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gao_GGD-99-173 | gao_GGD-99-173_0 | DEA’s background investigations were part of its personnel security program. Scope and Methodology
To identify and describe the circumstances that led DEA to consider relinquishing its delegated authority to conduct personnel background investigations, we interviewed cognizant officials of DEA, DOJ, and OPM. To assess whether OPM acted in an independent and objective manner in choosing to review DEA’s background investigations and security program, we applied three criteria posed in the following questions:
What was OPM’s responsibility for reviewing background investigations performed by DEA and/or its contractors? DEA Was Considering Relinquishing Its Background Investigation Authority
As of July 1999, DEA was considering whether to relinquish its personnel- security background investigation authority to OPM. Partially in response to this initiative, DEA conducted an assessment and concluded that it lacked the expertise and resources to capably perform or oversee all of its background investigations. Between 1996 and 1998, OPM reviewed a total of 265 background investigations conducted by DEA and its contractors. OPM also found that even though the background investigations were deficient, DEA still granted security clearances. In addition to its periodic review of investigations, OPM also reviewed DEA’s overall personnel security program in 1992 and again 6 years later in 1998. The memorandum was based on the DOJ audit and on the recurring findings of OPM. The assessment covered areas such as the (1) results of reviews performed by OPM and DOJ, (2) requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement with OPM, (3) efforts to correct deficiencies with the security program and background investigations, (4) contract with the company that currently did background investigations for DEA, and (5) other management issues related to background investigations. DEA did not comply with this requirement for its current contractor because DEA did not have funds to finance such investigations. DEA had been heavily criticized for its performance in this regard. As of July 1999, DEA had not made a final decision on relinquishing its background investigation authority. In his October 1998 memorandum, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration said that he believed that DEA should relinquish all authority, including the authority to investigate the backgrounds of Special Agent applicants. DEA said it believed that it would be unwise to segregate the background investigation from the overall Special Agent applicant selection process by having them conducted by an independent entity not familiar with DEA’s unique requirements for Special Agents. Because of the relationship between OPM and USIS, we reviewed whether OPM acted in an objective and independent manner in choosing to review DEA’s background investigation reports and personnel security program. OPM reviewed a sample of the background investigation reports of the U.S. Given DEA’s difficulties in ensuring the quality of its personnel background investigations and its conclusion that it is not able to capably perform or oversee background investigations, its consideration of relinquishing its delegated authority is not unreasonable. In October 1998, DOJ advised DEA to relinquish its authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on background investigations conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), focusing on: (1) the circumstances that led DEA to consider relinquishing its authority to conduct personnel background investigations; and (2) whether the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) acted in an independent and objective manner in choosing to review DEA and its background investigations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a series of evaluations in the 1990s critical of DEA's background investigations and personnel security program caused DEA to consider relinquishing its background investigation authority; (2) the findings of OPM's assessments over much of the 1990s, an assessment by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1998, and its own assessment in 1999 triggered DEA's consideration of this issue; (3) DEA's relinquishment of investigation authority would be consequential because DEA and its contractor performed an estimated 5,600 background investigations in 1998; (4) during the late 1990s, OPM reviewed a sample of 265 background investigation reports prepared by DEA and its contractors and determined that all but 1 investigation was deficient in meeting the investigative requirements that DEA had agreed to follow; (5) DOJ audited DEA's personnel security program in 1997 and found deficiencies similar to what OPM had found in 1992 and again in 1998; (6) based on the DOJ audit and the recurring finds of OPM, DOJ's Assistant Attorney General for Administration told the DEA Administrator in October 1998 that he believed that DEA should relinquish all of its background investigation authority to OPM; (7) in early 1999, DEA conducted its own examination of the personnel security program, focusing on background investigations, and concluded that DEA was not able to capably perform or oversee background investigations; (8) this lack of capability allowed security clearances to be granted, regardless of whether the related background investigations were adequate; (9) DEA had allowed contract investigators to perform background investigations, even though the investigators had not gone through required background investigations because DEA did not have funds to finance such investigations; (10) as of July 1999, subsequent to its examination of the personnel security program, DEA was considering relinquishing its authority for background investigations to OPM, except for the authority to investigate backgrounds of applicants for DEA Special Agent positions; (11) DEA believed that it would be unwise to separate the background investigation from the overall applicant selection process by having them conducted by an independent entity not familiar with DEA's unique requirements for Special Agents; and (12) OPM appeared to have been objective and independent in choosing to review DEA's personnel security program and background investigations. |
gao_GAO-11-256 | gao_GAO-11-256_0 | Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits are based, in part, on an individual’s length of active-duty service. VA reaches out to eligible servicemembers by providing information at Transition Assistance Program (TAP) briefings offered at the time they separate from the military and has sponsored marketing campaigns for the new Post-9/11 GI Bill. For example, officials from veterans’ organizations told us that some individuals may have difficulty determining which VA education program may be right for them. VA Targets Outreach and Support for Education Benefits to All Eligible Individuals, Not Necessarily to Those with Disabilities
Most of VA’s outreach and support activities for education benefits are targeted to the general population of servicemembers and veterans, not necessarily to those with disabilities. VA Has Few Efforts to Measure the Effectiveness of Outreach and Support Activities
Little is known about the effectiveness of VA’s education outreach and support because VA currently does not have outcome-oriented performance measures for these activities. Those we interviewed also said that this coordination has become necessary with Post-9/11 GI Bill tuition and fee payments being sent directly to schools. VA and school officials we interviewed attributed this increase to the Post-9/11 GI Bill. School Certifying Officials Were Generally Satisfied, but Reported a Lack of Comprehensive Policy Guidance, among Other Challenges
Although about 62 percent of school certifying officials stated they were generally or very satisfied with VA’s implementation of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, officials identified a range of challenges in fulfilling their responsibilities under the program (see fig. In addition, school certifying officials cited challenges due to the lack of a comprehensive source of policy information on the Post-9/11 GI Bill program, such as a VA policy manual. VA Lacks Comprehensive Information on the Effectiveness of Its Oversight of States and Schools
VA Monitors States’ Approval and Supervision of Schools, but Its Approach Has Limitations
VA monitors SAAs’ performance in approving and supervising schools through a range of oversight activities, such as reviewing reports SAAs submit on their activities (see table 4). In particular, VA has not set minimum standards for the review of student files. Absent standards, VA lacks assurance that the data collected from these file reviews by different SAAs are valid, comparable, and useful for determining whether schools are in compliance with federal requirements. Despite the federal requirement to conduct monitoring and oversight, in fiscal year 2010, VA suspended its audit program in order to reassign compliance staff to help process a backlog in Post-9/11 GI Bill claims. Although VA has resumed its audits of schools, there are indications that it may not be able to complete all required audits in fiscal year 2011. Going forward, VA plans to include audits that it did not conduct in fiscal year 2010 into its schedules for the next 2 years. VA Does Not Systematically Compile and Review Findings of School Audits
VA does not systematically consider the findings of its own or other entities’ audits of schools when carrying out its oversight. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve VA’s outreach and support for eligible servicemembers and veterans, communication with school officials, and oversight of its education benefit programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following five actions: Develop outcome-oriented performance measures for outreach to servicemembers and veterans who are seeking VA education benefits. VA concurred in principle with our fifth recommendation to undertake a systematic review of VA’s and SAA’s oversight of schools. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine: (1) what is known about the effectiveness of VA’s outreach to and support for individuals applying for education benefits, particularly for servicemembers and veterans with disabilities, such as post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury; (2) the role of school officials and the challenges they face in fulfilling their responsibilities for VA’s education benefit programs; and (3) how VA monitors and oversees states’ and schools’ implementation of its education benefit programs. We also assessed VA’s survey of SAAs and school certifying offic on the effectiveness of VA’s communications and training initiatives for the Post-9/11 GI Bill. W also obtained data from VA on the number of SAA supervisory visits to schools, by state, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provided $9 billion in education benefits to service-members and veterans in fiscal year 2010, mostly through the new Post-9/11 GI Bill. In providing education benefits, VA relies on State Approving Agencies (SAA) to approve schools; and on schools to report students' enrollment status. GAO was asked to determine: (1) what is known about the effectiveness of outreach to and support for individuals applying for VA education benefits, particularly those with disabilities; (2) the role of school officials and challenges they face in their role; and (3) how VA monitors and oversees states' and schools' implementation of these benefits. GAO reviewed VA reports and plans, conducted a nationally representative survey of school officials, interviewed VA and state officials in four states, and reviewed recent statutory changes to the Post-9/11 GI Bill.
What GAO Found
VA has various activities to reach out to and support individuals who are eligible for education benefits. For example, VA reaches eligible servicemembers through military separation briefings and has sponsored national marketing campaigns for the new Post-9/11 GI Bill. General awareness of VA education benefits among servicemembers and veterans is high, according to program stakeholders. In fiscal year 2010, more than 700,000 individuals were served by these programs. However, stakeholders also identified some limitations with VA's outreach and support. For instance, veterans' service organizations and school officials stated that some servicemembers and veterans may have difficulty determining which of VA's various programs may be right for them. In addition, VA primarily targets its outreach and support for its education benefits to the general population of servicemembers and veterans, not necessarily those with disabilities, because eligibility is based on length of military service and not disability status. Finally, little is known about the effectiveness of VA's outreach and support because VA has not established performance measures for these activities. School certifying officials' core responsibilities--primarily certifying student enrollment to VA and reporting enrollment changes--have become more complex under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, and officials identified challenges such as obtaining timely, comprehensive policy guidance and training from VA. For example, school officials must determine the tuition and fees that the Post-9/11 GI Bill will cover, which varies based on the length of active-duty military service and other factors. In our survey, school officials reported performing roles beyond those specifically required by VA, such as helping students apply for benefits. Although the majority of school officials were generally satisfied with VA's implementation of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, they cited a range of challenges, such as the lack of a Post-9/11 GI Bill policy manual. In addition, although VA provides training through conferences and its Web site, many officials did not participate due to other job responsibilities, travel costs, and lack of awareness about training opportunities. VA lacks comprehensive information on the effectiveness of its oversight of SAAs and schools. VA monitors SAAs, in part, by reviewing reports on the number of approved schools and completed site visits, but this approach has limitations. For example, VA has not set minimum standards for SAAs' reviews of student files during their site visits to schools and, therefore, lacks assurance that data collected from these file reviews are valid and comparable. Also, VA has not completed its own required school audits in recent years. Most recently, VA suspended its audits during fiscal year 2010 in order to reassign compliance staff to help process a backlog of Post-9/11 GI Bill claims. Although VA has resumed its audits, there are indications that it may not be able to complete all required audits in fiscal year 2011. Moreover, VA does not compile and review findings from its own or other entities' audits of schools that would, going forward, allow it to identify trends and better target its oversight of schools.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA establish outcome-oriented performance measures for outreach and support activities; improve communication with school officials; and undertake a systematic review of its oversight of SAAs and schools. VA concurred with four recommendations and concurred in principle with one recommendation aimed at strengthening oversight. VA noted a number of actions already taken in this area. GAO encourages VA to address all aspects of this recommendation moving forward. |
gao_GAO-15-217 | gao_GAO-15-217_0 | Background
Most of the federal funding for highway and transit infrastructure and safety improvements is provided by FHWA, FTA, and NHTSA. MAP-21 included a number of statutory requirements related to transforming the surface transportation system to a performance-based approach, for the operating administrations, as well as for states and other grantees, in many cases holding grantees accountable for the first time. DOT Has Made Progress in Moving toward a National Performance-Based System, but Multiple Factors Affect Progress
DOT Has Made Extensive Outreach Efforts to Communicate with States and Other Grantees
Since MAP-21 was enacted in July 2012, DOT has conducted an extensive outreach effort to prepare states and grantees for a national performance-based approach to surface transportation. FHWA has released three of its five proposed rules for public comment. In developing these rules, DOT has missed five out of six performance- related rulemaking deadlines established in MAP-21. As part of finalizing the rules, DOT plans to establish specific deadlines for grantees’ implementation of the MAP-21 performance target- setting and reporting requirements. Multiple Factors Affect DOT’s Progress in Developing a National Performance-Based Approach
DOT’s progress in developing a national performance-based approach has been affected by the extent to which MAP-21 transformed surface transportation programs, the length and complexity of the rulemaking process, and DOT’s varying levels of experience implementing a performance-based approach. For example, NHTSA has been collaborating with grantees and the Governors Highway Safety Association (GHSA) to develop performance measures in its highway safety grant programs since 2008. We have previously found that implementing a performance accountability framework necessitates agencies having to collect and analyze data that are useful and relevant. For example, state and grantee officials told us they were concerned that data may not be available to measure congestion, in part, because there is a lack of consensus among states and grantees regarding how to measure it. In addition, FHWA has proposed that states collect data on the average annual daily traffic on all public roads. According to some state officials we spoke with, however, this would be a substantial undertaking. For example, New York DOT officials told us the state currently has adequate data for only about 37 percent of its public roads. For example, DOT has encouraged and worked with states to share data, best practices, and templates for reporting. Implementation Costs Could Vary and Be a Significant Challenge for Some States and Grantees
Representatives from 5 national organizations and officials from 22 of the 29 states and other grantees we spoke to reported potential challenges with the costs of implementing a national performance measurement system. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine: (1) the progress that DOT has made in developing a national performance-based approach to surface transportation and (2) the challenges states and other grantees report facing in implementing this approach. To understand the challenges states and other grantees face in implementing a performance-based approach to surface transportation, we analyzed comments submitted to DOT by and interviewed representatives from seven national transportation organizations (such as AASHTO, Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and American Public Transportation Association), which broadly represent state and local transportation, transit, and planning interests and perspectives, both in urban and rural communities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, DOT provided about $50 billion to states and other grantees (such as metropolitan planning organizations and transit agencies) to support highway and transit infrastructure and safety. However, it is not clear if this funding has improved system performance because, in part, these programs have lacked links to performance and national goals. Since 2008, GAO has highlighted the need to link surface transportation programs to performance. MAP-21 transformed surface transportation programs by including provisions for both DOT and its grantees to move toward a national performance-based approach, in many cases holding grantees accountable for performance for the first time. This approach includes DOT establishing national performance measures, and states and other grantees setting targets related to these measures, and reporting progress.
GAO examined (1) the progress that DOT has made in developing a national performance-based approach to surface transportation and (2) the challenges states and other grantees report facing in implementing this approach. GAO reviewed proposed rules and DOT information on rulemaking milestones and interviewed officials from DOT, national transportation organizations, and a non-generalizable sample of 29 grantees in 13 states, selected on the basis of state population growth, performance management experience, and other factors. DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has made progress moving toward a national performance-based approach since the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) was enacted in July 2012. DOT has undertaken extensive outreach efforts with states and other grantees and is developing nine rules that, among other things, are to establish national performance measures, and target-setting and reporting requirements for grantees. Five of the rules have been released for public comment, and none has been finalized. (See figure.) DOT has missed five of six deadlines established by MAP-21. However, given the extent to which MAP-21 transformed surface transportation programs and the length and complexity of the rulemaking process, these deadlines may have been ambitious. DOT's progress has also been affected by the varying experiences within its operating administrations in implementing a performance-based approach. For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has been implementing such an approach in its grant programs since 2008, while other DOT operating administrations started more recently.
States and other grantees reported potential data and cost challenges with implementing a national performance-based approach. According to some grantees and national organizations GAO contacted, data may not be available for measuring performance in some areas, such as congestion, and collecting data that are available may prove difficult. For example, DOT has proposed states collect traffic data on all public roads, and some state officials told GAO this step would be a substantial undertaking; New York officials told GAO that the state has adequate data for only about 37 percent of its public roads. Further, some grantees noted they may lack the staff or resources to analyze data, and some raised concerns that implementation costs may be substantial. DOT officials acknowledged these challenges and are working with grantees to help overcome obstacles. For example, DOT is working with states to share data, best practices, and templates for reporting. |
gao_HEHS-98-118 | gao_HEHS-98-118_0 | VA Chicago Health Care System’s Integration Process
The Great Lakes network director established the VACHCS integration process. The network director, the VACHCS director, service chiefs, and stakeholders determined the membership of the committees and the groups participating in the VACHCS integration process. Between October 1996 and October 1997, the ICC held nine meetings to review, rework, and modify work group recommendations. Work group recommendations approved by the ICC were forwarded to the VACHCS director for review, approval, and implementation. The VHA Under Secretary for Health reviewed and approved integration recommendations affecting clinical services and programs. Consolidation may involve moving an entire service, or some part of a service, to a single location. Impacts of Integration
The VACHCS integration decisions affected veterans, employees, and medical schools. Impact on Veterans
VACHCS integration appears to have had a small but positive impact on veterans. VACHCS officials reported that the level of service to veterans is being maintained while some changes enhance access and quality of care. By eliminating unstaffed positions, VACHCS minimized the hardship on currently employed staff. Impact on Medical Schools
VACHCS integration appears to have had a positive impact on the affiliated medical schools. These services and medical education continue to be provided at both hospitals using the same management structure and operating procedures. This is because most savings involved reengineering decisions. VA Chicago Health Care System Integration Process
Members of the Integration Coordinating Committee
Services Identified as Administrative, Direct Patient Care, and Patient Support
The physical medicine and rehabilitation service (direct care) work group did not provide a report by October 1, 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) what impacts the Veterans Affairs (VA) Chicago Health Care System (VACHCS) had on veterans, employees, and medical schools in the Chicago area; (2) VACHCS' integration process; (3) the integration decisions made; and (4) dollar savings for these decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the VACHCS integration process, which began in 1996, included 28 work groups that studied administrative, patient support, and direct care services and made recommendations to an Integrated Coordinating Committee (ICC); (2) the ICC reviewed, reworked, and modified work group recommendations; (3) work group recommendations approved by ICC were sent to the VACHCS director for review, approval, and implementation; (4) recommendations involving changes to clinical services were also reviewed and approved by the Great Lakes network director and the Veterans Health Administration Under Secretary for Health; (5) VACHCS involved stakeholders in its integration process; (6) the VACHCS integration: (a) unified the management of 16 services; (b) reengineered 23 services by standardizing operating policies, practices, and databases or by establishing more efficient practices; and (c) consolidated parts of eight services in a single location; (7) the integration appears to have had a small but positive impact on veterans, employees, and medical schools; (8) VACHCS officials report that they have maintained the level of service to veterans and, in some instances, even improved access and quality while minimizing the hardship on VA employees by not dismissing any current employees; (9) medical school affiliations remain largely unchanged, and medical education continues to be provided at both hospitals, using the same management structure and operating practices; (10) the VACHCS integration saved about $7 million; and (11) VACHCS saved about $4 million by eliminating 80 positions, of which 74 were vacant, and approximately $2 million by avoiding the purchase of duplicate equipment and related construction. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-89 | gao_T-HEHS-99-89_0 | Some States’ Policies or Practices Limit the Filing of Complaints or Quick Response
Some states have practices that may limit the number of complaints that are filed and investigated. Michigan met its time frames in about one-fourth of cases. Application of Sanctions Does Not Ensure Nursing Homes Maintain Compliance
On the basis of of our analysis of nationwide survey data, we found that more than one in four nursing homes had serious and often repeated deficiencies that resulted in immediate jeopardy or actual harm to residents. While HCFA’s initiation of actions typically brought homes into at least temporary compliance, they were often ineffective in ensuring that homes maintained compliance over time with federal standards. Our review of 74 homes that states had referred to HCFA for federal enforcement action, as a result of serious or uncorrected deficiencies, showed that the threat of sanctions often helped bring the homes back into temporary compliance but provided little incentive to keep them from slipping back out of compliance. Because many homes corrected their deficiencies before the effective date of the sanction, HCFA often rescinded the sanction before it took effect. This yo-yo pattern of compliance and noncompliance could be found even among homes that were terminated from Medicare, Medicaid, or both. Within 5 months, state surveyors again identified a series of deficiencies involving harm to residents, including failure to prevent avoidable pressure sores or ensure that residents received adequate nutrition. Further HCFA Oversight and Enforcement Needed
Given these weaknesses in many states’ complaint practices and the current inadequacy of enforcement actions to maintain homes’ compliance with federal standards, one would expect HCFA to be more proactive in overseeing states and enforcing sanctions when nursing homes do not maintain compliance with its standards. HCFA, however, has exercised limited oversight or guidance of states’ complaint practices. Since July 1998, HCFA has taken or proposed several initiatives to improve nursing home oversight. The problem with terminations is twofold. Conclusions and Recommendations
As the Congress, HCFA, and the states seek to better ensure adequate quality of care for nursing home residents, our work has demonstrated that key components of complaint investigations and enforcement actions need to be strengthened to better protect the growing number of elderly and disabled Americans who rely on nursing homes for their care–one of the nation’s most vulnerable populations. Absent such improvements, many federal and state policies and practices continue to result in serious complaints—which allege harm to residents—not being investigated for weeks or months. Broadly, these recommendations call for HCFA to develop additional standards for the prompt investigation of serious complaints and strengthen its oversight of state complaint investigations; improve the effectiveness of enforcement actions, including reducing the backlog of appeals of civil monetary penalties; and strengthen policies regarding terminated homes, such as requiring reasonable assurance periods of sufficient duration and maintaining the home’s pretermination history; and develop better management information systems to integrate the results of complaint investigations, track the status and history of deficiencies, and monitor enforcement actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the effectiveness of complaint and enforcement practices to protect nursing home residents, and to ensure that homes participating in Medicare and Medicaid comply with federal standards, focusing on the: (1) effectiveness of states' complaint practices in protecting residents; (2) Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) role in establishing standards and conducting oversight of states' complaint practices and in using information about the results of complaint investigations to ensure compliance with nursing home standards; and (3) assessment of HCFA's use of sanction authority for homes that failed to maintain compliance with these standards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) neither complaint investigations nor enforcement practices are being used effectively to ensure adequate care for nursing home residents; (2) as a result, allegations or incidents of serious problems often go uninvestigated and uncorrected; (3) GAO's work in selected states reveals that, for serious complaints alleging harm to residents, the combination of inadequate state practices and limited HCFA guidance and oversight have often resulted in: (a) policies or practices that may limit the number of complaints filed; (b) serious complaints alleging harmful situations not being investigated promptly; and (c) incomplete reporting on nursing homes' compliance history and states' complaint investigation performance; (4) further, regarding enforcement actions, HCFA has not yet realized its main goal--to help ensure that homes maintain compliance with federal health care standards; (5) GAO found that too often there is a yo-yo pattern where homes cycle in and out of compliance; (6) more than one-fourth of the more than 17,000 nursing homes nationwide had serious deficiencies--including inadequate prevention of pressure sores, failure to prevent accidents, and failure to assess residents' needs and provide appropriate care--that caused actual harm to residents or placed them at risk of death or serious injury; (7) although most homes corrected deficiencies identified in an initial survey, 40 percent of these homes with serious deficiencies were repeat violators; (8) in most cases, sanctions initiated by HCFA never took effect; (9) the threat of sanctions appeared to have little effect on deterring homes from falling out of compliance because homes could continue to avoid the sanctions' effect as long as they kept temporarily correcting their deficiencies; and (10) HCFA has taken a number of recent actions to improve nursing home oversight in an attempt to resolve problems pointed out in earlier studies. |
gao_AIMD-99-24 | gao_AIMD-99-24_0 | VA reported that since 1992 it has sold approximately $9 billion of loans in this manner. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the level of control and accountability over VA’s HCA direct loan and loan sale activities. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs provided us with written comments, which are discussed in the “Agency Comments” section and are reprinted in appendix I.
VA Lacked Accountability and Control Over Its Direct Loan Portfolio
VA did not effectively plan or carry out the transfer of its direct loan portfolio to an outside contractor for servicing in fiscal year 1997. In this case, VA was responsible for determining the adequacy of the servicer’s internal control environment, as well as establishing and maintaining its own data or data sources for comparison purposes to allow it to be confident that the activity is being managed in the best interest of the federal government. VA had not yet established adequate controls over cash collected or disbursed on its behalf by the contractor and was unable to properly reconcile the cash flows reported by the contractor to those recorded in VA’s general ledger. Furthermore, VA had transferred incomplete and inconsistent loan data to the contractor. For example, there were delays in allocating payments to some borrowers’ accounts and in paying property taxes on their behalf as well as paying property taxes on VA-owned houses. VA Did Not Retain Records to Account for the Number and Status of Loans
As discussed later, even though the loan data originally submitted to the contractor were not adequate for servicing purposes, VA was able to reconcile contractor and agency records on the 24,000 loans with an outstanding balance of $1.2 billion that were initially transferred. The new procedures require the servicer to (1) hold, without depositing, loan payments that could not be allocated to a specific borrower’s account and (2) return the loan payments to the borrower in cases where two or more payments were unallocated, or part of the loan number was missing, unless either VA had instituted the paperwork for the loan in process or the servicer had received e-mail instructions from one of the regional offices regarding the borrower. As a result, VA lacked assurance that changes were legitimate and that funds were not being misdirected. VA Did Not Properly Account for Loan Sales and Subsequent Financial Activity
In addition, VA did not have processes in place to ensure that relevant reporting from servicers and the trustee/custodian was channeled to appropriate VA offices. Annually, VA should have reestimated the liability and included any reestimate in its budget and financial statements. The $3 billion in loans and VA-owned property and $9 billion in potential liability on loan sales represent guaranteed loans previously serviced by private lenders that went into default and were acquired by VA. VA now bears the primary responsibility for insuring prudent management of these assets, in an effort to recoup losses and to preclude additional losses on the properties for which loans were originally guaranteed. 4. Housing credit assistance program - A function of VA concerned with housing credit activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on: (1) the level of Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) accountability and control over its Housing Credit Assistance (HCA) program direct loan and loan sale activities: and (2) actions needed to improve VA's internal control environment and financial and budgetary reporting for these activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA did not have appropriate management and operational controls in place to maintain accountability over its direct loan and loan sale activities; (2) VA provided little oversight of contractors that were managing billions of dollars of assets on its behalf and did not ensure that revenues and expenses were accurate or that cash receipts were deposited promptly in Treasury accounts; (3) when VA outsourced the servicing of its direct loan portfolio to a contractor in fiscal year 1997, it did not adequately plan or manage the transfer; (4) it concurrently shut down its automated district loan system and surrendered almost all hard copy loan records to the contractor without retaining basic information needed to confirm or reconcile the number and value of loans serviced by the contractor; (5) as a result, VA was unable to appropriately manage its loan portfolio; (6) further, the data transferred to the contract servicer, which up to that point had been maintained by more than 40 VA regional offices, were incomplete and inconsistent; (7) this immediately created loan servicing problems; (8) there were delays in allocating payments to borrowers' accounts and in paying property taxes on behalf of borrowers as well as property taxes on VA-owned houses; (9) VA lacked assurance that receipts from loans were properly collected and allocated to borrowers' accounts, and did not determine the propriety of property tax expenses associated with VA-owned property and, accordingly, could not be confident that appropriate amounts were transmitted to the government; (10) in addition, VA lacked a basis for properly reconciling the financial activity reported by the contractor to the data recorded in VA's general ledger; (11) GAO found that VA's failure to timely monitor the contractors that service the loans, representing roughly $9 billion since 1992, allowed servicing inefficiencies and improper actions by two servicers to cause financial losses to VA; (12) GAO found that VA's financing and accounting for the guarantees associated with the loan sales in effect masked both the existence of the estimated liability for defaulted loans as well as the sources of funds being used to finance those liabilities; and (13) until 1997, VA had not reported or disclosed the loan sales in its financial statements or budget reports or requested funding to cover the cost of these guarantees. |
gao_GAO-08-542T | gao_GAO-08-542T_0 | Inspecting Travelers at Ports of Entry
CBP’s ability to inspect travelers at our nation’s ports of entry has been hampered by weaknesses in travel inspection procedures, inadequate physical infrastructure, and lack of staff at the air, land, and sea ports of entry. DHS plans to move forward to deploy technology to implement WHTI at land ports of entry, and staff and train officers to use it. In mid-2006, CBP reviewed videotapes from about 150 large and small ports of entry and, according to CBP officials, determined that while CBP officers carried out thorough traveler inspections in many instances, they also identified numerous instances where traveler inspections at land ports of entry were weak in that they did not determine the citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering the country as required by law, such as officers not stopping vehicles for inspection and pedestrians crossing the border without any visual or verbal contact from a CBP officer despite operating procedures that required officers to do so. DHS said it is taking steps to address our recommendations. To help provide better assurance that border officials have the tools and resources to establish that people are who they say they are, section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to develop and implement a plan that requires a passport or other document or combination of documents that the Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity and citizenship for U.S. citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico when entering the United States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America. DHS has developed general strategies for implementing WHTI—including staffing and training. U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
Another major initiative underway at the ports of entry is a program designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land ports of entry, called the US-VISIT Program. As of October 2007, after investing about $1.5 billion since 2003, DHS has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at more than 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry, but comparable operational exit capabilities are not. Deployment of fencing along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP’s December 2008 goal to deploy 370 miles of pedestrian and 300 miles of vehicle fencing will be challenging because of factors that include difficulties acquiring rights to border land and an inability to estimate costs for installation. The Secure Border Initiative
In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. In February 2008, we testified that DHS had announced its final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles along the southwest border, and was gathering lessons learned to inform future border security technology development. In addition, SBI program office officials are unable to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because of various factors that are not yet known, such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, and the cost to acquire the land. Border Patrol
In addition to technological and infrastructure improvements along the border, the Border Patrol has experienced an unprecedented growth in the number of its agents. Screening of International Travelers Before They Arrive in the United States
Because citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States on a temporary basis generally must apply for and obtain a nonimmigrant visa, the visa process is important to homeland security. Before September 11, U.S. visa operations focused primarily on illegal immigration concerns—whether applicants sought to reside and work illegally in the country. New policies and programs have since been implemented to enhance visa security, improve applicant screening, provide counterterrorism training to consular officials who administer the visa process overseas, and help prevent the fraudulent use of visas for those seeking to gain entry to the country. The Visa Waiver Program allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States for 90 days or less for business and tourism purposes without first having to obtain a visa. The program’s purpose is to facilitate international travel for millions of people each year and promote the effective use of government resources. DHS is in the process of implementing these recommendations and we plan to report later this year on the department’s progress. DHS has not yet announced when or how it will roll out the ETA system. DHS Pilot on the Immigration Advisory Program
DHS has also has begun to pilot the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), which is designed to provide additional scrutiny to passengers and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure for the United States. CBP has reported several successes through the IAP pilot. CBP stated that the plan has not yet been finalized. Concluding Remarks
CBP has made progress in taking actions to secure our nation’s borders. It has enhanced its ability to screen travelers before they arrive in the United States as well as once they arrive at a port of entry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between ports of entry--government-designated locations where DHS inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter the country illegally and undetected. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on DHS's efforts on selected border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United States and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's observations are based on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior reports, GAO has recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things, help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and processes, and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and documents. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken various actions to address them.
What GAO Found
CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBP's ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain identification documents when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative's requirements include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007, the agency has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program over 4 years and biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will verify when travelers exit the country. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects. Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide sufficient field training. To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United States, the federal government has implemented new policies and programs, including enhancing visa security and providing counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States, CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has not yet determined whether to make the program permanent. |
gao_GAO-04-594T | gao_GAO-04-594T_0 | GPRA Laid the Foundation for a More Results- Oriented Federal Government
Ten years after enactment, GPRA’s requirements have laid a solid foundation of results-oriented agency planning, measurement, and reporting. The results of our survey of federal managers indicate that since GPRA went into effect governmentwide in 1997, federal managers reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA— particularly outcome-oriented performance measures. This perception is partly borne out by our survey results. The foundation of results-oriented planning and reporting that has been established is also reflected in the quality of the plans and reports of six federal agencies we reviewed for our report. Beginning with federal agencies’ initial efforts to develop effective strategic plans in 1997 and annual performance plans and reports for fiscal year 1999, Congress, GAO, and others have commented on the quality of those efforts and provided constructive feedback on how agency plans and reports could be improved. Challenges to GPRA Implementation Exist
While a great deal of progress has been made in making federal agencies more results oriented, we found numerous challenges remain. These challenges included (1) top leadership does not consistently show commitment to achieving results, (2) managers reported mixed results in the use of performance information, (3) managers continue to confront a range of human capital management challenges, (4) managers face persistent challenges in setting outcome-oriented goals, measuring performance, and collecting useful data, (5) crosscutting issues are not adequately addressed, and (6) managers’ views that Congress’ use of performance information is limited. Top Leadership Commitment
As we noted in previous GAO reports, top leadership commitment and sustained attention to achieving results, both within the agencies and at OMB, are essential to GPRA implementation. Unfortunately, most existing federal performance appraisal systems are not designed to support a meaningful performance- based pay system in that they fail to link institutional, program, unit, and individual performance measurement and reward systems. This would provide important guidance to agencies that could then be incorporated in agency strategic and annual performance plans. However, we have frequently reported on approaches that agencies, OMB, and Congress could use to address the challenges. In our report we recommended that the Director of OMB implement five suggestions to improve its guidance and oversight of GPRA implementation: To provide a broader perspective and more cohesive picture of the federal government’s goals and strategies to address issues that cut across executive branch agencies, we recommend that the Director of OMB fully implement GPRA’s requirement to develop a governmentwide performance plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has been in effect for 10 years. In that context, the subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our recent report, Results- Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. Our testimony addresses the effectiveness of GPRA in creating a focus on results in the federal government.
What GAO Found
GPRA's requirements have established a solid foundation of results-oriented performance planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government. Federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA. GPRA has also begun to facilitate the linking of resources to results, although much remains to be done in this area to increase the use of performance information to make decisions about resources. In our report, we also found agency strategic and annual performance plans and reports have improved over initial efforts. Although a foundation has been established, numerous significant challenges to GPRA implementation still exist. Inconsistent top leadership commitment to achieving results within agencies and OMB can hinder the development of results-oriented cultures in agencies. Furthermore, in certain areas, federal managers continue to have difficulty setting outcome-oriented goals, collecting useful data on results, and linking institutional, program, unit, and individual performance measurement and reward systems. Finally, there is an inadequate focus on addressing issues that cut across federal agencies. OMB, as the focal point for management in the federal government, is responsible for overall leadership and direction in addressing these challenges. OMB has clearly placed greater emphasis on management issues during the past several years. However, OMB has showed less commitment to GPRA implementation in its guidance to agencies and is not using the governmentwide performance plan requirement of GPRA to develop an integrated approach to crosscutting issues. In our view, governmentwide strategic planning could better facilitate the integration of federal activities to achieve national goals. |
gao_GAO-15-667 | gao_GAO-15-667_0 | These systems have certifications for the design and construction of new buildings and the operations and maintenance of existing buildings, among others. information on federal reviews of third-party green building certification systems. Federal Efforts to Support Implementation of Key Green Building Requirements Include Oversight, Training, and Other Tools Provided by Several Agencies
Several agencies—CEQ, DOE, EPA, GSA, and OMB—provide oversight, training, and other tools to support agencies’ implementation of key federal green building requirements. OMB and CEQ provide guidance and oversight of agencies’ implementation of key green building requirements. DOE is also a resource for information for agencies with questions about key green building requirements. EPA’s ENERGY STAR Portfolio Manager is a web-based system for federal agencies and other entities to measure and track data on buildings, such as energy and water use. Agencies Use Third- Party Certification to Help Implement Key Federal Green Building Requirements
All five select agencies use third-party certification systems to help implement key federal green building requirements for new construction and major renovation projects. While third-party certification does not ensure that a building meets all of the key requirements, agencies we reviewed have developed various tools to ensure that any remaining federal requirements are implemented at their buildings after third-party certification and noted that there are additional benefits to using these systems beyond helping to implement key requirements. Of the select agencies we reviewed, none require third-party certification for existing buildings, but three of the agencies have developed their own systems for assessing the implementation of key requirements for existing buildings. Air Force officials stated that the DOD policy and its crosswalk will be updated when the Guiding Principles are revised; in the past when updating DOD policy they used GSA guidance and customized it through the “DOD lens.”
Officials from agencies we spoke with said that their agencies use different tools to ensure that remaining federal requirements are implemented at their buildings after third-party certification. In addition to helping agencies implement key federal green building requirements, agency officials and building energy managers (DOE, EPA, GSA, Army, Air Force, Navy, OASD EI&E, and VA) that we spoke with mentioned other benefits of using third-party certification, including the following: Provides a well-established framework. In addition, these systems offer frameworks for reducing energy and water use in buildings, compared with design approaches and practices used for conventional buildings, according to the National Research Council’s review. Reduces need for additional staff. Serves as a communication tool. Officials from some agencies (Army, EPA, and OASD EI&E) and GSA building-level officials said that certification can be used as a tool to communicate the agencies’ sustainability efforts with its own staff, the public, and contractors. Officials from several agencies we spoke with are not certain how they will use third-party certification systems in the future. Forthcoming revisions to the Guiding Principles may address some of these challenges, and we discuss them under the appropriate challenge. Special-Use Buildings (Laboratories, Hospitals, and Industrial Spaces)
According to officials from several agencies (DOD, DOE, EPA, and VA) their building inventories include certain building types, such as laboratories, hospitals, and industrial buildings for which some requirements are difficult to implement. Challenges implementing the requirements for leased space may be affected by the new Executive Order and revisions to the Guiding Principles. Criteria for Evaluating Compliance
Officials from DOD and DOE told us that the criteria used to evaluate compliance with the Guiding Principles—which require a building to meet all of the dozens of requirements included in the Guiding Principles—can be a disincentive to implementing some requirements at an individual building because they receive no credit for implementing one requirement if they do not implement all the requirements. CEQ officials could not comment on whether the all or nothing approach would be reconsidered as part of the revision, but officials said that they were aware of that issue and want to ensure that they are not providing any disincentives for agencies to meet some of the requirements even if they cannot meet all. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality; the Administrators of the General Services Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Veterans Affairs. Appendix II: Select Federal Efforts to Support Implementation of Key Federal Green Building Requirements
Provides instructions to federal agencies on designing, constructing, maintaining, and operating buildings in sustainable locations, as called for in Executive Order 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the nation's largest energy consumer, the federal government spent about $7 billion in fiscal year 2014 to provide energy to over 275,000 federally owned or leased buildings. Federal law and policies for improving sustainability across the federal government include “green building” provisions—construction and maintenance practices designed to make efficient use of resources and reduce environmental impacts, among other benefits. A March 2015 executive order required CEQ to revise key green building requirements and extended the time frames for implementation in existing buildings. Third-party certification systems are used to assess how well green building elements are incorporated into a building's design and operation.
GAO was asked to review federal green building efforts and agencies' use of third-party certification systems. This report examines (1) federal efforts to support agencies' implementation of key green building requirements, (2) select agencies' use of third-party certification systems, and (3) challenges select agencies face in implementing requirements. GAO reviewed federal requirements; agency policies and guidance; and interviewed officials from agencies with supporting roles and agencies with experience implementing the requirements and using different certification systems. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed representatives from third-party certification organizations.
GAO is not making recommendations. CEQ, DOD, DOE, EPA, GSA, OMB, and VA reviewed a draft report and most provided technical comments that GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), General Services Administration (GSA), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide guidance, oversight, training, and other support to agencies implementing key federal green building requirements. For example, DOE offers training on measuring and reporting on the implementation of requirements, among other things. Also, EPA's Energy Star Portfolio Manager is a web-based tool agencies and other entities can use to measure and track buildings' energy and water use. According to officials, some federal support efforts will need to be updated when the revised requirements are issued, as called for in the March 2015 executive order.
All of the select agencies GAO reviewed—Department of Defense (DOD), DOE, EPA, GSA, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—use third-party certification systems to help implement key federal green building requirements for new construction and major renovation projects. While certification does not ensure that a building meets all requirements, agencies have developed tools to ensure that any remaining federal requirements are implemented at their buildings, and officials noted that there are additional benefits to using these systems. For example, officials stated that certification provides a well-established framework for documenting and ensuring compliance; serves as a tool to communicate with contractors and the public; and reduces the need for additional staff to verify that a building meets requirements. Of the select agencies GAO reviewed, none require third-party certification for existing buildings, but three have developed their own systems for assessing the implementation of key requirements for existing buildings. Several agencies stated that they are not certain how they will use third-party certification systems in the future after the revisions to key green building requirements are issued. For example, EPA and VA officials stated that they may reevaluate their requirement to certify specific projects after the revised green building requirements are issued.
Regardless of whether they use certification systems, the agencies GAO reviewed identified a variety of challenges in implementing current green building requirements, including challenges related to their building inventories, missions, and the criteria for evaluating compliance. For example, DOD officials said that the sheer number of buildings in their inventory proves challenging. In addition, according to officials from several agencies, their building inventories include certain building types, such as laboratories, hospitals, and industrial buildings for which some requirements are difficult to implement. VA cited mission concerns, including new safety requirements and extended hours to address patient backlogs, as a challenge to implementing energy and water conservation requirements. Also, some agency officials said that the criteria for evaluating compliance with the requirements can be a disincentive to implementing some requirements because no credit is received unless all of the requirements are implemented. Forthcoming revisions to key green building requirements may address some of these challenges. CEQ officials said that they were aware of the challenges and want to ensure that they are not providing any disincentives for agencies to meet some of the requirements even if they cannot meet all. |
gao_GAO-04-491 | gao_GAO-04-491_0 | Medicaid and SCHIP generally limit the use of beneficiary contribution requirements. Medicaid allows states to require certain beneficiaries to contribute to the cost of their coverage by charging premiums and requiring cost sharing. Federal law generally bars states from requiring beneficiary contributions of certain populations, but exceptions do exist. Children Were More Likely to Be Subject to Beneficiary Contributions in SCHIP than in Medicaid
In response to our survey, states reported that children were more likely to be subject to premiums and cost sharing in SCHIP than in Medicaid. Twenty- five states charged cost sharing for children in SCHIP compared to six states for Medicaid. Premiums
Twenty-six states reported charging premiums for some portion of children in SCHIP, compared to 9 states for Medicaid: 5 states charged premiums for some portion of children in both Medicaid and SCHIP, 21 states charged premiums for SCHIP children only, and 4 states charged premiums for Medicaid children only. Most states that reported charging cost sharing applied copayment requirements to the six health care services that we considered. 1.) 2.) Copayments were the predominate form of cost sharing for adults, with states most frequently reporting copayments for adults with disabilities, noninstitutionalized elderly persons, and parents. The services for which states most frequently reported charging copayments were physician services and prescription drugs. Copayment amounts varied depending on the service and the state. Across states, copayments ranged from $.50 to $25 for physician services and prescription drugs. Thirty-Four States Increased and Ten States Decreased the Amount of Beneficiary Contributions
From the beginning of their 2001 state fiscal years through August 1, 2003, 34 states reported increasing and 10 states reported decreasing the amount of beneficiary contributions they required in Medicaid, SCHIP, or both. For the states that provided us information on the amount of beneficiary contribution increases, premium increases to existing requirements ranged from $2 a month to $39 a month. Other states added new premium requirements, some of which were as much as several hundred dollars a month. While no states reported decreasing their beneficiary contribution requirements for children in Medicaid, five states decreased these requirements (premiums, cost sharing, or both) for some portion of children in SCHIP, and five other states decreased cost sharing requirements for some portion of adults in Medicaid. Agency Comments
We asked CMS officials to verify the technical accuracy of the statutory and regulatory information on Medicaid and SCHIP beneficiary contributions presented in the background section of this report. These officials provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. Tennessee did not have a SCHIP program. This population includes working adults with disabilities. Population not covered in the state’s Medicaid program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 50 million low-income adults and children receive health insurance coverage through Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Federal law allows states to require beneficiary contributions, such as premiums and cost sharing (coinsurance, copayments, and deductibles), for at least some Medicaid and SCHIP beneficiaries. GAO was asked to (1) identify and compare states' Medicaid and SCHIP beneficiary contribution requirements for children, (2) identify states' Medicaid beneficiary contribution requirements for adults, and (3) determine the extent to which states' Medicaid and SCHIP beneficiary contribution requirements have changed since 2001. GAO surveyed Medicaid and SCHIP program offices in the 50 states and the District of Columbia about their beneficiary contribution requirements as of August 2003, including their requirements for specific population groups and for six selected services, such as inpatient hospital, physician services, and prescription drugs. For each population group covered, states were asked to indicate the portion of the group charged beneficiary contributions by selecting "all," "most," "some," or "none." GAO also interviewed officials of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) regarding the Medicaid and SCHIP statutory requirements for beneficiary contributions.
What GAO Found
GAO's survey found that children were more likely to be subject to beneficiary contributions, specifically premiums and cost sharing, in SCHIP than in Medicaid. Overall, 26 states reported charging premiums for a portion of children--"some," "most," or "all"--in SCHIP, compared to 9 states in Medicaid. Twenty-five states charged cost sharing for some portion of children in SCHIP, compared to 6 states for Medicaid. States used copayments as the primary form of cost sharing for children. Most states that reported charging cost sharing applied copayment requirements to the six health care services. Most states reported requiring beneficiary contributions from adults enrolled in Medicaid. Twenty-five states charged premiums, generally charging portions of certain populations, such as adults with disabilities. Over 40 states charged cost sharing to most, if not all, adults, including those with disabilities, noninstitutionalized elderly persons, and parents. Copayments were the predominate form of cost sharing. States most frequently reported copayments for prescription drugs and physician services. From the beginning of their 2001 state fiscal years through August 1, 2003, 34 states reported increasing and 10 states reported decreasing the amount of beneficiary contributions required in Medicaid, SCHIP, or both. For the 33 states that provided information on the amount of increases, premium increases to existing requirements ranged from $2 a month to $39 a month. Other states added new premium requirements, some of which were as much as several hundred dollars a month. In most instances, reported copayment increases were generally limited to $5 or less. GAO asked CMS officials to provide technical comments on the statutory and regulatory information on Medicaid and SCHIP beneficiary contributions, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-96-109 | gao_GGD-96-109_0 | IRS’ most recent estimate put the gross income tax gap—the difference between income taxes owed and voluntarily paid—at $127 billion for 1992 alone. As planned, the major research tool will be the Compliance Research Information System (CRIS). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) review the many lessons that IRS learned from past compliance efforts, including Compliance 2000, to identify the factors most critical to the success of the new compliance research approach and (2) analyze the current status of the new approach and its ability to incorporate these factors as well as help IRS achieve the goal of 90-percent total compliance by 2001. Our National Office work focused on NORA. We found that IRS had not tracked whether its districts started research projects on the basis of objective compliance data or researched the most noncompliant market segments. IRS’ New Approach Offers Potential for Improving Compliance Research
IRS holds high hopes for its new compliance research approach in integrating the Compliance 2000 philosophy with efforts to boost compliance. IRS is implementing CRIS in the following three stages. For example, about 63 percent of those we interviewed believed that this approach will reduce the tax gap, and nearly 70 percent, who had knowledge of previous attempts, believed that it will be more cost effective. Even so, Final CRIS is developing more slowly than expected. NORA officials said training in these areas is being developed. New Approach Lacks Success Measures
IRS has not developed specific measures for evaluating the success of the new research approach. On the basis of lessons learned from the past, IRS officials believe, and we agree, that among the factors needed to better ensure success of the new approach, at least five stand out in terms of relative importance: (1) support for the research throughout IRS, (2) objective compliance data that are readily accessible for research, (3) skilled staff capable of doing rigorous research, (4) an infrastructure for organizing and managing the research, and (5) measures to evaluate whether the new approach works. IRS has taken or planned some actions to address these issues. Thus, it is important that IRS monitor its progress in addressing these issues and position itself to take corrective action if and when needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) tax compliance research program, focusing on: (1) the success IRS has had with its new research approach; and (2) IRS ability to implement lessons learned from its Compliance 2000 initiative.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS implemented its new compliance research approach to address concerns over taxpayer noncompliance and the large gap between income taxes owed and taxes paid; (2) IRS attempted to address these concerns through Compliance 2000, but had limited success due to inadequate compliance data; (3) IRS could avoid these mistakes by establishing more support for its research, using objective compliance data, acquiring more specialized staff, developing an organizational infrastructure, and setting objective measurements; (4) IRS officials believe that this new research approach is more cost-effective, but they doubt that they will reach 90-percent compliance by 2001; (5) IRS officials are concerned that district offices will spend 85 percent of their resources on national compliance issues rather than on district-level issues; (6) IRS has made some progress in developing the Compliance Research Information System (CRIS), but it is unsure when it will become available; (7) IRS officials believe that more training is needed in specialized areas to achieve research objectives; and (8) IRS is in the process of developing tools that track and measure the success of its research projects. |
gao_GAO-14-648 | gao_GAO-14-648_0 | Construction started at the campus in 2009. DHS and GSA officials reported that they have taken some initial actions that could affect consolidation plans, such as adopting recent workplace standards at the department level and assessing DHS’s leasing portfolio. These types of actions may facilitate consolidation planning in a manner consistent with leading practices. However, the current collection of plans, which DHS and GSA finalized between 2006 and 2009, have not been updated to address these changes and funding instability that could affect future headquarters needs and capabilities. DHS and GSA have not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives that would help officials adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. According to DHS and GSA officials, they have begun to work together to consider changes to the DHS headquarters consolidation plans. However, DHS and GSA have not announced when new plans will be issued, and it is unclear if they will fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices to help plan project implementation. As discussed earlier, from fiscal year 2009—when construction began—through the time of the fiscal year 2014 appropriation, the gap between what DHS and GSA requested and what was received was over $1.6 billion. According to DHS and GSA officials, this funding gap has created cost escalations of over $1 billion and schedule delays of 10 years, relative to their original estimates. For example:
Keep the current estimated number of staff (14,000) with a reduced square footage (3.7 million). We compared the 2013 cost estimate and the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates with leading practices for developing such estimates and found that the estimates do not or only minimally or partially conform with key characteristics for developing reliable estimates. Specifically, our comparison showed that the project cost estimate:
Does not include a life-cycle cost analysis. We found that the estimate was updated based on available funding, but was not regularly updated to reflect significant changes to the program including actual costs. Does not include an independent cost estimate. Do not include a complete schedule baseline document. Because DHS and GSA project cost and schedule estimates inform Congress’s funding decisions and affect the agencies’ abilities to effectively allocate resources across competing projects in their capital programs, there is a risk that funding decisions and resource allocations could be made based on information that is not reliable. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve transparency and allow for more informed decision making by congressional leaders and DHS and GSA decision-makers, we recommend that, before requesting additional funding for the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration work jointly to take the following two actions: conduct the following assessments and use the results to inform updated DHS headquarters consolidation plans: a comprehensive needs assessment and gap analysis of current and needed capabilities that take into consideration changing conditions, and an alternatives analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the project and prioritizes options to account for funding instability. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider making future funding for the St. Elizabeths project contingent upon DHS and GSA developing a revised headquarters consolidation plan, for the remainder of the project, that conforms with leading practices and that (1) recognizes changes in workplace standards, (2) identifies which components are to be colocated at St. Elizabeths and in leased and owned space throughout the NCR, and (3) develops and provides reliable cost and schedule estimates. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We conducted our review to examine (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the General Services Administration (GSA) developed DHS headquarters consolidation plans in accordance with leading capital decision-making principles, and (2) the extent to which DHS and GSA have estimated the costs and schedules of the DHS headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths in a manner that is consistent with leading practices. To determine the extent to which DHS and GSA developed DHS headquarters consolidation plans in accordance with leading capital decision-making principles, we reviewed and analyzed DHS and GSA capital planning documents and interviewed DHS and GSA officials responsible for the planning and management of the St. Elizabeths project, as well as DHS and GSA senior leadership. To determine the extent to which DHS and GSA have estimated the costs and schedules of the DHS headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths in a manner that is consistent with leading practices, we interviewed DHS and GSA program officials and compared DHS and GSA overall project cost and schedule estimates with GAO leading practices. The 2008 schedule estimate listed project completion in 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS and GSA are managing an estimated $4.5 billion construction project at the St. Elizabeths Campus in Washington, D.C. The project, designed to consolidate DHS's executive leadership, operational management, and other personnel at one secure location rather than at multiple locations throughout the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, has a projected completion date of 2026.
GAO was asked to examine DHS and GSA management of the headquarters consolidation, including the development of the St. Elizabeths campus. This report addresses the extent to which DHS and GSA have (1) developed consolidation plans in accordance with leading capital decision-making practices and (2) estimated the costs and schedules of the St. Elizabeths project in a manner that is consistent with leading practices. GAO assessed various DHS and GSA plans, policies, and cost/schedule estimates, and interviewed DHS and GSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and General Services Administration (GSA) planning for the DHS headquarters consolidation does not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices intended to help agencies effectively plan and procure assets. DHS and GSA officials reported that they have taken some initial actions that may facilitate consolidation planning in a manner consistent with leading practices, such as adopting recent workplace standards at the department level and assessing DHS's leasing portfolio. For example, DHS has an overall goal of reducing the square footage allotted per employee across DHS in accordance with current workplace standards. Officials acknowledged that this could allow more staff to occupy less space than when the campus was initially planned in 2009. DHS and GSA officials also reported analyzing different leasing options that could affect consolidation efforts. However, consolidation plans, which were finalized between 2006 and 2009, have not been updated to reflect these changes. According to DHS and GSA officials, the funding gap between what was requested and what was received from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, was over $1.6 billion. According to these officials, this gap has escalated estimated costs by over $1 billion—from $3.3 billion to the current $4.5 billion—and delayed scheduled completion by over 10 years, from an original completion date of 2015 to the current estimate of 2026. However, DHS and GSA have not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives to help them adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. DHS and GSA reported that they have begun to work together to consider changes to their plans, but as of August 2014, they had not announced when new plans will be issued and whether they would fully conform to leading capital decision-making practices to help plan project implementation.
DHS and GSA did not follow relevant GSA guidance and GAO's leading practices when developing the cost and schedule estimates for the St. Elizabeths project, and the estimates are unreliable. For example, GAO found that the 2013 cost estimate—the most recent available—does not include a life-cycle cost analysis of the project, including the cost of operations and maintenance; was not regularly updated to reflect significant program changes, including actual costs; and does not include an independent estimate to help track the budget, as required by GSA guidance. Also, the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates do not include all activities for the government and its contractors needed to accomplish project objectives. GAO's comparison of the cost and schedule estimates with leading practices identified the same concerns, as well as others. For example, a sensitivity analysis has not been performed to assess the reasonableness of the cost estimate. For the 2008 and 2013 schedule estimates, resources (such as labor and materials) are not accounted for and a risk assessment has not been conducted to predict a level of confidence in the project's completion date. Because DHS and GSA project cost and schedule estimates inform Congress's funding decisions and affect the agencies' abilities to effectively allocate resources, there is a risk that funding decisions and resource allocations could be made based on information that is not reliable or is out of date.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS and GSA develop revised DHS headquarters plans that reflect leading practices for capital decision making and reliable cost and schedule estimates. Congress should consider making future funding for the project contingent upon DHS and GSA developing plans and estimates commensurate with leading practices. DHS and GSA concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-831T | gao_GAO-09-831T_0 | More than 90 percent of the $29 billion in federal outlays has been provided through the increased Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund administered by the Department of Education. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an estimated $149 billion in Recovery Act funding will be obligated to states and localities in fiscal year 2009. Together, these nine programs are estimated to account for approximately 87 percent of federal Recovery Act outlays to state and localities in fiscal year 2009. With regard to the states’ receipt of the increased FMAP, all 16 states and the District had drawn down increased FMAP grant awards totaling just over $15.0 billion for the period of October 1, 2008 through June 29, 2009, which amounted to 86 percent of funds available. Most commonly, states reported that they are using or planning to use freed-up funds to cover their increased Medicaid caseload, to maintain current benefits and eligibility levels, and to help finance their respective state budgets. Several states noted that given the poor economic climate in their respective states, these funds were critical in their efforts to maintain Medicaid coverage at current levels. As of June 25, 2009, $15.9 billion of the funds had been obligated for over 5,000 projects nationwide, and $9.2 billion had been obligated for nearly 2,600 projects in the 16 states and the District that are the focus of GAO’s review. Almost half of Recovery Act highway obligations nationwide have been for pavement improvements. Many state officials told us they selected a large percentage of resurfacing and other pavement improvement projects because they did not require extensive environmental clearances, were quick to design, could be quickly obligated and bid, could employ people quickly, and could be completed within 3 years. As of June 25, 2009, $233 million had been reimbursed nationwide by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and $96.4 million had been reimbursed in the 16 states and the District. Specifically, a March fact sheet, the Secretary’s April letter to Governors, and program guidance issued in April and May mention that the purposes of the SFSF include helping stabilize state and local budgets, avoiding reductions in education and other essential services, and ensuring LEAs and public IHEs have resources to “avert cuts and retain teachers and professors.” The documents also link educational progress to economic recovery and growth and identify four principles to guide the distribution and use of Recovery Act funds: (1) spend funds quickly to retain and create jobs; (2) improve student achievement through school improvement and reform; (3) ensure transparency, public reporting, and accountability; and (4) invest one-time Recovery Act funds thoughtfully to avoid unsustainable continuing commitments after the funding expires, known as the “funding cliff.”
After meeting assurances to maintain state support for education at least at fiscal year 2006 levels, states are required to use the education stabilization fund to restore state support to the greater of fiscal year 2008 or 2009 levels for elementary and secondary education, public IHEs, and, if applicable, early childhood education programs. As of June 30, 2009, of the 16 states and the District of Columbia covered by our review, only Texas had not submitted an SFSF application. Pennsylvania recently submitted an application but had not yet received funding. The remaining 14 states and the District of Columbia had submitted applications and Education had made available to them a total of about $17 billion in initial funding. Regarding LEAs, most states planned to allocate funds based on states’ primary funding formulae. Officials in many school districts told us that SFSF funds would help offset state budget cuts and would be used to maintain current levels of education funding. Single Audit Reporting Will Not Facilitate Timely Reporting of Recovery Act Program Findings and Risks
The single audit reporting deadline is too late to provide audit results in time for the audited entity to take action on deficiencies noted in Recovery Act programs. Efforts to Assess the Impact of Recovery Act Spending
As recipients of Recovery Act funds and as partners with the federal government in achieving Recovery Act goals, states and local units of government are expected to invest Recovery Act funds with a high level of transparency and to be held accountable for results under the Recovery Act. Under the Recovery Act, direct recipients of the funds, including states and localities, are expected to report quarterly on a number of measures including the use of funds and an estimate of the number of jobs created and the number of jobs retained. In response to requests for more guidance on the recipient reporting process and required data, OMB, after soliciting responses from an array of stakeholders, issued additional implementing guidance for recipient reporting on June 22, 2009. However, we remain concerned that OMB’s planned actions would not achieve the level of accountability needed to effectively respond to Recovery Act risks and does not provide for timely reporting on internal controls for Recovery Act programs. The first of these reports is due on October 10, 2009. OMB does not have a master timeline for issuing federal agency guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony is based on a GAO report being released today--the second in response to a mandate under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). The report addresses: (1) selected states' and localities' uses of Recovery Act funds, (2) the approaches taken by the selected states and localities to ensure accountability for Recovery Act funds, and (3) states' plans to evaluate the impact of Recovery Act funds. GAO's work for the report is focused on 16 states and certain localities in those jurisdictions as well as the District of Columbia--representing about 65 percent of the U.S. population and two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance available. GAO collected documents and interviewed state and local officials. GAO analyzed federal agency guidance and spoke with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials and with program officials at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the Departments of Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Labor, and Transportation.
What GAO Found
Across the United States, as of June 19, 2009, Treasury had outlayed about $29 billion of the estimated $49 billion in Recovery Act funds projected for use in states and localities in fiscal year 2009. More than 90 percent of the $29 billion in federal outlays has been provided through the increased Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) administered by the Department of Education. GAO's work focused on nine federal programs that are estimated to account for approximately 87 percent of federal Recovery Act outlays in fiscal year 2009 for programs administered by states and localities. Increased Medicaid FMAP Funding All 16 states and the District have drawn down increased Medicaid FMAP grant awards of just over $15 billion for October 1, 2008, through June 29, 2009, which amounted to almost 86 percent of funds available. Medicaid enrollment increased for most of the selected states and the District, and several states noted that the increased FMAP funds were critical in their efforts to maintain coverage at current levels. States and the District reported they are planning to use the increased federal funds to cover their increased Medicaid caseload and to maintain current benefits and eligibility levels. Due to the increased federal share of Medicaid funding, most state officials also said they would use freed-up state funds to help cope with fiscal stresses. Highway Infrastructure Investment As of June 25, DOT had obligated about $9.2 billion for almost 2,600 highway infrastructure and other eligible projects in the 16 states and the District and had reimbursed about $96.4 million. Across the nation, almost half of the obligations have been for pavement improvement projects because they did not require extensive environmental clearances, were quick to design, obligate and bid on, could employ people quickly, and could be completed within 3 years. State Fiscal Stabilization Fund As of June 30, 2009, of the 16 states and the District, only Texas had not submitted an SFSF application. Pennsylvania recently submitted an application but had not yet received funding. The remaining 14 states and the District had been awarded a total of about $17 billion in initial funding from Education--of which about $4.3 billion has been drawn down. School districts said that they would use SFSF funds to maintain current levels of education funding, particularly for retaining staff and current education programs. They also said that SFSF funds would help offset state budget cuts. Accountability States have implemented various internal control programs; however, federal Single Audit guidance and reporting does not fully address Recovery Act risk. The Single Audit reporting deadline is too late to provide audit results in time for the audited entity to take action on deficiencies noted in Recovery Act programs. Moreover, current guidance does not achieve the level of accountability needed to effectively respond to Recovery Act risks. Finally, state auditors need additional flexibility and funding to undertake the added Single Audit responsibilities under the Recovery Act. Impact Direct recipients of Recovery Act funds, including states and localities, are expected to report quarterly on a number of measures, including the use of funds and estimates of the number of jobs created and the number of jobs retained. The first of these reports is due in October 2009. OMB--in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders--issued additional implementing guidance for recipient reporting on June 22, 2009, that clarifies some requirements and establishes a central reporting framework. |
gao_GAO-17-500 | gao_GAO-17-500_0 | Corps’ Role in M&I Water Storage
The Corps enters into agreements with M&I water users, such as states or local water utilities, for water storage within Corps-managed projects, such as reservoirs or dams. Under the Water Supply Act of 1958, the Corps also may reallocate or reassign water storage at an existing project (e.g., reservoir) from one use to another, such as reallocating storage for hydropower generation to M&I water supply. Specific costs. Variability of M&I Water Storage Agreement Prices Cannot Be Reliably Determined, but Some Officials Cited Multiple Factors That May Affect Prices Set by the Corps
Based on our review of M&I water storage agreement data stored in the Corps’ OMBIL database and discussions with agency officials, we could not determine the extent to which storage prices varied because Corps’ data were not sufficiently reliable for such an analysis. However, some Corps officials and a few M&I water users and stakeholders stated that water storage prices vary, and agency officials identified several factors that may contribute to the variation, including the original construction costs for a project and the authorized purposes of the project. Some data contained errors. For example, we compared information from a randomly selected sample of nine agreements from the Corps’ Kansas City, Savannah, and Tulsa districts to the corresponding data in OMBIL. Some data were missing. Some inconsistencies existed in how data were recorded in the database. Corps officials said that they do not systematically review the M&I water storage data, such as regularly tracing OMBIL data back to the originating agreement to ensure the data in OMBIL are accurate. Instead, Corps officials said they conducted a limited quality control review of the M&I water storage agreement data in OMBIL, as of fiscal year 2016. Corps headquarters officials said they do not currently have plans to systematically review the M&I water storage agreement data in OMBIL in the future because the agency does not have a policy and implementing guidance requiring a review of the data. In addition, under federal internal control standards, agency management should design control activities, such as controls over information processing, to achieve objectives and respond to risks. Without developing policy and implementing guidance on how staff should conduct systematic reviews of the M&I water storage agreement data in OMBIL, the Corps will continue to have issues related to the reliability of the data. M&I Water Users We Interviewed Were Generally Satisfied with the Corps’ Water Storage Pricing Process, but Water Users and Stakeholders Also Cited Some Concerns
Many M&I water users we interviewed said they were generally satisfied with the Corps’ process for setting water storage prices, but many water users and stakeholders also cited some concerns. For example, one M&I water user said that in the 16 years it took the Corps to finalize its reallocation study, the community faced a drought that put its ability to meet the water storage needs of a local nuclear power plant at risk and could have affected the plant’s ability to supply energy to its customers. Corps officials also said they were unable to provide estimated time frames because the agency does not systematically track the time it takes to complete the reallocation agreement process. Such activities include promptly recording all transactions to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. Without systematically reviewing and correcting, as appropriate, data on M&I water storage agreements in the OMBIL database, the Corps cannot ensure it is providing users of the information with accurate and reliable information on M&I water storage agreements. Without collecting and analyzing data on the length of time it takes to complete the reallocation process, including data on its initiation and authorization through its final decision, the Corps does not have the information necessary to measure progress in implementing initiatives designed to streamline its planning process as well as identifying areas that may hinder the Corps’ ability to complete projects in a timely manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Chief of Engineers and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following three actions: systematically review data on municipal and industrial water storage agreements stored within the OMBIL system and correct errors, as appropriate, to ensure that the data are accurate and complete; develop policy and implementing guidance directing staff to conduct systematic reviews of M&I water storage agreement data in OMBIL; and collect and analyze data on the length of time it takes to complete the reallocation process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to examine (1) how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) sets municipal and industrial (M&I) water storage prices, (2) what is known about the variability, if any, of those prices, and (3) M&I water users’ and stakeholders’ views on water storage prices and how the Corps sets M&I water storage prices. These data were obtained from the Corps’ primary water storage database—the Operations and Maintenance Business Information Link (OMBIL)—which maintains storage data on Corps’ projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps is to implement the water storage provisions of the Water Supply Act of 1958 at Corps' projects, such as reservoirs, across the United States. Under the act, the Corps enters into agreements with M&I water users, such as local water utilities, for storage space in the projects. As part of these agreements, the Corps includes the terms of repayment to cover the cost to construct, operate, and maintain the project.
GAO was asked to review the Corps' process for setting M&I water storage agreement prices. Among other objectives, this report examines (1) what is known about the variability of these prices and (2) M&I water users' and stakeholders' views on water storage prices and how the Corps sets M&I water storage prices. GAO reviewed the M&I water storage agreement data stored in OMBIL and assessed the reliability of the data, in part, by comparing information in agreements with data in OMBIL and interviewed Corps officials in headquarters and the Kansas City, Savannah, and Tulsa districts and a nongeneralizable sample of 26 M&I water users and 14 stakeholders such as industry groups, all selected for such factors as number of storage agreements.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's review of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) municipal and industrial (M&I) water storage agreement data stored in the Operations and Maintenance Business Information Link (OMBIL) database and discussions with agency officials, GAO could not determine the extent to which storage prices varied because Corps' data were not sufficiently reliable for such an analysis. Specifically, some data contained errors or were missing, and inconsistencies existed in how some data were recorded in OMBIL. Corps officials said that they do not systematically review the data, such as regularly tracing data in OMBIL back to the originating agreement to ensure the data are accurate. Instead, Corps officials said they conducted a limited quality control review of the M&I water storage agreement data in OMBIL but have not resolved all the errors they identified to help ensure complete and accurate information, as called for by federal standards for internal control. Without systematically reviewing and correcting the data in OMBIL, the Corps and users of the information may not have access to reliable M&I water storage agreement data. Corps officials also said they do not currently have plans to systematically review the M&I water storage agreement data in OMBIL because the agency does not have a policy and implementing guidance requiring review of the data, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Without developing a policy and implementing guidance on how staff should systematically review and correct M&I water storage agreement data, the Corps will continue to have issues with the reliability of the data. While GAO could not determine the extent of variability in prices, Corps officials and M&I water users and stakeholders said that M&I water storage agreement prices vary. Agency officials identified factors that may contribute to the variation, including a project's original construction costs and the year the M&I water storage agreement was signed, given that inflation may increase prices charged for storage.
Many M&I water users GAO interviewed were generally satisfied with the Corps' M&I water storage pricing process. However, many M&I water users and stakeholders also highlighted concerns with their water storage agreements, primarily the length of time it took to complete the process for establishing agreements that reassign storage at existing projects from one use, such as hydropower generation, to use for M&I water supply. For example, one M&I water user GAO interviewed said it took the Corps 16 years to finalize its study for the water user's storage request and in that time the community faced a drought that jeopardized the ability to meet water storage needs of a local power plant. Corps officials could not provide estimates of the time it takes to complete the process because the agency does not systematically track this information. Under federal standards for internal controls, management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. Such activities include promptly recording all transactions to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. Without collecting and analyzing data on the length of time it takes to complete the process, the Corps does not have the information to identify areas that may hinder its ability to complete the water storage pricing process in a timely manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps systematically review and correct its data on M&I water storage agreements and develop policy and guidance for conducting such reviews; and collect and analyze data on the time it takes to complete reallocation agreements. The agency concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-846T | gao_GAO-15-846T_0 | See figure 1 for an illustration of the parties that we identified as part of our June 2014 report in the multistep pension advance processes that we reviewed. Various state and federal agencies have oversight roles and responsibilities related to consumer and investor issues. A Number of Geographically Concentrated and Affiliated Companies Were Involved in Pension Advances and Marketed to Financially Vulnerable Consumers Nationwide
In June 2014, we reported on the number and characteristics of entities offering pension advances and the marketing practices that pension advance companies employ. During our review, we identified at least 38 companies that offered lump-sum advance products in exchange for pension payment streams. Eleven of the 38 companies that we identified used marketing materials or sales pitches designed to target consumers with poor or bad credit. We also observed this type of marketing during our undercover investigative phone calls. The Six Pension Advance Companies That Provided GAO Investigators Quotes Offered Unfavorable Terms Compared with Other Financial Products
Six pension advance companies provided our undercover investigator with quotes for pension advances with terms that did not compare favorably with other financial products such as loans and lump-sum payment options provided directly through private-sector pension plans. Comparison to Usury Rates
We determined that the effective interest rate for 97 out of 99 offers provided to our undercover investigator by six companies ranged from approximately 27 percent to 46 percent. The effective interest rates on some of these offers could be even higher than the rates we calculated to the extent some pension advance companies require the pensioner to purchase life insurance, and “collaterally assign” the life- insurance policy to the company, to protect the company in the event of the pensioner’s death during the term of the contract. There Is Limited Federal Oversight of Pension Advances
Questionable Practices Related to Unregulated Transactions Pose Consumer Risks
Our June 2014 report identified questionable elements of pension advances, such as the lack of disclosure and unfavorable agreement terms. Hence, we recommended that CFPB and FTC review pension advance practices and companies, and exercise oversight and enforcement as appropriate. CFPB agreed with this recommendation and took action by investigating pension advance companies with questionable business practices. FTC also agreed with our recommendation and, according to FTC officials, the agency has also taken actions to review consumer complaints related to pension advances, pension advance advertising, and the pension advance industry overall. At the time of our 2014 review, we found that CFPB and four other agencies had taken some actions to provide consumer education on pension advances. CFPB agreed with this recommendation and released a consumer advisory about pension advances in March 2015. However, in response to our review, in 2014, FTC also posted additional consumer-education information about pension advances on its agency website. CFPB and FTC have taken actions to implement the recommendations that we made to review pension advance practices and companies, and exercise oversight and enforcement as appropriate, as well as to disseminate consumer-education materials on pension advances. We believe their implementation of these recommendations will help to strengthen federal oversight or enforcement of pension advance products while ensuring that consumer-education materials on pension advances reach their target audiences, especially given that Treasury’s recent announcement restricting permitted benefit increases may make these products more desirable to pensioners. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent questions have been raised about companies attempting to take advantage of retirees using pension advances. In June 2014, GAO issued a report on pension advances. The report (1) described the number and characteristics of pension advance companies and marketing practices; (2) evaluated how pension advance terms compare with those of other products; and (3) evaluated the extent to which there is federal oversight.
This testimony summarizes GAO's June 2014 report (GAO-14-420) and actions taken by CFPB and FTC in response to GAO's recommendations. In June 2014, GAO identified 38 pension advance companies and related marketing practices. GAO conducted a detailed nongeneralizable assessment of 19 of these companies. GAO used undercover investigative phone calls to identify additional marketing practices and obtain pension advance offers. This information was compared with the terms of other financial products, such as personal loans. GAO also examined the role of selected federal agencies with oversight of consumer protection and pension issues.
What GAO Found
In a June 2014 report, GAO identified at least 38 companies that offered individuals lump-sum payments or “advances” in exchange for receiving part or all of their pension payment streams. The 38 companies used multistep pension advance processes that included various other parties. At least 21 of the 38 companies were affiliated with each other in ways that were not apparent to consumers. Some companies targeted financially vulnerable consumers with poor or bad credit nationwide.
GAO undercover investigators received offers from 6 out of 19 pension advance companies. These offers did not compare favorably with other financial products or offerings, such as loans and lump-sum options through pension plans. For example, the effective interest rates on pension advances offered to GAO's investigators typically ranged from approximately 27 percent to 46 percent, which were at times close to two to three times higher than the legal limits set by the related states on the interest rates assessed for various types of personal credit.
GAO identified questionable elements of pension advance transactions, including lack of disclosure of some rates or fees, and certain unfavorable terms of agreements. GAO recommended that the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—the two agencies with oversight responsibility over certain acts and practices that may harm consumers—provide consumer education about these products, and that CFPB take appropriate action regarding identified questionable practices.
Since the time of GAO's review, CFPB has investigated pension advance companies that GAO referred to the agency and disseminated additional consumer-education materials on pension advances. Similarly, FTC posted consumer education on pension advances on its website, and FTC officials report that they have reviewed consumer complaints related to pension advances, pension advance advertising, and the pension advance industry overall. CFPB's and FTC's actions are a positive step toward strengthening federal oversight or enforcement of pension advance products.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2014 report, GAO recommended that CFPB and FTC review the pension advance practices identified in that report and exercise oversight or enforcement as appropriate. GAO also recommended that CFPB coordinate with relevant agencies to increase consumer education about pension advances. CFPB and FTC agreed with and have taken actions to address GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-504T | gao_GAO-04-504T_0 | System Development Behind Schedule and Critical Plans Incomplete
Key activities in the development of CAPPS II have been delayed, and TSA has not yet completed key system planning activities. However, TSA has not completely tested these initial two increments because it was unable to obtain the necessary passenger data for testing from air carriers. TSA is currently developing increment 3. Until project officials develop a plan that includes scheduled milestones and cost estimates for key deliverables, CAPPS II is at increased risk of not providing the promised functionality, not being fielded when planned, and being fielded at an increased cost. Developmental, Operational, and Privacy Issues Identified by the Congress Remain Unresolved
In reviewing CAPPS II, we found that TSA has not fully addressed seven of the eight issues identified by the Congress as key areas of interest related to the development and implementation of CAPPS II. While TSA is in various stages of progress to address each of these issues, only the establishment of an internal oversight board to review the development of CAPPS II has been fully addressed. The following briefly summarizes the status of TSA’s efforts to address each of the eight issues. Although DHS has the Board in place to provide internal oversight and monitoring for CAPPS II and other large capital investments, we recently reported that concerns exist regarding the timeliness of its future reviews. The accuracy of CAPPS II databases has not yet been determined. Stress testing and demonstration of the system’s efficacy and accuracy have been delayed. The establishment of a security policy and the completion of the system security plan, security risk assessment, and certification and accreditation process are critical to ensuring the security of CAPPS II. Other Challenges Could Affect the Successful Implementation of CAPPS II
In addition to facing developmental and operational challenges related to key areas of interest to the Congress, CAPPS II faces a number of additional challenges that may impede its success. We identified three issues that, if not adequately resolved, pose major risks to the successful development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II. These issues are developing the international cooperation needed to obtain passenger data, managing the expansion of the program’s mission beyond its original purpose, and ensuring that identity theft—in which an individual poses as and uses information of another individual—cannot be used to negate the security benefits of the system. Uncertainties surrounding the system’s future functionality and schedule alone result in the potential that the system may not meet expected requirements, may experience delayed deployment, and may incur increased costs throughout the system’s development. The development of plans identifying the specific functionality that will be delivered during each increment of CAPPS II and its associated milestones for completion and the expected costs for each increment would provide TSA with critical guidelines for maintaining the project’s focus and achieving intended system results and milestones within budget. Completion of system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The security of U.S. commercial aviation is a long-standing concern, and substantial efforts have been undertaken to strengthen it. One such effort is the development of a new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) to identify passengers requiring additional security attention. The development of CAPPS II has raised a number of issues, including whether individuals may be inappropriately targeted for additional screening and whether data accessed by the system may compromise passengers' privacy. GAO was asked to summarize the results of its previous report that looked at (1) the development status and plans for CAPPS II; (2) the status of CAPPS II in addressing key developmental, operational, and public acceptance issues; and (3) additional challenges that could impede the successful implementation of the system.
What GAO Found
Key activities in the development of CAPPS II have been delayed, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not yet completed important system planning activities. TSA is currently behind schedule in testing and developing initial increments of CAPPS II, due in large part to delays in obtaining needed passenger data for testing from air carriers because of privacy concerns. TSA also has not established a complete plan identifying specific system functionality that will be delivered, the schedule for delivery, and estimated costs. The establishment of such plans is critical to maintaining project focus and achieving intended results within budget. Without such plans, TSA is at an increased risk of CAPPS II not providing the promised functionality, of its deployment being delayed, and of incurring increased costs throughout the system's development. TSA also has not completely addressed seven of the eight issues identified by the Congress as key areas of interest related to the development, operation, and public acceptance of CAPPS II. Although TSA is in various stages of progress on addressing each of these eight issues, as of January 1, 2004, only one--the establishment of an internal oversight board to review the development of CAPPS II--has been completely addressed. However, concerns exist regarding the timeliness of the board's future reviews. Other issues, including ensuring the accuracy of data used by CAPPS II, stress testing, preventing unauthorized access to the system, and resolving privacy concerns have not been completely addressed, due in part to the early stage of the system's development. GAO identified three additional challenges TSA faces that may impede the success of CAPPS II. These challenges are developing the international cooperation needed to obtain passenger data, managing the possible expansion of the program's mission beyond its original purpose, and ensuring that identity theft--in which an individual poses as and uses information of another individual--cannot be used to negate the security benefits of the system. GAO believes that these issues, if not resolved, pose major risks to the successful deployment and implementation of CAPPS II. |
gao_GAO-03-709 | gao_GAO-03-709_0 | The system incorporates four components: a strategic plan with goals and objectives; a balanced scorecard, with strategies and performance measures; a business plan containing initiatives; and a review and analysis process that assesses performance. Of the 97 DLA initiatives contained in DLA’s Strategic Management System, DLA identified 18 that are aimed specifically at mitigating spare parts shortages and 6 that are aimed at improving DLA’s internal logistics operating systems and processes that may improve logistics support to customers and thus help reduce critical readiness-degrading spare part shortages affecting the military forces. Such improvements are likely, in part, because some of the 24 initiatives address recurring causes for the shortages. However, some of these initiatives are not expected to be fully implemented until 2007. A Separate DOD-Directed Aviation Investment Initiative Has Significantly Increased Availability of Some Critical Aviation Parts, but Others Remain in Short Supply
A separate DOD-directed, $500 million aviation investment initiative— although not included in DLA’s business plan—has significantly improved the availability of many critical aviation spare parts and most likely supply readiness. During its first 3 fiscal years, 2000-2002, the initiative, called the Aviation Investment Strategy, significantly improved critical aviation parts. Shortages, however, will continue, in part, because the 85-percent aggregate goal does not reveal that while 47 percent of the critical aviation spare parts were raised to this level, many—5,414 (53 percent) as of the end of fiscal year 2002—are below the goal. Without such a waiver, these spare parts could continually be below DLA’s availability goal, adversely affect readiness, and increase DLA backorders. DLA Can Estimate the Impact of Additional Investment on Supply Availability, Which Contributes to Supply Readiness
DLA can estimate that added investment in safety level inventories of critical readiness-related spare parts will increase parts availability and will likely improve supply readiness of the military services. Several parts even exceeded 3 years. Such waivers would allow DLA to buy sufficient critical spare parts that affect readiness of service weapon systems to attain an 85-percent minimum availability goal; change the agency’s current aggregate 85-percent supply availability goal for critical spare parts that affect readiness, to a minimum 85- percent supply availability goal for each critical spare part, and because of the long lead times in acquiring certain critical parts, establish annual performance targets for achieving the 85-percent minimum goal; and prioritize funding as necessary to achieve the annual performance targets and ultimately the 85-percent minimum supply availability goal. For example, after 3 years of focused investment to increase the availability of over 10,000 critical aviation parts, 53 percent were not available at the 85-percent aggregate goal and over half of these parts were available below 35 percent of the time. We assessed the adequacy of DLA’s strategic planning by comparing DLA planning to the requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to determine if DLA’s planning contained key management attributes that are necessary to reduce spare parts shortages. Comments from the Department of Defense
Schematic of Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Management System
Description of DLA Initiatives Aimed at Mitigating Spare Parts Shortages
DLA identified 18 strategic initiatives in varying stages of implementation in its Strategic Management System that are aimed at mitigating shortages of spare parts, including critical ones. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's management, funding, and reporting of spending for spare parts programs have been a focus of GAO high risk reports for over a decade. They noted that spare parts shortages adversely affect military operations and readiness. Despite funding of about $1.9 billion over fiscal years 1999-2002 to increase availability of spare parts, managing to mitigate shortages still challenges the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). GAO examined if (1) DLA's strategic planning addresses mitigating critical spare parts shortages that affect readiness, (2) strategic initiatives will likely mitigate these shortages, (3) a DOD-directed initiative has improved availability of critical aviation parts, and (4) DLA can identify the impact of added investment on parts availability.
What GAO Found
DLA's Strategic Management System, meant to transform its 2002-2007 logistics operations, addresses the mitigation of readiness-affecting shortages of critical spare parts. The system includes a strategic plan with goals, strategies, and objectives; a balanced scorecard to monitor progress; and a business plan that contains 97 initiatives. Of these initiatives, DLA identified 24 as linked to spare parts shortages. The DLA strategic system incorporates attributes of strategic planning outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. The 24 initiatives, if fully implemented, could help mitigate critical spare parts shortages and improve supply readiness because, in part, they address causes for the shortages. Of the 24 DLA-identified initiatives, 18 should improve availability of parts identified by the services as critical to readiness; and 6 should indirectly improve parts availability through modernized logistics systems and business processes. A $500-million DOD-directed aviation investment initiative, not part of DLA's strategic system, increased critical parts availability and likely supply readiness. It improved the aggregate, or total average, availability of three critical groups of DLA-managed parts in the first 3 fiscal years--2000-2002--of the 4-year initiative. However, DLA's aggregate 85-percent goal does not clearly reveal that many parts are still far below 85 percent. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2002, of the 10,291 critical aviation parts selected for investment, about 4,900 met or exceeded the aggregate measure, but over 5,400 did not. Of these, about 2,900 parts were available under 35 percent of the time. A DOD regulation, since revised to allow waivers, caused 3,342 parts to be below the 85-percent availability goal. DLA can estimate the impact of increased funding on supply availability. Investment costs, however, will be significant--DLA estimated $748 million to obtain an 85-percent minimum availability of the 219,071 most critical parts. Also, necessary inventory levels may take years to build, and increases in unit readiness are not assured because supply is only one readiness factor. |
gao_GAO-14-480 | gao_GAO-14-480_0 | Description of the AFWCF
During fiscal year 2013, the AFWCF earned $21.2 billion in revenue. First, the monthly cash balances were generally high in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 because the Air Force charged more than it cost for spare parts. Second, the monthly cash balances fluctuated because of the cyclical nature of events, such as the DOD operating under a continuing resolution. Finally, large-dollar transactions, such as transfers in and out of the AFWCF, affected the monthly cash balances. AFWCF Monthly Cash Balances Are Projected to Be Above the Maximum Requirement in Fiscal Year 2014 but to Fall Below the Minimum Requirement by the End of Fiscal Year 2015
The AFWCF’s fiscal year 2015 budget information shows that the fund’s projected monthly cash balances are only expected to fall within the minimum and maximum cash requirements about 25 percent of the time in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Our analysis of AFWCF financial documents and interviews with AFWCF headquarters officials identified two reasons for the fiscal year 2014 projected AFWCF cash balances being above the projected maximum cash requirement: (1) the AFWCF entered fiscal year 2014 with a cash balance ($1,458 million) that was above the projected maximum cash requirement for fiscal year 2014 by about $260 million or 22 percent and (2) the AFWCF is building or maintaining a higher cash balance in preparation for the October 1, 2014, implementation of a Treasury initiative to provide visibility over daily cash balances for all appropriations, including the AFWCF. The higher cash balance is needed to cover the volatility in the daily cash balance. To enable it to better compete with commercial providers, USTRANSCOM’s airlift rates are set to compete with private sector rates and do not cover the full cost of the Air Force’s readiness requirements for military airlift operations. The difference between the full cost and the revenue received from airlift customers is to be provided to USTRANSCOM in the ARA through the use of Air Force appropriated funds. Achieving Expected Savings from AFWCF Initiatives Is Necessary to Meet AFWCF Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 Projected Monthly Cash Balances
As stated previously, our analysis of fiscal year 2015 AFWCF budget information that contains the AFWCF cash management plans for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 showed that the projected monthly cash balances are expected to be above the maximum cash requirement in fiscal year 2014 and decline in fiscal year 2015 and fall below the minimum cash requirement in September 2015. Conclusions
The work that the AFWCF performs supports military readiness by repairing aircraft and engines; selling inventory items (spare parts); and providing air, land, and sea transportation for DOD in times of peace and war. Second, the Air Force did not fully fund the ARA requirement in its operations and maintenance budget for fiscal year 2015, which increases the risk of a cash shortfall in fiscal year 2015. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander of USTRANSCOM to take the following action:
Take steps to help ensure that the AFWCF receives the appropriate funding if a cash shortfall occurs because of (1) the implementation of the daily cash requirement, (2) a lack of fiscal year 2015 ARA funding, and (3) fiscal year 2015 budgeted savings not being realized. In its comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, DOD concurred with the three recommendations and cited actions planned or under way to address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine to what extent the Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF) monthly cash balances were within the Department of Defense (DOD) minimum and maximum cash requirements for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, we (1) obtained the DOD regulation on calculating the minimum and maximum cash requirements, (2) calculated the cash requirements for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 based on the regulation, and (3) obtained monthly cash balances for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. If the cash balances were above the maximum amount or were below the minimum amount, we met with Air Force and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) officials and reviewed AFWCF budgets and other Air Force and USTRANSCOM documentation to ascertain the reasons. Beginning in the April and May time frame each year, AFWCF monthly cash balances generally increased because the AFWCF generated more revenue from customers for spare parts that result from the Air Force flying more training mission hours during the spring and summer months because of better weather conditions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The AFWCF earned revenue of $21.2 billion in fiscal year 2013 by, among other things, (1) repairing aircraft and engines; (2) selling inventory items (parts); and (3) providing air, land, and sea transportation. Cash generated from the sale of goods and services is used by the AFWCF to cover its expenses, such as paying employees. As requested, GAO reviewed issues related to AFWCF cash management.
GAO's objectives were to determine to what extent (1) the AFWCF monthly cash balances were within the DOD minimum and maximum cash requirements for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and (2) the AFWCF projected monthly cash balances were within the minimum and maximum cash requirements for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 and if not why. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant DOD cash management guidance, analyzed AFWCF actual and projected cash balances and related data, and interviewed Air Force and United States Transportation Command officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF) cash data showed that monthly cash balances fell within the minimum and maximum cash requirements about one-third of the time in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. GAO identified three reasons why monthly cash balances were above the maximum or below the minimum cash requirements. First, the cash balance began fiscal year 2009 above the maximum requirement and generally remained above the maximum requirement in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 because the AFWCF charged more than it cost for spare parts. Second, cash balances fluctuated each year because of the cyclical nature of events. For example, in the spring and summer months, the Air Force flies more training missions, which increases revenue for parts and thus the cash balance. Finally, large-dollar transactions caused cash balances to fluctuate above and below cash requirements. These transactions were used to increase cash to pay for costs such as fuel price increases or reduce cash if it was above the maximum requirement.
AFWCF projected monthly cash balances are expected to fall within cash requirements about 25 percent of the time in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. In managing cash for those fiscal years, the AFWCF faces three challenges:
The AFWCF plans to implement a Department of the Treasury initiative to provide daily cash balances, instead of monthly balances, in October 2014. Because daily balances are more volatile, the AFWCF faces a greater risk that a cash shortfall would occur. However, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not updated its regulation on receiving daily cash balances.
Because airlift rates are set to compete with private sector rates, they do not cover the full cost. The difference between the full cost and revenue received is to be provided by the Airlift Readiness Account (ARA) funded by the Air Force. The projected cash balance declines in fiscal year 2015 because the Air Force did not fully fund the ARA by $927 million. If a cash shortfall materializes, the Air Force stated its intent to fund the requirement from other programs. Without sufficient ARA funding, the AFWCF cash balance is at risk of falling below the minimum cash requirement in fiscal year 2015.
The AFWCF has included $620 million in savings from Air Force and United States Transportation Command initiatives in its fiscal year 2015 projected monthly cash balances. If these saving are not realized, the Air Force may need to take action to reduce the risk of a cash shortfall.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to DOD that are aimed at implementing the Department of the Treasury's daily cash balance initiative and ensuring that the AFWCF receives the appropriate funding if a cash shortfall occurs because of a lack of ARA funding or estimated savings not being realized. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and cited related actions planned or under way. |
gao_GAO-09-655 | gao_GAO-09-655_0 | DHS’s Criteria for Significant Increase in Operational Effectiveness Require a Marginal Improvement in the Detection of Certain Nuclear Materials and a Large Reduction in Innocent Alarms
Although the DHS criteria for primary screening require an improved ability to detect certain nuclear materials at operational thresholds, ASPs could meet the criteria for improvement while still failing to detect anything more than lightly shielded material. DNDO officials acknowledge that passive radiation detection equipment, which includes both the new and current-generation portal monitors, is capable of detecting certain nuclear materials only when this material is unshielded or lightly shielded. For this reason, the DOE threat guidance used to set PVTs’ detection threshold is based on the equipment’s limited sensitivity to anything more than lightly shielded nuclear material rather than on the assumption that smugglers would take effective shielding measures. Other aspects of the criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require that ASPs either provide more than a marginal improvement in addressing other limitations of current-generation equipment or at least maintain the same level of performance in areas in which the current-generation equipment is considered adequate: The primary screening requirement for an 80 percent reduction in the rate of innocent alarms could result in hundreds of fewer secondary screenings per day, thereby reducing CBP’s workload and delays to commerce. However, the testing still had limitations, and the preliminary results are mixed. Improvements to Testing Provided Credibility to Test Results
As we testified in September 2008, DHS’s improvements to the 2008 round of ASP testing addressed concerns we raised about previous tests. In contrast, the plan for the 2008 performance test stipulated that there would be no system contractor involvement in test execution, and no ASP contractors were at the test location on the day we observed performance testing. The performance test results cannot be generalized beyond the limited set of scenarios tested. Other phases of testing, particularly integration testing, uncovered multiple problems meeting requirements for successfully integrating the new technology into operations at ports of entry. CBP officials anticipate that they will continue to uncover problems during the first few years of use if the new technology is deployed in the field. Schedule Delays Have Allowed More Time for Analysis and Review of Test Results, but DNDO’s Latest Schedule Does Not Include Computer Simulations to Provide Additional Insight into ASP Capabilities
Delays to the schedule for the 2008 round of testing have allowed more time for analysis and review of results, particularly from performance testing conducted at the Nevada Test Site. DHS’s most recent schedule anticipated a decision on ASP certification as early as May 2009, but DHS has not updated its schedule for testing and certification since suspending field validation in February 2009 due to ASP performance problems. Problems uncovered during testing of ASPs’ readiness to be integrated into operations at U.S. ports of entry have caused the greatest delays to date and have allowed more time for DNDO to analyze and review the results of performance testing. However, DNDO does not plan to complete the studies prior to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision on certification even though DNDO and other officials have indicated that the studies could provide additional insight into the capabilities and limitations of advanced portal monitors. DNDO has the data needed to conduct the studies. Preliminary results of DNDO’s performance testing show that ASPs outperformed the PVTs in detection of such materials during runs with light shielding, but ASPs’ performance rapidly deteriorated once shielding was slightly increased. First, the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness do not take into account recent efforts to improve the current-generation portal monitors’ sensitivity to nuclear materials through the “energy windowing” technique, most likely at a much lower cost. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the degree to which Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness address the limitations of the current generation of radiation detection equipment, we clarified the intent of the criteria through the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) written answers to our questions and through interviews with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is testing new advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection monitors. DNDO expects ASPs to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. Congress has required that the Secretary of DHS certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale procurement. GAO was asked to review (1) the degree to which DHS's criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness address the limitations of existing radiation detection equipment, (2) the rigor of ASP testing and preliminary test results, and (3) the ASP test schedule. GAO reviewed the DHS criteria, analyzed test plans, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require a minimal improvement in the detection of threats and a large reduction in innocent alarms. Specifically, the criteria require a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, considered to be a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The criteria require improved performance over the current detection threshold, which for certain nuclear materials is based on the equipment's limited sensitivity to anything more than lightly shielded materials, but do not specify a level of shielding that smugglers could realistically use. In addition, DNDO has not completed efforts to improve current-generation portal monitors' performance. As a result, the criteria do not take the current equipment's full potential into account. With regard to innocent alarms, the other key limitation of current equipment, meeting the criteria could result in hundreds fewer innocent alarms per day, thereby reducing CBP's workload and delays to commerce. DHS increased the rigor of ASP testing in comparison with previous tests. For example, DNDO mitigated the potential for bias in performance testing (a concern GAO raised about prior testing) by stipulating that there would be no ASP contractor involvement in test execution. Such improvements added credibility to the test results. However, the testing still had limitations, such as a limited set of scenarios used in performance testing to conceal test objects from detection. Moreover, the preliminary results are mixed. The results show that the new portal monitors have a limited ability to detect certain nuclear materials at anything more than light shielding levels: ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Testing also uncovered multiple problems in ASPs meeting the requirements for successful integration into operations at ports of entry. CBP officials anticipate that, if ASPs are certified, new problems will appear during the first few years of deployment in the field. While DNDO's schedule underestimated the time needed for ASP testing, test delays have allowed more time for review and analysis of results. DNDO's original schedule anticipated completion in September 2008. Problems uncovered during testing of ASPs' readiness to be integrated into operations at U.S. ports of entry caused the greatest delays to this schedule. DHS's most recent schedule anticipated a decision on ASP certification as early as May 2009, but DHS recently suspended field validation due to ASP performance problems and has not updated its schedule for testing and certification. In any case, DNDO does not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though delays have allowed more time to conduct the simulations. DNDO officials believe the other tests are sufficient for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-03-14 | gao_GAO-03-14_0 | DOD officials have indicated that they have reinitiated their efforts to develop a strategy but have not set a target date for their completion. Services Are Implementing Risk Management but Provide Inadequate Oversight
The services and commands we reviewed are generally following prescribed guidance and regulations to use the DOD risk management approach in developing their installation antiterrorism requirements, but a significant weakness exists with the oversight of this process. Specifically, the services are not required to evaluate the thoroughness of all installations’ annual risk management assessments or whether installations used required methodologies to perform these assessments. DOD’s Combating Terrorism Funding Reports Do Not Clearly Reflect Costs
DOD has reported that $32.1 billion has been allocated or requested for combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear picture of total combating terrorism costs. The most recent budget report, submitted to Congress in March 2002, includes the following: the combating terrorism program descriptions and budget request estimates for fiscal year 2003, the estimated budget for fiscal year 2002, and the actual obligations for fiscal year 2001. 1.) In accordance with DOD’s Financial Management Regulation, the Department’s combating terrorism costs include funding for personnel in designated specialties that have combating terrorism missions, such as military police, civilian police, and security guards. Our analysis indicates that the military services generally are not applying a results-oriented management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts, in part, because DOD does not yet have a Department-wide antiterrorism strategy. To determine whether the services use a results-oriented management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense and service headquarters and command antiterrorism officials, and reviewed their strategic-planning documents for evidence of the critical elements of a strategic plan and performance plan—as embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. | What GAO Found
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, domestic military installations increased their antiterrorism measures to their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks following the attacks, but because of the persistent nature of the threat, the antiterrorism posture at domestic installations remains at a higher than normal level more than 1 year later. The Department of Defense's (DOD) budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes more than $10 billion for combating terrorism activities, which includes a substantial increase in funding for antiterrorism measures to safeguard personnel and strategic issues. The service headquarters GAO reviewed did not use a comprehensive results-oriented management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts. According to service officials, a comprehensive results-oriented management framework for antiterrorism efforts is not consistently used across all services and commands because DOD does not require it, and service officials indicated that they were reluctant to develop such an approach before the forthcoming DOD-wide antiterrorism strategy was issued. Although the Department has recently restarted its efforts toward developing this strategy, it has not set a specific time frame for its completion. The services and commands are following prescribed guidance and regulations to conduct risk management analyses to support their antiterrorism requirements, but significant weaknesses exist with the current approach. The commands do not always require documentation of the assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment methodology used at each installation to determine the thoroughness of the analyses or the consistency with required assessment methodology. DOD has reported that $32.1 billion has been allocated or requested for combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear picture of total combating terrorism costs. GAO's analysis indicates that $19.4 billion of this amount is for military and civilian personnel and personnel-related operating costs associated with individuals in designated specialties that have combating terrorism-related missions, such as military police, civilian police, and security guard. |
gao_GAO-16-248 | gao_GAO-16-248_0 | Agencies, including DOL, are generally required to respond to a FOIA request within 20 working days. In fiscal year 2014, the department reported receiving 16,106 FOIA requests—a 14 percent decrease from fiscal year 2013. However, in fiscal year 2015, the reported number of requests processed increased to 17,104. DOL and Its Components Have Implemented a Decentralized Process to Manage and Prioritize FOIA Requests; However, Not All Responses to Requests Have Been Timely
Responsibilities for managing and processing FOIA requests are handled by DOL’s 23 component offices. Within one of these components (the Office of the Solicitor), the Office of Information Services (OIS) serves as the department’s central FOIA office and has agency-wide responsibility for managing the program, to include developing and issuing guidance to implement FOIA initiatives, providing training, and preparing required annual reports. In addition, while the components had provided timely responses to many of the FOIA requests, an estimated 24 percent of the requests were not responded to within the statutory time frame and most components had not documented the rationale for these delays in the automated FOIA tracking system or notified requesters of the delayed responses. This act requires federal agencies to make their electronic information accessible to people with disabilities. However, the department had not implemented 4 other recommended capabilities, and had partially implemented 1 capability. By implementing the additional recommended capabilities, the department has the opportunity to enhance its FOIA processing and, thus, improve the efficiency with which it can respond to information requests. Further, the components processed an estimated 76 percent of the requests within the statutory time frame of 20 working days. Agencies are then required to respond to the requester with a decision regarding the administrative appeal within 20 working days. In its technical comments on a draft of this report, DOL stated that it had taken various actions to reduce backlogged appeals. DOL Received Sixty- Eight FOIA-Related Lawsuits; Results of Lawsuits Varied, and Requesters Were Not Notified of Mediation Services as an Alternative to Litigation
From January 2005 through December 2014, 68 FOIA-related lawsuits were filed against DOL, primarily as a result of the department either failing to respond to requests or because it withheld certain requested information based on exemptions. Of these lawsuits, the court ruled in favor of the department in 18 cases, and jointly in favor of both the department and the requester in 1 case. In addition, among 47 lawsuits, the requesters received relief either as a result of (1) the courts rendering decisions in favor of the requesters (3 lawsuits) or (2) the department and the requesters establishing settlement agreements that awarded attorney’s fees and other costs to the requesters or resulted in the department potentially releasing additional information (44 lawsuits). Two lawsuits were undecided as of April 2016. Specifically, because it has not updated its FOIA regulation to reflect recent changes to its process, the department may be hindering the public’s use of that process. Further, although the department responded to the majority of its fiscal year 2014 FOIA requests within the time frame mandated by law, it has not consistently documented the reasons for delays in its automated FOIA tracking system or notified requesters about them. By ensuring that requesters are made aware of mediation services offered by the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Government Information Services as an alternative to litigation, DOL may be able to avoid future lawsuits, thus saving resources. Establish a time frame for implementing, and take actions to fully implement, recommended best practice capabilities for enhanced processing of requests in the department’s FOIA system and online portal. Establish a time frame for consulting with the Department of Justice’s Office of Information Policy on including language in DOL’s response letters to administrative appeals notifying requesters of the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Government Information Services’ mediation services as an alternative to litigation, and then ensure that the department includes the language in the letters. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the Department of Labor (DOL) and its components manage and process Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, including how they prioritize requests, and the extent that responses to requests have been timely; and (2) how many lawsuits DOL has been subject to arising from FOIA requests, and the results of those lawsuits. | Why GAO Did This Study
FOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government information in accordance with principles of openness and accountability and generally requires agencies to respond to requests for information within 20 working days. When an agency does not respond or a requester disagrees with the outcomes of his or her request, the requester can appeal a decision or file a lawsuit against the agency. Like other agencies, DOL responds to thousands of FOIA requests each year. In fiscal year 2015, the department received approximately 16,800 requests.
GAO was asked to review DOL's FOIA processing. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) how the department and its components manage and process FOIA requests, including how they prioritize requests, and the extent that responses to requests have been timely; and (2) how many lawsuits DOL has been subjected to arising from FOIA requests, and the results of those lawsuits. To do so, GAO reviewed DOL reports, policies, guidance, and other documentation; analyzed a random sample of FOIA requests processed by the department in fiscal year 2014; reviewed FOIA-related legal records; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
Responsibilities for managing and processing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests are handled by the Department of Labor's (DOL) 23 component offices. Within one of these components, the Office of Information Services (OIS) functions as the department's central FOIA office and has agency-wide responsibility for managing the program; however, the department has not updated its FOIA regulation to reflect changes in its process made in response to more recent amendments to the law and new implementing guidance. DOL uses an information technology (IT) system to manage and track requests, but it has not implemented key required and recommended capabilities for enhancing FOIA processing, such as capabilities to accommodate individuals with disabilities or electronic redaction. Implementing the required and recommended capabilities could improve the efficiency of the department's FOIA processing. DOL and its components have implemented a process for prioritizing FOIA requests, allowing for expedited processing in certain cases, and in fiscal year 2014 the department processed an estimated 76 percent of requests that GAO reviewed within 20 working days. For the estimated 24 percent of cases that were not timely, officials attributed these delays, in part, to the involvement of multiple components in a single request or the time required to process large volumes of requested records. However, the department did not document the rationales for delays in its FOIA tracking system or notify requesters of them. Further, the department had not responded to administrative appeals within the statutory time frame of 20 working days, but is taking steps to reduce the backlog of appeals.
From January 2005 through December 2014, 68 FOIA-related lawsuits were brought against DOL. Of these lawsuits, the court ruled in favor of the department in 18 cases, jointly in favor of both the department and the requester in 1 case, and in favor of the requesters in 3 cases. In 44 of the remaining lawsuits, the department and the requesters established settlement agreements that awarded attorney's fees and other costs to the requesters or resulted in the department potentially releasing additional information. A decision on 2 lawsuits was undecided as of April 2016 (see figure).
Although recommended by Department of Justice guidance, the department did not notify requesters of mediation services offered by the Office of Government Information Services as an alternative to litigation. By doing so, DOL may be able to avoid future lawsuits, thus saving resources and ensuring that requesters are kept informed about the department's FOIA process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending, among other things, that DOL establish a time frame to finalize and issue its updated FOIA regulation and take actions to implement required and recommended system capabilities. In written comments on a draft of the report, the department agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-82 | gao_HEHS-98-82_0 | Nearly 90 Percent of Portable EKGs and Ultrasound Tests Are Done in Nursing Homes
Medicare paid for more than 14 million EKG and 5 million ultrasound services in 1995 at a cost to the Medicare program of about $597 and $976 million, respectively. Most EKG and ultrasound services were performed in physicians’ offices or hospitals. In 1995, about 2 percent of the EKG and less than 1 percent of the ultrasound services were provided in beneficiaries’ homes or nursing homes, costing the Medicare program about $12 million for the EKGs and $8 million for the ultrasound services. These services were usually provided by portable x-ray suppliers and IPLs. Likewise, these two types of providers accounted for a high portion of the Medicare ultrasound services provided in nursing homes. Thus, this change in transportation policy will have a larger effect on Medicare spending in some geographic areas. EKG and Ultrasound Services Are Likely to Be Available in Nursing Homes After Revised Payment Policy
About 19 percent of the EKGs and 21 percent of the ultrasound tests done in nursing homes in 1995 would be unaffected by any change in the transportation payment policy because BBA eliminates separate payments for services provided to beneficiaries in skilled facilities while their stay is covered under posthospital extended care. Consequently, 56 percent of the EKG services and 89 percent of the ultrasound tests provided to beneficiaries in their place of residence would be unaffected by the elimination of separate transportation payments. Consequently, nursing homes could be affected as well. However, these savings would have materialized only to the extent that homebound beneficiaries and nursing home residents did not travel outside in Medicare-paid ambulances to receive these tests. They also noted that residents needing EKGs would receive quicker service if the equipment were always on the premises. Many of the EKGs and most of the ultrasound tests performed in those settings would be unaffected by the elimination of separate transportation payments. Consequently, our estimate of the effect of a revised payment policy ranges from a savings of $11 million to a cost of $9.7 million for EKG tests and a savings of $400,000 to a cost of $125,000 for ultrasound tests. Because providers’ reactions are uncertain, HCFA would have to eliminate transportation payments to reliably gauge the revised policy’s effect on Medicare spending. In estimating the potential net cost to Medicare from eliminating transportation payments, we did the following: (1) identified, from the sample 5-percent national claims data file, the Medicare beneficiary population that received an EKG or ultrasound service from a provider that was paid a transportation fee for delivering the service; (2) reduced this count by the beneficiaries who also had an x-ray service (since the provider would continue to get transportation fees for the x-ray), the beneficiaries who had the service delivered by a provider who could not be paid transportation expenses, and beneficiaries receiving the services while covered under posthospital extended care; (3) estimated the percentage of beneficiaries who would have been transported by ambulance (using our observations from case files in two states); (4) developed an average ambulance fee paid in each state (using data on the skilled nursing home beneficiaries who went by ambulance in 1995 to an outpatient facility for a diagnostic test); and (5) determined the transportation fee paid to mobile providers in each state. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) revised payment policies would affect Medicare beneficiaries and program costs, focusing on the: (1) Medicare recipients, places of service, and providers who might be affected most; (2) number of services that would be affected by the changed policy; and (3) effect on Medicare's program costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) only a fraction of the electrocardiogram (EKG) and ultrasound tests paid for by Medicare are performed outside of physicians' offices or hospital settings and, thus, are potentially affected by the payment policy changes; (2) in 1995, Medicare paid approximately $597 million for 14 million EKGs and about $976 million for 5 million ultrasound tests in various settings; (3) only 290,000 of the EKGs and only 37,000 of the ultrasound tests were done in locations such as nursing homes or beneficiaries' residences where the provider needed to transport the diagnostic equipment; (4) nearly 90 percent of the services that required transporting equipment were provided to residents of nursing homes; (5) they were usually provided by portable x-ray and ultrasound providers; (6) some states appear to have a higher concentration of these services, with a small number of providers accounting for a large portion of each state's total portable EKG and ultrasound services; (7) many EKGs and ultrasound services provided in nursing homes would be unaffected if transportation payments were eliminated; (8) given the experience of 1995, about 56 percent of the EKGs and 89 percent of the ultrasound services provided in nursing homes would be unaffected by transportation payment changes and presumably would continue to be provided in those settings; (9) in July 1998, nursing homes will receive an inclusive per diem payment for all services provided to beneficiaries receiving Medicare-covered skilled nursing care; (10) a decision to eliminate or retain separate transportation payments for other beneficiaries will not affect the per diem payment; (11) another reason is that many nursing home EKGs and most ultrasound services in 1995 were performed by providers who did not receive a transportation payment; (12) the effect of eliminating transportation payments on the remaining 44 percent of the EKG and 11 percent of the ultrasound services is unknown because it depends on how providers respond; (13) because relatively few services would be affected, eliminating transportation payments would likely have a nominal effect on Medicare spending; (14) Medicare could save $11 million if mobile providers continue to supply services; (15) however, if mobile providers stopped bringing portable EKG equipment to beneficiaries, then some people would travel in Medicare-paid ambulances to obtain these tests; (16) eliminating transportation payments for ultrasound services would have a smaller effect; and (17) GAO estimates the effect on Medicare spending might range from $400,000 in savings to $125,000 in increased costs. |
gao_GAO-10-466 | gao_GAO-10-466_0 | Two of these initiatives are related to improving cybersecurity R&D—one is aimed at improving the coordination of federal cybersecurity R&D, and the other is aimed at developing a plan for advancing the United States’ R&D in high- risk, high-return areas. One of the report’s recommendations was to strengthen coordination and oversight of federal cybersecurity efforts. We identified, through input from experts from relevant federal, private, and academic organizations, six major challenges that are impeding efforts to improve cybersecurity R&D. Specifically, according to the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, a national R&D agenda should include near-term (1 to 3 years), mid-term (3 to 5 years), and long-term (5 years and longer) goals. It is also essential that cyberspace security research efforts are ranked across all sectors and funding sources to ensure that national goals are addressed. While officials from NITRD and OMB stated that they consider the following key documents to comprise a national R&D agenda, these documents do not constitute, whether taken collectively or separately, a prioritized national agenda: NITRD’s 2006 Cyber Security and Information Assurance Working Group’s Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance R&D: As we have previously reported, this plan was intended to be the first step toward developing a federal agenda for cybersecurity research, which provides baseline information about ongoing federal R&D activities; however, mid-term and long-term cybersecurity research goals were not defined. Until such an agenda is developed that (1) contains short-term, mid-term, and long-term priorities, (2) includes input from both public and private sectors, and (3) is consistent with the updated national cybersecurity strategy (when it is available), increased risk exists that agencies and private sector organizations will focus on their individual priorities for cybersecurity R&D, which may not be the most important national research priorities. Specifically, PITAC indicated that federal cybersecurity R&D efforts should be focused, coordinated, and overseen by a central body. Although NITRD is primarily responsible for providing leadership in coordinating cybersecurity R&D, it has played a facilitator role, rather than leading agencies in a strategic direction toward a cybersecurity R&D agenda. Until NITRD exercises its leadership responsibilities, federal agencies will likely lack overall direction for cybersecurity R&D. Additionally, government and private sector officials indicated that the government does not have a process in place to communicate the results on completed federal R&D. Nevertheless, without an ongoing process for industry and government to share cybersecurity R&D information, the nation could be at great risk of funding duplicative efforts or having gaps in needed R&D. OMB did not implement our recommendation. In addition, a private sector expert stated that having a centralized database in place would improve coordination between the public and private sectors. However, without a mechanism to track all active and completed cybersecurity R&D initiatives, federal researchers and developers as well as private companies lack essential information about ongoing and completed R&D, thus increasing the likelihood of duplicative efforts, inefficient use of government funding, and lost collaboration opportunities. Finally, the lack of a mechanism to track all active and completed cybersecurity R&D initiatives and the lack of a process for sharing information among the public and private sectors may result in duplicative efforts or gaps in needed R&D. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help address the key cybersecurity R&D challenges, we are recommending that the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in conjunction with the national Cybersecurity Coordinator, direct the Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development to exercise its leadership responsibilities and take the following four actions: Establish a comprehensive national R&D agenda by expanding on the CSIA IWG framework and ensure that it contains priorities for short-term, mid-term, and long-term complex cybersecurity R&D; includes input from the private sector and academia; and is consistent with the updated national cybersecurity strategy (when available). The Assistant Director for Information Technology R&D from OSTP agreed with our recommendation and provided details on the office’s plans and actions to address our recommendation. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine the key challenges to enhancing national-level cybersecurity research and development (R&D) efforts among the federal government and private companies. To identify key challenges to enhancing national-level cybersecurity R&D efforts, we analyzed documentation, such as agencies’ research plans and cybersecurity reports, and interviewed federal officials and industry experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Computer networks and infrastructures, on which the United States and much of the world rely to communicate and conduct business, contain vulnerabilities that can leave them susceptible to unauthorized access, disruption, or attack. Investing in research and development (R&D) is essential to protect critical systems and to enhance the cybersecurity of both the government and the private sector. Federal law has called for improvements in cybersecurity R&D, and, recently, President Obama has stated that advancing R&D is one of his administration's top priorities for improving cybersecurity. GAO was asked to determine the key challenges in enhancing national-level cybersecurity R&D efforts among the federal government and private companies. To do this, GAO consulted with officials from relevant federal agencies and experts from private sector companies and academic institutions as well as analyzed key documents, such as agencies' research plans.
What GAO Found
Several major challenges impede efforts to improve cybersecurity R&D. Among the most critical challenges are the following: 1) Establishing a prioritized national R&D agenda. While R&D that is in support of specific agencies' missions is important, it is also essential that national research efforts be strategically guided by an ordered set of national-level R&D goals. Additionally, it is critical that cyberspace security research efforts are prioritized across all sectors to ensure that national goals are addressed. Accordingly, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace recommended that the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) coordinate the development of an annual cybersecurity research agenda that includes near-term (1-3 years), mid-term (3-5 years), and long-term (5 years or longer) goals. Although OSTP has taken initial steps toward developing such an agenda, one does not currently exist. OSTP and Office of Management and Budget officials stated that they believe an agenda is contained in existing documents; however, these documents are either outdated or lack appropriate detail. Without a current national cybersecurity R&D agenda, the nation is at risk that agencies and private sector companies may focus on their individual priorities, which may not be the most important national research priorities. 2) Strengthening leadership. While officials within OSTP's Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD)--a multiagency coordination body that is primarily responsible for providing leadership in coordinating cybersecurity R&D--have played a facilitator role in coordinating cybersecurity R&D efforts within the federal government, they have not led agencies in a strategic direction. NITRD's lack of leadership has been noted by many experts as well as by a presidential advisory committee that reported that federal cybersecurity R&D efforts should be focused, coordinated, and overseen by a central body. Until NITRD exercises its leadership responsibilities, federal agencies will lack overall direction for cybersecurity R&D. 3) Tracking R&D fundingand establishing processes for the public and private sectors to share key R&D information. Despite a congressional mandate to develop a governmentwide repository that tracks federally funded R&D, including R&D related to cybersecurity, such a repository is not currently in place. Additionally, the government does not have a process to foster the kinds of relationships necessary for coordination between the public and private sectors. While NITRD hosted a major conference last year that brought together public, private, and academic experts, this was a one-time event, and, according to experts, next steps remain unclear. Without a mechanism to track all active and completed cybersecurity R&D initiatives, federal researchers and developers as well as private companies lack essential information about ongoing and completed R&D. Moreover, without a process for industry and government to share cybersecurity R&D information, the nation is at risk of having unforeseen gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Director of OSTP direct NITRD to exercise its leadership responsibilities by taking several actions, including developing a national agenda, and establishing and utilizing a mechanism to keep track of federal cybersecurity R&D funding. OSTP agreed with GAO's recommendation and provided details on planned actions. GAO recommends that TSA establish milestones for a staffing study, verify the accuracy of all reported screening data, develop a contingency plan for screening domestic cargo, and develop plans for meeting the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. TSA partially concurred with verifying screening data and did not concur with developing a contingency plan because it did not believe such actions were feasible. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as discussed in this report. TSA agreed with all other recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-176 | gao_GAO-12-176_0 | Processing of Returns Was Timely, but Opportunities to Improve Taxpayer Service Exist
During the 2011 filing season, the percentage of returns e-filed increased considerably and IRS expects new systems to speed refunds to taxpayers. Although fewer taxpayers receive face-to- face assistance than in other ways, IRS is taking steps to improve service at TAC and VITA sites. E-Filing Increased and the Shift to New Processing Systems Continues
IRS processed about 140 million returns and almost reached its e-file goal of 80 percent (78 percent of individual returns were e-filed and 22 percent filed on paper), established by Congress in 1998. IRS’s Refund Timeliness Measure and Goal Do Not Reflect Processing Performance and Capabilities
IRS’s current refund timeliness measure and goal, which it routinely uses in budget justification documents and to assess its performance, do not include e-filed returns. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 requires IRS to report to Congress on how it has maintained processing times of 40 days or less for paper returns, in addition to implementing a plan to increase electronic filing, and IRS maintains a goal of issuing Due to improvements refunds for returns filed on paper within 40 days.in the percentage of e-filed returns (nearly 80 percent of returns are now filed electronically) the measure does not apply to the majority of returns filed by taxpayers. In 2011, 72 percent of taxpayers seeking live telephone assistance got through to a CSR, compared to 81 percent in 2007. Where’s My Refund online self-service tool. IRS officials were uncertain exactly how much it would cost to develop the line but said that it would probably cost less than $1 million. In addition, from January 1 through June 30, 2011, CSRs answered over 60,000 calls from taxpayers inquiring about the location of a TAC or VITA site. However, IRS does not have an automated telephone line for those taxpayers to call. Due to budgetary constraints, IRS does not plan to expand the number of IRS employees or sites supported in 2012. IRS officials believe that the increase in the use of the search tool over the years is due in part to site visitors not being able to easily locate the information they are seeking. IRS acknowledged that the existing manner in which IRS manages content on its website contributes to more searches because of duplicative and outdated information. IRS Is Developing an Internet Strategy, but Fundamental Elements Are Missing
As we noted earlier, IRS has begun spending a planned $320 million on its website over a 10-year period. IRS’s investment plans include, among other things, introducing new, more secure portals for taxpayers to access information. Online services are a substantially less expensive means for IRS to conduct business with taxpayers compared to telephone or paper correspondence, making it important for IRS to promote interactive website services. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following four actions: develop a new refund timeliness measure and goal to more appropriately reflect current capabilities; offer an automated telephone line that gives taxpayers the status of their amended tax return, unless IRS has a convincing cost-benefit analysis to suggest that the costs exceed the benefits; assess the costs and benefits of automating the TAC/VITA location telephone lines, and automate these lines if the benefits exceed the costs; and complete an Internet strategy that provides a justification for the implementation of online self-service tools and includes an assessment of providing online self-service tools that allow taxpayers to access and update elements of their account online; acknowledges the cost and benefits to taxpayers of new online services; sets the time frame for when the online service would be created and available for taxpayer use; and includes a plan to update the strategy periodically. Since 2007, IRS telephone service has continued to suffer and we believe that a rigorous assessment of the costs and benefits of automating the TAC/VITA telephone line will give IRS better information on how to allocate scarce resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax filing season is an enormous undertaking in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processes millions of tax returns, issues billions of dollars in refunds to taxpayers, corrects taxpayers' errors, and provides service to millions of taxpayers through telephones, website, and face-to-face assistance. Among other things, GAO was asked to assess (1) IRS's performance processing returns and issuing refunds, and providing telephone assistance, and (2) IRS's plans to expand self-service options on its website. To conduct the analyses, GAO obtained and compared data from 2007 through 2011, reviewed IRS documents, interviewed IRS officials, observed IRS operations, and interviewed tax-industry experts, including from tax preparation firms.
What GAO Found
During the 2011 filing season the following occurred:
Electronic filing (e-filing) increased to nearly 80 percent of the 140 million individual returns filed. The benefits of e-filing include that it is more accurate, faster, and less expensive for IRS than processing returns filed on paper.
Due to the increase in e-filing, new systems, and IRS's performance in recent years, its refund timeliness measure and goal are outdated. The measure only relates to the 22 percent of returns filed on paper. IRS's goal is to issue refunds for paper-filed returns within 40 days. In 2012, IRS expects to issue most refunds within 4 to 6 days of processing a return (paper and e-filed), meaning the current goal does not reflect current performance and capabilities.
The percent of callers seeking live assistance who receive it remained much lower than in 2007 and the average wait time for callers continued to increase. Providing live telephone assistance is expensive. However, IRS can shift some assistor-answered calls to less costly tools. Two such opportunities include creating self-service phone lines for taxpayers seeking to identify the (1) status of their amended return--a source of high call volume--and (2) location of a Taxpayer Assistance Center (TAC) or Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) site, where IRS employees and volunteers prepare returns, respectively. IRS officials expect the benefits of the amended return line to exceed the costs, but have not studied the costs and benefits of adding a TAC/VITA locator line.
The use of IRS's website is growing, particularly the number of searches, which IRS officials attribute, in part, to taxpayers having difficulties locating information. Having an easily searchable website is important for IRS because it reduces costly phone calls. IRS has begun spending a planned $320 million on its website over 10 years. However, IRS's initial strategy for providing new self-service tools online does not include allowing taxpayers to access account information and is missing fundamental elements, including a justification for new services and time frames. Doing so would provide Congress and taxpayers with a better understanding of the online services IRS plans to provide with its significant investment on its website.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS develop a new refund timeliness performance measure to better reflect current capabilities, create an automated telephone line for taxpayers seeking information about amended returns unless IRS has a convincing costbenefit analysis suggesting the costs exceed the benefits, assess the costs and benefits of automating a TAC/VITA locator line, and finalize a strategy for determining which self-service tools to provide on its website.
IRS agreed with three of GAO's recommendations, but said that resources are not available to automate the TAC/VITA line. GAO believes a review of the costs and benefits would better inform IRS decisions about how to allocate scarce resources. |
gao_AIMD-97-19 | gao_AIMD-97-19_0 | Predevelopment Project Costs
As of October 18, 1996, estimated predevelopment costs had increased from about $55.2 million to about $55.8 million or by a net amount of about $617,000 (1 percent), since our last report. All land has been acquired for the arena site. However, the final cost for one of the parcels of land acquired will be determined by the outcome of legal proceedings. Construction of the Metrorail connection is about 25 percent complete as of October 18, 1996. All District employees have been relocated; however, office improvements on the new space have not been completed. Finally, the two old buildings have been demolished and relocating utilities and securing regulatory approvals are nearly complete as of October 18, 1996. The District’s Project Manager for the sports arena stated that based on the project’s current status and known estimates for predevelopment costs, as of September 30, 1996, the District does not expect to exhaust the $5 million capital reserve fund established to cover cost overruns. The District’s projections of Arena Tax revenues at the current level of $9 million annually appear sufficient to redeem the bonds by the year 2002.
Financing Predevelopment Costs
In August 1995, the District secured a $53 million loan commitment from a syndicate of banks led by NationsBank and Crestar Bank to finance predevelopment costs for the arena project. The funds originally available to pay the arena’s predevelopment costs and establish a debt service reserve totaled $66.6 million. The make up of these funds consisted of (1) $57.4 million in net bond proceeds (after financing costs) from the sale of RLA Revenue Bonds in January 1996 and (2) $9.3million in 1995 tax collections from the dedicated Sports Arena Tax. Of the $66.6 million available, $11 million is held in reserve in two parts. In addition, a $6 million reserve was established for debt service. DCALP stated that the arena should open in late 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the District of Columbia's sports arena project, focusing on the: (1) project's predevelopment costs, revenue collections, and financing; (2) interest rates received on the arena bonds; and (3) construction status.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of October 18, 1996, while the estimated predevelopment costs for most cost categories for the arena had somewhat changed, overall estimated predevelopment costs increased by a net amount of $617,000 or approximately 1 percent, from about $55.2 million to about $55.8 million, since GAO's last report; (2) the District had $66.6 million available to fund its predevelopment activities and establish a debt service reserve for the arena project; (3) this amount consisted of $57.4 million in net bond proceeds (after financing costs) and $9.2 million in 1995 revenue tax collections from the dedicated Arena Tax; (4) of the $66.6 million, $11 million is held in reserve ($5 million for cost overruns and $6 million for debt service); (5) based on estimates as of October 18, 1996, the District had sufficient funds to pay predevelopment costs; (6) the bond trustee has made the 1996 debt service payment of about $5.9 million on arena bonds, and the District's projections of Arena Tax revenues of $9 million annually appear sufficient to redeem the bonds by the year 2002 as scheduled; (7) arena predevelopment activities are nearing completion; (8) all land has been acquired; however, the final cost of the parcel of land acquired through condemnation proceedings will be determined by the outcome of legal proceedings; (9) the buildings formerly on the arena site have been demolished and the relocation of utilities and the securing of regulatory approvals are nearly complete; (10) District employees have been relocated and office improvements are underway; (11) construction of the Metrorail connection is about 25 percent complete; and (12) arena construction began on February 18, 1996, and the arena should open in late 1997. |
gao_GAO-04-1029 | gao_GAO-04-1029_0 | Individuals receiving the HCTC in advance may claim the credit at the end of the year for any months in which they were eligible for the HCTC but did not receive it in advance. State high-risk pools. Once an individual successfully enrolls for the advance HCTC, the HCTC program office sends an invoice for the individual’s 35 percent share of the premium, and, when this payment is received, the remaining 65 percent is added and the full premium amount is forwarded to the participating health plan. More Than 19,000 Individuals Received HCTC for 2003, but Participation May Have Been Limited by Several Factors
For 2003, 19,410 individuals received about $37 million in payments for themselves and dependents for the advance and end-of-year HCTC, the majority by filing for the credit on their end-of-year tax return. For July 2004, enrollment for the advance HCTC was about 13,200, about 60 percent of whom were PBGC beneficiaries. Some of the individuals identified by states and PBGC as potentially eligible may have other health coverage that would disqualify them from receiving the HCTC. Majority of Advance HCTC Enrollees Purchased Automatically Qualified Coverage, and 40 Percent Enrolled in State-Qualified Plans
Cumulatively, from the time the advance credit became available in August 2003 through April 2004, the majority (60 percent) of advance HCTC enrollees obtained coverage through one of the automatically qualified coverage options specified in the TAA Reform Act. Cost of HCTC Health Coverage Varied Depending on Coverage Purchased
The cost of qualified coverage for advance HCTC enrollees varied according to the number of individuals covered, whether the advance HCTC enrollee was a TAA recipient or a PBGC beneficiary, and the type of qualified coverage purchased. In the eight states that we reviewed, the cost of coverage for HCTC recipients was partly determined by the premium-setting practices of qualified health plans. A major factor cited by many state and health plan officials as a reason for lower than expected enrollment was the affordability of coverage, as some eligible individuals may find it difficult to pay the entire premium for 3 to 6 months to maintain coverage until they receive the advance HCTC, and even the 35 percent share of premiums, once the HCTC covers remaining premium costs can represent a high proportion of income, particularly for displaced workers or retirees. For example, The multitude of tax, labor, and health coverage requirements related to the HCTC are challenging for workers and retirees to navigate. To more promptly reimburse eligible individuals for some of the health coverage premiums they paid during the 3 to 6 months that the advance HCTC eligibility and enrollment process typically takes, Congress may wish to allow the HCTC program to retroactively pay the 65 percent HCTC for the 1 to 3 months between enrollment for and receipt of the advance HCTC, rather than requiring individuals to wait for the end-of-year credit to receive that portion of the benefit. Appendix I: Advance Health Coverage Tax Credit Enrollees, by State, July 2004
Data for Puerto Rico are also included in this table. According to federal officials, only a small percentage of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) recipients and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) beneficiaries eligible to receive the HCTC likely had access to mini-COBRA coverage, as few of these individuals formerly worked for an employer with fewer than 20 employees. Total monthly premiums—representing both the individual and federal shares—were affected by the number of people covered on each enrollee’s health plan and whether the advance HCTC enrollee was a TAA recipient or a PBGC beneficiary (see table 15). | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress enacted the health coverage tax credit (HCTC) in 2002 for certain displaced workers receiving income support through the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program and for certain retirees receiving pensions from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The HCTC equals 65 percent of the cost of qualified health coverage, which individuals can receive in advance--the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pays the credit to the qualifying health plan and the individual pays the remaining 35 percent--or by filing for the credit in their federal tax return. GAO was asked to review the implementation of the HCTC and examined, among other issues, how many individuals received it and factors influencing participation, and the type and cost of coverage they purchased. GAO obtained data from federal and state agencies and private health plans.
What GAO Found
For 2003, 19,410 individuals received about $37 million in benefits from IRS for the HCTC for themselves and dependents, with 12,594 (65 percent) claiming the credit on their tax returns rather than receiving it in advance. As of July 2004, about 13,200 individuals were enrolled for the advance HCTC, the majority of whom were PBGC beneficiaries. The number receiving the HCTC remains a small portion of the workers and retirees initially identified as potentially eligible. For example, some potentially eligible individuals may have other health coverage that would disqualify them from receiving the HCTC. Several additional factors may have limited participation to date. First, the advance credit only became available beginning in August 2003. Second, the enrollment process is fragmented and complex and requires individuals to meet tax, labor, and health coverage criteria before they can become eligible. Third, eligible individuals must pay the entire premium for about 3 to 6 months while completing eligibility and enrollment requirements and until IRS's first payment is made on behalf of these individuals. Fourth, the health coverage may not be affordable both in terms of an individual's ability to pay the entire premium amount while waiting to receive the advance HCTC and the ability to pay the 35 percent share once payment starts. Individuals can purchase one of several types of qualifying coverage for the HCTC: the coverage they had through their previous employer or insurance coverage options designated by states (primarily high-risk pools or arrangements with insurers). More than half of recipients chose coverage from their previous employer for the advance HCTC and another 40 percent of advance HCTC recipients enrolled in state-designated coverage options, which were available in 35 states and the District of Columbia as of July 2004. The average monthly premiums (representing both the individual and federal shares) for individuals receiving the advance HCTC were $480 for TAA recipients and $661 for PBGC beneficiaries as of April 2004. The tax credit resulted in an average monthly individual share of $168 for TAA recipients and $231 for PBGC beneficiaries. The premiums paid by advance credit recipients varied widely depending on the coverage purchased, including the type of health plan and the number of individuals covered. The cost of HCTC coverage also was affected by the premium-setting practices of qualified health plans. |
gao_GAO-04-312 | gao_GAO-04-312_0 | The number of such entities newly identified each year grew from 31 in 2000 to 60 in 2002. Of the 144 unique entities, the states identified 77 entities that DOL did not, DOL identified 40 that the states did not, and both the states and DOL identified another 27. 1.) Seven states had 25 or more entities that operated during this period; 5 of these states were located in the South. 2.) Unauthorized Entities Covered Thousands of Employers and Policyholders, Leaving Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Unpaid Claims
At least 15,000 employers, including many small employers, purchased coverage from unauthorized entities, affecting more than 200,000 policyholders from 2000 through 2002. At the time of our 2003 survey, DOL and states reported that the 144 entities had not paid at least $252 million in medical claims, and only about 21 percent of these claims, about $52 million, had been recovered on behalf of those covered by these entities. States most often identified unauthorized entities operating within their borders through consumer complaints. DOL often relied on states to stop unauthorized entities through cease and desist orders while it conducted investigations, usually in multiple states, to obtain the evidence needed to stop these entities’ activities nationwide through the courts. States and DOL Alerted the Public and Used Other Methods to Help Prevent Unauthorized Entities from Continuing to Operate
To help prevent unauthorized entities from continuing to operate, officials in the insurance departments we interviewed in four states—Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Texas—took various actions to alert the public and to inform insurance agents about these entities. These states have also taken other actions to increase public awareness. 3.) A national association representing agents and brokers and many state insurance departments distributed this alert. DOL Alerted Employer Groups and Provided Guidance and Assistance to States and Others
DOL primarily focused its efforts to prevent unauthorized entities from continuing to operate on employer groups, small employers, and the states. DOL, NAIC, Florida, and Texas provided written comments on the draft. Methodology for Identifying Unauthorized Entities
To identify the number of unique unauthorized entities nationwide from 2000 through 2002 and to obtain information, such as the number of employers covered and unpaid claims, pertaining to each of these entities, we obtained and analyzed data from state and federal sources. We obtained state-level data through a survey we sent to officials located in insurance departments or equivalent offices in all 50 states and the District of Columbia and federal-level data from the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Health insurance premiums have increased at double-digit rates over the past few years. While searching for affordable options, some employers and individuals have purchased coverage from certain entities that are not authorized by state insurance departments to sell this coverage. Such unauthorized entities--also sometimes referred to as bogus entities or scams--may collect premiums and not pay some or all of the legitimate medical claims filed by policyholders. GAO was asked to identify the number of these entities that operated from 2000 through 2002, the number of employers and policyholders covered, the amount of unpaid claims, and the methods state and federal governments employed to identify such entities and to stop and prevent them from operating. GAO analyzed information on these entities obtained from the Department of Labor (DOL) and from a survey of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. GAO also interviewed officials at DOL headquarters, at three regional offices, and at state insurance departments responsible for investigating these entities in four states--Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Texas.
What GAO Found
DOL and the states identified 144 unique entities not authorized to sell health benefits coverage from 2000 through 2002. The number of entities newly identified increased each year, almost doubling from 31 in 2000 to 60 in 2002. Many of these entities targeted employers and policyholders in multiple states, and, of the seven states with 25 or more entities, five were located in the South. DOL and the states reported that the 144 unique entities (1) sold coverage to at least 15,000 employers, including many small employers; (2) covered more than 200,000 policyholders; and (3) left at least $252 million in unpaid medical claims, only about 21 percent of which had been recovered at the time of GAO's 2003 survey. States and DOL often identified these entities based on consumer complaints. DOL often relied on states to stop these entities within their borders while DOL focused its investigations on larger entities operating in multiple states and, in three cases, obtained court orders to stop these entities nationwide. Most of the states' prevention activities were geared to increasing public awareness and notifying the agents who sold this coverage, while DOL focused its efforts on alerting employer groups and small employers. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOL, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Florida, and Texas highlighted their efforts to increase public awareness, coordinate investigations, and take enforcement actions regarding these entities. |
gao_GAO-07-806T | gao_GAO-07-806T_0 | In May 2002, New York City formally requested federal assistance to clean and test building interiors in the vicinity of the WTC site for airborne asbestos. EPA Incorporated Some Recommendations, but Its Decision Not to Adopt Others May Limit the Second Program’s Effectiveness
In response to recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel members, EPA’s second program incorporates some additional testing elements. For example, EPA is testing for a wider range of contaminants. EPA will also test dust as well as the air. However, EPA’s second program does not incorporate the following other recommendations: (1) broadening the geographic scope of the testing effort, (2) testing HVACs and “inaccessible” locations, and (3) expanding the program to include workplaces. EPA reported that it did not expand the scope of testing because it was not able to differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, which would have enabled it to determine the geographic extent of WTC contamination. Some expert panel members had suggested that EPA investigate whether it was feasible to develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust and WTC dust. Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the disaster—EPA conducted this investigation. In its November 2005 draft plan for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a number of locations in HVACs. EPA explains in the second plan that it will not sample within HVACs because it chose to offer more limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing in a smaller number of these areas. Expanding the program to include workers/workplaces. According to EPA’s second program plan, the plan is “the result of ongoing efforts to respond to concerns of residents and workers.” Workers were concerned that workplaces in Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination as residences. EPA Did Not Provide the Public With Sufficient Information to Make Fully Informed Decisions
EPA did not provide sufficient information in its second plan so that the public could make informed choices about their participation. Specifically, EPA did not fully disclose the limitations in the testing results from its first program. While EPA stated that the number of samples in its first program exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was “very small,” it did not fully explain that this conclusion was limited by the following factors. EPA took over 80 percent of the samples after professional cleaning was complete. Without providing complete explanations of the data, residents who could have elected to participate might have been discouraged from doing so. Instead, EPA is implementing this program with the funding remaining after its first program— approximately $7 million. Concluding Observations
Shortcomings in EPA’s second program to test and clean residences for WTC contamination raise questions about the agency’s preparedness for addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. The effectiveness of this program may be limited because some important recommendations were not incorporated, and because program implementation will not begin until later this year—more than 5 years after the World Trade Center collapsed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site. As the towers collapsed, Lower Manhattan was blanketed with building debris and combustible materials. This complex mixture created a major concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. In May 2002, New York City formally requested federal assistance to address indoor contamination. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. Several years later, after obtaining the views of advisory groups, including its Inspector General and an expert panel, EPA announced a second test and clean program in December 2006. Program implementation is to begin later in 2007, more than 5 years after the disaster. GAO's testimony, based on preliminary work evaluating EPA's development of its second program, addresses (1) EPA's actions to implement recommendations from the expert panel and its Inspector General, (2) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second plan, and (3) EPA's assessment of available resources to conduct the program. We discussed the issues we address in this statement with EPA.
What GAO Found
EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations from the Inspector General and expert panel members into its second program, but its decision not to incorporate other recommendations may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, EPA's second program incorporates recommendations to expand the list of contaminants it tests for, and to test for contaminants in dust as well as the air. However, it does not incorporate a recommendation to expand the boundaries of cleanup to better ensure that WTC contamination is addressed in all locations. EPA reported that it does not have a basis for expanding the boundaries because it cannot distinguish between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA did not begin examining methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust until nearly 3 years after the disaster, and therefore the process for finding distinctions was more difficult. In addition, EPA's second program does not incorporate recommendations to sample heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. According to EPA's plan, the agency chose to offer limited testing in a greater number of apartments and common areas rather than provide more comprehensive testing (such as in HVACs) in a smaller number of these areas. EPA's second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not explain that this conclusion was to be expected because it took over 80 percent of the samples after residences were professionally cleaned. Without this additional information, residents who could have participated might have opted not to do so because of EPA's conclusion. EPA did not assess the adequacy of available resources for the second program. EPA stated that it plans to spend $7 million on this program, which is not based on any assessment of costs, but is the funding remaining from the first program. Without careful planning for future disasters, timely decisions about data collection, and thorough communication of sampling results, an evaluation of the adequacy of cleanup efforts may be impossible. |
gao_GAO-09-675 | gao_GAO-09-675_0 | To carry out its mission, HUD is organized into five main program areas: Housing, Community Planning and Development, Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, Public and Indian Housing, and the Government National Mortgage Association. Among other things, these controls include strategic planning and performance measurement, portfolio-based investment management, human capital management, enterprise architecture (and supporting segment architecture) development and use, and establishing responsibility and accountability for modernization management. EA development and use is aimed at establishing a corporate blueprint for investing that connects strategic plans with individual programs and system solutions. Key IT Management and Modernization Controls Have Not Been Fully Established
The department has, to varying degrees, established certain key IT management and modernization controls needed to help ensure that its existing IT environment adequately supports mission operations and that its efforts to modernize this environment are successful. However, these controls have not been fully implemented either in accordance with a statutory requirement, federal guidance, or related best practices. Until it does, the performance of HUD’s existing IT environment, as well as its efforts to modernize this environment, will be at risk. Moreover, while HUD assessed and reported on its IT performance in fiscal year 2007, this assessment showed that it was either behind schedule or not making progress in 46 percent of the activities it defined as needed to achieve its IT strategic goals. Without having defined and implemented practices for evaluating the performance of its IT investment portfolios, HUD will be limited in its ability to control the risks and achieve the benefits associated with the mix of legacy system and modernization investments that it selects. The office performed an analysis of the gaps between its IT workforce requirements and skills (inventory) in fiscal year 2008 using an outdated inventory of human capital skills, thus rendering the identified gaps unreliable. The office developed a strategy for closing the gaps, including steps, activities, and related milestones. HUD Has Yet to Develop Sufficient Architectural Context to Guide and Manage Modernization Projects
A key aspect of HUD’s approach to modernizing its IT environment is to extend its EA to include what are referred to as segment architectures, which are to provide the modernization details needed to develop and implement system solutions for portions, or segments, of a department or agency. Moreover, the majority of the segment architectures developed thus far are out of date and do not fully address key aspects of federal guidance, such as provisions for performance goals and measurement. Nevertheless, we also reported that HUD had not addressed two important elements. To date, the department has not established its EPMO and thus has not assigned responsibility and authority for management of its modernization efforts. To HUD’s credit, it is aware of the need to improve many of these IT management controls, but its IT resources have in recent years been almost exclusively directed to sustaining its existing IT environment, and it has yet to develop specific plans for strengthening each of these management controls. 3. 4. GAO Comments
1. 2. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information technology (IT) plays a critical role in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) ability to carry out its home ownership and community development mission, which was recently expanded under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Pursuant to a congressional mandate to study HUD's IT environment, GAO reviewed the adequacy of key IT management and modernization controls within the department, including strategic planning and performance measurement, investment management, human capital management, enterprise architecture development and use, and modernization program office establishment. To do so, GAO compared HUD policies, guidance, plans, reports, and other products and actions to relevant aspects of statutory requirements, federal guidance, and related best practices.
What GAO Found
The department has to varying degrees established key IT management and modernization controls needed to help ensure that its existing IT environment adequately supports mission operations and that its efforts to modernize this environment are successful. However, these controls have not been fully implemented either in accordance with a statutory requirement, federal guidance, or related best practices. Specifically, HUD has (1) developed an IT strategic plan, with strategic goals and related activities and performance targets, but it has not assessed its IT performance since fiscal year 2007, and its assessment at that time showed performance shortfalls. For example, it reported that it was behind schedule or not making progress on about one-half of the activities needed to achieve its IT strategic goals. (2) established policies and procedures for creating portfolios of IT investments, but it lacks related practices to effectively control them. For example, criteria to evaluate the performance of its portfolio do not exist. (3) analyzed gaps in its IT workforce and developed a strategy for addressing them, but the analysis was based on an incomplete and outdated inventory of human capital skill levels, thus rendering its strategy unreliable. (4) established an enterprise architecture program--to connect strategic plans with individual programs and system solutions--that meets key aspects of related best practices, but its efforts to extend its architecture by adding the level of detail needed to implement modernization projects, referred to as segment architectures, are not sufficient. For example, while HUD has identified and prioritized segments to be modernized, it has not adhered to these priorities, and the segments developed do not reflect important elements of federal guidance, and most are out of date. (5) identified the need for a modernization program office with the responsibility for managing its modernization efforts but has not established this office. Department officials acknowledged these shortcomings and stated that efforts to address them have been constrained by such factors as turnover in IT leadership and, until recently, limited modernization resources and initiatives. Until it strengthens these IT management controls, the performance of its existing IT environment and the success of its recent and future efforts to modernize this environment will be at risk. |
gao_RCED-97-57 | gao_RCED-97-57_0 | Both producers and consumers of agricultural products and commodities, such as beef, seafood, grain, vegetables, food additives, and animal drugs, benefit from these services. Categories of Services
The food-related services provided by the federal government can be grouped into four general categories. The agency also inspects imported and exported meat, poultry, and egg products to ensure that they meet U.S. standards. One-Quarter of Food-Related Services Are Funded Through User Fees
Of the about $1.6 billion available to the six agencies in fiscal year 1995 for food-related services, about $411 million was provided by user fees. Certain types of activities, for example grading, were generally funded through user fees, whereas the costs of other activities, such as compliance inspections, generally were funded through general fund appropriations. Opportunities Exist to Increase the Share of Funding by Program Beneficiaries
Potentially about $723 million in additional user fees could have been charged to program beneficiaries in fiscal year 1995, according to our review of selected food-related services. Applying OMB’s criteria in Circular A-25, we determined that these user fees could have been assessed in three areas. Full Costs of Providing Services Are Not Always Recovered
For certain food-related services, the federal government charges user fees that are less than the full costs of providing the service. For example, some user fees are based on calculations that exclude the cost of activities essential to the service, such as the cost associated with developing program standards. Border Inspections
In addition to inconsistencies in user fees for premarket reviews, user fees are not charged consistently for agricultural inspection activities at the nation’s borders and ports of entry. NMFS develops and maintains processing, inspection, and grading standards. Food-Related Services That Are Provided Without Charge to Identifiable Beneficiaries
The federal government provides a number of food-related services for which no user fees are charged. In addition to meat and poultry inspection and marketing agreements and orders discussed in the body of this report, other federal services provided without charge that benefit specific individuals or industries include (1) the Food Safety Inspection Service’s (FSIS) egg product inspections, laboratory services, pathogen reduction activities, and import inspections; (2) the Agricultural Marketing Service’s (AMS) seed regulatory activities; (3) the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration’s (GIPSA) regulatory oversight of packers and stockyards; and (4) Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) domestic and import compliance inspections. The amount of the fee would vary based on the size of the firm. Comments From the Department of Commerce
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify and evaluate opportunities for increasing the share of program funding paid for by beneficiaries of food-related services, we identified (1) the types of food-related services provided by federal agencies, (2) the extent to which beneficiaries currently pay for such services through user fees, and (3) potential opportunities for recovering more of the service costs through user fees, as well as arguments for and against doing so. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed opportunities to increase the share of funding by beneficiaries for food-related services provided by the federal government, focusing on: (1) the types of food-related services provided by the federal government; (2) the extent to which beneficiaries currently pay for such services through user fees; and (3) potential opportunities for recovering more of the service costs through user fees, as well as arguments for and against doing so.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal agencies provide individuals, firms, and industries such food-related services as: (a) premarket reviews, including approving new animal drugs and food additives for use and grading grain and other commodities for quality; (b) compliance inspections of meat and poultry and domestic foods and processing facilities to ensure adherence to safety regulations; (c) import inspections and export certifications to ensure that food products in international trade meet specified standards; and (d) standard setting and other support services essential to these functions; (2) about one-quarter of the $1.6 million spent by the federal government in fiscal year (FY) 1995 on food-related services was funded through user fees; (3) the premarket service of quality grading of grains and agricultural commodities was the primary food-related service funded through user fees; (4) nearly three-quarters of the cost of food-related services was funded by general fund appropriations rather than user fees; (5) compliance activities, such as the inspection of meat and poultry, were the primary food-related activities funded through general fund appropriations; (6) on the basis of its review of selected food-related services, GAO determined that potentially about $723 million in additional user fees could have been charged for services provided in FY 1995; (7) according to the Office of Management and Budget's criteria, additional user fees could have been assessed in three principal areas; (8) additional user fees could have been charged for some federal services by including the full costs of providing the service, such as the cost of setting standards, in the fee calculations; (9) user fees currently charged for certain food-related services, such as agricultural inspections at the nation's borders and ports of entry, could have been consistently applied to similar types of services that are provided without charge; (10) user fees could have been assessed on certain services, such as the inspection of meat and poultry, that are provided to identifiable beneficiaries without charge; and (11) although the arguments for and against user fees vary with the agency and service in question, the arguments center on who benefits from the service, the general public or specific beneficiaries, and the impact the user fee would have on producers or consumers. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-105 | gao_T-HEHS-98-105_0 | The revisions would generally increase Medicare payments to physician specialties that provide more office-based services while decreasing payments to physician specialties that provide primarily hospital-based services. HCFA’s Method to Estimate Direct Expenses Was Reasonable
HCFA faced significant challenges in revising the practice expense component of the fee schedule—perhaps more challenging than the task of estimating the physician work associated with each procedure. However, they also believed that the CPEP estimates needed to be adjusted to convert them to a common scale, eliminate certain inappropriate expenses, and align the panels’ estimates with data on aggregate practice expenses. While we agree with the intent of these adjustments, we identified methodological weaknesses with some and a lack of supporting data with others. HCFA excluded these physician practice expenses from the panels’ estimates because, under current Medicare policy, those expenses are covered by payments to hospitals rather than to physicians. HCFA officials said that they will review that information to determine whether a change in their position is warranted. If additional data indicate that this practice occurs frequently, it would be appropriate for HCFA to determine whether Medicare reimbursements to hospitals and physicians warrant adjustment. Finally, HCFA adjusted the CPEP data so that it was consistent in the aggregate with national practice expense data developed from the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Socioeconomic Monitoring System (SMS) survey—a process that it called “scaling.” HCFA found that the aggregate CPEP estimates for labor, supplies, and equipment each accounted for a different portion of total direct expenses than the SMS data did. Impact on Access to Care Needs Continued Monitoring
It is not clear whether beneficiary access to care will be adversely affected by Medicare’s new fee schedule payments for physician practice expenses. This will depend upon such factors as the magnitude of the Medicare payment reductions experienced by different medical specialties, other health insurers’ use of the fee schedule, and fees paid by other purchasers of physician services. Therefore, there is a continuing need to monitor indicators of beneficiary access to care, focusing on services and procedures with the greatest reductions in Medicare payments. Furthermore, HCFA has done little in the way of conducting sensitivity analyses to determine which of its adjustments and assumptions have the greatest effects on the proposed fee schedule revisions. There is no need, however, for HCFA to abandon the work of the expert panels and start over using a different methodology; doing so would needlessly increase costs and further delay implementation of the fee schedule revisions. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the efforts of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to revise the practice expense component of Medicare's physician fee schedule.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HCFA's general approach for collecting information on physicians' practice expenses was reasonable; (2) HCFA convened 15 panels of experts to identify the resources associated with several thousand services and procedures; (3) HCFA made various adjustments to the expert panels' data that were intended to: (a) convert the panels' estimates to a common scale; (b) eliminate expenses reimbursed to hospitals rather than to physicians; (c) reduce potentially excessive estimates; and (d) ensure consistency with aggregate survey data on practice expenses for equipment, supplies, and nonphysician labor; (4) while GAO agrees with the intent of these adjustments, GAO believes that some have methodological weaknesses, and other adjustments and assumptions lack supporting data; (5) HCFA has done little in the way of performing sensitivity analyses that would enable it to determine the impact of the various adjustments, methodologies, and assumptions, either individually or collectively; (6) such sensitivity analyses could help determine whether the effects of the adjustments and assumptions warrant additional, focused data gathering to determine their validity; (7) GAO believes this additional work should not, however, delay phase-in of the fee schedule revisions; (8) since implementation of the physician fee schedule in 1992, Medicare beneficiaries have generally experienced very good access to physician services; (9) the eventual impact of the new practice expense revisions on Medicare payments to physicians is unknown at this time, but they should be considered in the context of other changes in payments to physicians by Medicare and by other payers; (10) recent successes in health care cost control are partially the result of purchasers and health plans aggressively seeking discounts from providers; (11) how Medicare payments to physicians relate to those of other payers will determine whether the changes in Medicare payments to physicians reduce Medicare beneficiaries' access to physician services; and (12) this issue warrants continued monitoring, and possible Medicare fee schedule adjustments, as the revisions are phased in. |
gao_GAO-02-904 | gao_GAO-02-904_0 | NNSA and its Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program (R&D program) are key players in the United States’ nonproliferation efforts. 1.) 2.) One of these systems was also used at the World Trade Center site after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to monitor for hazardous chemicals that might affect construction workers. Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed by NNSA, but Some Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed
Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology developed by NNSA’s R&D program, in general, found the technology useful and said that they had an effective relationship with the program. However, some questioned whether the program is achieving the right mix of long- and short-term research. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program’s management of its R&D efforts, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the following actions: Ensure that all of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program’s projects’ life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain complete data on project objectives, progress in meeting milestones, user feedback, funding, and deliverables and upgrade the program’s project management information system to track all of this information to enhance program management by providing timely data to program managers and assist communications with users and other agencies conducting R&D. To determine the amount of funding received by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) research and development (R&D) program from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002 and the program’s distribution of that funding to the national laboratories in the field, we examined each of the research area’s financial plans, quarterly project reports, and project life-cycle plans. | What GAO Found
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. In fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program received an average of $218 million per year--a total of $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of that total was distributed for R&D at three NNSA national laboratories. Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs, and the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms of users, NNSA's role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them to, users in the federal government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others. The program requires that projects' life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and deliverables. Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use the technology developed by NNSA's R&D program have found the technology useful, but some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-term and short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. |
gao_GAO-02-589 | gao_GAO-02-589_0 | The Corps acquired and owns the Corps of Engineers Enterprise Information System (CEEIS) wide area network, which supports multiple unclassified Corps systems, including its key financial management system, CEFMS. An effective general controls environment would (1) ensure that an adequate computer security management program is in place; (2) protect data, files, and programs from unauthorized access, modification, and destruction; (3) limit and monitor access to programs and files that protect applications and control computer hardware; (4) prevent unauthorized changes to systems and applications software; (5) prevent any one individual from controlling key aspects of computer-related operations; (6) ensure the recovery of computer processing operations in case of a disaster or other unexpected interruption; and (7) ensure that only authorized individuals can gain network access to sensitive and critical agency data. Of the 75 recommendations that we made on general controls in our fiscal year 1999 audit, the Corps had completed action on 41 and had partially completed or was implementing action plans to correct the remaining 34. Although the Corps made substantial progress in correcting vulnerabilities, continuing and newly identified vulnerabilities in general computer controls continue to impair the Corps’ ability to ensure the reliability, confidentiality, and availability of financial and sensitive data. Such access places Corps network assets at risk. The Corps did not formally document test plans and test results for CEFMS software changes, increasing the risk that developers might unknowingly introduce processing anomalies or make unauthorized changes. The Corps has determined the manual to be obsolete and is performing a functional review. During the fiscal year 2001 audit, several instances were identified of CEFMS users sharing their CEFMS electronic signature smartcards with other Corps employees. Conclusions
Information system general and application controls are critical to the Corps’ ability to manage its computer security and to ensure the reliability, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive data. At the application control level, the Corps had not maintained current and accurate CEFMS access authorizations and maintained CEFMS current user manuals. | What GAO Found
GAO tested selected general and application controls of the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS). The Corps relies on CEFMS to perform key financial management functions supporting the Corps' military and civil works missions. The Corps has made substantial progress in improving computer controls at each of its data processing centers and other Corps sites. The Corps had completed action on 54 of GAO's 93 previous recommendations and partially completed or had action plans to correct the remainder. During the current review, nine new weaknesses were identified and corrected. Nevertheless, continuing and newly identified vulnerabilities involving general and application computer controls continue to impair the Corps' ability to ensure the reliability, confidentiality, and availability of financial and sensitive data. Such vulnerabilities increase risks to other Department of Defense networks and systems to which the Corps' network is linked. Weaknesses in general controls impaired the Corps' ability to ensure that (1) computer risks are adequately assessed, and security policies and procedures within the organization are effective and consistent with overall organizational policies and procedures; (2) users have only the access needed to perform their duties; (3) system software changes are properly documented before being placed in operation; (4) test plans and results for application changes are formally documented; (5) duties and responsibilities are adequately segregated; (6) critical applications are properly restored in the case of a disaster or interruption; and (7) the Corps has adequately protected its network from unauthorized traffic. Application control weaknesses impaired the Corps' ability to ensure that (1) current and accurate CEFMS access authorizations were maintained, (2) user manuals reflect the current CEFMS environment, and (3) the Corps is effectively using electronic signature capabilities. |
gao_GAO-02-669T | gao_GAO-02-669T_0 | In fiscal year 2001, school meal programs provided lunch, breakfast, and snacks to over 27 million school children daily. For those outbreaks with a known cause, the most commonly identified cause of the illnesses were foods contaminated with salmonella or Norwalk-like viruses. To evaluate the trend in the number of school outbreaks, and in their number relative to non-school outbreaks, we compared the observed numbers to the estimated numbers of school and non-school outbreaks.This analysis shows that there is an upward trend in foodborne illness outbreaks reported in schools between 1990 and 1999 and that not all of this increasing trend is attributable to changes that took place when CDC began a more active data collection effort. The other 7 outbreaks were not linked to foods served in the school meal programs, but with foods brought to schools from home or other sources. Therefore, data limitations make it difficult to assert with complete certainty to what extent the foods served in the school meal programs are the cause of the reported outbreaks from 1990 to 1999. However, as we stated most recently in our October 2001 testimony, the existing food safety system is a patchwork structure that hampers efforts to adequately address existing and emerging food safety risks whether those risks involve inadvertent or deliberate contamination. | Why GAO Did This Study
The national school lunch and breakfast programs provide inexpensive or free meals to more than 27 million children each day. During the 1990s, nearly 300 outbreaks of foodborne illness at the nation's schools sickened 16,000 students. The rise in the number of school outbreaks mirrors a rise in the number of outbreaks in the overall population, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Because the CDC data include outbreaks attributable to food brought from home or other sources, GAO could not determine the extent to which food served in the school meal programs caused reported outbreaks. Data from 1998 and 1999 do show, however, that most of the outbreaks during those years were caused by foods served through the school meal program. Foods contaminated with salmonella and Norwalk-like viruses were the most common causes of outbreaks.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Agriculture has not developed security measures to protect foods served at schools from deliberate contamination. The existing food safety system is a patchwork of protections that fall short in addressing existing and emerging food safety threats. |
gao_GAO-13-280SP | gao_GAO-13-280SP_0 | Case Study of U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement in Angola
U.S. and Chinese Trade with Angola
China’s Total Trade in Goods in Angola Surpassed U.S. Trade in 2008, and Oil Imports Dominated Both
U.S. and Chinese trade in goods with Angola has risen dramatically, dominated by oil imports, with China’s trade surpassing the United States’. 1), according to the Angolan Ministry of Finance and a U.S. official.Chinese government loans to Angola are generally guaranteed by Angola’s oil in case of default and are repaid through proceeds from the sale of oil, according to officials from the U.S. government and a donor agency in Angola. According to experts, data on China’s foreign direct investments are likely under-reported, and according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), data on U.S. foreign direct investments may also be underreported, limiting precise comparisons of the United States’ and China’s investments. telecommunications, computers and information technology, and transportation sectors. European and African firms operate the majority of the remaining oil blocks. China and other Asian countries to manufacture apparel for export to the United States, according to U.S. officials in these countries. Comparable country-level data on China’s trade in services in Kenya are not available. government and business interests to take advantage of large telecommunications projects in countries such as Kenya. United States’ and China’s Grants and Loans to Kenya
U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
This supplemental report is a companion to Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement (GAO-13-199). This supplement presents the results of our case studies of U.S. and Chinese economic engagement in three sub-Saharan African countries--Angola, Ghana, and Kenya. We conducted these case studies to compare the United States' and China's trade, grants and loans, and investment activities in sub-Saharan Africa. For contextual information about the three countries and additional information on U.S. and Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa broadly, see GAO-13-199 .
What GAO Found
We selected the three countries on the basis of our assessment of the levels, types, and intersection of the United States' and China's engagement in trade, grants and loans, and investment activity in each country; the three countries' geographic diversity; and input from U.S. government officials and relevant experts. The case studies are meant to be illustrative and are not generalizable. We conducted work in Washington, D.C., and in Angola, Ghana, and Kenya, including meetings with officials from U.S. agencies, host-government ministries, U.S. businesses, other donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). We were unable to meet with Chinese government officials, despite our requests, in Africa or Washington, D.C. We have noted data limitations as appropriate, such as lack of available data on China's grants and loans and likely underreporting of its investment data. Overall, we determined that the data presented in these case studies are generally reliable for the purposes for which the data are used. |
gao_GAO-12-739 | gao_GAO-12-739_0 | FPS Does Not Currently Assess Risks at Federal Facilities, but Multiple Agencies Are Conducting Their Own Assessments
FPS Is Not Completing Risk Assessments
In the absence of RAMP, FPS currently is not assessing risk at the over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and control of GSA in a manner consistent with federal standards such as NIPP’s risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. As a result, FPS has accumulated a backlog of federal facilities that have not been assessed for several years. According to FPS data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. However, we were unable to determine the extent of the FSA backlog because we found FPS’s FSA data to be unreliable. In addition, since September 2011, FPS’s inspectors have been collecting information about federal facilities, such as location, purpose, agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, and closed-circuit television systems). These assessments are taking place even though according to FPS’s Chief Financial Officer, FPS received $236 million in basic security fees from federal agencies to conduct FSAs and other security services in fiscal year 2011. FPS Lacks Reliable FSA Data
In addition to not having a tool that allows it to conduct risk assessments, FPS does not have reliable FSA data, which has hampered the agency’s ability to manage its FSA program. FPS Efforts to Develop a Risk Assessment Tool Are Evolving, but Challenges Remain
FPS Has Developed an Interim Vulnerability Assessment Tool
In September 2011, FPS signed an inter-agency agreement with Argonne National Laboratory for about $875,000 to develop MIST by June 30, According to FPS’s MIST documentation, MIST is an interim 2012.vulnerability assessment tool that FPS plans to use until it can develop a permanent solution to replace RAMP. Three of the four risk assessment experts we spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess the risks to a federal facility. In addition to conducting FSAs, FPS developed RAMP as a comprehensive system to help oversee two aspects of its contract guard program: (1) verifying that guards are trained and certified to be on post in federal facilities and (2) conducting guard post inspections. No Independent Verification of Contract Guard Information
FPS does not independently verify the guard training and certification information provided by guard contractors. To verify the guard companies’ reports, FPS conducts monthly audits. Most notably, FPS has developed an interim vulnerability assessment tool that once implemented, may allow it to resume assessing federal facilities, which it has not done consistently for several years. Finally, FPS recently decided to not use RAMP to oversee its contract guards, but still does not have a comprehensive and reliable system to ensure that its approximately 12,500 contract guards have met training and certification requirements, and that FPS’s guard post inspections are occurring in accordance with the agency’s guidelines. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to take the following five actions: incorporate NIPP’s risk management framework—specifically in calculating risk to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence information—in any permanent risk assessment tool; coordinate with GSA and other federal tenant agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in security assessments of facilities under the custody and control of GSA; address MIST’s limitations (assessing consequence, comparing risk across federal facilities, and measuring performance) to better assess and mitigate risk at federal facilities until a permanent system is developed and implemented; develop and implement a new comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight; and verify independently that FPS’s contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements. We also visited 3 of FPS’s 11 regions and interviewed regional managers, area commanders, and inspectors about how they are completing FSAs in the absence of RAMP. We examined FPS’s requirement and project documents to determine whether in developing MIST, FPS complied with selected GAO and industry project-management best practices, such as: conducting alternative analysis, managing requirements, and conducting user acceptance testing. To assess FPS’s effort to manage its contract guard workforce, we reviewed FPS’s guard oversight policies and procedures and RAMP’s September 30, 2011, post inspection data. | Why GAO Did This Study
FPS provides security and law enforcement services to over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and control of the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO has reported that FPS faces challenges providing security services, particularly completing FSAs and managing its these challenges, FPS spent about $35 million and 4 years developing RAMPessentially a risk assessment and contract guard oversight tool. However, RAMP ultimately could not be used because of system problems.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which FPS is completing risk assessments; (2) the status of FPSs efforts to develop an FSA tool; and (3)FPSs efforts to manage its contract guard workforce. GAO reviewed FPS documents, conducted site visits at 3 of FPSs 11 regions, and interviewed FPS officials and inspectors, guard companies, and 4 risk management experts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plans (NIPP) risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. Instead of conducting risk assessments, since September 2011, FPSs inspectors have collected information, such as the location, purpose, agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, and closed-circuit television systems). This information notwithstanding, FPS has a backlog of federal facilities that have not been assessed for several years. According to FPSs data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. However, GAO was unable to determine the extent of FPSs facility security assessment (FSA) backlog because the data were unreliable. Multiple agencies have expended resources to conduct risk assessments, even though the agencies also already pay FPS for this service. FPS received $236 million in basic security fees from agencies to conduct FSAs and other security services in fiscal year 2011. Beyond not having a reliable tool for conducting assessments, FPS continues to lack reliable data, which has hampered the agencys ability to manage its FSA program.
FPS has an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), which it plans to use to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term solution. According to FPS, once implemented, MIST will allow it to resume assessing federal facilities vulnerabilities and recommend countermeasuressomething FPS has not done consistently for several years. Furthermore, in developing MIST, FPS generally followed GAOs project management best practices, such as conducting user acceptance testing. However, MIST has some limitations. Most notably, MIST does not estimate the consequences of an undesirable event occurring at a facility. Three of the four risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time to validate. MIST also was not designed to compare risks across federal facilities. Thus, FPS has limited assurance that critical risks at federal facilities are being prioritized and mitigated.
FPS continues to face challenges in overseeing its approximately 12,500 contract guards. FPS developed the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) to help it oversee its contract guard workforce by (1) verifying that guards are trained and certified, and (2) conducting guard post inspections. However, FPS faced challenges using RAMP, such as verifying guard training and certification information, for either purpose and has recently determined that it would no longer use RAMP. Without a comprehensive system, it is more difficult for FPS to oversee its contract guard workforce. FPS is verifying guard certification and training information by conducting monthly audits of guard contractor training and certification information. However, FPS does not independently verify the contractors information. Additionally, according to FPS officials, FPS recently decided to deploy a new interim method to record post inspections to replace RAMP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FPS incorporate NIPPs risk management framework in any future risk assessment tool; coordinate with federal agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in FPSs assessments; address limitations with its interim tool to better assess federal facilities; develop and implement a comprehensive and reliable contract guard oversight system; and independently verify that its contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-4 | gao_T-AIMD-99-4_0 | Despite Slow Start, the District Is Acting to Address the Year 2000 Problem
Until June 1998, the District had made very little progress in addressing the Year 2000 problem. For example, to improve program management, the District has hired a new chief technology officer, appointed a full-time Year 2000 program manager, established a Year 2000 program office, and continued to use its chief technology officer council to help coordinate and prioritize efforts. The District also contracted with an information technology firm to assist in completing the remediation effort. To accomplish this in the short time remaining, the District and the contractor plan to concurrently (1) remediate and test system applications, (2) assess and fix the information technology (IT) infrastructure, including the data centers, hardware, operating systems, and telecommunications equipment, (3) assess and correct noninformation technology assets, and (4) develop contingency plans. So far, the District has done the following. Developed an inventory of information technology applications. Initiated pilot remediation and test efforts with the pension and payroll system. Adopted a contingency planning methodology that it is now piloting on the 911 system, the water and sewer system, and the lottery board system. Developed a strategy for remediating non-IT assets that is now being tested on the water and sewer system. The District Is Still Significantly Behind in Addressing the Year 2000 Problem
The District’s recent actions reflect a commitment on the part of the city to address the Year 2000 problem and to make up for the lack of progress. For example, it has not identified all of its essential business functions that must continue to operate, finished assessing its IT infrastructure and its non-IT assets, provided guidance to its agencies on testing, and identified resources that will be needed to complete remediation and testing. Until the District completes the assessment phase, it will not have reliable estimates of how long it will take to renovate and test mission-critical systems and processes and to develop business continuity and contingency plans. Essential Steps Needed to Mitigate Increased Risks
District officials acknowledge that the city is not able to provide assurance that all critical systems will be remediated on time. Therefore, to minimize disruptions to vital city services, it will be essential for the District to effectively manage risks over the next 15 months. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 risks facing the District of Columbia, focusing on: (1) its progress to date in fixing its systems; and (2) the District's remediation strategy.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) until June 1998, the District had made very little progress in addressing the year 2000 problem; (2) to compensate for its late start, the District has hired a new chief technology officer, appointed a full-time year 2000 program manager, established a year 2000 program office, and continued to use its chief technology officer council to help coordinate and prioritize efforts; (3) the District also contracted with an information technology firm to assist in completing the remediation effort; (4) to accomplish this in the short time remaining, the District and the contractor plan to concurrently: (a) remediate and test system applications; (b) assess and fix the information technology (IT) infrastructure, including the data centers, hardware, operating systems, and telecommunications equipment; (c) assess and correct noninformation technology assets; and (d) develop contingency plans; (5) the District has done the following: (a) developed an inventory of information technology applications; (b) initiated pilot remediation and test efforts with the pension and payroll system; (c) adopted a contingency planning methodology which it is now piloting on the 911 system, the water and sewer system, and the lottery board system; and (d) developed a strategy for remediating non-IT assets which is now being tested on the water and sewer system; (6) the District's recent actions reflect a commitment on the part of the city to address the year 2000 problem and to make up for the lack of progress; (7) however, the District is still significantly behind in addressing the problem; (8) the District has not: (a) identified all of its essential business functions that must continue to operate; (b) finished assessing its IT infrastructure and its non-information technology assets; (c) provided guidance to its agencies on testing; and (d) identified resources that will be needed to complete remediation and testing; (9) until the District completes the assessment phase, it will not have reliable estimates on how long it will take to renovate and test mission-critical systems and processes and to develop business continuity and contingency plans; (10) District officials acknowledge that the city is not able to provide assurance that all critical systems will be remediated on time; and (11) therefore, to minimize disruptions to vital city services, it will be essential for the District to effectively manage risks over the next 15 months. |
gao_AIMD-96-6 | gao_AIMD-96-6_0 | Approximately 5.8 million active employees participate in the 34 federal government defined benefit plans. The largest federal defined contribution plan is the Thrift Savings Plan, which has 2.1 million participants, or 97 percent of the participants enrolled in federal government defined contribution plans. In addition, some defined benefit plans are supplemented with defined contribution plans and Social Security benefits, and others are not. Because contributions to most agency plans, under applicable requirements, have covered less than the full accruing cost of retirement benefits to covered employees, the agencies’ budgets have not reflected the full cost of government programs. Retirement System Financing
For the most recent plan filings, 21 of the 34 federal government defined benefit plans—3 of the 15 agency plans and 18 of the 19 plans sponsored by the nonappropriated fund activities and federal reserve and farm credit entities—were fully funded under the static Accumulated Benefit Obligation measure. Therefore, because special issue Treasury securities are used, whether the obligation is funded or unfunded has no effect on current budget outlays. Also, the obligation is not a measure of the government’s ability to pay retirement benefits in the future. The Treasury must obtain the necessary money through tax receipts or borrowing to pay plan benefits to annuitants when those benefits are due for plans having trust funds invested in special issue Treasury securities and for pay-as-you-go plans. Assets in the 17 federal government defined contribution plans are primarily invested in various marketable stock, bond, and government security funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of public pension plan funding, focusing on federally sponsored defined benefit and contribution plans subject to reporting requirements legislation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 34 federal government defined benefit plans have over 10 million participants and 17 defined contribution plans have 2.2 million participants; (2) the 34 defined benefit plans vary considerably and have benefits of over $1.2 trillion; (3) most of the defined benefit plans are administered as trust funds which almost exclusively invest in nonmarketable, special issue Treasury securities, while 6 plans pay benefits from their current year appropriations; (4) most agency plans, except for the Federal Employees Retirement System, are underfunded; (5) the 19 nonappropriated fund activity, federal reserve, and farm credit defined benefit plans are fully funded; (6) the use of trust funds has no effect on current budget outlays and is not a measure of the government's ability to pay future retirement benefits out of tax and other receipts; (7) agencies' budgets have not reflected the full cost of their pension plan programs; (8) the 17 defined contribution plans have more than $28 billion invested in stocks, bonds, and government securities, with the Thrift Savings Plan having about $26 billion in Treasury securities; and (9) defined contribution plan obligations are limited to the employee and employer contributions made and any earnings on them. |
gao_GAO-07-729 | gao_GAO-07-729_0 | TSA does not have its own program through which aviation security training and technical assistance are formally provided to foreign aviation security officials. TSA Data Identified That More than One-Third of Foreign Airports Complied with All Relevant ICAO Standards during Fiscal Year 2005, and the Remaining Airports Had Security Deficiencies
Of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show that at the completion of these assessments, 46 (about 36 percent) complied with all ICAO standards reviewed by TSA, while 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard reviewed by TSA. Based on data provided by TSA, TSA inspectors identified 419 violations (security deficiencies) as a result of the 156 air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005 where TSA identified at least one security deficiency. While TSA has controls such as these in place for the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs to ensure consistent implementation and documentation, we identified four additional controls that would strengthen TSA’s oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs: tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections, documenting foreign governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies, tracking air carrier violations, and measuring the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. For example, the findings database did not include information on the action taken by TSA inspectors for all security violations that were identified in the inspections database. TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections
TSA is taking action to address challenges—particularly the lack of available inspectors and various host government concerns—that have limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections according to schedule. During October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments in order to focus its limited inspector resources on higher- risk airports. Harmonization of Security Standards and Assessment and Inspection Processes Would Help TSA Address Host Government Concerns Regarding Resource Burdens
Harmonization of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European Commission) security standards and the processes used to assess foreign airports and air carriers would address concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits conducted by TSA and others. While foreign government officials and air carrier representatives acknowledged that TSA’s efforts have helped to strengthen the security of U.S.-bound flights, there are several opportunities for TSA to strengthen oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. It will be important for TSA to continue working with foreign officials to address their concerns, such as sovereignty issues, in order to continue assessing the security at foreign airports that service the United States. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen oversight of TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, in our April 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, we recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following five actions: develop controls to track the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments from initiation through completion, including the reasons why assessments were deferred or canceled; develop controls to track the status of scheduled air carrier inspections from initiation through completion, including the reasons why inspections were deferred or canceled, as well as the final disposition of any investigations that result from air carrier inspections; develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments; develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport compliance with ICAO standards; and develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance and enforcement actions have on improving air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to evaluate the security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the United States are of great importance, particularly considering that flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. For this review, GAO evaluated the results of foreign airport and air carrier evaluations; actions taken and assistance provided by TSA when security deficiencies were identified; TSA's oversight of its foreign airport and air carrier evaluation programs; and TSA's efforts to address challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier evaluations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport and air carrier evaluation results and interviewed TSA officials, foreign aviation security officials, and air carrier representatives.
What GAO Found
Of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA found that about 36 percent complied with all applicable security standards, while about 64 percent did not comply with at least one standard. The security deficiencies identified by TSA at two foreign airports were such that the Secretary of Homeland Security notified the public that the overall security at these airports was ineffective. Of the 529 overseas air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005, for about 71 percent, TSA did not identify any security violations, and for about 29 percent, TSA identified at least one security violation. TSA took enforcement action--warning letters, correction letters, or monetary fines--for about 18 percent of the air carrier security violations. TSA addressed most of the remaining 82 percent of security violations through on-site consultation. TSA assisted foreign officials and air carrier representatives in addressing identified deficiencies through on-site consultation, recommendations for security improvements, and referrals for training and technical assistance. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. For example, TSA did not have adequate controls in place to track whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted, deferred, or canceled. TSA also did not always document foreign officials' progress in addressing security deficiencies identified by TSA. Further, TSA did not always track what enforcement actions were taken against air carriers with identified security deficiencies. TSA also did not have outcome-based performance measures to assess the impact of its assessment and inspection programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights. Without such controls, TSA may not have reasonable assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are operating as intended. TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and host government concerns regarding sovereignty. In October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, which should allow TSA to focus its limited inspector resources on higher-risk airports. TSA is also exploring opportunities to conduct joint airport assessments with the European Commission and use the results of airport assessments conducted by the European Commission to potentially adjust the frequency of TSA airport visits. |
gao_GAO-11-200 | gao_GAO-11-200_0 | Cases of Individuals with Histories of Sexual Misconduct Hired or Retained by Public and Private Schools
Our 15 cases show that individuals with histories of sexual misconduct were hired or retained by public and private schools as teachers, administrative and support staff, volunteers, and contractors. In at least 11 of these 15 cases, schools allowed offenders with histories of targeting children to obtain or continue employment. Even more disturbing, in at least 6 of the cases, offenders used their new positions as school employees or volunteers to abuse more children after they were hired. We identified the following factors contributing to these employment actions. Voluntary Separations and Positive Recommendations: In four of the cases we investigated, school officials allowed teachers who would have been subject to disciplinary action for sexual misconduct toward students to resign or otherwise separate from the school rather than face punishment. Examples from our case studies include the following. This school district also provided him with positive references. Ultimately, the offender was arrested and convicted for sexually abusing a young female student at the school. Inadequate Criminal History Checks: Even if schools do perform criminal history checks on employees, they may not be adequate because they are not national, fingerprint-based, or recurring. Overview of Federal and State Laws Related to the Employment of Sex Offenders in K-12 Public and Private Schools
We found no federal laws regulating the employment of sex offenders in public or private schools and widely divergent laws at the state level, especially with regard to requirements and methods for conducting criminal history checks on employees. For a summary of laws related to the hire and retention of sex offenders by schools in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, see appendix 1. Termination of employment, revocation of license, or refusal to hire: Some states prohibit public schools from employing an individual convicted of a violent or sexual felony, while others have a broader prohibition that applies to both public and private schools, as well as to contractors and employees. Fingerprint-based national and state criminal history checks are required of all public school employees. Any crimes committed in a school must be reported to law enforcement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prior GAO testimonies have described cases of physical abuse of children at youth residential treatment programs and public and private schools. However, children are also vulnerable to sexual abuse. A 2004 Department of Education report estimated that millions of students are subjected to sexual misconduct by a school employee at some time between kindergarten and the twelfth grade (K-12). GAO was asked to (1) examine the circumstances surrounding cases where K-12 schools hired or retained individuals with histories of sexual misconduct and determine the factors contributing to such employment actions and (2) provide an overview of selected federal and state laws related to the employment of convicted sex offenders in K-12 schools. To identify case studies, GAO compared 2007 to 2009 data employment databases from 19 states and the District of Columbia to data in the National Sex Offender Registry. GAO also searched public records from 2000 to 2010 to identify cases in which sexual misconduct by school employees ultimately resulted in a criminal conviction. GAO ultimately selected 15 cases from 11 states for further investigation. For each case, to the extent possible, GAO reviewed court documents and personnel files and also interviewed relevant school officials and law enforcement. GAO reviewed applicable federal and state laws related to the employment of sex offenders and requirements for conducting criminal history checks.
What GAO Found
The 15 cases GAO examined show that individuals with histories of sexual misconduct were hired or retained by public and private schools as teachers, support staff, volunteers, and contractors. At least 11 of these 15 cases involve offenders who previously targeted children. Even more disturbing, in at least 6 cases, offenders used their new positions as school employees or volunteers to abuse more children. GAO found that the following factors contributed to hiring or retention: (1) school officials allowed teachers who had engaged in sexual misconduct toward students to resign rather than face disciplinary action, often providing subsequent employers with positive references; (2) schools did not perform preemployment criminal history checks; (3) even if schools did perform these checks, they may have been inadequate in that they were not national, fingerprint-based, or recurring; and (4) schools failed to inquire into troubling information regarding criminal histories on employment applications. GAO found no federal laws regulating the employment of sex offenders in public or private schools and widely divergent laws at the state level. For example, some states require a national, fingerprint-based criminal history check for school employment, while others do not. State laws also vary as to whether past convictions must result in termination from school employment, revocation of a teaching license, or refusal to hire. |
gao_GAO-11-446 | gao_GAO-11-446_0 | These types of collections represent amounts recovered by HHS and DOJ as a result of health care enforcement activities. Agencies Took Action to Address Three of Four GAO Recommendations
In our April 2005 report, we identified weaknesses related to not properly capturing certain expenditure data in agency information systems, non- adherence to accounting policy for select HCFAC expenditures, and lengthy HCFAC report review processes. Both agencies disagreed with our recommendation to notify Congress on delays in issuing the HCFAC report by the mandated deadline and thus, did not take action. Record staff hours in workload tracking systems. Develop a more expedited review process. Using these new time frames, HHS and DOJ jointly issued the fiscal year 2010 HCFAC report on January 24, 2011, only 23 days later than the mandated reporting date. According to DOJ officials responsible for preparing the HCFAC report, they intend to use these time frames to meet the mandated deadline when preparing future year reports. HHS and DOJ did not concur with this recommendation. We also found errors in reported HCFAC amounts. Documentation Controls Insufficient to Fully Support HCFAC Deposits and Expenditures
While HHS and DOJ designed controls that were incorporated into its policies and procedures generally requiring the retention of documentation for 6 years, the policies and procedures for CMS, Administration on Aging, and DOJ did not provide sufficient details with respect to where these documents were to be filed, who should be responsible for maintaining them, or a combination of both, which would help ensure accountability and adequate support of HCFAC deposits and expenditures. During our review, we found instances at HHS and DOJ where documentation was not available to support expenditures. Also, we found that although DOJ issued the Report Completion Guide in June 2010 that specified time frames for both HHS and DOJ for submitting information to complete the annual HCFAC report, the guide did not require that monitoring control activities, such as comparisons and supervisory reviews, be performed to help ensure that reported amounts were accurately presented. For example, for fiscal year 2009 we found that $716.8 million of the $1.0 billion reported in the restitution and compensatory damages line item was not transferred to the HI trust fund as stated in the report. Recoveries for Medicare Part B and Medicaid are not transferred to the HI trust fund, but instead are to be transferred to the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund and the Medicaid appropriation account within CMS, respectively. These inaccuracies overstated the amount of funds transferred to the HI trust fund. Conclusions
Although HHS and DOJ have taken action to address our previous recommendations aimed at improving procedures for recording HCFAC expenditures and issuing the annual HCFAC report, we found that controls are not sufficient to ensure that the report is accurate and supported. We recommend that the Secretary of HHS, direct the Administrator of CMS to: revise procedures for properly maintaining supporting documentation for HCFAC deposits and expenditures, to include specifying the titles of staff responsible for maintaining supporting documentation; develop written procedures that incorporate monitoring controls for HCFAC deposit information recorded in the departmentwide accounting system, including reconciling the deposit data in this system to the regional offices’ data collection system; direct the Assistant Secretary for Aging to: revise the Administration on Aging’s procedures for properly maintaining supporting documentation for HCFAC expenditures, to include specifying the titles of staff responsible for maintaining supporting documentation and the location of records; develop written procedures that incorporate monitoring controls to verify that the payroll expenditures charged against HCFAC are reasonable and supported; and direct the Acting General Counsel to develop written procedures that incorporate monitoring controls for the Office of the General Counsel staff hours related to HCFAC activities captured in workload tracking systems, including the reconciliation to staff hours captured in the departmentwide payroll system; and develop written procedures in collaboration with DOJ that incorporate monitoring controls for preparing the joint annual HCFAC report to help ensure reported amounts are accurate. Of the seven recommendations we made, in its written comments, HHS generally agreed with five, disagreed with one, and did not address the remaining recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine to what extent the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) (1) took action to address the recommendations we made in 2005 and (2) designed effective controls over reporting Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) program deposits and expenditures for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Assessed the reliability of data used to select our nongeneralizable tracing deposit control totals of the electronic databases to the corresponding deposit line item totals reported in the HCFAC reports and the Bureau of the Public Debt’s Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (HI trust fund) statements; obtaining the funding decision memorandum detailing how the HCFAC funds would be distributed between HHS and DOJ for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to verify the HCFAC funds certified by HHS and DOJ officials; comparing amounts reported in the joint HCFAC reports to the approved funding decision memorandum and comparing amounts from the decision memorandum to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) documentation (Apportionment Schedule SF-132) to verify that the amounts were made available; tracing total expenditure amounts to supporting documentation, including electronic databases, billing packages, and intra- and interagency agreements; and reviewing existing information about the electronic data and the systems that produced them. GAO Recommendation No. GAO Recommendation No. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help combat fraud and abuse in health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, Congress enacted the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) program as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). HIPAA requires that the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Justice (DOJ) issue a joint annual report to Congress on amounts deposited to and appropriated from the Federal Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund for the HCFAC program. In April 2005, GAO reported on the results of its review of HCFAC program activities for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and made recommendations to HHS and DOJ. The objectives of this requested review were to assess the extent to which HHS and DOJ (1) took actions to address the recommendations made in the 2005 report and (2) designed effective controls over reporting HCFAC deposits and expenditures for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. GAO reviewed HHS and DOJ documentation; selected nongeneralizable samples; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Although HHS and DOJ have taken action to address our previous recommendations aimed at improving procedures for recording HCFAC expenditures and issuing the annual HCFAC report, GAO found that controls are not sufficient to ensure that the report is accurate and supported. HHS and DOJ took action to address three of the four recommendations in GAO's 2005 report related to recording staff hours in agency workload tracking systems, using the appropriate account class to record HCFAC expenditure data, and expediting the review process for issuing the annual HCFAC report. Neither agency agreed with the remaining recommendation to notify Congress on delays in issuing the HCFAC report within 1 month after missing the mandated January 1 deadline and thus, did not take action. However, in June 2010, HHS and DOJ implemented an expedited review process for completing the HCFAC report. The fiscal year 2010 HCFAC report was issued on January 24, 2011, 23 days later than the mandated reporting date. According to DOJ officials responsible for preparing the HCFAC report, they intend to use this new expedited review process to meet the mandated deadline when preparing future year reports. Regarding the design of controls, while HHS and DOJ had designed polices and procedures for documentation that generally required the retention of documentation for 6 years, these did not provide sufficient controls to ensure adequate support of HCFAC deposits and expenditures, in accordance with internal control standards. (1) Components at both HHS and DOJ that manage HCFAC activities did not include in their respective policies and procedures controls that specified the person responsible for maintaining the records, the location of records, or a combination of both. (2) GAO found instances at HHS and DOJ where documentation could not be provided to support HCFAC expenditures, such as time and attendance reports. Also, both agencies did not have sufficient monitoring controls such as reconciliations, comparisons, and supervisory reviews, as outlined in internal control standards, to ensure accurate reporting of HCFAC deposits and expenditures. As a result, GAO found instances where data recorded in accounting and payroll systems were inconsistent with other sources such as the HI trust fund statements and agency workload tracking systems. GAO also identified presentation errors in the 2008 and 2009 annual HCFAC reports. For example, in reviewing the line item for restitution and compensatory damages, GAO found that $717 million (70 percent) of the $1.03 billion reported in the fiscal year 2009 HCFAC report was not transferred to the HI trust fund as stated in the report. These amounts, primarily related to Medicare Part B and Medicaid, were transferred to the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund and the Medicaid appropriation account as required. These inaccuracies overstated the amount of funds transferred to the HI trust fund.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 11 recommendations to HHS and DOJ to revise or develop written procedures that include documentation and monitoring controls for HCFAC activities and reporting. DOJ agreed with all four of its recommendations. Of the seven recommendations to HHS, it generally agreed with five, disagreed with one, and did not address the remaining recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-140 | gao_GAO-06-140_0 | In fiscal year 1998, Congress began requiring states to provide a minimum of 25 percent of their programs’ operating costs. Since the program’s inception, the funding provided by NGB has been based on a cost per student of $14,000. Between fiscal years 1998 and 2004, total expenditures for the Challenge Program, including funds spent to cover the federal and state cost shares and federal management expenses, have increased from about $63 million to about $107 million. The program has now grown to 29 sites in 24 states and Puerto Rico. NGB Has Reported Positive Performance Outcomes
NGB has reported positive performance outcomes in academic performance, community service activities, and post-residential placements. For example, NGB reported that 70 percent of graduates in 2004 earned a GED. Reserve Affairs and NGB Have Not Analyzed Data to Determine Actual Program Costs or the Need to Adjust the Federal and State Cost Share
Although Reserve Affairs and NGB have expressed concern about the current program funding level and have suggested increasing both the cost basis used to determine funding needs and the federal cost share, we found that neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has performed analyses to support the need for such changes. Since 1993, NGB has used a cost of $14,000 per student as the basis for determining the amount of funds needed to cover program operating costs. In addition to expressing a desire to change the amount of funding per student, Reserve Affairs, NGB, and participating states have suggested that the cost-share ratio be changed from its current 60 percent federal share to a 75 percent federal share because they believe that the current 40 percent state share is sometimes difficult for states to meet; however, neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has analyzed states’ financial situations or the impact of adjusting the federal and state cost share. A complete oversight framework, as suggested by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, includes performance goals and measures against which to objectively measure performance as well as a mechanism for tracking findings of audits or reviews and responding to those findings. However, these audits have not been conducted as required; and, when audits are conducted, copies of the results are not provided to NGB for review. Without regular audits and access to results, NGB cannot be assured that programs are using federal funds appropriately and that audit findings are addressed. The National Guard Bureau Does Not Require Participating States to Establish Performance Goals for the Challenge Program
Although NGB requires state Challenge Programs to report on certain outcome measures, such as GED attainment and number of graduates, NGB does not require states to establish any performance goals in these areas to measure the effectiveness of the program. Without better cost and financial information, DOD cannot justify future funding requests or a change in the cost-share ratio. Without these performance goals in place, NGB does not have a firm basis for evaluating program outcomes and DOD’s return on investment. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management and oversight of the National Guard Youth Challenge Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to take the following three actions: Determine the actual costs of the Challenge Program, including states’ ability to fund their share of the program, and use this information, as appropriate, to support funding requests or a request to change the cost- share ratio. | Why GAO Did This Study
The fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act established the National Guard Youth Challenge Program as a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness of providing military based training to improve the life skills of high school dropouts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for overall policy for the program. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides direct management and oversight. In 1998, Congress permanently authorized the program and began decreasing the federal cost share until it reached its current level of 60 percent in 2001. Conference Report 108-767 directed GAO to review the program. Specifically, GAO reviewed (1) historical trends of the program; (2) the extent of analyses performed to determine program costs and the need to adjust the federal and state cost share; and (3) NGB oversight of the program. GAO is also providing information on Reserve Affairs' and states' efforts to obtain funding from alternative sources.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 1998 and 2004, total expenditures for the Challenge Program, including funds spent to cover the federal and state cost shares and federal management expenses, have increased from about $63 million to $107 million. During this same period, participation in the program has grown from 10 sites in 10 states to 29 sites in 24 states and Puerto Rico. Since the program's inception, NGB has reported positive performance outcomes in academic performance, community service activities, and post-residential placements. For example, in 2004, NGB reported graduating 7,003 students, or 79 percent of those enrolled, with 70 percent of those graduates earning a high school equivalent diploma. While Reserve Affairs and NGB have expressed concern about the current program funding level and have suggested increasing both the cost basis used to determine funding needs and the federal cost share, neither has performed analyses to support the need for such changes. Federal financial standards state that reliable cost information is crucial for effective management of government operations. Since 1993, NGB has used $14,000 per student as the basis for determining the amount of funds needed to cover program operating costs, and applied the federal-state cost share to this amount. To keep pace with inflation, NGB has suggested increasing the per student cost to $18,000. Reserve Affairs has reported some states are having difficulty meeting their share and, in 2004, recommended the federal share be increased from 60 percent to 75 percent. However, neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has compiled or analyzed data on actual program costs, states' financial situations, or the impact of adjusting the federal and state cost-share. Without better cost and financial information, the Department of Defense (DOD) cannot justify future funding requests or a change in the cost-share ratio. Although NGB uses various oversight mechanisms, it lacks a complete oversight framework, making it difficult to measure program effectiveness and to adequately address audit and review findings. Also, some audits have not been performed as required. The Government Performance and Results Act suggests a complete oversight framework including goals and measures against which to objectively evaluate performance. While NGB requires states to report certain performance outcomes, it does not require states to establish performance goals in these areas, and therefore does not have a firm basis for evaluating program outcomes and DOD's return on investment. Existing agreements require state programs to be audited at least every three years. However these audits have not been conducted as required and no provisions exist for submitting audit results to NGB. Without regular audits and access to results, NGB cannot be assured that programs are using federal funds appropriately and that audit findings are addressed. |
gao_GAO-10-668 | gao_GAO-10-668_0 | Schools, lenders, and guaranty agencies often employ third-party servicers to perform functions related to the administration of the FFEL program. In addition, Education contracts with a servicer (DL servicer) to administer certain aspects of the DL program, such as payment processing. Borrowers who may have been eligible to obtain new FFEL loans prior to the passage of HCERA could receive loans under the DL program. Overview of Audit Guidance
Audits required under FFEL or DL are performed in accordance with guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the applicable Department of Education Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit guide. The FFEL program relies on lenders, guaranty agencies, and other entities that are subject to statutory, regulatory, and contractual audit requirements. The DL program does not have as many of these audit requirements because DL loans are provided by the federal government, and fewer external entities are involved. Audit Requirements Generally Differed for the FFEL and DL Programs
The FFEL and DL programs have different statutory and regulatory requirements for audits and program reviews, with more audit requirements in place for the FFEL program, which involves more participants external to the government. The audits focus on whether these participants comply with applicable statutes, regulations, and program requirements. For both programs, compliance with these requirements is monitored through the annual compliance audit. Certain Audit Guidance for FFEL Lenders Did Not Incorporate All Requirements
As noted previously, HCERA terminated the authority to make new FFEL loans after June 30, 2010. Education Has Designed Procedures for Oversight of the DL Servicer
The functions performed by the DL servicer are similar to certain functions performed by lenders, guaranty agencies, and their servicers in the FFEL program. Financial Partners is responsible for the oversight of audits of lenders, guaranty agencies, and their servicers participating in the FFEL program. Gap Noted in Receipt and Review of Certain Audit Reports
We noted a gap in Education’s policies and procedures regarding review of audited financial statements for lender servicers. However, our review found that lender servicers did not submit their audited financial statements to Education. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help address any gaps in the guidance for audits FFEL lenders perform in accordance with the OIG Lender Audit Guide, we recommend that the Education Inspector General update the OIG Lender Audit Guide to include all appropriate regulatory audit requirements. To ensure that Education properly oversees the ongoing servicing of outstanding FFEL student loans and mitigates risks related to lender servicers, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct the Chief Operating Officer of the Office of Federal Student Aid to develop and implement policies and procedures requiring Federal Student Aid review of audited financial statements for lender servicers. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Education Office of Inspector General and Federal Student Aid agreed with our recommendations. Regarding our recommendation to develop and implement policies and procedures requiring the review of lender servicer audited financial statements, the Chief Operating Officer of Federal Student Aid acknowledged the need to update the OIG Lender Audit Guide and existing processes and procedures to require lender servicers to prepare and submit audited financial statements, and stated that Federal Student Aid will review the audited financial statements. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address the first objective, we reviewed our September 30, 2009, report to determine the extent to which the audit and review requirements were applicable to both the Federal Family Education Loan and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program participants in order to identify similarities and differences. For nonprofit and for-profit schools and lenders, we analyzed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. We interviewed officials from Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid (Federal Student Aid) and the OIG, including the Acting Director of Financial Partner Eligibility and Oversight (Financial Partners), the General Manager of the School Eligibility Channel, and the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audit, to obtain clarification and explanations for any discrepancies identified during our review of documentation. The scope of our audit did not include testing that the audit guides were used by the auditors as intended. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-315, mandated GAO to study the financial and compliance audits and reviews required or conducted for the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program and the Federal Direct Student Loan (DL) program. The Department of Education's (Education) Office of Federal Student Aid is responsible for administering these programs. This report focuses on (1) identifying differences and similarities in audit requirements and oversight procedures for the FFEL and DL programs, including anticipated changes to selected oversight activities and (2) describing how the Office of Federal Student Aid's policies and procedures are designed to monitor audits and reviews. To do so, GAO interviewed Education and inspector general officials and reviewed numerous audit guides, agency procedures, checklists, and audit tracking systems.
What GAO Found
GAO identified differences and similarities in audit requirements and oversight procedures for the two programs. Differences include the following: (1) The FFEL and DL programs generally had different audit requirements stemming primarily from divergent program structures. The FFEL program relied on lenders, guaranty agencies--which administer federal government loan guarantees to lenders--and other entities that were subject to statutory and regulatory audit requirements. The DL program did not have as many audit requirements because DL loans are provided by the federal government, and fewer external entities are involved. (2) GAO found differences in audit requirements for nonprofit and for-profit lenders. Certain applicable audit objectives included in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements for compliance audits of nonprofit lenders were not included in the Department of Education Office of Inspector General (OIG) Lender Audit Guide for compliance audits of for-profit lenders. As a result, audits of lenders performed in accordance with the OIG Lender Audit Guide were at risk of omitting compliance testing for a key audit objective. Similarities in audit requirements and oversight procedures include these: (1) Schools were subject to annual financial statement and compliance audits under both programs. (2) The functions performed by the DL servicer, with which Education contracts to administer certain functions of the DL program, were similar to functions performed by lenders, guaranty agencies, and their servicers in the FFEL program. GAO's analysis found that objectives addressed by FFEL participant compliance audits were similar to the objectives addressed through oversight procedures for the DL servicer, such as Education's review of the servicer's monthly performance metrics. The passage of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 terminated the authority to make new FFEL loans after June 30, 2010. Borrowers who would have been eligible to obtain new FFEL loans could receive loans under the DL program. Regarding Office of Federal Student Aid's monitoring activities, staff were to use financial statement audits to oversee the financial condition of the schools and guaranty agencies that participate in the student loan programs. Compliance audits of schools, lenders, guaranty agencies, and their third-party servicers help Education ensure that these participants comply with applicable statutes, regulations, and program requirements. The Office of Federal Student Aid was required to track findings in these audit reports. GAO found that third-party servicers for lenders in the FFEL program did not submit their audited financial statements to Education as required. Education lacked a policy and specific procedures to ensure receipt and review of these audited financial statements. Without such reviews, the Office of Federal Student Aid might not be informed of a third-party servicer's unfavorable audit opinion or significant reported findings that could affect program operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Education Inspector General update the OIG Lender Audit Guide to include all appropriate regulatory requirements for audits of ongoing FFEL participants. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Education develop and implement policies and procedures requiring Office of Federal Student Aid review of audited financial statements for lender servicers. The Education Office of Inspector General and Education agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-202 | gao_GAO-06-202_0 | The act established a livestock marketing information program to (1) provide producers, packers and other industry participants with market information that can be readily understood; (2) improve USDA price and supply reporting services; and (3) encourage more competition in these markets. Market News was responsible for collecting and generating market news reports from information supplied by packers. When ARC found packers that were reporting incorrectly, ARC notified the Market News reporters, who were responsible for notifying and following up with packers until the packers reported correctly. However, we found that while AMS had made progress, its livestock market news program fell short of ensuring reliability because AMS reporting was not fully transparent, and AMS audits of packers revealed some problems with the quality of packers’ transaction data. Our analysis shows that from April through June 2005, when livestock prices were declining somewhat, AMS reporters excluded about 9 percent of the cattle transactions that packers had reported to AMS, about 3 percent of the reported beef transactions, and 0.2 percent of the reported hog transactions. AMS guidance for its reporters on eliminating transactions is limited, lacking clarity and precision. Given that AMS reporters’ decisions to exclude transactions modified the prices they reported, AMS has not well-explained this practice to readers of AMS livestock market news. Detailed information was available for 844 of these audits conducted over the 36 months ending in April 2005. AMS officials also said that its audit results should be considered in the context of the volume of transactions that AMS reports—compared to the hundreds of thousands of pieces of transaction data that packers reported daily, the errors identified by AMS audits were relatively few. However, some packers, including three of the largest packers, did not promptly correct reporting problems that AMS identified. In addition, twice AMS levied fines on packers of $10,000, although these fines were suspended provided these packers went a year without additional violations of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. As of September 2005, AMS had continuing issues with 2 of 11 the packers that received AMS warning letters. While AMS audit reports identified many problems in packers’ reporting of transactions, there are two reasons why the reports do not provide a clear basis for assessing the overall accuracy of packers’ data which underlie AMS livestock mandatory market news reports. GIPSA and AMS Coordination Has Been Limited
GIPSA and AMS coordination has been limited, primarily due to the legal authority within which each operates. AMS implemented and enforced the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. However, GIPSA identified instances in which the packer’s reports of negotiated livestock purchases met the documentation standards of the Packers and Stockyards Act, but may not have met the standards of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. GIPSA officials said that individual packer transaction data held by AMS would be useful for monitoring competitive behavior in livestock markets. This monitoring effort is limited because AMS reports do not include the company-specific transaction data that might reveal anti-competitive behavior. Among other things, USDA stated that AMS would (1) prepare publicly available reports on the volume of transactions excluded by reporters and their effect on reported prices, and take steps to increase public awareness of reporting methods and processes; (2) clarify AMS reporters’ instructions while following federal and departmental statistical and information reporting guidance; (3) post quarterly audit information to its website and identify additional audit information to add in the future; (4) develop auditing methods to allow conclusions to be drawn about overall data accuracy; (5) review its auditing methods to increase the overall effectiveness of the compliance program; and (6) conduct further inquiry into the issues raised during one of GIPSA’s investigations. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review the extent to which (1) the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) takes sufficient steps to ensure the quality of its livestock mandatory market news reports, and (2) AMS and the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) coordinate efforts to encourage competition in livestock markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Livestock producers, with gross income of $63 billion in 2004, depend on USDA's daily, weekly, and monthly livestock market news reports. These reports provide them and others in the industry with livestock and meat prices and volumes, which are helpful as they negotiate sales of cattle, hogs, lamb and meat products. Packers also use the average prices in these reports as a basis for paying some producers with whom the packers have contracts. In 1999, the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act was passed to substantially increase the volume of industry sales transactions covered by USDA's market news reports and thereby encourage competition in the industry. In the context of ongoing discussions about the renewal of this act, GAO reviewed (1) USDA's efforts to ensure the quality of its livestock market news reports and (2) the coordination between two USDA agencies that are responsible for promoting competition in livestock markets.
What GAO Found
While the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) took important actions to produce quality livestock market news reports, GAO found that USDA could improve the reports' transparency. Although packers with large plants must report all of their livestock transactions to USDA, GAO found that USDA market news reporters regularly excluded some transactions as they prepared USDA's reports. For example, GAO's analysis showed that from April through June 2005, USDA reporters excluded about 9 percent of the cattle transactions that packers had reported. When USDA excluded transactions, this sometimes changed the low, high, and average prices that USDA would have otherwise reported. However, USDA has not informed its readers of the extent of this practice. Moreover, USDA's instructions for guiding its market news reporters as they prepared their reports lacked clarity and precision, leading to inconsistency in their reporting decisions. In addition, GAO found the accuracy of USDA's livestock market news reports is not fully assured. About 64 percent of 844 USDA audits of packers--conducted over 36 months ending in April 2005--identified packers' transactions that were inaccurately reported, unsupported by documentation, or omitted from packers' reports. Moreover, some packers have not promptly corrected problems. Since 2002, USDA has sent 11 packers 21 letters urging the packers to correct longstanding problems and warning them of the consequences of delay. Twice USDA has levied $10,000 fines on packers, but suspended the fines when these packers agreed to comply. As of September 2005, USDA had continuing issues with 2 of the 11 packers. USDA officials noted that packers' errors are relatively few compared to the large volumes of data that packers report daily. However, USDA has not (1) assessed the overall quality of packers' data, (2) used its audit results to help focus future audit efforts, and (3) ensured that follow-up promptly resolves problems. Two USDA agencies have addressed competition in livestock markets--the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) and the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA). GAO found the coordination between these agencies to be limited, primarily due to the legal authority within which each operates. AMS has implemented the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. That act did not provide authority for AMS to share individual packer transaction data within USDA except for enforcement purposes. In two investigations, AMS provided packers' data to GIPSA. On the other hand, GIPSA enforces the Packers and Stockyards Act and is responsible for addressing unfair and anti-competitive practices in the marketing of livestock. Furthermore, GAO found that GIPSA monitors cattle and hog markets by analyzing publicly available livestock market news reports--an approach that has limitations because it lacks the company-specific information that would be useful for detecting anti-competitive behavior. |
gao_GAO-15-304 | gao_GAO-15-304_0 | Consistent with PPACA, CMS established two types of loans: start-up loans and solvency loans. CMS and a contractor reviewed applications. Additionally, in January 2013, the American Tax Payer Relief Act of 2012 rescinded another $1.3 billion of the unobligated CO-OP program appropriation, leaving about $1.1 billion of the original $6 billion CO-OP appropriation available for the credit subsidy costs of CO-OP program loan awards and The American Tax Payer Relief Act of CO-OP program administration.2012 also transferred any remaining appropriation to a contingency fund for providing assistance and oversight to CO-OP loan awardees, which essentially restricted CO-OP program participation to the 24 organizations that received CO-OP loan awards prior to January 2013. One organization in Vermont was unable to obtain a license as a health insurance issuer from its state’s insurance commissioner. PPACA establishes rules governing how issuers can set premium rates. CMS Has Disbursed Nearly Two Thirds of the $2.4 Billion in CO-OP Program Loans Awarded
As of early January 2015, CMS has disbursed about $1.6 billion (64 percent) of the $2.4 billion in loans awarded to the 23 CO-OPs. The $351 million in start-up loan disbursements represents about 98 percent of the total amount of start-up loans awarded, whereas the $1.2 billion in solvency loan disbursements represents about 59 percent of the total amount of solvency loans awarded. The percentage of solvency loan funding disbursed to the remaining 11 CO-OPs ranged from 53 percent to 92 percent. The percentages of solvency loan awards disbursed to CO-OPs reflect each CO-OP’s need for additional resources to meet state solvency and reserve requirements, which may be the result of enrollment growth or higher than anticipated claims from members. Average Premiums for CO-OP Health Plans Were Lower than Those for Other Health Plans in More than Half of the Rating Areas, but Differences Varied across Tiers
In the 22 states where CO-OPs offered health plans on the states’ health insurance exchanges in 2014, the average premiums for CO-OP health plans in all tiers were lower than the average premiums for other health plans in more than half of the rating areas. For 4 of 5 tiers, the average premiums for CO-OP health plans were lower than the average premiums for other health plans in 54 to 63 percent of rating areas where both a CO-OP and at least one other For platinum, the average premiums for issuer offered health plans.CO-OP health plans were lower than the average premium for other health plans in 89 percent of rating areas where CO-OPs and other issuers offered health plans. There was also variation across rating areas in the difference between the average premiums for CO-OP health plans and for other health plans. For example, for all rating areas in which CO-OPs offered silver tier health plans, average CO-OP premiums were priced between 10 and 30 percent lower in 31 percent of rating areas and between 10 and 30 percent higher in 21 percent of rating areas. However, total enrollment was short of the overall projections of about 559,000 that CO-OPs included in their original loan applications and 8 CO-OPs accounted for about 385,000 (85 percent) of the total number of CO-OP enrollees. These 8 CO-OPs, in particular, exceeded their enrollment projections for the first open enrollment period with 5 more than doubling their projected enrollment. The remaining 14 CO-OPs did not meet their enrollment projections for the first enrollment period. And 10 of those CO-OPs enrolled less than half of their projected enrollment numbers. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. In its written comments which appear in appendix XXIV, HHS stated its commitment to beneficiaries of the CO-OP program and taxpayers, and described various activities used to monitor the CO-OP program. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans and Loan Awards
Table 2 provides the total loan amounts awarded to each of the 23 consumer operated and oriented plans (CO-OP) as of January 2014. The premiums for health plans offered by the CO-OP in Nevada varied depending on the tier and rating area. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) established the CO-OP loan program, which helped create 23 consumer-governed, nonprofit health insurance issuers known as CO-OPs. To foster the creation of the CO-OPs, PPACA authorized two types of loans: (1) start-up loans, which help cover the costs of establishing a CO-OP; and (2) solvency loans, which help meet states' solvency requirements associated with becoming a licensed health insurance issuer. While the program seeks to increase competition and improve accountability to members, questions have been raised about the effects CO-OPs will have on health insurance markets.
GAO was asked to study the CO-OP program during 2014. This report examines (1) the status of the CO-OP program loans, (2) how CO-OP health plan premiums compare to the premiums of other health plans, and (3) enrollment in CO-OP health plans. GAO analyzed data from CMS and states; reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, guidance, and other documentation; and interviewed officials from CMS and seven CO-OPs that were selected based on the total amount of loans awarded, geographic region, and the type of health insurance exchange (i.e., federally facilitated or state-based exchange) operated in the state where the CO-OP offered health plans.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services described activities used to monitor the CO-OP program and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
As of January 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that administers and monitors the consumer operated and oriented plan (CO-OP) program—has disbursed about two thirds of the $2.4 billion in loans awarded to 23 CO-OPs. CMS has disbursed about $351 million in start-up loans and $1.2 billion in solvency loans. The percentage of start-up loan funding disbursed to CO-OPs equaled all, or nearly all, of their awards. However, the percentage of solvency loan funding disbursed varied depending on each CO-OP's need to meet state solvency and reserve requirements. Disbursements to three CO-OPs equaled 100 percent of their solvency awards, while disbursements to 20 other CO-OPs ranged from 26 to 92 percent of their awards.
The average premiums for CO-OP health plans were lower than those for other issuers in more than half of the rating areas—geographical areas established by states and used, in part, by issuers to set premium rates—for the 22 states where CO-OPs participated in the exchange during 2014. As shown in the table below, for four of the five coverage tiers—standardized levels of coverage based on the portion of health care costs expected to be paid by the health plan—the average premiums for CO-OP health plans were lower than the average premiums for other health plans in 54 to 63 percent of these rating areas.
In addition, there was variation across rating areas in the difference between the average premiums for CO-OPs and other plans. For example, average CO-OP premiums for silver health plans were priced between 0 and 10 percent lower in 20 percent of rating areas and between 10 and 30 percent lower in 31 percent.
During the first open enrollment period (October 1, 2013, through March 31, 2014), the 22 participating CO-OPs enrolled over 470,000 people. However, the total was short of the overall projections included in the CO-OPs' original loan applications, and 8 of the 22 CO-OPs accounted for more than 85 percent of the total number of CO-OP enrollees. These 8 CO-OPs exceeded their enrollment projections with 5 more than doubling their projected enrollment. The remaining 14 did not meet their enrollment projections. Ten of those CO-OPs enrolled less than half of their projected enrollment numbers. Officials from the CO-OPs GAO interviewed cited relatively high premiums, for example, as a reason for lower than projected enrollment levels. |
gao_GAO-10-470 | gao_GAO-10-470_0 | Energy Star, according to officials, largely relies on manufacturers or others to identify and report products claiming to meet Energy Star criteria that are violating the rules. The federal government has placed significant emphasis and allocated tax dollars to encourage the use of energy-efficient products. In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 increased and extended the energy tax credits for homeowners who make energy-efficient improvements to their existing homes. Each state and U.S. territory was allowed to design its own rebate program and all 56 plans have been app roved by DOE. 26 U.S.C. As noted by the Consortium for Energy Efficiency, the EPA Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Consumer Reports, DOE OIG, and a prior GAO report there is currently no requirement for independent third-party verification of energy performance reporting for most product categories prior to gaining access to Energy Star logos and promotional materials. Based on our investigative results, we found that the current process for becoming an Energy Star partner and certifying specific products as Energy Star compliant provides little assurance that products with the Energy Star label are some of the most efficient on the market. Our proactive testing revealed that the Energy Star program is primarily a self-certification program relying on corporate honesty and industry self-policing to protect the integrity of the Energy Star label. Table 1 below summarizes the certification details of bogus products submitted for Energy Star qualification during the course of our investigation. For all cases, Energy Star did not call our bogus firms or visit our firm’s addresses. Energy Star Product Certifications
We successfully obtained Energy Star qualification for 15 bogus products, including a gas-powered alarm clock and a room cleaner represented by a photograph of a feather duster adhered to a space heater on our manufacturer’s Web site. This control resulted in the fan being rejected. Undercover Tests Expose Weaknesses in Fraud Prevention Controls
We found that for most of the bogus products we submitted, the Energy Star program preventive controls were ineffective, rendering the program vulnerable to fraud and abuse. However, we found that controls over specific product certifications were not effective in preventing firms from submitting bogus energy-efficiency data. We found that Energy Star is for the most part an online self-certification program. Only 4 of 20 products we tested required independent verification of energy use and other industry standards by a third party. Officials acknowledged that currently the Energy Star program relies on self- policing, manufacturer integrity, and after-market testing for high volume products in cases where there is not a third-party testing requirement for certification. Because all of these controls occur after a product has been certified by Energy Star and placed on the market, we were not able to test their effectiveness and did not validate agency representations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To perform the undercover test of attaining Energy Star partnership and earning Energy Star qualification for fictitious products, we consulted publicly available audit reports by federal agencies and consumer advocacy publications to identify program vulnerabilities to inform our methodology. We submitted Energy Star Partnership Agreements for each of the four bogus manufacturing firms and fictitious product energy-efficiency specifications via e-mail to the Energy Star program to obtain partnership and certify products. For example, at the beginning of testing, products mirroring efficiency standards of listed Energy Star products were submitted, whereas in the later stages of the proactive testing phase of this investigation, we submitted an implausible product for Energy Star certification. We briefed program officials with the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and EPA OIG as well as attorneys with the Consumer Protection division of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the results of our work, and incorporated their comments concerning controls in place to protect the Energy Star label from fraud and abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
American consumers, businesses, and federal agencies rely on the Energy Star program to identify products that decrease greenhouse emissions and lower energy costs. In addition, the federal government and various states offer tax credits and other incentives to encourage the use of energy-efficient products including Energy Star products. Specifically, approximately $300 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act will be used for state rebate programs on energy-efficient products. The Energy Star program, which began in 1992, is overseen jointly by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Given the millions of dollars allocated to encourage use of Energy Star products and concerns that the Energy Star program is vulnerable to fraud and abuse, GAO was asked to conduct proactive testing to (1) obtain Energy Star partnership status for bogus companies and (2) submit fictitious products for Energy Star certification. To perform this investigation, GAO used four bogus manufacturing firms and fictitious individuals to apply for Energy Star partnership and submitted 20 fictitious products with fake energy-savings claims for Energy Star certification. GAO also reviewed program documents and interviewed agency officials and officials from agency Inspector General (IG) offices.
What GAO Found
GAO's investigation shows that Energy Star is for the most part a self-certification program vulnerable to fraud and abuse. GAO obtained Energy Star certifications for 15 bogus products, including a gas-powered alarm clock. Two bogus products were rejected by the program and 3 did not receive a response. In addition, two of the bogus Energy Star firms developed by GAO received requests from real companies to purchase products because the bogus firms were listed as Energy Star partners. This clearly shows how heavily American consumers rely on the Energy Star brand. The program is promoted through tax credits and appliance rebates, and federal agencies are required to purchase certain Energy Star certified products. In addition, companies use the Energy Star certification to market their products and consumers buy products relying on the certification by the government of reduced energy consumption and costs. For example, in 2008 Energy Star reported saving consumers $19 billion dollars on utility costs. The table below details several fictitious GAO products certified by Energy Star. GAO found that for our bogus products, certification controls were ineffective primarily because Energy Star does not verify energy-savings data reported by manufacturers. Energy Star required only 4 of the 20 products GAO submitted for certification to be verified by an independent third party. For 2 of these cases GAO found that controls were effective because the program required an independent verification by a specific firm chosen by Energy Star. However, in another case because Energy Star failed to verify information provided, GAO was able to circumvent this control by certifying that a product met a specific safety standard for ozone emission. At briefings on GAO's investigation, DOE and EPA officials agreed that the program is currently based on self-certifications by manufacturers. However, officials stated there are after-market tests and self-policing that ensure standards are maintained. GAO did not test or evaluate controls related to products that were already certified and available to the public. In addition, prior DOE IG, EPA IG, and GAO reports have found that current Energy Star controls do not ensure products meet efficiency guidelines. |
gao_GAO-04-127T | gao_GAO-04-127T_0 | Other Countries’ Succession Planning and Management Practices
Leading organizations engage in broad, integrated succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity. As part of this approach, these organizations identify, develop, and select successors who are the right people, with the right skills, at the right time for leadership and other key positions. We identified specific succession planning and management practices that agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are implementing that reflect this broader focus on building organizational capacity. Link to Strategic Planning. For RCMP, succession planning and management is an integral part of the agency’s multiyear human capital plan and directly supports its strategic needs. The program places participants in a series of jobs designed to provide experiences, each of which is linked to strengthening specific competencies required for admission to the Senior Civil Service. In addition, leading organizations use succession planning and management to identify and develop knowledge and skills that are critical in the workplace. Faced with the urgent need to capture and pass on the inspectors’ expertise, judgment, and insights before they retire, the agency embarked on a major knowledge management initiative in 1999 as part of its succession planning and management activities. Agencies in other countries have developed several approaches to respond to this challenge. Government agencies around the world, including in the United States, are facing challenges in the demographic makeup and diversity of their senior executives. Achieve a More Diverse Workforce. Leading organizations recognize that diversity can be an organizational strength that contributes to achieving results. Preparing future leaders who could help the organization successfully adapt to recent changes in how it delivers services is one of the objectives of the FCA’s Leadership, Excellence, Achievement, Progression program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Leading public organizations here and abroad recognize that a more strategic approach to human capital management is essential for change initiatives that are intended to transform their cultures. To that end, organizations are looking for ways to identify and develop the leaders, managers, and workforce necessary to face the array of challenges that will confront government in the 21st century. The Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, House Committee on Government Reform, requested GAO to identify how agencies in four countries--Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--are adopting a more strategic approach to managing the succession of senior executives and other public sector employees with critical skills.
What GAO Found
As part of a reexamination of what the federal government should do, how it should do it, and in some cases, who should be doing it, it is important for federal agencies to focus not just on the present but also on future trends and challenges. Succession planning and management can help an organization become what it needs to be, rather than simply to recreate the existing organization. Leading organizations go beyond a succession planning approach that focuses on simply replacing individuals and engage in broad, integrated succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity. As part of this broad approach, these organizations identify, develop, and select successors who are the right people, with the right skills, at the right time for leadership and other key positions. Governmental agencies around the world anticipate the need for leaders and other key employees with the necessary competencies to successfully meet the complex challenges of the 21st century. To this end, the experiences of agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom can provide insights to federal agencies, many of which have yet to adopt succession planning and management initiatives that adequately prepare them for the future. |
gao_GAO-03-297T | gao_GAO-03-297T_0 | Background
Seaports are critical gateways for the movement of international commerce. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that various assessments of national security have concluded that the nation’s ports are far more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than the nation’s aviation system, where most of the nation’s efforts and resources have been placed since September 11th. Many of these participants carry out their roles in the exporting country (see fig. Efforts Aimed Specifically at Detecting Nuclear Cargo Entering U.S. These efforts are based largely on an approach of targeting a small percentage of containers for in-depth screening. The main thrust of several new initiatives has been to create multiple lines of defense by pushing security beyond U.S. docks to include points of departure and, ultimately, places of manufacture. Although various efforts to do so are under way, these efforts are in their preliminary stages. OSC relies on using new technology such as electronic container seals to strengthen the security of cargo as it moves along the international supply chain. Efforts center on the following: ensuring that containers are loaded in a secure environment at the point of product origin, with 100 percent verification of their contents; using such technology as pressure, light, or temperature sensors to continually monitor containers throughout their overseas voyage to the point of distribution in the United States; and using cargo-tracking technology to keep accurate track of containers at all points in the supply chain, including distribution to their ultimate destinations. For example, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, which is being finalized in conference committee action, calls for the Secretary of Transportation to assess the acceptability of foreign port security “based on the standards for port security and recommended practices of the IMO and other appropriate international organizations.”
Establishing Stronger Customs Procedures through the World Customs Organization
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations. Key Challenges Include Creating and Implementing Standards, Ensuring Cooperation of Diverse Groups, and Securing Resources
In our August 2002 testimony on security actions being taken to improve security within domestic ports, we found indications that there could be considerable challenges. The attempts to improve existing nuclear-detection programs and to implement the new initiatives now under way could face challenges domestically and internationally in these three areas as well. Efforts to develop international standards are under way on several fronts, but much still remains to do. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. Scope and Methodology
To determine the programs in place to prevent illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into the United States through our ports, we relied on issues raised in a number of GAO-issued products, as indicated in footnote 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas. This testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such attempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation's security against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts.
What GAO Found
U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation. Efforts to target cargo for screening are hampered by the quality of information regarding which cargo poses the greatest risk. New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish additional lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. In essence, this means moving part of the security effort overseas, where goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas; reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of containers from their point of origin. The nation faces three key challenges to implementing efforts to improve the security of ports and containers: creating and enforcing a set of security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with competing interests when it comes to the specifics of how things are to be done, and paying the increased security bill. Such challenges exist both for strengthening domestic efforts and for developing new initiatives that expand security on an international basis. GAO is currently reviewing several aspects of port and container security, and will report as those efforts are completed. |
gao_GAO-09-896 | gao_GAO-09-896_0 | 3 for examples of fencing.) SBInet Deployment Delays Require Border Patrol to Rely on Existing Technology Which Has Limitations That Newer Technology Is Planned to Overcome
SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays due to flaws found in testing and potential environmental impacts. Until SBInet is deployed, Border Patrol agents continue to rely on existing technology that has limitations such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. CBP cannot determine what operational changes it will need to make as a result of the new technology, and Border Patrol will not be able to realize the potential of this technology until it is deployed. Until SBInet Technology Is in Place, Border Patrol Agents Continue to Use Existing Equipment and CBP Is Limited in Its Ability to Fully Implement the Objectives of the Border Patrol Strategy
Until SBInet capabilities are deployed across the southwest border, Border Patrol agents are using existing capabilities, including Project 28 and legacy equipment supplemented by more recently procured MSS, but all have limitations. In all southwest border sectors, Border Patrol relies on legacy equipment, such as cameras mounted on towers. Border Patrol officials told us that in the three sectors, the cameras have intermittent problems, including signal loss and problems with power and weather. To fill gaps or augment the legacy equipment, the SBI program office procured and delivered a total of 40 MSSs. Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but Their Impact on Border Security Has Not Been Measured
The deployment of 661 miles of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border is nearing completion, but delays persist, due mainly to property acquisition issues. CBP plans to complete 10 more miles of fencing using fiscal year 2009 funds, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds are to be used primarily for supporting infrastructure. As of June 2009, 633 miles had been completed (see table 2). However, fence deployment continues to face delays due to challenges in constructing tactical infrastructure on difficult terrain and acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. As a result, this segment is anticipated to be completed in November 2009. While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because all construction contracts have been awarded, cost estimates are less likely to change. The life- cycle cost estimates include deployment and operations and future maintenance costs for all tactical infrastructure, including the fence, roads, and lighting, among other things. The Number of Southwest Border Miles That CBP Reports as Being under Effective Control Has Increased, but the Impact of Tactical Infrastructure Has Not Been Measured
CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained Border Patrol agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under effective control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. However, these analyses were largely subjective because they were based primarily on the experience and expertise of senior border patrol agents. Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure to border security beyond a measure of miles covered by tactical infrastructure, it is not positioned to address the impact this costly resource has had in each sector or might have if deployed in other locations across the southwest border. Conclusions
While the SBInet program continues to test and evaluate potential technology applications, a major part of DHS’s effort to secure the nation’s borders from the illegal entry of aliens and contraband has been the deployment of tactical infrastructure. We will also send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Office of Management and Budget. Related GAO Products
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, U.S. Custom and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting. GAO was asked to provide periodic updates on the status of the program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented SBInet and the impact of delays that have occurred, and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its results. To do this work, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports, and previous GAO work; interviewed DHS and CBP officials, among others; and visited three SBI sites where initial technology or fencing had been deployed at the time of GAO's review.
What GAO Found
SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays require Border Patrol, a CBP component, to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using newer technology planned to overcome the existing technology's limitations. Flaws found in testing and concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations caused delays. As of September 2006, SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. As a result of such delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon as it is operationally available should better position CBP to identify and implement operational changes needed for securing the border. Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their impact on border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP had completed 633 of the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. However, delays continue due mainly to challenges in acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because all construction contracts have been awarded, costs are less likely to change. CBP plans to use $110 million in fiscal year 2009 funds to build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds for supporting infrastructure. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based primarily on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading practices suggest that a program evaluation would complement those efforts. Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the impact of this investment. |
gao_GAO-03-630 | gao_GAO-03-630_0 | FDIC’s acting CIO is the corporation’s key official for computer security. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the progress FDIC had made in correcting or mitigating weaknesses reported in our calendar year 2001 financial statement audit and (2) the effectiveness of information system general controls. These information system controls also affect the security and reliability of other sensitive data, including personnel, legal, and bank examination information maintained on the same computer systems as the corporation’s financial information. Of the 41 weaknesses identified in our calendar year 2001 audit, FDIC has corrected 19 and is taking action intended to resolve the 22 that remain. In addition, new weaknesses in other information system controls, including physical security, application software, and service continuity, further increase the risk to FDIC’s information systems. Computer Security Program Enhanced, but Full Implementation Not Yet Achieved
The primary reason for FDIC’s continuing weaknesses in information system controls is that it has not yet fully developed and implemented a comprehensive corporate program to manage computer security. Nonetheless, FDIC’s program does not cover all critical evaluation areas. FDIC has not adequately restricted mainframe access, sufficiently secured its network, or completed a program for fully monitoring access activity. Implementation of FDIC’s plan to correct these weaknesses is essential to establish an effective information system control environment. While it has made progress in the past year in establishing key elements of this program—including a security management structure, security policies and procedures, and promoting security awareness—its systems will remain at heightened risk until FDIC establishes a process for assessing and managing risks on a continuing basis and fully implements a comprehensive, ongoing program of testing and evaluation to ensure policies and controls are appropriate and effective. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective controls over information systems are essential to ensuring the protection of financial and personnel information and the security and reliability of bank examination data maintained bythe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). As part of GAO's 2002 financial statement audits of the three FDIC funds, we assessed (1) the corporation's progress in addressing computer security weaknesses found in GAO's 2001 audit, and (2) the effectiveness of FDIC's controls.
What GAO Found
FDIC has made progress in correcting information system controls since GAO's 2001 review. Of the 41 weaknesses identified that year, FDIC has corrected or has specific action plans to correct all of them. GAO's 2002 audit nonetheless identified 29 new computer security weaknesses. These weaknesses reduce the effectiveness of FDIC's controls to safeguard critical financial and other sensitive information. Based on our review, mainframe access was not sufficiently restricted, network security was inadequate, and a program to fully monitor access activities was not implemented. Additionally, weaknesses in areas including physical security, application software, and service continuity further increased the risk to FDIC's computing environment. The primary reason for these continuing weaknesses is that FDIC has not yet completed development and implementation of a comprehensive program to manage computer security across the organization. FDIC has, among other things, established a security management structure, but still has not fully implemented a process for assessing and managing risk on a continuing basis or an ongoing program of testing and evaluating controls. The corporation's acting chief information officer has agreed to complete actions intended to address GAO's outstanding recommendations by December 31 of this year. |
gao_GAO-08-688T | gao_GAO-08-688T_0 | After a May 9, 2007, congressional hearing, Interior’s Deputy Secretary directed the Service Director to examine all work products produced by the Service and reviewed by Ms. MacDonald that could require additional review because of her involvement. The regions generally applied three criteria to identify decisions for potential revision: (1) Ms. MacDonald influenced the decision directly, (2) the scientific basis of the decision was compromised, and (3) the decision was significantly changed and resulted in a potentially negative impact on the species. Several Types of Decisions Were Excluded from the Service’s Review of Potentially Inappropriately Influenced ESA Decisions
Several types of decisions were excluded from the Service’s review of decisions that may have been inappropriately influenced. Second, the Service excluded policy decisions that limited the application of science, focusing instead only on those decisions where the scientific basis of the decision may have been compromised. The Service’s May 2005 Informal Guidance Had No Substantive Effect on 90-Day Petition Findings, Although Other Challenges Exist
While the Service’s May 2005 informal guidance had no substantive effect on the processing of 90-day petition findings, the Service still faces several other challenges in processing these petitions. Notwithstanding the Service’s May 2005 Informal Guidance, Additional Information Collected by Service Biologists Was Used to Support and Refute 90-day Petitions
In our survey of 44 Service biologists who prepared 54 90-day petition findings from 2005 through 2007, we found that additional information collected to evaluate the petitions was generally used, as applicable, to both support and refute information in the petitions, including during the 18-month period when the May 2005 informal guidance was being used. The Service Faces Challenges in Processing 90-day Petitions in a Timely Manner and in Responding to Court Decisions Issued since 2004
While the May 2005 informal guidance did not have a substantive effect on the Service’s processing of 90-day petitions, the Service still faces challenges in processing 90-day petitions in a timely manner and in responding to court decisions issued since 2004. None of the 90-day petition findings issued from 2005 through 2007 were issued within the desired 90-day time frame. During this period, the median processing time was 900 days, or about 2.5 years, with a range of 100 days to 5,545 days (more than 15 years). According to a senior Service official, the Service is planning to issue official guidance on how 90-day petition findings should be developed to eliminate confusion and inconsistencies. Recovery Criteria for Threatened and Endangered Species Were Generally Met in Final Delisting Decisions but Not in Proposed Delisting Decisions
Of the eight U.S. species delisted from 2000 through 2007 because of recovery, the Service reported that recovery criteria were completely met for five species and partially met for the remaining three species. When the delistings were first proposed, however, the respective recovery criteria for only two of the eight species had been completely met. Although the ESA does not specifically require the Service to meet recovery criteria before delisting a species, courts have held that the Service must address the ESA’s five threat factors for listing/delisting, to the maximum extent practicable, in developing recovery criteria. For the species where the criteria were not completely met before final delisting, the Service indicated that the recovery criteria were outdated or otherwise not feasible to achieve. In January 2008, in response to our recommendation, the Director of the Service issued a memorandum requiring all new and revised recovery plans to include criteria addressing each of the five threat factors. However, no comments were provided in time for them to be included as part of this testimony. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (Service) selection process of Endangered Species Act (ESA) decisions that were potentially inappropriately influenced; (2) the extent to which the Service’s May 2005 informal guidance affected the Service’s decisions on petitions to list or delist species; and (3) the extent to which the Service determined, before delisting, whether species met recovery criteria outlined in recovery plans. Many ESA decisions must be based, at least in part, on the best available scientific information. Objective 2: Decisions excluded from the Service’s selection process
Following criterion 3, the Service excluded decisions that were changed but not significantly or to the point of negative impact on the species. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) is generally required to use the best available scientific information when making key decisions under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Controversy has surrounded whether former Deputy Assistant Secretary Julie MacDonald may have inappropriately influenced ESA decisions by basing decisions on political factors rather than scientific data. Interior directed the Service to review ESA decisions to determine which decisions may have been unduly influenced. ESA actions include, among others, 90-day petition findings, 12-month listing or delisting findings, and recovery planning. The Service distributed informal guidance in May 2005 on the processing of 90-day petitions. Recovery plans generally must include recovery criteria that, when met, would result in the species being delisted. GAO examined three separate issues: (1) what types of decisions, if any, were excluded from the Service's review of decisions that may have been inappropriately influenced; (2) to what extent the Service's May 2005 informal guidance affected 90-day petition findings; and (3) to what extent the Service has, before delisting species, met recovery criteria. GAO interviewed Service staff, surveyed Service biologists, and reviewed delisting rules and recovery plans. Interior did not provide comments in time for them to be included in this testimony.
What GAO Found
Several types of decisions were excluded from the Service's review of decisions that may have been inappropriately influenced. Using the following selection criteria, the Service identified eight ESA decisions for potential revision: (1) whether Ms. MacDonald influenced the decision directly, (2) was the scientific basis of the decision compromised, and (3) did the decision significantly change and result in a potentially negative impact on the species. The Service excluded (1) decisions made by Interior officials other than Ms. MacDonald, (2) policy decisions that limited the application of science, and (3) decisions that were changed but not significantly or to the point of negative impact on the species. The Service's May 2005 informal guidance had no substantive effect on 90-day petition findings. In May 2005, Service headquarters distributed a guidance document via e-mail to endangered-species biologists that could have been interpreted as instructing them to use additional information collected to evaluate a 90-day petition only to refute statements made therein. GAO's survey of 90-day petition findings issued by the Service from 2005 through 2007 found that biologists used additional information collected to evaluate petitions to both support and refute claims made in the petitions, as applicable, including during the 18-month period when the May 2005 informal guidance was being used. However, GAO found that the Service faces various other challenges in processing petitions, such as making decisions within 90 days and adjusting to recent court decisions. None of the 90-day petition findings issued from 2005 through 2007 were issued within the desired 90-day time frame. During these years, the median processing time was 900 days, or about 2.5 years, with a range of 100 days to 5,545 days (over 15 years). Additionally, the Service faces several challenges in responding to court decisions issued since 2004. For example, the Service has not yet developed new official guidance on how to process 90-day petitions after the courts invalidated a portion of the prior guidance. Finally, of the eight species delisted because of recovery from 2000 through 2007, the Service determined that recovery criteria were completely met for five species and partially met for the remaining three species because some recovery criteria were outdated or otherwise not feasible to achieve. When the delistings were first proposed, however, only two of the eight species had completely met all their respective recovery criteria. Although the ESA does not explicitly require the Service to follow recovery plans when delisting species, courts have held that the Service must address the ESA's listing/delisting threat factors to the maximum extent practicable when developing recovery criteria. In 2006, GAO reported that the Service's recovery plans generally did not contain criteria specifying when a species could be recovered and removed from the endangered species list. Earlier this year, in response to GAO's recommendation, the Service issued a directive requiring all new and revised recovery plans to include criteria addressing each of the ESA's listing/delisting threat factors. |
gao_GAO-14-748T | gao_GAO-14-748T_0 | Several Mechanisms Have Been Established Over Time to Help Facilitate SBIR Technology Transition
Transitioning technologies from defense research organizations and technology development programs, such as the SBIR program, to military users has been a long-standing challenge for DOD. To address technology transition challenges in DOD’s SBIR program, Congress and DOD have established several program provisions and mechanisms over the past decade, including the following:
Congress directed the establishment of the Commercialization Pilot Program, subsequently renamed the Commercialization Readiness Program, in fiscal year 2006 to accelerate the transition of SBIR- funded technologies to Phase III, especially those that lead to acquisition programs and high priority military requirements, such as fielded systems. Each military department’s SBIR program also has a network of transition facilitators who manage the Commercialization Readiness Program and other SBIR activities that support technology transition. Although the roles and responsibilities vary somewhat across the military departments, in general, transition facilitators foster ties among small businesses, military research laboratories, and the acquisition community in support of transition opportunities, and monitor project progress, including outcomes. In the fiscal year 2012 reauthorization of the SBIR program, Congress authorized a pilot effort to allow the DOD SBIR program the opportunity to use more of their SBIR funds (up to 3 percent) for program administration, technical assistance, and commercialization and outreach activities. The military departments have developed mechanisms to do this, which provide awardees additional SBIR funding to move Phase II projects closer to transition. Further, at other times, promising technologies are not taken advantage of because their potential has not been adequately demonstrated or recognized, they do not meet military user requirements, or users are unable to fund the final stages of development and testing. DOD’s SBIR Program Has Developed Some Technologies that Support Military Users, but Lacks Comprehensive Data on Transition Outcomes
In our 2013 review, we found that the military department SBIR programs have identified some technologies that successfully transitioned into acquisition programs or fielded systems over the past several years, but the extent of transition is unknown because comprehensive and reliable transition data are not collected. The military departments collect information on selected transition “success stories” on a somewhat ad hoc basis from SBIR program officials, acquisition program officials, prime contractors, or directly from small businesses. In addition to less formal transition tracking efforts, the military departments use, to varying degrees, two data systems—Company Commercialization Reports (CCR) and the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG)—to identify transition results for their programs. While these systems provide high-level commercialization information that the departments use to track progress in achieving overall program goals, the systems have significant gaps in coverage and data reliability concerns that limit their transition tracking capabilities. In addition, the systems are not designed to capture detailed information on acquisition programs, fielded systems, or on projects that did not transition. DOD is in the Early Stages of Developing a Plan to Improve Technology Transition Reporting
New reporting requirements in the NDAA for fiscal year 2012 directed DOD to begin reporting new SBIR-related transition information to SBA, which is to be included in SBA’s annual report to designated congressional committees. At the time of our 2013 review, DOD was still assessing how to comply with the new transition reporting requirements directed by Congress, and no specific plan that included a time line for meeting the requirements had been established. DOD acknowledged that it may need to modify its existing data systems or develop new tools to compile more complete and accurate technology transition data, but cited several challenges to obtaining better data. In a recent update to our 2013 work, DOD officials confirmed that alternatives are still being evaluated and no plan for how and when it would improve the tracking and reporting of technology transition has been completed. Without better information on technology transition, questions will remain as to whether the DOD SBIR program is providing the right technologies at the right time to users, using effective approaches to select, develop, and transition technologies, and providing tangible benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on its research and development community to identify, pursue, and develop new technologies that improve and enhance military operations and ensure technological superiority over adversaries. The SBIR program is a key mechanism for DOD to use small businesses to meet its research and development needs; stimulate technological innovation; foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation; and increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal research and development funding. DOD is the largest SBIR participant in the federal government, with over $1 billion spent annually on the program.
This testimony is based primarily on a report GAO issued in December 2013 and addresses: (1) practices the military departments use to facilitate the transition of SBIR technologies, (2) the extent to which these technologies are successfully transitioning to military users, such as weapon system programs or warfighters in the field, and (3) DOD's efforts to meet fiscal year 2012 NDAA transition reporting requirements. This statement draws from the 2013 report and other work GAO has conducted on technology transition activities in DOD's science and technology programs.
What GAO Found
Transitioning technologies from defense research and technology development programs, such as through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, to military users has been a long-standing challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD). Over the past decade, Congress and DOD have taken several steps to address transition challenges in DOD's SBIR program. For example, the military departments can offer additional SBIR funding to certain awardees to supplement or extend technology development projects in order to move them closer to transition. Additionally, each of the military departments has a network of transition facilitators who work directly with small businesses, military research laboratories, and the acquisition community to foster transition opportunities. Further, in fiscal year 2012, Congress provided federal agencies the opportunity to use more of SBIR funding (up to 3 percent) for program administrative purposes, including activities that facilitate transition. However, at times, promising technologies are not taken advantage of because their potential has not been adequately demonstrated, they do not meet military requirements, or users are unable to fund the final stages of development and testing.
GAO found that DOD's SBIR program has developed some technologies that successfully transitioned into acquisition programs or fielded systems, but the extent of transition is unknown because comprehensive and reliable transition data are not collected. The military departments collect information on selected transition “success stories” on a somewhat ad hoc basis from SBIR program officials, acquisition program officials, prime contractors, or directly from small businesses. In addition to these less formal transition tracking efforts, the military departments use, to varying degrees, two data systems—Company Commercialization Reports and the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation—to identify transition results program-wide. While these systems provide high-level commercialization information that the departments use to track progress in achieving overall program goals, the systems have significant gaps in coverage and data reliability concerns that limit their transition tracking capabilities. In addition, the systems are not designed to capture detailed information on acquisition programs, fielded systems, or on projects that did not transition.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2012 directed DOD to begin reporting the number and percentage of SBIR projects that transition into acquisition programs or to fielded systems, among other things. DOD acknowledged that it may need to modify its existing data systems or develop new tools to compile more complete and accurate technology transition data. At the end of 2013, DOD was still assessing how to comply with the new transition reporting requirements, and had not established a specific plan, as GAO had recommended, for how and when it would be able to meet the requirements. In a recent update, DOD officials confirmed that alternatives are still being evaluated and no plan for improving the tracking and reporting of technology transition has been completed. Without better information on technology transition outcomes, questions will remain as to whether the DOD SBIR program is providing the right technologies at the right time to users, using effective approaches to select, develop, and transition technologies, and providing tangible benefits. |
gao_GAO-07-1051T | gao_GAO-07-1051T_0 | System Infrastructure and Service Strategies Have Evolved To Meet the Needs of Job Seekers and Employers
Seven years after the implementation of the workforce investment system under WIA, the system’s infrastructure continues to evolve. Nationwide, the number of comprehensive one-stop centers has decreased somewhat, but not uniformly across states. States generally reported increased availability of services for some of the mandatory programs at comprehensive one-stop centers. But despite WIA’s requirement that all mandatory partners provide services through the one-stop system, some states have maintained a completely separate system for delivering services for Wagner-Peyser-funded Employment Services (ES). Adults and dislocated workers receive a wide range of services through the one-stop system, but states and local areas have generally focused their youth services on in-school youth, finding it difficult to recruit and retain out-of- school youth. Most medium and large employers are aware of and use the system and are quite satisfied with its services, but they generally use one- stop centers to fill their needs for low-skilled workers. States continue to have services for two key programs—WIA Adult and Dislocated Workers—available on-site at the majority of the one-stop centers. Local boards used about 40 percent of the approximately $2.4 billion in WIA funds they had available in program year 2003 to provide training services to an estimated 416,000 WIA participants, primarily in occupational skills. Additional Action Could Help System Development
Despite the successes state and local officials have had since WIA’s implementation, some aspects of the law and other factors have hampered their efforts. For example, the formulas in WIA that are used to allocate funds to states do not reflect current program design and have caused wide fluctuations in funding levels from year to year. In addition, Labor’s focus on expenditures without including obligations overestimates the amount of funds available to provide services at the local level. Labor has taken some steps to improve guidance and communication, but does not involve key stakeholders in the development of some major initiatives and provides too little time for states and local areas to implement them. Funding Allocation and Spending Information Do Not Reflect Program Structure
As states and localities have implemented WIA, they have been hampered by funding issues, including statutory funding formulas that are flawed. Little Is Known about What the System Is Achieving
We have little information at a national level about what the workforce investment system under WIA achieves. Furthermore, Labor has limited information about employer involvement in the one-stop system. Both Labor’s OIG and our early studies of WIA raised issues on the quality of the performance data, and Labor has taken steps aimed at addressing these issues. In 2004, we recommended that Labor comply with the requirements of WIA and conduct an impact evaluation of WIA services to better understand what services are most effective for improving outcomes. In 2005, we recommended that Labor consider alternative approaches that involve ongoing consultation with key stakeholders as the agency seeks to implement its new initiatives. Labor has not taken steps to more accurately estimate states’ available fund by considering obligations as well as expenditures, establish suitable performance levels for states to achieve by developing and implementing a systematic approach for adjusting expected performance to account for different populations and local economic conditions, maximize the likelihood that new initiatives will be adopted in an achievable time frame by using a collaborative approach that engages all key stakeholders, and improve policymakers’ understanding of what employment and training programs achieve by conducting important program evaluations, including an impact study on WIA, and releasing those findings in a timely way. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Workforce Investment Act's (WIA) enactment in 1998, GAO has issued numerous reports that included recommendations regarding many aspects of WIA, including performance measures and accountability, funding formulas and spending, one-stop centers, and training, as well as services provided to specific populations, such as dislocated workers, youth, and employers. Collectively, these studies employed an array of data collection techniques, including surveys to state and local workforce officials and private sector employers; site visits; interviews with local, state, and Labor officials; and analysis of Labor data and documents. This testimony draws upon the results of these reports, issued between 2000 and 2007, as well as GAO's ongoing work on one-stop infrastructure, and discusses issues raised and recommendations made. Specifically, the testimony addresses (1) progress made by federal, state, and local officials in implementing key provisions of WIA; and (2) challenges that remain in implementing an integrated employment and training system.
What GAO Found
Seven years after implementing the workforce investment system under WIA, the system's infrastructure continues to evolve. Nationwide, the number of comprehensive one-stop centers has decreased somewhat, but not uniformly across states. States generally reported increased availability of services for some of the mandatory programs at comprehensive one-stop centers. However, despite WIA's requirement that all mandatory partners provide services through the one-stop system, some states have maintained a completely separate system for delivering services for Wagner-Peyser-funded Employment Services. Adults and dislocated workers receive a wide range of services through the one-stop system. Local areas used about 40 percent of their WIA funds in 2003 to provide training services to an estimated 416,000 participants, but the vast majority of job seekers receive services other than training. States and local areas have generally focused their youth services on in-school youth and have found it difficult to recruit and retain out-of-school youth. Most medium and large employers are aware of and use the system and are quite satisfied with its services, but they generally use one-stop centers to fill their needs for low-skilled workers. Despite the successes state and local officials have had since WIA's implementation, some aspects of the law and other factors have hampered their efforts. Funding issues continue to hamper the system. WIA's formulas that are used to allocate funds to states do not reflect current program design and have caused wide fluctuations in funding levels from year to year that do not reflect actual layoff activity. In addition, Labor's focus on expenditures without including obligations overestimates the amount of funds available to provide services at the local level. Moreover, little is known about what the system is achieving because only a small minority of participants are captured in the performance measures, and Labor has not conducted an impact study to assess the effectiveness of the one-stop system, as required under WIA. Labor has taken some steps to improve guidance and communication, but does not involve key stakeholders in the development of some major initiatives and provides too little time for states and local areas to implement them. We are suggesting that Congress consider taking steps to improve the stability of the funding and enhance the data available on people who use the system. In addition, in our past work, we have recommended that Labor use obligations when estimating states' available funds, that it comply with the requirements of WIA and conduct an impact evaluation, and that it consider alternative approaches in implementing new initiatives that involve ongoing consultation with key stakeholders. Labor has taken little action on these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-490 | gao_GAO-17-490_0 | Agencies Generally Use Cost- Reimbursement Contracts with Incentives for Satellite Acquisitions
Given high development risks and the likelihood of requirements changes in satellite programs, most government satellite acquisitions use cost- reimbursement contracts. When lower-risk items are being acquired, such as standard spacecraft and communications satellites, agencies are more likely to use firm-fixed-price contracts. Agencies Primarily Used Cost-Reimbursement Contracts to Acquire Satellites Given Development Risk
Across the 19 programs we reviewed at DOD, NASA and NOAA, about $43.1 billion of $52.1 billion (83 percent) was obligated on cost- reimbursement contracts and orders, while the remaining $9 billion (17 percent) of obligations were on firm-fixed-price and fixed-price incentive contracts and orders. Program officials also said that award fee determinations can be effective in changing contractor behavior. On-orbit incentives included on the contracts and orders for our 12 case study programs ranged from no on-orbit incentive to approximately 10 percent of the contract value (see appendix III for more information on the on-orbit incentive amounts by contract). The timing of an on-orbit incentive represents how the at-risk amount is spread out over a satellite’s mission life. For some of the contracts and orders we reviewed for selected case study programs, the on-orbit incentives covered a satellite’s entire mission life. Government’s Recourse Is Limited When a Satellite Fails
The government’s recourse in the event of a catastrophic satellite failure on-orbit is generally limited to recovery of a portion of the on-orbit incentive. By design, on-orbit incentives are only a portion of the total contract value and therefore will not make the government whole in the event of total failure. Further, the government accepts more of the on-orbit risk than the contractor, in part because catastrophic failures are rare, according to satellite studies and industry experts we spoke to. Also, it is unclear whether increased on-orbit incentives would decrease the likelihood of on-orbit failures. Attributing positive on-orbit performance directly to on- orbit incentives is challenging, given the many factors that contribute to a satellite program’s success, including requirements and funding stability, technology maturity, and government and contractor experience. As a result, it appears the most cost effective way to limit the government’s loss in the event of a catastrophic failure may be to reduce cost growth and schedule delays by using best practices during satellite development, as we have previously recommended. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, NASA, and NOAA for their review and comment. As a result, the total costs for a given program will be larger than the contracts values discussed in this report. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) contract and incentive structures, under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, we examined (1) the types of contracts and incentive structures government satellite programs use to develop satellites and why, (2) how selected programs structure on-orbit incentives, and (3) government options for recourse, if any, when a satellite fails or underperforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Acquiring and fielding satellites are high stakes endeavors. Each year, DOD, NASA, and NOAA spend billions of dollars acquiring satellites. Unlike with other major acquisitions, such as ships or aircraft, an agency can only determine the quality of a satellite after it is launched. That means any defects that occur may be impossible to repair, and in space, a single failure can be catastrophic for a mission's success.
As a result, contractor performance is critical to a program's success, and contract incentives can be particularly important in aligning government and contractor interests—both in achieving mission success and ensuring responsible financial management.
This report addresses (1) the types of contracts DOD, NASA, and NOAA use to develop satellites, (2) how selected programs structure on-orbit incentives, and (3) what recourse, if any, the government has in the event of satellite failure or underperformance. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed contract obligations data and documentation for 19 current satellite programs; reviewed policies and guidance regarding contact types and incentives; selected 12 case studies to determine incentive structures and recourse options; and interviewed program and contracting officials at each agency, as well as commercial representatives and industry experts.
What GAO Found
Given high development risks and uncertain requirements in satellite programs, most government satellite acquisitions use cost-reimbursement contracts. When lower-risk items are being acquired, such as standard spacecraft and communications satellites, agencies used firm-fixed-price contracts. Overall, across 19 programs GAO reviewed at the Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), about $43.1 billion of $52.1 billion was obligated on cost-reimbursement contracts and orders, while the remaining $9 billion were on firm-fixed-price and fixed-price incentive contracts and orders.
Most of the 12 selected programs that GAO reviewed contained an on-orbit incentive—incentives based on successful performance in space; however, they varied widely in terms of the amount at-risk for the contractor and the timing of payments. For example, the on-orbit incentives included on the contracts and orders for the 12 selected programs ranged from no on-orbit incentive to approximately 10 percent of the contract value. GAO also found variation in how the at-risk amount was spread out over a satellite's mission life. For example, some contracts included on-orbit incentives that covered a satellite's entire mission life while other contracts covered only a portion of the mission life.
The government's recourse in the event of a catastrophic satellite failure is limited, relative to its overall investment. Given the small on-orbit incentive amounts included in contracts, the government's maximum financial recovery potential is modest. This is by design, however, as on-orbit incentives are not intended to make the government whole in the event of total failure. The government accepts this level of risk, in part because such failures are rare, according to government and industry experts. Also, it is unclear whether larger on-orbit incentives would reduce on-orbit failures given numerous other factors that affect a program's success, including requirements stability, design maturity and contractor experience. As a result, the most cost effective way to limit the government's loss in the rare case of a catastrophic failure may be to reduce cost growth and schedule delays by using best practices during satellite development, as GAO has previously recommended.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-02-415T | gao_GAO-02-415T_0 | In 1978, it established a regulatory process for recognizing tribes whose relationship with the United States had either lapsed or never been established—although tribes may seek recognition through other avenues, such as legislation or Department of the Interior administrative decisions unconnected to the regulatory process. Essentially, these criteria require the petitioner to show that it is a distinct community that has continuously existed as a political entity since a time when the federal government broadly acknowledged a political relationship with all Indian tribes. Clearer Guidance Needed on Evidence Required for Recognition Decisions
While we found general agreement on the seven criteria that groups must meet to be granted recognition, there is great potential for disagreement when the question before the BIA is whether the level of available evidence is high enough to demonstrate that a petitioner meets the criteria. To mitigate this risk, BIA uses precedents established in past decisions to provide guidance in interpreting key aspects in the criteria. Recognition Process Ill-Equipped to Provide Timely Response
Because of limited resources, a lack of time frames, and ineffective procedures for providing information to interested third parties, the length of time needed to rule on petitions is substantial. The chief of the branch responsible for evaluating petitions told us that, based solely on the historic rate at which BIA has issued final determinations, it could take 15 years to resolve all the currently completed petitions. In contrast, the regulations outline a process for evaluating a completed petition that should take about 2 years. However, weaknesses in the process have created uncertainty about the basis for recognition decisions, calling into question the objectivity of the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1978, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) established a regulatory process for recognizing tribes. The process requires tribes that are petitioning for recognition to submit evidence that they have continuously existed as an Indian tribe since historic times. Recognition establishes a formal government-to-government relationship between the United States and a tribe. The quasi-sovereign status created by this relationship exempts some tribal lands from most state and local laws and regulations, including those that regulate gambling.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the basis for BIA's tribal recognition decisions is not always clear. Although petitioning tribes must meet set criteria to be granted recognition, no guidance exists to clearly explain how to interpret key aspects of the criteria. This lack of guidance creates controversy and uncertainty for all parties about the basis for decisions. The recognition process is also hampered by limited resources; a lack of time; and ineffective procedures for providing information to interested third parties, such as local municipalities and other Indian tribes. As a result, the number of completed petitions waiting to be considered is growing. BIA estimates that it may take up to 15 years before all currently completed petitions are resolved; the process for evaluating a petition was supposed to take about two years. This testimony summarizes a November report (GAO-02-49). |
gao_T-HEHS-97-90 | gao_T-HEHS-97-90_0 | Also, exemptions from and exceptions to the cost limits are available to SNFs and home health agencies that meet certain conditions. The combination of these legislative and coverage policy changes has had a dramatic effect on utilization of these two benefits in the 1990s, both in terms of the number of beneficiaries receiving services and in the extent of these services. The number of beneficiaries receiving home health care more than doubled in the last few years, from 1.7 million in 1989 to about 3.9 million in 1996. We found that a lack of adequate controls over the home health program, such as little intermediary medical review and limited physician involvement, makes it nearly impossible to know whether the beneficiary receiving home care qualifies for the benefit, needs the care being delivered, or even receives the services being billed to Medicare. Administration’s Proposals for Prospective Payment Systems
The goal in designing a PPS is to ensure that providers have incentives to control costs and that, at the same time, payments are adequate for efficient providers to furnish needed services and at least recover their costs. An alternative to the proposal’s choice of a day of care as the unit of service is an episode of care—the entire period of SNF care covered by Medicare. Regarding the types of costs covered by PPS rates, a major contributor to Medicare’s SNF cost growth has been the increased use of ancillary services, particularly therapy services. Proposal for a Home Health PPS
The summary of the administration’s proposal for a home health PPS is very general, saying only that a PPS for an appropriate unit of service would be established in 1999 using budget neutral rates calculated after reducing expenditures by 15 percent. As we reported in March 1996, controls over the use of home health care are virtually nonexistent. Consolidated Billing for SNFs
The administration has also announced that it will propose requiring SNFs to bill Medicare for all services provided to their beneficiary residents except for physician and some practitioner services. In effect, outside suppliers would have to make arrangements with SNFs under such a provision so that nursing homes would bill for suppliers’ services and would be financially liable and medically responsible for the care. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed Medicare's skilled nursing facility (SNF) and home health care benefits and the administration's forthcoming legislative proposals related to them.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicare's SNF costs have grown primarily because a larger portion of beneficiaries use SNFs than in the past and because of a large increase in the provision of ancillary services; (2) for home health care costs, both the number of beneficiaries and the number of services used by each beneficiary have more than doubled; (3) a combination of factors led to the increased use of both benefits: (a) legislation and coverage policy changes in response to court decisions liberalized coverage criteria for the benefits, enabling more beneficiaries to qualify for care; (b) these changes also transformed the nature of home health care from primarily posthospital care to more long-term care for chronic conditions; (c) earlier discharges from hospitals led to the substitution of days spent in SNFs for what in the past would have been the last few days of hospital care, and increased use of ancillary services, such as physical therapy, in SNFs; and (d) a diminution of administrative controls over the benefits, resulting at least in part from fewer resources being available for such controls, reduced the likelihood of inappropriately submitted claims being denied; (4) the major proposals by the administration for both SNFs and home health care are designed to give the providers of these services increased incentives to operate efficiently by moving them from a cost reimbursement to a prospective payment system; (5) however, what remains unclear about these proposals is whether an appropriate unit of service can be defined for calculating prospective payments and whether the Health Care Financing Administration's databases are adequate for it to set reasonable rates; (6) the administration is also proposing that SNFs be required to bill for all services provided to their Medicare residents rather than allowing outside suppliers to bill; and (7) this latter proposal has merit, because it would make control over the use of ancillary services significantly easier. |
gao_GAO-02-557T | gao_GAO-02-557T_0 | Although DOD has responded positively to increases in servicemembers with family obligations by incorporating a number of family friendly benefits, opportunities exist to improve some current benefits in this area. In addition, DOD faces challenges in reaching out to servicemembers to increase their awareness and use of benefits. Following the passage of the Military Child Care Act of 1989, DOD worked to improve the quality, availability, and affordability of military child care. DOD Offers Wide Array of Benefits for Active Duty Servicemembers
When we compared the types of benefits offered as part of the military’s overall benefit package with private-sector benefits, we did not identify significant gaps in the benefit package offered to active duty servicemembers. These benefits are retirement, health care, life insurance, and paid time off. Like the military, the private sector also has reacted to demographic changes in the workforce. | What GAO Found
Since the advent of the all-volunteer Army in 1973, the number of servicemembers with spouses and children has grown significantly. Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has responded positively to this change, GAO believes that some current family benefits could be strengthened. For example, despite improvements to the quality of military child care centers, DOD needs to further expand child care capacity. Moreover, DOD faces challenges in increasing awareness and use of these benefits. GAO compared the military's benefits with those of the private sector, including retirement pay, health care, life insurance, and paid time-off, and found no significant gaps in the benefits offered to active duty servicemen and women. In fact, some military benefits exceed those offered by the private sector. |
gao_GAO-06-672 | gao_GAO-06-672_0 | Federal regulation recognizes the need to protect critical infrastructures. Although Both Cyber and Physical Incidents Have Caused Disruptions, the Internet Has Not Yet Suffered a Catastrophic Failure
The Internet’s infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions in service due to terrorist and other malicious attacks, natural disasters, accidents, technological problems, or a combination of the above. Recent cyber and physical incidents have caused localized or regional disruptions, highlighting the importance of recovery planning. These incidents can be intentional (such as a cyber attack or a terrorist attack on our nation’s physical infrastructure) or unintentional (such as a software malfunction or a natural disaster). A physical incident could be caused by an intentional attack, a natural disaster, or an accident. Existing Laws and Regulations Apply to the Internet, but Numerous Uncertainties Exist in Using Them for Internet Recovery
Several federal laws and regulations provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet infrastructure, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption, because some do not specifically address Internet recovery and others have seldom been used. However, this law and regulation do not specifically address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. Although certain policies direct DHS to work with the private sector to ensure infrastructure protection, DHS does not have the authority to direct Internet owners and operators in their recovery efforts.”
DHS Initiatives Supporting Internet Recovery Planning Are under Way, but Much Remains to Be Done and the Relationships among Initiatives Are Not Evident
DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and national disaster response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure are not complete. In addition, DHS has started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation’s ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. As a result, the nation is not prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Multiple Challenges Exist to Planning for Recovery from Internet Disruptions
Although DHS has various initiatives under way to improve Internet recovery planning, it faces key challenges in developing a public/private plan for Internet recovery, including (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to a disruption difficult, (2) a lack of consensus on DHS’s role and on when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS’s ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of the private-sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until it addresses these challenges, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as the focal point for recovering the Internet from a major disruption. However, the vast majority of the Internet is owned and operated by the private sector. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identify the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluate the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assess challenges to such efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts business. While the Internet was originally developed by the Department of Defense, the vast majority of its infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to (1) identify examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identify the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluate DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assess challenges to such efforts.
What GAO Found
A major disruption to the Internet could be caused by a cyber incident (such as a software malfunction or a malicious virus), a physical incident (such as a natural disaster or an attack that affects key facilities), or a combination of both cyber and physical incidents. Recent cyber and physical incidents have caused localized or regional disruptions but have not caused a catastrophic Internet failure. Federal laws and regulations addressing critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, and the telecommunications infrastructure provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption. Specifically, key legislation on critical infrastructure protection does not address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. Other laws and regulations governing disaster response and emergency communications have never been used for Internet recovery. DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and incident response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure are not complete. In addition, the department has started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation's ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. However, progress to date on these initiatives has been limited, and other initiatives lack time frames for completion. Also, the relationships among these initiatives are not evident. As a result, the government is not yet adequately prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet disruptions include (1) innate characteristics of the Internet (such as the diffuse control of the many networks making up the Internet and private sector ownership of core components) that make planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) a lack of consensus on DHS's role and when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as a focal point for helping to recover the Internet from a major disruption. |
gao_GAO-01-863 | gao_GAO-01-863_0 | Background
SEC introduced its ARP program in 1989 because of capacity and other problems in the exchanges’ and clearing organizations’ information systems. Since the ARP program was created, exchanges, clearing organizations, and the systems that link the stock and options markets have continued to periodically experience capacity-related problems or other disruptions. Scope and Methodology
To determine the adequacy and completeness of the criteria SEC uses to conduct capacity and security oversight, we compared the criteria with guidance issued by other financial regulators and organizations that have developed standards for auditing information systems, including the information security manual we developed for use by federal agencies.We also used a list of criteria we developed based on the procedures recommended in a publication written by experts in the field of capacity planning for information systems and on the findings from our prior reports or testimonies that address automation issues in the securities markets. SEC Inspections of SROs Address Key Issues but Are Less Frequent Than SEC Staff Prefer
We found that, for the most part, SEC’s on-site inspections addressed key capacity and security issues. Most Independent Reviews Are Now Done By Internal Auditors Using a Risk- Based Approach
In the 1989 policy statement announcing the ARP program, SEC called for annual independent reviews of SROs that would cover capacity planning, security, and other areas. SEC staff told us that at that time, SEC proposed that external organizations perform these independent reviews. However, the program was not established under SEC’s rule making process. If SROs were required by SEC rule to provide SEC with notifications of significant changes to their automated systems, then the failure to have procedures in place for ensuring that notices of systems modifications are provided to SEC would likely demonstrate a weakness in the SRO’s internal controls. Appendix I: Comments From the Securities and Exchange Commission
The following are GAO’s comments on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s letter dated July 18, 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
Capacity problems and other disruptions at the securities and options exchanges have caused processing delays within the U.S. securities markets in recent years. These exchanges and clearing organizations have also been concerned about unwarranted access by hackers and other unauthorized users. To address these issues, the securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created its automation review policy program in 1989. The program calls for the exchanges and clearing organizations that act as self-regulatory organizations to voluntarily follow SEC guidance and submit to oversight of their information systems. The program includes two key policy statements that provide voluntary guidelines to these organizations, periodic on-site inspections by SEC staff, and independent reviews of systems by internal auditors or external organizations. In addition, self-regulatory organizations are expected to provide SEC with reports of system outages and notices of system modifications. This report reviews SEC's effectiveness in its oversight roles.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the program reasonably ensures that self-regulatory organizations address capacity, security, and other information systems issues. However, SEC could improve its program oversight by consolidating criteria used by program staff into a comprehensive guide. Overall, SEC's inspections addressed the key areas of program guidance and often contained substantive recommendations designed to improve the organizations' procedures. |
gao_GAO-14-497 | gao_GAO-14-497_0 | DHA’s TRICARE Dental Care Office administers and oversees the TRICARE dental care programs. TRICARE Dental Care Programs
The TRICARE Active Duty Dental Program
The ADDP supplements the dental services available to active duty servicemembers through DTFs with the goal of maintaining readiness for deployment. The TRICARE Dental Program
The TDP is a dental insurance program that is available to dependents of active duty servicemembers, and to members of the National Guard and Reserve and their dependents.sharing premiums, certain procedure fees, and costs above annual and lifetime maximums. The TRICARE Retiree Dental Program
The TRDP is a dental insurance program that is available to retired uniformed service members and their dependents. Acquisition Planning. DHA Analyzed Market Research, Performance Data, and Other Information in Developing Dental Services Contract Requirements
To develop requirements for each of its current dental services contracts, DHA officials analyzed market research, data from contractors’ past performance, legislation, independent cost estimates, and other information. DHA officials used this information to align the contracts’ requirements with contract goals to deliver high quality dental services in a cost effective manner, and to facilitate access to care. As part of its development of contract requirements, DHA officials gathered information through market research and analyzed it to determine the capabilities within the dental services market to satisfy the agency’s needs. Performance Monitoring. DHA officials analyzed information about contractors’ past performance, including contractors’ monthly reports and claims payment data, to assess and revise contract requirements for future contractors. Legal requirements. DHA officials reviewed laws relevant to each dental services contract to identify changes required by statute. DHA officials reviewed independent cost estimates for new benefit requirements they were considering to assess cost efficiency. Other sources of information DHA officials reviewed prior to determining whether to add, change, or eliminate requirements from their dental service contracts included
Lessons learned from previous procurements for other health services. Dental best practices and changes in the professional practice of dentistry. DHA Uses Separate Contracts Because of Funding Differences and Other Factors
DHA uses separate contracts for different beneficiary groups, in part, because the programs that serve them are funded differently. For example, the TRDP contract is separate from the ADDP and the TDP contracts because the government does not contribute any funds for the TRDP, but does contribute funds for the ADDP and TDP. Other factors that contributed to DHA’s decision to use separate contracts for its different beneficiary groups included differences between programs, such as differences in their purposes, covered dental services, and network access standards. DHA officials told us that they discussed this issue with potential contractors, who said that they would have to operate the programs separately. DHA officials determined that there would be minimal cost savings or efficiencies from combining contracts under these circumstances. ADDP and TDP Contracts
Among other factors, differences in how the ADDP and TDP programs are funded also influenced DHA’s decision to use separate contracts for these programs. For example, DOD pays all costs for necessary care provided to active duty servicemembers through the ADDP upon receipt of invoices for individually priced services. In contrast, the TDP is an insurance program: DOD and TDP beneficiaries share in the costs of premiums, which are paid to the contractor; and the contractor is at risk for payment to providers. The potential disadvantages of combining the contracts that DHA officials and contractors identified included: a reduction in competition if carriers do not want to participate in one or the other program, do not want to manage two different programs simultaneously under the same contract, or do not want to undertake a contract of the resultant size; greater difficulty in selecting the best contractor to award the contract, as one offer may be a better match for the ADDP requirements and another offer a better match for the TDP requirements; the potential for confusion among beneficiaries, dentists, and contractor staff because of differences between the programs (such as different benefits and payment requirements); and the potential for a compromise on quality if the contractor is not able to meet the requirements of both programs simultaneously and well. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this product from DOD. DOD also provided a technical comment, which was incorporated. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD offers comprehensive health care coverage to millions of beneficiaries through TRICARE, a system of health care that DOD purchases from private insurers to supplement the health care that DOD provides through its military and dental treatment facilities (DTF). Purchased dental services are provided through separate programs for different groups of beneficiaries: (1) the ADDP provides dental care to active duty servicemembers who do not have ready access to a DTF; (2) the TDP provides dental insurance to eligible dependents of active duty servicemembers, and to National Guard and Reserve members and their dependents; and (3) the TRDP provides dental insurance to retired uniformed service members and their dependents. DHA is responsible for awarding, administering, and overseeing contracts with private insurers for these programs.
Senate Report 112-173, which accompanied the Senate Committee on Armed Services' version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013, mandated that GAO review DOD's private sector care contracts, including its contracts for dental services. GAO examined (1) how DHA developed the requirements for its current dental services contracts and (2) the reasons for DHA's use of separate contracts for different beneficiary groups. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DOD contracts and acquisition planning documents. GAO also interviewed DHA officials and other stakeholders.
GAO made no recommendations.
What GAO Found
To develop requirements for its current dental services contracts, officials from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Health Agency (DHA) analyzed market research, data from contractors' past performance, legislation, independent cost estimates, and other information. DHA officials used this information to align the contracts' requirements with contract goals to deliver high quality dental services in a cost effective manner and to facilitate access to care.
Market research: DHA officials gathered information through market research and analyzed it to determine the capabilities within the dental services market to satisfy the agency's needs.
Performance monitoring: DHA officials analyzed information about contractors' past performance, including claims payment data, to assess and revise contract requirements.
Legal requirements: DHA officials reviewed laws relevant to each dental services contract to identify changes required by statute.
Independent cost estimates: DHA officials reviewed cost estimates for new benefit requirements they were considering for the TRICARE Retiree Dental Program (TRDP) and TRICARE Dental Program (TDP) contracts to assess cost efficiency.
Other sources of information: DHA officials reviewed lessons learned from previous procurements, current dental services contract requirements, and dental best practices and changes in the professional practice of dentistry.
DHA uses separate contracts for different beneficiary groups in part because the programs that serve them are funded differently. The TRDP contract is separate from the TRICARE Active Duty Dental Program (ADDP) and the TDP contracts because the government does not contribute any funds for the TRDP, but does contribute funds for the ADDP and TDP. To provide assurance that government funds are not expended for the TRDP, contractors said they would have to operate the programs separately. As a result, DHA officials determined that there would be minimal cost savings from combining contracts. Differences in how the ADDP and TDP programs are funded also influenced DHA's decision to use separate contracts for these programs. DOD pays all costs for necessary care provided to active duty servicemembers through the ADDP. In contrast, the TDP is an insurance program: DOD and TDP beneficiaries share in the costs of premiums, which are paid to the contractor; the contractor is at risk for payment to providers. DHA officials concluded that the disadvantages of combining these two contracts outweighed the potential advantages. Other factors that contributed to DHA's decision to use separate contracts for different beneficiary groups included differences in program purposes, dental services, and network access standards.
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with its findings and provided a technical comment, which was incorporated. |
gao_GAO-07-1122T | gao_GAO-07-1122T_0 | 2). The compact and the congressional notification also state that the compact will provide benefits to approximately 65,000 poor, rural inhabitants (see fig. 3). MCC used the estimated benefits and costs to calculate the compact’s ERR and impact on Vanuatu’s GDP and per capita income. MCC projects several direct and induced benefits from the compact’s infrastructure improvement projects over a 20-year period, beginning in full in 2008 or 2009 and increasing by at least 3 percent every year. MCC projects that direct benefits will include, for example, construction spending, reduced transportation costs, and time saved in transit on the improved roads. MCC’s Data Do Not Support Its Portrayal of Compact Benefits
MCC’s public portrayal of the Vanuatu compact’s projected effects on per capita income and on GDP suggest greater impact than its analysis supports. In the compact and the congressional notification, MCC states that the transportation infrastructure project is expected to increase “average income per capita (in real terms) by approximately $200, or 15 percent of current income per capita, by 2010.” MCC’s investment memo states that the compact will cause per capita income to increase by $488, or 37 percent, by 2015. However, MCC’s underlying data show that these percentages represent the sum of increases from per capita income in 2005 that MCC projects for each year. Our analysis of MCC’s data shows that actual gains in per capita income, relative to income in 2005, would be $51, or 3.9 percent, in 2010 and $61, or 4.6 percent, in 2015 (see fig. 5). In the compact and the 2006 congressional notification, MCC states that the compact will have a transformational effect on Vanuatu’s economy, causing GDP to “increase by an additional 3 percent a year.” Given the GDP growth rate of about 3 percent that MCC expects in Vanuatu without the compact, MCC’s statement of a transformational effect suggests that the GDP growth rate will rise to about 6 percent. 7). MCC’s portrayal of the compact’s projected impact on poverty does not identify the proportion of the financial benefits that will accrue to the rural poor. However, MCC does not establish the proportion of local- population benefits that will go to the 65,000 poor, rural beneficiaries. Several Risks May Lead to Reduced Project Benefits
Our analysis shows that risks related to construction costs, timing of benefits, project maintenance, induced benefits, and efficiency gains may lessen the Vanuatu compact’s projected impact on poverty reduction and economic growth. Although MCC considered the risk of construction cost increases, the contingencies used in its calculations may not be sufficient to cover actual construction costs. Timing of benefits. Although MCC’s analysis assumes compact benefits from 2008 or 2009—shortly after the end of project construction—we found that benefits are likely to accrue more slowly. Project maintenance. The compact’s induced benefits depend on the response of Vanuatu tourism providers and agricultural producers. MCC counts efficiency gains—such as time saved because of better roads—as compact benefits. Recommendations
In our report, we recommend that the CEO of MCC take the following actions: revise the public reporting of the Vanuatu compact’s projected impact to clearly represent the underlying data and analysis; assess whether similar statements in other compacts accurately reflect the underlying data and analysis; and improve its economic analysis by phasing the costs and benefits in compact ERR calculations and by more fully accounting for risks such as those related to continuing maintenance, induced benefits, and monetized efficiency gains as part of sensitivity analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for foreign assistance. Congress has appropriated almost $6 billion to MCC. As of March 2007, MCC had signed almost $3 billion in compacts with 11 countries, including a 5-year, $65.7 million compact with Vanuatu. MCC states that the Vanuatu compact will have a transformational effect on the country's economy, increasing per capita income and GDP and benefiting 65,000 poor, rural people. This testimony summarizes a July 2007 report (GAO-07-909) examining (1) MCC's methods of projecting economic benefits, (2) MCC's portrayal and analysis of the projected benefits, and (3) risks that may affect the compact's impact. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed MCC's analyses and met with officials and business owners in Vanuatu as well as with other donors. In its July 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Chief Executive Officer of MCC revise the public reporting of the Vanuatu compact's projected impact; assess whether similar reporting in other compacts accurately reflects underlying analyses; and improve its economic analyses by more fully accounting for risks to project benefits. MCC did not directly address GAO's recommendations but commented that it had not intended to make misleading statements and that its portrayal of projected results was factual and consistent with underlying data.
What GAO Found
MCC projects that the Vanuatu compact's transportation infrastructure projects will provide direct benefits such as reduced transportation costs and induced benefits from growth in tourism and agriculture. MCC estimated the costs and benefits over 20 years, with benefits beginning in full in 2008 or 2009 and growing each year, and it counted poor, rural beneficiaries by defining the area where benefits were likely to accrue. Using projected benefits and costs, MCC calculated the compact's economic rate of return (ERR) and its effects on Vanuatu's gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita income. MCC's portrayal of the projected impact does not reflect its underlying data. MCC states that per capita income will increase by approximately $200, or 15 percent, by 2010 and by $488, or 37 percent, by 2015. However, MCC's underlying data show that these figures represent the sum of individual years' gains in per capita income relative to 2005 and that actual gains will be $51, or 3.9 percent, in 2010 and $61, or 4.6 percent, in 2015. MCC also states that GDP will increase by an additional 3 percent a year, but its data show that after GDP growth of 6 percent in 2007, the economy's growth will continue at about 3 percent, as it would without the compact. MCC states that the compact will benefit approximately 65,000 poor, rural inhabitants, but this statement does not identify the financial benefits that accrue to the rural poor or reflect its own analysis that 57 percent of benefits go to others.We identified five key risks that could affect the compact's projected impacts. (1) Cost estimate contingencies may not be sufficient to cover project overruns. (2) Compact benefits will likely accrue more slowly than MCC projected. (3) Benefit estimates assume continued maintenance, but MCC's ability to ensure maintenance will end in 2011, and Vanuatu's maintenance record is poor. (4) Induced benefits depend on businesses' and residents' response to new opportunities. (5) Efficiency gains, such as time saved in transit, may not increase per capita income. Our analysis of these areas of risk illustrates the extent that MCC's projections are dependent on assumptions of immediate realization of benefits, long-term maintenance, realization of induced benefits, and benefits from efficiency gains. |
gao_GAO-14-493 | gao_GAO-14-493_0 | In fiscal year 2013, Congress appropriated about $66.5 million to ILAB for international technical assistance provided that “$40 million shall be for programs to combat exploitative child labor internationally” and “not less than $6.5 million shall be used to implement model programs that address worker rights issues.” Of that amount, the child labor office obligated about $56 million, and the trade and labor office obligated about $6.5 million for technical assistance projects. Labor Has Guidance for Developing ILAB Grant Solicitations
ILAB has guidance and criteria for developing project ideas. Officials from both the trade and labor office and child labor office told us the criteria are not formally weighted and that they consider many factors in deciding where to provide technical assistance, including the nature and extent of the problem, U.S. government priorities, and host government commitment. Before ILAB can publish a grant solicitation, it must go through Labor’s agency-wide clearance process. ILAB has faced challenges in maximizing competition, broadening the pool of organizations that apply for grants, because that pool is potentially constrained by the specialized nature of the work, challenging location of grants, and size and complexity of the grants. ILAB officials told us they take steps to maximize competition, including writing scopes of work that are broad enough for an applicant to develop its own strategy and publishing Notices of Intent to give applicants more time to develop proposals. Applicants’ past performance is assessed under the organizational capacity criterion. Incomplete Award File Documentation Causes Uncertainty about Whether Labor Followed Its Procedures
Incomplete documentation makes it difficult to determine if Labor has established internal controls over, and is following, its grant award procedures, including ensuring that Labor does not award grants to organizations that have been debarred from doing business with the federal government. Our review of 26 grant award files showed that some key pre-award documentation was missing in over half of the files and 4 files were missing all pre-award documents. Without such assurance, achieved through sufficient internal controls, that Labor is following its grant award procedures, ILAB is at increased risk of not meeting the goals of its programs. Labor officials acknowledged that many grant award files were missing documents, and the office has been trying to improve the organization of the files so that it is easier to follow the sequence of the award process. For example, the procurement office is now trying to more consistently use the responsiveness review checklist to record the documents it receives from applicants as well as another checklist to record the documents in the award files. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, internal control and all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. Further, the standards state that all documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the integrity of the procurement process for ILAB grants, the Secretary of Labor should: 1. provide guidance as to what documents should be in the grant award files to show that all grant award requirements were met; and 2. establish a mechanism to ensure that the guidance is implemented. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report reviews issues related to the Department of Labor’s (Labor) Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) international technical assistance. The objectives of this report examined (1) how ILAB develops its technical assistance projects; (2) how ILAB selects recipients of its funding; and (3) how Labor manages its grant award documentation. We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of 26 projects out of a total of 98 projects that were active in calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2013. We selected the sample based on several factors, such as dollar value and geographic location. Past performance of Labor-funded child labor projects in a given country. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent incidents, including the collapse of a factory building in Bangladesh, have highlighted poor working conditions overseas. According to the International Labour Organization, millions of children worldwide are engaged in labor that hinders their development. ILAB provides technical assistance mainly through international and nongovernmental organizations to improve working conditions by supporting worker rights and combating child labor. You asked us to review issues related to ILAB's international technical assistance. This report examines (1) how ILAB develops its technical assistance projects, (2) how ILAB selects recipients of its funding, and (3) how Labor manages its grant award documentation.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Labor guidance on procurement, ILAB project manager manuals, and grant solicitations. GAO examined a nongeneralizable sample of 26 award files that were active in calendar years 2011-2013. GAO selected this sample based on several factors, including dollar value and geographic location. GAO also interviewed officials from ILAB and the Labor procurement office as well as ILAB grantees in Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's (Labor) Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) has guidance and criteria for developing projects covering trade and labor and child labor. In fiscal year 2013, the child labor office obligated about $56 million and the trade and labor office obligated about $13.5 million for technical assistance projects. Officials from both offices said they consider many factors in deciding where to provide technical assistance, including the nature and extent of the problem, U.S. government priorities, and host government commitment. Each office uses a variety of information sources to develop project ideas. Once ILAB has decided to develop a project, the draft grant solicitation must go through Labor's agency-wide clearance process.
Labor has established procedures to select recipients of its funding, including processes for evaluating applications for grants, such as assessing applicants' past performance and capacity to manage grant funds. Officials said they have difficulty attracting a large number of applicants because the pool is potentially constrained by the specialized nature of the work, challenging location of the grants, and size and complexity of the grants. According to officials, ILAB takes steps to maximize competition, such as publishing Notices of Intent to give applicants more time to develop proposals.
Incomplete documentation makes it difficult to determine if Labor is following its grant award procedures, including conducting due diligence on financial viability and past performance of applicants. Based on GAO's review of 26 grant award files, over half of the files were missing some documentation, and 4 were missing all pre-award documents (see figure). Officials said that the procurement office has been trying to improve the organization of the files so that it is easier to follow the steps of the award process. For example, procurement officials said they are trying to more consistently use a checklist to record the documents the office receives, such as past performance information. However, use of this checklist is not required, and Labor guidance does not clearly state what documents must be retained in award files. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , internal control, all transactions, and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available. Further, the standards state that all documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained. Without such assurance that Labor is following its grant award procedures, ILAB is at increased risk of not meeting the goals of its programs.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure the integrity of the procurement process for ILAB grants, the Secretary of Labor should provide guidance about documents required in grant award files and ensure that the guidance is implemented. Labor agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-855 | gao_GAO-14-855_0 | Background
DOD’s military Tuition Assistance Program helps active duty service members—some of whom may regularly be reassigned to another location, including overseas—pursue an education. Schools participating in the military Tuition Assistance Program must sign DOD’s Voluntary Education Partnership memorandum of understanding (MOU), which requires, among other things, that the schools (1) be accredited by a national or regional accrediting agency recognized by the Department of Education (Education); (2) comply with state authorization requirements consistent with Education regulations; (3) be certified to participate in federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965; (4) disclose basic information about the school’s programs and costs, including tuition, fees, and other charges to service members; and (5) undergo, when requested, an evaluation of the quality of the education programs it is providing to service members. In accordance with contract requirements, the contractor was to conduct evaluations of individual postsecondary schools. In Fiscal Year 2013, 571 Advisors Provided Information on Programs and Educational Support to Nearly 280,000 Eligible Service Members
Since Fiscal Year 2011, the Number of Advisors Increased Slightly Overall, with the Air Force Driving Most of the Increase
In fiscal year 2013, 571 advisors were available to provide a range of information on programs and educational support to nearly 280,000 service members taking courses funded under the Tuition Assistance Program (see fig. From fiscal year 2011 through 2013, the number of service members taking courses using the Tuition Assistance Program declined by 8,819 (about 3 percent), according to DOD data. DOD advisors, who are required to have specific training in educational advising, are available to help service members determine their educational goals, advise them about the range and types of schools they can attend, and the types of courses and degrees these schools offer. Evaluations of Schools Participating in the Programs Do Not Provide DOD with Information Needed for Assessment
The evaluations of schools by DOD’s contractor have provided a range of different information on schools participating in the Tuition Assistance Program, according to DOD officials, but they do not provide the information DOD needs to assess the schools. This is because DOD lacked a specific plan to frame and guide the evaluations, and did not require the contractor to develop one. According to federal standards, an evaluation plan should clearly define the evaluation questions and methodology and address the collective knowledge, skills, and experience needed by the entity conducting the evaluations. According to DOD’s contract, evaluations were to assess school quality. However, our review of the contract found that the 15 areas for evaluation that DOD provided to the contractor were often broad, not clearly defined, and lacked specificity (see app. For example, one area was simply stated as “the methods whereby academic institutions are invited on the installation.” Another simply stated “the degree of congruence among various missions (the military, installation, and the institutions), the education plan of the installation, the educational programs provided by the institutions which have a MOU with the installation and the distance learning providers.” Based on our review of these 15 areas, it was not always clear what DOD was asking the contractor to evaluate and how the 15 areas would be measured. Had DOD developed a specific plan to frame and guide the evaluations, such a plan could have better positioned DOD to fully assess the skills needed by the contractor before awarding the evaluation contract. Thus, DOD had to modify its contract to obtain the needed skills (see app. After concluding that the evaluations are not providing the information needed, DOD decided not to renew its school evaluation contract. Without a plan, it will be difficult for DOD to obtain information on the quality of the schools and determine whether any adjustments are needed in the program. In its comments, DOD agreed with our recommendation that a plan was needed to guide future school evaluations. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's military Tuition Assistance Program includes partnership agreements with about 3,000 schools through which service members can pursue a postsecondary education. Through this program, service members' tuition is paid directly to participating schools and in fiscal year 2013, the program spent $540 million. The program also provides service members with education advisors, and conducts evaluations of schools to assess quality. Congress mandated that GAO provide information on the role of these advisors and on the DOD contractor evaluations of schools participating in the program.
GAO examined (1) the number of advisors and the type of advice they provide, and (2) the information collected through evaluations of schools participating in the military Tuition Assistance Program. For this work, GAO analyzed DOD data on the program from fiscal year 2011 through 2013; reviewed all DOD contractor evaluations for fiscal years 2012 and 2013; and interviewed officials from DOD and the military services, contractor staff responsible for the evaluations, and advisors at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. GAO visited this base because many of its service members participate in the program, and some of the participating schools were evaluated by DOD's contractor in 2013.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2013, 571 Department of Defense (DOD) education advisors were available to provide information and educational support to the nearly 280,000 service members taking courses funded through the military Tuition Assistance Program. This program accommodates service members, who may regularly be reassigned to another location (including overseas), by allowing them to take classes online, directly on base, or at nearby schools. DOD advisors offer a range of services to service members such as helping them understand the types of degrees and courses schools offer and helping them develop educational goals and plans.
DOD used a contractor to conduct evaluations of schools participating in the Tuition Assistance Program, however, according to DOD, the evaluations did not provide the agency the information it needed to assess schools. This is because DOD lacked a specific plan to frame the evaluations, which according to federal standards, should clearly define the evaluation questions and methodology and address the collective knowledge, skills, and experience needed by the entity conducting the evaluations. According to DOD's contract, evaluations were to assess school quality, but the 15 areas DOD provided the contractor for evaluation were often not clearly defined and it was not clear what the contractor was to evaluate. For example, one of the areas was the “degree of congruence” among various entities involved in delivering educational services, which DOD provided the contractor without further specificity. Further, because DOD's contract did not specify all the skills needed by the contractor, DOD had to modify its contract to require such skills. However, still lacking information it needs, DOD recently decided not to renew the contract. DOD has suspended the evaluations and is exploring alternative options for evaluating schools, but does not yet have a plan to guide future efforts. Absent a plan, it will be difficult for DOD to have all of the information it needs to effectively evaluate schools.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a plan for future school evaluations. DOD agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-998T | gao_GAO-07-998T_0 | As of June 2007, 15 UN peacekeeping operations were ongoing in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas. Estimated Costs for a U.S. Operation Are at Least Twice the Cost of a Similar UN Mission
We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct an operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. Virtually the entire difference is attributable to the higher cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. Using the same basic parameters of troop and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimate that a comparable U.S. operation would cost about $876 million, slightly more than twice as much as the UN. Civilian police. U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, equipment, and special training. Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay and support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United States $260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related costs, while we estimate that the cost to the United States would be $208 million. Based on consultations with the joint staff officials and other experts, we analyzed how the cost of a U.S. operation would vary if we (1) changed the mix of active duty to reserve soldiers from 85 percent active to an entirely reserve force, (2) assumed U.S. forces would fully deploy within 60 rather than 180 days, and (3) increased the intensity of the operation. U.S. and UN-Led Operations Each Have Strengths and Limitations
Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States or the UN should lead a peace operation. U.S. Military Has Elements Critical for Peacekeeping, but Faces Shortages of Personnel and Equipment
Traditionally, U.S. operations have benefited from the advantages of a strong and well-established military that has provided quick deployment, a unified command and control structure, and direct access to well-trained military personnel and equipment. This has helped the United States rapidly deploy in past operations. However, ongoing operations in Iraq have challenged U.S. capabilities in key areas. Our work has shown that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have challenged DOD’s capabilities and created a continuing high demand for certain combat specialties, including military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. Thus, the UN operation was considered the most politically feasible option and the UN Security Council, with U.S. support, expanded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The UN has developed a cadre of senior officials who have gained experience with peacekeeping and nation-building activities over many missions. The UN has fostered a network of humanitarian agencies and development banks that UN peacekeeping missions can draw on to coordinate the extensive humanitarian and developmental activities related to operations with broad, integrated mandates that include nation building. Conclusion
The costs, strengths, and limitations of the United States and the UN are important factors in considering who should lead a peacekeeping operation. The UN has certain strengths in leading a peacekeeping operation, including multinational participation and international legitimacy, access to international civil servants needed for peacebuilding activities, and a structure for coordinating international assistance. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of June 2007, more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel are engaged in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 15 locations in Africa, Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East. In 2006, the United States provided the UN with about $1 billion to support peacekeeping operations. Given that thousands of U.S. troops are intensively deployed in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations are an important element in maintaining a secure international environment. As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the costs of the current UN mission in Haiti compared with the estimated cost of a hypothetical U.S. operation and (2) the strengths and limitations of the United States and the UN in leading peace operations. This testimony is based on our prior report and information we updated for this hearing. To estimate U.S. costs, we developed parameters for a U.S. mission similar to the UN mission in Haiti, which the Joint Staff validated as reasonable. We then applied DOD's official cost estimating model. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would implement an operation in Haiti in the same way as the UN.
What GAO Found
We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN mission in Haiti. The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of the mission. A similar U.S. operation would have cost an estimated $876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference can be attributed to cost of civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities. First, civilian police costs are less in a UN operation because the UN pays police a standard daily allowance, while U.S. police are given salaries, special pay, and training. Second, U.S. military pay and support reflect higher salaries and higher standards for equipment, ammunition, and rations. Third, U.S. facilities-related costs would be twice those of the UN and reflect the cost of posting U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. When we varied specific factors, such as increasing the number of reserve troops deployed, the estimated cost for a U.S. operation increased. Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the UN should lead a peacekeeping operation. Each offers strengths and limitations. Traditionally, the United States' strengths have included rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped personnel. However, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced personnel and equipment readiness levels and resulted in shortfalls for military police, engineers, and civil affairs experts. The UN provides broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN Security Council mandate and direction for its operations. The UN also has access to international civil servants, police, and senior officials who have nation-building experience and diverse language skills. Finally, the UN has fostered a network of agencies and development banks to coordinate international assistance with peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has traditionally had difficulties in rapidly deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping forces. |
gao_GGD-99-53 | gao_GGD-99-53_0 | The inspection report placed special emphasis on five of these recommendations. To determine the status of Nasdaq’s compliance with OCIE’s inspection recommendations, we met with appropriate SEC and Nasdaq officials, reviewed documents relating to SEC’s follow-up to the 1997 inspection, and reviewed NLQ procedures. SEC and Nasdaq Developed Reports in Response to Our Recommendations
In August 1998, in response to our recommendation, OCIE submitted an information memorandum to the SEC Commissioners that included the status of significant open recommendations resulting from OCIE inspections of the securities SROs. The purpose of our recommendation was to keep the commissioners informed and to provide an additional incentive for SROs to comply with OCIE recommendations. OCIE’s memorandum addressed recommendations from all OCIE SRO inspection programs. In August and November 1998, NLQ sent Nasdaq management quarterly statistical summary reports on the progress of the Nasdaq listing program. These summaries used statistical information as indicators of the effectiveness of Nasdaq’s listing program. The reports provided information pertaining to three primary activities within NLQ—exception granting and administration, application review, and compliance monitoring. They reported that they intend to follow up on three of the recommendations to ensure that the actions taken have been effective. OCIE recommended that NLQ: implement procedures requiring its analysts to closely scrutinize the value of unaudited assets and the value of audited assets that are unusual or of questionable value; train its analysts to thoroughly investigate and evaluate disclosures made by issuers in public filings and press releases and require its analysts to routinely conduct investigations into the backgrounds of those individuals involved with issuers, including independent accountants and underwriters; implement procedures to require companies that receive going concern opinions to set forth a business plan demonstrating their ability to continue business operations in compliance with listing requirements; create a uniform, concise compilation of its basic review procedures; and modify its program to monitor listed companies to enable NLQ to more quickly detect companies that are falling out of compliance. OCIE officials told us that the next inspection of Nasdaq’s listings department is scheduled for August 1999. RSCS Is Scheduled for Implementation During Mid-1999
Nasdaq officials told us that they have made substantial progress in their development of RSCS. They said that they expect RSCS to be implemented into Nasdaq’s compliance monitoring program some time during mid-1999. As a result, OCIE has stated that it is satisfied that Nasdaq has addressed all of its recommendations. Comments From the Securities and Exchange Commission
Comments From the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.
Major Contributors to This Report
General Government Division, Washington, D.C.
Michael A. Burnett, Assistant Director Edwin J. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. have implemented the recommendations from a previous GAO report, focusing on the status of Nasdaq's: (1) response to recommendations SEC made as part of its oversight of Nasdaq's Listing Qualifications Department (NLQ); and (2) new automated Risk Scoring Compliance System (RSCS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SEC and Nasdaq have implemented the GAO report's 2 recommendations; (2) SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) developed and issued its first report to SEC Commissioners on significant, open recommendations resulting from OCIE inspections; (3) OCIE's report included not only recommendations involving listing programs, but also those from OCIE inspections of various other self-regulatory organization (SRO) regulatory programs; (4) bringing open, significant inspection recommendations to the attention of SEC Commissioners, and letting the SROs know that this is being done, provides additional incentive for SROs to comply with OCIE recommendations; (5) NLQ has started preparing quarterly reports to Nasdaq's management that provide statistical measures of the listing program's results; (6) the report contains information pertaining to three primary NLQ activities, including: (a) exception granting and administration; (b) application review; and (c) compliance monitoring; (7) routinely reporting these overall program statistics to Nasdaq management should help to keep officials informed about whether the listings program is achieving results appropriate to program goals; (8) Nasdaq and SEC officials said that Nasdaq has addressed all 27 of the recommendations resulting from OCIE's 1997 inspection of NLQ; (9) SEC officials told GAO that they would follow up on three of these recommendations during the next OCIE inspection of Nasdaq to ensure that the actions taken have been effective; (10) Nasdaq officials told GAO that they have made substantial progress in their development of RSCS; (11) they expect RSCS to be implemented into Nasdaq's compliance monitoring program sometime during mid-1999; and (12) officials said that RSCS is to help NLQ analysts more quickly detect problem companies that are falling out of compliance with Nasdaq listing requirements. |
gao_GAO-03-884T | gao_GAO-03-884T_0 | States and Localities Have Embraced WIA’s Flexibility to Develop Promising Approaches to Serving Job Seekers and Employers
States and localities have found ways to use the flexibility in WIA to develop creative new ways to serve job seekers and employers. In particular, a group of 14 one-stops, identified as exemplary by government officials and workforce development experts for our study of promising one-stop approaches, has developed strategies for streamlining services for job seekers, engaging and serving employers, and building a solid one- stop infrastructure. In addition, to engage employers and provide them needed services, all of the centers used strategies that included dedicating specialized staff to work with employers or industries, tailoring services to meet specific employers’ needs, or working with employers through intermediaries, such as Chambers of Commerce or economic development entities. Finally, to provide the infrastructure needed to support better services for job seekers and employers, many of the one-stops we visited found innovative ways to develop and strengthen program partnerships and to raise additional funds beyond those provided under WIA. Selected One-Stops Used Strategies to Streamline Services for Job Seekers
All of the one-stop centers in our recent study focused their efforts on streamlining services for job seekers by ensuring that job seekers could readily access needed services, educating program staff about all of the one-stop services available to job seekers, or consolidating case management and intake procedures. First, the performance measurement system is flawed—the need to meet certain performance measures may be causing one-stops to deny services to some clients who may be most in need of them; there is no measure that assesses overall one-stop performance; and the data used to measure outcomes are outdated by the time they are available and are, therefore, not useful in day-to-day program management. Second, funding issues continue to plague the system. The funding formulas used to allocate funds to states and local areas do not reflect current program design and has caused wide fluctuations in funding levels from year to year. In addition, WIA provided no separate funding source to support one-stop infrastructure and developing equitable cost sharing agreements has not always been successful, largely because of the limitations in the way funds for some of the mandatory programs can be spent. Third, the current provision for certifying training providers as eligible is considered overly burdensome by many providers and may reduce training options for job seekers as providers have withdrawn from the WIA system. Finally, state officials have told us that they need more help from Labor in the form of clearer guidance and instructions and greater opportunities to share promising practices in managing and providing services through their one- stop centers. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony highlights findings from today's report on strategies that exemplary one-stop centers have implemented to strengthen and integrate services for customers and to build a solid one-stop infrastructure. It also shares findings and recommendations from our past work on challenges that states and localities have experienced as they implement WIA, which may be helpful as WIA is reauthorized.
What GAO Found
The workforce development system envisioned under WIA represents a fundamental shift from prior systems, and barely 3 years have passed since it was fully implemented. States and localities have found ways to use the flexibility in WIA to develop creative new approaches to providing services through their one-stop systems. In particular, a group of 14 one-stops, identified as exemplary by government officials and workforce development experts, developed promising strategies in several key areas. To streamline services for job seekers, they ensured that job seekers could readily access needed services, made sure that staff were knowledgeable about all of the one-stop services available, or consolidated case management and intake procedures. To engage and serve employers, the centers dedicated specialized staff to work with employers or industries, tailored services to meet specific employers' needs, or worked with employers through intermediaries. To build a solid one-stop infrastructure, the centers found innovative ways to develop and strengthen program partnerships and to raise additional funds beyond those provided under WIA. Our work on WIA implementation over the past 3 years has identified a number of issues that should be considered during WIA reauthorization. First, the performance measurement system is flawed--the need to meet certain performance measures may be causing one-stops to deny services to some clients who may most need them; there is no measure that assesses overall one-stop performance; and the outcome data are outdated by the time they are available and are not useful in day-to-day program management. Second, funding issues continue to plague officials. The funding formula used to allocate funds to states and local areas does not reflect current program design and often causes unwarranted fluctuations in funding levels from year to year. In addition, WIA provided no separate funding source to support one-stop infrastructure, and developing equitable cost sharing agreements has not always been successful. Third, many training providers consider the current process for certifying their eligibility to be overly burdensome, resulting in reduced training options for job seekers as providers have declined to serve WIA-funded clients. Finally, state officials have told us that they need more help from Labor in the form of clearer guidance and greater opportunities to share promising practices in managing and providing services through their one-stop centers. |
gao_GAO-13-462T | gao_GAO-13-462T_0 | In order to ensure the implementation of this framework, FISMA assigns specific responsibilities to agencies, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and inspectors general:
Each agency is required to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program and to report annually to OMB, selected congressional committees, and the U.S. Comptroller General on the adequacy of its information security policies, procedures, practices, and compliance with requirements. On February 12, 2013, the President issued an executive order on Among other improving the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.things, it stated that the policy of the U.S. government is to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared with U.S. private sector entities and ordered the following actions to be taken:
The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence are, within 120 days of the date of the order, to issue instructions for producing unclassified reports of cyber threats and establish a process for disseminating these reports to targeted entities. The directive calls for a number of specific implementation actions, along with associated time frames, which include developing a description of the functional relationships within DHS and across the federal government related to critical infrastructure security and resilience; conducting an analysis of the existing public-private partnership model; identifying baseline data and system requirements for the efficient exchange of information and intelligence; demonstrating a near real-time situational awareness capability for critical infrastructure; updating the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; and developing a national critical infrastructure security and resilience research and development plan. The Federal Government Continues to Face Challenges in Effectively Implementing Cybersecurity
We and federal agency inspector general reports have identified challenges in a number of key areas of the federal government’s approach to cybersecurity, including those related to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. Designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at federal agencies. Shortcomings persist in assessing risks, developing and implementing security controls, and monitoring results at federal agencies. As a result, they have limited assurance that controls are in place and operating as intended to protect their information resources, thereby leaving them vulnerable to attack or compromise. Recently, some agencies have demonstrated improvement in this area. Establishing and identifying standards for critical infrastructures. required by law or regulation to comply with specific cybersecurity requirements. Moreover, sectors vary in the extent to which they are Detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents. DHS has made progress in coordinating the federal response to cyber incidents, but challenges remain in sharing information among federal agencies and key private-sector entities, including critical infrastructure owners. Difficulties in sharing information and the lack of a centralized information- sharing system continue to hinder progress. These strategy documents address aspects of the above-mentioned challenge areas. However, as we noted in our February 2013 report, the government has not developed an overarching national cybersecurity strategy that synthesizes the relevant portions of these documents or provides a comprehensive description of the current strategy. Nonetheless, these actions do not fulfill the recommendation that an updated strategy be prepared for the President’s approval. In addition to lacking an integrated strategy, the government’s current approach to cybersecurity lacks key desirable characteristics of a national strategy. In 2004, we developed a set of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of national strategies in allocating resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability. Existing cybersecurity strategy documents have included selected elements of these desirable characteristics, such as setting goals and subordinate objectives, but have generally lacked other key elements. The missing elements include the following: Milestones and performance measures. Roles and responsibilities. Cybersecurity strategy documents have assigned high-level roles and responsibilities but have left important details unclear. In addition, while the law gives OMB responsibility for oversight of federal information security, OMB transferred several of its oversight responsibilities to DHS. While OMB’s decision to transfer these responsibilities is not consistent with FISMA, it may have had beneficial practical results, such as leveraging resources from DHS. Additional legislation could clarify these responsibilities. This strategy should also better ensure that federal government departments and agencies are held accountable for making significant improvements in cybersecurity challenge areas by, among other things, clarifying how oversight will be carried out by OMB and other federal entities. Such legislation could clarify the respective responsibilities of OMB and DHS, as well as those of other key federal departments and agencies. Cyberspace: United States Faces Challenges in Addressing Global Cybersecurity and Governance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal government agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures have become increasingly dependent on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their operations. While creating significant benefits, this can also introduce vulnerabilities to cyber-threats. Pervasive cyber attacks against the United States could have a serious impact on national security, the economy, and public health and safety. The number of reported cyber incidents has continued to rise, resulting in data theft, economic loss, and privacy breaches. Federal law and policy assign various entities responsibilities for securing federal information systems and protecting critical infrastructures. GAO has designated federal information security as a high-risk area since 1997 and in 2003 expanded this to include cyber critical infrastructure protection.
GAO was asked to testify on its recent report on challenges facing the government in effectively implementing cybersecurity and the extent to which the national cybersecurity strategy includes desirable characteristics of a national strategy. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on the report, as well as related previous work.
What GAO Found
The federal government continues to face challenges in a number of key areas in effectively implementing cybersecurity; these challenge areas include the following, among others:
Designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at federal agencies. Shortcomings persist in assessing risks, developing and implementing security programs, and monitoring results at federal agencies. This is due in part to the fact that agencies have not fully implemented information security programs, resulting in reduced assurance that controls are in place and operating as intended to protect their information resources.
Establishing and identifying standards for critical infrastructures. Agencies with responsibilities for critical infrastructure have not yet identified cybersecurity guidance widely used in their respective sectors. Moreover, critical infrastructure sectors vary in the extent to which they are required by law or regulation to comply with specific cybersecurity requirements.
Detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents. Sharing information among federal agencies and key private-sector entities remains a challenge, due to, for example, the lack of a centralized information-sharing system. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has yet to fully develop a capability for predictive analysis of cyber threats.
The federal cybersecurity strategy has evolved over the past decade, with the issuance of several strategy documents and other initiatives that address aspects of these challenge areas. However, there is no overarching national cybersecurity strategy that synthesizes these documents or comprehensively describes the current strategy. In addition, the government's existing strategy documents do not always incorporate key desirable characteristics GAO has identified that can enhance the usefulness of national strategies. Specifically, while existing strategy documents have included elements of these characteristics--such as setting goals and subordinate objectives--they have generally lacked other key elements. These include milestones and performance measures to gauge results; costs of implementing the strategy and sources and types of resources needed; and a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of federal entities. For example, although federal law assigns the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) responsibility for oversight of federal government information security, OMB recently transferred several of these responsibilities to DHS. This decision may have had practical benefits, such as leveraging additional resources and expertise, but it remains unclear how OMB and DHS are to share oversight of individual departments and agencies. Additional legislation could clarify these responsibilities. Further, without an integrated strategy that includes key characteristics, the federal government will be hindered in making further progress in addressing cybersecurity challenges.
What GAO Recommends
In its report, GAO recommended that an integrated national strategy be developed that includes milestones and performance measures; costs and resources; and a clear definition of roles and responsibilities. It also stated that Congress should consider clarifying federal cybersecurity oversight roles through legislation. |
gao_GAO-03-733 | gao_GAO-03-733_0 | Background
U. S. Attorneys serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General. EOUSA provides each U.S. Attorney and the 94 U.S. DOJ Guidelines Covering U.S. Attorneys’ Grant Activities
Guidelines first established by the Attorney General in 1994 stated that U.S. Attorneys and their staff may be involved in their community’s crime prevention and control efforts—including efforts to secure DOJ grant funds and work with grantees—as long as they subscribe to legal and ethical considerations. Attorneys to Be Active in Community Based Programs Involving DOJ Grants
U.S. According to guidelines established by the Attorney General in 1994 and revised in January 2001, U.S. However, U.S. Attorneys’ names are not to appear on grant applications unless required by law, and U.S. Attorneys and their offices in carrying out their grant-related responsibilities. Similarly, federal regulations and procedures call for systematic financial disclosure reporting to, among other things, facilitate the review of possible conflicts of interest to guarantee the efficient and honest operation of the government. Attorneys Offices that work with grantees and potential grantees and nonfederal appointees to PSN grant selection committees—to provide management assurance that these individuals are free from actual or apparent conflicts of interest. EOUSA has an evaluation program to assess and oversee the overall operations of each U.S. However, the evaluations are not designed to assess compliance with the Weed and Seed and PSN guidance related to ethical concerns that EOUSA recently issued. In some of these districts, U.S. Attorneys are not required to screen the selection committee members they appoint for actual or apparent conflicts of interests, nor are committee members asked to self-identify any actual or apparent conflicts of interest. Without a mechanism for monitoring U.S. Attorneys Offices’ compliance with available guidance, DOJ does not have reasonable assurance that its steps taken to date—such as the issuance of guidance, ethics training, and video presentations—are adequately understood and have reached all those who are covered by this guidance. On May 19, 2003, Department of Justice officials informed us that they had no comments on the report. Attorneys and their staff during calendar year 2002 regarding their role in working with grants and grantees awarded under the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) and Weed and Seed Programs. PSN Grants
During 2002, DOJ issued two sets of guidelines for U.S. Attorneys and their staff may, among other things serve as that chair or co-chair of the Weed and Seed Steering certify to the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) via a “letter of intent” that a potential Weed and Seed site can receive “official recognition;” that is the site has developed a strategy sufficient to make them eligible to apply for a Weed and Seed grant; review Official Recognition applications and prepare a cover letter for submission to EOWS supporting the site and its strategy; review funding applications to ensure technical accuracy and consistency with the Weed and Seed strategy; sign a statement of support for the Weed and Seed strategy; and supervise the site, as chair or co-chair of the steering committee, throughout the life of the initiative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ninety-three U.S. Attorneys serve 94 judicial districts (the same U.S. Attorney serves the District of Guam and the District of the Northern Mariana Islands) under the direction of the Attorney General. Among other things, the Attorney General expects U.S. Attorneys to lead or be involved with the community in preventing and controlling crime including efforts to secure Department of Justice (DOJ) grant funds and work with grantees. This report provides information about the guidance U.S. Attorneys are given in carrying out their responsibilities with regard to DOJ grants. It makes recommendations to assess compliance with guidance and to reduce the potential for conflicts of interest.
What GAO Found
U.S. Attorneys' grant activities are guided by legal and ethical considerations. General guidelines established by the Attorney General in 1994 and revised in 2001 outline how U.S. Attorneys and their staff can be involved in their community's crime prevention and control efforts, including DOJ grant activities. Last year, DOJ issued guidance in response to U.S. Attorneys' questions about their role in relation to two DOJ grant programs--Project Safe Neighborhoods and Weed and Seed. In addition, through its Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), DOJ provided training on ethical considerations in dealing with grant applicants and grantees under both grant programs. Although EOUSA has an evaluation program to assess and oversee the overall operations of each U.S. Attorney's Office, the evaluations are not designed to assess whether U.S. Attorneys and their staffs are following the recently established guidelines. Without a mechanism to make this assessment, EOUSA does not have assurance that DOJ guidance is adequately understood, has reached all those who are covered by it, and is correctly applied. In addition, federal regulations and procedures call for systematic financial disclosure reporting to facilitate the review of possible conflicts of interest and ensure the efficient and honest operation of the government. However, while GAO did not identify any incidences of conflicts of interest, certain individuals--staff in U.S. Attorneys Offices that work with grantees and nonfederal members of committees that are appointed by each U.S. Attorney to, among other things, assess the merits of grant proposals--are not required to disclose whether they are free from actual or apparent conflicts of interest. Based on the merits of GAO's work, DOJ officials stated that they would issue a directive to require members of these committees to sign a self-certified conflict of interest statement that is to be held on file subject to DOJ grant monitoring. |
gao_GAO-05-431T | gao_GAO-05-431T_0 | MNF-I Plan for Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces
In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The plan’s objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq’s insurgency and second with the development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. Data on Iraqi Security Forces Has Limitations
U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the status of Iraqi military and police forces. Ministry of Defense reports exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable. According to a senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not know how many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from police stations across Iraq. The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have their necessary equipment. The Insurgency Has Intensified
According to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq—particularly the Sunni insurgency—has grown in number, complexity, and intensity over the past 18 months. These key challenges are (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) determining progress in developing capable forces without a system for measuring their readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing police capable of democratic law enforcement in a hostile environment. This makes it difficult to provide effective support—the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command- Iraq cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical element in developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. To address this weakness, MNF-I and the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare some police to operate during an insurgency. Conclusion
The multinational force has been working to transfer full security responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. However, the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an intense insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a system to measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership and chain of command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it difficult to uphold the rule of law in a hostile environment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 2) the data on the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the Multi. National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed unclassified Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March 2005 that provided information about the number of troops by the Ministries of Defense and Interior. We also examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy, funding documents from the Office of Management and Budget and State Department, and the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental Request of the President. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military and police forces capable of maintaining security. To support this effort, the United States provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-04 to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the president requested a supplemental appropriation with an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi military and police forces. GAO provides preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces; (2) the data on the status of forces, and (3) challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments of Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other statements for the record from officials such as the Secretary of Defense. In addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training facility in Jordan.
What GAO Found
The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently maintain security. U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of March 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and about 62,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor. The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity, and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force has faced four key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment. The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq. |
gao_GAO-04-105 | gao_GAO-04-105_0 | Sentencing Commission (USSC) and directed that it develop a comprehensive sentencing scheme for federal crimes. As incorporated in USSC’s sentencing guidelines, both the substantial assistance and the safety valve provision may affect sentencing for offenders whose offense of conviction does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence—that is, whose sentences are solely governed by the application of the sentencing guidelines. More Than Half of Drug Sentences Fell below an Otherwise Applicable Mandatory Minimum Sentence
Of 41,861 federal drug sentences included in our analysis that carried a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, more than half (52 percent) fell below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence. After adjusting for differences in drug offenses and offender characteristics, the likelihood of an offender receiving a lower sentence due to either a prosecutor’s substantial assistance motion or for other reasons varied substantially across the 12 U.S. circuits and the 94 U.S. district courts. However, these differences, in and of themselves, may not indicate unwarranted sentencing departures or misapplication of the sentencing guidelines. Nationally for drug cases, USSC received 96 percent or more of each of these documents from the district courts. However, the missing data could limit analyses of sentencing practices in the few districts where missing data are most prevalent. More could be done to help reduce the number of documents that are missing, incomplete, or too difficult for USSC to interpret. We state in our report on page 11 that other downward departures are attributable to prosecutors as well as judges. Fast-track programs in the southwest border districts provide lower sentences initiated by prosecutors for low-level drug trafficking offenses. We will also make copies available to others upon request. Specifically, our objectives were to identify the percentage of federal sentences, and specifically, those for drug-related offenses, departing downward from the applicable guidelines range as determined by the court due to substantial assistance motions or other reasons; identify the percentage of federal drug sentences that fell below an applicable mandatory minimum due to substantial assistance motions or other reasons; compare the likelihood across judicial circuits and districts that offenders received downward departing sentences or sentences below a mandatory minimum; identify limitations, if any, of the U.S. Appendix III: Likelihood of Sentences Falling below a Guideline Range or an Otherwise Applicable Mandatory Minimum
This appendix provides odds and odds ratios to describe the differences across circuits and districts in sentences falling below a guideline range or an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum for substantial assistance and other reasons, both before and after controlling for differences in offender and offense characteristics. We did not confirm this statement with federal prosecutors. According to USSC database for drug sentences in fiscal years 1999-2001, the first reason provided for an other downward departure in 18 percent of the sentences was the government’s fast track programs; in 16 percent, plea agreement; and in 4 percent, deportation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Created in 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) was charged with developing the federal sentencing guidelines to limit disparities in sentencing among offenders with similar criminal backgrounds found guilty of similar crimes. Judges determine a specific sentence based on an applicable sentencing guideline range, such as 57 to 71 months, provided in the guidelines. Judges may impose sentences that fall anywhere within the range, above it (upward departures), or below it (downward departures). For some offenses, Congress established mandatory minimum sentences. Judges may also sentence below the minimum in certain circumstances. We examined the differences in drug offense departures from sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences among federal courts and the documents the USSC used to record and analyze sentences.
What GAO Found
Generally, downward departures are defined as (1) substantial assistance departures, made at the prosecutor's request because the offender provided substantial assistance to the government; and (2) other downward departures made for other reasons, such as a plea agreement, a judge's consideration of mitigating factors, or early disposition, i.e., "fast track" programs initiated by prosecutors for low-level drug trafficking offenses. Of federal sentences for drug-related offenses in fiscal years 1999-2001, the majority (56 percent) was within applicable guideline ranges. Downward sentencing departures were more frequently due to prosecutors' substantial assistance motions (28 percent) than for any other reasons (16 percent). For federal drug sentences that carried a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, more than half of the drug sentences imposed fell below a mandatory minimum. Of these, half fell below a minimum due to prosecutors' substantial assistance motions and half due to other reasons. After adjusting for differences in offense and offender characteristics among judicial circuits and districts, our analysis showed variations among certain circuits and districts in the likelihood an offender received a substantial assistance departure, other downward departure, or a sentence falling below a mandatory minimum. However, these variations did not necessarily indicate unwarranted sentencing departures or misapplication of the guidelines because data were not available to fully compare the offenders and offenses for which they were convicted. For drug sentences nationally, USSC receives 96 percent or more of the three key documents, including the statement of reasons (SOR), used to record sentence length and departures. For a small percentage of drug cases in USSC's database, information is missing, incomplete, or too difficult for USSC to interpret, principally affecting sentencing analyses in districts where the missing or incomplete data are most prevalent. |
gao_GAO-03-795 | gao_GAO-03-795_0 | Under TOP, FMS identifies federal payments, such as tax refunds, that are owed to individuals and applies the payments to their outstanding debt. SEC and CFTC Have Taken Steps to Improve Their Collection Programs, but SEC Has Not Ensured That All Eligible Cases Are Referred to FMS and TOP
SEC and CFTC have taken actions to improve their collection programs, addressing the three recommendations in our 2001 fines report. In contrast, SEC did not have a formal strategy for referring pre-guidelines cases and, further impeding its collection efforts, it did not have a reliable agencywide system for tracking monies owed in these cases. However, it has not established a time frame for fully implementing the computer system for the second phase of the plan. According to an agency official, the guidelines went into effect agencywide on September 2, 2002. It was too early to fully assess the effectiveness of SEC’s strategy for tracking, collecting, and referring post-guidelines cases, because most of these cases were not yet 180 days delinquent. Recognizing that the agency did not have a system that provided an accurate assessment of levied amounts and payments (among other things), SEC developed a draft action plan for implementing a new system to replace DPTS. The collection rates for closed cases (cases with a final judgment order for which all collection actions were completed) for SEC,CFTC, and the SROs from January 1997 to August 2002 showed that the regulators collected most of the fines imposed. Broadening the analysis to include open cases (cases with a final judgment order that remained open while collection efforts continued) had the greatest impact on SEC’s and CFTC’s collection rates because of a few large uncollected fines. Collection Rates Can Be Influenced by Factors That Are Beyond Regulators’ Control
Collection rates are the most widely available—and in some cases the only—measure of regulators’ success in collecting fines for violations of securities and futures laws. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To evaluate SEC’s and CFTC’s actions to improve their collection programs, we assessed their responses to our 2001 recommendations that (1) SEC take steps to ensure that regulations allowing SEC fines to be submitted to TOP are adopted; (2) SEC continue to work with FMS to ensure that compromise offers presented by FMS are approved in a timely manner; and (3) CFTC take steps to ensure that delinquent fines are referred promptly to FMS, including creating formal procedures that address both sending debts to FMS within the required time frames and requiring all of the necessary information from the Division of Enforcement on these debts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Collecting fines ordered for violations of securities and futures laws helps ensure that violators are held accountable for their offenses and may also deter future violations. The requesters asked GAO to evaluate the actions the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have taken to address earlier recommendations for improving their collection programs. The committees also asked GAO to update the fines collection rates from previous reports.
What GAO Found
SEC and CFTC have improved their collection programs since GAO issued its 2001 fines report. While it was too early to fully assess the effectiveness of their actions, SEC could be doing more to maximize its use of Treasury's collection services. SEC has implemented regulations, procedures, collections guidelines, and controls for using the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), which applies payments the federal government owes to debtors to their outstanding debts. However, SEC has been focusing on referring to TOP those delinquent cases with amounts levied after its new collections guidelines went into effect. The agency has not developed a formal strategy for referring older cases, reducing the likelihood of collecting monies on what could be more than a billion dollars of delinquent debt. Further impeding collection efforts, SEC does not have a reliable system for tracking monies owed on these older cases and therefore could not determine which cases were not being referred to TOP. SEC has drafted an action plan for a new system to track all cases with a monetary judgment. Once the system is in place, the agency should have a tool for identifying all cases, including older delinquent cases that can be referred to TOP. However, SEC has not established a time frame for fully implementing the plan. GAO's calculations for closed cases (collection actions completed) showed that regulators' collection rates on fines imposed between 1997 and August 2002 equaled or exceeded those from 1992 to 1996. Recalculating the rates to include closed and open cases (collection actions ongoing) affected SEC's and CFTC's collection rates, primarily because of a few large uncollected fines. |
gao_GGD-99-45 | gao_GGD-99-45_0 | Few State Retirement Programs Had Exactly the Same Component Mix as FERS or CSRS
All of the 50 state retirement programs had two or more of the four design components but few of them had all of the same design components as FERS or CSRS. A majority of states included three of the design components, but these were not the same components included in either FERS or CSRS. The lack of employer contributions distinguished these programs from FERS, and the inclusion of Social Security coverage distinguished them from CSRS. All States Made Design Changes to Their Retirement Programs Since They Were Established
All states have in some way changed the design components of their retirement programs since the programs were established. Six states have never added Social Security coverage to their retirement programs. Of the 48 state retirement programs with a DB component, officials representing 21 states told us that they had considered dropping their DB component in favor of a program consisting of a DC component with an employer contribution and Social Security. As shown in table 5, reducing government costs, enhancing portability, and/or lobbying by special interests or group(s) were among the reasons cited for considering such a change. The most common reasons officials cited for their states not making the change to a DC plan during their past legislative sessions were that (1) studies done by the states showed there was no need to change, (2) further study was needed, (3) the state’s labor unions opposed the change, and/or (4) there was a lack of interest or support. Officials representing the remaining 27 state retirement programs with a DB component told us that their states had never considered dropping the DB component. The most common reasons state officials gave for not considering the change from a DB to a DC plan were that (1) the DB component provided greater benefits, including survivor and disability benefits; (2) they regarded the DB plan as a better way to retain employees; and/or (3) there was little or no support for the change. These components are similar to the components found in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Does plan only include state general employees? | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the: (1) design components of retirement programs that states offer to their general employees and compared them to the design components of the two principal retirement programs for federal employees; and (2) changes states have considered and made to their retirement programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) all states used two or more of the four design components, but few of their retirement programs had all of the same components as the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) or the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS); (2) the majority of states--35--included three components and differed by only one component from either FERS or CSRS; (3) the lack of employer contributions to defined contribution (DC) plans distinguished these programs from FERS, and the inclusion of social security coverage distinguished them from CSRS; (4) in the final analysis, three state programs had the same components as FERS and six had the same components as CSRS; (5) GAO's review showed that all states have in some way changed the design components of their retirement programs since the programs were established; (6) developments in federal law that might enhance employee benefits prompted most of these changes; (7) officials representing 21 of the 48 state retirement programs with a defined benefit (DB) component told GAO that their states had recently considered dropping their DB plan component in favor of a program consisting solely of a DC component with an employer contribution and social security; (8) however, only two states have no DB plan, and one of these states--Michigan--recently dropped its DB plan and switched to a DC plan with an employer contribution for its state-sponsored retirement benefits; (9) officials from the 21 states cited reducing government costs, enhancing portability, and lobbying by special interests as the major reasons for considering such a change; (10) they also cited a number of reasons for not dropping their DB plans, the most common were that: (a) studies showed no need for the change; (b) further study was needed; (c) labor unions opposed the change; or (d) there was lack of interest or support for the change; (11) officials representing the other 27 state programs told GAO that their states had never considered dropping their DB component; and (12) the most common reasons state officials gave for not considering such a change were that: (a) the DB component provided greater benefits, including survivor and disability benefits; and (b) they regarded the DB plan as a better way to retain employees. |
gao_GAO-15-557T | gao_GAO-15-557T_0 | Its mission is to support the export of U.S. goods and services, thereby supporting U.S. jobs. Ex-Im offers export financing through direct loans, loan guarantees, and insurance. In addition, Ex-Im must provide financing on a competitive basis with other export credit agencies, minimize competition in government- supported export financing, and submit annual reports to Congress on its actions. Status of Ex-Im’s Actions to Address GAO Recommendations since Its 2012 Reauthorization
In six reports on Ex-Im issued since March 2013, we presented findings and made 16 recommendations to improve Ex-Im’s operations, summarized in this testimony in three broad areas: (1) portfolio risk management, (2) underwriting and fraud prevention processes, and (3) exposure forecasting and reporting on estimates of its impact on U.S. jobs. Ex-Im’s Portfolio Risk Management
Our recent work has produced several findings and recommendations about how Ex-Im manages risks related to the overall size and composition of its portfolio. Ex-Im agreed with all of these recommendations and has taken action to implement them. We therefore consider this recommendation implemented and closed. Stress Testing
GAO-13-303. Workload Benchmarks
GAO-13-620. Wide-Body Jets
GAO-14-642R. Ex-Im’s Underwriting and Overall Fraud Processes
Our most recent mandated report, in September 2014, found that Ex-Im had implemented many key aspects of its underwriting process but identified weaknesses in certain procedures.recommendations to Ex-Im to enhance its loan guarantee underwriting process and further document aspects of its underwriting and processes to detect, prevent, and investigate fraud. Furthermore, Ex-Im did not have mechanisms to verify compliance with certain established procedures, including documenting certain loan guarantee eligibility procedures. We are currently reviewing Ex-Im’s actions related to this recommendation. Dual-Use Monitoring
Our August 2014 annual report on Ex-Im’s monitoring of dual-use exports also found weaknesses in Ex-Im’s documentation of required procedures. Ex-Im’s Exposure Forecasting and its Reporting of Jobs Supported
In two May 2013 Ex-Im reports, we reported weaknesses in how Ex-Im estimated its future exposure, and we reported the limitations in its calculations of the number of jobs its financing supports. Exposure Forecasting
In our May 2013 report on Ex-Im’s exposure and resources, we found weaknesses in the methodology Ex-Im used to forecast future financial Although Ex-Im’s forecast model is sensitive to key exposure levels.assumptions, Ex-Im had not reassessed these assumptions to reflect changing conditions, nor had it conducted sensitivity analyses to assess and report the range of potential outcomes. We made two recommendations to Ex-Im: (1) that Ex-Im compare previous forecasts and key assumptions to actual results and adjust its forecast models to incorporate previous experience and (2) that Ex-Im assess the sensitivity of the exposure forecast model to key assumptions and estimates and identify and report the range of forecasts based on this analysis. Appendix I: Content and Status of Relevant GAO Recommendations
GAO-14-574: EXPORT-IMPORT BANK: Enhancements Needed in Loan Guarantee Underwriting Procedures and for Documenting Fraud Processes (September 2014)
The Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States should direct the appropriate officials to develop and implement procedures, prior to loan guarantee approval, for (1) verifying that transaction applicants are not delinquent on federal debt, including using credit reports to make such a determination, and (2) performing assessments of collateral for nonaircraft medium- and long-term loan guarantee transactions. GAO-13-446: EXPORT-IMPORT BANK: More Detailed Information about Its Jobs Calculation Methodology Could Improve Transparency (May 2013)
To ensure better understanding of its jobs calculation methodology, the Chairman of Ex-Im Bank should increase transparency by improving reporting on the assumptions and limitations in the methodology and data used to calculate the number of jobs Ex-Im supports through its financing. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the export credit agency of the United States, Ex-Im helps U.S. firms export goods and services by providing financing assistance, including direct loans, loan guarantees, and insurance. Following the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, Ex-Im's authorizations and financial exposure both increased rapidly. To strengthen Ex-Im, Congress mandated several reform measures in the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 and also required certain reviews and reports by GAO and others. Since March 2013, GAO has issued four reports mandated by the act ( GAO-13-303 , GAO-13-446 , GAO-13-620 , and GAO-14-574 ). In addition, in August and July 2014, GAO reported on Ex-Im's financing of exports with potential dual military and civilian uses and provided information on aircraft financing by Ex-Im and other countries' export credit agencies, respectively ( GAO-14-719 and GAO-14-642R ).
This testimony summarizes the findings and recommendations in those six recent reports, and provides updated information on the status of Ex-Im's actions taken to address GAO's recommendations. To update the status of its recommendations, GAO reviewed Ex-Im's modified and updated procedures and documentation and interviewed Ex-Im officials.
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
In six reports on the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) issued since March 2013, GAO presented findings and made 16 recommendations to improve Ex-Im's operations, summarized in this testimony in three broad areas: (1) risk management, (2) underwriting and fraud prevention, and (3) forecasting its exposure and reporting on its estimates of its impact on U.S. jobs.
Six of GAO's recommendations focus on improving Ex-Im's management of risks related to its overall portfolio. For example, in March and May 2013, GAO recommended addressing weaknesses in Ex-Im's model for estimating losses, data retained to analyze default risks, reporting of portfolio stress testing, and analysis of staff resources. Ex-Im has implemented all 6 of these recommendations.
In September 2014, GAO found that Ex-Im had implemented many key aspects of its underwriting process but identified weaknesses in the design, implementation and documentation of some procedures. For example, GAO found that Ex-Im did not have mechanisms to verify compliance with certain loan guarantee eligibility procedures and had not documented its overall processes related to fraud. Ex-Im has implemented 4 of the 6 recommendations in this report. It has not fully implemented 2 recommendations concerning assessing collateral on certain transactions and verifying that applicants are not delinquent on federal debt. GAO's August 2014 report on Ex-Im's transactions involving exports with potential dual military and civilian uses also found documentation weaknesses and made one recommendation. GAO is reviewing the status of Ex-Im's actions in the context of GAO's ongoing dual use review.
Finally, in May 2013, GAO found weaknesses in how Ex-Im forecasts its aggregate outstanding amount of financing (exposure) and how it reports estimates of its impact on U.S. jobs. GAO recommended that Ex-Im (1) adjust its exposure forecast model to incorporate previous experience and (2) assess and report the model's sensitivity to key assumptions. GAO also recommended that Ex-Im improve reporting on the assumptions and limitations in its methodology and data for calculating the number of jobs it supports through its financing. Ex-Im has implemented GAO's 3 recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-236 | gao_GAO-06-236_0 | Many stakeholders with whom we spoke and panelists on our expert panel identified a number of weaknesses with the command-and-control process. Although there is limited consensus about fully adopting either alternative model in the future, many stakeholders and members of our expert panel, as well as the Spectrum Policy Task Force, support balanced approaches that would combine elements of all three models. In addition, some panelists noted that the current allocation process leads to underutilization of spectrum. FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force Identified Two Alternatives to the Command-and-Control Allocation Process but Recommends a Balanced Approach
The Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, a document produced by FCC staff, identified two alternative spectrum management models to the command-and-control model: the exclusive, flexible rights model, and the open-access model. The open-access model allows an unlimited number of unlicensed users to share frequencies, with usage rights governed by technical standards. This is a licensed-based approach to spectrum management that extends the existing allocation process by providing greater flexibility regarding the use of spectrum and the ability to transfer licenses or to lease spectrum usage rights. We found that FCC’s implementation of auctions has no negative impact on end-user prices, infrastructure deployment, and competition; the evidence on the impact on entry and participation of small businesses is less clear. FCC’s implementation of auctions mitigates a number of problems associated with comparative hearings and lotteries. Auctions are a transparent process. Secondary Markets Provide an Additional Mechanism for Companies to Acquire Licenses and Gain Access to Spectrum
While FCC’s initial assignment mechanisms provide one means for companies to acquire licenses, companies can also acquire licenses or access to spectrum through secondary market transactions. In recent years, FCC has undertaken actions to facilitate secondary-market transactions. Industry Stakeholders and Panelists Suggested Several Options to Improve Spectrum Management
Industry stakeholders and panelists on our expert panel offered a number of options for improving spectrum management. The most frequently cited options include (1) extending FCC’s auction authority, (2) reexamining the distribution of spectrum—such as between commercial and government use—to enhance the efficient and effective use of this important resource, and (3) ensuring clearly defined rights and flexibility in commercially licensed spectrum bands. While panelists on our expert panel overwhelmingly supported extending FCC’s auction authority, a majority also suggested modifications to enhance the use of auctions. However, there was little consensus on the suggested modifications. Scope and Methodology
The Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act required us to review the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) commercial spectrum licensing process. The objectives of our study included examining the (1) characteristics of the current spectrum allocation process for commercial uses; (2) impact of the assignment process—specifically the adoption of auctions to assign spectrum licenses—on end-user prices, infrastructure deployment, competition, and entry and participation of small businesses; and (3) options for improving spectrum management. | Why GAO Did This Study
The radio-frequency spectrum is a natural resource used to provide an array of wireless communications services, such as television broadcasting, which are critical to the U.S. economy and national security. In 1993, the Congress gave the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to use competitive bidding, or auctions, to assign spectrum licenses to commercial users. The Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act required GAO to examine FCC's commercial spectrum licensing process. Specifically, GAO examined the (1) characteristics of the current spectrum allocation process for commercial uses; (2) impact of the assignment process--specifically the adoption of auctions to assign spectrum licenses--on end-user prices, infrastructure deployment, competition, and entry and participation of small businesses; and (3) options for improving spectrum management.
What GAO Found
The current spectrum allocation process is largely characterized as a "command-and-control" process, in which the government largely dictates how the spectrum is used. Many stakeholders we spoke with, along with panelists on our expert panel, identified a number of weaknesses of the existing spectrum allocation process, including that the current process is slow and leads to underutilization of the spectrum. FCC staff have identified two alternative allocation models: the "exclusive, flexible rights" model--which would extend the existing process by providing greater flexibility to spectrum license holders--and the "open-access" (or "commons") model--which would allow an unlimited number of unlicensed users to share spectrum. While little consensus exists about fully adopting either alternative model, FCC staff, as well as many stakeholders and panelists on our expert panel, recommend a balanced approach that would combine elements of the current process and the two alternative models. FCC's use of auctions to assign spectrum appears to have little to no negative impact on end-user prices, infrastructure deployment, and competition; evidence on how auctions impact the entry and participation of small businesses is less clear. Additionally, FCC's implementation of auctions has mitigated problems associated with comparative hearings and lotteries, which FCC previously used to assign licenses. In particular, auctions are quicker, less costly, and more transparent. Finally, secondary markets provide an additional mechanism for companies to acquire licenses and gain access to spectrum, and FCC has undertaken actions to facilitate secondary-market transactions, such as streamlining the approval process for leases. Industry stakeholders and panelists on our expert panel offered a number of options for improving spectrum management. The most frequently cited options include (1) extending FCC's auction authority, (2) reexamining the use and distribution of spectrum--such as between commercial and governmental use--to enhance the efficient and effective use of this important resource, and (3) ensuring flexibility in commercially licensed spectrum bands. Stakeholders and panelists on our expert panel overwhelmingly supported extending FCC's auction authority; however, there was little consensus on the other identified options for improvement. |
gao_GAO-11-58 | gao_GAO-11-58_0 | 1.) For example, the Recovery Act does not prohibit states from reducing optional services, or reducing provider payment rates. Nearly every state used the funds to cover increased Medicaid enrollment, which grew by over 14 percent nationally between October 2007 and February 2010. States Have Accessed Most Available Increased FMAP Funds and Made Program Adjustments to Comply with the Act
Through the end of the third quarter of FFY 2010, states had drawn down a total of $60.8 billion in increased FMAP funds—95 percent of the funds available at that point, or 70 percent of the total estimated $87 billion in increased FMAP that was provided through the Recovery Act. If current spending patterns continue, we estimate that the states will draw down $82 billion by December 31, 2010—about 94 percent of the estimated total allocation of $87 billion. 2.) Enrollment growth across the states varied considerably—ranging from about 1 percent in Tennessee and Texas to almost 38 percent in Nevada. Twenty-three states experienced a 10 to less than 20 percent enrollment increase, with 16 states experiencing an enrollment increase of 20 percent or greater. Across the states, most enrollment growth was attributable to children, a population that comprises over half of total Medicaid enrollment, and is sensitive to economic downturns. However, the highest rate of increase during this period occurred among the nondisabled, nonaged adult population. States’ Actions to Address Program Sustainability Include New or Altered Financing Arrangements and Reductions to Provider Payments
Forty-eight states reported concerns regarding the sustainability of their Medicaid programs after Recovery Act funding is no longer available, with most states reporting that the factors driving their concerns included the increased share of the state’s Medicaid payments in 2011, and the projection of the state’s economy, tax revenues, and Medicaid enrollment growth for 2011. Four states—Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, and Texas—and the District of Columbia reported that they did not implement any changes in response to their concerns about program sustainability; however, Medicaid officials in most of those states and the District told us that they were considering future changes. On August 10, 2010, Congress passed legislation amending § 5001 of the Recovery Act to extend the increased FMAP through June 30, 2011, but at a lower level. How states will fare as they return to their regular FMAP rates will vary depending on each state’s unique economic circumstances and the size of their Medicaid population. In addition, the recently enacted PPACA includes several provisions that affect states’ Medicaid programs, and states will need to take into account these provisions when considering additional adjustments to their programs. Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the extent to which states have accessed increased Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) funds, we reviewed data provided by two divisions within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation—on increased FMAP rates and Medicaid grant awards under the Recovery Act for federal fiscal years (FFY) 2009 and 2010. To examine how states used the increased FMAP funds and how states planned to sustain their Medicaid program once the increased FMAP funds are no longer available, we administered a Web-based survey to the Medicaid directors or their designated contacts in all states in August 2009 and in March 2010, and obtained a response rate of 98 and 100 percent, respectively. State did not provide responses to this survey. State also reported using funds to expand Medicaid eligibility levels. Appendix VI: Estimated Changes in States’ FMAP Rates and Share of Medicaid Payments
Percentage increase in state share of Medicaid For the portion of federal fiscal year 2011 not in the Recovery Act recession adjustment period (i.e., after December 31, 2010), the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) will provide Louisiana with an FMAP of 68.04 (rather than the current FMAP of 63.61). | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) initially provided states and the District of Columbia (the District) with an estimated $87 billion in increased Medicaid funds through December 2010, provided they met certain requirements. Funds were made available to states and the District through an increase in the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), the rate at which the federal government matches state expenditures for most Medicaid services. In March 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which prohibits states from adopting certain changes to program eligibility in order to receive federal reimbursement, and in August 2010, extended increased FMAP rates through June 2011. GAO was asked to examine issues related to Medicaid funds under the Recovery Act. GAO examined (1) states' and the District's access to and use of increased FMAP funds, and (2) states' and the District's plans to sustain their Medicaid programs once these funds are no longer available. To do this work, GAO surveyed state Medicaid officials in the 50 states and the District in August 2009 and March 2010 about their program enrollment, uses of funds, program adjustments, and program sustainability. GAO obtained responses from all states and the District. GAO also reviewed CMS data and guidance and interviewed CMS and state officials.
What GAO Found
States and the District are on pace to draw down about 94 percent--$82 billion of the estimated $87 billion--in increased FMAP funds provided by the Recovery Act. Most states adjusted their Medicaid programs to comply with the act's requirements, and nearly all states and the District reported using the increased FMAP to cover increased enrollment, which grew by 14.2 percent nationally between October 2007 and February 2010. Enrollment growth across the states and the District ranged from about 1 percent to 38 percent, with 22 states and the District experiencing a 10 to less than 20 percent increase. Although most enrollment growth was attributable to children, the highest growth rate was among the non-disabled, non-aged adult population. Forty-seven states and the District reported concern regarding the sustainability of their Medicaid programs without the increased FMAP, and 46 states took steps to address sustainability, including introducing financing arrangements, such as taxes on health care providers, or reducing provider payments. Most states and the District also reported proposed changes for the future. Congress passed legislation in August 2010 to extend the increased FMAP through June 2011, although at lower rates than provided by the Recovery Act. How the subsequent return to regular FMAP rates will affect states and the District will vary depending on their unique economic circumstances. GAO estimates that regular FMAP rates will be, on average, nearly 11 percentage points lower than increased FMAP rates available in December 2010. For future adjustments, states and the District will need to consider PPACA, which prohibits more restrictive eligibility standards, methods, or procedures until 2014, in order to receive federal Medicaid reimbursement. HHS provided technical comments to this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-738T | gao_GAO-03-738T_0 | Lack of General Agreement on Standards for Market Analysis and Market Conduct Examinations Results in Wide Variations Among States
In the absence of generally accepted standards, individual states decide how they will do market analysis and perform market conduct examinations. While all states do market analysis in some form, few have established formal programs that look at companies in a consistent and routine manner. States also have no generally agreed upon standards for how many examinations to perform, which companies to examine and how often, and what the scope of the examination should be. As a result of the lack of common standards for market analysis and the lack of consistency in the application of the guidelines for examinations, states find it difficult to depend on other states’ oversight of companies’ market behavior. Few States Do Systematic and Routine Market Analysis
NAIC and some states have a growing awareness that better market analysis can be a significant tool for monitoring the marketplace behavior of insurance companies and deciding which insurers to examine. Each of the three states with an analysis process that we visited approached market analysis in a different way. Ohio’s program consisted of special data calls to obtain extensive information from selected company files, and using computerized audit tools to analyze specific aspects of companies’ operations relative to norms identified by peer analysis and to state law. We Found Variations in the Way States We Visited Performed Examinations
Each state has between 900 and 2,000 licensed insurance companies. The states we visited used a variety of factors to choose companies for a market conduct examination. The requirements for and level of training for examiners also varied widely among the states. We asked 40 of the largest national insurance companies to provide information about their market conduct examination experience for the years 1999 to 2001. One of the most common complaints from the 25 insurers that responded to our questionnaire was that states did not coordinate their examinations with other states. The companies told us that such examinations create difficulties for them and limited the resources they had available to assist the examiners. For example, one insurer wrote, “It takes an insurer a tremendous amount of effort to prepare for and deal with individual state insurance department’s exams (every one is different, plus states generally do not accept others exams in place of another similar exam being done). NAIC’s survey of states’ use of the Examination Tracking System concluded that no more than 66 percent of the states, or 36 states, consistently reported their market conduct or combined market conduct/financial examination schedules to NAIC. Since then NAIC has launched a number of market conduct efforts intended to identify and address the issues and concerns caused by the lack of uniformity in states’ market conduct examination processes, and more recently in the market analysis area. Although progress has been slow in establishing more uniformity in market conduct regulation, NAIC has had some successes. Moreover, the handbook in not intended to cover some aspects of examinations, including examination frequency and company selection criteria. While the process used by state insurance regulators to oversee solvency could provide a model for oversight of market conduct as well, there are structural differences in market regulation that will undoubtedly affect the ultimate design of an improved market conduct oversight system. Finally, even to the extent that properly designed and competently performed market conduct oversight can effectively monitor and regulate insurance company practices, it will extend to the sales practices of insurance agents only to the extent that the company takes responsibility for and exercises control of the behavior of the agents that sell its products. Preliminary Observations
In the current environment of market regulation, most insurance regulators believe they need to oversee the market behavior of all companies selling insurance in their state because they cannot depend on the oversight of the other states. Formal and rigorous market analysis is in its infancy among state regulators, and whether, when, and how states do market conduct examinations vary widely. We support the goal of increasing the effectiveness of market conduct regulation through the development and implementation of consistent, nationwide standards for market analysis and market conduct examinations across the states in order to better protect insurance consumers. The emphasis placed on these issues by NAIC has increased substantially over the last 3 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony provides information on two important tools state insurance regulators use to oversee the market activities of insurance companies--market analysis and market conduct examinations. Market analysis is generallly done in the state insurance departments. It consists of gathering and integrating information about insurance companies' operations in order to monitor market behavior and identify potential problems at an early stage. Market conduct examinations, which are generally done on site, are a review of an insurer's marketplace practices. The examination is an opportunity to verify data provided to the department by the insurer and to confirm that companies' internal controls and operational processes result in compliance with state laws and regulations. Specifically, this testimony focuses on (1) the states' use of market analysis and examinations in market regulation, and (2) the effectiveness of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) efforts to improve these oversight tools and encourage the states to use them.
What GAO Found
We found that while all states do some level of market analysis, few states have established formal market analysis programs to maintain a systematic and rigorous overview of companies' market behavior and to more effectively identify problem companies for more detailed review. The way state insurance regulators approach and perform market conduct examinations also varied widely across the states. While NAIC has developed a handbook for market conduct examiners, states are not required to use it, and we found that it is not consistently applied across states. Moreover, the handbook is not intended to provide guidance for some important aspects of market conduct examinations--for example, how often examinations should be performed or what criteria states should use to select companies to examine. We also found that the number of market conduct examiners differed widely among states and that there were no generally accepted standards for training and certifying examiners. These differences make it difficult for states to depend on other states' oversight of market activities. Most of the states that we visited told us that they felt responsible for regulating the behavior of all companies that sold insurance in their state. With anywhere from 900 to 2,000 companies operating within each state, the pool of companies is simply too large for any one insurance department to handle. Attempts to do so are neither efficient nor effective. Moreover, since many states do not coordinate their examinations with other states, some large multistate insurance companies reported being examined by multiple states, while other companies were examined infrequently or never. We also found that since the mid 1970s, NAIC has taken a variety of steps to improve the consistency and quality of market conduct examinations. However, despite the NAIC's long-standing efforts and some limited successes, progress toward a more effective process has been slow. Recently, NAIC has increased the emphasis it places on market analysis and market conduct examinations as regulatory tools that could improve states' ability to oversee market conduct. With more consistent implementation of routine market analysis, states should be better able to use the resources they already have available to target companies requiring immediate attention. Also, by consistently applying common standards for market conduct examinations, states should be able to rely on regulators in other states for assessments of an insurance company's operations. These improvements should in turn increase the efficiency of the examination process and improve consumer protection by reducing existing overlaps and gaps in regulatory oversight. However, if NAIC cannot convince the various states to adopt and implement common standards for market analysis and examinations, current efforts to strengthen these consumer protection tools are unlikely to result in any fundamental improvement. While we focus on the states' use of market analysis and market conduct examinations, market regulation includes several other important regulatory tools, including complaint handling and investigation, policy rate and form review, agent and company licensing, and consumer education. Most states have functioning programs addressing each of these four regulatory areas. Ideally, all regulatory tools, including market analysis and market conduct examinations, should work together in an integrated and interrelated way. |
gao_GAO-14-323 | gao_GAO-14-323_0 | Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA). Agencies Met the Targets in Six Objectives Primarily Because of Additional Federal Resources or Because Targets Continued Previously- Established Efforts
We found that a key reason why agencies met the targets for five objectives in the 2008 5-year plan was because additional resources, mostly federal but also private, were dedicated to their efforts. For example, from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, EPA reported that it expended $22 million on efforts to identify and address contaminated houses and other structures, compared with the $1.5 million it expended on similar efforts in the preceding 5 years. Further, EPA officials said that funds from the bankruptcy settlement were instrumental in providing the initial funding for the agency’s efforts to pursue potentially responsible parties at other abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo reservation. Agencies Did Not Meet the Targets in Two Objectives for a Variety of Reasons, Including Optimistic Schedules and Decisions to Perform Additional Work That Extended Time Frames
Federal agencies did not meet the targets for two of the eight objectives in the 2008 5-year plan—cleanup of the Northeast Church Rock mine and the Tuba City Dump—for a variety of reasons, including that the schedules were optimistic and ambitious, and EPA decided to increase outreach work at the Northeast Church Rock mine and assessment work at the Tuba City Dump before identifying final cleanup actions for the sites. For example, the estimate did not completely define the program, an important aspect of a comprehensive schedule. Agencies Have Not Estimated the Full Scope of Work, Time Frames, or Costs Needed to Address Uranium Contamination but Recognize That Significant Work Remains
The agencies that implemented the 2008 5-year plan have not identified the full scope of remaining work, time frames, or costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, especially at abandoned uranium mines, but have recognized that significant work remains for addressing such contamination beyond the targets in the plan. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders do not have sufficient information about the overall remaining work, time frames, and costs to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts. Even when significant uncertainties regarding the scope of work and available funding remain, however, we have reported that agencies can create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that can be useful for decision makers and stakeholders. Without an estimate of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs to fully address uranium contamination, especially at the abandoned mines, decision makers and stakeholders neither have the information they need to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts, nor do they have a basis to put the agencies’ accomplishments under the 2008 5-year plan into perspective. Agencies Face Challenges Meeting Funding Needs and Engaging Affected Communities, Though Opportunities Exist for Improving Relationships with the Navajo and Hopi People
Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address uranium contamination on and near the Navajo reservation, including securing adequate funding and effectively engaging tribal communities. According to both federal and tribal agency officials, federal agencies could also enhance their collaboration with Navajo agencies by including additional tribal agencies in future efforts. However, absent a statutory requirement to develop such a comprehensive estimate, it appears unlikely that the agencies will undertake such an effort. In doing so, however, BIA has experienced a number of challenges, some concerning contract management. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To develop an estimate of the scope of work remaining to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, Congress should consider requiring that the Environmental Protection Agency take the lead and work with the other federal agencies to develop an overall estimate of the remaining scope of the work, time frames, and costs. In agreeing with our recommendation that the federal agencies incorporate key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaborative efforts into their coordinated outreach strategy, EPA, DOE, and the Department of Health and Human Services provided additional details about the contents of the draft outreach strategy that they intend to include in their 2014 5-year plan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examined: (1) the extent to which federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Department of Health and Human Services’ Indian Health Service (IHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) achieved the targets identified in the 2008 5-year plan, and the reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about the scope of work, time frames, and estimated costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation; and (3) the key challenges, if any, faced by federal agencies in completing this work and the opportunities, if any, which may be present to help overcome these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Four million tons of uranium ore were extracted from mines on the Navajo reservation primarily for developing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. For over 30 years, the Navajo people have lived with the environmental and health effects of uranium contamination from this mining. In 2008, five federal agencies adopted a 5-year plan that identified targets for addressing contaminated abandoned mines, structures, water sources, former processing sites, and other sites. Federal agencies also provide funding to Navajo Nation agencies to assist with the cleanup work.
GAO was asked to examine the agencies' cleanup efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which the agencies achieved the targets set in the 5-year plan and reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about the future scope of work, time frames, and costs; and (3) any key challenges faced by the agencies in completing this work and any opportunities to overcome them. GAO examined agency documents; interviewed agency officials, tribal leaders, and stakeholders; and visited sites on the Navajo and Hopi reservations.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies implementing the 2008 5-year plan, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Indian Health Service, met the targets in six of the plan's eight objectives, working in cooperation with tribal agencies, including the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency. Reasons agencies met the targets were primarily because additional federal and other resources were dedicated to these efforts compared with prior years. For example, from 2008 through 2012, EPA spent $22 million to test and replace contaminated houses, compared with $1.5 million spent in the preceding 5 years. In contrast, targets for two objectives—cleanup of the Northeast Church Rock mine and Tuba City Dump—were not met primarily because EPA's and BIA's estimated schedules were optimistic, and EPA added additional work that extended the time frames. BIA experienced project and contract management challenges in conducting work at Tuba City Dump and did not always follow best practices when estimating the schedule for assessment work at the site. These challenges, if not addressed, could affect BIA's ability to meet future targets for cleanup at the site and successfully plan for project resources.
Federal agencies have not identified the full scope of remaining work, time frames, or costs to fully address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, although they recognize that significant work remains. In 2008, congressional decision makers requested the agencies provide an overall estimate of the full scope of work needed to address the contamination. The 5year plan the agencies developed in response to this request does not provide a comprehensive estimate; instead, it focuses on the highest priorities over 5 years. EPA officials said that they typically do not provide cost or schedule estimates until a specific cleanup action is selected and that a number of current uncertainties make developing such an estimate difficult. Even with significant uncertainties, GAO has reported that agencies can create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that can be useful for decision makers and stakeholders. The agencies have collected important information that could provide a starting point for such an estimate. However, absent a statutory requirement to develop such a comprehensive estimate, it appears unlikely that the agencies will undertake such an effort. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders will not have the information they need to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts or make resource allocation decisions.
Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. For example, according to EPA officials, funding for EPA's efforts at the Navajo abandoned uranium mines is expected to decrease from funding levels available during the 2008 5-year plan because of overall declining federal resources for cleanup. Further, agencies face challenges in effectively engaging tribal communities, in part, because agencies have not always collaborated on their outreach efforts. These agencies identified opportunities to enhance their collaboration by creating a coordinated outreach strategy for the next 5-year plan. Creating such a strategy is consistent with one of the several key practices that GAO has reported can enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and help ensure that agencies make efficient use of limited resources.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring federal agencies to develop an overall estimate of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs to fully address uranium contamination. GAO also recommends that BIA address its project management challenges, and agencies incorporate key practices into their coordinated outreach strategy. In commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-623 | gao_GAO-04-623_0 | The key component of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. The DBT has been traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. DOE Took Immediate Steps to Improve Security in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001, but the Effectiveness of These Steps Is Uncertain
DOE took immediate steps to improve physical security in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. With respect to improved security, DOE security officials believe that the implementation of SECON levels 2 and 3 has, for example, increased the visible deterrence at DOE sites by placing more protective forces around the sites. Studies and analyses have also resulted in different and less vulnerable storage strategies for some special nuclear material. While some of the SECON measures, such as vehicle inspection checkpoints, have undergone some limited performance testing of their effectiveness, most DOE sites generally have not assessed the SECON level measures in place using the vulnerability assessment tools, such as computer modeling and full-scale force-on-force performance tests, that play such a key role in developing and verifying protective strategies at their sites. Second, increased SECON measures have been expensive. Development of the New DBT Took Almost 2 Years Because of Delays in Developing the Postulated Threat and DOE’s Lengthy Review and Comment Process
Under DOE Order 470.1, the DBT is intended to provide the foundation for all of DOE’s protective strategies. According to DOE and DOD officials, this delay was the result of other post September 11, 2001, demands placed on the intelligence community, as well as sharp debates among the organizations involved with developing the Postulated Threat over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the resources needed to meet these projected threats. First, while the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT in most cases is less than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated Threat. Finally, the department’s criteria for determining the severity of radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient. DOE Has Been Slow to Resolve a Number of Significant Issues That May Affect the Ability of its Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT
While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation guidance. Consequently, the fiscal year 2006 budget may be the first budget to begin to accurately reflect the safeguards and security costs of meeting the requirements of the new DBT. The department plans to complete DBT implementation by the end of fiscal year 2006. For example, one NNSA site already has developed detailed plans and budgets to meet the new DBT requirements. Conclusions
DOE took a series of immediate actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Rather, DOE must press forward with a series of actions to ensure that it is fully prepared to provide a timely and cost effective defense. | Why GAO Did This Study
A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete. GAO examined DOE's response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and identified the remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat contained in the new DBT.
What GAO Found
DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, DOE must press forward with additional actions to ensure that it is fully prepared to provide a timely and cost effective defense. DOE took immediate steps to improve physical security in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. DOE's most visible effort involved moving to higher levels of security readiness, known as security condition (SECON) levels. While this effort has increased the visible deterrence at DOE sites, it has been expensive and has resulted in fatigue, retention problems, and less training for most sites' protective forces. In addition, the effectiveness of these increased SECON levels generally have not been assessed using the vulnerability assessment tools, such as computer modeling and full-scale force-on-force exercises, that DOE routinely uses to develop protective force strategies for its sites. Development of the new DBT took almost 2 years because of (1) delays in developing an intelligence community assessment--known as the Postulated Threat--of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities and (2) DOE's lengthy comment and review process for developing policy. In addition, during the DBT development process, there were sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats that contributed to the delay. While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT in most cases is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites. |
gao_T-RCED-97-115 | gao_T-RCED-97-115_0 | Since 1975, about 5,400 flights have been covered. Appendix I summarizes the major attributes of the program. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 Addressed the Majority of Problems With Insurance Program Funding
In 1994, we reported that the Fund’s balance was insufficient to pay many potential claims and that delays in the payment of claims could cause a financial hardship for affected airlines. 104-201) has addressed these problems for DOD-sponsored flights. Because the FAA would have needed to seek supplemental funding to pay any claims that exceeded the Fund’s balance, airline officials had expressed concern that untimely reimbursements could cause severe financial hardships and possible bankruptcy. Further Changes Are Needed in the Aviation Insurance Program
We have two remaining concerns about the program. The first is making sure that the program has sufficient funds available to pay potential insurance claims for non-Defense-related flights in a timely manner. Not counting the liability associated with the loss of a flight, a claim for the loss of a single aircraft—which can cost $100 million—could liquidate the Fund’s entire balance and still leave a substantial portion of the claim unpaid for an indeterminate period of time. Clarifying That Flights Are in the Interests of the United States
In our 1994 report, we recommended that the program’s authorizing legislation be clarified because there were ambiguities in the legislation and in FAA’s implementing regulations about the need for FAA to obtain a presidential determination that a flight is in the foreign policy interests of the United States before issuing nonpremium insurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Aviation Insurance Program, focusing on changes made to the program since GAO last reported on it in 1994.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in its 1994 report, GAO found that the program did not have sufficient funds available to pay potential insurance claims in the unlikely event of a catastrophic loss; (2) progress has been made in addressing this matter; specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 made funds available to indemnify the program for losses incurred under Department of Defense (DOD)-sponsored flights, which account for the majority of flights insured; (3) while GAO's major concern has been addressed, two other concerns that it raised in the 1994 report remain unresolved; (4) gaps remain in the program's ability to pay claims for non-DOD flights; (5) although these flights account for a relatively small percentage of the flights that have been insured by the program, a single major loss could liquidate the program's available funds and leave a substantial portion of the claim unpaid; (6) FAA would need to seek supplemental funding to pay the claim, but the delay could cause financial hardship for the affected airline; and (7) GAO believes that some uncertainty about the program continues to be caused by ambiguity in the statutory language and FAA's current implementing regulations about whether the President must make a determination that a flight is in the foreign policy interests of the United States before issuing insurance. |
gao_GAO-03-620 | gao_GAO-03-620_0 | Medicaid Formula Narrows Differences in Some States’ Funding Ability and Widens Differences in Others
The Medicaid formula reduces by 20 percent the differences among states in their ability to fund program services, compared with the national average funding ability. While the formula narrows differences for 30 states, making the average difference in funding ability smaller, it moves 21 states farther away from the national average, making the average difference wider. These 21 states include 3 that are among those with the largest populations in poverty—California, Florida, and New York. Because of the formula’s current structure, in many instances, two states devoting the same proportion of their own resources toward funding Medicaid services are unable, after receiving federal matching aid, to spend the same amounts per person in poverty, adjusted for cost differences related to age and geographic location. Nationwide, the average difference between a state’s funding ability and that of the average state is 22.7 percent. After the receipt of federal matching aid, differences in states’ funding abilities ranged from 26 percent below the national average for California and New York to 179 percent above for Alaska. 2). For example, in fiscal year 2000, both California and Wisconsin devoted roughly the same proportion of their own resources to fund program benefits—about $8 per $1,000 of taxable resources—which was close to the national average ($8.37) proportion of resources states devoted to Medicaid that year. This occurred because Wisconsin receives a high federal match despite its relatively high funding ability, whereas California receives a low federal match despite its relatively low funding ability. Once federal matching aid was factored in, with their nearly identical funding effort, Wisconsin is enabled to spend more than twice what California could spend per person in poverty—$7,532 compared with $3,731. Use of PCI and 50 Percent Floor Inhibits Formula’s Ability to Further Narrow Differences in States’ Funding Ability
Two factors prevent the Medicaid formula from further reducing differences in states’ funding ability. PCI Is Not a Comprehensive Measure of States’ Resources and Is a Poor Proxy for the Size of and Cost to Provide Services to Their People in Poverty
PCI is an inadequate measure of states’ funding ability because it is an incomplete measure of states’ resources, it is a poor proxy for the size of a state’s population in poverty, and it does not take into account differences in the cost of providing health care services to people in poverty. However, two states with similar PCIs may differ widely in their percentages of people in poverty. Connecticut and New Jersey benefit the most from the statutory minimums, receiving—as a result of the 50 percent floor— matching rates that are 35 and 20 percentage points higher, respectively, than the rates they would have received based solely on their PCI. Receiving a higher matching rate than what the formula provides on the basis of PCI enables these states to spend more on program benefits per person in poverty than states with less funding ability that devote a higher percentage of their resources to funding program benefits. Comments from External Reviewers
We received comments on our draft report from two external reviewers who have Medicaid formula expertise. The reviewers generally agreed with our analysis and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Calculating the Reduction of Differences in States’ Funding Ability
To measure the effect of the current formula in reducing differences in states’ funding ability, we compared differences between each state’s funding ability before and after the value of federal matching aid is added and calculated the percentage reduction in these differences. | Why GAO Did This Study
A primary goal in establishing Medicaid's statutory formula, whereby states with lower per capita incomes (PCI) receive higher rates of federal reimbursement for program costs, was to narrow differences among states in their ability to fund Medicaid services. States' ability to fund services depends on their financial resources in relation to their number of and costs to serve people in poverty. GAO and others have testified before Congress that the current formula does not address wide differences among states in their ability to fund their Medicaid programs and that the formula's reliance on PCI is the primary cause. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the formula narrows these differences and to identify factors that impede further narrowing of differences. To evaluate the extent to which the formula narrows differences in states' funding ability, GAO used an alternative to PCI that more directly measures states' resources, number of people in poverty, and cost of providing services to this population. Using this measure, GAO determined the effect of the current formula by comparing states' funding ability before and after receiving their federal matching aid. If differences in funding ability were eliminated, the formula would have reduced differences by 100 percent.
What GAO Found
The Medicaid formula narrows the average difference in states' funding ability by 20 percent but often widens the gap between individual states and the national average. Although the receipt of federal matching aid moves 30 states closer to the national average, making the average difference in funding ability smaller, it also moves 21 states farther away from the average, widening the average difference. These 21 states include 3 that are among the states with the largest populations in poverty--California, Florida, and New York. After federal matching aid is added, states' funding ability ranges from 26 percent below the national average for two states to 179 percent above for another. Because of the formula's current structure, in many instances, two states devoting similar proportions of their own resources to Medicaid can spend very different amounts per person in poverty. For example, in fiscal year 2000, California and Wisconsin each devoted about $8 for every $1,000 of their own state resources toward Medicaid. However, under the current formula, Wisconsin receives a relatively high federal matching rate despite its relatively high ability to fund program services, whereas California receives a low federal matching rate despite its relatively low ability to fund program services. With the addition of federal matching aid, Wisconsin is enabled to spend more than twice what California is able to spend per person in poverty ($7,532 versus $3,731). Two factors constrain the formula from further decreasing differences in states' funding ability. First, PCI is not a comprehensive indicator of a state's total available resources and is a poor measure of the size of and cost to serve a state's people in poverty. Second, the statutory provision that guarantees no state will receive less than a 50 percent matching rate benefits many states that already have above-average resources to fund health care for their populations in poverty. For example, 2 of the 11 states that benefit the most from the 50 percent "floor" receive matching rates that are 35 and 20 percentage points higher, respectively, than the rates they would receive based solely on their PCI. GAO received comments on a draft of this report from two external reviewers who have Medicaid formula expertise. They generally agreed with the analysis and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-101 | gao_T-AIMD-98-101_0 | Risk of Disruption to Government Services Is High
The federal government is extremely vulnerable to the Year 2000 issue due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations. Unless this issue is successfully addressed, serious consequences could ensue. For example:
Unless the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) takes much more decisive action, there could be grounded or delayed flights, degraded safety, customer inconvenience, and increased airline costs. Payments to veterans with service-connected disabilities could be severely delayed if the system that issues them either halts or produces checks so erroneous that it must be shut down and checks processed manually. The military services could find it extremely difficult to efficiently and effectively equip and sustain their forces around the world. Federal systems used to track student loans could produce erroneous information on loan status, such as indicating that a paid loan was in default. Internal Revenue Service tax systems could be unable to process returns, thereby jeopardizing revenue collection and delaying refunds. The Social Security Administration process to provide benefits to disabled persons could be disrupted if interfaces with state systems fail. In addition, the year 2000 also could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years that contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs found uneven progress. One of the largest, and largely unknown, risks relates to the global nature of the problem. Setting Priorities Is Critical
Agencies have taken longer to complete the awareness and assessment phases of their Year 2000 programs than is recommended. This leaves less time for critical renovation, validation, and implementation phases. Ability to Address Governmentwide Issues Could Be Strengthened
The CIO Council’s Subcommittee on the Year 2000 has been useful in addressing governmentwide issues. Success of the New Presidential Council Is Critical
Given the sweeping ramifications of the Year 2000 issue, other countries have set up mechanisms to solve the Year 2000 problem on a nationwide basis. While the Year 2000 problem could have serious consequences, there is no comprehensive picture of the nation’s readiness. As one of its first tasks, the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion could formulate such a comprehensive picture in partnership with the private sector and state and local governments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed year 2000 risks and actions that should be taken by the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the federal government is extremely vulnerable to the year 2000 issue due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations; (2) unless this issue is successfully addressed, serious consequences could ensue, for example: (a) unless the Federal Aviation Administration takes much more decisive action, there could be grounded or delayed flights, degraded safety, customer inconvenience, and increased airline costs; (b) payments to veterans with service-connected disabilities could be severely delayed if the system that issues them either halts or produces checks so erroneous that it must be shut down and checks processed manually; (c) the military services could find it extremely difficult to efficiently and effectively equip and sustain its forces around the world; (d) federal systems used to track student loans could produce erroneous information on loan status, such as indicating that a paid loan was in default; (e) Internal Revenue Service tax systems could be unable to process returns, thereby jeopardizing revenue collection and delaying refunds; and (f) the Social Security Administration process to provide benefits to disabled persons could be disrupted if interfaces with state systems fail; (3) the year 2000 could also cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years that contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (4) GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs found uneven progress; (5) one of the largest, and largely unknown, risks relates to the global nature of the problem; (6) agencies have taken longer to complete the awareness and assessment phases of their year 2000 programs than is recommended; (7) this leaves less time for critical renovation, validation, and implementation phases; (8) the Chief Information Officers Council's Subcommittee on the year 2000 has been useful in addressing governmentwide issues; (9) given the sweeping ramifications of the year 2000 issue, other countries have set up mechanisms to solve the year 2000 problem on a nationwide basis; and (10) there is no comprehensive picture of the nation's readiness and, as one of its first tasks, the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion could formulate such a comprehensive picture in partnership with the private sector and state and local governments. |
gao_GAO-04-975T | gao_GAO-04-975T_0 | Since the act’s passage, a number of voting jurisdictions have replaced their older voting equipment with direct recording electronic systems. These standards define minimum functional and performance requirements, as well as minimum life-cycle management processes for voting equipment developers to follow, such as quality assurance. The Help America Vote Act Was Enacted to Strengthen the Overall Election Process
Enacted by the Congress in October 2002, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 addressed a range of election issues, including the lack of explicit federal (statutory) responsibility for developing and maintaining standards for electronic voting systems and for testing voting systems against standards. In particular, the act established a program to provide funds to states to replace punch card and lever machine voting equipment, established the EAC to assist in the administration of federal elections and provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election laws and programs, and established minimum election administration standards for the states and units of local government that are responsible for the administration of federal elections. Other examples of EAC responsibilities include ● developing and adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and maintaining information on the experiences of states in implementing the guidelines and operating voting systems; ● testing, certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting system hardware and software through accredited laboratories; ● making payments to states to help them improve elections in the areas of voting systems standards, provisional voting and voting information requirements, and computerized statewide voter registration lists; and ● making grants for research on voting technology improvements. In the 2000 election, about 12 percent of voters used this type of technology. ● A “review” feature. ● Accommodations for voters with disabilities. Expanded Use of Electronic Voting Systems Has Raised Concerns
As older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, the debate has shifted from hanging chads and butterfly ballots to vulnerabilities associated with DREs. Electronic Voting Systems’ Performance Can Be Judged on Several Attributes
Although the current debate concerning electronic voting systems primarily relates to security, other factors affecting election administration are also relevant in evaluating these systems. Ensuring the security of elections is essential to public confidence and election integrity, but officials choosing a voting system must also consider other performance factors, such as accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as cost. ● Audit trails. Accessibility to diverse types of voters, including those with disabilities, is a further aspect of ease of use. Among other things, these differences can be attributed to differences in what is included in the unit cost as well as differences in the characteristics of the equipment. In fact, one large jurisdiction that used optical scan equipment reported that its operating costs were $545,000. Electronic Voting System Performance Depends on System Design and Implementation
The performance of any information technology system, including electronic voting systems, is heavily influenced by a number of factors, not the least of which is the quality of the system’s design and the effectiveness with which the system is implemented in an operational setting. As described already, DRE equipment is designed to minimize voter error (by preventing overvotes, for example), but problems can also occur with this voting method. Jurisdictions Face Immediate and Longer Term Challenges in Leveraging Voting Technologies
In 2001, we identified four key challenges confronting local jurisdictions in effectively using and replacing voting technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the immediate and longer-term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting systems.
What GAO Found
An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment (another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities. One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the developed system performs as designed. In the design and development process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic; the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines, and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of elections. In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both immediate and more long term challenges. |
gao_GAO-07-445 | gao_GAO-07-445_0 | Summary of Findings
A key reason for the difference between the 2003 total project cost estimate and the revised 2005 estimate to install in-line baggage screening systems at LAX and ONT was that the 2003 estimate was developed at an early stage in the design process and was therefore based on preliminary data and assumptions that were subject to change. Consequently, the estimate did not adequately foresee some of the costs of retrofitting new systems into existing buildings or allow for sufficient space for the EDS machines, baggage inspection rooms, and conveyor belts. The 2003 total project cost estimate used concepts and construction estimates developed in about 12 weeks by Boeing, TSA’s contractor. According to TSA and LAWA officials, both TSA and Los Angeles signed the LOI/MOA knowing the preliminary nature of the cost estimate. According to construction industry guidance, an estimate’s accuracy depends on the quality of information known about the project at the time the estimate is prepared. In December 2003, LAWA presented TSA with a summary of inadequacies it had found in the original Boeing concept and the associated potential cost and scheduling impacts. LAWA then began an engineering study to update the in-line system concepts at LAX and ONT, the results of which it presented to TSA in September 2004. TSA reviewed these updated concepts and determined that they would meet its performance requirements; however, TSA’s review did not address cost issues. LAWA used these updated concepts to develop its 2005 estimate, which was based on more definitive information about terminal design requirements than the 2003 estimate. According to LAWA, new construction and excavation included in the 2005 designs increased the estimated costs. Among the design changes, LAWA determined that the placement of EDS machines in the 2003 concepts was infeasible in five of nine of the LAX terminals and both ONT terminals. In addition, the 2005 estimate included 20 additional baggage inspection rooms, 9 rooms for on-screen resolution of EDS alarms, and 10 computer rooms at LAX and ONT terminals. The 2005 estimate also included over $11 million in computer networking costs and costs associated with on-screen resolution of EDS alarms, which the 2003 estimate did not foresee. TSA also highlighted two additional factors that caused differences between the two estimates—cost increases due to the delay in beginning construction of the project and the escalation of construction costs between 2003 and 2005. LAWA also determined that TSA’s contractor and subcontractor made a mathematical error in the 2003 concept development estimate: construction costs were only included for one of the two baggage screening facilities and neither of the connected tunnels at ONT. TSA officials told us in January 2007 they were not able to substantiate this error. However, under the terms agreed to in the LOI/MOA, TSA has no obligation to amend the LOI/MOA or to reimburse the City of Los Angeles for any additional costs beyond those agreed to in the LOI/MOA, and TSA officials have stated that the agency does not have plans for such reimbursement. We interviewed officials from TSA and LAWA, as well as TSA contractors and other relevant officials who participated in the cost- estimation process to learn about the factors that contributed to the increased estimate of the cost of in-line checked baggage screening systems at LAX and ONT. In its second point, LAWA suggests that the GAO report avoids assigning responsibility to TSA or its contractors and, as a result, “failed to answer the Senate Committee’s direction to provide a detailed explanation of the reasons for any differences the original estimate, including identification of and the party responsible for any material mistakes, omissions, and infeasible design concepts in the original estimate.”
The objective of the report, as agreed with the appropriate congressional offices in accordance with our Congressional Protocols, was to identify factors contributing to differences between the estimates. The report notes that “LAWA officials stated that they were under a tight timeframe because TSA had told them that federal funding was limited and 17 other airports were competing for the funding.” We identified this as a factor associated with the preliminary nature of the 2003 estimate. Appendix II: Briefing Slides
Review of Cost Estimates for Installing
Introduction
Objectives
Senate Report 109-273 directs GAO to review the
differences between the original 2003 cost estimate and LAWA’s revised 2005 cost estimate. Background
In-line EDS systems are advantageous because they can: Increase the efficiency of airport, airline, and TSA operations. Lower costs by reducing the number of transportation security officers required to screen checked baggage. out of airport lobbies where it causes overcrowding, creating a potential target for terrorists. In-line EDS systems are integrated with airports’ baggage- handling conveyor systems. LAWA and TSA agreed to add another $57 million (or 20 percent) for estimated administrative expenses for a total project cost of $341 million. In April 2005, LAWA submitted a revised cost estimate to TSA based on TSA approved concepts from a September 2004 LAWA engineering study. This revised cost estimate included a request that TSA amend the LOI/MOA to increase the federal reimbursement by about $122 million, a sum that would raise the total federal reimbursement to about $378 million. As of February 2007, TSA has obligated $256 million in accordance with the schedule set forth in the LOI/MOA for Los Angeles. As of October 2006, TSA had reimbursed LAWA for about $26 million in expenses from the total amount obligated. The 2003 estimate was made at the “concept development” stage where the final project cost can be expected to range from 50 percent under to 100 percent over the estimated cost based on construction industry guidance.5 The 2005 estimate was made at the “design development” stage where the final project cost can be expected to range from 20 percent under to 30 percent over the estimated cost. Appendix III: Comments from Los Angeles World Airports | Why GAO Did This Study
To meet the mandate to screen all checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) placed minivan-sized explosive detection systems (EDS) and other screening equipment in airport lobbies. However, these interim lobby solutions have caused operational inefficiencies, in part because they require a large number of screeners. According to TSA, in-line baggage screening--where EDS machines are integrated with an airport's baggage conveyor system--can be a more cost-effective and efficient alternative to lobby-based, stand-alone equipment. For example, in-line systems can increase the efficiency of airport, airline, and TSA operations, and lower costs by reducing the number of screeners. Moreover, in-line explosive detection systems can enhance security because they reduce congestion in airport lobbies, thus removing a potential target for terrorists. However, installing in-line systems can have large up-front costs, related to the need for airport modifications. To help defray these costs, in 2003, Congress authorized TSA to reimburse airports up to 75 percent of the cost to install these systems by entering "letter of intent" (LOI) agreements. An LOI, though not a binding commitment of federal funding, represents TSA's intent to provide the agreed-upon funds in future years if the agency receives sufficient appropriations to cover the agreement. TSA has issued eight letters of intent to help defray the costs of installing in-line systems at nine airports as of February 2007, but none since February 2004. In September 2003, TSA and the City of Los Angeles signed an LOI and an attached memorandum of agreement (LOI/MOA) in which TSA agreed to pay an amount not to exceed 75 percent of the agreed upon estimated total project cost of $341 million (about $256 million) to install in-line checked baggage screening systems at both Los Angeles (LAX) and Ontario (ONT) International Airports. However, in December 2003, officials from the City of Los Angeles' airport authority--Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA)--informed TSA that aspects of the design concept were infeasible and that additional construction modifications would be needed. LAWA subsequently submitted a revised cost estimate to TSA in April 2005 and requested that TSA amend the LOI/MOA to increase the federal reimbursement by about $122 million. TSA has not amended the LOI to provide for additional reimbursements; however, as of February 2007, TSA had obligated the $256 million for the City of Los Angeles LOI/MOA in accordance with the schedule agreed to in the LOI and had reimbursed LAWA for about $26 million in expenses. Senate Report 109-273 directs us to review the reasons for the differences between the original 2003 cost estimate and the revised 2005 cost estimate submitted by LAWA. In response and as agreed with committee offices, we identified the key factors that contributed to the differences between the two cost estimates. On January 23, 2007, we briefed staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, on the results of our work.
What GAO Found
A key reason for the difference between the 2003 total project cost estimate and the revised 2005 estimate to install in-line baggage screening systems at LAX and ONT was that the 2003 estimate was developed at an early stage in the design process and was therefore based on preliminary data and assumptions that were subject to change. Consequently, the estimate did not adequately foresee some of the costs of retrofitting new systems into existing buildings or allow for sufficient space for the EDS machines, baggage inspection rooms, and conveyor belts. LAWA officials stated that they were under a tight timeframe to apply for the LOI because TSA had told them that federal funding was limited and that 17 other airports were competing for the funding. The 2003 total project cost estimate used concepts and construction estimates developed in about 12 weeks by Boeing, TSA's contractor. According to TSA and LAWA officials, both TSA and Los Angeles signed the LOI/MOA knowing the preliminary nature of the cost estimate. According to construction industry guidance, an estimate's accuracy depends on the quality of information known about the project at the time the estimate is prepared. The 2003 estimate was made at the "concept development" stage where the final project cost can be expected to range from 50 percent under to 100 percent over the estimated cost, according to this guidance. The 2005 revised estimate was made at the "design development" stage where the range of the final project cost estimate can be expected to be more accurate--from 20 percent under to 30 percent over the estimated cost. In December 2003, LAWA presented TSA with a summary of inadequacies it had found in the original Boeing concept and the associated potential cost and scheduling impacts. LAWA then began an engineering study to update the in-line system concepts at LAX and ONT, the results of which it presented to TSA in September 2004. TSA reviewed these updated concepts and determined that they would meet its performance requirements; however, TSA's review did not address cost issues. LAWA used these updated concepts to develop its 2005 estimate, which was based on more definitive information about terminal design requirements than the 2003 estimate. According to LAWA, new construction and excavation included in the 2005 designs increased the estimated costs. Among the design changes, LAWA determined that the placement of EDS machines in the 2003 concepts was infeasible in five of nine of the LAX terminals and both ONT terminals. In addition, the 2005 estimate included 20 additional baggage inspection rooms, 9 rooms for on-screen resolution of EDS alarms, and 10 computer rooms at LAX and ONT terminals. The 2005 estimate also included over $11 million in computer networking costs and costs associated with on-screen resolution of EDS alarms, which the 2003 estimate did not foresee. TSA also highlighted two additional factors that caused differences between the two estimates--cost increases due to the delay in beginning construction of the project and the escalation of construction costs between 2003 and 2005. LAWA also determined that TSA's contractor and subcontractor made a mathematical error in the 2003 concept development estimate: construction costs were only included for one of the two baggage screening facilities and neither of the connected tunnels at ONT. TSA officials told us in January 2007 they were not able to substantiate this error. |
gao_NSIAD-99-46 | gao_NSIAD-99-46_0 | DOD has not systematically tracked or updated the savings estimates from competitions. OMB has recognized DOD as the pacesetter among government agencies in the use of competitions to gain economies and efficiencies in operations and to reduce support costs. Prior to establishing the competition goal of 229,000 positions, DOD aimed for cumulative savings of about $6 billion between fiscal years 1997 and 2003. That goal still existed at the time we completed our review and DOD has already begun to reduce future years operating budgets of components in anticipation of these savings and to transfer the expected savings to their research and development and procurement accounts to increase funding for weapon system modernization. Initial Savings Are Likely to Be Less Than Estimated
The projections of competition savings that DOD provided to Congress in fiscal year 1998 appear overstated. While the components are registering concern about these costs, they have not yet developed comprehensive assessments of them. Rather, it expects to use military personnel released as a result of the competitions to fill other priorities. Some components have expressed concerns about these goals. Reductions are also planned as a result of legislative requirements. Another Air Force official said that most major commands are concerned about the effects of funding A-76 competitions and of personnel separation costs on their installations. However, comprehensive planning among the services to identify specific functions and locations for competition has been limited. Consequently, the estimated savings between fiscal year 1997 and 2003 are overstated. Also, the number of competitions DOD expects to complete over the next several years continues to increase, even as difficulties in meeting previous goals grow. Scope and Methodology
For this report, we (1) identified the Department of Defense’s (DOD) competitive sourcing study and savings goals, (2) assessed the accuracy of the savings estimates provided to Congress, and (3) evaluated the adequacy of program planning to support the overall program. The A-76 Process
In general, the A-76 process consists of six key activities—(1) developing a performance work statement and quality assurance surveillance plan; (2) conducting a management study to determine the government’s most efficient organization (MEO); (3) developing an in-house government cost estimate for MEO; (4) issuing a Request for Proposals or Invitation for Bid; (5) evaluating the proposals or bids and comparing the in-house estimate with a private sector offer or interservice support agreement and selecting the winner of the cost comparison; and (6) addressing any appeals submitted under the administrative appeals process, which is designed to ensure that all costs are fair, accurate, and calculated in the manner prescribed by the A-76 handbook. 11, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) use Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 as a means of realizing an estimated $6 billion savings in support costs between fiscal years (FY) 1997 and 2003, focusing on: (1) identifying the competition and savings goals; (2) assessing the accuracy of the savings estimates provided to Congress; and (3) evaluating the adequacy of planning to support the overall program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has underway an unprecedented program to use competitions to gain economies and efficiencies in its operations and to reduce support costs; (2) while the numbers have evolved over time, as of now, DOD is planning to open over 229,000 government positions to competition within the public and private sectors over the next several years; (3) it estimates $6 billion cumulative savings between FY 1997 and FY 2003, and $2.3 billion in recurring savings each year thereafter, as a result of these efforts; (4) however, estimates of competitive savings provided to Congress in FY 1998 are overstated, and several issues are likely to reduce the estimated savings, at least in the short-term; (5) DOD has not fully calculated either the investment costs associated with undertaking these competitions or the personnel separation costs likely to be associated with implementing them; (6) further, there are numerous indications that DOD components have already begun to experience difficulties in launching and completing the competitions within the timeframes they initially projected; (7) as a result, the achievement of savings may be delayed; (8) various officials have expressed concern about the effects of not achieving the expected savings because reductions in future operating budgets have already been planned in anticipation of these savings; (9) comprehensive planning to identify specific functions and locations for competition among the services has been limited; (10) within individual military services, it has largely been up to individual installations or major commands to identify and prioritize specific activities and functions for study and to conduct competitions; and (11) the one service that has carried out a comprehensive assessment, the Air Force, has identified a potential shortfall in viable candidates for competition. |
gao_GAO-05-735 | gao_GAO-05-735_0 | In 1989, SSA implemented a national, toll-free 800 number to better enable individuals to request information on SSA programs or report events that affect their own or someone else’s SSA records or payments. SSA Has Improved Overall Access to the 800 Number, but Many Calls Seeking Agent Assistance Do Not Get Through
Despite making improvements to its 800-number systems, SSA still has difficulty keeping pace with caller demand for agent assistance. In fiscal year 2004, about 51 million callers requested to speak to an agent. Of these calls, 8.7 million, or 17 percent, of these calls did not get through to an agent—a 2 percent increase over the previous year. This change gave SSA the ability to monitor call traffic and agent availability in real time at each call center and receive “cradle to grave” management information on a call’s movement from the time the caller dials the 800 number until the call is terminated. SSA Expanded Its Automated and Agent- Assisted Services, but 17 Percent of Calls Seeking Agent Assistance Do Not Get Through
Since the inception of the nationwide 800 number and the later introduction of limited 24-hour automated services, SSA has continually improved the quality and quantity of services available to callers. SSA Trains and Provides Agents on- the-Job Resources, but Agents Have Not Met SSA’s Standard for Accuracy of Assistance
SSA has taken steps to help agents provide callers accurate information and comply with agency requirements, but still has problems with agents meeting its standards for accurate service. In addition, SSA monitors agents’ calls and compiles agencywide assessments of agent accuracy in handling calls and identifies agent training needs. SSA has taken several actions to help agents improve their performance, but these actions have not resulted in sustained improvements in service accuracy. To assist agents in providing callers with accurate and consistent services, SSA provides agents with the Customer Help and Information Program (CHIP)—a customized online computer application for providing services to 800-number callers. Agents Have Not Met SSA’s Standard for Accuracy of Assistance
Although SSA takes a number of actions to help agents provide callers accurate information in accordance with agency policies and procedures, agents still have problems meeting SSA’s standard for service accuracy. SSA has not determined why agents fail to follow agency procedures when handling some calls, resulting in service errors. SSA Conducts Training, Monitoring, and Customer Surveys but Lacks a Uniform System for Assessing Agent Courtesy
SSA uses training, call monitoring, and surveys to ensure that agents deliver courteous service, but does not routinely document or analyze all incidents of discourtesy or caller complaints. It also determines through monitoring whether agents are being courteous. Call center staff told us that they typically apologize to callers and offer to provide the desired assistance whenever callers lodge complaints by phone. Moreover, they may not record the complaint or attempt to capture and assess information on the nature of complaints. SSA Relies on Training, Monitoring, and Customer Surveys to Ensure Agent Courtesy
As part of its comprehensive, multiweek training curriculum, SSA teaches interviewing and interpersonal skills to help agents serve callers in a professional and courteous manner. SSA also relies on its annual survey of callers to assess and ensure agent courtesy. Because SSA does not routinely capture information on all customer complaints about discourtesy, however, it loses the ability to assess the severity of the problem and misses opportunities to better understand caller needs, solve unanticipated problems, and retain the good will of the public. To develop information on the actions SSA takes at the headquarters level to ensure quality 800-number telephone service, we reviewed documents related to (1) SSA’s forecasts of call volumes and projected staffing levels for auxiliary agents; (2) services offered using the automated menu; (3) vendor-contracted services for the 800-number telephone systems hardware, software, and performance data; and (4) requirements for training agents, monitoring agent performance, and agent courtesy to callers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration (SSA) at some point touches the life of nearly every American. Each day thousands of people contact SSA to file claims, update records, and request information from its 1,300 field offices, website, and national toll-free 800 number. Implemented nationwide in 1989, SSA's 800-number has become a principal contact point for millions of individuals seeking agency services. Congressional requesters asked GAO to review the quality of SSA's 800 number in terms of caller access and agent accuracy of response and courtesy.
What GAO Found
Despite making improvements to its 800-number service, SSA still has difficulty keeping pace with caller demand for agent assistance. In 2001, SSA upgraded its 800-number network so that all callers could either access its automated services or be routed to the next available agent at any site in the network--a feat not possible under the previous system. The new network also enhanced SSA's ability to monitor and manage call traffic, agent availability, and network operations in real-time to ensure the network's integrity and the consistent delivery of services. SSA also expanded its automated and agent-assisted services accessible through the 800-number network. However, SSA's expansion of its automated services to reduce agent call burden has not had its intended effect, as callers continue to show a strong preference for agent assistance. In fiscal year 2004, about 51 million of the more than 71 million callers requested to speak to an agent. However, 8.7 million, or 17 percent, of these calls did not get through to an agent--a 2 percentage point increase over the previous year. SSA has taken steps to help agents provide callers with accurate information and consistent services, but still has problems with agents assisting callers in line with agency policies and procedures. SSA's training curriculum provides agents with a comprehensive overview of SSA programs. Agents are also encouraged to use available on-the-job resources, including a customized computer application that helps agents provide consistent service and accurate responses. Nevertheless, from 2001 through 2003, SSA did not meet its 90 percent target for service accuracy--that is, agents' performance in handling non-payment related issues in accordance with agency requirements. Although SSA has taken several actions to help agents improve their performance, including mandating agent use of the computer application, it has not yet determined why agent compliance with agency policies continues to fall short. SSA trains and monitors agents for courtesy and conducts periodic customer satisfaction surveys, but does not routinely capture all customer complaints about alleged agent discourtesy. Agents receive training on developing their interviewing and interpersonal skills, and SSA monitors agents to determine whether or not they are providing courteous service to callers. SSA monitoring indicates that agent courtesy levels are high. SSA solicits limited customer feedback on agent courtesy in its annual surveys and compiles general ratings, but these surveys do not ask callers for the reasons behind the ratings. Callers to the 800 number do complain of agent discourtesy, but SSA does not routinely document and assess all complaints. Some call center staff told us that when they receive allegations of agent discourtesy, they typically apologize for the discourteous service and may proceed to assist the caller without recording the complaint. SSA has feedback mechanisms in place to capture caller complaints, but these mechanism do not do so in a manner that allows SSA to assess complaints and identify corrective actions needed. |
gao_GAO-16-479 | gao_GAO-16-479_0 | Background
Patent Examination Process and Prior Art Searches
The focus of patent examination is to determine whether the invention in a patent application satisfies the legal requirements for a patent, including that the invention be novel and not obvious. Clarity of patent applications. Search tools and capabilities. Patent Offices for Europe and Japan Use Various Approaches to Help Address Challenges in Identifying Relevant Prior Art
EPO and JPO use several approaches that may help their examiners address challenges in identifying prior art similar to those that experts and respondents to our survey of patent examiners cited. In some cases, these actions are coordinated with, similar to, or could be informed by approaches taken by EPO or JPO. However, USPTO and patent examiners have experienced some challenges with this effort. USPTO Is Making Improvements to Prior Art Search Tools but Has Not Developed a Strategy to Assess New Sources of Art
USPTO is making improvements to its prior art search tools that may help address some of the challenges examiners face in identifying relevant prior art, but USPTO has not developed a strategy to assess incorporating new sources of art into these tools over time. According to USPTO officials, the capabilities of the new Patents End-to-End system can be expanded in the future to include additional nonpatent literature sources. Because information technology changes rapidly, the internal control standards note that controls must evolve to remain effective. Furthermore, despite potential improvements in how OPQA and supervisory patent examiners conduct and document reviews of examiners’ prior art searches, USPTO’s ability to use these data to monitor prior art searches may be limited because USPTO (1) does not have a clear definition of what constitutes a thorough prior art search, (2) may not collect sufficient information to assess examiners’ search strategies or the sources of prior art they consider, and (3) has not established goals and indicators for improving prior art searches. Conclusions
Examiners face a number of challenges in their efforts to search for prior art, including the large volume of prior art from multiple sources to consider, unclear patent applications, difficulties identifying or accessing relevant nonpatent literature and prior art in foreign languages, and limits on the time available to search for relevant prior art, among others. Third, the agency has not established goals or indicators covering prior art search performance. Monitoring the thoroughness of examiners’ prior art searches at a level of rigor and consistency to assess trends within individual technology centers would better enable USPTO to identify issues that vary by technology center and develop appropriate responses as called for by federal internal control standards. To ensure that USPTO is able to take full advantage of its investment in new information technology tools and capabilities, USPTO should develop and periodically update a documented strategy to identify key sources of nonpatent literature for individual technology centers and to assess the optimal means of providing access to these sources, such as including them in USPTO’s search system. However, additional steps are needed to ensure that USPTO’s reviews of examiners’ prior art searches collect information on whether, for example, examiners are searching patent literature, foreign patents, and nonpatent literature, as is required by the manual for patent examiners. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the challenges examiners face in identifying relevant prior art, (2) describes how selected foreign patent offices have addressed challenges in identifying relevant prior art, and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has taken steps to address any challenges in identifying relevant prior art. The weighted response rate was also 80 percent. We conducted site visits with EPO and JPO, during which we interviewed officials from these offices and reviewed documents they provided. We also interviewed stakeholders knowledgeable about the offices’ practices, such as academics who study these offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPTO examines patent applications to ensure that inventions are, among other requirements, novel and not obvious. USPTO patent examiners accomplish this by comparing applications to “prior art”—existing patents and applications in the United States and abroad, and nonpatent literature, such as scientific articles. Thorough prior art searches help ensure the validity of granted patents.
GAO was asked to identify ways to improve patent quality through use of the best available prior art. This report (1) describes the challenges examiners face in identifying relevant prior art, (2) describes how selected foreign patent offices have addressed challenges in identifying relevant prior art, and (3) assesses the extent to which USPTO has taken steps to address challenges in identifying relevant prior art. GAO surveyed a generalizable stratified random sample of USPTO examiners with an 80 percent response rate; interviewed experts active in the field, including patent holders, attorneys, and academics; interviewed officials from USPTO and similarly sized foreign patent offices, and other knowledgeable stakeholders; and reviewed USPTO documents and relevant laws.
What GAO Found
Experts and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examiners described a variety of challenges in identifying information relevant to a claimed invention—or “prior art”—that can affect examiners' ability to complete a thorough prior art search in the time allotted and their confidence in their search efforts. These challenges include, among others, the quantity and availability of prior art, the clarity of patent applications, and USPTO's policies and search tools.
The European Patent Office and Japan Patent Office face similar challenges to USPTO in identifying prior art and use various approaches to help address them, such as leveraging work of other patent offices on related patent applications and integrating nonpatent literature into their search tools. In some cases, these approaches are coordinated with, similar to, or could inform USPTO actions.
USPTO has taken actions to address challenges in identifying prior art, but some actions have limitations. For example, USPTO is in the process of upgrading its search tools. However, examiners will still need to access a variety of external sources to meet USPTO's requirement to consider nonpatent literature. Federal internal control standards call for controls to evolve to remain effective and USPTO officials noted that the new search system can be expanded to include more nonpatent literature as the European and Japan patent offices have done. However, USPTO does not have a documented strategy for identifying additional sources. Without such a strategy, USPTO cannot be assured that its information technology investment will improve examiners' searches. USPTO is also taking steps to augment the number of, and consistency with which, reviews of examiners' work are conducted and documented, which could improve USPTO's monitoring of examiners' work. However, USPTO still faces limitations in assessing the thoroughness of examiners' prior art searches, because, for example, the agency has not established goals or indicators for search quality and may not be collecting sufficient information on examiners' searches to assess prior art search quality. Without monitoring examiners' prior art searches, the agency cannot be assured that examiners are searching all relevant sources of prior art and may not be able to develop appropriate responses as called for by federal internal control standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations, among them, that USPTO develop a strategy to identify key sources of nonpatent literature, establish goals and indicators for prior art search quality, and collect sufficient information to assess prior art search quality. USPTO concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_T-GGD-96-124 | gao_T-GGD-96-124_0 | As agreed with your office, our statement includes information on the results to date of federal downsizing efforts, whether agencies’ use of buyouts reflected the administration’s workforce restructuring goals as articulated by the National Performance Review (NPR), the demographic results of the buyouts, the extent to which we estimate that the statutorily mandated workforce reduction goals could be met through attrition, and the cost and savings implications of buyouts versus reductions-in-force (RIF). 103-226) placed annual ceilings on executive branch full-time equivalent (FTE) positions from fiscal years 1994 through 1999. If implemented as intended, these ceilings will result in downsizing the federal workforce from 2.08 million FTE positions during fiscal year 1994 to 1.88 million FTE positions during fiscal year 1999. To help accomplish this downsizing, the act allowed non-Department of Defense (DOD) executive branch agencies to pay buyouts to employees who agreed to resign, retire, or take voluntary early retirement by March 31, 1995, unless extended by the head of the agency, but no later than March 31, 1997. According to OPM data, as of September 30, 1995, more than 112,500 buyouts had been paid governmentwide. DOD was responsible for about 71 percent of these buyouts. As shown in table 3, although the percentage of supervisors at DOD agencies dipped from 12.7 percent of the workforce to 11.9 percent, (1 supervisor for every 6.9 employees to 1 supervisor for every 7.4 employees), all but one of the other designated management control positions increased somewhat. GAO estimates. Because of the rights of higher graded employees to “bump” or “retreat” to lower-graded positions during a RIF, employees separated through RIFs are frequently not those who were in the positions originally targeted for elimination. We found that buyouts could generate up to 50 percent more in net savings than RIFs over the 5-year period following separation. their workforces by reducing management control positions. Nevertheless, some agencies may be required to downsize more than others. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the government's progress in downsizing its workforce and use of employee buyouts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) executive branch full-time equivalent (FTE) positions could decrease to 1.88 million during fiscal year (FY) 1999 under mandated ceilings; (2) as of September 30, 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) paid 71 percent of the more than 112,500 governmentwide buyouts; (3) the actual FY 1995 FTE level was 73,100 positions below the FY 1995 ceiling; (4) the FY 1997 budget calls for nearly 53,000 fewer FTE positions; (5) employee buyouts have helped limit reductions-in-force (RIF) to 6 percent of personnel cuts; (6) agencies have used buyouts more to meet required downsizing goals than to meet the administration's restructuring goals; (7) management control positions of DOD agencies have decreased to under 12 percent, but other designated positions have increased; (8) 70 percent of buyouts between FY 1993 and FY 1995 were paid to employees who took regular or early retirement; (9) retirements decreased 20 percent from FY 1991 through FY 1992, but increased 35 percent after buyout authorization; (10) the FY 1999 workforce goal could probably be met through normal attrition, but budget cuts may force some agencies to rely on other strategies to reduce their workforces below their goals; and (11) in general, buyouts generate up to 50 percent more in net savings over 5 years than RIF because higher-graded employees retreat to lower-graded positions during RIF. |
gao_GAO-12-361 | gao_GAO-12-361_0 | IT Supply Chain Presents Numerous Information Security Risks to Federal Agencies
Reliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems and underscores the importance of threat assessments and risk mitigation. These risks include threats posed by actors—such as foreign intelligence services or counterfeiters—who may exploit vulnerabilities in the supply chain, thus compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the end-system and the information it contains. This in turn can adversely affect an agency’s ability to carry out its mission. Each of the key threats presented in table 1 could create an unacceptable risk to federal agencies. Three National Security-Related Agencies Have Not Fully Addressed IT Supply Chain Risk
Although the four agencies in our review have acknowledged the risks presented by supply chain vulnerabilities, two of the agencies—Energy and DHS—have not yet defined supply chain protection measures for department information systems and are not in a position to have implementing procedures or monitoring capabilities to verify compliance with and effectiveness of any such measures. Justice has identified supply chain protection measures, but has not developed procedures for implementing or monitoring compliance with and the effectiveness of these measures. In contrast, Defense has made greater progress through its incremental approach to supply chain risk management. National Security-Related Agencies Participate in Governmentwide Efforts to Address Supply Chain Security
The four national security-related agencies also participate in interagency efforts to address supply chain security. These include participation in the CNCI, development of technical and policy tools, and collaboration with the intelligence community. Agencies Have Not Determined the Extent of Foreign- Developed IT Telecommunications Equipment, Software, or Services
Officials within the offices of the chief information officer at the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Defense, and the Justice Management Division stated that their respective agencies have not determined and do not currently track the extent to which their telecommunications networks contain foreign-developed equipment, software, or services. Until comprehensive policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities are developed, documented, and implemented, it is more likely that these national security-related agencies will rely on security measures that are inadequate, ineffective, or inefficient to manage emergent information technology supply chain risks. To assist the Department of Homeland Security in protecting against IT supply chain threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the appropriate agency officials to take the following three actions: develop and document departmental policy that defines which security measures should be employed to protect against supply chain threats; develop, document, and disseminate procedures to implement the supply chain protection security measures defined in departmental policy; and develop and implement a monitoring capability to verify compliance with, and assess the effectiveness of, supply chain protection measures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) the key risks associated with the supply chains used by federal agencies to procure information technology (IT) equipment, software, or services; (2) the extent to which selected national security-related agencies have addressed information technology supply chain risks; and (3) the extent to which national security-related federal agencies have determined that their telecommunication networks contain foreign-developed equipment, software, or services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies rely extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their operations. The exploitation of information technology (IT) products and services through the global supply chain is an emerging threat that could degrade the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical and sensitive agency networks and data.
GAO was asked to identify (1) the key risks associated with the IT supply chains used by federal agencies; (2) the extent to which selected national security-related departments have addressed such risks; and (3) the extent to which those departments have determined that their telecommunication networks contain foreign-developed equipment, software, or services. To do this, GAO analyzed federal acquisition and information security laws, regulations, standards, and guidelines; examined departmental policies and procedures; and interviewed officials from four national security-related departments, the intelligence community, and nonfederal entities.
What GAO Found
Reliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems. These risks include threats posed by actorssuch as foreign intelligence services or counterfeiterswho may exploit vulnerabilities in the supply chain and thus compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an end system and the information it contains. This in turn can adversely affect an agencys ability to effectively carry out its mission. Each of the key threats could create an unacceptable risk to federal agencies.
Although four national security-related departmentsthe Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and Defensehave acknowledged these threats, two of the departmentsEnergy and Homeland Securityhave not yet defined supply chain protection measures for department information systems and are not in a position to have implementing procedures or monitoring capabilities to verify compliance with and effectiveness of any such measures. Justice has identified supply chain protection measures, but has not developed procedures for implementing or monitoring compliance with and effectiveness of these measures. Until comprehensive policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities are developed, documented, and implemented, it is more likely that these national security-related departments will rely on security measures that are inadequate, ineffective, or inefficient to manage emergent information technology supply chain risks. In contrast, Defense has made greater progress through its incremental approach to supply chain risk management. The department has defined supply chain protection measures and procedures for implementing and monitoring these measures. The four national security-related departments also participate in governmentwide efforts to address supply chain security, including the development of technical and policy tools and collaboration with the intelligence community.
Officials at the four departments stated that their respective agencies have not determined or tracked the extent to which their telecommunications networks contain foreign-developed equipment, software, or services. Federal agencies are not required to track this information, and officials from four components of the U.S. national security community believe that doing so would provide minimal security value relative to cost.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice take steps, as needed, to develop and document policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities that address IT supply chain risk. These departments generally concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1104 | gao_GAO-08-1104_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether participating judges’ contributions for the 3 plan years ending on September 30, 2007, funded at least 50 percent of the JSAS costs and, if not, what adjustments in the contribution rates would be needed to achieve the 50 percent ratio. History of JSAS
JSAS was created in 1956 to help provide financial security for the families of deceased federal judges. It provides benefits to surviving eligible spouses and dependent children of judges who participate in the plan. Judges may elect coverage within 6 months of taking office, 6 months after getting married, if they were not married when they took office, 6 months after being elevated to a higher court, or during an open season authorized by statute. Active and senior judges currently contribute 2.2 percent of their salaries to JSAS, and retired judges contribute 3.5 percent of their retirement salaries to JSAS. The annuity may not exceed 50 percent of the high-3 and is guaranteed to be no less than 25 percent. In response to concerns that required contributions of 5 percent may have created a disincentive to participate, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992. The increase in the federal government’s contribution rates was a result of the increase in normal costs resulting from several combined factors, such as changes in actuarial assumptions; lower-than-expected investment experience on plan assets; demographic changes—retirement, death, disability, new members, pay increases; as well as an increase in plan benefit obligations. The judges’ average contribution share for the 9-year period was approximately 60 percent. For the 3-years covered by this review, we determined and reported that judges’ contributions represented approximately 54 percent of the normal costs of JSAS, and therefore, an adjustment to the judges’ contribution rates was not needed under the existing legislation because the judges’ contribution achieved 50 percent of JSAS costs. This percentage is the JSAS’s normal cost rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Judicial Survivors' Annuities System (JSAS) was created in 1956 to provide financial security for the families of deceased federal judges. It provides benefits to eligible spouses and dependent children of judges who elect coverage within 6 months of taking office, 6 months after getting married, 6 months after being elevated to a higher court, or during an open season authorized by statute. Active and senior judges currently contribute 2.2 percent of their salaries to JSAS, and retired judges contribute 3.5 percent of their retirement salaries to JSAS. Pursuant to the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-572), GAO is required to review JSAS costs every 3 years and determine whether the judges' contributions fund at least 50 percent of the plan's costs during the 3-year period. If the contributions fund less than 50 percent of these costs, GAO is to determine what adjustments to the contribution rates would be needed to achieve the 50 percent ratio.
What GAO Found
For the 2005 to 2007 time frame covered by this review, the participating judges funded approximately 54 percent of JSAS costs, and the federal government funded 46 percent. The increase in the government's contribution rate over the 3-year period was a result of increases in costs. The increase in costs reflected the combined effects of changes in actuarial assumptions; lower-than-expected rates of return on plan assets; demographic changes such as retirement, death, disability, new members, and pay increases; as well as an increase in plan benefit obligations. GAO determined that an adjustment to the judges' contribution rate was not needed because their average contribution share for the 3-year period exceeded the 50 percent minimum contribution goal specified by law. GAO examined the annual share of normal costs covered by judges' contributions over a 9-year period and found that, on average, the participating judges funded approximately 60 percent of JSAS's costs. |
gao_GAO-14-413 | gao_GAO-14-413_0 | Federal agencies expect to spend at least $82 billion in fiscal year 2014 to meet their increasing demand for IT products and services, such as purchases of software licenses. OMB and Federal Agencies Need to Improve Policies on Managing Software Licenses
OMB and most federal agencies that we reviewed do not have adequate policies for managing software licenses. OMB has a broader IT management initiative, known as PortfolioStat, which is intended to assist agencies in gathering information on their IT investments, including software licenses. Further, while 2 agencies have adequate policies for managing software licenses, the vast majority of agencies do not. Specifically, of the 24 major federal agencies, 18 have developed them, but they are not comprehensive; and 4 agencies have not developed any. Without guidance from OMB or comprehensive policies, it will be difficult for the agencies to consistently and effectively manage software licenses. The Majority of Agencies Have Software License Management Policies, but They Are Not Comprehensive
Given the absence of an OMB directive providing guidance to agencies on licensing management policy, we identified seven elements that a comprehensive software licensing policy should specify: identify clear roles, responsibilities, and central oversight authority within the department for managing enterprise software license agreements and commercial software licenses; establish a comprehensive inventory (80 percent of software license spending and/or enterprise licenses in the department) by identifying and collecting information about software license agreements using automated discovery and inventory tools; regularly track and maintain software licenses to assist the agency in implementing decisions throughout the software license management life cycle; analyze software usage and other data to make cost-effective provide training relevant to software license management; establish goals and objectives of the software license management consider the software license management life-cycle phases (i.e., requisition, reception, deployment and maintenance, retirement, and disposal phases) to implement effective decision making and incorporate existing standards, processes, and metrics. The general consensus of the agency officials we spoke to on their policy weaknesses was that they were due, in part, to the lack of a priority for establishing or enhancing department- or agency-level software license management. Table 2 describes these leading practices in managing software licenses. The inadequate implementation of leading practices in software license management can be linked to the weaknesses in agencies’ policies and decentralized approaches to license management. As a result, agencies’ oversight of software license spending has been limited or lacking. Agencies’ Most Widely Used Software Applications Are Not Known Due to Data Limitations
Given the weaknesses identified in this report regarding agencies’ lack of comprehensive, well-maintained inventories of software licenses, we cannot accurately describe the most widely used software applications across the government, including the extent to which they were over and under purchased. Further, the data provided by agencies regarding their most widely used applications are varying, incomplete, or not available—and thus, cannot be compared across the government. Varying data: The agencies that had data on widely used software applications provided it in various ways, including by license count, usage, and cost. NASA reported that in fiscal year 2012 the agency spent about $13 million on its most widely used applications. Incomplete data: The data provided by the agencies on the most widely used applications were not always complete. OMB has issued a policy associated with a broader IT management initiative but does not have a directive that assists agencies in developing licensing policies. In written comments, OMB noted that there are several management tools in place with respect to software license management, including the three we identified in our report; however, the agency disagreed with our statements that OMB and federal agencies need to improve policies on managing software licenses, and that until agencies have sufficient direction from OMB, opportunities to systematically identify software license related cost savings across the federal government will likely continue to be missed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this engagement were to (1) assess the extent to which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have appropriate policies on software license management, (2) determine the extent to which federal agencies are adequately managing software licenses, and (3) describe the software applications most widely used by the federal agencies and the extent to which they were over or under purchased. ● Fully met—the agency provided evidence that it fully addressed the leading practice. leading practice. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government plans to spend at least $82 billion on IT products and services in fiscal year 2014, such as software licenses. Federal agencies engage in thousands of licensing agreements annually. Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software.
GAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of software licenses. GAO (1) assessed the extent to which OMB and federal agencies have appropriate policies on software license management, (2) determined the extent to which agencies adequately manage licenses, and (3) described agencies' most widely used software and extent to which they were over or under purchased. GAO assessed policies from 24 agencies and OMB against sound licensing policy measures. GAO also analyzed and compared agencies' software inventories and management controls to leading practices, and interviewed responsible officials. To identify sound licensing policy measures and leading practices, GAO interviewed recognized private sector and government software license management experts.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the vast majority of agencies that GAO reviewed do not have adequate policies for managing software licenses. While OMB has a policy on a broader information technology (IT) management initiative that is intended to assist agencies in gathering information on their IT investments, including software licenses, it does not guide agencies in developing comprehensive license management policies. Regarding agencies, of the 24 major federal agencies, 2 have comprehensive policies that include the establishment of clear roles and central oversight authority for managing enterprise software license agreements, among other things; 18 have them but they are not comprehensive; and 4 have not developed any. The weaknesses in agencies' policies were due, in part, to the lack of a priority for establishing software license management practices and a lack of direction from OMB. Without an OMB directive and comprehensive policies, it will be difficult for the agencies to consistently and effectively manage software licenses.
Federal agencies are not adequately managing their software licenses because they generally do not follow leading practices in this area. The table lists the leading practices and the number of agencies that have fully, partially, or not implemented them.
The inadequate implementation of leading practices in software license management was partially due to weaknesses in agencies' policies. As a result, agencies' oversight of software license spending is limited or lacking, and they may miss out on savings. The potential savings could be significant considering that, in fiscal year 2012, one major federal agency reported saving approximately $181 million by consolidating its enterprise license agreements even though its oversight process was ad hoc.
Given that agencies lack comprehensive software license inventories that are regularly tracked and maintained, GAO cannot accurately describe the most widely used software applications across the government, including the extent to which they were over and under purchased. Further, the data provided by agencies regarding their most widely used applications had limitations. Specifically, (1) agencies with data provided them in various ways, including by license count, usage, and cost; (2) the data provided by these agencies on the most widely used applications were not always complete; and (3) not all agencies had available data on the most widely used applications. Until weaknesses in how agencies manage licenses are addressed, the most widely used applications cannot be determined and thus opportunities for savings across the federal government may be missed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends OMB issue a directive to help guide agencies in managing licenses and that the 24 agencies improve their policies and practices for managing licenses. OMB disagreed with the need for a directive, but GAO believes it is needed, as discussed in the report. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. |
gao_GAO-16-632 | gao_GAO-16-632_0 | For example, airport operators determine the boundaries for the security-restricted areas of their airport based on the physical layout of the airport and in accordance with TSA requirements. As of the end of fiscal year 2015, TSA conducted JVAs at 81 (about 19 percent) of the 437 airports since fiscal year 2009. TSA Has Not Updated Its Risk Assessment of Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security or Shared Updated Risk Information with Stakeholders
While TSA released its Risk Assessment of Airport Security in May 2013, it has not updated this assessment to reflect changes in the airport security risk environment or routinely shared updated national risk information with airports or other stakeholders. According to both TSA and the FBI, the insider threat is one of aviation security’s most pressing concerns. As such, updating the Risk Assessment of Airport Security with TSSRA information that reflects this current, pressing threat as well as with findings from JVAs already conducted, future Special Emphasis Assessments, and any other TSA risk assessment activities would better ensure TSA is basing its risk management decisions on current information and focusing its limited resources on the highest-priority risks to airport security. TSA Has Not Assessed Vulnerability of Airports System-wide
TSA has not comprehensively assessed the vulnerability of airports system-wide through its JVA process—its primary measure for assessing vulnerability at commercial airports. TSA officials stated that they are limited in the number of JVAs they conduct because of resource constraints. While we recognize that conducting JVAs at all or a statistically representative sample of the approximately 440 commercial airports in the United States may not be feasible given budget and resource constraints, other approaches to assessing vulnerability may allow TSA to assess vulnerability at airports system-wide. TSA officials stated that PARIS—TSA’s system of record for security events—is a data repository, among other things. TSA Developed a National Strategy to Guide Oversight of Airport Security, but Has Not Updated It to Reflect Changes in Its Risk Assessment of Airport Security and Other Actions
TSA has not updated its September 2012 National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security (Strategy) to reflect actions it has subsequently taken to assess the airport security risk environment, oversee and facilitate airport security, and address Strategy goals and objectives. The Strategy, which TSA developed in response to our 2009 recommendation, defines how the agency seeks to secure the perimeters and controlled areas of the nation’s commercial airports. Updating the Strategy to reflect changes in the airport security risk environment as well as new and enhanced activities TSA has taken to facilitate airport security would help TSA to better inform management decisions and focus resources on the highest-priority risks, consistent with its strategic goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure TSA’s actions in overseeing and facilitating airport security are based on the most recent available risk information that assesses vulnerabilities system-wide and evaluates security events, and that these actions are orchestrated according to a strategic plan that reflects the agency’s goals and objectives and its progress in meeting those goals, we recommend that the Administrator of TSA take the following six actions:
Update the Risk Assessment of Airport Security to reflect changes to its risk environment, such as those updates reflected in TSSRA and JVA findings, and share results of this risk assessment with stakeholders on an ongoing basis. With regard to the third recommendation that TSA develop and implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport vulnerability, DHS concurred and stated that TSA has begun to take steps to develop methods that will provide a more comprehensive understanding of airport security vulnerabilities. More specifically, our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—related to commercial airport perimeter and access control security since 2009; (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions since 2009 to oversee and facilitate airport perimeter and access control security; and (3) the actions selected commercial airports have taken, if any, to strengthen perimeter and access control security since 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
Incidents of aviation workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons and drugs into security-restricted areas and onto planes has heightened awareness about security at commercial airports. TSA, along with airport operators, has responsibility for securing the nation's approximately 440 commercial airports.
GAO was asked to review TSA's oversight of airport perimeter and access control security since GAO last reported on the topic in 2009. This report examines, for airport security, (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to oversee and facilitate security, among other objectives.
GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment and security activities; analyzed relevant TSA security event data from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; obtained information from TSA and industry association officials as well as from a nongeneralizable sample of 11 airports, selected based on factors such as size.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made progress in assessing the threat, vulnerability, and consequence components of risk to airport perimeter and access control security (airport security) since GAO last reported on the topic in 2009, such as developing its Comprehensive Risk Assessment of Perimeter and Access Control Security (Risk Assessment of Airport Security) in May 2013. However, TSA has not updated this assessment to reflect changes in the airport security risk environment, such as TSA's subsequent determination of risk from the insider threat—the potential of rogue aviation workers exploiting their credentials, access, and knowledge of security procedures throughout the airport for personal gain or to inflict damage. Updating the Risk Assessment of Airport Security with information that reflects this current threat, among other things, would better ensure that TSA bases its risk management decisions on current information and focuses its limited resources on the highest-priority risks to airport security. Further, TSA has not comprehensively assessed the vulnerability—one of the three components of risk—of TSA-regulated (i.e., commercial) airports system-wide through its joint vulnerability assessment (JVA) process, which it conducts with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or another process. From fiscal years 2009 through 2015, TSA conducted JVAs at 81 (about 19 percent) of the 437 commercial airports nationwide. TSA officials stated that they have not conducted JVAs at all airports system-wide because of resource constraints. While conducting JVAs at all commercial airports may not be feasible given budget and resource constraints, other approaches, such as providing all commercial airports with a self-vulnerability assessment tool, may allow TSA to assess vulnerability at airports system-wide.
Since 2009, TSA has taken various actions to oversee and facilitate airport security; however, it has not updated its national strategy for airport security to reflect changes in its Risk Assessment of Airport Security and other security-related actions. TSA has taken various steps to oversee and facilitate airport security by, among other things, developing strategic goals and evaluating risks. For example, in 2012 TSA developed its National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security (Strategy), which defines how TSA seeks to secure the perimeters and security-restricted areas of the nation's commercial airports. However, TSA has not updated its Strategy to reflect actions it has subsequently taken, including results of the 2013 Risk Assessment and new and enhanced security activities, among other things. Updating the Strategy to reflect changes in the airport security risk environment and new and enhanced activities TSA has taken to facilitate airport security would help TSA to better inform management decisions and focus resources on the highest-priority risks, consistent with its strategic goals.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in March 2016. Information that TSA deems “Sensitive Security Information” has been removed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that TSA update its Risk Assessment of Airport Security, develop and implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport vulnerability, and update its National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security . DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-626 | gao_GAO-05-626_0 | Background
Recent economic, medical, technological, and social changes have increased opportunities for individuals with disabilities to live with greater independence and more fully participate in the workforce. These programs provide a wide range of assistance such as employment-related services, medical care, and monetary support. In fiscal year 2003, over $120 billion in federal funds were spent on programs that serve only people with disabilities. Although there were insufficient data available to estimate the total additional funds spent on people with disabilities by programs that also serve people without disabilities, benefit payments for people with disabilities for two such programs alone—Medicare and Medicaid— amounted to about $132 billion in fiscal year 2002. The rest of the programs are partially targeted to people with disabilities—they serve people with and without disabilities. Federal Programs Provide a Wide Range of Assistance to People with Disabilities
Federal programs provide a wide range of assistance to people with disabilities (see fig. 1). 2). 3). 4). 5). In addition to the billions of dollars spent on programs that serve only people with disabilities, additional amounts are spent on individuals with disabilities by partially targeted programs whose beneficiaries also include people without disabilities. Federal Programs That Support People with Disabilities Face an Array of Challenges
Both our past work and our recent survey of federal programs supporting people with disabilities indicate that these programs face a number of challenges. Among these are challenges in ensuring timely and consistent processing of applications for assistance, ensuring timely provision of services and benefits, interpreting complex eligibility requirements, planning for growth in the demand for program benefits and services, making beneficiaries or clients aware of program services or benefits, and communicating or coordinating with other federal programs. Key Factors to Consider in Transforming Programs for the 21st Century
Over the past several years, GAO, in reporting that the largest federal disability programs were mired in outdated concepts of disability, has identified the need to reexamine and transform these programs to better position the government to meet the challenges and expectations of the 21st century. On the basis of more than a decade of research focusing on the nation’s largest disability programs and our review of prior GAO reports examining efforts to reform federal programs and transform agencies, we have identified several key factors that are important to consider in assessing the need for, and nature of, program transformations. In particular, our prior work identifying shortcomings in the work incentives and supports provided by the largest federal disability programs indicates that these basic program design issues need to be addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, GAO designated modernizing federal disability programs as a high-risk area requiring urgent attention and organizational transformation to ensure that programs function as efficiently and effectively as possible. GAO found that although social attitudes have changed and medical advancements afford greater opportunities for people with disabilities to work, the Social Security Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs have maintained an outmoded approach that equated disability with inability to work. We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority as part of a continued effort to help policymakers better understand the extent of support provided by federal programs to people with disabilities and to assist them in determining how these programs could be better aligned to more effectively meet the needs of individuals with disabilities in the 21st century. This report identifies (1) the wide array of federal programs that serve people with disabilities, and (2) the major challenges these federal programs face in the 21st century. In addition, GAO presents factors policy makers and program administrators should address in assessing whether, and how, they could be transformed to better meet 21st century challenges.
What GAO Found
More than 20 federal agencies and almost 200 programs provide a wide range of assistance to people with disabilities, including employment-related services, medical care, and monetary support. About half of these programs serve only people with disabilities while the rest serve people both with and without disabilities. In fiscal year 2003, more than $120 billion in federal funds was spent on programs that only serve people with disabilities, with over 80 percent of these funds spent on monetary support. In addition, considerable funds are spent on people with disabilities by programs that also serve people without disabilities, like Medicare and Medicaid. The program challenges cited most frequently in our recent survey of nearly 200 programs serving people with disabilities are largely consistent with several of the key findings from past reports that led GAO to place federal programs supporting people with disabilities on its high-risk list. Both our recent survey and our past work have identified challenges in (1) ensuring timely and consistent processing of applications; (2) ensuring timely provision of services and benefits; (3) interpreting complex eligibility requirements;( 4) planning for growth in the demand for benefits and services; (5) making beneficiaries or clients aware of benefits and services; and (6) communicating or coordinating with other federal disability programs. In light of the vital role federal programs play in providing assistance to people with disabilities and in helping to ensure an adequate national labor force, we have identified a number of factors that are important to consider in assessing the need for, and nature of, program transformations including (1) program design issues; (2) fiscal implications of proposed program changes; and (3) feasibility of implementing program changes. |
gao_GAO-07-1047T | gao_GAO-07-1047T_0 | Background
The United States has historically sought to attract international students to its colleges and universities. In recent years international students have earned about one-third or more of all of the U.S. degrees at both the master’s and doctoral levels in several of the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. Several federal agencies coordinate efforts to attract and bring international students to the United States and implement related requirements. Although the United States continues to enroll more international students than any other country, the number of international students enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions leveled off and even dropped slightly after 2001, as shown in figure 1. The Global Higher Education Landscape Is Providing More Options for Students
As worldwide demand for higher education continues to rise, changes in the global higher education landscape have provided students with more options. International branch campuses now provide international students the opportunity to receive an American education without leaving their home country. Greater competition has prompted some countries to embrace instruction in English and encouraged other systems to expand their recruiting activities and incentives. In addition, some countries have also developed strategic plans or offices that address efforts to attract international students. Rising Cost of U.S. Higher Education May Discourage Some International Students from Coming
As the cost of attending college in the United States rises, international students may be discouraged from coming here to study. Higher education in the United States ranks among the most expensive in the world. Moreover, student costs at U.S. colleges and universities continue to rise. The effects of high and rising tuition and other factors on international enrollment patterns are difficult to estimate, but some policymakers are concerned that costs may be discouraging some international students from coming to U.S. higher education institutions. Almost all visa applicants must now be interviewed by a consular adjudicating officer at a U.S. embassy or post; this requirement has both affected the number of visas issued and extended wait times for visas under certain circumstances. We have reviewed aspects of the visa process and have made many recommendations to strengthen the process in a way that reduces barriers for international students while balancing national security interests. Recent visa data show an increase in the number of student visas issued in the last few years. State has expedited interviews for students. In addition, the length of time that some visa clearances are valid has been extended. Concluding Observations
The United States must maintain an appropriate balance between protecting national security interests and ensuring our long-term competitiveness. Changes designed to protect national security in the wake of September 11 may have contributed to real and perceived barriers for international students, and the subsequent decline in international enrollments raises concerns about the long-term competitiveness of U.S. colleges and universities. While federal efforts to reduce barriers for international students have helped, monitoring current trends and federal policies is essential to ensuring that the United States continues to obtain talented international students in the face of greater global competition. | Why GAO Did This Study
More international students obtain a higher education in the United States than in any other country, and they make valuable contributions while they are here. For those students returning home after their studies, such exchanges support federal public diplomacy efforts and can improve understanding among nations. International students have earned about one-third or more of all U.S. degrees at both the master's and doctoral levels in several of the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields. Yet recent trends, including a drop in international student enrollment in U.S. colleges and universities, and policy changes after September 11, 2001, have raised concerns about whether the United States will continue to attract talented international students to its universities. This testimony is based on ongoing and published GAO work. It includes themes from a September 2006 Comptroller General's forum on current trends in international student enrollment in the United States and abroad. Invitees to the forum included experts from the Congress, federal agencies, universities, research institutions, higher education organizations, and industry.
What GAO Found
GAO identified key issues that may affect the United States' ability to continue attracting the world's most talented international students to our universities and colleges. First, the global higher education landscape is changing and providing more alternatives for students, as other countries expand their educational capacity and technology-based distance learning opportunities increase. For example, enrollment in college-level distance education has nearly quadrupled since 1995. In addition, U.S. universities are establishing branch campuses in other countries and partnerships with international institutions, allowing international students to receive a U.S. education without leaving home. Greater competition has prompted some countries to offer courses in English and to expand their recruiting activities and incentives. Some countries also have developed strategic plans or offices focused on attracting international students. Second, the cost of obtaining a U.S. degree is among the highest in the world and rising, which may discourage international students. Average tuition in 2003 at public U.S. colleges and universities was second only to Australia. Moreover, tuition and associated costs continue to rise. While the effects of high and rising costs and related factors are difficult to estimate, some policymakers are concerned they may be discouraging international students from coming to the United States. Lastly, visa policies and procedures, tightened after September 11 to protect our national security, contributed to real and perceived barriers for international students. Post-September 11 changes included a requirement that almost all visa applicants be interviewed, affecting the number of visas issued and extending wait times for visas under certain circumstances.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made several recommendations to strengthen the visa process in a way that reduces barriers for international students while balancing national security, and recent changes have improved the process. Processing times for certain security reviews have declined, and recent data show more student visas issued in the last few years. The Department of State also has taken steps to ease the burden on students, including expediting interviews and extending the length of time that some visa clearances are valid. We are continuing to study aspects of these issues. The United States must maintain an appropriate balance between protecting national security interests and ensuring our long-term competitiveness. Monitoring current trends and federal policies is essential to ensuring that the United States continues to obtain talented international students in the face of greater global competition. |
gao_HEHS-96-1 | gao_HEHS-96-1_0 | Employees under FERS are automatically enrolled in TSP because federal agencies are required to contribute an amount equal to 1 percent of their employees’ salaries to the plan. Salary Deferral Rates Have Increased, but Lower-Wage Employees’ Rates Remain Lower Than Others
Overall, in 1993 FERS-covered employees making voluntary contributions were deferring an average of 5.7 percent of their salaries compared with 3.7 percent in 1987. TSP Contributions Needed to Reach Target Retirement Replacement Rates
Our analysis showed a disparity in the extent to which higher- and lower-paid employees under FERS may need to contribute to TSP to achieve total FERS retirement benefits that would be commensurate with their preretirement standard of living. Effect of Preretirement Contributions Not Explained in TSP Educational Materials
The TSP Board produces and provides to federal agencies a variety of educational materials for their employees. However, TSP’s educational materials are not explicit in discussing the importance of employee TSP contributions in achieving total FERS retirement benefits that would be commensurate with preretirement living standards, that is, benefits in the range of 60 to 80 percent of earnings. On average, most private sector section 401(k) plans offer four or more investment options that include a number of bond and stock funds of varying risk. The new options would allow TSP participants to diversify their investments. Recommendation to the Congress
We recommend that to help ensure that TSP participants have investment opportunities similar to those available under comparable private sector plans, the Congress enact legislation adding the two investment options sought by TSP’s Board. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS), focusing on: (1) the extent to which employees under FERS voluntarily contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP); (2) how well TSP educational materials address the importance of employee participation; and (3) whether there should be additional TSP investment options.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of September 1994, about 76 percent of FERS employees voluntarily contributed an average of 5.7 percent of their salaries to TSP; (2) most of the non-contributing employees were in lower pay grades; (3) lower paid workers contribute less of their salaries to TSP because social security benefits are proportionally higher for lower income workers; (4) these workers may not need to contribute as much to TSP in order to maintain their preretirement standard of living; (5) mid- and high-pay level workers need to contribute at least 5 percent of their salaries over their careers to achieve 60 to 80 percent of preretirement income; (6) although TSP educational materials extensively discuss the plan's financial aspects, they do not explicitly discuss the importance of employee participation in TSP; (7) the TSP Board is seeking legislation that would add two stock fund options to the three investment options it already offers in order to make these options more similar to those available in private-sector plans; and (8) although they carry a higher investment risk, these new investment options could potentially produce higher earnings for plan participants. |
gao_GAO-01-473 | gao_GAO-01-473_0 | The July 2000 plan also called for transferring the management of 25 stores located in the Eastern Region to the Midwest Region. Conclusions
While the Defense Commissary Agency has not fully refined its cost and savings estimates, it appears that, by eliminating the Eastern Region’s area offices and consolidating those regional operations at its Virginia Beach location, the Agency will produce savings and improve operations. However, with the implementation of the plan comes a loss of operational expertise in the closing offices that could potentially disrupt operations and customer service. Whether the Agency’s proposed regional reorganization is the best approach for achieving efficiencies is unclear because the Agency did not assess alternative structural approaches to improving regional operations and creating efficiencies. The plan is limited because it considers only the Eastern Region and not the totality of the regional structure, which is to be considered in the Agency’s follow-on study of the current reorganization plan. While the closure of the area offices is likely to improve efficiency, the planned study to determine the optimum number of stores for the Agency’s regions provides an additional opportunity for achieving additional streamlining and improved regional operations and efficiencies. In this regard, experience from commercial-sector retailers may provide useful insights into determining how to shape the Agency’s future regional structure. | What GAO Found
In July 2000, the Defense Commissary Agency proposed changes to its regional management structure that it expects will generate savings, improve efficiencies, and provide more effective management of commissary operations. The plan calls for eliminating the two area offices within the Eastern Region and consolidating most of the Eastern Region's operations at the region's headquarters at Virginia Beach, Virginia. Although the agency has not fully refined its cost and savings estimates, it appears that these proposed changes will yield savings and improve operations. However, with the implementation of the plan comes a loss of operational expertise in the closing offices that could potentially disrupt operations and customer service. Whether the proposed regional reorganization is the best approach for achieving efficiencies is unclear because the agency did not assess alternative structural approaches to improving regional operations and creating efficiencies. The plan is limited because it considers only the Eastern Region and not the overall regional structure, which is to be considered in the agency's follow-on study of the current reorganization plan. Although the closure of the area offices is likely to improve efficiency, the planned study to determine the optimum number of stores for the agency's regions provides an additional opportunity for streamlining and improved regional operations and efficiencies. Experiences from the private-sector may provide useful lessons into how best to shape the agency's future regional structure. |
gao_GAO-08-429T | gao_GAO-08-429T_0 | The WTC health programs that are providing screening and monitoring are tracking thousands of individuals who were affected by the WTC disaster. NIOSH Has Not Ensured the Availability of Services for Nonfederal Responders Residing outside the NYC Metropolitan Area
NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area, although it has taken steps toward expanding the availability of these services. AOEC experienced challenges in providing these screening services. Mount Sinai’s subcontract with AOEC ended in July 2004, and from August 2004 until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund any organization to provide services to nonfederal responders outside the NYC metropolitan area. In June 2005, NIOSH began its second effort by awarding $776,000 to the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide both screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. DCC, however, had difficulty establishing a network of providers that could serve nonfederal responders residing throughout the country—ultimately contracting with only 10 clinics in seven states to provide screening and monitoring services. In this request, NIOSH described the scope of a national program as offering screening, monitoring, and treatment services to about 3,000 nonfederal responders through a national network of occupational health facilities. Therefore we recommended in July 2007 that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the attack on the WTC, regardless of where they reside. As of January 2008, the department has not responded to this recommendation. Appendix I: Abbreviations
Related GAO Products
September 11: Improvements Needed in Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring Services for Responders. GAO-07-1229T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2007. September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders. GAO-07-892. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2007. September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack. | Why GAO Did This Study
Six years after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), concerns persist about health effects experienced by WTC responders and the availability of health care services for those affected. Several federally funded programs provide screening, monitoring, or treatment services to responders. GAO has previously reported on the progress made and implementation problems faced by these WTC health programs. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's testimony, September 11: Improvements Needed in Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring Services for Responders ( GAO-07-1229T , Sept. 10, 2007), which updated GAO's report, September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders ( GAO-07-892 , July 23, 2007). In this testimony, GAO discusses efforts by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to provide services for nonfederal responders residing outside the New York City (NYC) area. For the July 2007 report, GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials, grantees, and others. GAO updated selected information in August and September 2007 and conducted work for this statement in January 2008.
What GAO Found
In July 2007, following a reexamination of the status of the WTC health programs, GAO recommended that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the WTC attack, regardless of where they reside. As of January 2008, the department has not responded to this recommendation. As GAO testified in September 2007, NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC area, although it has taken steps toward expanding the availability of these services. In late 2002, NIOSH arranged for a network of occupational health clinics to provide screening services. This effort ended in July 2004, and until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund screening or monitoring services for nonfederal responders outside the NYC area. In June 2005, NIOSH funded the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide screening and monitoring services; however, DCC had difficulty establishing a nationwide network of providers and contracted with only 10 clinics in seven states. In 2006, NIOSH began to explore other options for providing these services, and in 2007 it took steps toward expanding the provider network. |
gao_GAO-03-167T | gao_GAO-03-167T_0 | We found that both HUD and Education lacked fundamental internal controls over their purchase card programs that would have minimized the risk of improper purchases. Combined with a lack of monitoring, environments were created at HUD and Education where improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection. One of the most important internal controls in the purchase card process is the review of supporting documentation and approval of each purchase by the approving official. Another control that is effective in helping to prevent improper purchases is the blocking of certain merchant category codes (MCC). This control, available as part of the agencies purchase card contracts with the card issuing financial institutions, allows agencies to prohibit certain types of purchases that are clearly not business related, such as purchases from jewelry stores or entertainment establishments. Strategies to Manage Improper Payments
Now I would like to talk about some of the things that HUD, Education, and other federal agencies can do to address their improper payments comprehensively. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses (1) how internal control weaknesses make the departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Education vulnerable to, and in some cases have resulted in, improper and questionable payments and (2) strategies these and other federal agencies can use to better manage their improper payments. Despite a climate of increased scrutiny, most improper payments associated with federal programs continue to go unidentified as they drain taxpayer resources away from the missions and goals of our government.
What GAO Found
GAO found that both HUD and Education lacked fundamental internal controls over their purchase card programs that would have minimized the risk of improper purchases. Combined with a lack of monitoring, environments were created at HUD and Education where improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection. One of the most important internal controls in the purchase card process is the review of supporting documentation and approval of each purchase by the approving official. Another control that is effective in helping to prevent improper purchases is the blocking of certain merchant category codes. This control, available as part of the agencies' purchase card contracts with the card issuing financial institutions, allows agencies to prohibit certain types of purchases that are clearly not business related. |
gao_GAO-14-732 | gao_GAO-14-732_0 | C Corporation: a corporation that is generally taxed at the entity level under subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Partnerships report the share of income or losses accruing to each partner on a Schedule K-1 with copies going to the partners and to IRS. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
In response to concerns about IRS’s ability to audit partnership returns, Congress enacted specific rules regarding partnerships audits in TEFRA. Most Large Partnerships Have Complex Structures with Thousands of Partners and Multiple Tiers
Almost two-thirds of large partnerships had 1,000 or more direct and indirect partners in tax year 2011, but hundreds of large partnerships had more than 100,000 partners. Several Challenges Related to Complexity May Limit IRS’s Ability to Audit Large Partnerships and to Recommend Changes
IRS officials said that they do not have sufficient data on the results from field audits of large partnerships to know what is driving the high no Our focus groups with IRS field change rate and minimal tax changes.auditors and interviews with IRS officials, however, provided insights on the challenges to finding noncompliance in field audits. TEFRA Reduces Time IRS Can Actually Spend on Audits IRS focus group participants stated that the interaction of TEFRA procedures with increasingly complex partnership structures has reduced the amount of time to effectively audit the return within the statute of limitations. Without a TMP, IRS is not able to conduct the audit. For example, TEFRA does not require partnerships to designate a TMP on their returns. If IRS does so within 45 days, IRS can close the audit as no change without having to notify the partners. In addition, time spent identifying the TMP reduces the time available to make this determination. As a consequence, the process for passing audit adjustments through to partners is costly and very time consuming. Large Partnerships May Pay Tax on Audit Adjustments Rather Than Pass Them Through to the Partners but Such Payments are Not Widely Used Current law allows large partnerships to pay a tax owed as determined by audit adjustments at the entity level rather than passing the adjustments through to partners, which would avoid all the costs of campus audits. However, few large partnerships elect to become an ELP. IRS has not developed the two field audit-related projects consistent with project planning principles, as shown in table 9. Without following the principles in table 9, IRS may not be able to assess whether the projects succeeded in making large partnership audits more efficient and effective. While IRS has initiated three projects to improve its audit procedures, it has not followed project planning principles, including taking the steps needed to effectively track the results for the two projects that have been implemented. In its written comments, IRS agreed with our recommendations but said two of our recommendations, related to revising IRS’s activity codes to enable tracking large partnership audits and then analyzing audit results, are dependent upon future funding. The names of GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) determine what IRS knows about the number and characteristics of large partnerships; (2) determine what IRS knows about the costs and results of audits of large partnership returns and assess IRS’s ability to effectively conduct such audits; and (3) identify and assess IRS’s efforts to address the challenges of auditing large partnership returns. To determine the number and characteristics of large partnerships, we obtained data on tax returns filed by large partnerships from the Enhanced Large Partnership Indicator (ELPI) file on partnerships for tax years 2002 to 2011, and on the number of partnerships with 100 or more direct and indirect partners and $100 million or more in assets. To determine the number of IRS audits of large partnership returns and the characteristics of those audits, we obtained data from the Audit Information Management System (AIMS) and reported those partnership returns subject to IRS audit that were closed during fiscal years 2007 to 2013.returns, we only reported those audits that were traditional IRS field audits (in which IRS audited the books and records of a large partnership return), and not campus audits (in which IRS usually passed audit adjustments through to the related partners’ returns), as they are mainly an administrative function and do not include an examination of the books and records of the taxpayer return in question. | Why GAO Did This Study
More businesses are organizing as partnerships while fewer are C corporations. Unlike C corporations, partnerships do not pay income taxes but pass on income and losses to their partners. Large partnerships (those GAO defined as having $100 million or more in assets and 100 or more direct and indirect partners) are growing in number and have complex structures. Some partnerships create tiers of partnerships with hundreds of thousands of partners. Tiered large partnerships are challenging for IRS to audit because tracing income through the tiers to the ultimate partners is complex.
GAO was asked to assess IRS's ability to audit large partnerships. GAO's objectives include: 1) determine what IRS knows about the number and characteristics of large partnerships, 2) assess IRS's ability to audit them, and 3) assess IRS's efforts to address the audit challenges. GAO analyzed IRS data from 2002 to 2011 and IRS audit documentation, interviewed IRS officials, met with IRS auditors in six focus groups, and interviewed private sector tax lawyers knowledgeable about partnerships.
What GAO Found
The number of large partnerships has more than tripled to 10,099 from tax year 2002 to 2011. Almost two-thirds of large partnerships had more than 1,000 direct and indirect partners, had six or more tiers and/or self reported being in the finance and insurance sector, with many being investment funds.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits few large partnerships. Most audits resulted in no change to the partnership's return and the aggregate change was small. Although internal control standards call for information about effective resource use, IRS has not defined what constitutes a large partnership and does not have codes to track these audits. According to IRS auditors, the audit results may be due to challenges such as finding the sources of income within multiple tiers while meeting the administrative tasks required by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) within specified time frames. For example, IRS auditors said that it can sometimes take months to identify the partner that represents the partnership in the audit, reducing time available to conduct the audit. TEFRA does not require large partnerships to identify this partner on tax returns. Also under TEFRA, unless the partnership elects to be taxed at the entity level (which few do), IRS must pass audit adjustments through to the ultimate partners. IRS officials stated that the process of determining each partner's share of the adjustment is paper and labor intensive. When hundreds of partners' returns have to be adjusted, the costs involved limit the number of audits IRS can conduct. Adjusting the partnership return instead of the partners' returns would reduce these costs but, without legislative action, IRS's ability to do so is limited.
Note: A 3-year statute of limitations governs the time IRS has to conduct partnership audits, which is about equally split between the time from when a return is received until the audit begins and the time to do the audit. IRS then has a year to assess the partners their portion of the audit adjustment.
IRS has initiated three projects—one of which is under development—to make large partnership audit procedures more efficient, such as identifying higher risk returns to audit. However, the two projects implemented were not developed in line with project planning principles. For example, they do not have clear and measurable goals or a method for determining results. As a consequence, IRS may not be able to tell whether the projects succeed in increasing audit efficiency.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring large partnerships to identify a partner to represent them during audits and to pay taxes on audit adjustments at the partnership level. IRS should take multiple actions, including: define large partnerships, track audit results using revised audit codes, and implement project planning principles for the audit procedure projects. IRS agreed with all the recommendations, but noted that revision of the audit codes is dependent upon future funding. |
gao_GAO-06-860 | gao_GAO-06-860_0 | SBA’s limited planning contributed to insufficient DCMS user capacity, which restricted the number of staff that could access the system and process the large volume of applications in a timely manner. As table 2 shows, as of May 27, 2006, SBA had issued more than 2.1 million applications to victims affected by the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Ineffective Technical Support Affected the Stability of DCMS and SBA’s Ability to Provide Timely Disaster Assistance
SBA experienced instability with DCMS during the initial months following Hurricane Katrina, as users experienced outages, difficulties connecting to the system, and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. These backlogs combined peaked at over 204,000 applications in late December 2005. As a result of the backlogs, victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes waited about 74 days on average for SBA to process their loan applications, compared with the agency’s goal of within 21 days. For example, SBA increased the number of concurrent users that could access DCMS by acquiring additional computer hardware and adding a second work shift for loan processing staff to better balance the system’s workload. SBA’s Processing Changes and Other Initiatives Had Varied Success
After the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA made several changes to its disaster loan process and implemented other initiatives intended to improve its response to victims. While some of these initiatives improved SBA’s ability to process large numbers of disaster loan applications, others did not. For example, in November 2005, SBA implemented the GO Loan Program. Moreover, SBA based the maximum number of concurrent users for DCMS solely on its historical experience rather than considering information available from catastrophe risk modeling firms and disaster simulations, such as the likelihood and severity of damages from potential catastrophes to help predict the volume of applications that it might expect from such events. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to provide more timely disaster assistance in the future, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA direct the Office of Disaster Assistance to take the following four actions: reassess DCMS’s maximum user capacity and related loan processing resource needs based on such things as lessons learned from the Gulf Coast hurricanes, a review of information available from catastrophe risk modeling firms and disaster simulations, and related cost considerations; conduct complete stress testing to ensure that DCMS can function at planned for maximum user capacity levels; improve management controls over assessing contractor performance through inspections of all equipment purchased or leased to support DCMS; and expedite plans to resume business process reengineering efforts to analyze the disaster loan process and identify ways to more efficiently process loan applications including an evaluation of the feasibility of implementing a secure Internet-based application feature for home loan applicants. As we noted in our report, SBA planned the maximum user capacity for DCMS based on the volume of applications it received from victims of the Northridge earthquake—the single largest disaster SBA had previously faced—and did not anticipate the likelihood of a single disaster or series of disasters of the magnitude of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Scope and Methodology
In this report, we evaluate: (1) what affected the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) ability to provide timely disaster assistance and (2) the actions SBA took after the disasters to improve its response to disaster victims. This report focuses primarily on the Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS) and the disaster loan process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma (the Gulf Coast hurricanes) caused more than $118 billion in estimated property damages across the Gulf Coast region in 2005. The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps individuals and businesses recover from disasters through its Disaster Loan Program. GAO initiated work to determine how well SBA provided victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance. This report, the first of two, focuses primarily on the Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS) and disaster loan process. Here, GAO evaluates (1) what affected SBA's ability to provide timely disaster assistance and (2) actions SBA took after the disasters to improve its response to disaster victims. In conducting this study, GAO analyzed data on loan applications and assessed key aspects of SBA's acquisition and implementation of DCMS.
What GAO Found
Although DCMS provided SBA with a number of benefits, several factors affected SBA's ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. First, the large volume of applications SBA processed greatly exceeded any previous disaster, including the 1994 Northridge earthquake--the largest single disaster SBA previously faced. Second, SBA primarily used this earthquake as the basis for planning the maximum user capacity for DCMS and did not consider information available from catastrophe risk modeling firms and disaster simulations, such as the likelihood and severity of damages from potential catastrophes, to help predict the expected application volume from such events. SBA's limited planning contributed to insufficient DCMS user capacity, which restricted the number of staff that could access the system and process the large volume of applications in a timely manner. SBA also did not receive the correct computer hardware from its contractor, and the agency did not completely stress test DCMS before implementation, which contributed to the system instability, outages, and slow response times initially experienced by SBA staff. As a result of these and other factors, SBA faced significant delays and backlogs in processing loan applications, as depicted in the figure below. This backlog peaked at more than 204,000 applications 4 months after Hurricane Katrina. As of May 27, 2006, SBA processed applications, on average, in about 74 days compared with its goal of within 21 days. Some of the actions SBA took after the Gulf Coast hurricanes helped to improve its response to disaster victims. For example, SBA addressed system-related issues by increasing the number of users that could access DCMS, and it plans to further increase the system's maximum user capacity. SBA implemented other initiatives that had limited success. For example, SBA made only a few loan guarantees under its Gulf Opportunity Pilot Loan Program for small businesses in communities affected by the disasters. SBA would benefit by expediting its planned business process reengineering efforts to analyze ways to more efficiently process loan applications, such as implementing a secure Internet-based application feature for home loan applicants. |
gao_GAO-03-6 | gao_GAO-03-6_0 | Background
Over $460 million has been awarded or approved in grants under the 1998 HEA amendments to enhance the quality of teacher training programs and the qualifications of current teachers. Education Awarded Grants in Accordance with Legislative Requirements, but Failed to Maintain an Effective System for Communicating with Grantees
Education awarded grants to applicants according to the legislation but failed to maintain an effective system for communicating with grantees. While the legislation allows many activities to be funded under broad program goals outlined in HEA, most grantees have focused their efforts on reforming requirements for teachers, providing professional development to current teachers, and recruiting new teachers. The extent to which these activities will affect the quality of teaching in the classroom will be difficult to determine because Education does not have a systematic approach to evaluate all grant activities. Information Collected and Reported for the Accountability Provisions Does Not Accurately Portray the Quality of Teacher Training Programs And the Qualifications of Teachers
The information collected as part of the accountability provisions did not allow Education to accurately report on the quality of teacher training programs and the qualifications of current teachers in each state. The accountability provisions require all institutions that enroll students who receive federal student financial assistance and train teachers—not just those institutions receiving teacher quality enhancement grants—to provide information to their states on their teacher training programs and program graduates. In order to facilitate the collection of this information, the legislation required Education to develop definitions for key terms and uniform reporting methods, including the definitions for the consistent reporting of pass rates. Education officials told us that they made significant efforts to define these terms so that the terms reflected the uniqueness of teacher training programs, state reporting procedures, and data availability. In doing so, Education defined some terms broadly. Education officials told us that this gave states and institutions discretion to interpret some terms as they wished—resulting in the collection and reporting of information that was not uniform and thereby making it difficult to assess accountability. Institutions of higher education. States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, Congress amended the Higher Education Act (HEA) to enhance the quality of teaching in the classroom by improving training programs for prospective teachers and the qualifications of current teachers. This report focuses on two components of the legislation: one that provides grants and another, called the "accountability provisions," that requires collecting and reporting information on the quality of all teacher training programs and qualifications of current teachers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education has approved or awarded 123 grants to states and partnerships totaling over $460 million. Education awarded grants to applicants according to the legislation, but failed to maintain an effective system for communicating with grantees. Grantees have used funds for activities they believe will improve teaching in their locality or state. While HEA allows many activities to be funded under broad program goals outlined in the legislation, most grantees have focused their efforts on reforming requirements for teachers, providing professional development to current teachers, and recruiting new teachers. The extent to which these activities will affect the quality of teaching in the classroom will be difficult to determine because Education does not have a systematic approach to evaluate all grant activities. The information collected as part of the accountability provisions did not allow Education to accurately report on the quality of teacher training programs and the qualifications of current teachers in each state. The accountability provisions require all institutions that enroll students who receive federal student financial assistance and train teachers to provide information to their states on their teacher training programs and program graduates. In order to facilitate the collection of this information, HEA required Education to develop definitions for terms and uniform reporting methods. Education officials told GAO that they made significant efforts to define these terms so that the terms reflected the uniqueness of teacher training programs, state reporting procedures, and data availability. In doing so, Education defined some terms broadly. The officials also told GAO that this gave states and institutions discretion to interpret some terms as they wished, resulting in the collection and reporting of information that was not uniform and thereby making it difficult to assess accountability. |
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