimating the standard price—even though the differences between its estimated and actual costs have been considerable since that time. DOD Has Not Reevaluated Its Approach or Documented its Assumptions for Setting the Standard Price
According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, a cost estimate should be updated regularly to reflect significant changes—such as changes to assumptions—and actual costs, so that it always reflects current conditions. In its comments, DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the second recommendation. Reevaluating its approach for estimating the components of the standard price would allow DOD to develop more- informed estimates and better position the department to minimize risks and uncertainty resulting from changing market conditions. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a cost estimate should be supported by detailed documentation that describes how it was derived. Documenting DOD’s assumptions, including the rationale for each component of the standard price, would provide greater transparency and clarify for fuel customers and decision makers the process DOD uses to set the standard price. To determine how estimated bulk fuel costs have compared with actual costs since fiscal year 2009 and identify the factors that contributed to any differences, we compared the estimated budget costs for fuel against actual costs in the budget year of execution and identified any differences. Next, we compared each of the three components of the standard price (crude oil price, refinement markup, and nonproduct costs—such as transportation and facilities maintenance) against the actual costs for each component to determine which one contributed most to the difference between the standard price and actual fuel costs. To determine the extent to which DOD has considered options for adjusting its approach for estimating bulk fuel costs and managing working capital funds, we reviewed related studies and recommendations that we identified through interviews with DOD officials and literature searches that discuss options available to DOD to adjust its approach to managing bulk fuel costs and working capital funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD purchases bulk fuel and sells it to customers, including the military services. Each fiscal year, DOD sets a standard price for budgeting purposes, endeavoring to closely approximate the price it will pay when it buys the fuel almost a year later. If this price is different than the standard price, DOD may need to take actions to manage its working capital funds—funds used to purchase fuel and other commodities that are reimbursed through sales.
Senate Report 113-44, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, mandated GAO to review DOD's approach for establishing its bulk fuel pricing. This report discusses, among other things, (1) how estimated bulk fuel costs have compared to actual costs since FY 2009 and the factors that have contributed to any differences; and (2) the extent to which DOD has considered options for adjusting its approach to estimating bulk fuel costs and managing working capital funds in light of any differences between estimated and actual fuel costs. GAO compared estimated and actual fuel costs for FY 2009 through 2013 and analyzed DOD actions to manage working capital funds.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Department of Defense's (DOD) actual costs for bulk fuel differed considerably from its budget estimates, largely because of fluctuations in fuel price in the open market. During this period, DOD underestimated its costs for 3 years and overestimated them for 2 years as shown below. GAO identified two factors that contributed to the differences between estimated and actual costs—(1) fuel price fluctuations and (2) differences between the military services' estimated fuel requirements and their actual fuel consumption. GAO's analysis showed that the differences between the price DOD paid for fuel and the price it charged its fuel customers—the standard price—accounted for, on average, 74 percent of the difference between estimated and actual costs. Specifically, of the three components of the standard price that DOD sets each fiscal year—crude oil, refinement markup, and nonproduct costs, such as transportation and facilities maintenance costs—differences in the price of crude oil accounted for most of the difference between estimated and actual fuel costs in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. In fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the refinement markup accounted for most of the difference. Differences between the services' estimated fuel requirements and actual fuel consumption accounted for an average of 26 percent of the difference between estimated and actual fuel costs.
Since 2004, DOD has conducted reviews of aspects of its bulk fuel program to determine whether adjustments should be made, including managing acquisition strategies, managing working capital funds, and budgeting for cost fluctuations. However, it has not updated its approach to reflect current market conditions or documented its rationale for the assumptions it uses in estimating the standard price. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and Office of Management and Budget guidance state that a cost estimate should be updated regularly to reflect changes to assumptions and actual costs, so that it always reflects current conditions. Furthermore, cost estimates should be supported by detailed documentation that describes how they were derived. Reevaluating its approach for estimating the standard price would allow DOD to develop more informed estimates and better position it to minimize risks and uncertainty resulting from changing market conditions. Further, documenting the rationale for its assumptions would provide greater transparency and clarify for fuel customers and decision makers the process DOD uses to set the standard price.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD reevaluate its approach for estimating the components of the standard price and document the rationale for its assumptions. DOD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second stating there is a closely-monitored, formal process. GAO continues to believe the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-234 | gao_GAO-07-234_0 | Improvements to Supply Chain Management Are Linked with Overall Defense Business Transformation and Completion of a Comprehensive, Integrated Logistics Strategy
DOD’s success in improving supply chain management is closely linked with its overall defense business transformation efforts and completion of a comprehensive, integrated logistics strategy. In previous reports and testimonies, we have stated that progress in DOD’s overall approach to business transformation is needed to confront problems in other high-risk areas, including supply chain management. DOD has taken several steps intended to advance business transformation, including establishing new governance structures and aligning new information systems with its business enterprise architecture. It would identify the scope of logistics problems and capability gaps to be addressed and include specific performance goals, programs, milestones, resources, and metrics to guide improvements in supply chain management and other areas of DOD logistics. DOD has not established a target date for completing the “To Be” roadmap. According to DOD officials, its completion is pending the results of the department’s ongoing test of new concepts for managing logistics capabilities. Without such a strategy, decision makers will lack the means to effectively guide program efforts and the ability to determine if these efforts are achieving the desired results. DOD Is Unable to Demonstrate the Full Extent of Its Progress Toward Improving Supply Chain Management
Although DOD is making progress implementing supply chain management initiatives, it is unable to demonstrate at this time the full extent to which it is improving supply chain management. DOD’s Supply Chain Management Plan Does Not Track Performance Outcomes and Costs Metrics Associated with Focus Areas and Initiatives
The supply chain management improvement plan generally lacks outcome- focused performance metrics that track progress in the three focus areas and at the initiative level. DOD’s plan does include four high-level performance measures that are being tracked across the department, and while they are not required to do so, these measures do not explicitly relate to the focus areas. In addition to improving the provision of supplies to the warfighter and improving readiness of equipment, DOD’s stated goal in its supply chain management improvement plan is to reduce or avoid costs. DOD Has Implemented Recommendations for Improving Aspects of Supply Chain Management
Over the last 5 years, audit organizations have made more than 400 recommendations that focused specifically on improving certain aspects of DOD’s supply chain management. DOD or the component organization concurred with almost 90 percent of these recommendations, and most of the recommendations that were closed as of the time of our review were considered implemented. DOD agreed with the intent of the recommendation, but not the prescribed action. In further analyzing the recommendations, we found that they addressed five common themes—management oversight, performance tracking, policy, planning, and processes. In addition, while DOD has made a commitment to improving supply chain management, as demonstrated by the development and implementation of the supply chain management improvement plan, the plan generally lacks outcome-focused performance metrics that would enable DOD to track and demonstrate the extent to which its individual efforts improve supply chain management or the extent of improvement in the three focus areas of requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to guide logistics programs and initiatives across the department and to demonstrate the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of its efforts to resolve supply chain management problems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following two actions: Complete the development of a comprehensive, integrated logistics strategy that is aligned with other defense business transformation efforts, including the Enterprise Transition Plan. However, it is unclear from DOD’s response how and under what timeframes the department plans to implement this goal. A-2. Development of the foundational role of the Distribution Process Owner. | Why GAO Did This Study
Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused attention on the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. The supply chain can be critical to determining outcomes on the battlefield, and the investment of resources in DOD's supply chain is substantial. In 2005, with the encouragement of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD prepared an improvement plan to address some of the systemic weaknesses in supply chain management. GAO was asked to monitor implementation of the plan and DOD's progress toward improving supply chain management. GAO reviewed (1) the integration of supply chain management with broader defense business transformation and strategic logistics planning efforts; and (2) the extent DOD is able to demonstrate progress. In addition, GAO developed a baseline of prior supply chain management recommendations. GAO surveyed supply chain-related reports issued since October 2001, identified common themes, and determined the status of the recommendations.
What GAO Found
DOD's success in improving supply chain management is closely linked with its defense business transformation efforts and completion of a comprehensive, integrated logistics strategy. Based on GAO's prior reviews and recommendations, GAO has concluded that progress in DOD's overall approach to business defense transformation is needed to confront problems in other high-risk areas, including supply chain management. DOD has taken several actions intended to advance business transformation, including the establishment of new governance structures and the issuance of an Enterprise Transition Plan aligned with the department's business enterprise architecture. As a separate effort, DOD has been developing a strategy--called the "To Be" logistics roadmap--to guide logistics programs and initiatives across the department. The strategy would identify the scope of logistics problems and capability gaps to be addressed and include specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and metrics. However, DOD has not identified a target date for completion of this effort. According to DOD officials, its completion is pending the results of the department's ongoing test of new concepts for managing logistic capabilities. Without a comprehensive, integrated strategy, decision makers will lack the means to effectively guide logistics efforts, including supply chain management, and the ability to determine if these efforts are achieving desired results. DOD has taken a number of actions to improve supply chain management, but the department is unable to demonstrate at this time the full extent of its progress that may have resulted from its efforts. In addition to implementing audit recommendations, DOD is implementing initiatives in its supply chain management improvement plan. However, it is unclear how much progress its actions have resulted in because the plan generally lacks outcome-focused performance metrics that track progress in the three focus areas and at the initiative level. DOD's plan includes four high-level performance measures, but these measures do not explicitly relate to the focus areas, and they may be affected by many variables, such as disruptions in the distribution process, other than DOD's supply chain initiatives. Further, the plan does not include overall cost metrics that might show efficiencies gained through the efforts. Therefore, it is unclear whether DOD is meeting its stated goal of improving the provision of supplies to the warfighter and improving readiness of equipment while reducing or avoiding costs. Over the last 5 years, audit organizations have made more than 400 recommendations that focused specifically on improving certain aspects of DOD's supply chain management. About two-thirds of the recommendations had been closed at the time GAO conducted its review, and most of these were considered implemented. Of the total recommendations, 41 percent covered the focus areas in DOD's supply chain management improvement plan: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. The recommendations addressed five common themes--management oversight, performance tracking, planning, policy, and processes. |
gao_GAO-11-439 | gao_GAO-11-439_0 | IRS may contact taxpayers about any differences. New Zealand Does Integrated Evaluations of Tax Expenditures and Discretionary Spending Programs to Analyze Their Effects and Improve Program Delivery
New Zealand, like the United States, addresses various national objectives through a combination of tax expenditures and discretionary spending programs. Rather than doing separate evaluations, New Zealand completes integrated evaluations of tax expenditures and discretionary spending programs to analyze their combined effects. The research found that the WFF program aided the transition from relying on government benefits to employment, as intended. Electronic tax administration is part of a governmentwide policy to use electronic services to lower the cost of government and encourage growth in the private sector. Overall, the growth of electronic services, according to Finnish officials, has helped to reduce Tax Administration staff by over 11 percent from 2003 to 2009 while improving taxpayer service. This cultural attitude helps promote compliance. IRS Considers Foreign Tax Practices That Might Merit Adoption
IRS officials learn about foreign tax practices by participating in international organizations of tax administrators. Second, the IRS participates with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), which is chaired by the IRS Commissioner during 2011. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For our objective to describe how other countries have approached tax administration issues that are similar to those in the U.S. tax system, we selected six foreign tax administrators. We based our selection of these practices on several factors, including whether the tax administrators had advanced economies and tax systems and the foreign tax administrator’s approach differed, at least in part, from how the United States approaches similar issues. To describe whether and how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) identifies and integrates tax administration practices used in other countries, we interviewed IRS officials and reviewed related documents. We also followed up with IRS officials based on any information we found independently about practices that relate to issues in the U.S. tax system and our comparison of U.S. and other administrator’s practices. The descriptive information on the practices of foreign administrators presented in this report may provide useful insights for Congress and others on alternatives to current U.S. tax policies and practices. What Is New Zealand’s Working For Families Tax Credits Program? The IRD and MSD portions of the WFF tax credit program are intended to work together to assist low- to middle- income families and promote employment. Why Did Finland Increase Its Use of Electronic Tax Administration? The UK and United States both have individual income tax returns and use information reporting and tax withholding to help ensure the correct tax is reported and paid. In 2009, IRS formed the Global High Wealth Industry (GHWI) program to take a holistic approach to high- wealth individuals. IRS consulted with the ATO to discuss ATO’s approach to the high-wealth population as well as its operational best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and foreign tax administrators face similar issues regardless of the particular provisions of their laws. These issues include, for example, helping taxpayers prepare and file returns, and assuring tax compliance. Understanding how other tax administrators have used certain practices to address common issues can provide insights to help inform deliberations about tax reform and about possible administrative changes in the U.S. existing system to improve compliance, better serve taxpayers, reduce burdens, and increase efficiencies. GAO was asked to describe (1) how foreign tax administrators have approached issues that are similar to those in the U.S. tax system and (2) whether and how the IRS identifies and adopts tax administration practices used elsewhere. To do this, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed six foreign tax administrators. In some cases, GAO also interviewed tax experts, tax practitioners, taxpayers, and trade-group representatives who were selected based on their expertise or involvement in developing or using the foreign systems. GAO also examined documents and met with IRS officials.
What GAO Found
Foreign and U.S. tax administrators use many of the same practices such as information reporting, tax withholding, providing Web-based services, and finding new approaches for tax compliance. These practices, although common to each system, have important differences. Although differences in laws, culture, or other factors likely would affect the transferability of foreign tax practices to the United States, these practices may provide useful insights for policymakers and the IRS. For example, New Zealand integrates evaluations of its tax and discretionary spending programs. The evaluation of its Working For Families tax benefits and discretionary spending, which together financially assist low- and middle-income families to promote employment, found that its programs aided the transition to employment but that it still had an underserved population; these findings likely would not have emerged from separate evaluations. GAO previously has reported that the United States lacks clarity on evaluating tax expenditures and related discretionary spending programs and does not generally undertake integrated evaluations. In Finland, electronic tax administration is part of a government policy to use electronic services to lower the cost of government and encourage private-sector growth. Overall, according to Finnish officials, electronic services have helped to reduce Tax Administration staff by over 11 percent from 2003 to 2009 while improving taxpayer service. IRS officials learn about these practices based on interactions with other tax administrators and participation in international organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In turn, the IRS may adopt new practices based on the needs of the U.S. tax system. For example, in 2009, the IRS formed the Global High Wealth Industry program. The IRS consulted with Australia about its approach and operational practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-04-225 | gao_GAO-04-225_0 | In November 2002 the Corporation suspended enrollments in AmeriCorps. Trust Database and Participant Documentation Discrepancies Could Affect Estimates of Probable Education Award Expenditures
Discrepancies between the information in the Trust database and participant documentation indicate that not all AmeriCorps enrollment and exit information has been accurately recorded in the Trust database. We estimate that about 5 percent (8,300 enrollments) have a discrepancy between the Trust database and participant documentation. Of these, about 3 percent (4,400 enrollments) could affect estimates of future probable expenditures of the Trust. The New Model Increased Funding Estimates and Does Not Consider External Factors
In 2003, the Corporation began using a new model to estimate the funding needed to provide future education awards through the Trust. This new model used conservative values that increased the Trust’s funding estimates as compared with the previous model. However, they chose to use more conservative values because the AmeriCorps program does not have a long history and they wanted to regain credibility after having had to suspend enrollments in 2002. According to Corporation officials, the SAL model was used from 1996 to 2003. However, the Corporation has formed a Management Improvement Team to examine the potential costs and benefits of upgrading the model to account for some external factors. Operational Changes Should Reduce the Risk of Enrollment Suspensions, but Two New Policies May Hinder Service Delivery and May Contribute to Higher Balances in the Trust
The Corporation has implemented and planned substantive changes that should minimize the risk of an enrollment suspension in the future, and it has met or plans to meet the requirements established by the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act. The Corporation has made changes to address these factors. Some Changes Have Not Been Fully Implemented
Corporation officials stated that they are planning to improve oversight of grantees’ performance. As previously mentioned, since the passage of the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act, the Corporation obligates funds for all AmeriCorps positions when the grants are approved and prior to participants actually enrolling. Additionally, as previously stated, we found that the Corporation has not fully implemented its efforts to improve oversight of grantees’ performance, its procedures do not ensure accurate data in the Trust database, and the Corporation’s ability to fully use the data on its participants may be limited because the users’ manual for the database has not been kept current. To enhance the accuracy of Trust budget estimates and ensure the Trust does not accumulate large balances, create a means to take into account the possible impact that external factors may have on participant behavior in its funding estimates and budget requests, establish and execute a periodic deobligation schedule for unused Trust review the assumptions being used in the new funding model after the Corporation gains more experience with the new model and current participant behavior. The act redefined what an obligation is for purposes of the AmeriCorps program by authorizing the Corporation to “record as an obligation an estimate of the net present value of the national service educational award associated with the position, based on a formula that takes into consideration historical rates of enrollment in such a program, and of earning and using national service educational awards for such a program.” With regard to when the Corporation incurs a liability, the act requires the Corporation to change its obligation practices by specifying that the Corporation obligate funds from the Trust at the time it awards a grant approving a new participant slot, rather than at time of enrollment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corporation for National and Community Service (the Corporation) was created to help meet community needs and expand educational opportunity by providing education awards to participants. The Corporation oversees and funds the AmeriCorps program as well as the National Service Trust (the Trust), which pays the education awards. From November 2002 to March 2003 the Corporation suspended AmeriCorps enrollments because there would not have been sufficient funds in the Trust to pay education awards. GAO was asked to determine (1) if all AmeriCorps enrollments were accurately recorded, (2) how the Corporation estimated its funding needs, and (3) if the Corporation made changes to prevent another enrollment suspension and to address requirements established in the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act. GAO analyzed laws, reviewed documents, interviewed officials, assessed the reliability of the Trust database, examined the model used to estimate funding needs, and surveyed Americorps grantees.
What GAO Found
Discrepancies between information in the Trust database and participant documentation indicate that not all AmeriCorps participant information was accurately reflected in the Trust database. An estimated 5 percent (8,300) of about 158,000 enrollments from program years 2000 to 2002 have discrepancies, and about 3 percent (4,400) have discrepancies that could affect estimates of future probable expenditures of the Trust. Further, the users' manual for the Trust database system had not been updated. In 2003 the Corporation began using a new model with conservative assumptions of participant behavior to develop its funding estimates. Corporation officials explained that they used conservative assumptions because the AmeriCorps program does not have a long history from which to extrapolate participant behavior, and the Corporation wanted to regain credibility after the enrollment suspension in 2002. Using the new model may be prudent until the Corporation gains more experience. However, because the new model increased the Trust's funding estimates, the Corporation will need to monitor actual experience compared with the model's assumptions and may need to deobligate unused Trust funds. Further, the new model does not incorporate external factors, such as downturns in the economy, which may affect funding estimates or the Trust's balances. The Corporation recently formed a team to assess the costs and benefits of adding external factors in its model. The Corporation has made some changes to its operations that minimize the likelihood it will need to suspend enrollments in the future. Corporation officials have been obligating Trust funds when positions are approved since June 2003, and the communication and coordination among officials have greatly improved. Changes have also been implemented and planned to address the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act requirements. However, changes to improve oversight of grantees have not been fully implemented, and policies related to refilling vacated positions and converting unfilled positions may limit enrollments, hinder service delivery, and contribute to the accumulation of a larger Trust balance. |
gao_GGD-99-67 | gao_GGD-99-67_0 | These agencies, in effect, took the first step toward defining the performance consequences of budget decisions. However, 14 agency plans, or 40 percent of those included in our review, both identified the funding for program activities and explained how that funding would be allocated to a discrete set of performance goals. Funding Was Allocated to Performance Under a Variety of Conditions But Using Some Common Approaches
Our review of selected fiscal year 1999 performance plans indicated that agencies with budget and planning structures of widely varying complexity were able to develop approaches toward achieving a fundamental purpose of the Results Act—clarifying the relationship between resources and results. For example, agencies that (1) established simple relationships between program activities and performance goals or (2) fully integrated budget justifications and performance plans were significantly more likely to allocate program activity funding to performance goals. In addition, each of the three agencies that changed their budget structures to align them with their planning structures made these allocations. Certainly, some agencies were able to develop informative approaches to connect budgetary resources to results. integrating performance information with budget justifications. Linkages between plans and budgets must be supported by results-oriented and credible performance data to be useful. Moreover, challenges in performance planning and measurement and deficiencies in cost accounting systems continue to confront federal agencies. The progress that has been made and the challenges that persist underscore the importance of developing a specific agenda to ensure continued progress in better showing the performance consequences of budgetary decisions. Recommendation to OMB
In light of the indefinite delay of the performance budgeting pilots required by the Results Act and the experiences of agencies during the fiscal year 1999 performance planning and budgeting cycle, we recommend that the Director of OMB assess the approaches agencies use to link performance goals and program activities in the fiscal year 2000 performance plans. To do this, our objectives were to describe agencies’ approaches to linking performance goals and examine characteristics that might be associated with different approaches to linkage, and identify implications for future efforts to clarify the relationship between budgetary resources and results. We reviewed linkages between the program activities and performance goals presented in the plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected fiscal year (FY) 1999 federal agency performance plans, focusing on: (1) agencies' approaches to linking performance goals and budgetary resources; (2) characteristics that might be associated with different approaches to linking performance goals and budgetary resources; and (3) implications for future efforts to clarify the relationship between budgetary resources and results.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in their first Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 performance plans, agencies experimented with a variety of approaches to connect budget requests with anticipated results; (2) although most agencies reviewed (30 of 35) defined some type of relationship between the program activities of their proposed budgets and the performance goals of their plans, far fewer (14 or 40 percent of the plans reviewed) translated these relationships into budgetary terms--that is, most plans did not explain how funding would be allocated to achieve performance goals; (3) such allocations are a critical first step in defining the performance consequences of budgetary decisions; (4) GAO found that agencies with budget and planning structures of widely varying complexity made these allocations, but some common approaches were used; (5) agencies were significantly more likely to have allocated funding to program activities if they: (a) showed simple, clear relationships between program activities and performance goals (as illustrated by eight agencies in GAO's review); (b) fully integrated performance plans into congressional budget justifications (as illustrated by five agencies); or (c) had changed their program activity structures to reflect their goal structures (as illustrated by three agencies); (6) agencies' first-year experiences show progress in bringing planning and budgeting structures and presentations closer together, but much remains to be done if performance information is to be more useful for budget decisionmaking; (7) continued efforts are needed to: (a) clarify and strengthen links between planning and budgeting structures and presentations; and (b) address persistent challenges in performance planning and measurement and cost accounting; and (8) the progress that has been made, the challenges that persist--including the indefinite delay in the performance budgeting pilots called for by the act--and Congress' interest in having credible, results-oriented information underscore the importance of developing an agenda to ensure continued improvement in showing the performance consequences of budgetary decisions. |
gao_GAO-14-194 | gao_GAO-14-194_0 | The Number of Drug Shortages Remains High and Nearly Half Involve Generic Sterile Injectables
The number of drug shortages reported each year remains high, although there was a decrease in 2012 relative to the record number of new shortages reported in 2011. 2.) 3.) During a shortage, providers may have to cancel or delay procedures, which can have detrimental health effects on patients. Supply Disruptions Stemming from Quality Problems Frequently Identified as Triggering Recent Shortages
Quality Problems Leading to Shortages
The most frequently cited immediate cause for a drug shortage was that a manufacturer halted or slowed production after a quality problem was identified, resulting in a supply disruption. One manufacturer representative said that while manufacturers have experienced disruptions due to natural disasters, this has been rare. Half of the studies (10 of 20) we reviewed suggested that the immediate causes of drug shortages, such as quality problems, are driven by an underlying cause that stems from the economics of the generic sterile injectable drug market. Among other things, FDA is working to improve its response to drug shortages by implementing FDASIA’s requirements and the recommendations we made in 2011. FDA Has Prevented More Potential Shortages and Has Improved Its Ability to Respond to Shortages That Do Occur
FDA has taken steps that have prevented more potential shortages and improved its ability to resolve existing drug shortages since 2011, including expediting review of ANDAs and supplements, working with manufacturers to increase production, and using its regulatory discretion to allow certain products to remain on the market or bring new products to market. FDA has also taken steps to respond to the recommendations we made in our 2011 report. The first such data check was completed in 2012. In addition, FDA has not conducted routine analyses of its existing drug shortage database to identify, evaluate, and respond to the risks of drug shortages proactively. Many shortages are prolonged, with some spanning multiple years. These shortcomings could hinder FDA’s efforts to understand the causes of shortages as well as undermine its efforts to prevent them from occurring. Recommendations
To enhance its oversight of drug shortages, particularly as the agency fine-tunes the manner in which it gathers data on shortages and transitions from its database to a more robust system, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following two actions: develop policies and procedures for the use of the existing drug shortages database (and, ultimately, the new drug shortages information system) to ensure staff enter information into the database in a consistent manner and to ensure the accuracy of the information in the database; and conduct periodic analyses using the existing drug shortages database (and, eventually, the new drug shortages information system) to routinely and systematically assess drug shortage information, and use this information proactively to identify risk factors for potential drug shortages early, thereby potentially helping FDA to recognize trends, clarify causes, and resolve problems before drugs go into short supply. Specifically, to review trends in recent drug shortages that occurred from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2013, we analyzed data from the University of Utah Drug Information Service (UUDIS), which were the most recent data available at the time we did our work. These data are generally regarded as the most comprehensive and reliable source of drug shortage information for the time period we reviewed and are what we used in preparing our 2011 report. Department of Health and Human Services. Food and Drug Administration. activities. manufacturer and association representatives and to FDA for comment. Further, in response to new Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) authority, the agency is in the process of establishing a risk- based inspection schedule for all establishments. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
From prolonged duration of a disease, to permanent injury, to death, drug shortages have led to harmful patient outcomes. FDA—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—is responsible for protecting public health and works to prevent, alleviate, and resolve shortages. In 2011, GAO recommended that FDA should enhance its ability to respond to shortages. In 2012, FDASIA gave FDA new authorities to improve its responsiveness and mandated GAO to study drug shortages.
In this report, GAO (1) reviews the trends in recent drug shortages and describes what is known about their effect on patients and providers; (2) examines the causes of drug shortages; and (3) evaluates the progress FDA has made in addressing drug shortages. GAO analyzed data from FDA and the University of Utah Drug Information Service, which is generally regarded as the most comprehensive source of drug shortage information for the time period we reviewed. GAO interviewed officials from FDA and other federal agencies, organizations representing patients and providers, and drug manufacturers. GAO also reviewed the literature, relevant statutes, regulations, and documents.
What GAO Found
The number of drug shortages remains high. Although reports of new drug shortages declined in 2012, the total number of shortages active during a given year—including both new shortages reported and ongoing shortages that began in a prior year—has increased since 2007. Many shortages are of generic sterile injectable drugs. Provider association representatives reported that drug shortages may force providers to ration care or rely on less effective drugs.
The immediate cause of drug shortages can generally be traced to a manufacturer halting or slowing production to address quality problems, triggering a supply disruption. Other manufacturers have a limited ability to respond to supply disruptions due to constrained manufacturing capacity. GAO's analysis of data from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also showed that quality problems were a frequent cause. GAO also identified potential underlying causes specific to the economics of the generic sterile injectable drug market, such as that low profit margins have limited infrastructure investments or led some manufacturers to exit the market.
While shortages have persisted, FDA has prevented more potential shortages in the last 2 years by improving its responsiveness. Among other things, FDA implemented Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) requirements and recommendations GAO made in 2011. FDA has also initiated other steps to improve its response to shortages, such as developing procedures to enhance coordination between headquarters and field staff. However, there are shortcomings in its management of drug shortage data that are inconsistent with internal control standards. For example, FDA has not created policies or procedures governing the management of the data and does not perform routine quality checks on its data. Such shortcomings could ultimately hinder FDA's efforts to understand the causes of specific shortages as well as undermine its efforts to prevent them from occurring. In addition, FDA has not conducted routine analyses of the data to proactively identify and evaluate the risks of drug shortages.
What GAO Recommends
FDA should strengthen its internal controls over its drug shortage data and conduct periodic analyses to routinely and systematically assess drug shortage information, using this information to proactively identify drug shortage risk factors. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-39 | gao_HEHS-96-39_0 | We found three common themes among their recommendations: (1) states should first clearly define equity goals in terms of the funding level needed to ensure adequate learning resources for all students or the funding needed to ensure a certain level of student performance, (2) states should link school finance reform to accountability, and (3) the reform process should be inclusive and encourage the participation of all groups affected by such reform. Clearly Define Goals of School Finance System
Officials in all three states suggested that states clarify the equity goals of a school finance system by defining such goals in terms of adequate learning resources or student performance standards. Legislative solutions have had to be sensitive to taxpayers’ concerns about increased taxes and to concerns of wealthy districts that want to maintain existing spending levels. Technical Appendix
The objectives of this study were to characterize, for each state reviewed, (1) the reforms to the school finance systems and the legal, budgetary, and political pressures the state legislatures faced in making the reforms and (2) the general impact of the legislative remedies, especially in addressing disparities in educational funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the experiences of three states that reformed their school finance systems, focusing on the: (1) reforms made to each school finance system; (2) legal, budgetary, and political pressures that state legislatures faced in making the reforms; and (3) impact of the legislative remedies in addressing educational funding disparities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) lawsuits prompted each state to address education funding disparities among school districts; (2) legislative solutions in all three states helped poor districts without harming the educational programs of wealthy districts and were sensitive to public sentiments concerning taxes; and (3) states undergoing similar education finance reforms should define the equity goals of their school finance systems in terms of the funding needed to achieve a certain level of student performance, link funding reform with greater accountability for student performance, and encourage all groups affected by education finance reform to participate in the decisionmaking process. |
gao_GAO-05-121 | gao_GAO-05-121_0 | Background
When DHS was created in March 2003, ODP was transferred from the Justice Department’s OJP to DHS’s Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. In addition, other preparedness grant programs from agencies within DHS were transferred to SLGCP. ODP Established Grant Award Procedures for States and Localities That Support Efforts to Improve Accountability in State Preparedness Planning
Over time, ODP has developed and modified its procedures for awarding grants to states, governing how states distribute funds to local jurisdictions, and facilitating reimbursements for states and localities purchasing first responder equipment and services. ODP Gave States Flexibility in Administering and Distributing Grants
For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, ODP developed procedures and guidelines for awarding SDPP/SHSGP and UASI grants to states that enabled states to distribute grant funds and states and localities to expend funds and seek reimbursement for first responder equipment or services they purchased directly. ODP directed the states in fiscal year 2003 to update their homeland security strategies to better reflect post-September 11 realities and to identify progress on the priorities originally outlined in the initial strategies. ODP Has Begun Drafting National Preparedness Standards to Better Assess First Responder Needs
In addition to the issues raised about the accuracy of the fiscal year 2003 needs assessments, other factors may affect ODP’s and states’ abilities to identify and assess first responder needs and priorities. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, ODP did not set formal monitoring goals, such as a specific number of on-site visits to be made in a given year. Congress, ODP, States, and Localities Have Acted to Expedite Grant Awards, but Challenges Remain
Statutory Deadlines Were Imposed to Expedite the Grant Award and Distribution Process
Congress, the Conference of Mayors, some state and local officials, and others expressed concerns about the time ODP was taking to award grant funds to states and for states to transfer grant funds to local jurisdictions. According to ODP data for SHSGP II, ODP made the grant application available to states within the required deadline and awarded over 90 percent of the grants within 14 days of receiving the applications. For SHSGP II, the appropriations statute also mandated that states submit grant applications within 30 days of the grant announcement. To further assist states in expediting the transfer of grant funds to local jurisdictions, ODP also modified its requirements for documentation to be submitted as part of the grant application process for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DHS generally agreed with the report’s findings. To determine how SHSGP and UASI were administered in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 so that ODP could ensure that grant funds were spent in accordance with grant guidance and state preparedness planning, we interviewed ODP officials and homeland security and grant management officials and first responders in the five selected states and from selected local jurisdictions within those states. To determine the time frames for awarding and distributing SHSGP and UASI grants established by ODP grant guidance or by law, and how these time frames affected the grant cycle, we obtained and analyzed appropriations acts and program guidelines for the grant programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)--originally established in 1998 within the Department of Justice to help state and local first responders acquire specialized training and equipment needed to respond to terrorist incidents--was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security upon its creation in March 2003. After September 11, 2001, the scope and size of ODP's grant programs expanded. For example, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, ODP grants awarded to states and some urban areas grew from about $91 million to about $2.7 billion. This growth raised questions about the ability of ODP and states to ensure that the domestic preparedness grant programs--including statewide and urban area grants--are managed effectively and efficiently. GAO addressed (1) how statewide and urban area grants were administered in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 so that ODP could ensure that grant funds were spent in accordance with grant guidance and state preparedness planning and (2) what time frames Congress and ODP established for awarding and distributing grants, and how time frames affected the grant cycle.
What GAO Found
ODP has established and refined grant award procedures for states and localities to improve accountability in state preparedness planning. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, ODP developed procedures and guidelines for awarding statewide and urban area grants to states and for determining how states and localities could expend funds and seek reimbursement for first responder equipment or services. ODP gave states flexibility by allowing them to determine how grant funds were to be managed and distributed within their states. In fiscal year 2003, ODP required states to update homeland security strategies and related needs assessments prepared in earlier years. These efforts are intended to guide states and localities in targeting grant funds. ODP also took steps to improve grant oversight procedures. Finally, to help meet mandates contained in a presidential directive, ODP has begun drafting national preparedness standards to identify and assess gaps in first responder capabilities on a national basis. Congress and ODP have acted to expedite grant awards by setting time limits for grant application, award, and distribution processes. For fiscal year 2002 through February 2003, the appropriations statutes did not require ODP to award grant funds to states within a specific time frame. Then, in April 2003, the supplemental appropriations act imposed new deadlines on ODP and the states. As a result, ODP reported that all states submitted grant applications within the mandated 30 days of the grant announcement, and that over 90 percent of grants were awarded within the mandated 15 days of receipt of the applications. ODP also took steps to expedite the transfer of funds from states to local jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the ability of states and localities to spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the need to adhere to various legal and procurement requirements. ODP is identifying best practices to help states address the issue. In reviewing a draft of the report, the Department of Homeland Security generally agreed with GAO's findings; however, it questioned whether the report's title adequately reflected the agency's progress in meeting grant management challenges. |
gao_GAO-15-758T | gao_GAO-15-758T_0 | Ineffective protection of these information systems and networks can result in a failure to deliver these vital services, and result in loss or theft of computer resources, assets, and funds; inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, such as national security information, PII, and proprietary business information; disruption of essential operations supporting critical infrastructure, national defense, or emergency services; undermining of agency missions due to embarrassing incidents that erode the public’s confidence in government; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch attacks on other systems; damage to networks and equipment; and high costs for remediation. These laws include the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), which, among other things, authorizes DHS to (1) assist the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with overseeing and monitoring agencies’ implementation of security requirements; (2) operate the federal information security incident center; and (3) provide agencies with operational and technical assistance, such as that for continuously diagnosing and mitigating cyber threats and vulnerabilities. The Federal Government Faces an Evolving Array of Cyber-Based Threats
Risks to cyber-based assets can originate from unintentional or intentional threats. Unintentional threats can be caused by, among other things, natural disasters, defective computer or network equipment, and careless or poorly trained employees. These inherent advantages, combined with the increasing sophistication of cyber tools and techniques, allow threat actors to target government agencies and their contractors, potentially resulting in the disclosure, alteration, or loss of sensitive information, including PII; theft of intellectual property; destruction or disruption of critical systems; and damage to economic and national security. Since fiscal year 2006, the number of information security incidents affecting systems supporting the federal government has steadily increased each year: rising from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 67,168 in fiscal year 2014, an increase of 1,121 percent. We and agency inspectors general have identified challenges in protecting federal information and systems, including those in the following key areas:
Designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at federal agencies. Specifically, for fiscal year 2014, 19 of the 24 federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Actreported that information security control deficiencies were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency in internal controls over Moreover, inspectors general at 23 of the 24 their financial reporting.agencies cited information security as a major management challenge for their agency. We and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies aimed at improving their implementation of these information security controls. Enhancing oversight of contractors providing IT services. We also made one recommendation to OPM and the agency concurred, but has not yet implemented this recommendation. Improving security incident response activities. Responding to breaches of PII. Implementing security programs at small agencies. Until federal agencies take actions to address these challenges— including implementing the hundreds of recommendations we and inspectors general have made—federal systems and information will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats. Government-wide Cybersecurity Initiatives Present Potential Benefits and Challenges
In addition to the efforts of individual agencies, DHS and OMB have several initiatives under way to enhance cybersecurity across the federal government. Subsequently, NIST defined requirements for such personal identity verification (PIV) credentials based on “smart cards”—plastic cards with integrated circuit chips to store and process data—and OMB directed federal agencies to issue and use PIV credentials to control access to federal facilities and systems. National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS): The National Cybersecurity Protection System, operationally known as “EINSTEIN,” is a suite of capabilities intended to detect and prevent malicious network traffic from entering and exiting federal civilian government networks. Our final report is expected to be released later this year, and our preliminary observations include the following:
DHS appears to have developed and deployed aspects of the intrusion detection and intrusion prevention capabilities, but potential weaknesses may limit their ability to detect and prevent computer intrusions. While recent government-wide initiatives hold promise for bolstering the federal cybersecurity posture, it is important to note that no single technology or set of practices is sufficient to protect against all these threats. A “defense in depth” strategy is required that includes well-trained personnel, effective and consistently applied processes, and appropriately implemented technologies. Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Address Challenges Facing Federal Systems. Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective cybersecurity for federal information systems is essential to preventing the loss of resources, the compromise of sensitive information, and the disruption of government operations. Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area, and in 2003 expanded this area to include computerized systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure. Earlier this year, in GAO's high-risk update, the area was further expanded to include protecting the privacy of personal information that is collected, maintained, and shared by both federal and nonfederal entities.
This statement summarizes (1) cyber threats to federal systems, (2) challenges facing federal agencies in securing their systems and information, and (3) government-wide initiatives aimed at improving cybersecurity. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published and ongoing work in this area.
What GAO Found
Federal systems face an evolving array of cyber-based threats. These threats can be unintentional—for example, from equipment failure or careless or poorly trained employees; or intentional—targeted or untargeted attacks from criminals, hackers, adversarial nations, or terrorists, among others. Threat actors use a variety of attack techniques that can adversely affect federal information, computers, software, networks, or operations, potentially resulting in the disclosure, alteration, or loss of sensitive information; destruction or disruption of critical systems; or damage to economic and national security. These concerns are further highlighted by recent incidents involving breaches of sensitive data and the sharp increase in information security incidents reported by federal agencies over the last several years, which have risen from 5,503 in fiscal year 2006 to 67,168 in fiscal year 2014.
GAO has identified a number of challenges federal agencies face in addressing threats to their cybersecurity. For example, agencies have been challenged with designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs, as illustrated by 19 of 24 major agencies declaring cybersecurity as a significant deficiency or material weakness for financial reporting purposes. Other challenges include:
enhancing oversight of contractors providing IT services,
improving security incident response activities,
responding to breaches of personal information, and
implementing cybersecurity programs at small agencies.
Until federal agencies take actions to address these challenges—including implementing the hundreds of recommendations GAO and agency inspectors general have made—federal systems and information will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats.
Several government-wide initiatives are under way to bolster cybersecurity.
Personal Identity Verification: The President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to issue credentials with enhanced security features to control access to federal facilities and systems. OMB recently reported that only 41 percent of user accounts at 23 civilian agencies had required these credentials to access agency systems.
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation: This program is to provide agencies with tools for continuously monitoring cybersecurity risks. The Department of State adopted a continuous monitoring program, and GAO reported on the benefits and challenges in implementing the program.
National Cybersecurity Protection System: This system is to provide capabilities for monitoring network traffic and detecting and preventing intrusions. GAO has ongoing work reviewing the system's implementation. Preliminary observations indicate that implementation of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities may be limited and requirements for future capabilities appear to have not been fully defined.
While these initiatives are intended to improve security, no single technology or tool is sufficient to protect against all cyber threats. Rather, agencies need to employ a multi-layered approach to security that includes well-trained personnel, effective and consistently applied processes, and appropriate technologies.
What GAO Recommends
In previous work, GAO and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to assist agencies in addressing cybersecurity challenges. GAO has also made recommendations to improve government-wide initiatives. |
gao_GAO-08-950 | gao_GAO-08-950_0 | Important methodological decisions to make when computing effective tax rates on corporate income are the scope of the corporate taxpayer to study and what measures of taxes and income to use. Corporations Vary Considerably Both in the United States and across Foreign Locations
The weighted average U.S. effective tax rate on the domestic income of large corporations with positive domestic income in 2004 was 25.2 percent, while the median effective tax rate for this population of corporations was 31.8 percent. However, as figure 1 shows, under these two summary measures there was considerable variation in effective tax rates across taxpayers. The Residual U.S. Average Effective Tax Rate on the Foreign Income of Large U.S. First, in cases where a U.S. MNC has paid foreign income taxes at a rate that is close or equal to the U.S. tax rate, the U.S. foreign tax credit eliminates most or all of the U.S. tax liability on that corporation’s foreign-source income. Another approach for estimating the effective tax rate on the foreign- source income of U.S. businesses is to use BEA’s data on the operations of U.S. MNCs, which includes the amount of net income earned and foreign taxes paid by foreign affiliates of these MNCs. Effective Tax Rates by Principal Place of Business
Although the CFC data may be preferable to the BEA data for estimating an overall average effective tax rate for the foreign operations of U.S. MNCs, the former data provide an imperfect basis for estimating average effective tax rates for specific countries. Most of the Activity of U.S. MNCs Remains Located in the United States, but the Share of Activity Located Abroad Has Increased
Figure 5 shows the trends across the last four BEA benchmark studies of U.S. MNC operations (1989–2004) for six key measures of business activity: value added, sales, physical assets, compensation of employees, number of employees, and pretax income excluding income from equity investments. Business activity by all measures increased in absolute terms both domestically and abroad during this period, but the relative share of activity that was based in foreign affiliates increased. Nevertheless, as of 2004, over 60 percent of the activity (by all six measures) of U.S. MNCs remained located in the United States. With the exception of China, all of the countries with relatively low effective rates of tax have income shares that are significantly larger than their share of the three measures least likely to be affected by income-shifting practices: physical assets, compensation, and employment. This relationship holds for all three income measures. Luxembourg, the United Kingdom Caribbean Islands (and, to a lesser extent, Bermuda and Switzerland) also have significant shares of income from equity investments. Appendix II: BEA Data Used in This Report
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data provide a wide array of data items on multinational corporations (MNC) cross-classified by country and industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. and foreign tax regimes influence decisions of U.S. multinational corporations (MNC) regarding how much to invest and how many workers to employ in particular activities and in particular locations. Tax rules also influence where corporations report earning income for tax purposes. The average effective tax rate, which equals the amount of income taxes a business pays divided by its pretax net income (measured according to accounting rules, not tax rules), is a useful measure of actual tax burdens. In response to a request from U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, this report provides information on the average effective tax rates that U.S.-based businesses pay on their domestic and foreign-source income and trends in the location of worldwide activity of U.S.-based businesses. GAO analyzed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on corporate taxpayers, including new data for 2004 and Bureau of Economic Analysis data on the domestic and foreign operations of U.S. MNCs. Data limitations are noted where relevant. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The average U.S. effective tax rate on the domestic income of large corporations with positive domestic income in 2004 was an estimated 25.2 percent. There was considerable variation in tax rates across these taxpayers. The average U.S. effective tax rate on the foreign-source income of these large corporations was around 4 percent, reflecting the effects of both the foreign tax credit and tax deferral on this type of income. Effective tax rates on the foreign operations of U.S. MNCs vary considerably by country. According to estimates for 2004, Bermuda, Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) Caribbean Islands, and China had relatively low rates among countries that hosted significant shares of U.S. business activity, while Italy, Japan, Germany, Brazil, and Mexico had relatively high rates. U.S. business activity (measured by sales, value added, employment, compensation, physical assets, and net income) increased in absolute terms both domestically and abroad from 1989 through 2004, but the relative share of activity that was based in foreign affiliates increased. Nevertheless, as of 2004, over 60 percent of the activity (by all six measures) of U.S. MNCs remained located in the United States. The U.K., Canada, and Germany are the leading foreign locations of U.S. businesses by all measures except income. Reporting of the geographic sources of income is susceptible to manipulation for tax planning purposes and appears to be influenced by differences in tax rates across countries. Most of the countries studied with relatively low effective tax rates have income shares significantly larger than their shares of the business measures least likely to be affected by income shifting practices: physical assets, compensation, and employment. The opposite relationship holds for most of the high tax countries studied. |
gao_GAO-05-447T | gao_GAO-05-447T_0 | Fiscal Year 2004 Performance and Results
In fiscal year 2004, much of our work examined the effectiveness of the federal government’s day-to-day operations, such as administering benefits to the elderly and other needy populations, providing grants and loans to college students, and collecting taxes from businesses and individuals. We also informed policymakers about long-term challenges facing the nation, such as the federal government’s financial condition and fiscal outlook, new security threats in the post-cold war world, the aging of America and its impact on our health care and retirement systems, changing economic conditions, and the increasing demands on our infrastructure—from highways to water systems. See appendix I for our Strategic Plan Framework for serving the Congress and the nation. Outcomes of Our Work
In fiscal year 2004, our work generated $44 billion in financial benefits, primarily from recommendations we made to agencies and the Congress (see fig. 1). Financial benefits could also result from increases in federal revenues—due to changes in laws, user fees, or sales—that our work helped to produce. Many of the benefits that result from our work cannot be measured in dollar terms. During fiscal year 2004, we recorded a total of 1,197 other benefits (see fig. 4). Putting these recommendations into practice is generating tangible benefits for the American people. Testimonies That Serve the Congress
During fiscal year 2004, experts from our staff testified at 217 congressional hearings (see fig. 9) covering a wide range of complex issues. Streamlining and Management Improvement Efforts
Shortly after I was appointed in November 1998, I determined that GAO should undertake a major transformation effort to better enable it to “lead by example” and better support the Congress in the 21st century. This has resulted in a 14 percent reduction in our support staff since 1998. Currently, as shown in figure 12, over 50 percent of our staff resources in the support area are contractors, allowing us to devote more of our staff resources to our mission work. We recently surveyed managers of agency mission support operations and identified additional activities that potentially could be filled through alternative sourcing strategies. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we will assess the feasibility of alternative sourcing for these activities using an acquisition sourcing maturity model and cost- benefit analyses. In fiscal year 2002, an independent study of GAO’s IT processes and related costs revealed that, “GAO is delivering superb IT application support and development services to the business units at 29 percent less than the cost it would take the Government peer group to deliver.” In confirmation of these findings, in fiscal year 2003, GAO was one of only three federal agencies to receive the CIO Magazine 100 Award for excellence in effectively managing IT resources to obtain the most value for every IT dollar. GAO’s Fiscal Year 2006 Request to Support the Congress
We are requesting budget authority of $493.5 million for fiscal year 2006. This budget request will allow us to continue to maximize productivity, operate more effectively and efficiently, and maintain the progress we have made in technology and other areas. However, it does not allow us sufficient funding to support a staffing level of 3,269—the staffing level that we requested in previous years. However, with about 80 percent of our budget composed of human capital costs, we needed to constrain hiring to keep our fiscal year 2006 budget request modest. There are increasingly greater demands on GAO’s resources. While we have reduced our planned staffing level for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we believe that the staffing level we requested in previous years is a more optimal staffing level for GAO and would allow us to successfully meet the future needs of the Congress and provide the return on investment that the Congress and the American people expect. Given current and projected deficits and the demands associated with managing a growing national debt, as well as challenges facing the Congress to restructure federal programs, reevaluate the role of government, and ensure accountability of federal agencies, a strong GAO will result in substantially greater benefits to the Congress and the American people. Table 2 summarizes the changes we are requesting in our fiscal year 2006 budget. As a knowledge-based, world-class, professional services organization in an environment of increasingly complex work and accelerating change, we maintain a strong commitment to staff training and development. We promote a workforce that continually improves its skills and knowledge. Mission Support programs provide the critical infrastructure we need to conduct our work. We also will continue to modernize or develop systems focusing on how analysts do their work. We continue to look for cost-reducing efficiencies in our utility usage. Due to recent budget constraints, we have curtailed some efforts related to archiving paper records. In the years ahead, GAO’s support will prove even more critical because of the pressures created by our nation’s large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance. I would be pleased to answer any questions the Members of the Committee may have. | Why GAO Did This Study
We are grateful to the Congress for providing us with the support and resources that have helped us in our quest to be a world-class professional services organization. We are proud of the work we accomplish as we continue to provide our congressional clients with professional, objective, fact-based, non-partisan, non-ideological, fair, balanced, and reliable information in a timely manner regarding how well government programs and policies are working and, when needed, recommendations to make government work better. We believe that investing in GAO produces a sound return and results in substantial benefits to the Congress and the American people. In the years ahead, our support to the Congress will likely prove even more critical because of the pressures created by our nation's current and projected budget deficit and long-term fiscal imbalance. These fiscal pressures will require the Congress to make tough choices regarding what the government should do, how it will do its work, who will help carry out its work in the future, and how government will be financed in the future. We summarized the larger challenges facing the federal government in our recently issued 21st Century Challenges report. In this report, we emphasize the critical need to bring the federal government's programs and policies into line with 21st century realities. Continuing on our current unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. We, therefore, must fundamentally reexamine major spending and tax policies and priorities in an effort to recapture our fiscal flexibility and ensure that our programs and priorities respond to emerging security, social, economic, and environmental changes and challenges in the years ahead. We believe that GAO can be of invaluable assistance in helping the Congress address these challenges. This testimony focuses on our (1) performance and results with the funding you provided us in fiscal year 2004, (2) streamlining and management improvement efforts under way, and (3) budget request for fiscal year 2006 to support the Congress and serve the American people.
What GAO Found
In summary the funding we received in fiscal year 2004 allowed us to audit and evaluate a number of major topics of concern to the nation and, in some cases, the world. We also continued to raise concerns about the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance, summarized key health care statistics and published a proposed framework for related reforms, and provided staff support for the 9/11 Commission. In fiscal year 2004, we exceeded or equaled our all-time record for six of our seven key performance indicators while continuing to improve our client and employee feedback results. We are especially pleased to report that we documented $44 billion in financial benefits--a return of $95 for every dollar spent, or $13.7 million per employee. In fiscal year 2004, we also recorded 1,197 other benefits that could not be measured in dollar terms including benefits that helped to change laws, to improve services to the public and to promote sound agency and governmentwide management. Also, experts from our staff testified at 217 congressional hearings covering a wide range of important public policy issues during fiscal year 2004. Shortly after David Walker was appointed Comptroller General, he determined that our agency would undertake a transformation effort. Our transformation effort has enabled us to eliminate a management layer, streamline our organization, reduce our overall footprint, and centralize many of our support functions. Currently, over 50 percent of our support staff are contractors, allowing us to devote more of our staff resources to our mission work. We recently surveyed managers of agency support operations and identified additional activities that potentially could be filled through alternative sourcing strategies. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we will further assess the feasibility of using alternative sourcing for these activities. I would be pleased to brief you at a later date on our preliminary analyses. In developing our fiscal year 2006 budget, we have taken into consideration the overall federal budget constraints and the committee's desire to lead by example. Accordingly, we are requesting $493.5 million which represents a modest increase of 4 percent over fiscal year 2005. This increase is primarily for mandatory pay costs and price level changes. This budget request will allow us to continue to maximize productivity, operate more effectively and efficiently, and maintain the progress we have made in technology and other areas, but it does not allow us sufficient funding to support a staffing level of 3,269--the staffing level that we requested in previous years. Even as we are tempering our budget request, it needs to be acknowledged that there are increasing demands on GAO's resources. While we have reduced our planned staffing level for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 in order to keep our request modest, we believe that the staffing level we requested in previous years is a more optimal staffing level for GAO and would allow us to better meet the needs of the Congress and provide the return on investment that both the Congress and the American people expect. |
gao_GAO-03-609T | gao_GAO-03-609T_0 | Security, Budget Scorekeeping Requirements, and Other Factors Have Affected Federal Building Costs in Recent Years
In managing the costs of constructing, leasing, and operating federal buildings, GSA has faced pressures in a number of areas in recent years. Many factors driving costs, such as security requirements, have tended to increase costs for construction, leasing, and operations. Security Requirements Have Raised Costs of Constructing, Leasing, and Operating Federal Buildings
As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, President Clinton directed the Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of federal office buildings to attack, which resulted in a 1995 report entitled Vulnerability Assessments of Federal Facilities. For example, according to a GSA official, security costs for courthouses have risen from about $8 a square foot to about $24 a square foot. To ensure budget recognition of the government’s commitments when they are made, budget scorekeeping requires GSA to include the total cost of a building construction project in its budget in the year that the government commits the resources. This has led GSA to lease rather than construct space for some new acquisitions needs. The new Patent and Trademark Office complex currently under construction in Alexandria, Virginia, is one example of an acquisition that cost taxpayers more because GSA leased the property rather than constructing it. A GSA present value cost analysis estimated that the recently leased U.S. Patent and Trademark Office complex cost taxpayers about $48 million more to lease than construct. This includes federal leased space. Contract modifications after the initial contract is issued also can affect costs. We Have Designated Federal Real Property as High-Risk
In January 2003, we designated federal real property as a high-risk area. Many assets are no longer effectively aligned with or responsive to agencies’ changing missions and are therefore no longer needed. Furthermore, many assets are in an alarming state of deterioration; agencies have estimated restoration and repair needs to be in the tens of billions of dollars. Given this situation, we concluded in our high- risk report that there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated transformation strategy for federal real property, and an independent commission or governmentwide task force may be needed to develop this strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Services Administration (GSA) has responsibility for more than 8,000 owned and leased buildings nationwide, together encompassing about 338 million square feet of space. Understanding construction and operating costs for these buildings is important, as the increased federal budget deficit has led to intensified competition for federal resources and recent events have highlighted security needs. GAO examined (1) factors that have affected GSA's construction, leasing, and operating costs and (2) our designation of federal real property as a high-risk area.
What GAO Found
Several factors have affected GSA's construction, leasing, and operating costs for federal buildings. For example, new security requirements for federal buildings developed after the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have led to increased costs for such measures as strengthening the ability of buildings to sustain a bomb blast and limiting building access. According to a GSA official, security costs for courthouses have increased from about $8 a square foot to about $24 a square foot. Another factor affecting costs is budget scorekeeping requirements meant to ensure full recognition of the government's financial commitments. The scorekeeping requirement that GSA must include in its budget the entire cost of constructing a building in the year the government commits the resources has led GSA to lease space rather than construct it, even though leasing often results in a higher overall cost to the taxpayer. For example, a GSA present value cost analysis estimated that the recently leased U.S. Patent and Trademark Office complex shown below, currently being constructed in Alexandria, Virginia, by a private company, cost taxpayers about $48 million more to lease over the 20-year lease period than it would have cost to purchase it. In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area, in part because of such cost factors and also because many property assets are no longer effectively aligned with or responsive to agencies' changing missions and are no longer needed. Furthermore, many assets are in an alarming state of deterioration that may cost tens of billions of dollars to address. GAO believes there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated transformation strategy for federal real property. |
gao_GAO-10-310T | gao_GAO-10-310T_0 | The Benefits of Exporting and U.S. Efforts to Promote Exports
Exports Provide Economic Benefits
Trade, and exports more specifically, contributes to the U.S. economy in a variety of ways. Trade generally enables the United States to achieve a higher standard of living through exporting goods and services that are produced domestically relatively efficiently, and importing goods and services that are produced domestically relatively inefficiently. In addition to macroeconomic considerations of job creation and economic growth, microeconomic considerations exist for government programs to address “market failures” – where conditions such as imperfect information and entry barriers prevent markets from generating the most efficient outcome. Rationales may also exist for export programs based on achieving broader trade policy objectives, such as helping U.S. exporters overcome foreign trade barriers that make it difficult for U.S. products to penetrate foreign markets. Not withstanding these rationales, measuring the effectiveness of export promotion activities is inherently difficult. For example, quantifying the growth in exports is complicated by the fact that other factors, such as government policies and firm-specific conditions, also determine growth. U.S. Export Promotion Is Supported by a Wide Variety of Agencies and Activities
Export promotion efforts in the United States are guided by the National Export Strategy and are pursued by a wide variety of agencies and through a wide range of activities. According to the strategy, 20 export promotion agencies are part of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), of which 9 of the agencies have budgets for programs or activities related to export promotion, with Commerce, the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture), and the Department of State (State) actively engaged in export promotion overseas. The wide range of activities that are considered export promotion include: providing basic export counseling; assisting with collecting and providing data on foreign markets; advising firms on how to best market their products overseas; providing loans, insurance, and guarantee programs; advocating on behalf of domestic firms; and monitoring trade agreements. Observations Regarding U.S. and Foreign Export Promotion Efforts
While GAO has not recently performed an in-depth comparison of U.S. and foreign export promotion activities, the findings and recommendations in our past reviews of U.S. agencies are consistent with several expert studies looking at export promotion practices in other countries. Specifically, GAO has identified elements of U.S. export promotion activities that warrant attention: (1) coordination; (2) targeted services for small and medium enterprises and other priorities; (3) performance monitoring; and (4) partnerships and methodologies for setting user fees. The expert studies we reviewed echo the importance of each of these activities for foreign export promotion. Coordination of U.S. Export Promotion Activities
U.S. export promotion activities are coordinated by the TPCC. Listing of Key Studies on Foreign Export Promotion Practices
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. | Why GAO Did This Study
As Congress considers policies to bolster the recovery of the U.S. economy, it must consider the full range of tools available to stimulate growth and create new jobs, including promoting exports. According to the Department of Commerce, U.S. exports of manufactured goods totaled $1.8 trillion in 2008--accounting for approximately 13 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. GAO's testimony addresses the benefits of exports and provides updated information on U.S. export promotion efforts. It also includes initial observations about foreign export promotion activities. The observations about U.S. export promotion efforts are based on a variety of reports and testimonies GAO has issued on international trade over the past 4 years. Observations about foreign export promotion practices are based on a preliminary review of several key expert studies.
What GAO Found
Exports, and trade more broadly, contribute to the U.S. economy in a variety of ways. Trade enables the United States to achieve a higher standard of living through producing and exporting goods and services that are produced here relatively efficiently, and importing goods and services that are produced here relatively inefficiently. Rationales for export promotion programs include macroeconomic considerations such as job creation and economic growth. Others are based on microeconomic considerations such as "market failures," for example where imperfect information prevents markets from generating the most efficient outcome. Rationales also exist for export programs based on achieving broader trade policy objectives, such as helping U.S. exporters overcome foreign trade barriers that make it difficult for U.S. products to penetrate foreign markets. However, measuring the effectiveness of export promotion activities is difficult. For example, quantifying the growth in exports is complicated by the fact that other factors, such as government policies and firm-specific conditions, also determine growth. Export promotion efforts in the United States are guided by the National Export Strategy. According to the strategy, 20 agencies are part of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), of which 9 of the agencies have budgets for programs or activities related to export promotion, with the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and State actively engaged in export promotion overseas. Agency export promotion activities include providing basic export counseling; assisting with collecting and providing data on foreign markets; and advising firms on how to best market their products overseas. While GAO has not recently performed an in-depth comparison of U.S. and foreign export promotion activities, the findings and recommendations in our past reviews of U.S. agencies are consistent with expert studies looking at export promotion practices in other countries. Specifically, GAO has identified elements of U.S. export promotion activities that warrant attention: (1) coordination; (2) targeted services for small and medium enterprises and other priorities; (3) performance monitoring; and (4) partnerships and methodologies for setting user fees. The expert studies GAO reviewed echo the importance of each of these elements with regard to the activities of foreign export promotion agencies and may be informative for policy discussions about U.S. export promotion activities. |
gao_GAO-08-891 | gao_GAO-08-891_0 | Prior to this legislation, U.S. citizens did not need a passport to enter the United States if they were traveling from within the Western Hemisphere, except from Cuba. State Was Unprepared for 2007 Surge in Passport Demand, Leading to Lengthy Wait Times for Applicants
State was unprepared for the record number of passport applications it received in 2007 because it underestimated overall demand for passports and did not anticipate the timing of this demand. Wait Times Reached Record Highs in 2007 due to Unprecedented Demand
As a result of the increased number of passport applications in the first half of 2007, reported wait times more than doubled, causing applicants to wait 10 to 12 weeks for their passports on average, though many applicants waited significantly longer. State’s actions, combined with seasonal declines in passport applications, decreased wait times to normal levels by October 2007. In addition, State took steps to increase the capacity of its facilities to handle the increased workload. For example, passport agencies used training and conference rooms to accommodate additional passport specialists. State commissioned a review of its passport operations, completed in 2005, that identified several deficiencies and proposed a number of potential measures to guide modernization efforts; however, State does not have a plan to prioritize and synchronize these efforts. State Has Improved its Ability to Respond to Near- Term Increases in Passport Demand
State has taken several steps to increase its passport production capacity and improve its ability to respond to near-term increases in passport demand. State Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Improve Long-Term Passport Operations
A 2005 study of passport operations commissioned by State identified several limitations in State’s passport operation, many of which were exposed during the department’s response to the 2007 surge in demand. Some of these proposed initiatives that State has not implemented could be useful to State’s current operations, including the following: leveraging electronic work flow management—enabling State to develop flexible, streamlined work streams that improve its ability to monitor and manage passport operations while reducing manual processes for the physical movement and storage of paper applications and supporting documentation—to ensure a more efficient work flow that supports the issuance of increasing numbers of passports every year; providing management visibility over the end-to-end passport issuance process extending across State and partner organizations, to effectively manage the process and enforce performance standards; applying validations and identity checks automatically upon receipt or modification of an application by consistently applying a comprehensive set of business rules, to strengthen an adjudication process that supports the integrity of the passport as a primary identity document; offering an online point of service with expanded functionality as a means for self-service by the public to facilitate a simplified, flexible, and well- communicated application process to enhance service to the passport customer; and conducting a comprehensive workforce analysis to define a sustainable workforce structure and plans through 2020 and enhancing communications within State and its business partners to improve efficiency and promote knowledge sharing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we review (1) the extent to which the Department of State (State) was prepared for the surge in passport demand in 2007 and how State’s readiness affected passport operations, (2) how State increased its passport production capacity in response to the 2007 surge, and (3) State’s readiness for near-term surges in demand and whether State has a comprehensive strategy in place to improve long-term passport operations. These deficiencies included the reliance on a manual, paper-based work flow, ineffective communications, and inflexible passport systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, following the implementation of new document requirements for travelers entering the United States from within the Western Hemisphere, the Department of State (State) received a record number of passport applications. In June 2009 further document requirements are scheduled to go into effect and will likely lead to another surge in passport demand. GAO examined (1) the extent to which State was prepared for the surge in passport demand and how its readiness affected passport operations, (2) State's actions to increase passport production capacity in response to the surge, and (3) State's readiness for near-term surges in demand and its strategy to improve passport operations. GAO interviewed officials from State and the Departments of the Treasury and Homeland Security, conducted site visits, and reviewed data on passport processing times and reports on passport operations.
What GAO Found
State was unprepared for the record number of passport applications it received in 2007, leading to significant delays in passport processing. State underestimated the increase in demand and consequently was not able to provide enough notice to the financial agent it uses for passport application payment processing for the agent to prepare for the increased workload, further adding to delays. As a result, reported wait times reached 10 to 12 weeks in the summer of 2007--more than double the normal wait--with hundreds of thousands of passports taking significantly longer. State had difficulty tracking individual applications and failed to effectively measure or communicate to applicants the total expected wait times, prompting many to re-apply and further straining State's processing capacity. State took a number of emergency measures and accelerated other planned efforts to increase its passport production capacity in 2007. For example, to help adjudicate passports, State established four adjudication task forces and deployed passport specialists to U.S. passport agencies severely affected by the surge. In addition, State accelerated hiring and expansion efforts. As a result of these efforts and the normal seasonal decline in passport applications, wait times returned to normal by October 2007. According to State estimates, these emergency measures cost $42.8 million. Although State has taken steps to improve its ability to respond to near-term surges in passport demand, it lacks a comprehensive strategy to improve long-term passport operations. State previously identified several deficiencies limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of passport operations, such as reliance on a paper-based work flow and ineffective communications, and these deficiencies were exposed by State's response to the surge. While State also identified a framework to guide its modernization efforts, it does not have a comprehensive plan to prioritize and synchronize improvements to its passport operations. A comprehensive strategy for making these improvements--for example, using a business enterprise approach--would better equip State to handle a significantly higher workload in the future. |
gao_GAO-12-541T | gao_GAO-12-541T_0 | TSA relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. Additional DHS and TSA Actions Needed to Validate TSA’s Behavior-Based Screening Program, Establish Performance Measures, and Assess Costs and Benefits
TSA developed the SPOT program in an effort to respond to potential threats to aviation security by identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security, including terrorists planning or executing an attack who were not likely to be identified by TSA’s other screening security measures. As we reported in September 2011, TSA had deployed about 3,000 BDOs to about 160 of the approximately 446 TSA-regulated airports in the United States at which passengers and their property are subject to TSA-mandated screening procedures. identifying high-risk travelers.effective than random screening to varying degrees. However, as noted in the study, the assessment was an initial validation step and was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. The study found that SPOT was more DHS’s study made recommendations related to the need for further validation efforts, comparing SPOT with other screening programs, and broader program evaluation issues, some of which echoed recommendations we made in May 2010. As we reported in May 2010, TSA had established output-based performance measuresprogram, such as the number of SPOT referrals to law enforcement officers and subsequent arrests; however, it had not fielded outcome- oriented performance measures, such as identifying individuals who may pose a threat to the transportation system, to evaluate the effectiveness of the SPOT program. With such outcome measures, TSA could more fully assess SPOT’s contribution to improving aviation security. In May 2010, we recommended that to better measure the effectiveness of the program and evaluate the performance of BDOs, TSA should establish a plan that includes objectives, milestones, and time frames to develop outcome-oriented performance measures. Cost-Benefit Analysis. According to TSA officials, AIT was to provide enhanced security benefits compared to walk-through metal detectors, such as enhanced detection capabilities for identifying nonmetallic threat objects and liquids. part 1520. cost-effectiveness of this acquisition. We analyzed TSA’s utilization data collected from March 2010 through February 2011 on all deployed AIT units and found that some deployed units were not used regularly, decreasing their potential security benefit. Using these figures, we estimate that the first year total cost–including acquisition, installation, and equipment operator salary—was several million dollars.study current AIT utilization and address the extent to which currently In January 2012, we made a recommendation to TSA to deployed AIT units are used. TSA concurred with our recommendation and plans to take efforts to address it. Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Internal Controls and Address TWIC Effectiveness
The TWIC program is intended to improve maritime security by using a federally sponsored credential to enhance access controls to secure areas at MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. As of March 20, 2012, the TWIC program has enrolled over 2.1 million maritime workers and issued nearly 2 million credentials. The following describes progress made and challenges faced by DHS related to the TWIC program’s system of internal controls and DHS’s efforts in assessing the effectiveness of TWIC. DHS has established a system of TWIC-related processes and controls to assist in implementation of the program. Therefore, we recommended in our May 2011 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security conduct an effectiveness assessment that includes addressing internal control weaknesses and, at a minimum, evaluate whether use of TWIC in its present form and planned use with readers would enhance the posture of security beyond efforts already in place given costs and program risks. We further recommended that the internal control and effectiveness assessments be used as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, and security risks of the TWIC program prior to requiring the use of TWICs with card readers. As of March 2012, DHS reports that it is further evaluating the TWIC program using its risk assessment model. Key contributors to the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each individual product. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS and TSA have made some notable achievements in securing the nations transportation systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but in recent years, GAO reported that DHS has experienced challenges in managing its efforts including fielding programs prior to determining their effectiveness or completing cost-benefit analyses. This testimony focuses on, among other things, DHS and TSAs progress and challenges in implementing three key security programs: SPOT, AIT, and TWIC. This testimony is based on reports and testimonies issued from November 2009 through March 2012, and includes selected updates conducted from February through March 2012. To conduct these updates, GAO obtained information on the current status of the programs and progress made related to the implementation of recommendations contained in prior GAO reports.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) relies on layers of security encompassing personnel, processes, and technology to deter, detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. The Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program consists of about 3,000 behavior detection officers (BDO) who examine passengers to identify those who might pose a security risk at over 160 TSA-regulated airports. Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)full body scannersare intended to help TSA staff detect explosives and other threats on passengers. Also, TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard manage the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which employs a federally-sponsored credential in an effort to enhance access controls at Maritime Transportation Security Act regulated facilities and vessels. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA have made progress and faced challenges in implementing these programs.
SPOT. Additional DHS and TSA actions are needed to validate SPOT and to establish performance measures. GAO reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT nationwide before determining whether it had a scientifically valid basis. GAO recommended that DHS convene an independent panel of experts to review DHSs efforts to validate SPOT and determine whether the methodology used was sufficiently comprehensive. DHS agreed and completed this study in April 2011. The study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, as noted in the study, the assessment was an initial validation step and was not designed to fully validate whether BDOs can reliably identify individuals who pose a security risk. According to DHS, additional work will be needed to validate SPOT. Also, GAO reported that TSA has implemented certain performance measures to assess the program, but has not fielded outcome-oriented performance measureswhich track progress by documenting the beneficial results of programsto help assess SPOTs contribution to improving aviation security. In May 2010, GAO recommended and TSA agreed that to better measure SPOTs effectiveness and evaluate the performance of BDOs, TSA should establish a plan to develop outcome-oriented performance measures.
AIT. DHS accelerated the deployment of AIT to identify threat materials and to provide enhanced security benefits compared to metal detectors. In January 2012, GAO reported instances where AIT units were not being used, raising questions about the cost-effectiveness of this acquisition. For example, data GAO collected from March 2010 through February 2011 on all deployed AIT units showed that some deployed units were not used regularly, decreasing their potential security benefit. GAO recommended and TSA agreed to study AIT utilization and address the extent to which currently deployed units are used.
TWIC. As of March 2012, the TWIC program has enrolled over 2.1 million maritime workers and DHS has established TWIC-related processes and controls. In May 2011, GAO recommended that DHS conduct an assessment that includes addressing internal control weaknesses and evaluate whether use of TWIC would further enhance the security posture. GAO also recommended that this assessment be used to evaluate the costs, benefits, and security risks of the TWIC program prior to requiring its use. DHS agreed and, as of March 2012, reports that it is further evaluating the TWIC program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address challenges related to assessing SPOT effectiveness as well as AIT utilization. GAO also recommended that DHS assess TWIC effectiveness and use this assessment to evaluate the costs, benefits, and risks of TWIC. DHS and TSA concurred and have actions underway to address the recommendations. |
gao_T-GGD-00-34 | gao_T-GGD-00-34_0 | Initial Steps to Implement the FAIR Act
The FAIR Act requires executive agencies to submit each year to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) inventories of activities that, in the judgment of the head of the agency, are not inherently governmental functions. The next step in implementing the FAIR Act includes potential challenges to the lists. Initial Implementation of the FAIR Act Raises Important Questions
Clearly, executive agencies and OMB still have plenty of work ahead to implement even the first step of the FAIR Act—the public release of inventories. A major area of interest during the initial implementation of the FAIR Act concerns the decisions agencies made about whether or not activities were eligible for competition and the reasons for those decisions. What Processes Did Agencies Use to Develop Their FAIR Act Inventories? questions about the efforts thus far which we will be reviewing for the Subcommittee. How useful are the FAIR Act inventories? What supplemental information can be included to increase the usefulness of inventories? By enacting the FAIR Act, Congress has increased the visibility of agencies’ commercial activities. Continuing congressional interest in the FAIR Act process is needed in order to maintain serious agency attention to developing and using the FAIR Act inventories. Oversight hearings, such as today’s hearing, send clear messages to agencies that Congress is serious about improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and the effective implementation of the FAIR Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its observations on the initial implementation of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, focusing on: (1) the progress to date in developing and releasing agencies' FAIR Act inventories; (2) the status of the initial steps taken to implement the FAIR Act; and (3) issues related to the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the General Services Administration FAIR Act inventories.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) most agencies' FAIR Act inventories have been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and consultation, and the first group of inventories is now publicly available; (2) clearly, executive agencies and OMB still have plenty of work ahead to implement the FAIR Act, including the public release of more inventories and the resolution of any challenges; (3) nevertheless, GAO's initial review of selected inventories raise some questions about the efforts thus far which GAO will be reviewing for the House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology; (4) these questions concern: (a) the decisions agencies make about whether or not activities were eligible for competition and what the reasons for those decisions were; (b) the processes agencies use to develop their FAIR Act inventories; (c) how useful the FAIR Act inventories are; and (d) what supplemental information can be included to increase the usefulness of inventories; (5) by enacting the FAIR Act, Congress has increased the visibility of agencies' commercial activities; (6) continuing congressional interest in the FAIR Act process is needed in order to maintain serious agency attention to developing and using the FAIR Act inventories; and (7) oversight hearings send clear messages to agencies that Congress is serious about improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and the effective implementation of the FAIR Act. |
gao_AIMD-96-99 | gao_AIMD-96-99_0 | DFAS Cleveland and Navy personnel deemed STARS the newest, least deficient, and most advanced of Navy’s 25 existing general fund accounting systems. Scope and Methodology
To assess Navy’s efforts to reduce the number of accounting systems and implement and enhance STARS, we examined DOD, DFAS, and Navy documents and conducted interviews with appropriate officials. The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. Some Cost Savings Are Expected
We believe that savings will accrue as a result of eliminating the duplication and inefficiencies of supporting and maintaining Navy’s 25 existing accounting systems, although we did not attempt to quantify such savings. However, we note that achieving the projected level of net savings could be diminished by the need to provide additional training and technical support to field activities in using STARS Field Level. Although STARS was selected without the benefit of an established architecture, such an architecture can provide needed structure and discipline as the STARS enhancement projects move forward. Incomplete Planning and Unrealistic Milestones Hamper Enhancement Efforts
Our analysis noted instances of incomplete planning and missing or slipped milestones that strongly suggest that STARS enhancements will not meet DOD requirements in the near future. The Plan of Action and Milestones also indicates missing and slipped milestones. For example, we found that the plan did not address how one of the STARS modules, which currently has its own general ledger account structure, will be brought into compliance with DOD’s standard general ledger; did not address how STARS will be enhanced to comply with the audit trail key accounting requirement which states that all transactions be traceable to individual source records maintained in the system; did not specify how the systems analysis for enhancing STARS field-level and headquarters claimant modules to meet the key accounting requirement for budgetary accounting will be performed and by whom, and did not provide for analyzing and documenting the current environment and identifying needed changes, which is the approach planned in making most key accounting requirement analyses; did not provide for identifying needed changes and solutions to control weaknesses as part of the analysis of the current environment related to the system control function of STARS field-level and headquarters claimant modules; and provided, in several cases, milestones for completing the analyses of the current STARS environment and planning for future STARS enhancements that were dated several months before a contractor was scheduled to provide them. Specifically, field staff received limited training. We also found that DFAS provided insufficient STARS Field Level technical support. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Defense Finance and Accounting Service's (DFAS) efforts to reduce the number of Navy accounting systems and to enhance and implement a Navy-wide system to account for general fund operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DFAS selected the Navy's Standard Accounting and Reporting System (STARS) to serve as the Navy's system for general fund accounting; (2) although believed to be the newest, least deficient, and most advanced of the Navy's 25 existing general fund accounting systems, STARS still has serious shortcomings; (3) savings will accrue as a result of eliminating duplicate and inefficient accounting systems, but could be diminished by the need to provide additional training and technical support; (4) STARS was selected without the benefit of an established architecture, and the lack of a target systems architecture will make it difficult to guide STARS enhancement efforts, estimate enhancement costs, and evaluate alternatives that may be more effective or less expensive; (5) the STARS Plan of Action and Milestones did not include several key analysis tasks and accounting requirements, and several instances of incomplete planning and slipped milestones strongly suggest that STARS enhancements will not meet Department of Defense (DOD) requirements; (6) this piecemeal approach to STARS enhancement could result in costly and time-consuming redesign efforts; and (7) implementation of STARS at field-level activities was not completely successful, since DFAS provided limited training and insufficient technical support. |
gao_GAO-08-647T | gao_GAO-08-647T_0 | VA Medical Facilities Have VA CRNA Recruitment and Retention Challenges Primarily Because of Noncompetitive Salaries
We reported in December 2007 that VA medical facilities had challenges recruiting and retaining VA CRNAs. On the basis of our survey results, we found that VA medical facilities had challenges in recruiting VA CRNAs at their facilities and will likely face challenges in retaining VA CRNAs in the next 5 years due to the number of VA CRNAs projected to either retire from or leave VA. VA medical facility officials reported in our survey that the recruitment and retention challenges were caused primarily by the low level of VA CRNA salaries when compared with CRNA salaries in local market areas. The recruiting challenges also affected VA medical facility officials’ ability to reduce existing VA CRNA vacancy rates at their medical facilities. According to our survey, VA CRNA vacancies impacted the delivery of services at VA medical facilities. In addition to the challenges of recruiting VA CRNAs, we also reported that VA medical facilities were likely to face another workforce challenge in the future. Specifically, we found that in the next 5 years VA medical facilities would likely have difficulty retaining VA CRNAs in their workforce and this trend could increase the number of VA CRNA vacancies across VA. On the basis of VA CRNA responses to our survey, we projected a VA CRNA attrition rate of 26 percent across VA in the next 5 years—that is, 26 percent of VA CRNAs either planned to retire or leave VA’s health care system within the next 5 years. According to VA Officials and VA CRNAs, Recruitment and Retention Challenges Are Due to Noncompetitive VA CRNA Salaries
Our surveys of VA medical facility chief anesthesiologists and HR officers indicated that medical facilities had trouble recruiting and will have trouble retaining VA CRNAs because salaries for VA CRNAs were low compared to CRNA salaries in local market areas. VA Medical Facilities Can Use LPS to Help Make VA CRNA Salaries Competitive, and While Majority of Facilities Have Used LPS, Some Have Not Followed VA’s LPS Policy
In December 2007, we reported that VA’s LPS system is a key mechanism that VA medical facilities can use to determine whether to adjust VA CRNA salaries to help the facilities remain competitive with CRNA salaries in local market areas. We also reported that the majority of VA medical facilities that employ VA CRNAs used LPS. However, at the eight VA medical facilities we visited, we found that although the facilities used VA’s LPS, the majority of them did not fully follow VA’s LPS policy correctly in either 2005 or 2006. The problems some VA medical facilities had fully following VA’s LPS policy, along with the explanations of facility officials, indicated that VA had not provided adequate training on its LPS policy. As a result, VA medical facility officials had not received LPS training that reflected VA’s current LPS policy and, accordingly could not ensure that VA CRNA salaries had been adjusted as needed to be competitive. In our December 2007 report we recommended that VA expedite the development and implementation of the training course for VA medical facility officials responsible for compliance with the policy. VA agreed with our recommendation and in comments on our draft report stated that it had developed a draft action plan for training staff on its LPS policy. VA anticipated that the online training course would be available by the end of fiscal year 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
Certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNA), registered nurses who have completed a master's degree program in nurse anesthesia, provide the majority of anesthesia care in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facilities. There are approximately 500 VA-employed CRNAs (VA CRNA) who provide care to veterans in VA medical facilities. While the demand for CRNAs has increased, many employed by VA are nearing retirement eligibility age. Concerns have been raised about the challenges VA may face in making VA CRNA salaries competitive in order to maintain its VA CRNA workforce, particularly in local markets that can be highly competitive. This testimony is based on GAO work reported in VA Health Care: Many Medical Facilities Have Challenges in Recruiting and Retaining Nurse Anesthetists, ( GAO-08-56 , Dec. 13, 2007). This testimony (1) identifies workforce challenges that VA medical facilities experience related to VA CRNAs, and (2) identifies a key mechanism that VA medical facilities have to help make VA CRNA salaries competitive and the extent to which VA facilities use this mechanism. For the December 2007 report, GAO analyzed surveys sent to VA chief anesthesiologists, VA human resources officers, and VA CRNAs. GAO also visited eight VA medical facilities and interviewed facility officials about efforts to recruit and retain VA CRNAs.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in December 2007 that VA medical facilities had challenges recruiting and retaining VA CRNAs. In GAO's report, most surveyed officials said that they had difficulty recruiting VA CRNAs at their facilities. The challenge of recruiting VA CRNAs affected the ability of VA officials to reduce existing VA CRNA vacancy rates--the number of unfilled VA CRNA positions--at their medical facilities. Vacancy rates varied across VA and, according to GAO's survey, impacted the delivery of services at VA medical facilities. On the basis of its survey results, GAO also found that in addition to their current recruiting challenges, VA medical facilities would likely face a challenge retaining VA CRNAs in the next 5 years due to the number of VA CRNAs projected to either retire from or leave VA. VA medical facility officials reported in GAO's survey that the recruitment and retention challenges were caused primarily by the low level of VA CRNA salaries when compared with CRNA salaries in local market areas. GAO also reported that VA's locality pay system (LPS) is a key mechanism VA medical facilities can use to determine whether to adjust VA CRNA salaries to help the facilities remain competitive with CRNA salaries in local market areas. GAO also reported that the majority of VA medical facilities that employ VA CRNAs used LPS. However, at the eight VA medical facilities it visited, GAO found that although the facilities used VA's LPS, the majority of them did not fully follow VA's LPS policy correctly in either 2005 or 2006. The problems some VA medical facilities had fully following VA's LPS policy, along with the explanations of facility officials, indicated that VA had not provided adequate training on its LPS policy. As a result, VA medical facility officials cannot ensure that VA CRNA salaries have been adjusted as needed to be competitive in local market areas. Training on the LPS is necessary to help ensure that VA medical facilities are competitive as an employer. In December 2007, GAO recommended that VA expedite the development and implementation of a training course for VA medical facility officials responsible for compliance with the policy. VA agreed with GAO's recommendation and in comments on GAO's draft report stated that it had developed a draft action plan for training staff on its LPS policy. VA anticipated that the online training course would be available by the end of fiscal year 2008. |
gao_GAO-03-920 | gao_GAO-03-920_0 | SSA provides two methods for driver licensing agencies to verify SSNs: batch and on-line. Although states’ use of SSA’s on-line service has increased steadily over the last several years, 5 states submitted over 70 percent of all on-line verification requests. Twenty-five States Have Used the Batch or On-line Methods
As of March 2003, driver licensing agencies in 25 states have used the batch or on-line method to verify SSNs with SSA. Over the last several years, states estimated submitting over 84 million requests to SSA using the batch method. States Weigh Considerations in Deciding to Use SSA’s Verification Service
Various factors—such as costs, performance problems, and state priorities—may affect states’ decisions about whether or not to use SSA’s verification service. Weaknesses in SSA’s Design and Management of the SSN Verification Service Has Limited Its Usefulness
Weaknesses in the design and management of SSA’s on-line verification service have contributed to capacity and performance problems and ultimately limited its usefulness. SSA Has Not Focused on Other Key Weaknesses in the Service It Provides States
Despite SSA’s recent efforts to focus more management attention on its verification service, problems regarding the high nonmatch rate and states’ continued vulnerability to fraud associated with the use of SSNs of deceased individuals by driver license applicants remain. Unlike the on-line service, SSA does not match batch requests against its death records. To further assess states’ vulnerability in this area, our own investigators, working in an undercover capacity, were able to obtain licenses in two batch states using a counterfeit out-of-state license and other fraudulent documents and the SSNs of deceased persons. States May Use Safeguards Beyond Visual Inspection of Identity Documents, but Lack a Systematic Means to Share All Driver Records
States may use tools beyond visual inspection to verify documents, but lack the ability to systematically exchange identity information on all drivers with other states. Although driver licensing agencies rely primarily on visual inspection of documents to verify applicants’ identity information, states may employ more extensive measures such as using independent sources to corroborate applicants’ identity information. For noncitizen applicants, staff also review a myriad of passports and U.S. immigration documents. Several states we visited made extensive use of computer systems to prevent identity theft and fraud. Social Security: Government and Other Uses of the Social Security Number are Widespread. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, more attention has been focused on the importance of identifying people who use false identity information or documents to obtain a driver license. The Social Security Administration (SSA) offers states a service to verify social security numbers (SSNs) collected during the driver licensing process. This report examines states' use of SSA's verification service, factors that may affect the usefulness of the service, and other tools states use or need to verify identity.
What GAO Found
GAO found that 25 states have used either one or both of the methods SSA offers for requesting SSN verification. Over the last several years, states used the batch and on-line method to submit over 84 million and 13 million requests, respectively. Although on-line use has been increasing, usage varied significantly among states, with 5 out of 18 states submitting over 70 percent of all requests. States decide to use SSA's service based on various factors, such as costs and state priorities. Weaknesses in SSA's design and management of its SSN verification service have contributed to capacity and performance problems and limited its usefulness. While SSA recently increased systems capacity and reduced outages, problems remain. For example, the level of service cannot be assessed because SSA has not established key performance measures. States are concerned that the high verification failure rate adds to their workloads. Several states noted that some of the failures could be prevented if SSA disclosed more information to states. States using the batch method are vulnerable to licensing individuals using SSNs of deceased persons because SSA does not match requests against its death files. In fact, GAO obtained licenses using fraudulent documents and deceased persons' SSNs in 2 states. Driver licensing agencies rely primarily on visual inspection of documents such as birth certificates, driver licenses, and U.S. immigration documents to verify applicants' identity. While states may use safeguards beyond visual inspection to verify documents, they lack the ability to systematically exchange identity information on all drivers with other states. Without a means to readily share all driver records, states face a greater risk for identity theft and fraud in the driver licensing process. A recent Department of Transportation report to Congress identified options that would provide states a system for exchanging records on all drivers and could help mitigate identity fraud. |
gao_GAO-04-578T | gao_GAO-04-578T_0 | These key practices are to ensure that top leadership drives the transformation, establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation, set implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one, dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation use the performance management system to define responsibility and ensure accountability for change, establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation, and build a world-class organization that continuously seeks to implement best practices in processes and systems in areas such as information technology, financial management, acquisition management, and human capital. Today, we continue to be encouraged by the progress that the FBI has made in some areas as it continues its transformation efforts. Specifically worthy of recognition are the commitment of Director Mueller and senior- level leadership to the FBI’s reorganization; the FBI’s communication of priorities; the implementation of core reengineering processes to improve business practices and assist in the bureau’s transformation efforts; the dedication of an implementation team to manage the reengineering efforts; the development of a strategic plan and a human capital plan; the efforts to involve employees in the strategic planning and reengineering processes; and the FBI’s efforts to realign its activities, processes, and resources to focus on a key set of principles and priorities. At that time it was anticipated that the plan would be completed by the start of fiscal year 2004. Overall we found the plan has some important strengths as well as some areas in which improvements could be made. Strategic Plan Could Be Improved by Discussing Other Key Elements
Although the FBI has addressed several key elements in its strategic plan, the plan needs more information on other elements of strategic planning that we have identified as significant to successful achievement of an organization’s mission and goals. FBI officials indicated that some of these elements are available in other documents and were not included in the plan for specific reasons. FBI Has Developed a Strategic Human Capital Plan
In prior testimony, we highlighted the importance of the development of a strategic human capital plan to the FBI’s transformation efforts, noting that strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of any management initiative, including any agency transformation effort. This plan contains many of the principles that we have laid out for an effective human capital system. As yet, the performance management system for the bulk of FBI personnel remains inadequate to identify meaningful distinctions in performance. Nevertheless, the bureau’s longstanding approach to managing IT is not fully consistent with leading practices, as has been previously reported by us and others. The effect of this, for example, can be seen in the cost and schedule shortfalls being experienced on Trilogy. A prime example is Trilogy, the FBI’s ongoing effort to, among other things, modernize its systems infrastructure and investigate case management applications. FBI Continues to Realign Staff Resources to Address Counterterrorism- Related Priorities
As we pointed out in our June 2003 testimony and our follow-up letter to the FBI in September 2003, a key element of the FBI’s reorganization and successful transformation is the realignment of resources to better ensure focus on the highest priorities. Since that time, as a result of the staff reprogrammings and funding for additional special agent positions received through various appropriations, the FBI staffing levels allocated to the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber program areas have increased to about 36 percent and now represent the single largest concentration of FBI resources and the biggest decrease is in organized crime and drugs. This information could help prioritize work and manage scarce resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks precipitated a shift in how the FBI uses its investigative resources to prevent future terrorist incidents. The attacks led to the FBI's commitment to reorganize and transform itself. Today's testimony discusses the FBI's progress in carrying out its transformation process. Specifically, it addresses FBI's (1) progress in developing a comprehensive transformation plan; (2) efforts to update its strategic plan; (3) development of a strategic human capital plan; (4) information technology management leadership and practices; and (5) realignment of staff resources to priority areas and the impact of the realignments on the FBI's drug and other criminal investigation programs.
What GAO Found
We commend the FBI for its progress in some areas of its transformation efforts since we last testified on this subject in June 2003. We believe that commitment from the top, a dedicated implementation team, involvement of employees in the process, and the achievement of key milestones are encouraging signs of progress. However, we continue to encourage the development of a comprehensive transformation plan that would consolidate the crosswalks between the various aspects of transformation. This could help management oversee all aspects of the transformation. The FBI's strategic plan has been completed. Overall we found the plan has important strengths as well as some areas in which improvements could be made. For example, the plan includes key elements of successful strategic plans (i.e. a comprehensive mission statement and results-oriented, longterm goals and objectives.). However, the plan is missing some elements that could have made it more informative. Officials advised us that some of these elements are available elsewhere (i.e. lists of stakeholders and performance measures). The absence of these elements makes the plan less comprehensive and useful. The FBI has also developed a strategic human capital plan that contains many of the principles that we have laid out for an effective human capital system (i.e. the need to fill identified skill gaps by using personnel flexibilities). However, the FBI has yet to hire a human capital officer to manage the implementation of this process and the performance management system for the bulk of FBI personnel remains inadequate to discern meaningful distinctions in performance. The FBI recognizes the importance of information technology (IT) as a transformation enabler, making it an explicit priority in its strategic plan and investing hundreds of millions of dollars in initiatives to expand its systems environment and thereby improve its information analysis and sharing. However, FBI's longstanding approach to managing IT is not fully consistent with the structures and practices of leading organizations. A prime example of the consequences of not employing these structures and practices is the cost and schedule shortfalls being experienced on Trilogy, the centerpiece project to modernize infrastructure and case management applications. Recent FBI proposals, plans, and initiatives indicate that it understands its management challenges and is focused on addressing them. Another key element of the FBI's transformation is the realignment of resources to better focus on the highest priorities--counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber investigations. The FBI resources allocated to priority areas continue to increase and now represent its single largest concentration of field agent resources--36 percent of its fiscal year 2004 field agent positions. |
gao_RCED-99-135 | gao_RCED-99-135_0 | DOE Has Spent Over $1 Billion on Its Downsizing Efforts
For fiscal years 1994 through 1998, DOE obligated and spent about $1.033 billion to provide benefits to contractor workers and communities affected by its downsizing efforts. At the end of fiscal year 1998, DOE had not used all workforce restructuring funds, resulting in a carryover balance of $72 million. These funds included $10 million that was unobligated and $62 million that was obligated but not yet spent (called uncosted balances). Combined, these programs spent about $853 million on worker assistance, and the remaining $179 million went to community assistance. Of the $1.033 billion spent on worker and community assistance, about $460 million was provided by the Office of Worker and Community Transition. DOE offered its separated contractor workers severance packages that were relatively consistent with the types of public and private sector benefits we analyzed. Of the 5,469 contractor workers separated during fiscal years 1997 and 1998, 4,788 received separation benefits. The Value of Benefits Varied Widely
While DOE generally offered its separated contractor employees the same types of benefits, the value of these benefits varied because of the differences in the packages among sites and employees’ length of service and base pay (which reflects employee job and skill level). DOE’s Criteria Do Not Ensure That Most Assistance Goes to the Communites Most Affected by Downsizing or Those With the Highest Unemployment
The use of DOE’s criteria does not result in the most assistance going to the communities most affected by DOE’s downsizing or those with the highest rate of unemployment. Furthermore, because most DOE assistance went to communities with relatively strong economies, the extent to which DOE’s assistance aided in the creation or retention of jobs is not clear. In addition to DOE’s written guidance, the Director of the Office of Worker and Community Transition told us that DOE formally uses four criteria prior to submitting a recommendation to the Secretary: (1) economic distress measured by unemployment and the loss of income; (2) job loss relative to the size of the community affected as a measure of economic dependence on DOE; (3) the diversity of employment within a community and the impact of job loss on the economic base; and (4) the overall size of the workforce reduction. In contrast, the communities surrounding Richland had more than twice the unemployment rate and nearly twice the job loss of Rocky Flats during this same time but received only about $18.5 million in community assistance. Some Community Assistance Would Have Been Ineligible Under Other Criteria
Applying EDA’s job loss and unemployment criteria to DOE’s community assistance funding decisions for fiscal years 1995 through 1998, we found that some communities that received assistance under DOE’s criteria would not be eligible under EDA’s criteria. Conclusions
DOE’s criteria for assessing community assistance requests focus on the merits of individual projects and not on a community’s relative economic need. DOE’s comments and our evaluation of them are provided in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To determine the amount of funds DOE has obligated and expended in support of its worker and community assistance program for fiscal years 1994 through 1998, we reviewed budget records and talked to officials in DOE’s Office of Worker and Community Transition and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. However, we did not attempt to compare the value of DOE’s benefits with the value of the benefits provided by other federal and private organizations. To examine the results of DOE’s criteria for determining which communities should receive assistance, we interviewed officials in DOE and the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) community assistance program for minimizing the impact of downsizing its contractor workforce, focusing on: (1) how much funding DOE had committed to spend and spent in support of its worker and community assistance program for fiscal years (FY) 1994 through 1998; (2) who received benefits during FY 1997 and FY 1998; (3) comparing DOE's separation benefits with the benefit packages of other federal and nonfederal organizations; and (4) what effect DOE's criteria had on determining which communities received assistance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE's assistance to separated contractor workers is reasonably consistent with the types of benefits offered by other government and private sector employers; (2) however, its community development assistance funds did not necessarily go to those communities most affected by downsizing or with the highest unemployment; (3) for FY 1994 through FY 1998, DOE obligated and spent about $1.033 billion on benefits for the contractor workers and communities affected by its downsizing; (4) about $853 million was spent on worker assistance and the rest on community assistance; (5) about $460 million of the $1.033 billion was provided by DOE's Office of Worker and Community Transition and the remainder by other DOE programs; (6) at the end of FY 1998, DOE had a carryover balance of $72 million, including $10 million in unobligated funds and $62 million in funds that were obligated but not yet spent; (7) most of the contractor workers separated during FY 1997 and FY 1998 received benefits under DOE's workforce restructuring program; (8) while DOE generally offered its separated contractor employees a large range of benefits, the value of the benefits varied widely, primarily because of the differences in benefits packages among sites and in the employees' length of service and base pay; (9) these benefit packages are reasonably consistent with the types of benefits offered by public and private employers; (10) DOE's community assistance criteria, which focus on the merits of individual projects and not on relative economic need, do not necessarily result in the most assistance going to the communities most affected by its downsizing or with the highest unemployment; (11) for example, for FY 1995 through FY 1998, the communities surrounding DOE's Richland, Washington, facility had more than twice the unemployment rate and nearly twice the DOE job loss of those surrounding the Rocky Flats, Colorado, facility, but Richland received $18 million less than the $24 million that Rocky Flats received; (12) had the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration unemployment and jobs lost criteria been used to evaluate the request for community assistance, Rocky Flats would have been ineligible for funding, given the strength of its employment; (13) in addition, 5 of the 8 DOE sites that received community assistance would have been ineligible under these criteria; and (14) furthermore, because most DOE assistance went to communities with relatively strong economies, the extent to which DOE's assistance aided in creating or retaining jobs is not clear. |
gao_GAO-06-1099T | gao_GAO-06-1099T_0 | OMB plays a key role in overseeing federal IT investments and how they are managed. The act also requires OMB to establish processes to analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital investments in information systems made by executive agencies. OMB is also required to report to Congress on the net program performance benefits achieved as a result of major capital investments in information systems that are made by executive agencies. To derive the total number of projects on the list that were reported for fiscal year 2005, OMB polled the individual analysts and compiled the numbers. Poorly Planned and Performing Projects Identified, Totaling About $12 Billion in Estimated Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2007
About 300 projects totaling about $12 billion in estimated IT expenditures for fiscal year 2007 have been placed on OMB’s Management Watch List or as a high risk project with performance shortfalls. Specifically, the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 included 857 major IT projects, totaling approximately $64 billion. In addition, agencies reported that 79 of the 226 high-risk projects identified as of March 2006, collectively totaling about $2.2 billion had a performance shortfall primarily associated with cost and schedule variances that exceeded 10 percent. Improvements Needed to Identify and Oversee Management Watch List and High Risk Projects
While the Management Watch List and high risk processes serve to highlight poorly planned and performing projects and focus attention on them, our reviews identified opportunities to strengthen the identification and oversight of projects for each. Management Watch List May Be Based on Unreliable Data and High Risk Project Criteria Are Not Always Consistently Applied
OMB’s Management Watch List may be undermined by inaccurate and unreliable data. Moreover, although agencies, with OMB’s assistance, generally identified their high risk projects using criteria specified by OMB, these criteria were not always consistently applied. For the projects we identified as appearing to meet OMB’s criteria for high risk, the responsible agencies reported that they did not consider these investments to be high risk projects for such reasons as (1) the project was not a major investment; (2) agency management is experienced in overseeing projects; or (3) the project did not have weaknesses in its business case. Without consistent application of the criteria, OMB and executives cannot have the assurance that all projects that require special attention have been identified. OMB Does Not Use an Aggregate List to Perform Its Oversight of the Management Watch List or High Risk Projects
While OMB’s Management Watch List identified opportunities to strengthen investments and promote improvements in IT management, OMB did not develop a single, aggregate list identifying the projects and their weaknesses. For example, to improve how the Management Watch List projects are identified, we have made several recommendations to improve the accuracy and validity of exhibit 300s for major IT investments, including that the Director require agencies to determine the extent to which the information contained in each exhibit 300 is accurate and reliable, and, where weaknesses in accuracy and reliability are identified, disclose them and explain the agency’s approach to mitigating them. Likewise, to improve how high risk projects are identified, we recommended that the Director direct federal agency CIOs to ensure that they are consistently applying the high risk criteria defined by OMB. To improve how the Management Watch List is provided oversight, in our April 2005 report, we recommended that the Director of OMB develop a central list of projects and their deficiencies and report to Congress on progress made in addressing risks of major IT investments and management areas needing attention. OMB generally disagreed with our recommendations for strengthening the Management Watch List and high risk projects processes. Addressing these recommendations would provide increased assurance that poorly planned and performing projects are accurately identified and more effectively provided oversight. The recommendations we made to agencies and OMB to address these issues are aimed at providing greater assurance that poorly planned and performing projects are more accurately identified and receiving adequate oversight, and ultimately ensuring that potentially billions of taxpayers dollars are not wasted. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plays a key role in overseeing federal IT investments. The Clinger-Cohen Act, among other things, requires OMB to establish processes to analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital investments in information systems made by agencies and to report to Congress on the net program performance benefits achieved as a result of these investments. OMB has developed several processes to help carry out its role. For example, OMB began using a Management Watch List several years ago as a means of identifying poorly planned projects based on its evaluation of agencies' funding justifications for major projects, known as exhibit 300s. In addition, in August 2005, OMB established a process for agencies to identify high risk projects, i.e., projects requiring special attention because of one or more reasons specified by OMB, and to report on those that are poorly performing or not meeting performance criteria. GAO recently issued reports on the Management Watch List, high risk projects, and agencies' exhibit 300s. GAO was asked to summarize (1) the number of projects and the fiscal year 2007 dollar value of Management Watch List and high risk projects, (2) previously reported results on how these projects are identified and provided oversight, and (3) recommendations it made to improve these processes.
What GAO Found
As a result of the Management Watch List and high risk projects processes, about 300 projects totaling about $12 billion in estimated IT expenditures for fiscal year 2007 have been identified as being either poorly planned or poorly performing. Specifically, of the 857 major IT projects in the President's budget for fiscal year 2007, OMB placed 263 projects, representing about $10 billion on its Management Watch List. In addition, in response to OMB's memorandum, agencies reported that 79 of 226 high risk projects, collectively totaling about $2.2 billion, had a performance shortfall. While this information helps to focus both agency and OMB management attention on these poorly planned and poorly performing projects, GAO identified opportunities to strengthen how these projects are identified and provided oversight. The Management Watch List may be undermined by inaccurate and unreliable data. OMB uses scoring criteria to evaluate agencies' exhibit 300s to derive the projects on its Management Watch List. GAO's detailed evaluation of exhibit 300s showed that the information reported in them is not always accurate or supported by documentation. The criteria for identifying high risk projects were not always consistently applied and projects that appeared to meet the criteria were not identified as high risk. Without consistent application of the high risk criteria, OMB and agency executives cannot have the assurance that all projects that require special attention have been identified. For both sets of projects, OMB did not develop a central list of projects and deficiencies that could facilitate tracking progress and reporting to Congress. Without such lists, OMB is not fully exploiting the opportunity to analyze and track these projects on a governmentwide basis and not involving Congress in the oversight of these projects with risks. To improve the way the Management Watch List and high risk projects are identified and provided oversight, GAO has made a number of recommendations to the Director of OMB. These recommendations include directing agencies to improve the accuracy and reliability of exhibit 300 information and to consistently apply the high risk criteria defined by OMB. In addition, GAO recommended that the Director develop a single, aggregate list for both the Management Watch List and high risk projects to facilitate tracking progress, performing governmentwide analysis, and reporting the results to Congress. OMB generally disagreed with these recommendations. However, GAO believes that they are needed to provide greater assurance that poorly planned and poorly performing projects are more accurately identified and provided oversight, and ultimately ensure that potentially billions of taxpayer dollars are not wasted. |
gao_GAO-12-554 | gao_GAO-12-554_0 | Multiple Agencies Provide Housing Assistance
Twenty different entities administered 160 programs, tax expenditures, and other tools that supported homeownership and rental housing in fiscal year 2010, reflecting the fragmentation in federal housing delivery. Although selected HUD, USDA, and Treasury multifamily housing programs had overlapping purposes, the products, areas served, and delivery methods differed to varying degrees. While a larger percentage of RHS borrowers with guaranteed loans were located in more remote rural areas compared with FHA and VA borrowers, FHA served a larger number of borrowers in these areas. Overall, the task force’s efforts have not incorporated key principles on effective collaboration. According to HUD, as of April 2012, no milestones or resource estimates were available for the task force and no results were expected until a more formal approach for the task force was established. Although the efforts of the working group have been consistent with a majority of our key practices, the group has yet to take additional steps to reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts. In particular, the agencies, through the Rental Policy Working Group, defined and articulated a common outcome; established mutually reinforcing or joint strategies in soliciting suggestions from federal, state, local, and private officials; allocated resources and identified key initiatives, including estimating the resources and time frames necessary for implementation; agreed on roles and responsibilities, including designating a responsible lead office and participating offices to help implement the alignment activities; established compatible policies and procedures and collected and analyzed information that led to the prioritization and development of the recommendations for rental policy alignment; developed mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on their efforts, established milestones for alignment activities, and launched pilots to test some alignment activities; and used performance-management systems to strengthen individual accountability for results for some senior agency executives. By not expanding its guiding principles to include statutory changes, the agencies may miss additional opportunities to highlight those areas in which statutory action could help respond to additional stakeholder concerns and generate savings and efficiencies in housing programs. Coordinated Reviews of Housing Tax Expenditures and Related Programs Would Be Beneficial
As we recommended in September 2005 and reiterated in March 2011, coordinated reviews of tax expenditures and related housing spending programs with similar goals could help assess the relative effectiveness of tax expenditures in terms of their benefits and costs, and help policymakers reduce overlap and inconsistencies and direct scarce resources to the most-effective or least-costly methods to deliver federal support. Consolidating Single- Family Loan Guarantee Programs Could Improve Programs and Produce Savings
Consolidation or greater coordination of RHS and HUD single-family loan programs that serve similar markets and provide similar products may offer opportunities for savings in the long term. Additionally, we noted the potential for administrative savings by consolidating programs that provided similar products and served similar markets. For example, VA’s housing program is an entitlement earned by veterans and RHS’s guaranteed program is only available to low- and moderate- income households in rural areas. In 2000, when we first recommended that Congress consider requiring USDA and HUD to examine the benefits and costs of merging programs such as their single-family guaranteed programs, USDA noted that such a merger could be detrimental to rural areas, which could lose a federal voice. In relation to concerns about the level of focus on rural housing in HUD, HUD currently serves a larger number of homeowners in rural areas than RHS serves, and HUD administration officials told us that they considered HUD an agency that served housing needs in all communities—urban, suburban, and rural. A recently created task force may help evaluate the potential for coordinating or consolidating the single-family housing loan programs at HUD, USDA, and VA and the agencies have been working to consolidate and align certain requirements in multifamily housing programs through the Rental Policy Working Group. Certain aspects of the single-family programs show great potential for consolidation—as we have reported, overlap exists in products offered, service delivery, and geographic areas served. However, any consolidation of multifamily programs would require statutory changes. To further improve HUD, USDA, and Treasury’s efforts through the Rental Policy Working Group to consolidate and align certain requirements in multifamily housing programs, the Rental Working Group should take steps to document collaborative efforts in strategic and annual plans to help reinforce agency accountability for these efforts. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) programs and activities the federal government uses to support rental housing and homeownership; (2) the extent to which overlap or fragmentation exists in the goals, products, geographic coverage, service delivery mechanisms, and recipient income levels of selected housing programs and activities of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Agriculture (USDA), Veterans Affairs (VA), and Treasury; and (3) the extent to which federal efforts have increased coordination for selected housing programs and activities, and implications of further coordinating or consolidating selected housing programs or activities. Extent to Which Overlap or Fragmentation Existed in Selected Housing Programs or Activities
To determine the extent to which overlap or fragmentation occurred in the selected housing programs or activities of HUD, USDA, VA, and Treasury, we updated and expanded the work from our 2000 report on opportunities and barriers to reducing overlap and fragmentation in We focused delivering single-family and multifamily housing programs.on selected single-family and multifamily programs at HUD, USDA, and VA, and on Treasury’s Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program and the mortgage interest and property tax deductions as of 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government plays a major role in providing housing assistance to homebuyers, renters, and state and local governments. It incurred about $170 billion in obligations for federal assistance and estimated forgone tax revenue in fiscal year 2010. However, fiscal realities raise questions about the efficiency of multiple housing programs and activities across federal agencies with similar goals, products, and sometimes parallel delivery systems. This report assesses the (1) extent to which there is overlap or fragmentation in selected housing programs, (2) federal collaborative efforts, and (3) implications of consolidating selected housing programs.
For this report, GAO updated and expanded prior work and collected and analyzed new data, focusing on the largest programs in terms of funding. In addition to addressing these objectives, GAO developed a catalog of federal programs and activities that support rental housing and homeownership and identified what is known about the purpose, cost, eligibility, and populations served. The catalog (GAO-12-555SP) is an electronic supplement to this report.
What GAO Found
Housing assistance is fragmented across 160 programs and activities. Overlap exists for some products offered, service delivery, and geographic areas served by selected programsparticularly in the Department of Agricultures (USDA) Rural Housing Service (RHS) and Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA). For instance, RHS, FHA, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) all guarantee mortgage loans for homeowners. According to fiscal year 2009 data (the most recent available), FHA served a larger number of households than RHS in all areas, including a larger number of low- and moderate-income households in rural areas. Although selected HUD, USDA, and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) multifamily programs had overlapping purposes, the products, areas served, and delivery methods differed. For example, HUD, RHS, and Treasury provide financing for development and rehabilitation of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income households, but RHS-financed properties were more concentrated in rural areas and HUDs and Treasurys tax credit properties were more concentrated in urban and suburban areas.
Opportunities exist to increase collaboration among the agencies and potentially realize efficiencies. In February 2011, the Administration announced a task force to evaluate the potential for coordinating or consolidating homeownership loan programs at HUD, USDA, and VA. But the task forces efforts have not yet incorporated key collaborative practices GAO identified. Practices such as identifying goals and resources and defining strategies and outcomes will be important as the task force moves forward. HUD, USDA, and Treasury also have been working to consolidate and align requirements in rental housing programs through the Rental Policy Working Group. Although its efforts have been consistent with many key collaborative practices, the group has not taken full advantage of opportunities to reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through the agencies annual and strategic plans, or expanded its guiding principles to evaluate areas requiring statutory action to generate savings and efficiencies. Also, in 2005 and in 2011, GAO recommended coordinating reviews of tax expenditures and related spending programs. Such reviews could help reduce overlap and inconsistencies and direct scarce resources to the most effective or efficient methods to deliver federal support.
Consolidating programs carries certain implications for users, existing programs, personnel, portfolios, and associated information systems. Nevertheless, GAO suggested in 2000 that Congress consider requiring USDA and HUD to examine the benefits and costs of merging programs serving similar markets and providing similar products. Since then, certain aspects of the RHS and FHA homeownership programs have shown evidence of growing similarity, such as RHS shift toward loan guarantees. However, the current statutory framework imposes additional challenges on the agencies ability to further consolidate similar programs. Thus, any evaluations of which programs, products, systems, and processes to retain, revise, consolidate, or eliminate would involve complex analyses, trade-offs, and difficult policy decisions. The task force offers opportunities for these agencies to identify potential areas for consolidation or greater coordination and which actions would require statutory change.
What GAO Recommends
To enhance evaluation of coordination or consolidation of single-family programs, HUD, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), USDA, and VA should adopt a more rigorous approach for their task force that incorporates collaborative practices. To further improve initiatives to consolidate and align requirements in multifamily programs, HUD, USDA, and Treasury should document their efforts in annual and strategic plans. As part of these collaborative efforts, these agencies also should identify specific programs for consolidation, including those requiring statutory changes. HUD, USDA, and VA generally agreed with the recommendations; however, HUD and OMB stated that actions should wait until after the housing markets stabilize. GAO noted that achieving efficiencies and cost savings also were important. |
gao_GAO-05-284T | gao_GAO-05-284T_0 | While we are unable to express an opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements, several key items deserve emphasis in order to put the information contained in the financial statements and the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the Financial Report of the United States Government into context. First, the federal government reported a $412.3 billion unified budget deficit and a $568 billion on-budget deficit in fiscal year 2004, representing approximately 3.6 percent and 4.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. Second, the U.S. government’s reported liabilities, commitments, and other obligations grew by over $13 trillion in fiscal year 2004, primarily due to the enactment of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, and now surpass $43 trillion, representing close to four times current GDP. Potential Impact of Restatements on Agencies’ Financial Statements
An emerging issue during fiscal year 2004 that merits concern and close scrutiny was the growing number of CFO Act agencies that restated certain of their financial statements for fiscal year 2003 to correct errors. The material internal control weaknesses discussed in this testimony increase the risk that additional misstatements may occur and not be identified on a timely basis by management or the auditors, resulting in further restatements. Frequent restatements to correct errors can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all responsible parties. The material deficiencies we identified were the federal government’s inability to satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the Department of Defense (DOD), were properly reported in the consolidated financial statements; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain agencies; ensure that the federal government’s consolidated financial statements were consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, balanced, and in conformity with GAAP; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies; and resolve material differences that exist between the total net outlays reported in federal agencies’ SBRs and the records used by Treasury to prepare the Statements of Changes in Cash Balance. Addressing Major Impediments to an Opinion on Consolidated Financial Statements
For the past 8 fiscal years, the federal government has been required to prepare, and have its consolidated financial statements audited. There are three primary ongoing reasons why the consolidated financial statements remained unauditable for fiscal year 2004: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements, and (3) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies. Closing Comments
The U.S. government is the largest, most complex and most diverse entity on earth today. Its services and programs—homeland security, national defense, Social Security, health care, mail delivery, and food inspection, to name just a few—directly affect the well-being of almost every American. Clearly, tough choices will be required to address the resulting structural imbalance. Sound decisions on the current results and future direction of vital federal programs and policies are made more difficult without timely, reliable, and useful financial and performance information. Proper accounting and financial reporting practices are essential in the public sector. Until the problems discussed in our audit report are adequately addressed, they will continue to present a number of adverse implications for the federal government and the taxpayers, which are outlined in our report. GAO’s long-term budget simulations paint a chilling picture. Problems in accounting for liabilities affect the determination of the full cost of the federal government’s current operations and the extent of its liabilities. Other Material Weaknesses
The federal government did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting (including safeguarding assets) and compliance with laws and regulations as of September 30, 2004. In addition to the material deficiencies discussed in appendix IV, we found the following four other material weaknesses in internal control. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required by law to annually audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Proper accounting and reporting practices are essential in the public sector. The U.S. government is the largest, most complex, and most diverse entity on earth today. Its services--homeland security, national defense, Social Security, health care, mail delivery, and food inspection, to name a few--directly affect the well-being of almost every American. Sound decisions on the current results and future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are made more difficult without timely, reliable, and useful financial and performance information. Until the problems discussed in GAO's audit report on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements are adequately addressed, they will continue to (1) hamper the federal government's ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other information; (2) affect the federal government's ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs; (3) impair the federal government's ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions; and (4) prevent the federal government from having reliable financial information to operate in an economical, efficient, and effective manner.
What GAO Found
The federal government completed its consolidated financial statements on December 15, 2004. This is just 76 days after the end of the fiscal year--a record for timeliness. However, as in the previous 7 fiscal years, certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and financial reporting practices resulted in conditions that continued to prevent GAO from being able to provide the Congress and American citizens an opinion as to whether the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government are fairly stated in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Three major impediments to an opinion on the consolidated financial statements continue to be (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements, and (3) the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies. Further, in our opinion, the federal government did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting and compliance due to numerous material weaknesses. While GAO was unable to express an opinion on the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government, several key items deserve emphasis in order to put the information contained in the financial statements and Management's Discussion and Analysis in perspective. First, the federal government reported a $412.3 billion unified budget deficit and a $568 billion on-budget deficit in fiscal year 2004, representing approximately 3.6 percent and 4.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. Second, the U.S. government's reported liabilities, commitments, and other obligations grew by over $13 trillion in fiscal year 2004, primarily due to enactment of the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, and now surpass $43 trillion, representing close to four times current GDP. In addition, while the size of the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance grew significantly during the fiscal year, the retirement of the "baby boom" generation is closer to becoming a reality. Given these and other factors, it seems clear that the nation's current fiscal path is unsustainable and that tough choices by the President and the Congress will be necessary in order to address the nation's large and growing fiscal imbalance. An emerging issue during fiscal year 2004 that merits concern and close scrutiny was the growing number of Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies that restated certain of their financial statements for fiscal year 2003 to correct errors. Frequent restatements to correct errors can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all responsible parties. The material internal control weaknesses discussed in this testimony serve to increase the risk that additional errors may occur and not be identified on a timely basis by management or the auditors, resulting in further restatements. |
gao_GAO-12-51 | gao_GAO-12-51_0 | Background
CMS’s method of adjusting payments to MA plans to reflect beneficiary health status has changed over time. CMS estimated that 3.41 percent of 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores was attributable to differences in diagnostic coding between MA and Medicare FFS since 2007. Diagnostic Coding Differences Accounted for Estimated MA Risk Score Growth of at Least $3.9 Billion in 2010, with Likely Larger Impacts in 2011 and 2012
We found that diagnostic coding differences exist between MA plans and Medicare FFS and that these differences had a substantial effect on payment to MA plans. We estimated that risk score growth due to coding differences over the previous 3 years was equivalent to $3.9 billion to $5.8 billion in payments to MA plans in 2010 before CMS’s adjustment for coding differences. Before CMS reduced 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores, we found that these scores were at least 4.8 percent, and perhaps as much as 7.1 percent, higher than the risk scores likely would have been as a result of diagnostic coding differences, that is, if the same beneficiaries had been continuously enrolled in FFS (see fig. Furthermore, CMS also found that the impact of coding differences While we did not have more recent data, increased from 2004 to 2008. the trend of coding differences through 2008 suggests that the impact of coding differences in 2011 and 2012 could be larger than in 2010. First, CMS did not include data from 2008. CMS did not update its estimate in 2011 and 2012 with more current data, even though data were available. By continuing to implement the same 3.41 percent adjustment for coding differences in 2011 and 2012, we believe CMS likely substantially underestimated the impact of coding differences in 2011 and 2012, resulting in excess payments to MA plans. We confirmed CMS’s finding that differences in diagnostic coding caused risk scores for MA beneficiaries to be higher than those for comparable Medicare FFS beneficiaries in 2010. This finding underscores the importance of continuing to adjust MA risk scores to account for coding differences and ensuring that these adjustments are as accurate as possible. Such steps could include, for example, accounting for additional beneficiary characteristics, including the most current data available, identifying and accounting for all years of coding differences that could affect the payment year for which an adjustment is made, and incorporating the trend of the impact of coding differences on risk scores. In its comments, CMS stated that it found our methodological approach and findings informative and suggested that we provide some additional information about how the coding differences between MA and FFS were calculated. CMS did not comment on our recommendation for executive action. Estimating the Impact on MA Risk Scores
To determine the extent to which differences, if any, in diagnostic coding between MA plans and Medicare FFS affected MA risk scores in 2010, we used Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) enrollment and risk score data from 2004 to 2008, the most current data available at the time of our analysis, and projected the estimated impact to 2010. In addition, for beneficiaries who were enrolled in Medicare FFS and switched to MA in 2005, 2006, or 2007, we included data for 1 year of Medicare FFS enrollment immediately preceding their MA enrollment.Our MA study population included three types of beneficiaries, each of which we analyzed separately for each period:
MA joiners—beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare FFS for the entire first year of each period and then enrolled in MA for all of the following year,
MA plan stayers—beneficiaries enrolled in the same MA plan for the first and second year of the period, and
MA plan switchers—beneficiaries enrolled in one MA plan for the first year of the period and a second MA plan in the following year. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays plans in Medicare Advantage (MA)the private plan alternative to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS)a predetermined amount per beneficiary adjusted for health status. To make this adjustment, CMS calculates a risk score, a relative measure of expected health care costs, for each beneficiary. Risk scores should be the same among all beneficiaries with the same health conditions and demographic characteristics. Policymakers raised concerns that differences in diagnostic coding between MA plans and Medicare FFS could lead to inappropriately high MA risk scores and payments to MA plans. CMS began adjusting for coding differences in 2010. GAO (1) estimated the impact of any coding differences on MA risk scores and payments to plans in 2010 and (2) evaluated CMSs methodology for estimating the impact of these differences in 2010, 2011, and 2012. To do this, GAO compared risk score growth for MA beneficiaries with an estimate of what risk score growth would have been for those beneficiaries if they were in Medicare FFS, and evaluated CMSs methodology by assessing the data, study populations, study design, and beneficiary characteristics analyzed.
What GAO Found
GAO found that diagnostic coding differences exist between MA plans and Medicare FFS. Using data on beneficiary characteristics and regression analysis, GAO estimated that before CMSs adjustment, 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores were at least 4.8 percent, and perhaps as much as 7.1 percent, higher than they likely would have been if the same beneficiaries had been continuously enrolled in FFS. The higher risk scores were equivalent to $3.9 billion to $5.8 billion in payments to MA plans. Both GAO and CMS found that the impact of coding differences increased over time. This trend suggests that the cumulative impact of coding differences in 2011 and 2012 could be larger than in 2010.
In contrast to GAO, CMS estimated that 3.4 percent of 2010 MA beneficiary risk scores were attributable to coding differences between MA plans and Medicare FFS. CMSs adjustment for this difference avoided $2.7 billion in excess payments to MA plans. CMSs 2010 estimate differs from GAOs in that CMSs methodology did not include more current data, did not incorporate the trend of the impact of coding differences over time, and did not account for beneficiary characteristics other than age and mortality, such as sex, health status, Medicaid enrollment status, beneficiary residential location, and whether the original reason for Medicare entitlement was disability.
CMS did not update its coding adjustment estimate in 2011 and 2012 to include more current data, to account for additional years of coding differences, or to incorporate the trend of the impact of coding differences. By continuing to implement the same 3.4 percent adjustment for coding differences in 2011 and 2012, CMS likely underestimated the impact of coding differences in 2011 and 2012, resulting in excess payments to MA plans.
GAOs findings underscore the importance of both CMS continuing to adjust risk scores to account for coding differences and ensuring that those adjustments are as complete and accurate as possible.
In its comments, CMS stated that it found our findings informative. CMS did not comment on our recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS should improve the accuracy of its MA risk score adjustments by taking steps such as incorporating adjustments for additional beneficiary characteristics, using the most current data available, accounting for all relevant years of coding differences, and incorporating the effect of coding difference trends. |
gao_AIMD-98-26 | gao_AIMD-98-26_0 | Background
The District of Columbia government, acting through the Mayor, the District’s Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA), and the District of Columbia Arena, L.P. (DCALP)—a limited partnership formed by the owner of the Washington Wizards and the Washington Capitals—agreed that DCALP would build a sports arena (estimated to cost about $175 million) and that the District would be responsible for financing certain predevelopment costs. Predevelopment Project Costs
Since our last report, predevelopment cost estimates have increased from $55.8 million to about $58.5 million, or by a net amount of $2.7 million (4.8 percent). Land Acquisition
As shown in table 1, land acquisition has represented over half of total predevelopment costs and remains the only known potential risk to the District’s predevelopment budget for the arena project. The District invoked its powers of eminent domain to secure title to the property and deposited $5.25 million with the D.C. Superior Court, which is $3.35 million less than the owner’s last requested price. The significant increase in expenditures in this category is primarily a result of a negotiated settlement related to delays in construction activities due to extended time frames for soil remediation efforts. According to DCALP, subcontractors had to pay additional premium labor rates to get back on schedule, and additional materials were also required. As shown in table 1, as of October 7, 1997, total expenditures for these activities is expected to be about $4 million, which is $804,000 less than what was estimated about a year ago. Dedicated Tax Revenue Collections and Other Revenues
As of September 30, 1997, collections for the 1997 Arena Tax had totaled about $9 million and were sufficient to meet 1997 principal and interest payments (about $5.9 million annually) on the bonds issued to finance the predevelopment expenses. Based on an analysis performed by the District’s lead underwriter for the Sports Arena Special Tax Revenue Bonds, if future Arena Tax collections remain in the $9 million range, and if revenues from the ground lease of the arena and the $6 million in the debt service reserve, including interest earnings, are used, the bonds could be paid off in 2002, well before the 2010 maturity date of the longest term bonds. The District’s lead underwriter on the Sports Arena Special Tax Revenue Bonds has performed an analysis that shows that if future collections of dedicated tax revenues remain about the same as past collections, and if revenues from the ground lease of the arena and from the debt service reserve fund were used, the bonds could be paid off in the year 2002, 8 years before the last scheduled maturity date. In addition, the analysis revealed that the District would save about $15.6 million in interest costs from early redemption of the term bonds at their par value. The arena is expected to be completed and available for its intended use on December 2, 1997, about 3 months later than the originally scheduled date of September 1, 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the progress of the sports arena project in the District of Columbia, focusing on the project's predevelopment costs, revenue collections, and construction status.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of October 7, 1997, the District of Columbia estimated total predevelopment expenditures to be about $58.5 million, a net increase of about $2.7 million over its October 18, 1996, estimate; (2) the increase is largely attributed to the extended time frames for soil remediation efforts, which in turn compressed construction schedules; (3) the subsequent negotiated settlement with the sports arena contractor on behalf of the subcontractors was to compensate them for premium labor rates to get back on construction schedule and to cover additional material costs; (4) the District's $61.9 million in available funds for predevelopment costs for the sports arena appears to be sufficient to meet estimated expenditures; (5) as of October 7, 1997, almost all the predevelopment activities had been completed, and the District had spent about $56.7 million, with an additional $1.8 million budgeted for activities that will soon be completed, leaving approximately $3.3 million to pay unanticipated expenses or to redeem term bonds prior to their redemption dates; (6) the only known potential risk to the sports arena budget is the price for property taken in a condemnation action, which is to be settled through court action scheduled for December 1997; (7) the difference between the funds on deposit with the courts to pay for the property and the owner's most recent asking price is $3.35 million; (8) collections from the dedicated arena tax have been more than sufficient to pay principal and interest of about $5.9 million annually on the bonds issued to finance the predevelopment expenses; (9) for each of the past two years, collections have exceeded $9 million, and it appears that 1997 collections will also exceed $9 million; (10) an analysis performed by the District's lead underwriter of the sports arena special tax revenue bonds shows that if future year dedicated tax collections remain in the $9 million range, and if revenues from the ground lease of the sports arena and existing debt service reserves funds were used, the bonds could be paid off by 2002, well before the last scheduled maturity date in 2010; (11) the analysis also revealed that the District would save about $15.6 million in interest costs if the bonds were redeemed in 2002; and (12) the sports arena is expected to be completed and available for use on December 2, 1997, 3 months behind the originally scheduled date of September 1, 1997. |
gao_NSIAD-96-7 | gao_NSIAD-96-7_0 | The Requirement for EFOG-M Has Not Been Established
The Army does not have an agreed-upon requirement for the EFOG-M. 215) that would (1) require the Secretary of the Army to certify by December 1, 1995, that a requirement exists for the EFOG-M and whether there is a cost-effectiveness analysis supporting such requirement and (2) limit the expenditure of funds for the EFOG-M program to that identified in the current program plan only ($280 million, based on fiscal year 1995 constant dollars) and deny continuation of the program beyond fiscal year 1998 if contract obligations are not met. The Army’s EFOG-M Advanced Technology Demonstration Plan establishes exit criteria for evaluating EFOG-M performance (see app. Resources for Fielding System Beyond the ACTD Are Not Ensured
Because of the early stage of the ACTD program, the Army has not yet planned for the personnel and funds to support, operate, and maintain the EFOG-M beyond the ACTD program. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Our review was not designed to evaluate the ACTD process, but rather to examine selected aspects of the acquisition of the Army’s EFOG-M system. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's plans for acquiring the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOG-M) system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army lacks a formal requirement for EFOG-M and has not prepared comprehensive comparative cost studies because requirements documents and analyses are not normally required for Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) programs; (2) the Army should develop the requirement documents because of its prior difficulty in justifying the systems; (3) Congress has required the Army to certify that the requirement and analyses exist by December 1, 1995; (4) the Army has not fully defined EFOG-M performance criteria to evaluate the system's military value; (5) the ACTD program may not shorten the EFOG-M acquisition process unless innovative strategies are devised and formal testing agreements are reached; and (6) resources are not available to support limited fielding of EFOG-M after the 2-year ACTD evaluation period. |
gao_GAO-10-136 | gao_GAO-10-136_0 | Background
History and Overview of Credits for Different Types of Research
Congress created the research tax credit in 1981 to encourage businesses to do more research. Three of the credits, the regular research credit, the alternative incremental research credit (AIRC), and the alternative simplified credit (ASC), rewarded the same types of qualified research and are simply alternative computational options available to taxpayers. The purpose of this design is to reduce the cost of providing a given amount of incentive. The Marginal Incentive Provided by the Research Tax Credit
One of the key measures that we will use to compare credit designs is the marginal effective rate (MER) of the credit, which quantifies the incentive that a credit provides to marginal spending and which can be simply stated as MER = change in the credit benefit / marginal qualified research expenses (QREs)
The definition of a “controlled group of corporations” for purposes of the credit has the same meaning as used in determining a parent -subsidiary controlled group of corporations for the consolidated return rules except the aggregate rule is broader, substituting corporations that are greater than 50 percent owned for 80 percent owned corporations. Large Corporations Have Dominated the Use of the Research Credit, Which Provided an Average Marginal Incentive of About 7 Percent in 2003 through 2005
Although more than 15,000 corporate taxpayers claimed research credits each year from 2003 through 2005, a significantly smaller population of large corporations (those with business receipts of $1 billion or more) claimed most of the credit during this period. In 2005, 44 percent of total net credits earned could not be used immediately. This result indicates that, even though the minimum base reduced the credits that taxpayers earned on both their marginal spending and on the spending they would have done anyway, taxpayers subject to the minimum base still received larger windfall credits than those who were not. An additional significant problem with the regular credit’s base is the difficulty that taxpayers have in substantiating their base computations to the IRS. Does one of the methods provide a greater incentive to increase research spending? Moreover, widespread disagreements between IRS and taxpayers over the adequacy of documentation leave many taxpayers uncertain about the amounts of credit they will ultimately receive. Recordkeeping burdens may discourage some taxpayers from using the credit and the uncertainty reduces the credit’s effective incentive. 3. Specifically, the inclusion of a component that has increased its relative share since the base period would eliminate the marginal incentive for a taxpayer who had been able to earn the credit if the inclusion caused that taxpayer’s base amount to exceed current-year QREs; the inclusion of a component that has increased its relative share would increase the marginal incentive if it increased the taxpayer’s base amount from being less than half of its current-year QREs to more than half (because this would remove the taxpayer from being subject to the 50-percent base constraint); The inclusion of a component that has decreased its relative share since the base period would have effects opposite to those described in the first two bullets; and if any potential component of gross receipts accounts for the same proportion of the taxpayer’s total gross receipts in the base period and over the last 4 years, then the marginal incentive would not be affected by the inclusion or exclusion of that component. Two factors have led to a considerable degree of controversy between IRS and taxpayers over the types of evidence that are sufficient to support a claim for the credit: Most taxpayers do not maintain project-based accounts for normal business purposes (and even those that do must collect additional details solely for purposes of claiming the credit), There has been an increase in the number of taxpayers filing claims on amended returns, based on studies prepared by consultants, and There is no specific guidance in law, regulations, or from IRS examiners as to what constitutes sufficient substantiation. Supplemental records and narratives are needed to explain how the expenses qualify. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax credit for qualified research expenses provides significant subsidies to encourage business investment in research intended to foster innovation and promote long-term economic growth. Generally the credit provides a subsidy for research spending in excess of a base amount but concerns have been raised about its design and administrability. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to describe the credit's use, determine whether it could be redesigned to improve the incentive to do new research, and assess whether recordkeeping and other compliance costs could be reduced. GAO analyzed alternative credit designs using a panel of corporate tax returns and assessed administrability by interviewing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and taxpayer representatives.
What GAO Found
Large corporations have dominated the use of the research credit, with 549 corporations with receipts of $1 billion or more claiming over half of the $6 billion of net credit in 2005 (the latest year available). In 2005, the credit reduced the after-tax price of additional qualified research by an estimated 6.4 to 7.3 percent. This percentage measures the incentive intended to stimulate additional research. The incentive to do new research (the marginal incentive) provided by the credit could be improved. Based on analysis of historical data and simulations using the corporate panel, GAO identified significant disparities in the incentives provided to different taxpayers with some taxpayers receiving no credit and others eligible for credits up to 13 percent of their incremental spending. Further, a substantial portion of credit dollars is a windfall for taxpayers, earned for spending they would have done anyway, instead of being used to support potentially beneficial new research. An important cause of this problem is that the base for the regular version of the credit is determined by research spending dating back to the 1980s. Taxpayers now have an "alternative simplified credit" option, but it provides larger windfalls to some taxpayers and lower incentives for new research. Problems with the credit's design could be reduced by eliminating the regular credit and modifying the base of the alternative simplified credit to reduce windfalls. Credit claims have been contentious, with disputes between IRS and taxpayers over what qualifies as research expenses and how to document expenses. Insufficient guidance has led to disputes over the definitions of internal use software, depreciable property, indirect supervision, and the start of commercial production. Also disputed is the documentation needed to support a claim, especially in cases affected by changes in the law years after expenses were recorded. Such disputes leave taxpayers uncertain about the amount of credit to be received, reducing the incentive. |
gao_GAO-06-711T | gao_GAO-06-711T_0 | The UN Established a Weak Control Environment for Enforcing Sanctions and Managing the Oil for Food Program
Although the sanctions curbed the Iraq regime’s ability to advance its military and weapons of mass destruction programs, the UN established a weak control environment for the Oil for Food program at its beginning due to compromises it made with the Iraq government and neighboring states. For example, the UN allowed Iraq to control contract negotiations for imported commodities with little oversight, allowing the regime to obtain illicit funds through contract surcharges and kickbacks. Several countries in the region depended on Iraqi trade, but no provisions were made to address the economic impact of the sanctions on these countries. This undermined international support for sanctions and allowed Iraq to smuggle oil outside the Oil for Food program. The sanctions helped prevent the Iraq regime from obtaining prohibited military and dual-use items, but little attention was given to oversight of the economic activities related to the Oil for Food program, such as monitoring the price and value of Iraq’s contracts. Unclear Authority, Lack of Risk Assessment, and Inadequate Monitoring and Oversight Further Undermined the Sanctions and Oil for Food Program
The UN did not adequately address other key internal control elements as it implemented the Oil for Food program: (1) establishing clear authorities, (2) identifying and addressing program risks, and (3) ensuring adequate monitoring and oversight. For example, the Office of the Iraq Program lacked clear authority to reject commodity contracts based on pricing concerns. In addition, the UN contractor at Iraq’s border did not have the authority to evaluate imports for price and quality, and no provisions were made to stop imports that were not purchased through the Oil for Food program. Moreover, the UN did not assess emerging risks as the Oil for Food program expanded from a 6-month emergency measure to deliver food and medicine to a 6-year program that provided more than $31 billion to 24 economic sectors. Some monitoring activities constrained the ability of the regime to obtain illicit contract surcharges, but smuggling continued despite the presence of inspectors. Although the UN focus on screening military and dual-use items was largely effective in constraining Iraq’s ability to import these goods through the Oil for Food program, the UN’s neglect of Iraq’s illicit revenue streams from smuggling and kickbacks undermined the program’s goal of using Iraqi oil revenues to benefit the Iraqi people. Establish clear authorities for key management, oversight, and monitoring activities. Assess the role of internal audit and evaluation units and take steps to ensure that these entities have the resources and independence needed for effective oversight. Although the UN’s internal audit office audited some aspects of the Oil for Food program and identified hundreds of irregularities, it lacked the resources and independence to provide effective oversight of this costly and complex UN effort. Recommendation
In our report on the Oil for Food program’s internal controls, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN work with other member states to encourage the Secretary General to ensure that UN programs with considerable financial risks establish, apply, and enforce the principles of internationally accepted internal control standards, with particular attention to comprehensive and timely risk assessments; and strengthen internal controls throughout the UN system, based in part on the lessons learned from the Oil for Food program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the United Nations (UN) and Iraq began the Oil for Food program after sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program was intended to allow the Iraqi government to sell oil to pay for humanitarian goods and prevent it from obtaining goods for military purposes. More than $67 billion in oil revenue was obtained through the program, with $31 billion in assistance delivered to Iraq. Internal controls serve as the first line of defense in preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and in helping agencies achieve desired outcomes. GAO assesses (1) the control environment the UN established for managing the sanctions and Oil for Food program and (2) other key internal control elements. In addition, we provide observations on the lessons learned from the program.
What GAO Found
The UN--the Security Council, the Secretariat, and member states--established a weak control environment for the Oil for Food program at the beginning. The UN allowed Iraq to control contract negotiations for imported commodities with little oversight, enabling the regime to obtain illicit funds through surcharges and kickbacks. The UN did not take steps to address the economic impact that the sanctions had on countries that depended on Iraqi trade, which undermined international support for sanctions and allowed Iraq to smuggle oil outside the Oil for Food program. Overall, the sanctions were effective in helping to prevent the Iraq regime from obtaining military items, but the UN was less rigorous in overseeing economic activities such as monitoring the price and value of Iraq's contracts. The UN's neglect of Iraq's illicit revenue streams helped support a sanctioned regime and undermined the goals of using oil revenues to benefit the Iraqi people. The UN did not adequately address key internal control elements as it implemented the Oil for Food program. First, UN entities lacked clear lines of authority. For example, the Office of the Iraq Program lacked clear authority for rejecting commodity contracts based on pricing concerns. In addition, the customs contractor at Iraq's border was not authorized to evaluate imports for price and quality. Second, the UN did not assess emerging risks as the Oil for Food program expanded from a 6-month emergency measure to deliver food and medicine to a 6-year program providing more than $31 billion to 24 economic sectors. Third, some monitoring activities constrained Iraq's ability to obtain illicit oil surcharges, but smuggling continued despite the presence of inspectors. In addition, the UN's internal audit office identified hundreds of weaknesses and irregularities in its reports. However, it lacked the resources and independence to provide effective oversight of this costly and complex UN effort. The Oil for Food program offers several lessons for designing future sanctions and strengthening existing UN programs: assess whether the sanctions program gives undue control to the sanctioned country; consider the economic impact that sanctions have on neighboring countries; ensure that all aspects of sanctions are equally enforced; establish clear authority and responsibility for management, oversight, and monitoring activities; assess and mitigate risk as programs and funding expand; and assess the role of internal oversight units and ensure that they have the resources and independence needed for effective oversight. |
gao_GGD-98-44 | gao_GGD-98-44_0 | To gather information on how annual performance planning and measurement could be used to address the critical planning challenges we observed in our reviews of the September plans, we relied on our recent report on critical challenges needing sustained attention, our report on governmentwide implementation of the Results Act, our guidance for congressional review of Results Act implementation, and our guidance on effectively implementing the Act. Critical Planning Challenges Remain to Be Addressed as Efforts Under the Results Act Proceed
Although the September plans appear to provide a workable foundation for the continuing implementation of the Results Act, we found that critical planning challenges remain. Agencies Can Use the Annual Performance Planning Process to Build Upon Their Initial Efforts to Establish a Strategic Direction
By improving on their draft strategic plans, agencies’ September plans undertook the first steps toward setting a strategic direction for their programs and activities. In our reviews of agencies’ September plans, we found that some agencies have begun to address the challenge of setting a strategic direction. For example, the plan for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) contains the following objectives supporting the goal for its compensation and pension area: “(1) evaluate compensation and pension programs and (2) modify these programs, as appropriate.” Also, although the first goal in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) September plan “o promote valued, strong, and responsive social security programs and conduct effective policy development, research, and program evaluation” sets a strategic direction for the agency, it could be stated in more measurable terms to better enable the agency to make a future assessment of whether it is being achieved. These presentations, and similar ones in other agencies’ September plans that identify agencies with crosscutting programs, also provide a foundation for the much more difficult work that lies ahead—undertaking the substantive coordination that is needed to ensure that those programs are effectively managed. Our work has shown that the next phases of the Results Act’s implementation will offer a structured framework to address crosscutting issues. Performance Planning Can Assist Agencies in Building the Capacity to Gather, Process, and Analyze Performance and Program Cost Information
Our previous work has shown that agencies need to have reliable data during their planning efforts to set realistic goals and later, as programs are being implemented, to gauge their progress toward achieving those goals. Verified and validated performance information, in conjunction with augmented program evaluation efforts, will help ensure that agencies are able to report progress in meeting goals and identify specific strategies to improve performance. The absence of both sound program performance and cost data and the capacity to use those data to improve performance is a critical challenge that agencies must confront if they are to effectively implement the Results Act. Agencies are required under the Results Act to describe in their annual performance plans how they will verify and validate the performance information that will be collected. It also discusses plans for future evaluations and provides a general schedule for their implementation. HHS submitted its revised strategic plan to the Office of Management and Budget and Congress on September 30, 1997. In the September 30, 1997, version of its strategic plan, EPA added the two elements required by the Results Act that were missing from the draft plan: (1) the relationship of the general goals in the strategic plan to the performance goals to be included in the annual performance plan and (2) the program evaluations used in developing its general goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal agencies' strategic plans submitted in response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, focusing on: (1) summarizing its observations on agencies' September plans; and (2) providing additional information on how the next phase of the Results Act's implementation--performance planning measurement--can be used to address the critical planning issue GAO observed in reviewing the September strategic plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the whole, agencies' September plans appear to provide a workable foundation for Congress to use in helping to fulfill its appropriations, budget, authorization, and oversight responsibilities and for agencies to use in setting a general direction for their efforts; (2) agencies' strategic planning efforts are still very much a work in progress; (3) GAO's reviews of September plans indicate that continued progress is needed in how agencies address three difficult planning challenges--setting a strategic direction, coordinating crosscutting programs, and ensuring the capacity to gather and use performance and cost data; (4) GAO found that agencies can build upon their initial efforts to set a strategic direction for their programs and activities; (5) the next stage in the Results Act's implementation--performance planning and measurement--can assist agencies in addressing the challenge of setting a strategic direction; (6) as an agency develops its performance plan, it likely will identify opportunities to revise and clarify those strategic goals in order to provide a better grounding for the direction of the agency; (7) also, as agencies develop the objective, measurable annual performance goals as envisioned by the Act, those goals can serve as a bridge that links long-term strategic goals to agencies' daily operations; (8) the Results Act's requirements for annual performance plans and performance measurement can also provide a structured framework for Congress, Office of Management and Budget, and agencies to address agencies' crosscutting programs--the second critical planning challenge; (9) GAO found that although agencies have begun to recognize the importance of coordinating crosscutting programs, they must undertake the substantive coordination that is needed for the effective management of those programs; (10) the third critical planning challenge is the need for agencies to have the capacity to gather and use sound program performance and cost data to successfully measure progress toward their intended results; (11) under the Results Act, agencies are also to discuss in their annual performance plans how they will verify and validate the performance information that they plan to use to show whether goals are being met; and (12) verified and validated performance information, in conjunction with augmented program evaluation efforts, will help ensure that agencies are able to report progress in meeting goals and identify specific strategies for improving performance. |
gao_GAO-10-715T | gao_GAO-10-715T_0 | DHS Could Better Assess Its Foreign Language Needs and Capabilities and the Extent to Which Its Programs and Activities Address Potential Shortfalls
DHS Has Taken Limited Action to Assess Foreign Language Needs and Capabilities, and Identify Resulting Shortfalls
In our June 2010 report on DHS’s foreign language capabilities, we identified challenges related to the Department’s efforts to assess their needs and capabilities and identify potential shortfalls. DHS has no systematic method for assessing its existing foreign language capabilities and has not conducted a comprehensive capabilities assessment. DHS and its components have not taken actions to identify potential foreign language shortfalls. We recommended that DHS comprehensively assess its foreign language needs and capabilities, and any resulting shortfalls and ensure these assessments are incorporated into future strategic planning. DHS agreed with our recommendation and officials stated that the Department is planning to take action to address it. DHS Has Developed a Variety of Foreign Language Programs, but the Extent to Which They Address Foreign Language Shortfalls Is Not Known
In June 2010, we also reported that DHS and its components had established a variety of foreign language programs and activities, but had not assessed the extent to which they address potential shortfalls. Although foreign language programs and activities at these components contributed to the development of DHS’s foreign language capabilities, the Department’s ability to use them to address potential foreign language shortfalls varies. DHS agreed with our recommendation and officials stated that the Department is planning to take action to address it. FEMA Has Developed a National Needs Assessment to Identify the Limited English Proficient Populations It Serves
In April 2010, we reported that FEMA had developed a national needs assessment to identify its LEP customer base and how frequently it interacts with LEP persons. Through its needs assessment, FEMA officials reported that FEMA has identified 13 of the most frequently encountered languages spoken by LEP communities. Locally, in response to a disaster, FEMA conducts a needs assessment by collecting information from the U.S. Census Bureau, data from local school districts, and information from foreign language media outlets in the area to help determine the amount of funding required to ensure proper communication with affected LEP communities. DOD and State Need to Take Additional Actions to Comprehensively Address Their Foreign Language Challenges
DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Foreign Language Capabilities, but Still Needs a Comprehensive Strategic Plan, a Complete Inventory, and a Validated Requirements Methodology
DOD has taken some steps to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, but additional actions are needed to guide its efforts and provide the information it needs to assess gaps in capabilities and assess related risks. In June 2009, we reported that DOD had designated senior language authorities at the Department-wide level, and in the military services as well as other components. Therefore, we recommended that DOD (1) develop a comprehensive strategic plan for its language and regional proficiency transformation, (2) establish a mechanism to assess the regional proficiency skills of its military and civilian personnel, and (3) develop a methodology to identify its language and regional proficiency requirements. However, we noted that these efforts had not closed the persistent gaps and reflected, in part, a lack of a comprehensive, strategic approach. We therefore recommended that the Secretary of State develop a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals, objectives, milestones, and feedback mechanisms that links all of State’s efforts to meet its foreign language requirements. State generally agreed with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations and described several initiatives to address these recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foreign language skills are an increasingly key element to the success of diplomatic efforts; military, counterterrorism, law enforcement and intelligence missions; and to ensure access to federal programs and services to Limited English Proficient (LEP) populations within the United States. GAO has issued reports evaluating foreign language capabilities at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the State Department (State). This testimony is based on these reports, issued from June 2009 through June 2010, and addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has assessed its foreign language needs and existing capabilities, identified any potential shortfalls, and developed programs and activities to address potential shortfalls; (2) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has conducted a needs assessment to help ensure access to its services for LEP persons; and (3) DOD and State have developed comprehensive approaches to address their foreign language capability challenges.
What GAO Found
In June 2010, we reported that DHS had taken limited actions to assess its foreign language needs and existing capabilities, and to identify potential shortfalls. For example, while two of three DHS components included in GAO's review had conducted foreign language assessments, these assessments were not comprehensive, as GAO's prior work on strategic workforce planning recommends. In addition, while all three DHS components GAO reviewed had various lists of employees with foreign language capabilities, DHS had no systematic method for assessing its existing capabilities. In addition, DHS and its components had not taken actions to identify potential foreign language shortfalls. Further, DHS and its components established a variety of foreign language programs and activities, but had not assessed the extent to which these programs and activities address potential shortfalls. The Department's ability to use them to address potential shortfalls varied and GAO recommended that DHS comprehensively assess its foreign language needs and capabilities, and any resulting shortfalls; and ensure these assessments are incorporated into future strategic planning. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations, and officials stated that the Department has actions planned to address them. In April 2010, we reported that FEMA had developed a national needs assessment to identify its LEP customer base and how frequently it interacted with LEP persons. Using this assessment, FEMA officials reported that the agency had identified 13 of the most frequently encountered languages spoken by LEP communities. Locally, in response to a disaster, FEMA conducts a needs assessment by collecting information from the U.S. Census Bureau and data from local sources to help determine the amount of funding required to ensure proper communication with affected LEP communities. In June 2009, GAO reported that DOD had taken steps to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, but it had not developed a comprehensive strategic plan to guide its efforts and lacked a complete inventory and validated requirements to identify gaps and assess related risks. GAO recommended that DOD develop a comprehensive strategic plan for its language and regional proficiency efforts, establish a mechanism to assess the regional proficiency skills of its personnel, and develop a methodology to identify its language and regional proficiency requirements. DOD concurred with these recommendations; however, as of June 2010, officials stated that related actions are underway, but have not been completed. Furthermore, GAO reported in September 2009 that State's efforts to meet its foreign language requirements had yielded some results but had not closed persistent gaps in foreign-language proficient staff and reflected, in part, a lack of a comprehensive, strategic approach. GAO recommended that State develop a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals, objectives, milestones, and feedback mechanisms that links all of State's efforts to meet its foreign language requirements. State generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and is working to address them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations; however, GAO made recommendations in prior reports to help DHS, DOD, and State better assess their foreign language capabilities and address potential shortfalls. All three agencies generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and have taken some actions. |
gao_GAO-10-737 | gao_GAO-10-737_0 | Background
NQF is a nonprofit organization established in 1999 that fosters agreement on national standards for measurement and public reporting of health care performance data. Under the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, HHS will reimburse NQF for costs incurred under the contract in addition to a fixed fee that is paid regardless of other costs. NQF Has Begun Work for Each of the Five Duties Required by MIPPA Related to Quality Measures
As of January 13, 2010—the end of the first year of HHS’s 4-year contract with NQF to implement the MIPPA duties—NQF had begun work for each of the five duties required by MIPPA related to health care quality measures: (1) make recommendations on a national strategy and priorities; (2) endorse quality measures; (3) maintain endorsed quality measures; (4) promote electronic health records; and (5) report annually to Congress and the Secretary of HHS. While NQF began work for each of the duties in the first contract year, HHS determines on an annual basis the specific work NQF will be expected to perform under the five MIPPA duties in each contract year. I for a detailed description of NQF’s endorsement process.) The measures were identified by HHS as being of interest to, or actually used by, HHS programs. While NQF has begun work for each of the duties in the first contract year, HHS determines on an annual basis the specific work NQF will be expected to perform under the five MIPPA duties each contract year. NQF Reported about $6.5 Million in Costs and Fixed Fees for the First Contract Year
NQF reported costs and fixed fees totaling approximately $6.5 million for the first year of its contract with HHS, which ended January 13, 2010. The amount NQF reported included direct and indirect costs, as well as fixed fees. Direct costs, which are costs incurred specifically for this contract, represented the largest percentage—about $3.2 million, or 49 percent—of the amount NQF reported (see fig. 1). NQF’s reported direct costs were largely labor costs for NQF employees and payments to subcontractors and consultants. In addition to direct costs, NQF reported about $2.9 million in indirect costs for the first contract year. Indirect costs cover additional items, such as employee benefits, overhead, and administrative costs. Of the approximately $6.5 million in costs and fixed fees NQF reported for the first contract year, most were incurred in the second half of the contract year. NQF and HHS Rely on Reviews of NQF Invoices in Order to Help Ensure That NQF’s Reported Costs Are Proper
NQF reviews invoices and carries out other activities prior to submitting them to HHS in order to help ensure that reported costs are proper. In particular, NQF officials told us NQF uses an electronic timesheet system in order to track employee labor hours. HHS Requires Its Officials to Review NQF Invoices following Certain Procedures in Order to Help Ensure That Reported Costs Are Proper
Like NQF, HHS relies on reviews of NQF’s invoices in order to help ensure that reported costs are proper. Two HHS officials assigned to oversee the NQF contract, the project officer and the contracting officer, are responsible for these reviews. Concluding Observations
While NQF has begun work in the first year of its contract for the five duties related to quality measurement established by MIPPA, it is too early for us to assess whether, or to what extent, NQF will be successful in carrying out these duties. This report describes NQF’s work for the first of 4 contract years, and HHS has flexibility to determine on an annual basis the specific work it expects NQF to perform for each of the MIPPA duties. Therefore, it is not yet known exactly what work NQF will be expected to complete during the remainder of the contract period. Our second report will provide another opportunity to review NQF’s performance and costs. Agency and Other External Comments
We provided drafts of this report to HHS and NQF for comment. Both HHS and NQF provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. This project was initiated prior to the NQF contract with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that was required by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to enter into a 4-year contract with an entity to perform five duties related to health care quality measurement and authorized $40 million from the Medicare Trust Funds for the contract. In January 2009, HHS awarded a contract to the National Quality Forum (NQF), under which HHS will reimburse NQF for its costs and pay additional fixed fees. Established in 1999, NQF is a nonprofit member organization that fosters agreement on national standards for measuring and public reporting of health care performance data. This is the first of two reports MIPPA requires GAO to submit on NQF's contract with HHS. In this report, which covers the first contract year--January 14, 2009, to January 13, 2010--GAO describes (1) the status of NQF's work on the five duties under MIPPA; (2) the costs and fixed fees NQF has reported; and (3) what NQF and HHS do in order to help ensure that NQF's reported costs are proper. GAO reviewed relevant MIPPA provisions and reviewed HHS and NQF documents, such as HHS's contract with NQF, monthly progress reports and invoices for the first contract year, and policies and other documents that describe how HHS and NQF review invoices. GAO also interviewed NQF and HHS officials responsible for implementing and overseeing the contract.
What GAO Found
NQF has begun work for each of five duties required by MIPPA related to quality measures: (1) make recommendations on a national strategy and priorities; (2) endorse quality measures, which involves a process for determining which ones should be recognized as national standards; (3) maintain--that is, update or retire--endorsed quality measures; (4) promote electronic health records; and (5) report annually to Congress and the Secretary of HHS. As of January 13, 2010--the end of the first contract year--NQF's work for four MIPPA duties was in progress and it had completed its first annual report for the fifth duty. For example, NQF had begun the duties related to endorsement and maintenance by initiating the endorsement process for three projects HHS selected and by starting maintenance reviews for a set of measures of interest to or used by HHS. While NQF began work for each of the duties in the first contract year, HHS determines on an annual basis the work NQF will be expected to perform under the five duties each contract year. NQF reported costs and fixed fees totaling approximately $6.5 million for the first contract year, including direct and indirect costs as well as fixed fees. Specifically, NQF reported about $3.2 million in direct costs, or 49 percent of the total. These were costs specifically incurred for the NQF contract, such as direct labor for NQF employees. NQF also reported about $2.9 million in indirect costs, which cover additional items such as employee benefits and overhead. Finally, NQF reported about $360,000 in fixed fees for the first contract year. Over $5 million of the reported costs and fixed fees were incurred in the second half of the contract year. NQF and HHS rely on reviews of NQF invoices in order to help ensure that NQF's reported costs are proper. At NQF, officials told us that they review the invoices prior to submitting them to HHS and carry out other activities, such as using an electronic system to track labor hours, in order to help ensure that the costs they report in the invoices are proper. Like NQF, HHS relies on reviews of NQF invoices in order to help ensure NQF's reported costs are proper. These reviews are governed by HHS policies and procedures and by requirements applicable to federal contracts generally. While NQF has begun work under the MIPPA contract, it is too early for GAO to assess whether, or to what extent, NQF will be successful in carrying out the five MIPPA duties. This report describes NQF's work for the first of 4 contract years. In the remaining 3 years of the contract, HHS will determine on an annual basis specific work for NQF to complete under each of the five MIPPA duties. Therefore, it is not yet known exactly what work NQF will be expected to complete during the remainder of the contract period. GAO's second report, which is due in January 2012, will provide another opportunity to review NQF's performance and costs. HHS and NQF reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-760T | gao_GAO-07-760T_0 | Background
Insurance is a mechanism for spreading risk over time, across large geographical areas, and among industries and individuals. Climate Change Is Expected to Alter the Frequency or Severity of Damaging Weather- Related Events
Assessments by leading scientific bodies suggest that climate change could significantly alter the frequency or severity of weather-related events, such as drought and hurricanes. While temperatures have varied throughout history, triggered by natural factors such as volcanic eruptions or changes in the earth’s orbit, the key scientific assessments we reviewed have generally concluded that the observed increase in temperature in the past 100 years cannot be explained by natural variability alone. Based on model projections and expert judgment, the IPCC reported that future increases in the earth’s temperature are likely to increase the frequency and severity of many damaging extreme weather-related events (summarized in table 1). Weather-Related Insured Losses Totaled More Than $320 Billion between 1980 and 2005 and Appear to Be Increasing
Based on an examination of loss data from several different sources, we found that insurers incurred about $321.2 billion in weather-related losses from 1980 through 2005. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 1, our analysis found that weather-related losses accounted for 88 percent of all property losses paid by insurers during this period. Weather-related losses varied significantly from year to year, ranging from just over $2 billion in 1987 to more than $75 billion in 2005. Major Private and Public Insurers Differ in How They Manage Catastrophic Risks Associated with Climate Change
Major private and federal insurers are responding differently to the prospect of increasing weather-related losses associated with climate change. Many large private insurers are incorporating both near and longer-term elements of climatic change into their risk management practices. In our interviews with eleven of the largest private insurers operating in the U.S. property casualty insurance market, we sought to determine what key private insurers are doing to estimate and prepare for risks associated with potential climatic changes arising from natural or human factors. Major Federal Insurers Have Taken Little Action to Prospectively Assess and Disseminate Information on Potential Increases in Catastrophic Risk Associated with Climate Change
NFIP and FCIC have not developed information on the programs’ longer- term exposure to the potential risk of increased extreme weather events associated with climate change as part of their risk management practices. The goals of the key federal insurance programs are fundamentally different from those of private insurers. Notably, the federal insurance programs’ liabilities have grown significantly, which leaves the federal government increasingly vulnerable to the financial impacts of catastrophic events. Figure 4 illustrates the growth of both program’s exposure from 1980 to 2005. The FCIC has effectively increased its exposure base 26-fold during this period. As one NFIP official explained, the flood insurance program is designed to assess and insure against current— not future—risks. Moreover, as previously discussed, both the IPCC and CCSP are expected to release significant assessments of the likely effect of increasing temperatures on weather events in coming months. Accordingly, our report being released today recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of the Risk Management Agency and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness to analyze the potential long-term implications of climate change for the FCIC and the NFIP, respectively, and report their findings to the Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Weather-related events in the United States have caused tens of billions of dollars in damages annually over the past decade. A major portion of these losses is borne by private insurers and by two federal insurance programs-- the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties against flooding, and the Department of Agriculture's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which insures crops against drought or other weather disasters. In this testimony, GAO (1) describes how climate change may affect future weather-related losses, (2) provides information on past insured weather-related losses, and (3) determines what major private insurers and federal insurers are doing to prepare for potential increases in such losses. This testimony is based on a report entitled Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades are Potentially Significant (GAO-07-285) being released today.
What GAO Found
Key scientific assessments report that the effects of climate change on weather-related events and, subsequently, insured and uninsured losses, could be significant. The global average surface temperature has increased over the past century and climate models predict even more substantial, perhaps accelerating, increases in temperature in the future. Assessments by key governmental bodies generally found that rising temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing and magnitude are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperatures on weather events is expected in the near future. Taken together, private and federal insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims on weather-related losses from 1980 to 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year--largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts--but have generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas and resulting real estate development have generally increased liabilities for insurers, and have helped to explain the increase in losses. Due to these and other factors, federal insurers' exposure has grown substantially. Since 1980, NFIP's exposure nearly quadrupled to nearly $1 trillion in 2005, and program expansion increased FCIC's exposure 26-fold to $44 billion. Major private and federal insurers are both exposed to the effects of climate change over coming decades, but are responding differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating climate change into their annual risk management practices, and some are addressing it strategically by assessing its potential long-term industry-wide impacts. In contrast, federal insurers have not developed and disseminated comparable information on long-term financial impacts. GAO acknowledges that the federal insurance programs are not profit-oriented, like private insurers. Nonetheless, a strategic analysis of the potential implications of climate change for the major federal insurance programs would help the Congress manage an emerging high-risk area with significant implications for the nation's growing long-term fiscal imbalance. |
gao_GAO-11-65 | gao_GAO-11-65_0 | Separate from, but related to, security clearances, are suitability determinations. Significant Overall Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness, but Some Executive Agencies Continue to Face Challenges in Meeting Timeliness Objectives
Timeliness Varies Across Agencies
The government has reported that significant overall progress has been made to improve the investigation and adjudication of personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner. This is largely attributable to DOD, whose clearances comprise a vast majority of governmentwide initial clearances. IRTPA required the executive branch to develop a plan under which, to the extent practical, each authorized adjudicative agency would be required to make a determination on at least 90 percent of initial security clearances within an average of 60 days by December 17, 2009. As can be seen in figure 2, according to the Performance Accountability Council’s February 2010 annual report to Congress, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, two agencies—the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office—met the timeliness requirement for investigations, seven agencies—the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of State—met the timeliness objectives for adjudications, and five agencies—the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Department of State—met the 60-day IRTPA timeliness objective. Performance Accountability Council Has Not Reported on Impediments to Meeting Timeliness Objectives or Plans to Address Impediments
While the Performance Accountability Council, responsible for driving implementation of the reform effort and ensuring accountability, has taken steps to assist in implementation of reform efforts, it has not reported on the impediments to meeting timeliness objectives or plans to address impediments. Executive Agencies Often Grant Reciprocity, Although Challenges Exist to Measuring and Tracking Reciprocity
Executive Agency Officials Reported That They Routinely Honor Another Agency’s Security Clearance, but Additional Steps May Be Taken before Granting Reciprocity
Officials representing executive branch agencies, including those within the Intelligence Community, stated that they routinely grant reciprocity (i.e., accept a background investigation or clearance determination completed by another authorized investigative or adjudicative agency). IRTPA generally requires that all security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. For example: Insufficient information. OPM has taken steps to ensure certain clearance data necessary for reciprocity is available to adjudicators. For example: Conducting suitability determinations. In the Absence of Consistent Metrics and Reporting Requirements, the Extent to Which Reciprocity Is Granted Is Unknown
Although agency officials have stated that reciprocity is regularly granted, agencies do not have complete records on the extent to which previously granted security clearance investigations and adjudications are honored governmentwide. The Performance Accountability Council developed quality metrics, including metrics to track reciprocity, in response to a March 2010 congressional inquiry. Although There Are No Plans to Develop a Single, Integrated Database, Steps Have Been Taken to Upgrade Existing Systems and Increase Information Sharing
The Executive Branch Has Opted to Leverage Existing Systems in Lieu of a Single, Integrated Database
Tasked with establishing a single, integrated database, the executive branch has opted to focus on leveraging existing systems rather than establish a new database. Instead, the focus will be on using a single search capability of existing databases as the means by which they intend to address the IRTPA requirement. OPM, DOD, and ODNI officials with whom we spoke explained that establishing, operating, and maintaining a single, integrated database is not a viable option due to concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Information from Two Primary Databases Can Be Accessed from a Single Entry Point
Although there are no plans to create a new governmentwide database, non-intelligence agencies in our review are sharing information about personnel who hold or are seeking security clearances through two main databases that can be accessed through a single entry point. All three agencies concurred with all of our recommendations. Specifically, ODNI noted that DOD, with the majority of clearances, achieved timeliness goals for adjudications for fiscal year 2010. To assess the extent to which executive branch agencies investigate and adjudicate initial personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner, we analyzed the timeliness objectives specified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and reviewed the self-reported timeliness data contained in the Performance Accountability Council’s Security and Suitability Process Reform Strategic Framework provided by the Performance Accountability Council Subcommittee on Performance Management and Measures for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010. Related GAO Products
DOD Personnel Security Clearance Reform: Preliminary Observations on Timeliness and Quality. DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of long-standing problems with delays and backlogs, Congress mandated personnel security clearance reforms through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). These included requirements related to timeliness, reciprocity, and the creation of a single database to house personnel security clearance information. In 2008, Executive Order 13467 established the Performance Accountability Council. GAO was asked to review the extent to which executive branch agencies (1) investigate and adjudicate personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner, (2) honor previously granted security clearances, and (3) share personnel security clearance information in a single, integrated database. GAO reviewed and analyzed Performance Accountability Council timeliness data for fiscal year 2009 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010. GAO also examined key clearance reform documents and conducted interviews with executive branch agencies, including members of the Intelligence Community, to discuss the three stated objectives.
What GAO Found
Significant overall progress has been made to improve the investigation and adjudication of personnel security clearance applications in a timely manner. This is largely attributable to the Department of Defense (DOD), whose clearances comprise a vast majority of governmentwide initial clearances. IRTPA establishes an objective for all agencies to make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days. The majority of clearances are processed in line with the IRTPA 60-day objective. Certain agencies, however, continue to face challenges for meeting timeliness objectives. Out of the 14 agencies included in GAO's review, DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency met the IRTPA 60-day timeliness objective in the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010. Timeliness among the other executive branch agencies ranged from 62 to 154 days. IRTPA and the recent Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 also require annual reporting on the progress made towards meeting objectives, including a discussion of impediments related to timeliness and quality. While the Performance Accountability Council has taken steps to assist in implementation of reform efforts, it has not reported on the impediments to meeting timeliness objectives for specific agencies not yet achieving this goal. Executive branch agency officials stated that they often honor previously granted personnel security clearances (i.e., grant reciprocity), but the true extent of reciprocity is unknown because governmentwide metrics do not exist. IRTPA generally requires that all personnel security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Agency officials stated that they grant reciprocity, but some noted that they have taken steps to obtain additional information before granting reciprocity. For example, officials stated that they may request copies of background investigation reports before they will honor a security clearance because information available in databases contain limited, summary level detail. Agency officials also reported that steps must be taken to conduct suitability determinations to ensure an applicant's character is appropriate for the position. The extent to which reciprocity is occurring is unknown because no metrics exist to consistently and comprehensively track reciprocity. Although there are no plans to develop a single, integrated database, steps have been taken to upgrade existing systems and increase information sharing. The Performance Accountability Council has opted to leverage existing systems in lieu of the single, integrated database required by IRTPA. Officials assert that a single database is not a viable option due to concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Therefore, a single search capability of existing databases is being used to address the IRTPA requirement. For example, information from two primary databases can now be accessed from a single entry point, allowing executive branch agencies to share clearance information with one another. The Intelligence Community agencies share information through a separate database.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Performance Accountability Council collaborate with executive agencies to develop a plan to improve timeliness for those agencies not yet achieving the 60-day timeliness objective and metrics to track reciprocity. In commenting on this draft, the Performance Accountability Council concurred with all recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-120 | gao_GAO-05-120_0 | Services’ Compliance with Force Health Protection and Surveillance Requirements for OIF Was Mixed, but Appears Better Than for OEF/OJG
The overall record of the military services in meeting force health protection and surveillance system requirements for OIF was mixed and varied by service, by installation visited, and by specific policy requirement; however, our data shows much better compliance with these requirements in the Army and Air Force installations we reviewed compared to the installations in our earlier review of OEF/OJG. Of the installations reviewed for this report, the Marine Corps generally had lower levels of compliance than the other services. Also, the services did not fully comply with requirements that servicemembers’ permanent medical records include required health-related information, and that DOD’s centralized database includes documentation of servicemember health-related information. Noncompliance with the requirements for pre-deployment health assessments may result in servicemembers with existing health problems or concerns being deployed with unaddressed health problems. Also, failure to complete post-deployment health assessments may risk a delay in obtaining appropriate medical follow-up attention for a health problem or concern that may have arisen during or following the deployment. Higher percentages of Army and Air Force servicemembers received required pre-deployment immunizations for OIF. Lower percentages of deployment health-related documentation were missing in the servicemembers’ permanent medical records and at DOD’s centralized database for OIF. Implementation of DOD’s Deployment Health Quality Assurance Program Is Ongoing
In response to congressional mandates and a GAO recommendation, DOD established a deployment health quality assurance program in January 2004 to ensure compliance with force health protection and surveillance requirements and implementation of the program is ongoing. DOD officials believe that their quality assurance program has improved the services’ compliance with requirements. DOD’s quality assurance program requires: Periodic reporting on pre- and post-deployment health assessments. The program requires joint visits by representatives from the Directorate and from service medical departments to military installations for the purpose of validating the service’s deployment health quality assurance reporting. The services are at different stages of developing their deployment quality assurance programs. At the installations we visited, we observed that the Army and Air Force had centralized quality assurance processes in place that extensively involved installation medical personnel examining whether DOD’s force health protection and surveillance requirements were met for deploying/ redeploying servicemembers. In contrast, we observed that the Marine Corps installations did not have well-defined quality assurance processes for ensuring that the requirements were met for servicemembers. To determine the extent to which the military services were meeting the Department of Defense’s (DOD) force health protection and surveillance requirements for servicemembers deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we identified DOD’s and each service’s overall deployment health surveillance policies. In comparing compliance rates for OIF with those for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Joint Guardian (OJG), we reviewed active duty servicemembers’ medical records for Army servicemembers and Air Force servicemembers at selected installations. At each sampled location, we examined servicemember medical records for evidence of the following force health protection and deployment health-related documentation required by DOD’s force health protection and deployment health surveillance policies: Pre- and post-deployment health assessments, as applicable; Tuberculosis screening test (within 1 year of deployment); Pre-deployment immunizations: hepatitis A; influenza (within 1 year of deployment); measles, mumps, and rubella; polio; tetanus-diphtheria (within 10 years of deployment); and typhoid (within 5 years of deployment); and Immunizations required prior to deployment or in theater: anthrax (at least one immunization); and smallpox To provide assurances that our review of the selected medical records was accurate, we requested the installations’ medical personnel to reexamine those medical records that were missing required health assessments or immunizations and adjusted our results where documentation was subsequently identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
A lack of servicemember health and deployment data hampered investigations into the nature and causes of illnesses reported by many servicemembers following the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. Public Law 105-85, enacted in November 1997, required the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a system to assess the medical condition of servicemembers before and after deployments. Following its September 2003 report examining Army and Air Force compliance with DOD's force health protection and surveillance policies for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Joint Guardian (OJG), GAO was asked in November 2003 to also determine (1) the extent to which the services met DOD's policies for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and, where applicable, compare results with OEF/OJG; and (2) what steps DOD has taken to establish a quality assurance program to ensure that the military services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies.
What GAO Found
Overall compliance with DOD's force health protection and surveillance policies for servicemembers that deployed in support of OIF varied by service, installation, and policy requirement. Such policies require that servicemembers be assessed before and after deploying overseas and receive certain immunizations, and that health-related documentation be maintained in a centralized location. GAO reviewed 1,862 active duty and selected reserve component servicemembers' medical records from a universe of 4,316 at selected military service installations participating in OIF. Overall, Army and Air Force compliance for sampled servicemembers for OIF appears much better compared to OEF and OJG. For example, (1) lower percentages of Army and Air Force servicemembers were missing pre- and post-deployment health assessments for OIF; (2) higher percentages of Army and Air Force servicemembers received required pre-deployment immunizations for OIF; and (3) lower percentages of deployment health-related documentation were missing in servicemembers' permanent medical records and at DOD's centralized database for OIF. The Marine Corps installations examined generally had lower levels of compliance than the other services; however, GAO did not review medical records from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OJG. Noncompliance with the requirements for health assessments may result in deployment of servicemembers with existing health problems or concerns that are unaddressed. It may also delay appropriate medical follow-up for a health problem or concern that may have arisen during or after deployment. In January 2004, DOD established an overall deployment quality assurance program for ensuring that the services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies, and implementation of the program is ongoing. DOD's quality assurance program requires (1) reporting from DOD's centralized database on each service's submission of required pre-deployment and post-deployment health assessments for deployed servicemembers, (2) reporting from each service regarding the results of the individual service's deployment quality assurance program, and (3) joint DOD and service representative reviews at selected military installations to validate the service's deployment health quality assurance reporting. DOD officials believe that their quality assurance program has improved the services' compliance with requirements. However, the services are at different stages of implementing their own quality assurance programs as mandated by DOD. At the installations visited, GAO analysts observed that the Army and Air Force had centralized quality assurance processes in place that extensively involved medical personnel examining whether DOD's force health protection and surveillance requirements were met for deploying/re-deploying servicemembers. In contrast, GAO analysts observed that the Marine Corps installations did not have well-defined quality assurance processes for ensuring that requirements were met for servicemembers. |
gao_GAO-17-654T | gao_GAO-17-654T_0 | Based on the 2005 Mission Needs Statement, DHS approved a program of record in 2007—known as the Deepwater program—that provided the additional capability required. Figure 1 shows some of the Coast Guard’s newer assets that are part of this broader modernization effort. The Coast Guard’s Newer Assets Offer Greater Capability than Its Legacy Fleet
The Coast Guard is currently procuring three new cutter classes that will have more capability than the legacy assets they are intended to replace. Specifically, the FRC and NSC have greater fuel capacity and efficiency, engine room and boat launch automation, handling/sea-keeping, and food capacity, all of which increase endurance and effectiveness. The OPC is also expected to provide increased capabilities compared to the Medium Endurance Cutter it is replacing. The Coast Guard is also updating and acquiring new aviation assets that have increased capabilities compared to the legacy assets they are replacing. New Coast Guard Cutters Are Experiencing Maintenance and Equipment Issues
FRC and NSC Mission Capable Rates Are Lower than Expected
The Coast Guard has not been able to take full advantage of increased capabilities of the FRC and NSC due to maintenance issues that have limited their time available for operations. As we reported in March 2017, while over the past few years both the FRC and NSC met their minimum mission capable targets on average, which are 48 percent for the FRC and 49 percent for the NSC, our analysis of a more recent period—from October 2015 to September 2016—found that both cutters fell below their minimum targets due to needed increased depot-level maintenance. The main diesel engines on both cutters, which were manufactured by the same vendor, were among the equipment systems that resulted in the most lost operational days from 2014 through 2016 and have been problematic since the cutters became operational. Affordability of the Coast Guard’s Acquisition Portfolio Remains in Doubt
As we found in June 2014, there are gaps between what the Coast Guard estimates it needs to carry out its program of record for its major acquisitions and what it has traditionally requested and received. For example, senior Coast Guard officials have stated a need for over $2 billion per year, but the President’s budget requested $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2018, after asking for $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2017. In an effort to address the funding constraints it has faced annually, the Coast Guard has been in a reactive mode, delaying and reducing its capability through the annual budget process by delaying new acquisitions, and does not have a plan to realistically set forth affordable priorities. For instance, the Coast Guard has realized delays in many of its programs but, in particular, is facing a gap in the capability provided by its Medium Endurance Cutter fleet, which will likely begin reaching the end of their service lives before the OPCs are operational. These key actions included: 1) the Coast Guard conducting a comprehensive portfolio review across all its acquisitions to develop revised baselines that meet mission needs and reflect realistic funding scenarios and 2) the Coast Guard developing a 20-year plan that identifies all necessary recapitalization efforts and any fiscal resources likely necessary to complete these efforts. In June 2014, we also recommended that the Coast Guard develop a 20- year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions necessary for maintaining at least its current level of service and the fiscal resources necessary to build these assets. DHS concurred with the recommendation, but it is unclear when the Coast Guard plans to complete this effort. In conclusion, as the Coast Guard continues to field new or refurbish existing cutters and aircraft with improved capabilities, it is important that the Coast Guard plan for the affordability of its future portfolio so that it can minimize the capability gaps that can occur as legacy assets reach the end of their service lives before the new assets become operational. | Why GAO Did This Study
In order to meet its missions of maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship, the Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), employs a variety of surface and air assets, several of which are approaching the end of their intended service lives. As part of its efforts to modernize its surface and air assets (an effort known as recapitalization), the Coast Guard has begun acquiring new vessels, such as the National Security Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, and a number of air assets, and developing the Offshore Patrol Cutter. Despite the addition of new assets, concerns surrounding capability and affordability gaps remain.
This statement addresses (1) the capabilities provided by the newer Coast Guard assets, (2) maintainability and equipment challenges for the new cutters, and (3) the overall affordability of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of work examining the Coast Guard's acquisition efforts spanning several years, including the March 2017 report on the NSC and FRC's maintainability.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard is currently procuring three new cutter classes that are intended to have more capability than the legacy assets they are replacing. In particular, the National Security Cutter (NSC) and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) are generally demonstrating improved mission performance (see figure). Both cutters have greater fuel capacity and efficiency and handling/sea-keeping than the legacy assets they replace, all of which increase endurance and effectiveness. Another new asset—the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)—is also expected to provide increased capabilities compared to the Medium Endurance Cutter it is replacing, such as the ability to conduct longer patrols.
The Coast Guard, however, has not been able to take full advantage of the FRC's and NSC's capabilities because of maintenance and equipment issues limiting their time available for operations. GAO found in March 2017 that while both cutters met their minimum mission capable targets on average over the long-term, more recently—from October 2015 to September 2016—they fell below their minimum targets due to needed increased depot-level maintenance. Both cutters have also been plagued by problems with critical equipment, such as the diesel engines, which have contributed to lost operational days.
In June 2014, GAO found gaps between the funding amounts the Coast Guard estimates its major acquisitions need and what it has requested. This has continued. For example, senior Coast Guard officials peg acquisition needs at over $2 billion per year, but the President's budget requested $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2018. In an effort to address funding constraints, the Coast Guard delayed new acquisitions through the annual budget process, but lacks a long-term plan to set forth affordable priorities. As a result of these issues, it is facing a gap in the capability provided by its Medium Endurance Cutters, which are slated to reach the end of their service lives before all the OPCs are operational. GAO recommended in 2014 that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service—aviation and surface—and the fiscal resources needed to buy the identified assets. DHS concurred with the recommendation, but it is unclear when the Coast Guard will complete this effort.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this statement but has made recommendations to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past regarding recapitalization and the specific assets involved, including that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them. DHS agreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-752 | gao_GAO-02-752_0 | Background
Privately funded school voucher programs got their start in 1991 when an Indianapolis businessman founded a local program that provided tuition assistance to about 750 low-income students in grades kindergarten through 8 (K-8). Programs Shared Characteristics and Challenges, but Varied in Size and Voucher Amounts
The privately funded voucher programs we reviewed had a number of common characteristics, including several long-term challenges, but they varied widely in the dollar amounts of the vouchers they awarded and number of students served. Most programs collected only the information they needed to determine student eligibility and administer the programs, such as family income and number of siblings. Looking to the future, program officials said voucher programs face two major challenges— specifically, sustaining programs for the long term and retaining students in the programs. Some programs we contacted have begun developing ways to address these challenges. Many programs have established separate lotteries for private and public school students. Information on the students or families who receive privately funded vouchers is limited, as is information on the private schools the students attend. In general, researchers found that African American students in New York City who used vouchers to attend private schools exhibited more substantial improvements on test scores in math and reading than African American students in the comparison group. These studies have also found that the parents of voucher users in all programs were consistently more satisfied with their children’s education, regardless of ethnic group. The studies of privately funded voucher programs in New York; Dayton; and Washington, D.C., found that the parents of voucher users reported less disruption in their children’s schools compared to the parents of control group students. | What GAO Found
Privately funded voucher programs are a new development in the nation's experiment with school vouchers. These programs, started in the early 1990s, provide low-income families with private, nongovernmental tuition assistance at private schools for kindergarten through grade 12. Although private schools have long offered various forms of financial assistance, many of these privately funded voucher programs are different from traditional scholarship efforts in two key respects: they are open to any applicant solely on the basis of family income level, and recipients are free to decide which schools their children should attend. The 78 privately funded voucher programs GAO reviewed shared numerous characteristics and faced common challenges, but the programs varied widely in the dollar amount of the vouchers awarded and the number of students receiving them. The average voucher amount in school year 2001-2002 ranged widely among programs, from $600 to $2,000 per student, and program size ranged from as few as four students to over 3,000 students. Beyond the information needed to determine eligibility and conduct financial oversight, most programs reported collecting little data about participating students, their families, or the schools they attended. Program officials said that voucher programs face two major challenges--sustaining programs for the long term and retaining students in the programs. Some programs have begun developing ways to address these challenges. Rigorous evaluations of privately funded voucher programs in New York, Dayton, and Washington, D.C., provided some evidence that African Americans students who used vouchers to attend private schools showed greater improvements in math and reading than students in the comparison group and have also found that the parents of voucher users of all racial and ethnic groups were consistently more satisfied with their children's education than parents of comparison group students. |
gao_GAO-08-6 | gao_GAO-08-6_0 | BOP Lacks Data Needed to Perform a Methodologically Sound Cost Comparison and Is Not Positioned to Evaluate Alternatives for Confining Inmates in Low and Minimum Security Facilities
A methodologically sound cost comparison analysis of BOP and private low and minimum security facilities is not currently feasible because BOP does not gather data from private facilities that are comparable to the data collected on BOP facilities. However, without comparable data, BOP is not able to analyze and justify whether confining inmates in private facilities would be more cost-effective than other confinement alternatives such as constructing new BOP facilities or renovating existing BOP facilities. According to BOP officials and private contractors, BOP and private facilities have different characteristics and provide different levels of service. With regard to quality of service, BOP also lacks sufficient data on measurements of safety and security for inmates, staff, and the general public for a methodologically sound cost comparison of BOP and private facilities. BOP officials provided two reasons why they do not collect or require contractors to collect comparable data that would facilitate a comparison of the cost of confining inmates in low and minimum security BOP and private facilities: (1) federal regulations do not require such data as a means for selecting among competing contractors, and (2) BOP believes collecting comparable data from contractors could add costs. Our past work has shown that over the long term, it is usually more cost- effective for an agency to own a facility than to lease one. Among other things, this guide articulates key principles agencies should follow when making decisions about the acquisition of capital assets such as prisons. Nonetheless, according to the OMB guide, selecting alternatives to meet space requirements without adequate analysis by federal agencies has resulted in higher costs than anticipated. Consequently, without such an analysis, it is difficult to know whether BOP is deciding on the most cost-effective alternative for acquiring low and minimum security facilities to confine inmates, including whether to contract, build, or expand. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help BOP evaluate alternatives for confining inmates in low and minimum security facilities, and recognizing that there is a cost associated with gathering and analyzing data needed to compare costs across BOP and private facilities, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Director of BOP to develop a cost-effective way to collect comparative data on low and minimum security facilities confining inmates under BOP’s custody and design and conduct methodologically sound analyses that compare the costs of confining inmates in these facilities in order to consider contracting among other alternatives for low and minimum security confinement, consistent with OMB requirements. Nonetheless, OMB staff also said that they need more and better cost comparison information to help them understand the long-term costs and benefits of owning versus the short-term costs and benefits of privatization. However, BOP has not determined the cost of collecting the data or whether the estimated costs would outweigh the benefits of knowing the most cost-effective alternative for confining inmates. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. We did our work at BOP headquarters and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Washington, D.C. We reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and studies on BOP programs, prison management, and contracting requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last 10 years, the cost to confine federal Bureau of Prison (BOP) inmates in non-BOP facilities has nearly tripled from about $250 million in fiscal year 1996 to about $700 million in fiscal year 2006. Proponents of using contractors to operate prisons claim it can save money; others question whether contracting is a cost-effective alternative. In response to Conference Report 109-272, accompanying Pub. L. No. 109-108 (2005), this report discusses the feasibility and implications of comparing the costs for confining federal inmates in low and minimum security BOP facilities with those managed by private firms for BOP. GAO reviewed available data on a selection of 34 low and minimum security facilities; related laws, regulations, and documents; and interviewed BOP and contract officials.
What GAO Found
A methodologically sound cost comparison analysis of BOP and private low and minimum security facilities is not currently feasible because BOP does not gather data from private facilities that are comparable to the data collected on BOP facilities. GAO's past work has shown that generally accepted evaluation criteria for comparing private and public prisons calls for the comparison to be based on a variety of factors, including selection of facilities with similar characteristics (i.e., staffing levels and educational programs offered) and quality of service (i.e., levels of safety and security for staff, inmates, and the general public). However, according to BOP officials, BOP and private facilities differ in characteristics and quality of service, and BOP does not collect or maintain sufficient data on private facilities to account or adjust for these differences in a cost comparison. According to private contractors, some characteristics data are maintained for their own purposes, but at present the data are not in a format that would enable a methodologically sound cost comparison. BOP officials stated that there are two reasons why they do not require such data of contractors. First, federal regulations do not require these data as a means for selecting among competing contractors. Second, BOP believes collecting comparable data from contractors could increase the cost of the contracts, but BOP officials did not provide support to substantiate these concerns. Without comparable data, BOP is not able to evaluate and justify whether confining inmates in private facilities is more cost-effective than other confinement alternatives such as building new BOP facilities. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires agencies to consider and weigh various alternatives using analyses that help determine the benefits and costs of making decisions about the acquisition of assets, such as prisons. According to OMB requirements, selecting alternatives to meet capacity needs without adequate analysis by federal agencies has resulted in higher costs than expected. OMB provides guidance to help federal agencies analyze and weigh the costs and benefits of alternatives, which is important for BOP because BOP officials stated that the population for low and minimum security facilities continues to grow. OMB staff also added that they need more and better cost comparison information on the various alternatives for BOP's low and minimum security facilities to help them better understand the long-term costs and benefits of owning versus the short-term costs and benefits of privatization. Without analyses consistent with OMB requirements, it is difficult to know whether BOP is deciding on the most cost-effective alternative for acquiring low and minimum security facilities to confine inmates, including whether to contract, build, or expand. |
gao_GAO-01-842 | gao_GAO-01-842_0 | INS’ Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting illegal entry along the border between the nation’s ports of entry. Conclusions
INS has spent 7 years implementing its Southwest border strategy, but it may take INS up to a decade longer to fully implement the strategy. This assumes that INS obtains the level of staff, technology, equipment, and fencing it believes it needs to control the Southwest border. Although illegal alien apprehensions have shifted, there is no clear indication that overall illegal entry into the United States along the Southwest border has declined. INS’ current efforts to measure the effectiveness of its border control efforts could be enhanced by analyzing data in its IDENT system. These data offer INS an opportunity to develop additional performance indicators that could be incorporated into its Annual Performance Plan review process and could help INS assess whether its border control efforts are associated with an overall reduction in the flow of illegal aliens across the border. Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could be used to address several important questions related to illegal entry. The strategy’s impact on local communities has been affected by the timing of INS’ infusion of agent and other resources intended to protect the local community from a surge in illegal alien traffic; what routes the illegal aliens have used in crossing the border; and INS’ involvement with the community. INS has learned the importance of outreach efforts in attempting to mitigate the potential negative effects the strategy can cause a community and the harm that can befall illegal aliens who risk injury and death to cross the border. | What GAO Found
To deter illegal entry between the nation's ports of entry, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed its Southwest Border Strategy. INS has spent seven years implementing the border strategy, but it may take INS up to a decade longer to fully implement the strategy. This assumes that INS obtains the level of staff, technology, equipment, and fencing it believes it needs to control the Southwest border. Although illegal alien apprehensions have shifted, there is no clear indication that overall illegal entry into the United States along the Southwestern border has declined. INS' current efforts to measure the effectiveness of its border control efforts could be enhanced by analyzing the data in its automated biometric identification system (IDENT). These data offer INS an opportunity to develop additional performance indicators that could be incorporated into its Annual Performance Plan review process and could help INS assess whether its border control efforts are associated with an overall reduction in the flow of illegal aliens across the border. Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could be used to address several important questions related to illegal entry. The strategy's impact on local communities has been affected by the timing of INS, infusion of agent and other resources intended to protect the local community from a surge in illegal alien traffic; what routes the illegal aliens have used in crossing the border; and INS' involvement with the community. INS has learned the importance of outreach efforts in attempting to mitigate the potential negative effects the strategy can cause a community and the harm that can befall illegal aliens who risk injury and death to cross the border. |
gao_GAO-08-281 | gao_GAO-08-281_0 | During this same period, the portion of depository institutions revenues derived from noninterest sources— including, but not limited to, fees on savings and checking accounts— increased somewhat. Federal regulators’ examination procedures for Regulations DD and E do not require examiners to evaluate the reasonableness of fees associated with checking and savings accounts. In analyzing complaints specifically about checking and savings accounts from 2002 through 2006, we found that, on average, about 10 percent were related to fees, and 3 percent were related to disclosures. Collectively fee and disclosure complaints represented less than 5 percent of all complaints received during this period. On average, this is about 335 instances annually among the nearly 17,000 depository institutions that these regulators oversee. Despite Federal Regulations and Compliance Examinations, We Experienced Difficulty Obtaining Fee Information
The results of our requests for information on fees or account terms and conditions at depository institutions we visited, as well as our visits to institutions’ Web sites, suggest that consumers may find it difficult to obtain such information upon request prior to opening a checking or savings account. Further, federal banking regulators’ examination processes do not assess whether potential customers can easily obtain information that institutions are required to disclose. Smaller percentages had information on fees for overdrafts and insufficient fund fees. Changes in both consumer behavior, such as increased use of electronic forms of payment, and in the terms and conditions of accounts offered by depository institutions may be influencing these trends in fees, but available data do not permit determining their exact effects. However, even under the revised procedures, the regulators’ examinations do not determine whether consumers actually receive required disclosure documents before opening an account. We were unable to obtain detailed information about fees and account terms and conditions at over one-fifth of the branches we visited and, in many cases, we found inconsistencies among branches of the same depository institution. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to determine (1) the trends in the types and amounts of fees associated with checking and deposit accounts since 2000; (2) how federal and selected state banking regulators address checking and deposit account fees in their oversight of depository institutions; and (3) the extent to which consumers are able to obtain account terms and conditions and disclosures of fees, including information about specific transactions and bank practices that determine when such fees are assessed, upon request prior to opening an account. We reviewed the federal Truth-in-Savings Act (TISA) and Regulation DD, which implements TISA, to determine what disclosure documents depository institutions were required to provide to new and potential customers. Some bank fees have increased since 2000, while a few, such as monthly fees, have decreased. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, consumers paid over $36 billion in fees associated with checking and savings accounts, raising questions about consumers' awareness of their accounts' terms and conditions. GAO was asked to review (1) trends in the types and amounts of checking and deposit account fees since 2000, (2) how federal banking regulators address such fees in their oversight of depository institutions, and (3) the extent that consumers are able to obtain account terms and conditions and disclosures of fees upon request prior to opening an account. GAO analyzed fee data from private data vendors, publicly available financial data, and information from federal regulators; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and used direct observation techniques at depository institutions nationwide.
What GAO Found
Data from private vendors indicate that average fees for insufficient funds, overdrafts, returns of deposited items, and stop payment orders have risen by 10 percent or more since 2000, while others, such as monthly account maintenance fees, have declined. During this period, the portion of depository institutions income derived from noninterest sources--including fees on savings and checking accounts--varied but increased overall from 24 percent to 27 percent. Changes in both consumer behavior, such as making more payments electronically, and practices of depository institutions are likely influencing trends in fees, but their exact effects are unknown. Federal banking regulators address fees associated with checking and savings accounts primarily by examining depository institutions' compliance with requirements, under the Truth in Savings Act (TISA) and its implementing regulations, to disclose fee information so that consumers can compare institutions. They also review customer complaints but do not assess whether fees are reasonable. The regulators received relatively fewer consumer complaints about fees and related disclosures--less than 5 percent of all complaints from 2002 to 2006--than about other bank products. During the same period, they cited 1,674 violations of fee-related disclosure regulations--about 335 annually among the 17,000 institutions they oversee. GAO's visits to 185 branches of 154 depository institutions suggest that, despite the disclosure requirements, consumers may find it difficult to obtain information about checking and savings account fees. GAO staff posing as customers were unable to obtain detailed fee information and account terms and conditions at over one-fifth of visited branches and also could not find this information on many institutions' Web sites. Federal regulators examine institutions' written policies, procedures, and documents but do not determine whether consumers actually receive disclosure documents. While consumers may consider factors besides costs when shopping for accounts, an inability to obtain information about terms, conditions, and fees hinders their ability to compare institutions. |
gao_GAO-03-1115T | gao_GAO-03-1115T_0 | The Internet Has Emerged as the Principal Tool for Exchanging Child Pornography
Historically, pornography, including child pornography, tended to be found mainly in photographs, magazines, and videos. According to experts, pornographers have traditionally exploited—and sometimes pioneered—emerging communication technologies—from the dial-in bulletin board systems of the 1970s to the World Wide Web—to access, trade, and distribute pornography, including child pornography. Web sites. In another study, focused on the availability of pornographic video files on peer-to-peer sharing networks, a sample of 507 pornographic video files retrieved with a file-sharing program included about 3.7 percent child pornography videos. Several Agencies Have Law Enforcement Responsibilities Regarding Child Pornography on Peer- to-Peer Networks
Table 2 shows the key national organizations and agencies that are currently involved in efforts to combat child pornography on peer-to-peer networks. Two organizations in the Department of Justice have responsibilities regarding child pornography: the FBI and the Justice Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS). Our analysis of 1,286 titles and file names identified through KaZaA searches on 12 keywords showed that 543 (about 42 percent) of the images had titles and file names associated with child pornography images. Of the remaining files, 34 percent were classified as adult pornography, and 24 percent as nonpornographic (see fig. The ease of access to child pornography files was further documented by retrieval and analysis of image files, performed on our behalf by the Customs CyberSmuggling Center. In 2002, peer-to-peer referrals increased more than fourfold, from 156 to 757, reflecting the increased popularity of file-sharing programs. Juvenile Users of Peer- to-Peer Applications May Be Inadvertently Exposed to Pornography
Juvenile users of peer-to-peer networks face a significant risk of inadvertent exposure to pornography when searching and downloading images. In a search using innocuous keywords likely to be used by juveniles searching peer-to-peer networks (such as names of popular singers, actors, and cartoon characters), almost half the images downloaded were classified as adult or cartoon pornography. To document the risk of inadvertent exposure of juvenile users to pornography, the Customs CyberSmuggling Center performed KaZaA searches using innocuous keywords likely to be used by juveniles. We determined that 61 images contained adult pornography (34 percent), 24 images consisted of cartoon pornography (14 percent), 13 images contained child erotica (7 percent), and 2 images (1 percent) contained child pornography. Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Are Beginning to Focus Resources on Child Pornography on Peer- to-Peer Networks
Because law enforcement agencies do not track the resources dedicated to specific technologies used to access and download child pornography on the Internet, we were unable to quantify the resources devoted to investigations concerning peer-to-peer networks. These agencies (including the FBI, CEOS, and Customs) do devote significant resources to combating child exploitation and child pornography in general. Law enforcement officials told us, however, that as tips concerning child pornography on the peer-to-peer networks increase, they are beginning to focus more law enforcement resources on this issue. The increase in reports of child pornography on peer-to-peer networks suggests that this problem is increasing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The availability of child pornography has dramatically increased in recent years as it has migrated from printed material to the World Wide Web, becoming accessible through Web sites, chatrooms, newsgroups, and now the increasingly popular peer-to-peer file sharing programs. These programs enable direct communication between users, allowing users to access each other's files and share digital music, images, and video. GAO was requested to determine the ease of access to child pornography on peer-to-peer networks; the risk of inadvertent exposure of juvenile users of peer-to-peer networks to pornography, including child pornography; and the extent of federal law enforcement resources available for combating child pornography on peer-to-peer networks. Today's testimony is based on GAO's report on the results of that work (GAO- 03-351), Because child pornography cannot be accessed legally other than by law enforcement agencies, GAO worked with the Customs Cyber-Smuggling Center in performing searches: Customs downloaded and analyzed image files, and GAO performed analyses based on keywords and file names only.
What GAO Found
Child pornography is easily found and downloaded from peer-to-peer networks. In one search, using 12 keywords known to be associated with child pornography on the Internet, GAO identified 1,286 titles and file names, determining that 543 (about 42 percent) were associated with child pornography images. Of the remaining, 34 percent were classified as adult pornography and 24 percent as non-pornographic. In another search using three keywords, a Customs analyst downloaded 341 images, of which 149 (about 44 percent) contained child pornography. These results are in accord with increased reports of child pornography on peer-to-peer networks; since it began tracking these in 2001, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has seen a fourfold increase--from 156 in 2001 to 757 in 2002. Although the numbers are as yet small by comparison to those for other sources (26,759 reports of child pornography on Web sites in 2002), the increase is significant. Juvenile users of peer-to-peer networks are at significant risk of inadvertent exposure to pornography, including child pornography. Searches on innocuous keywords likely to be used by juveniles (such as names of cartoon characters or celebrities) produced a high proportion of pornographic images: in our searches, the retrieved images included adult pornography (34 percent), cartoon pornography (14 percent), child erotica (7 percent), and child pornography (1 percent). While federal law enforcement agencies--including the FBI, Justice's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, and Customs--are devoting resources to combating child exploitation and child pornography in general, these agencies do not track the resources dedicated to specific technologies used to access and download child pornography on the Internet. Therefore, GAO was unable to quantify the resources devoted to investigating cases on peer-to-peer networks. According to law enforcement officials, however, as tips concerning child pornography on peer-to-peer networks escalate, law enforcement resources are increasingly being focused on this area. |
gao_GAO-05-491 | gao_GAO-05-491_0 | Form 5500 Reports Provide Detailed Private Pension Plan Information, Which Is Primarily Used to Determine Compliance with Federal Laws
Detailed information on private pension plans is reported on the Form 5500 and is used by Labor, IRS, and PBGC for compliance, research, and public disclosure purposes. Each agency uses data from Form 5500 Reports primarily as a means to identify actual and potential violations of ERISA and the IRC, as well as for research and policy formulation. Form 5500 schedules are used to collect more in-depth information, including data on assets, liabilities, insurance, and financial transactions. Finally, others outside of the federal government use Form 5500 information. The public disclosure of the form is a Labor function required by ERISA. Statutory Reporting Requirements, Current Processing Methods, and Labor Practices Delay the Release of Form 5500 Information
Statutory reporting requirements, EFAST processing issues, and current Labor practices delay the release of Form 5500 information for up to 3 years in some cases. Agency officials told us that the timeliness of Form 5500 Reports affects their use of the information. Thus, plan sponsors can take up to 285 days from the end of the plan year to file their Form 5500 reports. According to Labor officials, paper filings take more than three times as long as electronic filings to process and have nearly twice as many errors. Labor’s Need for Complete and Accurate Filing Records for a Plan Year Also Delays the Release of Certain Form 5500 Information
We found that currently Labor waits until EFAST has processed all filings for a plan year before finalizing work on the Form 5500 research file— Form 5500 information in its most practical form for producing aggregate statistics and conducting policy research. The Timeliness of Form 5500 Reports Affects Federal Agencies’ Use of the Information
Although Labor, IRS and, PBGC have access to the Form 5500 information sooner than other federal agencies and the general public, the agencies are affected by the long processing times for paper filings and EFAST’s paper- based correction process. Despite Efforts to Improve Its Content, the Form 5500 Lacks Key Information
Labor, IRS, and PBGC have taken steps to improve the content of the Form 5500, including reviewing the form annually and revising the content as needed to ensure that the form is collecting all required information while not overburdening plan sponsors. Despite the content changes that have been made, the Form 5500, in its current form, lacks key information that could better assist Labor, IRS, and PBGC in tracking and identifying plans from year to year and monitoring multiemployer plans. In addition to having more information on defined contribution plans, federal and private sector researchers also said that it would be useful if information reported on Section 4010 filings, such as information about the ability of a defined benefit plan to meet its obligations to participants if the plan were to be terminated, were captured on the Form 5500. Conclusions
The Form 5500 is the primary source of information available concerning the operation, funding, assets, liabilities, and investments of private pension plans. Alternatively, certain types of information could be reported earlier than the current filing deadline, such as information on a plan’s funding status, which could also provide regulators with more timely information. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Labor, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Executive Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the Commissioner of Social Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Form 5500 is the primary source of information for both the federal government and the private sector regarding the operation, funding, assets, and investments of private pension and other employee benefit plans. Currently, the Department of Labor (Labor) requires about 3 years to provide certain usable Form 5500 information to the public, leading to complaints that the information is not timely. We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority, and it is intended to assist Congress in improving the timeliness and content of Form 5500 information. This report is addressed to the congressional committees of jurisdiction. It examines: (1) the information reported on the form and how it is used, (2) factors that affect the timeliness of Form 5500 information, and (3) issues affecting the content of the form.
What GAO Found
Detailed information on private pension plans is reported on the Form 5500, and Labor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) use the information for compliance, research, and public disclosure purposes. Information collected on the form includes basic plan identifying information as well as detailed information including assets and liabilities, insurance, and financial transactions. The principal users of Form 5500 Reports--Labor, IRS, and PBGC--use the reports primarily as a compliance tool to identify actual and potential violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code. Other federal agencies and policy researchers also use Form 5500 information. Statutory reporting requirements, processing issues, and current Labor practices affect the timeliness of the release of Form 5500 information, resulting in a 3 year lag, in some cases, in releasing certain usable computerized Form 5500 information to the non-principal federal agencies and others. First, under the current statutory reporting requirements, filers can have up to 285 days after the end of the plan year to file their Form 5500. Second, 98 percent of filings are in a paper format. These take more than three times as long as electronic filings to process and have twice as many errors. Third, the release of the Form 5500 information in the research file--the Form 5500's most practical form--is further delayed because Labor waits until all filings for that plan year are processed, which can take up to 2 years. Despite the efforts of Labor, IRS, and PBGC to improve its content, the Form 5500 lacks key information. These agencies have taken certain steps to improve the content of the Form 5500, such as reviewing the Form 5500 annually to ensure that the form is collecting all the information required by law. However, the form still lacks key information that could better assist Labor, IRS, and PBGC in identifying and tracking all plans over time and monitoring multiemployer plans. Federal and private sector researchers also told us the form could collect better plan financial information, such as 40l(k) plan fees. In addition, federal agency officials told us certain information could be reported earlier than the current filing deadline, such as information on a plan's funding status, as well as its assets and liabilities. |
gao_GAO-04-651T | gao_GAO-04-651T_0 | Despite concerns that sanctions may have worsened the humanitarian situation, the Oil for Food program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. According to the United Nations, the average daily food intake increased from around 1,275 calories per person per day in 1996 to about 2,229 calories at the end of 2001. Former Iraqi Regime Diverted an Estimated $10.1 Billion from the Oil for Food Program
We estimate that, from 1997 through 2002, the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues related to the Oil for Food program—$5.7 billion through oil smuggling and $4.4 billion through surcharges against oil sales and illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. We updated our estimate to include (1) oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, (2) updated letters of credit from prior years, and (3) newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. However, the Iraqi government negotiated contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities. While OIP was to examine each contract for price and value, it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee responded to illegal surcharges on oil, but it is unclear what actions it took to respond to commissions on commodity contracts. Iraqi control over contract negotiations may have been one important factor in allowing Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. As provided in Security Council resolution 986 of 1995 and a memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the Iraqi government, OIP was responsible for monitoring the sale of Iraq’s oil, monitoring Iraq’s purchase of commodities and the delivery of goods, and accounting for the program’s finances. The Sanctions Committee Had a Key Role in Enforcing Sanctions and Approving Contracts
The sanctions committee was responsible for three key elements of the Oil for Food Program: (1) monitoring implementation of the sanctions, (2) screening contracts to prevent the purchase of items that could have military uses, and (3) approving Iraq’s oil and commodity contracts. CPA’s Administration of the Oil for Food Program
In November 2003, the United Nations transferred to the CPA responsibility for 3,059 Oil for Food contracts totaling about $6.2 billion and decided not to transfer a remaining 2,199 contracts for a variety of reasons. In addition, poor planning and coordination are affecting the execution of food contracts. U.N. resolution 1483 requested the Secretary General, through OIP, to transfer to the CPA all relevant documentation on Oil for Food contracts. The CPA received few source documents such as the original contracts, amendments, and letters of credit needed to identify the status of commodities, prepare shipment schedules, and contact suppliers. The CPA and WFP addressed these problems with emergency procurements from nearby countries. CPA and Transitional Government Face Challenges in Preventing Corruption and Reforming the Food Distribution System
The history of inadequate oversight and corruption in the Oil for Food program raises questions about the Iraqi government’s ability to manage the import and distribution of Oil for Food commodities and the billions in international assistance expected to flow into the country. CPA’s coordination center continues to provide on-the-job training for ministry staff who will assume responsibility for Oil for Food contracts after July 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Oil for Food program was established by the United Nations and Iraq in 1996 to address concerns about the humanitarian situation after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program allowed the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance. The program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. From 1996 through 2001, the average daily food intake increased from 1,300 to 2,300 calories. From 1997-2002, Iraq sold more than $67 billion of oil through the program and issued $38 billion in letters of credit to purchase commodities. GAO (1) reports on its estimates of the revenue diverted from the program, (2) provides preliminary observations on the program's administration, (3) describes some challenges in its transfer to the CPA, and (4) discusses the challenges Iraq faces as it assumes program responsibility.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that from 1997-2002, the former Iraqi regime attained $10.1 billion in illegal revenues from the Oil for Food program, including $5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion through surcharges on oil sales and illicit commissions from suppliers exporting goods to Iraq. This estimate includes oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, updated letters of credit from prior years, and newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. Both the U.N. Secretary General, through the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) and the Security Council, through its sanctions committee for Iraq, were responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food Program. However, the Iraq government negotiated contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities, which may have been one important factor that allowed Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. While OIP was responsible for examining Iraqi contracts for price and value, it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee was responsible for monitoring oil smuggling, screening contracts for items that could have military uses, and approving oil and commodity contracts. While the sanctions committee responded to illegal surcharges on oil, it is unclear what actions it took to respond to illicit commissions on commodity contracts. OIP transferred 3,059 Oil for Food contracts--with pending shipments valued at $6.2 billion--to the CPA on November 22, 2003. However, the CPA stated that it has not received all the original contracts, amendments, and letters of credit it needs to manage the program. These problems, along with inadequate CPA staffing during the transfer, hampered the efforts of CPA's Oil for Food coordination center in Baghdad to ensure continued delivery of commodities. Poor planning, coordination, and the security environment in Iraq continue to affect the execution of these contracts. Inadequate oversight and corruption in the Oil for Food program raise concerns about the Iraqi government's ability to import and distribute Oil for Food commodities and manage at least $32 billion in expected donor reconstruction funds. The CPA has taken steps, such as appointing inspectors general, to build internal control and accountability measures at Iraq's ministries. The CPA and the World Food Program (WFP) are also training ministry staff to help them assume responsibility for Oil for Food contracts in July 2004. The new government will have to balance the reform of its costly food subsidy program with the need to maintain food stability and protect the poorest populations. |
Subsets and Splits