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gao_RCED-96-57 | gao_RCED-96-57_0 | During the fiscal year, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) apportions the appropriations to DOE. To examine the effectiveness of DOE’s approach for identifying the carryover balances that exceed the requirements of the Department’s programs and may be available to reduce the request for new obligational authority, we first reviewed DOE’s process for tracking and reporting on carryover balances and any analysis by DOE of what causes unobligated balances and uncosted obligations. DOE Lacks an Effective Approach for Analyzing Carryover Balances
In formulating a budget request, DOE officials do not use a standard, effective approach for identifying excess carryover balances. Instead, DOE relies on broad estimates of potentially excess balances in its individual programs. DOE’s required annual report on the status of uncosted obligations is limited and not used to propose how much in carryover balances should be used. The report is limited because it does not (1) provide detailed analysis of all of the sources of carryover balances—namely, uncosted obligations at DOE’s nonintegrated contractors and unobligated balances; (2) accurately identify the available balances; and (3) provide relevant information that can be used for consideration in formulating the budget. Furthermore, DOE had unobligated balances of $3.6 billion at the start of fiscal year 1995. However, the Office of Waste Management, within DOE’s Environmental Management program, has undertaken an effort to determine the “proper” or “right” amount of uncosted obligations. The office has established separate benchmarks for funding operating activities, capital equipment procurements, and construction projects. Some programs have developed fairly accurate cost-tracking and estimating systems. Expanding on the efforts already being explored could lead to a process that establishes goals for each program for all of the carryover balances (including unobligated balances) needed to meet its unique requirements, projects the carryover balances for the beginning of the new fiscal year’s budget on the basis of each program’s cost estimates and cost history, and focuses analysis on justifying any differences between a program’s goals and the projected balances in order to identify the balances that exceed the program’s requirements and are thus available to reduce DOE’s budget request. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) approach for identifying carryover balances from previous years' budgets that may be available to reduce budget requests for new fiscal years.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOE does not use a uniform, effective method of identifying carryover balances; (2) DOE makes separate, general estimates of excess funds in its individual programs; (3) some DOE programs have reduced their carryover balance while others have allowed their carryover balances to increase; (4) the DOE annual report on uncosted obligations is not used to identify potential carryover balances because it does not identify all of the carryover balances, identify all of the uncosted obligations that are available to reduce DOE budget request, or include enough information to be useful during the formulation of DOE budget; (5) within DOE, the Office of Waste Management has studied the operations of DOE programs and developed standard expectations for their levels of uncosted obligations; (6) the Office of Waste Management has determined that balances in excess of one month's worth of operating activities funding may indicate carryover balances and should be investigated; (7) within DOE, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer has suggested estimating the uncosted obligations at the start of each fiscal year using estimates of yearly costs or past costs; and (8) the various plans developed in DOE have not been implemented departmentwide and would need to be altered to fit individual programs. |
gao_GAO-11-119 | gao_GAO-11-119_0 | The degree of responsibility and risk borne by workers in 401(k) plans underscores the need for prudent investment decisions if these plans are to provide an adequate source of income in retirement. While plan sponsors and participants may rely on service providers for assistance in making investment decisions, concerns have been raised about the independence of the advice provided in some cases. Service Providers May Have Conflicts of Interest in Providing Investment Assistance to Plan Sponsors because of Third- Party Payments and Other Business Arrangements
Service Providers’ Business Arrangements May Create Conflicts of Interest in Investment Assistance Provided to Plan Sponsors
Several industry experts we spoke with cited third-party payments, also known as revenue sharing, as a potential conflict of interest for service providers involved in the fund selection process for a 401(k) plan. Many Service Providers Are Reported to Arrange Their Association with Plan Sponsors in a Manner That Avoids ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility
Although service providers that are subject to ERISA fiduciary standards are prohibited from benefiting from the investment of plan assets, many service providers that assist in selecting investment options are reported to structure their relationships with plans to avoid being subject to these standards. Consequently, plan sponsors may not be aware that service providers can have a financial incentive to recommend certain funds that would be prohibited if they were ERISA fiduciaries. Participants May Receive Conflicted Investment Education and Advice from Service Providers in Certain Circumstances, but Enhanced Disclosure Could Help Mitigate Such Conflicts
Participants May Perceive Investment Education as Advice and May Be Unaware of Situations when Service Providers Have Conflicts of Interest
Participants may be unaware that service providers, when furnishing education, may have financial interests in the investment options available to participants. For example, the statement is not required to explain that the service provider is not providing advice as an ERISA fiduciary who is required to act in the participants’ best interests, and the provider may stand to profit from participants’ investment decisions. Consequently, without the benefit of an enhanced disclaimer that explicitly states that the highlighted funds are not advice and that the service provider may have a financial interest in the funds, participants may believe that providers are giving investment advice that is in participants’ best interests, even in situations where this may not be the case. Participants who confuse investment education for impartial advice may choose investments that do not meet their needs, pay higher fees than with other investment options, and have lower savings available for retirement. Conflicts of Interest May Arise from Compensation to Service Providers for Cross-Selling Financial Products outside of Retirement Plans to Participants
Several industry experts we spoke with said that conflicts of interest also arise for 401(k) service providers who sell nonplan products and services, such as IRA rollovers, to participants outside their 401(k) plan, a practice known as cross-selling, which can considerably increase the service provider’s compensation. Indeed, although EBSA has taken steps to address conflicted investment advice provided to plan sponsors or other plan fiduciaries by establishing the Consultant/Adviser Project (CAP), this effort is constrained by the current definition of an ERISA fiduciary investment adviser in its regulations. These efforts include (1) revising the definition of an ERISA fiduciary, (2) requiring enhanced disclosure of providers’ direct or indirect compensation and fiduciary status, and (3) establishing safeguards for PPA investment advice arrangements. If the requirements specified in these regulations are implemented as they are currently written, they may help EBSA and plan sponsors detect and deter conflicted investment advice, but plan sponsors and participants still would not have sufficient and comparable information to identify potential conflicts of interest because disclosures are not required to be provided in a consistent and summary format. Specifically, the interim final regulations do not specify that these disclosures be made in any particular manner or format. In addition, to better ensure that plan participants have sufficient information when deciding whether to move plan funds into investment alternatives outside their plan, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury amend the applicable requirements of its proposed disclosure rule to specifically require that service providers, when recommending the purchase of investment products outside retirement plans, inform plan participants that fees applicable outside their plans may be higher than fees applicable within their plans. Overall, Labor generally agreed with our findings and to consider our recommendations as it conducts a review of these issues and evaluates public comments received on pending regulations. To describe the steps that Labor has taken to address conflicts of interest, we reviewed documentation of Labor’s enforcement activities related to conflicted investment advice practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent volatility in financial markets highlights the need for prudent investment decisions if 401(k) plans are to provide an adequate source of retirement income. While plan sponsors and participants may receive help in assessing their investment choices, concerns have been raised about the impartiality of the advice provided. GAO was asked to describe circumstances where service providers may have conflicts of interest in providing assistance related to the selection of investment options for (1) plan sponsors and (2) plan participants, and (3) steps the Department of Labor (Labor) has taken to address conflicts of interest related to the selection of investment options.
What GAO Found
The sponsors of 401(k) plans face conflicts of interest from service providers assisting in the selection of investment options because of third-party payments and other business arrangements. For example, providers who help sponsors to establish and maintain their plans may receive third-party payments from investment fund companies. The payments, sometimes called revenue sharing, create a conflict of interest because the provider may receive greater compensation from certain funds. Moreover, providers are reported to commonly structure their relationships with sponsors in a manner that avoids being subject to fiduciary standards under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). According to several industry experts, many sponsors, particularly of smaller plans, do not understand whether or not providers to the plan are fiduciaries, nor are they aware that the provider's compensation may vary based on the investment options selected. Such conflicts could lead to higher costs for the plan, which are typically borne by participants. In certain situations, participants face conflicts of interest from providers that have a financial interest when providing investment assistance. For example, although investment education is defined as generalized investment information, providers may highlight their own funds as examples of investments available within asset classes even though they may have a financial interest in the funds. According to industry experts, participants perceive education as investment advice. Thus, participants may not understand that the provider is not a fiduciary adviser required to act solely in participants' best interests. Also, several industry experts expressed concerns that providers stand to gain higher profits from marketing investment products outside of plans to participants, a practice known as cross-selling. For example, if participants use their plan provider for Individual Retirement Account rollovers, they may not understand, because of insufficient disclosures, that fees are often higher for products offered outside the plan and that the provider may not be serving as a fiduciary adviser. Consequently, participants may choose funds that do not meet their needs and pay higher fees, which reduce their retirement savings. While Labor has taken steps to address the potential for conflicted investment advice provided to sponsors and participants, more can be done to ensure they receive impartial advice. In fiscal year 2007, the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) began a national enforcement project that focuses on the receipt of improper or undisclosed compensation by certain providers, but its enforcement efforts are constrained to fiduciary providers and limited by EBSA's approach for generating cases. In addition, EBSA issued regulations to revise the definition of an ERISA fiduciary and require enhanced disclosure of providers' compensation and fiduciary status. These regulations, as currently specified, would help EBSA and sponsors detect and deter conflicted investment advice. However, the regulations do not require that certain disclosures be made in consistent or summary formats, which may leave sponsors with information that is not sufficient or comparable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor amend pending regulations to require that service providers disclose compensation and fiduciary status in a consistent, summary format and revise current standards, which permit a service provider to highlight investment options in which it has a financial interest. GAO also recommends that the Department of the Treasury amend proposed regulations to require disclosure that investment products outside a plan typically have higher fees than products available within a plan. Overall, Labor and Treasury generally agreed to consider our recommendations as they evaluate comments received on pending regulations. |
gao_GAO-08-757 | gao_GAO-08-757_0 | Individuals attempting to legally enter the United States by land present themselves to a CBP officer at one of the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S. citizens entering the country by air from such locations as the Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica could establish their citizenship by oral assertions and documents such as drivers’ licenses and birth certificates. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and monitors areas between ports of entry. As mentioned above, in the September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee, a CBP official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were patrolling the U.S.–Canada border at any given time—about a quarter of all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border during that period. Ports of Entry
We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at ports of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the government inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators’ counterfeit documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed them to enter the country. We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports of entry as different from our land crossings. Similar follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and 2004, resulting in successful entry at locations in Washington, New York, California, Texas, and Virginia using counterfeit identification. In 2006, investigators successfully entered the United States using counterfeit drivers’ licenses and other bogus documentation through seven land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, adding the states of Michigan, Idaho, and Arizona to the list of states they had entered. They also used bogus U.S. passports and, in one case, a fake employee identification card in the name of a major U.S. airline. Undercover Investigators Did Not Show Identification in All Cases
For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of entry in California. For example, on February 23, 2006, two investigators crossed the border from Mexico into Texas on foot. The officer replied, “OK, that would be good.” The investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver’s license from his wallet when the officer said “That’s fine, you can go.” The CBP officer never looked at the license. Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations
We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting testing at U.S.–Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our investigators was able to walk into the United States from Canada at a park straddling the border. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we visited were defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below. We identified state roads close to the border that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. However, the U.S. Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the port of entry. Ports of Entry with Posted Hours
We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in one state on the northern border. Federally Managed Lands
Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. Our investigators were not challenged regarding their activities. CBP stated that the northern border presents more of a challenge than the southern border for several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the existence of many antiquated ports of entry. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but have included its full response in appendix I. | Why GAO Did This Study
From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report.
What GAO Found
GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations. |
gao_GAO-15-399 | gao_GAO-15-399_0 | Landowners Experience Property Damage Potentially as a Result of Illegal Border Crossers and Corresponding Enforcement Activity; the Extent of Such Damage Is Unknown
Landowners Reported Experiencing Private Property Damage on a Regular Basis in Certain Southwest Border Sectors
Landowners we spoke with reported that damage occurs to private properties in south Texas on a regular basis, the majority of which affects fencing as a result of individuals trying to illegally cross the border. Damage reported by landowners includes broken gates, destroyed crops, and injured or lost livestock. Although the 33 landowners we spoke to stated that most damage they experienced is caused by illegal border crossers, 21 of these landowners have also experienced damage that may have resulted from Border Patrol as well as state law enforcement activities or were aware of such events occurring in their community. Few Landowners Sought Compensation from CBP in Fiscal Year 2013 for Private Property Damage through the Administrative Tort Claims Process
Landowners may file a SF 95 administrative tort claim seeking compensation for private property damage allegedly caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of an employee of Border Patrol or any CBP component, where such employee acted within the scope of his or her official duties. In our review of all 821 SF 95s from fiscal year 2013, 16 were related to private property damage along the southwest border, as we have defined this term for the purposes of this report. CBP Has Taken Action to Address Property Damage along the Southwest Border, but Border Community Liaison Agents Lack Training Specific to Their Responsibilities
Ranch Etiquette and the Border Community Liaison Program Have Helped Foster Community Relationships
According to Border Patrol officials, Border Patrol agents generally adhere to what is referred to as ranch etiquette when working with the community and crossing onto private property. This entails treating private property and its owners and operators with respect and dignity while on patrol and conducting enforcement efforts. In an effort to enhance Border Patrol’s relationships with landowners and the community as a whole, Border Patrol initiated the BCL Program in April 2011 in all Border Patrol sectors. According to the former and acting national BCL program managers, Border Patrol is responsible for ensuring that its BCL agents receive training. Given the frequent turnover of agents in the BCL role, providing these liaisons with training specific to their responsibilities and tracking the receipt of such training could help better ensure that BCL agents have the necessary skills to meet the established goals of the BCL Program, including facilitating information sharing between Border Patrol and the community on border security issues. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help strengthen the knowledge and experience of agents serving as BCLs, we recommend that the Chief of the Border Patrol ensure that agents serving in the BCL role receive training and track the receipt of such training. DHS agreed with our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) the types of private property damage landowners along the southwest border are experiencing, potentially as a result of illegal border crossers and corresponding enforcement activities, and what steps, if any, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or other entities have taken to collect information on such damage and (2) the extent to which CBP takes action to address private property damage suspected to have been caused by illegal border crossers and related enforcement activity. The information obtained during these interviews is not generalizable to all landowners living along the southwest border. | Why GAO Did This Study
Persons illegally crossing the United States' southwest border and corresponding law enforcement activity may, at times, result in private property damage. Such damage that persists over extended periods of time can result in expensive repairs for landowners. GAO was asked to identify the types of private property damage experienced along the southwest border, as well as the extent to which the federal government addresses such damage.
This report (1) describes the types of private property damage landowners along the southwest border are experiencing and the steps taken by CBP to collect information on such damage, and (2) examines the extent to which CBP addresses private property damage suspected to be caused by illegal border crossers and enforcement activities. GAO analyzed documentation, including administrative tort claims and memos implementing the Border Community Liaison Program; conducted a visit to south Texas; and interviewed Border Patrol officials, as well as landowners living along the southwest border, regarding private property damage that occurs and how, if at all, it is addressed.
What GAO Found
Landowners GAO spoke with reported that damage occurs to private properties along the southwest border on a regular basis. The most prevalent types of damage reported include broken fences and gates (see picture below), which can result in destroyed crops and injured livestock. According to 33 landowners GAO spoke with, the majority of damage is caused by illegal border crossers; however, 21 of these landowners said they had also experienced damage that may have resulted from Border Patrol as well as state law enforcement activities or were aware of such occurrences in their community. Landowners may file a Standard Form 95 (SF 95) administrative tort claim to seek compensation for private property damage allegedly caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of an employee of any U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component, including Border Patrol while acting within the scope of their office or employment, but few landowners have filed such claims. Of the 821 SF 95s filed during fiscal year 2013, 16 were related to private property damage along the southwest border, with a total of $11,622 paid to 7 of the 16 claimants.
According to Border Patrol officials, agents generally adhere to ranch etiquette, which entails treating private property and its owners respectfully while conducting enforcement efforts. To further promote this concept, CBP established a Border Community Liaison (BCL) Program within Border Patrol in 2011, in which designated agents serve as the conduit between Border Patrol and the community. To enhance relationships with the community, liaisons work with landowners to address, when appropriate, damage allegedly caused by illegal border crossers or their pursuit by Border Patrol. The BCL Program has helped foster community relationships. However, new BCL agents have not received training specific to their role, such as those agents who assumed the BCL role in 2014. Moreover, a mechanism does not exist to track which or how many BCL agents have received training specific to their role. Given that CBP has stated that there is frequent turnover of agents in this position, providing BCL agents with training specific to their role and tracking the receipt of such training could help better ensure that BCL agents have the necessary skills to meet the goals of the BCL Program, including facilitating information sharing between Border Patrol and the community on border security issues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Border Patrol ensure that agents serving in the BCL role receive training and track the receipt of such training. DHS concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-684T | gao_GAO-07-684T_0 | Recent Actions Warranted the Postal Service’s Removal from Our High-Risk List
Several actions—both by the Service and the Congress—led us to remove the Service’s transformation efforts and long-term outlook from our high- risk list. The Service’s basic business model, which assumed that rising mail volume would cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases, was outmoded as First-Class Mail volumes stagnated or deteriorated in an increasingly competitive environment. Much of the Service’s recent financial improvement was due to the change from this law that reduced the Service’s annual pension expenses. This change enabled the Service to significantly cut its costs, achieve record net incomes, repay over $11 billion of outstanding debt, and delay rate increases until January 2006. After years of thorough discussion, Congress passed a comprehensive postal reform law in late December 2006 that provides tools and mechanisms that can be used to establish an efficient, flexible, fair, transparent, and financially sound Postal Service. The Postal Service’s Current Financial Condition
The Service’s financial condition for fiscal year 2007 has been affected by the reform act, which, along with the May change in postal rates, will continue to affect its near- and long-term financial outlook. Since enactment of the reform law, the Service has updated its expense projections. These uncertainties include how the Service and its customers will respond to the: limited implementation times—the 2-month implementation period (the Postal Service Board of Governors decision on March 19, 2007, stated that most new rates would become effective on May 14, 2007) leaves little time for the Service to educate the public and business mailers on the new rate changes and to allow mailers sufficient time to adjust their mailing practices and operations accordingly; delayed implementation times—how mailers and the Service will be affected by the delay in implementing new Periodical rates until mid-July; magnitude of certain restructured rates, particularly for those specific types of mail that will experience rather significant increases, and the related impact on volumes and revenues; and unfamiliarity with restructured rates—the prices for many popular products, such as certain types of First-Class Mail, will experience significant shifts based on the shape of the mail. Postal Reform Law Provides Opportunities to Address Challenges
The new postal reform law provides new opportunities to address challenges facing the Service as it continues its transformation in a more competitive environment with a variety of electronic alternatives for communications and payments. 3). 4). Reducing debt was one of the key factors we cited in removing the Service’s high-risk designation. While the reform act takes actions that increase current costs by improving the balance of retiree health benefit cost burdens between current and future ratepayers, it also eliminates other payments and provides opportunities to offset some of these costs pressures through efficiency gains that could restrain future rate increases. We have identified several major issues considered significant by various postal stakeholders, as well as areas related to implementation of the law that will warrant continued oversight. These key issues and areas for continued oversight include: the effect of the upcoming rate increases and statutory changes on the Postal Service’s financial condition; the decision by the Service whether or not to submit a rate filing under the old rate structure; actions by the PRC to establish a new price-setting and regulatory the Service’s ability to operate under an inflationary price cap while some of its cost segments are increasing above the rate of inflation; actions by the Service, in consultation with the PRC, to establish modern service standards and performance measures, and the Postal Service’s plan for meeting those standards; the Service’s ability to maintain high-quality delivery service as it takes actions to reduce costs and realign its infrastructure and workforce; and the PRC’s development of appropriate accounting and reporting requirements aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability of the Service’s internal data and performance results. The successful transformation of the Postal Service will depend heavily upon innovative leadership by the Postmaster General and the Chairman of the PRC, and their ability to work effectively with their employees, employee organizations, the mailing industry, Congress, and the general public. | Why GAO Did This Study
When GAO originally placed the U.S. Postal Service's (the Service) transformation efforts and long-term outlook on its high-risk list in early 2001, it was to focus urgent attention on the Service's deteriorating financial situation. Aggressive action was needed, particularly in cutting costs, improving productivity, and enhancing financial transparency. GAO testified several times since 2001 that comprehensive postal reform legislation was needed to address the Service's unsustainable business model, which assumed that increasing mail volume would cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases. This outdated model limited its flexibility and incentives needed to realize sufficient cost savings to offset rising costs, declining First-Class Mail volumes, unfunded obligations, and an expanding delivery network. This limitation threatened the Service's ability to achieve its mission of providing affordable, high-quality universal postal services on a self-financing basis. This testimony will focus on (1) why GAO recently removed the Service's transformation efforts and outlook from GAO's high-risk list, (2) the Service's financial condition in fiscal year 2007, (3) the opportunities and challenges facing the Service, and (4) major issues and areas for congressional oversight. This testimony is based on GAO's past work, review of the postal reform law, and updated information on the Service's financial condition.
What GAO Found
Key actions by both the Service and Congress have led GAO to remove the Service's transformation efforts and long-term outlook from its high-risk list in January 2007. Specifically, the Service developed a Transformation Plan and achieved billions in cost-savings, improved productivity, downsized its workforce, and improved its financial reporting. Congress enacted a law in 2003 that reduced the Service's annual pension expenses, which enabled it to achieve record net incomes, repay debt, and delay rate increases until January 2006. Finally, the postal reform law enacted in December 2006 provides tools and mechanisms that can be used to address key challenges facing the Service as it moves into a new regulatory and increasingly competitive environment. The two key factors that will affect the Service's financial condition for this fiscal year are the new reform law and new postal rates that go into effect in May. The reform law increases the costs of funding retiree health benefits but provides opportunities to offset some of these cost pressures through efficiency gains and eliminating certain pension payments. For the rest of the year, Service officials do not expect significant changes from its projected expenses and revenues. Other factors, such as costs for fuel or labor resolutions varying from plan, could affect the Service's projected outcome for this fiscal year. Congress's continued oversight of the Service's transformation is critical at this time of significant changes for the Service, Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), and mailing industry. Also, key to a successful transformation is innovative leadership by the Postmaster General and the PRC Chairman and their ability to work effectively with stakeholders to realize new opportunities provided under the postal reform law. GAO has identified key issues and areas for oversight related to implementing the reform law and new rate-setting structure, as well as other challenges to ensure the Service remains financially sound. |
gao_GAO-06-540 | gao_GAO-06-540_0 | From February 2001 through February 2003, the task force issued three reports containing 194 recommendations for improving DOD’s response to domestic violence. DOD’s Ability to Report on Domestic Violence Incidents and Commander Actions Is Hampered by Incomplete Data
DOD’s ability to report domestic violence incidents involving servicemembers and the disciplinary actions taken by commanders is hampered because the data systems that the department uses to collect domestic violence information contain incomplete data. Therefore, prior to 2006, DOD did not provide complete information on all reported instances of domestic violence. Without complete data on reported incidents of domestic violence and the steps taken by commanding officers to address these incidents, Congress and DOD will lack the visibility and information needed to understand the magnitude of the domestic violence problem, identify domestic violence trends, and proactively address these issues as they emerge. Resources Provided and Progress Made, but Challenges Exist to Implementing the Remaining Task Force Recommendations
Over the past 3 years, DOD provided the Family Violence Policy Office about $23 million, which it has used to make progress toward implementing many of the task force’s recommendations. Notwithstanding this point, of the 194 recommendations made by the task force, we found DOD had completed actions on 94 recommendations, had actions pending on 60 recommendations, and had not taken actions on 40 recommendations because the department either disagreed with the recommendations, the recommendation was not applicable to the department, or DOD felt that the recommended action was already undertaken. DOD’s method of communicating its policy changes has not been effective in ensuring consistent practices or promoting widespread understanding of the new policies among DOD and the services. Steps Taken to Ensure Confidentiality and Provide Domestic Violence Training, but Additional Efforts Needed
DOD is taking steps to address specific task force recommendations to ensure confidentiality for victims of domestic violence and to train commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains on how to respond to such incidents. DOD Has Not Established an Oversight Framework to Monitor Compliance and Evaluate Implementation of Recommendations
DOD has not established an oversight framework to monitor compliance with and evaluate implementation of the task force recommendations on domestic violence. The draft instruction, however, does not communicate how this should be done and the Military Community and Family Policy Office has not established a formal process for doing this. Without an overall management framework for monitoring and reporting on implementation, DOD and Congress will continue to have limited visibility and oversight to evaluate the changes associated with the recommendations and to make improvements. Conclusions
Understanding the size and nature of domestic violence is essential to DOD’s ability to improve its response to this important issue. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance implementation of the task force recommendations and improve the effectiveness of domestic violence efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following seven actions: Develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, a comprehensive management plan to address deficiencies in the data captured in DOD’s domestic violence database that focuses on ensuring that accurate and complete data exist and that all instances in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System and Family Advocacy Program Central Registry are matched and reported annually, as required in DOD’s Manual 7730.47-M; take appropriate steps, in conjunction with the service secretaries, to ensure all commander actions related to domestic violence incidents are entered in law enforcement systems; develop a plan to ensure adequate personnel are available to implement pending task force recommendations; establish a communication strategy for effectively informing DOD and service officials about new guidance implementing the task force recommendations, to include issuing a revised DOD family advocacy program directive that is consistent with interim guidance for implementing the task force recommendations; and clearly articulating its policy regarding the distribution of military protective orders using a method that will ensure consistent application by all services and DOD; develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, procedures and metrics to ensure that accurate, consistent, and timely domestic violence training data are collected for chaplains; develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, chaplain guidance and training materials that highlight and clarify chaplain responsibilities concerning privileged communication; and develop and implement, in conjunction with the services, a DOD-wide oversight framework that includes a results-oriented evaluation plan for the implemented recommendations, and a process for ongoing monitoring of and reporting on implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to concerns about domestic violence in the military and its adverse effect on mission readiness, Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a task force to assess the services' response to domestic violence and recommend improvements. The task force issued three reports containing 194 recommendations. The Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to review DOD's progress in implementing the recommendations. This report discusses (1) DOD's ability to report on domestic violence incidents and disciplinary actions, (2) the resources DOD has provided to implement the recommendations, and (3) DOD's specific actions to ensure victim confidentiality and the education of commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains. GAO also examined whether DOD has established an oversight framework to monitor implementation.
What GAO Found
DOD's ability to report on domestic violence incidents and disciplinary actions taken by commanders is hampered because the systems that the department uses to collect domestic violence information do not contain complete data. DOD's domestic violence database does not capture data from all law enforcement systems and, therefore, does not provide a complete accounting of reported incidents and actions taken by commanders. Notwithstanding the task force's recommendation to report on the number of domestic violence incidents, DOD and the services have not developed any plans to address the data limitations, which do not allow for visibility over domestic violence incidents. Without complete information on reported incidents of domestic violence and the steps taken by commanders to address these incidents, DOD will not know the size and nature of the problems or be able to assess the effectiveness of its actions. DOD has provided about $23 million to implement the recommendations and has made progress in this regard. Specifically, GAO identified 94 recommendations of varying potential importance as completed, 60 as pending further action, and 40 in which no action had been taken because DOD either disagreed with the recommendations or determined that they were not applicable to the department. Nonetheless, DOD faces challenges in completing the pending recommendations in a timely manner because of potential shortages of essential personnel in the office overseeing implementation. In addition, DOD's method of communicating its policy changes resulting from the recommendations has not ensured consistent practices and widespread understanding of the policies among DOD and the services. While DOD is taking steps toward ensuring confidentiality for victims and to train its personnel on domestic violence issues, additional efforts are needed. To ensure victim confidentiality, DOD issued a policy, effective April 22, 2006, allowing victims to report domestic violence to specified people without notifying command. In addition, DOD issued guidance requiring training and is providing several educational options. However, data regarding which chaplains have completed training are not available because the department and the services do not track this training. Chaplains play a special role in assisting domestic violence victims and, without complete training data, DOD may be unable to determine if chaplains have been provided the needed resources to assist victims. DOD has not established an oversight framework to monitor compliance with and evaluate implementation of the task force recommendations. While the task force recommended and DOD's draft domestic violence instruction requires monitoring and evaluation of domestic violence efforts, DOD has not established a process to do so. Without an overall management framework, DOD and Congress have limited visibility and oversight to evaluate DOD's implementation efforts and make needed improvements. |
gao_HEHS-98-20 | gao_HEHS-98-20_0 | These issues are included in two general objectives: (1) the likelihood of a widespread agricultural labor shortage and its impact on the need for nonimmigrant guestworkers and (2) the H-2A program’s ability to meet the needs of agricultural employers while protecting domestic and foreign agricultural workers, both now and if a significant number of nonimmigrant guestworkers is needed in the future. The Department of Justice authorizes the State Department to issue nonimmigrant visas for H-2A workers only after the Department of Labor certifies that a labor shortage exists and that the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers similarly employed will not be adversely affected by the use of guestworkers. No Widespread Agricultural Labor Shortage Is Anticipated
A sudden widespread farm labor shortage requiring the importation of large numbers of foreign workers is unlikely to occur in the near future. There appears to be no national agricultural labor shortage now, although localized labor shortages may exist for individual crops and in specific geographical areas. In addition, while a significant percentage of the U.S. farm labor workforce is not legally authorized to work in the United States, INS does not expect its enforcement activities to significantly reduce the aggregate supply of farmworkers. Both growers and labor advocates described current difficulties in obtaining workers and concerns about future difficulties in certain areas. INS Enforcement Efforts Are Not Likely to Significantly Reduce the Availability of Agricultural Labor
Although many farmworkers are not authorized to work in this country, INS officials do not expect their enforcement efforts to significantly reduce the availability of agricultural labor, either nationally or regionally. Worksite enforcement consumed less than 4 percent of INS enforcement activities in fiscal year 1996. INS officers face a judicial requirement that can also complicate enforcement efforts at agricultural workplaces. H-2A Program Can Be Improved to Better Meet the Needs of Agricultural Employers and Workers
Labor currently certifies most of the workers that agricultural employers request through the H-2A program on both a regular and an emergency basis. In addition, the multiple agencies and levels of government involved in the H-2A program may result in redundant oversight and cause confusion for program participants. Specifically, ETA issued certifications for 99 percent of the 3,689 applications filed nationwide in fiscal year 1996 and the first 9 months of fiscal year 1997. Positive recruitment efforts after the certification have no bearing on the number of H-2A openings approved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed various aspects of the H-2A nonimmigrant guestworker program, focusing on the: (1) likelihood of a widespread agricultural labor shortage and its impact on the need for nonimmigrant guestworkers; and (2) H-2A program's ability to meet the needs of agricultural workers, both at present and if a significant number of nonimmigrant guestworkers is needed in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a sudden widespread farm labor shortage requiring the importation of large numbers of foreign workers is unlikely to occur in the near future; (2) there appears to be no national agricultural labor shortage, but localized labor shortages may exist for specific crops or geographical areas; (3) although many farmworkers--an estimated 600,000--are not legally authorized to work in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) does not expect its enforcement activities to significantly reduce the aggregate supply of farmworkers; (4) INS expects limited impact from its enforcement activities because of the prevalence of fraudulently documented farmworkers and INS' competing enforcement priorities; (5) in fiscal year (FY) 1996, less than 5 percent of the 4,600 INS worksite enforcement efforts were directed at agricultural workplaces; (6) INS conducts enforcement efforts largely in response to complaints, and it receives few complaints about agricultural employers; (7) INS officials in both field and headquarters positions stated unanimously that operational impediments prevented the agency from significantly reducing the number of unauthorized farmworkers; (8) the prevalence of unauthorized and fraudulently documented farmworkers does, however, leave individual growers vulnerable to sudden labor shortages if INS does target its enforcement efforts on their establishments; (9) although few agricultural employers seek workers through the H-2A program, those that do are generally successful in obtaining foreign agricultural workers on both a regular and an emergency basis; (10) during FY 1996 and the first 9 months of FY 1997, the Department of Labor approved 99 percent of all H-2A applications; (11) however, both employers and Labor officials have difficulty meeting time frames specified by law and regulation; (12) because Labor does not collect key program management information, it is unable to determine the extent and cause of missed time frames; (13) the multiple agencies and levels of government implementing the program may result in redundant oversight and confusion for both employers and workers; and (14) while INS enforcement efforts are unlikely to create a significant increase in demand for H-2A workers, changes in H-2A program operations could improve the ability of growers to obtain workers when needed--whether or not a nationwide labor shortage exists--and better protect the wages and working conditions of both domestic and foreign workers. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-172 | gao_T-HEHS-96-172_0 | The number of veterans 85 years of age and older is expected to increase more than eight-fold between 1990 and 2010. Veterans More Likely to Have Unmet Needs for Specialized and Long-Term Care Services Than for Acute Care Services
Veterans are more likely to have unmet needs for specialized and long-term care services than they are for acute hospital and outpatient care. Bringing more of those veterans into the VA system could increase demand for VA hospital care. Convert VA Hospitals to Nursing Homes or Other Uses
A third approach to preserving the direct delivery system would be to convert VA hospitals to provide nursing home or other types of care. Alternatives to maintaining the current direct delivery system include (1) establishing a VA-operated health financing system to purchase care from other public and private providers (or expanding an existing program); (2) including veterans under an existing health benefits program, such as Medicare, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, or TRICARE; and (3) issuing vouchers to enable veterans to purchase private health insurance. For example, it purchases services from its medical school affiliates and other government facilities through sharing agreements; it purchases care for eligible veterans geographically remote from VA facilities directly from private physicians through the fee-basis program; it contracts with groups of public or private-sector providers on a capitation basis to provide primary care services to veterans; and it operates a health financing program, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA), to purchase care for survivors and dependents of certain veterans. For example, expansion of capitation funding could shift risks for controlling veterans’ health care costs from the government to private providers contracting with VA. And increasing the use of private-sector providers within the VA health care system could retain the focus on veterans’ health care needs that might be lost by merging veterans’ health care with another program. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the future of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) health care system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA hospitals' workload has decreased 56 percent during the last 25 years and will probably decrease further as more veterans die and delivery settings and health care plans change; (2) the demand for nursing home care has increased for veterans 85 years of age and older; (3) VA and other public and private health benefit programs cannot meet all veterans' health care needs, notably for specialized and long-term care; (4) to meet such needs, VA could reduce services to certain veterans and use those funds to purchase private-sector health care services for other eligible veterans or increase the availability of specialized care; (5) VA could increase veterans' access to care by improving its facility resource allocations and the consistency of its coverage decisions; (6) other countries have closed veteran hospitals and integrated veterans' health care into their general health care systems; (7) VA could increase hospital workloads by attracting more veterans or extending coverage to veterans' dependents or nonveterans on a reimbursable basis; (8) converting VA hospitals to long-term care facilities is feasible, but operating costs would be higher than the cost of purchasing private-sector nursing home care unless cost-sharing arrangements are included; and (9) alternatives to the VA direct delivery system include purchasing more services directly from the private sector, issuing vouchers for private insurance, and covering veterans under other existing federal health benefit programs. |
gao_GAO-10-621 | gao_GAO-10-621_0 | States, territories, Indian tribes, and tribal organizations that wish to assist low-income households in meeting the costs of home energy may apply for a LIHEAP block grant. LIHEAP Is at Risk for Fraud and Improper Benefits in Selected States
Our analysis of LIHEAP data revealed that the program is at risk of fraud and providing improper benefits in all seven of our selected states. About 260,000 applications—9 percent of households receiving benefits in the selected states—contained invalid identity information, such as Social Security numbers, names, or dates of birth. Many applications may have inaccuracies due to simple errors such as typos or incomplete sections, making it impossible to determine whether these cases involve fraud. As described in the bullets below, thousands of cases show strong indications of fraud and improper benefits. The identities of over 11,000 deceased individuals were used as applicants or household members for LIHEAP benefits. Incarcerated individuals. Matching LIHEAP data with federal civilian payroll records, we identified about 1,100 federal employees whose federal salary exceeded the maximum income threshold at the time of their application. Our investigators created this energy-related company to receive the energy assistance payments. The Federal Government and Selected States Lack an Effective Fraud Prevention Framework for LIHEAP
LIHEAP’s internal controls framework has several key weaknesses at both the federal and state levels, as shown by GAO’s fraud prevention model. At the federal level, HHS has not provided specific guidance to states and other grantees for preventing fraud and abuse of LIHEAP. While grantees are primarily responsible for preventing fraud in LIHEAP, the LIHEAP statute establishes a number of oversight and enforcement responsibilities for HHS to ensure that grantees are properly applying the funds, including requiring the issuance of regulations to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in LIHEAP. In addition, the selected states do not have an effective design for a comprehensive fraud prevention framework. In fact, the states are lacking key efforts in all three crucial elements of a well-designed fraud prevention system: preventive controls, detection and monitoring, and investigations and prosecutions. Preventive controls. To be efficient in reaching similarly targeted recipients, certain states automatically enroll LIHEAP recipients based on the applicant or household member receiving benefits for certain federal programs (e.g., TANF or SNAP). Several state officials stated that they generally did not pursue investigations and prosecutions involving LIHEAP. Recommendations for Executive Action
To establish an effective fraud prevention system for the LIHEAP program in the seven states, the Secretary of HHS should evaluate our findings and consider issuing guidance to the states addressing the following six recommendations: Require applicants and household members to provide Social Security numbers for themselves and all members of the household in order to receive energy assistance benefits. These states were selected primarily based on the magnitude of total LIHEAP funding and the availability of a centralized database of applicants and benefits. To illustrate cases of fraudulent, improper, and abusive activity in LIHEAP, we identified 20 cases for detailed audit and investigation. To identify potential weaknesses in the design of key aspects of LIHEAP’s internal controls framework, we interviewed LIHEAP officials from the selected states and HHS. This audit was conducted in seven states, including Michigan. We did not determine that qualifying LIHEAP recipients based on their eligibility for such programs is prone to excessive fraudulent activity. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federally funded at about $5 billion a year, the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) provides financial assistance to low-income households for heating and cooling costs. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awards LIHEAP funds based on low-income populations and other factors. Grantees--states, the District of Columbia, territories, and Indian tribes and tribal organizations--then provide energy assistance payments to low-income households. GAO was asked to audit (1) the risk of fraud and abuse in LIHEAP in selected states; (2) case studies of fraudulent, improper, and abusive LIHEAP activity; and (3) key weaknesses in the design of LIHEAP's internal controls framework. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed LIHEAP data from seven states for fraud indicators, interviewed federal and state officials, performed investigations, and conducted proactive testing in two states using a bogus company, individuals, addresses, and documents. The seven states were primarily selected based on size of LIHEAP grant and availability of centralized database.
What GAO Found
LIHEAP is at risk of fraud and improper payments in all seven of our selected states. About 9 percent of households receiving benefits--totaling $116 million--in the selected states contained invalid identity information, such as Social Security numbers, names, or dates of birth. Although some of these cases are likely due to simple errors such as typos or incomplete data, thousands of other cases show strong indications of fraud and improper benefits. For example, the identities of over 11,000 deceased individuals were used as applicants or household members for LIHEAP benefits. Hundreds of individuals were used as applicants or household members even though they were incarcerated in state prisons, making them ineligible. Finally, we identified over a thousand federal employees whose federal salary exceeded the maximum income threshold when they applied. We nonrepresentatively selected and investigated 20 cases that either validated the potential fraudulent activity noted above or illustrated other improper activities. Although states are primarily responsible for preventing fraud, LIHEAP's internal controls framework has several key weaknesses. HHS has not provided specific guidance to states, instead issuing only broad regulations for states to establish appropriate systems and procedures to prevent fraud. The selected states do not have an effective design for a comprehensive fraud prevention framework. In fact, the states lack key efforts in all three crucial elements of a well-designed fraud prevention system: preventive controls, detection and monitoring, and investigations and prosecutions. Specifically, states lack essential preventive controls by not verifying identities or income. Some states automatically enroll certain individuals based on their eligibility for other programs. Although efficient in reaching similarly targeted recipients, this practice is dependent on the accuracy of the initiating program's eligibility determination. Finally, several state officials stated that they generally did not pursue investigations and prosecutions. The reason is that the benefit amounts are relatively small.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes six recommendations to HHS to issue guidance to states to better prevent fraud in LIHEAP. HHS agreed with the six recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-611 | gao_GAO-13-611_0 | NTSB is charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. NTSB determines the probable cause of the accidents and issues safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. This review focuses on the extent to which NTSB has achieved measurable improvements from actions the agency has taken in five management and operational areas based on prior GAO recommendations. In addition, NTSB increased the amount of training it delivered at the Training Center. Results across NTSB Management Areas
Our analysis found varying degrees of improvement associated with NTSB’s actions in each of the management and operational areas we selected for review. The automation of NTSB’s recommendation follow-up process has reduced the amount of time it takes to formally respond to agencies about whether planned actions to implement an NTSB recommendation are acceptable. We compared NTSB employees’ responses with employees in a group of small federal and independent agencies and found that NTSB employees’ satisfaction level increased while the proportion of employees from small agencies responding positively to this question during the same period was relatively unchanged from 57 percent in 2004 to 59 percent in 2012. Furthermore, because of lingering concerns, NTSB continues to monitor employees’ views about employee and management communication to address any remaining weaknesses. The federal survey of NTSB employees indicated an increase in the positive responses, from 54 percent to about 71 percent. Managers/supervisors/team leaders work well with employees of different backgrounds. The proportion of NTSB employees reporting positive responses on this survey question from 2004 to 2012 declined from 66 percent to 60 percent. NTSB’s total workforce increased 6 percent over the same period, from 378 in 2008 to 402 in fiscal year 2012. We compared these figures to those representing comparative groups in the civilian labor force and found that NTSB’s investigator and investigation-related workforce had a smaller proportion of minority and other groups, including African American, Asian, Hispanic, and women than the civilian labor force. However, as mentioned previously, NTSB has taken steps to implement initiatives as a result of its diversity management strategy, including its recently completed diversity and inclusiveness survey, which the agency plans to use to identify gaps in its diversity and inclusiveness efforts and to benchmark future progress. It is too soon to tell whether initiatives, such as its recruitment strategies, will lead to additional changes in its workforce diversity profile. In 2011, NTSB implemented a cost accounting system that includes a time and attendance program in response to a GAO recommendation. NTSB officials stated that they are currently focused on ensuring the quality of the time and attendance data before developing goals, targets, and management tools or using such information to make resource or operational decisions. Thus, NTSB has not yet fully achieved its vision of using the data to improve labor productivity and mission effectiveness. Recommendation
NTSB needs to continue its improvement efforts in each of the five areas discussed in this report. Further, to improve financial management and provide information to managers for operational decisions, we recommend that the Chairman of the NTSB direct senior management to develop a strategy for maximizing the utility of NTSB’s cost accounting system. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to NTSB for its review and comment. NTSB agreed with our recommendation and provided technical clarifications that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective in this review was to assess whether there have been management and operational improvements associated with the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) actions in areas where GAO had conducted previous work and made recommendations. Many of the 13 recommendations within these areas required only a single action by NTSB to implement (e.g. It is these latter types of recommendations that we focused on in this review, and based on these criteria, we identified 5 for review: increase the utilization of the Training Center, improve the process for changing the status of recommendations through computerization and concurrent review, develop mechanisms to facilitate communication from staff to develop strategies for diversity management as part of the human develop a full cost accounting system to track time employees spend on each investigation in training. The measures we identified for each recommendation are: (1) Training Center utilization—utilization of classroom and non-classroom space and operating deficit; (2) recommendation close-out process— average time to respond to agency proposals; (3) employee and management communication—employee responses to Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) federal employee surveys; (4) diversity management—employee responses to OPM’s federal employee surveys and NTSB employment levels of women and members of racial and ethnic groups; and (5) financial management—cost accounting reports used to measure performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The NTSB plays a vital role in transportation safety. It is charged with investigating all civil aviation accidents in the United States and selected accidents in other transportation modes, determining the probable cause of these accidents, and making appropriate recommendations, as well as performing safety studies.
In 2006, NTSB's reauthorization legislation mandated GAO to annually evaluate its programs. From 2006 to 2008, GAO made 21 recommendations to NTSB aimed at improving management and operations across several areas. Since that time, NTSB has taken action to address all 21 recommendations. Some of these were completed by requiring only a single action, whereas others required continuing effort to achieve operational improvement. For this review, GAO examined the extent to which desired outcomes are being achieved in five areas where continuing effort was necessary. GAO analyzed workforce, financial, and program data, and interviewed agency officials about actions NTSB has taken.
What GAO Found
GAOs analysis found varying degrees of improvement associated with the National Transportation Safety Boards (NTSB) actions in areas selected for review.
Training Center utilization . NTSB increased utilization of its Training Centerboth non-classroom and classroom spacesince 2006. NTSB has also set and achieved its cost recovery goal at the Training Center in the last 2 fiscal years, allowing NTSB to recover half of its operating costs.
Recommendation close-out process . By automating the recommendation follow-up process, NTSB has reduced by about 3 months the amount of time it takes to respond to agencies on whether planned actions to implement NTSB recommendations are acceptable; this allows agencies to move forward with approved actions sooner than under NTSBs former paper-driven process.
Communication . NTSB employees responses on federal employee surveys from 2004 to 2012 indicated an increase from 49 to 57 percent in employees positive responses regarding managers communication about agency goals, and from 44 to 49 percent regarding the amount of information received. We compared NTSB employees responses to those of employees from a group of small agencies and found that NTSB employees satisfaction level was about the same or more positive depending on the question. NTSB officials continue to monitor employees views about communication to address any remaining concerns.
Diversity management . NTSB employees positive responses to the federal employee survey questions about managers commitment to diversity and NTSBs diversity policies and programs increased from about 54 percent to over 70 percent from 2004 to 2012. However, employees positive responses to the question about managers ability to work well with employees with different backgrounds declined 6 percentage points over the same period. In addition, the proportion of minority and women employees in NTSBs workforce, including in its investigator staff, showed little appreciable change over the period 2008 to 2012. NTSBs workforce had a smaller proportion of some minority groups than the civilian labor force. NTSB officials are using results from their recent diversity survey to identify gaps in their diversity management efforts and to benchmark future progress. It is too soon to tell whether NTSBs actions will lead to additional changes in its workforce diversity profile.
Financial management . To improve operational effectiveness, NTSB has implemented a cost accounting system that includes a time and attendance program to track staff hours and costs related to accident investigations. NTSB is currently focused on ensuring the quality of the time and attendance data, but has not yet developed a strategy to maximize the utility of its cost accounting system for making resource and operational decisions. Thus, NTSB has not yet fully achieved its vision of using the data to improve labor productivity and mission effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
In each of the five areas NTSB needs to continue its improvement efforts. Further, GAO recommends that NTSB senior managers develop a strategy for maximizing the utility of NTSB's cost accounting system. GAO provided a draft of this report to officials at NTSB. NTSB officials concurred with the recommendation and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-98-33 | gao_GGD-98-33_0 | As shown in table 1, those indicators show that IRS met or exceeded most of its performance goals for the 1997 filing season. In that regard, IRS’ telephone data showed that the number of busy signals dropped from 86.0 million during the 1996 filing season to 22.7 million during the 1997 filing season and that the average number of call attempts per taxpayer dropped from 2.5 during the 1996 filing season to 1.4 during the 1997 filing season. Although the increase in the overall number of returns filed was small, the increase in the number filed through alternative methods was significant—about 25 percent higher than last year. New Procedures Enable IRS to Protect More Revenue
An important change for the 1997 filing season involved IRS’ implementation of new procedures for handling returns filed with missing or incorrect SSNs. IRS’ SSN error procedures changed in 1997 as a result of a provision in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. That provision authorized IRS to treat missing or incorrect SSNs as math errors, similar to the way it has historically handled computational mistakes. As of September 1, after netting out adjustments made in response to taxpayers’ calls and letters, IRS reported that it had protected about $1.46 billion in revenue (i.e., claimed refunds or credits not paid and additional taxes assessed). Information we obtained this year called into question a key assumption used to calculate the interest cost avoidance figures that IRS and FMS have cited to support the use of lockboxes to process those payments. For returns that will continue to be filed on paper, IRS planned to achieve its objective through document imaging and optical character recognition systems. In that regard, IRS estimated that about 95 percent of the Forms 1040EZ processed through SCRIPS in 1997 did not have the scannable preprinted address label, compared with about 50 percent in 1996, causing a significant increase in the amount of data IRS had to manually transcribe. It achieved significant increases in telephone accessibility and alternative filings, and it implemented a major change in dealing with missing or incorrect SSNs, all without any noticeable major problems. We are concerned, however, about the cost effectiveness of IRS’ use of lockboxes rather than service centers to receive and process Form 1040 tax payments. Although FMS had planned another study to further assess the comparative processing times and costs for lockboxes and service centers, those plans have been deferred, and it is unclear when such a study will be done. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue require the appropriate IRS officials to conduct, during the 1998 tax filing season, the analyses necessary to determine (1) whether there are net savings to the government attributable to the use of lockboxes to process Form 1040 tax payments and (2) whether the potential savings of requiring affected taxpayers to mail their tax returns to IRS and their tax payments to lockboxes in separate envelopes outweigh the estimated additional cost and other burden that this could be expected to cause taxpayers. Toll-Free Telephone Accessibility Test
To assess the ability of taxpayers to reach IRS by telephone to ask a question about the tax law or their accounts, we conducted a nonstatistical test of IRS’ toll-free telephone assistance system. The other five centers used the traditional keypunching system to process the Forms 1040EZ they received. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) performance during the 1997 tax filing season, focusing on: (1) the ability of taxpayers seeking answers to questions to reach IRS via the telephone; (2) the number of returns filed by means other than the traditional paper method; (3) IRS' efforts to deal with returns that have missing or incorrect social security numbers (SSN); (4) the use of banks, known as lockboxes, to process certain tax payments; and (5) performance of the imaging system IRS uses to process certain tax returns.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the IRS met or exceeded most of its 1997 filing season related performance goals; (2) of particular note is the substantial improvement in two important areas where GAO has criticized IRS' performance in past filing seasons--telephone accessibility and the use of alternative filing methods; (3) according to IRS data, telephone accessibility increased from 20 percent during the 1996 filing season to 51 percent during the 1997 filing season; (4) the number of tax returns filed by means other than the traditional paper method increased by 25 percent over the last year, with the number of returns filed by telephone (TeleFile) showing the most significant increase--65 percent; (5) although the revised tax package apparently contributed to an increase in the use of TeleFile, it also apparently contributed to a decrease in the performance of the Service Center Recognition/Image Processing System (SCRIPS)--a document imaging and optical character recognition system that IRS implemented in 1994 to process Forms 1040EZ and certain other tax documents; (6) another major change during the 1997 filing season involved the procedures IRS used to process returns that were filed with missing or incorrect SSNs; (7) in 1997, as authorized by the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, IRS began treating missing or incorrect SSNs as math errors rather than as issues that, in the past, had to be resolved through a lengthy notice process; (8) as of September 1, 1997, according to IRS, it had protected about $1.46 billion in revenue through the disallowance of claimed credits or dependent exemptions in 1997, more than doubling the amount disallowed using the procedures IRS followed in 1996; (9) one issue that GAO discussed in a previous report that continues to be of concern is the cost-effectiveness of IRS' use of lockboxes to process 1040 tax payments; (10) additional information GAO obtained this year heightened its concern by calling into question a key assumption IRS and the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) have used to calculate the interest cost savings associated with this use of lockboxes; and (11) although FMS had planned a study to further assess interest cost savings, those plans have been deferred, and there is no assurance when such a study will be done. |
gao_GAO-11-734T | gao_GAO-11-734T_0 | Potential Challenges with Reorganization of Oil and Gas Functions
Interior’s ongoing reorganization of bureaus with oil and gas functions will require time and resources, and undertaking such an endeavor while continuing to meet ongoing responsibilities may pose new challenges. Interior has begun implementing its restructuring effort, transferring offshore oversight responsibilities to the newly created BOEMRE and revenue collection to ONRR. While this reorganization may eventually lead to more effective operations, we have reported that organizational transformations are not simple endeavors and require the concentrated efforts of both leaders and employees to realize intended synergies and accomplish new organizational goals. Given that as of December 2010 Interior had not implemented many recommendations we made to address numerous weaknesses and challenges, we are concerned about Interior’s ability to undertake this reorganization while (1) providing reasonable assurance that billions of dollars of revenues owed to the public are being properly assessed and collected and (2) maintaining focus on its oil and gas oversight responsibilities. Challenges of Balancing Oil and Gas Development with Environmental Stewardship
We have reported that Interior has experienced several challenges in meeting its obligations to make federal oil and gas resources available for leasing and development while simultaneously meeting its responsibilities for managing public lands for other uses, including wildlife habitat, recreation, and wilderness. Finally, in September 2009, we reported that BLM’s use of categorical exclusions under Section 390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005—which authorized BLM, for certain oil and gas activities, to approve projects without preparing new environmental analyses that would normally be required in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act—was frequently out of compliance with the law and BLM’s internal guidance. As a result, we recommended that BLM take steps to improve the implementation of Section 390 categorical exclusions through clarification of its guidance, standardizing decision documents, and increasing oversight. Since 2009, BLM has taken steps to address our recommendations, but it has not yet completed implementing all of our recommendations. Human Capital Challenges
We have reported that BLM and MMS have encountered persistent problems in hiring, training, and retaining sufficient staff to meet Interior’s oversight and management responsibilities for oil and gas operations on federal lands and waters. For example, in March 2010, we reported that BLM and MMS experienced high turnover rates in key oil and gas inspection and engineering positions responsible for production verification activities. As a result, Interior faces challenges meeting its responsibilities to oversee oil and gas development on federal leases, potentially placing both the environment and royalties at risk. Moreover, the human capital issues we identified with BLM’s management of onshore oil and gas continue, and these issues have not yet been addressed in Interior’s reorganization plans. Concerns over Revenue Collection
Federal oil and gas resources generate billions of dollars annually in revenues that are shared among federal, state, and tribal governments; however, we found Interior may not be properly assessing and collecting these revenues. In September 2008, we reported that Interior collected lower levels of revenues for oil and gas production in the deep water of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico than all but 11 of 104 oil and gas resource owners whose revenue collection systems were evaluated in a comprehensive industry study—these resource owners included other countries as well as some states. GAO recommended Interior conduct a comprehensive review of the federal oil and gas system using an independent panel. Development of Existing Leases
In October 2008, we reported that Interior could do more do encourage the development of existing oil and gas leases and proposed a recommendation. Federal leases contain one provision–– increasing rental rates over time for offshore 5-year leases and onshore leases—to encourage development. In addition to using increasing rental rates, some states undertake additional efforts to encourage lessees to develop oil and gas leases more quickly, including shorter lease terms and graduated royalty rates—royalty rates that rise over the life of the lease. Recently, Interior has stated its intent to pursue legislation establishing a per acre fee on non-producing leases to encourage development of federal leases. Our past work has found a wide range of material weaknesses in Interior’s oversight of federal oil and gas resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior oversees oil and gas activities on leased federal lands and waters. Revenue generated from federal oil and gas production is one of the largest nontax sources of federal government funds, accounting for about $9 billion in fiscal year 2009. Since the April 2010 explosion on board the Deepwater Horizon, Interior has been in the midst of restructuring the bureaus that oversee oil and gas development. Specifically, Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees onshore federal oil and gas activities; the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE)--created in May 2010--oversees offshore oil and gas activities; and the newly established Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) is responsible for collecting royalties on oil and gas produced from both onshore and offshore federal leases. Prior to BOEMRE, the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) Offshore Energy and Minerals Management Office oversaw offshore oil and gas activities and revenue collection. In 2011, GAO identified Interior's management of oil and gas resources as a high risk issue. GAO's work in this area identified challenges in five areas: (1) reorganization, (2) balancing responsibilities, (3) human capital, (4) revenue collection, and (5) development of existing leases.
What GAO Found
Reorganization: Interior's reorganization of activities previously overseen by MMS, which Interior expects to be completed in October 2011, will require time and resources and may pose new challenges. While this reorganization may eventually lead to more effective operations, GAO has reported that organizational transformations are not simple endeavors. GAO is concerned with Interior's ability to undertake this reorganization while meeting its revenue collection and oil and gas oversight responsibilities. Balancing Responsibilities: GAO has reported that Interior has experienced several challenges with meeting its responsibilities for providing for the development of oil and gas resources while managing public lands for other uses, including wildlife habitat. For example, in September 2009, GAO reported that BLM's use of categorical exclusions under Section 390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was frequently out of compliance with the law and BLM's internal guidance. As a result, GAO recommended that BLM take steps to improve the implementation of Section 390. BLM has taken steps to address these recommendations, but it has not yet implemented all of them. Human Capital: GAO has reported that BLM and MMS have encountered persistent problems in hiring, training, and retaining sufficient staff to meet their oversight and management responsibilities for oil and gas operations. For example, in March 2010, GAO reported that BLM and MMS experienced high turnover rates in key oil and gas inspection and engineering positions responsible for production verification activities. As a result, Interior faces challenges meeting its responsibilities to oversee oil and gas development on federal leases, potentially placing both the environment and royalties at risk. Revenue Collection: While federal oil and gas resources generate billions of dollars in annual revenues, past GAO work has found that Interior may not be properly assessing and collecting these revenues. In September 2008, GAO reported that Interior collected lower levels of revenues for oil and gas production in the deep water of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico than all but 11 of 104 oil and gas resource owners whose revenue collection systems were evaluated in a comprehensive industry study. As GAO recommended, Interior is undertaking a comprehensive assessment of its revenue collection policies and processes--the first in over 25 years. Interior expects to complete this study later this year. Development of Existing Leases: In October 2008, GAO reported that Interior could do more to encourage the development of existing oil and gas leases. Federal leases contain one provision--increasing rental rates over time for offshore 5-year leases and onshore leases--to encourage development. In addition to escalating rental rates, states undertake additional efforts to encourage lessees to develop oil and gas leases more quickly, including shorter lease terms and graduated royalty rates. Recently, Interior has stated its intent to pursue legislation establishing a per acre fee on non-producing leases to encourage development of federal leases. |
gao_GAO-10-581 | gao_GAO-10-581_0 | For this report, we reviewed the 11 energy and infrastructure programs introduced previously. As discussed earlier, our focus is on the extent to which descriptions of awards reported by recipients and published on Recovery.gov provide a basic understanding of what funds are being spent on and what outcomes are expected. Recovery Act Created Broad Requirements for Reporting on Awards
The act created broad requirements for recipient reporting. Specifically, starting for the period ending September 30, 2009 (and repeated for the quarter ending December 31), OMB’s reporting instructions for the Recipient Reporting Data Model specified that recipients would provide, among other things, the project name, which should be brief and descriptive; a project description that captures the overall purpose of the award and expected outputs and outcomes or results; an award description that describes the overall purpose, expected outputs, and outcomes or results of the award, including significant deliverables and, if appropriate, units of measure; the project status, which was specified as not started, less than 50 percent complete, completed 50 percent or more, or complete; an activity description, which categorizes projects and activities; the amount of the award; and the primary place of performance, which is the physical location of award activities. A Quarter of the Descriptions of Awards Provide Sufficient Information for Transparency; Some Additional Information Is Publicly Available for Those That Did Not
We estimate that about a quarter of the awards on Recovery.gov for the nine programs we reviewed were transparent—that is, had sufficiently clear and understandable information on the award’s purpose, scope, location, cost, nature of activities, outcomes, and status of work. Recipient-reported information varied widely in its transparency. (The extent to which federal agency and state agency Recovery Act Web sites have material that supplement Recovery.gov recipient-reported information is discussed later in this section.) These did not meet our transparency criteria. Some agencies supplemented OMB’s high-level guidance with program- specific technical assistance on how to meet OMB’s reporting requirements, including specific instructions on what to write in the narrative fields. For information on each agency’s data quality reviews, see appendix XII. In addition to federal and state Web sites, information on the uses of Recovery Act funds can be found on some recipients’ Web sites and in other publicly available documents. In general, federal agency officials told us that they have received some feedback on Recovery Act awards and the award information made available to the public. These descriptions provide a key mechanism through which the public can understand clearly how their tax dollars are being spent and what is likely to be achieved from these expenditures. In doing so, OMB can use its central position to further mission agencies' efforts to tailor resulting guidance to their individual situations in a way that furthers the transparency goals discussed in this report. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further the goals of public understanding of what Recovery Act funds are being spent on and what results are expected, we recommend that the Director, Office of Management and Budget, take the following three actions: Revise OMB’s recipient reporting guidance, including the Recipient Reporting Data Model, to provide recipients with clearer general instructions and examples for narrative fields aimed at fostering more complete information on the uses of funds and expected outcomes. Work with executive departments and agencies to determine (1) whether supplemental guidance is needed to meet, in a reasonable and cost-effective way, the intent of the Recovery Act for reporting on projects and activities and (2) whether that supplemental guidance or other agency-proposed technical assistance dealing with narrative descriptions of awards provides for transparent descriptions of funded activities. Periodically (1) review, in partnership with executive departments and agencies, the descriptions of awards—in particular, the narrative fields—submitted by recipients to determine whether the information provides a basic understanding of the uses of the funds and the expected outcomes, and, if not, determine what actions to take, including encouraging agencies to develop or improve program-specific guidance and (2) work with the Recovery Board on the board’s assessments of departments’ and agencies’ data quality reviews to ensure the adequacy of these reviews and further reinforce actions to meet transparency goals. OMB officials agreed with our recommendations. Therefore, the agency does not have experience with how well OMB’s guidance ensures that the public has accurate information. Additionally, geothermal program officials did not review narrative description fields in Recovery.gov, which may have led to some reporting errors. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds allowed transit service to be sustained for nine (9) months. 3. About 30 Percent of Federal Buildings Fund Descriptions Met Our Transparency Criteria
We assessed the transparency of descriptive information for Federal Building Fund awards available on Recovery.gov, as described in the report. 3. Additional Information on Methodology
To identify the information that is required to be included as part of the descriptions of awards funded by the Recovery Act, we reviewed the reporting requirements contained in the act, OMB’s guidance, Recovery.gov reporting instructions, and supplemental agency reporting guidance that were applicable for the quarter ending December 31, 2009. The state and local officials that we contacted were those that were part of a judgmental sample of 52 awards we selected from those that we had previously contacted as part of our work to report bimonthly on how the Recovery Act is being implemented and from our search of media stories about Recovery Act awards. The federal agencies update their data at different frequencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
A hallmark of efforts to implement the $862 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) is to be transparent and accountable about what the money is being spent on and what is being achieved. To help achieve these goals, recipients are to report every 3 months on their award activities and expected outcomes, among other things. This information is available on Recovery.gov, the government's official Recovery Act Web site. As requested, this report covers 11 federal programs focused on broadband, energy, transportation, federal buildings, and civil works activities, representing $67 billion in Recovery Act funding. Primarily, the report (1) describes how the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies implemented the act to report funds' uses and (2) assesses the extent to which descriptions of awards meet GAO's transparency criteria. It also describes reported uses of funds for the 11 programs. GAO reviewed requirements for reporting in the act and OMB's guidance. Based on these requirements, GAO developed a transparency assessment and applied it to a probability sample of descriptions from 14,089 recipient reports. In addition, GAO reviewed 52 projects in detail in states that it had contacted as part of its bimonthly reviews and interviewed federal, state, and local officials about their experiences with reporting descriptions of awards.
What GAO Found
This report focuses on one aspect of transparency and accountability: the extent to which descriptions of awards found on Recovery.gov foster a basic understanding of award activities and expected outcomes. Section 1512 of the act created broad requirements for recipient reporting. The act does not further explain these requirements. To implement the act, OMB provided generic guidance instructing recipients to report narrative information, among other things, that captures the overall purpose of the award and expected results. GAO estimates that, for the nine programs with funds awarded by December 31, 2009, 25 percent of the descriptions met its transparency criteria; that is, they had sufficiently clear and complete information on the award's purpose, scope and nature of activities, location, cost, outcomes, and status of work. Two factors may have influenced what GAO found. First, GAO's results were somewhat more positive for programs in which the federal agencies provided program-specific materials that supplemented OMB's guidance with detailed information on what recipients should include in the narrative fields. The highway, transit, and geothermal programs that GAO reviewed tended to have more transparent descriptions compared with programs that only supplied general guidance. Second, officials in many programs told GAO that they did not typically include the narrative fields in their data quality reviews. While an estimated three-quarters of the recipient-reported information did not fully meet GAO's transparency criteria--thus potentially hampering understanding of what is being achieved with Recovery Act funding--GAO found that federal and state Recovery Act Web sites, in some cases, provided additional information that could aid the public in understanding what its tax dollars are being spent on and what outcomes are expected. GAO collected information on the reported uses of funds from federal agencies for the 11 programs it reviewed. These uses ranged from improving infrastructure to improving Internet access. Agencies have obligated program funds at different rates, which may be due, in part, to whether the programs were new, existing, or received sizable funding increases. GAO also asked the federal agencies and selected state agencies in its review about how they make Recovery Act project information available to the public and what feedback they have received. Each agency has established a Recovery Act Web site, as have states, some state auditors and Inspectors General, and some recipients. These sites contain varying amounts of information, such as program objectives, lists of projects, and interactive maps.
What GAO Recommends
To further public understanding of what Recovery Act funds are being spent on and the expected results, GAO recommends that the Director, OMB, (1) revise the agency's recipient reporting guidance to remedy the unclear examples and enhance instructions for completing narrative fields; (2) work with agencies to determine whether supplemental guidance is needed to meet the intent of the act and whether that supplemental guidance or other technical assistance proposed by agencies dealing with narrative descriptions of awards provides for transparent descriptions of funded activities; and (3) periodically review, in partnership with federal agencies, the recipients' descriptions of awards to determine whether the information provides a basic understanding of the uses of the funds and expected outcomes, and, if not, encourage agencies to develop or improve program-specific guidance, as well as work with the Recovery Board as the board reviews the results of agencies' data quality reviews to further reinforce actions to meet transparency goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB agreed with GAO's recommendations. OMB and the federal agencies provided a number of specific comments, many of which GAO incorporated. |
gao_GAO-05-116 | gao_GAO-05-116_0 | In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the Schedules of Federal Debt; assessed the accounting principles used and any significant estimates evaluated the overall presentation of the Schedules of Federal Debt; obtained an understanding of internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2004, related to financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations (including execution of transactions in accordance with budget authority); tested relevant internal controls over financial reporting and compliance, and evaluated the design and operating effectiveness of internal control related to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2004; considered the process for evaluating and reporting on internal control and financial management systems under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act; and tested compliance in fiscal year 2004 with the statutory debt limit (31 U.S.C. The comments are reprinted in appendix I.
Overview, Schedules, and Notes
Federal debt managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt comprises debt held by the public and debt held by certain federal government accounts, the latter of which is referred to as intragovernmental debt holdings. As of September 30, 2004 and 2003, outstanding gross federal debt managed by the bureau totaled $7,379 and $6,783 billion, respectively. As Figure 1 illustrates, intragovernmental debt holdings have steadily increased since fiscal year 2000 and debt held by the public decreased in fiscal year 2001, but increased in fiscal years 2002 through 2004. However, this interest represents a claim on future budgetary resources and hence an obligation on future taxpayers. As Figure 2 illustrates, total interest expense decreased each year from fiscal year 2001 through 2003, but increased in fiscal year 2004. (in billions)
Debt held by the public reflects how much of the nation’s wealth has been absorbed by the federal government to finance prior federal spending in excess of total federal revenues. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held by over 200 individual federal government accounts with either the authority or the requirement to invest excess receipts in special U.S. Treasury securities that are guaranteed for principal and interest by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. Delays in raising the current debt limit of $7,384 billion have forced Treasury to enter into a debt issuance suspension period (DISP) that involves Treasury’s departure from its normal investment and redemption procedures for certain federal government accounts. As a result, the intragovernmental debt holdings balances primarily represent the cumulative surplus of funds due to the trust funds’ cumulative annual excess of tax receipts, interest credited, and other collections compared to spending. Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt
Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt For the Fiscal Years Ended September 30, 2004 and 2003 Note 1. The Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow monies to operate the federal government within a statutory debt limit. Federal Debt Held by the Public As of September 30, 2004 and 2003, Federal Debt Held by the Public consisted of the following: Total Federal Debt Held by the Public Treasury issues marketable bills at a discount and pays the par amount of the security upon maturity. The average interest rates for fiscal years 2004 and 2003 were 5.4 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required to audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Due to the significance of the federal debt held by the public to the governmentwide financial statements, GAO has also been auditing the Bureau of the Public Debt's (BPD) Schedules of Federal Debt annually. The audit of these schedules is done to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) the schedules prepared are reliable, (2) BPD management maintained effective internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt, and (3) BPD complies with selected provisions of significant laws related to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Federal debt managed by BPD consists of Treasury securities held by the public and by certain federal government accounts, referred to as intragovernmental debt holdings. The level of debt held by the public reflects how much of the nation's wealth has been absorbed by the federal government to finance prior federal spending in excess of total federal revenues. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held by federal government accounts, primarily federal trust funds such as Social Security, that typically have an obligation to invest their excess annual receipts over disbursements in federal securities.
What GAO Found
In GAO's opinion, BPD's Schedules of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2004 and 2003 were fairly presented in all material respects and BPD maintained effective internal control related to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2004. GAO also found no instances of noncompliance in fiscal year 2004 with the statutory debt limit. A s of September 30, 2004 and 2003, federal debt managed by BPD totaled about $7,379 billion and $6,783 billion, respectively. At the end of fiscal year 2004, debt held by the public as a percentage of the U.S. economy is estimated at 37.5 percent, up from 33.1 percent at the end of fiscal year 2001. Further, certain trust funds (e.g., Social Security) continue to run surpluses, resulting in increased intragovernmental debt holdings. These debt holdings are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government and represent a priority call on future budgetary resources. Gross federal debt has increased 27 percent between the end of fiscal years 2001 and 2004. As a result of the increasing federal debt, on October 14, 2004, Treasury entered into a debt issuance suspension period to avoid exceeding the current $7,384 billion statutory debt limit and requested the Congress take action to raise the debt limit by mid- November 2004. The total federal debt increased over each of the last 4 fiscal years. Debt held by the public decreased as a result of cash surpluses for fiscal year 2001, but increased during fiscal years 2002 through 2004, with the return of annual unified budget deficits. Intragovernmental debt holdings steadily increased during this 4-year period primarily due to excess receipts over disbursements in federal trust funds. |
gao_GAO-16-590T | gao_GAO-16-590T_0 | In addition, NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines that include minimum information security requirements. In carrying out its mission, IRS relies extensively on computerized information systems, which it must effectively secure to protect sensitive financial and taxpayer data for the collection of taxes, processing of tax returns, and enforcement of federal tax laws. Although IRS Has Made Improvements, Information Security Weaknesses Continue to Place Taxpayer and Financial Data at Risk
As we reported in March 2016, IRS has implemented numerous protections over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented access and other controls, including elements of its information security program. In our most recent review we determined that IRS had improved access controls, but some weaknesses remain. However, key systems we reviewed had not been configured to encrypt sensitive user authentication data. Nevertheless, the control weaknesses can be attributed in part to IRS’s inconsistent implementation of elements of its agency-wide information security program. The collective effect of the deficiencies in information security from prior years that continued to exist in fiscal year 2015, along with the new deficiencies we identified, are serious enough to merit the attention of those charged with governance of IRS and therefore represented a significant deficiency in IRS’s internal control over financial reporting systems as of September 30, 2015. Implementing these recommendations—in addition to the 49 outstanding recommendations from previous audits—will help IRS improve its controls for identifying and authenticating users, limiting users’ access to the minimum necessary to perform their job-related functions, protecting sensitive data when they are stored or in transit, auditing and monitoring system activities, and physically securing its IT facilities and resources. We recommended that IRS correct these weaknesses, but the agency has yet to fully address them. IRS Faces Challenges in Addressing Identity Theft Refund Fraud
The importance of protecting taxpayer information is further highlighted by the billions of dollars that have been lost to IDT refund fraud, which continues to be an evolving threat. Given current and emerging risks, in 2015 we expanded our high-risk area on the enforcement of tax laws to include IRS’s efforts to address IDT refund fraud. IRS has taken steps to address IDT refund fraud; however, it remains a persistent and evolving threat. The agency has also taken actions to improve customer service related to IDT fraud by, for example, providing an increased level of service to taxpayers calling its identity theft toll-free phone line. Accordingly, we recommended that IRS assess the costs, benefits, and risks of its authentication options. In November 2015, IRS officials told us that the agency had developed guidance for its Identity Assurance Office to assess costs, benefits, and risk of authentication tools. Accordingly, OMB and NIST have prescribed policies, standards, and guidelines that are intended to assist federal agencies with identifying and providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, alteration, and destruction of information and information systems, including those systems operated by a contractor or others on behalf of the agency. In particular, DHS is responsible for administering, in consultation with OMB, the implementation of agency information security policies and practices for information systems (other than national security systems, Department of Defense, and the intelligence community’s “debilitating impact” systems); developing, issuing, and overseeing the implementation of binding operational directives to agencies on matters such as incident reporting, contents of agency’s annual reports, and other operational requirements; and operating the federal information security incident center (the U.S Computer Emergency Readiness Team or US-CERT), deploying technology to continuously diagnose and mitigate threats, compiling and analyzing data, and developing and conducting targeted operational evaluations, including threat and vulnerability assessments of systems. In May 2015 DHS issued its first directive, which required all departments and agencies to review and mitigate all critical vulnerabilities on their Internet-facing systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In collecting taxes, processing returns, and providing taxpayer service, IRS relies extensively on computerized information systems. Accordingly, it is critical that sensitive taxpayer and other data are protected. Recent data breaches at IRS highlight the vulnerability of taxpayer information. In addition, identity theft refund fraud is an evolving threat that occurs when a thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identity and claims a refund.
Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area, and in 2015 it expanded this area to include the protection of personally identifiable information. GAO also added identity theft refund fraud to its high-risk area on the enforcement of tax laws.
This statement discusses (1) IRS's information security controls over tax processing and financial systems and (2) roles that federal agencies with government-wide information security responsibilities play in providing guidance and oversight to agencies. This statement is based on previously published GAO work and a review of federal guidance.
What GAO Found
In March 2016 GAO reported that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had instituted numerous controls over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented safeguards intended to properly restrict access to systems and information. In particular, while IRS had improved some of its access controls, weaknesses remained with identifying and authenticating users, authorizing users' level of rights and privileges, encrypting sensitive data, auditing and monitoring network activity, and physically securing its computing resources. These weaknesses were due in part to IRS's inconsistent implementation of its agency-wide security program, including not fully implementing GAO recommendations. The table below shows the status of prior and new GAO recommendations as of the end of its fiscal year (FY) 2015 audit of IRS's information security. GAO concluded that these weaknesses collectively constituted a significant deficiency for the purposes of financial reporting for fiscal year 2015. Until they are effectively mitigated, taxpayer and financial data will continue to be exposed to unnecessary risk.
The importance of protecting taxpayer information is further highlighted by the billions of dollars that have been lost to identity theft refund fraud, which continues to be an evolving threat. While IRS has taken steps to address this issue, as GAO reported in January 2015 it has yet to assess the costs, benefits, and risks of methods for improving the authentication of taxpayers' identity.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide government-wide guidance and oversight for federal information security. These agencies have taken a number of actions to carry out these responsibilities. For example:
OMB has prescribed security policies, including direction on ensuring that online services provided by agencies are secure and protect privacy.
NIST has developed standards and guidelines for implementing security controls, including those for authenticating users during online transactions.
DHS has issued a directive requiring departments and agencies to mitigate critical vulnerabilities on their Internet-facing systems. It also assists agencies in monitoring their networks for malicious traffic.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to 49 prior recommendations that had not been implemented, GAO made 45 new recommendations to IRS in March 2016 to further improve its information security controls and program. GAO also recommended that IRS assess costs, benefits, and risks of taxpayer authentication options. |
gao_GAO-03-931T | gao_GAO-03-931T_0 | DOD’s serious financial management and related business systems problems led us in 1995 to put both DOD financial management and systems modernization on our list of high-risk areas in the federal government, a designation that continues today. Effective and efficient asset management and accountability is crucial to DOD’s defense of our national interests. Weak Control Environment
Fundamental flaws in DOD’s systems, processes, and overall control environment leave the department at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. We first identified underlying causes for the department’s inability to resolve its long-standing financial management problems, as well as the other areas of its operations most vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, in our May 1997 testimony. There are four underlying causes: a lack of sustained top-level leadership and management accountability deeply embedded cultural resistance to change, including military service parochialism and stovepiped operations; a lack of results-oriented goals and performance measures and inadequate incentives for seeking change. These elements, which we believe are key to any successful approach to financial management reform, include addressing the department’s financial management challenges as part of a comprehensive, integrated, DOD-wide business reform; providing for sustained leadership by the Secretary of Defense and resource control to implement needed financial management reforms; establishing clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability for such reform tied to the Secretary; incorporating results-oriented performance measures and monitoring tied to financial management reforms; providing appropriate incentives or consequences for action or inaction; establishing and implementing an enterprise architecture to guide and direct financial management modernization investments; and ensuring effective executive and congressional oversight and monitoring. Central to effectively addressing DOD’s financial management problems will be the recognition that they cannot be addressed in an isolated fashion separate from the other high-risk areas and management challenges facing the department. These are important steps in DOD’s plans to develop a human capital investment strategy and plan. DOD’s vast array of costly, nonintegrated, duplicative, and inefficient financial management systems reflects its lack of an integrated approach to addressing management challenges. DOD has already taken a number of actions under its business transformation program. In discussing their April 2001 report to the Secretary of Defense on transforming financial management, the authors stated that, “unlike previous failed attempts to improve DOD’s financial practices, there is a new push by DOD leadership to make this issue a priority.” To demonstrate his commitment towards reforming the department, Secretary Rumsfeld designated improving financial management operations, which included not only finance and accounting but also such business areas as logistics, acquisition, and personnel management, as 1 of the department’s top 10 priorities for reform. The Secretary of Defense has taken action to vest responsibility and accountability for financial management modernization with the DOD Comptroller. DOD is investing billions of dollars in financial management solutions and business process reform. DOD can ill afford to invest billions of dollars in systems that are not capable of providing DOD management and the Congress with more accurate, timely, and reliable information on the results of the department’s business operations. Monitoring and Oversight
Ensuring effective monitoring and oversight of progress will also be key to bringing about effective implementation of the department’s financial management and related business process reform. | Why GAO Did This Study
As seen again in Iraq, the excellence of our military forces is unparalleled. This same level of excellence is not yet evident in the Department of Defense's (DOD) financial management and other business areas, impeding DOD's ability to provide complete, reliable, and timely information to the Congress, DOD managers, and other decision makers. Congress asked GAO to testify on the status of DOD's financial management and business process reform efforts. Specifically, GAO was asked to provide an overview of the long-standing financial management weaknesses facing DOD and a summary of the underlying causes of DOD's financial management challenges. In addition, GAO's testimony focused on (1) key actions necessary to correct DOD's financial management problems and (2) the progress DOD is making toward business process reform.
What GAO Found
Overhauling DOD's financial management represents a major challenge that goes far beyond financial accounting to the very fiber of the department's range of business operations and management culture. Of the 25 areas on GAO's governmentwide "high risk" list, 6 are DOD program areas, and the department shares responsibility for 3 other high-risk areas that are governmentwide in scope. Key financial management weaknesses include the lack of effective and efficient asset management and accountability; unreliable estimates of environmental and disposal liabilities; lack of accurate budget and cost information; nonintegrated and proliferating financial management systems; and fundamental flaws in DOD's overall control environment. GAO has identified four underlying causes for DOD's inability to resolve its long-standing financial management problems: (1) a lack of sustained top-level leadership and management accountability for correcting problems; (2) deeply embedded cultural resistance to change, including military service parochialism and stovepiped operations; (3) a lack of results-oriented goals and performance measures and monitoring; and (4) inadequate incentives for seeking change. The following are elements that GAO has identified as key to a successful approach to financial management and business process reform: (1) addressing financial management challenges as part of a comprehensive, integrated, DOD-wide business reform; (2) providing for sustained leadership by the Secretary of Defense and resource control to implement needed financial management reforms; (3) establishing clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability for such reform tied to the Secretary; (4) incorporating results-oriented performance measures and monitoring tied to financial management reforms; (5) providing appropriate incentives or consequences for action or inaction; (6) establishing and implementing an enterprise architecture to guide and direct financial management modernization investments; and (7) ensuring effective executive and congressional oversight and monitoring. DOD has taken positive steps in many of these key areas. For example, the Secretary of Defense has included improving DOD's financial management as one of his top 10 priorities, and DOD has already taken a number of actions under its Business Transformation Program, including its efforts to develop an enterprise architecture to guide operational and technological changes. However, these are beginning steps and formidable challenges remain in each of the key reform areas. |
gao_GAO-06-1022T | gao_GAO-06-1022T_0 | Agencies also vary in how they allow requests to be made. In addition to providing their annual reports to the Attorney General, agencies are to make them available to the public in electronic form. In this and subsequent reviews, we examined the contents of these annual reports for 25 major agencies (shown in table 2). Increases in Requests Are Slowing, but Pending Cases Are Increasing
The annual FOIA reports for fiscal year 2005 show that many of the trends of previous years are continuing: Requests received and processed continue to rise; however, excepting one case—SSA—the rate of increase has flattened in recent years. We present SSA’s statistics separately because the agency reported an additional 16 million requests in 2005, dwarfing those for all other agencies combined, which together total about 2.6 million. SSA attributed this rise to an improvement in its method of counting requests. As this figure shows, when SSA’s numbers are excluded, the rate of increase is modest and has been flattening: from fiscal year 2002 to 2005, requests received increased by about 27 percent, and requests processed increased by about 25 percent. From fiscal year 2004 to 2005, requests received increased about 2.5 percent, and requests processed increased about 2.0 percent. According to SSA, the increases that the agency reported in fiscal year 2005 can be attributed to an improvement in its method of counting a category of requests it calls “simple requests handled by non-FOIA staff.” In the past 4 years, SSA’s FOIA reports have consistently shown significant growth in this category, which has accounted for the major portion of all SSA requests reported (see table 3). However, Justice officials have suggested that SSA consider treating the bulk of these requests as non-FOIA requests and thus not include them in future reports. This attachment also includes information on the number of requests reported by the agencies and components, which provides context for assessing the median times reported. In 2002, pending requests governmentwide were reported to number about 140,000, whereas in 2005, about 200,000—43 percent more—were reported. In addition, the rate of increase grew in fiscal year 2005, rising 24 percent from fiscal year 2004, compared to 11 percent from 2003 to 2004. About Half of FOIA Improvement Plans Do Not Include Goals and Timetables for Reducing the Backlog
The Executive Order, with its requirement for agencies to develop FOIA improvement plans, serves to focus agency managers’ attention on the important role that FOIA plays in keeping citizens well informed about the operations of their government. Most of the 22 agency plans available as of June 30 discussed reducing backlog, but not all consistently followed the Executive Order directions by establishing goals and timetables for reducing or eliminating their backlog. Many of these agencies did define process goals, such as establishing means to monitor and report on backlog, reviewing current processes, and identifying and reviewing tracking systems, but these were not accompanied by goals for backlog reduction: ● For example, the Department of Commerce’s plan stated that, to the extent possible, its components would use current backlog numbers as a ceiling (these generally range from 9 to 13 percent of the workload) and work aggressively to reduce these numbers, focusing particularly on the 10 oldest requests in each component’s backlog. However, most of the agency improvement plans do not clearly define baselines for their existing backlogs. In other cases, agencies did not specify whether they planned to measure from the date of their plans, from the end of fiscal year 2005, or from some other baseline. Our ongoing work suggests that factors contributing to these deficiencies included difficulties in coordinating responses among components in large decentralized agencies and limitations in the way that agency systems track FOIA processing. In addition, neither the Executive Order nor Justice guidance established a baseline date for measuring the backlog or directed agencies to establish such a baseline. Without clearly defined baselines, specific objectives, and timetables for reducing backlog, the risk is that agency heads, Justice, the Congress, and the public could be hampered in determining whether and how well agencies have achieved the Executive Order’s aims of improving FOIA processing and agency disclosure of information. When we complete our ongoing review and analysis, we expect to make recommendations aimed at improving agency implementation of the Executive Order, including efforts to reduce and eliminate backlog. Agency for International Development
No. Social Security Administration
No. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes that federal agencies must provide the public with access to government information, thus enabling them to learn about government operations and decisions. To help ensure appropriate implementation, the act requires that agencies report annually to the Attorney General, providing specific information about their FOIA operations. In addition, a recent Executive Order directs agencies to develop plans to improve their FOIA operations, including, among other things, goals to reduce backlogs in FOIA requests. GAO has reported previously on the contents of these annual reports for 25 major agencies. For this hearing, GAO was asked to testify both on the annual reports for fiscal year 2005 and on the recently developed improvement plans for these 25 agencies. GAO based its testimony on its ongoing work on these topics. Upon completion of its ongoing review, GAO expects to make recommendations to improve agency implementation of the Executive Order, including efforts to reduce and eliminate backlog.
What GAO Found
According to data reported by agencies in their annual reports, the public continues to request and receive increasing amounts of information from the federal government through FOIA; however, excepting one case--the Social Security Administration (SSA)--the rate of increase has flattened in recent years. (SSA reported an additional 16 million requests in 2005, dwarfing those for all other agencies combined, which together total about 2.6 million; SSA attributed this rise to an improvement in its method of counting requests. However, Justice officials have suggested that SSA consider treating the bulk of these requests as non-FOIA requests and thus not include them in future reports.) When SSA's numbers are excluded, data reported by the other 24 major agencies show that the number of requests received increased by 27 percent from fiscal year 2002 to 2005, but by only about 2.5 percent from fiscal year 2004. As more requests come in, agencies also report that they have been processing more of them--25 percent more from 2002 to 2005 (but only about 2.0 percent more than from 2004). Despite processing more requests, agencies have not kept up with the increase in requests being made: the number of pending requests carried over from year to year has been steadily increasing, rising to about 200,000 in fiscal year 2005--43 percent more than in 2002. The rate of increase in requests pending is also growing: the increase from fiscal year 2004 to 2005 is 24 percent, compared to 11 percent from 2003 to 2004. Most of the agency improvement plans discussed reducing backlog, but not all consistently followed the Executive Order or implementing guidance provided by the Justice Department. Of the 25 agencies, 3 had not posted their plans in time to be included in this testimony, and 1 reported no backlog. Of the remaining 21 agencies, 12 followed the Executive Order's instruction to establish measurable, outcome-oriented objectives for reducing or eliminating their backlogs, as well as timetables with milestones for meeting these objectives. Nine agencies did not do this, although they accounted for a substantial fraction--about 29 percent--of the requests reported to be pending at the end of fiscal year 2005. (Most agencies did provide goals and timetables for other kinds of objectives, however, such as performing staffing analyses and reviewing progress.) In addition, agencies generally did not specify the dates or numbers they were using as the baselines for their existing backlogs, which will be important for measuring improvement. GAO's ongoing work suggests that factors contributing to these deficiencies include difficulties in coordinating responses among components in large, decentralized agencies and limitations in the systems that track FOIA processing. In addition, neither the Executive Order nor Justice guidance established a baseline date for measuring the backlog or directed agencies to establish such a date. Without clearly defined baselines, specific objectives, and timetables for reducing backlog, it could be challenging for agency heads, Justice, and the Congress to gauge progress in improving FOIA processes as intended by the Executive Order. |
gao_GAO-05-82 | gao_GAO-05-82_0 | The Bureau has been using this survey, known as the ACS Supplementary Survey, to test procedures and to produce annual data for geographic areas with populations of 250,000 or more. According to the plan the Congress approved, the first annual ACS data for geographic areas with populations larger than 65,000 will be published beginning in 2006 with data for 2005; 3-year averages for geographic areas with populations between 20,000 and 65,000 will begin in 2008; and 5-year averages for geographic areas with populations smaller than 20,000, including Census tracts and block groups, will begin in 2010. For the ACS test program, the underlying population and housing characteristics varied. The Census Bureau did not provide a date when the methodology would be incorporated. Although it also has solicited advice from NAS panels, advisory committee members, and experts at workshops and conferences on some of the issues we have identified in this report, there is no indication that the Census Bureau will be following this advice. It has been more than a year since the Census Bureau announced, in March 2003, that it was looking into establishing an ACS partnership program that would involve advisory groups and expert panels to help it improve the program. We found that no such program has been established yet. When we reviewed the previous plan and other alternatives to the proposed ACS that would provide more timely and reliable data for small geographic areas, we determined that the only viable alternative to the current plans would be to expand the sample size for 2009–11, as proposed earlier. In addition, the Census Bureau has announced that comparisons of 2000 ACS and 2000 Census long-form data critical to the transition to the full ACS will be limited. Resolving all issues for the 2008 ACS is critical if these data are to be fully consistent with the ACS data for 2009–12 and the 2008–12 averages are to be fully consistent with the 2010 Decennial Census short-form data. Conclusions
The Census Bureau’s development of the ACS goes back several decades and has included intensive research and field testing programs, as well as substantial outreach efforts, in particular through the reports and workshops at NAS. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the ACS is an adequate replacement for the Decennial Census long form, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Census Bureau to (1) revise the ACS evaluation and testing plan and focus on the issues we have identified in this report; (2) provide key stakeholders, such as the National Academy of Sciences, with meaningful and timely input on decisions relating to these issues; and (3) make public the information underlying the Census Bureau’s decisions on these issues when it makes the decisions. Further delay will undercut the ability of the ACS to provide, by 2010, small-area data of the type traditionally collected on the census long-form sample and will jeopardize 2010 planning, which currently assumes a short-form-only census.” “the Bureau should also study the effects of imputation on the distributions of characteristics and the relationships among them and conduct research on improved imputation methods for use in the American Community Survey (or the 2010 census if it includes a long-form sample).” “publish distributions of characteristics and item imputation rates, for the 2010 census and the American Community Survey (when it includes group quarters residents), that distinguish household residents from the group quarters population (at least the institutionalized component). Each question provided information required by statute. These comparisons will have about the same reliability as changes between two censuses using data collected in the Census long form.” “encourage analysts to use the same length of cumulation when comparing areas of different sizes . . . . For example, we would use one year for comparing states, but would recommend 5 years for all the counties in a table comparing large and small counties.”
Alexander noted that this approach differed from that of Kish, the developer of the concept of a “rolling sample,” who would “let us use tables of counties with one-year estimates for large counties, 3-year averages for medium-sized ones, and 5-year averages for small ones.” He concluded this section of the paper by saying, “It will be interesting to see what practices data users will adopt in this regard.” “If there is little change in the population over the time covered by the average, the interpretation is about the same as that of a point-in-time estimate with the advantage that the ACS estimate is more current than the historical decennial census long-form estimate.”
The paper provided examples with “naive” assumptions about how users extrapolate between censuses to show that multiyear averages “work.” By implication, under other conditions, users will need guidance on when multiyear averages can be used. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress asked GAO to review operational and programmatic aspects of the Census Bureau's ACS that will affect the reliability of small geographic area data. The ACS will be a mail survey of about 3 million households annually, whose results will be cumulated over 5 years to produce estimates that will replace information previously provided by the Decennial Census long form. In addition, annual data will be published for geographic areas with 65,000+ populations and as 3-year averages for areas with populations of 20,000 to 65,000. Annual data will be published beginning in 2006 with data for 2005. The 5-year averages for 2008-12 will provide data for small geographic areas.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau's development of the American Community Survey goes back several decades and has included intensive research and field testing programs, as well as substantial outreach efforts, in particular through the reports and workshops at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). However, if the ACS is to be an adequate replacement for the Decennial Census long form as the major source of data on small geographic areas and if it is to provide similar annual data for larger areas, the Census Bureau will need to incorporate in a timely manner the resolution of issues it has already identified in the ACS testing and 2000 Decennial Census evaluation programs, such as the residence concept, group quarters, and questions on disability; complete the ACS testing plan as originally planned, such as the comparison and evaluation of long form-ACS supplementary survey data at the state level, to identify other unresolved issues and to provide information for users of 2000 Decennial Census long-form data that will be necessary for the transition to the full ACS; evaluate and consult with stakeholders and users on the resolution of issues identified in this report, such as the methodology for deriving population and housing controls, guidance for users on the impact of the characteristics of multiyear averages for small geographic areas, and the presentation of dollar-denominated values; coordinate the results of the testing program for the 2010 Decennial Census short form with the ACS implementation schedule; and resolve all issues so that the ACS estimates beginning with 2008 are consistent with the ACS estimates for 2009-12 and with the 2010 Census short form. Although the Census Bureau has solicited advice from external stakeholders and users and has supported research by its own staff on most of the issues identified in this report, there is no indication that the Census Bureau has yet followed this advice or implemented plans for consultation on resolving these issues. In addition, it has been more than a year since the Census Bureau announced that it was looking into establishing an ACS partnership program that would involve advisory groups and expert panels to improve the program, but no such program has been established. Another issue related to the proposed ACS is how the Census Bureau might provide more timely and reliable small geographic area data. This goal could be accomplished, but it would require additional funding. The most direct approach would be to increase the sample size for 2009-11. This increase would enable the Bureau to provide small geographic area data that would be the replacement for the 2010 Census long form 1 year earlier. |
gao_GAO-13-84 | gao_GAO-13-84_0 | Background
The United States provides military equipment and training to partner countries through a variety of programs. Agreement Development. Acquisition. DOD Reforms Address Many Challenges, but More Comprehensive Acquisition and Delivery Information Is Needed
DSCA has undertaken reforms to address challenges associated with (1) training and workforce structure, (2) defining partner country requirements, and (3) obtaining information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance agreements.addressing the first two challenges in the short term, reforms to address information system gaps are more long-term focused and are expected to take years to complete. DOD Efforts Underway Will Not Provide Comprehensive Information on Acquisition and Delivery Status until 2020
DOD officials participating in focus groups at all six combatant commands and officials at 16 of the 17 SCOs we interviewed reported difficulties obtaining information from DSCA and the implementing agencies of the military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of assistance agreements throughout the security assistance process. Security cooperation officers in three SCO reported discovering equipment at ports and airports that had arrived without advance notice. In addition to receiving reports of challenges encountered by officials using the various DOD information systems, we analyzed the extent to which data were available in the delivery tracking information system. However, we found that DOD is not ensuring that entities charged with carrying out deliveries are fully providing data for this system. Equipment deliveries for traditional security assistance programs are often executed by partner country freight forwarders. DSCA Data Indicate Improved Timeliness in the Initial Phases of the Security Assistance Process, but Provide Limited Information on Other Phases
DSCA has collected data that show improved timeliness in processing security assistance requests and developing security assistance agreements. However, assessing the timeliness of the entire security assistance process is difficult, because DSCA lacks timeliness performance measures for the other phases and for the overall process.For example, the agency does not measure the timeliness of assistance acquisition, delivery, and case closure, which usually comprise the most time-consuming activities. Aggregate DSCA data for all agreements indicate a reduction in the average, or mean, number of days for an assistance agreement to be fully developed and offered to partner countries from 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in fiscal year 2011, with a fiscal year 2009 low of 103 days (see fig. Without original estimated delivery dates and actual delivery receipt dates, DSCA cannot fully assess the timeliness of deliveries. While DOD’s reforms are addressing several challenges, existing information systems are not consistently populated with needed data. A lack of timely and accurate information for partners, combatant commands, and SCO staff on agreement and delivery status can delay assistance, impact the costs of fielding equipment and training, and may adversely affect U.S. relationships with partner countries. To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and efficiency of the security assistance process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the acquisition phase of the security assistance process; establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the delivery phase of the security assistance process; and establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the case closure phase of the security assistance process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a Senate Armed Service Committee mandate to review the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) program implementation processes, this report assesses the extent to which (1) Department of Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that security cooperation officials face in implementing assistance programs and (2) DSCA performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of security assistance. To identify challenges to the implementation of security assistance, we conducted focus groups or interviews with security cooperation officials in the six geographic combatant commands and interviewed security cooperation officers in Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) in 17 countries. Persian Gulf: U.S. Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress appropriated approximately $18.8 billion in fiscal year 2012 for various security cooperation and assistance programs that supply military equipment and training to more than 100 partner countries. Amid concerns that traditional security assistance programs were too slow, Congress established several new programs in recent years. DSCA oversees the security assistance process, with key functions in agreement development, acquisition, and equipment delivery performed by U.S. military departments. DOD has undertaken a variety of management reforms since 2010 to improve the security assistance process. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD reforms address implementation challenges faced by security cooperation officials and (2) DSCA performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of security assistance. GAO analyzed DOD data and performance measures, conducted focus groups and interviews with security cooperation officials at all six geographic combatant commands, and interviewed SCO staff for 17 countries.
What GAO Found
Security cooperation officials report three major types of challenges--training and workforce structure, defining partner country requirements, and obtaining acquisition and delivery status information--in conducting assistance programs. Ongoing Department of Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that DOD security cooperation officials reported in meeting staff training needs and achieving the optimum workforce structure. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has also initiated efforts to respond to challenges in developing assistance requests resulting from the limited expertise of partner countries and U.S. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) staff in identifying country assistance requirements and the equipment that can meet them. However, according to DOD security cooperation officials, information gaps in the acquisition and delivery phases of the security assistance process continue to hinder the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. Nearly all of GAO's focus groups and interviews reported persistent difficulties obtaining information on the status of security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. DOD's existing delivery tracking system provides only limited data on the status of equipment deliveries because partner country agents and DOD agencies are not entering the needed data into the system. Without advance notice of deliveries, SCO staff have been unable to ensure that addresses were correct and that partner countries were ready to receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased costs. DOD is developing a new information system to address information gaps, but it is not expected to be fully implemented until 2020.
DSCA data indicate that DOD has improved timeliness in the initial phases of the security assistance process, but these data provide limited information on other phases. The average number of days spent developing a security assistance agreement has improved from an average of 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in fiscal year 2011. However, assessing the timeliness of the whole security assistance process is difficult because DSCA has limited timeliness measures for later phases, which often comprise the most time-consuming activities. For example, DSCA has not established a performance measure to assess the timeliness of acquisition, which can take years. In addition, DSCA does not consistently measure delivery performance against estimated delivery dates. Without such performance measures, DSCA cannot assess historical trends or the extent to which reforms impact the timeliness of the security assistance process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish procedures to ensure that DOD agencies enter needed acquisition and delivery status data into security assistance information systems and (2) establish performance measures to assess timeliness for additional phases of the security assistance process. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-926T | gao_GAO-11-926T_0 | USPS’s Financial Crisis Has Worsened, and USPS Is Likely to Face Insolvency
As we have noted previously, USPS urgently needs to restructure its networks and operations as its financial condition and outlook have reached a crisis level. USPS has experienced a cumulative net loss of nearly $20 billion over the last 5 fiscal years, including an $8.5 billion loss in 2010; and a reported net loss of $5.7 billion in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2011. By the end of this fiscal year, USPS projects that it will incur a $9 billion loss, experience a substantial cash shortfall, reach its $15 billion borrowing limit, and not make its statutorily mandated $5.5 billion retiree health benefits payment to the federal government. USPS summarized its situation as the equivalent of facing Chapter 11 bankruptcy. USPS has said that mail volume declines and changes in the mail mix have outpaced even its most pessimistic forecasts. USPS does not now have—nor expects in the future to have—sufficient revenue to cover its costs without legislative changes. Proposals to Address USPS’s Financial Crisis
We have reviewed a variety of proposals to address USPS’s ongoing financial difficulties by reducing costs and improving operational efficiency, but the overall effects of these proposals are uncertain because many questions remain. In August 2011, USPS released two discussion drafts that outline major proposals to (1) seek legislative authority to withdraw USPS from the Federal Employee Health Benefit (FEHB) program and sponsor its own program and change pension benefits for new employees, and (2) seek legislative authority to eliminate the layoff protections it negotiated with its unions in collective bargaining to accelerate network and workforce downsizing. We also reviewed other proposals including
USPS proposals to seek reimbursement of the surplus in its Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) account and reduce costs by moving to 5-day delivery, restructuring its retail network, and reducing excess capacity in its mail processing network; pending legislation, including bills introduced in the Senate by Senators Carper and Collins and in the House of Representatives by Representatives Issa and Lynch; the President’s Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request; our recent work, including our April 2010 report on USPS’s business model which (1) concluded that this model is broken and that USPS needs to take more aggressive action to better align costs with revenues and (2) discussed a series of options that included restructuring USPS’s retiree health prefunding payments, adjusting its workforce mix to more part-time staff, closing unneeded retail and mail processing facilities, and moving to 5-day delivery; and, reports by the U.S. Proposals Related to Reducing Benefit Costs
The key considerations of the USPS benefit-related proposals include the financial impact on USPS, its employees, future hires, retirees, the federal budget, and benefit programs and USPS’s ability to administer its own program. How would such a change impact USPS health benefit contribution rates and costs? What would be the impact of this proposal on collective bargaining? To conserve cash immediately, however, in June 2011, USPS discontinued making its employer contribution payments for the defined benefit portion of FERS. USPS estimated this would reduce its costs by about $800 million in the current fiscal year but would not impact current or future postal retirees. Is additional clarification needed to determine whether USPS’s pension proposal for new employees is comparable to the private sector? Budgetary – What would be the impact on the federal budget of transferring the $6.9 billion FERS surplus to USPS? Thus, through legislation, FERS benefits for USPS employees could potentially be modified. In order to meet its 2015 goal, USPS has asked for legislation to eliminate the layoff provisions it has negotiated with its unions in collective bargaining so that it can accelerate reducing its workforce by an additional 125,000 career positions. USPS has proposed initiatives to remove more than $11 billion in costs from its networks and workforce. These proposals require making trade-offs among USPS cost savings, customer convenience and costs, employee agreements, and expectations related to the level of services USPS can afford to provide. The stark reality is that USPS’s business model is broken. The decline in mail volumes is continuing. The gap between revenues and expenses is growing. USPS cannot continue providing services at current levels without dramatic changes in its cost structure. Difficult choices must be made. Now is the time to decide USPS’s future. | Why GAO Did This Study
By the end of this fiscal year--in less than one month--the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) projects that it will incur a $9 billion loss; reach its $15 billion borrowing limit; not make its $5.5 billion retiree health benefits payment; and thus, become insolvent. USPS recently summarized this situation as the equivalent of facing Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In August 2011, USPS outlined new proposals to address the crisis. USPS seeks legislation to remove itself from the federal health benefit program and sponsor its own program; change pension benefits for new employees; and eliminate the layoff provisions it negotiated with its unions in collective bargaining to accelerate its delivery, processing, and retail network and workforce downsizing. Other USPS proposals, such as moving to 5-day delivery, and pending legislation include additional options for consideration. This statement discusses (1) updated information on USPS's financial crisis and (2) GAO's review and analysis of proposals to address this crisis, including USPS's new proposals, and options in current legislation. The testimony is based primarily on GAO's review of pending legislation, past and ongoing work related to postal issues, as well as USPS's recent financial results and GAO's discussions with senior postal officials regarding USPS's recent proposals. GAO has reported that action by Congress and USPS is urgently needed to restore USPS's financial viability. GAO provided a draft statement to USPS for comments and did not receive any suggested changes.
What GAO Found
USPS has experienced a cumulative net loss of nearly $20 billion over the last 5 fiscal years, including an $8.5 billion loss in 2010, and a net loss of $5.7 billion in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2011. USPS does not now have--nor does it expect to have--sufficient revenue to cover its costs without legislative changes. To conserve cash, USPS discontinued making its employer's contribution for the defined-benefit portion of the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) in June 2011, which it estimated would reduce its costs by about $800 million this fiscal year. USPS has said that mail volume decline has outpaced even its most pessimistic forecasts. USPS urgently needs to restructure its networks and workforce as its financial condition and outlook have reached a crisis level. A variety of proposals have been made to address USPS's financial crisis. These proposals affect USPS cost savings, postal rates, customer convenience, pension benefits for new employees, employee health benefits, collective bargaining agreements, and delivery and retail services. GAO has identified key issues needing consideration in determining the merits of these proposals. Examples of specific proposals and key considerations include: (1) USPS proposal to sponsor its own health benefit plan: USPS expects to save costs by increasing employee contribution rates, fully utilizing Medicare benefits, and administering its plan more efficiently than OPM. However, it is not clear whether USPS can achieve planned cost savings and what the implications are for the federal budget, as USPS has requested about $42 billion in retiree health benefit assets be transferred from Treasury to a USPS Fund. (2) USPS proposal to seek reimbursement of its $6.9 billion FERS surplus: Reimbursing the entire surplus all at once is a risk as the current FERS surplus is an estimate that could change as economic or demographic assumptions change. The President's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request proposed amortizing the reimbursement over 30 years, which would be consistent with the approach taken for any deficits. (3) USPS proposal on workforce optimization: USPS expects to reduce costs by closing about 300 mail processing plants and 12,000 retail facilities; reducing service; and eliminating layoff protections in collective bargaining agreements so that it can reduce its total workforce by about 125,000 career employees by 2015. This proposal accelerates the pace of USPS actions in this area, but it is not clear how USPS will address public resistance to facility closures that could lengthen the timeframes for implementation; employee resistance to making legislative changes to layoff protections; and potential loss of customers if service declines or costs increase. Little time remains to prevent USPS---the largest federal civilian employer---from insolvency. The stark reality is that USPS's business model is broken. The decline in mail volumes is continuing. The gap between revenues and expenses is growing. USPS cannot continue providing services at current levels without dramatic changes in its cost structure. Difficult choices must be made. Now is the time to decide USPS's future. |
gao_GAO-04-730T | gao_GAO-04-730T_0 | From 1997 to 2002, the Oil for Food program was responsible for more than $67 billion of Iraq's oil revenue. Despite concerns that sanctions may have worsened the humanitarian situation, the Oil for Food program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. Former Iraqi Regime Acquired an Estimated $10.1 Billion in Illicit Revenue
We estimate that, from 1997 through 2002, the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues—$5.7 billion through oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion through surcharges against oil sales and illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. We updated our estimate to include (1) oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, (2) updated letters of credit from prior years, and (3) newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. United Nations and Security Council Had Responsibility for Oversight of Program, but Iraq Contracted Directly with Purchasers and Suppliers
Both OIP, as an office within the U.N. Secretariat, and the Security Council’s sanctions committee were responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food Program. While OIP was to examine each contract for price and value, it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee responded to illegal surcharges on oil purchases, but it is unclear what actions it took to respond to commissions on commodity contracts. Iraqi control over contract negotiations was an important factor in allowing Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. OIP hired a private firm to monitor Iraqi oil sales at exit points. The reports stated that OIP was generally responsive to external audit recommendations. U.N. external audit reports contained no findings of fraud during the program. The Sanctions Committee Had a Key Role in Enforcing Sanctions and Approving Contracts
The sanctions committee was responsible for three key elements of the Oil for Food Program: (1) monitoring implementation of the sanctions, (2) screening contracts to prevent the purchase of items that could have military uses, and (3) approving Iraq’s oil and commodity contracts. Challenges Facing the CPA and Interim Iraqi Government in Administering Oil for Food Contracts
In November 2003, the United Nations transferred to the CPA responsibility for 3,059 Oil for Food contracts totaling about $6.2 billion; the remaining 2,199 contracts were not continued for a variety of reasons. A lack of coordination and communication about contract documentation and inadequate staffing affected the transfer process and hampered the ability of the CPA’s Oil for Food coordination center to ensure commodity deliveries continued without disruption. Evolving policy and implementation decisions on the food distribution system, coordination, and the security situation affected the execution of food contracts. In addition, inadequate oversight and alleged corruption in the Oil for Food program raise concerns about the Iraqi government’s ability to manage the remaining contracts and absorb donor reconstruction funds. The CPA has taken steps, such as appointing inspectors general, to strengthen accountability measures in Iraq’s ministries. Addressing Corruption
The history of inadequate oversight and alleged corruption in the Oil for Food program raises questions about the Iraqi government’s ability to manage the import and distribution of Oil for Food commodities and the billions in international assistance expected to flow into the country. Potential Issues for Further Investigation
Several investigations into the Oil for Food program are planned or under way. In addition, U.N. specialized agencies implemented the program in the northern governates while the program in central and southern Iraq was run by the central government in Baghdad. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
We used the following methodology to estimate the former Iraqi regime’s illicit revenues from oil smuggling, surcharges on oil, and commissions from commodity contracts from 1997 through 2002:
To estimate the amount of oil the Iraqi regime smuggled, we used Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates of Iraqi oil production and subtracted oil sold under the Oil for Food program and domestic consumption. However, the average surcharge could be lower. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Oil for Food program was established by the United Nations and Iraq in 1996 to address concerns about the humanitarian situation after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program allowed the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance. The program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. From 1996 through 2001, the average daily food intake increased from 1,300 to 2,300 calories. From 1997 to 2002, Iraq sold more than $67 billion of oil through the program and issued $38 billion in letters of credit to purchase commodities. However, over the years numerous allegations have surfaced concerning potential fraud and program mismanagement. GAO (1) reports on its estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of U.N. sanctions, (2) provides observations on program administration; (3) describes the challenges facing the CPA and the Iraqi government in administering remaining contracts, and (4) discusses potential issues for further investigation.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that from 1997 to 2002, the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues, including $5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion through surcharges on oil sales and illicit commissions from suppliers exporting goods to Iraq through the Oil for Food program. This estimate includes oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, updated letters of credit from prior years, and newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. The U.N. Secretary General, through the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) and the Security Council, through its Iraq sanctions committee, were both responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food Program. However, the Security Council allowed the Iraq government, as a sovereign entity, to negotiate contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities. This structure was an important factor in allowing Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. OIP was responsible for examining Iraqi contracts for price and value, but it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee was responsible for monitoring oil smuggling, screening contracts for items that could have military uses, and approving oil and commodity contracts. The sanctions committee took action to stop illegal oil surcharges, but it is unclear what actions it took on contract commissions. U.N. external audit reports contained no findings of program fraud. Summaries of internal audit reports pointed to some concerns regarding procurement, coordination, monitoring, and oversight and concluded that OIP had generally responded to audit recommendations. OIP transferred responsibility for 3,059 Oil for Food contracts--with pending shipments valued at $6.2 billion--to the CPA on November 22, 2003. Poor communication and coordination on contracting documents and inadequate staffing hampered efforts by the CPA's Oil for Food coordination center in Baghdad to ensure that commodities continued to be delivered. The execution of food contracts was also affected by evolving decisions about food distribution, inadequate coordination, and security issues. Challenges face the interim Iraqi government as it balances the need to reform a costly food subsidy program with the need to maintain food stability and protect the poorest populations. Also, inadequate oversight and alleged corruption in the program raise concerns about the Iraqi government's ability to manage the remaining Oil for Food commodities, continue the food distribution system, and absorb $32 billion in expected donor funds for reconstruction. The CPA has taken steps to build internal controls and accountability measures in Iraq's ministries. Several investigations of the Oil for Food program will soon be under way. These efforts may wish to consider several areas for further analysis to better determine the extent of corruption in the program, the adequacy of internal controls, and the lessons learned in implementing a large-scale humanitarian aid program within a sanctions framework. |
gao_GAO-04-299 | gao_GAO-04-299_0 | To adopt the elements of the management and accountability framework—strategic planning, organizational alignment, communications, performance measurement, and strategic human capital management—and build on efforts under way at AOC, we recommended that the Architect of the Capitol improve strategic planning and organizational alignment by involving key congressional and other external stakeholders in AOC’s strategic planning efforts and in any organizational changes that may result from these efforts; strengthen accountability for results by developing annual goals, measuring performance, and strategically managing human capital to support achieving those goals and measures, such as creating a line of sight by linking AOC’s senior executive and employee performance management system; and develop a comprehensive strategy to improve internal and external communications by completing the development of congressional protocols with stakeholder involvement and continuing to regularly measure customer satisfaction AOC-wide, among other strategies, such as providing opportunities for employee feedback. AOC is taking the first steps towards improving its management infrastructure and internal control, though in some cases, additional steps need to be taken to fully address the findings of our January 2003 report. However, while AOC has established three action plans to address our recommendation and begun efforts to implement them, none of the individual action items associated with the three action plans has been completed, and many are not scheduled for completion until fiscal years 2006 and 2007. While AOC has made progress since our January 2003 report, much work remains to address unplanned action items and complete ongoing planning and implementation efforts. In response, AOC is developing a new IT portfolio management process, referred to as its investment framework, which it plans to implement in fiscal year 2004. In building on this foundation, AOC needs to take additional steps to help it execute the more mature investment management processes provided for in our investment management guide. Moreover, AOC is taking steps to develop and use an EA. Specifically, we recommended that the Architect of the Capitol improve the overall approach to worker safety in identifying performance measures, clearly defining policies and procedures for reporting hazards, establishing a consistent system for conducting investigations and followup, establishing a safety training curriculum, assigning clear responsibility for tracking worker safety employee training, clarifying the role of the Office of the Attending Physician (OAP) in helping AOC to meet its safety goals, and establishing a senior management work group to routinely discuss worker compensation issues; improve its overall approach to project management by developing a Capitol Hill complex master plan and completing building condition assessments, developing a transparent process to prioritize agency capital projects, developing tools to effectively communicate priorities and progress of projects, clearly defining project-management-related measures, and aligning project management staff and resources with mission-critical goals; and improve its overall approach to its recycling program by developing a clear mission and goals, developing a performance measurement system to support accomplishing its recycling program, and examining the roles, responsibilities, and accountability of its recycling program staff. AOC is making progress in addressing long-standing areas of concern, though much remains to be done. For example, to address our concern regarding the lack of clearly defined and documented policies and procedures for reporting hazards, AOC has plans to develop a Hazard Assessment and Control policy, but it is not expected to be fully implemented across all jurisdictions until May 2006. AOC has also made some progress toward adopting a more strategic approach to its recycling program. For example, consistent with our recommendations, AOC is taking steps to clarify the mission of the recycling program and establish program goals as part of its environmental program plan. Moreover, greater effort will have to be made if more timely improvements are to occur. As AOC works to establish its strategic management and accountability framework, improve its management infrastructure, and address long- standing areas of concern, it must continue to demonstrate that progress is being made on each of our recommendations to help it sustain the momentum needed to accomplish its organizational transformation, particularly in improving communications with employees and stakeholders and improving its management of information technology. It has developed and begun to implement three broad-based action plans that are intended to accomplish AOC’s goal of institutionalizing financial management best practices that support the effective delivery of programs and services. GAO Analysis: AOC is making progress in addressing our recommendation. Until AOC completes the implementation of this policy and subsequent analysis across all jurisdictions, it will not be able to develop a comprehensive picture of AOC hazards. AOC expects this system to be operational by fiscal year 2005. 35. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) plays an important role in supporting the effective functioning of Congress and its neighboring institutions. In January 2003, GAO conducted a comprehensive management review of AOC's operations and made 35 recommendations to help AOC establish a strategic management and accountability framework, improve its management infrastructure and internal control, and address longstanding concerns. In February 2003, the Conference Report mandated GAO to monitor progress being made on the implementation of the 35 management review recommendations.
What GAO Found
As discussed in GAO's January 2003 report, many of AOC's management problems were long-standing and its organizational transformation would take time to fully accomplish. Not surprisingly, AOC's efforts in addressing these initial management review recommendations is very much a work in progress. Initial steps are being taken, but a great deal more needs to be done. Moreover, greater effort will have to be made if more timely improvements are to occur. Sustained commitment and assertive involvement of AOC's leadership is key to addressing AOC's long-standing weaknesses and instilling lasting change. AOC is taking the first steps in the development of its management and accountability framework, such as improving planning and organizational alignment through its draft strategic plan. AOC is also strengthening individual accountability for organizational goals through its senior executive performance management systems, but more progress can be made by aligning its employee performance management system with mission-critical goals. AOC needs to take additional steps to strengthen agencywide communications by providing opportunities to gather employee feedback sooner than fiscal year 2005 and by conducting a pilot of its congressional protocols. AOC is making some progress in improving its management infrastructure and internal control. AOC is addressing initial concerns about the lack of consistent human capital policies and procedures. Also, AOC has developed three broad-based action plans to achieve its strategy of institutionalizing financial management best practices. However, while efforts on individual action items associated with the three action plans have begun, many are not scheduled for completion until fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Much work remains to address unplanned action items and complete ongoing efforts in improving financial management. AOC is developing a new IT portfolio management process or investment framework, which it plans to implement in fiscal year 2004 and is also taking steps to develop and use EA. However, while AOC is generally implementing the kind of IT management reforms recommended, GAO makes additional recommendations to ensure that mature investment management and EA processes are developed and implemented. Finally, AOC is addressing GAO's concern about worker safety by developing a hazard assessment and control policy, but this policy is not expected to be fully implemented in all jurisdictions until May 2006. Until AOC completes this policy implementation and its subsequent analysis in all jurisdictions, it will not be able to develop a comprehensive picture of AOC hazards. AOC is also taking steps to establish a project priority framework for better project management and accountability. Also, AOC has made some progress toward adopting a more strategic approach to recycling taking steps to clarify the mission of the program and establishing goals as part of its environmental program plan. |
gao_GAO-07-543T | gao_GAO-07-543T_0 | We have requested supplemental fiscal year 2007 funds of $374,000 to support this effort. Performance, Results, and Plans
We anticipate that the funds requested for fiscal year 2008 will support efforts similar to those just completed in fiscal year 2006. The following tables provide summary information on GAO’s fiscal year 2006 performance and the results achieved in support of the Congress and the American people. GAO’s Fiscal Year 2008 Request to Support the Congress
Our fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks the resources necessary to allow GAO to rebuild and enhance its workforce, knowledge capacity, employee programs, and infrastructure. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request includes funds to regain the momentum needed to achieve these goals. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request will allow GAO to address supply and demand imbalances in responding to congressional requests for studies in areas such as health care, homeland security, the global “war on terrorism,” energy and natural resources, and forensic auditing; address our increasing bid protest workload; be more competitive in the labor markets where GAO competes for talent; address critical human capital components, such as knowledge capacity building, succession planning, and staff skills and competencies; enhance employee recruitment, retention, and development programs; restore program funding levels and regain our purchasing power; undertake critical initiatives necessary to continuously re-engineer processes geared to increasing our productivity and effectiveness and addressing identified management challenges; and pursue critical structural and infrastructure maintenance and improvements. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request represents an increase of $41.7 million (or 8.5 percent) over our fiscal year 2007 funding level and includes about $523 million in direct appropriations and authority to use about $7.5 million in offsetting collections as illustrated in table 5. This request reflects a reduction of nearly $5.4 million in nonrecurring fiscal year 2007 costs used to offset the fiscal year 2008 increase. Rebuilding our capacity. Our fiscal year 2007 budget request sought funds to support an increase of 50 FTEs from 3,217 to 3,267. We have also seen an increase in the number of bid protest filings. Legislative authority. We are grateful for the Congress’s continued support of our mutual effort to improve government and for providing the resources that allow us to be a world- class professional services organization. At this time, I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have. Appendix I: Serving the Congress—GAO’s Strategic Plan Framework
GAO exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony is given in support of the fiscal year 2008 budget request for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) before the House Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Committee on Appropriations. The requested funding will help us continue our support of the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and will help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO is especially appreciative of the Subcommittee's efforts to help us avoid a furlough of our staff during fiscal year 2007. Had we not received additional funds this year and not taken other cost minimization actions, GAO would have likely been forced to furlough most staff for up to 5 days without pay. At the same time, due to funding shortfalls, we were not able to make pay adjustments retroactive to January 7, 2007. Our testimony today focuses on key efforts that GAO has undertaken to support the Congress, our fiscal year 2006 performance results, our budget request for fiscal year 2008 to support the Congress and serve the American people, and proposed legislative changes.
What GAO Found
Our fiscal year 2008 budget request is designed to restore GAO's funding to more reasonable operating levels. Specifically, we are requesting fiscal year 2008 budget authority of $530 million, an 8.5 percent increase over our fiscal year 2007 funding level. The additional funds provided in fiscal year 2007 have helped reduce our requested increase for fiscal year 2008 from 9.4 percent to 8.5 percent. This funding level also represents a reduction below the request we submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in January as a result of targeted adjustments to our planned fiscal year 2008 hiring plan. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request will allow us to achieve our performance goals to support the Congress as outlined in our strategic plan and rebuild our workforce capacity to allow us to better respond to supply and demand imbalances in responding to congressional requests. This funding will also help us address our caseload for bid protest filings, which have increased by more than 10 percent from fiscal years 2002 through 2006. Our workload for the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 suggests a continuation of this upward trend in bid protest fillings. |
gao_GAO-08-1138 | gao_GAO-08-1138_0 | In January 2007, we reported on the steps that HHS was taking to ensure the protection of personal health information exchanged within a nationwide network and on the challenges facing health information exchange organizations in protecting electronic personal health information. HHS Has Taken Steps to Address Privacy Principles and Challenges, but It Has Not Fully Implemented an Overall Privacy Approach
Since January 2007, HHS has undertaken various initiatives that are contributing to its development of an overall privacy approach, although more work remains. We recommended that this overall approach include (1) identifying milestones and the entity responsible for integrating the outcomes of its privacy-related initiatives, (2) ensuring that key privacy principles in HIPAA are fully addressed, and (3) addressing key challenges associated with the nationwide exchange of health information. In this regard, the department has fulfilled the first part of our recommendation, and it has taken important steps in addressing the two other parts. Nevertheless, these steps have fallen short of fully implementing our recommendation because they do not include a process for ensuring that all key privacy principles and challenges will be fully and adequately addressed. The Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel continued work to “harmonize” standards directly related to several key privacy principles, primarily the security principle. Beyond the initiatives previously discussed, in June 2008, the Secretary released a federal health IT strategic plan that includes a privacy and security objective for each of its strategic goals, along with strategies and target dates for achieving the objectives. For example, the officials stated that the purpose of the American Health Information Community’s use cases is to provide guidance and establish requirements for privacy protections that are intended to be implemented throughout the department’s health IT initiatives (including standards harmonization, electronic health records certification, and the nationwide health information network). Further, stakeholders may lack the overall policies and guidance needed to assist them in their efforts to ensure that privacy protection measures are consistently built into health IT programs and applications. As a result, the department may miss an opportunity to establish the high degree of public confidence and trust needed to help ensure the success of a nationwide health information network. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that key privacy principles and challenges are fully and adequately addressed, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the National Coordinator for Health IT to include in the department’s overall privacy approach a process for assessing and prioritizing its many privacy-related initiatives and the needs of stakeholders. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services define and implement an overall approach for protecting health information that would (1) identify milestones and the entity responsible for integrating the outcomes of its privacy-related initiatives, (2) ensure that key privacy principles in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) are fully addressed, and (3) address key challenges associated with the nationwide exchange of health information. To determine the status of HHS’s efforts to develop an overall privacy approach, we analyzed the department’s federal health IT strategic plan and documents related to its planned confidentiality, privacy, and security framework. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although advances in information technology (IT) can improve the quality and other aspects of health care, the electronic storage and exchange of personal health information introduces risks to the privacy of that information. In January 2007, GAO reported on the status of efforts by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure the privacy of personal health information exchanged within a nationwide health information network. GAO recommended that HHS define and implement an overall privacy approach for protecting that information. For this report, GAO was asked to provide an update on HHS's efforts to address the January 2007 recommendation. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant HHS documents that described the department's privacy-related health IT activities.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's January 2007 report on protecting the privacy of electronic personal health information, the department has taken steps to address the recommendation that it develop an overall privacy approach that included (1) identifying milestones and assigning responsibility for integrating the outcomes of its privacy-related initiatives, (2) ensuring that key privacy principles are fully addressed, and (3) addressing key challenges associated with the nationwide exchange of health information. In this regard, the department has fulfilled the first part of GAO's recommendation, and it has taken important steps in addressing the two other parts. The HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT has continued to develop and implement health IT initiatives related to nationwide health information exchange. These initiatives include activities that are intended to address key privacy principles and challenges. For example: (1) The Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel defined standards for implementing security features in systems that process personal health information. (2) The Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology defined certification criteria that include privacy protections for both outpatient and inpatient electronic health records. (3) Initiatives aimed at the state level have convened stakeholders to identify and propose solutions for addressing challenges faced by health information exchange organizations in protecting the privacy of electronic health information. In addition, the office has identified milestones and the entity responsible for integrating the outcomes of its privacy-related initiatives, as recommended. Further, the Secretary released a federal health IT strategic plan in June 2008 that includes privacy and security objectives along with strategies and target dates for achieving them. Nevertheless, while these steps contribute to an overall privacy approach, they have fallen short of fully implementing GAO's recommendation. In particular, HHS's privacy approach does not include a defined process for assessing and prioritizing the many privacy-related initiatives to ensure that key privacy principles and challenges will be fully and adequately addressed. As a result, stakeholders may lack the overall policies and guidance needed to assist them in their efforts to ensure that privacy protection measures are consistently built into health IT programs and applications. Moreover, the department may miss an opportunity to establish the high degree of public confidence and trust needed to help ensure the success of a nationwide health information network. |
gao_T-RCED-99-120 | gao_T-RCED-99-120_0 | Prior Difficulties in Comparing Budget Justifications
In 1998, we reported that difficulties in comparing EPA’s fiscal year 1999 and 1998 budget justifications arose because the 1999 budget justification was organized according to the agency’s strategic goals and objectives, whereas the 1998 justification was organized according to EPA’s program offices and components. In its fiscal year 1999 budget justification, EPA did not show how the funds requested for each goal and objective would be allocated among its program offices or components. To be able to compare EPA’s requested fiscal year 1999 funds for Science and Technology to the previous fiscal year’s enacted funds, EPA would have had to maintain financial records in two different formats—by program components and by strategic goals and objectives—and to develop crosswalks to link information between the two. Guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not require agencies to develop or provide crosswalks in their justifications when a budget format changes. With these two formats of financial data, the Office of Research and Development could readily crosswalk, or provide links, to help compare the 1998 enacted funds, organized by program components, to the fiscal year 1999 budget justification, organized according to EPA’s strategic goals and objectives. Therefore, because the radiation program could not be readily identified in the fiscal year 1999 budget justification, congressional decisionmakers could not easily compare funds for it with the amount that had been enacted for fiscal year 1998. EPA’s Changes Improved the Clarity of the Budget Justification, but Additional Information Is Needed
For fiscal year 2000, EPA made several changes to improve the clarity of its budget justification. According to EPA officials, they planned to provide tables for each goal and objective to show the amounts of funds requested for key programs, starting with the agency’s fiscal year 2000 budget justification. However, they intended to make available backup information to show the program offices that would be administering the requested funds. However, for the objectives that rely on Science and Technology funds, EPA made several changes without explanations or documentation to link the changes to the fiscal year 1999 budget justification. EPA (1) acknowledged that funds from one objective were allocated to several other objectives but did not identify the objectives or amounts, (2) did not identify funds in Science and Technology amounts that were transferred from Hazardous Substances Superfund, and (3) made other changes to the number or wording of objectives that rely on Science and Technology funds. Therefore, a clear comparison of 1999 and 2000 budget justifications cannot be made. The amounts for Science and Technology as shown in the budget justification for the objective are shown in table 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) budget justification for its Science and Technology account, and changes among the justifications for fiscal years (FY) 1998, 1999, and 2000, focusing on: (1) difficulties experienced in comparing EPA's Science and Technology budget justification for FY 1999 with those of previous years; and (2) actions that EPA planned and implemented in order to improve the clarity and comparability of the FY 2000 justification, and items that need further clarification.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA's budget justification for FY 1999 could not be readily compared to amounts requested or enacted for FY 1998 and prior years because the justification did not show how the budget would be distributed among program offices or program components--information needed to link to the prior years' justifications; (2) the Office of Management and Budget does not require EPA to provide information to compare the justifications when the format changes; (3) to facilitate such comparisons, agency officials provided supplemental information to congressional committees; (4) because EPA did not maintain financial records by both program components and strategic goals and objectives for all enacted Science and Technology funds for FY 1998, it could not readily provide information for all amounts; (5) at GAO's request, EPA estimated the 1998 enacted amounts so that the 1998 budget could be compared with the FY 1999 request; (6) EPA implemented several changes to its FY 2000 justification to solve problems experienced in comparing the 1998 and 1999 budget justifications; (7) to improve the clarity of its budget justification for FY 2000, EPA included tables that detail, for each objective, how requested amounts are allocated among key programs; (8) backup information is also available that shows the program offices that will be administering the requested funds; (9) the agency also implemented a new accounting system that records budget data by goals and objectives, which enhances reporting financial data by goals and objectives; (10) while the budget justification followed the basic format reflecting the agency's strategic goals and objectives, EPA made changes to the objectives without explanations or documentation to link the changes to the FY 1999 budget justification; (11) for example, funds were allocated from one objective to other objectives without identifying the objectives or amounts, funds that included money transferred from another account were shown as Science and Technology funds, and changes were made to the number or wording of objectives without explanations; and (12) as a result, the FY 2000 budget justification cannot be completely compared with the FY 1999 justification without supplemental information. |
gao_GAO-16-235 | gao_GAO-16-235_0 | Figure 1 outlines the areas of effort under which these activities fall. As discussed below, these activities were selected based, in part, on the needs of each country. Some of these activities relate directly to firearms trafficking, such as ATF firearms identification training, while others broadly support antitrafficking or border security efforts that include efforts to stem the trafficking of firearms as one of many goals. These training courses covered a number of topics related to firearms and explosives and included 10 firearms identification courses. 2). PPD 23 asserts that U.S. agencies should consider several key factors in planning security sector assistance, including partner country needs, absorptive capacity, sustainability, and other donor and other U.S. efforts. Agencies and Implementers Achieved Many of Their Goals for Counter-Firearms Trafficking Activities We Reviewed, but Efforts to Track and Report on Progress Are Inconsistent
Agencies Established Performance Measures and Targets for Most but Not All Key Counter- Firearms Trafficking Activities We Reviewed
U.S. agencies and other implementers established performance measures and targets for five of eight key activities we reviewed that assist in building capacity to combat firearms trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, managers should compare actual performance against planned or expected results and analyze significant differences. Two Ongoing Activities Are Meeting Their Goals, and Three Completed Activities Met or Partially Met Their Goals, According to Agency and Implementer Reports
As of the second quarter of fiscal year 2015, agency reports show that implementing agencies and organizations of the five activities that established performance targets had met or partially met their targets for all measures. In other cases, quarterly reports we reviewed did not identify challenges or plans for addressing them. The United States has worked well with partner countries to implement a variety of capacity-building activities focused on partner country needs. U.S. agencies have established performance metrics and targets for most of the eight key counter-firearms trafficking efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico that we reviewed, but ATF has not set targets by which it can measure progress for its activities to provide firearms training and support the use of eTrace. According to State’s and implementers’ reports, other U.S. agencies funded by State have made progress toward key activities to counter firearms trafficking, but they have not consistently reported on key challenges to meeting their goals or on the strategies they intended to use to address these challenges. Without this information, implementers may not fully meet their goals. Additionally, without this information, State, as the primary funder of these activities, is limited in its ability to ensure that it is able to maximize the use of U.S. resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend the following two actions to enhance U.S. agencies’ performance monitoring of counter-firearms trafficking activities:
The Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives should establish and document performance targets for the bureau’s key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as appropriate. The Secretary of State should work with other U.S. agencies and implementers to help ensure that quarterly progress reports identify key challenges and plans to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examined (1) the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico and the extent to which they considered key factors in selecting the activities and (2) the progress the United States has made in building partner capacity in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to combat firearms trafficking. To determine whether agencies considered these factors, we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Trafficking of illicit materials, including firearms, is widespread across Mexico's more than 700-mile southern border with Guatemala and Belize. Such trafficking presents a challenge for law enforcement in all three countries and for U.S. security interests. State and other U.S. agencies, such as ATF, have provided support to build the capacity of their counterparts in these three countries to address problems related to firearms trafficking. GAO was asked to review U.S. support to the governments of Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to stem firearms trafficking across their shared border. This report examines, for these three countries, (1) the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking and the extent to which they considered key factors in selecting the activities and (2) progress the United States has made in building such capacity. GAO analyzed program documentation and conducted interviews with U.S., Belizean, Guatemalan, and Mexican officials. To examine progress, GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight key activities based on a number of factors, including whether the activity addressed firearms trafficking.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies and their implementing partners have undertaken a number of capacity-building activities that support counter-firearms trafficking efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. The figure below outlines examples of the areas of effort under which these activities fall. Selected, in part, based on partner country needs, these activities include efforts to provide support in using the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) web-based firearms tracing system (eTrace) and providing forensics training, including on ballistics. Some of these activities, such as firearms identification training, relate directly to firearms trafficking, while others broadly support antitrafficking or border security efforts for which stemming the trafficking of firearms is one of many goals. Presidential Policy Directive 23 highlights key factors, including partner country needs, absorptive capacity, sustainability, and other U.S. and other donor efforts, as important in planning security sector assistance. Agencies considered these factors in determining what activities to fund.
U.S. agencies and implementing partners have achieved many of their goals for eight key counter-firearms trafficking activities GAO reviewed, but could enhance their efforts to measure and report on progress. Agencies and implementers established performance measures and targets for five of these eight activities. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that managers should compare actual performance against expected results, highlighting the importance of such measures and targets. ATF tracks its activities but has not established performance targets for them, without which it is difficult to measure the success of its efforts. Two of the five activities GAO reviewed that established metrics and targets are ongoing and are meeting their goals, while three other activities were completed and met or partially met their goals, according to Department of State (State) and implementer reports. For activities it funds, State requires implementers to include a discussion of key challenges and strategies to address those challenges in quarterly reports. However, implementers' reports for activities GAO reviewed were inconsistent and did not always identify challenges or strategies for addressing them. Without this information, agencies risk not fully meeting their goals and may be unable to maximize the use of U.S. resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) ATF establish and document performance targets for its key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as appropriate, and (2) State work with other U.S. agencies and implementers to help ensure that progress reports identify key challenges and plans to address them. ATF and State agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-442 | gao_GAO-12-442_0 | DOD Conducts Biometrics Training, but Its Training for Leaders Does Not Fully Support Warfighter Use of Biometrics
DOD has trained thousands of personnel on the collection and transmission of biometrics data since 2004; however, training for leaders does not fully support warfighter use of biometrics because it does not instruct unit commanders and other military leaders on (1) the effective use of biometrics, (2) selecting the appropriate personnel for biometrics collection training, and (3) tracking personnel who have been trained in biometrics collection to effectively staff biometrics operations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and Central Command each has emphasized in key documents the importance of training. Biometrics Training for Leaders Does Not Provide Detailed Instruction on the Effective Use and Management of Biometrics
DOD’s draft instruction for biometrics emphasizes the importance of training leaders in the effective employment of biometrics. Moreover, existing biometrics training for leaders limits the ability of military personnel to collect higher quality biometrics enrollments to better confirm the identity of enemy combatants through biometrics. Biometrics Collections Occur across Afghanistan, but Several Factors during the Transmission Process Limit the Effectiveness of Biometrics Data
Since 2004, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have collected biometrics from more than 1.2 million individuals with approximately 3,000 successful matches to enemy combatants, but factors during the transmission process limit biometrics’ timely identification of enemy combatants using biometrics. Although DOD officials said they are aware of this and other synchronization issues, the absence of clearly defined responsibility during the biometrics data transmission process has contributed, in part, to DOD’s inability to expeditiously correct data transmission issues as they arise, such as instances in which biometrics data collected in Afghanistan have been separated from their identities. However, DOD is unclear on how the number of servers correlates to transmission timeliness. Biometrics Lessons Learned Are Collected, but Not Disseminated across DOD
Lessons learned from U.S. forces’ experiences with biometrics in Afghanistan are collected by and used within each of the military services and Special Operations Command, but those lessons are not disseminated across DOD. Army and Marine Corps guidance both emphasize using lessons learned to sustain, enhance, and increase preparedness to conduct current and future operations. Currently, DOD has no requirement to disseminate biometrics lessons learned across the department. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following seven actions: To better ensure that training supports warfighter use of biometrics, direct the military services and Special Operations Command to expand biometrics training for leaders to include the effective use of biometrics in combat operations, the importance of selecting appropriate candidates for training, and the importance of tracking who has completed biometrics training prior to deployment to help ensure appropriate assignments of biometrics collection responsibilities. To better ensure the completeness and accuracy of transmitted biometrics data, direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and in coordination with the military services, Special Operations Command, and Central Command, to identify and assign responsibility for biometrics data throughout the transmission process, regardless of the pathway the data travels, to include the time period between when warfighters submit their data from the biometrics collection device until the biometrics data reach ABIS. Agency Comments
We requested comments from DOD on the draft report, but none were provided. To determine the extent to which DOD is effectively collecting and transmitting biometrics data, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed relevant Central Command issued Joint Urgent Operational Need Statements. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a process to collect and disseminate biometrics lessons learned, we analyzed relevant Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, and Marine Corps guidance and policies, and met with officials from each of these organizations to discuss current practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The collection of biometrics data, including fingerprints and iris patterns, enables U.S. counterinsurgency operations to identify enemy combatants and link individuals to events such as improvised explosive device detonations. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which (1) DOD's biometrics training supports warfighter use of biometrics, (2) DOD is effectively collecting and transmitting biometrics data, and (3) DOD has developed a process to collect and disseminate biometrics lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO focused on the Army and to a lesser extent on the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command, since the Army collected about 86 percent of the biometrics enrollments in Afghanistan. GAO visited training sites in the United States, observed biometrics collection and transmission operations at locations in Afghanistan, reviewed relevant policies and guidance, and interviewed knowledgeable officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has trained thousands of personnel on the use of biometrics since 2004, but biometrics training for leaders does not provide detailed instructions on how to effectively use and manage biometrics collection tools. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and U.S. Central Command each has emphasized in key documents the importance of training. Additionally, the Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command have trained personnel prior to deployment to Afghanistan in addition to offering training resources in Afghanistan. DODs draft instruction for biometrics emphasizes the importance of training leaders in the effective employment of biometrics collection, but existing training does not instruct military leaders on (1) the effective use of biometrics, (2) selecting the appropriate personnel for biometrics collection training, and (3) tracking personnel who have been trained in biometrics collection to effectively staff biometrics operations. Absent this training, military personnel are limited in their ability to collect high-quality biometrics data to better confirm the identity of enemy combatants.
Several factors during the transmission process limit the use of biometrics in Afghanistan. Among them is unclear responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of biometrics data during their transmission. As a result, DOD cannot expeditiously correct data transmission issues as they arise, such as the approximately 4,000 biometrics collected from 2004 to 2008 that were separated from their associated identities. Such decoupling renders the data useless and increases the likelihood of enemy combatants going undetected within Afghanistan and across borders. Factors affecting the timely transmission of biometrics data include the biometrics architecture with multiple servers, mountainous terrain, and mission requirements in remote areas. These factors can prevent units from accessing transmission infrastructure for hours to weeks at a time. The DOD biometrics directive calls for periodic assessments, and DOD is tracking biometrics data transmission time in Afghanistan, but DOD has not determined the viability and cost-effectiveness of reducing transmission time.
Lessons learned from U.S. military forces' experiences with biometrics in Afghanistan are collected and used by each of the military services and U.S. Special Operations Command. Military services emphasize the importance of using lessons learned to sustain, enhance, and increase preparedness to conduct future operations, but no requirements exist for DOD to disseminate existing biometrics lessons learned across the department.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take several actions to: expand leadership training to improve employment of biometrics collection, help ensure the completeness and accuracy of transmitted biometrics data, determine the viability and cost-effectiveness of reducing transmission times, and assess the merits of disseminating biometrics lessons learned across DOD for the purposes of informing relevant policies and practices. GAO requested comments from DOD on the draft report, but none were provided. |
gao_GAO-01-588 | gao_GAO-01-588_0 | Conclusions
VA and DOD have made important progress, particularly this past year, in their collaborative efforts to jointly procure drugs to help control spiraling prescription drug costs. While their joint procurement efforts have been impressive, to date the departments have largely targeted generic drugs, which make up less than 10 percent of their combined expenditures. More dramatic cost reductions could be realized through procurements of high-cost brand name drugs, although in doing so, it may be more complex and time-consuming to garner the necessary clinical support and provider acceptance on therapeutic interchangeability. Nonetheless, DOD’s greatly expanded retiree drug benefit, and both departments’ developing formularies should provide added joint procurement opportunities for such drugs. Also, the departments’ have demonstrated that flexible approaches to developing joint solicitations can take into account differences in their health systems while still maximizing drug discounts. In our view, their joint activities could be further enhanced by periodically conferring with private managed care pharmacy experts and reporting to the Congress on their joint procurement activities. In the same regard, VA and DOD have also made progress in their efforts to conduct a CMOP pilot. The sooner the pilot proves feasible, the sooner DOD can begin to realize the financial and quality of care benefits associated with the transfer of its refill workload. Also, to help build on the departments’ progress with joint drug procurement and distribution activities, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs ensure that the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and VA’s Under Secretary for Health take the following actions: as part of the departments’ annual reporting to the Congress on resource sharing activities, provide information on ongoing and planned joint procurements—including the volume and expenditures relative to the departments’ top-ranking drug classes and total drug expenditures and the consequent annual cost avoidance—as well as on progress toward implementing a CMOP pilot; consider the benefits of periodically conferring with private, managed care pharmacy experts to exchange information, experiences, and lessons learned that could be relevant to the departments’ joint drug procurement activities; and work together to move ahead promptly on the CMOP pilot and develop an interagency agreement governing the pilot’s operation, including actions needed to provide added CMOP capacity should DOD decide to use the CMOPs systemwide. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have made important progress, particularly during the past year, in their efforts to jointly procure drugs to help control spiraling prescription drug costs. Although their collaborative efforts have been impressive, the two agencies have largely targeted generic drugs, which comprise less than 10 percent of their combined expenditures. More dramatic cost reductions could be achieved through procurements of high-cost brand-name drugs, although doing so can be more complex and time consuming to garner the necessary clinical support and provider acceptance on therapeutic interchangeability. Nonetheless, DOD's greatly expanded retiree drug benefit and the formularies being developed by both agencies should provide added joint procurement opportunities for such drugs. Also, VA and DOD have shown that flexible approaches to developing joint solicitations can take into account differences in their health systems while still maximizing drug discounts. In GAO's view, their joint activities could be further enhanced by periodically conferring with private managed care pharmacy experts and reporting to Congress on their joint procurement activities. Top management at DOD and VA need to stay focused on their joint procurement and distribution activities as leadership changes continue at the two agencies. VA and DOD have also made progress in their efforts to conduct a consolidated mail outpatient pharmacy pilot. The sooner the pilot proves feasible, the sooner DOD can begin to realize the financial and quality of care benefits associated with the transfer of its refill workload. |
gao_HEHS-98-8 | gao_HEHS-98-8_0 | In addition, HCFA guidance states that the HMO is allowed to direct the delivery of care. Role of Home Health Services Varies Between HMO and Fee-for-Service Providers
Contrasting financial incentives and different interpretations of the Medicare home health benefit have led to some divergence in the way home health services are used by HMO and fee-for-service providers. HMOs Emphasize Different Goals for Home Health Services
Home health agency staff described HMOs as having a somewhat different approach to home health than fee-for-service providers. To do so, they establish specific rehabilitation goals focused on a patient’s needs. In contrast, HMOs tend to focus on the specific condition that initiated the home health episode. The director for admissions at another home health agency said that there are always gray areas in the coverage guidelines and that fee-for-service providers tend to provide more services, while HMOs tend to provide fewer. In general, the Medicare HMOs we visited reported that they occasionally covered more benefits than patients are entitled to in the Medicare fee-for-service program. These differences in utilization likely stem from HMOs’ more active management of home health services and greater emphasis on rehabilitation and acute care, along with a lack of controls in the fee-for-service program and reported problems with overutilization. One study, which compared the use of home health services by frail elderly Medicare patients in HMOs and fee-for-service, found that—after adjusting for differences in demographic, physical, mental, and functional status—HMO patients were just as likely to have home health episodes as fee-for-service patients but received 71 percent fewer visits. Greater differences, especially in the use of aides, were found for patients with longer episodes of home health care. The remaining two-thirds received more visits over a longer period. The other half were medically stable but functionally impaired and used home health care, especially aide services, to meet long-term care needs. Home health agency and HCFA staff told us that it is difficult to evaluate the significance of home health care utilization differences between managed care and fee-for-service settings without comparative data on patient outcomes—information that links the care provided to the patient’s health status. HCFA has initiatives under way to collect some information on patient outcomes from home health services, but that data will not be available for some time. Still, without such data, it is difficult to determine to what extent utilization differences are appropriate or represent unnecessary services provided in fee-for-service or insufficient services provided by HMOs. While we did note some differences in the provision of home health services by HMO and fee-for-service providers, we did not collect information that would allow us to comment on the appropriateness of care offered to the two groups of patients. Scope and Methodology
To collect information on how Medicare HMOs manage home health services, we visited six Medicare HMOs, conducted phone interviews with home health agencies that contracted with these HMOs to provide home health services, and reviewed appeals from Medicare HMO enrollees who were denied home health services. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on home health services provided by Medicare health maintenance organizations (HMO), focusing on: (1) how Medicare HMOs provide and manage home health services, as compared to fee-for-service providers; and (2) what is known about the appropriateness of home health services provided to HMO enrollees, especially to vulnerable populations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since the late 1980s, when the Congress and the courts liberalized Medicare coverage of home health services, the contrasting financial incentives of HMO and fee-for-service providers have led to some divergence in the use of these services; (2) fee-for-service providers generally have responded to the increased latitude in the home health benefit by providing more patients with more services for longer periods, in some cases providing excessive services; (3) in contrast, home health agencies and HMOs tend to emphasize shorter-term recuperation and rehabilitation goals--much as fee-for-service provider did prior to the changes in coverage guidelines; (4) differences between HMO and fee-for-service providers are most apparent in the use of home health aides; (5) in the fee-for-service program, the use of home health aides to provide long-term care for patients with chronic conditions is growing, whereas the six HMOs GAO visited report that they do not provide aide services on a long-term basis; (6) typically, Medicare HMOs manage home health care much more actively than the fee-for-service program; (7) in contrast, the fee-for-service program has less effective controls for preventing unnecessary and noncovered services; (8) home health utilization differs between HMO and fee-for-service patients; (9) the greater emphasis on short-term goals and the more active management of care by HMOs likely contribute to shorter episodes of care and the use of fewer home health visits, especially by home health aides; (10) in addition, data from one managed care market suggest utilization differences are more pronounced for longer-term home health patients; (11) given the approach to home health care by some Medicare HMOs, including a greater focus on post-acute needs, Medicare beneficiaries with long-term care needs and chronic illnesses enrolled in HMOs may not receive the same services as they would in fee-for-service Medicare; (12) although there are these differences in utilization, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) does not have the information it needs to evaluate the home health care patients receive in either the HMO or fee-for-service program; (13) HCFA does not review home health care during monitoring visits to HMOs; and (14) HCFA plans to collect some outcomes information, but it will not be available for some time. |
gao_GAO-09-25 | gao_GAO-09-25_0 | Beneficiaries in PFFS Plans Were Healthier and Younger Than Beneficiaries in Other MA Plans and Medicare FFS and Differed in Other Ways
Relative to beneficiaries in other MA plans and Medicare FFS in April 2007, beneficiaries in PFFS plans were healthier, generally younger, and more likely to live in rural areas with fewer MA options. Beneficiaries in PFFS plans had projected health care expenditures that were 7 percent less than those of beneficiaries in other MA plans and 10 percent less than beneficiaries in Medicare FFS. About 81 percent of new enrollees in PFFS plans were in Medicare FFS prior to joining their plan, compared to 65 percent of new enrollees in other MA plans (see table 2). PFFS Beneficiaries May Have Faced Certain Financial Risks Generally Not Assumed by Beneficiaries in Other MA Plans and Medicare FFS
In contrast to most beneficiaries in other MA plans and Medicare FFS, beneficiaries in PFFS plans may have faced certain financial risks if they or their providers did not contact their plan before receiving services. However, CMS guidance for PFFS plans related to prior authorization has been inconsistent and sometimes incorrect. PFFS Beneficiaries Who Did Not Contact Their Plans to Determine Service Coverage before Receiving Services May Have Faced Unexpected Costs
If PFFS beneficiaries or their providers did not contact their plan before receiving a service to obtain an advance coverage determination, beneficiaries may have been responsible for the entire cost of the service if coverage for it was later denied by the plan because it was not medically necessary. One plan increased the coinsurance rate for durable medical equipment and prosthetic devices from 30 percent to 70 percent for items that cost more than $750 if beneficiaries or their providers did not prenotify. CMS officials stated that PFFS plans should not have used the term prior authorization because PFFS plans are not permitted to deny service coverage due to lack of prior plan approval. PFFS Plans Had Relatively High Beneficiary Disenrollment Rates and CMS Did Not Comply with Statutory Requirements to Mail Current Rates
From January through April 2007, beneficiaries in PFFS plans disenrolled at an average rate that was more than twice that of other MA plans, and we conclude that CMS did not comply with statutory requirements to mail disenrollment rates to Medicare beneficiaries for the previous 2 years for MA plans in their area. However, PFFS beneficiaries were more likely than other MA beneficiaries to be in a plan with high disenrollment rates. However, given the recent growth in PFFS plans, from about 109,000 beneficiaries in June 2005 to about 2.3 million beneficiaries in June 2008, disenrollment rates and reasons for disenrollment based on disenrollment in 2004 and 2005 may not accurately represent the experience of PFFS plans available to beneficiaries in 2008. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Acting Administrator of CMS take the following three actions: investigate the extent to which beneficiaries in PFFS plans are faced with unexpected out-of-pocket costs due to the denial of coverage when they did not obtain an advance coverage determination from their plan; ensure that CMS guidance on prior authorization accurately reflects CMS policy and that PFFS plan materials conform to CMS requirements; and mail to Medicare beneficiaries MA plan disenrollment rates for the previous 2 years for MA plans that are or will be available in their areas, as required by statute, and update disenrollment rates provided to Medicare beneficiaries through MOC. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix explains the scope and methodology that we used to address our reporting objectives that (1) compare the characteristics of beneficiaries in private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans to the characteristics of beneficiaries in other MA plans and Medicare FFS; (2) describe the financial risks that beneficiaries in PFFS plans face, compared to beneficiaries in other Medicare Advantage (MA) plans and Medicare fee- for-service (FFS), if they do not contact their plan prior to receiving services; and (3) compare the rates at which beneficiaries in PFFS plans disenroll to the rates for other MA plans and evaluate whether the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) met statutory requirements to mail disenrollment rates to beneficiaries. We also interviewed officials from CMS and the plan sponsors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans are an alternative to the original Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program. Private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans--one type of MA plan--give beneficiaries an option that is more like Medicare FFS than other MA plans, with a wider choice of providers and less plan management of services and providers. PFFS enrollment increased from about 35,000 beneficiaries in June 2004 to about 2.3 million in June 2008. This report compares PFFS plans to other MA plans and Medicare FFS in three areas: (1) characteristics of beneficiaries, (2) financial risks for beneficiaries who do not contact their plans before receiving services, and (3) disenrollment rates. To do this work, GAO reviewed materials from a selected sample of nine PFFS plan sponsors, analyzed Medicare data, and interviewed officials from CMS, which administers the Medicare program, and other organizations.
What GAO Found
In April 2007, beneficiaries in PFFS plans tended to be healthier and generally younger than beneficiaries in other MA plans and Medicare FFS. Specifically, projected health care expenditures for PFFS beneficiaries were 7 percent less than the projected average for beneficiaries in other MA plans and 10 percent less than the projected average for beneficiaries in Medicare FFS. Beneficiaries in PFFS plans also generally were more likely than beneficiaries in other MA plans and Medicare FFS to reside in rural areas where fewer other MA plans were available. In addition, about 81 percent of beneficiaries who were new enrollees in PFFS plans were in Medicare FFS before enrolling in their plan, compared to 65 percent in other MA plans. PFFS beneficiaries may have faced certain financial risks if they did not contact their plan before receiving services. These risks were generally not assumed by beneficiaries in other MA plans and Medicare FFS. Specifically, if beneficiaries or their providers did not contact their PFFS plans before obtaining a service to make sure it would be covered, beneficiaries unexpectedly may have had to pay for the entire cost of the service if coverage was later denied by their plan. CMS officials told GAO they did not have data on the extent to which PFFS beneficiaries were faced with such costs. Furthermore, some beneficiaries likely experienced higher out-of-pocket costs for covered services if they did not contact their plan before obtaining the services. For example, one sponsor of PFFS plans increased the share of the cost for which beneficiaries were responsible from 30 percent to 70 percent if the beneficiaries did not contact the plan before obtaining certain durable equipment. GAO found that some PFFS plans were inappropriately using the term prior authorization, which can involve denying service coverage if prior plan approval is not obtained, in their informational materials. CMS officials stated that PFFS plans should not have used this term because these plans were not permitted to deny service coverage due to lack of prior plan approval. However, CMS guidance on this issue has been inconsistent and sometimes incorrect. From January through April 2007, beneficiaries in PFFS plans disenrolled at an average rate of 21 percent compared to 9 percent for other MA plans, and GAO concludes that CMS has not complied with statutory requirements to mail disenrollment rates to Medicare beneficiaries. Disenrollment rates can reflect factors such as beneficiary satisfaction and CMS is required by law to mail this information to Medicare beneficiaries to help them compare available MA plans in their area. Although CMS has not mailed disenrollment rates to beneficiaries since 2000, the agency did provide disenrollment rates through Medicare's Web site. However, this information was based on disenrollment in 2004 and 2005 and, given the enrollment growth since then, may not accurately reflect plans available to beneficiaries in 2008. |
gao_GAO-06-566 | gao_GAO-06-566_0 | 106-107 OMB is required to direct, coordinate, and assist federal agencies in developing and implementing a common application and reporting system, including electronic processes with which a nonfederal entity can apply for, manage, and report on the use of funds from multiple grant programs that serve similar purposes but are administered by different federal agencies; and federal grant-making agencies are required to streamline and simplify their application, administrative, and reporting procedures and enable applicants to apply for and report on the use of federal grants funds electronically. Grants.gov is a single Web portal that enables users of all types to search for grants electronically. Grants.gov continues to make improvements to its cross-agency systems at which potential grantees can find and apply for grant opportunities. Further, a newly designed Grants.gov Web site was introduced in July 2006. 106-107 have not been met. Lack of Standardization in Applying for and Managing Grants
Grantees continue to express frustration with having to work with varying systems to apply for and report on the use of grant funds, to respond to different administrative requirements, and to use different payment systems. They said these details had not yet been decided. Grantees Identified Areas Where Administrative Inefficiencies Continue to Exist
In addition to the lack of standardization in procedures and systems across agencies, grantees mentioned other areas where inefficiencies in grant administration and excess administrative burden on grantees exist. The Grants.gov officials have worked at addressing some of these problems. Grantees Report That Inadequate Communication and Lack of a Clear Schedule Have Resulted in Slow Progress
Grantees we interviewed were concerned that, while the three cross- agency grants management reform initiatives related to P.L. 106-107 are moving forward, progress to date has been inadequate. Grantees identified two specific areas where the management of P.L. Inadequate Communication with the Grantee Community
According to some grantees and grantee associations, insufficient ongoing communication with the grantee community has resulted in poor implementation and prioritization of initiatives and has limited grantees’ use and understanding of new functionality of electronic systems. 106-107 initial plan. As discussed earlier, grantees experienced problems stemming from policies and technologies that are inconsistent with grantees’ business practices and these have caused inefficiencies in their administration of grants. Grantees Are Unsure of Plans and Time Lines
Plans and time lines for the P.L. Since then, individuals from many agencies have begun to work together to meet the act’s goals of simplifying grant administration and improving the effectiveness of grants. As a result of P.L. Action is still needed to ensure that adequate progress is made on streamlining grant administration. 106-107’s objectives. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 106-107 requirements—the Grants.gov Program Management Office, the Grants Management Line of Business leaders, and leadership from the Grants Policy Committee and its cross-agency teams. | Why GAO Did This Study
At least 26 federal entities distribute grants, often with differing administrative requirements. As a result, grantees may be diverting resources from program objectives to comply with varying administrative requirements. Congress, attempting to reduce this inefficiency, passed the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999, commonly referred to as P.L. 106-107. It required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to ensure that agencies streamline processes, develop common systems, and consult with grantees; it also required GAO to evaluate the law's effectiveness. In response, this report discusses aspects of grant administration that grantees identified as inadequate to meet the act's goals and on which further action was needed. GAO reviewed grantee comments on changes needed, obtained views from grantee associations and users of the Web portal called Grants.gov, performed detailed site visits at selected grantees, and obtained views of OMB.
What GAO Found
While some progress has been made since GAO issued its report last year on interagency reform initiatives (GAO-05-355), federal grantees continue to identify areas where the goals of P.L. 106-107 have not yet been met. These include continued lack of standardization and continued inefficiencies in grant administration across agencies and technological difficulties with implementing Grants.gov, the Web site where grantees can find and apply for grants. Grantees report they continue to need to use different application, reporting, and payment systems, and definitions differ across agencies. Further, some inefficiencies continue to exist, such as agency grant processes not aligning with typical grantee business practices. In addition, problems using Grants.gov, such as search engine problems and complex registration practices, have caused grantees frustration as they have used the site for identifying and applying for grant opportunities. The Grants.gov Program Management Office has taken actions to address some of these problems and has plans for further improvements. Grantees GAO interviewed were concerned that, while the three federal cross-agency initiatives underway to streamline grant administration--Grants.gov, the Grants Management Line of Business, and the cross-agency workgroups--were moving forward, progress to date has been inadequate. Grantees identified two specific areas where the management of P.L. 106-107 initiatives contributed to the lack of progress. They pointed out that inadequate ongoing communication with grantees before decisions on changes were made resulted in poor implementation and prioritization of initiatives. Grantees also said lack of clear objectives and a public time line for the reform process sometimes prevented them from understanding the scope and timing of planned changes. |
gao_GAO-14-518 | gao_GAO-14-518_0 | Nearly Half of Funds Allocated for TSCTP since 2009 Have Been Disbursed, but TSCTP Program Managers Are Unable to Readily Provide Data on the Status of Funding
U.S. agencies allocated about $288 million for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, of which they have disbursed slightly less than half. Although State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal control note that effective internal management requires financial information, TSCTP’s managers at State and USAID do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funds for TSCTP activities, such as the amounts of funds unobligated or disbursed—key data that could help inform their management of the program. Consequently, TSCTP’s program managers may lack the day-to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal control state is required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. As the figure demonstrates, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral funding, collectively accounting for approximately $106 million of the funds allocated. However, although agencies have taken steps to (6) leverage their resources and (7) establish compatible procedures to operate across agency boundaries, State could do more to integrate Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. joint 2014 TSCTP strategy, which also provides a common outcome for U.S. agencies participating in TSCTP. Examples of these steps include the following: 1. U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Consider Partner Country Needs, Absorptive Capacities, and Other Donor Efforts when Selecting TSCTP Activities
In selecting TSCTP activities, and consistent with the presidential policy directive on security sector assistance, U.S. agencies conduct a variety of assessments and meetings to consider partner country needs and absorptive capacities. For instance, several officials named the Global Counterterrorism Forum and its Sahel Working Group as key multilateral venues for sharing information and insights on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations. Conclusions
Terrorist groups in northwest Africa continue to pose a national security threat to the United States. Further, while State, USAID, and DOD are generally consistent with most key practices of interagency collaboration in their efforts to implement a whole-of- government approach to TSCTP, the Department of Justice has not been fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts although it has expertise in building law enforcement capacity—one of TSCTP’s five lines of effort. Second, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Defense, take steps to ensure that the Department of Justice is better integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts. State concurred with our recommendations to take steps to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP and to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine the status of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)–related funding and U.S. agencies’ ability to track such funding, we reviewed relevant laws and other funding documents and asked officials from the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide data on allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements for TSCTP by country and account for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. To examine the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration, we collected and reviewed U.S. government strategy documents, agency reports, and evaluations to identify and compare agency actions with key practices GAO has identified for enhancing interagency collaboration. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
Events in northwest Africa—such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's seizure of territory in Mali in 2012 and Boko Haram's near-daily attacks in Nigeria—have underscored concerns that the region is vulnerable to the spread of violent extremism. TSCTP, a U.S. multiagency counterterrorism effort begun in 2005, led by State, and primarily coordinated with USAID and DOD, focuses on strengthening partner countries' counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of terrorist ideology through diplomacy, development, and security assistance.
This report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-related funding and U.S. agencies' ability to track such funding; (2) the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. GAO reviewed agency documents, met with key officials in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Africa Command in Germany and in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger.
What GAO Found
Nearly half of the funds allocated for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) since fiscal year 2009 have been disbursed, but TSCTP program managers are unable to readily provide data on the status of these funds. As of late 2013, U.S. agencies reported disbursing nearly $140 million of the approximately $288 million allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral funding. Although the Department of State's (State) Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal control note that effective internal management requires financial information for planning, programming, and performance evaluation, TSCTP's program managers do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funding for TSCTP, such as the amount of funds unobligated. Consequently, TSCTP's program managers may lack the day-to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal control state is required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources.
State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) actions to implement TSCTP are generally consistent with most but not all of the key practices of interagency collaboration that GAO has identified as important to enhancing collaborative agency efforts. For example, agencies have agreed on their roles and responsibilities, established a joint strategy, and defined a common outcome for TSCTP. However, although agencies have taken steps to leverage their resources and establish compatible procedures to operate across agency boundaries, the Department of Justice has not been fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts despite its expertise in building law enforcement capacity—one of TSCTP's five lines of effort.
U.S. agencies have used various means to consider partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. These include assessment reports, meetings with host governments, and bilateral and multilateral outreach to other donors. For example, the United States participates in the Global Counterterrorism Forum, a multilateral venue for sharing information on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds for TSCTP. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. State and USAID both concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-203 | gao_GAO-10-203_0 | This guidance defines egregious as any act that is cruel to animals or a condition that is ignored and leads to the harming of animals. These inconsistencies may be due, in part, to weaknesses in FSIS’s guidance and training for key inspection staff. GAO Survey Results and FSIS Data Indicate Inconsistent Enforcement
According to FSIS officials, inspectors are to use their judgment in deciding whether to suspend a plant’s operations or take the less stringent enforcement action (that is, issue a noncompliance report and a regulatory control action) when a humane handling violation occurs. In addition, the expert we consulted testified in April 2008 that FSIS inspectors need better training and clear directives to improve consistency of HMSA enforcement. Our survey results indicate differences in the enforcement actions that inspectors reported they would take when faced with a humane handling violation. As figure 5 shows, 23 percent of inspectors reported they would suspend operations, while 38 percent would issue a regulatory control action for multiple unsuccessful captive bolt gun stuns. We also identified several incidents in FSIS’s noncompliance reports in which inspectors did not suspend plant operations or take a regulatory control action. Two of the suspensions were for dragging nonambulatory conscious veal calves that were about 1-week old. FSIS Cannot Fully Identify and Plan Resource Needs for HMSA Enforcement
FSIS cannot fully identify trends in its inspection resources—specifically, funding and staffing—for HMSA enforcement, in part because it cannot track humane handling inspection funds separately from the inspection funds spent on other food safety activities. Furthermore, FSIS does not have a current workforce planning strategy to guide its efforts to allocate staff to inspection activities, including humane handling. Although FSIS has strategic, operational, and performance plans for its inspection activities, these plans do not specifically address HMSA enforcement. That is, they do not clearly outline the agency’s goals for enforcing HMSA, identify expected resource needs, specify time frames, or lay out performance metrics. To ensure that FSIS strengthens its enforcement of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, as amended, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FSIS to take the following three actions: establish clear and specific criteria for when inspectors-in-charge should suspend plant operations for an egregious HMSA violation and when they should take enforcement actions because of repeat violations; identify some type of objective tool, such as a numerical scoring mechanism, and instruct all inspectors-in-charge at plants to use this measure to assist them in evaluating the plants’ HMSA performance and determining what, if any, enforcement actions are warranted; and strengthen the analysis of humane handling data by analyzing the narrative in noncompliance reports to identify areas that need improvement. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) efforts to enforce the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, as amended (HMSA); (2) the extent to which FSIS tracks recent trends in FSIS inspection resources for enforcing HMSA; and (3) FSIS’s efforts to develop a strategy to guide HMSA enforcement. Although we did not state that numerical scoring is not regulatory in nature, we did state that using it to measure compliance would be inconsistent with the HMSA requirement that animals be rendered insensible to pain on the first blow. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns about the humane handling and slaughter of livestock have grown; for example, a 2009 video showed employees at a Vermont slaughter plant skinning and decapitating conscious 1-week old veal calves. The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, as amended (HMSA) prohibits the inhumane treatment of livestock in connection with slaughter and requires that animals be rendered insensible to pain before being slaughtered. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for HMSA. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate FSIS's efforts to enforce HMSA, (2) identify the extent to which FSIS tracks recent trends in resources for HMSA enforcement, and (3) evaluate FSIS's efforts to develop a strategy to guide HMSA enforcement. Among other things, GAO received survey responses from inspectors at 235 plants and examined a sample of FSIS noncompliance reports and suspension data for fiscal years 2005 through 2009.
What GAO Found
GAO's survey results and analysis of FSIS data suggest that inspectors have not taken consistent actions to enforce HMSA. Survey results indicate differences in the enforcement actions that inspectors would take when faced with a humane handling violation, such as when an animal was not rendered insensible through an acceptable stunning procedure by forcefully striking the animal on the forehead with a bolt gun or properly placing electrical shocks. Specifically, 23 percent of inspectors reported they would suspend operations for multiple unsuccessful stuns with a captive bolt gun whereas 27 percent reported that they would submit a noncompliance report. GAO's review of noncompliance reports also identified incidents in which inspectors did not suspend plant operations or take regulatory actions when they appeared warranted. The lack of consistency in enforcement may be due in part to the lack of clarity in current FSIS guidance and inadequate training. The guidance does not clearly indicate when certain enforcement actions should be taken for an egregious act--one that is cruel to animals or a condition that is ignored and leads to the harming of animals. A noted humane handling expert has stated that FSIS inspectors need clear directives to improve consistency of HMSA enforcement. According to GAO's survey, FSIS's training may be insufficient. For example, inspectors at half of the plants did not correctly answer basic facts about signs of sensibility. Some private sector companies use additional tools to assess humane handling and improve performance. FSIS cannot fully identify trends in its inspection funding and staffing for HMSA, in part because it cannot track HMSA inspection funds separately from the inspection funds spent on food safety activities. FSIS also does not have a current workforce planning strategy for allocating limited staff to inspection activities, including HMSA enforcement. FSIS has strategic, operational, and performance plans for its inspection activities but does not clearly outline goals, needed resources, time frames, or performance metrics and does not have a comprehensive strategy to guide HMSA enforcement. |
gao_GAO-07-1115T | gao_GAO-07-1115T_0 | Amended Compacts of Free Association: 2004- 2023
In 2003, the United States approved separate amended compacts with the FSM and RMI that (1) continue the defense relationship, including a new agreement providing U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI through 2086; (2) strengthen immigration provisions; and (3) provide an estimated $3.6 billion in financial assistance to both nations from 2004 through 2023, including about $1.5 billion to the RMI (see app. The amended compacts identify the additional 20 years of grant assistance as intended to assist the FSM and RMI governments in their efforts to promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of their people. Financial assistance is provided in the form of annual sector grants and contributions to each nation’s trust fund. The amended compacts and their subsidiary agreements, along with the countries’ development plans, target the grant assistance to six sectors—education, health, public infrastructure, the environment, public sector capacity building, and private sector development—prioritizing two sectors, education and health. In addition, the RMI has not enacted economic policy reforms needed to improve its growth prospects. The RMI’s economy shows continued dependence on government spending of foreign assistance and limited potential for expanded private sector and remittance income. The RMI’s government budget is characterized by limited tax revenue paired with growing government payrolls. The RMI Faces Challenges to Effectively Implementing Compact Assistance for Its Long-Term Development Goals
The RMI has allocated funds to priority sectors, although several factors have hindered its use of the funds to meet long-term development needs. Further, despite actions taken to effectively implement compact grants, administrative challenges have limited its ability to ensure use of the grants for its long-term goals. However, data deficiencies, report shortcomings, capacity constraints, and inadequate communication have limited the RMI and U.S. governments’ ability to consistently ensure the effective use of grant funds to measure progress, and monitor day-to-day activities. Although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund balance with additional contributions, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risks. Despite the impact of market volatility and investment strategy, the trust fund committee’s reports have not yet assessed the fund’s potential adequacy for meeting the RMI’s long- term economic goals. For example, the RMI received a commitment from Taiwan to contribute $40 million over 20 years to the RMI trust fund, which improved the RMI fund’s likely capacity for disbursements after 2023. The RMI trust fund committee has experienced management challenges in establishing the trust fund to maximize earnings. As of June 2007, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. However, the RMI faces significant challenges in working toward the compact goals of economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance as the compact grants decrease. Largely dependent on government spending of foreign aid, the RMI has limited potential for private sector growth, and its government has made little progress in implementing reforms needed to increase investment opportunities and tax income. Because the trust fund’s earnings are intended as a main source of U.S. assistance to the RMI after compact grants end, the fund’s potential inadequacy to provide sustainable income in some years could impact the RMI’s ability to provide government services. Prior Recommendations
Our prior reports on the amended compacts include recommendations that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as chair of the RMI management and trust fund committees, to, among other things, ensure that JEMFAC address the lack of RMI progress in implementing reforms to increase investment and tax income; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the the RMI to establish plans to minimize the impact of declining assistance; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the RMI to fully develop a reliable mechanism for measuring progress toward compact goals; and ensure the RMI trust fund committee’s assessment and timely reporting of the fund’s likely status as a source of revenue after 2023. Appendix II: Estimated FSM and RMI per Capita Compact Grant Assistance for Fiscal Years 1987 – 2023
Appendix III: Amended Compact Implementation Framework
Annual sector grant budget
FSM/RMI propoe grnt budget for ech ector tht inclde proviion report to used to: – Monitor gener – Expenditre, performnce go, nd pecific performnce indictor – Brekdown of peronnel expenditre nd other co – Informtion on U.S. federl progr nd other donor United Ste evuate the propoed ector grnt budget for: – Contency with fnding requirement in the compct nd relted – Identify poitive event thccelerte performnce otcome nd prolem encontered nd their impct on grnt ctivitie nd performnce measureopertion to ensure complince with grnt condition Submit nnual report to the U.S.
Joint management and accountability committees
Appendix IV: RMI Sector Grant Allocation, 2004 through 2006
Appendix V: Probability of RMI Trust Fund Income Not Reaching the Maximum Disbursement Levels Allowed
Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could result in the RMI trust fund’s inability to disburse the maximum level of income allowed in the trust fund agreement, or any income, in some years. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1987 through 2003, the United States provided more than $2 billion in economic assistance to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the RMI under a Compact of Free Association; approximately $579 million of this economic assistance went to the RMI. In 2003, the U.S. government approved an amended compact with the RMI that provides an additional 20 years of assistance, totaling about $1.5 billion from 2004 through 2023. The Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) is responsible for administering and monitoring this U.S. assistance. The amended compact with the RMI identifies the additional 20 years of grant assistance as intended to assist the RMI government in its efforts to promote the economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance of its people. The assistance is provided in the form of annually decreasing grants that prioritize health and education, paired with annually increasing contributions to trust funds intended as a source of revenue for the country after the grants end in 2023. The amended compact also contains several new funding and accountability provisions that strengthen reporting and bilateral interaction. These provisions include requiring the establishment of a joint economic management committee and a trust fund committee to, respectively, among other things, review the RMI's progress toward compact objectives and to assess the trust fund's effectiveness in contributing to the country's long-term economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance. In 2003, we testified that these provisions could improve accountability over assistance but that successful implementation will require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from both the United States and the RMI. Drawing on several reports that we have published since 2005, I will discuss the RMI's economic prospects, implementation of its amended compact to meet long-term goals, and potential trust fund earnings.
What GAO Found
The RMI has limited prospects for achieving its long-term development objectives and has not enacted policy reforms needed to enable economic growth. The RMI depends on public sector spending of foreign assistance rather than on private sector or remittance income; public sector expenditure accounts for more than half of its gross domestic product (GDP). The RMI government budget largely depends on foreign assistance and, despite annual decrements in compact funding to support budgetary expenditures, is characterized by a growing wage bill. Meanwhile, the two private sector industries identified as having growth potential--fisheries and tourism--face significant barriers to expansion because of the RMI's remote geographic locations, inadequate infrastructure, and poor business environment. In addition, RMI emigrants lack marketable skills that are needed to increased revenue from remittances. Moreover, progress in implementing key policy reforms necessary to improve the private sector environment has been slow. Foreign investment regulations remain burdensome, and RMI government involvement in commercial activities continues to hinder private sector development. The RMI has made progress in implementing compact assistance, but it faces several challenges in allocating and using this assistance to support its long-term development goals. RMI grant allocations have reflected compact priorities by targeting health, education, and infrastructure--for example, funding construction of nine new schools. The RMI also has not planned for long-term sustainability of services that takes into account the annual funding decrement. Capacity limitations have further affected its ability to ensure the effective use of grant funds. The RMI currently lacks the capacity to adequately measure progress, owing to inadequate baseline data and incomplete performance reports. Moreover, although accountability--as measured by timeliness in single audit reporting and corrective action plans to single audit findings--has improved, insufficient staff and skills have limited the RMI's ability to monitor day-to-day sector grant operations as the compacts require. Inadequate communication about grant implementation may further hinder the U.S. and RMI governments from ensuring the grants' effective use. The RMI trust fund may not provide sustainable income for the country after compact grants end, potential sources for supplementing trust fund income have limitations, and the trust fund committee has experienced management challenges. Market volatility and the choice of investment strategy could cause the RMI trust fund balance to vary widely, and there is increasing probability that in some years the trust fund will not reach the maximum disbursement level allowed--an amount equal to the inflation-adjusted compact grants in 2023--or be able to disburse any income. The trust fund committee's reporting has not analyzed the fund's potential effectiveness in helping the RMI achieve its long-term economic goals. Although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund income with a contribution from Taiwan, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risk. As of June 2007, for example, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. |
gao_GAO-13-631T | gao_GAO-13-631T_0 | 2013 Annual Report Identifies 31 New Areas to Achieve Greater Efficiency or Effectiveness
In 17 of the 31 new areas where agencies may be able to achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness, we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among federal programs or activities. We identified fragmentation in multiple programs we reviewed, including the following:
Combat Uniforms: We found that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fragmented approach to developing and acquiring combat uniforms could be more efficient. In addition, DOD reported that it could save up to $82 million in development and acquisition cost savings through increased collaboration among the military services. Among the 14 areas of opportunity to reduce costs or enhance revenue identified in our 2013 annual report are the following examples of opportunities for executive branch agencies or Congress to take action to address the issues we reported:
Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration: We report concerns about CMS’s Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration, which is expected to cost $8.35 billion over 10 years, most of which will be paid to plans with average performance. Through our three annual reports, we have identified 162 areas in which there are opportunities to reduce fragmentation, overlap, or duplication or to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue. 2). First, we reviewed the budget functions of the federal government representing nearly all of the overall federal funds obligated in fiscal year 2010.budget resources by national need (such as National Defense, Energy, or Agriculture), and instances in which multiple federal agencies obligate funds within a particular budget function may indicate potential duplication or cost savings opportunities (see fig. 3). The Administration and Congress Have Made Some Progress in Addressing the Areas That We Previously Identified
In addition to the new actions identified for our 2013 annual report, we have continued to monitor the progress that the executive branch agencies and Congress have made in addressing the issues we identified in our 2011 and 2012 annual reports. In these reports, we identified approximately 300 actions that the executive branch and Congress could take to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness. We found that the executive branch agencies and Congress have made progress in addressing the 131 areas we identified in 2011 and 2012. As of March 6, 2013, the date we completed our audit work, about 12 percent of the 131 overall areas were addressed; 66 percent were partially addressed; and 21 percent were not addressed. Congress has also taken steps to address some of our suggested actions. The President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission proposes eliminating direct payments to farmers. The President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission also states that the President will again seek reorganization authority and use such authority to consolidate the economic and business development activities in the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury, as well as the Small Business Administration, into a new department with a focused mission to foster economic growth and spur job creation. Addressing these issues will require sustained attention by the executive branch agencies and the Congress. However, realizing the intent of the GPRA Modernization Act for assessing government performance and improvement and reducing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication will require sustained oversight of implementation. Additionally, we reported that a total of 31 federal departments and agencies collect, maintain, and use geospatial information—information linked to specific geographic locations that supports many government functions, such as maintaining roads and responding to natural disasters. Better planning and implementation among federal agencies could help reduce duplicative investments and provide the opportunity for potential savings of millions of dollars. Similarly, in our three annual reports, we reported that better evaluation of performance and results is needed for multiple federal programs and activities to help inform decisions about how to address the fragmentation, overlap, or duplication identified or achieve other financial benefits. The regular collection and review of performance information, both within and among federal agencies, could help executive branch agencies and Congress determine whether some of the federal programs or initiatives included in this series are making progress toward addressing the identified issues and could determine the actions that need to be taken to improve results. Congress Could Help Address Actions We Have Identified Through Legislative Action, Oversight, and Other Strategies
Congress also has an important role to play—both in its legislative and oversight capacities—in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the fiscal pressures facing the nation continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. Opportunities to take such action exist in areas where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative.
To highlight these challenges and to inform government decision makers on actions that could be taken to address them, GAO is statutorily required to identify and report annually to Congress on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives, both within departments and governmentwide, that have duplicative goals or activities. GAO has also identified additional opportunities to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness by means of cost savings or enhanced revenue collection.
This statement discusses the (1) new areas identified in GAO's 2013 annual report; (2) status of actions taken by the administration and Congress to address the 131 areas identified in GAO's 2011 and 2012 annual reports; (3) President's April Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission and recently introduced legislation; and (4) strategies that can help address the issues we identified. GAO's 3-year systematic examination included a review of the budget functions of the federal government representing nearly all of the overall federal funds obligated in fiscal year 2010.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2013 annual report identifies 31 new areas where agencies may be able to achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness. Seventeen areas involve fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, GAO reported that the Department of Defense could realize up to $82 million in cost savings and ensure equivalent levels of performance and protection by taking action to address its fragmented approach to developing and acquiring combat uniforms. Additionally, GAO reported that a total of 31 federal departments and agencies collect, maintain, and use geospatial information. Better planning and implementation could help reduce duplicative investments and save of millions of dollars.
The report also identifies 14 additional areas where opportunities exist to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue collections. For example, GAO suggested that Department of Health and Human Services cancel the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration. GAO found most of the bonuses will be paid to plans with average performance and that the demonstration's design precludes a credible evaluation of its effectiveness. Canceling the demonstration for 2014 would save about $2 billion. GAO also noted opportunities to save billions more in areas such as expanding strategic sourcing, providing greater oversight for Medicaid supplemental payments, and reducing subsidies for crop insurance. Additionally, GAO pointed out opportunities for enhancing revenues by reducing the net tax gap of $385 billion, reviewing prices of radioactive isotopes sold by the government, and providing more equity in tobacco taxes for similar types of products.
The executive branch and Congress have made some progress in addressing the areas that GAO identified in its 2011 and 2012 annual reports. Specifically, GAO identified approximately 300 actions among 131 overall areas that the executive branch and Congress could take to reduce or eliminate fragmentation, overlap, or duplication or achieve other potential financial benefits. As of March 6, 2013, the date GAO completed its progress update audit work, about 12 percent of the areas were addressed, 66 percent were partially addressed, and 21 percent were not addressed. More recently, both the administration and Congress have taken additional steps, including proposals in the President's April Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission.
Addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication will require continued attention by the executive branch agencies and targeted oversight by Congress. In many cases, executive branch agencies have the authority to address the actions that GAO identified. In other cases, such as those involving the elimination or consolidation of programs, Congress will need to take legislative action. Moreover, sustained congressional oversight will be needed in concert with the administration's efforts to address the identified actions by improving planning, measuring performance, and increasing collaboration. Effective implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 also could help the executive branch and Congress as they work to address these issues over time. |
gao_T-GGD-00-53 | gao_T-GGD-00-53_0 | Implementation Under Way but Work Remains
IRS has made a concerted effort to implement the Restructuring Act’s taxpayer rights and protections mandates. IRS’ Difficulties in Implementing the Restructuring Act
IRS has also experienced some difficulty in implementing the Restructuring Act. A second example of IRS difficulty in implementing the Restructuring Act is related to “innocent spouse” cases. Creating a Taxpayer- Focused Structure and Clearer Lines of Authority and Accountability
Notwithstanding a reduction in the number of its field offices, IRS’ organizational structure has not changed significantly in almost 50 years. Under this structure, authority for serving taxpayers and administering the tax code is decentralized to 33 districts and 10 service centers, with each of these geographic units organized along functional lines—such as collection, examination, and taxpayer service. Through its new taxpayer-focused operating divisions, IRS is centralizing management of key functions and creating narrower scopes of responsibility. Creating a simpler, more coherent organization and management structure is an important step, but it does not guarantee good management. Consequently, IRS needs to develop an integrated performance management system that aligns employee, program, and strategic performance measures and creates incentives for behavior supporting agency goals, including that of giving due recognition to taxpayers’ rights and interests. At the operational level, IRS is measuring its progress toward these goals through customer satisfaction surveys and through the business results measures of quality and quantity. Modernizing Information Systems to Support Business Modernization
accessing comprehensive information about individual taxpayer accounts or summary data on groups of taxpayers. For years, IRS has struggled to modernize its information systems to support high quality taxpayer service and management information needs. In 1995, we made over a dozen recommendations to correct management and technical weaknesses that jeopardized the modernization process. In February 1998, we made additional recommendations to ensure, among other things, that IRS develops a complete systems architectural blueprint for modernizing its information systems. Subsequently, in fiscal years 1998 and 1999, Congress provided IRS funds for systems modernization and limited their obligation until certain conditions, similar to our recommendations, were met. While IRS has made progress in addressing our recommendations and complying with the legislative conditions, the Service has not yet fully implemented our recommendations. As a result, at the direction of the Senate and House appropriation subcommittees responsible for IRS’ appropriation, we have continued to monitor and report on IRS’ system modernization efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) progress in implementing the taxpayer rights and protection mandates of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 and IRS' ongoing efforts to modernize its organizational structure, performance management system, and information systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS has embarked on a concerted effort to implement the taxpayer rights and protection provisions; (2) in some instances, implementation is not complete, and in some others, it is too early to tell if implementation is successful; (3) IRS has experienced difficulties in implementing some aspects of the mandates; (4) these difficulties included determining when enforced collection actions, such as the seizure of delinquent taxpayers' assets, are appropriate and dealing with requests for relief under the innocent spouse provisions; (5) to streamline its management structure and create a more taxpayer-focused organization, IRS is in the midst of instituting a major reorganization; (6) IRS' new organization structure is built around four operating units, each with end-to-end responsibility for serving a group of taxpayers with similar needs; (7) through its new taxpayer-focused divisions, IRS is centralizing management of key functions and creating narrower scopes of responsibility; (8) IRS needs to develop an integrated performance management system that aligns employee, program, and strategic performance measures and creates incentives for behavior supporting agency goals; (9) at the operating level, IRS is measuring its progress toward these goals through customer satisfaction surveys and through business results measures of quality and quantity; (10) IRS' system difficulties hinder, and will continue to hinder, efforts to better serve taxpayer segments; (11) IRS has dozens of discrete databases that are function specific and are designed to reflect transactions at different points in the life of a return or information report--from its receipt to disposition; (12) as a consequence, IRS does not have any easy means of accessing comprehensive information about individual taxpayer accounts or summary data on groups of taxpayers; (13) GAO made over a dozen recommendations to correct management and technical weaknesses that jeopardized IRS' information systems modernization process; (14) in fiscal years 1998 to 1999, Congress provided IRS funds for systems modernization and limited their obligation until certain conditions, similar to GAO's recommendations, were met; (15) while IRS made progress in addressing GAO's recommendations and complying with the legislative conditions, IRS has not yet fully implemented GAO's recommendations; and (16) GAO believes that IRS' ongoing efforts to modernize its organizational structure, performance management system, and information systems are heading the agency in the right direction. |
gao_AIMD-96-64 | gao_AIMD-96-64_0 | Some private and public sector organizations, on the other hand, have designed and managed IT to improve their organizational performance. However, managing IT projects as investments works most effectively when implemented as part of an integrated set of management practices. However, none of these five agencies had implemented a complete, institutionalized investment approach that would fulfill requirements of PRA and ITMRA. While all four weaknesses may not have been present at each agency, in comparison to leading organizations, the case study agencies lacked a consistent process (used at all levels of the agency) for uniformly selecting and managing systems investments; focused their selection processes on selected efforts, such as justifying new project funding or focusing on projects already under development, rather than managing all IT projects—new, under development, and operational—as a portfolio of competing investments; made funding decisions without giving adequate attention to management control or evaluation processes, and made funding decisions based on negotiations or undefined decision criteria and did not have the up-to-date, accurate data needed to support IT investment decisions. One of the agencies we reviewed—the Coast Guard—used common investment criteria for making cross-agency IT decisions. They do this by conducting project postimplementation reviews (PIRs) to compare actual to planned cost, returns, and risks. GAO Comments
1. 2. It is based upon analysis of the IT management best practices found in leading private and public sector organizations and is explained in greater detail in OMB’s Evaluating Information Technology Investments: A Practical Guide. The agency process is to (1) provide for the selection, management, and evaluation of IT investments, (2) be integrated with the processes for making budget, financial, and program management decisions, (3) include minimum criteria for selecting IT investments and specific quantitative and qualitative criteria for comparing and prioritizing projects, (4) provide for identifying potential IT investments that would result in shared benefits with other federal, state, or local governments, (5) provide for identifying quantifiable measurements for determining the net benefits and risks of IT investments, and (6) provide the means for senior agency managers to obtain timely development progress information, including a system of milestones for measuring progress, on an independently verifiable basis, in terms of cost, capability of the system to meet specified requirements, timeliness, and quality. The Information Technology Management Reform Act takes effect 180 days from the date of enactment (February 10, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) information technology (IT) investment practices of several federal agencies and compared them to those used by leading private- and public-sector organizations; and (2) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as it responds to the investment requirements of the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) leading private- and public-sector organizations manage their IT projects as investments and rank projects based on maximizing returns and minimizing risks; (2) the five federal agencies reviewed have some elements of an IT investment process in place, but they lack a complete, institutionalized approach that would fulfill the requirements of ITMRA or the Paper Reduction Act; (3) the agencies reviewed need to manage their IT projects as an investment portfolio, viewing each project as a competing investment and make decisions based on the project's overall contribution to the agency's goals; (4) the agencies do not conduct postimplementation reviews (PIR) to determine actual costs, returns, and risks; (5) agency IT decisions are based on inconsistent or inaccurate data; (6) with the exception of the Coast Guard, none of the agencies reviewed have a set of explicit criteria for making IT decisions; and (7) OMB has taken a proactive role in developing IT investment policy to assist federal agencies in implementing ITMRA requirements. |
gao_GAO-14-823 | gao_GAO-14-823_0 | The order also requires Treasury to submit semi-annual reports so that the court can monitor Treasury’s progress. In 2010, BEP proposed a three-pronged approach consisting of three elements it believes will provide meaningful access to currency: 1) large, high-contrast numerals to allow low vision individuals to determine the denomination of currency, 2) currency readers that can indicate a note’s value, and 3) a raised tactile feature to allow visually impaired persons to denominate currency by touch. BEP Has Taken Actions to Make Currency Accessible and Is Considering Costs As It Continues Its Efforts
BEP Has Made Some Progress Implementing Its Three-Pronged Approach
BEP has taken steps to make currency accessible to visually impaired persons, but has not yet fully implemented any element of its three- pronged approach. BEP projects spending about $35 million on the currency reader program over the next 3 years. BEP officials described steps they have taken, or plan to take, to evaluate the currency reader program’s effectiveness. Raised Tactile Feature
Because BEP has not determined how it will apply a tactile feature to notes, it does not have final current estimates of the costs to produce currency with a tactile feature. As a result, it is unknown when the next redesign will occur. In 2014 testimony, the BEP’s Director stated that a note with a tactile feature would not be introduced before 2020. BEP’s need to address identified counterfeit threats could affect the redesign process. BEP officials told us they are continuously developing security features to stay ahead of counterfeiters. Representatives from organizations that advocate for visually impaired persons expressed concern about the length of time it is taking BEP to provide access to currency. BEP has faced difficulties developing a raised tactile feature, and it has fallen behind its estimated schedule. However, BEP did not discover these problems until over a year after the problem occurred. Senior BEP and Federal Reserve officials told us that they have discussed the Federal Reserve’s concerns about the potential cost impact of a tactile feature and whether the extent of technological changes since the 2008 court order could provide alternative options to its current approach; however, they remain committed to providing access through their three-pronged approach. In particular, BEP has incorporated high-contrast, large numerals on some denominations of notes, and plans to continue incorporating them in future redesigns; it has launched the initial phase of its currency reader program; and it has been developing a tactile feature to be incorporated in the next family of redesigned notes. As a result, U.S. currency without a tactile feature will be in circulation for many years. Recommendations for Executive Action
To determine the extent to which the currency reader program provides assistance to visually impaired persons while a tactile feature is being developed and integrated into the next currency redesign, we recommend that the Director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing take the following action:
Evaluate the currency reader program to include facets such as how well the program provides visually impaired persons with a means to independently denominate currency. BEP did not take a position on our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to examine (1) the status of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s (BEP) efforts to provide currency that is accessible for visually impaired persons and how BEP is considering costs as part of these efforts, and (2) factors that may affect BEP’s efforts to make currency accessible for visually impaired persons. To identify and discuss factors that may affect BEP’s efforts to make currency accessible for visually impaired persons, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from BEP and the Federal Reserve. | Why GAO Did This Study
All blind and many persons with low vision are unable to distinguish currency denominations without assistance. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that Treasury failed to provide meaningful access to U.S. currency to visually impaired persons, and in 2008, ordered Treasury to take steps to do so. The court did not define meaningful access, leaving it to Treasury to choose a course of action. Within Treasury, BEP designs and manufactures currency. GAO was asked to review the progress BEP has made toward meeting the district court's order. In addition, the Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, mandated GAO to report on strategies for minimizing the cost of developing currency with accessibility features.
This report examines (1) the status of BEP's efforts to provide currency that is accessible for visually impaired persons and how BEP is considering costs as part of these efforts and (2) factors that may affect BEP's efforts. To answer these questions GAO reviewed court and BEP documents, and interviewed officials from BEP, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Secret Service as well as representatives from advocacy organizations for visually impaired persons and trade associations for cash-handling companies.
What GAO Found
The Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) has progressed in making currency accessible through a three-pronged approach it adopted and is considering the costs of its approach as it continues its efforts. BEP has:
Added large, high-contrast numerals to notes, and it plans to continue to refine these numerals.
Started to distribute free currency-reader devices that can scan a note and audibly announce its value. However, BEP's plans to evaluate the effectiveness of this new program are incomplete, and without a complete evaluation, BEP cannot determine the program's effectiveness.
Made limited progress in developing a raised tactile feature on notes, which would provide the ability to determine the note's value by touch. While BEP has narrowed the options of what a tactile feature would look like on a note and how it would be applied, BEP officials stated that challenges developing the feature will delay selecting an option to test until March 2015—over a year behind schedule.
Supplementing these efforts, BEP developed a smartphone app that identifies notes. High-contrast numerals add little additional cost, and BEP estimates it will spend about $35 million on currency readers over 3 years. Cost estimates to produce a tactile feature are preliminary and range widely.
GAO identified three factors that may affect BEP's efforts to complete its three-pronged approach. First, the inclusion of a tactile feature will require a redesign of currency, but it is not known when this will occur. Because BEP makes changes to currency to stay ahead of counterfeit threats, redesign occurs as needed and not at regular intervals. Second, BEP has faced difficulties developing a raised tactile feature, falling behind its internal schedule. Third, senior BEP and Federal Reserve officials told us that they have discussed the Federal Reserve's concerns about the potential cost impact of a tactile feature and whether technological changes since the 2008 court order could provide alternative options to BEP's current approach. BEP officials stated that they have not yet determined how these concerns might be addressed. Advocates for organizations representing visually impaired persons consider a tactile feature to be important and are concerned about the length of time it is taking BEP to provide access to currency.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends BEP evaluate its currency reader program while it develops a tactile feature in the next redesign of currency. BEP did not take a position on our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-1009 | gao_GAO-04-1009_0 | Local municipalities differ in their history of multijurisdiction cooperation. The UASI provides support to metropolitan areas designated by DHS as high-threat areas. Collaborative Organizations and Strategic Planning Foster Regional Coordination
As corroborated by officials with whom we met, collaborative regional organizations that include a wide range of stakeholders from multiple jurisdictions and disciplines contribute to successful regional coordination for a variety of public programs. Where Consistent with Civic and Political Traditions, Flexible Approaches Can Enhance Regional Organizations
Metropolitan regions differ in their civic and political traditions. Two examples follow. Such plans can guide grant expenditures. Finally, federal financial assistance for coordination activities can provide important support. Some Federal Requirements Support Regional Organizations
Federal grantor agencies support the existence of regional organizations by requiring the grantee to establish such an organization before receiving federal funds. For example, federal transportation law requires an MPO to write metropolitan transportation improvement plans before federal highway and transit funds can be allocated. Federal Grant Requirements for Comprehensive Strategic Planning with Measurable Objectives and Resource Alignment Encourage Effective Regional Coordination
Some federal grant programs require strategic plans as a precondition for receiving federal grant dollars to encourage regional coordination, but for the plans to be effective they should include measurable objectives and corresponding resource alignment. For example, the coordination activities of MPOs are paid in part with federal transportation funds. NCR Emergency Preparedness Effort Can Benefit from Comprehensive Planning and Application of Standards
Our observations about regional coordination in the implementation of federal programs in metropolitan areas we visited are applicable to the efforts to coordinate homeland security in the NCR. As envisioned in the current UASI plans, the NCR’s UASI program may be on the way to developing multilayered regional coordination structures for the UASI. According to comments provided by DHS and as discussed at a September 1, 2004, meeting of the UASI governance structures SPG and CAOs Committee, the UASI governance structure now plans to address these issues by gathering information from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia on funding sources other than UASI, how the funds were allocated and for what purposes, and how they were distributed by jurisdiction. Fourth, some grants fund the costs of regional organizations, thereby providing additional incentives for localities to collaborate interjurisdictionally. Regional approaches for homeland security continue to evolve quickly, but the nation is still in the early stages of building institutions and processes to address emergency preparedness. Based on our work and given the important role that regional planning and governance can play in improving national preparedness, these developments warrant continued congressional monitoring and oversight. The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator of Washington, D.C., also provided comments. He also commented that the NCR is unique compared to the six metropolitan areas we chose for detailed analysis because only the NCR (1) involves two states and a governmental entity that combines state and local functions; (2) contains monuments and memorials that are the most visible symbols of our national strength and patriotism that, if attacked, would create a perception of vulnerability on the part of the federal government; and (3) is the seat of the federal government, creating a partnership between the national government and state and local governments. Scope and Methodology
Our overall goal for this engagement was to identify features of regional collaboration in urban areas outside of the National Capital Region (NCR) that could be transferred to homeland security efforts in the NCR and elsewhere. Based on these various considerations and recommendations, we identified the Dallas-Fort Worth, Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, New York, Philadelphia, and Tampa-St. Petersburg areas as sites meeting one or more of these criteria and selected them for a more detailed analysis of regional coordination across a variety of federal programs. We understand that the report has not been fully reviewed within GAO and is, therefore subject to revision.In general, the report describes factors that enhance regional coordination in selected metropolitan areas, the features of federal programs that enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination, and how to incorporate regional coordination for emergency preparedness features from other metropolitan areas into the NCR. The report also recognizes the importance of strategic plans developed by regional organizations can be effective tools to focus resources and efforts to address problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
As requested, GAO reviewed coordination practices in various metropolitan areas to find regional programs with lessons learned that could be applied in the National Capital Region (NCR) and elsewhere. We addressed the following questions: (1) In selected metropolitan areas, what factors enhance regional coordination? (2) What features of federal programs enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination? (3) How does regional coordination for emergency preparedness in the NCR incorporate features from other areas and federal programs? For detailed analysis, we selected Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Tampa-St. Petersburg--considered by DHS to be high-threat urban areas because of their population and critical infrastructure, among other factors. We also analyzed regional coordination in the planning and implementation of transportation and environmental programs because of their history of requiring such collaboration. DHS and the District of Columbia's Deputy Mayor/City Administrator generally agreed with our report regarding the characteristics of regional coordination and that the NCR's Urban Area Security Initiative governance structure was relatively advanced.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of federal program documents and plans, and interviews with federal, state, and local officials in six metropolitan areas revealed several factors that characterize effective regional coordination of federally supported efforts. Regional coordination efforts are enhanced by the presence of a collaborative regional organization that includes representation from many different jurisdictions and different disciplines. Also, when regional civic and political traditions foster interjurisdictional coordination, flexibility in the membership and geographic area of the regional organization can enhance collaborative activities. In addition, a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals and objectives helps focus resources and efforts to address problems. Finally, funding regional organizations provides incentives for their collaborative planning activities. The federal government can provide support for regional coordination. In particular, through its grant design and requirements, it encourages structures and practices associated with effective regional efforts. For example, federal transportation law requires the existence of metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) before transportation funds can be awarded. Some programs have recognized the importance of flexibility by allowing local jurisdictions to organize themselves in ways consistent with their regional environment. For example, the DHS' Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program allowed three San Francisco Bay programs to pool some of their grant resources to establish a regionwide UASI effort. Moreover, some federal grants require regional organizations to prepare plans that guide funding decisions. Transportation law, for example, requires MPOs to prepare transportation improvement plans as a condition for awards. Finally, federal financial support can facilitate coordination activities. Several programs, including the MPO program, provide such support. The characteristics of effective regional coordination we identified are applicable to the NCR's efforts to coordinate emergency preparedness. If implemented as planned and as observed in its early stage, the NCR's UASI program would include a collaborative regional organization. However, as we reported in May 2004, the NCR did not include a full array of homeland security grants in its planning. The NCR's UASI program plans to address those issues by identifying non-UASI funding sources and collecting information about the funding allocations, expenditures, and purposes, as well as data on spending by NCR jurisdiction. DHS and UASI officials believe these data will enable program managers to avoid duplication of expenditures and to better utilize program funds. Regional approaches are changing quickly, and the nation is still in the early stages of building regional institutions across the country to deal with homeland security issues. Those important developments warrant continued congressional monitoring and oversight. |
gao_RCED-99-51 | gao_RCED-99-51_0 | Actions Taken to Implement Key Operational Recommendations
We found that the Corporation has taken actions to implement the key recommendations we believed should be completed before issuing any funding commitment letters to applicants. Specifically, the Corporation has sampled applications that were already processed to identify and correct any systemic weaknesses in its program integrity review procedures; finalized the program’s procedures, automated systems, and internal controls; and obtained a report from its independent accountants that the Corporation had suitably designed its internal controls to prevent or detect material departures from program objectives, as of November 4, 1998, in conformity with criteria set forth by the Corporation in its “Management’s Statement of Universal Service Discount Mechanism Program Objectives and Internal Control Objectives.”
In addition, the Corporation is following our recommendation to complete its special reviews of high-risk applications before issuing funding commitment letters to these applicants. One recommendation, however, still needs to be implemented: FCC needs to develop adequate goals, performance targets, and measures for the program. These represent about $1.2 billion of the $2 billion requested by all applicants for the program’s first year. In many ways, the Corporation is still in a start-up mode and continues to need help in resolving operational problems. We subsequently met with officials from the Schools and Libraries Division, the Common Carrier Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Schools and Libraries Corporation's progress in implementing GAO's July 16, 1998, recommendations for improving its procedures and internal controls.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Corporation has taken actions to implement the key recommendations that GAO believed needed to be completed prior to issuing any funding commitment letters to applicants; (2) these included: (a) sampling processed applications to identify and correct any systemic weaknesses in program integrity review procedures; (b) finalizing the program's procedures, automated systems, and internal controls; and (c) obtaining a report from its independent accountants on the suitability of the Corporation's internal controls to prevent or detect material departures from its program objectives; (3) the Corporation is taking action on GAO's recommendation to complete special reviews of high-risk applicants before issuing commitment letters to these applicants; (4) the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not yet implemented GAO's recommendation to develop adequate goals, performance targets, and measures for the program; (5) with GAO's key operational recommendations implemented, the Corporation began issuing its funding commitments for the first year to applicants in late November 1998; (6) the program still faces major challenges as it moves into new operational areas, such as reviewing and authorizing reimbursements to vendors; and (7) given the fact that the program is still essentially in a start-up mode, close oversight by FCC will be especially important in helping to identify and resolve operational problems. |
gao_GAO-12-994T | gao_GAO-12-994T_0 | DHS and the White House Have Taken Action to Enhance Biosurveillance
In December 2009, we published a report assessing DHS’s efforts to establish the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC). We reported that NBIC was not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacked key resources—data and personnel—from its partner agencies, a situation that could be at least partially attributed to collaboration challenges NBIC faced. In August 2012, DHS issued the National Biosurveillance Integration Center Strategic Plan. In June 2010, we reported on federal efforts that support a national biosurveillance capability and the extent to which mechanisms were in place to guide the development of a national biosurveillance capability. The White House did not comment on these recommendations. In July 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance to describe the U.S. government’s approach to strengthening biosurveillance. The strategy describes guiding principles, core functions, and enablers for strengthening biosurveillance. A strategic implementation plan is to be completed within 120 days of the strategy issuance. The strategy does not fully meet the intent of our June 2010 and October 2011 recommendations, as discussed later in this statement, but it is possible that it will when the implementation plan is complete. DHS Did Not Develop Critical Knowledge before Proceeding with the Gen-3 Acquisition
DHS Proceeded with the Gen-3 Acquisition before Establishing a Mission Need
DHS approved the Gen-3 acquisition in October 2009 without fully developing critical knowledge that would help ensure sound investment decision making, pursuit of optimal solutions, and reliable performance, cost, and schedule information. DHS Did Not Fully Develop Performance, Cost, and Schedule Information
In October 2009, DHS approved the Gen-3 acquisition at Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) 2A—one of the key formal decision points in DHS’s Acquisition Life-cycle Framework—based on information contained in acquisition documents provided by the BioWatch program. Further, we reported that some performance, cost, and schedule expectations presented at ADE-2A were not developed in accordance with DHS guidance and good acquisition practices—like accounting for risk in schedule and cost estimates. Specifically, certain performance requirements have been revised, the estimated date for full deployment has been delayed from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2022, and the expected life cycle cost has changed from the $2.1 billion point estimate prepared for ADE-2A to a risk-adjusted $5.8 billion estimate, calculated at the 80 percent confidence level. We recommended that before continuing the acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and alternatives and develop performance, cost, and schedule information in accordance with guidance and good acquisition practices. DHS concurred with the recommendations but plans to proceed with the next step in the acquisition—performance testing—while implementing them. Several Steps Remain before Gen-3 Is Ready for Deployment
The BioWatch program completed initial testing and evaluation on a Gen- 3 prototype technology in June 2011, but several steps remain before For example, the BioWatch Gen-3 can be deployed and operational.program must complete additional testing. Observations about Prior Strategy Recommendations and the July 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance
In the report on Gen-3 released today, we noted that beyond the uncertainty related to the costs and benefits of the planned Gen-3 approach, there is additional uncertainty about the incremental benefit of this kind of environmental monitoring as a risk mitigation activity because of its relatively limited scope. Rather, we believe the need to consider value within the larger biosurveillance enterprise as part of an effort to define mission need for a single federal program like Gen-3 provides a timely and concrete illustration of the kind of issues we sought to address with our June 2010 recommendation. The recommendation for the Homeland Security Council to direct the National Security Staff to identify a focal point to lead the development of a national biosurveillance strategy was grounded in previous work on desirable strategy characteristics for complex homeland security missions. We recognized the difficulty that decision makers and program managers in individual federal agencies face prioritizing resources to help ensure a coherent effort across a vast and dispersed interagency, intergovernmental, and intersectoral network. However, the strategy does not yet offer a mechanism to identify resource and investment needs, including investment priorities among these various efforts. Accordingly, the enterprise is still without a framework to guide the systematic identification of risk, assessment of resources needed to address those risks, and the prioritization and allocation of investment across the entire biosurveillance enterprise, as we recommended in June 2010. We are encouraged by the National Strategy for Biosurveillance and the work the White House has done to date to provide a platform for achieving a well-integrated national biosurveillance enterprise. | Why GAO Did This Study
A catastrophic biological event could have devastating consequences. The U.S. government has efforts to provide early detection and warning of biological threats. DHSs BioWatch, which aims to detect certain pathogens in the air, is one such program. DHS has been pursuing a third generation of BioWatch technology (Gen-3) to further enhance detection. GAO has published a series of reports on national biosurveillance efforts, including a report released today on DHSs efforts to acquire Gen-3. This statement discusses (1) prior biosurveillance work and related federal efforts, (2) todays report on the Gen-3 acquisition, and (3) prior strategy recommendations and the White Houses July 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance. This statement is based on GAO reports published from December 2009 to September 2012 and GAOs review of the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in relation to prior GAO recommendations for a national biosurveillance strategy.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the White House have acted to strengthen biosurveillance consistent with prior GAO recommendations made from December 2009 through October 2011.In August 2012, DHS issued a strategic plan for its National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) that officials say was written in coordination with federal partners and designed to respond to GAOs December 2009 findings that NBIC did not have key resources to carry out its mission, in part due to collaboration issues it faced. In July 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance, which describes guiding principles, core functions, and enablers for strengthening biosurveillance. In June 2010, GAO recommended a national biosurveillance strategy to provide a unifying framework for building and maintaining a national biosurveillance capability. In October 2011, GAO also recommended the strategy account for the need to leverage resources and respond to challenges while partnering with nonfederal entities. The July 2012 strategy partially responds to the issues GAO called for such a strategy to address, but does not fully address them, as discussed below. A strategic implementation plan is to be published within 120 days of strategy issuance (October 2012), and may align the strategy more fully with the array of issues GAO identified.
DHS approved the Generation-3 (Gen-3) acquisition in October 2009, but it did not fully engage its acquisition framework to ensure that the acquisition was grounded in a justified mission need and that it pursued an optimal solution. The performance, schedule, and cost expectations presented in required documents when DHS approved the acquisition were not developed in accordance with DHS guidance and good acquisition practiceslike accounting for risk in schedule and cost estimates. Since October 2009, the estimated date for full deployment has been delayed from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2022. The 2009 life-cycle cost estimatea point estimate unadjusted for riskwas $2.1 billion. In June 2011, DHS provided a risk-adjusted estimate at the 80 percent confidence level of $5.8 billion. Several steps remain before DHS can fully deploy Gen-3 including additional performance testing, operational testing, and developing location specific deployment plans.
The White Houses National Strategy for Biosurveillance serves as a foundation for enterprisewide efforts and begins to define mission, goals, and objectives, as we called for in making the June 2010 strategy recommendation; however, the strategy does not yet offer the mechanism GAO recommended to identify resource and investment needs, including investment priorities. Accordingly, the biosurveillance enterprise remains without a framework to guide the systematic identification of risk, assessment of resources needed to address those risks, and the prioritization and allocation of investment across the entire enterprise. In recommending a national strategy, GAO recognized the challenges individual federal programs and agencies face prioritizing resources to help ensure a coherent effort across the dispersed biosurveillance enterprise. Todays report on Gen-3 offers a timely and concrete example of this challengeto assess the extent to which Gen-3 warrants the investment of scarce resources when the incremental value of the environmental monitoring Gen-3 offers is considered as part of a layered biosurveillance strategy.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO made biosurveillance recommendations to DHS and the White House Homeland Security Council. DHS concurred with prior recommendations. The White House did not comment. In todays report, GAO recommended that before continuing the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and alternatives and update associated performance, schedule, and cost information. DHS concurred but stated it plans to reevaluate the acquisition and pursue performance testing concurrently. We believe DHS should first develop the critical information we recommended. |
gao_GAO-08-845 | gao_GAO-08-845_0 | Since the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, its earnings have been extremely volatile. U.S. Airlines’ Financial Condition Has Improved, but It Appears to Be Short- lived
The U.S. passenger airline industry has generally improved its financial condition in recent years, but its recovery appears short-lived because of rapidly increasing fuel prices. The U.S. airline industry recorded a net operating profit of $2.2 billion and $2.8 billion in 2006 and 2007, respectively, the first time since 2000 that it had earned a profit. Since 2004, legacy airlines have shifted portions of their domestic capacity to more profitable international routes. For example, Northwest Airlines pilots agreed to two pay cuts—15 percent in 2004 and an additional 23.9 percent in 2006, while in bankruptcy—to help the airline dramatically reduce operating expenses. Although the industry saw profits in 2007 and some were predicting even larger profits in 2008, experts and industry analysts now estimate that the industry could incur significant losses in 2008. Domestic Airline Competition Increased from 1998 through 2006, as Low- Cost Airlines Expanded
Competition within the U.S. domestic airline market increased from 1998 through 2006 as reflected by an increase in the average number of competitors in the top 5,000 city-pair markets, the presence of low-cost airlines in more of these markets, lower fares, fewer dominated city-pair markets, and a shrinking dominance by a single airline at some of the nation’s largest airports. Overall, the average number of effective competitors—any airline that carries at least 5 percent of the traffic in that market—in the top 5,000 markets rose from 2.9 in 1998 to 3.3 in 2006. In all, the growth of low-cost airlines into more markets and providing service to more passengers contributed to the shift in passenger traffic between legacy and low-cost airlines. Of the 16 airports dominated by a single airline, 14 were dominated by legacy airlines. Airlines Seek to Combine to Increase Profits and Improve Financial Viability, but Challenges Exist
Airlines seek mergers and acquisitions as a means to increase profitability and long-term financial viability, but must weigh those potential benefits against the operational and regulatory costs and challenges posed by combinations. Airline Mergers and Acquisitions Aim to Increase Profitability by Reducing Costs and Increasing Revenues
A merger or acquisition may produce cost savings by enabling an airline to reduce or eliminate duplicative operating costs. Airlines may also seek to merge with or acquire an airline as a way to generate greater revenues from an expanded network, which serves more city-pair markets, better serves passengers, and thus enhances competition. The integration of two disparate aircraft fleets may also be costly. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Review Is a Critical Step in the Airline Merger and Acquisition Process
The DOJ’s review of airline mergers and acquisitions is a key step for airlines hoping to consummate a merger. Additionally, the Guidelines have evolved to provide clarity as to the consideration of efficiencies, an important factor in airline mergers. The Department of Justice Uses the Guidelines to Identify Antitrust Concerns
Most proposed mergers or acquisitions must be reviewed by DOJ. DOJ estimated that the merger would have resulted in higher air fares for businesses and millions of customers. In making its decision as to whether the proposed merger is likely anticompetitive—whether it is likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise—DOJ considers the particular circumstances of the merger as it relates to the Guidelines’ five-part inquiry. Increased Competition Indicates That Airline Entry May Be More Likely than in the Past
A variety of characteristics of the current airline marketplace indicate that airline entry into markets vacated by a merger partner may be more likely than in the past, unless higher fuel prices substantially alter recent competitive trends in the industry. Both DOT and DOJ officials provided some clarifying and technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To review the financial condition of the U.S. airline industry, we analyzed financial and operational data, reviewed relevant studies, and interviewed industry experts. To identify the key factors that airlines consider in deciding whether to merge with or acquire another airline, we reviewed relevant studies and interviewed industry experts. Related GAO Products
Airline Deregulation: Reregulating the Airline Industry Would Likely Reverse Consumer Benefits and Not Save Airline Pensions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The airline industry is vital to the U.S. economy, generating operating revenues of nearly $172 billion in 2007, amounting to over 1 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. It serves as an important engine for economic growth and a critical link in the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying more than 700 million passengers in 2007. Airline deregulation in 1978, led, at least in part, to increasingly volatile airline profitability, resulting in periods of significant losses and bankruptcies. In response, some airlines have proposed or are considering merging with or acquiring another airline. GAO was asked to help prepare Congress for possible airline mergers or acquisitions. This report describes (1) the financial condition of the U.S. passenger airline industry, (2) whether the industry is becoming more or less competitive, (3) why airlines seek to merge with or acquire other airlines, and (4) the role of federal authorities in reviewing proposed airline mergers and acquisitions. To answer these objectives, we analyzed Department of Transportation (DOT) financial and operating data; interviewed agency officials, airline managers, and industry experts; and reviewed Horizontal Merger Guidelines and spoke with antitrust experts. DOT and the Department of Justice (DOJ) provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The U.S. passenger airline industry was profitable in 2006 and 2007 for the first time since 2000, but this recovery appears short-lived because of rapidly increasing fuel costs. Legacy airlines (airlines that predate deregulation in 1978) generally returned to modest profitability in 2006 and 2007 by reducing domestic capacity, focusing on more profitable markets, and reducing long-term debt. Low-cost airlines (airlines that entered after deregulation), meanwhile, continued to be profitable. Airlines, particularly legacy airlines, were also able to reduce costs, especially through bankruptcy- and near-bankruptcy-related employee contract, pay, and pension plan changes. Recent industry forecasts indicate that the industry is likely to incur substantial losses in 2008 owing to high fuel prices. Competition within the U.S. domestic airline industry increased from 1998 through 2006, as reflected by an increase in the number of competitors in city-to-city (city-pair) markets, the presence of low-cost airlines in more of those markets, lower air fares, fewer dominated markets, and a shrinking dominance by a single airline at some of the nation's largest airports. The average number of competitors in the largest 5,000 city-pair markets rose to 3.3 in 2006 from 2.9 in 1998. This growth is attributable to the increased presence of low-cost airlines, which increased nearly 60 percent. In addition, the number of largest 5,000 markets dominated by a single airline declined by 15 percent. Airlines seek to merge with or acquire other airlines with the intention of increasing their profitability and financial sustainability, but must weigh these potential benefits against operational and regulatory costs and challenges. The principal benefits airlines consider are cost reductions--by combining complementary assets, eliminating duplicate activities, and reducing capacity--and increased revenues from higher fares in existing markets and increased demand for more seamless travel to more destinations. Balanced against these potential benefits are operational costs of integrating workforces, aircraft fleets, and systems. In addition, because most airline mergers and acquisitions are reviewed by DOJ, the relevant antitrust enforcement agency, airlines must consider the risks of DOJ opposition. Both DOJ and DOT play a role in reviewing airline mergers and acquisitions, but DOJ's determination as to whether a proposed merger is likely substantially to lessen competition is key. DOJ uses an integrated analytical framework set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines to make its determination. Under that process, DOJ assesses the extent of likely anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets, in this case, airline city-pair markets. DOJ further considers the likelihood that airlines entering these markets would counteract any anticompetitive effects. It also considers any efficiencies that a merger or acquisition could bring--for example, consumer benefits from an expanded route network. Our analysis of changes in the airline industry, such as increased competition and the growth of low-cost airlines, indicates that airline entry may be more likely now than in the past provided recent increases in fuel costs do not reverse these conditions. Additionally, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have evolved to provide clarity as to the consideration of efficiencies, an important factor in airline mergers. |
gao_NSIAD-98-230 | gao_NSIAD-98-230_0 | Uncertainty Regarding Navy’s Adherence to Site Selection Criteria and Assessment of Costs Associated With Competing Locations
In reviewing CINCLANTFLT’s recommendation of NWS Earle for the new command headquarters, we could not be certain to what extent the Navy had fully considered its stated criteria to evaluate or compare alternate sites because documentation to support the Navy’s decision was limited. Cost Estimates for Establishing the Command at NWS Earle May Be Understated
CINCLANTFLT did perform analyses sufficient to estimate the cost to establish the command at NWS Earle at $1.89 million. Various Operating Factors Raise Issues About Whether NWS Earle Is the Optimal Location for the New Headquarters
In examining mission and support requirements of the new command, we found that the NWS Earle location raises two basic operational limitations when compared to the current location at NSB New London or the facilities at Newport. These limitations relate to increased travel time and costs associated with operating from that location and the adequacy of existing facility infrastructure to support the new headquarters relative to at least the NSB New London and Newport locations. Staff Travel Time and Costs Could Be Greater Operating From NWS Earle
According to CINCLANTFLT’s Fact and Justification Sheet, the proposed mission of the Commander, Navy Region Northeast, would primarily involve management and oversight of the widely dispersed naval shore activities in the northeast region. Therefore, it is not clear that NWS Earle provides a geographic advantage over other locations. Moreover, we noted that by moving the new command away from NSB New London, the Navy would be separating the command from other regional activities currently located at NSB New London, including the Regional Supply Coalition and the Regional Emergency Command Center. Our draft report raised questions about the extent to which the Navy had followed its own criteria regarding the establishment of shore activities since we could not be certain to what extent the Navy met its stipulated requirements because the Navy had limited documentation to support its analyses. We also visited and interviewed officials at NWS Earle, New Jersey, and the naval base at Newport, Rhode Island, to determine how the command would be accommodated if relocated to these locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Navy's site selection process for its northeast regional command; (2) the extent to which the Navy fully evaluated the costs and implications of establishing a new command at the Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Earle, New Jersey, versus the Naval Submarine Base (NSB) New London, Connecticut or the Naval Undersea Warfare Center located at Newport, Rhode Island; (3) the extent to which the Navy followed its criteria for establishing shore activities and the extent to which it fully analyzed prospective costs of the three sites; and (4) location and infrastructure factors that would affect costs and operations of the new command at each of the three locations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) weaknesses exist in the Navy's process for selecting the location for the headquarters for its new northeast regional command; (2) in selecting NWS Earle, it is not clear to what extent the Navy followed its own criteria for the establishment, disestablishment, or modification of shore activities or fully assessed the comparative costs of establishing and operating the new headquarters at all sites it had indicated were under consideration; (3) the costs to establish the command at NWS Earle may be greater than the Navy estimated; (4) the NWS Earle site has some basic operational limitations compared with at least two other sites, including NSB New London and Newport; (5) these limitations relate to facilities' infrastructure to support the new command and increased travel time and costs associated with operating from NWS Earle; (6) the Navy stated that it needs a flag rank command closer to New York City to attain certain operational benefits; and (7) while this need may be appropriate, questions exist about: (a) how often the need to visit New York City arises; (b) whether the NWS Earle location provides a significant reduction in travel time compared with travel from the current location at NSB New London; and (c) whether it is desirable to separate the new command from other centralized support activities located at NSB New London. |
gao_GAO-12-1009T | gao_GAO-12-1009T_0 | DHS Has Made Substantial Progress in Improving Maritime Security
Our work has shown that DHS and its component agencies—particularly the Coast Guard and CBP—have made substantial progress in implementing various programs that, collectively, have improved maritime security. In general, our maritime security-related work has addressed four areas: (1) national and port-level security planning, (2) port facility and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information sharing, and (4) international supply chain security. Developing port-level security plans: The Coast Guard has developed Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP) around the country to enhance the security of domestic ports. These security plan reviews and inspections have
Conducting vessel crew screenings: To enhance the security of port facilities, both CBP and the Coast Guard receive and screen advance information on commercial vessels and their crew before they arrive at U.S. ports and assess risks based on this information. Maritime Domain Awareness and Information Sharing
DHS has worked with its component agencies to increase maritime domain awareness and taken steps to (1) conduct risk assessments, (2) establish area security committees, (3) implement a vessel tracking system, and (4) better share information with other law enforcement agencies through interagency operations centers. In addition, in July 2011, CBP developed the Small Vessel Reporting System to better track small boats arriving from foreign locations and deployed this system to eight field locations. International Supply Chain Security
DHS and its component agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities intended to improve the security of the international supply chain, including: enhancing cargo screening and inspections, deploying new cargo screening technologies to better detect contraband, implementing programs to inspect U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, partnering with the trade industry, and engaging with international partners. Challenges Have Hindered Implementation of Maritime Security Programs
DHS and its component agencies have encountered a number of challenges in implementing programs and activities to enhance maritime security since the enactment of MTSA in 2002. In general, these challenges are related to (1) program management and implementation; (2) partnerships and collaboration; (3) resources, funding, and sustainability; and (4) performance measures. However, as we reported in July 2003, CBP initially did not have a strategic plan or workforce plan for this security program, which are essential to long-term success and accountability. Inadequate acquisitions management: DHS has also experienced challenges managing some of its acquisition programs. Budget and funding constraints: Budget and funding decisions also affect the implementation of maritime security programs. For example, within the constrained fiscal environment that the federal government is operating, the Coast Guard has had to prioritize its activities and Coast Guard data indicate that some units are not able to meet self- imposed standards related to certain security activities—including boarding and escorting vessels. For example, we reported in November 2011 that the Coast Guard developed a measure to report its performance in reducing maritime risk, but faced challenges using this measure to inform decisions. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency responsible for implementing MTSA requirements and related maritime security programs. DHS relies on a number of its component agencies that have responsibilities related to maritime security, including the following:
U.S. Coast Guard: The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. maritime interests and leading homeland security efforts in the maritime domain. This appendix is based primarily on GAO reports and testimonies issued from August 2002 through July 2012 related to maritime, port, vessel, and cargo security efforts of the federal government, and other aspects of implementing MTSA-related security requirements. The appendix also includes selected updates—conducted in August 2012—to the information provided in these previously-issued products on the actions DHS and its component agencies have taken to address recommendations made in these products and the obligations for key programs and activities through May 2012. National Strategy for Maritime Security
We were unable to obtain funding information for this strategy. Area Maritime Security Plans
Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSPs) are developed by the Coast Guard with input from applicable governmental and private entities and these plans serve as the primary means to identify and coordinate Coast Guard procedures related to prevention, protection, and security response. Our work also found areas for improvement as well. For example, in February 2008 we made recommendations to help ensure effective implementation of MTSA-required facility inspections. GAO-10-400. Such activities fall under the Coast Guard’s ports, waterways and coastal security mission. DHS generally concurred with the recommendation and is in the process of implementing it. Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ports, waterways, and vessels handle billions of dollars in cargo annually and an attack on this maritime transportation system could impact the global economy. November 2012 marks the 10-year anniversary of MTSA, which required a wide range of security improvements. DHS is the lead federal department responsible for implementing MTSA and it relies on its component agencies, such as the Coast Guard and CBP, to help implement the act. The Coast Guard is responsible for U.S. maritime security interests and CBP is responsible for screening arriving vessel crew and cargo. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on implementation of MTSA requirements over the last decade and addresses (1) progress the federal government has made in improving maritime security and (2) key challenges that DHS and its component agencies have encountered in implementing maritime security-related programs. GAO was unable to identify all related federal spending, but estimated funding for certain programs. For example, from 2004 through May 2012, CBP obligated over $390 million to fund its program to partner with companies to review the security of their supply chains. This statement is based on GAO products issued from August 2002 through July 2012, as well as updates on the status of recommendations made and budget data obtained in August 2012.
What GAO Found
GAO's work has shown that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its component agencies, particularly the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have made substantial progress in implementing various programs that, collectively, have improved maritime security. In general, GAO's work on maritime security programs falls under four areas: (1) security planning, (2) port facility and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information sharing, and (4) international supply chain security. DHS has, among other things, developed various maritime security programs and strategies and has implemented and exercised security plans. For example, the Coast Guard has developed Area Maritime Security Plans around the country to identify and coordinate Coast Guard procedures related to prevention, protection, and security response at domestic ports. In addition, to enhance the security of U.S. ports, the Coast Guard has implemented programs to conduct annual inspections of port facilities. To enhance the security of vessels, both CBP and the Coast Guard receive and screen advance information on commercial vessels and their crews before they arrive at U.S. ports and prepare risk assessments based on this information. Further, DHS and its component agencies have increased maritime domain awareness and have taken steps to better share information by improving risk management and implementing a vessel tracking system, among other things. For example, in July 2011, CBP developed the Small Vessel Reporting System to better track small boats arriving from foreign locations and deployed this system to eight field locations. DHS and its component agencies have also taken actions to improve international supply chain security, including developing new technologies to detect contraband, implementing programs to inspect U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and establishing partnerships with the trade industry community and foreign governments.
Although DHS and its components have made substantial progress, they have encountered challenges in implementing initiatives and programs to enhance maritime security since the enactment of the Maritime Security Transportation Act (MTSA) in 2002 in the areas of: (1) program management and implementation; (2) partnerships and collaboration; (3) resources, funding, and sustainability; and (4) performance measures. For example, CBP designed and implemented an initiative that placed CBP staff at foreign seaports to work with host nation customs officials to identify high-risk, U.S.-bound container cargo, but CBP initially did not have a strategic or workforce plan to guide its efforts. Further, the Coast Guard faced collaboration challenges when developing and implementing its information management system for enhancing information sharing with key federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies because it did not systematically solicit input from these stakeholders. Budget and funding decisions have also affected the implementation of maritime security programs. For example, Coast Guard data indicate that some of its units are not able to meet self-imposed standards related to certain security activities--including boarding and escorting vessels. In addition, DHS has experienced challenges in developing effective performance measures for assessing the progress of its maritime security programs. For example, the Coast Guard developed a performance measure to assess its performance in reducing maritime risk, but has faced challenges using this measure to inform decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports and testimonies to strengthen its maritime security programs. DHS generally concurred and has implemented or is in the process of implementing them. |
gao_GAO-09-989 | gao_GAO-09-989_0 | Within Consular Affairs, the directorate of Overseas Citizen Services in Washington, D.C., is charged with protecting and providing services to U.S. citizens abroad. Overseas, emergency services are provided by State’s 267 embassies and consulates in 174 countries. State Provides a Variety of Emergency Services to Americans Abroad
State provides an extensive range of around-the-clock services to Americans in need of emergency assistance overseas. Emergency Assistance Provided at All Hours
Emergency assistance to American citizens is available and provided by posts at any time of day or night. Travel and Emergency Information Is Provided by Consular Affairs through Several Mechanisms
Consular Affairs provides information to travelers and Americans living overseas through several of mechanisms. Embassies and consulates also maintain a warden system for American citizens living overseas. Based on a random sample of embassy and consulate Web sites, we estimate that 14 percent had the post’s phone number on the main page of its Web site. State’s Ability to Provide Emergency Services Depends on Having Trained and Experienced Consular Staff
State relies on a cadre of trained consular staff to provide assistance to U.S. citizens in need of emergency services. Some staff may rotate through the ACS section at a larger post, whereas at smaller posts, the consular officer may be the sole provider of all consular services, including emergency services. LES are a key component of posts’ provision of emergency services, as is State’s ability to move both FSOs and LES from post to post when emergencies arise. State provides guidance, training, and other resources to ensure staff are able to carry out these services. As a result, the bureau does not know the global demand for its services or if it is allocating its resources effectively. For example, reporting weaknesses and unclear guidance associated with the ACS system prevent posts from monitoring and evaluating their workload or using the data to make management decisions. Although State shifts consular resources to meet emergency service demands, such as in the case of the Mumbai bombings, resource allocation, training, and planning decisions may not be based on a clear understanding of global workload. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the Bureau of Consular Affairs has accurate and reliable data from the mechanisms used to monitor and evaluate its provision of emergency services worldwide, and therefore make informed resource allocation decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Bureau of Consular Affairs to take the following two actions: provide guidance on the information to be entered into the ACS system to ensure that data are consistently captured across posts and accurately reflect workload, and improve functionality in the ACS system so that Consular Affairs and posts can use the system more effectively. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the emergency services that the Department of State (State) provides U.S. citizens, (2) how State is prepared to assist U.S. citizens in need of emergency services, and (3) how State monitors the assistance it provides U.S. citizens in need of emergency services. To describe the services State provides to U.S. citizens who are the victims of crimes, suffer accidents, or otherwise need emergency services overseas, we interviewed State officials from the Bureau of Consular Affairs, including officials from the Office of Overseas Citizens Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, the Department of State (State) estimated nearly 5 million U.S. citizens lived overseas, and 64 million trips were taken overseas by U.S. citizens. Since protecting and serving U.S. citizens abroad are among State's chief priorities, State must be prepared to provide emergency assistance to Americans abroad. This report describes (1) what services State provides to U.S. citizens who are the victims of crimes, suffer accidents, or otherwise need emergency services; (2) how State is prepared to assist U.S. citizens who are in need of emergency services; and (3) how State monitors the assistance it provides to U.S. citizens in need of emergency services.
What GAO Found
State provides a number of emergency services to American citizens abroad through its network of 267 embassies and consulates in 174 countries. State's emergency services cover circumstances including deaths, arrests, medical or financial concerns, crime, and missing persons' cases. State provides emergency assistance to Americans at all hours, and provides information such as travel warnings to travelers and U.S. citizens living overseas through a variety of mechanisms, including the department's embassy and consulate Web sites. However, our review of a random sample of posts' Web sites found that only 14 percent had emergency phone numbers on the Web sites' main page. State also maintains a warden system to disseminate information from the embassy to U.S. citizens living in the country, and can send messages directly to Americans who provide contact information to the department. State has trained staff dedicated to providing emergency assistance overseas as well as in Washington, D.C. Depending on the size of the post, American Citizen Services (ACS) may be provided by multiple staff, or a single consular officer serving as the sole provider of all consular services including emergency services. Locally engaged staff are a key component of posts' provision of emergency services, as is State's ability to deploy staff where needed when emergencies arise. State provides guidance, largely through the Foreign Affairs Manual, formal on-the-job training, and other resources to ensure staff are able to carry out these services. The Bureau of Consular Affairs has a variety of mechanisms to monitor its provision of emergency services; however, all of these mechanisms have limitations and, as a result, Consular Affairs cannot be assured it is allocating its resources effectively. The ACS system, which is intended to track emergency services provided by posts, and the consular package, which provides post-specific workload information to guide consular resource allocations, both contain unreliable data. For example, reporting weaknesses and unclear guidance associated with the ACS system prevent posts from accurately monitoring and evaluating their workload or using the data to make management decisions. Although State shifts its consular resources to meet emergency demands, absent current and reliable data on the worldwide demand for emergency services, Consular Affairs may not make decisions based on a clear understanding of the global workload. |
gao_GAO-04-602 | gao_GAO-04-602_0 | Along with their primary water, power, resource, and other management and regulatory responsibilities, these agencies are responsible under various laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions for protecting, mitigating, and enhancing fish and wildlife resources in the basin, as well as involving the tribes in the process. A Multilayered Collection of Directives Defines Federal Responsibilities to Fish, Wildlife, and Tribes in the Columbia River Basin
Federal responsibilities for protecting, mitigating, and enhancing fish and wildlife resources in the basin, as well as involving the tribes in the process, are defined by a multilayered collection of laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions. Federal responsibilities and activities under these layers of directives have been defined and clarified over the years through numerous court decisions. Agency Responsibilities Are Defined by Nationwide, Basin-specific, and Mission-specific Fish and Wildlife Directives
Federal agencies are responsible under nationwide, basin-specific, and agency mission-specific laws for mitigating the impacts of their activities that could potentially harm fish, wildlife, and their habitat. Treaties and executive orders also establish federal agency responsibilities for fish and wildlife. These decisions provide guidance regarding the fish and wildlife activities of federal agencies such as Bonneville, the Corps, and NMFS. Multiple Plans and Programs Guide Federal Fish and Wildlife Activities in the Basin
Federal agency fish and wildlife activities in the basin are guided by numerous plans and programs, but the majority of fish and wildlife benefits are achieved through a few key collaborative plans, driven by the Northwest Power Act and the ESA. Under the Northwest Power Act, the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program outlines a collaborative strategy for benefiting fish and wildlife affected by the development and operation of hydroelectric dams in the Columbia River Basin, and under the ESA, agencies are guided by biological opinions developed collaboratively by FWS and NMFS for the recovery of threatened and endangered species, as well as by two other related collaborative plans. Additional laws and specific agency missions drive numerous other collaborative and individual fish and wildlife plans and programs. The Northwest Power Act directs Bonneville to fund the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife in a manner consistent with the act. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided copies of our draft report to the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, the Interior, as well as Bonneville and EPA. Bonneville and the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce provided official written comments. We made changes to the report, where appropriate, based on the technical comments provided by the three entities that commented on the report. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments in time to be included in this report. Scope and Methodology
To identify and describe the laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions that define the responsibilities of the Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville) and other federal agencies to perform activities benefiting fish and wildlife in the Columbia River Basin and involve tribes in the process, we reviewed our prior report on salmon and steelhead recovery activities in the Columbia River Basin for 11 agencies with significant responsibility for fish and wildlife in the Pacific Northwest. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) within the Department of the Interior; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) within the Department of Defense; the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within the Department of Commerce; and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In accordance with our policy to refrain from addressing matters that are in litigation, we did not examine or report on any issues that are before the court. | Why GAO Did This Study
Numerous federal agencies conduct water, power, or resource management activities affecting the fish and wildlife of the Columbia River Basin, as well as the 13 tribes residing there. These agencies, such as the Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville), Army Corps of Engineers, and Forest Service, and regulatory agencies, such as the National Marine Fisheries Service, are also responsible for protecting, sustaining, and enhancing fish and wildlife resources in the basin and involving the tribes in the process. Recently, Bonneville's financial position deteriorated significantly, and some tribes in the basin challenged Bonneville's actions modifying funding of fish and wildlife activities in federal court. In this context, GAO agreed to (1) identify and describe the laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions that define federal responsibilities to perform activities benefiting fish and wildlife in the basin and involve the tribes, and (2) describe the plans and programs that guide these respective fish and wildlife activities. In accordance with our policy to refrain from addressing matters that are in litigation, GAO did not examine any issues that are before the court.
What GAO Found
Federal responsibilities for protecting, mitigating, and enhancing fish and wildlife resources in the basin, as well as involving the tribes in the process, are defined by a multi-layered collection of laws, treaties, executive orders, and court decisions. Nationwide, basin-specific, and agency mission-specific laws create responsibilities for federal agencies to mitigate the impacts of federal activities that could potentially harm fish, wildlife, and their habitat. For example, the Endangered Species Act establishes nationwide responsibilities for agencies to protect listed species, while the Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act) establishes responsibilities in the basin to mitigate the impacts of hydropower development, and each agency has mission-related responsibilities to fish and wildlife, such as the Forest Service's responsibilities under the National Forest Management Act. Regarding tribes, federal agencies must consult and collaborate with Indian tribes on fish and wildlife activities that may impact tribal rights established under various treaties and executive orders. Federal responsibilities and activities under these laws, treaties, and executive orders have been defined and clarified over the years through numerous court decisions. Federal agency fish and wildlife activities in the basin are guided by numerous plans and programs, but the majority of fish and wildlife activities are driven by the Northwest Power Act and the Endangered Species Act. Under the Northwest Power Act, the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program addresses all fish and wildlife impacted by the Federal Columbia River Power System, and under the Endangered Species Act, agencies are guided by the biological opinions developed by the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the protection of threatened and endangered species, as well as two other related collaborative plans. Agency participation in these key efforts varies widely, from mandatory funding of fish and wildlife activities to voluntary collaboration on the design of activities, but interagency collaboration is essential to successful implementation of these activities. In addition, other laws and specific agency missions drive numerous other collaborative and individual fish and wildlife activities. We provided copies of our draft report to the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, the Interior, as well as Bonneville and the Environmental Protection Agency. Bonneville and the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce provided official written comments. The comments were generally technical in nature and we made changes to the report, where appropriate. The Department of Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency had no comments on the report. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments in time to be included in this report. |
gao_GAO-06-598T | gao_GAO-06-598T_0 | For these reasons, we designated the implementation of the department and its transformation as high risk; we also pointed out that failure to effectively address DHS’s management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for our national security. In addition, these organizations establish these controls and capabilities within a governance structure that centralizes leadership in an empowered CIO. DHS Is Making Progress but Has Yet to Fully Institutionalize IT Management Controls and Capabilities
Over the last 3 years, our work has shown that the department has continued to work to establish effective corporate governance and associated IT management controls and capabilities, but progress in each of the key areas has been uneven, and more remains to be accomplished. Until it fully institutionalizes effective governance controls and capabilities, it will be challenged in its ability to leverage IT to support transformation and mission results. Enterprise Architecture
Leading organizations recognize the importance of having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an authoritative operational and technical frame of reference to guide and constrain IT investments. With respect to the depth and detail of these descriptions (which are the focus of most of our 41 prior recommendations), the department has reported progress, such as (1) completing its first inventory of information technology systems, a key input to its description of the “as-is” environment; (2) establishing departmentwide technology standards; (3) developing and beginning to implement a plan for introducing a shared services orientation to the architecture, particularly with regard to information services (e.g., network, data center, e-mail, help desk, and video operations); and (4) finalizing content for the portion of its architecture that relates to certain border security functions (e.g., the alien detention and removal process that is a major facet of the department’s new Strategic Border Initiative). IT Investment Management
Through IT investment management, organizations define and follow a corporate process to help senior leadership make informed decisions on competing options for investing in IT. Systems Development and Acquisition Management
Managing systems development and acquisition effectively requires applying engineering and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing and acquiring, testing, deploying, and maintaining IT systems and services. Information Security Management
Effective information security management depends on establishing a comprehensive program to protect the information and information systems that support an organization’s operations and assets. Since it was established, both we and the department’s inspector general (IG) have reported that although the department continues to improve its IT security, it remains a major management challenge For example, within its first year the department had appointed a chief information security officer and developed and disseminated information system security policies and procedures, but it had not completed a comprehensive inventory of its major IT systems—a prerequisite for effective security management. . DHS Is Making Some Progress in Implementing IT Systems and Infrastructure
A gauge of DHS’s progress in managing its IT investments is the extent to which it has deployed and is currently operating more modern IT systems and infrastructure. To the department’s credit, our reviews have shown progress in these areas, and DHS has reported other progress. In summary, they show that DHS IT programs are not being managed consistently: some programs are at least partially implementing certain program management best practices, but others are largely disregarding most of the practices. IT investment alignment with the enterprise architecture. Reliable cost estimates. For example, they did not include detailed work breakdown structures defining the work to be performed, so that associated costs could be identified and estimated. Implementing the IT management processes that I have been describing requires that programs have the right people—not only people who have the right knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also enough of them to do the job. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information technology (IT) is a critical tool for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), not only in performing its mission today, but also in transforming how it will do so in the future. In light of the importance of this transformation and the magnitude of the associated challenges, GAO has designated the implementation of the department and its transformation as high risk. GAO has reported that in order to effectively leverage IT as a transformation tool, DHS needs to establish certain institutional management controls and capabilities, such as having an enterprise architecture and making informed portfolio-based decisions across competing IT investments. GAO has also reported that it is critical for the department to implement these controls and associated best practices on its many IT investments. In its past work, GAO has made numerous recommendations on DHS institutional controls and on individual IT investment projects. The testimony is based on GAO's body of work in these areas, covering the state of DHS IT management both on the institutional level and the individual program level.
What GAO Found
DHS continues to work to institutionalize IT management controls and capabilities (disciplines) across the department. Among these are (1) having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT investments; (2) defining and following a corporate process for informed decision making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options; (3) applying system and software development and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; (4) establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect its information and systems; (5) having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and (6) centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer. Over the last 3 years, the department has made efforts to establish and implement these IT management disciplines, but it has more to do. Despite progress, for instance, in developing its enterprise architecture and its investment management processes, much work remains before these and the other disciplines are fully mature and institutionalized. For example, although the department recently completed a comprehensive inventory of its major information systems--a prerequisite for effective security management--it has not fully implemented a comprehensive information security program, and its other institutional IT disciplines are still evolving. The department also has more to do in deploying and operating IT systems and infrastructure in support of core mission operations, such as border and aviation security. For example, a system to identify and screen visitors entering the country has been deployed and is operating, but a related exit capability largely is not. Also, a government-run system to prescreen domestic airline passengers is not yet in place. Similarly, some infrastructure has been delivered, but goals related to consolidating networks and e-mail systems, for example, remain to be fully accomplished. Similarly, GAO's review of key nonfinancial systems show that DHS has more to do before the IT disciplines discussed above are consistently employed. For example, these programs have not consistently employed reliable cost estimating practices, effective requirements development and test management, meaningful performance measurement, strategic workforce management, and proactive risk management, among other recognized program management best practices. Until the department fully establishes and consistently implements the full range of IT management disciplines embodied in best practices and federal guidance, it will be challenged in its ability to manage and deliver programs. |
gao_GAO-03-999T | gao_GAO-03-999T_0 | The agreement prescribes prevention and cleanup measures to improve environmental conditions in the Great Lakes. Many Federal and State Programs Fund Restoration Activities in the Great Lakes Basin
About 200 programs—148 federal and 51 state—fund restoration activities within the Great Lakes Basin. Most of these programs, however, involve the localized application of national or state environmental initiatives and do not specifically focus on basin concerns. While these broadly scoped federal and state programs contribute to basin restoration, program officials do not track or try to isolate the portion of funding directed toward specific areas, such as the basin, which makes it difficult to determine their contributions to total Great Lakes spending. However, basin-specific information was available on some of these programs. Officials from seven federal agencies identified 33 Great Lakes specific programs that had expenditures of $387 million in fiscal years 1992 through 2001. In lieu of such a plan, organizations at the binational, federal, and state levels have developed their own strategies for the Great Lakes, which have inadvertently made the coordination of the various programs operating in the basin more challenging. The strategic plan developed for the South Florida ecosystem by the task force made substantial progress in guiding the restoration activities. Although there are many strategies and coordination efforts ongoing, no one organization coordinates restoration efforts. The ultimate responsibility for coordinating Great Lakes restoration programs rests with GLNPO; however, GLNPO has not fully exercised this authority. Specifically, the act directs EPA to coordinate the actions of EPA’s headquarters and regional offices aimed at improving Great Lakes water quality. To improve coordination of Great Lakes activities and ensure that federal dollars are effectively spent, we recommended that the Administrator, EPA, ensure that GLNPO fulfills its responsibility for coordinating programs within the Great Lakes Basin; charge GLNPO with developing, in consultation with the governors of the Great Lakes states, federal agencies, and other organizations, an overarching strategy that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities for coordinating and prioritizing funding for projects; and submit a time-phased funding requirement proposal to the Congress necessary to implement the strategy. Recent assessments of overall progress, which rely on a mix of quantitative data and subjective judgments, do not provide an adequate basis for making an overall assessment. To fulfill the need for a monitoring system called for in the GLWQA and to ensure that the limited funds available are optimally spent, we recommended that the Administrator, EPA, in coordination with Canadian officials and as part of an overarching Great Lakes strategy, (1) develop environmental indicators and a monitoring system for the Great Lakes Basin that can be used to measure overall restoration progress and (2) require that these indicators be used to evaluate, prioritize, and make funding decisions on the merits of alternative restoration projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The five Great Lakes, which comprise the largest system of freshwater in the world, are threatened on many environmental fronts. To address the extent of progress made in restoring the Great Lakes Basin, which includes the lakes and surrounding area, GAO (1) identified the federal and state environmental programs operating in the basin and the funding devoted to them, (2) evaluated the restoration strategies used and how they are coordinated, and (3) assessed overall environmental progress made in the basin restoration effort.
What GAO Found
There are 148 federal and 51 state programs funding environmental restoration activities in the Great Lakes Basin. Most of these programs are nationwide or statewide programs that do not specifically focus on the Great Lakes. However, several programs specifically address environmental conditions in the Great Lakes. GAO identified 33 federal Great Lakes specific programs, and states funded 17 additional unique Great Lakes specific programs. Although Great Lakes funding is not routinely tracked for many of these programs, we identified a total of about $3.7 billion in basin-specific projects for fiscal years 1992 through 2001. GAO identified several Great Lakes environmental strategies being used at the binational, federal, and state levels. These strategies are not coordinated or unified in a fashion comparable to other large restoration projects, such as the South Florida ecosystem. Without an overarching plan for these strategies, it is difficult to determine overall progress. The Water Quality Act of 1987 charged EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office with the responsibility for coordinating federal actions for improving the Great Lakes' water quality, however, it has not fully exercised this authority to this point. With available information, it is not possible to comprehensively assess restoration progress in the Great Lakes. Current indicators rely on limited quantitative data and subjective judgments to determine whether conditions are improving, such as whether fish are safe to eat. The ultimate success of an ongoing binational effort to develop a set of overall indicators for the Great Lakes is uncertain because it relies on the resources voluntarily provided by several organizations. Further, no date for completing a final list of indicators has been established. |
gao_GAO-02-931T | gao_GAO-02-931T_0 | The problem areas include cumbersome communication links between headquarters and field units; complex, overlapping organizational relationships; confusion about the district offices’ primary customer; and a field structure not consistently matched with mission requirements. In response to our findings and additional challenges identified by OMB and the SBA Inspector General, SBA drafted a 5-Year Workforce Transformation Plan. Disagreement Regarding the District Office’s Primary Customer
We found disagreement within SBA over the primary customer of the district offices. According to SBA’s transformation plan, the mission of its districts will become one of marketing SBA’s continuum of services, focusing on the customer, and providing entrepreneurial development assistance. Eleven SBA staff positions and specific reporting relationships were also required by law. Organizational Alignment is Crucial to Maximizing Performance and Ensuring Accountability
Integrating personnel, programs, processes, and resources to support the most efficient and effective delivery of services—organizational alignment—is key to maximizing an agency’s performance and ensuring its accountability. Our work has shown that the major elements that underpin a successful transformation—and that SBA should consider employing—include strategic planning; strategic human capital management; senior leadership and accountability; alignment of activities, processes, and resources to support mission achievement; and internal and external collaboration. However, SBA has lost much of its direct connection with its small business owner clients. | What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has made organizational structure and service delivery changes during the past 10 years. However, ineffective lines of communication, confusion over the mission of district offices, complicated and overlapping organizational relationships, and a field structure not consistently matched with mission requirements all combine to impede SBA staff efforts to deliver services effectively. SBA's structural inefficiencies stem in part from realignment efforts during the mid-1990s that changed SBA's functions but left aspects of the previous structure intact, congressional influence over the location of field offices and centers, and legislative requirements such as specified reporting relationships. In response to GAO's findings and additional challenges identifies by the Office of Management and Budget and the SBA Inspector General, SBA recently announced a draft 5-year workforce transformation plan that discusses many of GAO's findings regarding the difficulties posed by its current structure. Organizational alignment is crucial if an agency is to maximize its performance and accountability. As SBA executes its workforce transformation plan, it should employ strategies common to successful transformation efforts both here and abroad. Successful efforts begin with instilling senior-level leadership, responsibility, and accountability for organizational results and transformation efforts. Organizations that have successful undertaken transformation efforts also typically use strategic planning and human capital management, alignment of activities, processes, and resources, and internal and external collaboration to underpin their efforts. |
gao_GAO-03-850 | gao_GAO-03-850_0 | The NPL is EPA’s list of the nation’s most contaminated sites. The Superfund Program’s Historical Revenue Source Is Dwindling While EPA Continues to Add Sites to the NPL
The balance of the Superfund trust fund available for future appropriations has decreased significantly since 1996, while EPA has continued to add sites to the NPL. Apart from the annual appropriation from the Superfund trust fund, EPA collects funds from other sources to pay for the activities of the Superfund program. The more prominent of these factors considered are the availability of alternative federal or state programs that could be used to clean up the site, the status of responsible parties associated with the sites, and the cost and complexity of the cleanup. Hazardous waste cleanup officials in 6 of the 10 states that we interviewed indicated a preference for cleaning up hazardous waste sites under their state programs. Because Superfund lacks indicators to fully measure the outcomes of the program’s cleanup efforts, EPA has asked the advisory council to develop criteria by which to measure the program’s progress. However, it is unclear whether the advisory council will reach consensus on its recommendations; and its findings are not expected until December 2003, at the earliest. To offset this decline in funds, EPA is seeking a 73 percent increase in its fiscal year 2004 budget request for general revenues—from $632 million in fiscal year 2003 to $1.1 billion. Conclusions
As the Superfund program continues to add sites to the NPL and funding sources shift toward general revenues, the effect of EPA’s actions to address future program challenges remains uncertain. If successfully implemented for the Superfund program, establishing these measures would also help EPA and the Congress make the difficult funding, policy, and program decisions that the current budget environment demands. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine (1) the current status of the Superfund program, (2) the factors guiding the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) selection of sites to be placed on the National Priorities List (NPL), and (3) the program’s future outlook. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the Superfund program in 1980 to clean up highly contaminated hazardous waste sites. Among other things, the law established a trust fund to help the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pay for cleanups and related program activities. The trust fund was financed primarily by three dedicated taxes until 1995, when the taxing authority expired. EPA continues to discover sites eligible for cleanup under the Superfund program. GAO was asked to examine the current status of the Superfund program, the factors guiding EPA's selection of sites to be placed on its National Priorities List, and the program's future outlook.
What GAO Found
The balance of the Superfund trust fund available for future appropriations has decreased significantly since 1996, while highly contaminated hazardous waste sites continue to be added to the National Priorities List (NPL), EPA's list of the nation's most contaminated sites. A decline in revenues to the trust fund has led the Superfund program to rely increasingly on appropriations from the general fund. In EPA's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Superfund program, the general fund appropriation would make up about 80 percent of the program's total appropriation. At the end of fiscal year 2002, the NPL had 1,233 sites in various stages of cleanup. EPA considers many factors in selecting from the sites that are eligible to be listed, the most prominent of which are the availability of alternative federal or state programs that could be used to clean up the site, the status of responsible parties associated with the sites, and the cost and complexity of the cleanup required. As the Superfund program continues to add sites to the NPL and funding sources shift toward general fund appropriations, the effect of EPA's actions to address future program challenges remains uncertain. Because Superfund lacks indicators to fully measure the outcomes of the program's cleanup efforts, EPA has asked an advisory council to develop criteria by which to measure the program's progress. However, it is unclear whether the advisory council will reach consensus on its recommendations, and its findings are not expected until December 2003, at the earliest. Performance indicators could help EPA and the Congress make the difficult funding, policy, and program decisions that the current budget environment demands. |
gao_GAO-14-410 | gao_GAO-14-410_0 | To assess whether the HUD Manufactured Housing Program was meeting the Act’s intent for establishing a consensus process for developing, revising, and interpreting standards, we reviewed:
Federal Register Notices from HUD, from 2002 until 2013, to understand the creation of the MHCC;
MHCC documents, such as available meeting minutes and voting ballots from 2002 until 2013 to assess the timing and topics of MHCC recommendations to HUD; proposed and final rules from 2002 until 2013 to assess the status of documentation of HUD’s efforts to ensure the operation of the MHCC and rulemaking process, such as the contract for the administering organization and related documents; and
HUD’s staffing and other resources allocated to the program. To assess HUD’s efforts to facilitate the availability of affordable manufactured homes, we collected and analyzed fiscal year 2012 data from Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan programs. Like other site-built homes, modular homes are categorized as real property and are built to state and local building codes, most commonly the International Residential Code (IRC). The Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and General Duties of the HUD Office of Manufactured Housing Programs
The National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 was amended by the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (2000 Act) to create a balanced consensus process for establishing and revising manufactured home building standards. Owners of manufactured homes also had lower monthly costs than renters. Although manufactured homes generally cost less to purchase than other homes and have lower monthly costs, owners of manufactured homes are more likely to have higher-priced financing than owners of site-built homes. HUD Has Not Fully Achieved the Manufactured Housing Program’s Key Purposes
HUD has encountered challenges in meeting key purposes of the 2000 Act, as seen by, among other things, delays and backlogs in its rulemaking process, limited assessment of financing alternatives, and incomplete documentation of enforcement-related activities. The purposes of the 2000 Act include (1) establishing a consensus-based process to update and interpret manufactured housing safety and construction standards and regulations for enforcing them; (2) facilitating the availability of affordable manufactured housing; and (3) ensuring uniform and effective enforcement of manufactured housing standards and protecting consumers. HUD Has a Process for Updating the HUD Code, but Has Not Resolved Delays Related to the Lack of Economic Analyses
HUD has met the requirements for the initial establishment of both the MHCC and a process for updating the HUD Code. HUD has also put in place a process for updating the standards. As required by the Act, if two-thirds of the MHCC members approve a proposal, the committee finalizes it and recommends it to HUD in the form of a proposed rule with an economic analysis. However, we observed that HUD had not accepted, rejected, or modified any of the MHCC recommendations for updating the HUD Code within 1 year of their submission. Recognizing the impact that a lack of low-cost financing could have on the affordability of manufactured homes, Congress directed HUD in the 2000 Act to review the FHA programs for manufactured home loans. However, HUD has not yet examined or researched the effectiveness of these loan programs because its research has focused on other priorities. Under the 2000 Act, all HUD label certification fee collections from HUD transportable units are deposited into the Manufactured Housing Fees Trust Fund and are available for use to the extent provided in annual appropriations acts. In order to meet its increasing budget obligations, the program has relied on congressional appropriations from the U.S. Department of Treasury’s general fund. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the viability and safety of manufactured housing produced in accordance with the HUD Code, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development should take the following three actions:
Develop and implement a plan for updating construction and safety standards for manufactured homes on a timely, recurring basis to include: addressing unresolved issues related to defining and developing sufficient economic analyses tied to proposed changes to the construction and safety standards; and ensuring sufficient resources and capacity within HUD and the MHCC and its administering organization; or if such a plan cannot be devised and implemented, identify and report to Congress on alternative methods of ensuring the quality, durability, safety, and affordability of manufactured homes, including the possibility of relying more extensively on existing industry standards. To better ensure that Congress, stakeholders, and agencies have complete information about changing costs and whether a fee needs to be changed, HUD should:
Complete the necessary rulemaking changes to allow the Office of Manufactured Housing Programs to adjust its label fees from the $39 per label toward levels up to the congressionally authorized level that better reflect the current levels of manufactured home production, while considering the impact that such fees may have on the industry; put in place a process for regular fee reviews to determine whether the fees currently being charged will allow the program to respond to spikes and surges in label fee revenue and to identify any factors that may drive label fee revenue instability; and identify any additional sources of funding that may mitigate initial revenue shortfalls and the program’s fixed and variable costs. HUD provided written comments that are discussed below and presented in Appendix I. HUD agreed with two recommendations, partially agreed with two recommendations, and stated its intent to consider the remaining two recommendations. We therefore continue to recommend that HUD act on the report’s recommendations. However, HUD did not agree to develop a plan to assess how FHA financing might further promote the affordability of manufactured homes. However, as noted in the report, HUD has not taken action to fully address this requirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Manufactured housing traditionally has been a low-cost option in the U.S. housing market. For nearly 40 years, HUD has provided standards for the manufactured housing industry by developing and updating the HUD Code. The 2000 Act was intended, among other things, to establish a balanced consensus process for updating the standards and regulations for enforcing them and to encourage manufactured housing as an affordable option. GAO was asked to study HUD’s implementation of the 2000 Act.
This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which HUD has met key purposes of the 2000 Act and assesses whether user fees cover program costs. GAO interviewed and collected data for 2000-2013 from HUD, other agencies, and industry groups. GAO also visited large and small plants that built manufactured housing to solicit industry perspectives.
What GAO Found
HUD has established a process for updating the preemptive building standardsfor manufactured homes known as the HUD Code but has not fully met key purposes of the 2000 Manufactured Housing Improvement Act (2000 Act). Key purposes of the Act include:
Establish a balanced, consensus-based process to update manufactured housing construction and safety standards. HUD has not accepted, rejected, or modified any of the Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee’s recommendations for updating the HUD Code within 1 year of their submission. The 2000 Act requires HUD to act on the committee’s recommended standards within 1 year if they were submitted in the form of a proposed rule with an economic analysis. According to HUD, because the committee did not include economic analyses in the proposals, HUD staff performed this task. They also stated because the proposals lacked the analyses, the Act’s 1-year timeline was not triggered. In some cases, HUD has not decided on recommendations made more than a decade ago and lacks a plan to address the backlog. Meanwhile, some states’ and localities’ residential building codes require standards not in the HUD Code, resulting in post-production upgrades that may increase costs to homeowners. Not updating the HUD Code delays its intended benefit—to improve the quality, durability, safety, and affordability of manufactured homes.
Facilitate the availability of affordable manufactured homes. Owners of manufactured homes have lower monthly housing costs than site-built owners and apartment renters, but high financing costs often keep these homes from being even more affordable. HUD’s Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has two insurance programs for manufactured home loans. Although most manufactured homes are titled or owned as personal property, HUD’s programs primarily insure loans on manufactured homes financed as real estate. Additionally, owners of manufactured homes are more likely to have higher-priced financing than owners of site-built homes. The 2000 Act required HUD to review the effectiveness of the FHA programs, but HUD has not developed a plan to do so. Such research would help HUD determine whether and how it might further facilitate the availability of affordable manufactured homes.
The 2000 Act establishes HUD’s authority to collect fees for certification labels on manufactured homes built to the HUD Code. The fees are placed in the Manufactured Housing Fees Trust Fund that provides annual appropriations to fund the expenses of the Manufactured Housing Program. The current fee rate does not produce sufficient collections to fully fund the program’s expenses and must be supplemented by annual appropriations from Treasury’s General Fund. HUD has indicated its intent to raise the label fee, which currently stands at $39. As we provided a draft of this report, HUD issued a proposed rule to increase the label fee, but has not yet completed the rulemaking process. It has also not fully assessed the feasibility and benefits of putting in place other fees authorized by recent appropriation acts, in part, because it has carryover balances from past years. Without more fee revenue, however, the program will continue to require Treasury’s General Fund appropriations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes several recommendations, including that HUD develop and implement a plan for updating construction and safety standards in a timely fashion; develop a plan to assess how FHA financing might further manufactured home affordability; complete label fee rule-making; and assess the need for other user fees. Of these, HUD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the next two because it believes it has already taken actions. HUD stated it would consider the last recommendation. GAO continues to believe these recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-585T | gao_GAO-04-585T_0 | The Long-term Budget Challenge
The long-term fiscal pressures created by the impending retirement of the baby boom generation, rising health care costs and increased homeland security and defense commitments sharpen the need to look at competing claims on existing federal budgetary resources and emerging new priorities. Absent substantive entitlement reform and/or dramatic changes in tax and spending policies, we will face large, escalating, and persistent deficits. As a result, we need to incorporate new metrics and mechanisms into the budget process that better signal the long-term commitments and implicit promises made by the government—its fiscal exposures—so that decision makers’ attention and efforts can be more concentrated on their long-term sustainability. Fiscal Exposures Are Wide-ranging and Varied
While Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are the major drivers of the long-term spending outlook in the aggregate, they are not the only promises the federal government has made to the future. The federal government undertakes a wide range of responsibilities, programs, and activities that may either obligate the government to future spending or create an expectation for such spending. Given this breadth, it is useful to think of fiscal exposures as a spectrum extending from explicit liabilities to the implicit promises embedded in current policy and/or public expectations. Truth and transparency in government reporting are essential if the United States is to effectively address its long-term fiscal challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The structure of the budget process can help ensure that budget decision makers are presented with the information and choices for timely and informed decisionmaking. GAO's long-term budget simulations show that, absent substantive entitlement reform and/or dramatic changes in tax and spending policies, we will face large, escalating, and persistent deficits. A budget process incorporating new metrics and mechanisms that better signal the long-term commitments and promises made by the government will help concentrate decision makers' efforts on long-term sustainability.
What GAO Found
The long-term fiscal pressures created by the impending retirement of the baby boom generation sharpen the need to look at competing claims on existing federal budgetary resources and emerging new priorities. Truth and transparency in government reporting are essential if the United States is to effectively address these long-term fiscal challenges. Current metrics and mechanisms do not fully inform policy makers about the sustainability of existing federal programs or commitments they are considering making. While Social Security and health programs are the major drivers of the long-term spending outlook, they are not the only promises the federal government has made to the future. The government undertakes a wide range of responsibilities, programs, and activities that may either obligate the government to future spending or create an expectation for such spending. It is useful to think of such fiscal exposures as a spectrum extending from explicit liabilities to the implicit promises embedded in current policy and/or public expectations. |
gao_GAO-04-781T | gao_GAO-04-781T_0 | The CFSR Is a Valuable Yet Substantial Undertaking, but Data Enhancements Could Improve Its Reliability
ACF and many state officials perceive the CFSR as a valuable process— highlighting many areas needing improvement—and a substantial undertaking, but some state officials and child welfare experts told us that data enhancements could improve its reliability. ACF staff in 8 of the 10 regions considered the CFSR a helpful tool to improve outcomes for children. Further, 26 of the 36 states responding to a relevant question in our survey commented that they generally or completely agreed with the results of the final CFSR report, even though none of the 41 states with final CFSR reports released through 2003 has achieved substantial conformity on all 14 outcomes and systemic factors. In addition, both ACF and the states have dedicated substantial financial and staff resources to the process. However, several state officials and child welfare experts we interviewed questioned the accuracy of the data used to compile state profiles and establish the national standards. While ACF officials in the central office contend that stakeholder interviews and case reviews compliment the data profiles, many state officials and experts reported that additional data from the statewide assessment could bolster the evaluation of state performance. ACF and the States Report That Reviews Have Been a Substantial Undertaking
Given the value that ACF and the states have assigned to the CFSR process, both have spent substantial financial resources and staff time to prepare for and implement the reviews. All of the states we visited experienced discrepant findings between the aggregate data from the statewide assessment and the information obtained from the on-site review. As states progress in PIP implementation, some ACF officials expressed a need for more guidance on how to monitor state accomplishments, and both ACF and state officials were uncertain about how the estimated financial penalties would be applied if states fail to achieve the goals described in their plans. Officials in the states we visited echoed survey respondents’ concerns with officials from 3 of the 5 states informing us that ACF had given states different instructions regarding acceptable PIP format and content. ACF’s Focus Rests Almost Exclusively on Implementing the CFSR
To implement the CFSRs, ACF has focused its activities almost entirely on the CFSR review process, and regional staff report limitations in providing assistance to states in helping them to meet key federal goals. To ensure that ACF uses the best available data in measuring state performance, we recommended in our April 2004 report that the Secretary of HHS expand the use of additional data states may provide in their statewide assessments and consider alternative data sources when available, such as longitudinal data that track children’s placements over time, before making final CFSR determinations. In addition, to ensure that ACF regional offices and states fully understand the PIP development, approval, and monitoring processes, and that regional offices fully understand ACF’s prioritization of the CFSR as the primary mechanism for child welfare oversight, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS issue clarifying guidance on the PIP process and evaluate states’ and regional offices’ adherence to this instruction and provide guidance to regional offices explaining how to better integrate the many training and technical assistance activities for which they are responsible, such as participation in state planning meetings and the provision of counsel to states on various topics, with their new CFSR responsibilities. In response to the first recommendation, HHS acknowledged that the CFSR is a new process that continues to evolve, and also noted several steps it has taken to address the data quality concerns we raise in our report. Child and Family Services Reviews: Better Use of Data and Improved Guidance Could Enhance HHS’s Oversight of State Performance. District of Columbia Child Welfare: Long-Term Challenges to Ensuring Children’s Well- Being. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) implemented the Child and Family Services Reviews (CFSR) to increase states' accountability. The CFSR uses states' data profiles and statewide assessments, as well as interviews and an on-site case review, to measure state performance on 14 outcomes and systemic factors, including child well-being and the provision of caseworker training. The CFSR also requires progress on a program improvement plan (PIP); otherwise ACF may apply financial penalties. This testimony is based on our April 2004 report and addresses (1) ACF's and the states' experiences preparing for and conducting the statewide assessments and on-site reviews; (2) ACF's and the states' experiences developing, funding, and implementing items in PIPs; and (3) any additional efforts that ACF has taken beyond the CFSR to improve state performance. For the April 2004 report, we surveyed all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico regarding their experiences throughout the CFSR process, visited 5 states to obtain first-hand information, and conducted a content analysis of all 31 available PIPs as of January 1, 2004. We also interviewed HHS officials--including those in all 10 regional offices--and key child welfare experts.
What GAO Found
ACF and many state officials perceive the CFSR as a valuable process and a substantial undertaking, but some data enhancements could improve its reliability. ACF staff in 8 of the 10 regions considered the CFSR a helpful tool to improve outcomes for children. Further, 26 of 36 states responding to a relevant question in our survey commented that they generally or completely agreed with the results of the final CFSR report, even though none of the 41 states with final CFSR reports released through 2003 has achieved substantial conformity on all 14 outcomes and systemic factors. Additionally, both ACF and the states have dedicated substantial financial and staff resources to the process. Nevertheless, several state officials and child welfare experts we interviewed questioned the accuracy of the data used in the review process. While ACF officials contend that stakeholder interviews and case reviews complement the data profiles, many state officials and experts reported that additional data from the statewide assessment could bolster the evaluation of state performance. Program improvement planning is under way, but uncertainties have affected the development, funding, and implementation of state PIPs. Officials from 3 of the 5 states we visited said ACF's PIP-related instructions were unclear, and at least 9 states reported in our survey that challenges to implementing their plans include insufficient funding, staff, and time. While ACF has provided some guidance, ACF and state officials remain uncertain about PIP monitoring efforts and how ACF will apply financial penalties if states fail to achieve their stated PIP objectives. Since 2001, ACF's focus has been almost exclusively on the CFSRs and regional staff report limitations in providing assistance to states in helping them to meet key federal goals. While staff from half of ACF's regions told us they would like to provide more targeted assistance to states, and state officials in all 5 of the states we visited said that ACF's existing technical assistance efforts could be improved, ACF officials acknowledged that regional staff might still be adjusting to the new way ACF oversees child welfare programs. In the April 2004 report, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS ensure that ACF uses the best available data to measure state performance. We also recommended that the Secretary clarify PIP guidance and provide guidance to regional officials on how to better integrate their many oversight responsibilities. In commenting on a draft of the April 2004 report, HHS acknowledged that the CFSR is a new process that continues to evolve, and noted several steps it has taken to address the data quality concerns we raised in that report. |
gao_GAO-13-640 | gao_GAO-13-640_0 | Regulators. 1). Second, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires SEC to review the “accredited investor” definition in its entirety beginning in 2014 and every 4 years thereafter and to conduct rulemaking as SEC deems appropriate after each review. Net Worth Identified as Most Important Criterion for Qualifying as Accredited Investor
Among existing criteria, market participants whom we interviewed said a net worth criterion was most important for balancing the goals of protecting investors and facilitating capital formation. Two market participants told us that net worth demonstrated an investor’s ability to accumulate wealth over time. Specifically, we found that increasing the minimum net worth or income thresholds would decrease the number of eligible household investors. Our analysis of federal household net worth data showed that adjusting the minimum thresholds to account for inflation from $1 million to approximately $2.3 million—the inflation adjusted amount—would decrease the number of households qualifying as accredited from approximately 8.5 million to approximately 3.7 million. For example, according to four representatives from associations, the small business and investor communities would be resistant to increased thresholds because this would limit the pool of investors. Market Participants Identified Alternative Criteria SEC Could Use in the Investor Standard
In addition to asking about the existing criteria, we asked market participants about eight alternative criteria related to investors’ financial resources and their understanding of financial risk. Among the financial resources criteria, market participants thought a liquid investments requirement (that is, a minimum dollar amount of investments in assets that can be easily sold, are marketable, and the value of which can be verified by a financial institution) was the most important for balancing investor protection and capital formation. Figure 7 summarizes participants’ views on these alternatives. Of the six alternative criteria related to an investor’s understanding of financial risk, participants most often said that the registered investment adviser criterion should be added to the existing criteria. However, beyond excluding an investor’s primary residence in the calculation of net worth in 2010, the standards for qualifying as an individual accredited investor have remained unchanged since the 1980s. Recommendation for Executive Action
To further advance the goals of balancing investor protection and capital formation in its accredited investor standard, SEC should consider alternative criteria, including those in this report, to help determine an individual’s ability to bear and understand the risks associated with investing in private placements. For example, market participants that we spoke with identified adding a liquid investment requirement or use of an investment adviser as alternative criteria that would balance investor protection and capital formation, be relatively feasible to implement, and have some level of acceptance by the market. SEC said that it would consider alternative criteria (particularly, adding liquid investments and the use of a registered adviser) when it completes its mandated review. For both objectives, we reviewed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) current definition and legislative history of the standard. To examine market participants’ views on the existing criteria for accredited investor status, and the potential effects of changes to the standard on investor protection and capital formation, we conducted structured interviews by telephone with a judgmental sample of 27 market participants whom we categorized in four groups intended to represent different segments of the accredited investor population: (1) attorneys who have experience in private placement transactions, (2) accredited investors who invest in private placement securities, (3) retail investors who meet the current accredited investor criteria but do not actively invest in private placement securities, and (4) investment advisers and broker- dealers who work with accredited investors. From the list of proposed and foreign regulator criteria, we identified a list of criteria that was consistent with the intended purpose of the accredited investor standard and that could be used to qualify individual investors as accredited. | Why GAO Did This Study
Accredited investors who meet certain income and net worth thresholds may participate in unregistered securities offerings. GAO determined that the intended purposes of the accredited investor standard are to (1) protect investors by allowing only those who can withstand financial losses access to unregistered securities offerings and (2) streamline capital formation for small businesses. To qualify as accredited, SEC requires an investor to have an annual income over $200,000 ($300,000 for a married couple) or a net worth over $1 million, excluding a primary residence. The thresholds were set in the 1980s and 2010. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act mandates GAO to study the criteria for qualifying individual investors as accredited.
This report examines market participants' views on (1) the existing criteria for accredited investor status and (2) alternative criteria. To address these objectives, GAO conducted a literature review, examined relevant data, and interviewed domestic and foreign regulators and industry representatives to identify alternative criteria. GAO also conducted structured interviews of 27 market participants (including broker-dealers, investment advisers, attorneys, and accredited investors).
What GAO Found
Of the existing criteria in the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) accredited investor standard, many market participants identified net worth as the most important criterion for balancing investor protection and capital formation. For example, two market participants said the net worth criterion, more so than income, likely indicates the investors' ability to accumulate wealth and their investment knowledge. Others noted that some parts of the market might not accept adjustments to the thresholds. For example, an association of angel investors--accredited investors who invest in start-up companies--told GAO that they would be resistant to increased thresholds because it would decrease the number of eligible investors. GAO analysis of federal data on household net worth showed that adjusting the $1 million minimum threshold to approximately $2.3 million, to account for inflation, would decrease the number of households qualifying as accredited from approximately 8.5 million to 3.7 million.
While citing net worth as the most important criterion, several market participants GAO interviewed said that alternative criteria related to an investor's liquid investments and their use of an investment adviser also could balance investor protection and capital formation. GAO obtained views on eight alternative criteria that focus on investors' financial resources and their understanding of financial risk--criteria that SEC or industry groups previously proposed or that foreign regulators use. Among the financial resources criteria, market participants with whom GAO spoke most often identified a liquid investments requirement--a minimum dollar amount of investments in assets that can be easily sold, are marketable, and the value of which can be verified--as the most important for balancing investor protection and capital formation. Among the understanding financial risk criteria, market participants most often identified the use of a registered investment adviser. Beginning in 2014, SEC must review the accredited investor definition every 4 years to determine whether it should be adjusted. This study provides a reasonable starting point for SEC's review. Specifically, SEC will have the views of market participants about how existing and alternative qualifying criteria could help determine an investor's ability to bear and understand risks associated with unregistered securities offerings.
What GAO Recommends
SEC should consider alternative criteria for the accredited investor standard. For example, participants with whom GAO spoke identified adding liquid investments and use of a registered adviser as alternative criteria. SEC agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-930T | gao_GAO-06-930T_0 | In 2005, over 2,300 businesses and heating districts in 21 states used geothermal resources directly for heat and hot water. Geothermal Development Faces Many Challenges
The development of geothermal resources for electricity production faces major challenges, including high risk and financial uncertainty, insufficient transmission capacity, and inadequate technology. Power plant developers state that the process for approving leases and issuing permits to drill wells and construct power plants has become excessively bureaucratic. In addition, developers of geothermal resources for both power plants and direct uses faced a challenging federal royalty system prior to the Energy Policy Act. Efforts by Federal, State, and Local Governments to Address the Challenges of Developing Geothermal Resources Show Promise
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 includes a variety of provisions designed to help address the challenges of developing geothermal resources, including the high risk and financial uncertainty of developing renewable energy projects and the lack of sufficient transmission capacity. Provisions within the Act address high risk and financial uncertainty by providing tax credits and other incentives. These incentives include property tax incentives, sales tax incentives, and business tax credits. To address technological challenges, the state of California and the Department of Energy provide financial assistance and grants to the geothermal industry. Finally, the Act also contains provisions that simplify and/or reduce federal geothermal royalties on resources that generate electricity and on resources put to direct use. Geothermal Royalty Disbursements Will Change Significantly, and Changes in Electricity Prices Could Alter Total Royalty Collections
A royalty provision of the Energy Policy Act redistributes the federal royalties collected from geothermal resources—cutting in half the overall geothermal royalties previously retained by the federal government. While the Energy Policy Act continues to provide that 50 percent of federal geothermal royalties be disbursed to the states in which the federal leases are located, an additional 25 percent will now be disbursed to the counties in which the leases are located, leaving only 25 percent to the federal government. While, for most leases, the Energy Policy Act directs that the Secretary of the Interior seek to maintain the same level of royalty revenues as before the Act, our analysis suggests that this will be difficult because changing electricity prices could significantly affect the percentage of future royalty revenues collected. Finally, MMS does not routinely collect data from the sales of electricity that are necessary to demonstrate that MMS is seeking to maintain the same level of royalty collections from geothermal resources, as directed by the Energy Policy Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Act) contains provisions that address challenges to developing geothermal resources, including the high risk and uncertainty of developing geothermal power plants, lack of sufficient transmission capacity, and delays in federal leasing. Among the provisions are means to simplify federal royalties on geothermal resources while overall collecting the same level of royalty revenues. This testimony summarizes the results of a recent GAO report, GAO-06-629 . In this testimony, GAO describes: (1) the current extent of and potential for geothermal development, (2) challenges faced by developers of geothermal resources, (3) federal, state, and local government actions to address these challenges, and (4) how provisions of the Act are likely to affect federal geothermal royalty disbursement and collections.
What GAO Found
Geothermal resources currently produce about 0.3 percent of our nation's total electricity and heating needs and supply heat and hot water to about 2,300 direct-use businesses, such as heating systems, fish farms, greenhouses, food-drying plants, spas, and resorts. Recent assessments conclude that future electricity production from geothermal resources could increase by 25 to 367 percent by 2017. The potential for additional direct-use businesses is largely unknown because the lower temperature geothermal resources that they exploit are abundant and commercial applications are diverse. One study identified at least 400 undeveloped wells and hot springs that have the potential for development. In addition, the sales of geothermal heat pumps are increasing. The challenges to developing geothermal electricity plants include a capital-intensive and risky business environment, technological shortcomings, insufficient transmission capacity, lengthy federal review processes for approving permits and applications, and a complex federal royalty system. Direct-use businesses face numerous challenges, including challenges that are unique to their industry, remote locations, water rights issues, and high federal royalties. The Act addresses many of these challenges through tax credits for geothermal production, new authorities for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and measures to streamline federal leasing and simplify federal royalties, which totaled $12.3 million in 2005. In addition, the Department of Energy and the state of California provide grants for addressing technology challenges. Furthermore, some state governments offer financial incentives, including investment tax credits, property tax exclusions, sales tax exemptions, and mandates that certain percentages of electricity within the state be generated from renewable resources. Under the Act, federal royalty disbursement will significantly change because half of the federal government's share will now go to the counties where leases are located. Although the Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to seek to maintain the same level of royalty collections, GAO's analysis suggests this will be difficult because changing electricity prices could significantly affect royalty revenues. Finally, MMS does not collect sales data that are necessary to monitor these royalty collections. |
gao_GAO-07-93 | gao_GAO-07-93_0 | For the fiscal year 2007 estimates, the reserve components submitted the same maximum levels as fiscal year 2006 because there were no substantial increases or decreases in their numbers, according to DOD officials. DOD Based Its Initial Request on Data That Did Not Accurately Reflect the Number of Volunteer Reservists on Active Duty for Operational Support
One key factor that contributed to the increase in authorization levels requested for fiscal year 2006 was that DOD’s initial request for fiscal year 2005 was not developed using data that accurately reflected the maximum number of reservists on voluntary active duty for operational support. DOD Lacked a Definition of Operational Support Prior to its Fiscal Year 2005 Estimate
Another key factor that contributed to the increase in DOD’s fiscal year 2006 estimate for the maximum number of reservists authorized was that DOD did not have a definition of operational support prior to its initial estimate for fiscal year 2005. Reserve Components Are Not Identifying Numbers of Active Duty Reservists for Operational Support Consistently across Components
The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. For example, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not include voluntary active duty performed by recalled retired reservists in their accounting amounts, even though this is one of the five categories listed under DOD’s definition of operational support. In addition, the reserve components are inconsistent on whether they include volunteer reservists serving on extended active duty in their reported operational support numbers. We found that in each month from January through June 2006, the Navy Reserve erroneously reported to DOD cumulative totals instead of the highest number of reservists in each month. The DMDC official stated that the effectiveness of the proposed change to automate reporting on volunteer operational support reservists still depends on the components, which are responsible for aligning their policies and systems to provide the appropriate information according to changes in data reporting requirements. DOD is in the process of developing an instruction on accounting and reporting procedures in the new DOD Instruction 1215.6, which it plans to officially release in late October 2006. Until DOD and all of the reserve components update and uniformly align their implementing guidance, inconsistencies and errors in the reporting of the number of operational support reservists may continue. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the components can report accurate and consistent information about the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the reserve components to develop guidance to clarify and consistently define the categories of operational support that should be included in the reported numbers. The department concurred with the recommendation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the factors leading to the increase in the maximum number of reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006, we reviewed and analyzed the authorization levels for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and the requested authorization levels for fiscal year 2007. To determine the extent to which the reserve components have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity, we obtained DOD’s memorandums, implementing guidance, and regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress have expressed concern with the frequency and length of time that volunteer reservists serve on active duty. In fiscal year 2006, DOD nearly doubled its fiscal year 2005 estimate for the total maximum levels of reservists volunteering to be on active duty for operational support. Congress required GAO to review the reasons behind the increases and expressed an interest in understanding which reservists were being included or excluded from these numbers. In this report, GAO (1) identified the factors that led to the increase in DOD's requests for the maximum number of volunteer reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support since DOD's initial request in fiscal year 2005 and (2) assessed the extent to which the reserve components have consistently reported the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since 2005. In conducting this review, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
DOD's requested authorization levels for reserve personnel voluntarily on active duty for operational support grew substantially between fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for two reasons. First, when developing its fiscal year 2005 estimate, DOD used data reported annually that excluded some reservists serving in operational support capacities. Second, the definition of operational support was not included with the legislation and DOD did not distribute an official definition until 6 months after the fiscal year 2005 authorized levels were in place. Based on the published definition and greater outreach to personnel responsible for monitoring the number of volunteers for this type of active duty, most reserve components submitted higher estimates for maximum levels for fiscal year 2006. DOD submitted the same estimates in fiscal year 2007 as fiscal year 2006 because the number of volunteers did not change greatly. The reserve components have not been consistently identifying the number of reservists serving in an operational support capacity since this monthly reporting requirement was adopted in fiscal year 2005. The reserve components are inconsistently including certain categories of personnel in their reported numbers. For example, two of the six reserve components do not include personnel serving as voluntarily recalled retired reservists in their reported totals, even though this category is listed in DOD's definition of operational support. In addition, only three of the six components include reservists serving on extended active duty missions in their reported numbers. GAO also found that the Navy Reserve erroneously submitted cumulative amounts instead of the highest amount of volunteer reservists each month for 6 months, so that it appeared to exceed its maximum authorized level three times. DOD is implementing a change to its Defense Manpower and Data Center to systematically generate the highest count of reservists each month, but the effectiveness of this change depends on whether the components update and align their policies and systems to provide these data. DOD is in the process of developing an instruction and only four of the reserve components have updated or have plans to update their guidance to clarify and consistently define what categories to include when accounting for these operational support reservists. Without updating and aligning their guidance, inconsistencies and errors in the reported numbers of operational support reservists may continue. |
gao_RCED-96-79 | gao_RCED-96-79_0 | Extensive research has also been conducted on the impact of deregulation on air safety. Because the estimate of the fare per passenger mile is developed from a statistical sample, it has a sampling error. When full-year data for 1979 and 1994 are compared, fares were 8.5 percent lower at airports serving small communities, 10.9 percent lower at airports serving medium-sized communities, and 8.3 percent lower at airports serving large communities. Regional Differences in Fare Trends Are Caused Largely by the Entry of Low-Cost Airlines and More Competition in the West
Since deregulation, the largest decreases in fares have occurred at airports in the West and Southwest, and the largest increases in fares have occurred at airports in the Southeast and Appalachian region. The Quantity and Safety of Air Service Have Generally Increased, but Trends in Quality Indicators Are Mixed
Overall, the quantity of air service has increased since deregulation at small-, medium-sized, and large-community airports. The Quality of Air Service Has Improved for Large Communities, but Indicators Are Mixed for Small and Medium-Sized Communities
The quality of air service a community receives is generally measured by four variables: the number of (1) departures and available seats, (2) destinations served by nonstop flights, (3) destinations served by one-stop flights and the efficiency of the connecting service, and (4) jet departures compared with the number of turboprop departures. As noted in chapter 1, the overall accident rate for commuters has fallen by over 90 percent since deregulation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the deregulation of the airline industry, focusing on: (1) airfares and the quantity, quality, and safety of air service since deregulation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the average fare per passenger mile is 9 percent lower at small-community airports, 11 percent lower at medium-sized airports, and 8 percent lower at large-community airports; (2) the largest increase in fares occurred in the Southeast and Appalachian regions, and the largest decrease occurred in the West and Southwestern regions; (3) this geographic disparity exists because of the intense competition between low-cost, new carriers in the west and dominant, high-maintenance carriers in the Southeast; (4) the overall quantity of air service at airports has increased, but large communities have experienced the largest increase; (5) air service quality is difficult to measure and depends on the number of destinations served by nonstop flights and one-stop connections, and the type of aircraft used; (6) air service quality since deregulation has been mixed largely due to the airlines hub networks and greater use of turboprop aircraft; and (7) the overall accident rate since deregulation has dropped, but there are no statistically significant differences in air safety trends for any of the airport groups. |
gao_GAO-12-713T | gao_GAO-12-713T_0 | Background
The TANF block grant was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and was designed to give states the flexibility to provide both traditional welfare cash assistance benefits as well as a variety of other benefits and services to meet the needs of low-income families and children. TANF has four broad goals: (1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or homes of relatives; (2) end dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce out-of- wedlock pregnancies; and (4) encourage two-parent families. PRWORA ended low-income families’ entitlement to cash assistance by replacing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program— for which the federal grant amount was based on the amount of state spending—with the TANF block grant, a $16.5 billion per year fixed federal funding stream to states. PRWORA coupled the block grant with an MOE provision, which requires states to maintain a significant portion of their own historic financial commitment to their welfare programs as a condition of receiving their full federal TANF allotments. The most recent data available, for fiscal year 2010, show that the federal government and states spent almost $36 billion on benefits and services meeting one or more of the TANF goals. These requirements are an important element of TANF—if a state fails to meet its MOE requirement for any fiscal year, HHS is required by law to reduce dollar- for-dollar the amount of a state’s basic TANF grant for the following fiscal year. Figure 1 shows the federal programs with related state spending that were included in establishing the fixed annual amount of the TANF block grant and state maintenance-of-effort level for each state. The required percentages of these previous state spending levels vary under different conditions:
80 percent—To receive its federal TANF funds, a state must generally spend state funds in an amount equal to at least 80 percent of the amount it spent on welfare and related programs in fiscal year 1994. MOE Spending Has Increased Significantly, But the Extent to Which It Represents Increased Service Levels Is Unclear
MOE Levels Have Increased in Recent Years
State MOE levels remained stable for many years and then increased more recently for several reasons. For example, in fiscal year 2009, the most recent year for which data are available, less than 50 percent of TANF cash assistance families participated in work activities for the specified number of hours each week in 44 states, according to HHS. However, various policy and funding options in federal law and regulations allowed most of these states to meet their work participation rates. Factors that influenced states’ abilities to meet the work participation rates included not only the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance who participated in work activities, but also decreases in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance, and state MOE spending beyond what is required, for example. In each year since TANF was created, many states have used caseload declines to help them lower the required work participation rates. In fiscal year 2009, 32 of the 45 states that met their required work participation rates for all TANF families claimed excess state MOE spending toward their caseload reduction credits. While one state had used MOE expenditures toward its caseload reduction credit before fiscal year 2007, over half of the states (27) relied on these expenditures to increase their credits and help them meet their required work participation rates in one or more years between fiscal years 2007 and 2009. However, the extent to which states have relied on these expenditures to help them meet work participation rates as well as meeting MOE generally highlights the importance of having reasonable assurances that current oversight is working. Based on our previous work on federal grant design as well as more recent work on some MOE provisions under the Recovery Act, it is clear that such provisions are important mechanisms for helping ensure that federal spending achieves its intended effect. While MOE provisions may be imperfect tools, with appropriate attention to design, implementation, and monitoring issues, such provisions are one way to help strike a balance between the potentially conflicting objectives of increasing state and local flexibility while attaining certain national objectives, including efficient use of federal resources in today’s fiscal environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The $16.5 billion TANF block grant, created in 1996, is one of the key federal funding streams targeted to assist low-income families. While the block grant provides states with a fixed amount of federal dollars annually, it also includes state MOE requirements, which require states to maintain a significant portion of their own historic financial commitment to welfare-related programs. Over the last 15 years, this federal-state partnership has seen multiple program and fiscal changes, including a dramatic drop in the number of families receiving monthly cash assistance, as well as two economic recessions. To provide information for its potential extension or reauthorization, this testimony draws primarily on previous GAO work to focus on (1) the key features of the state MOE requirements and (2) how the role of state MOE spending has changed over time. To address these issues, GAO relied on its prior work on TANF block grant and state MOE spending issued between 2001 and 2010, including the May 2010 report examining how state MOE spending affects state TANF programs work participation rates. To develop the spending-related findings in this body of work, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance, state TANF data reported to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and related financial data from selected states. GAO also interviewed relevant officials from HHS and selected states.
What GAO Found
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants maintenance of effort (MOE) provisions include specified state spending levels and general requirements on the use of funds. For example, these provisions generally require that each state spend at least 80 percent (75 percent if the state meets certain performance standards) of the amount it spent on welfare and related programs in fiscal year 1994, before TANF was created. If a state does not meet its MOE requirements in any fiscal year, the federal government will reduce dollar-for-dollar the states federal TANF grant in the following year. In order to count state spending as MOE, funds must be spent on benefits and services to families with children that have incomes and resources below certain state-defined limits. Such benefits and services must generally further one of TANFs purposes, which broadly focus on providing financial assistance to needy families; promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; reducing out-of-wedlock births; and encouraging the formation of two-parent families. Within these broad goals, states have significant flexibility to design programs and spend their funds to meet families needs.
Total MOE spending reported by states remained relatively stable around the required minimum spending level of $11 billion through fiscal year 2005, and then increased to about $4 billion higher than this minimum in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Several reasons likely accounted for these increases, including states reliance on MOE spending to help them meet TANF work participation rates. Work participation rates identify the proportion of families receiving monthly cash assistance that participate in allowable work activities for a specified number of hours each week. Federal law generally requires that at least 50 percent of families meet the work requirements; however, most states have engaged less than 50 percent of families in required activities in each year since TANF was created, according to HHS data. Various policy and funding options in federal law and regulations, including credit for state MOE expenditures that exceed required spending levels, have allowed most states to meet the rate requirements even with smaller percentages of families participating. States generally began relying on MOE spending to get credit toward meeting TANF work participation rates in fiscal year 2007 because of statutory changes to the rate requirements enacted in 2006. For example, for fiscal year 2009, the most recent data available, 16 of the 45 states that met the TANF work participation rate would not have done so without the credit they received for excess state MOE spending.
The expanded role of MOE in state TANF programs highlights the importance of having reasonable assurance that MOE spending reflects the intended commitment to low-income families and efficient use of federal funds. GAOs previous work makes clear that MOE provisions are often difficult to administer and oversee, but can be important tools for helping ensure that federal spending achieves its intended effect. This work also points out that with appropriate attention to design, implementation, and monitoring issues, such provisions are one way to help strike a balance between the potentially conflicting objectives of increasing state and local flexibility while attaining certain national objectives. |
gao_T-GGD-99-150 | gao_T-GGD-99-150_0 | This type of mail, known as deceptive mail, includes sweepstakes and other types of mailed material, such as lotteries and chain letters. Finally, I will provide information on initiatives in which various federal agencies and other organizations have participated to address consumers’ problems with deceptive mail marketing practices and help educate consumers about potential problems that could occur with such practices. Also, we obtained updated available information on efforts by various federal, state, local, and nongovernmental organizations to address consumers’ deceptive mail problems and educate them about possible problems that could occur with deceptive mail marketing practices. We obtained comments on a draft of this testimony from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Extent and Nature of Consumers’ Problems With Deceptive Mail
Comprehensive data that could indicate the full extent of consumers’ problems with deceptive mail were not available. Various officials from the agencies and organizations we contacted told us that such data were unavailable mainly because consumers oftentimes did not report their problems and no centralized database existed from which comprehensive data could be obtained. The results of the survey, which was conducted in November 1998, indicated that 51 percent of the survey respondents believed that within the preceding 6 months, they had received mail involving sweepstakes or documents resembling cashier’s checks, known as cashier’s check look-alikes, that appeared to be misleading or deceptive. The total amount of money these consumers said they had paid was about $4.9 million. We recently learned from a Postal Inspection Service official that additional fraud complaints were contained in a third FCS category called “consumer complaint program.” According to the official, for the period October 1, 1997, through March 31, 1999, the category included a total of about 48,000 complaints, which generally involved such matters as fraud, bad business practices, or misunderstandings between consumers and companies. The four were (1) lotteries, (2) telemarketing, (3) investment schemes, and (4) work-at-home plans. In fiscal year 1998, FTC, the Postal Inspection Service, and Attorneys General offices for various states initiated 203 law enforcement actions that targeted specific organizations, companies, and individuals that allegedly attempted to deceive, mislead, or defraud consumers through various mail marketing practices. However, FTC, the Postal Inspection Service, and various state Attorneys General offices estimated that about 10,400 consumer complaints led to or initiated the 101 law enforcement actions. For example, FTC: established, on July 7, 1999, a national toll-free hotline (i.e., 1-877-FTC- HELP or 1-877-382-4357) that consumers could use to file complaints on various topics, including deceptive mail. These efforts focused on telemarketing fraud, but have also involved discussions about deceptive mail, including sweepstakes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed matters related to deceptive mail marketing practices, focusing on the extent and nature of consumers' problems with deceptive mail and the initiatives various federal agencies and other organizations have made to address deceptive mail problems and educate consumers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) examples of deceptive mail include sweepstakes, chain letters, cashier's check look-alikes, work-at-home schemes, and fraudulent charity solicitations; (2) officials in various agencies and organizations said that comprehensive data on the full extent of consumers' deceptive mail problems were not available mainly because consumers often did not report their problems and no centralized database existed from which such data could be obtained; (3) however, data GAO collected from various sources suggested that consumers were having substantial problems with deceptive mail; (4) based on a GAO sponsored November 1998 statistically generalizable sample of the U.S. adult population, GAO estimates that about half of the adult population believed that within the preceding 6 months, they had received deceptive mailed sweepstakes material or cashier's check look-alikes; (5) officials from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Postal Inspection Service, and state Attorneys General offices estimated that in fiscal year (FY) 1998, about 10,400 deceptive mail complaints led to or initiated about 100 law enforcement actions; (6) for the period October 1, 1997, through March 31, 1999, FTC received over 18,000 deceptive mail complaints, of which about 2,700 reported consumer payments of about $4.9 million; (7) also, the Postal Inspection Service received over 16,700 complaints on fraud and chain letters, of which about 3,000 reported consumer fraud losses of about $5.2 million; (8) the Inspection Service also had over 1,800 open investigative cases on deceptive mail during FY 1998; (9) various federal agencies and other organizations have undertaken efforts to address consumers' deceptive mail problems and educate them about such problems; (10) for example, FTC established a national toll-free hotline for receiving deceptive mail and other complaints; (11) one joint effort was Project Mailbox, which involved such organizations as FTC, Postal Inspection Service, and various state Attorneys General; and (12) these organizations initiated over 200 law enforcement actions against companies and individuals that used the mail to allegedly defraud consumers. |
gao_GAO-17-218 | gao_GAO-17-218_0 | In order to plan for the individual maintenance needs of each cutter, SFLC generates and maintains a 5-year maintenance plan for each asset class depicting the major depot-level maintenance tasks. This can include conducting both anticipated and unanticipated maintenance. Depot-Level Maintenance Is Lowering the Mission Capable Rates of the Fast Response Cutter and National Security Cutter
Over the past few years, when the FRC and NSC began using their current mission capable metrics, they have both met their minimum targets on average. According to Coast Guard officials, this is primarily because of an increase in the amount of time the first 13 cutters are spending in depot maintenance for warranty drydock work, which has reduced the FRC’s ability to conduct operations. Failures associated with the main diesel engine have been particularly problematic. The Coast Guard is also in the process of developing prototype components to address issues with the main diesel engine in advance of the completion of the propulsion study. The Coast Guard Is Addressing Some Maintenance Problems through Engineering Design Changes, but Has Not Documented Key Cost Analysis
During operations and testing, the FRC and NSC have experienced problems that require engineering design changes or repairs. Replacing the FRC’s engines, which contributed to the cutter’s lost operational days, represented about $52 million of the costs avoided. The FRCs Are Undergoing Several Design Changes and Several Repairs Covered by Warranty
The Coast Guard has encountered several issues on systems aboard the FRC that were discovered during operations and testing and require design changes and retrofits to correct. This problem was first reported in the cutter’s Initial Operational Test and Evaluation report in July 2013. Table 6 shows the list of design changes for the NSC estimated to cost at least $1 million. This means that systems with known defects or deficiencies will be installed during production only to be replaced later, requiring maintenance on some of these systems until the retrofits are complete. Cost Estimates for FRC and NSC Depot Maintenance Do Not Reflect Actual Expenditures and Estimates Are Not Regularly Updated
The FRC’s and NSC’s annual depot-level expenditures have generally been well below their estimated levels since 2010. Combined, these cutters have used $106.6 million less than estimated since 2012 and 2010, respectively. According to Coast Guard officials, the combined difference of $106.6 million in depot maintenance funds from the FRC and NSC remained in a centrally managed surface asset depot maintenance account, which is available for use on other Coast Guard surface assets, such as the High Endurance Cutter, which officials explained requires additional maintenance funding over what was originally planned. We recommended that this process conform to cost-estimating best practices, with which the Coast Guard concurred. First, DHS stated that cost estimating best practices are most applicable to new acquisitions. Visibility into decisions on how and when to implement planned design changes on the NSCs—including those not yet constructed—is currently limited because the Coast Guard’s guidance does not require programs to perform and document cost analyses that support the cost and timing of when the changes should be incorporated. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Coast Guard makes effective use of its resources, specifically regarding its budget, we recommend the Secretary of DHS direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following two actions:
Update the Joint Surface Engineering Change Process Guide to require a documented cost analysis to provide decision makers adequate data to make informed decisions regarding the expected costs and when it is most cost effective to install design changes. Appendix 1: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine the maintenance, equipment failures, and spare parts availability for the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and National Security Cutter (NSC), we reviewed the mission capability data provided from the Coast Guard from the Electronic Asset Logbook (EAL) database for both cutters and compared their rates to the target ranges for each cutter established by the Coast Guard over at least a 12-month time frame as Coast Guard officials stated was the most meaningful use of the data. To examine the extent to which the Coast Guard’s cost estimates for depot maintenance reflects actual expenditures for the FRC and NSC, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s standard support levels, which are the estimated costs for depot-level maintenance each year over the course of an asset’s life cycle, and compared that to the depot-level maintenance expenditures for both cutters from fiscal years 2012 to 2016 for the FRC and from 2010 to 2016 for the NSC. We compared the Coast Guard’s process for creating and updating standard support levels to GAO’s best practices for cost estimating. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard is procuring the FRC and NSC to replace its aging cutters. Both cutters have had operational problems—such as propulsion system issues—that are being addressed through maintenance. Prior GAO work identified issues related to performance and maintenance of these vessels, particularly related to the main diesel engines on both cutters.
The House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure asked that GAO examine maintenance of the FRC and NSC. This report addresses the extent to which (1) maintenance issues are affecting FRC's and NSC's operational status, (2) design changes affect the maintenance of the cutters, and (3) the Coast Guard's cost estimates reflect actual expenditures for maintenance for the FRC and NSC.
To conduct this work, GAO analyzed data on cutter maintenance and operations; analyzed the costs and timing of design changes; reviewed Coast Guard budgets and compared GAO best practices in cost estimating to the Coast Guard's process for estimating depot maintenance costs; and interviewed Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Found
Maintenance work for the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and National Security Cutter (NSC) has lowered the operational availability of each fleet. Although both cutters on average have met their minimum mission capable targets over the long term, increased depot maintenance has more recently reduced each cutter's rates below targets. The FRC's rate is lower, in part, because of a series of unanticipated drydock periods to correct issues covered by its 12-month warranty. The NSC's lower rate is primarily because of anticipated 2-year maintenance and system upgrade periods performed on each newly delivered NSC. Both cutters have experienced problems with the diesel engines, which caused lost operational days and hindered operations while underway.
The Coast Guard's 154-foot Fast Response Cutter and 418-foot National Security Cutter
The Coast Guard has initiated design changes on the FRC and NSC, but some of the NSC's changes to address maintenance problems will not be installed until after each cutter is delivered. While the Coast Guard plans at least $17 million on FRC design changes, officials estimate the warranty has helped avoid $77 million for repaired systems. This includes about $52 million to replace 20 diesel engines that have degraded FRC operations since first discovered in July 2013. Design changes on the NSCs are expected to cost the Coast Guard at least $260 million. In order to maintain production schedules, several changes will be completed after delivery of each NSC, including the ninth NSC, which has not yet begun construction. Thus, systems with known deficiencies are being installed, only to be replaced later. Officials stated this approach is more cost effective; however, the Coast Guard did not document its cost analyses, in accordance with GAO cost estimating best practices. Without such documentation, the Coast Guard cannot demonstrate that it is making cost-effective decisions.
Since 2010, depot maintenance expenditures for the FRC and NSC have been $106.6 million less than the Coast Guard estimated. This amount remains in a centrally managed account and is made available for other surface assets, such as aging, legacy vessels. Coast Guard officials stated that depot maintenance estimates are not adjusted or updated over the service life of an asset class. Periodically updating depot maintenance cost estimates—in accordance with GAO cost estimating best practices—for each asset class could provide decision makers with much needed information with which to determine future budgets.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure that it effectively uses its resources, the Coast Guard should document cost analyses on the cost and timing of engineering design changes and periodically evaluate and update its depot maintenance cost estimates. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with both recommendations and provided timeframes for actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-05-664T | gao_GAO-05-664T_0 | When INS was abolished in 2003 by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, its enforcement functions were transferred to two bureaus within the DHS. Within ICE, investigators and intelligence analysts from former INS and the U.S. Customs Service were merged into the investigations and intelligence offices, while staff from former INS’s detention and removal program were placed in the detention and removal office. For service functions, INS’s Immigration Services Division, responsible for processing applications for immigration benefits, was placed in Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), which reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of DHS. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (Secretary)
Transition efforts for CBP posed fewer challenges than for ICE. Whether further structural changes are warranted is one of the topics that this hearing is to address. Therefore, the department needs to articulate how it envisions conducting its missions five to ten years from now and let this vision drive the organizational design, particularly the structure of border security operations.” Another witness stated, “Whether the decision is ultimately made to merge ICE and CBP or not, the real issues will remain unless the underlying mission, vision, and planning occur in a unified manner.”
Similar Management Challenges Continue
Over the years, we have issued numerous reports that identified management challenges INS experienced in its efforts to achieve both effective immigration law enforcement and service delivery. We testified that while restructuring may help address certain management challenges, we saw an organization (INS) that faced significant challenges in assembling the basic building blocks that any organization needs: clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures that effectively balance competing priorities, effective internal and external communications and coordination, and automation systems that provide accurate and timely information. In 2004, we reported DHS experienced management challenges similar to those we had found at INS. Further, we reported in 2004 that CBP and ICE lacked formal guidance for addressing some overlapping responsibilities. Factors to Consider for Resolving Management Challenges
As this Subcommittee, DHS officials, and other stakeholders consider potential structural changes to ICE and CBP, we have identified three factors to consider for resolving management challenges including (1) a management framework for ICE and CBP, (2) systems and processes to support this framework, and (3) the context of the larger DHS transformation. Management Framework for ICE and CBP
Based on our work on the creation and development of DHS, and additional work on transformation and mergers, we have identified a number of key success factors. Those factors that I would like to focus on today include clarity of mission, strategic planning, organizational alignment, performance measures, and leadership focus and accountability. Broader DHS Transformation and Management Integration Efforts May Affect ICE and CBP Management Challenges
In addition to considering developing a management framework and corresponding systems and processes, it is important to consider these changes in the larger context of the transformation of DHS. Further, some management challenges at ICE and CBP might be affected by department-wide management initiatives. Resolving these challenges at the top levels could help address similar management challenges in DHS’s component organizations including ICE and CBP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the immigration programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). This testimony focuses on CBP and ICE, which took over the immigration enforcement function. CBP is responsible for functions related to inspections and border patrol, and ICE is responsible for functions related to investigations, intelligence, detention, and removal. The Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary, held a hearing to discuss management challenges and potential structural changes. Some research organizations have suggested structural changes to address management challenges, including a merger of CBP and ICE. This testimony addresses the following questions: (1) Have ICE and CBP encountered similar management challenges to those encountered at INS? (2) What factors might be considered in addressing some of the management challenges that exist at ICE and CBP?
What GAO Found
A number of similar management challenges that had been experienced by INS have continued in the new organizations now responsible for immigration enforcement functions. In 2001, GAO testified that, while restructuring may help address certain management challenges, INS faced significant challenges in assembling the basic systems and processes that any organization needs to accomplish its mission. These include clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures that effectively balance competing priorities, effective internal and external communications and coordination, and automation systems that provide accurate and timely information. In March 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred to the new DHS and placed in the newly-created ICE and CBP. In 2004, we reported that many similar management challenges we found at INS were still in existence in the new bureaus. In evaluating solutions to ICE and CBP management challenges, including potential structural changes, several factors might be considered. The first factor is whether ICE and CBP currently have good management frameworks in place. Such a management framework, among other items, would include a clear mission, a strategic planning process, good organizational alignment, performance measures, and leadership and accountability mechanisms. The second factor is whether ICE and CBP have developed systems and processes to support the management frameworks they may have in place. The third factor is that the management challenges in these two bureaus exist in the larger context of the creation and evolution of DHS. The transformation and integration activities at DHS can take 5-7 years to accomplish, and some management challenges might be resolved in this process. |
gao_GAO-11-688T | gao_GAO-11-688T_0 | Background
TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the security of the mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail systems. TSA Has Made Progress in Conducting Comprehensive Risk Assessments across All Modes of Transportation, Including Rail
In response to our previous recommendations, TSA has taken steps to conduct comprehensive risk assessments across the transportation sector and within the passenger and freight rail modes that are based on assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. In March 2009, we reported that TSA had taken some actions to implement a risk management approach but had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments that integrate threat, vulnerability, and consequence for each mode or the transportation sector as a whole, as called for by the NIPP. DHS concurred with this recommendation, and in June 2010 TSA produced the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA), which assessed risk within and across the various aviation and surface transportation modes, including rail, and incorporated threat, vulnerability, and consequence. In June 2011, agency officials stated that TSA is working to address these limitations in the next version, which is scheduled for completion by the end of calendar year 2011. We recommended that TSA conduct a risk assessment that integrates all three elements of risk. We recommended that TSA expand its efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy. While industry has taken these steps to implement technology to enhance rail security, the nature of the rail system has presented challenges to further implementation. We have also reported that several technologies are available to help address rail security challenges, but they are at varying levels of maturity and using them involves trade-offs in mobility, cost, and privacy. For example, in July 2010, we reported that the ability of explosives detection technologies to help protect the passenger rail environment depends both upon their detection performance and how effectively the technologies can be deployed in that environment. More-established explosives detection technologies—such as handheld explosive trace detection systems, x-raying imaging systems, and canines—have demonstrated good performance against many conventional explosives threats but are challenged by threats from certain explosives. The 9/11 Commission Act mandates TSA to develop and issue regulations for a public transportation security training program and for a railroad security training program. In June 2009, we reported that TSA had not implemented this requirement or several others related to mass transit and passenger rail security, and recommended that DHS develop a plan with milestones for doing so. DHS concurred with this recommendation, and in June 2011, TSA stated that it had developed a plan and milestones for addressing uncompleted 9/11 Commission Act requirements. TSA also stated that it is finalizing the security training program regulations and expects to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for public comment by November 2011. Opportunities Exist to Streamline Security Information for Transit Agencies, and Preliminary Results Indicate Some Freight Rail Agencies Do Not Receive Actionable Information and Analysis from TSA
While TSA is taking steps to improve information sharing with freight and passenger rail stakeholders, potential overlap could complicate stakeholder efforts to discern relevant information and take appropriate actions to enhance security. We recommended that DHS establish time frames for a working group of federal and industry officials to assess opportunities to streamline information-sharing mechanisms to reduce any unneeded overlap. DHS concurred with this recommendation. Preliminary observations from our ongoing work also indicate that some freight rail stakeholders would prefer to receive more analysis or actionable security information from TSA. TSA officials agree that improvements are needed in the products and mechanisms by which they alert rail agencies of security-related information and intelligence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Alleged terrorist plots against rail systems in major U.S. cities have increased focus on these systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary federal agency responsible for rail security. This testimony addresses the following: (1) the extent that DHS has conducted comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector, including for rail, (2) technologies available to enhance rail security, (3) TSA's efforts regarding rail security training, and (4) rail stakeholders' satisfaction with security-related information TSA is providing. GAO's testimony is based on GAO reports issued from March 2009 through September 2010, selected updates conducted in May through June 2011, and preliminary results from ongoing work on information sharing. As part of the ongoing work, GAO surveyed the seven largest freight rail carriers (based on revenue) and interviewed security officials from three of these rail carriers selected for location, as well as TSA officials.
What GAO Found
TSA has taken steps to conduct comprehensive risk assessments across the transportation sector and within passenger and freight rail modes that combine the three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence. For example, in March 2009, GAO reported that TSA had taken actions to implement a risk management approach but had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector as a whole, and recommended that TSA do so to help ensure that resources are allocated to the highest-priority risks. DHS concurred and in June 2010 produced the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment, which assessed risk as a factor of all three risk elements within and across the transportation sector, including rail. GAO has also made recommendations to strengthen risk assessments within individual modes, such as expanding TSA's efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail assessments, including potential sabotage to bridges, tunnels, and other critical infrastructure. DHS concurred and is addressing the recommendations. Several technologies are available to address rail security, such as security cameras, handheld explosive trace detection systems, x-raying imaging systems, and canines. However, technologies are at varying levels of maturity and involve trade-offs in mobility, cost, and privacy. In July 2010, for example, we reported that the ability of explosives detection technologies to help protect the passenger rail environment depends on detection performance and how effectively they can be deployed. TSA has not issued regulations for public transportation and railroad security training programs, as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. In June 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not implemented the training requirement and recommended that DHS develop a plan with milestones for doing so, as called for by project management best practices. DHS concurred, and in June 2011 TSA stated that it had developed a timeline for uncompleted 9/11 Commission Act requirements. TSA also stated that it is finalizing the security training program regulations and expects to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for public comment by November 2011. Opportunities exist to streamline security information for transit agencies, and preliminary results of ongoing work indicate that some freight rail agencies do not receive actionable information from TSA. In September 2010, GAO recommended that DHS assess opportunities to streamline information-sharing mechanisms to reduce overlap. DHS concurred, and in response it and the rail industry have developed a streamlined product. However, preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work indicate that some rail stakeholders would prefer to receive actionable security information and analysis from TSA that could allow them to adjust to potential terrorist threats. TSA officials agreed that improvements are needed in the products and mechanisms by which they alert rail agencies of security-related information. GAO will continue to monitor this issue and expects to issue a report by the end of 2011.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to enhance DHS's and TSA's rail security efforts. DHS generally concurred with the recommendations and has actions under way to address them. DHS generally agreed with the preliminary observations in this statement, and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-71 | gao_GAO-15-71_0 | State environmental laws, such as laws related to the growth-inducing effects of agency actions may also apply to a proposed highway project. Three Factors Generally Affect the Types of Environmental Reviews Required for Highway Projects, and State Environmental Review Document Types Largely Mirror NEPA
Three Factors Generally Affect Whether Federal or State Environmental Reviews Are Required for Highway Projects
Three factors—project funding sources, project characteristics, and rules allowing state adoption of federal review documents—generally determine whether a highway project needs a federal environmental review or a state environmental review, or both. These requirements contrast with NEPA, which generally focuses on the potential for significant environmental impacts. Figure 5 illustrates the number of states allowing for full adoption, in which the NEPA review fulfills the SEPA requirements; those allowing for the adoption of the federal review with additional state analyses or documentation (i.e., partial adoption); and those requiring that state requirements be met separately from the FHWA NEPA review. In addition, we surveyed state DOTs in each of those 18 states about the degree of similarity between state requirements and federal requirements identified in FHWA’s NEPA Toolkit for five of FHWA’s six NEPA principles: assessment of project impacts, development and evaluation of project alternatives, mitigation of adverse project impacts, interagency coordination, and public involvement. Consideration of Project Impacts
For each of the 5 individual requirements related to the consideration of project impacts, from 10 to 13 (of 17) states reported in our survey that their requirements for analyzing the environmental impacts of a proposed highway project are similar to FHWA’s NEPA requirements, although other states reported having less stringent requirements. Mitigation of Adverse Project Impacts
The extent to which states have requirements to consider mitigation of environmental impacts as part of their environmental review process that are similar to FHWA’s NEPA requirements often varies by the type of review, and 4 of the 17 states reported in our survey that they do not have mitigation requirements similar to FHWA’s NEPA requirements for any level of review. Having less stringent or no state requirements for parkland protection and historic preservation may affect whether a project is determined to have significant impacts and therefore whether, for those states that require mitigation, those impacts are considered and mitigated. State responses to our survey indicated that public involvement requirements vary, ranging from states that have no requirement to allow public involvement, to others that may have more stringent requirements than FHWA’s NEPA rules. Officials in three states told us that they match the higher standard of FHWA’s NEPA public involvement requirements for state-only reviews to meet public expectations, even if less was required by state law. Few Instances of Federal–State Duplication Were Reported; FHWA and States Have Improved Coordination
Few States Reported Duplication Resulting from Federal and State Environmental Review Processes; More Than Half Reported No Duplication for Any Reason
Officials in 4 (of 18) states expressly identified instances of federal–state duplication in environmental review processes. In seven of these states, adopting a NEPA review fulfills SEPA requirements, and state officials pointed to this adoption as the reason for reporting no duplication in their survey responses. DOT and CEQ provided technical corrections about federal and state environmental review requirements, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: A Comparison of Federal NEPA Requirements and State Environmental Policy Act Requirements as Applied to Federal-Aid Highway Projects
As discussed in the body of this report, we identified state statutes, regulations, and orders in the 18 states where review of highway projects is required under a state environmental policy act (SEPA), and we compared those requirements to the federal requirements for federal-aid highway projects under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and implementing regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Some SEPA states are authorized to use NEPA documentation to meet their SEPA requirements but state officials must make some kind of independent decision under state law. This report addresses: (1) the factors that determine whether federal or state environmental reviews are required for highway projects, and how the types of federal and state environmental review documents compare; (2) how state environmental review requirements and practices compare with federal requirements for assessing federal-aid highway projects; and (3) the extent of any duplication in federal and state reviews, including frequency and cost, in states with environmental review requirements for highway projects. This report focuses on duplication that might occur between state and federal processes for environmental review of highway projects where there is duplication of effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under NEPA, federal agencies evaluate the potential environmental impacts of proposed projects. FHWA has developed a process for NEPA reviews for federal-aid highway projects, such as roads or bridges. According to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and GAO analysis, 18 states have SEPAs that also require the review of environmental impacts of a variety of actions for highway projects.
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) required GAO to examine state environmental reviews for highway projects, including whether they duplicate federal environmental reviews for federal-aid highway projects. This report focuses solely on environmental reviews of highway projects in states with SEPAs and addresses 1) factors determining whether federal or state environmental reviews are required; 2) how state and federal review requirements compare; and 3) the extent of any duplication in federal and state reviews, including frequency and cost. GAO reviewed FHWA and CEQ documents and interviewed officials of these federal agencies; analyzed state laws and regulations; surveyed the 18 states with SEPAs required for highway projects; and interviewed selected state agencies within 9 of those states based on the number of FHWA NEPA reviews underway and other factors.
This report has no recommendations. The U.S. Department of Transportation and CEQ provided technical corrections about federal and state environmental review requirements, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Three factors—project funding sources and project characteristics, and whether a state allows the adoption of federal review documents—generally determine whether a highway project needs a federal environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or a state environmental review under state law, or both. Projects without federal highway funding usually do not require a Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) NEPA review, but NEPA reviews of highway projects may still be required to obtain federal permits. Thresholds for environmental review vary under state environmental policy acts (SEPA) and may include project cost or length, whereas NEPA focuses on the potential for significant environmental impacts. Eighteen states have SEPAs required for highway projects, and 17 of these allow for the partial or full adoption of FHWA analyses or documentation to meet state environmental review requirements, according to GAO's survey of these states.
State environmental review requirements are generally similar to the FHWA NEPA process—including consideration of impacts, development and evaluation of project alternatives, mitigation of adverse project impacts, interagency coordination, and public involvement—although differences in specific requirements may affect key environmental decisions. For example, for the consideration of environmental impacts of a proposed highway project, a majority of states responding to GAO's survey indicated that their requirements are similar to FHWA's NEPA requirements overall. However, officials in 7 states GAO surveyed reported that their SEPA requirements related to social and environmental justice impacts are less stringent than FHWA's NEPA requirements. In addition, while state public involvement requirements are generally similar to FHWA's NEPA requirements overall, individual requirements vary, ranging from states that have no requirements to allow public involvement to others that may have more stringent requirements than FHWA's. Officials in 3 states told GAO that in practice they match FHWA's NEPA public involvement requirements for state-only reviews to meet public expectations, even if state law requires less. Further, in the absence of required federal NEPA reviews, certain federal laws related to protection of parklands and historic preservation may not apply to a project, potentially affecting whether a project is determined to have significant impacts and whether those impacts are mitigated.
Officials in 4 of the 18 states in GAO's survey identified instances of potential federal–state duplication in environmental review processes, stemming either from supplemental state requirements or from the lack of alignment between required federal and state review documents. By contrast, 10 of the states in GAO's survey reported that there was no duplication in environmental reviews. Generally, state officials explained that little duplication of effort occurs in state and federal review processes because these reviews are done concurrently by state officials able to address requirements with analyses used for different purposes without replicating effort. Further, 7 of the 10 states reporting no duplication allow for the adoption of a NEPA review to fulfill SEPA requirements. Finally, 4 states pointed to potential duplication or overlap that did not stem from the interaction of state and federal requirements, such as the rework necessary to keep environmental reviews up to date. |
gao_GAO-13-170 | gao_GAO-13-170_0 | Over 675,000 children were found to be the victims of abuse or neglect. Many of the children (both victims and non-victims) who were referred to child welfare agencies, as well as their caregivers and families, received some child welfare services, such as in-home services and counseling or other mental health services. Another way child welfare agencies secure services is by relying on partner agencies, such as behavioral health agencies and public housing authorities. Federal Funds Dedicated to Child Welfare
Title IV-B is the primary source of federal child welfare funding available for child welfare services, representing about 9 percent of dedicated federal child welfare appropriations ($730 million of $8 billion) in fiscal year 2012. Funds authorized under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act make up the large majority of federal funding dedicated to child welfare, with funds chiefly available for specific foster care and adoption expenses, but not for services. Selected States Used Title IV-B Funds to Support a Wide Array of Services, and Strategies for Using These Funds Varied
Officials from the four states we studied reported spending Title IV-B CWS funds in state fiscal year 2011 to support a variety of services and other activities, and they told us they largely spent PSSF funds for services in the program’s four required expenditure categories. Most States Rely on Flexible Federal Funding to Provide Additional Support for Child Welfare Services
States Use TANF, SSBG, and Medicaid to Fund Services Also Covered by Title IV-B
Nationally, most states supplement Title IV-B funds with other federal funding that is not dedicated to child welfare, according to expenditure data states reported to ACF. As seen in figure 2 below, our selected states each used different combinations of federal funds not dedicated to child welfare to support services and other activities covered under Title IV-B in state fiscal year 2011. Moreover, nationally states reported spending these funds for a variety of purposes. For example, 16 states reported using TANF funds for in-home services, family preservation services, or both. For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated $1.7 billion in SSBG funds. One of our selected states, Minnesota, claimed $24 million in federal reimbursement for Medicaid targeted case management for children at risk of placement in foster care and their families in calendar year 2011. Another selected state, Virginia, reported claiming $1.9 million in federal Medicaid reimbursement for targeted case management activities related to children in foster care in state fiscal year 2011. Some States Have Waivers that Permit Them to Use Title IV-E Funding for Services Covered under Title IV-B
Although states are generally prohibited from funding services, such as parenting classes and substance abuse treatment, with Title IV-E funds, ACF has granted waivers permitting some states to do so. Child Welfare Agencies Have Difficulty Securing Many Services Due to a Variety of Challenges
Gaps in Child Welfare Services Include Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Data from a national survey conducted by ACF indicate that not all children and families in the child welfare system receive the services they need. In response to a GAO data collection instrument, most of these localities reported key service gaps in the areas of substance abuse assessment and treatment services; assistance with material needs, such as housing and transportation; and in-home services (see figure 4). Officials in one of these localities noted that clients often wait 2 to 3 months for these services. Officials in several of our selected localities also said it could be difficult for families experiencing substance abuse to achieve reunification within Delays in receiving treatment can make it difficult mandated deadlines. In 6 of 13 localities, officials cited lack of health insurance as a factor contributing to difficulty securing medical services for families. For instance, local officials in New Mexico described challenges in securing resources to provide services to children and families at risk of foster care placement. For example, one ACF official we interviewed noted that most states have experienced budget cuts in social services, which affect both child welfare and substance abuse services. There are also other opportunities on the federal, state, and local level for child welfare and partner agencies to coordinate to improve service delivery for children and families in the child welfare system. According to agency officials, 14 grantees were coordinating with child welfare agencies to address service development, funding, and access to care for children and youth in the child welfare system and those at risk of abuse or neglect. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2011, over 675,000 children were found to be victims of abuse or neglect. To help ensure that such children have safe and permanent homes, state and local child welfare agencies secure child welfare services, such as parenting classes and substance abuse treatment. Title IV-B of the Social Security Act is the primary source of federal funding designated for child welfare services that is available to states. In fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated $730 million under Title IV-B. Although states augment these funds with state, local, and other federal funds, some children and families may not receive the services they need. Congress mandated that GAO provide information about the funding and provision of child welfare services. This report addresses: (1) how selected states use funds provided under Title IV-B, (2) what alternative sources of federal funding states use to fund child welfare services and other activities covered under Title IV-B, and (3) what services, if any, child welfare agencies have difficulty securing for children and their families. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, guidance, and reports; analyzed HHS expenditure data and program evaluations; and interviewed HHS officials, child welfare experts, and state and local child welfare officials in 4 states and 13 localities selected to illustrate a variety of approaches to financing and delivering services. GAO also reviewed state fiscal year 2011 expenditure data from selected states and administered a data collection instrument to selected localities.
What GAO Found
The four states GAO selected used funds provided under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act for a variety of child welfare services and other activities, and had different strategies for spending these funds. For instance, in fiscal year 2011 Virginia provided funding to all local child welfare agencies to spend on their own priorities, such as parenting classes. New Mexico targeted certain counties for services, such as intensive in-home services for families at risk of foster care.
States nationwide also use other federal funds, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) funds, as well as Medicaid, for purposes covered under Title IV-B. In the spring of 2011, 31 states reported spending TANF funds, and in fiscal year 2010, 44 states reported spending SSBG funds on these purposes. Some states also claim federal Medicaid reimbursement for activities covered under Title IV-B. One selected state, Minnesota, claimed reimbursement for case management for children at risk of foster care placement in 2011. Funds authorized under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act make up the large majority of federal child welfare funds, but are designated for purposes such as providing room and board payments for children in foster care and subsidies to adoptive parents, and generally cannot be used for child welfare services. However, 14 states have waivers allowing them to use these funds more flexibly to improve child and family outcomes. Among GAO's selected states, Florida had a waiver allowing it to use some Title IV-E funds for in-home services designed to prevent foster care placement.
Many services, including substance abuse treatment and assistance with material needs, such as housing, are difficult for child welfare agencies to secure due to a variety of challenges. A 2008-2009 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) survey that sampled children and families in the child welfare system found that many did not receive needed services. For example, an estimated 58 percent of children age 10 and under at risk of emotional, behavioral, or substance abuse problems had not received related services in the past year. Local child welfare officials in four selected states reported service gaps in multiple areas. Service gaps may harm child wellbeing and make it more difficult to preserve or reunite families. For example, officials from one locality noted 2- to 3-month wait times for substance abuse services. Due to the chronic nature of the disease, delays in receiving services may make it more difficult to reunify families within mandated deadlines. Officials cited factors contributing to service gaps that included provider shortages and lack of transportation. Additionally, officials noted difficulty securing services from partner agencies, such as housing authorities. State fiscal constraints, which affect both child welfare and partner agencies, contribute to such difficulties. |
gao_NSIAD-95-91 | gao_NSIAD-95-91_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed the training results of the seven enhanced brigades that were former roundout/up brigades to determine whether (1) the Bold Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime training goals, (2) the advisers assigned to the brigades were working effectively to improve training readiness, and (3) prospects of having the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely. Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews in less than one-third of the battalions were able to meet gunnery goals. Brigades Were Trained in Few Mission-Essential Tasks
Army doctrine states that peacetime training is to be focused on the requirements of a unit’s wartime mission. According to brigade officials, many of the personnel were excused to take individual training courses in their assigned jobs. Adviser Program Is Hampered by Numerous Problems
The new adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness have been limited by factors such as an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role; poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and Guard leadership, which caused confusion and disagreement over Bold Shift’s goals; and difficult working relationships. Conclusions
Any significant improvement in the proficiency levels of National Guard combat brigades are not likely to be attained without a marked improvement in the relationship between the active Army and the Guard. Prospects for Achieving the 90-Day Deployment Goal Are Uncertain
It is highly uncertain whether the National Guard combat brigades can be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. Initial postmobilization models estimated that the brigades would need between 68 and 110 days before being ready to deploy. Initial Models Estimate 68 to 154 Days
In February 1992, the Army Chief of Staff testified before the House Committee on Armed Services that the Army could not have the Guard brigades ready to deploy with less than 60 to 90 days of postmobilization preparation time. Another brigade estimated it would need only 37 days of training. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army National Guard's combat brigades' war-readiness, focusing on whether: (1) the Bold Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime training goals; (2) the brigades' advisers are working effectively to improve training readiness; and (3) prospects of having the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in general, none of the 7 enhanced brigades achieved the training proficiency required during the first 3 years of the Bold Shift training strategy; (2) in 1993, combat platoons mastered only 14 percent of their mission-essential tasks and less than one-third of the battalions met their gunnery goals; (3) the brigades could not meet staffing and personnel goals, since many personnel were not sufficiently trained in their individual job and leadership skills; (4) the brigades' training problems are long-standing and will be difficult to improve; (5) although training strategy revisions are under way, the improvements will take years to be effective; (6) the Army advisers' efforts to improve the Guard's training readiness have been limited by an ambiguous definition of the advisers' role, poor communications between the Army, advisers, brigades, and other Guard officials, particularly regarding training goals, and difficult working relationships between the Army and the state-run Guard; (7) it is highly uncertain whether the brigades could be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization, since the Guard's peacetime training is inadequate; (8) the postmobilization model estimated that the brigades would need 68 to 154 days of postmobilization training before deployment, while another model estimated that the best trained brigades would need 102 days to deploy; and (9) brigade proficiency reports have generally overstated brigade readiness levels. |
gao_GAO-01-441 | gao_GAO-01-441_0 | Conclusion
Unless DOE revisits its disposal needs and its current options for disposing of wastes off-site, it could miss opportunities to reduce cleanup costs at the three sites and at other sites, such as Paducah, that might propose the development of new on-site facilities. Building in a decision checkpoint before major investment decisions are finalized could identify instances when the use of off-site disposal would be less expensive, or when the cost difference no longer outweighs the long-term risks associated with on-site disposal. Such validation of the cost comparison is especially important in instances where DOE is aware that the scope or timeframe of the cleanup effort has changed dramatically. Remaining open to new proposals for off-site disposal would also inject an element of competition into this process. Thus, even if the validation did nothing more than confirm the original decision to dispose of the wastes on-site, it has the potential to ensure that costs are kept to a minimum. These sites are: the Fernald Environmental Management Project (Ohio); the Oak Ridge Reservation (Tennessee); and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho). | What GAO Found
Unless the Department of Energy (DOE) revisits its disposal needs and its current option for disposing of wastes off-site, it could miss opportunities to reduce cleanup costs at the Fernald, Oak Ridge, and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) sites and at other sites, such as Paducah, that might propose the development of new on-site facilities. Building in a decision checkpoint before major investment decisions are finalized could identify instances in which the use of off-site disposal would be less expensive, or when the cost difference no longer outweighs the long-term risks associated with on-site disposal. Such validation of the cost comparison is especially important in instances in which DOE is aware that the scope or timeframe of the cleanup effort has changed dramatically. Remaining open to new proposals for off-site disposal would also inject an element of competition into this process. Thus, even if the validation did nothing more than confirm the original decision to dispose of the wastes on-site, it has the potential to ensure that costs are kept to a minimum. |
gao_GAO-01-1122T | gao_GAO-01-1122T_0 | Since it is the nation’s only launch system capable of carrying people to and from space, the shuttle’s viability is important to NASA’s other space programs, such as the International Space Station. NASA operates four orbiters in the shuttle fleet. Since the shuttle’s first flight in 1981, the space shuttle program has developed and incorporated many modifications to improve performance and safety. This condition clearly jeopardized the program’s ability to hand off leadership roles to the next generation. NASA subsequently recognized the need to revitalize its workforce and began taking actions toward this end. Finally, in December 1999, NASA terminated its downsizing plans for the shuttle program and initiated efforts to begin hiring new staff. Significantly, NASA’s current budget request projects an increase of more than 200 full-time equivalent staff for the shuttle program through fiscal year 2002—both new hires and staff transfers. NASA is also focusing more attention on human capital management in its annual performance plan. But there are considerable challenges ahead. Second, agencies do not have the sustained commitment from leaders and managers needed to implement reforms. Progress and Challenges in Making Shuttle Safety Upgrades
At this time last year, NASA planned to develop and begin equipping the shuttle fleet with a variety of safety and supportability upgrades, at an estimated cost of $2.2 billion. Second, while NASA had begun to establish a dedicated shuttle safety upgrade workforce, it had not fully determined its needs in this area. | What GAO Found
In August 2000, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle program was at a critical juncture. Its workforce had declined significantly since 1995, its flight rate was to double to support the assembly of the International Space Station, and costly safety upgrades were planned to enhance the space shuttle's operation until at least 2012. Workforce reductions were jeopardizing NASA's ability to safely support the shuttle's planned flight rate. Recognizing the need to revitalize the shuttle's workforce, NASA ended its downsizing plans for the shuttle program and began to develop and equip the shuttle fleet with various safety and supportability upgrades. NASA is making progress in revitalizing the shuttle program's workforce. NASA's current budget request projects an increase of more than 200 full-time equivalent staff through fiscal year 2002. NASA has also focused more attention on human capital management in its annual performance plan. However, considerable challenges still lie ahead. Because many of the additional staff are new hires, they will need considerable training and will need to be integrated into the shuttle program. Also, NASA still needs to fully staff areas critical to shuttle safety; deal with critical losses due to retirements in the coming years; and, most of all, sustain management attention to human capital reforms. Although NASA is making strides in revitalizing its workforce, its ability to implement safety upgrades in a timely manner is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-12-18 | gao_GAO-12-18_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the current system of appointing Reserve Bank directors effectively ensures that they are elected without discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, or national origin, and that, for some directors, they are elected with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers, as required by section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act, we reviewed the Reserve Banks’ processes for identification, nomination, and selection of directors. Also, we interviewed selected Reserve Bank directors and Reserve Bank officials from each Reserve Bank to collect information on directors’ roles and responsibilities, any conflict of interest concerns and procedures for addressing the appearance of or actual conflicts, and potential changes to Reserve Bank governance. 1). Class A directors represent the member banks, while Class B and C directors represent the public with, as required by the Federal Reserve Act, “due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers.” As required by the Federal Reserve Act, six of the nine directors, Class A and Class B, are elected by the member banks, and the remaining three, the Class C directors, are appointed by the Federal Reserve Board. For example, in 2006, minorities accounted for 13 of 108 director positions; and in 2010 they accounted for 15 of 108 director positions. More specifically, in 2010, head office directors comprised 78 white men, 15 white women, 12 minority men, and 3 minority women. Reserve Bank officials said they generally focus their search on senior executives. In general, Reserve Banks use a combination of personal networking and community outreach efforts to identify potential candidates. Federal Reserve Bank directors often serve on the boards of a variety of financial firms as well as those of nonprofit, private, and public companies. In addition, as the financial services industry has evolved, more companies are involved in financial services or otherwise interconnected with financial institutions. These steps include defining the roles and responsibilities of directors to avoid conflicts, managing and mitigating conflicts of interest through adherence to federal law and the Federal Reserve board’s conflict-of-interest policies, and establishing internal controls and policies to identify and manage potential conflicts. According to Federal Reserve Board and Reserve Bank officials, because the Federal Reserve Board has delegated the examination of bank and financial holding companies, member banks, and affiliates to the Reserve Bank staff, the staff report through the Reserve Bank presidents to the Federal Reserve Board and not directly to the boards of directors of the Reserve Bank. The Bank of Canada does not have a waiver process. Third, some in Congress and others recommended that the Federal Reserve System’s role in supervision and regulation be eliminated, which would have eliminated concerns about conflicts of interest involving directors affiliated with institutions supervised by the Reserve Banks. However, Reserve Banks lack transparency in their governance practices compared with those of other organizations we reviewed. Most Reserve Banks do not routinely disclose governance practices to the public, while most comparable institutions we reviewed do. These unprecedented actions resulted in Congress and the public raising questions about the Reserve Banks’ governance practices and potential conflicts of interest involving the directors. Our analysis shows that from 2006 through 2010 labor and consumer groups tended to be less represented than other industry groups on both head office and branch boards. As such, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board take the following four actions: To help enhance economic and demographic diversity and broaden perspectives among Reserve Bank directors who are elected to represent the public, encourage all Reserve Banks to consider ways to broaden their pools of potential candidates for directors, such as including officers who are below the senior executive level at their organizations. As part of the Federal Reserve System’s continued focus on strengthening governance practices, develop, document, and require all Reserve Banks to adopt a process for requesting waivers from the Federal Reserve Board director eligibility policy and ethics policy for directors. With respect to our three recommendations to improve transparency, the Federal Reserve Board stated that it will work with the Reserve Banks to consider ways to more clearly include the directors’ roles and responsibilities in the bylaws and the Federal Reserve System will continue to ensure that Reserve Bank directors are fully aware of their roles and the policies that govern their positions on the Reserve Bank boards. 2. 12. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
Events surrounding the 2007 financial crisis raised questions about the governance of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks), particularly the boards of directors' roles in activities related to supervision and regulation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act required GAO to review the governance of the Reserve Banks. This report (1) analyzes the level of diversity on the boards of directors and assesses the extent to which the process of identifying possible directors and appointing them results in diversity on the boards, (2) evaluates the effectiveness of policies and practices for identifying and managing conflicts of interest for Reserve Bank directors, and (3) compares Reserve Bank governance practices with the practices of selected organizations.
What GAO Found
The Federal Reserve Act requires each Reserve Bank to be governed by a nine-member board--three Class A directors elected by member banks to represent their interests, three Class B directors elected by member banks to represent the public, and three Class C directors that are appointed by the Federal Reserve Board to represent the public. The diversity of Reserve Bank boards was limited from 2006 to 2010. For example, in 2006 minorities accounted for 13 of 108 director positions, and in 2010 they accounted for 15 of 108 director positions. Specifically, in 2010 Reserve Bank directors included 78 white men, 15 white women, 12 minority men, and 3 minority women. According to the Federal Reserve Act, Class B and C directors are to be elected with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumer representation. During this period, labor and consumer groups had less representation than other industries. In 2010, 56 of the 91 directors that responded to GAO's survey had financial markets experience. Reserve Banks generally review the current demographics of their boards and use a combination of personal networking and community outreach efforts to identify potential candidates for directors. Reserve Bank officials said that they generally limit their director search efforts to senior executives. GAO's analysis of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission data found that diversity among senior executives is generally limited. While some Reserve Banks recruit more broadly, GAO recommends that the Federal Reserve Board encourage all Reserve Banks to consider ways to help enhance the economic and demographic diversity of perspectives on the boards, including by broadening their potential candidate pool. The Federal Reserve System mitigates and manages the actual and potential conflicts of interest by, among other things, defining the directors' roles and responsibilities, monitoring adherence to conflict-of-interest policies, and establishing internal controls to identify and manage potential conflicts. Reserve Bank directors are often affiliated with a variety of financial firms, nonprofits, and private and public companies. As the financial services industry evolves, more companies are becoming involved in financial services or interconnected with financial institutions. As a result, directors of all three classes can have ties to the financial sector. While these relationships may not give rise to actual conflicts of interest, they can create the appearance of a conflict as illustrated by the participation of director-affiliated institutions in the Federal Reserve System's emergency programs.
What GAO Recommends
To increase transparency, GAO recommends that all Reserve Banks clearly document the directors' role in supervision and regulation activities in their bylaws. One option for addressing directors' conflicts of interest is for the Reserve Bank to request a waiver from the Federal Reserve Board, which, according to officials, is rare. Most Reserve Banks do not have a process for formally requesting such waivers. To strengthen governance practices and increase transparency, GAO recommends that the Reserve Banks develop and document a process for requesting conflict waivers for directors. The Federal Reserve System's governance practices are generally similar to those of selected central banks and comparable institutions such as bank holding companies and have similar selection procedures for directors. However, Reserve Bank governance practices tend to be less transparent than those of these institutions. For instance, comparable organizations make information on their board committees and ethics policies available on their websites; most Reserve banks do not. |
gao_GAO-14-110 | gao_GAO-14-110_0 | The 12 Reserve Banks provide coins and notes to depository institutions, among other responsibilities. 2.) The Federal Reserve also contracts with armored carriers to transport notes for circulation or storage. 4.) The Federal Reserve’s 2012–15 strategic plan includes an objective to use financial resources efficiently and effectively. To monitor costs related to coin and note operations, CPO officials said they review currency management costs—which include costs related to both coins and notes—at the national level because individual Reserve Banks may vary in their accounting for operational costs related to coins and notes. Our analysis of coin management costs, using CPO data, indicates that coin management costs increased by 69 percent from 2008 through 2012. Without taking steps to identify and share cost-effective coin management practices across Reserve Banks, While the Federal Reserve may be missing opportunities to support more efficient and effective use of Reserve Bank resources. The Federal Reserve Follows Some Key Practices in Managing the Circulating Coin Inventory but Lacks Performance Information for Additional Metrics and Forecasting
In managing the circulating coin inventory, we found that the Federal Reserve follows key practices for collaboration and risk management and partially follows key practices for performance metrics, forecasting demand, and system optimization. CPO has multiple mechanisms, such as stakeholder working groups, for sharing information related to the circulating coin inventory with partner entities. Key Practices Partially Followed
Performance Metrics
The Federal Reserve partially follows the key practice of performance metrics because its use of performance metrics is limited to inventory targets and it has not developed other goals or metrics related to coin- supply chain management. Demand for Currency Expected to Decline Gradually in the Near Term, but a Variety of Factors Make Predicting Longer- Term Change Difficult
Potential Changes in Demand for Currency
To collect data and information on potential changes in the demand for currency, the Federal Reserve has conducted studies and outreach with groups such as depository institutions and merchants, and found a general consensus that the use of currency may decline slightly in the near term. Federal Reserve studies and data also indicate electronic payment options have increased over time. During this period, the value of currency in circulation rose approximately 26 percent. The Federal Reserve Is Managing the Existing $1 Coin Inventory, Took Steps to Meet Demand for Circulation, and Plans No Future Action
Management of the $1 Coin Inventory
The Federal Reserve manages the $1 coin inventory as it does all other coin denominations, overseeing the distribution of coins produced by the U.S. Mint and those already in circulation. The Federal Reserve’s goal, based on its statutory responsibilities, is to ensure that sufficient supplies of coins are available to meet demand nationwide. Reserve Banks held approximately $1.4 billion in $1 coin inventory as of March 2013. According to Reserve Bank officials, depository institution representatives, coin terminal operators, and vending machine industry representatives we met with, $1 coins are readily available to the public throughout the country. Beginning in 2007, the Federal Reserve met regularly with depository institution representatives to gather feedback about demand for $1 coins and identify potential barriers to circulation. In addition, the Federal Reserve and U.S. Mint While the Federal Reserve took steps to overcome barriers to the circulation of the $1 coin to meet existing demand, according to Federal Reserve officials, it can do little else given the $1 coin is no longer produced for circulation and the agency’s statutory responsibilities focus on ensuring $1 coins are available to meet demand, not on taking steps to change demand. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure efficient management of the circulating coin inventory, we recommend that the Board of Governors direct CPO to take the following three actions: develop a process to assess the factors that have influenced increasing coin operations costs and differences in costs across Reserve Banks and a process to use this information to identify practices that could lead to cost-savings; establish, document, and annually report to the Board performance goals and metrics for managing the circulating coin inventory, (e.g., Reserve Bank coin management costs) and measure performance towards those goals and metrics; and establish and implement a process to assess the accuracy of forecasts for new coin orders and revise the forecasts as needed. In written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, the Federal Reserve generally agreed with the report’s recommendations. (2) To what extent does the Federal Reserve follow key supply-chain management practices in managing the circulating coin inventory? (3) What actions has the Federal Reserve taken to respond to potential changes in demand for coins and notes? Appendix II: Data and Figures on Coin and Note Inventory, Orders, and Circulation
Reserve Bank Coin Inventory and Inventory Targets
In 2009, the Federal Reserve’s Cash Product Office (CPO) established national upper and lower inventory targets for pennies, nickels, dimes, and quarters to track and measure the coin inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Efficiently managing the circulating coin inventory helps ensure that enough coins are available to meet public demand while avoiding unnecessary production and storage costs. The Federal Reserve fulfills the coin demand of the nation's depository institutions (e.g., commercial banks and credit unions) by managing Reserve Bank inventory and ordering new coins from the U.S. Mint. GAO was asked to review this approach. This report examines (1) how the Federal Reserve manages the circulating coin inventory and the related costs, (2) the extent to which the Federal Reserve follows key practices in managing the circulating coin inventory, (3) actions taken to respond to potential changes in demand for coins and notes, and (4) actions taken with regard to the circulation of the $1 coin. GAO interviewed federal and foreign officials, experts, and industry representatives; reviewed documents and data on coin inventories; and compared the Federal Reserve's coin inventory management practices to key practices in supply chain management.
What GAO Found
In 2009, the Federal Reserve centralized coin management across the 12 Reserve Banks, established national inventory targets to track and measure the coin inventory, and in 2011 established a contract with armored carriers that store Reserve Bank coins in their facilities. However, according to Federal Reserve data, from 2008 to 2012, total annual Reserve Bank coin management costs increased by 69 percent and at individual Reserve Banks increased at rates ranging from 36 percent to 116 percent. The Federal Reserve's current strategic plan calls for using financial resources efficiently and effectively and monitoring costs to improve cost-effectiveness. However, the agency does not monitor coin management costs by each Reserve Bank--instead focusing on combined national coin and note costs--thus missing potential opportunities to improve the cost-effectiveness of coin-related operations across Reserve Banks.
In managing the circulating coin inventory, the Federal Reserve followed two of five key practices GAO identified and partially followed three. For example, the Federal Reserve follows the key practice of collaboration because it has established multiple mechanisms for sharing information related to coin inventory management with partner entities. The Federal Reserve has developed some performance metrics in the form of upper and lower national coin inventory targets. However, it has not developed other goals or metrics related to coin supply-chain management. One key practice is for agencies to identify goals, establish performance metrics, and measure progress toward those goals. Establishing goals and metrics, such as those related to coin management costs, could aid the Federal Reserve in using information and resources to identify additional efficiencies.
To collect information on potential changes in the demand for currency (coins and notes), the Federal Reserve has conducted studies and outreach, including developing a long-term strategic framework beginning in 2010 to consider changes in demand and implications for operations. While the magnitude of potential changes in the demand for currency is inherently uncertain, the Federal Reserve anticipates a gradual decline in currency use, and officials reported such changes could likely be accommodated by the current system. While Federal Reserve studies and data indicate electronic payments have increased over time, currency usage has remained strong. For example, from 2009 to 2012, the value of currency in circulation rose about 26 percent.
Starting in 2007, the Federal Reserve took actions to overcome barriers to circulation of the $1 coin, such as holding regular meetings with depository institution representatives to gather feedback about demand for $1 coins. The Federal Reserve manages the $1 coin inventory as it does for all other coin denominations--overseeing distribution and ensuring sufficient supply is available to meet demand nationwide. Reserve Banks currently hold approximately $1.4 billion in $1 coins, an amount that, according to the Federal Reserve, is sufficient to meet demand for more than 40 years. Reserve Bank officials, depository institution representatives, and coin terminal operators stated that $1 coins are readily available to the public throughout the country, but there is very low public demand for these coins.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, the Federal Reserve should (1) develop a process to assess factors influencing coin operations costs and identify practices that could lead to cost-savings and (2) establish additional performance goals and metrics relevant to coin inventory management. The Federal Reserve generally agreed with the report's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-633T | gao_GAO-13-633T_0 | EPA’s 10 regional offices implement Superfund within several states and, in some cases, territories. When EPA decides not to list a site on the NPL or otherwise retain oversight, it may defer oversight of the site’s cleanup to other federal and state cleanup programs. CERCLA and its implementing regulations establish a process of specific steps to evaluate and to clean up sites. States Play a Critical Role in Characterizing and Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites
As we reported in April 2013, states, in consultation with EPA, participate in the identification and cleanup of hazardous waste sites eligible for the NPL in many ways. Examples of this participation include the following:
States may notify EPA of potential hazardous waste sites for listing in the Superfund program database;
States may act under cooperative agreements with EPA to evaluate the relative potential for sites being considered for the NPL to pose a threat to human health and the environment;
As a matter of policy, EPA seeks concurrence from state governors or environmental agency heads before proposing a site for listing on the NPL;
States may assume the lead oversight role at NPL sites under cooperative agreements with EPA; and
EPA may only pay for a remedial action at a site if the relevant state agrees, among other things, to pay a portion of the cleanup expenses, as well as all operations and maintenance costs after construction of the cleanup remedy is completed. In addition to overseeing cleanup at some sites on the NPL, states may oversee cleanup at sites that are eligible for listing on the NPL but that were not reported to EPA for listing in the Superfund program database. In fact, as we reported in April 2013, this approach is the most common for cleanup of sites that are eligible for listing on the NPL. As of December 2012, of the 3,402 sites EPA identified as eligible for the NPL, EPA regions had deferred oversight of 1,984 sites to cleanup approaches outside the Superfund program, including 1,606 deferrals to states (47 percent of all eligible sites). State cleanup programs vary in their capacity and resources to manage the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, according to EPA and state officials. Forty- seven states address such sites under their own versions of the Superfund program. DOD Is Responsible for Many Contaminated Sites, Including Over 80 Percent of Federal Facilities on the NPL
DOD is responsible for the majority of federal facilities on the NPL. Importantly, under the executive order, DOD and the Department of Energy have authority to clean up all of their NPL and other contaminated sites, while EPA has authority for managing cleanup of other agencies’ NPL sites. As we noted in July 2010, across all environmental cleanup and restoration activities at its installations, including NPL and non-NPL sites, DOD spent almost $30 billion from 1986 to 2008. Our prior work has identified challenges stemming from the fact that DOD has not always adhered to the CERCLA requirement to enter into interagency agreements with EPA at NPL sites. Specifically, in July 2010, we reported that although CERCLA requires federal agencies to enter into an interagency agreement with EPA to guide cleanup within a certain period, as of February 2009, 11 DOD installations had not signed such agreements after 10 or more years on the NPL. DOD has made progress on this issue by decreasing the number of such installations from 11 to 2, but both sites still pose significant risks. In addition, we found that guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program—under which DOD conducts cleanup activities at its installations—was silent regarding actions DOD should take in response to these recommendations. The Federal Government Faces Liabilities from Abandoned Hardrock Mine Sites and Ensuring Adequate Financial Assurance for Liabilities from Current Mining Operations
Our previous work has found that hardrock mine sites present liabilities to the federal government when they are abandoned or have inadequate financial assurance. As we reported in March 2008, from 1997 to 2008, four federal agencies—BLM, the Forest Service, EPA, and the Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement—funded the cleanup and reclamation of some of these abandoned hardrock mine sites, spending at least $2.6 billion to reclaim abandoned hardrock mines on federal, state, private, and American Indian lands. In addition, we have repeatedly reported that operators of hardrock mines on BLM lands have not provided financial assurances sufficient to cover estimated reclamation costs. Of these, we found that 57 hardrock operations had inadequate financial assurances—about $24 million less than needed to cover estimated reclamation costs. CERCLA and Other Environmental Statutes Involve Litigation among Numerous Parties
As the primary federal agency charged with implementing many of the nation’s environmental laws, EPA often faces the prospect of litigation over its regulations and other actions. In August 2011, we reported on environmental litigation and cases against EPA across 10 environmental statutes filed for fiscal years 1995 to 2010. Of the approximately 2,500 cases we reviewed, about 5 percent of cases against EPA involved CERCLA. The largest category comprised trade associations (25 percent), followed by private companies (23 percent), local environmental groups and citizens’ groups (16 percent), and national environmental groups (14 percent). EPA may also initiate litigation against PRPs under CERCLA seeking to compel these parties to clean up contaminated sites or to seek reimbursement for cleanup EPA has conducted. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to EPA, the agency that manages the nation's principal hazardous waste cleanup program, one in four Americans lives within 3 miles of a hazardous waste site. Many such sites pose health and other risks, and their cleanup can be lengthy and expensive. EPA's Superfund program, established under CERCLA, provides a process to address contaminated sites. Under CERCLA, parties that contributed to the contamination of a site are generally liable for cleanup and related costs. These parties may include federal agencies, such as DOD, and companies. Based on the risk a site poses, EPA may place the site on the NPL, a list that includes some of the nation's most seriously contaminated sites. As of April 2013, the NPL included about 1,300 sites, and states and federal agencies may address additional contaminated sites outside of EPA's Superfund program. GAO's prior work has identified challenges cleaning up DOD's NPL sites and abandoned mining sites and has assessed litigation related to the Superfund program.
In this testimony, GAO summarizes its work from March 2008 to April 2013 on (1) the role of states in cleaning up hazardous waste sites, (2) DOD's management of its sites on the NPL, (3) federal liabilities from contaminated hardrock mining sites, and (4) litigation under CERCLA and other statutes.
GAO is not making new recommendations but has made numerous recommendations to DOD, EPA, and Interior to better address hazardous waste sites. As described in this statement, the responses to these recommendations have varied.
What GAO Found
States, in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), participate in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites in several ways. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, sites that meet certain risk thresholds are eligible for placement on the National Priorities List (NPL)--a list that includes some of the nation's most contaminated sites. In this context, states may notify EPA of potential hazardous waste sites, evaluate the health and environmental risks at sites being considered for the NPL, or oversee cleanups of NPL sites. In some cases, EPA may elect to defer sites that are eligible for the NPL to other federal or state cleanup programs. As GAO reported in April 2013, EPA had deferred to states the oversight of the cleanup of 47 percent of sites eligible for the NPL. GAO recommended that EPA provide guidance on the most common type of deferral to states, and EPA agreed with GAO's recommendation. In addition, 47 states have their own versions of the Superfund program.
As of April 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for cleanup at 129 NPL sites (over 80 percent of federal facilities on the NPL). In addition to its NPL sites, GAO reported in 2010 that DOD had over 50,000 areas that required cleanup and that the agency had spent almost $30 billion on cleanup from 1986 to 2008. In July 2010, GAO found that CERCLA requires federal agencies to enter into an interagency agreement with EPA to guide cleanup within a certain period but, as of February 2009, 11 DOD installations had not signed such agreements after 10 or more years on the NPL. DOD has made progress on this issue by decreasing the number of such installations from 11 to 2, but both sites still pose significant risks. GAO recommended that EPA pursue changes to a key executive order that would increase its authority to hasten cleanup at these sites. EPA agreed but has not taken action to have the executive order amended.
GAO's work has identified challenges and liabilities for the federal government stemming from hardrock mining operations, primarily at abandoned mines on federal land. In many cases, mine operators abandoned mines and did not have adequate financial assurance to pay for cleanup. As a result, the government may have to cover these costs. In 2011, GAO found that 57 hardrock mines on federal land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had inadequate financial assurance to cover estimated reclamation costs and recommended that BLM improve its ability to evaluate the adequacy of financial assurances. In 2012, BLM reported implementing GAO's recommendation.
CERCLA and other major environmental statutes involve litigation among numerous parties. In addition to cases brought by EPA to enforce laws, litigation includes citizen suits to compel EPA to take action when it does not meet deadlines, and to question regulations and permitting decisions. In addition, potentially responsible parties at hazardous waste sites often file lawsuits against each other or EPA. In 2011, GAO found that about 5 percent of lawsuits against EPA for fiscal years 1995 to 2010 involved CERCLA and that, across 10 environmental statutes, trade associations and private companies comprised 48 percent of the litigants, followed by environmental groups (30 percent), nonfederal governments (12 percent), and other parties (10 percent). |
gao_GAO-15-590 | gao_GAO-15-590_0 | Use of Federal Supply Schedules Has Declined at Roughly the Same Rate as Overall Procurement Spending
Use of Federal Supply Schedules Is Declining
In fiscal year 2014, GSA reported its total FSS program sales as $33.1 billion, which, according to GSA officials, includes data not reported in FPDS-NG such as awards under the $3,000 micro-purchase threshold and those made by federal intelligence agencies and state and local governments. According to data we reviewed from FPDS-NG, the federal government obligated $25.7 billion through the FSS program in 2014—a decrease of 19 percent or $6 billion since 2010. Since 2010, the proportion of total federal contracting obligations awarded under the FSS program has remained approximately the same—between 5 and 6 percent. HHS Practice of Targeting Solicitations to Fewer Vendors May Result in Fewer Quotes
According to FPDS-NG data, in fiscal year 2014, HHS received only one or two quotes for orders accounting for 51 percent of its total FSS obligations. DOD and GSA received one or two quotes for 35 and 32 percent of total FSS obligations, respectively. Although this practice is consistent with FAR procedures, the relatively higher percentage of HHS obligations on orders for which the government received only one or two quotes in fiscal year 2014 suggests that HHS contracting officers may not be putting enough emphasis on ensuring that three or more quotes are received when competing orders. In two cases at HHS, contracting officials did not prepare these determinations and told us they were not aware of this requirement. Agencies Are Paying Insufficient Attention to the Prices Paid under FSS Orders
Our analysis of how agencies assessed prices for the 60 orders in our sample showed that agencies are not paying sufficient attention to prices for goods and services under FSS orders. Ordering Agencies Did Not Consistently Seek Discounts from Schedule Prices When Required
In our sample of FSS orders that were over the SAT, we found a significant number of cases—16 out of 45 orders—in which contracting officers did not seek discounts from FSS prices, as required per the FAR. When contracting officers do not seek discounts for FSS orders, the government may be missing opportunities for cost savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure contracting officers follow ordering procedures when using FSS, and to enhance internal controls, we recommend that the Secretaries of DOD and HHS and the Administrator of GSA take the following three actions: Issue guidance emphasizing the requirement to seek discounts and outlining effective strategies for negotiating discounts when using the FSS program; Issue guidance reminding contracting officials of the procedures they must follow with respect to purchasing open market items through the FSS program, including the requirement to perform a separate determination that the prices of these items are fair and reasonable; and
Assess existing training programs to determine whether they are adequate to ensure that contracting officials are aware of the ordering procedures of the FSS program, including requirements to 1) properly prepare justifications for noncompetitive awards, 2) seek discounts, and 3) assess prices for open market items included in FSS orders. In addition, HHS concurred with our recommendation to assess the reasons contributing to the agency’s high percentage of orders with one or two quotes. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to address (1) how and to what extent the government is using Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts to order goods and services; (2) factors influencing the degree of competition for FSS orders; and (3) the extent to which agencies examine prices to be paid for FSS orders. We also analyzed the product and service obligations to determine which product and service categories accounted for the most obligations in fiscal year 2014. Using FPDS-NG data, we identified the three agencies with the highest obligations on FSS orders under GSA schedule contracts in fiscal year 2013: the Department of Defense (DOD), GSA, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The FSS program provides agencies a simplified method of purchasing commercial products and services at prices associated with volume buying. In 2011, the FAR was amended to enhance competition on FSS orders. Competition helps agencies get lower prices on products and services and get the best value for taxpayers.
GAO was asked to examine competition and pricing for FSS orders. This report addresses (1) how and to what extent the government is using the FSS program, (2) factors influencing the degree of competition for FSS orders, and (3) the extent to which agencies examine prices to be paid for FSS orders.
GAO analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation on obligations through the FSS program for fiscal years 2010-2014 and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 60 FSS orders awarded in fiscal year 2013 by DOD, HHS and GSA, the agencies with the highest use of the FSS program. GAO also interviewed officials from these agencies and FSS vendors.
What GAO Found
According to the General Services Administration (GSA), total sales through the Federal Supply Schedules (FSS) program in fiscal year 2014 were $33.1 billion. This includes purchases by federal, state, and local agencies, including federal intelligence agencies which do not report their FSS spending publicly. GAO's analysis of publicly reported federal procurement data shows that federal use of the FSS program has declined from $31.8 billion in 2010 to $25.7 billion in 2014—a 19 percent inflation-adjusted decrease. This is consistent with the decline in overall federal contracting obligations. The FSS portion of total federal contracting obligations remained steady—between 5 and 6 percent.
Most FSS obligations were competed in fiscal year 2014, but only 40 percent of obligations were on orders for which the government received three or more quotes—a number frequently mentioned in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). These results are influenced by various factors. One factor identified in the orders from the agencies GAO reviewed—the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Health and Human Services (HHS) and GSA—involves situations where few vendors can fulfill agencies' specific needs.
HHS had a significantly higher percentage of FSS obligations in fiscal year 2014 on orders that were competed but the agency received only one or two quotes—51 percent—compared to DOD and GSA, which received one or two quotes for 35 and 32 percent of their FSS obligations, respectively. HHS's practice of targeting solicitations to fewer vendors may be contributing to this higher rate.
Agencies are paying insufficient attention to prices when using FSS. Ordering agencies did not consistently seek discounts from schedule prices, even when required by the FAR. In addition, GAO found cases in which officials did not assess prices for certain items, as required, or had insufficient information to assess prices. Contracting officials were not always aware of the requirement to seek discounts and told GAO that the need to assess prices was not emphasized in training and guidance. When contracting officials are not aware of these regulations, agencies may be missing opportunities for cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD, HHS and GSA issue guidance and assess training to focus attention on rules related to pricing. DOD, HHS and GSA concurred. GAO also recommends HHS assess reasons contributing to its higher rate of orders with only one or two quotes. HHS concurred. |
gao_GAO-15-163 | gao_GAO-15-163_0 | Background
Return Processing and Other Services
During the tax filing season, IRS processes paper and electronically filed (e-filed) tax returns and validates key pieces of information, such as a taxpayer’s name and social security number. Despite Decreases in Call Volume and Continued Success Shifting Calls to Automated Services, Access to Live Assistors Remained Low and Wait Times Remained High Compared to Prior Years
Between fiscal years 2009 and 2014, as shown in figure 2,
Call volume to IRS’s taxpayer service lines varied, and was the lowest in 2014. Figure 2 illustrates aspects of IRS telephone service. In recent years, the type of telephone calls IRS receives and answers has changed. IRS May Be Missing Opportunities to Improve Telephone Service by Not Systematically Comparing Its Telephone Service to the Best in the Business
Comparing performance data on calls answered by IRS assistors to the best in the business can help IRS understand taxpayer needs and improve service. In addition, Executive Order 12862, Setting Customer Service Standards, requires that all executive departments and agencies that “provide significant services directly to the public shall provide those services in a manner that seeks to meet the customer service standard established” which is “equal to the best in business.” Most recently, Executive Order 13571, Streamlining Service Delivery and Improving Customer Service, was issued to strengthen customer service and required agencies to develop and publish a customer service plan, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). By not comparing customer service performance against the best in the business, IRS is missing an opportunity to identify and address gaps in actual and desired service and inform Congress about resources needed to improve the level of service provided to taxpayers. While IRS collected some data that it could use to evaluate effectiveness, it did not develop plans to analyze the data or track it in a way that would allow officials to draw causal connections and develop valid conclusions about the effectiveness of its 2014 service changes (see appendix VII for an assessment against our criteria and appendix VIII for our analysis of IRS’s service changes). Without such information, it will be difficult for Congress, IRS management, and others to understand the benefits and potential budget trade-offs associated with IRS’s service changes. This is important because IRS has identified additional ones for 2015 and beyond. IRS Used its New Enterprise Risk Management Process to Identify Major Risks for the 2015 Filing Season, but Management Plans Lack Specificity
According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, implementation of new tax laws such as PPACA combined with a tight budget and the possibility of Congress passing a late package of tax extenders threatens to make 2015 “the most complicated filing season before us in a long time, if ever.” At the enterprise level, in February 2014, IRS undertook a new approach to risk management in response to management failures related to applications for tax exempt status. The top two risks IRS identified were (1) staffing and training and (2) budget sufficiency. As table 2 shows, IRS has made good progress in setting up its risk management process. While IRS has taken some steps to improve telephone service, it has not systematically and periodically compared its service to the best in business. We disagree that IRS’s telephone operations cannot be compared to others. IRS did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation to include specific countermeasures in its risk management plans. Without countermeasures specifically articulated in risk management plans, IRS’s ability to respond quickly and appropriately to an adverse event may be hampered. Therefore, we believe IRS should implement our recommendation and include specific countermeasures in its risk management plans. IRS had some data that it could have used to assess the effectiveness of its 2014 service changes. These reports included 20 recommendations for IRS to improve filing season operations, become more efficient, and provide taxpayers with better customer service. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the filing season, IRS processes tax returns, issues refunds, and provides telephone, correspondence, online, and face-to-face service. GAO has reported that in recent years IRS has absorbed significant budget cuts and struggled to provide quality service. In response, IRS has taken steps, including eliminating some services and implementing a new risk management process. GAO assessed IRS's (1) 2014 filing season performance, including how it compares itself to best practices; (2) efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of 2014 service changes; and (3) actions to manage risk for filing season operations, among other objectives. GAO analyzed IRS documents and data, visited IRS facilities, and interviewed IRS officials and external stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) processing of tax returns was timely, even though the filing season was delayed due to the 2013 government shutdown. Continued growth in e-filing allows IRS to reduce costs and issue refunds faster. Although IRS received fewer calls in 2014, the percentage of callers seeking help who received it remained low and wait times remained high compared to prior years.
One way to improve taxpayer telephone service is to compare it to the best in business, as required by Congress and executive orders. However, IRS has not systematically made such a comparison for its telephone service because of budget constraints and difficulty in identifying comparable organizations, according to IRS officials. By not comparing itself to other call center operations, IRS is missing an opportunity to identify and address gaps between actual and desired service, and inform Congress about resources needed to close the gap. More efficient telephone service could help improve correspondence service because the same staff provides those services.
IRS did not set numerical goals—such as a reduction in wait time—or develop a plan to assess the effects of its 2014 service changes. Such information would help Congress, IRS managers, and others understand the benefits and potential budget tradeoffs associated with IRS service changes. This is important because IRS has identified additional service changes for 2015 and beyond.
IRS used its new enterprise-wide risk management approach to identify risks such as staffing and training. IRS has made good progress in setting up its risk management process. However, while risks were identified and countermeasures discussed, such as contingency plans and workload adjustments, most countermeasures were not specific. Without specific countermeasures identified in advance, IRS's ability to respond to adverse events may be hampered.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends IRS systematically compare telephone service to the best in business, develop measures and a plan to analyze service changes, and include specific countermeasures in risk management plans.
IRS disagreed with comparing its telephone service to the best in business stating it (1) is not comparable to other organizations and (2) has done targeted comparisons. GAO disagrees. In its view, the recommendation remains valid and benchmarking all aspects of service to the best in business could help IRS improve its service. IRS agreed to develop measures and a plan to analyze service changes. It neither agreed nor disagreed to include specific countermeasures in its risk management plans. |
gao_GGD-95-22 | gao_GGD-95-22_0 | In recent years, the states we selected confronted similar challenges and, in response, implemented reforms similar to those required by GPRA. Table 1 provides an overview of the results-oriented management reforms implemented or being considered by the six states we visited. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to identify some of the experiences state governments had in implementing management reforms that were reported as successful and thus, may assist federal agencies in implementing GPRA. We focused on identifying successful management reforms implemented in the six states we selected that may help federal agencies in their efforts to implement GPRA and become more results oriented. We did not obtain comments from the states on a draft of this report. State officials said that training and involvement in the development of performance measures helped ensure that agency managers and staff used the performance measures to gauge their progress in meeting goals and to adjust their operations to meet such goals. Development and Use of Measures Required Training, Involvement, and Commitment
Based on the reported experiences of Oregon and Minnesota officials, for stakeholders, including agency managers and staff, to use performance measures to gauge progress toward goals, they needed to be involved in developing the measures and needed to understand how the resulting performance information would be used. Management Systems Alignment Intended to Support Emphasis on Results
The states and state agencies we selected that had begun to use strategic planning and performance measurement generally determined that they also needed to align their information, human resource, budgeting, and financial systems to support program goals. These administrative waivers would provide federal managers with more flexibility to structure agency systems to better support program goals. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed six states' experiences in implementing management reforms and how their experiences could assist federal agencies in implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) federal agencies may be able to better implement GPRA and increase program effectiveness if they adopt results-oriented management reforms similar to those implemented by the six states; (2) federal agencies will need long-term commitment and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to implement management reforms and mission-related program goals and performance measures to effectively implement GPRA; (3) the states' use of strategic planning has helped build consensus on statewide goals and has fostered interagency cooperation; (4) the states use a variety of performance measures to gauge agencies' progress in meeting strategic goals; (5) the states train their staff on how to use performance measures and involve them in the development process to effectively implement results-oriented reform; (6) the states have aligned their information, human resources, budgeting, and financial management systems to better support managers in their efforts to achieve statewide goals and to obtain stakeholders' agreement on strategic goals; (7) the states have provided program managers with progress reports, ways to assess staff achievement, and greater flexibility to meet program goals; and (8) although the effects of the management reforms could not be fully determined, the states remain committed to change. |
gao_GAO-07-1228T | gao_GAO-07-1228T_0 | WTC Federal Responder Screening Program Has Had Difficulties Ensuring the Availability of Screening Services, and NIOSH Was Considering Expanding the Program to Include Monitoring
HHS’s WTC Federal Responder Screening Program has had difficulties ensuring the uninterrupted availability of services for federal responders. 1.) After resuming screening examinations in December 2005 and conducting them for about a year, HHS again placed the program on hold and suspended scheduling of screening examinations for responders from January 2007 to May 2007. This interruption in service occurred because there was a change in the administration of the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, and certain interagency agreements were not established in time to keep the program fully operational. However, the program stopped scheduling and paying for these specialty diagnostic services in April 2006 because the program’s contract with a new provider network did not cover these services. In July 2007 we reported that NIOSH was considering expanding the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program to include monitoring examinations—follow-up physical and mental health examinations—and was assessing options for funding and delivering these services. If federal responders do not receive this type of monitoring, health conditions that arise later may not be diagnosed and treated, and knowledge of the health effects of the WTC disaster may be incomplete. NIOSH Has Not Ensured the Availability of Services for Nonfederal Responders Residing outside the NYC Metropolitan Area
NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area, although it recently took steps toward expanding the availability of these services. Mount Sinai’s subcontract with AOEC ended in July 2004, and from August 2004 until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund any organization to provide services to nonfederal responders outside the NYC metropolitan area. In June 2005, NIOSH began its second effort by awarding $776,000 to the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide both screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC metropolitan area. DCC, however, had difficulty establishing a network of providers that could serve nonfederal responders residing throughout the country—ultimately contracting with only 10 clinics in seven states to provide screening and monitoring services. NIOSH Awarded Funding for Treatment Services to Four WTC Health Programs
In fall 2006, NIOSH awarded and set aside funds totaling $51 million from its $75 million appropriation for four WTC health programs in the NYC metropolitan area to provide treatment services to responders enrolled in these programs. In addition to the $44 million it awarded for outpatient services, NIOSH set aside about $7 million for the FDNY WTC program and NY/NJ WTC Consortium to pay for responders’ WTC-related inpatient hospital care as needed. NIOSH, the administrator of the program, has been considering expanding the program to include monitoring but has not done so. Therefore we recommended in July 2007 that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the attack on the WTC, regardless of who their employer was or where they reside. As of early September 2007 the department has not responded to this recommendation. Appendix I: Abbreviations
Related GAO Products
September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders. GAO-07-892. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2007. September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack. | Why GAO Did This Study
Six years after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), concerns persist about health effects experienced by WTC responders and the availability of health care services for those affected. Several federally funded programs provide screening, monitoring, or treatment services to responders. GAO has previously reported on the progress made and implementation problems faced by these WTC health programs. This testimony is based on and updates GAO's report, September 11: HHS Needs to Ensure the Availability of Health Screening and Monitoring for All Responders ( GAO-07-892 , July 23, 2007). In this testimony, GAO discusses the status of (1) services provided by the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, (2) efforts by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to provide services for nonfederal responders residing outside the New York City (NYC) area, and (3) NIOSH's awards to WTC health program grantees for treatment services.
What GAO Found
In July 2007, following a re-examination of the status of the WTC health programs, GAO recommended that the Secretary of HHS take expeditious action to ensure that health screening and monitoring services are available to all people who responded to the WTC attack, regardless of who their employer was or where they reside. As of early September 2007 the department has not responded to this recommendation. As GAO reported in July 2007, HHS's WTC Federal Responder Screening Program has had difficulties ensuring the uninterrupted availability of screening services for federal responders. From January 2007 to May 2007, the program stopped scheduling screening examinations because there was a change in the program's administration and certain interagency agreements were not established in time to keep the program fully operational. From April 2006 to March 2007, the program stopped scheduling and paying for specialty diagnostic services associated with screening. NIOSH, the administrator of the program, has been considering expanding the program to include monitoring, that is, follow-up physical and mental health examinations, but has not done so. If federal responders do not receive monitoring, health conditions that arise later may not be diagnosed and treated, and knowledge of the health effects of the WTC disaster may be incomplete. NIOSH has not ensured the availability of screening and monitoring services for nonfederal responders residing outside the NYC area, although it recently took steps toward expanding the availability of these services. In late 2002, NIOSH arranged for a network of occupational health clinics to provide screening services. This effort ended in July 2004, and until June 2005 NIOSH did not fund screening or monitoring services for nonfederal responders outside the NYC area. In June 2005, NIOSH funded the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Data and Coordination Center (DCC) to provide screening and monitoring services; however, DCC had difficulty establishing a nationwide network of providers and contracted with only 10 clinics in seven states. In 2006, NIOSH began to explore other options for providing these services, and in May 2007 it took steps toward expanding the provider network. NIOSH has awarded treatment funds to four WTC health programs in the NYC area. In fall 2006, NIOSH awarded $44 million for outpatient treatment and set aside $7 million for hospital care. The New York/New Jersey WTC Consortium and the New York City Fire Department WTC program, which received the largest awards, used NIOSH's funding to continue outpatient services, offer full coverage for prescriptions, and cover hospital care. |
gao_GAO-05-285T | gao_GAO-05-285T_0 | Reserve Components and Categories
DOD has six reserve components: the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. On January 19, 2005, more than 192,000 National Guard and Reserve members were mobilized. About 85 percent of these mobilized personnel were members of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. Availability of Reserve Components Is Greatly Influenced by Mobilization Authorities and Personnel Policies
DOD does not have the strategic framework and associated policies necessary to maximize reserve component force availability for a long-term Global War on Terrorism. Furthermore, many of DOD’s policies that affect mobilized reserve component personnel were implemented in a piecemeal manner, and were focused on the short-term needs of the services and reserve component members rather than on long-term requirements and predictability. The availability of reserve component forces will continue to play an important role in the success of DOD’s missions because requirements that increased significantly after September 11, 2001, are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. The partial mobilization authority limits involuntary mobilizations to not more than 1 million reserve component members at any one time, for not more than 24 consecutive months, during a time of national emergency. The manner in which DOD implements the partial mobilization authority affects the number of reserve component forces available for deployment. Under this cumulative implementation approach, it is possible for DOD to run out of forces during an extended conflict, such as a long-term Global War on Terrorism. Under the considered approach, DOD would have been able to mobilize its forces for less than 24 months, send them home, and then remobilize them, repeating this cycle indefinitely and providing essentially an unlimited flow of forces. After our review was complete, DOD said it would continue its implementation of the partial mobilization authority that limits mobilizations to a cumulative total of 24 months. However, DOD did not clarify how it planned to meet its longer-term requirements for the Global War on Terrorism as successive groups of reserve component personnel reach the 24-month mobilization point. Specifically, reserve component members have faced uncertainties concerning the cohesion of their units, the likelihood of their mobilizations, the length of their service commitments, the length of their overseas rotations, the types of missions they would be asked to perform, and the availability of their equipment. These policies are short-term measures that increase the availability of reserve component forces while decreasing predictability for reserve component members who are prevented from leaving the service at the end of their enlistment periods. According to Army officials, a substantial number of reserve component members have been affected by the changing stop-loss policies. Although many of the members who have been called to active duty under the partial mobilization authority have been demobilized, as of January 19, 2005, more than 192,000 of DOD’s reserve component members were still mobilized and serving on active duty, and DOD has projected that for the next 3 to 5 years it will have more than 100,000 reserve component members mobilized, with most of these personnel continuing to come from the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. In June 2004, DOD noted that about 30,000 reserve members had already been mobilized for 24 months. In particular, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic framework that sets human capital goals concerning the availability of its reserve force to meet the longer-term requirements of the Global War on Terrorism, and we recommended that DOD identify policies that should be linked within the context of the strategic framework. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has six reserve components: the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. DOD's use of Reserve and National Guard forces increased dramatically following the events of September 11, 2001, and on January 19, 2005, more than 192,000 National Guard and Reserve component members were mobilized. About 85 percent of these personnel were members of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve. Furthermore, the availability of reserve component forces will continue to play an important role in the success of DOD's future missions, and DOD has projected that over the next 3 to 5 years, it will continuously have more than 100,000 reserve component members mobilized. Since September, 2001, GAO has issued a number of reports that have dealt with issues related to the increased use of Reserve and National Guard forces. For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the results of its work on the extent to which DOD has the strategic framework and policies necessary to maximize reserve component force availability for a long-term Global War on Terrorism.
What GAO Found
DOD does not have a strategic framework with human capital goals concerning the availability of its reserve component forces. The manner in which DOD implements its mobilization authorities affects the number of reserve component members available. The partial mobilization authority limits involuntary mobilizations to not more than 1 million reserve component members at any one time, for not more than 24 consecutive months, during a time of national emergency. Under DOD's current implementation of the authority, members can be involuntarily mobilized more than once, but involuntary mobilizations are limited to a cumulative total of 24 months. Given this implementation, DOD could eventually run out of forces. During GAO's 2004 review, DOD was facing shortages of some reserve component personnel, and officials considered changing their implementation of the partial mobilization authority to expand the pool of available personnel. Under the proposed implementation, DOD could have mobilized personnel for less than 24 consecutive months, sent them home for a period, and remobilized them, repeating this cycle indefinitely and providing an essentially unlimited flow of forces. After GAO's review was done, DOD said it would retain its current implementation that limits mobilizations to a cumulative total of 24 months. However, DOD did not clarify how it planned to meet its longer-term requirements for the Global War on Terrorism as additional forces reach the 24-month mobilization point. By June 2004, 30,000 reserve component members had already been mobilized for 24 months. DOD's policies also affect the availability of reserve component members. Many of the policies that affect reserve component availability were focused on the services' short-term requirements or the needs of individual service members rather than on long-term requirements and predictability. For example, DOD implemented stop-loss policies, which are short-term measures that increase force availability by retaining active or reserve component members on active duty beyond the end of their obligated service. Because DOD's various policies were not developed within the context of an overall strategic framework, they underwent numerous changes as DOD strove to meet current requirements, and they did not work together to meet the department's long-term Global War on Terrorism requirements. These policy changes created uncertainties for reserve component members concerning the likelihood of their mobilization, the length of service commitments and overseas rotations, and the types of missions they will have to perform. The uncertainties may affect future retention and recruiting efforts, and indications show that some parts of the force may already be stressed. |
gao_GAO-10-210T | gao_GAO-10-210T_0 | DHS Has Made Limited Progress in Implementing Our Prior Recommendations
In June 2007, we made six recommendations to DHS to help the department reduce the risks associated with acquiring and implementing a departmentwide financial management system. Our preliminary analysis indicates that DHS has begun to take actions toward the implementation of four of the recommendations, as shown in table 1. However, it is unclear how the DHS-prepared concept of operations document will relate to the selected contractor’s concept of operations document called for in the request for proposal. The concept of operations for TASC should, among other things: define how DHS’ day-to-day financial management operations are and will be carried out to meet mission needs; clarify which component and departmentwide systems are considered financial management systems; include a transition strategy that is useful for developing an understanding of how and when changes will occur; develop an approach for obtaining reliable information on the costs of its financial management systems investments; and link DHS’ concept of operations for the TASC program to its enterprise architecture. While we recognize that the actual development and implementation of these plans cannot be completed until the TASC contractor and system have been selected, it will be critical for DHS to ensure that these plans are completed and effectively implemented prior to moving forward with the implementation of the new system. DHS Has Not Yet Identified All Business Processes Needing Reengineering and Standardization Across the Department
Although, DHS has identified nine end-to-end business processes that will be addressed as part of the TASC program, the department has not yet identified all of its existing business processes that will be reengineered and standardized as part of the TASC program. While the actual migration approach will depend on the selected system and events that occur during the TASC program implementation, critical activities include (1) developing specific criteria requiring component agencies to migrate to the new system rather than attempting to maintain legacy business systems; (2) defining and instilling new values, norms, and behaviors within component agencies that support new ways of doing work and overcoming resistance to change; (3) building consensus among customers and stakeholders on specific changes designed to better meet their needs; and (4) planning, testing, and implementing all aspects of the migration of the new system. Planned TASC Implementation Efforts Pose Unnecessary Risks
While updating the status of the six prior recommendations, we identified two issues that pose unnecessary risks to the success of the TASC program. These risks are DHS’ significant reliance on contractors to define and implement the new system and the lack of independence of DHS’ V&V function for the TASC program. Significant Reliance Placed on Contractors to Define and Implement the TASC Program
The department plans to have the selected contractor prepare a number of key documents including plans needed to carry out disciplined processes, define additional business processes to be standardized, and propose a migration approach. Work with other systems acquisition and implementation efforts have shown that placing too much reliance on contractors can result in systems efforts plagued with serious performance and management problems. As a result, according to the OIG report, contractors were performing functions that should have been performed by government workers. On October 21, 2009, DHS officials indicated that they have restructured the V&V contract to address our concerns by changing the reporting relationship and the organization that is responsible for managing the V&V contract. It is important that V&V is technically, managerially, and financially independent of the organization in charge of the system development and/or acquisition it is assessing. DHS has started, but not completed implementation of the six recommendations we made in June 2007, aimed at helping the department to reduce risk to acceptable levels, while acquiring and implementing an integrated departmentwide financial management system. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2007, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had made little progress in integrating its existing financial management systems and made six recommendations focused on the need for DHS to define a departmentwide strategy and embrace disciplined processes. In June 2007, DHS announced its new financial management systems strategy, called the Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) program. GAO's testimony provides preliminary analysis of the status of its prior recommendations and whether there were additional issues identified that pose challenges to the successful implementation of the TASC program. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, such as the January 2009 Request for Proposal and its attachments, and interviewed key officials to obtain additional information. GAO provided a draft report that this testimony is based on to DHS on September 29, 2009, for review and comment. After reviewing and considering DHS' comments, GAO plans to finalize and issue the report including providing appropriate recommendations aimed at improving the department's implementation of the TASC program.
What GAO Found
GAO's preliminary analysis shows that DHS has begun to take actions to implement four of the six recommendations made in the 2007 report; however, none of these recommendations have been fully implemented. GAO recognizes that DHS cannot fully implement some of the recommendations aimed at reducing the risk in accordance with best practices until the contract for TASC is awarded. DHS has taken, but not completed, actions to (1) define its financial management strategy and plan, (2) develop a comprehensive concept of operations, (3) incorporate disciplined processes, and (4) implement key human capital practices and plans for such a systems implementation effort. DHS has not taken the necessary actions on the remaining two recommendations, to standardize business processes across the department, including applicable internal control, and to develop detailed consolidation and migration plans since DHS will not know the information necessary to develop these items until a contractor is selected. While some of the details of the department's standardization of business processes and migration plans depend on the selected new system, DHS would benefit from performing critical activities, such as identifying all of its affected current business processes so that DHS can analyze how closely the proposed system will meet the department's needs. GAO's preliminary analysis during this review also identified two issues that pose challenges to the TASC program--DHS' significant risks related to the reliance on contractors to define and implement the new system and the lack of independence of the contractor hired to perform the verification and validation (V&V) function for TASC. DHS plans to rely on the selected contractor to complete key process documents for TASC such as detailed documentation that governs activities such as requirements management, testing, data conversion, and quality assurance. The extent of DHS' reliance on contractors to define and implement key processes needed by the TASC program, without the necessary oversight mechanisms to ensure that (1) the processes are properly defined and (2) effectively implemented, could result in system efforts plagued with serious performance and management problems. Further, GAO identified that DHS' V&V contractor was not independent with regard to the TASC program. DHS management agreed that the V&V function should be performed by an entity that is technically, managerially, and financially independent of the organization in charge of the system development and/or acquisition it is assessing. Accordingly, DHS officials indicated that they have restructured the contract to address our concerns by changing the organization that is responsible for managing the V&V function. |
gao_GAO-08-630T | gao_GAO-08-630T_0 | As the government’s human capital leader, OPM is responsible for helping agencies develop their human capital management systems and holding them accountable for effective human capital management practices. Thirty-three percent of federal career employees on board as of the end of fiscal year 2007 will be eligible to retire during fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Many workers projected to become retirement eligible by 2012 are concentrated in certain agencies. As figure 3 shows, the agency rates range from a low of 20 percent at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to a high of 46 percent at four agencies—the Agency for International Development (AID), the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Department of Transportation (Transportation). Several of these occupations, such as air traffic controllers, customs and border protection interdiction agents, and administrative law judges are considered mission critical. Retirement eligibility will be especially pronounced among the agencies’ executives and supervisors (see fig. Federal Agencies Have a Variety of Options Available to Hire and Retain Older Workers, but Some Federal Practices Make It Difficult to Use These Options
Federal agencies have a range of flexibilities at their disposal to help them engage and retain mission critical staff, including older, experienced workers. While only one of the available flexibilities is largely focused on older workers—dual compensation waivers—many, such as flexible and part time work, are particularly appealing to older workers. A Case Study: How One Agency Uses Available Flexibilities to Address a Looming Retirement Wave
One of the agencies we reviewed—the Social Security Administration (SSA)—is particularly at risk of losing a substantial portion of its workforce at a time when it will experience unprecedented growth in demand for its services. However, the proportion of administrative law judges eligible to retire is far higher—about 86 percent will be eligible by 2012 and nearly all by 2017. Other Federal Agencies Have Developed Alternative Approaches to Hire and Engage Older Workers to Meet Their Workforce Needs
In addition to SSA, we interviewed officials in several other agencies and learned that some have developed their own approaches to hiring and engaging older workers. Federal Employment Has a Number of Attributes Attractive to Older Workers
Overall, the federal government is making progress toward becoming a model employer of older, experienced workers. While there remain opportunities for improvement, OPM and Congress are taking action to minimize the challenges faced in hiring and retaining older, experienced workers. OPM and Congress Are Taking Steps to Minimize Challenges
As we discussed earlier, individual agencies have strategies that they can use to address some challenges to employing older workers, but actions from OPM, as the government’s human capital leader, and Congress play pivotal roles in changing the landscape of rules regarding federal employment. OPM has taken steps to provide agencies with guidance on how to use available flexibilities and authorities. For example, in the fall of 2005, OPM put a hiring flexibilities decision support tool online to assist agencies in assessing which flexibilities would best meet their needs. OPM has also recently proposed legislation to Congress that would enhance agencies’ ability to hire and retain older workers. Collectively, these measures will help make federal agencies more competitive in the labor market for all demographic groups. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the age and retirement eligibility trends of the current federal workforce; (2) the strategies federal agencies are using to recruit, hire, and retain older workers; and (3) our observations on how these strategies position federal agencies to engage and retain older workers. We also analyzed the percentage of career federal employees on board at the end of fiscal year 2007, who would be eligible to retire from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, and the percentage of workers eligible to retire in occupations where the retirement rates exceeded the governmentwide average. Strategies Available to Federal Agencies to Hire and Retain Older Workers
To address this objective, we reviewed strategies available to federal agencies to hire and retain older workers through governmentwide hiring authorities and other flexible arrangements, we interviewed officials at OPM and other selected federal agencies, including Labor, and we reviewed previous GAO work relating to older workers and federal human capital strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal workforce, like the nation's workforce as a whole, is aging. As experienced employees retire, they leave behind critical gaps in leadership and institutional knowledge, increasing the challenges government agencies face in maintaining a skilled workforce. We and others have emphasized the need to hire and retain older workers as one part of a comprehensive strategy to address expected labor shortages. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as the government's central personnel management agency, is responsible for helping agencies manage their human capital. The Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked GAO to discuss (1) the age and retirement eligibility trends of the current federal workforce, (2) the strategies federal agencies are using to hire and retain older workers, and (3) our observations on how these strategies position federal agencies to engage and retain older workers. To address these objectives, we analyzed demographic data from OPM's Central Personnel Data File, and interviewed officials at OPM and selected federal agencies. OPM is taking action to address past recommendations related to better assisting agencies in using personnel flexibilities. GAO is making no new recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
Governmentwide, about one-third of federal career employees on board at the end of fiscal year 2007 are eligible to retire between now and 2012. Many of these workers are concentrated in certain agencies. For example, nearly half of employees on board at the end of fiscal year 2007 at the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Transportation, and at the Agency for International Development and the Small Business Administration, will be eligible to retire by 2012. The proportion of workers eligible to retire is also expected to be high in certain occupations, including those considered mission critical, such as air traffic controllers and customs and border protection agents, where more than half of the employees will be eligible at that time. Retirement eligibility will be especially pronounced among the agencies' executives and supervisors--over 60 percent of career executives are projected to be eligible by 2012. Federal agencies have a variety of flexibilities at their disposal to help them recruit and retain older workers, including using temporary hires to address short-term needs and rehiring retired federal workers. However, we found that agencies have not always been aware of the full range of available flexibilities. One agency we reviewed--the Social Security Administration--is particularly at risk of losing a substantial portion of its workforce to retirement and has used a variety of strategies to hire and retain older workers, including offering recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses. Other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, have developed alternative approaches to attract experienced workers to meet their mission needs. Moreover, certain governmentwide flexibilities, such as flexible and part-time schedules, while not focused directly toward older workers, are particularly attractive to them. Overall, the federal government already has a number of characteristics that appeal to all employees and is making progress toward becoming a model employer of older, experienced workers. For example, federal employees can telecommute, work flexible hours, and receive health and retirement benefits that older workers find especially attractive. OPM and Congress are taking steps to minimize some challenges that agencies face, but opportunities for improvement remain. For example, OPM has developed online decision support tools to provide agencies with guidance on how to use available hiring flexibilities and retention strategies. Congress has legislation pending that incorporates OPM's proposals to enhance agencies' ability to hire and retain older workers by giving agencies the authority, without OPM approval, to rehire retirees without penalty. Agencies have a shared responsibility to pursue the full range of flexibilities and authorities available and to communicate this information within their own agencies. Collectively, these measures will help make federal agencies more competitive in the labor market for all demographic groups. |
gao_GAO-05-742 | gao_GAO-05-742_0 | In December 2002, the United States passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, authorizing increased assistance to Afghanistan. The strategy did not include reconstruction. In contrast to fiscal years 2002-2003, when more than three-fourths of U.S. spending was for humanitarian and quick-impact assistance, approximately 75 percent— about $538 million—of the 2004 expenditures supported reconstruction and development projects. United States Remained Largest International Donor
As in previous years, the United States provided the largest share of international assistance to Afghanistan, contributing about 38 percent of the $3.6 billion pledged by the international community for 2004. U.S. Assistance Benefited Afghanistan, but Accelerated Reconstruction Did Not Meet All Targets
U.S. humanitarian and quick-impact assistance benefited vulnerable populations and returning refugees; however, the success of efforts to accelerate large-scale reconstruction varied. Further, the United States accelerated its major reconstruction programs to increase visible progress before the 2004 Afghan presidential elections. Finally, despite a goal of building or rehabilitating 10 courthouses by the end of fiscal year 2004, according to USAID and contractor reporting, only 7 were completed due to late funding. USAID also instituted several other smaller education-focused projects in 2004. In addition, USAID did not always enforce required contract provisions, USAID directives, or a federal acquisition regulation necessary to hold contractors accountable for their performance. Economic governance. All sectors. Owing to these weaknesses and other problems, the performance measures that the Kabul mission provided to decision makers in Washington, D.C., did not completely portray the status of each sector or the overall Accelerating Success initiative. This ratio improved by September 2004 after USAID increased its staff from 41 to 101. For example, the mission had three different directors in fiscal year 2004. The United States and the international community continued to take steps to improve security in Afghanistan. Delayed Funding Negatively Impacted Acceleration Efforts
Delayed funding continued to negatively impact the U.S. assistance effort in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. Conclusions
Afghanistan has made progress since the fall of the Taliban in October 2001. To meet the requirements of the directive and provide Congress with a comprehensive accounting of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan for the fiscal year 2004 period, we analyzed (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures, (2) the progress and results of U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, (3) the management of U.S. assistance and mechanisms to coordinate U.S. and international assistance, and (4) the major factors that obstructed the advancement of the assistance effort and the achievement of U.S. policy goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
In October 2001, coalition forces forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, responding to their protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States. Congress subsequently passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 authorizing funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. humanitarian, development, and counternarcotics assistance. This report analyzes, for fiscal year 2004, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures, (2) progress and results of assistance efforts, (3) assistance management and coordination, and (4) major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. goals.
What GAO Found
The United States spent $720 million on nonsecurity-related assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. Approximately 75 percent paid for reconstruction activities, with the remainder supporting humanitarian and quick-impact projects. Conversely, in 2002-2003, humanitarian and quick-impact assistance accounted for more than three-fourths of U.S. spending. The United States continued to be the largest donor, contributing about 38 percent of the $3.6 billion pledged by the international community. U.S. humanitarian assistance benefited vulnerable populations in fiscal year 2004. Further, the United States increased reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and made notable progress in several sectors through its "Accelerating Success Initiative". Although progress varied among sectors, the United States did not meet all of its targets due to security and other obstacles. For example, USAID intended to rehabilitate or build 286 schools by the end of 2004. However, owing to poor contractor performance and security problems, by September 2004 it had completed only 8. As in 2002-2003, complete financial information was not readily available, and USAID lacked a comprehensive strategy to direct its efforts. Further, USAID did not consistently require contractors to fulfill contract provisions needed to ensure accountability and oversight. USAID also did not systematically collect information needed to assess the progress of its major projects. Moreover, measures provided by the embassy to decision-makers in Washington did not comprehensively portray progress in each sector or the overall U.S. program. Deteriorating security, increased opium production, and delayed funding continued to obstruct U.S. reconstruction efforts in fiscal year 2004 and threatened the achievement of U.S. goals. Deteriorating security rendered large areas inaccessible to the assistance community, and the continued rise in opium production undermined legitimate economic activity. In addition, most assistance funds were not available until nearly 6 months into the fiscal year, preventing USAID from accelerating reconstruction efforts. |
gao_GAO-10-331 | gao_GAO-10-331_0 | However, in service-level UAS vision statements, the Air Force and the Army have identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel for UAS operations, but they have not yet fully developed strategies that specify the actions and resources required to supply the personnel needed to meet current and projected future UAS force levels. Facilities Needed to Support UAS Programs Have Not Been Systematically Defined and Costs Are Uncertain
Although DOD has requested funding to some extent in recent budget requests and expects to request additional funds in future years, the Air Force and the Army have not fully determined the specific number and type of facilities needed to support UAS training and operations. 2). Various Factors Have Contributed to a Lag in Planning for Personnel, Facilities, and Communications Infrastructure for UAS Programs
Several factors have contributed to a lag in Air Force and Army planning for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure that are integral to the operation of UAS. Finally, while DOD components are expected to identify deficiencies in their strategies to support weapon systems programs and to make necessary adjustments to them as requirements change, the Air Force and the Army have not completed the analyses or developed plans to account for new personnel and facility requirements, and the Air Force has not developed a plan to ensure the communications infrastructure needed to support its UAS programs. In the absence of detailed action plans that fully account for these factors and include milestones for tracking progress and synchronize funding and personnel, DOD cannot have a reasonable assurance that these services’ approaches will fully support current and projected increases in UAS inventories. This competition, among other factors, has affected the amount of training UAS personnel can conduct and their ability to prepare for deployments. As more advanced UAS are fielded in greater numbers, the military services will require increased access to the national airspace system. DOD estimated in a December 2008 report that based on planned UAS inventories in fiscal year 2013, the services will require more than 1 million flight hours to train UAS personnel within the United States. DOD’s current UAS simulators have limited capabilities, however, to enhance training. Absent an integrated, results-oriented plan to address the challenges in a comprehensive manner, DOD will not have a sound basis for prioritizing available resources, and it cannot be assured that the initiatives it has under way will fully address limitations in Air Force and Army training approaches. The lack of comprehensive and timely publications that are written for a range of stakeholders limits the quality of information that is available to serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs and to assist military planners and operators in integrating UAS on the battlefield. However, the rapid fielding of new systems and the considerable expansion of existing Air Force and Army programs has posed challenges for military planners to fully account for UAS support elements, such as developing comprehensive plans that account for the personnel and facilities needed to operate and sustain UAS programs and ensure the communications infrastructure that is necessary to control UAS operations. To ensure that DOD can comprehensively resolve challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the military services and other organizations as appropriate, to develop a results-oriented training strategy that provides detailed information on the steps that DOD will take to identify and address the effects of competition and airspace restrictions on UAS training, increase the opportunities that Army ground units and Air Force UAS personnel have to train together in a joint environment, maximize the use of available assets in training exercises, and upgrade UAS simulation capabilities to enhance training. However, we identified many cases where DOD’s UAS publications did not incorporate updated information needed by military personnel to understand current practices and capabilities, and we found that the military services have not, in some instances, assigned personnel to positions that are responsible for UAS publication development. In determining the extent to which DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations, we visited select military installations and the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and spoke with knowledgeable DOD and military service officials to determine the specific challenges that the Air Force and the Army faced when training service personnel to perform UAS missions in joint operations. To determine the extent to which DOD updated its existing publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations, we examined joint, multiservice, and service-specific UAS doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and concept of operations publications. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) requested about $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and for expanded capabilities in existing ones. To support ongoing operations, the Air Force and Army have acquired a greater number of larger systems. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) plans were in place to account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure needed to support Air Force and Army UAS inventories; (2) DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations; and (3) DOD updated its publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations. Focusing on UAS programs supporting ongoing operations, GAO reviewed the services' program and funding plans in light of DOD's requirements definition and acquisition policy; interviewed UAS personnel in the United States and in Iraq about training experiences; and reviewed joint, multiservice, and service-specific publications.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to increase UAS inventories, but in some cases, the Air Force and the Army lack robust plans that account for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure to support them. Regarding personnel, the Air Force and the Army have identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to meet current and projected UAS force levels, but they have not yet fully developed plans to supply needed personnel. Further, although DOD has recently requested funding and plans to request additional funds, the Air Force and the Army have not completed analyses to specify the number and type of facilities needed to support UAS training and operations. Having identified a vulnerability to the communications infrastructure network used to control UAS missions, the Air Force is taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by a natural or man-made disruption to the network but has not formalized a plan in the near term to provide for the continuity of UAS operations in the event of a disruption. While DOD guidance encourages planning for factors needed to operate and sustain a weapon system program in the long term, several factors have contributed to a lag in planning efforts, such as the rapid fielding of new systems and the expansion of existing ones. In the absence of comprehensive planning, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that Air Force and Army approaches will support current and projected UAS inventories. The lack of comprehensive plans also limits the ability of decision makers to make informed funding choices. DOD has not developed a results-oriented strategy to resolve challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations. GAO found that the limited amount of DOD-managed airspace adversely affected the amount of training that personnel conducted to prepare for deployments. As UAS are fielded in greater numbers, DOD will require access to more airspace for training; for example, DOD estimated that based on planned UAS inventories in fiscal year 2013, the military services will require more than 1 million flight hours to train UAS personnel within the United States. Further, Air Force UAS personnel and Army ground units have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment, and they have not maximized the use of available assets during training. Current UAS simulators also have limited capabilities to enhance training. DOD has commenced initiatives to address training challenges, but it has not developed a results-oriented strategy to prioritize and synchronize these efforts. Absent a strategy, DOD will not have a sound basis for prioritizing resources, and it cannot be assured that the initiatives will address limitations in Air Force and Army training approaches. In many cases, DOD's UAS publications articulating doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures did not include updated information needed by manned and unmanned aircraft operators, military planners, and ground units to understand current practices and capabilities. Such information can serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs and can assist military personnel in integrating UAS on the battlefield. |
gao_GAO-13-83 | gao_GAO-13-83_0 | NDF’s Authorities Provide It Significant Operational Flexibility, but under Its No-Year Budget Authority, NDF Has Not Determined Needed Carryover Balances
NDF has several key authorities that provide it significant operational flexibility; however, it has not determined its needed carryover balances and it has taken years to close out many of its projects in the absence of guidance for closing them. Annual appropriations bills have consistently provided NDF with three key authorities that it has used to carry out its activities. Second, NDF has used its geographic authority to fund projects in a range of countries around the globe. Third, NDF has used its no-year budget authority to carry over balances not designated for specific projects from one year to the next. However, NDF has not determined appropriate levels for these balances, which have increased significantly in the past several years. Additionally, NDF has taken many years to close some projects where work was never started, or was suspended, and has not established guidance for determining when inactive projects should be closed out and unexpended no-year funds made available for other projects. NDF Used Its Notwithstanding Authority to Implement Several Projects Where Laws and Regulations Otherwise Restricted U.S. Assistance
Annual appropriations acts have consistently granted NDF notwithstanding authority, which allows NDF to undertake projects “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” As a result, NDF has the ability to fund projects in countries where other U.S. programs are generally barred from operating by U.S. legal restrictions. NDF’s authority to fund projects globally since the program’s start in 1994 is in contrast to the authorities of some other U.S. nonproliferation programs. As a result, NDF funds may be tied up for years in projects where no work is occurring, precluding the funds’ use for other projects. State has developed a new policy requiring bureaus to evaluate programs, projects, and activities. To comply with this policy, State issued guidance requiring bureaus to submit an evaluation plan for fiscal years 2012 through 2014, identifying the programs and projects they plan to evaluate. However, ISN, which oversees NDF, did not include NDF in its fiscal years 2012 through 2014 evaluation plan. Moreover, State currently lacks information, such as the results of some projects and lessons learned, that could be used to conduct a program evaluation of NDF and that would help inform the management of the program. In part to comply with the requirements of this Act, State established a policy in February 2012 to evaluate programs and projects. Project management standards note the importance of documenting results in project close-out documents, but not all of the project close-out reports that we examined discussed the results of the project. In addition, NDF officials stated that NDF encourages but does not require the use of the project management guide and the guide does not detail the information that project managers need to include in their reports or specify the report format. Partly in response to our work, NDF officials stated that they plan to develop standard operating procedures to address the issues we identified in the project close-out reports, which will also include a requirement for project managers to identify lessons learned. However, as of November 2012, they had not made any changes to their procedures. Finally, NDF’s project close-out reports could provide useful information to inform future program evaluations’ identification of lessons learned that could be systematically incorporated into future projects. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively manage NDF’s resources, increase program accountability, and ensure that NDF has the information necessary to improve program performance, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following four actions: direct NDF to develop a methodology for determining the amount of reserves that it should carry over annually to meet program requirements to address unanticipated nonproliferation and disarmament opportunities; direct NDF to develop guidance for determining when inactive NDF projects should be closed and the remaining, unexpended funds made available for use on other projects; direct ISN and NDF to periodically and systematically conduct and document program evaluations of NDF; direct NDF to revise its project management guide to establish requirements for project managers’ close-out reports to include information useful for improving the management of NDF projects. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) the Department of State’s (State) use of Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) authorities in developing and implementing NDF projects and (2) the extent to which State has conducted a program evaluation of NDF and used this information to improve program performance. To assess the extent to which State has evaluated NDF and used this information to improve program performance, we interviewed State officials with the Bureaus of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) and Budgeting and Planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
The proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and advanced conventionalweapons poses significant threats toU.S. and international security. StatesNDF began operating in 1994 to helpcombat such threats by funding a variety of nonproliferation and disarmament projects. NDFs legal authorities provide it significant flexibility to perform its work and it has initiated high-profile projects in locations that are significant to U.S. interests. Nonetheless, questions have been raised about how NDF has used its authorities, including its authority to carry over balances into future fiscal years, and the extent to which NDF is effectively implementing its activities. This report examines (1) States use of NDF authorities in developing and implementing NDF projects and (2) the extent to which State has conducted a program evaluation of NDF and used this information to improve program performance. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed NDF program and project data and documentation, analyzed a sample of NDF project close-out documents, and interviewed NDF and other U.S. officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of State's (State) Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has several key authorities that provide it significant operational flexibility; however, it has not determined its needed carryover balances and it has taken years to close out many of its projects in the absence of guidance for closing them. Annual appropriations bills have consistently provided NDF with three key authorities that it has used to carry out its activities. First, NDF has the authority to undertake projects notwithstanding any other provision of law. NDF has used this authority to fund projects in countries, such as North Korea, where U.S. assistance is prohibited by U.S. sanctions and other legal restrictions. Second, NDF has the authority to undertake projects globally. NDF has used this authority to fund projects in numerous regions around the world, in contrast with other U.S. nonproliferation programs, which have historically focused on countries in the former Soviet Union. Third, NDF's appropriations do not expire within a particular time period, enabling NDF to carry over balances from year to year not designated for specific projects. However, NDF has not determined appropriate levels for these balances, which increased significantly in the past few years. Additionally, NDF has sometimes taken many years to close projects, including those where work was never started or was suspended, and has not established criteria to determine when inactive projects should be closed and unexpended resources made available for other projects. As a result, NDF funds may be tied up for years in inactive projects, precluding the funds' use for other projects.
State has never conducted a program evaluation of NDF. In February 2012, State developed a policy requiring bureaus to evaluate programs, projects, and activities, and outlined the requirements for these evaluations. As part of this policy, State required bureaus to submit an evaluation plan for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 that identified the programs and projects they plan to evaluate. However, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), which oversees NDF, did not include NDF in its fiscal years 2012 through 2014 evaluation plan. State currently lacks information that could be used to conduct a program evaluation and to improve NDF's management of the program. Project close-out reports are critical to the process of closing out a project and identifying lessons learned, but NDF project close-out reports do not contain information that could enable NDF to better manage its program. For example, not all closeout reports address the results of the project. NDF uses e-mails and face-to-face meetings to communicate lessons learned without documenting them. Established standards suggest that these should be transferred to a database of lessons learned for use in future projects and activities, an action State officials said they are considering taking. NDF has also produced a project management guide to encourage project managers to use standard procedures and write close-out reports, but does not require the use of this guide. In addition, the guide does not detail a format for project managers to use in preparing their close-out reports or list the information that project managers must address. NDF officials said they plan to develop standard operating procedures to address these issues, but had not done so as of November 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State (1) develop a methodology for determining the amount of carryover reserves needed to meet program requirements, (2) develop guidance for determining when inactive NDF projects should be closed out, (3) conduct periodic program evaluations of NDF, and (4) establish requirements for the types of information to be included in project close-out reports. State agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-103 | gao_T-AIMD-99-103_0 | IRS’ Financial Reporting Controls Are Inadequate and Its Financial Management Systems Do Not Comply With FFMIA
IRS does not have internal controls over its financial reporting process adequate to provide reasonable assurance that its principal financial statements are reliable. In an effort to overcome these deficiencies, IRS employs a costly, labor intensive, and time-consuming process involving extensive and complex analysis and ad hoc procedures to assist in preparing its principal financial statements. With respect to IRS’ administrative activities, this approach was unsuccessful in producing reliable balances. IRS (1) cannot reliably prepare four of the six principal financial statements required by the Office of Management and Budget, which prescribes the form and content of federal financial statements, (2) does not have a general ledger(s) that conforms to the SGL, (3) lacks a subsidiary ledger for its unpaid assessments, accounts payable, and undelivered orders, and (4) lacks an effective audit trail from its general ledgers back to subsidiary detailed records and transaction source documents. Although IRS has detective (post-refund) controls in place, the lack of sufficient preventive controls exposes the government to potentially significant losses due to inappropriate disbursements for refunds. According to IRS’ records, IRS investigators identified over $17 million in alleged fraudulent refunds that had been disbursed during the first 9 months of calendar year 1998 and prevented the disbursement of an additional $65 million in alleged fraudulent refund claims. Physical Security Over Manual Tax Receipts and Taxpayer Information Is Inadequate
As we have previously reported, IRS’ controls over cash, checks, and related hardcopy taxpayer data it manually receives from taxpayers are not adequate to reduce to an acceptably low level the risk that these payments will not be properly credited to taxpayer accounts and deposited in the Treasury or that proprietary taxpayer information will not be properly safeguarded. IRS Did Not Reconcile Its Fund Balance With Treasury
Throughout fiscal year 1998, IRS did not reconcile its administrative fund balance with Treasury accounts. Based on assets included in IRS’ property systems, we found that $1.2 billion, or 69 percent of IRS’ gross P&E, was not included as property and equipment in the financial statements because of the use of this threshold to capitalize P&E assets. Continued weaknesses in these areas can allow unauthorized individuals access to critical hardware and software where they may intentionally or inadvertently add, alter, or delete sensitive data or programs. Significant Efforts Will Be Needed to Resolve IRS’ Financial Management Issues
IRS continues to be plagued by serious internal control and systems deficiencies that hinder its ability to achieve lasting financial management improvements. Additionally, significant progress continues to be made on the serious computer security issues we have reported for several years. Components of IRS’ $222 Billion of Unpaid Assessments (Dollars in Billions)
Taxes Receivable - Collectible ($26)
Taxes Receivable - Uncollectible ($55)
Compliance Assessments ($22)
Write-offs ($119)
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the results of its audit of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) fiscal year (FY) 1998 financial statements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) serious internal control and financial management issues continue to plague the IRS; (2) pervasive weaknesses in the design and operation of IRS' financial management systems, accounting procedures, documentation, recordkeeping, and internal controls, including computer security controls, prevented IRS from reliably reporting on the results of its administrative activities; (3) in contrast, IRS was able to report reliably on the results of its custodial activities for FY 1998, including tax revenue received, tax refunds disbursed, and taxes receivable due from the public; (4) this was the second year GAO has been able to render an unqualified opinion with respect to IRS' financial reporting of its custodial activities; (5) this achievement, however, required extensive, costly, and time-consuming ad hoc procedures to overcome pervasive internal control and systems weaknesses; and (6) IRS' major accounting, reporting and internal control deficiencies include: (a) an inadequate financial reporting process that resulted in IRS' inability to reliably prepare several of the required principal financial statements, and financial management systems that do not comply with the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996; (b) the lack of a subsidiary ledger to properly manage taxes receivable and other unpaid assessments, resulting in instances of both taxpayer burden and lost revenue to the government; (c) deficiencies in preventive controls over tax refunds that have permitted the disbursement of millions of dollars of fraudulent refunds; (d) vulnerabilities in controls over tax receipts and taxpayer data that increase the government's and taxpayers' risk of loss or inappropriate disclosure of sensitive taxpayer data; (e) a failure to reconcile its fund balance to Treasury records during FY 1998, and an inability to provide assurance that its budgetary resources are being properly accounted for, reported, and controlled; (f) the inability to properly safeguard or reliably report its property and equipment; and (g) vulnerabilities in computer security that may allow unauthorized individuals to access, alter, or abuse proprietary IRS programs and data, and taxpayer information. |
gao_GAO-07-241 | gao_GAO-07-241_0 | A DPNA denies a home payments for new admissions until deficiencies are corrected. Surveys were to be conducted at 6-month intervals rather than annually. Despite the decline in the number of serious deficiencies, the homes we reviewed generally were cited for more deficiencies that caused harm to residents than other homes in the four states. The deterrent effect of sanctions for the homes was further eroded because CMS generally imposed CMPs on the lower end of the allowable dollar range and did not exercise its authority to use discretionary DPNAs and terminations, allowing the homes more opportunities to escape sanctions prior to implementation. Decline in Sanctions and Deficiencies for the Homes Reviewed Is Consistent with Nationwide Trends
The number of implemented sanctions at the homes we reviewed as well as the number of serious deficiencies cited in these homes declined across two time periods—fiscal years 2000 through 2002 and fiscal years 2003 through 2005—consistent with nationwide trends. 2). The median per day CMP implemented for nonimmediate jeopardy deficiencies was $500 in fiscal years 2000 through 2002 and $350 in fiscal years 2003 through 2005, significantly below the maximum of $3,000 per day. Many Homes Cycled In and Out of Compliance, Continuing to Harm Residents
Consistent with our earlier work, our current analysis showed that sanctions appear to have induced homes to correct deficiencies only temporarily because surveyors found that many of the homes we reviewed with implemented sanctions were again out of compliance on subsequent surveys. We found no record that CMS imposed a sanction for 15 of the 69 double Gs, but the data did show that CMS implemented sanctions for the remaining double G cases. Termination Used Infrequently
Nursing homes, even those that repeatedly harm residents, are infrequently terminated because of CMS’s concerns about access to other sources of nursing care and the impact of moving residents. Although the homes that remained open met the deadline to correct deficiencies before the termination would have been implemented, a home’s ability to correct deficiencies in a specified period of time may not be the strongest criteria upon which to determine whether a home should remain open, because correcting deficiencies does not ensure that the home will improve residents’ quality of care and does not prevent the home from again falling out of compliance. Complex Immediate Sanctions Policy and Data Limitations Hamper CMS Management of Enforcement
While the goal of enforcement is to help ensure nursing home compliance with federal quality requirements, CMS management of the process is hampered by the complexity of its immediate sanctions policy and by its fragmented and incomplete data systems. Finally, CMS has taken some steps intended to improve enforcement of nursing home quality requirements, such as developing guidance to help ensure greater consistency across states in CMP amounts, revising its Special Focus Facility program, and commissioning two studies to examine the effectiveness of nursing home enforcement. It is not clear, however, the extent to which—or when—these initiatives will address the enforcement weaknesses we found. Such rules may in part explain why the homes we reviewed only had 69 instances of immediate sanctions over a 6-year period, despite being cited 444 times for deficiencies that harmed residents. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address weaknesses that undermine the effectiveness of the immediate sanctions policy, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS reassess and revise the policy to ensure that it accomplishes the following three objectives: (1) reduce the lag time between citation of a double G and the implementation of a sanction, (2) prevent nursing homes that repeatedly harm residents or place them in immediate jeopardy from escaping sanctions, and (3) hold states accountable for reporting in federal data systems serious deficiencies identified during complaint investigations so that all complaint findings are considered in determining when immediate sanctions are warranted. At that time, we will send copies to the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and appropriate congressional committees. These homes had a history of providing poor quality care to residents prior to 1999. CMS enforcement data and reliability issues. Range of sanctions. Immediate sanctions policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998 and 1999 reports, GAO concluded that enforcement actions, known as sanctions, were ineffective in encouraging nursing homes to maintain compliance with federal quality requirements: sanctions were often rescinded before being implemented because homes had a grace period to correct deficiencies. In response, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) began requiring immediate sanctions for homes that repeatedly harmed residents. Using CMS enforcement and deficiency data, GAO (1) analyzed federal sanctions from fiscal years 2000 through 2005 against 63 homes previously reviewed and (2) assessed CMS's overall management of enforcement. The 63 homes had a history of harming residents and were located in 4 states that account for about 22 percent of homes nationwide.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2000 through 2005, the number of sanctions decreased for the 63 nursing homes GAO reviewed that had a history of serious quality problems, a decline consistent with nationwide trends. While the decline may reflect improved quality or changes to enforcement policy, it may also mask survey weaknesses that understate quality problems, an issue GAO has reported on since 1998. Although the number of sanctions decreased, the homes generally were cited for more deficiencies that caused harm to residents than other homes in their states. Almost half of the homes reviewed continued to cycle in and out of compliance; 19 did so 4 times or more. These homes temporarily corrected deficiencies and, even with sanctions, were again found out of compliance on subsequent surveys. Several weaknesses appeared to undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions implemented against the homes reviewed. First, civil money penalties (CMP), which by statute are not paid while under appeal--a process that can take years--were generally imposed at the lower end of the allowable dollar range. For example, the median per day CMP ranged from $350 to $500, significantly below the maximum of $3,000 per day. Second, CMS favored the use of sanctions that give homes more time to correct deficiencies, increasing the likelihood that the sanctions would not be implemented. Thus, more than half of the denial of payment for new admissions (DPNA) that CMS imposed were the type that give homes 3 months to correct deficiencies rather than those that only give homes up to 15 days. Third, there was no record of a sanction for about 22 percent of the homes reviewed that met CMS's criteria for immediate sanctions, a problem GAO also identified in 2003; moreover, 60 percent of DPNAs imposed as immediate sanctions were not implemented until 1 to 2 months after citation of the deficiency. Finally, involuntary termination of homes from participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs was rare because of concerns about access to other nearby homes and resident transfer trauma; 2 of the 63 homes reviewed were involuntarily terminated because of quality problems. CMS's management of enforcement is hampered by the complexity of its immediate sanctions policy and by its fragmented and incomplete data. Its policy allows some homes with the worst compliance histories to escape immediate sanctions. For example, a home cited with a serious deficiency and that has not yet corrected an earlier serious deficiency is spared an immediate sanction. Such rules may in part explain why the 63 homes reviewed only had 69 instances of immediate sanctions over a 6-year period despite being cited 444 times for deficiencies that harmed residents. Although CMS initiated development of a new enforcement data system 6 years ago, it is fragmented and has incomplete national reporting capabilities. CMS is taking additional steps to improve nursing home enforcement, such as developing guidance to encourage more consistency in CMP amounts, but it is not clear whether and when these initiatives will address the enforcement weaknesses GAO found. |
gao_GAO-16-508 | gao_GAO-16-508_0 | IRS estimates that it prevented or recovered $22.5 billion in IDT refunds. Despite Recent Changes, Vulnerabilities in the Taxpayer Protection Program Limit IRS’s Ability to Prevent IDT Refund Fraud
One of IRS’s key defenses in reducing the risk of IDT refund fraud is TPP, which is intended to verify the identities of suspicious filers. While TPP Protects Billions in Revenue, Some IDT Fraudsters Pass TPP Authentication and Potentially Receive Millions in Fraudulent Refunds
Of the about 1.6 million returns selected for TPP processing in filing season 2015, IRS estimated that it potentially paid about $30 million to IDT fraudsters who filed about 7,200 returns that passed TPP authentication. While we cannot quantify the specific amount by which IRS’s analysis underestimated the number of fraudulent IDT returns that passed TPP authentication, we conducted a scenario analysis to demonstrate the effect of omitting potential IDT returns on IRS’s estimates. IRS’s Most Recent Risk Assessment May Not Reflect the Threat That IDT Refund Fraud Currently Poses to TPP Authentication Procedures
Although IRS conducted a risk assessment for TPP authentication in October 2012, the agency has not updated this assessment to reflect the current threat of IDT refund fraud—specifically, the threat that some fraudsters possess the PII necessary to pass authentication questions. IRS officials said IRS uses the thresholds because it wants to prioritize IRS enforcement efforts. Further, the GAO Cost Guide states that analysis should be regularly updated to reflect significant changes in the methodology and should include all relevant costs. Further, incomplete Taxonomy estimates could impede IRS and congressional efforts to assess the effectiveness of its IDT defenses over time. According to IRS officials, the Global Report counts each time a return is caught by IRS defenses as a separate instance of refund fraud. However, officials said they use the Global Report to develop estimates of prevented IDT refund fraud because it represents IRS’s official record of IDT fraud and because IRS has invested substantial resources in improving the report. Further, the GAO Cost Guide states that estimates be based on primary data sources and contain few mistakes. In addition, IRS took steps to incorporate better quality data into its refunds paid estimate by utilizing both the modeling data set’s return-level information and results from a new sampling effort. Conclusions
IRS’s continued efforts to improve TPP are critical to combatting IDT refund fraud. In turn, strengthened authentication would help IRS reduce revenue lost to IDT fraudsters, improve the efficiency of fraud filter investments, and reduce the number of legitimate taxpayers who become victims of IDT refund fraud. More accurate Taxonomy estimates would help IRS better understand how and to what extent IDT refund fraud is evading IRS defenses. Additionally, reducing overcounting and ensuring all relevant IDT returns—even those that fail to meet specific refund thresholds—are included in Taxonomy estimates could help IRS communicate more accurate information on the amount and cost of IDT refund fraud to decision makers. Recommendations
To further deter noncompliance in the Taxpayer Protection Program, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following two actions in accordance with OMB and NIST e-authentication guidance: 1. conduct an updated risk assessment to identify new or ongoing risks for TPP’s online and phone authentication options, including documentation of time frames for conducting the assessment, and 2. implement appropriate actions to mitigate risks identified in the assessment. To improve the quality of the Taxonomy’s IDT refund fraud estimates, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following two actions: 1. remove refund thresholds from criteria used to develop IRS’s refunds- paid estimates, and 2. utilize return-level data—where available—to reduce overcounting and improve the quality and accuracy of the refunds-prevented estimates. IRS did not change its upper threshold. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) evaluates the performance of Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) and (2) assesses IRS efforts to improve its estimates of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud costs for 2014. To assess IRS’s efforts to improve its Identity Theft Taxonomy (Taxonomy) estimates of IDT refund fraud for 2014, we reviewed the Taxonomy’s methodology and estimates. We then evaluated them against selected best practices in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GAO Cost Guide) that were applicable to the Taxonomy and consistent with IRS and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) information quality guidelines. Met. We continue to monitor IRS’s progress. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS estimates that, in 2014, it prevented or recovered $22.5 billion in attempted IDT refund fraud, but paid $3.1 billion in fraudulent IDT refunds. Because of the difficulties in knowing the amount of undetected fraud, the actual amount could differ from these point estimates. IDT refund fraud occurs when a refund-seeking fraudster obtains an individual's identifying information and uses it to file a fraudulent tax return. Despite IRS's efforts to identify and prevent IDT refund fraud, this crime is an evolving and costly problem.
GAO was asked to examine IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report (1) evaluates the performance of IRS's TPP and (2) assesses IRS's efforts to improve its estimates of IDT refund fraud costs for 2014. To evaluate TPP, GAO reviewed IRS studies, reviewed relevant guidance, and met with agency officials. Further, GAO conducted a scenario analysis to understand the effect of different assumptions on IRS's TPP analysis. To assess IRS's IDT cost estimates, GAO evaluated IRS's methodology against selected best practices in the GAO Cost Guide .
What GAO Found
Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) . While the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has made efforts to strengthen TPP—a program to authenticate the identities of suspicious tax return filers and prevent identity theft (IDT) refund fraud—fraudsters are still able to pass through and obtain fraudulent refunds. TPP authenticates taxpayers by asking questions only a real taxpayer should know; however, fraudsters can pass by obtaining a taxpayer's personally identifiable information (PII). IRS estimates that of the 1.6 million returns selected for TPP, it potentially paid $30 million to IDT fraudsters who filed about 7,200 returns that passed TPP authentication in the 2015 filing season; however, GAO's analysis suggests the amount paid was likely to be higher. Although IRS conducted a risk assessment for TPP in 2012, IRS has not conducted an updated risk assessment that reflects the current threat of IDT refund fraud—specifically, the threat that some fraudsters possess the PII needed to pass authentication questions. Federal e-authentication guidance requires agencies to assess risks to programs. An updated risk assessment would help IRS identify opportunities to strengthen TPP. Strengthened authentication would help IRS prevent revenue loss and reduce the number of legitimate taxpayers who become fraud victims.
IDT Refund Fraud Cost Estimates . In response to past GAO recommendations, IRS adopted a new methodology in an effort to improve its 2014 IDT refund fraud cost estimates. However, the estimates do not include returns that fail to meet specific refund thresholds. IRS officials said the thresholds allow them to prioritize IRS's enforcement efforts. However, using thresholds could result in incomplete estimates. Improved estimates would help IRS better understand how fraud is evading agency defenses. The GAO Cost Guide states that cost estimates should include all relevant costs. Additionally, IRS's estimates of refunds it protected from fraud are based on the Global Report , which counts each time a fraudulent return is caught by IRS and thus counts some returns multiple times. IRS uses this data source because it is IRS's official record of IDT refund fraud. The GAO Cost Guide states that agencies should use primary data for estimates and the data should contain few mistakes. By using the Global Report , as opposed to return-level data, IRS produces inaccurate estimates of IDT refund fraud, which could impede IRS and congressional efforts to monitor and combat this evolving threat.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS update its TPP risk assessment and take appropriate actions to mitigate risks identified in the assessment. GAO also recommends that IRS improve its IDT cost estimates by removing refund thresholds and using return-level data where available. IRS agreed with GAO's TPP recommendations and will update its risk assessment. IRS took action consistent with GAO's IDT cost estimate recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-82 | gao_GAO-06-82_0 | Several Key Issues Have Affected States’ Efforts to Ensure the Quality of WIA Performance Data
Three key issues—flexibility in federal guidance, major changes to states’ information technology (IT) systems and limited monitoring efforts—have compromised states’ early efforts to collect and report WIA performance data. More than three-fourths of the states told us that they had made major modifications to their WIA IT systems since implementation. In a recent review we found considerable variation in exit practices at the state and local levels. States Have Taken Steps to Improve the Quality of WIA Performance Data
States have made efforts to address data quality concerns and improve the quality of WIA performance data. Most states have taken actions to clarify Labor’s guidance to help local areas determine who should be tracked in the performance measures. Almost all states reported on our survey that they have controls for IT systems, such as edit checks or reports to help screen for errors or missing data. In addition, most states reported to us that they monitor local areas to ensure data quality and consistency by assessing local procedures and policies. Over 40 states reported to us that they provide guidance to help local areas determine which jobseekers should be tracked—or registered—for WIA and when participants leave—or exited—services, and therefore get counted in the performance measures. 5). Labor Has Taken Steps to Improve WIA Data Quality, but Some Issues Remain
Labor recently began addressing data quality issues, however, some data quality issues remain. However, Labor does not currently have methods in place to review states’ data validation efforts and hold states accountable to the data validation requirements. Labor’s guidance requiring states to implement common performance measures on July 1, 2005, clarified some key data elements that had been problematic with regard to the WIA performance measures, but it does not address all the issues. Further, Labor has some federal monitoring processes in place but lacks a standard monitoring guide to address data quality. Labor’s Data Validation Requirements May Be Having Some Positive Effects on States and Local Areas
It is too soon to fully assess whether Labor’s efforts have improved data quality, however, at least 46 states reported on our survey that Labor’s new requirements have helped increase awareness of data accuracy and reliability at the state and local level (see fig. In addition, over 30 states said that the new requirements have helped them in their monitoring of outcomes and eligibility. The magnitude of changes required considerable retooling of states’ IT systems, which had a negative effect on the integrity of WIA performance data during the initial years of implementation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the data quality issues that have affected states’ efforts to collect and report Workforce Investment Act (WIA) performance data; (2) states’ actions to address them; and (3) the actions the Department of Labor (Labor) is taking to address data quality issues, and the issues that remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal programs carried out in partnership with states and localities continually balance the competing objectives of collecting uniform performance data with giving program implementers the flexibility they need. Our previous work identified limitations in the quality of performance data for the key employment and training program--the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). WIA relies on states and localities to work together to track and report on participant outcomes, and it changed the way outcomes are measured. Given the magnitude of changes and the impact such changes can have on data quality, we examined (1) the data quality issues that affected states' efforts to collect and report WIA performance data; (2) states' actions to address them; and (3) the actions the Department of Labor (Labor) is taking to address data quality issues, and the issues that remain.
What GAO Found
Three key issues--flexibility in federal guidance, major changes to states' information technology (IT) systems, and limited monitoring--compromised states' early efforts to collect and report WIA performance data. Labor's initial guidance allowed states and local areas flexibility in deciding which jobseekers to track and when jobseekers leave services and get counted in the measures. As a result, states and local areas have differed on whom they track and for how long. States took various approaches to implement IT systems for meeting WIA reporting requirements. Thirty-nine states reported to us that they made major modifications to their IT systems since WIA was first implemented in 2000. Thirteen of them said the changes resulted in problems affecting data quality, and 5 states are still trying to resolve these problems. In addition, oversight of WIA performance data was insufficient at all levels during early implementation. Almost all states have made efforts to improve the quality of WIA performance data--at least 40 states have controls in their IT systems that capture WIA performance data, such as edit checks or exception reports to help screen for errors or missing data. Forty-three states have taken actions to clarify Labor's guidance and help local areas determine who should be tracked in the performance measures. In addition, most states said they monitor local areas by assessing local procedures and policies. Labor recently began addressing data quality issues, however, some issues remain. In 2004, Labor addressed some data quality concerns by requiring states to validate their data and ensure the accuracy of their performance outcomes. Most states told us that Labor's requirements have increased awareness of data quality at the state and local level. However, Labor does not have methods in place to review states' validation efforts or hold states accountable for complying with its requirements. Labor issued guidance requiring states to implement common performance measures on July 1, 2005, which clarified some key data elements, but does not address all the issues. Labor has some federal monitoring processes in place but lacks a standard monitoring guide to address data quality. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-157 | gao_T-HEHS-98-157_0 | NCS has a strategic plan for addressing the demand for veterans’ burials up to fiscal year 2003, but the plan does not address longer term burial needs—that is, the demand for benefits during the expected peak years of veteran deaths, when pressure on the system will be greatest. Beyond the year 2003, NCS officials said they will continue using the basic strategies contained in the current 5-year plan. Five-Year Plan Has Multiple Strategies
According to its 5-year strategic plan (1998-2003), one of NCS’ primary goals is to ensure that burial in an open national or state veterans’ cemetery is an available option for all eligible veterans and their family members. First, NCS plans to build, when feasible, new national cemeteries. Third, NCS plans to encourage states to provide additional grave sites for veterans through participation in the State Cemetery Grants Program. For example, NCS’ strategic plan does not articulate how NCS will mitigate the effects of the increasing demand for burial services. Although NCS projects annual interments to increase about 42 percent from 73,000 in 1995 to 104,000 in 2010, peaking at 107,000 in 2008, its strategic plan does not indicate how the agency will begin to position itself to handle this increase in demand for burial benefits. We believe that, given the magnitude of the projected increase in demand for burial benefits, NCS’ strategic plan should discuss how its current strategies will be adjusted to address the demand during the peak years of veterans’ deaths. According to NCS’ Chief of Planning, NCS will encourage states to locate cemeteries in areas where it does not plan to operate and maintain national cemeteries. Since the State Cemetery Grants Program’s inception in 1978, fewer than half of the states have established veterans’ cemeteries, primarily because, according to NCS officials, states must provide up to half of the funds needed to establish, expand, or improve a cemetery as well as pay for all equipment and annual operating costs. While historical data imply that the majority of veterans and eligible dependents prefer a casket burial, NCS national data show that the demand for cremation at national cemeteries is increasing. Conclusion
designed to increase state participation by increasing the share of federal funding. Therefore, NCS needs to rely more on extending the service periods of its existing cemeteries. Columbaria can more efficiently utilize available cemetery land at a lower average interment cost than the other interment options and can also extend the service period of existing national cemeteries. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the National Cemetery System's (NCS) plans to accommodate the increasing demand for burial benefits and what it can do to extend the service period of existing cemeteries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NCS has adopted a 5-year strategic plan for fiscal years 1998 through 2003 with the goal of ensuring that burial in a national or state veterans' cemetery is an available option for all veterans and their eligible family members; (2) strategies outlined in NCS' plan include: (a) building new national cemeteries; (b) expanding existing cemeteries; and (c) encouraging states to provide additional burial sites through participation in the State Cemetery Grants Program; (3) however, it is unclear how NCS will address the veterans' burial demand during the peak years, when pressure on it will be greatest, since NCS' strategic plan does not indicate how it will begin to position itself to handle the increasing demand for burial benefits; (4) NCS officials stated that beyond 2003, NCS will continue using the basic strategies contained in its current 5-year plan; (5) for example, NCS plans to encourage states to establish veterans' cemeteries in areas where it does not plan to operate national cemeteries; (6) however, since the grant program's inception in 1978, fewer than half of the states have established veterans' cemeteries; (7) states have also shown limited interest in a legislative proposal designed to increase state participation by increasing the share of federal funding; (8) given the magnitude of the projected increase in demand for burial benefits, GAO continues to believe that it is important for NCS to articulate to Congress and other stakeholders how it plans to address the increasing demand; (9) as annual interments increase, cemeteries reach their burial capacity, thus increasing the importance of making the most efficient use of available cemetery space; (10) to identify feasible approaches to extending the service period of existing cemeteries, GAO analyzed the impact of adding burial sites to an acre of land in an existing cemetery; (11) GAO's analysis of three interment options showed that columbaria offered the most efficient option because they would involve the lowest average interment cost and would significantly extend a cemetery's service period; and (12) morever, while the majority of veterans and eligible family members prefer a casket burial, cremation is an acceptable interment option for many, and the demand for cremation, which varies by region, continues to increase. |
gao_GAO-10-676 | gao_GAO-10-676_0 | EVM Data for the GMD and Targets and Countermeasures Programs Are Not Sufficiently Reliable
For GMD and Targets and Countermeasures, we determined that the EVM data were not sufficiently reliable to analyze these contracts’ cost and schedule performance because of instability in these programs. Without reliable EVM data, we are unable to identify significant performance drivers or forecast future cost and schedule performance. Further, when the baseline on which the work is performed and measured against is no longer representative of the program of record, program managers and other decision makers lose the ability to develop constructive corrective action plans to get the program on track. Further, he intends to report EVM information to Congress annually. For example, although the GMD program experienced a $1.3 billion dollar restructure in 2007, another major restructure beginning in fiscal year 2008 for over $500 million that was completed in fiscal year 2009, and a third in fiscal year 2010 for over $380 million, the GMD program has not conducted an IBR since December 2006.DOD’s acquisition policy states that an IBR is to be conducted within 6 months after contract award, exercise of contract options, or major modifications to a contract.DCMA officials told us that the GMD program had an IBR underway following the restructure that began in fiscal year 2008 and completed in fiscal year 2009, but in May 2009 the program was again redirected and the baseline review was cancelled. Based on discussions with and reports issued by DCMA, the Targets and Countermeasures contractor was unable to update its baseline because of numerous program changes. In addition, during fiscal year 2009 DCMA identified several issues with the stability of the Targets and Countermeasures program baseline. For example, program changes since fiscal year 2008 on one delivery order included over 20 contract changes to the scope of work or corrective actions to quality issues. In addition, the schedule and quantity of planned flight tests changed significantly. Because of the instability in the baseline and the contractor’s inability to update the baseline with these frequent changes, we determined the cost performance reports for 2009 do not reflect an appropriate baseline against which to measure cost and schedule progress. During the course of our audit, we interviewed DCMA representatives at each of the contractor sites to understand the basis for the noncompliance determination and to gain information to help us assess the reliability of the data. BMDS Prime Contractors Aggregate Analysis Not Appropriate Due to Data Reliability Issues
We are unable in this year’s report to aggregate total projected underruns or overruns in our analysis of the remaining 12 prime contracts because we had to exclude the GMD and Targets and Countermeasures programs due to data reliability issues. Nine of the remaining 12 contracts experienced cost overruns for fiscal year 2009. Most of the overruns were because of issues with maturing technologies, immature designs, or other technical issues. For example, the ABL contractor experienced a failure in some of the system’s optics which required it to develop and procure new high power optics, delaying the test schedule and increasing program cost. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct MDA to resolve prime contractor data reliability issues by the beginning of fiscal year 2011 and, if MDA has not resolved the data reliability problems, determine the barriers preventing resolution and provide a report to Congress on: the steps MDA is taking to make its contractor data sufficiently reliable, how the data reliability issues affect MDA’s ability to provide oversight of its contractors, and the effect these issues have on MDA’s ability to report contractor progress to others, including Congress. DOD concurred with our recommendation to resolve prime contractor EVM data reliability issues by 2011; however, DOD stated that MDA considers its fiscal year 2009 prime contractor performance data to be reliable. The contractor tracks earned value management (EVM) by making comparisons that inform the program as to whether the contractor is completing work at the cost budgeted and whether the work scheduled is being completed on time and then reports this information on Contract Performance Reports. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
To examine the progress Missile Defense Agency (MDA) prime contractors made in fiscal year 2009 in cost and schedule performance, we examined contractor performance on 14 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) element contracts. We received this documentation through the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which performs independent EVM surveillance of MDA contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
By law, GAO is directed to assess the annual progress the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made in developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). GAO issued its latest assessment of MDA's progress covering fiscal year 2009 in February 2010. This report supplements that assessment to provide further insight into MDA's prime contractor performance for fiscal year 2009. Prime contractors track earned value management (EVM) by making comparisons that inform the program as to whether the contractor is completing work at the cost budgeted and whether the work scheduled is being completed on time. Our analysis of contractor EVM data included examining contract performance reports for 14 BMDS contracts, reviewing the latest integrated baseline reviews, performing extensive analysis of data anomalies, and conducting interviews with Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) officials--the independent reviewers of MDA contractor EVM systems.
What GAO Found
Unlike GAO's reports in previous years, GAO was unable to analyze the EVM data for all MDA contracts. GAO determined that the data for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and Targets and Countermeasures programs were not sufficiently reliable to include in our report because of instability in these programs' baselines. When the baseline on which the work is performed and measured against is no longer representative of the program of record, program managers and other decision makers lose the ability to develop constructive corrective action plans to get the program on track. Specifically, without reliable EVM data, GAO was unable to identify significant performance drivers or forecast future cost and schedule performance. Because the two contracts associated with these programs represent half of the budgeted cost at completion for the 14 contracts GAO reviewed, GAO also determined it was not appropriate in this report to aggregate total projected underruns or overruns of the remaining 12 prime contracts as GAO has in prior reports. The GMD prime contractor performance data was not sufficiently reliable to use as the basis for analysis because the contractor was unable to update its baseline to include numerous changes to the program and modifications to the contract. Despite three large restructures since 2007 totaling over $2 billion, the GMD program has not conducted an integrated baseline review since December 2006. DOD acquisition policy states that an integrated baseline review is to be conducted within 6 months after contract award, exercise of contract options, or a major modification to an existing contract. The Director, MDA has taken extra steps to gain insight into the contractor's performance. Further, he intends to report EVM information to Congress annually. Similarly, the EVM data for the Targets and Countermeasures contractor is also not sufficiently reliable to use in our analysis. DCMA identified several issues with the stability of the Targets and Countermeasures program baseline including a large amount of schedule and quantity changes to planned flight tests and over 20 contract changes to the scope of work or corrective actions to quality issues for one of the delivery orders over the course of a year. Because the contractor has not been able to update the established budget in the baseline, the cost performance reports do not reflect an appropriate baseline against which to measure cost and schedule progress. Nine of the remaining twelve contracts experienced cost overruns for fiscal year 2009 mostly because of issues with maturing technologies, immature designs, or other technical issues. For example, the Airborne Laser contractor experienced a failure in some of the system's optics which required it to develop and procure new high power optics, delaying the test schedule and increasing program cost.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that MDA resolve prime contractor EVM data reliability issues by the beginning of fiscal year 2011. If, by this time, MDA has not resolved these issues, the Secretary of Defense should provide a report to Congress on the steps MDA is taking to resolve them. DOD concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-1048T | gao_GAO-05-1048T_0 | The strategies that the organizations at our symposium considered in designing and managing market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems and examples of how organizations are implementing them are as follows. Focus on a set of values and objectives to guide the pay system. Organizations need to focus on a set of values and objectives when designing and managing their market-based and more performance- oriented pay systems. Examine the value of employees’ total compensation to remain competitive in the market. Build in safeguards to enhance the transparency and help ensure the fairness of pay decisions. 4. Devolve decision making on pay to appropriate levels. Provide training on leadership, management, and interpersonal skills to facilitate effective communication. We have reported that training and developing new and current staff to fill new roles and work in different ways will play a crucial part in the federal government’s endeavors to meet its transformation challenges. Organizations found that training employees and managers on performance management skills, such as setting expectations, linking individual performance to organizational results, and effectively giving and receiving feedback, as well as placing an emphasis on communicating the content of the pay reforms in a simple and clear format, are needed to make market- based and more performance-oriented pay succeed. Build consensus to gain ownership and acceptance for pay reforms. Experience shows that this shift to market-based and more performance-oriented pay must be part of a broader strategy of change management and performance improvement initiatives and cannot be simply overlaid on most organizations’ existing performance management systems. Before implementing any pay reform, each executive branch agency should have demonstrated and OPM should have certified that the agency has in place the institutional infrastructure to help ensure that this reform is effectively and equally implemented. We need to move forward with human capital reforms. “Highlights” of Selected GAO Reports
Critical to the success of the federal government’s transformation are its people— human capital. Yet the government has not transformed, in many cases, how it classifies, compensates, develops, and motivates its employees to achieve maximum results within available resources and existing authorities. One of the questions being addressed as the federal government transforms is how to update its compensation system to be more market based and performance oriented. While implementing market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems is both doable and desirable, organizations’ experiences show that the shift to market-based and more performance-oriented pay must be part of a broader strategy of change management and performance improvement initiatives. 1. To further the discussion of federal pay reform, GAO, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the U.S. Representatives from public, private, and nonprofit organizations made presentations on the successes and challenges they experienced in designing and managing their market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems. 3. Safeguards are the precondition to linking pay systems with employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to results. 6. 7. Monitor and refine the implementation of the pay system. To begin to make this change, organizations need to build up their basic management capacity at every level of the organization. 2. 5. Make meaningful distinctions in performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government must have the capacity to plan more strategically, react more expeditiously, and focus on achieving results. Critical to the success of this transformation are the federal government's people--its human capital. Yet, in many cases the federal government has not transformed how it classifies, compensates, develops, and motivates its employees to achieve maximum results within available resources and existing authorities. A key question is how to update the federal government's compensation system to be market-based and more performance-oriented. To further the discussion of federal pay reform, GAO partnered with key human capital stakeholders to convene a symposium in March 2005 to discuss public, private, and nonprofit organizations' successes and challenges in designing and managing market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems. This testimony presents the strategies that organizations considered in designing and managing market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems and describes how they are implementing them.
What GAO Found
GAO strongly supports the need to expand pay reform in the federal government. While implementing market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems is both doable and desirable, organizations' experiences in designing and managing their pay systems underscored three key themes that can guide federal agencies' efforts. First, the shift to market-based and more performance-oriented pay must be part of a broader strategy of change management and performance improvement initiatives. Second, market-based and more performance-oriented pay cannot be simply overlaid on most organizations' existing performance management systems. Rather, as a precondition to effective pay reform, individual expectations must be clearly aligned with organizational results, communication on individual contributions to annual goals must be ongoing and two-way, meaningful distinctions in employee performance must be made, and cultural changes must be undertaken. Finally, organizations need to build up the basic management capacity of their organizations. Training and developing new and current staff to fill new roles and work in different ways will play a crucial part in building the capacity of the organizations. Organizations presenting at our symposium considered the following strategies in designing and managing their pay systems. (1) Focus on a set of values and objectives to guide the pay system; (2) Examine the value of employees' total compensation to remain competitive in the market; (3) Build in safeguards to enhance the transparency and help ensure the fairness of pay decisions; (4) Devolve decision making on pay to appropriate levels; (5) Provide training on leadership, management, and interpersonal skills to facilitate effective communication; (6) Build consensus to gain ownership and acceptance for pay reforms; and (7) Monitor and refine the implementation of the pay system. Moving forward, it is possible to enact broad-based reforms that would enable agencies to move to market-based and more performance-oriented pay systems. However, before implementing reform, each executive branch agency should demonstrate and the Office of Personnel Management should certify that the agency has the institutional infrastructure in place to help ensure that the pay reform is effectively and equally implemented. At a minimum, this infrastructure includes a modern, effective, credible, and validated performance management system in place that provides a clear linkage between institutional, unit, and individual performance-oriented outcomes; results in meaningful distinctions in ratings; and incorporates adequate safeguards. |
gao_GAO-14-26 | gao_GAO-14-26_0 | sample and survey, stakeholders and resources, and As demonstrated in figure 3, the Bureau generally followed most of the 25 key practices for two of the three field test designs and at least partially for the third field test design. Design Process Management
Good management of the design process can help managers identify factors that can affect test quality, such as potential risk of delays and challenges to the lines of communication. First, the Bureau identified clear reporting relationships for only the 2013 QCT. It partially followed this practice for the 2013 NCCT design, and did not follow it for the 2012 NCT design. Recent Changes to a Design Template Could Help the Bureau Better Follow Key Practices in Future Test Designs
The Bureau’s design templates outline the information that should be included in two of its key design documents, the field test overview and the field test plan. The Bureau Has Already Begun Incorporating Lessons Learned from Initial Test Designs
As the Bureau works to develop field tests to inform decisions about the 2020 Census, Bureau officials are learning lessons that can strengthen the design of future tests. Ensure Team Leaders Are Informed of Key Design Elements
The Bureau has also recognized the importance of keeping team leaders informed about key design elements. Further, they said that the Bureau has already taken steps to identify one point of contact for each future test. This lesson complements the practice of identifying clear internal reporting relationships, including who reports to whom and points of contact for different types of information for a sound research plan. While the Bureau has taken some initial steps to implement its proposed restructuring, such as conducting a field test management group meeting to further integrate the 2020 field tests across projects, it has not formalized other proposed field test management restructuring and guidance revisions. Without a timeline and milestones for this restructuring, the Bureau risks uncoordinated management for its field tests. Documenting these lessons can help reduce the risk of repeating prior deficiencies or inconsistencies that may lead to test development delays. Given the long time frames involved in planning the census, documentation is essential to ensure lessons are incorporated into future tests. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce require the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs who oversees the Economics and Statistics Administration, as well as the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, to take the following three steps to improve the Bureau’s process of designing its census field tests for the 2020 Census:
Finalize planned revisions that focus on field test management in the team leader handbook. Set a timeline and milestones for formalizing proposed field test management restructuring and guidance revisions. Document lessons learned from designing initial field tests. The Department of Commerce also provided minor technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine to what extent the Bureau followed key practices for a sound study plan in designing the earliest 2020 Decennial Census field tests, and to identify any lessons learned from the design process that may help improve future tests. To determine to what extent the designs for the initial 2020 Decennial Census field tests were consistent with key practices for a sound study plan, we reviewed Bureau design documents and interviewed Bureau officials about the field test design process. To identify lessons learned from how the tests were designed, we examined where the Bureau had not followed key practices and identified corrective actions needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau is continuing its early testing efforts to prepare for the decennial. These tests must be well designed to produce useful information about how to implement the 2020 Census. The Bureau has completed the designs of three field tests. GAO was asked to monitor the Bureau's testing for the 2020 Census.
This report (1) determines the extent to which the Bureau followed key practices for a sound study plan in designing the earliest 2020 Decennial Census field tests, and (2) identifies what lessons were learned that may help improve future tests. To meet these objectives, GAO first selected 25 key practices for a sound research plan after reviewing its program evaluation literature. GAO then compared Bureau field test design documents for its three initial tests to these practices. GAO also examined where the Bureau had not followed key practices, identified actions needed to address them, and interviewed officials about lessons learned.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau (Bureau) generally followed most key practices for a sound study plan in designing the three initial field tests. However, some practices were only partially followed. For example, the test designs varied for four practices related to design process management. Good management of the design process can help managers identify factors that can affect the quality of a test, such as potential risk of delays and challenges to the lines of communication. For example, the Bureau generally followed one of the practices for design process management--identifying clear reporting relationships--for only one of the test designs. The Bureau partially followed this practice for another test design, and did not follow it for the third.
The Bureau has already begun incorporating lessons learned from its initial field test designs. These lessons include obtaining internal expert review, and conducting reviews after each test to learn additional lessons. The Bureau has also recognized the importance of keeping design team leaders informed about key design elements. Yet the Bureau has not finalized planned revisions to the team leader handbook, which could help implement this lesson.
Additionally, the Bureau is realigning field test governance structures to improve communication and accountability. It has already taken such steps as identifying one point of contact for each test. However, GAO found that the Bureau needs to set timelines and milestones to formalize other restructuring proposals for managing field tests, such as creating a field test management team. Having a formalized proposal and guidance revisions will better position the Bureau to improve accountability, communication, and the monitoring of its test design processes. While lessons the Bureau identified should help it better design future field tests, it has not consistently documented these lessons learned. Documenting lessons can help reduce the risk of repeating prior deficiencies that may lead to test development delays, and can reinforce lessons learned. Given the long time frames involved in planning the census, documentation is essential to ensure lessons are incorporated into future tests.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Commerce (1) finalize field test management revisions in the team leader handbook, (2) set a timeline and milestones for formalizing proposed field test management restructuring and guidance revisions, and (3) document lessons learned from designing initial field tests. The Department of Commerce concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations, and provided minor technical comments, which were included in the final report. |
gao_GGD-95-60 | gao_GGD-95-60_0 | Introduction
Two Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs—the Office of the General Sales Manager (GSM)-102 and GSM-103 export credit guarantee programs—are intended to promote the export of U.S. agricultural commodities. 117) recommending that the administration extend another $1.5 billion in agricultural credit guarantees to the Soviet Union—assuming the administration found the country could service the debt—if certain foreign policy objectives would also be realized. In addition, we (1) considered the general economic and political environment in the FSU and its successor states; (2) reviewed how the Soviet debt crisis developed and the relationship between debt problems, on the one hand, and economic reform and creditworthiness on the other; (3) examined how USDA assessments of creditworthiness and market considerations affected USDA’s decisions on providing the FSU/successor states with credit guarantees; and (4) estimated the exposure of the GSM-102 portfolio to default by the FSU and its successor states. To assess the creditworthiness of the FSU and its successor states, we (1) analyzed their debt burden and liquidity situations, using historical and forecast data; (2) considered the importance of arrears, debt relief, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements as measures of creditworthiness; (3) applied USDA/TEID criteria for measuring the relative creditworthiness of countries to the successor states; (4) reviewed secondary market prices of FSU loans and bonds; and (5) analyzed several country risk ratings of the creditworthiness of the FSU and its successor states, including preparing a composite rating for each of the states. Of this amount, $3.6 billion, or 40.9 percent, was accounted for by guarantees provided to the FSU, Russia, and Ukraine. Russia has agreed with its official creditors to accept responsibility for the FSU debts. Five of the former Soviet republics have experienced significant armed conflict within their borders. The IMF found that most countries in transition have made substantial progress in structural reform. He had spearheaded the government’s radical economic reform program. This situation would reduce their debt burden but increase Russia’s. Reserves-to-Imports Ratio. (See prior discussion on debt burden.) For the forecast period, 1993 through 1997, 8 of the 15 states are expected to experience severe liquidity problems. The GSM-102 portfolio is exposed to a high level of risk of default because a large portion of the portfolio includes FSU debt and because of Russia’s lack of creditworthiness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the creditworthiness of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and its successor states in the context of the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Office of the General Sales Manager (GSM)-102 Export Credit Guarantee Program, focusing on: (1) the countries' general economic and political environment; (2) the relationship between the Soviet debt crisis and Soviet economic reform and creditworthiness; (3) how assessments of creditworthiness and market considerations affect USDA decisions on providing credit guarantees; and (4) the GSM-102 portfolio's exposure to default by FSU and its successor states.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most of the FSU successor states are not creditworthy because of their heavy debt burdens and severe liquidity problems; (2) as a block, FSU and its successor states hold the largest portion of program credits; (3) USDA extended $5 billion in credit guarantees to FSU, Russia, and Ukraine despite their high risk because it believed the states could service the debt; (4) the poor creditworthiness of FSU countries heavily exposes the GSM-102 loan portfolio to default; (5) FSU and Russian loan defaults have already occurred and the U.S. government has expended over $1 billion to settle loan guarantee claims; (6) the countries' continued ability to import food due to credit extensions may have hampered their agricultural reforms and food production and prolonged the existence of state-owned processors; (7) FSU debt arrearages continue to increase despite efforts to defer and reschedule debt and foreign economic assistance; (8) the countries' debt burden has grown out of their increased reliance on imports and credit programs, particularly for food; (9) Russia's debt burden increased significantly when it accepted responsibility for all FSU debt; (10) much of the foreign assistance provided to Russia in 1992 was contingent on Russia's implementation of additional economic reforms; and (11) the successor states are expected to experience further economic decline despite some progress in market reforms. |
gao_GAO-01-506 | gao_GAO-01-506_0 | Background
To emphasize fair and responsible use of the False Claims Act, DOJ issued “Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health Care Matters” on June 3, 1998. These steps have helped to encourage compliance. DOJ Evaluation Process Now Provides Meaningful Assessment of Compliance With the Guidance
We found that DOJ’s periodic evaluations of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices now incorporate a more substantive examination of compliance with the guidance. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices Certify Compliance
DOJ’s annual requirement that all U.S. Attorneys’ Offices involved in national civil health care fraud initiatives certify their compliance with the guidance appears to have promoted compliance at the offices we visited. PPS Transfer and Pneumonia Upcoding Initiatives Are Being Conducted in Accordance With the Guidance
Based on our analysis of working group materials and review of case files at four offices, we believe that DOJ is following its guidance as it pursues the PPS Transfer and Pneumonia initiatives. In addition, the working groups have prepared model contact letters and other documents to ensure that hospitals are contacted in a manner consistent with the guidance. These associations also did not identify instances of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices failing to comply with the guidance. It has strengthened its oversight of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 1998, The Department of Justice (DOJ) issued guidance on the fair and responsible use of the False Claims Act in civil health care matters. This report evaluates DOJ's efforts to ensure compliance with the guidance and focuses on the application of the guidance in two recent DOJ initiatives-the Prospective Payment System (PPS) Transfer and Pneumonia Upcoding Project.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOJ has taken steps to further strengthen its oversight of compliance with its False Claims Act guidance. These steps include (1) reviewing each U.S. Attorneys Office's compliance with the guidance as part of the periodic evaluation of all U.S. Attorneys' Offices, (2) requiring all U.S. Attorneys' Offices involved in civil health care fraud control to certify their compliance with the guidance, (3) forming working groups to coordinate national initiatives, and (4) maintaining ongoing contacts with participating U.S. Attorneys' Offices to help ensure that they are complying with the guidance. GAO also found that DOJ is implementing the PPS Transfer and Pneumonia Upcoding projects in a manner consistent with the guidance. |
gao_RCED-96-50 | gao_RCED-96-50_0 | The act defined the capital ratio as the ratio of the Fund’s capital, or economic net worth, to its unamortized insurance-in-force. Our Estimates of the Fund’s Economic Net Worth
The Fund had amortized insurance-in-force valued at about $305 billion as of September 30, 1994. The actual economic net worth and capital ratios of the Fund and the validity of our estimates will depend on a number of future economic factors, including the rate of appreciation in house prices over the life of the FHA mortgages of up to 30 years. Under this scenario, we estimate that the Fund had an economic net worth of about $6.1 billion and resulting capital ratio of 2.02 percent at the end of fiscal year 1994. Under our low-case economic scenario, which assumes house price rates of appreciation of 2 percentage points lower than our baseline and a higher unemployment rate, we estimate that the Fund’s economic net worth would be $3 billion. As a result, its economic net worth would decline. In its most recent report dated May 8, 1995, Price Waterhouse reported that the Fund had an economic net worth of about $6.68 billion—compared with our baseline estimate of $6.1 billion—and a resulting capital ratio of 1.99 percent of the unamortized insurance-in-force as of the end of fiscal year 1994—compared with our baseline estimate of 2.02 percent of the amortized insurance-in-force. Factors Contributing to the Growth in the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund’s Economic Net Worth in Fiscal Year 1994
We estimate that during fiscal year 1994, the economic net worth of the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund increased by about $1.2 billion. The rates of house price appreciation and unemployment are based on DRI/McGraw-Hill’s forecasts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, focusing on: (1) an estimate of the Fund's economic net worth as of the end of fiscal year 1994; (2) the results of the legislatively prescribed capital reserve ratio that expresses economic net worth as a percentage of insurance-in-force; and (3) a comparison between the GAO estimate of the Fund's economic net worth and an estimate prepared by an accounting firm.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in 1994, the Fund's economic net worth continued to improve; (2) as of September 30, 1994, the Fund had $305 billion in outstanding mortgage loans; (3) using moderate house price appreciation rates and unemployment rates, the Fund had an economic net worth of about $6.1 billion and a resulting capital ratio of 2.02 percent; (4) using low house price appreciation rates and high unemployment rates, the Fund had an economic net worth of $3 billion; (5) using high house price appreciation rates and low unemployment rates, the Fund had an economic net worth of $7.4 billion; (6) during fiscal year 1994, the Fund's capital ratio of 2.02 percent of the amortized insurance-in-force exceeded the November 2000 capital ratio goal of 2 percent; (7) the firm estimated that the Fund had an economic net worth of about $6.68 billion and a resulting capital ratio of 1.99 percent at the end of fiscal year 1994, which was about the same as GAO estimate; and (8) the Fund's future economic net worth will depend on a number of economic factors including the appreciation rates in housing prices and whether FHA is restructured. |
gao_GAO-03-502 | gao_GAO-03-502_0 | According to the Office of Intelligence and Security’s (OIS) Associate Director for National Security (hereafter referred to as the Associate Director), the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program is, in part, DOT’s effort to meet these Presidential Decision Directive requirements. On March 1, 2003, TSA became part of the newly created Department of Homeland Security. TIA Program Is Scheduled to End in December 2003 with Completion of Four Vulnerability Assessments
The TIA program is scheduled to end in December 2003, resulting in the completion of four vulnerability assessments aimed at identifying and finding ways to mitigate threats against the nation’s transportation infrastructure. RSPA plans to work with OIS to disseminate the results of the program to private transportation system operators and to stakeholders in DOT and other federal agencies through 11 formal reports, presentations, workshops, and the Internet. Congress appropriated $1 million each year to RSPA for the TIA program in fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. RSPA Has Not Fully Coordinated Their Activities with OIS in Selecting the Vulnerabilities to Be Assessed and in Implementing the Assessments for the TIA Program
RSPA has not fully coordinated their activities with OIS—DOT’s key transportation security stakeholder—in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed or in implementing the assessments for the TIA program. In this initial proposal, the Director of OIS said that significant OIS involvement would be required to effectively implement the program given its responsibilities for defining transportation security vulnerabilities, ensuring that vulnerability assessments are conducted, and implementing actions to mitigate those vulnerabilities. Instead, RSPA selected two transportation vulnerabilities for assessment under the program after holding discussions with Volpe Center researchers and officials from RSPA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. They agreed that increased coordination would be beneficial. Specifically, they agreed to hold bi-monthly updates on the progress of each of the vulnerability assessments, discuss program task methodologies and approaches, and identify options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the program’s vulnerability assessments. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a copy of the draft report to DOT and RSPA officials who agreed with the contents of the report and provided technical clarifications that we incorporated into the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, increased attention on efforts to assess the vulnerabilities of the nation's transportation infrastructure and develop needed improvements in security. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) had already begun research in this area in June 2001. The goals of RSPA's Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program are to identify, and develop ways to mitigate the impact of, threats to the nation's transportation infrastructure. DOT's Office of Intelligence and Security is responsible for defining the requirements for transportation infrastructure protection, ensuring that vulnerability assessments of transportation infrastructure are conducted, and taking action to mitigate those vulnerabilities. The House Committee on Appropriations asked GAO to determine (1) the status and anticipated results of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program, and (2) the extent to which RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security have coordinated their activities in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed and implementing the vulnerability assessments for the program. DOT and RSPA officials reviewed a draft of the report, agreed with its contents, and provided technical clarifications that we incorporated.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Infrastructure Assessment program is scheduled to end in December 2003 after the completion of four transportation vulnerability assessments. Congress appropriated $1 million in each of the fiscal years from 2001 through 2003 to RSPA for the program. RSPA plans to disseminate reports, conduct workshops, and post information on the Internet to inform decision-makers in the transportation community about the results. Prior to March 2003, RSPA did not fully coordinate their activities with the Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed, or in implementing the assessments for the program. We discussed this problem with officials from both offices who agreed that closer coordination would be beneficial, particularly to discuss options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the program's vulnerability assessments. In March 2003, officials from both offices began regular meetings to facilitate this coordination. |
gao_GAO-03-601 | gao_GAO-03-601_0 | More than 70 percent, or 28.5 million, of the 40 million people with HIV/AIDS worldwide live in sub- Saharan Africa. The Fund was formally launched in January 2002. Key Governance and Other Supporting Structures Established
The Fund has made noteworthy progress in establishing key headquarters and country-level governance structures. The Fund Developed Comprehensive Oversight Systems and Issued Procurement Guidance, but Systems Face Challenges, and Guidance Is Still Evolving
The Fund has developed systems for financial accountability and for monitoring and evaluating grant activities and has issued guidance on procurement. Lack of Resources Threatens Fund’s Ability to Continue to Approve and Finance Grants
The Fund’s ability to approve and finance additional grants is threatened by a lack of sufficient resources. The Fund does not currently have enough pledges to allow it to approve more than a small number of additional proposals in 2003. In addition, without significant new pledges, the Fund will be unable to support all of the already approved grants beyond their initial 2-year agreements. As of April 1, 2003, only $834 million had been pledged for 2003, 6 percent of which came from the private sector. Improvements in Grant-Making Processes Enhance Fund’s Ability to Achieve Key Objectives, but Challenges Remain
The Fund has established detailed objectives, criteria and procedures for its grant decision process and is making enhancements to the process in response to concerns raised by participants and stakeholders. These efforts will seek to address ongoing challenges, including ensuring that the money from the Fund supplements existing spending for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and that recipients are able to use the new aid effectively. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, we assessed (1) the Fund’s progress in developing governance structures; (2) the systems that the Fund has developed for ensuring financial accountability, monitoring and evaluating grant projects, and procuring goods and services; (3) the Fund’s efforts to mobilize resources; and (4) the Fund’s grant decision-making process. We also interviewed Fund officials in Geneva and U.S. government officials from the Departments of State and Health and Human Services and the U.S. Agency for International Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
By the end of 2002, more than 40 million people worldwide were living with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), with 5 million newly infected that year. HIV/AIDS, along with tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, causes nearly 6 million deaths per year and untold human suffering. Established in January 2002, the Global Fund (the Fund) aims to rapidly disburse grants to augment existing spending on the prevention and treatment of these three diseases while maintaining sufficient oversight of financial transactions and program effectiveness. As of April 1, 2003, the United States had pledged $1.65 billion to the Fund and is expected to remain its single largest donor. In this study, GAO was asked to assess (1) the Fund's progress in developing governance structures; (2) the systems that the Fund has developed for ensuring financial accountability, monitoring and evaluating grant projects, and procuring goods and services; (3) the Fund's efforts to raise money; and (4) its grant-making process. In responding to our draft report, the Fund, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development agreed with our findings.
What GAO Found
The Fund has made noteworthy progress in establishing essential governance and other supporting structures and is responding to challenges that have impeded its ability to quickly disburse grants. A key challenge involves locally based governance structures, many of which are not currently performing in a manner envisioned by the Fund. The Fund has developed comprehensive oversight systems for monitoring and evaluating grant performance and ensuring financial accountability and has issued guidance for procurement; however, the oversight systems face challenges at the country level and some procurement issues have not been finalized. The Fund's ability to approve and finance additional grants is threatened by a lack of sufficient resources. Pledges made through the end of 2003 are insufficient to cover more than a small number of additional grants and without significant new pledges, the Fund will be unable to support all of the already approved grants beyond their initial 2-year agreements. Improvements in the Fund's grant-making processes have enhanced its ability to achieve its key objectives, but challenges remain. These challenges include ensuring that grants add to and complement existing spending on HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and that recipients have the capacity to effectively use grants. |
gao_GAO-09-36 | gao_GAO-09-36_0 | However, only a few of these studies attempted to quantify these benefits or costs. In general, quantitative information on environmental benefits and costs is limited because states have not tracked such information; however, some states are beginning to do so. Finally, although none of the studies we reviewed identified benefits of the DBE program, transportation officials identified some benefits of the program, such as providing greater opportunities for minority- and women-owned firms on federally funded projects. The studies we reviewed did identify benefits of the Buy America program, including protecting against unfair competition from foreign firms and costs of the DBE and Buy America programs, such as increased administrative costs to states and U.S. Studies Included Information on the Benefits and Costs of the Davis-Bacon Prevailing Wage Requirement but Did Not Specifically Focus on Highway Projects
Several studies we reviewed attempted to quantify benefits and costs of the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirement, but these studies did not provide data exclusive to transportation or highway projects. For example, U.S. One study—FHWA’s benefit-cost study—identified higher iron and steel prices, higher overall project costs, reduced bidding competition, and project delays as the major types of costs that federally funded transportation projects could incur in complying with Buy America program provisions, but the study did not attempt to quantify these costs. Federal Requirements May Encourage States to Use Nonfederal Funds for Certain Highway Projects, but Other Factors Also Influence Their Decision
Most state transportation officials told us that costs and delays associated with the federal requirements we reviewed have, in certain instances, encouraged them to use nonfederal funds for certain highway projects eligible for federal aid; however, other factors, such as a state legislature’s requirements and the availability of nonfederal funds, also contribute to a state’s decision to use nonfederal funds. More specifically, 39 of the 51 state DOTs we surveyed reported that, in the past 10 years, the federal requirements had, in at least one instance, influenced their decision to use nonfederal funds for highway projects that were eligible for federal aid. Some states have laws that require the use of domestically made steel and other materials. Officials from one of these 37 states, Hawaii, said that they have limited nonfederal funds available. As a result, the officials said that they do not often use nonfederal funds to avoid federal requirements and that they have to rely on federal funds to finance their highway projects. They also claimed that coordinating with the multiple stakeholders involved in planning a highway project can be challenging because agencies may have competing interests and lack enforceable time frames. Furthermore, according to a U.S. In addition to the federal government, several state transportation agencies are implementing strategies to expedite compliance with the federal requirements we are reviewing. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the challenges associated with the federal requirements we reviewed, to better ensure that federal funds are used as efficiently as possible, and to assist states in minimizing project delays and costs associated with federal requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation re-evaluate the $2,500 regulatory threshold for the Buy America program and the $750,000 regulatory personal net worth ceiling of the DBE program, and modify them, if necessary, through appropriate rulemaking. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the types of benefits and costs associated with selected federal requirements for federal-aid highway projects; (2) the influence of these federal requirements on states’ decisions to use nonfederal or federal funds for highway projects; and (3) the challenges associated with the federal requirements and strategies that federal, state, and local government agencies and contractors have used or proposed to address these challenges. Although many requirements apply to federally funded highway projects, our review focused on four federal requirements: the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirement, the Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) program, and the Buy America program. To determine the influence of these federal requirements on states’ decisions to use nonfederal or federal funds for highway projects, we surveyed state DOT officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. This proposal has not been finalized. | Why GAO Did This Study
As highway congestion continues to be a problem in many areas, states are looking to construct or expand highway projects. When a state department of transportation (DOT) receives federal funding for highway projects from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the projects must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirement, the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program, and the Buy America program. While complying with these requirements, states must use limited transportation dollars efficiently. As requested, GAO addressed (1) the types of benefits and costs associated with these requirements for federal-aid highway projects; (2) the influence of these federal requirements on states' decisions to use nonfederal or federal funds for highway projects; and (3) the challenges associated with the federal requirements and strategies used or proposed to address the challenges. To complete this work, GAO reviewed 30 studies, surveyed DOTs in all states and the District of Columbia, and interviewed transportation officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Several of the studies GAO reviewed describe the benefits of environmental requirements for highway projects, such as better protection for wetlands, but none attempted to quantify these benefits. Some studies quantified certain types of environmental costs, such as costs for administering NEPA. In general, however, quantitative information on environmental benefits and costs is limited because states do not generally track such information. Several studies attempted to quantify the benefits and costs of the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirement; however, these studies did not focus on transportation projects specifically. Furthermore, while the studies reviewed did not identify the benefits of the DBE program, transportation officials identified some benefits of the program, such as providing greater opportunities for DBE firms. One study we reviewed identified the benefits of the Buy America program, including protecting against unfair competition from foreign firms. The studies reviewed also identified, and in some cases quantified, the costs of the DBE and Buy America programs, including administrative costs and the use of higher priced iron and steel in projects. Of the 51 state DOTs GAO surveyed, 39 reported that, in the past 10 years, federal requirements had influenced their decision to use nonfederal funds for highway projects that were eligible for federal aid. Thirty-three of these state DOTs reported that NEPA factored into their decision to use nonfederal funds, while the other three requirements GAO reviewed were a factor only in a few states. State officials said that they use nonfederal funds for certain projects to avoid project delays or costs associated with the federal requirements or because of other factors, such as requirements imposed by a state legislature. A state's funding decision may depend on whether the state has requirements similar to these federal requirements. The decision may also take into consideration the availability of nonfederal and federal funds. For example, officials from one state said that they have limited nonfederal funds available, and as a result, like other states GAO interviewed, rely on the federal funds to finance their highway projects. According to transportation officials and contractors, administrative tasks associated with the federal requirements pose challenges. For example, analyzing impacts and demonstrating compliance with NEPA requires extensive paperwork and documentation. State officials also said that coordinating with multiple government agencies on environmental reviews is challenging, in part because these agencies may have competing interests. Furthermore, according to state DOTs, some provisions of the federal requirements may be outdated. For example, the $2,500 regulatory cost threshold for compliance with the Buy America program for purchasing domestic steel and $750,000 regulatory personal net worth ceiling of the DBE program have not been updated since 1983 and 1999, respectively. All of these challenges may cause delays and increase project costs. Some government agencies have implemented strategies to address these challenges and these strategies have had varied success in decreasing project costs and delays. |
gao_GAO-17-478 | gao_GAO-17-478_0 | DOT’s Administrations Conduct and Have Methods to Coordinate Similar Activities
DOT’s Administrations Conduct Similar Activities That Generally Have Different Goals, Recipients, Requirements, or Funding Sources
DOT’s administrations have similar missions and responsibilities and, therefore, perform similar activities related to helping the Department meet its overall mission of ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and convenient transportation system. Further, DOT carries out a number of different project-grant and credit programs specified in statute with different requirements and conducts a number of programs that receive funding from different sources such as the HTF, the AATF, and general appropriations. Experts Suggested Areas Where DOT Could Make Improvements without Organizational Changes to More Efficiently and Effectively Carry Out Its Missions
According to the experts in transportation and organizational change we met with, DOT could make operational improvements, but does not need to implement organizational changes to efficiently and effectively carry out its missions. Expert opinion “…there are definitely some operations that could be improved… there are opportunities for greater collaboration… especially in areas that are clearly intermodal or multi-modal, some form of… councils or other operating bodies that work across the modes… seems like an easy, maybe even a non-legislative sort of a fix that could really make a difference in certain areas.”
Collaboration and coordination: Efforts to support transportation projects and address concerns—such as driver or operator fatigue—often benefit from collaboration among DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies, state and local stakeholders, and private industry. For example, experts discussed several of DOT’s ongoing internal collaborative groups and noted that some groups could have been more effective if they consistently included senior-level officials to provide needed leadership and decision-making authority. Experts also discussed opportunities for DOT to improve how it coordinates externally with state and local governments and other federal agencies. DOT officials we spoke with said a variety of methods are used to coordinate its activities with state and local agencies to help achieve DOT’s missions, including the use of standard processes for developing regulations and approving infrastructure projects. Experts also discussed the need to focus on prioritizing the data DOT collects to ensure they are of high quality and can be used to answer specific transportation-related questions. According to the experts we spoke with, DOT could reduce barriers and challenges facing state and local governments in the project delivery processes (e.g., funding, financing, and environmental review) without organizational changes. For example, experts frequently mentioned that DOT is falling behind the private sector’s need for research and specific regulations for autonomous vehicles and intelligent transportation systems. While DOT officials noted ongoing initiatives within its modal administrations intended to address challenges in the five areas identified by experts, they agreed that more could be done but did not identify plans to conduct a department-wide review in these areas. The current administration, however, recently released an Executive Order and the Budget Blueprint indicating that federal agencies, including DOT, are expected to continue to assess their ability to efficiently and effectively meet their missions. Undertaking a department-wide review of the areas experts identified, particularly as they relate across the modal administrations, provides an opportunity for DOT to assess how it can more effectively achieve its missions and how best to position the department to proactively address the challenges it faces. Recommendations for Executive Action
To leverage and build upon the ongoing efforts within individual DOT modal administrations and to address concerns raised by experts regarding collaboration and coordination, data quality and analytics, regulation development, project delivery processes, and addressing emerging issues, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation: (1) conduct a department-wide review of DOT’s current efforts to address these concerns; and (2) develop an action plan with specific steps to implement improvements, as identified, in these areas. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) what activities multiple Department of Transportation (DOT) modal administrations perform to fulfill their missions and how, if at all, DOT coordinates these activities, and (2) according to experts, what, if any, organizational changes or operational changes could enable DOT to more efficiently and effectively carry out its missions. To collect expert views on organizational or other changes that could enable DOT to more efficiently and effectively carry out its missions, in September 2016, with the assistance of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies), we convened a one and a half day GAO meeting with 18 experts. Participants were identified and recommended by the National Academies and approved by us using several criteria, including experience with multiple modes of transportation and DOT administrations, and expertise in organizational change, among others. Data Quality and Analytics
GAO. Regulation Development
GAO. Commercial Space: FAA Should Examine How to Appropriately Regulate Space Support Vehicles. GAO. Addressing Emerging Issues
GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOT was established over 50 years ago, in part, to build, maintain, and oversee a vast national transportation system. Millions of Americans rely on this system every day to travel and receive goods and services. DOT is organized into nine modal administrations that are generally responsible for activities related to specific transportation modes, such as air, rail, public transit, and highways.
GAO was asked to examine how well DOT's organizational structure enables DOT to address today's transportation challenges. This report addresses (1) activities performed by multiple DOT administrations to fulfill their missions and how, if at all, DOT coordinates these activities, and (2) expert opinions on what, if any, organizational or operational changes could enable DOT to more efficiently and effectively carry out its missions. GAO reviewed documentation on DOT's missions, interviewed DOT officials, and worked with the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine to convene a meeting with transportation and organizational-change experts. Experts were selected for their experience working with multiple modes of transportation and expertise in organizational change, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The United States Department of Transportation's (DOT) nine modal administrations conduct a range of similar activities that are generally intended: (1) to achieve different goals (e.g., to protect consumers or improve motor vehicle efficiency); (2) to serve different recipients (e.g., airlines, railroads); or (3) to meet different requirements (e.g., grant and credit programs specified in statute). DOT has numerous efforts to coordinate similar activities across administrations, such as formal coordinating bodies that bring together staff from multiple modes on a variety of topics. DOT also has processes designed to coordinate regulations' development and to approve infrastructure projects.
Experts told GAO that DOT could make operational improvements but does not need to implement organizational changes, to help efficiently and effectively carry out its missions. Experts identified five areas:
Collaboration and coordination: Additional efforts to collaborate among the nine modal administrations, state and local governments, and other federal agencies would better support the development of transportation projects. For example, experts stated DOT could improve the effectiveness of internal collaborative groups by including senior-level officials who could provide leadership and have the authority to make decisions.
Data quality and analytics: Prioritizing which data to collect and improving analytic capabilities could help DOT ensure data are effectively used. Experts stated DOT could do a better job identifying and improving data quality to answer specific, transportation-related questions.
Regulation development: Improving how regulations are developed could help DOT ensure the agency's priorities are addressed and coordinated among all stakeholders. Experts stated that DOT could improve the quality and timeliness of its regulations by seeking earlier input from stakeholders.
Project delivery processes: Streamlining and making the project delivery processes more consistent across modal administrations could reduce barriers and challenges for state and local governments. For example, experts suggested creating a central position to help state and local governments navigate the environmental review process.
Addressing emerging issues: Proactively focusing on how to address technological advancements (e.g., autonomous vehicles) and other emerging issues (e.g., safely transporting domestic oil and gas) could help DOT achieve its missions more efficiently and effectively. For example, experts were concerned that DOT was falling behind the private sector's need for research and specific regulations for autonomous vehicles.
DOT officials agreed improvements are needed across DOT within the areas identified by experts. However, DOT did not identify plans to conduct a department-wide review. The administration recently released documents requiring federal agencies, including DOT, to assess their ability to efficiently and effectively meet their missions. In addition, federal internal control standards require agencies to assess and, typically, develop an action plan to determine whether their policies are effective. Such an assessment could help DOT to improve how it implements programs across all of its modal administrations.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should conduct a department-wide review of its current efforts to address issues in the areas experts identified for improvement and develop an action plan to implement improvements, as identified, in these areas. DOT concurred with these recommendations and cited new initiatives to improve the department. |
gao_AIMD-97-150 | gao_AIMD-97-150_0 | DISA’s implementation plan for DPAS was dated February 6, 1996. In addition, we reviewed DPAS implementation at the Huntsville DISA Defense Megacenter. However, DPAS does not have the financial information to process certain minor types of general PP&E, such as foreclosed assets and the depletion of natural resources, in accordance with DOD policy and existing accounting requirements. For example, natural resources represent only 1.2 percent of DOD’s total general PP&E. Also, the DOD Comptroller has not yet provided guidance to ILSC on implementing federal accounting standards that become effective for periods beginning after September 30, 1997. The DPAS functional design can be modified to meet all current and pending property accounting requirements through changes that include the addition of data elements and financial transactions. DPAS cannot track deferred maintenance costs. Implementation of DPAS at DISA Does Not Ensure Financial Control and Accurate Reporting
An objective of implementing DPAS DOD-wide is to ensure financial control and accurate reporting of general PP&E. Therefore, DPAS data cannot be completely reconciled with DISA’s core accounting system data. We found over $100 million in differences between the values shown in the DPAS detailed property records and the summary- level records maintained in the DISA general ledger. DISA was not performing reconciliations between DPAS and its general ledger. DOD Does Not Have a Detailed DPAS Implementation Strategy
Many of the problems experienced at DISA and resulting in inaccurate property data can be linked to several issues that affect DOD-wide implementation of DPAS. Conclusions
As designed, DPAS produces transactions to provide financial control and to account for most general PP&E, but needs to be enhanced to meet all applicable federal accounting standards. Develop, in consultation with the appropriate Assistant Secretaries, a concept of operations that (1) lays out how the property function is to be accomplished, including identification of needed manual and automated interfaces and related controls, and (2) defines for both the current and future operating environments the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the various DOD entities involved, such as the Comptroller’s office, DFAS, DOD component agencies, and the military services. Develop a detailed DPAS implementation plan that includes a schedule that identifies at what sites and when the system will be implemented. In addition, to resolve the implementation problems specific to DISA, we recommend that the Director, DISA, (1) submit a request to the DPAS project office to include appropriate additional transaction edits required by DISA for general ledger processing, (2) correct the interface program, and (3) finalize procedures for reconciliation of DISA’s general ledger accounts for property to DPAS property records, including provisions to ensure timely reconciliations are accomplished and general ledger control is maintained over general PP&E. We believe that the implementation issue which arose at DISA could have been mitigated if the DPAS design included the standard general ledger posting logic. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO determined whether the Defense Property Accountability System (DPAS): (1) was designed to meet functional accounting requirements for general property, plant, and equipment (PP&E); and (2) was implemented at the Defense Information System Agency's (DISA) Defense Megacenters in a manner that ensures it meets functional accounting requirements for general PP&E.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as functionally designed, DPAS can provide financial control and generate information to account for most general PP&E; however, DPAS cannot yet meet requirements that become effective for accounting periods beginning after September 30, 1997; (2) DPAS does not contain the information needed to meet new federal accounting standards for deferred maintenance and environmental clean-up costs; (3) the DPAS design does not meet several current Department of Defense (DOD) accounting requirements for certain minor types of PP&E; for example, DPAS does not have the information to meet the requirements for recording depletion of natural resources, which represent 1.2 percent of DOD's total general PP&E; (4) DPAS needs to be modified with the addition of data elements and financial transactions to meet new standards and requirements as well as the current ones not yet covered; (5) implementation of DPAS at DISA did not ensure financial control and accurate reporting of general PP&E; (6) DPAS was not correctly interfaced with the accounting system due to errors in the interface program used to translate DPAS data to data understandable to DISA's general ledger; (7) this caused transactions to be recorded incorrectly in the general ledger, resulting in a material difference of over $118 million in property values between DPAS detailed records and the general ledger summary records; (8) the problem with the interface program could have been mitigated if transactions using the standard general ledger accounts were created in DPAS; (9) in addition, compensating controls, such as routine reconciliations between the two systems, were in place; (10) many of the problems with the accuracy of property data experienced at DISA can be linked to several issues that affect DOD-wide implementation of DPAS; (11) DOD, as part of its DPAS strategic planning process, has not defined the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the various DOD entities involved, interfaces, and related controls; (12) this part of the strategic planning has not developed a detailed DPAS implementation schedule that identifies at what sites and when the system will be implemented; and (13) DOD has left it up to each military service to determine where, when, and how DPAS is to be implemented without providing adequate implementation guidance or ensuring that the implementation schedule includes all sites, making it unlikely that DPAS will be implemented across DOD by the Comptroller's target date of 2000. |
gao_GAO-12-717 | gao_GAO-12-717_0 | May-issue: The state applies discretion in granting permits to carry concealed handguns. Shall-issue: Issuing authorities are required to issue a permit to an applicant that fulfills the objective statutory criteria if no statutory reason for denial exists. Permit not required: States do not require a permit to carry a concealed handgun. Shall-issue states generally issue more permits than may-issue states relative to the state population. V for information on the approximate number of active permits by state as of December 31, 2011.) of permit applicants. States’ Eligibility Requirements Differ; Thus Some States Would Issue a Permit to an Applicant and Others Would Not
While the majority of states share some common eligibility requirements for qualifying an individual for a concealed carry permit, such as firearms safety training and being at least 21 years of age, the 9 states included in our case study that issue permits define certain eligibility requirements very differently, which can affect who is granted a permit (see app. Majority of States Recognize Permits of at Least 20 Other States; May- Issue States Generally Do Not Grant Reciprocity
As of March 2012, 39 of the 48 states that issue permits and Vermont allow concealed carry, and recognize permits from other states. In addition, Illinois and the District of Columbia do not allow concealed carrying of handguns or issue permits, nor do they recognize other states’ permits. Select States Reported Having Mechanisms to Monitor Continued Eligibility
Issuing authorities from all 9 states included in our case study reported that they take action to confirm an individual’s continued eligibility to hold a permit as part of the permit renewal process, and 8 of these 9 states also use mechanisms to monitor resident permit holders’ continued eligibility between issuance and renewal. In 8 of the 9 states that issue permits in our case study, issuing authorities are to be notified if a resident or nonresident permit holder commits a disqualifying act within their state through law enforcement or state databases. After detecting a disqualifying criminal offense or other disqualifying factors, officials from each of the 9 states in our case study that issues permits reported that they begin the revocation process by notifying the permit holder through a letter or court order, or in some cases, issuing authorities send law enforcement to deliver the letter and retrieve the permit. In addition, these states have varying retrieval processes. Of the 9 states in our case study that issue permits, 3 (Georgia, Maryland, and Tennessee) reported that they can impose a penalty for failure to surrender a revoked permit or continuing to possess one. Law Enforcement in Select States Visually Check Permits to Verify Validity, among Other Actions
When encountering an individual with a concealed carry permit, such as during a routine traffic stop, law enforcement officials in our 9 case study states that issue permits told us that they visually inspect a permit to verify its status to ensure it is valid and active. 8. 7. Specifically, there is a definition for what constitutes a felony. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report describes (1) the extent to which states allow concealed carry permits, and how select states’ eligibility requirements and laws regarding and recognition of other states’ permits differ, (2) what processes select states use to help ensure they revoke permits when holders no longer meet eligibility requirements, and (3) how law enforcement officials in select states determine whether permits they encounter are current and valid. However the results cannot be generalized across all states. The information obtained from these case studies provides a broad understanding of the different requirements and processes states utilize in issuing permits. Reciprocity—the number of states that have reciprocity with each other and the number of agreements in place. To determine states’ concealed carry permit practices and whose permits they honor, we gathered information on permit issuing laws, issuing authorities, and reciprocity agreements for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This report presents the states’ laws as they were as of March 2012. To identify how law enforcement officials in the 9 select states that issue permits determine whether permits they encounter are current and valid, we obtained information on the physical features embedded in each state’s permit, and the state and federal systems utilized to check the status of permits, and we interviewed state and local law enforcement officials across the 9 states to obtain information on processes they use to validate permits. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to state reporting to GAO, there were at least 8 million active permits to carry concealed handguns in the United States as of December 31, 2011. States and local authorities control the issuance of concealed carry permits. Applicants who wish to obtain such permits are required to meet certain state eligibility requirements, such as minimum age and the lack of a felony conviction. States also decide which other states permits to honor. Typically, states enter into reciprocity agreements that establish which out of- state permit holders can carry concealed firearms within each state. In recent years, Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would require each issuing state to recognize any permit. GAO was asked to provide information on the status of concealed carry permitting. This report describes (1) the extent to which states allow concealed carry permits, and how select states eligibility requirements and recognition of other states permits differ, (2) what processes select states use to help ensure they revoke permits when holders no longer meet eligibility requirements, and (3) how law enforcement officials in select states determine whether permits they encounter are current and valid. GAO gathered information on the number of permits, laws, issuing authorities, and reciprocity agreements for 50 states and the District of Columbia, and conducted a case study on 9 states that issue permits. GAO selected these states to reflect differences among states eligibility requirements, state reciprocity of permits, and permit issuing processes; the results cannot be generalized across all states but provide a broad understanding of the different requirements and processes states utilized in issuing permits.
What GAO Found
The number of states allowing concealed carry permits is increasing, and states broadly differ in eligibility requirements and the extent to which they have reciprocity agreements. In June 2002, 7 states and the District of Columbia prohibited the concealed carry of handguns. As of March 2012, individuals can carry concealed handguns in all but 1 state (Illinois) and the District of Columbia. Shall-issue statesin which issuing authorities are required to issue a permit to an applicant that fulfills the objective statutory criteria generally issue more permits than states with greater discretion in granting permits (may-issue states). Because of differing eligibility requirements, some states would issue a permit to an applicant, while others would not. For example, some states define what constitutes a disqualifying felony differently or have different firearms training requirements. As of March 2012, 39 states that issue permits and Vermont (permits not required) recognize concealed carry permits from other states. Of the 9 states that do not grant reciprocity, 8 are may-issue states.
Issuing authorities from all 9 states included in GAOs case study stated that they take action to confirm an individuals continued eligibility to hold a permit as part of the permit renewal process; and issuing authorities from 8 of these 9 states reported using mechanisms to monitor resident permit holders continued eligibility between issuance and renewal. In these 8 states, issuing authorities told GAO that they are notified if a permit holder commits a disqualifying act within their state through law enforcement or state databases. After detecting a disqualifying criminal offense or other disqualifying factors, each of the 9 states begins the revocation process by notifying the permit holder. The states have varying retrieval processes, and 3 of them have authority to impose a penalty for failure to surrender a revoked permit or continuing to possess one. Law enforcement in the 9 case study states that issue permits told GAO that when encountering permits, such as during routine traffic stops, they visually check them and can take additional steps, such as checking state databases, as needed, to determine whether the permits are current and valid.
Law enforcement in the 9 case study states that issue permits told GAO that when encountering permits, such as during routine traffic stops, they visually check them and can take additional steps, such as checking state databases, as needed, to determine whether the permits are current and valid. |
gao_GAO-13-315 | gao_GAO-13-315_0 | There are two kinds of satellite ground stations: control stations and tracking stations. These dedicated networks have 23 antennas at 10 locations around the world. DOD’s Satellite Control Networks are Fragmented, Resulting in Inefficiencies Across Satellite Programs
Over the past 50 years, and especially in the last decade, DOD has increasingly deployed dedicated satellite control networks in lieu of integrating them into a larger shared satellite control network. As of February 2013, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force had not worked to move its current dedicated operations to a shared satellite control network, which could better leverage investments. This fragmented approach requires more infrastructure and personnel than shared networks, because the dedicated networks often require unique software, separate and possibly unique hardware, and specialized training. Air Force’s Modernization Efforts May do Little to Improve the Air Force Satellite Control Network
The Air Force has budgeted about $400 million to modernize the AFSCN over the next five years, but the planned upgrades will do little to increase the network’s capability. These efforts are mainly focused on sustaining the network at its current level of capability, and ignore more than a decade of research recommending more significant improvements to the AFSCN. A long-term plan for modernizing the network and any future shared satellite control operations networks could assist DOD in making more informed decisions about investments and whether and to what extent expand satellite control operations capabilities. Commercial Practices Have the Potential to Increase DOD’s Satellite Control Operations Efficiencies
Commercial satellite companies that we spoke with incorporate varying degrees of interoperability, automation, and other practices into their satellite control operations networks to decrease programs costs and increase efficiencies. Over a Decade of Government and Industry Research Supports Applying Commercial Practices to DOD’s Satellite Control Operations
Government and space industry reports for over 10 years have reported that commercial practices for satellite interoperability may increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government satellite control operations, and many of these studies have recommended that DOD adopt these practices. Though Air Force officials, management at commercial companies, and a decade of government research agree that there are opportunities to use commercial practices in Air Force satellite control operations, the Air Force has generally not implemented these practices. DOD Faces Barriers to Making Improvements to its Satellite Control Networks and Adopting Commercial Practices
While opportunities exist to improve DOD satellite control operations, there are also barriers that hinder DOD’s ability to make these improvements. These barriers exist at both at the program level and at higher management levels within DOD, and include: the lack of a long- term plan for satellite control; limited insight into satellite control operations spending; no existing requirement to establish a business case for a program’s satellite control operations approach; and lack of autonomy at the program level to implement satellite control operations improvements. DOD is unable to identify all funding for satellite control operations across all DOD satellite programs. However, programs are not required to conduct an analysis to determine a business case for proceeding with a dedicated or shared network, or to validate their network’s requirements Currently, the lack of cost data means that DOD cannot perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the potential benefits of individual programs using dedicated networks outweighs the potential drawbacks of continued and even increased systemic fragmentation and inefficiency. Satellite programs do not have the autonomy to implement improvements to satellite control operations. 2. Develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its Air Force Satellite Control Network and any future shared satellite control services and capabilities. This plan should identify methods that can capture or estimate satellite control costs as well as authorities that can be given to the program managers to give them the flexibility needed to ensure ground systems are built to a common network when the business case analysis shows it to be beneficial. In its written comments, DOD concurred with our two recommendations. To assess the status of modernization efforts and the costs associated with current and planned upgrades and sustainment efforts for the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) and other services’ satellite control efforts, we reviewed the military services’ satellite operations budget documents for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. Based on interviews and reviews of commercial documentation and DOD reports on satellite control operations, we determined that specific commercial practices—such as automation and commercial off- the-shelf products—may be beneficial to DOD satellite programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD manages the nation's defense satellites, which are worth at least $13.7 billion, via ground stations located around the world. These ground stations and supporting infrastructure perform three primary functions: monitoring the health of the satellite; ensuring it stays in its proper orbit; (activities collectively known as satellite control operations), and planning, monitoring, and controlling the execution of the overall mission of the satellite. Based on the House Armed Services Committee Report and discussions with defense committee staff, GAO (1) reviewed the Air Force's satellite control operations to assess the potential for fragmentation or duplication, (2) assessed the status of modernization efforts, (3) identified any commercial practices that could improve the Air Force's satellite control operations, and (4) identified any barriers to implementing them. GAO reviewed modernization funding documents, related studies and interviewed DOD and 7 commercial satellite companies, from a nongeneralizable sample selected in part because of their companies' satellite capabilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) satellite control networks are fragmented and potentially duplicative. Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly deployed standalone satellite control operations networks, which are designed to operate a single satellite system, as opposed to shared systems that can operate multiple kinds of satellites. Dedicated networks can offer many benefits to programs, including possible lower risks and customization for a particular program's needs. However, they can also be more costly and have led to a fragmented, and potentially duplicative, approach which requires more infrastructure and personnel than shared operations. For example, one Air Force base has 10 satellite programs operated by 8 separate control centers. According to Air Force officials, DOD continues to acquire standalone networks and has not worked to move its current standalone operations towards a shared satellite control network, which could better leverage DOD investments.
The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), DOD's primary shared satellite control network, is undergoing modernization efforts, but these will not increase the network's capabilities. The Air Force budgeted about $400 million over the next 5 years for these efforts. However, these efforts primarily focus on sustaining the network at its current level of capability and do not apply a decade of research recommending more significant improvements to the AFSCN that would increase its capabilities.
Commercial practices have the potential to increase the efficiency and decrease costs of DOD satellite control operations. These practices include: interoperability between satellite control operations networks; automation of routine satellite control operations functions; use of commercial off-the-shelf products instead of custom ones; and a "hybrid" network approach which allows a satellite operator to augment its network through another operator's complementary network. Both the Air Force and commercial officials GAO spoke to agree that there are opportunities for the Air Force to increase efficiencies and lower costs through these practices. Numerous studies by DOD and other government groups have recommended implementing or considering these practices, the Air Force has generally not incorporated them into Air Force satellite control operations networks.
DOD faces four barriers that complicate its ability to make improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. First, DOD has no long-term plan for satellite control operations. Second, the agency lacks reliable data on the costs of its current control networks and is unable to isolate satellite control costs from other expenses. Third, there is no requirement for satellite programs to establish a business case for their chosen satellite control operations approach. And fourth, even if program managers wanted to make satellite control operations improvements, they do not have the autonomy to implement changes at the program level. Until DOD begins addressing these barriers by implementing a long-term plan for future satellite control network investments that can capture estimates of satellite control costs as well as authorities that can be given to program managers and incorporates commercial practices, the department's ability to achieve significant improvements in satellite control operations capabilities will be hindered.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct future DOD satellite acquisition programs to determine a business case for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that program's satellite control operations and develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its AFSCN and any future shared networks and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control networks. DOD concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-422T | gao_GAO-07-422T_0 | Background
The federal Food Stamp Program is intended to help low-income individuals and families obtain a more nutritious diet by supplementing their income with benefits to purchase nutritious food such as meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, but not items such as soap, tobacco, or alcohol. States Have Made Progress Reducing Payment Errors, and Further Challenges Remain
The national payment error rate for the Food Stamp Program combines states’ overpayments and underpayments to program participants and has declined by about 40 percent, from 9.86 percent in 1999 to a record low of 5.84 percent in 2005, in a time of increasing participation. FNS and the states we reviewed have taken many approaches to improving food stamp payment accuracy, most of which are parallel with internal control practices known to reduce improper payments. If the 1999 error rate had been in effect in 2005, the program would have made payment errors totaling over $2.8 billion rather than the $1.7 billion it experienced. In fiscal year 2005, food stamp payment errors totaled about $1.7 billion in benefits. However, payment error rates vary among states. These include practices to improve accountability, perform risk assessments, implement changes based on such assessments, and monitor program performance. FNS has taken advantage of EBT and other new technology to improve its ability to detect trafficking and disqualify retailers who traffic, while law enforcement agencies have investigated and referred for prosecution a decreasing number of traffickers, instead focusing their efforts on fewer high-impact investigations. FNS Estimates Suggest That the Rate of Food Stamp Trafficking Has Declined and That It Occurs More Frequently in Smaller Stores
The national rate of food stamp trafficking declined from about 3.8 cents per dollar of benefits redeemed in 1993 to about 1.0 cent per dollar during the years 2002 to 2005, as shown in table 1. Despite the Progress That Has Been Made against Trafficking, Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Program
Despite the progress FNS has made in combating retailer trafficking, the Food Stamp Program remains vulnerable because retailers can enter the program intending to traffic and do so, often without fear of severe criminal penalties, as the declining number of investigations referred for prosecution suggests. Concluding Observations
Improper food stamp payments and trafficking of benefits have declined in a time of rising participation, and although progress has been made, ensuring program integrity will continue to be a fundamental challenge facing the program. To reduce program vulnerabilities and better target its limited compliance- monitoring resources, we recommended in our October 2006 report on trafficking that FNS develop additional criteria to identify stores most likely to traffic; conduct risk assessments, using compliance and other data, to systematically identify stores and areas that meet these criteria, and allocate resources accordingly; and provide more targeted and early oversight of stores determined most likely to engage in trafficking. To provide further deterrence for trafficking, we recommended that FNS work to develop a strategy to increase the penalties for trafficking, working with the Inspector General as needed, and consider developing legislative proposals if the penalties entail additional authority. They stated that they believe they do have a strategy for targeting resources through their use of EBT transaction data to identify suspicious transaction patterns. We believe that FNS has made good progress in its use of EBT transaction data. However, it is now at a point where it can begin to formulate more sophisticated analyses. GAO-07-53. GAO-05-245. Food Stamp Program: States Seek to Reduce Payment Errors and Program Complexity. Food Stamp Program: Information on Trafficking Food Stamp Benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Stamp Program is intended to help low-income individuals and families obtain a better diet by supplementing their income with benefits to purchase food. USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and the states jointly implement the Food Stamp Program, which is to be reauthorized when it expires in fiscal year 2007. This testimony discusses our past work on two issues related to ensuring integrity of the program: (1) improper payments to food stamp participants, and (2) trafficking in food stamp benefits. This testimony is based on a May 2005 report on payment errors (GAO-05-245) and an October 2006 report on trafficking (GAO-07-53). For the payment error report, GAO analyzed program quality control data and interviewed program stakeholders, including state and local officials. For the trafficking report, GAO interviewed agency officials, visited field offices, conducted case file reviews, and analyzed data from the FNS retailer database.
What GAO Found
The national payment error rate for the Food Stamp Program combines states' overpayments and underpayments to program participants and has declined by about 40 percent between 1999 and 2005, from 9.86 percent to a record low of 5.84 percent, due in part to options made available to states that simplified program reporting rules. In 2005, the program made payment errors totaling about $1.7 billion. However, if the 1999 error rate was in effect in 2005, program payment errors would have been $1.1 billion higher. FNS and the states we reviewed have taken several steps to improve food stamp payment accuracy, most of which are consistent with internal control practices known to reduce improper payments. These include practices to improve accountability, perform risk assessments, implement changes based on such assessments, and monitor program performance. FNS estimates indicate that the national rate of food stamp trafficking declined from about 3.8 cents per dollar of benefits redeemed in 1993 to about 1.0 cent per dollar during the years 2002 to 2005 and that trafficking occurs more frequently in smaller stores. FNS has taken advantage of electronic benefit transfer and other new technology to improve its ability to detect trafficking and disqualify retailers who traffic. Law enforcement agencies have investigated and referred for prosecution a decreasing number of traffickers; they are instead focusing their efforts on fewer high-impact investigations. Despite the progress FNS has made in combating retailer trafficking, the Food Stamp Program remains vulnerable because retailers can enter the program intending to traffic and do so, often without fear of severe criminal penalties, as the declining number of investigations referred for prosecution suggests. While both payment errors and trafficking of benefits have declined in a time of rising participation, ensuring program integrity remains a fundamental challenge facing the Food Stamp Program. To reduce program vulnerabilities and ensure limited compliance-monitoring resources are used efficiently, GAO recommended in its October 2006 trafficking report that FNS take additional steps to target and provide early oversight of stores most likely to traffic; develop a strategy to increase penalties for trafficking, working with the Inspector General as needed; and promote state efforts to pursue recipients suspected of trafficking. FNS generally agreed with GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. However, FNS believes it does have a strategy for targeting resources through their use of food stamp transaction data to identify suspicious transaction patterns. GAO believes that FNS has made good progress in its use of these transaction data; however, it is now at a point where it can begin to formulate more sophisticated analyses. |
gao_RCED-96-68 | gao_RCED-96-68_0 | It is likely that private investment in advanced telecommunications will be slower in rural areas as well. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry asked us to provide information on selected states that have started developing their telecommunications infrastructure, specifically (1) how these states encouraged private investment in improving their telecommunications infrastructure, (2) how they provided for increased and affordable access to advanced telecommunications services, and (3) what lessons their experiences could provide for others. By demonstrating that a state could build its own network, Iowa reduced some of the earlier uncertainties about cost and demand. According to participants in the projects in Nebraska and North Carolina, these long-term agreements between the states and the telephone companies benefited the companies in the following ways: Investment risk was reduced by ensuring a stream of revenues to help recover the costs of installing the hardware. States Have Provided Access to Many Local Organizations and Plan to Do More
The three states we visited agreed that making advanced telecommunications services available to public organizations was more practical than providing services to individual homes. While all three states have made progress in providing advanced telecommunications services to communities, they are still in the early stages of deploying their networks and plan to connect many more sites over the next several years. All three states found that some local sites needed assistance in paying for on-site equipment and offered such assistance using a variety of techniques. Two states—Iowa and North Carolina—are making the services more affordable by charging the same price for using the network at every location, even at remote locations that are more expensive to serve. For all three states, maps showing the connected high schools relative to the total number of high schools in each county are presented in appendix I. Their experiences illustrate the importance of building and maintaining consensus among those parties that will be involved in constructing, financing, and using the network—the telecommunications companies, anticipated users, state legislators, and state executive branch officials. Addressing the concerns of these parties can help prevent the construction delays and increased costs that result from disagreements and financial constraints. In Nebraska, the state plans to connect all elementary and high schools to the Internet by 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on three states' initiatives to promote increased access and private investment in advanced telecommunications.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Iowa, Nebraska, and North Carolina encouraged telephone companies to make private investment in advanced telecommunications infrastructure by offering to become their major customers; (2) in 1987, Iowa financed and built its own network, since the telephone companies were reluctant to make the investment needed to provide these services; (3) by 1990, telephone companies in the other two states began upgrading their systems on their own and were more willing to make investments, since they realized that long-term arrangements provided a steady income and states were better customers than competitors; (4) to provide affordable access to many people, all three states are making advanced telecommunications services available through sites located in public facilities; (5) some states and federal agencies are assisting local organizations by paying some of the equipment and connection costs and reducing the rates for using these services, even at remote locations; (6) all three states plan to make these services available to many more sites over the next several years; (7) the three states have given high priority to connecting high schools to the network, but more than half of the high schools in these states remain unconnected and even more rural high schools are not connected; and (8) building and maintaining consensus among interested parties, addressing the concerns of these parties, and ensuring a stable source of funding will be important to prevent construction delays, promote present and future widespread use by local organizations, and the successful implementation of the advanced telecommunications network. |
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