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gao_T-HEHS-98-127 | gao_T-HEHS-98-127_0 | Mandatory Coverage Would Benefit the Social Security Program
Extending mandatory Social Security coverage to states and localities with noncovered workers would reduce the trust funds’ long-term financial shortfall, increase program participation, and simplify program administration. Impact of Mandatory Coverage on Employers, Employees, and Their Pension Plans Would Vary
If all newly hired public employees were to receive mandated Social Security coverage, they would have the income protection afforded by Social Security. From discussions with state and local representatives, however, we believe states and localities with noncovered workers would likely adjust their pension plans to reflect Social Security’s costs and benefits. This response would also likely increase costs and benefits for newly hired employees. Maintaining Level Benefits Would Likely Increase Costs
States and localities with noncovered workers could opt to provide newly hired employees with Social Security and pension benefits that, in total, approximate the pension benefits of current employees. If coverage is mandated, states and localities with noncovered employees could decide to provide newly hired employees with pension plan benefits similar to those provided to currently covered employees. Concluding Observations
In deciding whether to extend mandatory Social Security coverage to all newly hired state and local employees, the Congress will need to weigh several factors. First, the Social Security program would benefit from mandatory coverage. The long-term actuarial deficit would be reduced, and the trust funds’ solvency would be extended for about 2 years. Mandatory coverage would also increase participation in an important national program and simplify program administration. At the same time, Social Security would provide newly hired employees with benefits that are not available, or are available to a lesser extent, under current state and local pension plans. In addition, mandatory coverage would present legal and administrative issues. States and localities might attempt to halt mandatory Social Security coverage in court, although such a challenge is unlikely to be upheld. Finally, states and localities could require up to 4 years to implement mandatory coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed extending mandatory Social Security coverage to all newly hired state and local government employees, focusing on: (1) the implications of mandating such coverage for the Social Security program, public employers, newly hired employees, and the affected pension plans; and (2) potential legal and administrative issues associated with implementing mandatory coverage.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) mandating coverage for all newly hired public employees would reduce Social Security's long-term financial shortfall by about 10 percent, increase participation in an important national program, and simplify program administration; (2) the impact on public employers, employees, and pension plans would depend on how states and localities with noncovered employees would react to these new coverage provisions; (3) one often-discussed option would be for public employers to modify their pension plans in response to mandatory Social Security coverage; (4) costs would likely increase for those states and localities that wanted to keep their enhanced benefits for newly hired employees; (5) alternatively, states and localities that wanted to maintain level spending for retirement would likely need to reduce some pension benefits; (6) regardless, mandating coverage for public employees would present legal and administrative issues that would need to be resolved; (7) in deciding whether to extend mandatory Social Security coverage to all newly hired state and local employees, Congress would need to weigh several factors: (a) the Social Security program would benefit from mandatory coverage; (b) the long-term actuarial deficit would be reduced; and (c) the trust funds' solvency would be extended for about 2 years; (8) states and localities with noncovered workers would likely need to increase total retirement spending to provide future workers with pension benefits that, when combined with Social Security benefits, approximate the benefits provided to current workers; (9) at the same time, Social Security would provide newly hired employees with benefits that are not available, or are available to a lesser extent, under current state and local pension plans; (10) states and localities might attempt to halt mandatory Social Security coverage in court, although such a challenge is unlikely to be upheld; and (11) states and localities could require up to 4 years to implement mandatory coverage. |
gao_GAO-16-432 | gao_GAO-16-432_0 | FDA’s 2011 strategic plan identified eight priority areas for regulatory science, of which seven related to medical products where the agency determined that new or enhanced engagement is essential to the continued success of the agency’s public health and regulatory mission. FDA Lacks Measurable Goals to Assess Progress Meeting Its Regulatory Science Priorities
FDA’s 2011 and 2013 strategic planning documents do not identify measurable goals, such as targets and time frames, for assessing progress in regulatory science. FDA Lacks Information Necessary to Track Funding and Strategically Plan for Its Regulatory Science Priorities across the Agency
FDA does not have the information necessary to track funding and conduct strategic planning agency-wide for its regulatory science priorities because most of the centers and offices did not collect information on the FDA priority areas that were addressed by the projects they funded. Six centers and offices—CDRH, NCTR, OCET, OIP, OMH, and OWH—fund regulatory science projects that address multiple FDA priority areas, but generally did not collect information about how funds are distributed across those priority areas. All six had to retrospectively identify associated FDA priority areas for our review. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that complete and accurate data are needed to make operating decisions and to allocate resources. In addition, to ensure program goals are met, our work encourages agencies to manage efforts that cut across the agency. 2.) FDA Reported That the Selected Regulatory Science Projects Led to Changes in Agency and External Stakeholder Practices
FDA reported that the 17 regulatory science projects that we selected for review helped to advance regulatory science. Dissemination of project findings. These projects resulted in the development of tools or proposed standards for use by industry or the implementation or use of new tools or standards by industry or outside organizations. For example, a CDRH study of radio interference with automated external defibrillators led FDA to recommend to an international commission that standards for these types of defibrillators be modified to account for radio interference. FDA projects targeted at advancing regulatory science have led to internal and external impacts in understanding new science associated with medical products. Such goals are a best practice for strategic planning and could enable FDA to assess and report its progress in addressing its identified priority areas and strategically plan and allocate resources for its broader regulatory science initiative. Systematic tracking by each center or office is needed for the agency to examine obligations across, or progress within, specific priority areas and would help the agency to strategically plan for its regulatory science initiative as a whole. Develop and document measurable goals, such as targets and time frames, for its regulatory science efforts so it can consistently assess and report on the agency’s progress in regulatory science efforts. Nevertheless, FDA should develop measureable goals that are related to the impacts that are discussed in HHS’s comments, including the effectiveness and efficiency of FDA’s regulatory review, new pathways for medical product development, enhancements in the agency’s ability to provide useful guidance to sponsors, and new technologies to monitor manufacturing and real world use of approved medical products. Appendix I: Description of Projects Included in Our Review of Achievements Resulting from FDA’s Regulatory Science Projects
We examined the achievements related to regulatory science for 17 projects funded by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Center or office funding project: ORSI Priority area(s) covered: Clinical evaluations and personalized medicine Funding obligations and time period of funding: $1.425 million (fiscal years 2010 through 2012)
Description of project: This project had three main objectives: 1) create protocols, processes, and standards by which a consortium for tuberculosis biomarkers—composed of three organizations central to tuberculosis clinical drug development—would operate; 2) create a repository for receiving, storing, and shipping samples to designated investigators; and 3) establish a peer review panel to review proposals related to the discovery and qualification of tuberculosis biomarkers, especially some surrogate markers. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA has faced challenges regulating medical products, owing in part to rapid changes in science and technology. In 2010, FDA established a regulatory science initiative that identified eight priority areas for medical products where new research was needed to advance its mission. Legislation enacted in 2012 required FDA to establish a plan for measuring its progress on its regulatory science efforts.
GAO was asked to examine FDA's progress on its regulatory science efforts related to medical products. In this report, GAO (1) evaluates FDA's strategic planning efforts to address its regulatory science priorities, (2) describes FDA's funding targeted at regulatory science projects, and (3) describes the achievements of selected FDA regulatory science projects. GAO compared related FDA strategic planning documents to federal internal control standards and leading practices for strategic planning. GAO reviewed FDA data on obligations targeted at regulatory science projects for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 and reviewed the achievements FDA reported from a sample of 17 projects, chosen to ensure nine FDA centers and offices and priority areas are represented.
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) lacks measurable goals to assess its progress in advancing regulatory science—the science supporting its effort to assess the products it regulates. The agency issued strategic planning documents in 2011 and 2013 to guide its regulatory science efforts and identify priority areas for conducting work, but these documents do not specify the targets and time frames necessary for the agency to measure progress overall or within each of the eight priority areas related to medical products. According to leading practices for strategic planning, identifying and using consistent measurable goals in planning and progress documents is important to assessing effectiveness. While FDA cited examples of its achievements in regulatory science in a 2015 report, FDA cannot assess how those achievements constitute progress towards its goals. In addition, FDA lacks information about how funding targeted at regulatory science is distributed across the priority areas. Decisions to award these funds are made by individual FDA centers and offices, which generally did not collect information on the associated priority areas of funded projects. Rather, FDA retrospectively identified these areas for the purpose of GAO's review. The lack of consistent information limits FDA's ability to examine obligations across, or progress within, specific priority areas. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that complete and accurate data are needed to make operating decisions and allocate resources. Furthermore, multiple centers or offices fund projects toward a given priority area and leading practices for strategic planning encourage agencies to manage efforts that cut across the agency.
For the 17 regulatory science projects GAO reviewed, FDA identified achievements ranging from the dissemination of project findings to changes in both agency and external stakeholder practices. For example, FDA reported that all projects resulted in some type of change within FDA. About half of the projects resulted in the agency developing standards, methods, tools, or training that it could use internally, and about one-third of the projects affected guidance or regulations. FDA also reported that about half of the projects resulted in the development of new tools or standards for use by industry or other stakeholders, in areas such as setting new standards for defibrillators to account for radio interference.
What GAO Recommends
To improve strategic planning for regulatory science efforts, FDA should (1) develop and document measurable goals, including targets and time frames, and (2) systematically track funding across its regulatory science priority areas. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-562 | gao_GAO-15-562_0 | BLM’s mining law program is responsible for managing the environmentally responsible exploration and development of locatable minerals on public land under the General Mining Law of 1872 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. BLM’s Mining Law Program Was Appropriated and Expended Almost $40 Million Annually in Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013
According to our review of BLM’s data, reports, and relevant appropriations laws, BLM was appropriated for its mining law program approximately $37 million, $40 million, and $38 million for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, respectively. At the end of the fiscal year, BLM deposits the amount of fees collected into the Department of the Treasury’s General Fund. BLM’s Deficiencies in the Design and Implementation of Internal Controls over Mining Law Program Expenditures Weaken Accountability for Program Resources
BLM has designed internal controls, including policies and procedures, over mining law program funds. However, some of these policies and procedures are outdated, inconsistent, and not effectively communicated. BLM Did Not Effectively Implement Controls to Reasonably Assure That Mining Law Program Nonpayroll Expenditures Were Properly Recorded and Supported
BLM did not effectively implement key control activities to reasonably assure that mining law program expenditures were properly recorded and supported. Although these examples cannot be generalized to all BLM employees, they illustrate control deficiencies that increase the risk that BLM employees are not charging their hours to the programs for which they actually performed work. Until BLM updates its policies and procedures and properly implements them through effective communication, training, and monitoring, there is increased risk that the mining law program may be charged for future transactions that do not benefit the program and that its reported information will not accurately reflect the actual costs of the program or reasonably assure accountability of program funds. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen BLM’s controls and reasonably assure accountability over mining law program expenditures, both payroll and nonpayroll, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Bureau of Land Management to take the following four actions:
Perform a comprehensive review of applicable temporary directives, including instruction memorandums, related to mining law program expenditures and update or incorporate them into permanent policies in BLM’s Fund Coding Handbook or relevant manuals, as appropriate. Develop and implement internal control activities for regularly monitoring compliance with expenditure-related policies and procedures in the mining law program. In written comments, reprinted in appendix II, Interior generally agreed with our findings, concurred with our recommendations, and described actions taken or planned to address each recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the funding amounts appropriated to and expended for the Mining Law Administration Program (mining law program) during fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and (2) the extent to which the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has designed and implemented internal controls to reasonably assure that designated funds are spent only on mining law program operations. To test the implementation of controls over the use of mining law program funds, we conducted tests on a random probability sample of 100 nonpayroll transactions from the mining law program’s fiscal year 2013 expenditures. | Why GAO Did This Study
BLM's mining law program is responsible for managing the exploration and development of minerals, such as gold, silver, and copper, on federal land. The program is funded through fees collected from holders of mining claims and sites, subject to limits in annual appropriations acts, and is appropriated funds from the Department of the Treasury to the extent that the actual fees collected fall short of such limits.
GAO was asked to review the funding and spending of the mining law program. This report discusses (1) the amounts appropriated and expended for the program and (2) the extent to which BLM designed and implemented internal controls to reasonably assure that designated funds are spent only on mining law program operations. To address these objectives, GAO (1) reviewed relevant BLM policies and procedures and financial data, (2) conducted tests on a statistical random sample of fiscal year 2013 nonpayroll expenditures, and (3) interviewed BLM officials and employees.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) Mining Law Administration Program (mining law program) was appropriated and expended almost $40 million annually from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Funds are to be used for mining law program activities such as administering mining claims and processing notices for mineral exploration. The mining law program's largest expenditures include personnel compensation and contractual services and supplies, which account for over 96 percent of its expenditures.
BLM has designed internal controls, including policies and procedures over mining law program funds, but some of them are inconsistent, outdated, and not effectively communicated. GAO's statistical tests of fiscal year 2013 nonpayroll mining law program expenditures showed that BLM did not effectively implement controls to reasonably assure that such mining law program transactions were properly recorded and supported.
In addition, in interviews conducted at selected BLM offices, GAO found that some employees were charging hours of work to the mining law program based on funding allocations or supervisor instructions rather than the actual work performed, as required by BLM policies. While these examples cannot be generalized to all BLM employees, they illustrate control deficiencies that increase the risk that BLM employees are not charging the program correctly.
GAO found that internal control implementation deficiencies were the result of design flaws in BLM's policies and procedures as well as the lack of training and monitoring to reinforce them. Because of these deficiencies, BLM does not have reasonable assurance that mining law program expenditures relate to or are reasonably allocated to the program. As a result, the information in BLM's financial records may be at risk of not reflecting the actual cost of the mining law program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BLM (1) review and update its mining law program policies and procedures, as necessary; (2) establish procedures for communicating such changes; (3) develop and implement a related training program; and (4) regularly monitor compliance with its policies and procedures. Interior generally agreed with the findings, concurred with GAO's recommendations, and described actions taken or planned to address each recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-255 | gao_GAO-03-255_0 | The Report Responded to the Mandate’s Requirements
The President’s report responded to the five requirements in the Senate’s mandate and provided responses with regard to each of the nine countries. Report Provided Limited Discussion of Some Eligibility Issues
The President’s report presented a detailed discussion of the defense, budgetary, information security, legal, and economic issues surrounding each country’s eligibility for membership. The information was accurate and current. However, the report’s discussion of the challenges facing the nine countries in such areas as civil liberties, judicial independence, human rights, and minority rights—as well as government efforts to address those challenges—was either limited or absent. Because of these considerations, we have provided additional information on countries’ implementation of democratic principles and reforms in appendix II to help Congress in its deliberations on NATO enlargement. We found these adjustments to be generally reasonable for a preliminary estimate. If Congress finds this material useful during upcoming deliberations on NATO enlargement, it may wish to request that future reports contain more detailed information on these issues. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the National Security Council. In oral comments, the council generally concurred with the contents of this report. Additional Information on the Implementation of Democratic Principles and Reforms in Countries Seeking NATO Membership
Because the President’s discussion of the implementation of democratic principles and reforms in relation to countries’ eligibility for NATO membership was limited, this appendix provides additional information, by country, that we believe will be useful in understanding the challenges and developments in the nine countries seeking NATO membership and the actions their governments are taking to achieve the goals of NATO’s Membership Action Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
On November 21 and 22, 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will consider the admission of new members to the alliance. To facilitate congressional deliberations on NATO enlargement, the United States Senate mandated in 1998 that GAO review and assess a report that Congress directed the President to provide on countries seeking membership in NATO. The President submitted a classified report to Congress on August 26, 2002. To fulfill its mandate, GAO determined if the report met the Senate's requirements and if the cost estimates were sound.
What GAO Found
The President's report responded to the mandated requirements with information that was generally accurate and current. The report provided a detailed discussion of each country's eligibility in terms of defense, budgetary, information security, legal, and economic issues. However, the discussion of each country's efforts to implement democratic principles and reforms was limited. That discussion did not reflect the challenges these countries face in the transition to democratic societies--or their efforts to address those challenges--in areas such as civil liberties, judicial independence, human rights, and minority rights. These are important principles of the alliance and a fuller discussion could be useful. GAO provides additional information on these issues in appendix II to help Congress in its deliberations on NATO enlargement. The figure below shows current NATO members and the nine countries that will be considered for membership in November 2002. The National Security Council generally concurred with the contents of this report. |
gao_GAO-10-64 | gao_GAO-10-64_0 | FP&S application and award numbers are for fiscal year 2007 funding and reflect all fiscal year 2007 awards made through July 2009. FEMA received about 25,000 applications for AFG, SAFER, and FP&S grants in fiscal year 2007 and awarded more than 5,000 grants. As of July 2009, FEMA Had Met Four of Five AFG Statutory Requirements for Distributing Fiscal Year 2008 Grants, but Had Not Fully Met One of Three Fiscal Year 2008 Program Requirements
Although FEMA Met Most AFG Statutory Requirements, It Did Not Fully Track EMS Data to Ensure That It Met One Statutory Requirement for Fiscal Year 2008
FEMA met four of five statutory requirements related to AFG grants for fiscal year 2008. Specifically, the AFG 2008 grant guidance specified two requirements for FEMA to distribute grant awards: (1) volunteer departments are to receive at least 22 percent and (2) combination departments are to receive at least 33 percent of the total appropriation. We also analyzed fiscal year 2007 data to determine whether FEMA met the requirement related to distributing funds to combination departments since the separation between volunteer and combination departments occurred. 5). FEMA Has Taken Actions to Assist Grant Applicants and Involves the Fire Service Community in Establishing Grant Criteria and Reviewing Grant Applications
FEMA has developed various tools to assist grant applicants with the application process and involves the nine major fire service organizations in developing criteria for annual fire grant funding priorities and in the peer review process. For example, each year, FEMA brings together a panel of fire service professionals representing the leadership of the nine major fire service organizations to conduct a criteria development meeting to develop the program’s priorities for the coming year. Peer Review Panel Process Is Designed to Support Independent Assessment of Application Merits
FEMA’s peer review process—in which members of the nine major fire service organizations participate in assessing grant applications—also helps ensure that the fire service community is involved in making grant awards. AFG Program Office officials stated that while they strive to provide an even chance to as many fire departments and other organizations as possible to serve on peer review panels, representatives of departments that are invited sometimes fail to appear to serve on the panel without informing FEMA. In addition, they also stated that they are considering conducting outreach efforts to expand peer review participation, such as announcing opportunities to serve on an upcoming peer review panel at workshops. Grant Priorities Are Generally Perceived as Clear by Grant Applicants, but Are Not Consistently Aligned with the Scoring Matrix and Grant Application Questions
Seventy-eight percent (28 of 36) of the grant applicants that we interviewed described the grant guidance as being clear to a great or to a very great extent, 7 said that it was clear to a moderate extent, and 1 applicant said that he did not know. However, 10 applicants provided suggestions for how FEMA could further clarify its grant guidance— including its grant priorities. For example, the fiscal year 2008 SAFER guidance states that continuity—which refers to whether an applicant’s recruitment and retention activities are designed to continue beyond the grants’ period of performance—is a priority for recruitment and retention grants. It is important that FEMA ensure that its grant guidance is not only clear but also consistently aligned with the application questions and scoring matrix. Developing grant guidance and application questions that are consistent with funding priorities could help FEMA ensure that grant funds are awarded in accordance with the agency’s priorities. Moreover, 61 percent of the 36 grant applicants that we interviewed (22 of 36) stated that the feedback they received from FEMA regarding why their applications were turned down was helpful to little or no extent. AFG Program Office officials acknowledged that they could strengthen efforts to improve feedback to applicants who are turned down for grants following the peer review process. Thus, we addressed the following questions: To what extent has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) met statutory and program requirements for distributing the grant funds to a variety of applicants and activities? To review the extent to which FEMA met statutory and program requirements for distributing fire grants to a variety of applicants and activities, we reviewed relevant statutory requirements from sections 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (called the Fire Act and the SAFER Act, respectively, for purposes of this report). To determine the actions FEMA has taken to provide assistance to grant applicants and involve the fire service community in the grant process, we collected and reviewed pertinent FEMA documents, such as program guidance, and observed FEMA’s fiscal year 2010 criteria development panel process and the fiscal year 2008 FP&S peer review panel process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), awards grants to fire departments and other organizations for equipment, staffing, and other needs. As of July 2009, FEMA had received about 25,000 and 22,000 applications for its fiscal years 2007 and 2008 fire grant programs, respectively, and had awarded more than 5,000 grants in both years. GAO was congressionally directed to review the application and award process for these grants. This report addresses the (1) extent to which FEMA has met statutory and program requirements for distributing the grant funds; (2) actions FEMA has taken to provide assistance to grant applicants and involve the fire service community in the grant process; and (3) extent to which FEMA has ensured that its grant process is accessible, clear, and consistent with requirements, including its grant guidance. GAO analyzed relevant laws and interviewed 36 randomly selected grant applicants to obtain their views, but the results are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
FEMA met seven of eight statutory requirements and two of three FEMA established program requirements for distributing fiscal years 2007 and 2008 grant funds. (GAO used fiscal year 2007 data for two requirements because not all fiscal year 2008 funds had been awarded by July 2009.) For example, FEMA met the statutory requirement that volunteer and combination fire departments (which have both paid and volunteer firefighters) collectively receive at least a minimum of 55 percent of fiscal year 2008 grant funds, and also met the program requirement that volunteer departments receive at least 22 percent. GAO was unable to determine whether FEMA met the statutory requirement that at least 3.5 percent of fiscal year 2008 grant funds be awarded for EMS. FEMA reported that its system is not designed to separately track grants awarded to fire departments for EMS purposes and, therefore, it could not determine if it met this requirement. FEMA reported that while it conducted research to determine that it met this requirement for 1 year, doing so was laborious. Establishing procedures to track awards for EMS purposes would allow FEMA to readily determine if it met statutory requirements. FEMA assists grant applicants by sponsoring workshops and involves representatives of the fire service community in establishing criteria and reviewing applications. Each year, FEMA convenes leaders of nine major fire service organizations to conduct a criteria development meeting to develop the program's criteria and funding priorities. FEMA's peer review process--in which members of the fire service organizations assess grant applications--also helps ensure that the fire service community is involved in the grant process. FEMA officials stated that they strive to provide an even chance for as many fire departments and other organizations as possible to serve on peer review panels. They also stated that they are considering conducting outreach efforts to expand peer review participation, such as announcing opportunities to serve on an upcoming peer review panel at workshops. FEMA has taken actions to ensure that its fire grants award process is accessible and clear to grant applicants--28 of 36 applicants GAO interviewed found the guidance to be clear--but GAO also identified inconsistencies between the stated grant application priorities and the application questions and scoring values. For example, the fiscal year 2008 guidance for the grant that funds the recruitment and retention of firefighters states that continuity--maintaining recruitment and retention efforts beyond the life of the grant--was a priority for grant awards. However, no grant application question addressed this priority and the scoring values did not include it. Thus, it is difficult for FEMA to ensure that grant funds are awarded in accordance with the agency's funding priorities. Further, four of the nine major fire service organizations voiced concerns about feedback FEMA provided to rejected applicants, and 22 of the 36 applicants stated that the feedback was helpful to little or no extent. FEMA officials stated that they could strengthen efforts to improve feedback. Providing specific feedback to rejected applicants could help FEMA strengthen future grant application processes. |
gao_GAO-13-333 | gao_GAO-13-333_0 | Results Show Lack of Progress on Strategy Goals, although Implementation of Most Action Items Is Complete or On Track; ONDCP Established a New Mechanism to Monitor Progress
Our analysis indicates that ONDCP and federal agencies have not made progress toward achieving four of five goals established in the 2010 Strategy for which primary data are available. However, ONDCP reported strong progress in implementing most of the action items in the Strategy intended to support achievement of these goals. ONDCP officials stated that implementing these action items is necessary but may not be sufficient to achieve Strategy goals. ONDCP’s Performance Reporting System (PRS) is a new monitoring mechanism intended to provide more specific, routine information on progress and help identify causal factors for performance gaps and options for improvement. According to ONDCP officials, the office plans to report on PRS results for the first time in 2013 and assess the system’s reliability and effectiveness, which could help increase accountability for improving results and identify ways to bridge the gap between the lack of progress toward Strategy goals and the strong progress on implementing actions in the Strategy. However, 29 of 76 (about 40 percent) surveyed programs reported no coordination with other federal agencies on drug abuse prevention or treatment activities. Drug Abuse Programs Are Fragmented across 15 Federal Agencies, and Many Are Overlapping, Which May Result in Inefficiencies
Federal drug abuse prevention and treatment programs are fragmented across 15 federal agencies that administered 76 programs in fiscal year 2011. However, overlapping programs are not necessarily duplicative, if the services provided and the populations Of the programs we reviewed, 59 of served differ in meaningful ways.the 76 programs (nearly 80 percent) are overlapping because they can provide or fund at least one drug abuse prevention or treatment service that at least one other program can provide or fund, either to similar population groups or to reach similar program goals. Many Programs Reported That They Do Not Coordinate, and ONDCP Has Not Assessed the Extent of Overlap and Identified Coordination Opportunities to Help Improve Efficiencies
Coordination Efforts in Two Areas with Overlap Helped Minimize Risk of Duplication, but Not All Programs Reported Such Efforts
Agency officials who administer programs in two areas that we reviewed in more detail—specifically, programs for youth and programs for offenders—reported making various efforts to coordinate overlapping program activities or services, which can serve to minimize the risk of duplication. While ONDCP has identified activities related to the development and implementation of the Strategy and Drug Control Budget that promote coordination, it has not systematically assessed all drug abuse prevention or treatment programs to examine the extent of overlap and potential for duplication and identified opportunities for coordination among programs to more efficiently use limited resources. ONDCP has developed a 5-year Strategy to reduce illicit drug use and its consequences, but our analysis shows lack of progress toward achieving four of the Strategy’s five goals for which primary data are available. Recommendation for Executive Action
To identify opportunities to increase efficiencies and therefore better leverage agency prevention and treatment resources, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP assess the extent of overlap and potential for duplication across federal programs engaged in drug abuse prevention and treatment activities and identify opportunities for increased coordination. With regard to progress toward achieving Strategy goals, ONDCP stated that it is important to analyze trends for each drug category separately and noted that we recognized this in our discussion of ONDCP’s goal to reduce drug use among 12- to 17-year-olds by 15 percent by 2015. As the report states, marijuana accounts for almost 80 percent of drug use in this age group, and the lack of progress on this goal is due primarily to an increase in the rate of reported marijuana use, offset by decreases in the rates of other drug use. To what extent does fragmentation, overlap, and duplication exist across drug abuse prevention and treatment programs, and do ONDCP and federal agencies coordinate efforts to reduce the potential for unnecessary overlap or duplication? Assessing Progress toward Strategy Goals and Mechanisms to Monitor Progress
To assess progress toward Strategy goals and the extent to which ONDCP has mechanisms in place to monitor progress, we analyzed the 2010 Strategy and 2011 and 2012 annual updates, the National Drug Control Budget, and ONDCP documentation about its Performance Reporting System and associated performance measures. Assessing Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication across Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Programs and Agency Coordination Efforts
Identifying Programs
To identify federal drug abuse prevention and drug abuse treatment programs, and programs that include drug abuse prevention or treatment activities, we developed a preliminary list based on the agencies included in our previous work in this area and a review of ONDCP and agency information, such as the fiscal year 2013 National Drug Control Budget, the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, and publically available information on agency websites. | Why GAO Did This Study
ONDCP is responsible for coordinating implementation of drug control policy across the federal government to address illicit drug use. ONDCP developed the 2010 Strategy, which sets forth a 5-year plan to reduce illicit drug use through programs intended to prevent or treat drug abuse or reduce the availability of drugs. GAO was asked to review Strategy implementation and drug abuse prevention and treatment programs. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which progress has been made toward achieving Strategy goals; ONDCP has mechanisms in place to monitor progress; fragmentation, overlap, and duplication exist across prevention and treatment programs; and ONDCP and federal agencies coordinate efforts to reduce the potential for unnecessary overlap or duplication. GAO analyzed the Strategy and its updates, available data on progress toward achieving Strategy goals, and documents about ONDCP's monitoring mechanisms. GAO also analyzed data from questionnaires sent to the 15 federal agencies that administer prevention and treatment programs that collected information on services provided and coordination efforts.
What GAO Found
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and federal agencies have not made progress toward achieving most of the goals articulated in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy (the Strategy), but are reported to be on track to implement most Strategy action items intended to support these goals. ONDCP established seven Strategy goals related to reducing illicit drug use and its consequences by 2015. As of March 2013, GAO's analysis showed that of the five goals for which primary data on results are available, one shows progress and four show no progress. For example, no progress has been made on reducing drug use among 12- to 17-year-olds by 15 percent. This is primarily due to an increase in the rate of reported marijuana use, offset by decreases in the rates of reported use of other drugs. Nevertheless, ONDCP reported that 107 of the 112 action items in the Strategy are complete or on track. ONDCP officials stated that implementing these action items is necessary but may not be sufficient to achieve Strategy goals.
ONDCP primarily intends to address the extent of progress in achieving Strategy goals through its new Performance Reporting System (PRS)--a monitoring mechanism intended to provide specific, routine information on progress toward Strategy goals and help identify factors for performance gaps and options for improvement. ONDCP officials stated that they plan to report on PRS results for the first time in 2013. They also said that they plan to assess the system's reliability and effectiveness. This could help increase accountability for improving results and identify ways to bridge the gap that currently exists between the lack of progress toward Strategy goals and the strong progress made on implementing Strategy actions.
Drug abuse prevention and treatment programs are fragmented across 15 federal agencies and provide some overlapping services, which could increase the risk of duplication. Specifically, GAO identified overlap in 59 of the 76 programs included in its review. These programs could provide or fund one or more drug abuse prevention or treatment service that at least one other program could also provide or fund, either to similar population groups or to reach similar program goals. Such fragmentation and overlap may result in inefficient use of resources among programs providing similar services.
GAO's prior work has found that inefficiencies created by fragmentation and overlap can be minimized through coordination. However, many prevention and treatment programs that GAO surveyed did not report coordination efforts, and ONDCP has not assessed the extent of overlap, duplication, and coordination. Agency officials who administer the 21 programs that GAO reviewed in detail-- programs for youth and offenders--reported making various efforts to coordinate program activities, but 29 of 76 (about 40 percent) surveyed programs reported no coordination with other federal agencies on drug abuse prevention or treatment activities. Moreover, ONDCP has not assessed all drug abuse prevention or treatment programs to identify the extent of overlap and potential duplication and any opportunities for coordination. Such an assessment would better position ONDCP to help ensure that agencies better leverage and more efficiently use limited resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ONDCP assess the extent of overlap and the potential for duplication across federal programs engaged in drug abuse prevention and treatment activities and identify opportunities for increased coordination. ONDCP concurred and stated that it will work with agencies administering these programs to further enhance coordination. |
gao_RCED-97-14 | gao_RCED-97-14_0 | Various Actions That Occurred Around 1990 Have Resulted in Federal Liability
From October 1992 through June 1996, the Forest Service and BLM paid more than $6.6 million in claims for 49 contracts that were suspended or canceled to protect threatened or endangered species. The agencies have paid the purchasers for the value of replacement timber, interest, lost profits, and unrecovered costs incurred under the contracts. BLM settled its claim of almost $228,000 (plus interest) by modifying another contract held by the purchaser to reduce the amount paid to the government without changing the original volume to be harvested. The outcome of ongoing and future litigation is unpredictable and could result in the award of more or less in damages than the purchasers claim. Also uncertain are the results of countersuits that could be filed by the Forest Service or BLM, the success of the agencies’ offers to replace timber in lieu of paying damages, and the settlement of claims that have not yet been filed. Claims pending against the Forest Service and BLM for contracts suspended or canceled to protect threatened or endangered species totaled almost $61 million and about $2.2 million, respectively, as of October 1996. Funding for Pending and Future Settlements May Be a Problem
According to Forest Service officials, the agency may not have the funds to settle pending and future claims. As of October 1, 1996, BLM had one claim pending for almost $2.2 million. Therefore, if the purchasers were successful in their claims, BLM would first determine whether the purchasers had other contracts with the agency and, if so, attempt to negotiate a settlement that would modify existing contracts to reduce the price by the damages awarded without changing the original amount of timber to be harvested. The Forest Service has not finalized either document. BLM uses a formula to determine the government’s liability. Conclusions
BLM has suspended or canceled significantly fewer timber sale contracts than the Forest Service, and BLM has consistently taken actions to protect itself from the damages that could arise from suspending or canceling timber sale contracts to protect threatened or endangered species. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests and Public Land Management, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, asked us to determine (1) the amounts and types of damages awarded to purchasers whose timber sale contracts have been suspended or canceled and the ways the agencies have paid the damages, (2) the amounts and types of claims pending against the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the sources of funds from which the agencies expect to pay the claims, and (3) the actions that the Forest Service and BLM are taking to minimize the future liability arising from suspended or canceled timber sale contracts. The draft regulations are aimed at reducing the Forest Service’s liability for canceled timber sales and the draft timber sale contract would assign risk differently between the Forest Service and purchasers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the federal government's liability when the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) suspend or cancel timber sale contracts to protect threatened or endangered species, focusing on what: (1) amounts and types of damages have been awarded to purchasers and how the Forest Service and BLM paid for the damages; (2) amounts and types of claims are pending against the Forest Service and BLM, and how the agencies expect to pay these claims; and (3) actions the Forest Service and BLM are taking to minimize the future liability arising from suspended or cancelled timber sale contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) from October 1992 through June 1996, the Forest Service and BLM paid more than $6.6 million in claims for 49 contracts that were suspended or cancelled to protect threatened or endangered species; (2) the agencies have paid purchasers for the value of replacement timber, interest, lost profits, and unrecovered costs; (3) the Forest Service paid damages of almost $6.5 million from its appropriations and BLM settled its single claim by modifying another contract held by the purchaser to reduce the amount paid to the government for purchased timber without changing the original volume of timber to be harvested; (4) as of October 1996, the Forest Service had 73 pending claims with potential damages of about $61 million, but it could incur at least an additional $198 million in damages; (5) BLM had one pending claim for almost $2.2 million, but it could incur between $35 million and $40 million more in potential future liability; (6) uncertainty arises from the agencies' inability to predict the outcome of ongoing and future litigation that could result in the award of more or less in damages than the purchasers claim, the results of countersuits that could be filed by the Forest Service and BLM, or the success of the agencies' efforts to offer replacement timber or other settlements in lieu of paying damages; (7) Forest Service officials stated that the Service may not have the funds to pay for pending and future claims without additional congressional funding; (8) according to a BLM official, if purchasers sought and were awarded damages, the agency would first attempt to reduce the price of existing contracts to offset damages; and (9) BLM has repeatedly revised its timber sale contract to minimize its liability when it must suspend or cancel a timber sale contract to protect threatened and endangered species, but the Forest Service has not finalized either new regulations or a new timber sale contract that would limit the government's liability on cancelled timber sale contracts and redistribute the risk between the Forest Service and the purchaser. |
gao_GAO-17-102 | gao_GAO-17-102_0 | Full Extent of Retirement Account Investment in Unconventional Assets Is Unknown, but Custodians Reported Nearly Half a Million Accounts Invested in Unconventional Assets in 2015
Federal Government Collects Limited Data on Unconventional Asset Holdings in Retirement Accounts
To date, federal data collection efforts capture limited information on the unconventional asset holdings in IRAs and solo 401(k) plans, making their overall prevalence unknown. For tax year 2015, IRS began requiring IRA custodians to report selected information on unconventional asset holdings in IRAs. As of November 2016, IRS has not provided a date on when the new IRA asset type data will be available for further analysis. IRAs made up the vast majority of accounts and assets reported, and solo 401(k) plans constitute less than 1 percent of reported accounts and assets. Retirement Account Owners Investing in Unconventional Assets Are Responsible for Account Management and Compliance
Transferring existing retirement savings to a new account or plan that allows investment in unconventional assets expands the roles and responsibilities of account owners for managing aspects of their accounts. For example, all 20 custodial agreements we reviewed required individuals to agree to be responsible for directing their investments; and oversee the selection, management, monitoring, and retention of all investments in the account. Our analysis of custodian documentation found that assets like promissory notes or precious metals require minimal documentation from the account owner, while other assets, such as real estate or private equity, can require the account owner to provide considerable documentation before a purchase can be made. IRA Owners with Unconventional Assets Can Face Challenges with Tax Liability, Valuation, and Distribution, and IRS Provides Limited Guidance to Assist Them
Certain IRA Transactions Can Trigger Loss of Tax- Favored Status or Generate Immediate Tax Liability
Loss of Tax-Favored Status
IRA owners who invest in unconventional assets take on a heightened risk of engaging in a prohibited transaction and losing tax-favored status for their retirement savings. Examples include using an IRA to invest in an active business or using debt to finance a portion of an asset’s purchase. IRA custodians need to monitor IRA investments for UBTI and pay any applicable taxes from the IRA, but we found custodians often delegated the responsibility for monitoring for tax liability to the account owner. Difficulty Obtaining Fair Market Value for Hard-to- Value Assets Can Heighten the Risk of IRA Noncompliance and Fraud
IRA owners who invest in unconventional assets may face challenges meeting their responsibilities to provide updated FMV information to their custodian to meet IRS’s annual FMV reporting requirement because some unconventional assets are inherently hard to value. As a result, the FMV reported to IRS may not reflect a nonpublicly traded asset’s current value. IRS Provides Limited Guidance to Account Owners Who Invest Their Retirement Savings in Unconventional Assets
Current IRS guidance provides little information to help IRA owners understand their expanded responsibilities and potential challenges associated with investing in unconventional assets. Fair market value. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist IRA owners in addressing challenges associated with investing their retirement savings in unconventional assets, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following three actions:
Provide guidance to IRA owners on the potential for IRA transactions involving certain unconventional assets to generate unrelated business taxable income subject to taxation in the current tax year and subsequent years. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this study were to determine: (1) what is known about the prevalence of retirement accounts that invest in unconventional assets; (2) how these accounts are managed, and; (3) what challenges, if any, are associated with the administration of these types of retirement accounts. For all objectives, we reviewed pertinent federal laws, regulations, and guidance on the use of retirement account savings, as well as recent federal and state enforcement actions against entities involved with these types of retirement accounts. To identify challenges associated with administering retirement accounts that invest in unconventional accounts, we analyzed investor complaint data from three federal agencies and two independent organizations. Next, to learn about the approximate number and value as well as types of retirement accounts held under custody at the end of calendar year 2015, we conducted a survey data collection effort from the 26 custodians that we had identified from available sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law places few restrictions on the types of investments allowable in tax-favored retirement accounts, such as IRAs or employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. Recent federal and state investigations and litigation have raised questions as to whether investing in unconventional assets may jeopardize the accounts' tax-favored status, placing account owners' retirement security at risk. GAO was asked to examine issues related to the potential risks and responsibilities associated with investments in unconventional assets.
GAO examined: (1) what is known about the prevalence of accounts that invest in unconventional assets; (2) how these accounts are managed; and (3) what challenges are associated with administering these retirement accounts. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed data collected from the retirement industry; analyzed available industry documents; and reviewed 334 related consumer complaints collected from three federal agencies and two independent entities.
What GAO Found
Federal data collection efforts to date have captured little information on retirement accounts holding unconventional assets—such as real estate, precious metals, private equity, and virtual currency—making the prevalence of such accounts unknown. In tax year 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began requiring that custodians or trustees of individual retirement accounts (IRA)—including banks or other institutions approved to hold account assets—report selected information on unconventional assets in their clients' accounts to IRS. As of November 2016, IRS plans to begin compiling the new IRA asset data in 2017, but has not specified when the new IRA asset data will be available for analysis. Seventeen of the 26 custodians, who GAO identified as allowing retirement accounts with unconventional assets and who participated in GAO's data collection effort, reported having nearly half a million of these accounts in their custody at the end of calendar year 2015. IRAs made up the vast majority of accounts and assets reported.
An IRA owner's decision to invest in unconventional assets can expand their role and responsibilities substantially. GAO's review of industry documents found that individuals wanting to invest in unconventional assets through their IRA generally agree to be responsible for overseeing the selection, management, and monitoring of account investments and shoulder the consequences of most decisions affecting their accounts. For example, owners of such accounts assume a fiduciary role, which makes them assume greater responsibility for overseeing the selection, management, and monitoring of account investments, and shoulder the consequences of most decisions affecting their accounts.
Current IRS guidance provides little information to help IRA owners understand their expanded responsibilities and potential challenges associated with investing in unconventional assets. Targeted IRS guidance for these IRA owners may help them navigate the potential compliance challenges associated with certain types of unconventional assets. For example, GAO found that some IRA owners can experience challenges in the following areas:
Monitoring for ongoing federal tax liability : IRA owners are not always aware of the need to monitor the gross income from certain unconventional assets in their accounts for ongoing federal tax liability. For example, IRA owners who invest in active businesses or debt-financed properties need to monitor their accounts for ongoing tax liability that must be paid from the IRA. Failure to do so can result in underpayment penalties.
Obtaining annual fair market valuations for nonpublicly traded assets : IRA owners investing in hard-to-value unconventional assets can face challenges meeting their responsibilities to provide updated fair market value information to their custodian to meet IRS's annual reporting requirement. Failure to provide an updated fair market value in a timely manner can result in a custodian prematurely distributing account assets to the owner at a fair market value that is not current, potentially incorrect, and which could lead to a loss of tax-favored status for their retirement savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to, among other things, improve guidance for account owners with unconventional assets on monitoring for ongoing federal tax liability and to clarify how to determine the fair market value of hard-to-value unconventional assets. IRS generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-192 | gao_RCED-97-192_0 | Purpose and Effectiveness of IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
U.S. officials and representatives of other IAEA major donor countries told us that the principal purpose of IAEA’s technical cooperation program is to help ensure that IAEA member states, many of whom are developing countries, support IAEA’s safeguards and the NPT. IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program Helps Ensure Support for Safeguards and the NPT
While the United States and other IAEA major donor countries believe that applying safeguards is IAEA’s most important function, most developing countries believe that receiving technical assistance through the technical cooperation program is just as important, and they participate in IAEA primarily for the technical assistance it provides. Technical assistance ($89.0)
Other programs ($67.2)
Concerns About the Effectiveness and Efficiency of IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program Led to IAEA Initiatives to Improve the Program
In the past, officials in the United States and other IAEA major donor countries had concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation program. We found that most of the 40 reports and audit summaries did not assess the impact of specific technical assistance projects, and no performance criteria had been established to help measure the success or failure of the projects. Cost of U.S. About $16 million of the $36 million U.S. voluntary contribution to IAEA went to the technical cooperation fund; this contribution represented about 32 percent of the fund, which totaled $49 million. Seventy-two—or 58 percent—of the member states made no payments at all, yet 57 of these states received technical assistance. U.S. Officials Do Not Systematically Monitor Projects for Consistency With U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety Goals
U.S. officials do not systematically review or monitor all of IAEA’s technical assistance projects to ensure that IAEA’s activities do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. Moreover, since 1996, a portion of the funds for projects in countries of concern to the United States has come from U.S. voluntary contributions to IAEA. ACDA, DOE, and U.S. Mission officials told us that the vast majority of IAEA’s technical assistance projects do not pose any concerns about nuclear proliferation because the assistance is provided in benign areas, such as medicine and agriculture, that do not involve transferring sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. Although IAEA provides most of its technical assistance in areas that do not generally pose concerns about nuclear proliferation, our review of projects in countries of concern to the United States identified three cases in which IAEA provided technical assistance to countries where the United States has concerns about nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear safety. We reviewed program files at the Department of State and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria. The United States and other IAEA member states strongly support the Deputy Director General’s efforts to improve the program. Nuclear Safety: International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Technical Assistance for Cuba (GAO/RCED-97-72, Mar. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined: (1) the purpose and effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) technical cooperation program; (2) the cost of U.S. participation in IAEA's technical cooperation program; and (3) whether the United States ensures that the activities of IAEA's technical cooperation program do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while the United States and other IAEA major donor countries believe that applying safeguards is IAEA's most important function, most developing countries believe that receiving technical assistance through IAEA's technical cooperation program is just as important; (2) the United States and other major donors principally participate in the program to help ensure that the member states fully support IAEA's safeguards and the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (3) in the past, concerns were raised about the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation program; (4) most of IAEA's program evaluation reports, internal audits, and project files that GAO reviewed did not assess the impact of the technical cooperation program, and no performance criteria had been established to help measure the success or failure of the program; (5) for the past 5 years, IAEA's Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation has been taking steps to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the program, but State Department officials are concerned about their sustainability; (6) the United States, historically the largest financial donor to the fund, provided a voluntary contribution of about $16 million, or about 32 percent of the total $49 million paid by IAEA member states for 1996; (7) for 1996, 72 of the 124 member states made no payments at all to the technical cooperation fund yet most of these states received technical assistance from IAEA; (8) officials from the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria, told GAO that they do not systematically review or monitor all of IAEA's technical assistance projects to ensure that they do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation or safety goals; (9) however, GAO found that U.S. officials had sporadically reviewed projects in countries of concern to the United States; (10) U.S. officials also told GAO that the vast majority of IAEA's technical assistance projects do not pose any concerns about nuclear proliferation because the assistance is generally in areas that do not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies; (11) however, GAO found that IAEA has provided nuclear technical assistance projects for countries where the United States is concerned about nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear safety; and (12) moreover, a portion of the funds for projects in countries of concern is coming from U.S. voluntary contributions to IAEA. |
gao_GAO-11-63 | gao_GAO-11-63_0 | The Military Has Relied Heavily on Open Pit Burning at Installations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but Burn Pit Operators Have Not Always Followed Relevant Guidance
Since the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the military has relied heavily on open burn pits to dispose of the large quantities of solid waste generated at its installations, but CENTCOM did not develop comprehensive guidance on operating or monitoring burn pits until 2009, well after both conflicts were under way. Furthermore, our site visits and review of contractor documentation found that burn pit operators did not always comply with this guidance. In addition, DOD health officials said that many items now prohibited from burn pits, such as plastics, have been routinely burned at U.S. military bases from the start of each conflict. DOD Has Relied Heavily on Burn Pits for Solid Waste Disposal in Afghanistan and Iraq
Prior to 2004, the military used burn pits exclusively to handle waste disposal needs in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, according to DOD officials, between 2005 and 2010, there was a large increase in the number of operational solid waste incinerators in both countries. First, CENTCOM does not routinely collect such data. By August 2010, there were 251 active burn pits in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq. Alternatives to Open Pit Burning Include Source Reduction, Recycling, Incinerators, and Landfills, but DOD Has Not Evaluated Their Benefits or Costs
Alternative waste management practices, such as source reduction, recycling, incinerators, and land filling, are alternatives for managing DOD’s wartime waste stream, decreasing its volume and potential toxicity, and reducing the potential health impacts of burn pits at U.S. bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD guidance discourages long- term use of burn pits and encourages the use of incinerators and landfills instead. DOD has also been slow in implementing waste management alternatives because other logistical and operational priorities took precedence over environmental programs, according to CENTCOM officials. DOD’s recycling practices at its bases in Afghanistan and Iraq were also limited and primarily involved large scrap metals. We discussed the costs of burn pits and solid waste incinerators with DOD contract management officials, military officers in both countries, and other DOD officials to determine the extent to which DOD has analyzed these costs. However, in part because DOD and VA lack information on burn pit emissions and individuals’ exposure to burn pits, the potential health impacts of burn pit emissions on individuals are not well understood. However, these surveillance efforts do not collect data on specific individuals’ level of exposure to burn pit emissions. DOD and VA Have Sponsored Studies to Better Understand the Health Impact of Servicemembers’ Exposure to Burn Pit Emissions
The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (now the Army Public Health Command) and the Air Force Institute for Operational Health (now the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine) jointly conducted the studies of Joint Base Balad, described earlier, in response to concerns expressed by servicemembers about the possible health impacts of their exposures to burn pit emissions and to gain a better understanding of the situation at Balad. However, burn pits remain a significant waste disposal method in each conflict and the overall incidence of exposure of service personnel, contractors, and host country nationals to burn pits and any related health outcomes is unclear. This is largely because of the expedience of burn pits, a lack of awareness of current guidance, and the fact that some contracts for burn pit operators do not reflect the most recent guidance. Furthermore, the fact that DOD and its forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have not implemented a more comprehensive air sampling and monitoring plan leaves DOD and other affected stakeholders without the benefit of potentially useful information on emissions that could help in characterizing risks from burn pit emissions and possibly determining whether pollutants detected in ambient monitoring stem from burn pits or other sources. In its written response, included as appendix II, DOD said that it concurred with five of the six recommendations and partially concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to monitor burn pits in accordance with current guidance. The Department of Veterans Affairs said they appreciated the opportunity to comment on the draft and had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) determine the extent to which the U.S. military installations in Afghanistan and Iraq have used open pit burning and adhered to guidance governing their use; (2) identify alternatives to open pit burning and the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) evaluated these alternatives; and (3) determine the extent to which U.S. forces have monitored the air quality, exposures, and potential health impacts of burn pit emissions in accordance with relevant guidance. In addition, we analyzed DOD air sampling, health risk characterization, and health surveillance documents; as well as documents from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which provides healthcare and other benefits to veterans and their families, on health surveillance efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
From the start of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military and its contractors have burned solid waste in open burn pits on or near military bases. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), burn pit emissions can potentially harm human health. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) guidance directs the military's use of burn pits, and the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) provides healthcare and other benefits to veterans and their families. GAO was asked to report on the (1) extent of open pit burning in Afghanistan and Iraq, and whether the military has followed its guidance; (2) alternatives to burn pits, and whether the military has examined them; and (3) extent of efforts to monitor air quality and potential health impacts. GAO visited four burn pits in Iraq, reviewed DOD data on burn pits, and consulted DOD and VA officials and other experts. GAO was unable to visit burn pits in Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
The military has relied heavily on open pit burning in both conflicts, and operators of burn pits have not always followed relevant guidance to protect servicemembers from exposure to harmful emissions. According to DOD, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq generate about 10 pounds of solid waste per soldier each day. The military has relied on open pit burning to dispose of this waste mainly because of its expedience. In August 2010, CENTCOM estimated there were 251 burn pits in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq. CENTCOM officials said the number of burn pits is increasing in Afghanistan and decreasing in Iraq, which reflects U.S. troop reallocations and efforts to install waste incinerators. Despite its reliance on burn pits, CENTCOM did not issue comprehensive burn pit guidance until 2009. Furthermore, to varying degrees, operators of burn pits at four bases GAO visited in Iraq were not complying with key elements of this guidance, such as restrictions on the burning of items, including plastic, that produce harmful emissions. DOD officials also said that, from the start of each conflict, operators routinely burned items that are now prohibited. The continued burning of prohibited items has resulted from a number of factors, including the constraints of combat operations, resource limitations, and contracts with burn pit operators that do not reflect current guidance. Waste management alternatives could decrease the reliance on and exposure to burn pits, but DOD has been slow to implement alternatives or fully evaluate their benefits and costs, such as avoided future costs of potential health effects. Various DOD guidance documents discourage long-term use of burn pits, encourage the use of incinerators and landfills, or encourage waste minimization such as source reduction. DOD has installed 39 solid waste incinerators in Iraq and 20 in Afghanistan, and plans to install additional incinerators in Afghanistan. To date, source reduction practices have not been widely implemented in either country and recycling consists primarily of large scrap metals. DOD plans to increase recycling at its bases in Iraq, but recycling at bases in Afghanistan has been limited. Further, DOD has not fully analyzed its waste stream in either country and lacks the information to decrease the toxicity of its waste stream and enhance waste minimization. U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq do not sample or monitor burn pit emissions as provided by a key CENTCOM regulation, and the health impacts of burn pit exposure on individuals are not well understood, partly because the military does not collect required data on emissions or exposures from burn pits. Army public health officials have, however, sampled the ambient air at bases in each conflict and found high levels of particle pollution that causes health problems but is not unique to burn pits. These officials identified logistical and other challenges in monitoring burn pit emissions, and U.S. Forces have yet to establish pollutant monitoring systems. DOD and VA have commissioned studies to enhance their understanding of burn pit emissions, but the lack of data on emissions specific to burn pits and related exposures limit efforts to characterize potential health impacts on service personnel, contractors, and host-country nationals. Among other things, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense improve DOD's adherence to relevant guidance on burn pit operations and waste management, and analyze alternatives to its current practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD said that it concurred with five of the six recommendations and partially concurred with the sixth. GAO addressed a DOD suggestion to clarify the sixth recommendation. VA reviewed the draft report and had no comments. |
gao_GAO-05-385 | gao_GAO-05-385_0 | Penalties in Mutual Fund Trading Abuses Cases Are among SEC’s Highest and Are Consistent with Penalties in Similarly Egregious Cases
Since NYSOAG announced its discovery of the trading abuses in the mutual fund industry in September 2003, SEC has brought 14 enforcement actions against investment advisers primarily for market timing abuses and 10 enforcement actions against broker-dealer, brokerage-advisory, and financial services firms for market timing abuses and late trading. SEC has entered into settlements in all 14 investment adviser cases and obtained penalties ranging from $2 million to $140 million (see fig. Before January 2003, penalties SEC obtained in settlement were generally under $20 million. SEC Coordinated Penalties and Disgorgement with States in the Majority of Settlements with Investment Advisers, but Some States Obtained Additional Sanctions
SEC coordinated penalties and disgorgements with interested states in many of the settled enforcement actions related to late trading and market timing. Other state officials told us they also reviewed cases involving mutual fund trading abuses for criminal potential. These officials said that the criminal prosecution of market timing is complicated by the fact that market timing conduct itself is not illegal. DOJ officials told us that they have brought criminal charges in cases where late trading occurred, primarily because late trading is a clear violation of federal securities laws and authorities can readily prosecute cases once evidence of late trading is established. In instituting administrative proceedings in the 14 investment adviser cases discussed above, SEC alleged that the undisclosed market timing conduct involved constituted securities fraud, conduct expressly prohibited under federal securities laws. According to DOJ and NYSOAG officials, for a variety of reasons their review of cases involving market timing arrangements concluded that they did not warrant criminal fraud prosecutions. Most Criminal Cases Brought Have Been Based on Late Trading Charges
NYSOAG and DOJ have brought at least 12 criminal prosecutions against individuals for charges that include late trading. Inadequate Documentation Procedures Limit SEC’s Capacity to Effectively Manage the Criminal Referral Process
SEC staff said that as state and federal criminal prosecutors were already aware of and generally evaluated the mutual fund trading abuse cases for potential criminal violations on their own initiative, they did not need to make specific criminal referrals to bring these cases to their attention. However, in the course of our review, we found that SEC’s capacity to effectively manage its overall criminal referral process may be limited by inadequate recordkeeping. Without proper documentation, SEC cannot readily determine and verify whether staff make appropriate and prompt referrals. Currently, SEC does not require staff to document that a referral has been made to a federal or state criminal investigative authority or the reasons for such referrals. According to federal internal control standards, such documentation is important for verifying that management directives have been carried out. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) compare the severity of civil money penalties (penalties) obtained in the mutual fund cases with penalties obtained in the past and with similarly egregious cases, review the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) penalty-setting process in these cases, and discuss SEC’s coordination with state securities regulators in civil enforcement actions; (2) provide information on state and federal criminal enforcement actions regarding market timing and late trading violations; (3) assess SEC’s management procedures for making referrals to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and state authorities for potential criminal prosecution; and (4) evaluate SEC’s procedures for ensuring compliance with federal laws and regulations that govern employees’ ability to negotiate and take positions with regulated entities, such as mutual fund companies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulators have recently identified two significant types of trading abuses--market timing and late trading--in the mutual fund industry. The more widespread abuse was market timing, which involved situations where investment advisers (firms that may manage mutual funds) entered into undisclosed arrangements with favored customers who were permitted to trade frequently in contravention of stated trading limits. These arrangements harmed long-term mutual fund shareholders by increasing transaction costs and lowering fund returns. Late trading, a significant but less widespread abuse, occurs when investors place trades after the mutual fund has calculated the price of its shares, usually at the 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time close of financial markets, but receive that day's fund share price. Investors who late trade have an opportunity to profit, which is not available to other investors. To assess SEC's efforts to impose penalties on violators, this report (1) discusses SEC's civil penalties in settled trading abuse cases, (2) provides information on related criminal enforcement actions, and (3) evaluates SEC's criminal referral procedures.
What GAO Found
Since September 2003, SEC has brought 14 enforcement actions against investment advisers and 10 enforcement actions against other firms for mutual fund trading abuses. Penalties obtained in settlements with investment advisers are among the agency's highest--ranging from $2 million to $140 million and averaging $56 million. In contrast, penalties obtained in settlements for securities law violations prior to 2003 were typically under $20 million. SEC's penalties in the investment adviser cases are also generally consistent with penalties it has obtained from firms involved in similarly egregious corporate misconduct. Further, SEC brought enforcement actions against 24 individuals associated with the investment advisers, many of them high-ranking, and obtained penalties as high as $30 million as well as life-time industry bars for some persons. In reviewing a sample of investment adviser cases, GAO found that SEC followed a consistent process for determining penalties and that it coordinated penalties and other sanctions with interested states. State and federal criminal prosecutors told us that while they have recently investigated market timing conduct, they have generally not pursued criminal prosecution in those cases. They have, however, brought criminal charges in cases involving late trading violations. These officials said that the criminal prosecution of market timing is complicated by the fact that market timing conduct itself is not illegal. Although SEC instituted administrative proceedings in the investment adviser cases discussed above by alleging that the undisclosed market timing conduct involved constituted securities fraud, both federal and state criminal prosecutors told us they reviewed cases involving such market timing conduct and generally concluded that it did not warrant criminal fraud prosecutions. In contrast, criminal charges have been brought against at least 12 individuals for alleged late trading violations. Federal criminal prosecutors said that criminal prosecution of late trading is fairly straightforward because federal securities laws prohibit the practice. SEC officials said that as state and federal criminal prosecutors were already aware of and generally evaluated the mutual fund trading abuse cases for potential criminal violations on their own initiative, they did not need to make specific criminal referrals to bring these cases to their attention. However, during the course of its review, GAO found that SEC's capacity to effectively manage its overall criminal referral process may be limited by inadequate recordkeeping. In particular, SEC does not require staff to document whether a referral was made or why. According to federal internal control standards, appropriate documentation of agency actions helps ensure that management directives are carried out. Without such documentation, SEC cannot readily determine whether staff make appropriate referrals. Such information is also important as an agency performance indicator and for congressional oversight purposes. |
gao_HEHS-98-134 | gao_HEHS-98-134_0 | Relatively Few Alaska Native Communities Contract Directly With IHS to Manage Health Services
Alaska Native communities that contract directly with IHS manage a relatively small share of health care services in Alaska. Because some communities have banded together for contracting purposes, the 34 communities are involved in a total of 21 contracts, which account for 6.5 percent of IHS’ total contract funding in Alaska under the Indian Self-Determination Act. Twenty-five communities have decided to stop obtaining some services through RHOs and to contract directly with IHS. These contracts are generally for a limited number of services—most often alcohol and mental health services, community health aides, community health representatives, and other community-based services. Individual Community Contracts Have Higher Administrative Costs
Administrative costs are higher under individual community contracts than under contracts with RHOs. IHS Determines Funding Needs With Native Organizations
Under the Indian Self-Determination Act, an Indian tribe or Alaska Native community that chooses to contract with IHS is entitled to funding for both direct program costs and contract support costs (CSC) to cover administrative functions. Our analysis of cost differences between RHO contracts and individual community contracts focused on the first two types of contract support costs—start-up and indirect costs. Small communities, however, generally have to build the administrative structure for these services alone. Native communities that are not in a financial position to absorb unfunded contract support costs may face the risk of having to divert funds from health services to cover their unfunded contract support needs. To Date, Service Availability Has Not Been Greatly Affected
When individual Alaska Native communities have contracted directly with IHS to provide some of their own health services, they generally have assumed management responsibility for existing, defined service programs being operated by IHS or an RHO. Generally, we did not find that a community’s takeover of services from an RHO in itself had a substantial effect on the types of services provided or service utilization. As a result, while IHS has agreed with each contractor on the amount of their CSC funding needs, it has not been able to fully fund those needs. As a mechanism for allocating available CSC funds among contractors, IHS maintains a waiting list for new contractors that have chosen to operate without full CSC funding. To the extent that Native communities assume management of a greater portion of their health services in a time of increasing CSC funding shortfalls, the risk for adverse impacts on health services delivery also increases. Comparison of IHS-Determined Funding Needs for Community and RHO Contractors
This appendix compares the recurring funding needs of the 12 community contractors that separated from RHOs with the funding needs of the RHOs for managing the same programs. The indirect cost need for each affiliated RHO is estimated by applying the RHO’s indirect cost rates to the community contractor’s program costs; it represents what the indirect costs would have been if the services provided by the community contractor had instead been managed by the RHO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the impact of individual Indian Health Service (IHS) contracts, focusing on the: (1) extent to which Alaska Native communities contract directly with IHS to manage their own health care services; and (2) effects these contracts are having on costs and the availability of services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) relatively few Alaska Native communities have contracted directly with IHS, and those that have done so generally contracted for a limited range of health services and thus continue to receive many services through a regional health organization (RHO); (2) fifteen percent of the 227 Alaska Native communities have some form of direct contract with IHS; (3) the dollar amount of these direct contracts represents about 6.5 percent of all IHS contracts in Alaska under the Indian Self-Determination Act; (4) GAO found that communities with their own contracts have higher administrative costs than RHOs; (5) IHS works with each contractor to determine the amount of administrative costs needed to manage the contracts; (6) indirect costs--the major component of the administrative costs--include such expenses as financial and personnel management, utilities and housekeeping, and insurance and legal services; (7) community contracts need about twice the amount of indirect costs that a RHO would need to manage the same programs; (8) when a community chooses the contract directly with IHS for services previously provided by a RHO, it also has a need for one-time start-up costs that increase the administrative cost differences between community contracts and RHOs; (9) determining the effects of individual community contracts on service availability proved difficult because contracts involving a switch from RHOs to local communities are relatively few in number, cover few services, and some have been in effect for a short time; (10) the limited comparisons that can be made show that service levels have not been greatly affected by the switches thus far; (11) however, under current IHS funding limitations, new contractors are receiving only part of their funding needs for administrative costs and may have to wait several years to receive full funding; (12) if communities decide to contract for service programs but do not receive full funding for administrative costs and do not have other resources from which to pay for these costs, they face the risk of having to divert funds from services to cover their unfunded administrative costs; (13) while funding shortfalls have not yet resulted in widespread adverse effects on health services availability in Alaska, the long-term picture raises cause for concern; and (14) in choosing to operate their health services without waiting for sufficient administrative funding, Alaska Native communities may have little option but to accept a potential for reduced services as a trade-off for managing elements of their health care systems. |
gao_RCED-99-80 | gao_RCED-99-80_0 | Prior to Ireland’s consolidation, more than 50 agencies shared food safety responsibilities. The four countries have recently completed or are still in the process of consolidating their activities. All four countries are incurring short-term costs while expecting long-term benefits. None had developed performance measures and data early in the process to assess the effectiveness of their new systems. In July 1998, Ireland enacted legislation that (1) created the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, (2) made the Authority responsible for overseeing food safety activities, and (3) had the Authority report to the Minister of Health and Children. Countries Expect Long-Term Benefits but Are Incurring Start-Up Costs
Officials in the four countries we visited anticipated start-up costs with the consolidation of food safety activities. Over the long term, however, food safety stakeholders in all four of the countries we visited believe that the benefits of consolidating food safety activities will outweigh the additional costs. None of the Four Countries Has Developed Data for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Consolidation
Food safety officials in all four countries said that their main priority to date has been to consolidate food safety activities. The Canadian inspection agency’s first business plan for 1999 acknowledges the need to establish measures to evaluate the agency’s performance. Lessons the Four Countries Learned From Their Experiences
Officials in the four countries identified several lessons that can be learned from their consolidation experiences. One of the most important is developing a consensus on the need to reform the food safety system. In Denmark and Canada, concerns about program effectiveness and budgetary savings drove the changes. Funding for start-up activities in the three countries that have consolidated their food safety activities was handled differently, but all three found that they needed additional funds. Organizational flexibility. Openness in the new agencies’ decisions and decision-making process is essential in order to maintain consensus and public confidence, according to officials in three of the four countries visited. Evaluation criteria. To identify foreign countries that could be changing their food safety responsibilities, we contacted the embassies of 16 foreign countries that officials in the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s the Food Safety and Inspection Service and the Foreign Agriculture Service identified as possibly making changes in their food safety structures. To (1) determine the reasons for and approaches taken to make changes; the costs and savings, if any, associated with the organizational change; and efforts to assess the effectiveness of the new systems and (2) identify the lessons that the United States might learn from these countries’ experiences, we visited four countries that were making such changes—Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, and Ireland. The new agency is headed by a President, who reports to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the experiences of foreign countries that are consolidating their food safety responsibilities, focusing on the: (1) reasons for and approaches taken to consolidation, the costs and savings, if any, associated with consolidation, and efforts to assess the effectiveness of the revised food safety systems; and (2) lessons that the United States might learn from these countries' experiences in consolidating their food safety functions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the reasons the four countries have consolidated, or are in the process of consolidating, their organizational responsibilities for food safety activities differed, as did the approaches they took; (2) however, all four countries had similar views regarding the costs and benefits of consolidation and the need to evaluate their consolidation efforts; (3) in deciding to consolidate food safety responsibilities, two of the countries--Great Britain and Ireland--were responding to public concerns about the safety of their food supplies and chose to consolidate responsibilities in the agencies that report to their ministers of health; (4) the other two countries--Canada and Denmark--were more concerned about program effectiveness and cost savings and consolidated activities in agencies that report to their ministers of agriculture, who already control most of the food safety resources; (5) all four countries are incurring short-term start-up costs in establishing their new agencies but are expecting long-term benefits in terms of money saved, more food safety for the money spent, and better assurance of food safety; (6) none of the countries had developed performance measures and data early in the consolidation process to assess the effectiveness of their new systems; (7) foreign officials identified several common lessons from their experiences that they believe could be broadly applicable to any U.S. consolidation effort; (8) in all four countries, a consensus had to be developed on the need to consolidate food safety responsibilities; (9) certain management initiatives were needed to establish any new agency; (10) adequate funding for start-up costs was also necessary; (11) furthermore, to help ensure the new agencies' early success, critical operational concerns, such as having the flexibility to shift program resources to the highest food safety priorities, establishing a common organizational culture, and ensuring openness in the decisionmaking process, were important factors that had to be addressed; and (12) evaluation criteria and mechanisms need to be established early in the process in order to assess the new agency's performance. |
gao_GAO-07-653 | gao_GAO-07-653_0 | This information can be disseminated through a variety of channels, including NASA publications, outside journals, presentations at meetings or workshops, and Web sites. Researchers at NIST and NOAA Have to Comply with Commerce and Agency-Specific Policies for the Dissemination of Research through Media Interviews and Press Releases
Researchers at NIST and NOAA are subject to Commerce’s department- level policies when disseminating research results through media interviews and press releases; however, these policies are outdated and unrealistic and can impede the dissemination of research results. 1.) In addition, more researchers at the three agencies are confident that they understand their agency’s policies on the dissemination of research through publications and presentations well enough to comply with them, than are confident that they understand their agency’s media interview and press release policies. Headquarters and several center officials told us that little or no formal training had been conducted on NASA’s recently revised media policy. Researchers Have More Concerns about Adhering to Their Agency’s Media Interview and Press Release Policies than to Their Publication and Presentation Policies
Most researchers at NASA, NIST, and NOAA feel confident that they know how to comply with their agency’s policies for publications and presentations, but many do not feel as confident that they know how to comply with their agency’s policies on media interviews and press releases. NOAA researchers, like NIST researchers, are also subject to Commerce’s policy that restricts their ability to discuss their personal views. Researchers Are Generally Unaware of Their Agencies’ Process for Appealing Dissemination Decisions
According to our survey, only 33 percent of NASA researchers, 26 percent of NIST researchers, and 17 percent of NOAA researchers are aware of their agencies’ processes to address disputes over dissemination requests. Six Percent of Researchers at NASA, NIST, and NOAA Had Dissemination Requests Denied, and Many Believe That Their Agencies Are Less Supportive of Media Interviews than Other Dissemination Methods
On the basis of our survey, we estimate that across NASA, NIST, and NOAA, 6 percent of researchers were denied the opportunity to disseminate their research results in the past 5 years, sometimes, they believe, without explanation. Finally, most researchers at NIST and NOAA believe that their agencies consistently applied the dissemination policies across all routes of dissemination. In contrast, more researchers at NASA believe that the agency consistently applies its policies for publications than believe the agency consistently applies its policies for press releases and media interviews. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the policies to guide researchers and public affairs officials in their efforts to disseminate research to the scientific community and the public are clear, transparent, consistently applied, and completely understood, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce and the NOAA Administrator each take the following action: Clarify their policies for disseminating research results via press releases and media interviews. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to (1) identify and evaluate the policies that guide the dissemination of federal research results at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); (2) determine how effectively the dissemination and dispute resolution policies of these agencies have been communicated to researchers; (3) determine the extent to which researchers at these agencies have experienced restrictions on the dissemination of their research results, and (4) provide an overview of the role of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in helping agencies develop and implement policies related to the dissemination of research results. To identify and evaluate the policies that guide the dissemination of federally funded research results at NASA, NIST, and NOAA, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed the dissemination policies for these agencies, in addition to relevant policies from the Department of Commerce. In all, we received a 66 percent response rate. a. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
Researchers at federal agencies disseminate their research results through a variety of approaches, including scientific publications, presentations, press releases, and media interviews. Because of recent concerns about some federal researchers possibly being restricted from disseminating their research on controversial topics, GAO determined (1) the policies that guide the dissemination of federal research at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); (2) how effectively these agencies have communicated their policies to researchers; and (3) the extent to which researchers have been restricted in disseminating their research. GAO conducted a survey of 1,811 researchers randomly selected at the three agencies, and had a 66 percent response rate.
What GAO Found
Most of the NASA, NIST, and NOAA policies that guide the dissemination of federally funded research generally facilitate the dissemination process, but some do not. GAO found that overall NASA's policies, including its recently revised media policy, are clear and should help facilitate dissemination regardless of the dissemination approach used. At NIST and NOAA, GAO found that the agencies' policies for dissemination through publications and presentations were generally clear and should facilitate dissemination; but their policies for disseminating research through media interviews and press releases may hinder it. For example, because both NIST and NOAA are part of Commerce, researchers at these agencies must comply with department-level policies to disseminate their research results through media interviews or press releases, but Commerce's policies are outdated and can prevent researchers from meeting media schedules. Moreover, requests by NOAA researchers to share their research via media interviews and press releases may be further hampered because these researchers must also comply with their own agency's media interview and press release policies in addition to the Department of Commerce's. NOAA officials told GAO that because its media interview and press release policies lack clarity, they have been inconsistently interpreted by NOAA public affairs officials. According to GAO's survey, NASA, NIST, and NOAA have made efforts to communicate their dissemination policies to their research staff, but many researchers are not confident that they know how to comply with some of the policies. The agencies have communicated their dissemination policies through staff meetings, on agency Web sites, and in limited formal training. While 90 percent of researchers are confident that they understand the policies for publications, only about 65 percent are confident they understand their agency's media interview and press release policies well enough to comply with them. Similarly, almost half of the researchers across the agencies are unsure whether their agency's policy allows them to discuss their personal views on the policy implications of their research. Finally, only 25 percent of researchers across the agencies are aware of a process to follow to appeal denials of requests to disseminate their research. On the basis of responses to GAO's survey, 6 percent--or about 200 researchers--across NASA, NIST, and NOAA had dissemination requests denied during the last 5 years. One of the most common reasons researchers mentioned for these denials was that the topic of the research was sensitive or restricted for security reasons; in some cases, no reason was given. Most researchers at these agencies believe that their agency is more supportive of dissemination of research through publications and presentations, than dissemination through the media. Most NIST and NOAA researchers believe that their agency consistently applies the dissemination policies for each route of dissemination, while more researchers at NASA believe the agency consistently applies its policies for publications than believe the agency consistently applies its policies for press releases and interviews. |
gao_GAO-16-132 | gao_GAO-16-132_0 | USDA’s case definition document also provides information about the presence or suspected presence of PED and PDCoV in the United States and other countries. USDA Did Not Take Regulatory Action During the Initial Response to the SECD Outbreak, Limiting Its Understanding of the Geographic Distribution, Spread, and Source of the Diseases
USDA did not take regulatory action during the initial response to the SECD outbreak, beginning in May 2013 when the PED virus was first detected, because it did not believe then that such action was necessary to manage the outbreak. Instead, the agency initially supported swine industry-led efforts to address SECD. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that more than 600,000 pigs are transported to slaughter on any given day in the United States. USDA provided support and collaborated with industry associations in the response. Further, in part because USDA did not have information about locations of the first infected herds, it did not investigate the first outbreak of SECD at the onset, and the source of entry of SECD into the United States will likely never be determined. Swine Enteric Coronavirus Diseases (SECD) Spread GAO’s review of literature found that there are multiple likely modes for the spread of SECD. When asked why USDA did not conduct a timely outbreak investigation at the premises where PED was first diagnosed, senior USDA officials told us that the agency did not have information about locations of the first infected herds—information that would have been gained through regulatory action to require reporting. USDA currently does not have a process in place that would help ensure this guidance is followed. USDA Imposed Reporting and Planning Requirements and Provided Financial Assistance to Manage SECD
In June 2014, USDA issued a federal order to help manage the diseases. However, USDA has not defined roles and responsibilities or criteria for actions that are included in its response to emerging diseases. USDA Has Drafted Guidance and an Associated List of Reportable Diseases to Improve Its Approach for Responding to Emerging Animal Diseases
USDA has drafted new guidance for responding to emerging animal diseases; according to a USDA summary document, the agency developed this guidance as a result of its experience with SECD and to improve the agency’s response to future diseases. Without a clearly defined and documented response to emerging animal diseases, response efforts could be slowed as agency staff and other stakeholders may not be able to quickly identify the appropriate actions to take. Until USDA develops such a process, it cannot have reasonable assurance that the guidance will be followed in future outbreaks. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve USDA’s ability to respond to and protect against future emerging animal diseases, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to take the following two actions:
Clarify and document how the agency will respond to emerging diseases including defining key aspects of its response, such as roles and responsibilities, potential response strategies, and what may trigger different types of actions. To develop a process to help ensure that its guidance for investigation of foreign or emerging diseases is followed, USDA stated that the intended refinement and expansion of the guidance for responding to emerging animal diseases will address when and how emerging diseases may be investigated differently from the procedures in its current investigation guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pork is consumed more than any other meat worldwide, and there are numerous other products made with ingredients from pigs, including medical products, such as insulin to treat diabetes. The United States is the world's third-largest producer of pork products. USDA estimated that U.S. pork exports in 2014 were valued at over $6 billion. Two lethal, highly contagious diseases in pigs emerged in the United States in 2013 and 2014, causing the deaths of millions of pigs. The two emerging diseases are collectively known as SECD.
GAO was asked to review federal actions to address SECD outbreaks. This report examines (1) the initial response to the SECD outbreaks, (2) USDA's subsequent actions to manage SECD, and (3) steps USDA has taken to improve its future response to emerging animal diseases. GAO analyzed USDA efforts to collect data about the number and location of infected herds; reviewed federal regulations and USDA animal disease response guidance; and interviewed USDA, state, and industry stakeholders involved in the response and control efforts.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not take regulatory action during the initial response to the outbreaks of Swine Enteric Coronavirus Diseases (SECD) beginning in May 2013, when an outbreak was first detected, because the agency did not believe then that such action was necessary. Instead, USDA initially supported swine industry-led efforts. Without regulatory action, such as requiring reporting of infected herds, USDA had limited information about the location of the first infected herds. In addition, USDA officials acknowledged that USDA did not follow its guidance that calls for conducting epidemiological investigations at the onset of outbreaks. As a result, USDA did not conduct timely investigations of the premises with the first infected herds, and the source of disease will likely never be determined. Further, USDA does not have a process to help ensure the guidance is followed. Without such a process, USDA lacks reasonable assurance that the guidance will be followed in the future.
In June 2014, amid concerns about the spread of SECD, USDA issued a federal order requiring reporting of newly infected herds. As a result, USDA has more accurate information about the number and location of such herds, and SECD have been confirmed in 28 U.S. states, as shown below. USDA also provided funding to help manage the diseases.
To help improve its future response to SECD and other emerging animal diseases—those not known to exist in the United States or which have changed to become a threat—USDA has drafted new guidance. However, it has not defined key aspects of its response such as roles and responsibilities, which according to its strategic plan, are key components of successful collaboration to protect animal health. Without a clearly defined response to such emerging animal diseases, response efforts could be slowed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA develop a process to help ensure its guidance for investigation of animal diseases is followed and clarify and document how it will respond to emerging diseases, including defining roles and responsibilities. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-670 | gao_GAO-06-670_0 | Forest Service and BLM Differ in How They Plan Needed Rehabilitation and Restoration Work
The Forest Service and BLM use similar procedures to determine whether any rehabilitation or restoration work is needed after a wildland fire, but they differ in how they plan, prioritize, and fund needed work. BLM’s rehabilitation program covers postfire work up to 3 years after a fire, and any subsequent restoration work must be addressed by other ongoing BLM programs, such as the wildlife and noxious weeds programs. BLM pays for nearly all of its postfire rehabilitation work with rehabilitation funds within its wildland fire management appropriation, and funding for such work is available for only 3 years after a fire. The Forest Service does not know how much rehabilitation and restoration work has been completed because it does not maintain comprehensive data on such work. Because the Forest Service does not have comprehensive data on rehabilitation and restoration needs and accomplishments nationwide, we administered a survey to agency officials in the field to collect this information, but determined that the information provided in the survey was not sufficiently reliable to report. Several officials told us that the only incomplete work is that needed beyond the first 3 years after a fire, which is defined as restoration work. Forest Service and BLM Officials Cite Different Challenges to Rehabilitating and Restoring Their Lands
Forest Service and BLM officials reported different challenges to their efforts to rehabilitate or restore their lands after fires. For BLM, headquarters and field officials told us that while they have completed most of their projects, they face challenges in achieving long-term success with some projects. Harvesting burned timber is also controversial. According to BLM officials, a variety of factors can cause planting and seeding projects to fail or to be only partially successful. 3). BLM has already taken the first steps toward improving its understanding about how frequently its rehabilitation projects fail and why. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our study were to determine (1) how the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) identify and plan postfire rehabilitation and restoration activities; (2) how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work the agencies have completed for wildland fires that occurred between 2000 and 2004; and (3) the challenges the agencies face in addressing their needs, and any actions they are taking in response. Amount of Needed Rehabilitation and Restoration Work That Has Been Completed
To determine how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work the Forest Service and BLM have completed, we collected available national, regional, state, and local data on project needs and accomplishments, interviewed Forest Service and BLM officials at all levels to ascertain their subjective assessments of the extent to which they had addressed postfire rehabilitation and restoration needs, and reviewed relevant agency reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Congress and federal agencies, including the Forest Service and Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), have recognized the importance of rehabilitating and restoring lands unlikely to recover on their own after wildland fires. However, while funding has increased for fire prevention, suppression, and first-year emergency stabilization, it has decreased for rehabilitation (work up to 3 years after fires) and restoration (work beyond the first 3 years). GAO was asked (1) how the Forest Service and BLM plan postfire rehabilitation and restoration projects, (2) how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work they have completed for recent wildland fires, and (3) what challenges the agencies face in addressing their needs.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service and BLM use similar procedures to identify rehabilitation and restoration needs, but differ in how they plan and fund related projects. Given the variety of ecosystems they manage, Forest Service field staff have the discretion to locally prioritize projects, and the agency addresses them through various programs with appropriations from multiple accounts. In contrast, BLM has a standard process for planning needed rehabilitation projects and, through a single account, funds projects for up to 3 years after fires. For restoration projects--that is, work needed beyond 3 years after a fire--BLM requires them to be addressed through other programs such as rangeland management. With available information, it is not possible to reliably determine how much needed rehabilitation and restoration work has been completed for recent Forest Service and BLM fires. The Forest Service does not know how much work has been completed because it does not collect nationwide data. BLM reported that, according to its data, it has completed most of its rehabilitation work, but the agency does not collect data on postfire restoration work, which is done through other programs. GAO surveyed Forest Service and BLM officials to determine how much needed work has been completed, but the information provided in the survey was not sufficiently reliable to report. Forest Service and BLM officials face different challenges to addressing their rehabilitation and restoration needs. Forest Service officials cited factors such as competing priorities within constrained budgets and controversy over certain activities. Agency officials said that controversy over harvesting burned timber can be exacerbated by the limited scientific research available to guide such decisions. BLM officials cited challenges to achieving long-term success when seeding burned areas. The agency is taking several steps to improve success rates. |
gao_GAO-08-264 | gao_GAO-08-264_0 | FRP Cycle
FRP represents a change in the way the Navy manages its forces. The plan changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, mans, and deploys its ships to allow a greater number of ships to surge on short notice while at the same time meeting forward- presence requirements. The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps to Implement a Sound Management Approach for FRP
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound management approach for FRP since our prior reports. Our prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach include defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The Navy’s implementation of FRP has included some of these elements. As that instruction noted, 3+3+1 means that the Navy’s goal is to have three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so (in the FRP sustainment or integrated phases), and one prepared to deploy within 90 days (in the FRP basic phase). The Navy Has Not Developed Comprehensive Implementation Goals, Fully Developed Performance Measures, or Fully Identified Resources Required to Achieve FRP Goals
The Navy has not developed comprehensive implementation goals for all Navy assets, finished developing performance measures, or fully identified all the resources required to achieve FRP goals– which are all key elements of a sound management approach. Specifically, the Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other forces that is analogous to the 3+3+1 goal for carrier strike groups. More recently, the Navy established several task forces and initiatives to help identify training requirements and costs, and to link costs to expected readiness levels. The task force on readiness has set a goal of having its results incorporated into the development of the fiscal year 2010 budget. The Navy Has Not Fully Considered Long-term Risks and Tradeoffs of Changes
The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes it has made in areas such as carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. Specifically, the Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, or only three times during their life cycles. It has also lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. We have previously advocated that DOD adopt a comprehensive risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes, among other things, assessing the risks of various courses of action for both near- and long-term challenges. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these changes to its maintenance and operational cycles because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, interacting with one another, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its full range of missions. The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed Ability to Meet FRP Goals during Periods When Less than 11 Carriers Will Be Available
The Navy has reported that FRP is supportable with 11 carriers and has developed plans to show how it would continue to meet FRP goals during two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10. The Navy’s plans may have presented optimistic assumptions about the total length of the gap. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic schedule assumptions and that can depict the likely challenges to implementation goals during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed trade-off decisions. Conclusions
The Navy considers FRP to be a critical enabler in meeting challenges of the twenty-first century security environment. Without implementation goals for extending FRP to expeditionary strike groups and other ship configurations; performance measures that identify readiness levels and are fully linked to acceptable levels of performance for FRP phases; and a completed analysis that links needed resources to FRP phases, goals, and readiness levels, the Navy may not be able to develop budget requests based on the resources needed to achieve required readiness levels or demonstrate to senior DOD officials and Congress whether it can achieve the intended benefits under FRP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy initiated its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in March 2003 as a critical enabler to help meet the new demands of the twenty-first century security environment. FRP represents a major change in the way the Navy manages its forces, and is intended to more rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To achieve the desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has altered its training, maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to provide presence and engagement in forward areas, as well as surge a greater number of ships on short notice. The Navy intends to achieve this goal without increasing its operations and maintenance budget of about $40 billion for each of the next 5 years. However, GAO previously reported that the Navy had not fully incorporated a sound management approach to guide and assess implementation of FRP. As a result, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound management approach for FRP and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and tradeoffs of FRP-related changes.
What GAO Found
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. GAO's prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing FRP since GAO's prior reports. For example, it has established a goal of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed trade-off decisions. |
gao_GAO-03-280 | gao_GAO-03-280_0 | Background
The F/A-22 is an air superiority aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges. The current production cost limit is $37.5 billion. To fully offset the $13.1 billion in estimated cost growth, the Air Force and contractors designed cost reduction plans. As a result, the estimated cost of the production program currently exceeds the congressional cost limit despite the establishment of cost reduction plans designed to offset a significant amount of this estimated cost growth. The effectiveness of these cost reduction plans has varied. It is unlikely that the Air Force will achieve the estimated $3.7 billion in cost growth offsets from the implementation of these PIPs if investment continues to be less than planned. Estimated Production Costs Are Likely to Increase
We found indications that, in the future, F/A-22 production costs are likely to increase more than the latest $5.4 billion in cost growth recently estimated by the Air Force and OSD. First, the current OSD production estimate does not include all costs. Second, schedule delays in developmental testing could delay the start of a multiyear contract designed to help control production costs. Last, we found several risk factors that may increase future production costs, including the dependency of certain cost reduction plans on congressional action and a reduction in funding for support costs. Delays in production and multiyear procurement would likely increase production costs. Furthermore, the Air Force reduced estimated funding for F/A-22 support costs by $1.8 billion in its latest production cost estimate. DOD Has Not Fully Informed Congress about Potential Impact of Reduced Offsets to Estimated Cost Growth
DOD has not fully informed Congress about specifics related to the total cost of the F/A-22 production program or the quantity of aircraft that can be purchased within the cost limitation. To ensure proper congressional oversight of the F/A-22 program, we also recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress with documentation showing that funding for PIPs is being invested at the planned level each fiscal year, and if not, explaining the reasons why and the potential consequences of not fully investing and potentially not offsetting cost growth as planned; reflecting the potential cost of F/A-22 production if cost reduction plans do not offset cost growth as planned; and reflecting the quantity of aircraft DOD believes can be procured with the existing production cost limit. To identify areas where additional production cost growth has occurred and may occur, we reviewed several aspects of the F/A-22 program that were likely to contribute to future cost growth. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1991, the Air Force began developing the F/A-22 aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for long distances. After a history of program cost increases, Congress limited the cost of F/A-22 production to $37.5 billion in 1997. Congress has remained interested in the potential cost of production. As requested, we (1) identified the latest production cost estimate and assessed the planned offsets from cost reduction plans, (2) identified areas where additional cost growth is likely to occur, and (3) determined the extent that DOD has informed Congress about production costs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth over the last 6 years. Even though the Air Force has designed cost reduction plans to offset a significant amount of this estimated cost growth, DOD still estimates that the cost of production will exceed the cost limit established by Congress in 1997. Furthermore, the Air Force has not fully funded certain cost reduction plans called production improvement programs (PIPs), and as a result, these PIPs may not achieve their estimated $3.7 billion in offsets to cost growth. In addition to the cost growth estimated by DOD, GAO identified areas where, in the future, F/A-22 production cost growth is likely to occur. First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's current production cost estimate does not include about $1.3 billion in costs that should be considered in future cost estimates. Second, schedule delays in developmental testing could delay the start of a multiyear contract designed to control costs. These delays could also result in additional costs owing to the expiration of an Air Force agreement with the contractor designed to help control production costs in fiscal year 2005. Last, other risk factors may increase future production costs, including the dependency of certain cost reduction plans on the availability of funding and a reduction in funding for support costs. DOD has not fully informed Congress (1) about what the total cost of the production program could be if cost reduction plans do not offset cost growth as planned or (2) about the aircraft quantity that can be procured within the production cost limit. If the cost limit is maintained and estimated production costs continue to rise, the Air Force will likely have to procure fewer F/A-22s. |
gao_GAO-15-7 | gao_GAO-15-7_0 | Disaggregation Offers an Array of Benefits and Limitations, but Significant Barriers to Implementation Exist
It is not yet known whether and to what extent disaggregation, on a broad scale, can enable DOD to reduce acquisition costs and increase the resilience of its satellite systems. But experts agree that decisionmaking would benefit from assessments that look well beyond a single satellite program. For instance, our work continues to find that there are time gaps—sometimes years—in aligning the delivery of satellites with associated user equipment and ground systems, which means that satellites may be in orbit for a long time with limited use. Acquiring smaller, less complex satellites may require less time and effort to develop and produce, for example. However, a larger number of small satellites may be needed to provide the same level of capability overall, and the transition from existing system designs to disaggregation could increase costs in the near term. Potential effects of disaggregation in terms of resilience are listed in table 2. For each of these segments, DOD is already facing considerable management and oversight challenges that disaggregation could well exacerbate. DOD Has Begun to Examine Disaggregation for Its Space Systems but Has Yet to Verify Effects
DOD has initiated and completed studies and demonstrations, including AOAs that examine disaggregated concepts for certain systems. While AOAs and other studies can provide initial insights, such as rough order of magnitude costs of selected disaggregated scenarios, they are not intended to comprehensively assess the effects of disaggregation. Moreover, the lack of common measures for key factors such as resilience may limit the effectiveness of these assessments. Technology demonstrations are providing an additional avenue for gaining knowledge about disaggregation, but demonstrations to date have been limited, concentrating more on technical feasibility and less on operational feasibility. Because most of DOD’s knowledge about disaggregation resides in paper studies and a limited number of demonstration efforts, continued or expanded demonstration efforts—including those to provide operational capabilities or otherwise aimed at quantifying the benefits, limitations, and feasibility of space system disaggregation—conducted before wide-scale change is implemented could go a long way towards gaining empirical data to help DOD develop quantifiable estimates and verify the wide range of potential benefits and limitations disaggregation may yield. Develop common measures for resilience; and 3. Expand demonstration efforts to examine the operational feasibility of disaggregation by empirically quantifying its benefits and limitations as well as addressing longstanding barriers that could hinder its implementation. In its written comments, DOD concurred with our first two recommendations and partially concurred with our third recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report, 113-44, accompanying S. 1197, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, mandated that we assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of disaggregating key military space systems—to include the use of hosted payloads—with a focus on whether disaggregation offers decreased acquisition and life cycle costs and increased survivability compared to more traditional approaches to acquiring capabilities.1, The report mandated that we examine disaggregation for three military space systems in particular: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and Weather Satellite Follow-on (WSF). This report (1) describes the potential benefits and limitations of disaggregating military space systems, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD is ready to make informed decisions regarding disaggregating AEHF, SBIRS, and WSF. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fiscal constraints and growing threats to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring space-based capabilities, including disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads (see graphic). A Senate Armed Services Committee report mandated GAO to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of disaggregation and examine if it offers decreased costs and increased survivability for selected DOD satellite systems.
This report (1) describes potential benefits and limitations of disaggregation, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD is ready to make informed decisions regarding disaggregating these systems. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 35 offices within DOD, civilian agencies, contractors, and third parties to compile a list of factors relating to potential impacts of disaggregation. GAO used these factors, along with prior GAO work on best practices and space acquisitions, as criteria for evaluating DOD's work to date on assessing disaggregation.
What GAO Found
It is not yet known whether and to what degree disaggregation can help the Department of Defense (DOD) reduce acquisition costs and increase the resilience of its satellite systems. Experts GAO spoke with identified an array of benefits and limitations. For example, acquiring smaller, less complex satellites may require less time and effort to develop and produce. On the other hand, a larger number of satellites may be needed to provide the same level of capability, and the transition from existing system designs could increase costs. Experts agree that decisionmaking would benefit from assessments that look beyond a single satellite program and consider the broad range of potential effects of disaggregation. Benefits and limitations aside, there are longstanding barriers to implementation. For instance, disaggregation could exacerbate delays in the delivery of user equipment and ground systems. As GAO has reported, such delays, tied to management and oversight shortcomings, have resulted in expensive satellites being in orbit for years with limited use.
DOD is examining whether disaggregation should be used for some of its space systems, but significant uncertainty—including how to quantify a broad range of potential effects—remains. For example, DOD has initiated and completed studies and demonstrations, including Analyses of Alternatives that examine disaggregated concepts for certain systems. These studies can provide initial insights, such as rough order of magnitude costs of selected disaggregated scenarios, but they are not intended to comprehensively assess the effects of disaggregation. Moreover, DOD does not have common measures for resilience—a key space system consideration—which may limit the effectiveness of these assessments. Additionally, while technology demonstrations are providing an avenue for gaining knowledge about disaggregation, they have been limited, concentrating more on technical than operational feasibility. Focusing more on operational feasibility would help to empirically quantify the effects of disaggregation and address implementation barriers. Until more knowledge is gained, disaggregation will not only remain inconclusive, but poorly informed decisions could be made in the interim.
What GAO Recommends
Before making decisions to disaggregate DOD space systems, DOD should (1) comprehensively examine the full range of potential effects of disaggregation, (2) develop common measures for resilience, and (3) expand demonstration efforts to examine the operational feasibility of disaggregation. DOD concurred with the first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third. GAO continues to believe DOD should demonstrate the operational feasibility of disaggregation. |
gao_NSIAD-98-200 | gao_NSIAD-98-200_0 | A dual-control system was established for tier 3 countries, such as Russia and China. It has identified high performance computing as having applications in such national defense areas as nuclear weapons programs, cryptology, conventional weapons, and military operations. The study concluded that “the acquisition and application of HPCs to nuclear weapons development would have the greatest potential impact on the Chinese nuclear program—particularly in the event of a ban on all nuclear weapons testing.” Also, India and Pakistan may now be able to make better use of HPCs in the 1,000 to 4,000 MTOPS range for their nuclear weapons programs because of the testing data they acquired in May 1998 from underground detonations of nuclear devices, according to the DOE report. Current Foreign Availability of HPCs
Based on EAA’s description of foreign availability, we found that subsidiaries of U.S. companies dominate overseas sales of HPCs. According to U.S. HPC exporters, there were no instances where U.S. companies had lost sales to foreign HPC vendors in tier 3 countries. The U.S. companies primarily compete against one another, with limited competition from foreign suppliers in Japan and Germany. The only global competitors for general computer technology are three Japanese companies, two of which compete primarily for sales of high-end computers—systems sold in small volumes and performing at advanced levels. Two of the companies reported no exports to tier 3 countries, while the third reported some exports on a regional, rather than country basis.One German company sells HPCs primarily in Europe but has reported a small number of sales of its HPCs over 2,000 MTOPS to tier 3 countries. However, foreign government officials said that they do not enforce U.S. reexport controls on unlicensed U.S. HPCs. Officials of U.S. HPC subsidiaries explained that they primarily compete for sales in local markets with other U.S. HPC subsidiaries. Moreover, Commerce’s position on this matter is not consistent with that of DOD. What our report actually states is that (1) except for nuclear weapons, the executive branch has not identified how and at what performance levels specific countries of concern may use HPCs for national security applications and (2) the executive branch did not undertake a threat analysis of providing HPCs to countries of concern. 105-85) required that we review the national security risks relating to the sale of computers with a composite theoretical performance of between 2,000 and 7,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to end users in tier 3 countries. To determine the executive branch’s actions to assess or analyze the national security risks of allowing high performance computers (HPC) to be provided to countries of proliferation and military concern, we reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) documents on how HPCs are being used for nuclear and military applications. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the efforts by the executive branch to determine national security risks associated with exports of high performance computers (HPC).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the executive branch has identified high performance computing as having applications in such national defense areas as nuclear weapons programs, cryptology, conventional weapons, and military operations; (2) however, except for nuclear weapons, the executive branch has not identified how and at what performance levels specific countries of concern may use HPCs for national defense applications--an important factor in assessing risks of HPC sales; (3) a Department of Energy study on nuclear weapons was completed in June 1998; (4) the study shows that nuclear weapons programs in tier 3 countries (which pose some national security and nuclear proliferation risks to the United States), especially those of China, India, and Pakistan, could benefit from the acquisition of HPC capabilities; (5) the executive branch has only recently begun to identify how specific countries of concern would use HPCs for nonnuclear national defense applications; (6) to date, a Department of Defense study on this matter begun in early 1998 is not completed; (7) with regard to foreign availability of HPCs, GAO found that subsidiaries of U.S. computer manufacturers dominate the overseas HPC market and they must comply with U.S. controls; (8) three Japanese companies are global competitors of U.S. manufacturers, two of which told GAO that they had no sales to tier 3 countries; (9) the third company did not provide data on such sales in a format that was usable for GAO's analysis; (10) two of the Japanese companies primarily compete with U.S. manufacturers for sales of high-end HPCs at about 20,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) and above; (11) two other manufacturers, one in Germany and one in the United Kingdom, also compete with U.S. HPC suppliers, but primarily within Europe; (12) only the German company has sold HPCs to tier 3 countries; (13) Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom each have export controls on HPCs similar to those of the United States, according to foreign government officials; (14) because there is limited competition from foreign HPC manufacturers and U.S. manufacturers reported no lost sales to foreign competition in tier 3 countries, GAO concluded that foreign suppliers of HPCs had no impact on sales by U.S. exporters; (15) in addition, Russia, China, and India have developed HPCs, but the capabilities of their HPCs are believed to be limited; (16) thus, GAO's analysis suggests that HPCs over 2,000 MTOPS are not available to tier 3 countries without restriction from foreign sources. |
gao_GAO-04-440T | gao_GAO-04-440T_0 | Two of the most important of these responsibilities are passenger and checked baggage screening. Although Progress Has Been Made, Concerns Remain Regarding Hiring and Deploying the Screener Workforce
Although TSA successfully met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages at some airports and TSA’s hiring process have hindered the ability of some FSDs to fully staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime and the use of a National Screening Force. TSA Has Enhanced Its Screener Training Programs, but Access to Programs Is Sometimes Limited
TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs. TSA Continues to Strengthen its Efforts to Measure Screener Performance in Detecting Threat Objects
TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. While TSA is making progress in each of these areas, it has collected limited data on the performance of its baggage screening operations. Officials stated that they have collected limited performance data related to baggage screeners due to their focus on passenger screener performance, but plan to collect additional performance data in the future. Covert Testing
TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review conducts unannounced covert tests of passenger and baggage screeners to assess their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved procedures. TSA Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Deploy and Leverage Screening Equipment and Technologies
TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by ATSA. Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports, TSA has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, due to screener and equipment shortages and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase the efficiency of screening checked baggage using EDS, including the development and construction of in-line baggage screening systems at larger airports—which, streamlines the screening processes. TSA is also conducting research and development activities to strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, and to develop the next generation of EDS equipment. Future Challenges
As TSA moves forward with passenger and baggage screening R&D, it faces a number of organizational, funding, and coordination challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created and charged with making numerous enhancements to aviation security, including federalizing passenger and baggage screening and screening checked baggage using explosive detection systems. To assess the progress of passenger and baggage screening operations, GAO was asked to describe TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment and technologies.
What GAO Found
TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by November 2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some airports and TSA's hiring process have hindered TSA's ability to fully staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to enhance its screener training programs, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners at some airports to fully utilize these programs. TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts include increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making progress in measuring the performance of passenger screeners, it has collected limited performance data related to its baggage screening operations. However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance data related to its baggage screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future. TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging screening equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection Systems and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener shortages, and equipment out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When this equipment is not available, TSA continues to screen checked baggage using alternative means. TSA also has ongoing initiatives designed to increase the efficiency of screening checked baggage, including implementing in-line baggage screening systems and streamlining screening processes. TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, and to develop next generation screening equipment. TSA faces a number of challenges with its R&D program, including balancing funding with competing priorities, and working with other components of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy for merging their R&D programs. |
gao_GAO-17-457 | gao_GAO-17-457_0 | Army Contracting Organizational Structure
The Army’s contracting leaders, contracting professionals, and requirements generators reside in different Army organizations. Top Army Leaders Conduct Department- wide Contracting Reviews, but They Have Not Consistently Evaluated the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Contracting Operations
Since 2012, the ASA(ALT) and DASA(P) have used quarterly reviews in an effort to assess the overall health of Army contracting and drive improvements in contracting operations. In 2014, one of the Army’s key strategic planning documents established that contracting operations should adhere to schedule, cost, and performance objectives, but the ASA(ALT) and DASA(P) have not established the timeliness, cost savings, and contractor quality metrics needed to evaluate contracting operations against such objectives. Since 2012, successive ASA(ALT)s have taken intermittent steps to improve evaluations of the Army’s contracting operations, but we found that they have not sustained these efforts. Additionally, Army leaders are concerned that appropriations in future years may decrease if the Army does not obligate all of its appropriations before they expire because it could appear that the Army was appropriated more funding than it needed. A former DASA(P) told us that he directed the Army’s PARCs to report their organizations’ cost savings attributable to contracting in the fiscal years 2015 and 2016 CER briefings. We have previously found that leadership must provide clear and consistent rationales to effectively drive organizational transformations, and federal standards for internal control state that management should internally communicate quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Army Leadership Has Not Evaluated How Major Organizational Changes Have Affected Contracting Operations, and Competing Leadership Visions Have Increased Tensions
From 2008 through 2016, top Army leaders repeatedly changed reporting relationships across the department’s contracting organizations, but they did not establish the measurable objectives needed to determine whether these changes were successful or if the benefits of the changes outweighed the costs to implement them. For example, successive ASA(ALT)s made organizational changes to centralize contracting decision-making, while a Secretary of the Army and an AMC commanding general made organizational changes intended to improve support to field operations. Army Leadership Has Not Evaluated the Effects of Major Organizational Changes, Which Officials Said Disrupted Operations and Caused Confusion
It is unclear whether the benefits of the major organizational changes Army leaders made from 2008 to 2016 have outweighed the costs because Army leaders did not establish the measurable objectives needed to assess the effectiveness of the changes. In the Absence of Measurable Objectives, Recent Disagreements about Reporting Relationships Have Increased Tensions among Officials
In the absence of measurable objectives and authoritative data to assess the effectiveness of organizational changes, disagreements over the risks and benefits of some of the most recent changes have increased tensions between officials in the ASA(ALT) office and at AMC. In the written comments, the Department of the Army generally concurred with our eight recommendations, although it did not concur with one part of our first recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine the extent to which Army leaders have evaluated (1) the efficiency and effectiveness of contracting operations, and (2) the effects of organizational changes on contracting operations. We also reviewed a 2013 report on Army contracting commissioned by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), which included recommendations for transforming Army contracting’s organizational structure and operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, GAO and other organizations have raised concerns about Army contracting operations, which directly affect a wide range of Army activities. In fiscal year 2016 alone, the Army obligated more than $74 billion through contract actions.
GAO was asked to examine the Army's contracting operations. This report assesses the extent to which Army leaders have evaluated (1) the efficiency and effectiveness of contracting operations and (2) the effects of organizational changes on contracting operations.
GAO reviewed reports on Army contracting commissioned by the Secretary of the Army and an ASA(ALT); ASA(ALT) memos; Army guidance reorganizing AMC; and Army-wide contracting oversight briefings from fiscal years 2015 and 2016. GAO also interviewed personnel in the Office of the ASA(ALT), at AMC, and other contracting organizations.
What GAO Found
Top Army leaders conduct department-wide contracting reviews, but they have not consistently evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of the department's contracting operations. Instead, they have primarily focused on efforts to obligate funds before they expire, as well as competition rates and small business participation. In 2014, one of the Army's key strategic planning documents established that contracting operations should adhere to schedule, cost, and performance objectives, but Army leaders have not established the timeliness, cost savings, and contractor quality metrics needed to evaluate contracting operations against such objectives. Without adequate metrics, Army leaders will not have the information needed to determine whether Army contracting operations are meeting the department's objectives. Since 2012, Army leaders, including successive Assistant Secretaries of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), have acknowledged a need for improvements in contracting and have taken positive intermittent steps, but GAO found that these leaders did not sustain the efforts or—alternately—provide a rationale for not doing so. GAO has previously found that leadership must provide clear and consistent rationales to effectively drive organizational transformations. If Army leadership does not document its rationale for key decisions, the Army's contracting organizations may be missing critical information to effectively improve operations going forward.
Top Army leaders have not evaluated the effects of major organizational changes on contracting operations despite repeatedly changing reporting relationships across contracting organizations since 2008, when the Secretary of the Army created the Army Contracting Command. The number of changes has increased since 2012, with five major changes in 2016.
Some Army leaders made organizational changes to centralize contracting decision-making, while others made changes intended to improve support to field operations. When Army leaders made these changes, they did not establish measurable objectives in accordance with federal standards for internal control, and officials from eight different Army organizations told GAO that the numerous changes disrupted contracting operations and caused confusion. Further, GAO found that disagreements over the associated risks and benefits have increased tensions among officials in the ASA(ALT) office and at the Army Materiel Command (AMC). In the absence of measurable objectives and authoritative data, it is unclear whether the benefits of the changes outweighed the costs to implement them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations to improve the Army's contracting operations such as: developing metrics to assess contracting operations for timeliness, cost savings, and contractor quality; documenting rationales for key decisions; and establishing measurable objectives to assess the effects of organizational changes on contracting operations. The Army generally concurred with GAO's recommendations, but did not agree to establish a contractor quality metric because contracting organizations cannot control all variables that affect quality. GAO continues to believe this action is needed as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-561T | gao_GAO-05-561T_0 | Section 501(c) entities are involved in a variety of activities and exempt purposes. Tax-Exempt Assets, Revenues, and Expenses Have Grown, Making It A Significant Sector In The Nation’s Economy
The tax-exempt sector is growing. Figure 1 shows the growth in reported assets for tax years 1998 to 2002 (the most recent year of data). The reported assets grew 15 percent to over $2.5 trillion—about 12 percent growth for section 501(c)(3) charities and about 22 percent growth for the other 27 types of noncharities covered under section 501(c). 2). Tax-Exempt Sector Is a Significant Part of the Economy and Civilian Workforce
The growth in the tax-exempt sector indicates that it has become a major part of our economy and workforce. Strong Self-governance And Transparency Are Essential Elements For A Thriving And Effective Exempt Sector
Strong self-governance and transparency are essential elements to help provide assurance that tax-exempt entities operate with integrity and effectiveness in meeting their missions while maintaining public trust. Transparency Complements Good Governance
While strong governance practices can help ensure that tax-exempt entities operate effectively and with integrity, public availability of key information about the entities--i.e., transparency--can both enhance incentives for ethical and effective operations and support public oversight of tax-exempt entities, while helping to achieve and maintain public trust. This is in stark contrast to the strong protections for the privacy of individuals’ tax returns. Recent Concerns about Abuses Have Led to Support for Enhanced Governance Processes and Transparency
With recent concerns about abuses in the tax-exempt sector, attention has been renewed on improving the sector’s governance and transparency. More information about the practices employed by exempt entities to compensate executives and others, and by nonprofit hospitals to serve their patients, would be valuable. This House Committee on Ways and Means’ hearing exemplifies that interest. IRS Has Been Challenged to Oversee Tax-Exempt Entities and Is Beginning Steps to Enhance Its Oversight Capacity
Staffing and insufficient data have constrained IRS’s oversight of the tax- exempt sector. 4). IRS Has Identified Priority Compliance Issues and Is Working to Address Them
Because of increasing concerns about specific types of noncompliance, IRS has created initiatives to address specific abuses across the tax-exempt sector. IRS plans to address other compliance problems as well. States Play an Important Role in Overseeing Tax- Exempt Entities and May Benefit from Additional Coordination With IRS
In addition to IRS oversight, states oversee tax-exempt entities, often focusing on potential fund-raising fraud and misuse of charitable assets. Our lives are enriched and improved through the work of this sector. As we recommended, we look forward to IRS, the Department of the Treasury, and states identifying the specific information that should be shared and procedures for sharing it consistent with taxpayer privacy rights, to help Congress in deliberating changes to current restrictions on IRS sharing such data with the states. 501(c)(7) orgs. IRS Data on Its Tax-Exempt Oversight
The following tables summarize data provided by IRS on its oversight activities involving tax-exempt entities under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax-exempt sector under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code covers over a million-and-a-half entities of varying sizes and purposes. Its diversity allows it to address the needs of many citizens. To help it do so, Congress and some in the tax-exempt sector itself encourage good governance practices by exempt entities. Transparency over exempt entities' activities is aided by public access to their annual tax returns. As the nation's tax administrator, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a key role in overseeing this sector. Oversight can help ensure adherence to exempt purposes, protect against abuses, and sustain public support for the sector. The Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means asked GAO to address (1) the growth of the section 501(c) tax-exempt sector; (2) the role of governance and transparency in ensuring that tax-exempt entities function effectively and with integrity; (3) IRS's capacity for overseeing the exempt sector, including its results and efforts to address critical compliance problems; and (4) states' oversight and their relationship with IRS in overseeing the tax-exempt sector.
What GAO Found
The section 501(c) tax-exempt sector has grown steadily in reported assets, revenues, and expenses. For example, between 1998 and 2002 (the most recent year of data), its reported assets grew to over $2.5 trillion---with 12 percent growth for 501(c) charities and 22 percent growth for other 501(c) entities (noncharities). Accordingly, this tax-exempt sector comprises a significant part of the nation's economy and workforce. For example, spending in this sector appears to be about one-tenth of our economy and the paid exempt workforce appears to be comparable in size to some of the largest sectors of the U.S. civilian workforce, such as food and lodging. Good governance and transparency are essential elements to help provide assurance that exempt entities operate with integrity and effectiveness in meeting their missions. Good governance facilitates well-run operations that dissuade abusive behavior. Transparency sheds light on entities' practices, which enhances ethical and effective operations and facilitates oversight by the public and others. With recent concerns about abuses in the tax-exempt sector, renewed attention is being given to improving governance practices and increasing the transparency related to the sector. Staffing trends and insufficient data have contributed to IRS being challenged in executing its oversight role. IRS has begun to increase staffing, obtain better data on tax-exempt entities, and increase its capacity to analyze and use the data it obtains. For the critical compliance issues IRS has identified, it has started special initiatives to improve compliance. States often oversee tax-exempt entities, frequently focusing on protecting the public from fraudulent activities and guarding against misuse of charitable assets. States and the IRS believe that more data sharing would make their oversight more efficient and effective. Consistent with our earlier recommendations, IRS has improved its processes for sharing its oversight data with the states, and Congress is considering expanded data sharing. |
gao_GAO-04-240 | gao_GAO-04-240_0 | All of the proposed commuter rail agencies have purchased or plan to purchase, lease, or pay to access existing rights-of-way from freight railroads or other entities. 2.) 1.) When the commuter rail owns rights-of-way, there is a role reversal between the freight railroad and the commuter rail agencies from the typical relationship—that is, if a freight railroad uses the commuter rail agency’s rights-of-way, the commuter rail agency is the host and the freight railroad is the tenant. Commuter Rail Agencies and Freight Railroads Face Numerous Challenges in Negotiating and Sharing Rights-of-Way
According to officials from commuter rail agencies and freight railroads, negotiating and sharing access to the same rights-of-way can be challenging. As a result, freight railroads typically require that the commuter rail agency contractually indemnify them from any liability in the event of a passenger accident, and procure a certain level of insurance coverage to guarantee the commuter rail agency’s ability to pay for all of the damages. Accepting these liability terms can be financially problematic for the commuter rail agencies. Specifically, the act limits the aggregate overall damages that may be awarded to all passengers for all claims (including punitive damages) from a particular rail accident to $200 million. The act also permits Amtrak and other providers of rail transportation to enter into indemnification agreements allocating financial responsibility for passenger accidents. In discussions with officials from commuter rail agencies and freight railroads, we found some confusion as to whether the liability cap established in the ARAA applies to commuter rail agencies. After reviewing the legislation, we have concluded that the liability cap applies to commuter rail operations on the basis of the plain language of the statute and our review of the pertinent legislative history. Although there is no template for success, officials from commuter rail agencies and freight railroads identified conditions or actions that can help facilitate mutually beneficial arrangements between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads. Although the officials discussed a range of ideas related to these themes, there were several recurring suggestions, including understanding each other’s position, identifying and using incentives to leverage cooperation, securing adequate and flexible funding to help improve capacity and infrastructure, and establishing good communication between both parties (see fig. Three federal agencies— FRA, FTA, and STB—have responsibility for different aspects of rail transportation. FTA does not currently play a role in commuter rail access issues. Commuter Rail Agencies and Freight Railroads Have Differing Views on the Appropriate Role of the Federal Government
Commuter rail agencies and freight railroads do not agree on the appropriate role for the federal government in commuter and freight rail access issues. Recommendation
In order to facilitate and inform negotiations between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation and the Chairman of the Surface Transportation Board determine whether it would be appropriate and useful for them to provide guidance and information, such as tips for successful negotiations and information on best practices, availability of federal resources, and the applicability of the liability provisions in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, to commuter rail agencies and freight railroads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Commuter and freight rail services have the potential to play increasingly important roles in the nation's economy and transportation system as demand for these services increases. Because the cost of building new infrastructure can be costprohibitive, commuter rail agencies typically seek to use existing infrastructure--which is primarily owned by private freight railroads. Consequently, commuter rail agencies must negotiate to purchase, lease, or pay to access the existing infrastructure from freight railroads. GAO was asked to examine (1) the challenges commuter rail agencies and freight railroads face when negotiating and sharing rights-of-way, (2) the actions that help facilitate mutually beneficial arrangements between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads, and (3) the role the federal government plays in negotiations between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads.
What GAO Found
Freight railroads and commuter rail agencies face a number of challenges when negotiating agreements and sharing access to the same rights-of-way, including reaching agreement on compensation, capacity, and liability issues. For instance, in negotiating the agreements, freight railroads typically require that the commuter rail agency contractually indemnify them from any liability in the event of a commuter rail accident and procure a certain level of insurance coverage. Officials from freight railroads said they seek these provisions to protect their shareholders from the potential costs associated with commuter rail accidents. However, accepting these liability terms--notably the expense of maintaining a high level of insurance--can be problematic for the commuter rail agencies. In 1997, Congress limited the aggregate damages that may be awarded to all passengers from claims from a particular rail accident to $200 million and permitted providers of rail transportation to enter into indemnification agreements. However, we found some confusion within the commuter and freight rail community as to whether the liability cap applied to commuter rail agencies, which could result in problems during negotiations. After reviewing the legislation, we have concluded that the liability cap applies to commuter rail operations. Although there is no exact formula for success, officials from commuter rail agencies and freight railroads identified actions that can help facilitate mutually beneficial arrangements--understanding each other's position, identifying and using incentives to leverage cooperation, securing adequate and flexible funding, and establishing good lines of communication. Although commuter rail agencies and freight railroads agreed on actions that could help facilitate win/win arrangements, they disagreed on the appropriate role for the federal government in negotiating access or resolving disputes between commuter rail agencies and freight railroads. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Federal Railroad Administration, and Surface Transportation Board (STB) have responsibility for different aspects of rail transportation. For example, FTA helps fund the planning and development of eligible commuter rail projects. However, none of the three agencies play a role in commuter rail access negotiations. Therefore, they have not provided any guidance or information to commuter rail agencies or freight railroads to facilitate and inform negotiations. |
gao_T-GGD-96-60 | gao_T-GGD-96-60_0 | Statement
Chairman Stevens, Chairman McHugh, and Members of the Subcommittees: We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing on how the reform experiences of other countries’ postal administrations may relate to ideas and proposals for reform of the U.S. Postal Service to provide uniform service to all communities in an increasingly competitive postal environment, as well as on issues involving the postal monopoly and postal rate setting in this country. While we believe that the overall experiences of other countries’ postal administrations are relevant to the current discussions of postal reform in the United States, meaningful comparisons of the specific operational practices followed and performance results can be difficult. Postal Service has at least seven times the mail volume, and at least twice the number of employees. Postal Service’s mail volume and about 6 percent of its number of employees. Major change has occurred more recently for some foreign postal administrations. Universal Service Remains a Common Goal Among Other Postal Administrations
The primary mission of the U.S. Any consideration of reforming the U.S. However, the definition of universal mail service varies somewhat from country to country. The U.S. Except for the French postal administration, all of the eight foreign postal administrations have some form of franchising policy for postal retail services. These include, but are not limited to, the quality of the Postal Service’s labor relations. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed other countries' postal service reform efforts and how their experiences may relate to U.S. Postal Service reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S Postal Service handles over seven times the mail volume and has at least twice as many employees as the 8 foreign countries reviewed; (2) increased competition from private delivery and communications networks has caused changes in U.S. postal law to allow more competitive flexibility; (3) the 8 foreign governments have reduced their control over their postal administration's day-to-day practices, which has led to improved service and financial performance for some of them; (4) universal mail service remains a common goal among these administrations, but their definition of it varies; (5) unlike the United States, 7 of the countries have franchising policies for postal retail services; (6) all of the countries provide certain subsidized mail services; (7) all of the countries except Sweden have postal monopolies, which vary widely in definition and scope; (8) some foreign countries have given their postal administrations greater freedom to set postal rates; (9) the overall experience of other countries' postal administrations are relevant to any U.S. postal reforms; and (10) any reform initiative must consider the quality of the Postal Service's labor relations. |
gao_GGD-95-66 | gao_GGD-95-66_0 | Key Recommendations for Tax Policy and Administration
In recommendations to Congress and the administration, we suggested actions that could be taken to improve compliance with the tax laws, increase accounts receivable collections, modernize the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), enhance the effectiveness of tax incentives, assist taxpayers, and improve financial management. 2, 1994). 20, 1994). We did our work on tax policy and administration matters pursuant to 31 U.S.C. Pursuant to a legislative requirement, we reviewed IRS’ financial management systems and internal controls over federal tax revenues. However, as of December 1994, IRS was taking actions related to these areas. We reviewed long-term travel assignments made at four IRS offices during fiscal year 1992. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO summarized its work on tax policy and administration issues during fiscal year (FY) 1994, including: (1) actions federal agencies took in response to its recommendations as of December 31, 1994; (2) recommendations made to Congress before and during FY 1994 that remain open; and (3) assignments for which GAO received authorized access to tax information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that its recommendations addressed specific actions that Congress and the administration could take to: (1) improve compliance with tax laws; (2) increase accounts receivable collections; (3) simplify the tax system; (4) modernize the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); (5) strengthen IRS management practices; and (6) enhance the effectiveness of tax incentives. |
gao_GAO-04-797 | gao_GAO-04-797_0 | The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contained new hiring flexibilities that could help agencies in expediting and controlling their hiring processes— category rating and direct-hire authority. Under this procedure, an agency manager can select any job candidate placed in a best-qualified category rather than being limited to three candidates under the “rule of three.” Direct-hire authority allows an agency to appoint individuals to positions without adherence to certain competitive examination requirements when OPM determines that there is a severe shortage of candidates or a critical hiring need. Some of the barriers they identified included (1) the lack of OPM guidance for using the flexibilities, (2) the lack of agency policies and procedures for using the flexibilities, (3) the lack of flexibility in OPM rules and regulations, and (4) concern about possible inconsistencies in the implementation of the flexibilities within the department or agency. As with category rating, OPM has provided agencies with guidance on the use of direct-hire authority in their hiring processes. Conclusions
Congress, OPM, and agencies have recognized the need to improve the federal hiring process and have initiated numerous efforts to address key problem areas. The federal government is now facing one of the most transformational changes to the civil service in half a century, which is reflected in the new personnel systems for DHS and DOD and in new hiring flexibilities provided to all agencies. Today’s challenge is to define the appropriate roles and day-to-day working relationships for OPM and individual agencies as they collaborate on developing innovative and more effective hiring systems. As a follow- up to that report, Jo Ann Davis, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, has requested that we update the status of ongoing efforts related to the federal hiring process by determining 1) the status of the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) efforts to help improve the federal hiring process, and 2) the extent to which federal agencies are using new hiring flexibilities authorized by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This survey is part of our effort to collect information from members of the Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) Council with regard to these matters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improving the federal hiring process is critical given the increasing number of new hires expected in the next few years. Congress asked GAO to report on the (1) status of recent efforts to help improve the federal hiring process and (2) extent to which federal agencies are using two new hiring flexibilities--category rating and direct-hire authority. Category rating permits an agency to select any job candidate placed in a best-qualified category. Direct-hire authority allows an agency to appoint individuals to positions without adherence to certain competitive examination requirements when there is a severe shortage of qualified candidates or a critical hiring need.
What GAO Found
Congress, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and agencies have recognized that federal hiring has needed reform, and they have undertaken various efforts to do so. In particular, Congress has provided agencies with additional hiring flexibilities, OPM has taken significant steps to modernize job vacancy announcements and develop the government's recruiting Web site, and most agencies are continuing to automate parts of their hiring processes. Still, problems remain with a job classification process that many view as antiquated, and there is a need for improved tools to assess the qualifications of job candidates. On the basis of our survey of members of the interagency Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Council, agencies appear to be making limited use of two new hiring flexibilities that could help agencies in expediting and controlling their hiring processes. Frequently cited barriers to using the new hiring flexibilities included (1) the lack of OPM guidance for using the flexibilities, (2) the lack of agency policies and procedures for using the flexibilities, (3) the lack of flexibility in OPM rules and regulations, and (4) concern about possible inconsistencies in the implementation of the flexibilities within the department or agency. The federal government is now facing one of the most transformational changes to the civil service in half a century. Today's challenge is to define the appropriate roles and day-to-day working relationships for OPM and individual agencies as they collaborate on developing innovative and more effective hiring systems. |
gao_T-RCED-97-105 | gao_T-RCED-97-105_0 | With the recently enacted Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (whose regulations are scheduled to take effect on Oct. 1, 1997), the Congress completed the process of separating Indian housing from public housing. Through its Native American Programs headquarters office and its six field offices, and with the help of approximately 189 Indian housing authorities, HUD administers the majority of the housing programs that benefit Native American families in or near tribal areas. HUD Provides Most Funding for Housing Assistance Through Indian Housing Authorities
Under current regulations, IHAs administer most of the low-income housing assistance that HUD provides to Native Americans. But HUD also provides some housing assistance directly to tribes and individuals. Funding available to tribes and individuals includes loan guarantees for home mortgages, block grants through the HOME program for tribes to develop affordable housing in tribal areas, and community development block grants to enhance infrastructure and other economic development activities. As shown in table 1, over the past decade HUD provided a total of $4.3 billion for these programs, which have produced or are expected to produce a total of 24,542 housing units. Providing Housing Assistance for Native Americans Is Challenging and Costly
HUD and IHAs encounter unique challenges and costly conditions in administering and providing housing programs for Native Americans. Among the challenges and conditions highlighted in our discussions with officials of HUD and several IHAs, as well as in the May 1996 study by the Urban Institute, are the remoteness and limited human resources of many IHAs and the Native American communities they serve; the lack of suitable land and the severity of the climate; the difficulty contractors and IHAs have in complying with statutory requirements to give hiring preference to Native Americans; and the pressure that vandalism, tenants’ neglect, and unpaid rent put on scarce maintenance funds. Land-Use Restrictions and the Inhospitality of the Land Complicate the Development and Maintenance of Low-Income Housing
In many tribal areas, observers see what appears to be a vast expanse of unused land. HUD Does Not Apply Its Risk Assessment Program Effectively, and New Legislation May Require Changes in Oversight
In December 1996, the Seattle Times reported a series of articles describing the possible mismanagement and misuse of federal funds by Indian housing authorities. HUD’s IG found that most of the Times reports were accurate, including reports of Indian housing authorities using federal funds to build luxury homes for families with incomes that exceeded the program’s eligibility criterion and reprogramming significant federal funds from one purpose to another without HUD’s approval. Although HUD has a system to identify poorly performing Indian housing authorities, our work showed that this system did not detect, for the most part, mismanagement by the authorities as reported in the Times. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Native American housing programs, focusing on the: (1) funding history and results of HUD's housing programs for Native Americans; (2) factors that complicate and make costly the development and maintenance of affordable housing for Native Americans; and (3) HUD's ability to detect mismanagement in Native American housing and the potential impact of the recently enacted Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 on HUD's oversight of Native American housing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from fiscal year (FY) 1986 through FY 1995, HUD provided $4.3 billion (constant 1995 dollars) for housing and community development in tribal areas; (2) of this amount, HUD provided $3.9 billion to approximately 189 Native American housing authorities to develop and maintain affordable housing and assist low-income renters; (3) in this period, the authorities used the funds to construct over 24,000 single-family homes, operate and maintain existing housing, and encourage other development; (4) over the decade, HUD also has provided direct block grants totalling over $424 million (constant 1995 dollars) to eligible tribes for community development and mortgage assistance; (5) many factors complicate and make costly the development and maintenance of affordable housing for Native Americans; (6) these factors include the remoteness and limited human resources of many Native American housing authorities and the Native American communities they serve, land-use restrictions and the inhospitality of the land, the difficulty that contractors and Native American housing authorities have in complying with statutory requirements to give hiring preference to Native Americans, and the vandalism and neglect that make heavy demands on the scarce maintenance funds available to Native American housing authorities; (7) in December 1996, the Seattle Times reported 29 instances of possible mismanagement or misuse of federal funds by Native American housing authorities; (8) for example, the Times reported that Native American housing authorities used federal funds to build luxury homes, covered the mismanagement of one federal grant with funds from another grant, and reprogrammed large federal grants without HUD's approval; (9) HUD's Inspector General found that most of these reports were accurate; (10) GAO's work found that HUD does not effectively apply its system for alerting it to poorly performing Native American housing authorities across its Native American Programs field offices; (11) as a result, HUD may not be able to detect additional instances of mismanagement or misuse of funding; and (12) futhermore, HUD's approach to overseeing Native American housing may change, depending on regulations now being developed to implement the new Native American housing legislation. |
gao_GAO-12-1023T | gao_GAO-12-1023T_0 | Sustained Leadership is Essential to Successful Human Capital Management
Effective leadership is the key driver of successful human capital management. As one example, in September 2011, OPM and the CHCO Council, as part of ongoing discussions between OPM, OMB, and us on progress needed to address the federal government’s human capital high risk area, established a working group to identify and mitigate critical skills gaps. Our preliminary findings show that the working group has, to date, taken some important steps forward, including developing a framework and timeline for identifying and addressing both government-wide and agency-specific skills gaps. If successfully implemented, initiatives such as the CHCO working group and Pathways could help agencies identify and close critical skills gaps. Strategic Human Capital Planning is Critical to Addressing Workforce Challenges
Strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader organizational strategic planning is essential for ensuring that agencies have the talent, skill, and experience mix they need to cost-effectively execute their mission and program goals. Likewise, certain occupations face the potential of large numbers of retirements. not carefully monitored and managed, as experienced employees leave, gaps could develop in an organization’s leadership and institutional knowledge. Talent Management Remains a Federal Workforce Challenge
Progress in talent management has been made on a number of fronts. However, our work had identified additional actions federal agencies can take to recruit, develop, and retain personnel with the skills essential to maintaining a workforce that will help agencies meet their vital missions. Both Congress and OPM have taken a series of important actions over the years to improve recruiting and hiring in the federal sector. In 2005, and again in 2008, OPM issued guidance on the use of hiring authorities and flexibilities, in 2006 developed the Hiring Toolkit to assist agency officials in determining the appropriate hiring flexibilities to use given their specific situations, and in 2008 launched an 80-day hiring model to help speed up the hiring process. Individual agencies have also taken actions to meet their specific needs for acquiring the necessary talent. Our recent work has also underscored the value of collaborative training. We recommended, among other things, that OPM improve guidance and assistance to agencies in establishing a process for setting and prioritizing training investments; improve the reliability of agency training investment information; and identify the best existing courses that fulfill government-wide training requirements and offer them to all agencies through their existing online training platform or another appropriate platform. Results-Oriented Cultures
Leading organizations have found that to successfully transform themselves they must often fundamentally change their cultures so that they are more results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative in nature. We have found that having a performance management system that creates a “line of sight” showing how unit and individual performance can contribute to overall organizational goals helps individuals understand the connection between their daily activities and the organization’s success. To ensure that the federal government is well positioned to become a model employer of individuals with disabilities, we recommended that the Director of OPM incorporate information about agency deficiencies in hiring individuals with disabilities into its regular reporting to the President on implementing the executive order; expedite the development of the mandatory agency training plans required by the order; and assess the accuracy of the data used to measure progress toward the order’s goals.recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. When we first identified strategic human capital management as a high risk area in 2001, it was because many agencies faced challenges in key areas including leadership; workforce planning; talent management; and creating results-oriented organizational cultures. Through a variety of initiatives, Congress, OPM, and individual agencies have strengthened the federal human capital infrastructure. As a result of these improvements, in 2011 we narrowed the focus of our high risk assessment to closing current and emerging critical skills gaps. Making greater progress requires agencies to continue to address their specific personnel challenges, as well as work with OPM and through the CHCO Council to address critical skills gaps. Office of Personnel Management: Retirement Modernization Planning and Management Shortcomings Need to Be Addressed. Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Executive Agencies’ Hiring Processes. Washington, D.C.: January 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high risk area in 2001 because of a long-standing lack of leadership.
Since then, important progress has been made. However, the area remains high risk because of a need to address current and emerging critical skills gaps that undermine agencies' abilities to meet their vital missions.
The federal government is facing evolving and crosscutting challenges that require a range of skills and competencies to address. Moreover, retirements and the potential loss of leadership and institutional knowledge, coupled with fiscal pressures, underscore the importance of a strategic and efficient approach to acquiring and retaining individuals with needed critical skills.
This testimony is based on a large body of GAO work from January 2001 through September 2012 and focuses on the progress made by executive branch agencies, the CHCO Council, and OPM, and the challenges that remain in four key areas of human capital management: (1) leadership; (2) strategic human capital planning; (3) talent management; and (4) resultsoriented organizational culture.
What GAO Found
Since 2001, Congress, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and executive branch agencies have taken action to address the government's human capital challenges. For example, in 2002, Congress passed legislation creating the CHCO Council, composed of the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) of 24 executive agencies and chaired by the Director of OPM. In 2004, through the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act, Congress provided agencies greater hiring flexibilities. OPM issued guidance on hiring reforms, developed the Hiring Toolkit, and launched an 80-day model to speed the hiring process.
Leadership:
The CHCO Council advises and coordinates the activities of member agencies on current and emerging personnel issues. Among its recent initiatives, OPM and the CHCO Council established a working group in September 2011 to identify and mitigate critical skills gaps. To date the group has taken important steps, including developing a framework and timeline for identifying and addressing government-wide and agency-specific skills gaps. However, the substantive work of addressing skills gaps remains, including defining workforce plans, implementing recruitment and retention strategies, and measuring the effects of these initiatives.
Strategic human capital planning:
Integrating human capital planning with broader organizational strategic planning is essential for ensuring that agencies have the talent and skill mix needed to cost-effectively execute their mission and program goals. If not carefully managed, anticipated retirements could cause skills gaps to develop further and adversely impact the ability of agencies to carry out their diverse responsibilities. GAO's work has identified skills shortages in areas government-wide, such as cybersecurity, acquisition management, and foreign language capabilities.
Talent management:
Ensuring that federal agencies are able to recruit, develop, and retain personnel with the necessary skills is essential to closing any skills gaps and maintaining a workforce that will meet its vital missions. Congress, OPM, and some individual agencies have taken important actions, such as providing and using flexibilities, to improve the hiring process and making investments in training and development. However, much work remains. For example, GAO recently reported that OPM can improve its guidance and assistance to agencies in establishing a process for setting and prioritizing training investments.
Results-oriented organizational culture:
Leading organizations have found that to successfully transform themselves they must often fundamentally change their cultures to be more results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative. As part of that, GAO has shown that agencies need to create clear "lines of sight" that align organizational and individual performance. These lines of sight help individual staff understand the connection between their daily activities and agency success.
What GAO Recommends
Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations to agencies and OPM to improve their strategic human capital management efforts. This testimony discusses agencies' actions to implement key recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-645 | gao_GAO-17-645_0 | When purchasing commercial items, firm knowledge of market pricing information is necessary and the contracting officer must obtain sufficient information to negotiate a fair and reasonable price. DOD’s Use of Commercial Item Procedures Has Gradually Declined Over 10 Years Within a Narrow Range DOD’s Use of Commercial Item Procedures Was Consistently Less than 25 Percent of Total Obligations
FPDS-NG data show that obligations under DOD contracts awarded using commercial item procedures (i.e. FAR Part 12) declined since fiscal year 2007, yet as a proportion of DOD’s total contracting obligations they have remained within a narrow range from 22 to 16 percent. Figure 1 depicts DOD’s total obligations and commercial item obligations from fiscal years 2007 through 2016. We could not determine the full extent to which DOD is procuring commercial items because FPDS-NG only captures information on whether or not commercial item acquisition procedures were used to acquire the product or service, and not whether items purchased are commercial or not commercial. In fiscal year 2016, products accounted for 54 percent of DOD’s commercial item obligations, while services accounted for 46 percent. Competition helps agencies get lower prices on products and services, and get the best value for taxpayers. DOD Has Taken Action in Response to Recent Commercial Item Acquisition Legislation
Recent legislation from Congress includes a number of provisions related to commercial item acquisitions, including both commercial item determinations and price reasonableness determinations. DOD is also in the process of updating its Guidebook for Acquiring Commercial Items. Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA
The fiscal year 2016 NDAA included provisions that required DOD to provide guidance related to commercial items and price reasonableness determinations, among other things. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense had no comments on a draft of this report. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. Appendix: Summary of Recent National Defense Authorization Act Sections Related to DOD’s Acquisition of Commercial Items
Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 NDAA Sections
Summary of Sections regarding Commercial Items Requires DOD to develop and begin implementation of a plan to train the acquisition workforce in the use of certain authorities for evaluating price reasonableness in procurements of commercial items and develop a cadre of experts within DOD to provide advice to the acquisition workforce. Department of Defense (DOD) Actions as of May 2017 Training:
Conferences addressing commercial item pricing occurring in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Industry day on contracting with DOD November 2014
DOD-wide pricing webinars
Week-long procurement contracting officer training for evaluating price reasonableness of commercial items According to Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy officials, the agency is coordinating with Defense Acquisition University to update training to be consistent with the DFARS and DOD Guidebook for Acquiring Commercial Items, both of which DOD is working to finalize. Cadre of experts:
Defense Contract Management Agency created six Commercial Item Centers of Excellence. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD purchases commercial items—generally defined as products and services readily available in the commercial marketplace—to meet many of its requirements. Relying on the commercial marketplace, when appropriate, enables DOD to take advantage of market innovations and reduce acquisition costs. Since 2013, Congress has enacted changes in the way DOD is to purchase commercial items.
GAO was asked to review the acquisition of commercial items by DOD. This report describes (1) what federal procurement data indicate about trends in DOD's acquisition of commercial items; and (2) recent legislative changes in the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) from fiscal years 2013 to 2017 related to the procurement of commercial items and DOD's actions in response to this legislation.
To obtain a longer term view, GAO analyzed data from FPDS-NG—the government's procurement database— for contracts awarded from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, reviewed applicable legislation and regulations, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) show that as a proportion of the Department of Defense's (DOD) total contracting obligations, contracts awarded using commercial item procedures have gradually declined in a narrow range from fiscal years 2007 to 2016 (see figure). These numbers, however, do not reflect the full extent to which DOD acquires commercial items because FPDS-NG only captures information on whether or not commercial item acquisition procedures were used to acquire the product or service, and not whether items purchased are commercial or not commercial.
DOD's Use of Commercial Item Procedures, Fiscal Years 2007-2016
In addition, GAO found that for fiscal year 2016:
54 percent of DOD's spending using commercial item procedures was on products, with the highest category being sustainment supplies and equipment;
46 percent of the remaining spending was for services, with knowledge-based services such as engineering and technical support accounting for the highest obligations; and
68 percent of DOD's commercial spending was competitive, slightly higher than DOD's past competition rate for overall contract spending.
Recent legislation from Congress includes a number of provisions related to commercial item acquisitions, including provisions intended to ensure contracting officers are negotiating fair and reasonable prices for commercial items. DOD has taken a number of actions to address this legislation, including updating its Guidebook for Acquiring Commercial Items and proposing Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement rules. When implemented, these rules will promote consistency in making commercial item determinations, among other things. Additionally, DOD has created six Commercial Item Centers of Excellence—a cadre of experts within DOD to provide advice to the acquisition workforce with regard to commercial item authorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-131 | gao_T-HEHS-98-131_0 | OPOs must meet service area and other requirements. 2. Problems With the Current Standard
determined to be a new entity and not subject to meeting the performance standard. A population-based standard, however, does not accurately assess OPO performance because OPO service areas consist of varying populations. Alternative Standards Could More Accurately Assess OPO Performance
We identified several performance measures as alternatives to the current population-based standard. The alternatives we examined included measuring organ procurement and transplantation compared with (1) the number of deaths, (2) the number of deaths adjusted for cause of death and age, (3) the number of potential donors based on medical records reviews, and (4) the number of potential donors based on modeling estimates in an OPO service area. HCFA did not consider two other methods for determining the number of potential donors—medical records reviews and modeling—that show promise for determining OPOs’ ability to acquire all usable organs. Other considerations include the extent to which the reviews would add to the cost of organs and whether these costs would outweigh the benefit of more accurately measuring the number of potential donors. HCFA’s continuous monitoring of the developments in approaches to identifying potential organ donors is important. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) whether the current standard for assessing the local organ procurement organizations' (OPO) effectiveness appropriately measures the extent to which OPOs are maximizing their ability to identify, procure, and transplant organs and tissue; and (2) alternatives to the current standard that could be more effective.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) current performance standard does not accurately assess OPO's ability to meet the goal of acquiring usable organs because it is based on the total population, not the number of potential donors within the OPOs' service areas; (2) GAO identified two alternative performance measures that would better estimate the number of potential organ donors--measuring the rates of organ procurement and transplantation compared with either the number of deaths or the number of deaths adjusted for cause of death and age; (3) both these approaches have limitations, however, in data availability and accuracy; (4) two other methods for assessing OPO performance--medical records reviews and modeling--show promise because they could more accurately determine the number of potential donors; and (5) because OPOs must meet performance goals to continue to operate, approaches that more accurately differentiate between OPOs that achieve greater or lesser proportions of all possible donations in their service areas can help increase donations. |
gao_GGD-95-6 | gao_GGD-95-6_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) review a group of commonly used notices and offer suggestions to enhance their clarity where appropriate and (2) determine if the IRS’ process for issuing notices produces clear notices. They considered the same factors in determining if the notices clearly conveyed the message IRS wanted to convey to taxpayers, including whether the text of the notice contained IRS’ intended message; title of the notice was consistent with the text; tax statement or statement of adjustment or other transaction was easy to read and compare to the taxpayer’s return; notice made any assumptions and, if so, whether they were clearly explained; terminology in the notice was easy to understand and logically presented; notice clearly explained what, if any, action was expected of the taxpayer notice provided the taxpayer with sufficient, but not excessive, information regarding the situation; and notice provided the taxpayer a telephone number to call or address to write to should he or she have questions or need additional guidance. We identified the computer programming changes required to implement the revisions. For example, we found that many of the 31 notices would have been improved by more specific language, clearer references, consistent terminology, logical presentation of material, and sufficient information and guidance. Faced with numerous demands to alter existing operational programs, ISM has found that it does not have the resources to respond to all requests. TSM is exploring ways of issuing single notices that could address multiple tax issues. IRS is considering (1) placing commonly asked questions and answers on the back of each notice and (2) expanding the existing tele-tax system to include notice information. Conclusions
IRS can do more to improve the clarity of its notices. These recommended notice changes include language and format modifications that are designed to improve notice clarity and usefulness. IRS is presently testing a new tax statement format on two other math error notices. IRS Response
IRS advised us that it is not possible for the existing computer and printing equipment to supply this kind of information on a notice. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) taxpayer notices, focusing on: (1) possible improvements to the notices; and (2) IRS processes for ensuring that its notices clearly convey essential information to taxpayers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 31 of the 47 most commonly used notices that it reviewed have clarity problems such as language, content, and format; (2) needed improvements to the notices include more specific language, clearer references, consistent terminology, logical presentation of material, and sufficient information and guidance on how to resolve taxpayer problems; (3) despite internal reviews and recommendations to improve the notices, IRS has delayed many notice revisions and has failed to implement others primarily due to its limited computer programming resources and higher priority programming demands; (4) IRS does not have a system to track recommended notice revisions; (5) IRS is testing whether its correspondence system can generate collection notices and make more timely notice revisions, since it has a number of capabilities that the master file notice system does not; (6) two other IRS initiatives to improve notices include testing a new notice format and acquiring new printing equipment for the service centers; (7) IRS is using its Tax Systems Modernization initiative to explore ways to issue single, comprehensive notices for taxpayers with multiple and interrelated tax problems; and (8) IRS is considering ways to supplement notices with commonly asked questions and appropriate answers to improve the quality of the notices. |
gao_GAO-07-606T | gao_GAO-07-606T_0 | DOD and VA Have Taken Actions to Facilitate the Transfer of Servicemembers but Experienced Problems in Exchanging Health Care Information
In our June 2006 report, we found that DOD and VA had taken actions to facilitate the transition of medical and rehabilitative care for seriously injured servicemembers who were being transferred from MTFs to PRCs. DOD and VA reported that as of December 2005 two of the four PRCs had real-time access to the electronic medical records maintained at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and only one of the two also had access to the records at the National Naval Medical Center. According to PRC officials, obtaining additional medical information in this way, rather than electronically, is very time consuming and often requires multiple phone calls and faxes. DOD was concerned that VA’s efforts may conflict with the military’s retention goals. While VA tries to prepare servicemembers for a transition to civilian life, VA’s outreach process may overlap with DOD’s process for evaluating servicemembers for a possible return to duty. In our report, we concluded that instead of working at cross purposes to DOD goals, VA’s early intervention efforts could facilitate servicemembers’ return to the same or a different military occupation, or to a civilian occupation if the servicemembers were not able to remain in the military. In this regard, the prospect for early intervention with vocational rehabilitation presents both a challenge and an opportunity for DOD and VA to collaborate to provide better outcomes for seriously injured servicemembers. DOD Screens Servicemembers for PTSD after Deployment, but DOD and VA Face Challenges Ensuring Further PTSD Services
In our May 2006 report, we described DOD’s efforts to identify and facilitate care for OEF/OIF servicemembers who may be at risk for PTSD. DOD health care providers review completed questionnaires, conduct face-to-face interviews with servicemembers, and use their clinical judgment in determining which servicemembers need referrals for further mental health evaluations. Using data provided by DOD, we found that 22 percent, or 2,029, of the 9,145 OEF/OIF servicemembers in our review who may have been at risk for developing PTSD were referred by DOD health care providers for further mental health evaluations. According to DOD officials, not all of the OEF/OIF servicemembers with three or four positive responses on the screening questionnaire need referrals. However, at the time of our review DOD had not identified the factors its health care providers used to determine which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Although OEF/OIF servicemembers may obtain mental health evaluations or treatment for PTSD through VA when they transition to veteran status, VA may face a challenge in meeting the demand for PTSD services. As a result, VA medical facility officials estimated that follow-up appointments for veterans receiving care for PTSD could be delayed. VA officials estimated the delays to be up to 90 days. Problems Related to Military Pay Have Resulted in Debt and Other Hardships for Hundreds of Sick and Injured Servicemembers
As discussed in our April 2006 testimony, problems related to military pay have resulted in overpayments and debt for hundreds of sick and injured servicemembers. We found that hundreds of battle-injured servicemembers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own, including at least 74 servicemembers whose debts had been reported to credit bureaus and private collections agencies. In our 2005 testimony about Army National Guard and Reserve servicemembers, we found that poorly defined requirements and processes for extending injured and ill reserve component servicemembers on active duty have caused servicemembers to be inappropriately dropped from active duty. For some, this has led to significant gaps in pay and health insurance, which has created financial hardships for these servicemembers and their families. VA and DOD Health Care: Efforts to Provide Seamless Transition of Care for OEF and OIF Servicemembers and Veterans. VA and Defense Health Care: More Information Needed to Determine If VA Can Meet an Increase in Demand for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of March 1, 2007, over 24,000 servicemembers have been wounded in action since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), according to the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO work has shown that servicemembers injured in combat face an array of significant medical and financial challenges as they begin their recovery process in the health care systems of DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). GAO was asked to discuss concerns regarding DOD and VA efforts to provide medical care and rehabilitative services for servicemembers who have been injured during OEF and OIF. This testimony addresses (1) the transition of care for seriously injured servicemembers who are transferred between DOD and VA medical facilities, (2) DOD's and VA's efforts to provide early intervention for rehabilitation for seriously injured servicemembers, (3) DOD's efforts to screen servicemembers at risk for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and whether VA can meet the demand for PTSD services, and (4) the impact of problems related to military pay on injured servicemembers and their families. This testimony is based on GAO work issued from 2004 through 2006 on the conditions facing OEF/OIF servicemembers at the time the audit work was completed.
What GAO Found
Despite coordinated efforts, DOD and VA have had problems sharing medical records for servicemembers transferred from DOD to VA medical facilities. GAO reported in 2006 that two VA facilities lacked real-time access to electronic medical records at DOD facilities. To obtain additional medical information, facilities exchanged information by means of a time-consuming process resulting in multiple faxes and phone calls. In 2005, GAO reported that VA and DOD collaboration is important for providing early intervention for rehabilitation. VA has taken steps to initiate early intervention efforts, which could facilitate servicemembers' return to duty or to a civilian occupation if the servicemembers were unable to remain in the military. However, according to DOD, VA's outreach process may overlap with DOD's process for evaluating servicemembers for a possible return to duty. DOD was also concerned that VA's efforts may conflict with the military's retention goals. In this regard, DOD and VA face both a challenge and an opportunity to collaborate to provide better outcomes for seriously injured servicemembers. DOD screens servicemembers for PTSD but, as GAO reported in 2006, it cannot ensure that further mental health evaluations occur. DOD health care providers review questionnaires, interview servicemembers, and use clinical judgment in determining the need for further mental health evaluations. However, GAO found that 22 percent of the OEF/OIF servicemembers in GAO's review who may have been at risk for developing PTSD were referred by DOD health care providers for further evaluations. According to DOD officials, not all of the servicemembers at risk will need referrals. However, at the time of GAO's review DOD had not identified the factors its health care providers used to determine which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Although OEF/OIF servicemembers may obtain mental health evaluations or treatment for PTSD through VA, VA may face a challenge in meeting the demand for PTSD services. VA officials estimated that follow-up appointments for veterans receiving care for PTSD may be delayed up to 90 days. GAO's 2006 testimony pointed out problems related to military pay have resulted in debt and other hardships for hundreds of sick and injured servicemembers. Some servicemembers were pursued for repayment of military debts through no fault of their own. As a result, servicemembers have been reported to credit bureaus and private collections agencies, been prevented from getting loans, gone months without paychecks, and sent into financial crisis. In a 2005 testimony GAO reported that poorly defined requirements and processes for extending the active duty of injured and ill reserve component servicemembers have caused them to be inappropriately dropped from active duty, leading to significant gaps in pay and health insurance for some servicemembers and their families. |
gao_GGD-00-48 | gao_GGD-00-48_0 | In recent years, banking regulators have changed their examination techniques by placing increased emphasis on an institution’s internal control systems and on the way it manages and controls its risks. The objectives of this report are to (1) describe the general characteristics of the regulators’ risk-focused approach to examinations of large, complex banks, explaining how they differ from past examination practices; (2) compare the implementation of the Federal Reserve’s and OCC’s risk- focused examination approaches; and (3) identify the challenges faced by both agencies as they continue to implement their examination programs for large, complex banks. The Risk-Focused Approach Relies on Ongoing Monitoring and Examination of the Bank
Under the risk-focused approach of both the Federal Reserve and OCC, examiners are to engage in ongoing monitoring and communication to keep abreast of the current financial condition and business strategies of a bank. Our objectives were to (1) describe the general characteristics of the regulators’ risk-focused approach to examinations of large, complex banks, explaining how they differ from past examination practices; (2) compare the implementation of the Federal Reserve’s and OCC’s risk-focused examination approaches; and (3) identify the challenges faced by both agencies as they continue to implement their examination programs for large, complex banks. Transaction testing remains important but is intended to validate examiners’ judgment on the reliability of an institution’s controls. Other Differences Between Risk-Focused and Earlier Approach to Examinations
Other differences between OCC’s and the Federal Reserve’s risk-focused approach to examinations of large, complex banks and earlier procedures include differences in the planning of examinations, allocation of examiner resources, ongoing monitoring of bank operations, and communication of the results of the examination to a bank’s management and board of directors. This results in certain bank operations receiving less scrutiny than others. They are to do this through the review of a variety of management reports and frequent meetings with key bank officials. OCC’s Program is Centrally Managed
OCC’s large bank supervision program, which was formally established in 1995, previously was directed out of its district offices but now is centrally managed by the Bank Supervision Operations group located in its Washington, D.C. headquarters. Examination of Large Banking Organizations Poses Challenges for Federal Reserve and OCC
The Federal Reserve and OCC face a number of challenges as they continue to implement their examination programs for large, complex banks. One key challenge, inherent in the design of the risk-based program, is how to identify the aspects of bank operations where examiner attention should be concentrated. A second challenge is maintaining an awareness of industrywide risk in an institution-specific examination program. Using Bank-Generated Information and Analysis to Make Risk Assessments Creates Heavy Reliance on Bank’s Risk- Management Systems
Examiners are challenged to avoid being overly influenced by banks’ risk- management systems while relying on those systems and other data furnished by the bank to make their assessments. Under risk-focused supervision, examiners assess a bank’s risk-management and internal controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the risk-focused approaches used by the Federal Reserve and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), focusing on: (1) the general characteristics of the regulators' risk-focused approach to examinations of large, complex banks, explaining how they differ from past examination practices; (2) comparing the implementation of the Federal Reserve's and OCC's risk-focused examination approaches; and (3) the challenges faced by both agencies as they continue to implement their examination programs for large, complex banks.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Federal Reserve and OCC's risk-focused approaches to supervising large, complex banking organizations are evolving with changes intended to strengthen oversight of these entities; (2) their effectiveness will depend on the expertise and independence of examiners, and the regulators' ability to maintain an awareness of industrywide risk in an institution-specific examination program; (3) transaction review and testing under the risk-focused approach is intended to validate the use and effectiveness of internal control and other risk-management systems; (4) examination activities now focus on risk assessments along business lines, which often cross bank charters, and the processes used to manage and control the attendant risks; (5) under a risk-focused approach, activities judged to pose the highest risk to an institution receive the most scrutiny by examiners; (6) this approach relies on examiner judgment and results in certain bank operations receiving less scrutiny than others; (7) examiners monitor and assess a bank's financial condition and risk-management systems through the review of a variety of management reports and meetings with key bank officials, documenting the areas they select for review and including their rationale for selecting those areas; (8) examiners conduct examinations to assess a bank's internal control and risk-management systems; (9) the Federal Reserve and the OCC differ in how they implement their risk-focused examinations programs for large, complex banks; (10) OCC's large bank supervision program is centrally managed from its headquarters and has achieved a degree of uniformity in its use of examiners who are located at the bank throughout the year and conduct ongoing monitoring and examinations, and report to one of three deputy comptrollers located in Washington D.C.; (11) the Federal Reserve's program is implemented through a less centralized system of Reserve Banks and has less uniformity in its ongoing monitoring and examinations, with sometimes differing staffing arrangements in place for each bank; and (12) regulators face a number of challenges in implementing examination programs for large, complex banks, including: (a) identifying the aspects of bank operations where examiner's attention should be concentrated; (b) maintaining an awareness of industrywide risk in an institution-specific examination program; (c) ensuring risk assessments are not overly influenced by the bank's risk-management systems on which they must rely; and (d) maintaining sufficient staffing numbers and expertise. |
gao_GAO-06-831 | gao_GAO-06-831_0 | The core elements can be further categorized by four groups: architecture governance, content, use, and measurement. Stage 4: Completing the EA. Specifically, although only seven have fully satisfied all the stage 2 elements, the 27 have on average fully satisfied 80, 78, 61, and 52 percent of the stage 2, 3, 4, and 5 elements, respectively. Most of the 27 have also at least partially satisfied a number of additional core elements across all the stages. For example, all but 7 have at least partially satisfied all the elements required to achieve stage 3 or higher. Without mature enterprise architecture programs, some departments and agencies will not realize the many benefits that they attributed to architectures, and they are at risk of investing in IT assets that are duplicative, not well-integrated, and do not optimally support mission operations. The Degree to which Major Departments and Agencies Have Fully Satisfied Our Framework’s Core Elements Is Uneven and Their Collective Efforts Can Be Viewed as a Work-in- Progress
To qualify for a given stage of maturity under our architecture management framework, a department or agency had to fully satisfy all of the core elements at that stage. Notwithstanding the additional perspective that the percentage of core elements fully satisfied across all stages provides, it is important to note that the staged core elements in our framework represent a hierarchical or systematic progression to establishing a well-managed architecture program, meaning that core elements associated with lower framework stages generally support the effective execution of higher maturity stage core elements. The challenge that most departments and agencies cited as being experienced to the greatest extent is the one that having and using an architecture is intended to overcome— organizational parochialism and cultural resistance to adopting an enterprisewide mode of operation in which organizational parts are sub- optimized in order to optimize the performance and results of the enterprise as a whole. As we have previously reported, sustained top management leadership is the key to overcoming each of these challenges. Without such organizational leadership, the benefits of enterprise architecture will not be fully realized. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist the 27 major departments and agencies in addressing enterprise architecture challenges, managing their architecture programs, and realizing architecture benefits, we recommend that the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Small Business Administration, and U.S. Agency for International Development; the Attorney General; the Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Social Security Administration; the Directors of the National Science Foundation and the Office of Personnel Management; and the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs ensure that their respective enterprise architecture programs develop and implement plans for fully satisfying each of the conditions in our enterprise architecture management maturity framework. Of these categories, architecture development activities accounted for the majority of costs— about $594 million (87 percent). This information includes architecture tools and frameworks. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the current status of federal department and agency enterprise architecture efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
A well-defined enterprise architecture is an essential tool for leveraging information technology (IT) to transform business and mission operations. GAO's experience has shown that attempting to modernize and evolve IT environments without an architecture to guide and constrain investments results in operations and systems that are duplicative, not well integrated, costly to maintain, and ineffective in supporting mission goals. In light of the importance of enterprise architectures, GAO developed a five stage architecture management maturity framework that defines what needs to be done to effectively manage an architecture program. Under GAO's framework, a fully mature architecture program is one that satisfies all elements of all stages of the framework. As agreed, GAO's objective was to determine the status of major federal department and agency enterprise architecture efforts.
What GAO Found
The state of the enterprise architecture programs at the 27 major federal departments and agencies is mixed, with several having very immature programs, several having more mature programs, and most being somewhere in between. Collectively, the majority of these architecture efforts can be viewed as a work-in-progress with much remaining to be accomplished before the federal government as a whole fully realizes their transformational value. More specifically, seven architecture programs have advanced beyond the initial stage of the GAO framework, meaning that they have fully satisfied all core elements associated with the framework's second stage (establishing the management foundation for developing, using, and maintaining the architecture). Of these seven, three have also fully satisfied all the core elements associated with the third stage (developing the architecture). None have fully satisfied all of the core elements associated with the fourth (completing the architecture) and fifth (leveraging the architecture for organizational change) stages. Nevertheless, most have fully satisfied a number of the core elements across the stages higher than the stage in which they have met all core elements, with all 27 collectively satisfying about 80, 78, 61, and 52 percent of the stage two through five core elements, respectively. Further, most have partially satisfied additional elements across all the stages, and seven need to fully satisfy five or fewer elements to achieve the fifth stage. The key to these departments and agencies building upon their current status, and ultimately realizing the benefits that they cited architectures providing, is sustained executive leadership, as virtually all the challenges that they reported can be addressed by such leadership. Examples of the challenges are organizational parochialism and cultural resistance, adequate resources (human capital and funding), and top management understanding; examples of benefits cited are better information sharing, consolidation, improved productivity, and reduced costs. |
gao_NSIAD-98-142 | gao_NSIAD-98-142_0 | This report focuses on the federal or federally funded organizations we identified as having a principal role in collecting and/or producing counterdrug intelligence. Within these 2 communities, we identified at least 22 federal or federally funded organizations spread across 5 cabinet-level departments (Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Defense, and State) and 2 cabinet-level organizations (ONDCP and the Director of Central Intelligence) whose roles include collecting and/or producing counterdrug intelligence information. Counterdrug intelligence organizations employ human, electronic, photographic, and/or other technical means to collect intelligence information. Organizations with a principal role in collecting and/or producing counterdrug intelligence provided us with unclassified information showing that at least $295 million was spent for counterdrug intelligence in fiscal year 1997. Numbers of Personnel Assigned to Counterdrug Intelligence Activities
The number of federal personnel assigned to counterdrug intelligence collection and/or production activities is difficult to determine because in many cases organizations are not authorized and/or do not track personnel positions specifically for counterdrug intelligence activities, yet have personnel who perform counterdrug intelligence functions; there is no single governmentwide source from which to obtain information on the number of counterdrug intelligence personnel (e.g., ONDCP’s 1997 National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary reported estimates of total counterdrug personnel resources—i.e., full-time equivalents—but did not further delineate personnel by intelligence or other key ONDCP drug function); some personnel perform functions that serve more than one purpose, and it was difficult for organization officials to determine the amount of time these people spent specifically on counterdrug intelligence duties as opposed to other duties (e.g., law enforcement officers collect intelligence as part of their investigative activities); and some intelligence personnel perform functions in support of multiple missions, and it was difficult to determine how much time they spent on counterdrug intelligence activities (e.g., Customs intelligence research specialists support Customs’ trade, fraud, and export control missions in addition to its counterdrug mission). The Justice, Defense, and Treasury Departments account for over 90 percent of the total estimated unclassified number of federal personnel who support counterdrug intelligence programs and activities. National level policymakers use these assessments in developing drug control policies and strategies. 2, 14 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated federal counterdrug intelligence coordination efforts, focusing on identifying: (1) organizations that collect or produce counterdrug intelligence; (2) the role of these organizations; (3) federal funding they receive; and (4) the number of personnel that support this function.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) more than 20 federal or federally funded organizations, spread across 5 cabinet-level departments and 2 cabinet-level organizations, have a principal role in collecting or producing counterdrug intelligence; (2) together, these organizations collect domestic and foreign counterdrug intelligence information using human, electronic, photographic, and other technical means; (3) this information is used by U.S. policymakers to formulate counterdrug policy and by law enforcement agencies to learn about the groups that traffic in drugs and to identify the points at which drug-trafficking operations are the most vulnerable; (4) the amount of federal funds spent on counterdrug intelligence programs and activities and the number of federal personnel assigned to counterdrug intelligence functions are difficult to determine; (5) there is no governmentwide budget or single source from which to obtain this data, including the Office of National Drug Control Policy's National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary; (6) in addition, it is difficult to determine the spending and personnel for counterdrug intelligence because: (a) most organizations do not have separate budget line items and are not authorized personnel positions specifically for counterdrug intelligence; and (b) some agency functions and personnel serve multiple purposes or support multiple missions; (7) unclassified information reported to GAO by counterdrug intelligence organizations show that over $295 million was spent for counterdrug intelligence activities during fiscal year 1997 and over 1,400 federal personnel were engaged in these activities; and (8) the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, and Defense account for over 90 percent of the money spent and personnel involved. |
gao_GAO-17-42 | gao_GAO-17-42_0 | CMS places all provider and supplier types into risk categories—limited, moderate, or high—based on CMS’s assessments of the potential risk of fraud, waste, and abuse each provider and supplier type poses to Medicare program integrity. CMS Applied the Revised Enrollment Screening Process to over 2.4 Million New Applications and Existing Records, and Estimated Avoiding $2.4 Billion in Medicare Payments to Ineligible Providers and Suppliers
CMS Denied or Rejected over 23,000 New Applications and Deactivated or Revoked over 703,000 Existing Enrollment Records
According to our analysis of PECOS data, CMS applied its revised enrollment screening process to over 2.4 million unique new applications and existing enrollment records from March 25, 2011, through December 31, 2015. Many were the result of enrollment screening conducted during CMS’s first revalidation cycle. CMS Estimates It Avoided $2.4 Billion in Medicare Payments to Ineligible Providers and Suppliers from Enrollment Screening Process, Among Other Benefits
CMS estimates the revised enrollment screening process avoided $2.4 billion in Medicare payments to ineligible providers and suppliers from March 2011 to May 2015, and CMS and MAC officials report additional benefits. CMS Modified Elements of the Revised Enrollment Screening Process and Plans to Implement Further Modifications in the Future
Since 2011, CMS has modified some of the methods it uses to screen providers and suppliers trying to enroll or maintain eligibility to bill Medicare. CMS officials stated that they have not yet determined future modifications and are waiting to see the results of the previous modifications before modifying the enrollment process further. CMS and MAC officials said they meet periodically to examine operational efficiency. Despite these efforts, we found that CMS’s monitoring of enrollment screening, including screening conducted as part of revalidation, lacks objectives and performance measures for assessing progress toward achieving its goals. Federal internal control standards specify that management should define objectives in specific and measurable terms, establish appropriate performance measures for the defined objectives, and conduct ongoing monitoring so that progress toward achieving desired goals can be assessed. CMS officials stated that while they want to assess the screening process, they are uncertain of what performance measures to establish in part because they are concerned that some measures would be inappropriate. However, without developing objectives and performance measures to use in ongoing monitoring, the agency will be unable to measure the progress it has made toward achieving its goals for the screening process and for revalidating provider and supplier enrollment information. While there may be challenges in developing such objectives and performance measures, there are opportunities to do so that would allow CMS to better monitor the enrollment screening process without setting specific targets for the number of deactivations or revocations. For example, CMS could focus on developing objectives and performance measures related to its goals for enrollment screening, such as keeping enrollment information up to date. CMS has subsequently modified some elements and conducted monitoring of the process. As CMS considers future modifications to the enrollment screening process and undertakes its second program-wide revalidation effort, opportunities exist to address limitations in its current monitoring of the process. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency’s enrollment screening process, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS establish objectives and performance measures for assessing progress toward achieving its goals. In commenting on this report, HHS agreed with our recommendation. Appendix II: Examples of Operational Modifications to Revalidation
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has made operational modifications to revalidation since 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
An effective provider and supplier enrollment process is a cornerstone of ensuring Medicare program integrity and limiting improper payments. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act contained provisions designed to strengthen CMS's enrollment screening process. In response, CMS implemented a revised screening process on March 25, 2011, that assigned all providers and suppliers to one of three risk categories—limited, moderate, or high—and based screening on the level of potential risk of fraud, waste, and abuse they present. The process is used to screen prospective, and revalidate enrolled, providers and suppliers. In September 2011, CMS began its first large scale revalidation effort to verify all enrolled providers' and suppliers' information and determine whether they remain eligible to bill Medicare. As of March 2016, it had begun its second large scale revalidation effort.
GAO was asked to examine the revised enrollment screening process. GAO examined 1) the results of the 2011 revised screening process, 2) CMS's implemented or planned modifications to the process, and 3) CMS's monitoring of the revised process. GAO examined enrollment data from March 25, 2011, through December 31, 2015, reviewed CMS policies and procedures, and interviewed CMS and Medicare contractor officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Medicare enrollment data found that CMS used its revised enrollment screening process to screen and revalidate over 2.4 million unique new applications and existing enrollment records. GAO's analysis showed that the screening resulted in over 23,000 new applications being denied or rejected and over 703,000 existing enrollment records being deactivated or revoked. CMS estimates the revised process avoided $2.4 billion in Medicare payments to ineligible providers and suppliers from March 2011 to May 2015 and resulted in other benefits, such as more accurate provider and supplier enrollment data. In June 2015, GAO reported some inaccuracies in the enrollment data after the revised process took effect, such as potentially ineligible practice location addresses, which CMS has taken action to address.
Since 2011, CMS has implemented some modifications to the revised screening process and made operational modifications to its revalidation efforts. For example, CMS eliminated automatic approvals of provider and supplier requests to extend the deadline for submitting enrollment information for revalidation. CMS officials stated that they plan to implement further modifications, but have not yet identified these future modifications. CMS officials said that they are waiting to see the results of the previous modifications before modifying the enrollment process further.
CMS has set goals and conducted monitoring of the enrollment screening process, but those monitoring activities lack objectives and performance measures for assessing progress toward those goals. CMS officials said they want to assess the screening process but they are uncertain of what objectives and performance measures to establish, in part because they are concerned that some measures would be inappropriate. While there may be challenges in developing objectives and performance measures, there are opportunities to do so that would allow CMS to better monitor the enrollment screening process without setting specific targets that could create inappropriate incentives for contractors. For example, CMS could focus on developing objectives and performance measures related to its goals for enrollment screening, such as keeping enrollment information up to date. Federal internal control standards and leading practices specify defining objectives and establishing performance measures so that an agency can monitor progress toward achieving desired goals. Without objectives and performance measures to use in ongoing monitoring, CMS will be unable to measure the progress it has made toward achieving its goals.
In commenting on this report, the Department of Health and Human Services agreed with GAO's recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the revised screening process, CMS should establish objectives and performance measures for assessing progress toward achieving its goals. |
gao_GAO-07-990 | gao_GAO-07-990_0 | At DHS, in fiscal year 2005 services accounted for $7.9 billion, or 67 percent, of total procurement obligations, with $1.2 billion obligated for four types of professional and management support services: program management and support, engineering and technical, other professional, and other management support (see fig. 1). Of the $805 million obligated by the Coast Guard, OPO, and TSA in fiscal year 2005 to procure four types of professional and management support services, more than one-half of the obligations was for engineering and technical services—most of which was contracted by the Coast Guard and OPO. However, most of the selected statements of work we reviewed did request reorganization and planning activities, acquisition support, and policy development—services that closely supported inherently governmental functions. DHS Did Not Consider Risk when Deciding to Contract for Selected Services
A lack of staff and expertise to get programs and operations up and running drove decisions to contract for professional and management support services. These conditions need to be carefully monitored to ensure the government does not lose control over and accountability for mission related decisions. DHS has not explored ways to manage the risk of contracting for these services such as determining the right mix of government-performed and contractor-performed services or assessing total workforce deployment across the department. Selected Cases May Have Been at Risk of Contractors Influencing Government Decisions
To ensure the government does not lose control over and accountability for mission-related decisions, long-standing federal procurement policy requires attention to the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor actions when contracting for services that closely support inherently governmental functions. Broadly defined requirements were also apparent in the 117 statements of work that we reviewed. However, program officials said the contractor never provided these services. For the nine cases we reviewed, the level of oversight DHS provided did not always ensure accountability for decisions—as called for in federal guidance—or the ability to judge whether contractors were performing as required. According to DHS contracting officers and program officials, cost, complexity, and visibility are risk factors that trigger the need for enhanced oversight. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the department’s ability to manage the risk of selected services that closely support inherently governmental functions as well as government control over and accountability for decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security implement the following five actions: establish strategic-level guidance for determining the appropriate mix of government and contractor employees to meet mission needs; assess the risk of selected contractor services as part of the acquisition planning process, and modify existing acquisition guidance and training to address when to use and how to oversee those services in accordance with federal acquisition policy; define contract requirements to clearly describe roles, responsibilities, and limitations of selected contractor services as part of the acquisition planning process; assess program office staff and expertise necessary to provide sufficient oversight of selected contractor services; and review contracts for selected services as part of the acquisition oversight program. To identify potential risk and the extent to which DHS considered risk when deciding to use contracts for selected professional and management support services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions, and to assess DHS’s management and oversight of contracts for these types of services, we conducted a detailed review of nine case studies—three at each component. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated $1.2 billion to procure four types of professional and management support services--program management and support, engineering and technical, other professional, and other management support. While contracting for such services can help DHS meet its needs, there is risk associated with contractors closely supporting inherently governmental functions--functions that should be performed only by government employees. This report (1) describes the contracted services, (2) identifies potential risk and the extent to which DHS considered risk when deciding to contract for these services, and (3) assesses DHS's approach to managing and overseeing these services. GAO analyzed 117 judgmentally selected statements of work and 9 cases in detail for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2005 by the Coast Guard, the Office of Procurement Operations (OPO), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
What GAO Found
More than half of the 117 statements of work that GAO reviewed provided for reorganization and planning activities, policy development, and acquisition support--services that closely support the performance of inherently governmental functions. Other such services supporting a broad range of programs and operations at Coast Guard, OPO, and TSA included budget preparation, regulation development, and employee relations. Decisions to contract for professional and management support services were driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs and operations up and running. However, for the nine cases we reviewed, program officials did not assess the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments. These cases included services that have the potential to increase this risk. For example, contractors directly supported DHS missions and performed on an ongoing basis work comparable to that of government employees. Most of the nine contracts also lacked detail or covered a wide range of services. Conditions such as these need to be carefully monitored to ensure the government does not lose control over and accountability for mission-related decisions. DHS has not explored ways to manage the risk of these contractor services, such as through total workforce deployment across the organization. The level of oversight DHS provided did not always ensure accountability for decisions or the ability to judge whether the contractor was performing as required. Federal acquisition policy requires enhanced oversight of contracts for services that can affect government decision making, policy development, or program management. While contracting officers and program officials acknowledged their professional and management support services contracts closely supported inherently governmental functions, they did not see a need for increased oversight. Insufficient oversight increases the potential for a loss of management control and the ability to ensure intended outcomes are achieved. |
gao_GAO-14-519 | gao_GAO-14-519_0 | EPA Generally Used RIAs to Inform Decision Making and Varied In Adherence to OMB Guidance for Selected Elements of RIAs
EPA generally used the seven RIAs we reviewed to inform decision making during the rulemaking process but did not always adhere to OMB guidance for selected elements of these RIAs. According to EPA officials, the agency most commonly used these RIAs to facilitate an iterative process with management, identify effects of regulations, and communicate the information supporting EPA’s regulatory decisions to Congress and the public. Specifically, OMB guidance states that RIAs should enable a third party to understand how the agency arrived at its estimates and conclusions (i.e., clarity and transparency), and Executive Order 12866 states that agencies should provide information to the public in plain, understandable language. EPA Varied in Its Adherence to Guidance for Estimating Benefits and Costs
In the RIAs we reviewed, EPA varied in its adherence to OMB’s guidance for estimating benefits and costs. EPA generally adhered to OMB guidance for providing information on benefits and costs for the regulatory alternatives under consideration and using OMB’s recommended discount rates. EPA Faced Challenges in Two Key Areas That Limited the Usefulness of Some of the Estimates in Its RIAs
In assessing EPA’s adherence to OMB guidance, we identified two key areas in which EPA faced challenges that limited the usefulness of some of the estimates in its RIAs—nonmonetized benefits and costs related to the primary purpose or key impacts of the regulatory actions and EPA’s approach for estimating the effects of regulations on employment. OMB guidance acknowledges that monetization is not always possible, and EPA officials said that limited data, modeling capabilities, and time and resource constraints precluded them from monetizing these effects in some cases. However, the officials also said that the study represented the best reasonably obtainable data when they conducted their analyses. Without additional information and improvements in its approach for estimating employment effects, EPA’s RIAs may be limited in their usefulness for helping decision makers and the public understand the potential effects of the agency’s regulations on employment. Similarly, the 2013 update of the technical support document references Circular A-4 in the body, but does not include a clear overall statement of its relationship to Circular A- 4. EPA officials said, however, they did not analyze other relevant uncertainties related to other aspects of these pollutants because of data limitations. Also, in this RIA, EPA did not analyze the uncertainties associated with its cost estimates. In addition, RIAs provide affected entities, government agencies, Congress, and the public with important information about the potential effects of new regulations, which can result in significant benefits and costs. OMB guidance provides best practices for conducting regulatory analysis and communicating this information; however, EPA did not always adhere to this guidance. In particular, EPA’s regulatory review process does not ensure that the information about selected elements that should appear in the analyses—such as clear descriptions of baselines and alternatives considered—is transparent or clear, within and across its RIAs. Without enhancements to its review process targeted at improving adherence to OMB guidance, EPA cannot ensure that its RIAs provide the public with a clear understanding of its decision making. First, resource and data limitations constrained EPA’s ability to monetize certain benefits and costs related to the primary purposes or key impacts of the rules we reviewed, such as the health benefits of reducing hazardous air pollutants and water quality effects. However, EPA officials were uncertain about when such information would be available. EPA’s use of the technical support document for estimating the value of reducing future carbon dioxide emissions and Circular A-4 for estimating other benefits and costs in its RIAs has raised questions about the agency’s adherence to Circular A-4 and has introduced an inconsistency in EPA’s analyses. To clarify the relationship between OMB Circular A-4 and an Interagency Working Group’s Technical Support document for estimating the effects of changes in carbon dioxide emissions, and the approach agencies should use when informing decision makers and the public of their findings, we recommend that the Director of OMB consider taking the following two actions: clarify the relationship between OMB Circular A-4 and the Technical Support Document by increasing the visibility of relevant language in the Technical Support Document; and continue monitoring the economic literature and working with agencies to identify approaches for presenting social cost of carbon estimates with other analytical results that have been discounted at different rates to help agencies more transparently communicate about the circumstances unique to assessing the long-term effects of changes in carbon dioxide emissions. We discussed these changes and clarifications with OMB staff, who said they neither agreed nor disagreed with the revised recommendations but saw some merit in them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used economic analyses in its decision making during the rulemaking process and the extent to which EPA adhered to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance in conducting selected elements of the economic analyses the agency used to support recent rulemakings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal regulations, especially those addressing health, safety, and the environment, can generate hundreds of billions of dollars in benefits and costs to society annually. Various statutes, executive orders, and OMB guidance direct federal agencies to analyze the benefits and costs of proposed regulations. These analyses—known as RIAs—can also provide affected entities, agencies, Congress, and the public with important information about the potential effects of new regulations.
According to OMB, EPA regulations account for the majority of the estimated benefits and costs of major federal regulations. GAO was asked to review EPA's RIAs for recent regulations. This report examines how EPA has used RIAs during the rulemaking process and the extent to which EPA adhered to OMB guidance on selected elements of RIAs for recent rules. GAO reviewed RIAs from a nonprobability sample of seven recent air, water, and other environmental regulations, assessed them against relevant OMB guidance, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used the seven Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA) GAO reviewed to inform decision making, and its adherence to relevant Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance varied. According to senior EPA officials, the agency used these RIAs to facilitate communication with management throughout the rulemaking process and communicate information that supported its regulatory decisions to Congress and the public. However, it generally did not use them as the primary basis for final regulatory decisions.
EPA generally adhered to many aspects of OMB's Circular A-4 guidance for analyzing the economic effects of regulations including, for example, considering regulatory alternatives and analyzing uncertainties underlying its RIAs. However, EPA did not always adhere to other aspects. Specifically, the information EPA included and presented in the RIAs was not always clear. According to OMB guidance, RIAs should communicate information supporting regulatory decisions and enable a third party to understand how the agency arrives at its conclusions. In addition, EPA's review process does not ensure that the information about selected elements that should appear in the analyses—such as descriptions of baselines and alternatives considered—is transparent or clear, within and across its RIAs. As a result, EPA cannot ensure that its RIAs adhere to OMB's guidance to provide the public with a clear understanding of its decision making.
In addition to using Circular A-4 (issued in 2003) to analyze the effects of regulations, EPA used more recent guidance developed by an interagency working group co-led by OMB and another White House office in 2010 for valuing carbon dioxide emissions. Applying this guidance while using Circular A-4 to estimate other benefits and costs yielded inconsistencies in some of EPA's estimates and has raised questions about whether its approach was consistent with Circular A-4. Circular A-4 does not reference the new guidance and the new guidance does not include an overall statement explaining its relationship to Circular A-4. Without increased clarity about the relationship, questions about the agencies' adherence to OMB guidance will likely persist.
In assessing EPA's adherence to OMB guidance, GAO identified two other areas in which EPA faced challenges that limited the usefulness of some of its estimates. First, EPA did not monetize certain benefits and costs related to the primary purposes or key impacts of the rules GAO reviewed, such as reducing hazardous air pollutants and water quality effects. EPA officials said resource and data limitations constrained the agency's ability to monetize these effects. OMB guidance acknowledges that monetizing effects is not always possible. However, without doing so, the public may face challenges understanding the trade-offs associated with regulatory alternatives. Second, EPA estimated effects of its regulations on employment, in part, using a study that, according to EPA officials, represented the best reasonably obtainable data when they conducted their analyses. However, the study was based on data that were more than 20 years old and may not have represented the regulated entities addressed in the RIAs. EPA officials said they are exploring new approaches for analyzing these effects but were uncertain about when such results would be available. Without improvements in its estimates, EPA's RIAs may be limited in their usefulness for helping decision makers and the public understand these important effects.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA improve adherence to OMB guidance and enhance the usefulness of its RIAs, and that OMB clarify the application of guidance for estimating the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA stated that it generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. On behalf of OMB, in oral comments OMB staff said that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations but saw some merit in them. |
gao_GAO-05-166 | gao_GAO-05-166_0 | 1.) As a result, the scheduled conclusion of the FTAA in January 2005 passed without an agreement. Before Miami, Negotiators Made Technical Progress, but Mounting U.S.-Brazil Differences Over Scope and Depth of Obligations Prevented Further Progress
From the November 2002 Quito ministerial to the November 2003 Miami ministerial, FTAA negotiators made technical progress. However, during this time—November 2002 to November 2003—mounting differences between the United States and Brazil and their respective allies over the scope and depth of obligations in the proposed agreement slowed substantive progress in the FTAA. As a result, the scheduled deadline for concluding the FTAA negotiations in January 2005 was missed without agreement. Two-tier Structure and Co- chairmanship Have Not Facilitated Compromise
A third factor hindering progress on the FTAA is that two mechanisms intended to facilitate U.S.-Brazil compromise—the new two-tier structure and the co-chairmanship—have thus far failed to do so. Though Pessimistic on Near-term Prospects, Many Believe Hemispheric Integration Worth Pursuing and Hope for Resumption of Talks in 2005
Although many participants and experts were pessimistic when we spoke with them in the fall of 2004, they generally believe that integrating the hemisphere is still worth pursuing and remain hopeful about prospects for reviving the FTAA in 2005. Second, officials from many of the nations we contacted continue to anticipate gains from concluding an FTAA. Agency Comments
We provided draft copies of this report to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture on January 4, 2005, and received formal comments from USTR and the Department of Commerce. USTR disagreed with our report, stating that it is an inaccurate and poorly framed portrayal of progress and problems in the negotiations, overemphasized the role of the United States and Brazil in the current impasse, and did not give sufficient weight to U.S. efforts to make progress in the talks. We disagree with USTR’s assessment. Our objectives were to assess the progress that was made since our April 2003 report, the factors that have affected progress, and future prospects for the FTAA. Scope and Methodology
To conduct our analysis of the progress made in FTAA negotiations since our last report (April 2003), the factors influencing the FTAA’s progress, and the FTAA’s future prospects, we reviewed public foreign government and official FTAA and executive branch documents. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 13. World Trade Organization: Early Decisions on Key Issues Vital to Progress in Ongoing Negotiations. Free Trade Area of the Americas: Negotiators Move Toward Agreement That Will Have Benefits, Costs to U.S. Economy. | Why GAO Did This Study
If completed, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement would encompass an area of 800 million people and about $13 trillion in production of goods and services, making it the most significant regional trade initiative presently being pursued by the United States. The 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere formally launched negotiations towards a FTAA in 1998, and set a January 2005 deadline for concluding a FTAA agreement. GAO was asked to analyze (1) progress made in FTAA negotiations since GAO's last (April 2003) report (2) factors that have been influencing the FTAA's progress; and (3) future prospects for the FTAA. USTR disagreed with our report, stating it was a poorly framed portrayal of progress and problems in the negotiations, overemphasized the role of the United States and Brazil in the current impasse, and did not give sufficient weight to U.S. efforts to make progress. GAO made several changes in response, but disagreed with USTR's assessment. The Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture provided technical comments, which we incorporated.
What GAO Found
Since our April 2003 report, FTAA negotiations reached an impasse that remains unbroken. Prior to the November 2003 FTAA Ministerial in Miami, negotiators made technical advances, but differences over the scope and depth of obligations in the FTAA slowed substantive progress. Despite adopting a new structure at Miami, negotiations have been suspended since early 2004, and the scheduled conclusion of the FTAA in January 2005 expired without agreement. This spurred recent efforts to re-start the talks. Three factors have been impeding progress in the FTAA negotiations: (1) the United States and Brazil have made little progress in resolving basic differences on key negotiation issues, (2) member governments have shifted energy and engagement from the FTAA to bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and (3) two mechanisms intended to facilitate progress--a new negotiating structure and the co-chairmanship by the U.S. and Brazil--have so far failed to do so. Although in the Fall of 2004 participants and experts were pessimistic about near-term prospects, many believe that integrating the hemisphere is still worth pursuing and hope that FTAA talks can be revived in 2005. Some believe that progress on agriculture at the World Trade Organization and the upcoming 2005 Summit of the Americas could spur movement on the FTAA. However, many still see finally concluding the FTAA as linked to further WTO progress and to renewal of U.S. Trade Promotion Authority, which facilitates U.S. Congressional approval in mid-2005. Nevertheless, officials from many of the nations and regional groups we contacted indicate continued commitment to establishing a mutually beneficial FTAA. |
gao_RCED-99-2 | gao_RCED-99-2_0 | In acting on the Forest Service appropriations for fiscal year 1995, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (1) consolidated line items in the agency’s budget for which specific amounts of funds are allocated, (2) expanded the agency’s authority to reprogram funds without requesting the Committees’ approval, and (3) restructured the agency’s budget so that all funding to carry out a project—including the funding for services provided by others—is consolidated in the program that will benefit most from the project. As agreed with their offices, this report discusses (1) the Forest Service’s implementation of the fiscal year 1995 reforms and (2) the progress that the agency has made toward becoming more accountable for its results. The Budget Reforms Have Resulted in Little Change in Managing the National Forests
The Forest Service’s management of the National Forest System has not appreciably changed as a result of the increased flexibility offered by the fiscal year 1995 budget reforms. However, the agency has seldom requested such approval either before or after the reforms. Thus, the reforms have not had a noticeable impact on the number of reprogrammings requested from the Appropriations Committees. This practice circumvents the requirements established by the Appropriations Committees and the agency to move funds between line items and understates a project’s costs. On the basis of information provided by the Forest Service, the agency submitted one or two requests a year for the Appropriations Committees’ approval to reprogram funds among line items for the National Forest System in fiscal years 1994 through 1997. In addition, the Forest Service has developed agencywide criteria to allocate appropriated funds to its regions and forests. However, (1) the Forest Service’s budget allocation criteria are often not linked to the agency’s strategic goals and objectives; (2) its performance measures do not, in many instances, adequately reflect its accomplishments or progress toward achieving its goals and objectives; and (3) the management cost and performance reporting system that the agency was, and is still, developing uses the performance measures as input. The broad discretion that the Forest Service has given its field and program managers has resulted in, among other things, (1) some forest and district offices continuing to distribute and track funds as if the reforms had not occurred, (2) some field managers redistributing work charged to other activities after the fact in order to achieve or maintain specific levels of funding within activities, and (3) programs without the funds needed to pay for a project’s support services requiring other programs that are providing the support to absorb the costs of the services rather than seeking to meet their needs by moving funds between line items or by requesting a reprogramming of funds by the Chief of the Forest Service or the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Although the Appropriations Committees gave the agency increased flexibility over its budget, the Forest Service has not provided the Committees with the improved accountability that they requested. As a result, the Forest Service, the Congress, and other interested parties do not have an adequate measure of the agency’s funding needs or its progress toward achieving its goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Forest Service's implementation of fiscal year (FY) 1995 budget reforms, focusing on the progress that the agency has made toward becoming more accountable for its results.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Forest Service's management of the National Forest System has not appreciably changed as a result of the increased flexibility offered by the FY 1995 budget reforms; (2) consolidating the line items was intended to provide field managers with greater discretion in deciding where to spend funds to better achieve the agency's goals and objectives; (3) however: (a) some field offices have continued to distribute and track funds as if the consolidation had not occurred; and (b) the budget is still structured primarily by individual resource-specific programs; (4) the reforms expanded the Forest Service's authority to move funds between line items without the appropriations committees' approval; (5) the agency has seldom requested such approval either before or after the reforms; (6) the agency submitted one or two requests a year for the Appropriations committees' approval to move funds among line items for the National Forest System in fiscal years 1994 through 1997; (7) the reforms have not had a noticeable impact on the number of times that the Forest Service has made such requests of the committees; (8) the reforms restructured the agency's budget so that all the funding for a project is consolidated in the program that will benefit most from the project; (9) however, a benefitting program may not have the funds needed to implement a project; (10) it may require other programs that are providing support services to absorb the costs of those services; (11) this practice circumvents the requirements established by the appropriations committees and the agency to move funds between line items and understates a project's costs; (12) the Forest Service has not provided Congress with the improved accountability that the appropriations committees requested when they gave the agency increased flexibility over its budget; (13) GAO found that: (a) the agencywide criteria developed by the Forest Service to allocate appropriated funds to its regions and forests are often not linked to its strategic goals and objectives; (b) the agency's performance measures do not adequately reflect its accomplishments or progress toward achieving the goals and objectives; and (c) the management cost and performance reporting system that the agency has been developing for over 10 years uses the inadequate performance measures as input; and (14) the Forest Service, Congress, and others do not have an adequate measure of the agency's funding needs or its progress toward achieving its goals and objectives. |
gao_GAO-13-668 | gao_GAO-13-668_0 | Federal Records Are to Be Stored in Three Types of Facilities; NARA Does Not Have Reliable Data about All Agencies’ Use of Records Storage Facilities
Federal agencies are to store records in three types of facilities: federal records centers that are managed by NARA, agency records centers, and commercial records storage facilities. NARA Federal Records Centers
As of May 2013, NARA manages 18 federal records centers located across the United States. Each facility includes storage areas, which NARA refers to as bays. As of May 2013, NARA had identified 18 records centers that were being operated by six federal agencies or offices: the Department of Energy, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Law Enforcement – Federal Marshal Records Center. Nevertheless, until NARA ensures that it has complete, current, and valid data on agencies’ records storage facilities, it cannot be certain that agencies are using one of the three types of authorized facilities. NARA Has Approved Almost All of Its Federal Records Centers as Compliant with Applicable Standards, but It Has Not Inspected and Validated the Majority of Agency and Commercial Records Facilities
In carrying out its responsibilities to store and archive federal records, Title 44 of the United States Code authorizes NARA to establish, maintain, and operate records centers for federal agencies; approve agency records centers; and promulgate standards, procedures, and guidelines to federal agencies with respect to the storage of their records in commercial records storage facilities. Part 1234, specify the minimum structural, environmental, property, and life-safety standards that a records storage facility must meet when the facility is used for the storage of federal records. NARA conducted inspections of 23 of its 24 federal records center facilities from February 2005 through January 2013 and determined that 20 of the facilities were compliant with 36 C.F.R. However, the plan does not include a schedule for completing these tasks consistent with standard practices for program management. While NARA has stated that it plans to bring all of its federal records center facilities into compliance with applicable regulations, the agency has not established a schedule for doing so at all facilities. NARA Has Not Inspected and Validated Compliance for the Majority of Agency and Commercial Records Storage Facilities
Agencies must obtain approval from NARA to store federal records at their own or a commercial records storage facility and, to do so, must provide documentation to show that the facility satisfies the requirements After a facility is approved, agencies are able to of 36 C.F.R. Documentation that we reviewed for 55 incidents that NARA reported as occurring from January 2009 through March 2013 indicated that the agency had taken steps consistent with its Emergency First Response for NARA Records checklist. As a result, NARA is not positioned to fully report on the effectiveness and outcome of its actions to minimize damage to records and does not have an institutional record that a third party can use to validate the results of its efforts. Storage fees charged by NARA in fiscal year 2013 were comparable to fees charged by commercial vendors on the GSA schedule in that same time frame. As shown in the table, NARA’s fee of $0.23 per cubic foot was consistent regardless of the storage quantity. Specifically, NARA’s fee was higher than fees charged by vendors 1 and 2, although its fees were lower than those of vendors 3 and 5. Conclusions
Although federal regulations call for records to be stored in one of three types of facilities—NARA-operated federal records centers, agency records centers, or commercial records storage facilities—the extent to which agency and commercial facilities are used to store records is uncertain because NARA does not know where all agencies store their records. As a result, NARA does not have a basis for determining progress toward correcting deficiencies in those facilities that do not fully meet the standards Additionally, although NARA has taken steps to prevent permanent damage to records in their facilities on a total of 55 occasions over a recent 4-year time period, the federal records centers did not always keep track of the results of their efforts and were unable to provide documentation confirming they were successful in 9 cases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the types of facilities agencies use to store federal records and the extent to which NARA’s data on agencies’ use of storage facilities are complete, (2) evaluate the extent to which NARA has determined these facilities to be compliant with standards in 36 C.F.R. Part 1234, (3) determine what actions NARA has taken to minimize damage to records in federal records centers and the extent to which it documents such efforts, and (4) determine how NARA determines storage fees and whether fees differ among facilities. Part 1234. | Why GAO Did This Study
NARA manages the Federal Records Centers Program, which is to ensure the storage and preservation of federal records, including paper, photographic, audio, video, and film. Records storage facilities are required to meet certain minimum structural, environmental, property, and life safety standards set forth in federal regulations.
GAO was requested to conduct a study of key aspects of the program. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the types of facilities agencies use to store federal records and the extent to which NARA's data on agencies' use of storage facilities are complete, (2) evaluate the extent to which NARA has determined these facilities to be compliant with standards in 36 C.F.R. Part 1234, (3) determine what actions NARA has taken to minimize damage to records in federal records centers and the extent to which it documents such efforts, and (4) determine how NARA determines storage fees and whether fees differ among facilities. To do so, GAO obtained, analyzed, and corroborated documentation on records storage facilities, identified and compared records storage fees, and interviewed NARA officials.
What GAO Found
Agencies are to store federal records in three types of facilities:
Federal records centers : The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) operates 18 federal records centers that are comprised of 24 facilities (buildings) located across the United States. Each facility includes storage areas, referred to as bays.
Agency records centers : Agencies also establish and operate records centers for storing their own records. As of May 2013, NARA had identified 18 agency records centers that were operated by 6 agencies or offices.
Commercial records storage facilities : Agencies also use private sector commercial facilities. As of May 2013, agencies reported that 12 vendors provided 22 facilities, which were used by 11 agencies.
These facilities notwithstanding, NARA does not know where all agencies are storing records. NARA has solicited data from agencies about their use of agency records centers and commercial records storage facilities, but not all agencies have submitted data. Further, the data agencies submitted--mostly from 2008 and 2009--are now outdated. As a result, NARA cannot be assured that all agencies are using one of the three types of authorized facilities.
NARA determined that 20 of its 24 federal records center facilities were fully compliant with 36 C.F.R. Part 1234 because all of their bays satisfied the regulation; of the remaining 4, 2 facilities with inadequate shelving were partially compliant, 1 facility with insufficient protections against pipe leaks was not compliant, and the remaining facility was to be replaced. As of July 2013, NARA had plans to bring these 4 facilities into full compliance, but did not have a schedule for completing the plans at 2 of the facilities. As a result, NARA does not have a basis for determining progress toward correcting deficiencies in those facilities that do not yet fully meet the standards. Also, while NARA had approved 10 agency records centers and 22 commercial records storage facilities, it has inspected 1 of 18 agency records centers and 13 commercial records storage facilities. Until NARA completes planned inspections of all remaining facilities, it cannot be reasonably assured that agencies are storing records in facilities that meet standards.
To facilitate the protection of federal records from permanent damage, NARA had generally taken steps consistent with a checklist it requires federal records centers to follow when incidents (e.g., roof or sprinkler leaks) occur. However, it did not always document the results of its efforts to minimize damage because the checklist does not include a step for doing so. Specifically, of the 55 incidents that occurred from January 2009 through March 2013, NARA provided documentation about the final outcome for 46 incidents. For the remaining 9 incidents, it could not provide documentation that included the final results of its efforts. Without a process that includes documenting the results of its efforts, NARA is not positioned to fully report on the effectiveness of its actions to minimize damage to federal records and to provide a third party with information to validate the results of its efforts.
Storage fees are determined by NARA's Federal Records Centers Program and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer using the existing fee schedule, expense projections, and workload projections. The storage fees charged by NARA in fiscal year 2013 were comparable to fees charged by commercial vendors in that same time frame. For example, NARA's fee of $0.23 per cubic foot was higher than fees charged by two vendors and lower than fees charged by two other vendors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NARA (1) obtain complete data on where agencies are storing records, (2) develop a schedule to bring noncompliant storage areas into compliance with 36 C.F.R. Part 1234, and (3) establish a requirement to document the results of efforts to minimize damage to federal records. NARA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1020 | gao_GAO-07-1020_0 | Labor and VA Have Implemented Some Elements of Their Agreement, but Data- Sharing Restrictions, Staffing Limitations, and Lack of a Comprehensive Plan Pose Challenges
Labor and VA have fulfilled some elements of their agreement to coordinate efforts, but the agencies face a variety of challenges to fully executing the agreement, including the lack of a comprehensive plan for implementing the agreement and measuring progress. The national offices of Labor and VA have implemented one of the elements of the agreement for which they are responsible, have begun to address four elements, and have not taken action on the others. Further, the agencies have provided states with limited guidance on implementation. VA Has Mostly Implemented Its Five- Track Employment Program for Disabled Veterans, but the Types and Severity of Recent Veterans’ Disabilities May Pose Challenges
Although VA has almost fully implemented the Five-Track employment program, the agency may face challenges serving the employment needs of recently returning veterans because of the types and severity of their disabilities. VA Has Implemented Most of Its Five-Track Employment Program for Disabled Veterans, but Some Components Are Still in Process
According to VA, officials have completed most of the seven components needed to implement the Five-Track program. VA launched the employment resource Web site, known as vetsuccess.gov, in 2005 to be a new supportive tool for veterans and VA staff. To address these challenges, VA told us that officials have developed programs to provide additional resources for recently returning veterans to receive employment services. While Employment Coordinators and Job Resource Labs in the Five States We Visited Provided Employment Assistance to Some Veterans, Similar Services Were Available Elsewhere
Employment coordinators and job resource labs in the five states we visited provided employment services to veterans, but some of these services were available elsewhere. Employment Coordinators Performed Direct Services, Job Development, and Outreach in Their Local Areas and Duplicated Some Other Available Resources
The employment coordinators in the five states we visited provided some direct assistance to veterans. Most of the employment coordinators we met with also performed some job development and outreach activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the complete and timely implementation of the agreement, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct VETS and VRE to take the following actions: develop a written plan for the full implementation of the agreement that includes long-term time frames, benchmarks by which to track implementation at the state level, and plans for taking action in instances when states are not fully implementing the agreement; provide additional direction to the states on implementing the agreement, including examples of promising practices from states, such as strategies for sharing information; provide technical assistance to states that are facing difficulties implementing the agreement; and collect and assess complete information on the progress of the states in implementing the agreement using well-designed and appropriate methodology, such as a systematic review of state-level memorandums of agreements or a comprehensive survey of all locations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our overall research objectives were to describe the status of the implementation of the October 2005 memorandum of agreement between the Department of Labor (Labor) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) aimed at coordinating efforts to advance the employment opportunities for veterans with service-connected disabilities, and to describe the status of the implementation of VA’s Five-Track employment program, with a particular emphasis on the role of employment coordinators and job resource labs. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with national Labor and VA officials and national representatives of veterans’ service organizations. We also toured the job resource labs. | Why GAO Did This Study
To better assist veterans with service-connected disabilities seeking employment, in 2005, the Departments of Labor (Labor) and Veterans Affairs (VA) signed an agreement to coordinate employment services for disabled veterans. Around the same time, VA rolled out a redesigned employment program for these veterans, known as the Five-Track program, which also established an employment coordinator position and job resource labs. To help Congress understand the status of these initiatives, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the progress in implementing the 2005 agreement and challenges to implementation, (2) the status of implementation of VA's Five-Track program and challenges posed by recently returning veterans, and (3) the role of employment coordinators and job resource labs in serving veterans. To obtain this information, GAO interviewed Labor and VA officials and national veterans' service organizations, and conducted site visits in five states.
What GAO Found
Labor and VA have implemented some elements of their agreement to coordinate efforts, but face challenges executing the agreement on the state level and lack a complete plan for implementing and assessing the progress of the agreement. Labor and VA have implemented one element of the agreement--establishing three joint work groups--but have only partially implemented or taken no action on the others. In addition, all five states we visited had implemented at least some elements of the agreement that need to be carried out on the state level, but faced challenges implementing others. Labor and VA have not developed an implementation plan that includes long-range time frames and benchmarks to measure progress. Further, Labor and VA have not fully assessed state actions to implement the agreement and may not have provided states with sufficient guidance. While VA has mostly implemented its Five-Track employment program for disabled veterans, the employment needs of newly returning veterans may pose challenges. VA officials have completed a pilot study, trained staff, distributed orientation materials, and deployed employment coordinators, but other components remain in process. Some officials expressed concerns that employment programs for disabled veterans--including the Five-Track program--may not be prepared to meet the needs of participants returning from recent conflicts, who VA predicts will be more likely than previous returning veterans to have certain disabilities, such as those associated with traumatic brain injuries. VA has begun efforts to address these needs. VA employment coordinators and job resource labs in the five states we visited provided employment assistance to a limited number of veterans and some of their functions were available elsewhere. Employment coordinators provided direct employment services for veterans and also performed job development and outreach activities. However, employment coordinators we met with provided limited services to veterans outside their local areas, and similar services were available elsewhere. Job resource labs provided some additional resources for veterans, but according to some staff, not many veterans are using the labs. Job resource labs also appeared to duplicate other available services. |
gao_GAO-11-760 | gao_GAO-11-760_0 | Although the augmented BCTs are specially resourced with advisor personnel to advise, assist, and mentor the Iraqi and Afghan security forces, the brigades still must balance the security force assistance advising mission with other brigade missions. Army Is Deploying Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan, but Some Challenges Exist
The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater commanders’ requests; however, these units have faced challenges because theater commanders’ guidance did not always clearly define how these units were to perform key aspects of the augmented BCT concept and theater commanders’ requests did not include some requirements needed to support the advising mission, given the brigades’ resource limitations. As a result, brigade commanders have faced challenges determining how to prioritize their resources when supporting multiple missions in addition to the advising mission and providing specialized personnel, equipment, transportation, and security for the advisors. For example, some advising teams told us that they were limited in their ability to advise in certain specialty areas and that advisor personnel may be advising Iraqi and Afghan leadership in functional areas where they have little or no experience. Augmented BCTs and Advisors Have Sometimes Lacked Unity of Command
Augmented BCTs and their advisor personnel sometimes lacked the unity of command envisioned under the Army’s augmented BCT concept because theater commanders did not always provide clear guidance on command and control structures for the advisors. As a result, in some cases, advisors were reassigned to be under the control of a division or a brigade other than the one that they trained and deployed with. According to Army officials, as a result of field grade officer shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade advisors to the augmented BCTs at least 45 days prior to the brigades’ mission rehearsal exercise. Specifically, the shift to augmented BCTs has: Decreased the total number of advisors required for the advising mission because, rather than relying completely on transition teams comprised of individually sourced personnel to man the advisor teams, the augmented BCT concept envisions advisor teams led by advisor augments (who are individually sourced) and further manned by pulling additional personnel from the brigade, as needed; Alleviated the strain on the Army’s pool of company grade officers (e.g., Captains) and non-commissioned officers (e.g., Sergeants 1st class) because these ranks were required in greater numbers on the transition teams than the augmented BCTs; and Increased requirements for field grade officer advisors, since the ranks of the advisors required for augmented BCTs are generally higher than the ranks of transition team personnel—particularly in Iraq, where all advisors are field grade officers. Some officials suggested that, given the challenge of providing all the advisors to the augmented BCTs within specified time frames, it would be helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived significantly earlier than currently required to help integrate the advisors into the BCT’s mission and structure. Conclusions
Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command, direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan assess their needs for how advisor teams should be structured and supported and, based on this assessment, ensure that any future requests for augmented BCTs clearly define related requirements, including the number of advisors, ranks of advisors, capabilities of advisors, and equipment for advisors. To determine the extent to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and what challenges, if any, these units have faced in implementing the concept, we reviewed Army unit deployment schedules, after action reviews and lessons learned from redeployed augmented BCTs, and mission briefings from deployed augmented BCTs and division commanders, dating back to 2009. To determine the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army’s ability to provide advisor personnel to BCTs in required time frames, we examined data provided to us by HRC regarding Army shortfalls faced in certain officer ranks currently and in coming years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in 2009, the Army began augmenting brigade combat teams (BCT) with advisor personnel to advise the host nation security forces in these countries. House Armed Services Committee report 111-491 directed GAO to report on the Army's plans to augment BCTs to perform advising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report (1) identifies the key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept; (2) assesses the extent to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs, and what challenges, if any, these units have faced; and (3) assesses the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army's ability to provide advisor personnel. GAO examined augmented BCT doctrine and guidance, analyzed advisor requirements, reviewed after- action reviews and lessons learned from augmented BCTs, and interviewed Army, theater command, and augmented BCT officials.
What GAO Found
Army guidance identifies key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept, such as how advisors are to be organized, commanded, and supported. For example, BCT commanders are to organize the advisors into teams, with other necessary resources being provided to the teams by the brigade. The theater commander determines the specific numbers and types of advisors based upon the operational environment and mission requirements. BCTs are envisioned to exercise command of advisor teams and provide support such as specialized personnel, equipment, and transportation and security. However, it is recognized that BCTs may have other priorities and must balance the demand for resources between the advising mission and other missions. The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater commanders' requests, but units have faced some challenges because commanders did not always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other missions or define specific requirements for how the BCTs should support the advising mission. For example, theater commanders did not require that advisor teams include specialized personnel, such as logisticians or intelligence officers. Because the BCTs already have high demand for these personnel, the brigades are challenged to meet the advisors' requirements for those same personnel. As a result, some advising teams told GAO that they were limited in their ability to advise in some specialty areas or that they may be advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces in functional areas where the advisors have little or no experience. Also, theater commanders' requests did not always specify command relationships. As a result, in some cases, advisors were reassigned to the control of a division or a brigade that they had not trained and deployed with, which disrupted the unity of command envisioned under the augmented BCT concept. The use of augmented BCTs has decreased the total number of advisor personnel required for the advising mission, but increased requirements for field grade officers, already in short supply. According to Army officials, as a result of these shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade advisors at least 45 days prior to the brigades' mission rehearsal exercise. In many cases, advisors did not join the brigades until after the exercise, hindering their integration into the BCTs and complicating efforts to establish support and command structures. Some officials suggested that it would be helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived significantly earlier than currently required in order to facilitate integration. Moreover, GAO found that augmented BCTs are organizing their advisors into smaller numbers of larger teams than envisioned in the theater commander requirements. As a result, augmented BCTs may not need the number and rank of advisors currently required by those requests.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that theater commands assess and refine, as appropriate, advisor requirements and define advisor support and command structures. GAO also recommends that the Army provide certain advisor personnel to brigades earlier in pre-deployment training. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-390 | gao_GAO-04-390_0 | Process for Payment of SF Property Expenses Relied Extensively on Contractor
HUD delegated oversight functions in a manner that weakened its control environment and resulted in established controls not being followed. We also found that HUD made payments in its single-family program to a contractor for 1 year after we testified that the same contractor was engaging in abusive billing practices in HUD’s multifamily program. Lack of Controls Contributed To Questionable and Potentially Fraudulent Payments
The lack of fundamental internal controls over the process used to pay SF property expenses likely contributed to $16.3 million of questionable and $181,450 of potentially fraudulent payments that we identified through the use of forensic auditing techniques, including data mining and document analysis. These potentially fraudulent billings were all made by a contractor we identified in our previous work on certain fiscal year 2001 MF property payments as carrying out highly questionable billing practices. At each of the nine properties we visited, we noted discrepancies between what was represented on select invoices and what was actually received, and determined that all of the $136,264 payments tested were potentially fraudulent payments. For example, HUD paid $2,060 for “emergency repairs” to a bathroom and $1,082 for repairs to a stairway. As evidenced by the photograph (fig. HUD paid this contractor $2 million in fiscal year 2002 and over $2.5 million in fiscal year 2003 for SF property expenses. Insufficient Monitoring of a Major Multifamily Program
We found HUD’s monitoring of a major multifamily pilot program with a state housing agency to be insufficient. Implement risk-based oversight and monitoring policies and procedures to reduce HUD’s vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in the multifamily program with the state housing agency. In particular HUD (1) disagreed with our classification of certain payments, including $15.2 million of inadequately supported payments for contract change orders, as questionable payments; (2) agreed that the contractor for the New York properties failed to provide certain services or provided unacceptable services, but stated it had held back certain payments to the contractor that included amounts we reported as potentially fraudulent; and (3) regarding our recommendations related to the MF pilot program, acknowledged that its agreement with the state agency did not contain the necessary controls and oversight protocols to preclude the types of problems we identified and agreed to examine opportunities to enhance its oversight over the remaining life of this particular program; however, it did not agree to enlist the HUD IG’s support to review the propriety of the use of the funds at this time. Scope and Methodology
Single-Family Property Program
To assess internal controls over HUD SF property payment transactions and determine whether they provide reasonable assurance that improper payments will not be made or will be detected in the normal course of business, we reviewed HUD SF policies and procedures, property management and marketing contracts and amendments, our previous reports, and reports issued by HUD’s IG, a financial management consultant, and an independent contractor. To determine whether payments are properly supported as a valid use of government funds, we performed data mining on the database of HUD’s fiscal year 2002 disbursements for HUD SF properties to identify potentially improper and questionable payments. 5. Therefore we continue to view these payments as questionable. | Why GAO Did This Study
In our 2003 performance and accountability report on the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), we continued to identify HUD's single-family (SF) mortgage insurance program as highrisk --an area we have found to be at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Also, for years, GAO and HUD's Office of Inspector General (OIG) have reported weaknesses in HUD's contract administration and monitoring for both SF and multifamily (MF) programs. Given these known risks and the millions of dollars in disbursements made by the agency each year, GAO was asked to review payments related to the single-family property program and determine whether (1) internal controls provide reasonable assurance that improper payments will not be made or will be detected in the normal course of business and (2) payments are properly supported as a valid use of government funds. We also assessed HUD's monitoring of a major multifamily project with a state housing agency.
What GAO Found
Significant internal control weaknesses in the process used to pay for SF property expenses made HUD vulnerable to and in some cases resulted in questionable payments and potential fraud. These weaknesses included (1) delegation of oversight functions in a manner that weakened the control environment, (2) lack of key control activities, including proper documentation and approvals and (3) limited monitoring of contractor performance. These weaknesses likely contributed to the $16.5 million in questionable and potentially fraudulent payments that we identified using data mining, document analysis and other forensic auditing techniques. GAO classified $16.3 million of payments as questionable because they were not supported by sufficient documentation to determine their validity. GAO also classified $181,450 of payments as potentially fraudulent after visiting single-family properties being managed by a certain contractor. At all the properties visited, GAO noted discrepancies between what was represented on paid invoices and what was actually received. The photographs below were taken at one of the occupied properties after HUD paid $2,060 for bathroom repairs. These potentially fraudulent payments for single-family properties were made to the same contractor that was engaging in potentially fraudulent billing practices related to our earlier work on the HUD MF property program. HUD paid this contractor $2 million in fiscal year 2002 and $2.5 million in fiscal year 2003 for SF property expenses. GAO also identified insufficient HUD monitoring of a major MF program with a state housing agency. While HUD provided all the funding for the program, it provided little oversight and instead relied on the state housing agency to perform oversight functions. Ten years into the program, actual cost totaled over $500 million dollars, almost triple the original development budget. |
gao_GAO-02-432 | gao_GAO-02-432_0 | As individual communities, the varied levels of service reflect differences in other factors such as the level of local economic activity and proximity to nearby airports. Most Small Communities Had Few Flights and Few Air Carriers, Though Service Levels Varied Considerably
In October 2000, the typical small community among the 202 we analyzed had the following levels of service: Service from two different airlines or their regional affiliates, each providing service to a different hub where passengers could make connections to other flights in the airline’s hub-and-spoke system. Airline Service at Small Communities Declined Between October 2000 and October 2001
Between October 2000 and October 2001 (revised), the number of total daily departures in small communities dropped by 19 percent. In all, the number of communities served by only one airline increased from 83 (41 percent) to 95 (47 percent) of the 202 communities in our review. National Economic Decline and September 11 Attacks, Along with Airlines’ Strategic Decisions, Underlie Shifts in Air Service
Two primary external events that occurred since October 2000—the economic decline that began in early 2001 and the collapse of airline passenger traffic after September 11—significantly affected carriers’ financial conditions and thus influenced decisions about service throughout their networks, including service to small communities. These reductions were dramatic. (The major U.S. airlines do not operate hubs in either state.) R-squared is a measure of the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variables in that particular model. | What GAO Found
Most major U.S. airlines began realizing net operating losses early in the 2001, and all of the major U.S. passenger carriers except Southwest Airlines reported losses for the year. Travelers throughout the nation shared in the difficulties. In October 2000, the typical or median small community that GAO analyzed had service from two airlines, with a total of nine daily departing flights. Forty-one percent of the communities were served by only one airline with size being the most obvious factor for service limitations. However, the level of service also varied by the level of local economic activity. The total number of daily departures from these small communities declined by 19 percent between October 2000 and October 2001. Although carriers had reduced total departure levels at small communities before September 11th, airlines made even more reductions after that date. Because profitability is so critical to airline decisions about what markets to serve and how to serve them, the changes in service levels in small communities can be traced to economic factors. Two such factors--the economic decline that began in early 2001 and the collapse of airline passenger traffic after September 11--are widely acknowledged as the main contributors to declining profitability in the industry. |
gao_GAO-09-577 | gao_GAO-09-577_0 | DOD Has Implemented 6 of 14 GAO Recommendations
Our January 2006 and September 2006 reports contained 14 recommendations for improving DOD’s management oversight and implementation of DTS and related travel policies. The 6 closed recommendations pertain to unused airline tickets, use of restricted airfare, proper testing of system interfaces, and streamlining of certain travel processes, such as approving travel vouchers. Requirements management processes. For example, we found that not all GSA city-pair flights were included in the display of flights provided to the traveler. The department has yet to establish a process to identify the universe of DTS-eligible transactions, which is needed to effectively measure DTS usage. DOD Has Implemented the 22 Recommendations Made in the 1995 Travel Reengineering Report
The 1995 DOD Travel Reengineering Report included 22 recommendations for reengineering DOD’s TDY travel rules and processes and automating these processes by implementing an integrated DOD travel system. In addition, DTMO is modifying CTO contract language, as CTO contracts become subject to renegotiation and renewal, to standardize the level of services CTOs provide DOD travelers. DOD Entities Use DTS and Legacy Systems to Process Travel Vouchers
According to DOD officials, except for locations where DTS has not yet been deployed, such as the Army Corps of Engineers and some locations within the military services, DTS is used by the military services and all 44 defense agencies and joint commands to process TDY travel vouchers. The department uses two legacy systems to process (1) TDY travel vouchers at locations where DTS is not yet deployed and (2) civilian and military permanent duty travel vouchers since DTS currently lacks the functionality to process these vouchers (see table 1). According to DOD officials, the department should complete its efforts to add military permanent duty travel functionality to DTS in fiscal year 2010. A decision on whether civilian permanent duty travel will be added to DTS has not yet been made. In response to our request for operating costs associated with these systems, DOD officials provided us with fiscal year 2008 expenditure data for one system and budget data for the other system. According to DOD officials, these legacy systems will not be eliminated because they provide the capability to process civilian permanent duty travel vouchers. It is about 15 times less expensive to process a travel voucher electronically versus manually. DOD officials acknowledged that the department continues to lack the data needed to ascertain the complete universe of travel vouchers that should be processed through DTS. Regarding the remaining six open recommendations relating to premium- class travel, DTS utilization, simplification of flight displays, and developing an approach that will permit the use of automated methods to reduce the need for hard-copy receipts to substantiate travel expenses, DOD stated that it believed it had taken sufficient action to address these recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to address our 14 recommendations and those made in the 1995 Task Force Report to streamline the department’s travel rules and processes, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation, such as travel policies and procedures, documents related to the Defense Travel System (DTS) requirements management and system testing, and monthly premium-class travel reports to assess the actions taken, under way, or planned by the department to address these recommendations. To determine if DOD has identified its legacy systems, their operating costs, and which legacy travel systems will be eliminated as well as the time frame for elimination, we reviewed and compared information provided by DTMO and the military services’ regarding the legacy systems used to manage their travel operations, associated costs, and the rationale for continued use of these systems. 2. DOD action taken to address the recommendation 4. 2. 3. 2. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system--the Defense Travel System (DTS). GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving DOD management, oversight, and implementation of DTS. GAO was asked to (1) assess the actions DOD has taken to implement GAO's prior recommendations; (2) determine the actions DOD has taken to standardize and streamline its travel rules and processes; (3) determine if DOD has identified its legacy travel systems, their operating costs, and which of these systems will be eliminated; and (4) report on DOD's costs to process travel vouchers manually and electronically. To address these objectives, GAO (1) obtained and analyzed relevant travel policies and procedures, and documents related to the operation of DTS and (2) interviewed appropriate DOD and contractor personnel.
What GAO Found
While the department has made progress in improving the efficiency of its travel operations by implementing DTS and revising its processes and policies, unresolved operational issues continue to exist. DOD has taken sufficient action to satisfactorily address 6 of the 14 recommendations GAO made in 2006 pertaining to unused airline tickets, restricted airfares, testing of system interfaces, and streamlining of certain travel processes. More effort is needed to address the remaining 8 related to requirements management and system testing, utilization, premium-class travel, and developing an automated approach to reduce the need for hard-copy receipts to substantiate travel expenses. For example, in the area of requirements management and testing, GAO's analysis found that the display of flight information by DTS is complicated and confusing. This problem continues because DOD has yet to establish DTS flight display requirements that minimize the number of screens DOD travelers must view in selecting a flight. The 1995 DOD Travel Reengineering Report made 22 recommendations to streamline DOD's travel rules and processes. GAO found that DOD had satisfactorily addressed all 22 recommendations. For example, DOD has mandated the use of commercial travel offices (CTO), established a single entity within DOD--the Defense Travel Management Office--to contract with CTOs for travel services, and has begun modifying CTO contracts as they become subject to renewal to standardize the level of services provided. According to DOD officials, except for locations where DTS has not yet been deployed, DTS is used by the military services and all 44 defense agencies and joint commands to process temporary duty (TDY) travel vouchers. The department uses two legacy systems to process (1) TDY travel vouchers at locations where DTS is not yet deployed and (2) civilian and military permanent duty travel vouchers since DTS currently lacks the functionality to process these vouchers. DOD provided us with fiscal year 2008 expenditure data for one system and budget data for the other system. The expenditure/budget data provided by DOD were comparable to the amounts budgeted for these systems for fiscal year 2008. According to DOD officials, these legacy systems will not be eliminated because they provide the capability to process military and civilian permanent duty travel vouchers. Although DTS is expected to provide the capability to process military permanent duty travel vouchers in fiscal year 2010, DOD has not yet decided if civilian permanent duty travel voucher processing will be added to DTS. DOD cost data indicate that it is about 15 times more expensive to process a travel voucher manually--$36.52 manually versus $2.47 electronically. DOD officials acknowledged that the department continues to lack the data needed to ascertain the complete universe of travel vouchers that should be processed through DTS. |
gao_GAO-07-777T | gao_GAO-07-777T_0 | The act requires the Commission to undertake certain activities, including (1) developing a national strategy to promote financial literacy and education for all Americans; (2) establishing a financial education Web site to provide information about federal financial literacy education programs and grants; (3) establishing a toll-free hotline; (4) identifying areas of overlap and duplication among federal activities and coordinating federal efforts to implement the national strategy; (5) assessing the availability, utilization, and impact of federal financial literacy and education materials; and (6) promoting partnerships among federal, state, and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private enterprises. As such, the strategy represents a useful first step in laying out key issues and highlighting the need for improved financial literacy. We have previously identified a set of desirable characteristics for any effective national strategy. The six characteristics we considered follow: Clear Purpose, Scope, and Methodology. For example, it does not identify the sectors or populations most in need of additional resources. However, the strategy is limited in identifying linkages with these initiatives, and it does not address how it might integrate with the overarching plans and strategies of these state, local, and private-sector entities. Our report recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury, in concert with other agency representatives of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, incorporate into the national strategy (1) a concrete definition for financial literacy and education to help define the scope of the Commission’s work; (2) clear and specific goals and performance measures that would serve as indicators of the nation’s progress in improving financial literacy and benchmarks for the Commission; (3) actions needed to accomplish these goals, so that the strategy serves as a true implementation plan; (4) a description of the resources required to help policymakers allocate resources and direct implementation of the strategy; and (5) a discussion of appropriate roles and responsibilities for federal agencies and others, to help promote a coordinated and efficient effort. Web Site and Telephone Hotline Offer Financial Education Information from Federal Agencies
The Financial Literacy Act required the Commission to establish and maintain a Web site to serve as a clearinghouse and provide a coordinated point of entry for information about federal financial literacy and education programs, grants, and materials. With minor exceptions, the Commission did not create original content for its Web site, which it called My Money. From October 2006 through March 2007, the site averaged about 69,000 visits per month. Without usability testing or measures of customer satisfaction, the Commission does not know whether the Web site’s content is organized in a manner that makes sense to the public, or whether the site’s visitors can readily find the information for which they are looking. The hotline serves as an order line for obtaining a free financial literacy “tool kit”—pamphlets and booklets from various federal agencies on topics such as saving and investing, deposit insurance, and Social Security. The Commission Has Taken Steps to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Efforts and Promote Partnerships but Faces Challenges
The Financial Literacy Act required that the Commission develop a plan to improve coordination of federal financial literacy and education activities and identify areas of overlap and duplication in these activities. However, the Commission has faced several challenges in coordinating the efforts of the 20 federal agencies that form the Commission. These have included calls to action in the Commission’s national strategy that encouraged partnerships; community outreach and events coordinated by Treasury and other agencies; and public meetings designed to gather input on the national strategy from various stakeholders. Given the wide array of state, local, nonprofit, and private organizations providing financial literacy programs, the involvement of the nonfederal sectors is important in supporting and expanding Commission efforts to increase financial literacy. As the Commission continues to implement its strategy, we believe it could benefit from further developing mutually beneficial and lasting partnerships with nonprofit and private entities that will be sustainable over the long term. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Financial Literacy and Education Improvement Act created, in December 2003, the Financial Literacy and Education Commission. This statement is based on a report issued in December 2006, which responded to the act's mandate that GAO assess the Commission's progress in (1) developing a national strategy; (2) developing a Web site and hotline; and (3) coordinating federal efforts and promoting partnerships among the federal, state, local, nonprofit, and private sectors. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Commission documents, interviewed its member agencies and private financial literacy organizations, and benchmarked the national strategy against GAO's criteria for such strategies.
What GAO Found
The National Strategy for Financial Literacy serves as a useful first step in focusing attention on financial literacy, but it is largely descriptive rather than strategic and lacks certain key characteristics that are desirable in a national strategy. The strategy provides a clear purpose, scope, and methodology and comprehensively identifies issues and challenges. However, it does not serve as a plan of action designed to achieve specific goals, and its recommendations are presented as "calls to action" that generally describe existing initiatives and do not include plans for implementation. The strategy also does not fully address some of the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO has previously identified. For example, it does not set clear and specific goals and performance measures or milestones, address the resources needed to accomplish these goals, or fully discuss appropriate roles and responsibilities. As a result of these factors, most organizations that GAO spoke with said the strategy was unlikely to have a significant impact on their financial literacy efforts. The Commission has developed a Web site and telephone hotline that offer financial education information provided by numerous federal agencies. The Web site generally serves as an effective portal to existing federal financial literacy sites. Use of the site has grown, and it averaged about 69,000 visits per month from October 2006 through March 2007. The volume of calls to the hotline--which serves as an order line for a free tool kit of federal publications--has been limited. The Commission has not tested the Web site for usability or measured customer satisfaction with it; these are recommended best practices for federal public Web sites. As a result, the Commission does not know if visitors are able to find the information they are looking for efficiently and effectively. The Commission has taken steps to coordinate the financial literacy efforts of federal agencies and has served as a useful focal point for federal activities. However, coordinating federal efforts has been challenging, in part because the Commission must achieve consensus among 20 federal agencies, each with its own viewpoints, programs, and constituencies, and because of the Commission's limited resources. A survey of overlap and duplication and a review of the effectiveness of federal activities relied largely on agencies' self-assessments rather than the independent review of a disinterested party. The Commission has taken steps to promote partnerships with the nonprofit and private sectors through various public meetings, outreach events, and other activities. The involvement of state, local, nonprofit, and private organizations is important in supporting and expanding Commission efforts to increase financial literacy, and our report found that the Commission could benefit from further developing mutually beneficial and lasting partnerships with these entities that will be sustainable over the long term. |
gao_GAO-13-27 | gao_GAO-13-27_0 | FECA Eligibility
The FECA program provides health benefits—reimbursement for medical expenses related to illnesses or injuries that DOL determines are service connected—as well as other benefits, such as wage-loss (death and disability) compensation. From 2009 through 2011, DOL Provided about $36 Million in Health Care and Other Benefits for Volunteers
From 2009 through 2011, DOL provided a total of about $36 million in FECA benefits for volunteers, providing about $22 million in health care benefits—reimbursements for medical expenses to treat service- connected injuries and illnesses for Peace Corps volunteers—and $13.8 million in other benefits. During this period, almost 1,400 volunteers each year received health care benefits. The most-common medical conditions for which DOL provided health care benefits—reimbursements for medical services— were mental, emotional, and nervous conditions; dental; other/nonclassified diseases; and infectious or parasitic diseases.These four medical conditions represented about 40 percent of all medical conditions and accounted for about $5.9 million—or more than a quarter—of all medical reimbursements for volunteers under FECA between 2009 and 2011. According to Peace Corps officials, these health care and other expenses represent a growing portion of its annual budget. The Peace Corps Uses Information on Volunteers’ Awareness of FECA, but Neither DOL Nor the Peace Corps Use Other Available Information to Monitor Access and Quality
The Peace Corps uses information it has to monitor volunteers’ awareness of the FECA program; however, in general, neither DOL nor the Peace Corps use information in the remaining three areas in our review to monitor the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. These areas are (1) information on volunteers’ knowledge of FECA program and application requirements, such as medical documentation that is required to be submitted with an application; (2) information on DOL’s timeliness in reviewing FECA applications and reimbursing medical expenses, and on the level of customer satisfaction with the FECA program; and (3) information on the availability of FECA- Table 2 summarizes the extent to which registered medical providers.DOL and the Peace Corps use information available in the four key areas to monitor the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. While the Peace Corps uses information on volunteer awareness, neither DOL nor the Peace Corps use available information related to the remaining three areas of our review to monitor the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. However, by not using this available information to review volunteers’ level of knowledge of the FECA requirements, DOL and the Peace Corps may be unaware, for example, of the extent to which volunteers experience difficulties accessing FECA benefits because of limited understanding of certain application requirements, such as in (a) providing appropriate and sufficient medical evidence and (b) establishing a service connection for the illness or injury for which the volunteer is seeking FECA benefits. geographic areas and for certain medical specialties.information DOL has on the geographic location and medical specialty of FECA-registered providers, DOL and the Peace Corps cannot determine the extent to which there are limitations in the availability of FECA- registered providers in certain geographic areas and for certain medical specialties. From DOL’s perspective, volunteers do not represent a large proportion of the overall FECA population. However, FECA is a relatively larger issue from the Peace Corps’ perspective. The volunteers are a unique population compared to others who receive benefits under FECA—for example, they are more likely to have mental, emotional, or nervous conditions that are service-connected—and, according to Peace Corps officials, the amount the Peace Corps pays DOL for FECA reimbursements represents an increasing portion of the Peace Corps’ annual budget. Because both of the agencies have certain responsibilities related to the provision of FECA benefits for eligible volunteers who return from service abroad, it is especially important that the Peace Corps and DOL jointly monitor the accessibility and quality of the FECA program to ensure that the FECA program is achieving its intended objectives— including ensuring that eligible volunteers receive needed FECA health care benefits. While information is available to DOL and the Peace Corps that could be used for monitoring, the agencies are generally not working together to use the available information to monitor the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. Unless the two agencies work together on monitoring, they will miss the opportunity to make use of the available information to help ensure the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Peace Corps jointly develop and implement an approach for working together to use available information to monitor the access to and quality of FECA benefits provided to returned volunteers. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Peace Corps for review. Neither DOL nor the Peace Corps indicated whether or not they agreed with our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Peace Corps volunteers who suffer a service-connected illness or injury are eligible to receive certain health care and other benefits under FECA--a workers' compensation program administered by DOL. FECA provides health care benefits--reimbursements for medical expenses--to federal employees and volunteers for illnesses or injuries that DOL determines are service-connected.
GAO was mandated to report on the access and quality of health care benefits for Peace Corps volunteers. This report (1) identifies the health care and other benefits provided to volunteers from 2009 through 2011 under the FECA program, and (2) examines the extent to which DOL and the Peace Corps use available agency information to monitor the accessibility and quality of FECA health care benefits provided to volunteers. GAO reviewed agency documents, interviewed agency officials, and analyzed DOL data. GAO developed a framework with four areas to define access and quality and examined available information in these areas that could be used for monitoring.
What GAO Found
From 2009 through 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) provided a total of about $36 million in Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) benefits--health and other benefits--for Peace Corps volunteers who have returned from service abroad (volunteers). Specifically, DOL provided about $22 million in health care benefits for these volunteers in the form of reimbursements for medical expenses related to service-connected injuries and illnesses, and $13.8 million in other benefits, such as reimbursement for travel expenses incurred when seeking medical care. During this period, approximately 1,400 volunteers each year received these health care benefits under the FECA program. The most common types of medical conditions for which DOL provided reimbursements were mental, emotional, and nervous conditions; dental; other/nonclassified diseases; and infectious or parasitic diseases. These four medical conditions accounted for more than a quarter of all medical reimbursements for volunteers under FECA from 2009 through 2011.
In general, neither DOL nor the Peace Corps use all available information in the four areas GAO reviewed to monitor access and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. GAO found that the Peace Corps uses information in just one of the areas--volunteers' awareness of the FECA program; however, in general, neither agency uses information in the remaining three areas. These areas are (1) information on volunteers' knowledge of FECA program and application requirements, such as required medical documentation; (2) information on DOL's timeliness in reviewing FECA applications and reimbursing medical expenses, and on the level of customer satisfaction; and (3) availability of FECA-registered medical providers. By not using information available to the agencies, DOL and the Peace Corps are missing an opportunity to determine whether, or to what extent, volunteers face access and quality issues in the FECA program. For example, DOL and the Peace Corps may not be able to determine the extent to which there are limitations in the availability of FECA-registered providers for certain medical specialties.
DOL and the Peace Corps each have certain responsibilities related to the provision of FECA benefits for eligible volunteers, and each has information that could be used for monitoring. From DOL's perspective, volunteers do not represent a large proportion of the overall FECA population. However, FECA is a relatively larger issue from the Peace Corps' perspective. The volunteers are a unique population compared to others who receive benefits under FECA, and the FECA costs associated with volunteers represent a growing portion of the Peace Corps' annual budget. Neither agency has all the information GAO reviewed, and the agencies generally do not work together to use available information to monitor the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. As a result, DOL and the Peace Corps are missing an opportunity to make use of the available information to help ensure the accessibility and quality of FECA benefits for volunteers. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Peace Corps jointly develop and implement an approach for working together to use available agency information to monitor the access to and quality of FECA benefits provided to volunteers. Neither DOL nor the Peace Corps indicated whether or not they agreed with GAO's recommendation. Instead, the agencies provided additional context related to the provision of FECA benefits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Peace Corps jointly develop and implement an approach for working together to use available agency information to monitor the access to and quality of FECA benefits provided to volunteers.
Neither DOL nor the Peace Corps indicated whether or not they agreed with GAOs recommendation. Instead, the agencies provided additional context related to the provision of FECA benefits. |
gao_RCED-97-102 | gao_RCED-97-102_0 | Several Developments Pose Challenges to Inspection Program
APHIS’ inspection workload has increased dramatically since 1990 because of growth in imports and exports, increased travel, and increased smuggling. Responding to the growing importance of trade to the national economy and to recent trade agreements, APHIS has taken an active role in facilitating trade. APHIS Changed Its Inspection Program to Address the New Challenges
APHIS made a number of changes to its inspection program to respond to the demands of its growing workload. To improve its ability to select passengers for inspection, APHIS is refining the list of risk characteristics that inspectors use in selecting passenger bags for inspection. APHIS Implemented Program to Determine Pest and Disease Risks at Ports
In October 1996, APHIS began implementing the AQI Results Monitoring Program, which is intended to measure the effectiveness of its inspections nationwide and provide information on which ports of entry pose the highest risk of having harmful pests and diseases enter the country. Furthermore, APHIS has little assurance that it is deploying its limited inspection resources efficiently and effectively because of weaknesses in the staffing models it uses for making such decisions. However, APHIS officials have not yet determined how to incorporate this information into the models. In view of APHIS’ increasing workload, it is critical that the agency be able to allocate its limited inspection resources to the ports of entry with the highest risks of pest and disease introduction. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) in minimizing the risks to agriculture from pests and diseases entering the United States. Specifically, we (1) identified recent developments that challenge the Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) program’s resources and ability to carry out its mission, (2) reviewed APHIS’ efforts to cope with these developments, and (3) reviewed the effectiveness of the inspection program in keeping pace with workload changes. We discussed with APHIS officials (1) shifts in staffing and funding, (2) programs used to reduce the inspection workload at U.S. ports of entry, (3) program priorities, (4) the implementation and use of the results monitoring program and staffing models, and (5) inspection coordination with the other Federal Inspection Service (FIS) agencies. Inspection staffing levels rose about 44 percent from fiscal year 1990 through 1996. To detect pests and contraband, AQI staff use a range of strategies, such as screening, detector dogs, and x-rays. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service's (APHIS) efforts to minimize the risks to agriculture from pests and diseases entering the United States, focusing on: (1) recent developments that could challenge the ability of APHIS' Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection program to carry out its mission; (2) APHIS' efforts to cope with these developments; and (3) the effectiveness of the inspection program in keeping pace with workload changes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) several developments are challenging APHIS' ability to effectively manage its inspection program; (2) key among these is the rapid growth in international trade and travel since 1990, which has dramatically increased the amount of cargo and the number of passengers that inspectors are to examine; (3) in addition, policy changes that emphasize facilitating trade and customer service have put pressure on APHIS to carry out its increased inspection responsibilities more quickly in order to speed the flow of passengers and trade; (4) APHIS has taken several steps to cope with these developments; (5) it increased funding and staffing for inspections by about 78 percent and 44 percent, respectively, from fiscal year (FY) 1990 to 1996; (6) the agency has attempted to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its inspections by: (a) using other inspection techniques in addition to visual inspections, such as x-ray technology and detector dogs, to pinpoint prohibited agricultural products, such as untreated fruits, vegetables, and meats from countries that present a higher risk for pests and diseases; and (b) coordinating with other Federal Inspection Service agencies to maximize inspection activities; (7) APHIS began implementing its results monitoring program in FY 1997 to better understand which ports of entry and commodities pose the highest risks of entry for harmful pests and disease; (8) despite these changes, inspectors at the ports GAO visited are struggling to keep pace with increased workloads; (9) heavy workloads have led to inspection shortcuts, which raise questions about the efficiency and overall effectiveness of these inspections; (10) on a broader scale, APHIS' efforts to address its workload problems are hampered by inadequate information for determining how to best deploy its inspectors; (11) in particular, its current staffing models, mathematical formulas used to help determine inspection staffing needs, are not based on reliable information and do not incorporate risk assessment factors similar to those being developed in its results monitoring program; and (12) consequently, APHIS has little assurance that it is deploying its limited inspection resources at the nation's ports of entry that are most vulnerable to the introduction of pests and diseases. |
gao_GAO-02-548T | gao_GAO-02-548T_0 | To develop this essential national strategy, the federal role needs to be considered in relation to other levels of government, the goals and objectives for preparedness, and the most appropriate tools to assist and enable other levels of government and the private sector to achieve these goals. More than 40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to terrorism, and more than 20 federal entities in bioterrorism alone. Concerns about coordination and fragmentation in federal preparedness efforts are well founded. The first of these is a lack of a cohesive effort from within the federal government. Second, the lack of leadership has resulted in the federal government’s development of programs to assist state and local governments that were similar and potentially duplicative. As state and local officials have noted, the multiplicity of programs can lead to confusion at the state and local levels and can expend precious federal resources unnecessarily or make it difficult for them to identify available federal preparedness resources. The design of federal policy will play a vital role in determining success and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to achieve critical national goals. Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today - a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an establishment of goals and performance measures, and a selection of appropriate tools— is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from terrorist attacks. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency. | What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges in addressing these issues. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and program duplication. As state and local officials have noted, this situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships, can enhance the government's capacity to (1) target areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibility by all parties, and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals. |
gao_GAO-02-738 | gao_GAO-02-738_0 | Among other things, the Space Commission emphasized the importance of increasing the visibility and accountability of space funding. Specifically, the U.S. Space Command is developing a space control strategy that is to outline objectives for space control over the next 20 years. This does not change the current process that the military services use to fund their own space programs, but it does aggregate space funding so that the department will be able to compare space funding to DOD’s total budget and conduct future trend analyses. Lastly, DOD has made changes to its acquisition policy that will affect how space systems are acquired and managed. Substantial Challenges Still Face DOD in Strengthening Space Control
DOD’s efforts to strengthen its management and organization of space activities, including space control, are a good step forward, particularly because they seek to promote better coordination among the services involved in space, prioritization of space-related projects, visibility over funding, and interoperability. Completion of this strategy is a considerable challenge for DOD because it has not yet been aligned with other strategies still being revised and because agreement among the military services on specific roles, responsibilities, priorities, milestones, and end states may prove difficult to achieve. By separating technology development from product development (system integration and system demonstration) and encouraging an evolutionary approach, for example, the new policy would help to curb incentives to over promise the capabilities of a new system and to rely on immature technologies. Scope and Methodology
To identify DOD’s efforts to strengthen its ability to protect and defend its space assets and the challenges facing DOD in making those space control efforts successful, we reviewed the DOD Instruction for Space Control, U.S. Space Command’s draft Space Control Strategy, U.S. Space Command’s Long Range Plan, military service space master plans, DOD’s 1999 Space Policy, the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. | What GAO Found
The United States is increasingly dependent on space for its security and well being. The Department of Defense's (DOD) space systems collect information on capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. They enable military forces to be warned of a missile attack and to communicate and navigate while avoiding hostile action. DOD's efforts to strengthen space control are targeted at seeking to promote better coordination among DOD components, prioritization of projects, visibility and accountability over funding, and interoperability among systems. Among other things, DOD is drafting a space control strategy that is to outline objectives, tasks, and capabilities for the next 20 years. It has also aggregated funding for space programs so that it can compare space funding, including space control funding, to its total budget, make decisions about priorities, and conduct future-trend analyses. In addition, DOD has changed its acquisition policy to include separating technology development from product development and encouraging an evolutionary, or phased, approach to development. There are, however, substantial challenges to making DOD's space control efforts successful. One challenge is putting needed plans in place to provide direction and hold the services accountable for implementing departmentwide priorities for space control. Further, DOD's draft space control strategy has been completed and does not yet define roles and responsibilities among the services, departmentwide priorities and end states, and concrete milestones. Finally DOD's aggregation of space funding is not a plan that targets investments at priority areas for DOD overall. |
gao_HEHS-99-80 | gao_HEHS-99-80_0 | In this regulatory framework, states (1) license nursing homes to do business in the state, (2) certify to the federal government, by conducting reviews of nursing homes, that homes are eligible for Medicare and Medicaid payment, and (3) investigate complaints about care provided in the homes. In addition to the requirement that states establish a complaint investigation process, HCFA requires that states investigate the most serious complaints that allege situations immediately jeopardizing the health or safety of residents within 2 workdays, but leaves the timing, scope, duration, and conduct of other complaint investigations to the discretion of the state survey agency. Nevertheless, some states we reviewed have procedures or practices that may limit the number of complaints. Maryland did not identify a single complaint as potentially representing immediate jeopardy. Many of these complaints alleged potential resident abuse by staff; resident neglect, including malnutrition and dehydration; preventable accidents; medication errors; and understaffing. Furthermore, delayed investigations can prolong, for extended periods, situations in which residents are harmed. HCFA’s Complaint Investigation Standards Are Minimal, and Its Oversight of States’ Complaint Practices Is Weak
Although HCFA funds, on average, 71 percent of state agencies’ complaint investigation costs, HCFA has established minimal standards for investigating complaints and has conducted little monitoring of states’ complaint practices. Previous HCFA Efforts to Strengthen Federal Standards for Nursing Home Complaint Investigations Were Abandoned
Between 1993 and 1995, a HCFA task force worked to develop formal complaint guidance for states and a complaint investigation manual to help state investigators. This optional guidance has not been widely used. However, these federal monitoring surveys are largely intended to focus on annual surveys rather than on complaint investigations, and few federal monitoring surveys are conducted of complaint investigations. In our report on California nursing homes, we determined that the results of complaint inspections are often cited as state, not federal, deficiencies. The combination of inadequate state practices and limited HCFA guidance and oversight have too often resulted in extensive delays in investigating serious complaints alleging harmful situations, a lack of careful review of states’ policies and practices, and incomplete reporting on nursing homes’ compliance history and states’ complaint investigation performance. These include a new interim requirement that states should investigate complaints alleging actual harm to residents within 10 workdays, and a complaint improvement project with the intention of developing additional minimum standards for complaint investigations; increased federal oversight of complaints, including allowing HCFA regional offices to conduct additional monitoring surveys based upon complaints and new state agency performance measures relating to complaints; and improved reporting on complaint information, including a review of the form states use to report complaint information to HCFA, further direction to states requiring that complaint findings be included in the federal as well as state database in a timely manner, and a review of potential long-term improvements in the federal data system. (continued)
Summary of allegation(s)
No hot water for several weeks or months at a time, so resident was not bathed or cleaned properly. Poor care and service; quality of care in home has declined. Nothing to do in nursing home. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how states implement the federal requirement that establishes a process for nursing home complaint investigations, focusing on the: (1) effectiveness of state complaint investigation practices as a component of the system to ensure sustained compliance with federal nursing home quality-of-care standards; and (2) Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) role in establishing standards and conducting oversight of states' complaint investigation practices and in using information about the results of complaint investigations to ensure compliance with nursing home standards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal and states' practices for investigating complaints about care provided in nursing homes are often not as effective as they should be; (2) among many of the 14 states GAO examined, GAO found numerous problems, including: (a) procedures or practices that may limit the filing of complaints; (b) understatement of the seriousness of complaints; and (c) failure to investigate serious complaints promptly; (3) serious complaints alleging that nursing home residents are being harmed can remain uninvestigated for weeks or months; (4) such delays can prolong situations in which residents may be subject to abuse, neglect resulting in serious care problems like malnutrition and dehydration, preventable accidents, and medication errors; (5) although federal funds finance over 70 percent of complaint investigations nationwide, HCFA plays a minimal role in providing states with direction and oversight regarding these investigations; (6) HCFA has left it largely to the states to decide which complaints potentially place residents in immediate jeopardy and must be investigated within the federally mandated 2 workdays; (7) if a serious complaint that could harm residents is not classified as potentially placing residents in immediate jeopardy, there is no formal requirement for prompt investigation; (8) more generally, HCFA's oversight of state agencies that certify federally qualified nursing homes has not focused on complaint investigations; and (9) GAO found that: (a) a HCFA initiative to strengthen federal requirements for complaint investigations was discontinued in 1995, and resulting guidance developed for states' optional use has not been widely adopted; (b) federal reviews of state nursing home inspections are primarily intended to focus on the annual surveys of nursing homes, and very few reviews are conducted of complaint investigations; (c) since 1998, HCFA has required state agencies to develop their own performance measures and quality improvement plans for their complaint investigations, but for several of the 14 states GAO reviewed, such assessments addressed complaint processes superficially or not at all; and (d) HCFA reporting systems for nursing homes' compliance history and complaint investigations do not collect timely, consistent, and complete information. |
gao_NSIAD-96-220 | gao_NSIAD-96-220_0 | Bulk Fuel Requirements
The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force O&M budget requests for bulk fuel could be reduced by $522.3 million for the following reasons: In September 1995, we reported that for fiscal year 1996, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force budget requests for bulk fuel totaled about $4.12 billion. In view of this overall trend in inaccurately establishing either requested amounts or obligations for specific projects, Congress could reduce the services’ O&M funding request to amounts that more accurately reflect what is actually needed. Aircraft Storage
The Air Force’s O&M budget request could be reduced by $376.2 million if some aircraft were retired and others placed in storage until needed. Defense Business Operating Fund Pass-throughs
The Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) is a revolving account that provides various types of services and materials to the military, which pays for these items with O&M funds. In fiscal year 1996, the Army’s budget request was based on 690,667 flying hours. Real Property Maintenance
The real property maintenance program funds the maintenance, repair, and minor construction of facilities and properties. Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System
The Army’s fiscal year 1997 O&M budget request includes $20 million to operate, support, and store the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO evaluated the military services' and Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year (FY) 1997 operations and maintenance (O&M) budget requests, focusing on whether the O&M accounts should be funded in the amounts requested.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) GAO identified potential budget reductions of about $3.4 billion to the FY 1997 O&M budget requests; (2) the FY 1997 Army, Navy, and Air Force budgets for spare parts could be reduced by $723 million; (3) the Army, Navy, and Air Force O&M budget requests for bulk fuel could be reduced by $522.3 million; and (4) in view of an overall trend in inaccurately establishing either requested amounts or obligations for specific projects, Congress could reduce the services' O&M funding request to amounts that more accurately reflect what is actually needed. GAO also found other potential reductions in budget requests involving: (1) aircraft storage; (2) Defense Business Operations Fund pass-throughs; (3) civilian personnel requirements; (4) Army operating tempo; (5) U.S. Transportation Command; (6) environmental restoration; (7) flying hours; (8) Air Force aircraft basing; (9) real property maintenance; (10) Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System; (11) training rotations at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center; (12) Army Prepositioning Afloat Program; (13) fuel tax refunds; (14) Bosnia operations; (15) ammunition maintenance; (16) mine hunter ships; and (17) morale, welfare, and recreation. |
gao_GAO-04-122T | gao_GAO-04-122T_0 | In fiscal year 2002, EPA awarded about $3.5 billion in nondiscretionary grants. EPA’s Competition Policy Shows Promise but Requires a Major Cultural Shift
EPA’s September 2002 competition policy requires that most discretionary grants be competed. These grants totaled about $719 million of the $4.2 billion in grants awarded in fiscal year 2002. EPA’s competition policy faces implementation barriers because it represents a major cultural shift for EPA staff and managers, who historically awarded most grants noncompetitively and thereby have had limited experience with competition, according to the Office of Grants and Debarment. These activities will require significant planning and take more time than awarding grants noncompetitively. While the policy and subsequent implementing guidance have been in effect for a number of months, it is too early to tell if the policy has resulted in increased competition over the entire fiscal year. EPA Needs A More Systematic Approach to Strengthen Oversight
EPA’s December 2002 oversight policy makes important improvements in monitoring grantees, but it does not enable the agency to identify and address systemic problems with grant recipients. Consequently, EPA is not able to effectively and efficiently analyze these data to determine systemic grantee problems. The full results of our analysis are presented in our report. A Systematic Approach to Collection and Analysis of Compliance Information Would Enhance Oversight
With a statistical approach to selecting grantees for review, standard reporting format, and a plan for using information from in-depth and other reviews, EPA could identify problem areas and develop trends to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions to better target its oversight efforts. EPA Faces Challenges to Enhancing Accountability
Successful implementation of EPA’s 5-year grants management plan requires all staff—senior management, project officers, and grant specialists—to be fully committed to, and accountable for, grants management. First, although the plan calls for ensuring that project officers’ performance standards adequately address their grants management responsibilities, agencywide implementation may be difficult. Furthermore, it is difficult to implement performance standards that will hold project officers accountable for grants management because (1) grants management is often a small part of a wide range of project officers’ responsibilities, (2) some project officers manage few grants, and (3) project officers’ grants management responsibilities often fall into the category of “other duties as assigned.” To address this issue, EPA officials are considering, among other options, whether the agency needs to develop a smaller cadre of well-trained project officers to oversee grantees, rather than rely on the approximately 1,800 project officers with different levels of grants management responsibilities and skills. Second, EPA will have difficulty achieving the plan’s goals unless, not only project officers, but all managers and staff are held accountable for grants management. The plan does not call for including grants management standards in all managers’ and supervisors’ agreements. The division of responsibilities between the Office of Grants and Debarment and program and regional offices will continue to present a challenge to holding staff accountable and improving grants management, and will require the sustained commitment of EPA’s senior managers. Conclusions
If EPA is to better achieve its environmental mission, it must more effectively manage its grants programs—which account for more than half of its annual budget. EPA’s new policies and 5-year grants management plan show promise, but they are missing several critical elements necessary for the agency to address past grants management weaknesses. Specifically to improve EPA’s oversight of grantees, our report recommends that EPA’ (1) incorporate appropriate statistical methods to identify grantees for review; (2) require EPA staff to use a standard reporting format for in-depth review so that the results can be entered into the grantee compliance database and analyzed agency wide; and (3) develop a plan, including modifications to the grantee compliance database, to integrate and analyze compliance information from multiple sources. These actions would help EPA identify systemic problems with its grantees and better target its oversight resources. Until EPA does so, it cannot be assured that is fulfilling its grants management responsibilities. While EPA’s 5-year grants management plan shows promise, we believe that, given EPA’s historically uneven performance in addressing its grants management challenges, congressional oversight is important to ensure that EPA’s Administrator, managers, and staff implement the plan in a sustained, coordinated fashion to meet the plan’s ambitious targets and time frames. To help facilitate this oversight, our report recommends that EPA annually report to Congress on its progress in improving grants management. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has faced persistent challenges in managing its grants, which, at about $4 billion annually constitute over one-half of the agency's total budget. EPA awards grants to thousands of recipients to implement its programs to protect human health and the environment. Given the size and diversity of EPA's programs, its ability to efficiently and effectively accomplish its mission largely depends on how well it manages its grant resources and builds accountability into its efforts. In our comprehensive report on EPA's management of its grants, released last week, we found that EPA continues to face four key grants management challenges despite past efforts to address them--(1) selecting the most qualified grant applicants, (2) effectively overseeing grantees, (3) measuring the results of grants, and (4) effectively managing its grant staff and resources. The report also discusses EPA's latest competition and oversight policies and its new 5-year plan to improve the management of its grants. This testimony, based on our report, focuses on the extent to which EPA's latest policies and plan address (1) awarding grants competitively, (2) improving oversight of grantees, and (3) holding staff and managers accountable for fulfilling their grants management responsibilities.
What GAO Found
Late in 2002, EPA launched new efforts to address some of its long-standing grants management problems. It issued two policies--one to promote competition in awarding grants and one to improve its oversight of grants. Furthermore, in April 2003, EPA issued a 5-year grants management plan to address its long-standing grants management problems. These policies and plan focus on the major grants management challenges we identified but will require strengthening, enhanced accountability, and sustained commitment to succeed. EPA's September 2002 competition policy should improve EPA's ability to select the most qualified applicants by requiring competition for more grants. However, effective implementation of the policy will require a major cultural shift for EPA managers and staff because the competitive process will require significant planning and take more time than awarding grants noncompetitively. EPA's December 2002 oversight policy makes important improvements in monitoring grantees, but it does not build in a process for effectively and efficiently analyzing the results of its monitoring efforts to address systemic grantee problems. Specifically, EPA does not (1) use a statistical approach to selecting grantees for review, (2) collect standard information from the reviews, and (3) analyze the results to identify and resolve systemic problems with grantees. As a result, EPA may not be using its oversight resources as efficiently as it could. With improved analysis, EPA could better identify problem areas and assess the effectiveness of its corrective actions to more efficiently target its oversight efforts. EPA's 5-year grants management plan recognizes the importance of accountability, but it does not completely address how the agency will hold all managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their grants management responsibilities. For example, the plan calls for developing performance standards for staff overseeing grantee performance, but it does not call for including grants management performance standards in their managers' and supervisors' performance agreements. Unless all managers and staff are held accountable for grants management, EPA cannot ensure the sustained commitment required for the plan's success. Our report, Grants Management: EPA Needs to Strengthen Efforts to Address Persistent Challenges, GAO-03-846 , details EPA's historically uneven performance in addressing its grants management challenges. Over the years, EPA's past actions to improve grants management have had mixed results because of the complexity of the problems, weaknesses in policy design and implementation, and insufficient management attention to overseeing grants. While EPA's latest policies and new 5-year grants management plan show promise, it is too early to tell if these will succeed more than past actions. If EPA is to better achieve its environmental mission, it must more effectively manage its grants. Our report contains specific recommendations to address critical weaknesses in EPA's new oversight policy and plan. EPA stated that it agreed with GAO's recommendations and it will implement them as part of its 5- year grants management plan. |
gao_GAO-08-1127T | gao_GAO-08-1127T_0 | Based on information gathered during bridge inspections and reported to the NBI, the HBP classifies bridge conditions as deficient or not; assigns each bridge a sufficiency rating reflecting its structural adequacy, safety, serviceability, and relative importance; and uses that information to provide funding for states to improve bridges. Deficient bridges include those that are structurally deficient, with one or more components in poor condition, and those that are functionally obsolete, with a poor configuration or design that may no longer be adequate for the traffic they serve. All bridges are grouped into one of two general categories: Federal-aid highway bridges and bridges not on Federal-aid highways. State DOTs Exercise Discretion in Determining How to Use HBP Funds and Select Bridge Projects for Funding
The HBP affords state DOTs discretion in determining how to use their HBP funds, and as a result, states use HBP funds and select bridge projects in a variety of ways. Thus, states have the flexibility to use HBP funds on bridge projects that may not immediately reduce their inventory of deficient bridges. Some deficient bridge projects can be cost-prohibitive. Some states have also developed tools and approaches beyond those required by the HBP—such as bridge management systems, element-level inspections, state-specific condition ratings, and various prioritization approaches—to help them gauge bridge conditions and further inform their selection of bridge projects for funding. Available Data Indicate That the Overall Condition of the Nation’s Bridges Has Improved, but the Impact of the HBP Is Difficult to Determine
Bridge conditions, as measured by the number of deficient bridges and average sufficiency rating, improved from 1998 through 2007. 1). 2). 3). 4). First, the impact of the federal investment in the HBP is difficult to measure in part because there are no comprehensive data for state and local spending on bridges. Second, the impact of the HBP is also difficult to measure because HBP funds can, in some cases, be used for a variety of bridge projects without regard to a bridge’s deficiency status or sufficiency rating. The HBP Lacks Focus, Performance Measures, and Sustainability
The HBP, while generally helping to improve bridge conditions, does not fully align with our principles for re-examining surface transportation programs in that the bridge program lacks focus, performance measures, and sustainability. First, HBP’s goals are not focused on a clearly identified federal interest. Over the years, the program’s statutory goals have expanded from improving deficient bridges to supporting seismic retrofitting, preventive maintenance, and many other activities, thus expanding the federal interest to potentially include almost any bridge in the country. Finally, the HBP’s fiscal sustainability remains a challenge in light of aging bridge infrastructure, coupled with the declining purchasing power of funding currently available for bridge maintenance, rehabilitation, replacement and the recent growth in construction costs. Observations on Proposed Bridge Legislation
Our work on the HBP can provide some perspective on several provisions in the proposed legislation under review by this committee, the National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008 (S. 3338). The legislation would also require DOT to strengthen bridge inspection standards, adopt a risk-based process for prioritizing certain bridge rehabilitation and replacement projects, and require that states develop 5-year performance plans for bridge inspections and for the rehabilitation or replacement of deficient bridges. To improve the focus, performance, and sustainability of the HBP, the report we are releasing at this hearing recommends that the Secretary of Transportation work with Congress to take the following actions: identify and define specific national goals for the HBP; determine the performance of the program by developing and implementing performance measures related to the goals for the HBP; identify and evaluate best tools and practices that can potentially be incorporated into the HBP, such as bridge management systems; and review and evaluate HBP funding mechanisms to align funding with performance and support a targeted and sustainable federal bridge program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The August 1, 2007, collapse of a Minnesota bridge raised nationwide questions about bridge safety and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) prioritization of bridge resources. The Highway Bridge Program (HBP), the primary source of federal funding for bridges, provided over $4 billion to states in fiscal year 2007. This testimony, based on a report GAO is releasing today, addresses (1) how states use HBP funds and select bridge projects for funding, (2) what data indicate about bridge conditions and the HBP's impact, and (3) the extent to which the HBP aligns with principles we developed, based on our prior work and federal laws and regulations, for reexamining surface transportation programs. The testimony also discusses the implications of our work for related sections of proposed legislation under review by this committee, the National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008 (S.3338).
What GAO Found
As context for understanding GAO's findings on the HBP, based on information gathered during bridge inspections that are generally conducted every 2 years, the HBP classifies bridge conditions as deficient or not; assigns each bridge a sufficiency rating reflecting its structural adequacy, safety, serviceability, and relative importance for public use; and uses that information to distribute funding to states to improve bridges. Deficient bridges include those that are structurally deficient, with one or more components in poor condition, and those that are functionally obsolete, with a poor configuration or design that may no longer be adequate for the traffic they serve. Use of HBP funds and project selection: The HBP affords states discretion to use HBP funds and select bridge projects in a variety of ways. Some states are focused on reducing their number of deficient bridges, while other states are pursuing different bridge priorities. For example, California has focused on seismically retrofitting bridges, a safety concern for that state. Furthermore, some states have developed tools and approaches for selecting bridge projects that go beyond those required by the HBP--such as bridge management systems and state-specific bridge condition rating systems. Bridge conditions and impact of HBP: Bridge conditions, as measured by the number of deficient bridges and average sufficiency rating of all bridges, improved from 1998 through 2007. However, the impact of the HBP on that improvement is difficult to determine because (1) the program provides only a share of what states spend on bridges and there are no comprehensive data for state and local spending on bridges and (2) HBP funds can, in some cases, be used for a variety of bridge projects without regard to a bridge's deficiency status or sufficiency rating. Alignment of HBP with GAO principles: The HBP does not fully align with GAO's principles in that the program lacks focus, performance measures, and sustainability. For example, the program's statutory goals are not focused on a clearly identified federal interest, but rather have expanded from improving deficient bridges to supporting seismic retrofitting, preventive maintenance, and many other projects, thus expanding the federal interest to potentially include almost any bridge in the country. In addition, the program lacks measures linking funding to performance and is not sustainable, given the anticipated deterioration of the nation's bridges and the declining purchasing power of funding currently available for bridge maintenance, rehabilitation, and replacement. The results of our work are generally consistent with provisions of S.3338 that call for a risk-based prioritization process for selecting bridge projects, 5-year performance plans, and bridge management systems. Our work does raise some questions about the legislation's focus on all deficient bridges because some deficient bridges do not need immediate repairs to carry traffic safely. |
gao_GAO-17-165 | gao_GAO-17-165_0 | The District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995 (School Reform Act) established PCSB, an independent agency which provides the primary oversight of D.C. charter schools. Suspension and Expulsion Rates in D.C. Charter Schools Are Down, but Are About Twice the National Charter School Rates
District of Columbia Charter School Discipline at a Glance
Discipline rates for charter schools overall dropped from school year 2011-12 through school year 2013-14 according to federal data, and continued to drop through school year 2015-16, according to D.C. data. Discipline Rates of Students in D.C. Charter Schools Have Dropped
Discipline rates—that is, out-of-school suspensions and expulsions—at D.C. charter schools dropped from school year 2011-12 through school year 2013-14, but remained disproportionately high for Black students and students with disabilities, as well as at some schools. Suspension Rates in D.C. Schools Are About Twice the National Rates
In both 2011-12 and 2013-14 both D.C. charter schools and traditional public schools had suspension rates that were about double the rates for schools nationally, according to Education’s data (see fig. Within D.C., charter schools’ suspension rates were slightly higher than D.C. traditional public schools. As shown in figure 5, although Black students represented 80 percent of charter school enrollment, they represented 93 percent of those suspended and 92 percent of those expelled. In particular, 16 of the 105 D.C. charter schools suspended 20 percent or more of their students, with 5 schools suspending 30 percent or more of their students over the course of that school year. Agencies Oversee Charter Schools, but Have Not Created a Coordinated Plan to Help Schools Continue to Bring Down Discipline Rates
PCSB Collects and Publishes Discipline Data by School and Alerts Schools of Concerns
PCSB has increased its focus on school discipline in recent years and uses several mechanisms to oversee charter schools’ use of suspensions and expulsions (see fig. In addition, PCSB conducts higher-level reviews of schools’ discipline policies on an annual basis. Several D.C. Agencies Oversee Charter Schools but We Observed a Lack of Consensus around Roles, Responsibilities, and a Key Agency’s Authority
While other D.C. education agencies also have oversight responsibility with respect to charter schools (see fig. Absent such a plan, continued progress in bringing down discipline rates may be slowed. The D.C. Mayor should direct the DME and OSSE to deepen collaboration with PCSB and other relevant stakeholders, such as charter school LEAs, to develop a coordinated plan to continue progress in reducing discipline rates and, as part of this process, make explicit their respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities with regard to discipline in D.C. charter schools. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to examine: (1) what is known about suspensions and expulsions in District of Columbia (D.C. or District) charter schools, and (2) to what extent the Public Charter School Board (PCSB) oversees the use of suspensions and expulsions at charter schools. To address these objectives, we used a variety of methods, including analyzing federal and D.C. data; reviewing published reports and monitoring documentation from PCSB and other D.C. agencies; and interviewing officials from these agencies, representatives from associations and advocacy groups, and officials from three charter schools. In its written comments on a draft of this report, PCSB noted the recent availability of data for the 2015-16 school year. Departments of Education and Justice. No recommendations found. | Why GAO Did This Study
D.C. charter schools served about 45 percent of D.C.'s public school students in the 2015-16 school year. The District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995 established PCSB to authorize and oversee charter schools. PCSB also oversees charter schools' use of suspensions and expulsions.
The District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, as amended, included a provision for GAO to conduct a periodic management evaluation of PCSB. This report examines (1) what is known about suspensions and expulsions in D.C. charter schools, and (2) to what extent PCSB oversees charter schools' use of suspensions and expulsions. GAO analyzed the most recent national federal data (school years 2011-12 and 2013-14) and D.C. data (school year 2015-16) on suspensions and expulsions; reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency policies and documentation; and interviewed officials at PCSB and other D.C. agencies, as well as other stakeholders selected to provide a range of perspectives. GAO also visited three charter schools that had high discipline rates.
What GAO Found
Discipline rates (out-of-school suspension and expulsion rates) at District of Columbia (D.C.) charter schools dropped from school years 2011-12 through 2013-14 (the most recent years of national Department of Education data available). However, these rates remained about double the rates of charter schools nationally and slightly higher than D.C. traditional public schools and were also disproportionately high for some student groups and schools. Specifically, during this period, suspension rates in D.C. charter schools dropped from about 16 percent of all students to about 13 percent, and expulsions, which were relatively rare, went down by about a half percent, according to GAO's analysis. However, D.C. Black students and students with disabilities were disproportionately suspended and expelled. For example, Black students represented 80 percent of students in D.C. charter schools, but 93 percent of those suspended and 92 percent of those expelled. Further, 16 of D.C.'s 105 charter schools suspended over a fifth of their students over the course of school year 2015-16, according to D.C. data.
Note: Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding.
The Public Charter School Board (PCSB) regularly uses several mechanisms to oversee charter schools' use of suspensions and expulsions. For example, PCSB reviews school-level data and schools' discipline policies to encourage schools to reduce reliance on suspensions and expulsions to manage student behavior. Several D.C. agencies have roles in overseeing charter schools and reported collaborating on other issues, but we observed a lack of consensus around roles and responsibilities regarding charter school discipline. Further, a plan to issue regulations addressing discipline disparities among D.C. public schools was unsuccessful because the D.C. agency that planned to issue the regulations was unsure of its authority to do so. Absent a coordinated plan to continue progress in reducing discipline rates in charter schools, as well as clarified roles, responsibilities, and authorities of D.C. agencies with respect to oversight of discipline in charter schools, continued progress may be slowed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making two recommendations, including that D.C. education agencies collaborate on a plan to further reduce discipline rates and make explicit agency roles, responsibilities, and authorities regarding charter school discipline. The agencies did not explicitly agree or disagree with our recommendations and indicated they could deepen their collaboration. |
gao_GAO-11-535T | gao_GAO-11-535T_0 | Continued Improvement in Acquisition Management Capabilities, Including Leveraging DOD Expertise
The Coast Guard has updated policies and processes for major acquisition programs to better reflect best practices and respond to our prior recommendations. Updates to Policies and Processes We found that the Coast Guard revised its Major Systems Acquisition Manual in November 2010 to include a description of the roles and responsibilities of a flag-level Executive Oversight Council, which was formed in 2009 to review programs and provide oversight; aligning roles and responsibilities of independent test authorities to DHS standards, which satisfied one of our prior recommendations; a formal acquisition decision event before a program receives approval for low-rate initial production, which addressed one of our prior recommendations; and a requirement to present an acquisition strategy when DHS is asked to validate the need for a major acquisition program. The Coast Guard has made progress in reducing its acquisition workforce vacancies. From April through November 2010, the percentage of vacancies for government positions dropped from about 20 percent to13 percent. As of November 2010, the Coast Guard support contractors made up 25 percent of the Coast Guard’s acquisition workforce. According to the Coast Guard, it currently has 81 interagency agreements, memorandums of agreement, and other arrangements in place primarily with DOD to support its major acquisition programs. According to Coast Guard contracting officials, the Coast Guard recently began to develop a database of all interagency agreements with DOD and other agencies, but at this point program staff have access to only 5 of the approximately 81 agreements. DHS agreed with the recommendation. Challenges in Major Acquisition Programs Exacerbated by Unrealistic Budget Planning
We have previously reported that the Coast Guard has gained insights into the risks it faces in managing its major acquisitions. At the same time, most major programs continue to experience challenges in program execution, resources, and schedule. The Coast Guard has reported that projected funding levels in the fiscal years 2011-2015 capital investment plan were lower than previously planned for some major acquisition programs. Programs experiencing instability due to reduced projected funding levels. Coast Guard Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Trade-off Analysis for the Deepwater Assets
To support its role as systems integrator, the Coast Guard planned to complete a fleet mix analysis in July 2009 to eliminate uncertainty surrounding future mission performance and to produce a baseline for the Deepwater acquisition. In July 2010, we reported that while the Coast Guard had not yet released the results, officials told us that the analysis considered the 2007 Deepwater baseline to be the “floor” for asset capabilities and quantities and did not impose financial constraints on the outcome. The Coast Guard initiated a second phase of the analysis to impose cost constraints. We recommended in our July 2010 report that since the 2007 DHS-approved baseline of $24.2 billion was no longer feasible because of cost growth, the Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive review of Deepwater cost, schedule, quantities, and mix of assets needed to meet mission needs, identify trade-offs given fiscal constraints, and report the results to Congress. The Coast Guard’s efforts to date have not addressed this recommendation. Given the significant increase in the number of assets needed for this objective fleet mix from the approved Deepwater program of record—the $24.2 billion baseline—the Coast Guard developed, based on risk metrics, incremental fleet mixes to bridge the two. They told us that the lower- and upper- bound constraints are, respectively, $1.2 billion and $1.7 billion annually; however, the basis for selecting these cost constraints is not documented. Based on our review of recent budget data, this upper bound for Deepwater is more than Congress has appropriated for the Coast Guard’s entire acquisition portfolio in recent years. Moreover, the Coast Guard officials stated that this analysis will not reassess whether the current program of record is the appropriate mix of assets to pursue and will not assess any mixes smaller than the current program of record. Because fleet mix analysis phase 2 will not assess options lower than the program of record, it will not prepare the Coast Guard to make the trade-offs that will likely be needed in the current fiscal climate. It is important to recognize that the Coast Guard continues to make progress in strengthening its capabilities to manage its acquisition portfolio by updating acquisition policies and practices, reducing vacancies in the acquisition workforce, and leveraging DOD contracts and resources to help support its major acquisitions. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard still faces significant challenges in carrying out these major acquisitions within a fiscally constrained environment, especially given continued cost growth and schedule delays that are exacerbated in part by unrealistic budget plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Coast Guard manages a broad major acquisition portfolio. GAO has reported extensively on the Coast Guard's significant challenges with its major acquisition programs, including its Deepwater Program. GAO has also recognized steps the Coast Guard has taken to improve acquisition management. Additionally, GAO has recommended that the Coast Guard complete a review of the Deepwater Program to clarify the mix of assets that are needed to meet mission needs and trade-offs while considering fiscal constraints, because the program had exceeded its $24.2 billion baseline. This testimony updates (1) Coast Guard efforts to manage major acquisitions, (2) challenges programs are facing in the areas of cost and schedule, and (3) the status of the Deepwater fleet mix analysis. This statement is largely based on GAO-11-480 , which is being issued today. In that report, GAO recommended that the Coast Guard formalize its database of agreements with the Department of Defense (DOD). The Department of Homeland Security agreed with the recommendation. This statement also draws from prior GAO reports and ongoing work related to Deepwater. GAO reviewed the first phase of the Coast Guard's fleet mix analysis, contract documents, and budget information. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for conducting the fleet mix analysis. For the new information, GAO obtained Coast Guard views and incorporated technical comments where appropriate
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard continues to improve its acquisition management capabilities by updating policies, reducing acquisition workforce vacancies, and leveraging DOD contracts. In November 2010, the Coast Guard updated its "Major Systems Acquisition Manual" to further incorporate best practices and respond to prior GAO recommendations, such as aligning the roles and responsibilities of independent test authorities to DHS standards. Additionally, the Coast Guard reduced its acquisition workforce vacancies from about 20 to 13 percent from April through November 2010. Shortfalls in hiring staff for certain key areas persist, though, and some programs continue to be affected by unfilled positions. The Coast Guard has entered into 81 memorandums of agreement and other arrangements--primarily with DOD--to support its major acquisition programs, but program staff currently have access to only 5 of the 81 agreements. Most of the Coast Guard's 17 major acquisition programs continue to experience challenges in program execution, schedule, and resources. Furthermore, the Coast Guard's unrealistic budget planning exacerbates these challenges. When programs receive funding lower than planned, schedule breaches and other problems are more likely to occur. In fact, 4 of the major acquisition programs have reported a baseline breach caused, at least in part, by reduced projected funding levels. Additionally, projected funding levels in the Coast Guard's fiscal years 2012-2016 capital investment plan are significantly higher than budgets previously appropriated or requested and therefore may be unrealistic. This is particularly true given the rapidly building fiscal pressures facing the nation. For example, the Coast Guard plans to request $2.35 billion for acquisitions in fiscal year 2015--including funding for construction of three major Deepwater surface assets--but the agency has not received more than $1.54 billion in any recent year. The Coast Guard has developed action items to address budget planning challenges. In July 2010, GAO recommended that because of significant cost growth in the Deepwater Program, the Coast Guard should review the cost and mix of assets and identify trade-offs given fiscal constraints. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with the recommendation; however, the Coast Guard has not yet implemented it. The Coast Guard began a fleet mix analysis in 2008 that considered the current Deepwater Program to be the "floor" for asset capabilities and quantities and did not impose cost constraints on the various fleet mixes. Consequently, the results will not be used as a basis for trade-off decisions. The Coast Guard has now begun a second analysis, which includes an upper cost constraint of $1.7 billion annually--more than Congress has appropriated for the entire Coast Guard acquisition portfolio in recent years. Further, Coast Guard officials told GAO that this analysis will not assess options lower than the current program of record. It therefore will not prepare the Coast Guard to make the trade-offs that will likely be needed in the current fiscal climate. The Coast Guard expects to complete the analysis this summer. |
gao_RCED-99-113 | gao_RCED-99-113_0 | While these evaluation requirements existed prior to the enactment of TEA-21, TEA-21 requires FTA, for the first time, to (1) develop a rating for each criterion as well as an overall rating of highly recommended, recommended, or not recommended for each project and to include this information in its annual new starts report due to the Congress each February, and (2) issue regulations on the manner in which it will evaluate and rate potential new starts projects. TEA-21 also directs FTA to use these evaluations and ratings in approving projects’ advancement to the preliminary engineering and final design phases and in deciding which projects will be recommended to the Congress for funding or receive full funding grant agreements. FTA Has Made Substantial Progress in Developing and Implementing a New Starts Evaluation Process That Reflects TEA-21 Requirements
FTA has made substantial progress in developing and implementing an evaluation process that includes the individual criterion ratings and overall project ratings required by TEA-21. Before TEA-21 was enacted in June 1998, FTA had already taken significant steps to revise its new starts evaluation process, since most of the evaluation requirements contained in TEA-21 were introduced by ISTEA. FTA’s Evaluation and Rating Process Assigns Individual Ratings on TEA-21 Criteria and Provides for Overall Project Ratings
FTA’s current new starts evaluation process, which it followed to prepare its fiscal year 2000 new starts report, assigns candidate projects individual ratings for each TEA-21 criterion in order to assess each project’s justification and local financial commitment. First, FTA evaluates and rates projects on each new starts criterion. Appendix I summarizes the measures that FTA uses in applying the criteria to develop these ratings. FTA Needs to Issue Regulations to Satisify TEA-21 Requirements
While FTA has implemented a new starts evaluation process that addresses the TEA-21 requirements, it still needs to issue final regulations to formalize the process. FTA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on April 7, 1999. Comments on the proposed rule are due on July 6, 1999. FTA plans to issue the final regulations in the summer of 1999. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) efforts to develop and implement evaluation and rating processes and procedures for evaluating new start transit projects for federal funding, focusing on: (1) the status of FTA's efforts; (2) how FTA implemented the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) requirements for evaluating, rating, and recommending projects; and (3) open issues that FTA needs to resolve to fully satisfy TEA-21 requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FTA has made substantial progress in developing and implementing a new starts evaluation and rating process, as required by TEA-21; (2) FTA had already revised its new starts evaluation process, since the criteria and most of the factors that TEA-21 requires FTA to consider while applying the criteria were also contained in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991; (3) in 1997, FTA first applied these criteria for its fiscal year (FY) 1999 project evaluations; (4) in 1998, FTA expanded its evaluation process to include the TEA-21 requirement to rate projects as either highly recommended, recommended, or not recommended and to provide individual ratings on each criterion; (5) the evaluation process FTA followed to prepare its FY 2000 new starts report uses ratings based on specific financial and project justification criteria to build toward an overall project rating; (6) FTA uses this rating information in deciding which projects will receive full funding grant agreements and to make funding recommendations to the Congress in its annual new starts report; (7) while FTA has implemented a new starts evaluation and rating process for FY 2000 that addressed TEA-21 requirements, it has not issued final regulations on the evaluation and rating process, as required by the legislation; and (8) FTA issued a proposed rule on April 7, 1999, and plans to issue final regulations in summer 1999. |
gao_GAO-05-129 | gao_GAO-05-129_0 | Unlike CMS and HHS-OIG, the processes in IRS and EBSA were initiated by the agencies under their authority to administer laws in these areas rather than in response to specific statutory requirements. Five Key Factors for Establishing an Advisory Opinion Process
The processes at the four agencies we contacted—CMS, HHS-OIG, IRS, and EBSA—reflect common elements that merit consideration when establishing an advisory opinion process. These factors are (1) establishing criteria for submitting advisory opinion requests, (2) developing alternative ways to respond to advisory opinion requests, (3) determining the time frame for issuing advisory opinions, (4) considering anticipated workloads, staffing requirements, and user fees, and (5) creating internal review and external coordination procedures. The structures of the legally binding advisory opinion processes at the four agencies, however, reflect differences in their respective constituencies and responsibilities. Establishing criteria for submitting advisory opinion requests: All four agencies have defined the scope of their processes by identifying criteria for submitting advisory opinion requests. Agencies also differed in the number of opinions issued per FTE. In addition, their external coordination includes consultation with the Department of Justice. Medicare Providers Consider Advisory Opinions as a Possible Way to Improve Guidance
Representatives of most provider organizations we spoke with told us that providers seeking clarification of Medicare rules and procedures often find it difficult to obtain reliable or timely written responses to their inquiries. Medicare Providers View Advisory Opinions as One of Several Approaches to Enhance Guidance
Overall, representatives from most of the provider organizations we spoke with agreed that an advisory opinion process would partially address their concerns about the guidance that they currently receive from CMS and its contractors. Specifically, most said that such a process would provide them with useful answers that they could rely on to appropriately interpret Medicare regulations. In addition, the lessons learned by other federal agencies may be useful in structuring a process for Medicare. Agency Comments
In written comments on a draft of this report, HHS stated that an enhanced and more formal advisory opinion process for the Medicare program would not be a successful pursuit at this time. Further, HHS said that such a process would not provide quick answers to providers’ questions, and would have limited applicability beyond the parties requesting advisory opinions. However, HHS acknowledged that the Medicare program and its implementing regulations are inherently complex and underscored its efforts to improve stakeholders’ understanding of the program’s complexities. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of CMS, and other interested parties. Medicare Stakeholders Contacted
Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Acknowledgments
Pauline Seretakis, Richard Lipinski, Janet Rosenblad, and Craig Winslow made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health care providers are concerned about the quality of Medicare guidance issued by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Specifically, they have reported that (1) they receive unclear guidance on program requirements and (2) because policies and procedures change frequently, they may rely on obsolete guidance, resulting in billing errors. Some government agencies issue advisory opinions in response to specific questions from requesters. These opinions permit agencies to apply law and regulation to a particular set of facts and provide requesters with specific guidance. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 directed GAO to determine the appropriateness and feasibility of establishing in the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to issue legally binding advisory opinions to interpret Medicare regulations. GAO (1) identified factors relevant in establishing an advisory opinion process and (2) assessed the role such a process could play in clarifying program requirements. GAO examined four federal agencies' advisory opinion processes and interviewed officials from organizations representing Medicare stakeholders to learn how such a process might address their concerns.
What GAO Found
GAO identified five common elements in the way four agencies--CMS, the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) of the Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and HHS's Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG)--set up their advisory opinion processes. While the processes at the four agencies reflected differences in the agencies' respective constituencies and responsibilities, each agency cited five key factors as critical. These were (1) establishing criteria for submitting advisory opinion requests, to define the scope of their processes, (2) developing alternative ways of responding to advisory opinion requests, such as providing other forms of written communication, (3) determining the time frame for issuing advisory opinions, (4) considering anticipated workload, staffing requirements, and user fees as a means of offsetting expenses incurred by the government, and (5) creating internal review and external coordination procedures with other federal agencies with a stake in the outcome of an issued opinion. These five factors and lessons learned from other agencies that issue advisory opinions may be useful in structuring a process for Medicare. Most of the representatives of provider organizations GAO contacted agreed that an advisory opinion process would partially address their concerns, for example, by providing them with reliable, written responses to their Medicare-related questions. However, they recognized that an advisory opinion process would not address all their concerns and that it is one of several approaches that could improve Medicare guidance. For example, refining existing forms of guidance would also be of value. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS stated that a more formal advisory opinion process for Medicare would be costly to implement, not provide quick answers to providers' questions, and have limited applicability. HHS acknowledged that the Medicare program and its implementing regulations are inherently complex and underscored its efforts to improve stakeholders' understanding of the program's complexities. |
gao_RCED-95-168 | gao_RCED-95-168_0 | Quantities of U.S. Nuclear Materials Exported to EURATOM and Japan From 1980-94
The largest amount of U.S. nuclear materials exported to EURATOM and Japan during the last 15 years was made up of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium. Quantities of U.S.-Origin Nuclear Materials Transferred From Japan to EURATOM From 1980-94
Japan uses enriched and natural uranium as fuel for nuclear power reactors. Japan also exported about 37,187 kgs of plutonium to EURATOM during this period. I contains information on the amount of U.S.-origin nuclear materials Japan transferred to EURATOM annually during this period.) In addition, nuclear reactor equipment and components have been exported by the United States to Japan annually between 1980 and 1994 under NRC’s general licenses. According to the Department of Commerce’s data base, the dollar value of U.S. exports to EURATOM countries of uranium (natural, enriched, and depleted) and plutonium in 1989 through August 1994 was about $1.1 billion. U.S. Nuclear Industry’s Views on Potential Impact of Nonrenewal of Agreement on Nuclear Commerce With EURATOM and Japan
Industry representatives anticipate that if the U.S.-EURATOM agreement is allowed to expire, EURATOM and Japan would turn to other suppliers of nuclear products and services outside the United States. According to USEC officials, if the U.S.-EURATOM agreement for cooperation expires, USEC’s future enrichment services would be seriously affected. Another $1.8 billion in potential new business from EURATOM and Japan might be lost. According to a nuclear industry representative, the U.S. share of the European nuclear industry market currently is about $100 million and may reach $300 million annually after the year 2000. The information on exported nuclear materials and U.S.-origin materials transferred from Japan to EURATOM in the NMMSS data base is collected from DOE and NRC forms. U.S. Nuclear Material Exports to EURATOM and Japan
U.S. Exports to EURATOM
Figure I.1 shows that U.S. exports of natural uranium to EURATOM ranged from 4,324 kilograms (kgs) to 1,811,478 kgs annually during 1980 through 1994. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the United States-European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) agreement, focusing on the: (1) amount of U.S. nuclear exports to EURATOM and Japan and U.S.-origin nuclear materials transferred from Japan to EURATOM; (2) value of U.S. nuclear exports to EURATOM and Japan; and (3) nuclear industry's views on the potential impact on nuclear commerce if the U.S.-EURATOM agreement is not renewed.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) from 1980 through 1994, the United States exported about 32.6 million kilograms (kgs) of nuclear materials to EURATOM and 11 million kgs to Japan, and Japan transferred about 4.7 million kgs of U.S.-origin nuclear materials to EURATOM for reprocessing; (2) various forms of uranium constituted the majority of the nuclear material exports and enriched uranium constituted the majority of the U.S.-origin material transferred to EURATOM; (3) Japan also transferred about 37,187 kgs of U.S.-origin plutonium to EURATOM from 1980 through 1994; (4) no nuclear power reactors were exported to EURATOM or Japan during this period, but reactor equipment and components were exported to EURATOM and Japan under general license agreements; (5) U.S. nuclear materials exported from 1989 through August 1994 were worth about $1.1 billion for EURATOM countries and $4 billion for Japan; (6) for fiscal years 1989 through 1993, U.S. enrichment services worth $168 million and $1.6 billion were charged to EURATOM and Japan, respectively; (7) the U.S. nuclear industry believes that if the U.S.-EURATOM agreement expires, EURATOM and Japan would seek other non-U.S. suppliers of nuclear materials and services and the industry would be substantially weakened; and (8) the expiration of the agreement could seriously affect the future of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation's uranium enrichment services, since it would jeopardize $630 million in current contracts and $1.8 billion in potential new contracts. |
gao_GAO-04-402T | gao_GAO-04-402T_0 | Lacking A Defined Strategy, VA And DOD Have Made Limited Progress Toward A Common Health Information Exchange
VA’s and DOD’s ability to exchange data between their separate health information systems is crucial to achieving the goals of HealthePeople (Federal). VA officials stated that they recognize the importance of a clearly defined architecture, but acknowledged that the departments’ actions were continuing to be driven by the less-specific, high-level strategy that has been in place since September 2002. Specifically, officials in both departments pointed to a project that they are undertaking in response to requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which mandated that VA and DOD develop a real-time interface, data exchange, and capability to check prescription drug data for outpatients by October 1, 2004. By late February, VA had hired a supporting contractor to develop the planned prototype, but the departments had not yet fully defined their approach or requirements for developing and demonstrating its capabilities. Thus, given the early stage of the prototype and the uncertainties regarding what capabilities it will demonstrate, there is little evidence and assurance as to how or whether this project will contribute to defining the architecture and technological solution for the two-way exchange of patient health information. However, neither department has had the authority to make final project decisions binding on the other, and there has been a visible absence of day-to-day project oversight for the joint initiative to develop an electronic interface between the departments’ planned information systems. Since November, both departments have delayed key milestones associated with the development and deployment of their individual health information systems. However, in seeking a virtual medical record based on the two-way exchange of data between their separate health information systems, VA and DOD have chosen an approach that necessitates the highest levels of project discipline, including a well-defined architecture for describing the interface for a common health information exchange and an established project management structure to guide the investment in and implementation of this electronic capability. The HIPAA privacy rule has a specific exception authorizing one-way sharing of health data at the time of a service member’s separation. | Why GAO Did This Study
A critical component of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) information technology program is its ongoing work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve the ability to exchange patient health care data and create electronic records for use by veterans, active military personnel, and their health care providers. GAO testified before Congress last November that one-way sharing of data, from DOD to VA medical facilities, had been realized. At the Congress's request, GAO assessed, among other matters, VA's and DOD's progress since that time toward defining a detailed strategy for and developing the capability of a twoway exchange of patient health information.
What GAO Found
Since November, VA and DOD have made little progress in determining their approach for achieving the two-way exchange of patient health data. Department officials recognize the importance of an architecture to articulate how they will electronically interface their health systems, but continue to rely on a nonspecific, high-level strategy--in place since September 2002--to guide their development and implementation of this capability. VA officials stated that an initiative begun this month to satisfy a mandate of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 will be used to better define the electronic interface needed to exchange patient health data. However, this project is at an early stage, and the departments have not yet fully identified the approach or requirements for this undertaking. Given these uncertainties, there is little evidence of how this project will contribute to defining a specific architecture and technological solution for achieving the two-way health data exchange. These uncertainties are further complicated by the absence of sound project management to guide the departments' actions. At present, neither department has the authority to make final decisions binding on the other, and day-to-day oversight of the joint initiative to develop an electronic interface is limited. Progress toward defining data standards continues, but delays have occurred in the development and deployment of the agencies' individual health information systems. |
gao_GAO-14-236 | gao_GAO-14-236_0 | Background
Radio frequency spectrum is used to provide an array of commercial and governmental services, like mobile voice and data, air-traffic control, broadcast television and radio, and public safety activities. FCC Establishes Buildout Requirements for Most Wireless Services
FCC has established buildout requirements for most wireless services, including paging, cellular, land mobile radio, and wireless communications services (see appendix II). Type of requirement. A population or geographic coverage requirement sets the percentage of the license’s population or geographic area, respectively, that must be covered by service. Lastly, a “substantial service” requirement describes the level of service that must be provided in narrative terms rather than in absolute, numeric benchmarks, such as with a coverage requirement. FCC Enforces Buildout Requirements through Automated Processes and Staff Reviews and Followed Its Process for Selected Wireless Services
FCC Enforces Buildout Requirements Primarily in Response to Licensee Actions
To enforce buildout requirements for wireless services, FCC requires licensees to self certify that they met buildout requirements and automatically terminates licenses that fail to do so, in line with FCC rules. Unless a licensee has other pending applications, an application to cancel a license is automatically approved. In general, the regulation states that FCC may grant an extension request if the licensee shows that its failure to meet a buildout deadline is due to causes beyond its control. For example, extension requests can be granted for issues such as a lack of available equipment for a band or interference problems with other spectrum users. Across the five services, we found that buildout requirements were met for 75 percent of licenses (19,582 of 26,217). As discussed above, FCC’s enforcement of buildout requirements also involves granting or dismissing extension requests. FCC officials said that the Commission seeks to be aggressive but pragmatic in its enforcement of buildout requirements and is flexible on deadlines when it needs to be. Many experts, licensees, and industry associations we interviewed said that extensions can be beneficial, but some concerns were raised. Some licensees and industry associations we interviewed said that extensions of buildout requirements can provide needed flexibility and be in the public interest. Stakeholders Generally Support Buildout Requirements but Identified Changes and Alternative Tools That They Thought Could Better Meet Goals
Most Selected Stakeholders Supported Buildout Requirements but Thought the Requirements More Effectively Met Some Goals Than Others
Nearly all licensees and industry associations we interviewed said that they support FCC’s having buildout requirements for wireless services because the requirements help ensure that spectrum will be put to use. Five experts said that they were ambivalent about the requirements for several reasons, including that the requirements are set too weak or undermined by FCC’s granting extensions; as previously mentioned, extensions were requested for 9 percent of licenses we examined, and FCC granted 74 percent of these extension requests. Of four goals commonly cited for buildout requirements, stakeholders tended to report that buildout requirements are effective in meeting two of these goals: encouraging licensees to provide service in a timely manner and preventing warehousing of spectrum. The stakeholders had mixed views on the effectiveness of buildout requirements in meeting the other two goals: promoting innovative services and promoting services to rural areas. Preventing the warehousing of spectrum. However, licensees and experts we interviewed generally said they did not believe that spectrum warehousing is a major problem, in their experience. Stakeholders Identified a Variety of Changes and Alternative Tools That They Thought Could Better Meet Commonly Cited Goals for Buildout Requirements Changes to Buildout
Requirements
While buildout requirements are generally supported, some stakeholders we spoke with said that the requirements were not effective in meeting some of the commonly cited goals, in particular promoting innovative services and services to rural areas, as discussed above. For example, one licensee said that having a spectrum-sharing policy would be a good supplement to buildout requirements; specifically, if a licensee does not meet its buildout requirements, FCC could require that the licensee negotiate sharing or leasing for the unused part of the license to help put it to use in timely manner. Subsidies. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FCC for review and comment. FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines Federal Communications Commission (FCC) buildout requirements for wireless services and the efficient use of spectrum. In particular, this report provides information on (1) the buildout requirements established by FCC for spectrum licenses for wireless services, (2) the extent that FCC follows its process to enforce buildout requirements for wireless services, and (3) stakeholder opinions on the extent that goals for buildout requirements have been met. To describe FCC buildout requirements for wireless services, we reviewed FCC regulations and guidance on buildout requirements for services that use spectrum. We also considered recommendations from FCC officials and other interviewees when selecting among wireless services. With respect to the outcomes for licenses that had buildout requirements, we examined the number of licenses in each wireless service that: met the requirement, including whether it met the requirement on did not meet the requirement and was terminated; did not meet the requirement and remained active after the did not reach the buildout deadline, meaning that the license was (1) canceled on or before the buildout deadline, (2) otherwise terminated before the buildout deadline, or (3) expired on or before the buildout deadline. | Why GAO Did This Study
Radio frequency spectrum is a natural resource used to provide a variety of communication services, such as mobile voice and data. The popularity of smart phones, tablets, and other wireless devices among consumers, businesses, and government users has increased the demand for spectrum. FCC takes a number of steps to promote efficient and effective use of spectrum. One such step is to establish buildout requirements, which specify that an entity granted a license must begin using the assigned spectrum within a specified amount of time or face penalties, such as loss of the license.
GAO was asked to review buildout requirements and the efficient use of spectrum. This report (1) describes the buildout requirements FCC established for wireless services, (2) assesses the extent to which FCC follows its process to enforce buildout requirements, and (3) examines stakeholder opinions on the extent that commonly cited goals for buildout requirements have been met. GAO reviewed FCC regulations and guidance on buildout requirements and examined FCC license data on outcomes of buildout requirements for 5 out of about 45 wireless services selected to ensure variety in type of use and buildout requirement, among other criteria. GAO also interviewed FCC officials, commercial spectrum licensees, industry associations, and spectrum policy experts.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. FCC reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has established buildout requirements—which require a licensee to build the necessary infrastructure and put the assigned spectrum to use within a set amount of time—for most wireless services, including cellular and personal communication services. FCC tailors the buildout requirements it sets for a wireless service based on the physical characteristics of the relevant spectrum and comments of stakeholders, among other factors. Therefore, buildout requirements vary across wireless services. For example, a buildout requirement can set the percentage of a license's population or geographic area that must be covered by service or can describe the required level of service in narrative terms rather than numeric benchmarks. Buildout requirements also vary by how much time a licensee has to meet a requirement and whether it has to meet one requirement or multiple requirements in stages.
FCC's enforcement process for wireless-service licenses with buildout requirements primarily relies on information provided by licensees, and FCC followed its process for the five wireless services GAO reviewed. Specifically, FCC requires licensees to self-certify that they have met buildout requirements. If a licensee does not do so, FCC automatically terminates the license. Some stakeholders GAO interviewed said that self-certification is an effective way for FCC to enforce buildout requirements because it is public and transparent. GAO examined FCC license data for five wireless services and found that buildout requirements were met for 75 percent of those licenses, and FCC generally terminated those that did not. As part of enforcement, FCC also grants or dismisses licensees' requests to extend the deadline for meeting a requirement. FCC may grant an extension if the licensee shows that it cannot meet a deadline due to causes beyond its control, like a lack of available equipment. For the five wireless services examined, GAO found that extensions were requested for 9 percent of licenses, and FCC granted 74 percent of these requests. FCC officials said that the Commission seeks to be aggressive but pragmatic when enforcing buildout requirements, including being flexible on deadlines when needed. Some licensees and industry associations GAO interviewed said that extensions can provide needed flexibility when unexpected problems occur. Some concerns were raised, however, that granting extensions can undermine buildout requirements by creating an impression that they will not be strictly enforced.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed generally said that buildout requirements are effective in meeting two of four goals commonly cited in FCC documents and statute—encouraging licensees to provide services in a timely manner and preventing the warehousing of spectrum. Stakeholders had mixed views on the effectiveness of buildout requirements in meeting two other goals—promoting innovative services and promoting services to rural areas—largely because they believed that other tools could better address these goals. Other tools stakeholders mentioned include greater use of spectrum licenses that allow a wider array of uses and providing licensees with subsidies to serve rural areas. Nearly all the licensees and industry associations GAO interviewed said they support FCC having buildout requirements, while spectrum policy experts GAO interviewed were mixed in their support of the requirements. Experts who did not support buildout requirements said that the requirements are set too weak or that other tools could better meet FCC goals, among other reasons. |
gao_GAO-15-741 | gao_GAO-15-741_0 | 1.) In cases in which GSA is unable to complete a long-term leasing action prior to a lease’s expiration, lease extensions may be used. Lease Extensions and Holdovers Are Common in GSA’s Real Property Portfolio, and Effects Vary
Lease Extensions and Holdovers Are Common, but Incidences of Holdovers Have Declined
From fiscal years 2012 through 2014, lease holdovers and extensions were a relatively common occurrence—3,058 out of 11,457 leases we identified in GSA’s portfolio, or 27 percent of all active leases, went into holdover, extension, or both over the 3-year period. Over Half of GSA’s Expiring Leases Experienced a Holdover or Extension
Of the 2,719 long-term leases set to expire in fiscal years 2012 through 2014, approximately 54 percent experienced a holdover, extension, or both—totaling 1,455 leases. Of these 1,455 leases, more than half experienced an extension and roughly 20 percent experienced a holdover. (See fig. Holdovers and Extensions Have a Variety of Effects on GSA, Tenant Agencies, and Lessors
Although holdovers and extensions represent two distinct situations, they can have similar effects on all parties involved in the federal leasing process, according to GSA officials, tenant agency officials, and lessors we interviewed. Uncertainty: The short-term nature of holdovers and extensions create uncertainty for tenant agencies and lessors; such uncertainty can make it challenging for federal tenant agencies to effectively plan and budget for the long term. Lessors may also face challenges securing financing for properties in holdover or extension. For example, as part of a consolidation of multiple leases into a single space for an HHS agency, GSA’s contracting officers negotiated short-term extensions to align the varying expiration dates of these leases with the first day of the term of the lease for the consolidated space. GSA Is Working to Improve Its Management of Expiring Leases
GSA headquarters officials stated their commitment to reducing the number of holdovers and extensions, and noted a variety of recent initiatives designed to improve planning and begin the leasing process earlier and improve communication with tenant agencies. In addition, GSA is providing new guidance to regional offices to begin the leasing process earlier. Additional Goals and Targets to Assess Progress in Reducing Holdovers and Extensions Would Be Beneficial
GSA has established goals, targets, and associated measures—such as for lease planning and costs of extensions—it believes will reduce the use of holdovers and extensions and help keep track of potential impacts. While GSA has taken these important steps, it lacks specific, current goals and targets for assessing its actual performance in negotiating replacement leases on time, thereby avoiding holdovers and extensions. While we understand GSA’s rationale and acknowledge the complexity involved in setting goals and targets for the expiring lease replacement measure, leading practices in performance management show that a fundamental element in an organization’s efforts to manage for results is its ability to set meaningful goals for performance and to measure progress toward those goals as part of its strategic-planning efforts. Furthermore, specific, relevant targets related to what happens to GSA’s leases when they expire (i.e., whether they enter into holdover, extension, or a long- term solution) and GSA’s expected outcomes for expiring leases could provide GSA with valuable information to support its ongoing efforts to reduce lease holdovers and extensions, as well as allow for greater transparency and accountability to GSA’s stakeholders, including Congress, tenant agencies, and taxpayers. In addition, the prevalence of holdovers and extensions has caused some private lessors to voice their hesitancy to lease space to the federal government. GSA should ensure such goals, targets, and associated measures fully reflect progress, by taking into account the frequency with which holdovers and extensions occur for expiring leases within its portfolio and GSA’s expected outcomes for expiring leases. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which the General Services Administration’s (GSA) leases went into holdover or extension from fiscal years 2012 through 2014 and the potential effects and (2) why some expiring leases are extended or go into holdover and what actions GSA has taken to address this issue. | Why GAO Did This Study
Overreliance on costly leasing is one reason that federal real property has remained on GAO's High-Risk List. More than half of the leases in GSA's portfolio will expire in the next 5 years. When leases expire before a long-term solution can be finalized, GSA may pursue short-term extensions, or if GSA and a private lessor cannot come to agreement prior to expiration, the lease may go into holdover status—where a federal tenant occupies space without a contractual agreement. Extensions and holdovers may limit GSA's ability to obtain favorable contract terms. GAO was asked to review GSA's lease expirations and holdovers.
This report examines (1) the extent to which GSA's lease holdovers and extensions occur and the potential effects and (2) why some expiring leases are extended or go into holdover and what actions GSA has taken to address this issue. GAO reviewed regulations, GSA's guidance, and plans; analyzed GSA's leasing data from fiscal years 2012 through 2014; and interviewed GSA officials, federal agency officials, and lessors responsible for these leases.
What GAO Found
Lease holdovers and extensions were common in the General Services Administration's (GSA) lease portfolio from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, with a variety of effects. While leases in holdover or extension represented 27 percent of the overall portfolio, of the long-term leases set to expire over this time period, approximately 54 percent experienced a holdover or extension, or both—totaling 1,455 leases. Of these 1,455 leases, over half experienced only an extension, about 20 percent experienced only a holdover, and the remaining leases experienced both a holdover and an extension (see fig.). In addition, 1,603 leases in GSA's portfolio were in holdover or extension at the beginning of fiscal year 2012. Holdovers and extensions occurred throughout all of GSA's 11 regions and across the government, resulting in a number of potential effects. For example, while the cost impact is difficult to estimate, the short-term nature of holdovers and extensions creates uncertainty for GSA, tenant agencies, and lessors, which can make it challenging for GSA and federal tenant agencies to plan and budget for space needs and difficult for lessors to secure financing.
Holdovers and extensions occur for a variety of reasons, including challenges finalizing space requirements and the duration of the leasing process. GSA officials noted that extensions can also be used strategically, such as to align varying lease-expiration dates across multiple leases when consolidating space into a single lease. To reduce holdovers and extensions, GSA has undertaken initiatives to improve lease planning, to begin the leasing process earlier, and to improve communication with agencies. For example, GSA has provided new guidance to its regions to begin the leasing process earlier. In addition, GSA has established goals, targets, and measures—such as for lease planning and costs of extensions—it believes will reduce the need for holdovers and extensions and help track potential effects. However, GSA lacks specific, current goals and targets to assess its actual performance in avoiding holdovers and extensions. Leading practices in performance management show that a fundamental element in an organization's efforts to manage for results is its ability to set meaningful goals for performance and to measure progress toward those goals. Specific, relevant goals and targets related to what happens to GSA's leases when they expire and expected outcomes could provide GSA with valuable information to identify any actions needed to support its ongoing efforts, and allow for greater transparency and accountability to GSA's stakeholders.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA identify performance goals and targets for measures related to the use of holdovers and extensions for expiring leases that take into account the frequency with which holdovers and extensions occur and GSA's expected outcomes for expiring leases. GSA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-526 | gao_GAO-15-526_0 | We also found that EPA and the Task Force agencies had not fully established a plan to guide an adaptive management process for the GLRI that could allow them to assess the We effectiveness of GLRI actions and, if needed, adjust their efforts.recommended, among other things, that the EPA Administrator, in coordination with the Task Force, address how factors outside the scope of the Action Plan that may limit progress, such as the effects of climate change, may affect GLRI efforts to restore the Great Lakes, and establish an adaptive management plan. $1.68 Billion Was Made Available for the GLRI in Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014, with $1.15 Billion Expended on 2,123 Projects as of January 2015
In fiscal years 2010 through 2014, $1.68 billion of federal funds was made available for the GLRI, and as of January 2015, EPA had allocated nearly all of the $1.68 billion, and the Task Force agencies had expended $1.15 billion on 2,123 GLRI projects. In agreeing on GLRI work and funding for fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the Task Force created a subgroup for each of the three priority issues and set aside a total of about $180 million to pay for work to address these issues. To agree on GLRI work to be conducted in fiscal year 2015 and future fiscal years, EPA officials told us that the Task Force began creating additional subgroups through which Task Force agency officials would work together to identify each agency’s GLRI work and share of GLRI funding in all five of the focus areas in the 2015-2019 Action Plan, not just the three priority issues. Information on GLRI Projects Activities and Results Is Available from Individual Agencies, while Project Information in GLAS Was Limited by Some Inaccurate Data
The Task Force has made some information about GLRI projects, including project activities and results, available to Congress and the public in three accomplishment reports and the GLRI website. In addition, the individual Task Force agencies collect information on activities and results from recipients, although this information is not collected and reported by EPA. Specifically, after reviewing the GLAS data we provided on funding amounts for 1,558 projects, four of the five agencies identified inaccuracies in the GLRI funding amounts that the agencies or their recipients had reported in GLAS. Some of these inaccuracies could have been caught through data quality controls or other edit checks, but our analysis found that EPA did not have controls for GLAS to prevent such errors. After this testing, in May 2015, EPA officials decided to use EAGL to collect information to monitor and report on GLRI progress, and they made the system available to Task Force agencies for an initial period of data entry. Fully implementing the actions needed to address the reliability of GLRI project data should ensure that EPA and the Task Force agencies can have confidence that EAGL can provide complete and accurate information. In particular, for a recommendation in our draft report that EPA determine whether the agency should continue using GLAS or acquire a different system to collect information to monitor and report on GLRI progress, EPA stated in its written comments that GLAS is no longer in use and has been replaced by EAGL. As a result, we removed the recommendation from the report. Third, for a recommendation that EPA should ensure that GLAS or another system establishes data quality control activities, such as verifications and documented procedures for ensuring system reliability, EPA stated that it will establish data quality control activities such as verifications and documented procedures for ensuring the reliability of the EAGL information system. We examined the (1) amount of federal funds made available for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) and expended for projects; (2) process the Great Lakes Interagency Task Force (Task Force) used to identify GLRI work and funding; and (3) information available about GLRI project activities and results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The GLRI seeks to address issues such as water quality contamination and nonnative, or “invasive,” species that threaten the health of the Great Lakes ecosystem. A Task Force of 11 federal agencies, chaired by the EPA Administrator, oversees the GLRI. Task Force agencies conduct work themselves or through agreements with nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, or other entities.
GAO was asked to review how GLRI funds have been used. This report examines the (1) amount of federal funds made available for the GLRI and expended for projects; (2) process the Task Force used to identify GLRI work and funding; and (3) information available about GLRI project activities and results. GAO analyzed funding data for the GLRI and five agencies that received the majority of GLRI funds; GLAS data; accomplishment reports; and 19 GLRI projects selected by funding amounts and agencies to illustrate projects with typical funding amounts. This sample is not generalizable to all projects.
What GAO Found
Nearly all of the $1.68 billion of federal funds made available for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 had been allocated as of January 2015. Of the $1.66 billion allocated, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the other Task Force agencies expended $1.15 billion for 2,123 projects (see fig.). Agencies can liquidate and adjust obligations for 7 years after funds are no longer available for obligation.
The Task Force's process to identify each agency's GLRI work and funding has evolved to emphasize interagency discussion. In fiscal year 2012, the Task Force created subgroups to discuss and identify work on three issues, setting aside about $180 million for these issues over 3 years. This included cleaning up severely degraded locations called Areas of Concern, such as the White Lake Area of Concern in Michigan that involved sediment cleanup; preventing invasive species; and reducing nutrient runoff. EPA officials told GAO that the Task Force created additional subgroups to identify all GLRI work and funding beginning in 2015.
The Task Force has made some information about GLRI project activities and results available to Congress and the public in three accomplishment reports. In addition, the individual Task Force agencies collect information on activities and results, although this information is not collected and reported by EPA. The conference report accompanying the Department of the Interior Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2010 directed EPA to establish a process to ensure monitoring and reporting on the progress of the GLRI. EPA created the Great Lakes Accountability System (GLAS) to monitor and report on GLRI progress, but some GLAS data are inaccurate, in part, because EPA did not provide clear guidance on entering certain information and GLAS did not have data quality controls. According to EPA officials, the agency replaced GLAS and, in May 2015, began an initial period of data entry into the new system. EPA also provided guidance on entering information into the new system and plans to establish data control activities for ensuring the reliability of the new system. Fully implementing these control activities should ensure that EPA can have confidence that the system can produce data that are accurate and complete.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommended in its draft report that EPA determine if it should continue using GLAS or acquire a different system and ensure that the agency develops guidance for entering data and establishes data quality control activities. EPA took action to address these recommendations as GAO completed its work. GAO reviewed the actions taken and determined that the recommendations had been addressed. As a result, GAO removed the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-143 | gao_GAO-10-143_0 | RAC claim reviews in the national program involve the same processes of automated and complex review of claims as during the demonstration project, and the Medicare claims administration contractors are responsible for recoupments, claims adjustments, and provider outreach and education. CMS Did Not Establish an Adequate Process to Address RAC-Identified Vulnerabilities That Led to Improper Payments; Corrective Actions Were Limited
CMS did not establish an adequate process during the demonstration project or in planning for the national program to ensure prompt resolution of the RAC-identified improper payment vulnerabilities. Although the agency’s goal was for the RACs to provide information to CMS and Medicare claims administration contractors that could help prevent future improper payments, CMS did not implement corrective actions for 60 percent of the most significant vulnerabilities identified during the RAC demonstration project. The IPPP listed the 58 most significant RAC-identified vulnerabilities—generally those that resulted in overpayment collections of $1 million or more—and whether any corrective actions were taken to address them. CMS’s Corrective Actions Did Not Address Most of the RAC-Identified Vulnerabilities That Led to Improper Payments
The lack of accountability and adequate processes for ensuring corrective actions are taken have resulted in most of the RAC-identified vulnerabilities that led to improper payments going unaddressed. Moreover, CMS officials and one of the RACs noted that many of these vulnerabilities were known to CMS before the demonstration project due to medical record reviews and the agency’s error reports. In addition, CMS reported that it was also expanding the use of electronic data to more efficiently detect improper payments and program vulnerabilities. CMS Is Taking Action to Resolve RAC and Medicare Claims Administration Contractor Coordination Issues
CMS used lessons learned from the RAC demonstration project to take actions to resolve RAC and Medicare claims administration contractor coordination issues for the RAC national program. CMS is taking multiple steps to resolve RAC and Medicare claims administration contractor coordination issues in the national program based on lessons learned during the demonstration project, such as continuing the RAC and Medicare claims administration contractors vulnerability calls, enhancing the existing data warehouse, automating the claims-adjustment process, and developing a system for electronic documentation sharing when RAC determinations are appealed. CMS Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of RAC Accuracy and Service to Providers
CMS took a number of steps to improve oversight of the accuracy of RACs’ claims review determinations and the quality of RAC service to providers in the national program. Specifically, CMS added processes to review the accuracy of RAC determinations and established Web site requirements to address provider concerns about service. CMS Established Processes to Review the Accuracy of RAC Determinations and Required Additional RAC Medical Expertise to Enhance Program Accuracy
For the national program, CMS created processes to more closely review the accuracy of RAC determinations to address provider concerns raised during the demonstration project. CMS officials in OFM have authority to allow the RACs to pursue clear-cut vulnerabilities that can lead to improper payments, such as duplicate payments for the same service. CMS required each RAC by January 1, 2010, to develop a tool on its Web site that will allow providers to track the status of a claim. CMS Developed Performance Metrics to Monitor RAC Accuracy and Provider Service
CMS developed performance metrics to oversee RAC accuracy, service to providers, and other aspects of performance. Neither the IPPP developed during the demonstration project nor the current plan for the national program provide for sufficient monitoring and control activities to ensure that corrective actions are taken to help meet the overall goal of reducing improper payments in the Medicare program. Appendix I: Selected Changes Made to the Medicare National Recovery Audit Contractors (RAC) Program
As a result of the RAC demonstration project, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) included the following features in the RAC national program: RACs are to have a physician medical director. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conducted a mandated 3-year project from March 2005 through March 2008 to demonstrate the use of recovery audit contractors (RAC) in identifying Medicare improper payments and recouping overpayments. CMS implemented a mandated national RAC program, which began in March 2009. GAO was asked to examine specific issues that arose during the demonstration project and CMS's efforts to address them in the national RAC program. This report examines the extent to which CMS (1) developed a process and took corrective actions to address vulnerabilities identified by the RACs that led to improper payments, (2) resolved coordination issues between the RACs and the Medicare claims administration contractors, and (3) established methods to oversee RAC claim review accuracy and provider service during the national program. GAO reviewed CMS documents and interviewed officials from CMS and contractors and provider groups affected by the demonstration project.
What GAO Found
CMS did not establish an adequate process in the 3-year demonstration project or in planning for the national program to address RAC-identified vulnerabilities that led to improper payments, such as paying duplicate claims for the same service. CMS stated that one purpose of the demonstration project was to obtain information to help prevent improper payments. However, CMS has not yet implemented corrective actions for 60 percent of the most significant RAC-identified vulnerabilities that led to improper payments, a situation that left 35 of 58 unaddressed. These were vulnerabilities for which RACs identified over $1 million in improper payments for medical services or $500,000 for durable medical equipment. CMS developed a spreadsheet, which listed the most significant improper payment vulnerabilities that were identified by the RACs during the demonstration project. However, the agency did not develop a plan to take corrective action or implement sufficient monitoring, oversight, and control activities to ensure these significant vulnerabilities were addressed. Thus, CMS did not address significant vulnerabilities representing $231 million in overpayments identified by the RACs during the demonstration project. For the RAC national program, CMS developed a process to compile identified vulnerabilities and recommend actions to prevent improper payments. However, this corrective action process lacks certain essential procedures and staff with the authority to ensure that these vulnerabilities are resolved promptly and adequately to prevent further improper payments. Based on lessons learned during the demonstration project, CMS took multiple steps in the national program to resolve coordination issues between the RACs and Medicare claims administration contractors. During the demonstration project, CMS learned that having regular communication with the claims administration contractors on improper payment vulnerabilities that the RACs were identifying was important. CMS also learned that the data warehouse used to store claims information for the RACs needed more capacity and utility, that manual claims adjustment by claims administration contractors to recoup improper payments was burdensome, and that sharing paper copies of medical records between RACs and claims administration contractors when claims denials were appealed was difficult to manage. As a result, CMS took steps to resolve these coordination issues in the national program, such as enhancing the existing data warehouse and automating the claims-adjustment process. CMS took steps to improve oversight of the accuracy of RACs' claims reviews and the quality of their service to providers for the national program. CMS added processes to review the accuracy of RAC determinations, including independent reviews by another CMS contractor. CMS also established requirements to address provider concerns about service, such as having the RACs establish Web sites that will allow providers to track the status of a claim being reviewed. In addition, CMS established performance metrics that the agency will use to monitor RAC accuracy and service to providers. |
gao_T-GGD-98-25 | gao_T-GGD-98-25_0 | Federal Housing Enterprises: Operations of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the operations of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and the status of OFHEO’s efforts to fulfill its mission of helping to ensure the safety and soundness of the two largest housing government-sponsored enterprises: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises). We concluded that OFHEO has not yet fully implemented its statutory responsibilities and faces considerable future challenges in doing so. In particular, OFHEO currently does not expect to establish final risk-based capital standards for the enterprises until 1999, even though this process was to have been completed under the act by December 1, 1994. Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been consistently profitable in recent years, we believe it is essential, given the enterprises’ outstanding financial commitments of about $1.5 trillion at year-end 1996, that OFHEO implement its safety and soundness responsibilities as quickly as feasible so that any potential long-term financial risks to taxpayers are lowered. Thus, we believe that strong congressional oversight of the development process is necessary to help ensure that OFHEO’s plan to complete the risk-based capital standards is accomplished as quickly as feasible. OFHEO Has Not Fully Implemented a Comprehensive and Timely Enterprise Examination Oversight Program
In the absence of a stress test and risk-based capital standards, OFHEO’s primary means of helping to ensure the safety and soundness of the enterprises is its examination program. OFHEO’s 3-to 4-year examination cycle and limited examination coverage raise questions about the organization’s ability to fully monitor the enterprises’ financial activities and risks. Limited Resources Allocated to the Examination Office and Attrition Contributed to OFHEO’s Inability to Fully Implement the 1994 Plan
decision to commit virtually its entire staff of line examiners to each core risk examination for 1 year and the significant attrition the examination office has experienced have contributed to OFHEO’s inability to fully implement its 2-year examination cycle. We stated in our report that, without a reassessment of and potential reallocation of resources, OFHEO may not be able to implement an annual examination cycle by early 1998, since it had not fully implemented a 2-year cycle with existing examination office resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the operations of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and the status of OFHEO's efforts to fulfill its mission of helping to ensure the safety and soundness of the two largest government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OFHEO has not fully implemented its statutory safety and soundness responsibilities for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and faces considerable future challenges in doing so; (2) OFHEO does not expect to complete a stress test and risk-based capital standards for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac until 1999, though it was to be completed by December 1, 1994; (3) OFHEO has not fully implemented a comprehensive and timely enterprise examination program, resulting in its limited ability to lower the long-term financial risks to taxpayers associated with the enterprises' activities; (4) GAO has identified a number of reasons for OFHEO's inability to comply with the statutory deadline for completing the stress test and risk based capital standards; (5) GAO believes that strong congressional oversight of the development process is necessary to ensure that OFHEO completes the process as quickly as feasible; (6) OFHEO has not been able to fully implement an enterprise examination schedule that it established in 1994, has taken 3 to 4 years to examine the major risks facing the enterprises, and reduced the planned coverage of the most recently completed risk examination; (7) among other factors, limited resources allocated to the examination office and staff attrition contributed to OFHEO's inability to fully implement the 1994 plan; (8) OFHEO officials said that they planned to reassess the examination cycle and implement an annual examination cycle by early 1998 to cover all enterprise risks; (9) without a reassessment of resource requirements and potentially a reallocation of resources to the examinations office, OFHEO may not be able to fully implement an annual examination cycle; and (10) although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been consistently profitable in recent years, GAO believes it is essential, given the enterprises' outstanding financial commitments of approximately $1.5 trillion at year-end 1996, that OFHEO implement its safety and soundness responsibilities as quickly as feasible. |
gao_RCED-98-8 | gao_RCED-98-8_0 | Under MCSAP, the federal government funds up to 80 percent of the costs of each state’s motor carrier safety program. During a compliance review, OMC and/or state investigators perform an on-site review of a motor carrier’s compliance with federal safety regulations by assessing its policies, management controls, and operations. From 1983 through 1995, the rate of fatal accidents involving large trucks dropped by 42 percent—from 4.3 to 2.5 fatal accidents per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. MCSAP and Other Initiatives Have Contributed to Improved Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
OMC and state officials and industry representatives told us that the most important factors in reducing the rate of fatal accidents involving commercial vehicles were federal and state initiatives to improve safety for commercial vehicles and actions that trucking firms have taken to improve the safety of their trucks and drivers. The new plan is intended to give each state more flexibility in choosing the combination of programs that would best achieve the goal of reducing motor carrier accidents in the state while retaining minimum levels of effort for roadside inspections. In fiscal year 1996, OMC identified motor carriers for compliance reviews primarily through its Selective Compliance and Enforcement (SCE) list, which prioritized motor carriers on such factors as the commodity being transported and the carrier’s out-of-service rate for vehicles, prior compliance reviews, and the written complaints that it had received. In April 1997, consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, OMC began using SafeStat, a computer program that uses performance-based data on accidents, roadside inspections, and compliance reviews to identify problem carriers. Many States Have Improved the Completeness and Timeliness of Their Safetynet Data
A key element in implementing performance-based criteria for selecting motor carriers is ensuring that the Safetynet database contains complete, accurate, and timely data about each motor carrier’s safety performance. The program assigns the vehicle a score on the basis of the number and the results of the motor carrier’s previous inspections and compliance reviews. While OMC will continue to perform compliance reviews, especially to upgrade the safety management of problem carriers, OMC plans to publish an advance notice of proposed rule making later this year to solicit public comments on alternatives for rating a carrier’s safety fitness, including the possible use of performance-based criteria. The investigators also examine the carrier’s recordable accidents. Recommendations
To better ensure that the safety fitness ratings of commercial motor carriers accurately reflect their on-the-road performance, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation (1) identify the barriers that prevent the states from providing complete and timely data and work with the states to develop a strategy for addressing each barrier and (2) develop alternative approaches to SafeStat, such as consulting with state and local law enforcement officials to identify problem motor carriers, in the states that have inadequate data. Recordable, preventable accident rate from compliance reviews. 1. Out-of-service violations for hazardous materials from roadside inspections. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carriers' commercial motor vehicle safety programs, focusing on the efforts by the Office and the states to: (1) reduce serious accidents by conducting roadside inspections and compliance reviews; (2) better target motor carriers for compliance reviews; and (3) improve the compliance review criteria for assessing and rating a carrier's safety fitness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal, state, and industry officials told GAO that federal and state initiatives to improve the safety of commercial vehicles and actions taken by trucking firms to improve the safety of their trucks and drivers were the most important factors behind the 42-percent reduction in the fatal accident rate for large trucks from 1983 to 1995; (2) effective in fiscal year (FY) 1998, the Office revised the criteria for awarding funding from the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program to provide each state with more flexibility in choosing the combination of programs--including roadside inspections and compliance reviews--that would best reduce accidents involving commercial vehicles; (3) in April 1997, consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Office began using performance-based data through its Safety Status Measurement System to identify carriers with the worst highway safety records; (4) while many states have improved the completeness and timeliness of their data submissions in recent years, the Office found that: (a) the states, overall, reported only about 74 percent of the recordable accidents in 1995; and (b) during FY 1997, five states submitted accident data more than 6 months, on average, after the accidents occurred; (5) without these data, the Office and the states cannot effectively target their limited compliance review resources on the motor carriers with safety problems; (6) the Office is in the early stages of revising its criteria for assessing and rating a commercial motor carrier's safety fitness; (7) the Office rates carriers on the basis of compliance reviews that examine a carrier's: (a) compliance with federal motor carrier safety regulations (primarily those related to financial responsibility, drivers' qualifications and operations, including hours-of-service, vehicle inspection and maintenance, and any hazardous materials handling); and (b) recordable, preventable accident rate; (8) while compliance reviews will continue to be an important element of the federal motor carrier safety program, the Office plans to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit public comments on alternatives for rating motor carriers' safety fitness; and (9) one option under consideration is to rely on accident date, roadside inspections, and other performance-based data for safety fitness ratings. |
gao_AIMD-96-9FS | gao_AIMD-96-9FS_0 | Operating Information
The PMAs—Alaska Power Administration (Alaska), Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville), Southeastern Power Administration (Southeastern), Southwestern Power Administration (Southwestern), and Western Area Power Administration (Western)—were established from 1937 through 1977 to sell and transmit electricity generated mainly from federal hydropower facilities. Western owns and operates over 16,000 miles of transmission lines serving customers in all or parts of 15 states. In 1994, Bonneville accounted for about 69 percent of total PMA revenues. In addition, table I.2 in appendix I shows some operating statistics including the amount of generating capacity used to generate the power sold by the PMAs, and the number of power plants, miles of transmission lines, and employees for each PMA, as of September 30, 1994. As shown in figure 3, as a whole, public power customers are not dependent on the PMAs as their sole source of power. The PMAs, other than Bonneville, generally receive appropriations annually to cover operations and maintenance expenses and capital investments in their transmission assets.10, 11, In fiscal year 1994, the PMAs received about $328 million in appropriations. The PMAs do not set their rates to earn a profit. The gross repayable investment assigned to be repaid by power revenues totaled nearly $34 billion, as of September 30, 1994. The PMAs generated about $3.2 billion in power-related revenues in fiscal year 1994. In addition, the PMAs’ weighted average interest rates on their outstanding debt to the Treasury ranged from 2.7 to 4.6 percent in fiscal year 1994.This compares with an average interest rate of 8.1 percent on outstanding long-term debt for the nation’s 179 largest investor-owned utilities in 1993, according to a DOE report. Because the PMAs’ debt is at low interest rates, four of the five PMAs have been able to carry high levels of debt without a corresponding increase in financial risk. However, as explained in the following discussion on competitive issues, high levels of debt currently pose problems for Bonneville and could pose problems for other PMAs in a more competitive environment. 3. 5. A Study of Power Marketing Administration Selected Financial Management Practices. U.S. Department of Energy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's five power marketing administrations (PMA), focusing on operating, financial, and competitive issues facing PMA.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) five PMA were established between 1937 and 1977 to sell and transmit electricity generated mostly from federal hydropower facilities; (2) PMA power accounted for about 3 percent of the power generated nationally in 1993; (3) each PMA owns and operates about 16,000 miles of transmission lines, serves customers in up to 15 states, and is headed by an appointed administrator that is authorized to make PMA operation decisions; (4) all PMA are required to give preferences in power sales to public power customers, but these customers are not dependent on PMA as their sole source of power; (5) although PMA operations and maintenance expenses and capital investments are covered by congressional appropriations, PMA are required to repay their transmission asset appropriations; (6) PMA are required to set their power rates to generate only enough revenue to recover costs; (7) PMA generated about $3.2 billion in power-related revenues in fiscal year 1994, but gross repayable investments totalled $34 billion as of September 1994; (8) as of September 1994, $23 billion of PMA cumulative debt was outstanding; (9) PMA are required to repay their debt and interest using revenues generated from power sales; and (10) although most PMA have been able to carry high levels of debt without an increase in financial risk, high levels of PMA debt could pose problems for PMA in a more competitive marketplace. |
gao_GAO-06-954T | gao_GAO-06-954T_0 | Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Prevention Controls
Prevention is the most effective and efficient way to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse in any federal program, including disaster assistance, and is also a key element described in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Figure 2 displays how preventive controls fit within a larger fraud, waste, and abuse prevention program. However, our work related to FEMA’s management of the IHP program for hurricanes Katrina and Rita found that their limited use of a third-party validation process left room for substantial fraud. However, within the FEMA IHP program we found significant fraud related to expedited assistance payments that were made prior to any physical inspection being performed. Adhering to existing control procedures is therefore also crucial when maintaining effective fraud prevention. Fraud Training and Field Testing
Beyond the uniform recording and validation of data, other controls, including a well-trained work force that is aware of the potential for fraud, can help prevent fraud. Detection and Monitoring
Even with effective preventive controls, there is substantial residual risk that fraudulent registrants are likely to gain access to a disaster relief program and begin to receive payments. Detection and monitoring efforts are addressed in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and include such activities as data-mining registrations, which have received payments, ensuring accountability over funds and monitoring how the disaster assistance is being spent, and establishing mechanisms to identify the existence of fraud. Also, setting up hotlines to identify potential frauds is an important activity that should be in place when distributing disaster funds. Finally, any lessons learned from detection and monitoring efforts should be used to improve preventive controls to reduce the risk for fraud, waste, and abuse in the future. The data-mining we performed on FEMA’s IHP program showed how important constant monitoring and detection can be. Investigations and Prosecution of Offenders
The final aspect of a program designed to reduce fraud in a disaster assistance program is the investigation and aggressive prosecution of individuals who have fraudulently received disaster assistance. In the course of our work performed on IHP fraud for hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we identified tens of thousands of potentially fraudulent registrations. This included one individual indicted for fraudulently obtaining over $25,000 from FEMA based on bogus registrations. While investigations and prosecution can be the most visible means to deal with fraudsters, they are also the most costly and should not be used in place of other more effective controls. Still, by successfully prosecuting fraudsters, agencies can deter others who are thinking of taking advantage of disaster programs. Concluding Comments
Managers of federal disaster assistance programs face a dual challenge— delivering aid as quickly as possible while at the same time ensuring that relief payments go only to those who are truly in need. Implementing an effective system of fraud prevention controls including upfront controls, post payment detection and monitoring, and prosecuting those who have exploited control weaknesses are crucial to building the American taxpayer’s confidence that federal disaster assistance is given to those in need. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies spend billions of dollars annually to aid victims of natural and other disasters and acts of terrorism. Managers of federal disaster assistance programs face a dual challenge--delivering aid as quickly as possible while at the same time ensuring that relief payments go only to those who are truly in need. Due to the very nature of the government's need to quickly provide assistance to disaster victims, federal disaster relief programs are vulnerable to significant risk of improper payments and fraudulent activities. On February 13, 2006, and on June 14, 2006, GAO testified concerning extensive fraud, waste, and abuse in the Individuals and Household Program (IHP), a component of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster assistance programs. GAO identified significant internal control weaknesses that resulted in FEMA making tens of thousands of Expedited Assistance payments that were based on bogus registration data. GAO also found numerous other internal control failures in FEMA's IHP disaster assistance program, resulting in an estimate that FEMA made $600 million to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to registrants. The purpose of this testimony is to establish a framework for preventing, detecting, and prosecuting disaster assistance fraud.
What GAO Found
Recent GAO audits have illustrated the importance of an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system in federal disaster assistance programs. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide a framework for internal control that can be used to minimize fraudulent, wasteful, and abusive activity regardless of whether dealing with the effects of natural disasters like hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or coping with the destruction left by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A well-designed fraud prevention system should consist of three crucial elements: (1) upfront preventive controls, (2) detection and monitoring, and (3) investigations and prosecutions. Upfront preventive controls can help screen out the majority of fraud, and are the most effective and efficient means to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse. Detection and monitoring, and aggressive prosecution of individuals committing fraud, while also crucial elements of an effective system, are less effective and generally cost more. Audit work has long confirmed that upfront preventive controls are most effective when they require validation of data provided by disaster registrants against other government or third-party sources, and physical inspections when possible. Preventive controls should also include procedures designed to identify problem registrants prior to payments. Training personnel on fraud awareness and potential fraud schemes is also an integral component in preventive controls. Collectively, these preventive controls can help improve program integrity and safeguard tax dollars. An effective fraud deterrence program must also include resources to continually monitor and detect potential fraud, and aggressively investigate and prosecute individuals who received assistance fraudulently. Monitoring and detection include data-mining for suspicious registrations and payment usage, and setting up fraud hotlines. Finally, program integrity is enhanced by investigating and prosecuting individuals who take advantage of program weaknesses. However, the high costs of prosecutions highlight our conclusion that upfront preventive controls are most effective in preventing fraud, and that lessons learned from detection and prosecutions should be used to improve preventive controls. |
gao_GAO-02-549T | gao_GAO-02-549T_0 | To develop this essential national strategy, the federal role needs to be considered in relation to other levels of government, the goals and objectives for preparedness, and the most appropriate tools to assist and enable other levels of government and the private sector to achieve these goals. More than 40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to terrorism, and more than 20 federal entities in bioterrorism alone. Concerns about coordination and fragmentation in federal preparedness efforts are well founded. The first of these is a lack of a cohesive effort from within the federal government. As state and local officials have noted, the multiplicity of programs can lead to confusion at the state and local levels and can expend precious federal resources unnecessarily or make it difficult for them to identify available federal preparedness resources. These are critical components for assessing program results. Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today—a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an establishment of goals and performance measures, and a selection of appropriate tools— is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from terrorist attacks. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency. | What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is intergovernmental, national policymakers need a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges when formulating antiterrorism strategies. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and program duplication. This situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals. |
gao_GAO-09-358 | gao_GAO-09-358_0 | Closing inactive investigations. Improving management of the Fair Funds program. We noted that because SEC had not yet staffed or defined the roles and responsibilities of a new office being established to administer the Fair Fund program, it was not possible to determine the extent to which the office may better facilitate the distribution of funds to investors harmed by securities fraud and other violations. Enforcement has now developed written procedures for review and approval of new investigations, which are included in a recently completed enforcement manual. Furthermore, our review identified questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of a dual reporting structure established for OCD. OCD has a deputy director. Also, the deputy director said that there has been confusion among OCD staff reporting to her on what issues are appropriate for the attention of the OCD director. Investigative Staffing Has Fallen and Resource Challenges Undermine the Ability to Bring Enforcement Actions
Overall Enforcement resources and case activity generally have been level in recent years, but the number of front-line investigative staff has fallen. As turnover has decreased, the experience level of front-line attorneys has increased. Meanwhile, Enforcement’s case backlog has declined somewhat, as the division has made case closings a greater priority (see fig. 5). More specifically, investigative attorneys with whom we spoke cited a number of resource challenges that have undercut their efforts, causing significant delays in bringing cases, reducing the number of cases that can be brought, and potentially undermining the quality of cases. Both SEC strategic goals and GAO internal control standards call for making efficient and effective use of resources a priority. Overall, the agency’s strategic plan calls for targeting resources strategically, examining whether positions are deployed effectively, and exploring how to improve program design and organizational structure. Our review also shows that in adopting and implementing the policies, the Commission did not act in concert with agency strategic goals calling for broad communication with, and involvement of, the staff. Enforcement Management, Investigative Attorneys, and Others Said That the Recent Penalty Policies have Contributed to Delays in Cases, and Fewer and Smaller Corporate Penalties
According to Enforcement management, investigative attorneys, and others, the 2006 and 2007 corporate penalty policies, as applied, have had a number of effects. Investigative attorneys have also been concerned that at the same time, it became more difficult to obtain formal orders of investigation, which compel witnesses by subpoena to testify and produce books, records, and other documents. In particular, the Enforcement division, which is responsible for implementing the policies, had only limited input into their development. Also, during both the adoption and implementation of these policies, the Commission has restricted communication, curtailing Enforcement management and staff input and insight into policies that management and staff are responsible for executing. 2. As part of ongoing efforts to explore the more effective use of resources, and to streamline internal review of cases and investigations, expand Enforcement’s current examination of its methods to include the level and mix of resources available to investigative staff in the areas of administrative and paralegal support, specialized services and expertise, and information technology support; and include in the examination an evaluation of the impact of the case review process on organizational culture factors such as risk aversion and incentives to drop or narrow the scope of cases. 3. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our first objective—evaluating the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Division of Enforcement’s (Enforcement) progress made in implementing our August 2007 recommendations—we reviewed relevant SEC and Enforcement documentation, including a report by the SEC Office of Inspector General on the Hub investigation management information system, the division’s Enforcement Manual, a user manual created for the Hub system, the agency’s fiscal year 2009 Congressional Justification, and documents detailing the organization and activities of SEC’s Office of Collections and Distributions (OCD). We also reviewed SEC’s strategic plan, federal internal control standards, and prior GAO reports on SEC and Enforcement processes and operations, including information technology systems and the Fair Fund program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) plays a key role in meeting the agency's mission to protect investors and maintain fair and orderly markets. In recent years, Enforcement has brought cases yielding record civil penalties, but questions have been raised about its capacity to manage its resources and fulfill its law enforcement and investor protection responsibilities. GAO was asked to evaluate, among other issues, (1) SEC's progress toward implementing GAO's 2007 recommendations; (2) the extent to which Enforcement has an appropriate mix of resources dedicated to achieving its objectives; and (3) the adoption, implementation, and effects of recent penalty policies. GAO analyzed information on resources, enforcement actions, and penalties; and interviewed current and former SEC officials and staff, and others.
What GAO Found
SEC has fully implemented three of GAO's four 2007 recommendations. GAO recommended SEC establish procedures for approving new investigations and for operating its new investigation management information system called the Hub; consider procedures for closing inactive cases; and improve management of the Fair Funds program, which returns funds to harmed investors. Enforcement has developed the procedures for new investigations and for operating the Hub, and made case closings a higher priority. SEC has also staffed a new Office of Collections and Distributions (OCD), which is responsible in part for administering the Fair Funds program. However, OCD has a dual reporting structure in which most of the staff report to Enforcement, not the OCD director. According to OCD management, this structure has slowed work and confused staff. SEC strategic goals and GAO internal control standards call for making efficient and effective use of resources a priority. SEC's strategic plan also calls for improving program design and organizational structures. Recent overall Enforcement resources and activities have been relatively level, but the number of investigative attorneys has decreased 11.5 percent over fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Enforcement management said resource levels have allowed them to continue to bring cases across a range of violations, but both management and staff said resource challenges have delayed cases, reduced the number of cases that can be brought, and potentially undermined the quality of some cases. Specifically, investigative attorneys cited the low level of administrative, paralegal, and information technology support, and unavailability of specialized services and expertise, as challenges to bringing actions. Also, Enforcement staff said a burdensome system for internal case review has slowed cases and created a risk-averse culture. SEC's strategic plan calls for targeting resources strategically, examining whether positions are deployed effectively, and improving program design and organizational structure. Enforcement management has begun examining ways to streamline case review, but the focus is process-oriented and does not give consideration to assessing organizational culture issues. Enforcement management, investigative attorneys, and others agreed that two recent corporate penalty polices--on factors for imposing penalties, and Commission pre-approval of a settlement range--have delayed cases and produced fewer, smaller penalties. GAO also identified other concerns, including the perception that SEC had "retreated" on penalties, and made it more difficult for investigative staff to obtain "formal orders of investigation," which allow issuance of subpoenas for testimony and records. Our review also showed that in adopting and implementing the penalty policies, the Commission did not act in concert with agency strategic goals calling for broad communication with, and involvement of, the staff. In particular, Enforcement had limited input into the policies the division would be responsible for implementing. As a result, Enforcement attorneys reported frustration and uncertainty in application of the penalty policies. |
gao_GAO-05-79 | gao_GAO-05-79_0 | Weaknesses in Error- Prone, Manual Travel Reimbursement Process Were Exacerbated by Increased Operational Tempo
The paper-intensive process used by DOD to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for their travel expenses was not designed to handle the dramatic increase in travel vouchers since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military activity. Guard soldiers told us about a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments. As a result, the soldiers were housed off-post in commercial hotels or apartments. Impact That Travel Reimbursement Problems Have Had on Army Guard Soldiers and Their Families
Our case studies of selected units and data mining of individual vouchers identified numerous soldiers who experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for travel expenses. We found that guidance did not adequately address some significant conditions that entitled a soldier to reimbursement of authorized meal expenses. The following example shows the effects of that problem. To its credit, during fiscal year 2004, DFAS CTO enhanced its training program for voucher examiners. System Problems Hamper Travel Reimbursement Process
Coupled with the process flaws and human capital issues previously addressed in this report, the lack of systems integration and automation along with other systems deficiencies contributed significantly to the travel reimbursement problems we identified. Defense Travel System Currently Does Not Address Key Issues for Mobilized Army Guard Soldiers
DOD’s current plan—deployment of the Defense Travel System (DTS)—to automate its paper-intensive, manual travel reimbursement process will not resolve key flaws we found in reimbursement of travel expenses to mobilized Army Guard soldiers. However, DTS is currently not able to process mobilized travel authorizations (e.g., mobilization orders, TCS orders, and SNAs) and vouchers and, therefore, does not provide an end-to-end solution for paying mobilized Army Guard soldiers for travel entitlements. We also reviewed the following Defense Finance and Accounting Service – Indianapolis (DFAS-IN), Travel Technical Messages (TTM)— policy implementation messages relating to late payment fees and interest: TTM 00-08, May 2000, which implemented the provisions of TTRA and provided that its terms applied to “settlement vouchers;”
TTM 01-01, November 2000, which provided that late payment interest and fees be calculated and submitted by the traveler on the final payment amount only; TTM 03-04, April 2003, which removed the requirement that the late payment interest calculation was to be calculated and submitted by the traveler; and TTM 04-10, May 2004, which directed that late payment interest and fees be calculated on all travel vouchers, not just final vouchers, as well as directed reviewers to sign a travel voucher on the same day it is submitted so that DFAS-IN can apply TTRA requirements using the reviewer’s signature date as a surrogate for the submission date. Instead, we used case study and data mining to provide a more detailed perspective of the design of controls and the nature of deficiencies in the key areas of processes, people (human capital), and systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to determine (1) the impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families; (2) the adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements; and (3) whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) current efforts to automate its travel reimbursement process will resolve the problems identified. GAO selected and audited 10 case study units that were identified in a preliminary assessment as having a variety of travel reimbursement problems.
What GAO Found
Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses. These weaknesses were more glaring in light of the sustained increase in mobilized Guard soldiers following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To its credit, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) hired over 200 new personnel to address travel voucher processing backlogs and recently upgraded their training. However, Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments. The soldier bears primary responsibility for travel voucher preparation, including obtaining paper copies of various types of authorizations. DFAS data indicate that it rejected and asked soldiers to resubmit about 18 percent of vouchers during fiscal year 2004--a churning process that added to delays and frustration. Also, existing guidance did not clearly address the sometimes complex travel situations of mobilized Army Guard soldiers, who were often housed off-post due to overcrowding on military installations. Further, DOD continued to be noncompliant with a law that requires payment of late payment interest and fees when soldiers' travel reimbursements are not timely. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training. Automated systems problems, such as nonintegration of key systems involved in authorizing and paying travel expenses and failure to automate key processes, also contributed to the inefficient, error-prone process. DOD has been developing and implementing the Defense Travel System (DTS) to resolve travel-related deficiencies. However, DTS will not address some of the key systems flaws. For example, DTS is currently not able to process mobilized soldier travel authorizations and vouchers and identify and calculate late payment interest and fees. |
gao_GAO-04-192T | gao_GAO-04-192T_0 | In addition, under the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, as amended, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for regulating all activities on refuges. One-Quarter of Refuges Have Past or Present Oil and Gas Activities
At least one-quarter, or 155, of the 575 refuges (538 refuges and 37 wetland management districts) that constitute the National Wildlife Refuge System have past or present oil and gas activities—exploration, drilling and production, transit pipelines, or some combination of these (see table 1).Since 1994, FWS records show that 44 refuges have had some type of oil and gas exploration activities—geologic study, survey, or seismic mapping. During the most recent 12-month reporting period, the 1,806 active wells produced 23.7 million barrels of oil and 88,171 million cubic feet of natural gas, about 1.1 and 0.4 percent of total domestic oil and gas production, respectively. Overall Effects of Oil and Gas Activities Are Unknown, but Those Activities Have Diminished Some Refuge System Resources
The overall environmental effects of oil and gas activities on refuge resources are unknown because FWS has conducted few cumulative assessments and has no comprehensive data. Available studies, anecdotal information, and our observations show that some refuge resources have been diminished to varying degrees by spills of oil, gas, and brine and through the construction, operation, and maintenance of the infrastructure necessary to extract oil and gas. New environmental laws and industry practice and technology have reduced, but not eliminated, some of the most detrimental effects of oil and gas activities. Also, improvements in technology may allow operators to avoid placing wells in sensitive areas such as wetlands. Oil and gas operators have taken steps, in some cases voluntarily, to reverse damages resulting from oil and gas activities, but operators have not consistently taken such steps, and the adequacy of these steps is not known. FWS Management and Oversight of Oil and Gas Activities Varies Widely
FWS’s management and oversight of oil and gas activities varies widely among refuges. However, the 16 refuges we visited varied widely in the extent to which these management practices occur. For outstanding mineral rights—cases where the mineral rights were separated from the surface lands before the government acquired the property—FWS has not formally determined its position regarding its authority to require access permits. Second, refuge managers lack sufficient guidance, resources, and training to properly monitor oil and gas operators. In our report, we made several recommendations to improve the framework for managing and overseeing oil and gas activities on national wildlife refuges, including (1) collecting and maintaining better data on oil and gas activities and their environmental effects, and ensuring that staff resources, funding, and training are sufficient and (2) determining FWS’s existing authority over outstanding mineral rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 95-million acres in the National Wildlife Refuge System are the only federal lands primarily devoted to the conservation and management of fish, wildlife, and plant resources. While the federal government owns the surface lands in the system, in many cases private parties own the subsurface mineral rights and have the legal authority to explore for and extract oil and gas. This testimony is based on an August 2003 report (GAO-03-517) in which GAO determined the extent of oil and gas activity on refuges, identified the environmental effects, and assessed the Fish and Wildlife Service's management and oversight of those activities.
What GAO Found
About one-quarter (155 of 575) of all refuges have past or present oil and gas activities, some dating to at least the 1920s. Activities range from exploration to drilling and production to pipelines transiting refuge lands. One hundred five refuges contain a total of 4,406 oil and gas wells--2,600 inactive wells and 1,806 active wells. The 1,806 wells, located at 36 refuges, many around the Gulf Coast, produced oil and gas valued at $880 million during the last 12-month reporting period, roughly 1 percent of domestic production. Thirty-five refuges contain only pipelines. The Fish and Wildlife Service has not assessed the cumulative environmental effects of oil and gas activities on refuges. Available studies, anecdotal information, and GAO's observations show that the environmental effects of oil and gas activities vary from negligible, such as effects from buried pipelines, to substantial, such as effects from large oil spills or from large-scale infrastructure. These effects also vary from the temporary to the longer term. Some of the most detrimental effects of oil and gas activities have been reduced through environmental laws and improved practices and technology. Moreover, oil and gas operators have taken steps, in some cases voluntarily, to reverse damages resulting from oil and gas activities. Federal management and oversight of oil and gas activities varies widely among refuges--some refuges take extensive measures, while others exercise little control or enforcement. GAO found that this variation occurs because of differences in authority to oversee private mineral rights and because refuge managers lack enough guidance, resources, and training to properly manage and oversee oil and gas activities. Greater attention to oil and gas activities by the Fish and Wildlife Service would increase its understanding of associated environmental effects and contribute to more consistent use of practices and technologies that protect refuge resources. |
gao_GAO-11-165 | gao_GAO-11-165_0 | (See appendix II for selected provisions regarding the Defense Access Roads program.) The DAR Program Has Begun to Address Some Transportation Needs in Growth Communities but Its Use Has Been Limited
Although the DAR program has addressed some transportation needs in communities surrounding many military growth installations, we found that a lack of knowledge of the program in general and, specifically, a lack of clear guidance on how to navigate the program’s complex certification and funding processes, has limited its use. Because most of the population growth at the 26 installations will likely occur by September 15, 2011—the mandated completion of the 2005 BRAC round—and considering the 10-year time frame necessary to proceed from design to construction for some major transportation projects, as estimated by the Maryland Department of Transportation’s State Highway Administration, most of the certified DAR projects to date will not immediately mitigate the transportation needs in the near term but should provide some relief in later years if and when the projects are funded and completed. When officials from these 22 installations were asked what could be improved with the program, 11 of the 22 said that more information on how to certify and fund DAR projects would be helpful. In addition, without up-to-date regulations and working-level guidance clearly communicated to better inform potential users about the DAR program process, the likelihood exists that the program as designed is not being used to its fullest extent. Defense-Related Transportation Needs Are Funded through Various Means
Transportation projects in defense-affected communities can be funded through several federal or state resources. As DOD implements our June 2008 recommendation to regularly hold meetings with high-level federal officials of the full Economic Adjustment Committee, as DOD agreed to do in concurring with our recommendation, we further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to routinely coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation to (1) meet regularly, (2) identify all existing federal transportation funding resources, and (3) develop a strategy for affording priority consideration for the use of those funds and other resources for the benefit of communities most severely affected by DOD. However, we continue to believe that in order to provide an opportunity for better utilization of the DAR program, DOD needs to work with the Department of Transportation to develop working-level guidance and effectively communicate the regulations and working-level guidance to all federal, state, and local stakeholders. According to DOD, three installations are located in the growth community of North Carolina Eastern Region—Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, and New River Marine Corps Air Station—and therefore, this review addresses the transportation needs and the use of the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program at a total of 26 growth “installations,” as listed in table 1 of this report, rather than 24 growth “communities.” In addition, to address our objectives, we developed a data collection instrument consisting of 12 structured interview questions addressing: (1) the installation’s transportation needs; (2) the possible sources of funding to address the needs; (3) the installation officials’ experience in interacting with state, local, and federal transportation authorities; (4) the impact, if any, of unmet transportation needs; (5) the installation officials’ awareness of the DAR program; its purpose, and its process; (6) the use of DAR program at the installation since 2000; and (7) the installation officials’ experiences with what works well and what improvements could be made to the DAR program. In order to determine the program’s purpose and processes, we (1) reviewed appropriate DOD and Department of Transportation regulations and guidance, (2) interviewed a DOD official in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) and Department of Transportation officials at the headquarters of the Federal Highway Administration in Washington, D.C., and (3) conducted extensive interviews with DOD officials responsible for implementing the DAR program at the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command— DOD’s program administrator—at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and with Department of Transportation officials from the Federal Highway Administration’s Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division in Sterling, Virginia, whose jurisdiction’s includes 18 of the 26 growth installations considered in this review. To identify any additional steps that may be necessary to address a large pool of unmet transportation needs in impacted communities, we identified potential transportation funding resources related to assisting defense-affected communities. To determine federal policy regarding assistance for defense-impacted communities, we reviewed Executive Order 12788, which designates the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, as chair of the Economic Adjustment Committee and directs federal agencies to give priority consideration to requests for federal assistance from defense-affected communities as part of a comprehensive plan used by the committee, and DOD Directive 5410.12, which states that it is DOD policy to take a leadership role in assisting defense-affected communities. Access roads providing new connections between either old or new military installations and main highways. This support may be used, to the extent permitted by law, to provide a coordinated Federal response to the needs of individual States, regions, municipalities, and communities adversely affected by necessary Defense changes; and (2) Afford priority consideration to requests from Defense-affected communities technical assistance, financial resources, excess or surplus property, or other requirements, that are part of a comprehensive plan used by the Committee. Construction. High Level Leadership Needed to Help Guam Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The unprecedented growth at 26 military installations across the country due to the implementation of several concurrent Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives is expected to stress transportation needs for surrounding communities. The Defense Access Roads program, while small when compared to other transportation funding sources, provides a means for DOD to pay a share of the cost of highway improvements due to unusual and sudden DOD-generated activities. In response to a congressional request to review the program, GAO (1) assessed the use of the program to mitigate transportation needs and (2) identified additional steps that may be necessary to address unmet transportation needs. GAO conducted extensive interviews with 26 growth installations and visited installations and state authorities in Maryland, Texas, and Virginia to discuss transportation issues.
What GAO Found
The Defense Access Roads program is providing some assistance in mitigating transportation needs in communities surrounding growth installations, but program usage has been limited, in part, by a lack of knowledge of the program, outdated regulations, and unclear guidance on how to navigate the program's complex process. DOD has certified 20 transportation projects at 11 of the 26 military installation locations since 2004. Of the 20 certified projects, 11 have been funded at about $125 million. Considering funding delays and construction time frames, most of the approved projects to date are unlikely to provide relief in the near term. The procedures of the Defense Access Roads program are complex, involving multiple federal, state, and local stakeholders. The guidance describing the program's procedures and, specifically, the application of the criteria, is difficult to follow and some regulations and guidance are outdated. Despite program outreach efforts and positive experiences with program administrators, military officials from 11 installations said that more information would be helpful to clarify the program's procedures. Without program guidance that clearly details the program's procedures and is effectively communicated to all stakeholders, the program may not be used to its fullest extent. GAO identified an additional step that may be necessary to meet the large pool of the transportation needs that are not being met by the Defense Access program--greater high-level federal interagency coordination. Aside from the Defense Access Roads program, other sources of funding exist that can be used to help mitigate unmet needs in the defense-affected communities. Local and state agencies generally have the responsibility for constructing and maintaining highways and are the recipients of billions of dollars from federal sources, such as grants from the Department of Transportation or through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. GAO found that some of the transportation projects at several of the military growth locations have been funded by the states in which they are located and others are recipients of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. Because this assistance is coming from diverse sources and is largely uncoordinated among the stakeholders involved, it is unclear to what extent priority consideration is being given to the defense-affected communities as prescribed by Executive Order 12788. This presidential order provided for a federal committee--the Economic Adjustment Committee--bringing together 22 agencies, under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense or his designee to, among other things, support various programs designed to assist communities most affected by defense activities. As chair of the committee, DOD has the opportunity to convene full committee meetings and exercise high-level leadership needed to ensure that federal agencies are affording priority consideration to defense-affected communities. However, the committee has only rarely convened and has at no time discussed transportation needs affecting all 26 growth locations. Without this leadership, it is unlikely that the federal agencies can provide the effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination and potential funds needed to help address the unmet transportation needs of defense-affected communities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD in coordination with the Department of Transportation (1) update, clarify, and communicate the program's guidelines to all stakeholders to promote more effective program utilization, and (2) ensure regular meetings of appropriate high-level leaders to identify existing federal transportation funding resources and develop a strategy for giving priority consideration to defense-affected communities. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-34 | gao_NSIAD-98-34_0 | The Navy also plans to field a prototype system—the User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)—beginning in September 1999. Technical problems that occurred in the two flight tests prior to the engineering and manufacturing development phase caused about a 6-month delay. The Area program acquisition plan has an optimistic schedule for conducting operational tests, which could result in the system remaining in a low-rate initial production phase longer than currently planned if the test program experiences serious problems. Navy Plans to Begin Low-Rate Initial Production Before Conducting Realistic Testing
The Navy plans to begin low-rate initial production of Area program missiles in June 2000 before conducting any operational tests of the system. According to Navy officials, the program needs to begin low-rate production in June 2000—5 months before system level developmental and operational tests are scheduled to begin—because of the urgent need for the system and to maintain an efficient flow in Standard missile production. Our review indicated that the following two factors raise some question about the criticality that the Navy attributes to initiating low-rate initial production. Even without low-rate production of the Area program’s Block IVA missile, Standard missile production will continue. Figure 3 shows planned production of the various configurations of the Standard missile. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program has met its milestones to date and its remaining schedule appears realistic, we interviewed agency officials and analyzed pertinent program cost, schedule, and requirements documentation. To determine whether the tests being conducted or planned will be adequate to demonstrate the system’s capabilities before production begins, we interviewed agency officials and analyzed pertinent test plans and schedules. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program to determine whether the: (1) program has met its milestones to date and its remaining schedule appears realistic; and (2) tests being conducted or planned will be adequate to demonstrate the system's capabilities before production begins.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Area program has experienced schedule slips totalling about 14 months due to several reasons, including technical problems in the two flight tests conducted prior to the engineering and manufacturing development phase; (2) further schedule slips are possible because of the acquisition plan's highly optimistic schedule for conducting operational tests; (3) slippages in completing these tests could result in the system remaining in a low-rate production phase longer than planned; (4) the Navy plans to begin production of Area program missiles before conducting any operational tests of the systems; (5) according to the Navy, it needs to begin low-rate initial production of the missiles in June 2000--5 months before system level developmental and operational tests are scheduled to begin--because of the urgent need for the system and to maintain an efficient flow in missile production; and (6) in GAO's opinion, two factors raise some questions about the Navy's rationale for the criticality of initiating low-rate initial production, namely: (a) a prototype system capability consisting of two cruisers equipped with User Operational Evaluation System missiles will be in service at that time; and (b) an earlier version of the Standard missile will still be in production, diminishing the need for low-rate production of the Block IVA missile to avoid a production gap. |
gao_GAO-16-92T | gao_GAO-16-92T_0 | Incomplete, unreliable, or understated estimates; risk assessments that may not accurately assess the risk of improper payment; and noncompliance with criteria listed in federal law hinder the government’s ability to understand the scope of the issue. We have reported on a number of strategies, including implementing preventive and detective controls and addressing open recommendations, that can help agencies reduce improper payments. In fiscal year 2014, agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling $124.7 billion, a significant increase—almost $19 billion—from the prior year’s estimate of $105.8 billion. The estimated improper payments for fiscal year 2014 were attributable to 124 programs spread among 22 agencies. Additional Efforts Are Needed to Reduce Medicare, Medicaid, and Earned Income Tax Credit Improper Payments
Improper payment estimates for the Medicare, Medicaid, and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programs accounted for more than 75 percent of the fiscal year 2014 improper payment estimate, as shown in figure 2. Over the past several years, we made numerous recommendations that if effectively implemented, could improve program management, help reduce improper payments in these programs, and help improve the government’s fiscal position. Strengthening verification of providers and suppliers. For example, CMS issued guidance to improve corrective actions taken by states. We have previously recommended matters for congressional consideration or executive actions that if effectively implemented, could help reduce EITC improper payments as well as the tax gap, as discussed later in this statement. Recent Legislation and Guidance Have Focused Attention on Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments and Identifying Root Causes, Including Fraud
Recent Legislation and Guidance Related to Improper Payments
The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA) is the latest in a series of laws Congress has passed to address improper payments. In our report on the Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Report of the United States Government, we continued to report a material weakness in internal control related to improper payments because the federal government is unable to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them. Specifically, two federal agencies did not report estimated improper payment amounts for four risk-susceptible programs. To determine the full extent of improper payments government-wide and to more effectively recover and reduce them, as we reported in March 2015, continued agency attention is needed to (1) identify programs susceptible to improper payments, (2) develop reliable improper payment estimation methodologies, (3) report on improper payments as required, and (4) implement effective corrective actions based on root cause analysis. Absent such continued efforts, the federal government cannot be assured that taxpayer funds are adequately safeguarded. Need to Address a Significant Tax Gap
The tax gap has been a persistent problem for decades. Key Factors Contributing to the Tax Gap Include Limited Third-party Information Reporting, Resource Trade-offs, and Complexities in the Tax Code
Our past work has found that three important factors contributing to the tax gap are the extent to which income is reported to IRS by third parties, IRS’s resource trade-offs, and tax code complexity. The extent to which individual taxpayers accurately report their income is correlated to the extent to which their income is reported to them and IRS (or taxes on that income are withheld) by third parties. 4). Accelerating W-2 filing deadlines could help IRS reduce improper EITC payments and help close the tax gap. IRS could use return on investment data to allocate its enforcement resources and potentially increase revenues. Ensuring high-quality services is a necessary foundation for voluntary compliance, as it can help taxpayers who wish to comply with tax laws but do not understand their obligations. Telephone services. Online services. In 2014, we suggested that Congress consider expanding the mandate for partnerships and corporations to electronically file their tax returns, as this could help IRS reduce return processing costs, select the most productive tax returns to examine, and examine fewer compliant taxpayers. A broader opportunity to address the tax gap involves simplifying the Internal Revenue Code, as complexity can cause taxpayer confusion and provide opportunities to hide willful noncompliance. Reducing the tax gap will require multiple strategies and long-term changes in IRS’s operations and systems. With outlays for major programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, expected to increase over the next few years, it is critical that actions are taken to reduce improper payments and minimize the tax gap. Tax Gap: Sources of Noncompliance and Strategies to Reduce It. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government continues to face an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Changing this path will require difficult fiscal policy decisions to alter both long-term federal spending and revenue. In the near term, executive branch agencies and Congress can take action to improve the government's fiscal position by addressing two long-standing issues—improper payments and the tax gap. Over time, these issues involve amounts near or exceeding $1 trillion.
Over the past decade, GAO has highlighted the issue of improper payments—defined by statute as payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments). GAO has reported for several years that the federal government is unable to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that actions are taken to reduce them.
The tax gap is the difference between taxes owed and those paid on time, as a result of taxpayers underreporting their tax liability, underpaying taxes, or not filing tax returns. Reducing the tax gap could provide additional revenue.
This statement discusses (1) actions needed to address improper payments government-wide and (2) strategies to reduce the tax gap. It is based on GAO's recent work on improper payments, agency financial reports and inspectors general reports, and prior reports on the tax gap, including those with open recommendations or matters for congressional consideration that could potentially help reduce the tax gap.
What GAO Found
A number of strategies, including implementing preventive controls and addressing GAO's prior recommendations, can help agencies reduce improper payments, which have been a persistent, government-wide issue. The improper payment estimate, attributable to 124 programs across 22 agencies in fiscal year 2014, was $124.7 billion, up from $105.8 billion in fiscal year 2013. The almost $19 billion increase was primarily due to the Medicare, Medicaid, and Earned Income Tax Credit programs, which account for over 75 percent of the government-wide improper payment estimate. Federal spending in Medicare and Medicaid is expected to significantly increase, so it is critical that actions are taken to reduce improper payments in these programs. Moreover, for fiscal year 2014, federal entities reported estimated error rates for 10 risk-susceptible programs that exceeded 10 percent. Recent laws and guidance have focused attention on improper payments, but incomplete or understated estimates and noncompliance with criteria listed in federal law hinder the government's ability to assess the full extent of improper payments and implement strategies to reduce them. For example, for fiscal year 2014, 2 federal agencies did not report improper payment estimates for 4 risk-susceptible programs, and 5 programs with improper payment estimates greater than $1 billion were noncompliant with federal requirements for 3 consecutive years. Identifying root causes of improper payments can help agencies target corrective actions, and GAO has made numerous recommendations that could help reduce improper payments. For example, strengthening verification of Medicare providers and suppliers could help reduce improper payments. GAO has stated that continued agency attention is needed to (1) identify susceptible programs, (2) develop reliable estimation methodologies, (3) report as required, and (4) implement effective corrective actions based on root cause analysis. Absent such continued efforts, the federal government cannot be assured that taxpayer funds are adequately safeguarded.
Addressing the estimated $385 billion net tax gap will require strategies on multiple fronts. Key factors that contribute to the tax gap include limited third-party reporting, resource trade-offs, and tax code complexity. For example, the extent to which individual taxpayers accurately report their income is correlated to the extent to which the income is reported to them and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by third parties. Where there is little or no information reporting, such as with business income, taxpayers tend to significantly misreport their income. GAO has many open recommendations to reduce the tax gap. For example, GAO recommended in 2012 that IRS use return on investment data to reallocate its enforcement resources and potentially increase revenues. Since 2011, GAO also recommended improvements to telephone and online services to help IRS deliver high-quality services to taxpayers who wish to comply with tax laws but do not understand their obligations. Other strategies GAO has suggested would require legislative actions, such as accelerating W-2 filing deadlines. Additionally, requiring partnerships and corporations to electronically file tax returns could help IRS reduce return processing costs and focus its examinations more on noncompliant taxpayers. Further, a broader opportunity to address the tax gap involves simplifying the Internal Revenue Code, as complexity can cause taxpayer confusion and provide opportunities to hide willful noncompliance. |
gao_RCED-95-16 | gao_RCED-95-16_0 | These processes have addressed potential conflicts between species protection and nonfederal land use activities. In such instances, nonfederal landowners have been required to modify their planned or ongoing activities to minimize and/or mitigate the impacts of their activities on protected species. More specifically, (1) the Service has initiated legal actions to enforce the act’s prohibition against the taking of listed species, (2) the United States and other parties have sought injunctive relief using the act’s provisions to stop or delay activities on nonfederal lands that were viewed as posing a threat to listed species, and (3) private citizens have claimed that species protection efforts have resulted in the loss of property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. According to the data base, for fiscal years 1988 through 1993, about 4,230 violations of the ESA had been adjudicated. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS’) seven regional offices. Using the survey, we collected data on (1) the number of ESA-protected species with habitat on nonfederal lands, (2) the portion of these species’ habitat on nonfederal lands, (3) the number of law enforcement investigations and prosecutions related to ESA takings on nonfederal lands, and (4) instances in which injunctive relief was obtained under the ESA to stop or delay nonfederal land projects or activities that could potentially harm protected species. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) efforts to protect species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), focusing on: (1) the extent to which species listed under ESA have habitat on nonfederal lands; (2) how two ESA provisions have addressed potential conflicts between species protection and the use of nonfederal lands; and (3) the extent and nature of legal actions taken to protect endangered species.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over 90 percent of the species protected under ESA have habitat on nonfederal lands; (2) nonfederal landowners have been required to alter their planned or ongoing activities in various ways to minimize and mitigate their potential impact on protected species; (3) FWS has enforced the ESA prohibition on the taking of protected species; (4) during fiscal years 1988 through 1993, FWS adjudicated 126 takings violations; (5) in at least four instances, FWS sought injunctive relief to stop or delay an activity on nonfederal lands that was viewed as posing a threat to a protected species; and (6) private citizens have claimed that species protection efforts have resulted in the uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. |
gao_GAO-01-542 | gao_GAO-01-542_0 | HHS incorporated many of the lessons learned from this study in the Early Head Start program. Impact Evaluations Are the Most Definitive Method for Determining a Program’s Effect on Its Participants
Many researchers consider impact evaluations to be the best method for determining a program’s effect on its participants because they isolate a program’s contribution from the effects of other factors that could have influenced participant outcomes. 1). 2). Impact Evalutions Are Being Used to Assess the Effectiveness of Early Education Programs
The two programs most focused on early childhood education—Head Start and Even Start—are currently being studied using impact evaluations with an experimental design. HHS is conducting impact studies of Head Start and Early Head Start, and Education is using an impact evaluation to study Even Start. Both of these programs are intended to improve children’s school readiness and educational and developmental outcomes, for example by encouraging enhanced literacy. The Head Start Study
The Head Start evaluation is a $28.3-million, nationally representative, longitudinal impact evaluation. It will cost about $21 million and take 6 years to complete. 3). Different Types of Studies Inform HHS and Education About Administered Programs
HHS and Education promote and sponsor many types of studies, other than impact evaluations, that can provide a wide variety of data valuable to program managers and policymakers. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services for comment, and they did not provide comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report examines the use of impact evaluations to determine program effectiveness for early childhood programs. GAO (1) describes the value of conducting impact evaluations, (2) describes their current use in evaluating selected early childhood education and care programs and (3) discusses the value of other types of early childhood education and care studies the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Education promote and sponsor.
What GAO Found
GAO found that many researchers consider impact evaluations to be the best method of determining the extent to which the program itself is causing participant outcomes. Two federal programs that focus on early childhood education--Head Start and Even Start--are now being studied using impact evaluations. Both of these programs are intended to improve children's school readiness and educational outcomes, including enhanced literacy. HHS is conducting two studies on its Head Start program, which will cost about $28.3 million, and Education will conduct a $21 million study on its Even Start program. Finally, HHS and Education promote and sponsor many types of research and evaluation studies. The value of a varied study agenda is that it provides agencies with answers to a broad range of questions about program operation and allows them to align research with the focus of the program. |
gao_GAO-17-398 | gao_GAO-17-398_0 | We found some cases where guidance dictated that an IGCE should have been prepared, but was not. Department-level Guidance Varies on When to Prepare IGCEs
All of the departments in our review have some type of guidance on IGCEs available—ranging from regulation to COR handbooks to checklists—with different emphasis on whether an IGCE is required. The Usefulness of IGCEs in Acquisition Planning Varied, and Most Did Not Include Supporting Documentation
In the 62 contracts we reviewed with IGCEs, the usefulness of IGCEs in acquisition planning varied and most did not include supporting documentation with details, such as the information sources and methodologies used, that could help contracting officers more effectively use IGCEs. Most of the IGCEs in GAO’s review—49 of 62—were not well-documented, which in some cases limited their usefulness to contracting officers; these officers had to perform additional, inefficient steps to validate IGCEs so they could be used. Only two of the agencies in our review (Army and DHS) had department-level guidance on what details to document in the IGCEs. Understand funding needs. The usefulness of this tool—when used to determine price reasonableness—depends in part on the quality of the estimate, which can differ from the contract value at award for a variety of reasons. Limited data sources. Most IGCEs Lacked Supporting Documentation
GAO cost estimating guidance and federal internal control standards emphasize the need for documentation, with GAO’s cost estimating guidance stating that well-documented cost estimates describe the data sources used, underlying assumptions, and the estimating methodologies used to derive costs. Departments’ Guidance and Training Do Not Consistently Emphasize How to Develop or Document IGCEs
Federal internal control standards state that agencies should internally communicate quality information to achieve their objectives, which can include developing guidance for IGCEs, following existing IGCE guidance, or providing training to support guidance. In the other departments in our review, guidance did not clearly state that IGCEs should contain all the elements of a good estimate per GAO’s cost estimating guide. In some cases, program officials said they had developed templates to prepare an IGCE for their individual acquisitions for a service. To ensure that IGCEs contain key information consistent with good cost estimating practices, we recommend that the Secretaries of Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Labor take the following action:
Revise or clarify guidance to require that IGCEs document data sources, methodology, and assumptions, and take steps to help ensure that guidance is followed by, for example, providing training or issuing reminders to officials to include this information when developing IGCEs. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the extent to which (1) selected departments developed independent government cost estimates (IGCE) for service contracts, and (2) selected departments’ IGCEs were useful in supporting the acquisition planning process. To address both objectives, we reviewed a random, non-generalizable sample of 76 contracts and task orders from six federal departments—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Labor—and interviewed program and contracting officials associated with each award. Using FPDS- NG data, we selected six departments with the following characteristics:
Highest total obligations for services: DOD, HHS, and DHS were among the top five federal agencies with obligations for service contracts in fiscal year 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
IGCEs are the government's best estimate of a contract's potential costs—an important tool for both program and contracting officials to provide information when planning for and awarding contracts. IGCEs are particularly critical for service contracts—accounting for more than $270 billion in government contract spending in fiscal year 2015—to ensure the costs associated with labor are fully understood.
GAO was asked to review federal agencies' use of IGCEs. This report examines the extent to which (1) selected departments developed IGCEs for service contracts and (2) selected departments' IGCEs were useful in supporting the acquisition planning process.
To conduct this work, GAO selected six departments that in fiscal year 2015, the most current data available, were among the top spenders on services or had a high percentage of spending on services. GAO reviewed a random non-generalizable sample of 76 service contracts, and compared IGCEs and related documentation with GAO's cost estimating guide. GAO also conducted interviews with contracting and program officials.
What GAO Found
Officials at the departments in GAO's review—Defense, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Education, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development—developed independent government cost estimates (IGCE) for 62 of the contracts GAO reviewed. All of the departments in GAO's review have some guidance on IGCEs available—ranging from regulation to handbooks to checklists—with different emphasis on whether an IGCE is required. GAO found some cases where guidance dictated that an IGCE should have been prepared, but was not. According to officials, one reason for not preparing an IGCE was that the procurement was a task order issued under an existing contract. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate quality information to achieve their objectives, such as including clear guidance for acquisition planning.
In the 62 contracts GAO reviewed with IGCEs, the IGCEs' use in acquisition planning varied—from determining funding needs to determining price reasonableness. The usefulness of an IGCE to a contracting officer depends in part on its supporting documentation, but most IGCEs did not document data sources and methodologies used (see figure) .
Lack of documented data sources and methodologies in an IGCE puts contracting officers at a disadvantage and could lead to additional, inefficient steps to validate IGCEs. Only two of the agencies in GAO's review had explicit guidance on what details to document in IGCEs, but officials were not always familiar with the available guidance. Instead, according to the officials GAO spoke with, they often follow program office practices and noted that training did not address how to develop and document an IGCE. GAO's cost estimating guidance and federal internal control standards emphasize the need for documentation, with GAO's guidance stating that well-documented cost estimates should describe the data sources used, underlying assumptions, and the estimating methodologies used to derive costs. Without clear guidance or more training on documentation of data sources and methodologies, departments may not be taking full advantage of this important acquisition tool.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the usefulness of IGCEs, GAO is making five recommendations, including that departments revise or clarify guidance or provide more training to help ensure IGCEs are prepared when required and are well-documented with clearly-stated data sources and methodologies. All six departments agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-326 | gao_GAO-04-326_0 | Scope and Methodology
To describe the status of the NMTC program, we interviewed various CDFI Fund and IRS officials tasked with program design and implementation. The identified issues that we could analyze were as follows: geographic distribution of the community development projects proposed by CDE allocatees, including the scope of the area to be served ranging from local to national, the type of community served such as urban or rural, and the specific states to be served; experience in serving low-income communities; and type of service activity proposed for the community development project. To determine whether the CDFI Fund and IRS have systems in place or planned to ensure compliance with the NMTC program and to evaluate the success of the NMTC program in achieving its goals, we interviewed various CDFI Fund and IRS officials on the systems for obtaining the data to be used for compliance monitoring and evaluation. We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the CDFI Fund and IRS; their comments are reprinted in appendixes IV and V.
Initial NMTC Investments in Community Development Projects Were Unlikely Until Late 2003 due to NMTC Program Start-up Delays
Although Congress authorized billions of dollars in annual NMTC allocations beginning in 2001 to spur investments in community development projects, it is unlikely that many investments had been made as of December 2003, according to CDFI Fund officials. According to CDFI Fund officials, they made the allocations to CDEs in 2003 instead of 2001 because of the time taken for various start-up tasks for the new program, such as establishing the rules for using the allocations. Finally, all allocatees reported at least some experience in assisting low-income communities. However, a number of details remain to be settled on how the data will actually be used to monitor compliance. The CDFI Fund and CDEs are expected to have significant amounts of data that should be useful for the evaluation. Officials from both agencies believe they have time to complete their plans for monitoring compliance, but they do not have schedules or documented plans for ensuring that compliance monitoring processes will be in place when needed. To monitor allocation agreement compliance, CDFI Fund officials said that they would focus on data in section 3.2 of the allocation agreement. However, there was no consensus on the specific data required to evaluate the NMTC program. Conclusions
The NMTC program provides billions of dollars over multiple years as an incentive to stimulate additional billions of dollars in investments in low- income communities. Distribution of New Markets Tax Credit Eligibility by State
Congressional Staff Interviews
To provide a profile of community development entities (CDE) that received New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) allocations, we reviewed the congressional contact file from a recent GAO report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 authorized up to $15 billion under the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program to stimulate capital investment in low-income and economically distressed communities. The act mandated that GAO report to Congress on the NMTC program by January 31, 2004, 2007, and 2010. Based on consultation with staff at appropriate congressional committees, this report (1) describes the status of the NMTC program, (2) profiles community development entities (CDE) that were selected to receive NMTC allocations in 2003, and (3) determines whether systems are in place or planned to ensure compliance and evaluate the success of the NMTC program.
What GAO Found
Although Congress authorized the NMTC program to provide credit against federal taxes for billions of dollars starting in 2001 to spur investments in community development projects, CDFI Fund officials said that it is unlikely that many projects had started by the end of 2003 and that they will not know the status of projects for all CDEs until early 2005. Progress was made in developing data systems, selection processes, and program rules, but allocations were delayed because of the various start-up tasks associated with a new program, especially in establishing the rules on using the allocated credits. CDEs that received NMTC allocations (allocatees) proposed projects to serve urban, rural, and mixed areas, as well as local, state, multiple-local, multistate, and national areas. The distribution of state and local allocations was not concentrated in any one state or in a few states. All allocatees reported at least some prior experience in low-income communities, particularly in providing capital to low-income communities. The CDFI Fund and IRS have identified data with which to monitor compliance with allocation agreements and tax laws, and are developing systems to collect the data. However, many details remain to be settled on how the data will actually be used to monitor compliance. Agency officials believe they have time to devise their compliance monitoring processes. However, they do not have schedules or documented plans for ensuring that compliance monitoring processes will be in place when needed, and they have other tasks to complete. In terms of evaluating the NMTC program, the CDFI Fund intends to contract for an evaluation, and officials believe they are collecting significant amounts of data that will be useful for the evaluation and that CDEs will maintain additional relevant data. |
gao_GAO-08-850 | gao_GAO-08-850_0 | Another frequently used authority, Section 2681 of Title 10, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to enter into contracts with commercial entities that desire to conduct commercial test and evaluation activities at a major range and test facility installation. Many Land Use Planning Authorities Are Available, but Section 2667 and Section 2681 of Title 10 Are Predominantly Used
Although many land use planning authorities currently exist that permit the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, or both to help make more efficient use of real property under their jurisdiction or control under various circumstances, our analysis of service data showed that Section 2667 of Title 10 is most frequently used for both traditional leases as well as longer-term, more financially complex enhanced use leases. Our analysis indicates that there are more than 30 available authorities of general and permanent applicability in the U.S. Code available to the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, or both pertaining to the utilization of existing real property controlled by DOD. Service officials indicated that while some of these other authorities were utilized with regard to their respective real property during fiscal years 2005 through 2007, they have been used much less often than Section 2667 and Section 2681 of Title 10. The services reported that Section 2869 of Title 10 was used only two times during fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Land, Buildings, and Facilities on DOD Installations May Appear Underutilized or Not Utilized for Several Reasons
Land, buildings, and facilities on DOD installations may appear underutilized or not utilized but are nonetheless unavailable for other uses for several reasons. Restrictions and constraints on DOD’s use of lands under its control include setbacks for antiterrorism protection, mission requirements, necessary safety zones, and environmental considerations. 3.) The Services Use Similar Policies and Procedures for Responding to Requests for Space at an Installation
The services use similar policies and procedures for responding to requests for space on an installation by other federal agencies and by organizations within DOD. In general, department officials told us that requests are received at the installation level and must include information on the requester’s facilities and land requirements, justification for selecting the proposed installation, and a statement of environmental impact. After a request is received, it is reviewed by the installation. The facilities directorate and affected activities make a presentation to the base commander with their recommendations on the request. We visited installations from each service and found that each installation we visited had multiple DOD and non-DOD federal tenants. Specifically, in our count of the number of pieces of special legislation pertaining to land use planning in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2005, 2006 and 2007, we included both new and modified authorities available to the Secretary of Defense or secretaries of the military departments pertaining to the utilization of a specific piece of real property, such as the authority to outlease, convey, or transfer that property, as well as requirements that the applicable secretary use a specific piece of real property in a particular manner. We interviewed service officials to identify the available uses for land, buildings, and facilities that may be underutilized or not utilized yet still be unavailable for development or other use. To determine the policies and procedures used by the services to respond to requests by other federal agencies for space at a DOD installation, we reviewed relevant DOD and service guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest landholding agencies in the federal government with more than 577,500 facilities at 5,300 sites on over 32 million acres. GAO has previously reported that the management of DOD-held real property is a high-risk area, in part because of deteriorating facilities and problems with excess and underutilized property. To address these problems, DOD has developed a multipart strategy involving base realignment and closure, housing privatization, and demolition of facilities that are no longer needed. DOD is also leasing out underutilized real property to gain resources to repair or construct facilities. The House Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Comptroller General to provide an analysis of DOD's use of its land use planning authorities. Specifically, GAO examined (1) how DOD has used its authorities; (2) the reasons why land, buildings, and facilities on DOD installations may appear to be underutilized or not utilized; and (3) the policies and procedures used by the services to respond to requests by other federal agencies for space at a DOD installation. GAO reviewed pertinent legislation and DOD and service policies, interviewed officials from DOD and all four services, and visited 10 installations from all four services.
What GAO Found
Although many land use planning authorities currently exist that permit the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, or both to help make more efficient use of real property under their control, Section 2667 of Title 10, U.S. Code, leasing of nonexcess property of military departments, was used the most frequently--744 times from fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Under Section 2667 of Title 10, traditional short-term lease agreements are typically executed, but more financially complex, longer-term enhanced use leases are also executed. Section 2681 of Title 10, the authority to enter into contracts with commercial entities that desire to conduct commercial test and evaluation activities at a major range and test facility installation, was also used frequently, with 601 uses during fiscal years 2005 through 2007. GAO's analysis indicates that there are more than 30 authorities in the U.S. Code pertaining to DOD's utilization of real property. Service officials indicated that they have used these other authorities much less often and only for a limited number of leases or other transactions. Land, buildings, and facilities on DOD installations may appear to be underutilized or not utilized for several reasons. For example, land that appears empty or underutilized often has a variety of restrictions and constraints placed upon its use, including setbacks for antiterrorism protection, mission requirements, safety zones, and environmental concerns. The services identified several reasons why buildings and facilities might be classified as underutilized or not utilized but still remain unavailable for other uses, including historical considerations. Each of the military departments has similar policies and procedures in place for responding to requests for space on an installation from other federal agencies. Service officials told us that requests for space are submitted directly to the installation and should include information on facilities and land requirements, justification for selecting the proposed installation, and a statement of environmental impact. An official request for space is reviewed at the installation level, and the installation commander makes a recommendation to the approving official, although the approving official differs depending on the service and the nature of the request. |
gao_GAO-04-873 | gao_GAO-04-873_0 | Increasingly, PME schools are using ADL techniques in their nonresident program offerings. DOD Does Not Have Specific Metrics for Assessing Performance Goals or Learning Outcomes
DOD does not have specific performance goals and metrics to assess the effectiveness of ADL in PME. Instead, DOD accreditation activities, like those in the private sector, focus primarily on educational process inputs, such as quality of facilities and student faculty ratios. We and a private- sector organization have recently established guidelines and frameworks for assessing the effectiveness of educational programs that stress a focus on measurable outcomes. ADL is a new and evolving tool for which systematic evaluation requirements have not been established. The third agency required schools to evaluate its nonresident programs to ensure comparability to resident programs. Metrics for Learning Outcomes Are Lacking
Student learning outcomes, as stated by the Council for Higher Education Accreditation—a national association representing accrediting organizations—are “properly defined in terms of the knowledge, skills, and abilities, that a student has attained at the end (or as a result) of his or her engagement in a particular set of higher education experiences.” PME schools generally are not assessed for student learning outcomes as a means of determining program effectiveness. Because we only surveyed nonresident students, we could not compare the results with those of resident students. However, we found no evidence to indicate that DOD is using this ability. ADL Conversion Varied by School and by Service Based on Subjective Assessments of Content Suitability
The processes for converting PME courses to ADL varied by school and by military service, and they feature a mixture of in-house and contractor approaches. PME schools did not identify any systematic criteria as the basis for their decisions as to which courses or curricula to convert to ADL. Cultural, Technological, and Resource Barriers and Challenges Affect ADL Implementation in PME Programs
PME schools identified a number of cultural, technological, and resource challenges that affect ADL implementation and may affect future maintenance or expansion of ADL efforts. An emerging funding issue involves the use of copyrighted material in ADL applications. Without clear goals and an effective process for evaluating the results of ADL application, DOD cannot ensure that ADL is achieving appropriate return on investment, student retention, student access, and other goals in comparison with prior efforts. Scope and Methodology
We reviewed Department of Defense’s (DOD) implementation of advanced distributed learning (ADL) in senior- and intermediate-level professional military education (PME) to determine processes and criteria used for converting courses, metrics to assess ADL effectiveness and its fulfillment of learning objectives, and barriers and challenges in ADL implementation. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its transformation to prepare the armed forces to meet current and future challenges, the Department of Defense (DOD) is expanding its use of advanced distributed learning (ADL) techniques in senior- and intermediate-level officer professional military education (PME). ADL instruction does not require an instructor's presence, and it facilitates the use of varied learning management systems. To date, the application of ADL has been targeted to nonresident students. To determine whether DOD uses a systematic process for evaluating the results of ADL application, GAO was asked to examine DOD's metrics for assessing program effectiveness, to compare DOD's criteria for converting courses to ADL with those of private-sector institutions, and to identify the challenges to ADL implementation.
What GAO Found
DOD does not have specific performance goals and metrics with which to assess ADL effectiveness in PME. Furthermore, although GAO and private-sector organization have established frameworks for assessing the effectiveness of educational programs by focusing on metrics for learning outcomes--that is, the knowledge, skills, and abilities that students attain through learning activities--DOD's oversight focuses instead on educational inputs such as facilities, student to faculty ratios, and student body composition. Since ADL is still a new and evolving tool, systematic evaluative processes have not yet been required. Without clear goals and an effective process for evaluating the results of ADL application, DOD cannot ensure that its program is achieving an appropriate return on investment and other goals. The criteria for converting PME courses and curricula to ADL vary by school and by military service, are based on subjective choices as to which content is suited for online delivery, and are focused solely on nonresident programs. The private sector similarly lacks systematic criteria in its use of ADL. However, DOD's implementation of ADL programs for PME compares favorably with private-sector institutions. Cultural, technological, and resource challenges affect ADL implementation. For example, some military policies reflect a lower estimation of the value of nonresident PME, and many respondents to a survey of ADL students and alumni indicated that its quality and achievement of outcomes did not compare favorably, in their view, with those of resident education programs. The technological challenges of balancing computer access with network security, along with resource challenges of funding and increased burdens on limited administrative staff, are additional concerns. |
gao_GAO-14-205 | gao_GAO-14-205_0 | In 2011, we added Interior’s management of federal oil and gas resources to our list of programs at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in part because Interior continued to experience problems hiring and retaining sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil gas operations on federal lands and waters. Nonetheless, field office officials told us that attrition raises concerns because it is not unusual for some field offices to have only one or two employees in any given position, meaning that a single retirement or resignation can significantly affect office operations. At BLM, the fiscal year 2012 attrition rate for petroleum engineers was over 20 percent, or more than double the average federal attrition (see fig. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on industry salaries confirm that there is a wide and growing gap between industry and federal government salaries for petroleum engineers and geologists (see fig. According to our analysis of Interior hiring data, the average hiring time for petroleum engineers and inspectors at BOEM and BSEE in recent months exceeded 180 calendar days (see table 1), and the average hiring times for these positions at BLM in fiscal year 2012 exceeded 120 days (see table 2). These hiring times are much longer than OPM’s target of 80 calendar days. Interior Has Taken Some Actions to Address Hiring and Retention Challenges
Interior and the three bureaus—BLM, BOEM, and BSEE—have taken some actions to address their hiring and retention challenges, such as actions to increase or supplement salaries to reduce the salary gap and streamline the hiring process to reduce hiring times. Although the department has taken some steps to reduce hiring times, it does not have complete and accurate data on hiring times to identify the causes of delays in the hiring process and help identify further opportunities for reducing them. For instance, our assessment of Interior data indicates that Interior’s use of recruitment, relocation, and retention awards for petroleum engineers and inspectors—critical positions that the bureaus have had difficulty hiring and retaining in recent years—has been limited (see tables 3 and 4). For example, BSEE human resources officials said that, in August 2012, they began collecting hiring data on a biweekly basis in a spreadsheet and tracking the status of each BOEM and BSEE job announcement to help track the progress of individual applicants as they move through the hiring process. Without reliable data on hiring times, Interior’s bureaus cannot identify how long it takes to complete individual stages in the hiring process, identify delays, and implement changes to expedite the hiring process. Officials at the three bureaus cited steps they have taken to address vacancies in key oil and gas positions, including reassigning staff from lower-priority to higher-priority tasks, borrowing staff from other offices, or increasing overtime. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure a consistent and comprehensive approach to addressing BLM’s, BOEM’s, and BSEE’s ongoing hiring and retention challenges, we recommend the Secretary of the Interior direct the following two actions:
Explore the expanded use of existing authorities, including recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives to help bridge the salary gap for key oil and gas oversight positions such as petroleum engineers, geologists, and geophysicists, and develop clear guidance for when the use of these incentives are warranted and how the effectiveness of their use will be assessed. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Interior for review and comment. Interior generally agreed with our findings and concurred with both recommendations. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which Interior continues to face challenges hiring and retaining key oil and gas staff and the causes of these challenges; (2) Interior’s efforts to address its hiring and retention challenges; and (3) the effects, if any, of hiring and retention challenges on Interior’s oversight of oil and gas activities. We also interviewed officials from Interior’s bureaus responsible for oil and gas oversight—the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). Appendix II: Survey of Interior’s Field Offices on the Challenges to Hire and Retain Staff to Oversee Oil and Gas Activities
As part of our assessment of the challenges that Interior’s field offices continue to face hiring and retaining key oil and gas oversight staff and the effects of these challenges on oversight, we surveyed officials from 44 field offices that have oil and gas management responsibilities on (1) the extent of these challenges, (2) the factors affecting hiring and retention, and (3) the effects of hiring and retention challenges on oil and gas oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interior employs a wide range of highly-trained specialists and scientists with key skills to oversee oil and gas operations on leased federal lands and waters. GAO and others have reported that Interior has faced challenges hiring and retaining sufficient staff to carry out these responsibilities. In February 2011, GAO added Interior's management of federal oil and gas resources to its list of programs at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in part because of Interior's long-standing and continued human capital challenges.
GAO was asked to update the status of Interior's human capital challenges. This report examines: (1) the extent to which Interior continues to face challenges hiring and retaining key oil and gas staff and the causes of these challenges; (2) Interior's efforts to address its hiring and retention challenges; and (3) the effects of hiring and retention challenges on Interior's oversight of oil and gas activities. GAO surveyed 44 Interior offices that oversee oil and gas operations of which 40 responded; analyzed offshore inspection records and other documents; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior (Interior) continues to face challenges hiring and retaining staff with key skills needed to manage and oversee oil and gas operations on federal leases. Interior officials noted two major factors that contribute to challenges in hiring and retaining staff: lower salaries and a slow hiring process compared with similar positions in industry. In response to GAO's survey, officials from a majority of the offices in the three Interior bureaus that manage oil and gas activities--the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)--reported ongoing difficulties filling vacancies, particularly for petroleum engineers and geologists. Many of these officials also reported that retention is an ongoing concern as staff leave for positions in industry. Bureau of Labor Statistics data confirm a wide gap between industry and federal salaries for petroleum engineers and geologists. According to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) data, the fiscal year 2012 attrition rate for petroleum engineers at BLM was over 20 percent, or more than double the average federal attrition rate of 9.1 percent. However, the attrition rate for other key oil and gas staff during fiscal year 2012 was lower than the federal average. Nonetheless, field office officials stated that attrition is of concern because some field offices have only a few employees in any given position, and a single separation can significantly affect operations. Additionally, Interior records show that the average time required to hire petroleum engineers and inspectors in recent months generally exceeded 120 calendar days--much longer than OPM's target of 80 calendar days.
Interior and the three bureaus--BLM, BOEM, and BSEE--have taken some actions to address their hiring and retention challenges but have not fully used their existing authorities to supplement salaries or collect and analyze hiring data to identify the causes of delays in the hiring process. For instance, BLM, BOEM, and BSEE officials said that recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives are key options to help hire and retain staff, but use of these incentives to attract and retain petroleum engineers and inspectors has been limited. Moreover, the department and bureaus have taken some steps to reduce hiring times, but they do not have complete and accurate data on hiring times. For instance, while BSEE and BOEM collect hiring data on a biweekly basis, the data are used primarily to track the progress of individual applicants as they move through the hiring process. Likewise, a BLM official stated that the bureau does not systematically analyze data on hiring times. Without reliable data on hiring times, Interior's bureaus cannot identify how long it takes to complete individual stages in the hiring process or effectively implement changes to expedite the hiring process.
According to BLM, BOEM, and BSEE officials, hiring and retention challenges have made it more difficult to carry out oversight activities in some field offices. For example, many BLM and BSEE officials GAO surveyed reported that vacancies have resulted in a reduction in the number of inspections conducted. As a result of these challenges, bureau officials cited steps they have taken to address vacancies in key positions, such as borrowing staff from other offices or using overtime, but these solutions are not sustainable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of the Interior explore the bureaus' expanded use of recruitment, relocation, retention, and other incentives and systematically collect and analyze hiring data. In commenting on a draft of this report, Interior generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-858T | gao_GAO-13-858T_0 | NFIP offers two types of flood insurance premiums to property owners who live in participating communities: subsidized and full-risk. These subsidized rates are not based on flood risk and, according to FEMA, represent only about 40-45 percent of the full flood risk. NFIP largely has relied on the private insurance industry to sell and service policies. NFIP Remains on GAO’s High-Risk List Due to Financial Instability and Other Challenges
NFIP was added to GAO’s High-Risk List in 2006 due to losses from the 2005 hurricanes and the financial exposure the program created for the federal government. As of July 31, 2013, the program owed Treasury approximately $24 billion. NFIP’s financial condition highlights structural weaknesses in program funding—primarily its rate structure. As a result, the annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and subsidized premiums is generally not enough to cover its operating costs, claim payments, and principal and interest payments to Treasury, especially in years of catastrophic flooding. This arrangement results in much of the financial risk of flooding being transferred to the federal government and ultimately the taxpayer. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) addressed some of the structural challenges that have contributed to the program’s financial instability.policies will not receive subsidized premium rates, subsidies on existing For example, new flood insurance policies for many other properties will be phased out, and policies for properties that are remapped to a higher risk level will be subject to higher premium rates. Furthermore, weaknesses in NFIP management and operations, including financial reporting processes and internal controls, strategic and human capital planning, and oversight of contractors, also have placed the program at risk. Change to Subsidized Policies and Implications of Additional Program Changes
The Biggert-Waters Act mandates that GAO conduct a number of studies related to actual and potential changes to NFIP, including analyses of remaining subsidized properties, and the effect of increasing coverage limits or adding coverage options. In one of our studies responding to these mandates, of remaining subsidized properties, we estimated that with the changes in the Biggert-Waters Act approximately 438,000 policies are no longer eligible for subsidies, including about 345,000 nonprimary residential policies, about 87,000 business policies, and about 9,000 single-family, severe-repetitive-loss policies.the approximately 715,000 remaining subsidized policies are expected to be eliminated over time. Target assistance for remaining subsidies. Mitigation efforts could be used to help reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage; especially if FEMA targeted the properties that were most costly to the program, such as those with repetitive losses. In our October 2008 study of NFIP’s rate-setting, we found that the losses generated by NFIP have created substantial financial exposure for the federal government and U.S. taxpayers—due in part to the program’s rate-setting process. Partly because of the rate-setting issues, in our July 2013 report on raising coverage limits or adding optional coverage types, we found that the advantages and disadvantages to making more changes to the program, such as these, would need to be carefully weighed. Additional Challenges for FEMA to Address
In July 2013, we reported that FEMA will require several years to fully implement the Biggert-Waters Act and FEMA officials acknowledged that they have data limitations and other challenges to resolve before eliminating some subsidies as required in the act. FEMA has data on whether a policy covers a primary residence, but officials stated that the data may be outdated or incorrect. Currently, FEMA is unable to make this determination as it does not maintain data on the fair market value of properties insured by subsidized policies. The act eliminates subsidies for severe repetitive loss policies and provides a definition of severe repetitive loss for single-family homes. The act also requires FEMA to phase in full-risk rates on active policies that no longer are eligible for subsidies, but we found that FEMA generally lacks information needed to establish full-risk rates that reflect flood risk for the properties involved and also lacks a plan for proactively obtaining such information. FEMA agreed with this recommendation and plans to evaluate the appropriate approach to obtain or require the submittal of this information. | Why GAO Did This Study
NFIP, established in 1968, provides policyholders with insurance coverage for flood damage. FEMA, within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for managing the program. NFIP offers two types of flood insurance premiums to property owners: subsidized and full-risk. The subsidized rates are not based on flood risk and, according to FEMA, represent only about 40-45 percent of the full flood risk. GAO placed NFIP on its high-risk list in 2006 because of concerns about its long-term solvency and related operational issues. GAO was asked to testify about NFIP issues and its recent work on NFIP. This statement discusses (1) the reasons that NFIP is considered high-risk, (2) changes to subsidized policies and implications of potential additional program changes, and (3) additional challenges for FEMA to address. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its past work on NFIP, including GAO-13-607 , GAO-13-568 , and GAO-13-283 .
What GAO Found
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was added to GAO's high-risk list in 2006 and remains high risk due to losses incurred from the 2005 hurricanes and subsequent losses, the financial exposure the program represents for the federal government, and ongoing management and operational challenges. As of July 31, 2013, the program owed approximately $24 billion to the U.S. Treasury (Treasury). NFIP's financial condition highlights structural weaknesses in how the program has been funded--primarily its rate structure. The annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and subsidized premiums is generally not enough to cover its operating costs, claim payments, and principal and interest payments for the debt owed to Treasury, especially in years of catastrophic flooding, such as 2005. This arrangement results in much of the financial risk of flooding being transferred to the federal government and ultimately the taxpayer. Furthermore, weaknesses in NFIP management and operations, including financial reporting processes and internal controls, strategic and human capital planning, and oversight of contractors have placed the program at risk.
The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) mandated that GAO conduct a number of studies related to actual and potential changes to NFIP, including analyses of remaining subsidies and the effect of increasing coverage limits or adding coverage options. In a study of remaining subsidies, GAO estimated that with the changes in the Biggert-Waters Act approximately 438,000 policies no longer are eligible for subsidies, including about 345,000 policies for nonprimary residences, about 87,000 business policies, and about 9,000 policies for single-family properties that had severe-repetitive losses. Subsidies on most of the approximately 715,000 remaining subsidized policies are expected to be eliminated over time as properties are sold or coverage lapses, as are previous exemptions from rate increases after flood zone map revisions. Reducing the financial impact of remaining subsidized policies on NFIP generally could involve accelerating elimination of subsidies, targeting assistance for subsidies, or expanding mitigation efforts, or some combination. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. In GAO's 2008 study about rate-setting, GAO noted that the losses generated by NFIP have created substantial financial exposure for the federal government and U.S. taxpayers--due in part to its rate-setting process. Partly because of these rate-setting issues, GAO concluded in a July 2013 report that the advantages and disadvantages to additional changes to the program, such as raising coverage limits or adding optional coverage types, would need to be carefully weighed.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will require several years to fully implement the Biggert-Waters Act. FEMA officials acknowledged that they have challenges to resolve. These include updating and correcting information on whether a policy is for a primary or secondary residence, determining the fair market value of insured properties, and developing a definition of severe repetitive loss for multifamily properties. Further, FEMA must establish full-risk rates that reflect flood risk for active policies that no longer are eligible for subsidies; but it does not have a plan to do so. In an effort to update payment formulas to insurance companies, as GAO recommended, FEMA has begun receiving actual flood-related information from some insurance companies but all companies are not reporting the information consistently.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to support its previous recommendations made to FEMA that focus on the need to address management and operational challenges, ensure that the methods and data used to set NFIP rates accurately reflect the risk of losses from flooding, and that oversight of NFIP and insurance companies responsible for selling and servicing flood policies is strengthened. FEMA agreed with these recommendations and is taking steps to address them. |
gao_HEHS-97-8 | gao_HEHS-97-8_0 | Who Relies on the Individual Market for Comprehensive Health Insurance Coverage? Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources asked us to report on the size of the individual health insurance market, recent trends, and the demographic characteristics of its participants; the market structure, including how individuals access the market, the prices, other characteristics of health plans offered, and the number of individual carriers offering plans; and the insurance reforms and other measures states have taken to increase individuals’ access to health insurance. Therefore, references to individual market products do not include more limited benefit products unless specifically noted. For About 10.5 Million Americans, Individual Health Insurance Was Their Only Source of Health Coverage in 1994
On the basis of our analysis of the March 1995 CPS, we estimate that about 10.5 million Americans under 65 years of age (4.5 percent of the nonelderly population) received health coverage through individual health insurance as their only source of health coverage during 1994. 2.2.) Consumers could choose from plans offered by no fewer than 7 to over 100 carriers. Medical Underwriting Affects Premiums and May Bar Access to the Individual Market
Absent state restrictions, carriers also evaluate the health status of each applicant to determine whether an applicant’s health status will result in an increase to the standard premium rate, the exclusion of a body part or an existing health condition, or the denial of the applicant altogether. Individuals with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) or other serious conditions, such as heart disease and leukemia, are virtually always denied coverage. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide examples of what individuals may face, given particular demographic characteristics and health conditions, when attempting to purchase individual insurance from carriers in the states we visited. In many of these states, high-risk insurance pools have been created to act as a safety net to ensure that these otherwise uninsurable individuals can obtain coverage, although at a cost that is generally 50 percent higher than the average or standard rate charged in the individual insurance market for a comparable plan. This provision, however, did not necessarily guarantee coverage to all individuals on demand. The individual insurance market is complex, and consumers, unlike those who have access to employer-sponsored plans, are largely on their own in obtaining and financing coverage. Thus in most states, those who are older or in poor health may be charged significantly higher premiums or may be denied coverage altogether. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the private individual health insurance market, focusing on the: (1) size of the market and characteristics of its participants; (2) structure of the market, including how individuals access the market, the prices, other characteristics of health plans offered, and the number of individual carriers offering plans; and (3) insurance reforms and other measures states have taken to increase individuals' access to health insurance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) about 10.5 million Americans under 65 years of age relied on private individual health insurance as their only source of health coverage during 1994; (2) when compared with those enrolled in employer-sponsored group coverage, individual health insurance enrollees are, on average, older and have lower income, but they are similar in their self-reported health status; (3) individual insurance is more prevalent among particular segments of the labor force, such as the self-employed and farm workers; (4) individuals must identify and evaluate multiple health insurance products and then obtain and finance the coverage on their own; (5) individuals in the states reviewed could select products from 7 to over 100 carriers, with deductibles ranging from $250 to $10,000; (6) in the majority of states, which permit medical underwriting, individuals may be excluded from the private insurance market, may only be able to obtain limited benefit coverage, or may pay premiums that are significantly higher than the standard rate for similar coverage; (7) carriers in these states determine premium price and eligibility on the basis of the risk indicated by each individual's demographic characteristics and health status; (8) carriers GAO visited declined coverage to up to 33 percent of applicants because of medical conditions, such as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and heart disease; (9) if they do not decline coverage, carriers may permanently exclude from coverage certain conditions or body parts, or charge significantly higher premiums to those expected to incur large health care costs; (10) at least 43 states have sought to increase the health coverage options available to otherwise uninsurable individuals; and (11) a new federal law contains provisions intended to enhance access to the individual insurance market, particularly regarding portability and guaranteed renewal. |
gao_GAO-17-72 | gao_GAO-17-72_0 | Asylum Grant Rates
For fiscal years 1995 through 2014, EOIR data indicate that affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates varied over time and across immigration courts, applicants’ country of nationality, and individual immigration judges within courts. Using this definition, annual grant rates for affirmative asylum applications ranged from 21 to 44 percent from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2014. In the same time period, grant rates for defensive asylum applications ranged from 15 to 26 percent. For example, the grant rate for affirmative applicants in the New York immigration court was 66 percent, while the grant rate in the Omaha and Atlanta immigration courts was less than 5 percent (see fig. 8). In addition, researchers have offered potential explanations for variation in asylum application outcomes. EOIR Data Show Variation in Outcomes of Asylum Applications Across Courts and Judges Persists when Holding Certain Case and Judge Characteristics Constant
On the basis of our analysis of EOIR data from fiscal years 1995 through 2014, we found that asylum grant rates varied across courts and judges, holding constant various case and judge characteristics. EOIR’s case management system was designed to manage and track workloads across immigration courts rather than to collect all data on the details of individual proceedings. As a result, our analysis could not hold constant the underlying facts and merits of individual asylum applications because EOIR’s case management system does not collect that information. For example:
Representation. Applicants who were represented by legal counsel were granted asylum at a rate 3.1 times higher than applicants who were not represented. Many of the factors we analyzed had similar associations for both affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates. For example:
Representation. Dependents. Asylum Grant Rates Varied Significantly Across Immigration Courts for a Representative Applicant After Controlling for Certain Factors
From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, we estimated that the affirmative asylum grant rate would vary by 29 percentage points if different immigration courts heard the case of a representative applicant with the same average characteristics we measured. Asylum Grant Rates Varied Significantly Across Immigration Judges for a Representative Applicant After Controlling for Certain Factors
From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, we estimated that the affirmative asylum grant rate would vary by 47 percentage points if different immigration judges heard the case of a representative applicant with the same average characteristics we measured. EOIR Could Improve Efforts to Measure LOP and LOPC Effectiveness
EOIR monitors LOP and LOPC through a variety of mechanisms, but has not established a system of performance measures, including establishing a baseline, to regularly evaluate the effectiveness of LOP and LOPC to determine whether these programs are having a measurable impact in meeting program objectives. Developing and implementing performance measures, including establishing a baseline, to independently and periodically determine whether LOP and LOPC are having a measurable impact would better position EOIR to make any adjustments necessary to improve the programs’ performance. However, in an e-mail received on October 24, 2016, an Associate General Counsel for EOIR stated that EOIR concurred with our recommendation. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the extent of variation in the outcomes of completed asylum applications over time and across immigration courts and judges; (2) discuss the factors associated with variability in the outcomes of completed asylum applications; and (3) examine the extent to which the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has taken action to facilitate access to legal resources, including representation, for asylum applicants. We interviewed EOIR headquarters officials responsible for overseeing immigration court proceedings; EOIR’s case management system; immigration judge training and guidance and legal access programs. Extent of Variation in Completed Asylum Applications
To describe the extent of variation in the outcomes of completed asylum applications, we analyzed data from EOIR about completions of asylum applications from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2014, the most current data available at the time of our analysis. Nonetheless, the data available allowed us to control for certain factors of each asylum application, enabling us to compare outcomes across immigration courts and judges. EOIR Actions to Facilitate Access to Legal Resources
To examine the extent to which EOIR has taken action to facilitate access to legal resources, we reviewed the Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and the Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien Children (LOPC) program documents and data, including the 2011 blanket purchase agreement and statements of work covering fiscal years 2013 through 2016; quarterly reports, annual reports; site visit reports, and evaluation reports; and, data reported by the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) on the number of unique individuals served by LOP (fiscal years 2008 through 2015) and LOPC (fiscal years 2011 through 2015). | Why GAO Did This Study
Tens of thousands of foreign nationals in the United States apply annually for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution on protected grounds. EOIR's immigration judges decide asylum application outcomes in court proceedings. In 2008, GAO reported that EOIR data from October 1994 through April 2007 showed significant variation in the outcomes across immigration courts and judges (grants versus denials) of such applications.
The Senate Appropriations Committee report for DHS Appropriations Act, 2015, included a provision for GAO to update its 2008 report. This report examines (1) variation in asylum applications outcomes over time and across courts and judges; (2) factors associated with variability; and (3) EOIR's actions to facilitate asylum applicants' access to legal resources. GAO analyzed EOIR data—using multivariate statistics—on asylum outcomes from fiscal years 1995 through 2014, the most current data available at the time of GAO's analysis; reviewed EOIR policies and procedures; and interviewed EOIR officials and immigration judges about court proceedings and legal access programs. GAO observed asylum hearings in 10 immigration courts selected on the basis of application data and other factors.
What GAO Found
GAO analyzed the outcomes of 595,795 asylum applications completed by the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) between fiscal years 1995 and 2014, and identified outcome variation both over time and across immigration courts and judges. From fiscal years 2008 through 2014, annual grant rates for affirmative asylum applications (those filed with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the initiative of the individual and referred to an EOIR immigration judge) ranged from 21 to 44 percent. In the same period, grant rates for defensive asylum applications (those initiated before an immigration judge) ranged from 15 to 26 percent. Further, EOIR data indicate that asylum grant rates varied by immigration court. For example, from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, the grant rate was 66 percent (affirmative) and 52 percent (defensive) in the New York, New York, immigration court and less than 5 percent (affirmative and defensive) in the Omaha, Nebraska, and Atlanta, Georgia, immigration courts.
GAO found that certain case and judge-related factors are associated with variation in the outcomes of asylum applications. For example, applicants who were represented by legal counsel were granted asylum at a rate 3.1 (affirmative) and 1.8 (defensive) times higher than applicants who were not represented. After statistically controlling for certain factors, such as judge experience and whether or not the applicant had dependents, GAO found variation remained in the outcomes of completed asylum applications across immigration courts and judges. For example, from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, GAO estimated that the affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates would vary by 29 and 38 percentage points, respectively, for a representative applicant with the same average characteristics we measured, whose case was heard in different immigration courts. In addition, GAO estimated that the affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates would vary by 47 and 57 percentage points, respectively, for the same representative applicant whose case was heard by different immigration judges. GAO could not control for the underlying facts and merits of individual asylum applications because EOIR's case management system was designed to track and manage workloads and does not collect data on all of the details of individual proceedings. Nonetheless, the data available allowed GAO to hold constant certain factors of each asylum application, enabling GAO to compare outcomes across immigration courts and judges.
EOIR provides legal resources to targeted populations, including asylum applicants, through the Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien Children (LOPC). EOIR and its contractor use LOP and LOPC site visits, monthly conference calls, and quarterly reports to monitor these programs. However, EOIR has not established performance measures, consistent with principles outlined in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, to determine whether these programs are having a measurable impact in meeting program objectives. Developing and implementing performance measures, including establishing a baseline, to determine whether LOP and LOPC are having a measurable impact would better position EOIR to make any adjustments necessary to improve the programs' performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EOIR develop and implement a system of performance measures, including establishing a baseline, to regularly evaluate the effectiveness of LOP and LOPC. EOIR concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-824 | gao_GAO-12-824_0 | DOD. Mission Plans Describe Strategic Approaches for U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries
Although no single comprehensive U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists for the Andean region, mission strategic resource plans (MSRPs) for each of the countries in the region delineate the strategic approaches guiding U.S. counternarcotics assistance. Agencies Allotted Billions to Andean Countries for Counternarcotics Assistance in Fiscal Years 2006-2011
State, USAID, DOD, and DEA allotted a combined estimated total of nearly $5.2 billion in counternarcotics assistance to Andean countries in fiscal years 2006-2011. 2). 3.) As figure 4 shows, each agency’s allotments decreased during this time period. State, USAID, and DEA Reported Meeting or Exceeding Many Targets, but DOD’s Reporting Has Been Unreliable
State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most of their annual targets related to key counternarcotics performance measures in the Andean countries, and each complied with the ONDCP requirement that each agency obtain its IG’s attestation to the reliability of the agency’s performance summary reports before submitting the reports to ONDCP. Some of the achievements reported in these evaluations include the following: USAID’s alternative development program has met and surpassed annual targets for voluntary eradication of illicit crops in Peru. In June 2012, DOD IG stated that it was unable to attest to the reliability of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 performance report. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen ONDCP’s ability to coordinate, oversee, and report to Congress on U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that DOD complies with the ONDCP requirement to submit to ONDCP performance summary reports that are accompanied by IG attestations of the reliability of the information reported. We also interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). To describe the U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics assistance in the five Andean countries, we examined multiple U.S. government documents and interviewed U.S. government officials. We reviewed department and agency planning, reporting, and budgeting documents and obtained and reviewed the various strategy documents produced by the United States that are the basis for overall drug control efforts, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) annual National Drug Control Strategy and the U.S. embassy’s mission strategic resource plans for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Each agency provided funding data organized by country (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and by fiscal year (2006-2011). DOD. DEA. To assess State, USAID, DOD, and DEA reporting on their performance of counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries, we reviewed agency planning and reporting documents related to counternarcotics performance measures and targets. State provided limited assistance In Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hundreds of metric tons of cocaine flow annually from South America to the United States, threatening the security and well-being of U.S. citizens. South American cocaine production and trafficking is centered in the five countries in the Andean region. State, USAID, DOD, and DEA provide counternarcotics assistance to stem production and trafficking of narcotics in these countries. ONDCP oversees and coordinates this assistance.
In this report, GAO (1) describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counter- narcotics assistance in the Andean countries; (2) identifies amounts allotted for such assistance by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and (3) reviews the agencies reporting on their performance. GAO reviewed agency and U.S. strategy documents, analyzed available agency data, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
No single U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists for the Andean region. In each countryBolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuelathe U.S. embassys mission strategic resource plan, developed in consultation with the countrys government, guides counternarcotics assistance provided by U.S. agencies. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that these plans incorporate high- level guidance from the Office of National Drug Control Policys (ONDCP) annual National Drug Control Strategy.
In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, estimated allotments for counternarcotics assistance to the Andean countries by U.S. agenciesState, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)totaled about $5.2 billion. Total allotments declined for each country during this time period.
State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most annual targets for key measures of their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries since 2007. For instance, State reported assisting in the eradication of illicit crops, USAID reported promoting alternative development, and DEA reported disrupting drug trafficking organizations. In addition, State, USAID, and DEA complied with an ONDCP requirement that each agencys Inspector General (IG) attest to the reliability of annual performance summary reports before submitting the reports to ONDCP. DOD reported tracking several performance measures, but DODs IG was unable to attest to the reliability of DODs reporting to ONDCP. As a result, ONDCP lacks assurance of the accuracy of information it receives from DOD and in turn reports to Congress.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD submits performance summary reports to ONDCP including the Inspector Generals attestation that the reported information is reliable to facilitate good management and oversight. DOD concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-787 | gao_GAO-08-787_0 | The Key Requirements Related to Postal Outsourcing, the Service’s Process for Making Outsourcing Decisions, and the Extent of Its Outsourcing
The Service has no statutory restrictions on the type of work it may outsource, but union collective bargaining agreements impose some limitations. The Service did provide data related to some of its outsourcing, including in its retail, processing, and delivery functions. First, it must address five factors—public interest, cost, efficiency, availability of equipment, and qualification of employees—when evaluating the need to outsource. Although the specific requirements vary by agreement, the Service must always notify the affected union of its intent to consider outsourcing and must consider union input before making a decision. If the SIAG determines that an outsourcing initiative will have a significant impact on work performed by bargaining unit employees, the affected unions must be notified and allowed to provide input into the analysis considered when comparing the performance of proposed work by postal employees and by a contractor. The unions have also addressed concerns about outsourcing through collective bargaining. The Extent of the Postal Service’s Outsourcing Is Unknown
Overall, the Service could not provide information on the total extent of its outsourcing activities that have impacted bargaining unit work because the contracts related to bargaining unit work are not separately tracked. The Service Holds Both Contractors and Postal Employees to Similar Standards but Uses Different Processes to Manage Them
The Service evaluates contractors and postal employees using similar suitability and performance standards, while holding them accountable using different management processes. In the fall of 2007, the Service revised its drug screening procedures so that it had similar criteria to evaluate both potential delivery service contractors and applicants. Without data to demonstrate results, Service management, stakeholders, and Congress are not able to assess the risk and value of outsourcing, accountability for results is limited, and the Service is not able to effectively address union concerns. The Service has a long history of outsourcing mail transportation, delivery services and other functions, much of which has been carried out within the framework of the Service’s collective bargaining agreements with its employee unions. Conclusions
Although the Service has outsourced activities related to many of its key functions, its employee unions are now challenging its ability to expand outsourcing in areas where postal employees have performed or could perform these activities. A key challenge for both the Service and its unions will be to reach agreement on outsourcing issues through collective bargaining. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to assess (1) the circumstances under which the Service can outsource postal functions, how it decides to outsource, and the extent to which it has outsourced; (2) how the Service’s management processes, including suitability (hiring and screening procedures) and performance evaluation, for contractors compare to those for postal employees; and (3) the results—including any costs savings, or other outcomes—of the Service’s outsourcing efforts and the challenges facing the Service related to outsourcing. To compare the Service’s suitability, performance evaluation, and management processes for postal employees and contractors, we reviewed the Service’s policies and procedures on qualifications, screening requirements, and performance evaluation for contractors and postal employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service (the Service) has a long history of contracting out postal functions, such as mail transportation, mail delivery in rural areas, vehicle and equipment maintenance, and retail postal services. However, postal employees also perform many of these same functions and unions representing these employees have concerns about the scope and impact of outsourcing. The objectives of this requested report are to assess (1) the circumstances under which the Service can outsource postal functions, how it decides to outsource, and the extent to which it has outsourced; (2) how the Service's management processes compare for contractors and postal employees; and (3) the results, including any savings, and key challenges related to the Service's outsourcing activities. GAO reviewed applicable statutes, collective bargaining agreements, postal processes and outsourcing data, and interviewed postal union and management officials.
What GAO Found
The Service has no statutory restrictions on the type of work it may outsource, but collective bargaining agreements with its unions impose some process requirements and limitations. When evaluating outsourcing proposals, the Service must consider five factors--public interest, cost, efficiency, availability of equipment, and qualification of employees--and determine whether outsourcing will have a "significant impact" on work performed by postal employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. If so, it must compare the costs of performing proposed work with postal employees and with a contractor, notify the affected union that it is considering outsourcing, and consider union input before making a decision. We could not determine the Service's total outsourcing contracts related to bargaining unit work, because the Service does not separately track these contracts. It did provide data on some outsourcing that has impacted work by employees of its four major unions in the areas of retail, processing, transportation, and delivery. The Service evaluates contractors and postal employees using similar suitability and performance standards, but uses different management processes. The Service recently revised its drug screening procedures so they are now similar for both groups. The Service manages contractors through specific performance requirements, as compared to Service policies and collective bargaining agreements for postal employees. Finally, the Service has mechanisms to evaluate performance and take actions related to performance problems for both, but does not compile performance data to permit comparisons between contractors and postal employees. The Service does not have a comprehensive mechanism for measuring results, including any actual savings; therefore, it could not provide information on the effectiveness of its outsourcing. Without cost-savings data, postal managers, stakeholders and Congress cannot assess the risk and value of outsourcing. Also, accountability for results is limited. The Service has stated that it will explore outsourcing opportunities, and postal unions are concerned that the Service's use of contractors for delivery service is growing as shown below. Proposed legislation to limit the Service's outsourcing is pending in Congress, which the Service says could limit its ability to contain costs. Key challenges include whether the Service and its unions can reach agreement on outsourcing issues through collective bargaining and whether the Service can provide analysis to substantiate the benefits of outsourcing. |
gao_GAO-16-263 | gao_GAO-16-263_0 | Required Distribution of Fiscal Year 2014 Reductions Affected a Relatively Small Portion of Mandatory Spending
In fiscal year 2014, the total amount of mandatory budget authority across the federal government was approximately $2.9 trillion, spread across roughly 443 accounts. Certain budget authority is exempt or subject to special rules. The exemptions and special rules lead sequestration to affect some areas of the federal government more than others. For example, nearly all mandatory budget authority for Medicare and more than 90 percent of the mandatory budget authority that supports the administration of justice was sequestrable, whereas national priorities such as social security and veterans benefits, which comprise a larger portion of the federal budget, were exempt from sequestration. About two-thirds of federal agencies with mandatory budget authority implemented sequestration procedures in 2014. Even though they had created the administrative framework to implement sequestration during its first year in fiscal year 2013, the agency officials we spoke with indicated that implementation of the fiscal year 2014 sequestration required them to engage in additional administrative activities to ensure that reductions were applied correctly and to accommodate the changes in cash flows for programs and services. For example, at the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), officials said sequestration reductions to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) created additional uncertainty about the availability of funds, which led to cash management concerns. Reported Effects on Program Participants Varied Across Entities and Individuals in Our Review
Selected agencies reported that program beneficiaries were affected in different ways by the sequestration reductions ranging from smaller direct payments, reduced services, delayed payments, and reduced tax credits. While those sequestered amounts are counted as reductions in the fiscal year for which they are sequestered, because they can be made available for obligation again in future years, they do not result in lasting savings for the federal government. For Certain Types of Sequestered Mandatory Spending, Actual Amounts Cannot be Determined Until After the End of the Fiscal Year
Section 251A of BBEDCA requires OMB to provide estimates of the required reductions for any fiscal year in which a sequestration of mandatory spending and reductions of discretionary spending limits has been ordered. However, OMB staff also confirmed that the reductions listed for mandatory accounts with indefinite budget authority may differ from the amounts that were actually sequestered because the amount of budget authority for these accounts is for an unspecified or indeterminable amount at the time of enactment. Moreover, they are not required under BBEDCA to tally the actual amounts reduced in a given year. Moreover, compiling such data could serve as a benchmark to evaluate the progress made each year toward the overall savings of $1.2 trillion required by law. This represents less than one percent of mandatory budget authority in fiscal year 2014. Aside from Medicare and certain other health programs, the largest drivers of mandatory spending growth are statutorily exempt from sequestration. However, these agencies said implementation involved additional administrative activities, and in certain cases, an additional element of uncertainty when planning and executing their budgets. The processes established under BBEDCA were designed to reduce the federal deficit by at least an additional $1.2 trillion over 10 years. Doing so, along with reporting the amount of “pop ups,” would provide a clearer picture to decision makers of the amount of funds that were permanently canceled, thereby representing the true savings generated from mandatory spending reductions each year. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the transparency to Congress about the total amount of funds agencies have available in a given year, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget identify and publicly report the total amount of actual budget authority government-wide that is temporarily sequestered and “pops up,” or becomes available again to agencies for obligation in the subsequent fiscal year. OMB agreed with the first recommendation but disagreed with the second, as discussed below. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) the designation of mandatory accounts across the federal budget under the President’s sequestration order for fiscal year 2014; (2) how selected agencies implemented the fiscal year 2014 sequestration order and the effects, if any, they reported the required spending reductions had on programs and services; and (3) how continued sequestration of mandatory spending relates to the achievement of deficit reduction goals. Furthermore, we reviewed budget data, guidance, and documentation of any reported programmatic effects of sequestration for each of the selected accounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, federal agencies implemented the second consecutive year of sequestration reductions to mandatory spending, which are scheduled through fiscal year 2025.
GAO was asked to review the implementation of sequestration on mandatory accounts and any related effects. This report examines 1) the designation of mandatory accounts government-wide under the President's sequestration order for fiscal year 2014, 2) how selected agencies implemented sequestration and any effects they reported on programs or services, and 3) how continued sequestration of mandatory spending relates to the achievement of deficit reduction goals.
GAO analyzed fiscal year 2014 budget data on sequestration; selected a nongeneralizable sample of 6 accounts from USDA, HHS, Treasury, and DOT based on the amount of sequestrable budget authority, budget function, and account type; reviewed documentation on sequestration; interviewed budget officials; and reviewed legislation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that in fiscal year 2014, total mandatory budget authority government-wide was approximately $2.9 trillion spread across roughly 443 accounts. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), as amended, required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to apply a range of sequestration rates to non-exempt mandatory spending. This resulted in estimated reductions of $19.4 billion in fiscal year 2014, which was less than one percent of mandatory budget authority. Exemptions and special rules in BBEDCA led some areas of government to be reduced more than others. For example, 90 percent or more of mandatory budget authority for the administration of justice and transportation was subject to reduction. Veterans benefits and services were exempt. About two-thirds of the 67 federal agencies with mandatory budget authority implemented sequestration procedures in 2014. The largest drivers of mandatory spending growth—Social Security and health care—are statutorily exempt from sequestration under BBEDCA, with the exception of Medicare and certain health programs which are subject to a special rate.
Agency officials responsible for managing the selected accounts in GAO's review at the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), the Treasury (Treasury), and Transportation (DOT) reported varied administrative and programmatic effects. While they said 2014 sequestration procedures were similar to the prior year, implementation involved additional administrative activities to ensure that reductions were applied correctly and to accommodate the changes in cash flows for programs and services. In certain cases, selected officials said sequestration added uncertainty when planning and executing their budgets. They also said that the required reductions affected program beneficiaries in different ways including smaller direct payments, reduced services, delayed payments, and reduced tax credits.
The processes established by BBEDCA were designed to reduce the deficit over 10 years by at least an additional $1.2 trillion. However, the subsequent availability of temporarily sequestered budget authority in certain accounts—referred to as “pop ups”—provide savings in the year they are sequestered but do not represent lasting savings. OMB staff said they do not tally the total amount of funds that “pop up,” nor are they required to do so. However, doing so would provide additional transparency to Congress about the total amount of funds agencies have available in a given year.
In addition, actual sequestered amounts for certain types of mandatory spending cannot be determined until the end of the fiscal year due to the variable nature of indefinite budget authority—budget authority for an unspecified or indeterminable amount at the time of enactment. OMB staff said they do not aggregate government-wide data on the actual amounts sequestered nor are they required to do so under BBEDCA. However, tabulating actual amounts after the close of the fiscal year would provide a clearer picture of the amount of funds that were permanently canceled, thereby representing the true savings generated from mandatory spending reductions each year. Moreover, compiling such data could improve transparency and serve as a benchmark to evaluate the progress made each year toward the required overall savings of $1.2 trillion.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB identify and publicly report the total amount of (1) temporarily sequestered budget authority that becomes available in subsequent fiscal years and (2) actual budget authority sequestered government-wide each year. OMB agreed with the first recommendation but disagreed with the second, citing implementation burden. GAO believes such information would enhance the transparency of achieving federal deficit reduction goals as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-02-828 | gao_GAO-02-828_0 | The utilities sold electricity to consumers at prices determined by the state’s Public Utilities Commission—a state regulatory agency. Costs of generating electricity rose in 2000. Suppliers Exercised Market Power during Periods of Tight Demand and Supply Balances
Our analysis found that electricity suppliers exercised market power by raising prices above competitive levels during some periods after the restructured market opened. Market Design in California Enabled Exercise of Market Power
California’s market design enabled wholesale electricity suppliers to exercise market power. According to prominent experts and analysts, two principal market design flaws increased suppliers’ ability to raise prices above competitive levels: (1) retail prices were frozen, and (2) with few exceptions, the Public Utilities Commission limited utilities’ ability to enter into long-term contracts with suppliers. Conclusion
As discussed in this report, a number of factors caused electricity prices to rise in California in the summer of 2000 and at other times since restructuring. California State Auditor. “Understanding Competitive Pricing and Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets” (unpublished). | What GAO Found
Historically, utility monopolies have generated electricity and sold it to customers at prices set by state regulators. Today, private companies in 24 states compete to sell electricity at market prices determined by supply and demand. California is part of a broader western market in which electricity is routinely bought and sold across state and national boundaries. GAO found evidence that wholesale electricity suppliers exercised market power by raising prices above competitive levels during the summer of 2000 and at other times after the restructuring. Neither GAO's analysis nor other studies addressed whether market power exercised in California violated federal or other laws. The design of California's electricity market enabled individual wholesale electricity suppliers to exercise market power. Once prices rose, the design was ineffective in returning prices to competitive levels. Prominent experts on market design and industry experts generally agree that two principal market designs flaws increased wholesale suppliers' incentive and ability to raise prices above competitive levels: (1) retail prices were frozen and (2) the California Public Utilities Commission generally prohibited or discouraged long-term contracts between utilities and wholesale suppliers. |
gao_GAO-17-177 | gao_GAO-17-177_0 | Experts Have Identified Several Capability Needs for Bioforensics
In addition to DHS and the FBI, other organizations, such as the NRC of the NAS and the NSTC of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), have been involved in identifying bioforensics capability needs. With the assistance of the NAS, we convened our own meeting of experts in April 2016 to review and update capability needs that the NRC and OSTP identified and to identify additional needs that might be useful for DHS and the FBI to consider when they identify their capability needs as part of a bioforensics capability gap analysis. However, we believe that this information could help inform the DHS’s and FBI’s efforts to identify capability needs and prioritize gaps. Some of the needs the experts confirmed as still relevant were similar to those identified by the DHS and the FBI, and some were different. For example, like DHS and the FBI the experts agreed that an ability to characterize genetically engineered agents was needed, but they also suggested that evaluating existing protocols, such as those for DNA sequencing, to determine whether they were validated, was needed. The identified needs in table 1 can generally be grouped into three broad areas: (1) science, (2) technology and methods, and (3) bioinformatics and data. These agencies could consider this information as part of any capability gap analysis. DHS and the FBI are Focusing on Methods- Based Capabilities to Provide a Broader Bioforensics Capability
DHS has taken several actions to enhance some of NBFAC’s bioforensics capabilities for use on FBI casework. It also reflects DHS’s shift toward methods-based approaches, such as genomics and proteomics. DHS is developing a capability that will allow NBFAC to characterize unique, novel agents, “unknowns” (emerging or synthetic organisms) and “unknown, unknowns” (de novo synthetic organisms). However, it is not clear to what extent or when DHS will be able address key challenges related to enhancing its bioforensics capabilities that include interpreting results from metagenomics and proteomic analyses, with a defined statistical confidence, according to both DHS and the FBI officials. Conclusions
DHS has identified some bioforensics capability gaps since 2010 using an informal, undocumented process but has not systematically identified the gaps or performed a bioforensics capability gap analysis. Therefore, without a capability gap analysis and documentation of the results of its process for identifying gaps, the rationale for DHS’s resource allocations and its plans for future enhancements to its existing capabilities are not clear. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security—in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation—conduct a formal bioforensics capability gap analysis to identify scientific and technical gaps and needs in bioforensics capabilities to help guide current and future bioforensics investments and update its analysis periodically. DHS concurred with our recommendation. Key contributors the report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this report, we evaluated (1) the extent to which DHS and the FBI have identified gaps in their bioforensics capabilities since 2010, (2) bioforensics needs experts have identified, and (3) any actions DHS and the FBI have taken to enhance their bioforensics capabilities, including those for characterizing a novel synthetic biological weapon, and any challenges they have experienced in enhancing bioforensics capabilities. To determine the extent to which DHS and the FBI have identified gaps in their bioforensics capabilities, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed relevant agency officials about their efforts to identify such gaps since 2010, which is when the Department of Justice closed the FBI’s investigation into the 2010 anthrax case. We also examined DHS’s actions to enhance NBFAC’s capabilities for the long term as well as for the FBI’s casework. Appendix II: DHS R&D to Enhance Bioforensics Capabilities, 2008 – 2016
Bacterial and viral bioforensics research and development
Sequence-based approach to bioforensics analysis Whole genome approach to microbial forensics Bioforensics research R&D: Whole genome approach to microbial forensics and the identification of adaptive mutations that can have forensic utility Establishing match criteria for discriminating “difference” or “sameness” in sample comparisons Developing statistically rigorous sampling strategies to acquire spatially referenced genetic information on reservoirs of these pathogens Developing bioinformatics-based analytical tools for supporting hypotheses testing regarding pathogen origin that go beyond current phylogeny-based inferential methods and can meet forensic (legal) admissibility Develop novel techniques to culture threat agents from complex environmental samples Improve dry collection and extraction strategies for forensic samples Develop detection methods for rare variant detection in a bacterial sample using ultra- high throughput next generation sequencing technology Understand dynamics of mobile elements in select agent bacteria Develop forensic genotyping methods for select agent viruses Develop novel applications of orthogonal methods to genetic characterization of biological threat agent signatures and their sample matrices Develop biased primer set design to amplify biological threat agents from complex backgrounds Production methods for ultraclean reagents Sequence data error model for next-generation and single molecule sequencing platforms Taxonomic classification of metagenomic sequences Develop and apply mathematical models for statistical confidence measurements in metagenomic analysis Develop a procedure to transport agents from BSL-3 to BSL-2 laboratories Produce whole-genome sequencing to capture the global biodiversity of human, plant, and animal pathogens (bacterial, viral, and fungal) in support of microbial forensics analysis Development and population of comparative genomic database with pathogen sequence data at the National Center for Biotechnology Information Center Products to identify select agents including C. botulinum toxins, with high confidence Next generation and novel technologies to characterize biological threat agents (the organism, the agent, or the sample matrix) for source attribution Research on the bacterial populations of select agents with critical knowledge gaps, including C. botulinum and B. anthracis (North Africa, Middle East)
Year 2016
Appendix III: List of Experts
The names and affiliations of the experts who participated in the group meeting held April 20-21, 2016, in Washington, D.C. are as follows:
Christopher Bidwell, J.D., Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy at the Federation of American Scientists. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ability to attribute the source of an intentionally released biological threat agent and quickly apprehend and prosecute the perpetrator is essential to our nation's safety. However, questions remain about whether DHS's and the FBI's capabilities have improved since the 2001 anthrax attack. GAO was asked to report on DHS's and the FBI's bioforensics capabilities.
This report examines the (1) extent to which DHS and the FBI have identified gaps in their bioforensics capabilities since 2010, (2) bioforensics needs experts have identified, and (3) actions, if any, DHS and the FBI have taken to enhance their ability to attribute the source of a biological attack, and to identify any challenges to enhancing bioforensics capabilities. GAO's review focused on the agencies' efforts since 2010, when the FBI's investigation of the 2001 anthrax attack was closed. GAO analyzed relevant agency documents and interviewed agency officials and scientists on issues related to bioforensics. GAO also convened a meeting of experts with NAS's assistance to discuss potential bioforensics needs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have identified some gaps in their bioforensics capabilities, but DHS has not performed a formal bioforensics capability gap analysis. It is therefore not clear whether DHS and the FBI have identified all of their capability gaps. A capability gap analysis can help identify deficiencies in capabilities and can help support the validation and prioritization of how to address the gaps. DHS and the FBI have identified capability gaps using an informal undocumented process. For example, DHS held informal meetings to seek FBI input on capability gaps associated with recent casework. Gaps identified through this informal process include the inability to (1) characterize unique, novel, and engineered agents and “unknowns” (emerging or synthetic organisms) and (2) understand and communicate uncertainty associated with analyzing complex biological samples, among other things. In the absence of a well-documented bioforensics capability gap analysis, the rationale for DHS's resource allocations, or its plans for future enhancements to existing capabilities are not clear and thus cannot ensure that resources are being targeted to the highest priority gaps.
In addition to DHS and the FBI, other organizations, such as the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), have identified potential bioforensics capability needs. These needs can generally be grouped into three areas: science, technology and methods, and bioinformatics and data. GAO also convened a meeting of experts, with the help of NAS, and these experts updated a list of potential bioforensics capability needs that NAS and OSTP had previously identified within each of these areas. Some of the needs these experts confirmed as still relevant were similar to those DHS and FBI officials have identified, while others were different. For example, like DHS and the FBI, the experts agreed that an ability to characterize genetically engineered agents was needed, but they also suggested that evaluating existing protocols, such as those for DNA sequencing, to determine whether they were validated, was needed. GAO believes that this information may be helpful to DHS and the FBI as part of any future bioforensics capability gap analysis they undertake.
Since 2010, DHS has enhanced some of its bioforensics capabilities, with FBI input, by focusing on developing methods-based capabilities while maintaining agent-based capabilities. DHS has funded research and development projects addressing areas such as genome sequencing approaches, which underpin many methods-based bioforensics capabilities. DHS is also developing an in-house reference collection for use in investigations. In addition, DHS is developing the ability to characterize unique, novel agents as well as “unknowns,” such as synthetic organisms. DHS projects that some enhanced capabilities will be complete in about 2025. However, in pursuing enhancements, DHS faces several challenges, including establishing a statistical framework for interpreting bioforensics analyses and associated inferences and communicating them in a court setting, as well as obtaining suitable biological agents and DNA sequences to ensure quality references for use in investigations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS—in consultation with the FBI—conduct a formal bioforensics capability gap analysis and update it periodically. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_RCED-96-179 | gao_RCED-96-179_0 | 1.) The Commission now plans, constructs, and operates several wastewater treatment plants and projects on both sides of the border. These unmet needs are particularly acute on the Mexican side of the border, where the basic infrastructure is generally insufficient and sometimes nonexistent for connecting outlying communities to services for municipal sewage collection, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal. The colonias, however, have many unmet environmental infrastructure needs, and some other communities need to expand or upgrade the capacity of their existing infrastructure to meet the ever-increasing demand from population and industrial growth. 2.) According to officials from the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, most border communities in Texas have adequate capacity to meet their solid waste disposal needs for at least the next 10 years. Communities on both sides of the border often lack the experience in planning, constructing, and operating public works projects as well as the financial and administrative ability to raise capital and to repay debt. This program will build upon efforts taken under EPA’s Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (First Stage, 1992-1994) to improve environmental conditions in the border region. We also traveled extensively in the U.S.-Mexican border region. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the efforts of the United States and Mexico to address environmental infrastructure needs in the border region, the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Commerce asked us to examine (1) the U.S.-Mexican border region’s current and projected unmet needs for environmental infrastructure, (2) the financial and institutional challenges each country faces in addressing present and future environmental infrastructure needs, and (3) the way in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified and prioritized funding for environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexican border. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the U.S.-Mexican border region's unmet environmental infrastructure needs, focusing on: (1) the financial and institutional challenges facing the United States and Mexico; and (2) how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identifies and prioritizes funding for environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexican border.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) many environmental infrastructure needs remain unmet on both sides of the border; (2) these needs are particularly acute on the Mexican side of the border, where the basic infrastructure is ill equipped to handle sewage collection, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal; (3) some Mexican communities need to expand the capacity of their infrastructure to meet ever-increasing population demands and industrial growth; (4) the Mexican border region has the capacity to treat 34 percent of its wastewater; (5) the border communities in Texas have the capacity to meet their solid waste disposal needs for at least 10 years; (6) EPA has spent approximately $520 million to help address pollution problems along the U.S.-Mexican border, but it has not developed agencywide criteria to ensure that its resources target the region's highest-priority needs; (7) communities on both sides of the border lack experience in planning public works projects, as well as the financial capacity to fund these projects; (8) the North American Development Bank provides financing for environmental infrastructure projects by securing equity, grants, and other sources of funding on a project-by-project basis; and (9) the Border XXI Program provides information on how to improve environmental conditions along the U.S.-Mexican border, develop environmental indicators, expand public participation, and address environmental health concerns. |
gao_GAO-17-635 | gao_GAO-17-635_0 | Dredging needs vary among ports. Selected Ports Varied in Terms of Type and Amount of Freight Moved, and Did Not Show a Consistent Traffic Trend from 2010 through 2015
Types of Freight
From 2010 through 2015, the 13 selected ports we reviewed moved the following types of freight: agricultural commodities (primarily soybeans, corn, and rice); petroleum products; crude materials (sand, gravel, and similar materials); chemicals; coal; and primary manufactured goods (such as lime and concrete). However, individual ports varied with respect to the type of freight moved through the port, with some ports specializing in certain commodities. While tonnage fluctuated annually, based on the 5-year averages, 6 ports transported less than 1- million tons; 6 ports transported 1-million tons to less than 10-million tons; and 1 port consistently transported over 10-million tons. In addition, crop yield per acre determines the amount of crop harvested, and can be affected by weather, seed quality, and other factors. Stakeholders Identified Challenges That Funding Constraints Pose to Dredging Inland Harbors and Concerns about the Corps’ Fund Allocation Process Funding Constraints Limit the Corps’ Ability to Fully Dredge Harbors, Which Negatively Affects Freight Movement
A majority of the stakeholders we interviewed, as well as officials from USDA and the Corps, cited funding constraints as a challenge that prevents the Corps from fully dredging all inland harbors, including the harbors at the selected ports. According to local Corps officials, the Corps needed approximately $20.6 million, and received approximately $13.1 million to dredge all of the harbors and channels associated with the 13 selected ports to their full dimensions in fiscal year 2016. The Corps’ Prioritization Process for Allocating Funds to Dredge Harbors Creates Challenges for Low Tonnage Ports
According to Corps officials, within current funding levels, the Corps must make decisions about which harbors to dredge, and the amount of dredging each harbor should receive. However, the Corps has developed some internal tools that might help it assess data related to some of the factors that Congress has required the Corps to consider when allocating funds from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, such as the national and regional significance of harbor operations and maintenance, and the use and benefit of the harbor for domestic trade. Further, the official explained that the Corps has also used the tool to generate metrics on the amount and the dollar value of cargo at risk when harbors lose 5 feet of depth. A senior Corps official agreed that it may be beneficial for the Corps to provide Congress with information on the extent to which the Corps’ existing tools could be adapted to allow it to consider factors beyond tonnage when allocating dredging funds, the limitations of using these tools, as well as the amount of additional resources that may be needed to pursue such an approach. Many Stakeholders Favored Continued Use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and Identified Potential Challenges of Alternative-Funding Options
Stakeholders Preferred the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund for Funding Dredging
Many stakeholders and experts we interviewed said that the federal government should make more use of the current mechanism for funding dredging—the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund—before considering alternative-funding options. Stakeholders Cited Potential Challenges Related to Alternative Funding Options
We asked selected stakeholders and experts about three options for funding inland harbors’ dredging: contributions from state and local governments; expanding the use of the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (currently used for new construction and major rehabilitation of locks and dams as well as other channel and waterway improvements) to include maintenance dredging; and a new user fee or tax. Stakeholders such as ports, port tenants, and state departments of transportation officials also stated that many of the selected ports in our review do not have the financial resources to provide a funding contribution, and that it may be difficult to secure state or local funds from rural, low income counties and states where a number of the inland ports are located. For example, a port tenant noted that a lock failure would have more significant effects to more users than shoaling at one harbor. In addition, some stakeholders noted that using state and local revenues to fund dredging could be an option if it could be used to match federal government funds. However, some of these tools were developed for coastal harbors, and the feasibility, potential limitations, and costs of adapting the Corps’ existing analytical tools and capabilities will need to be assessed before these tools could be successfully utilized. This report addresses three objectives: (1) what is known about the freight traffic (including types of freight and trends in traffic) of selected inland ports on the Mississippi River between St. Louis and Baton Rouge since 2010; (2) stakeholders’ views on any challenges that the current federal approach to funding dredging presents for inland ports and the reported effect on the movement of freight at these ports; and (3) stakeholders’ views on the potential benefits and challenges of using alternative options for funding dredging of inland harbors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Inland ports on the Mississippi River between St. Louis and Baton Rouge enable shippers to move millions of tons of agricultural and other bulk commodities. However, these ports' harbors can accumulate sediment that reduces their depth, width, and length, making it difficult for vessels to move. To address this, the Corps routinely dredges the harbors.
Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review dredging issues for ports in this region. This report addresses: (1) freight traffic of selected ports since 2010; (2) stakeholders' views on any challenges presented by the current federal funding approach to dredging inland harbors; and (3) the benefits and challenges of alternative options to fund dredging.
GAO reviewed Corps' 2010–2015 port traffic data for 13 of 18 inland ports in the region. Data for 2015 were the most recent available. GAO also interviewed Corps officials, industry stakeholders, and officials from 11 of 13 ports selected to include a range in terms of cargo handled, location, and dredging history. GAO conducted a literature search and interviewed 52 industry, port, and other stakeholders and experts about alternative options to fund dredging.
What GAO Found
From 2010 through 2015, 13 Mississippi River ports that GAO selected for review varied individually in terms of the amount, type, and trends in traffic handled. As a group, these ports primarily moved a mix of agricultural commodities (corn, soybeans, and rice); petroleum products; and crude materials (such as sand and gravel, among others). However, the ports varied individually, with some primarily moving agricultural commodities, and others moving a variety of commodities. These ports also varied in the quantity of goods transported through them, ranging from less than 1-million tons to more than 10-million tons per year. The amount of freight moved through each port tended to fluctuate each year due to various factors, such as weather, crop yields, and export markets.
A majority of the stakeholders GAO interviewed, as well as U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) officials, stated that funding constraints limit the Corps' ability to fully dredge the 13 ports' harbors, which can affect freight movement. According to local Corps officials, they received about $13.1 million of the $20.6 million needed to fully dredge the 13 ports' harbors in fiscal year 2016. Some stakeholders told GAO that smaller ports are negatively affected by the Corps' emphasis on the amount of cargo moved (measured in tons) when making decisions about which harbors to dredge. Congress has directed the Corps to consider harbors' significance and to conduct an assessment of harbors' use and benefits—considering factors beyond tonnage—to inform its allocation of dredging funds. Corps officials said they have not conducted such an assessment due to funding constraints, and raised concerns about the cost-effectiveness of conducting such assessments. However, the Corps has developed some tools that may help it assess inland harbors' significance, use, and benefits. For example, Corps officials explained that they have a tool that allows them to track the amount and type of cargo moving through harbors and to estimate the value of cargo at risk if a harbor loses depth. However, a Corps official noted the cargo-at-risk metric was based on deep coastal harbors and would need to be adapted for inland harbors. A senior Corps official agreed that it could be useful to inform Congress of the Corps' existing tools and capabilities and the resources needed to adapt these tools and capabilities to address the statutory requirements related to allocating dredging funds.
Many of the stakeholders GAO interviewed said that before considering alternative-funding options, the federal government should make more use of the current mechanism for funding dredging: the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. With regard to three other potential options for funding dredging—user fees, state and local contributions, and use of the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (which currently funds new construction and major rehabilitation of locks and dams as well as other channel and waterway improvements)—stakeholders identified challenges to their use. In particular, they noted the financial effects of these options on users, state and local governments, and the Inland Waterways Trust Fund. However, some stakeholders identified benefits related to these options, such as benefits from industry paying user fees for its infrastructure use, and state and local governments contributing funds to meet the dredging needs of harbors in their jurisdiction.
What GAO Recommends
The Corps should inform Congress whether it can adapt its existing tools to address factors for allocating funds from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, and the resources needed to do so. The agency concurred with the recommendation, with comment, and provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-98-42 | gao_AIMD-98-42_0 | 6 have the potential to improve information on maintenance needs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to (1) look at the plans and progress of the 11 agencies to implement the deferred maintenance requirements of SFFAS No. 6 and (2) obtain the official position of agency CFOs and IGs with respect to its implementation. Although all agencies said that they have estimated maintenance needs for ad hoc and budgetary purposes, only two agencies—DOI and NASA—indicated that they have made agencywide deferred maintenance estimates. These estimates have not been audited to ensure their reliability or conformance with the new requirements included in SFFAS No. Status of Agency Implementation Efforts
Although some initial steps have been taken, significant work remains to be done for all agencies to effectively implement the deferred maintenance requirements for fiscal year 1998 reporting. Four of the nine IGs expressed confidence that their agency would implement SFFAS No. Inadequate PP&E Reporting Will Impede Implementation Efforts
Improving PP&E reporting is a critical step to implementing the deferred maintenance requirements because deferred maintenance estimates are contingent upon a complete and reliable inventory of PP&E. Even for agencies where independent audits indicated no report modifications pertaining to PP&E, the deferred maintenance requirement of SFFAS No. 6 presents a significant challenge. The necessary flexibility in the standard increases the need for some departmental policies and guidance that are designed to be compatible with agency mission and organizational structure. In addition, adequate data collection and tracking systems will be necessary to gather and verify information on deferred maintenance costs. GAO Observations
If effectively implemented, the new deferred maintenance reporting required by SFFAS No. However, the deferred maintenance requirements present agencies with a significant challenge for which they must adequately prepare. In its deliberations on deferred maintenance reporting, FASAB considered both the need to improve information on the condition of federal assets and the complexities of measuring and reporting this information. As discussed in the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts No. The disclosure of deferred maintenance is an important management issue. DOD holds approximately 80.5 percent of the federal government’s reported PP&E. 6 to departmental CFO and accounting offices. Although the IG has not yet developed an audit plan for deferred maintenance, she noted that key issues for auditing the deferred maintenance amounts included reviewing the (1) methodology established to value deferred maintenance, (2) qualifications of officials making the determination of the value of deferred maintenance, and (3) completeness and accuracy of the deferred maintenance amounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the plans and progress of 11 agencies toward implementing the new deferred maintenance requirements of the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS) No. 6; and (2) the official position of agency Chief Financial Officers (CFO) and Inspector Generals (IG) with respect to its implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) agency officials at the 9 agencies specifically required to implement the standard for fiscal year (FY) 1998 told GAO that they intend to comply with the deferred maintenance requirements of SFFAS No. 6; (2) if effectively implemented, the new federal accounting requirements will improve information on the maintenance of federal assets; (3) accurate reporting of deferred maintenance is an important step toward more informed decision-making; (4) by improving the validity of information on maintenance, the disclosure of deferred maintenance has the potential to improve both the allocation of federal resources and, ultimately, the condition of federal assets; (5) the federal requirement to disclose deferred maintenance amounts presents agencies with a new challenge for which they must adequately prepare; (6) some initial steps have been taken, but significant work remains to be done for all agencies to effectively implement the deferred maintenance requirements promptly; (7) 4 of the cognizant IGs expressed confidence that their respective agencies would implement the deferred maintenance requirements and 5 expressed reservations or were reluctant to assess agency progress; (8) although most agencies do not have experience generating agencywide estimates of deferred maintenance because historically they have not been required to do so, all agencies reported that they have estimated maintenance for ad hoc and budgetary purposes; (9) a critical step in generating a deferred maintenance estimate is a complete and reliable inventory of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) on which to assess maintenance needs; (10) the results of the FY 1996 financial audits show that 4 agencies are hampered in their efforts to report deferred maintenance because they have been unable to fully report PP&E reliably; (11) the Department of Defense holds about 80 percent of the federal government's PP&E, and it faces significant issues to implement the deferred maintenance requirements; (12) even for agencies where the independent audits indicated no report modifications that pertained to PP&E, the deferred maintenance requirements present a significant challenge; (13) the flexibility in SFFAS No. 6 increases the need for agencies to develop departmental policies and guidance that are compatible with agency mission and organizational structure; and (14) adequate data collection and tracking systems will be necessary to gather and verify information on deferred maintenance amounts. |
gao_GGD-95-67 | gao_GGD-95-67_0 | The nature of these reforms requires RTC to monitor them to ensure that appropriate future actions it must take are initiated when necessary. (Reform 6). RTC has completed three reforms, and has work in progress to implement two other reforms. Furthermore, actions have been taken to implement the remaining 16 reforms. These categories are: (1) RTC general management functions; (2) RTC resolution and disposition activities; (3) RTC contracting, including related MWOB activities; and (4) the Oversight Board reform. In June 1994, RTC completed initial data quality action plans for its 17 critical information systems. Since the RTC Completion Act became law, RTC has ensured that all its field offices had client responsiveness units. This program is discussed under reform 7. Additional Details on Actions Taken by the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board to Implement Its Reform
Reform 8: Audit Committee
Requirements of the Reform: This reform requires the Oversight Board to establish and maintain an audit committee whose duties include (1) monitoring RTC’s internal controls; (2) monitoring the audit findings and recommendations of RTC’s IG, the Comptroller General of the United States, and RTC’s response to the findings and recommendations; (3) maintaining a close working relationship with RTC’s IG and the Comptroller General; (4) regularly reporting any of its findings and recommendations to RTC and the Oversight Board; and (5) monitoring RTC’s financial operations and reporting any incipient problem identified to RTC and the Oversight Board. Resolution Trust Corporation: Oversight of SAMDA Property Management Contractors Needs Improvement (GAO/GGD-94-5, Nov. 30, 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Resolution Trust Corporation's (RTC) efforts to implement management reforms required under the RTC Completion Act, focusing on: (1) how RTC and the Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board are implementing the reforms; and (2) RTC progress toward achieving full compliance with the requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RTC has completed actions on three reforms, and has made progress towards implementing the remaining 17 reforms; (2) RTC has taken action on six reforms involving RTC general managment functions; (3) RTC should monitor these reforms to ensure that appropriate future actions are taken when necessary; (4) in 1993, RTC created the Division of Minority and Women's programs, appointed a Chief Financial Officer, and created a client responsiveness unit in RTC field offices; (5) monitoring of RTC resolution and disposition activities is needed to ensure full compliance; (6) the Oversight Board has established an audit committee to monitor RTC audit activities; and (7) planned actions to enhance RTC information systems and develop draft guidelines to improve specific RTC contracting procedures have not been completed. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-276 | gao_T-AIMD-98-276_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to the Public Is High
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Nevertheless, overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant. However, unless agency progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time. In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress. Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains. First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established. These governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences. Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. Third, OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified. In fact, we have found cases in which agencies’ systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined. State and Local Governments Face Significant Year 2000 Risks
State and local governments also face a major risk of Year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services—such as benefits payments, transportation, and public safety—that they provide. Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed. For example, (1) Illinois’ Office of the Auditor General reported that significant future efforts were needed to ensure that the year 2000 would not adversely affect state government operations, (2) Vermont’s Office of Auditor of Accounts reported that the state faces the risk that critical portions of its Year 2000 compliance efforts could fail, (3) Texas’ Office of the State Auditor reported that many state entities had not finished their embedded systems inventories and, therefore, it is not likely that they will complete their embedded systems repairs before the year 2000, and (4) Florida’s Auditor General has issued several reports detailing the need for additional Year 2000 planning at various district school boards and community colleges. At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 computer system risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1) GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues; and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40 percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6) unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10) governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's assessment of the status of federal year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems' compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16) end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined; (17) state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant. |
gao_GAO-06-564T | gao_GAO-06-564T_0 | The Army plans to buy 15 brigades’ worth of FCS equipment by 2025. This would be a significant improvement over the traditional approach of building superior individual weapons that must be retrofitted and netted together after the fact. FCS Restructures the Program and Changes Contracting Approach
As a key element of its efforts to transform itself, the Army has recognized FCS from its outset as the greatest technology and integration challenge it has ever undertaken. We have reported that, as FCS started product development, it did not have mature technologies or adequately defined requirements. At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to product development demonstrating high levels of knowledge before significant commitments are made. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To develop the information on the Future Combat System program’s progress toward meeting established goals, the contribution of critical technologies and complementary systems, and the estimates of cost and affordability, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Army G-8; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator; and other contractors. Given that, an improved business case for the FCS program is essential to help ensure the program is successful in the long run. Yet system-level requirements are not yet stabilized and will continue to change, postponing the needed match between requirements and resources. We have previously reported unstable requirements can lead to cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. When the program was looked at again in April 2005, 31 percent of the technologies were expected to mature to a TRL 6 by 2005, and all technologies are not expected to be mature to that level until 2009. The FCS acquisition schedule indicates several key issues: The program did not have the basic knowledge needed for program start in 2003. Furthermore, this latest estimate does not include complementary programs that are essential for FCS to perform as intended, or the necessary funding for spin-outs. These and other unfunded programs would have to compete for already tight funding. Adding these items brings the total required FCS investment to the $200 billion range. Recent FCS Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
In our most recent report on the FCS, we made specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, with the intent that DOD limit its commitment to the FCS until it demonstrates a solid business case. Consequently, we added several matters for congressional consideration in order to highlight key issues and actions that Congress may want to take. If the business case for FCS is found not to be executable, determine whether investments in FCS design- and production-related activities should be curbed until system-level requirements are firm and technologies are mature. This should be a go/no-go review of the FCS program that is based on (1) the program’s ability to demonstrate whether it is meeting the knowledge markers outlined above at times consistent with DOD policy and best practices and (2) whether the funds can still be made available to afford its costs. DOD Comments on Our Report and Our Evaluation
DOD concurred with the intent of our recommendations but did not agree to limit its commitment to the FCS program or to take any action beyond what it had already planned to do. In light of DOD’s response, Congress should consider directing the Secretary of Defense to: report on the results of the May 2006 Defense Acquisition Board’s review of the FCS program business case in the areas of requirements, technologies, acquisition strategy, cost, and funding, and direct DOD to conduct and report the results of a milestone review in 2008, following the preliminary design review, that will be a go/no-go review of the FCS program based on its demonstration of a sound business case. Congress should also consider restricting annual appropriations for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the FCS program until definitive progress in establishing a sound business case is demonstrated in terms of firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Future Combat System (FCS) is a networked family of weapons and other systems in the forefront of efforts by the Army to become a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. When considering complementary programs, projected investment costs for FCS are estimated to be on the order of $200 billion. FCS's cost is of concern given that developing and producing new weapon systems is among the largest investments the government makes, and FCS adds significantly to that total. Over the last 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) doubled its planned investments in such systems from $700 billion in 2001 to $1.4 trillion in 2006. At the same time, research and development costs on new weapons continue to grow on the order of 30 to 40 percent. FCS will be competing for significant funds at a time when federal fiscal imbalances are exerting great pressures on discretionary spending. In the absence of more money being available, FCS and other programs must be executable within projected resources. Today, I would like to discuss (1) the business case needed for FCS to be successful and (2) our recent recommendations to DOD and matters for congressional consideration regarding the FCS program.
What GAO Found
There are a number of compelling aspects of the FCS program, and it is hard to argue with the program's goals. However, the elements of a sound business case for such an acquisition program--firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding--are not yet present. FCS began product development prematurely in 2003. Since then, the Army has made several changes to improve its approach for acquiring FCS. Yet today, the program remains a long way from having the level of knowledge it should have had before starting product development. FCS has all the markers for risks that would be difficult to accept for any single system, much less a complex, multiprogram effort. These challenges are even more daunting in the case of FCS not only because there are so many of them but because FCS represents a new concept of operations that is predicated on technological breakthroughs. Thus, technical problems, which accompany immaturity, not only pose traditional risks to cost, schedule, and performance; they pose risks to the new fighting concepts envisioned by the Army. Last month, we made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to take several actions, prior to DOD's long-term commitment to the program, to improve the FCS business case and establish knowledge-based measures to guide oversight of FCS progress. These recommendations detailed specific steps DOD should take leading up to a major milestone review of the program in 2008 when the program is expected to have achieved the level of knowledge it should have had in 2003. We believe it is at this point the program should be reviewed as to whether it has established enough of a solid business case to continue. While DOD concurred with the intent of our recommendations, it did not agree to limit its commitment to the FCS program or to do much beyond what it had already planned to do. This concerns us. As a result, we have also raised to Congress several matters for consideration to ensure that FCS has a sound business case before future funding commitments are made. We believe the actions we have recommended to DOD and the matters for consideration we have presented to Congress are necessary to improve the prospects for FCS success and to protect the government's ability to change course if the program does not progress as the Army plans. |
gao_T-RCED-98-198 | gao_T-RCED-98-198_0 | As the CDFI Act requires, these assistance agreements include performance measures that (1) the Fund negotiated with the awardees and (2) are generally based on the awardees’ business plans. Although awardees’ assistance agreements are not subject to the Results Act, the act establishes performance measurement standards for the federal government, including the CDFI Fund. As of January 1998, the Fund had entered into assistance agreements with 26 of the 31 awardees for 1996. As a result, the assistance agreements focus primarily on what the awardees will do, rather than on how their activities will affect the distressed communities. According to most of the case study awardees, difficulties in isolating and measuring the results of community development efforts and concerns about the effects of factors outside the awardees’ control inhibited the awardees’ use of accomplishment measures. We found that most of the goals and measures were related; however, in some agreements, the measures did not address all key aspects of the goals. Impact of the BEA Program Is Difficult to Assess
In the BEA program, as of January 1998, about 58 percent of the banks had completed the activities for which they received the awards and the Fund had disbursed almost 80 percent of the $13.1 million awarded in fiscal year 1996. Our case studies of five awardees and interviews with Fund officials indicate that although the BEA awards encouraged some banks to increase their investments, other regulatory or economic incentives were equally or more important for other banks. In addition, more complete data on some banks’ investments are needed to guarantee that the increases in investments in distressed areas rewarded by the BEA program are not being offset by decreases in other investments in these distressed areas. Discussions with our five case study banks indicated, however, that regulatory and economic incentives have a greater influence on these banks’ investments than the prospect of a BEA award. Fund Does Not Receive Information on Postaward Activity
The Fund does not require awardees to notify the Fund of material changes in their investments after awards have been made. For example, the effects of investment in community development may not be readily distinguishable from other influences and may not be observable for many years. Under the Results Act, an agency’s strategic plan must contain (1) a comprehensive mission statement; (2) agencywide strategic goals and objectives for all major functions and operations; (3) strategies, skill, and technologies and the various resources needed to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a relationship between the strategic goals and objectives and the annual performance goals; (5) an identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond its control, that could significantly affect the achievement of the strategic goals and objectives; and (6) a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals and objectives and a schedule for future program evaluations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has provided agencies with additional guidance on developing their strategic plans. Mission
In its strategic plan, the Fund states that its mission is “to promote economic revitalization and community development through investment in and assistance to community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and through encouraging insured depository institutions to increase lending, financial services and technical assistance within distressed communities and to invest in CDFIs.” Overall, the Fund’s mission statement generally meets the requirements established in the Results Act by explicitly referring to the Fund’s statutory objectives and indicating how these objectives are to be achieved through two core programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its ongoing review of the administration of the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, focusing on the first year's performance of the CDFI and the Bank Enterprise Award (BEA) programs and opportunities for improving their effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of January 1998, the Fund had entered into assistance agreements with 26 of the 31 CDFIs that received awards in 1996; (2) these agreements include performance goals and measures that were based on the business plans submitted by awardees in their application packages and negotiated between the Fund and the awardees, as the CDFI Act requires; (3) GAO found that the performance measures in the assistance agreements generally assess activities rather than the accomplishments reflecting the activities' results; (4) according to Fund officials and CDFIs in GAO's case studies, this emphasis on activity measures is due, in part, to difficulties in isolating and assessing the results of community development initiatives, which may not be observable for many years and may be subject to factors outside the awardees' control; (5) GAO further found that although the performance measures in the assistance agreements are generally related to specific goals, they do not always address the key aspects of the goals, and most assistance agreements lack baseline data that would facilitate tracking progress over time; (6) although the Fund has disbursed about 80 percent of the fiscal year 1996 BEA award funds, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the program has encouraged the 38 awardees to increase their investments in distressed communities; (7) GAO's case studies have five awardees and interviews with Fund officials indicate that although the prospect of receiving a BEA award prompted some banks to increase their investments, it had little or no effect on other banks; (8) GAO found that, in general, other regulatory or economic incentives exerted a stronger influence on banks' investments than the BEA award; (9) in addition, some banks do not collect all of the data on their activities needed to guarantee that increases in investments under the BEA program are not being offset by decreases in other investments in these distressed areas; (10) the CDFI Fund's strategic plan contains all of the elements required by the Government Performance and Results Act and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) associated guidance, but these elements generally lack the clarity, specificity, and linkage with one another that the act envisioned; and (11) although the plan identifies key external factors that could affect the Fund's mission, it does not relate these factors to the Fund's strategic goals and objectives and does not indicate how the Fund will take the factors into account when assessing awardee's progress toward goals. |
gao_AIMD-98-9 | gao_AIMD-98-9_0 | Our objectives were to determine (1) the status of DOD’s efforts to implement the new federal accounting standard for disclosure of liabilities, such as aircraft disposal, and (2) whether an estimate of the minimum disposal liability for aircraft, including the removal and disposal of hazardous materials, could be made. DOD Has Not Implemented SFFAS No. The Congress has also recognized that disposal costs will be incurred and has emphasized the importance of accumulating and considering this information. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 requires the Secretary of Defense to determine, as early in the acquisition process as feasible, the life-cycle costs for major defense acquisitions, including the materials to be used and methods of disposal. 5 for reporting of a liability is that an amount be reasonably estimable. Information is available to develop cost estimates for each of the major aircraft disposal processes described in the previous section—demilitarization, storage maintenance, and hazardous materials removal and disposal. 5 for reportable liabilities. DOD and the military services have information available to develop cost estimates on each of the major aircraft disposal processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed: (1) the status of the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement the new federal accounting standard for disclosure of liabilities, such as aircraft disposal; and (2) whether an estimate of the minimum disposal liability for aircraft, including the removal and disposal of hazardous materials, could be made.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has not implemented the federal accounting standard that requires recognizing and reporting liabilities such as those associated with aircraft disposal, nor has DOD provided guidance to the military services; (2) aircraft disposal is an ongoing process and the cost can be reasonably estimated; (3) accordingly, these activities meet the criteria for a reportable liability; (4) information on the three major disposal processes--demilitarization, storage and maintenance, and hazardous materials removal and disposal--is available to develop cost estimates; (5) Congress has recognized the importance of accumulating and considering disposal cost information; and (6) in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Congress required DOD to develop life-cycle environmental costs, including demilitarization and disposal costs, for major defense acquisition programs. |
Subsets and Splits