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gao_GAO-01-929 | gao_GAO-01-929_0 | Background
Budget-scorekeeping rules were developed by the executive and legislative branches in connection with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. These rules are to be used by the scorekeepers to assure compliance with budget laws. Their purpose is to ensure that the scorekeepers measure the effects of legislation consistent with scorekeeping conventions and specific legal requirements. The rules are reviewed annually and revised as necessary to achieve that purpose. Table 1 lists the leases or lease projects that we or GSA identified as being affected by scoring. According to GSA officials, GSA does not generally seek comparisons of short- and long-term lease costs in the solicitation process. Factors Other Than Scoring That Influence Lease Term Selection
According GSA officials, while scoring does affect the term of some leases, the term of most leases is determined by various factors other than budget scoring, such as the type of space—existing or build-to-suit—lease term desired by the agency, rental market condition, and location of the structure. Further, while a shorter term lease can be more costly than a longer term lease, we could not determine the actual overall monetary impact of shorter lease terms because GSA does not generally seek comparisons of short- and long-term lease costs in the solicitation process. Appendix I: Comments From the General Services Administration | What GAO Found
This report responds to a concern that budget-scoring restrictions were forcing the General Services Administration (GSA) to rely on shorter term leases that increase the costs to the Federal Buildings Fund because their per-square-foot costs are greater than longer term leases. Budget-scorekeeping rules are to be used by the scorekeepers to ensure compliance with budget laws and that legislation are consistent with scorekeeping conventions and that specific legal requirements. The rules are reviewed annually and revised as necessary to achieve those purposes. The way in which budget-scoring rules were implemented affected the lease or lease project term of at least 13 of the 39 federal agency leases GAO reviewed. Since GSA officials do not generally seek comparisons of long-term versus short-term leases in the solicitation process, GAO could not determine the overall monetary impact of budget scoring in the lease term. However, GAO identified three isolated cases that had comparisons of long term versus short-term leases in the solicitation process, and, in each case, the price per net useable square foot was lower with the longer term lease. GSA officials said that while budget scoring affects the term of some leases, the term of most leases is determined by various factors, either individually or in combination, such as rental market conditions, location, and the term desired by the agency. |
gao_GAO-08-814 | gao_GAO-08-814_0 | However, the commission has not developed its approach in sufficient detail to ensure that its certification activities are performed thoroughly and consistently. Officials further stated that they do not yet have written plans for addressing these gaps. Moreover, this lack of definition has caused EAC stakeholders to interpret certification requirements differently, and the resultant need to reconcile these differences has contributed to delays in certifying systems that several states were planning on using in the 2008 elections. According to EAC officials, its approach does not yet include such details because it is still new and evolving and because the commission’s limited resources have been devoted to other priorities. EAC Has Largely Followed Its Defined Certification Approach, but a Key System Verification Capability to Support States and Local Jurisdictions Is Not Yet in Place
EAC has largely followed its defined certification approach for each of the dozen voting systems that it is in the process of certifying, with one major exception. This means that states and local jurisdictions are at increased risk of using a version of a system during an election that differs from the certified version. EAC Has Not Established a Sufficient Means for States and Local Jurisdictions to Verify That Their Systems Match the Certified Version
Notwithstanding EAC’s efforts to follow its defined approach, it has not yet established a sufficient mechanism for states and local jurisdictions to use in verifying that the voting systems that they receive from manufacturers for use in elections are identical to the systems that were actually tested and certified. This approach reflects some key aspects of relevant guidance. However, other aspects are either missing or not adequately defined, and although EAC officials stated that they intend to address some of these gaps, the commission does not have defined plans or time frames for doing so. In addition, EAC’s problem tracking and resolution approach does not extend to any of the voting systems that are likely to be used in the 2008 elections, and it is uncertain when, and to what extent, this situation will change. In addition, while these officials said that they intend to address some of these gaps, they do not have defined plans or time frames for doing so. This in turn leaves state and local jurisdictions on their own to discover, disclose, and address any shared problems with systems. EAC plays a pivotal role in testing and certifying voting systems. Beyond the state of EAC’s efforts to define and follow an approach to testing and certifying voting systems, including efforts to track and resolve problems with certified systems and use this information to improve the commission’s testing and certification program, a void exists relative to having a national focus on tracking and resolving problems with voting systems that EAC has not certified, and thus has not been assigned explicit responsibility or has the resources to address. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist EAC in building upon and evolving its voting systems testing and certification program, we recommend that the Chair of the EAC direct the commission’s Executive Director to ensure that plans are prepared, approved, and implemented for developing and implementing detailed procedures, review criteria, and documentation requirements to ensure that voting system testing and certification review activities are conducted thoroughly, consistently, and verifiably; an accessible and available software repository for testing laboratories to deposit certified versions of voting system software, as well as procedures and review criteria for evaluating related manufacturer-provided tools to support stakeholders in comparing their systems with this repository; and detailed procedures, review criteria, and documentation requirements to ensure that problems with certified voting systems are effectively tracked and resolved, and that the lessons learned are effectively used to improve the certification program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has (1) defined an effective approach to testing and certifying voting systems, (2) followed its defined approach, and (3) developed an effective mechanism to track problems with certified systems and use the results to improve its certification program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and, among other things, assigned the commission responsibility for testing and certifying voting systems. In view of concerns about voting systems and the important role EAC plays in certifying them, GAO was asked to determine whether EAC has (1) defined an effective approach to testing and certifying voting systems, (2) followed its defined approach, and (3) developed an effective mechanism to track problems with certified systems and use the results to improve its approach. To accomplish this, GAO compared EAC guidelines and procedures with applicable statutes, guidance, and best practices, and examined the extent to which they have been implemented.
What GAO Found
EAC has defined an approach to testing and certifying voting systems that follows a range of relevant practices and statutory requirements associated with a product certification program, including those published by U.S. and international standards organizations, and those reflected in HAVA. EAC, however, has yet to define its approach in sufficient detail to ensure that certification activities are performed thoroughly and consistently. This lack of definition also has caused voting system manufacturers and test laboratories to interpret program requirements differently, and the resultant need to reconcile these differences has contributed to delays in certifying systems that several states were intending to use in the 2008 elections. According to EAC officials, these definitional gaps can be attributed to the program's youth and the commission's limited resources being devoted to other priorities. Nevertheless, they said that they intend to address these gaps, but added that they do not yet have written plans for doing so. EAC has largely followed its defined approach for each of the dozen systems it is in the process of certifying, with one major exception. Specifically, it has not established an effective and efficient repository for certified versions of voting system software, or related procedures and tools, for states and local jurisdictions to use in verifying that their acquired voting systems are identical to what EAC has certified. Further, EAC officials told GAO that they do not have a documented plan or requirements for a permanent solution. As an interim solution, they stated that they will maintain copies of certified versions in file cabinets and mail copies of these versions upon their request by states and local jurisdictions. In GAO's view, this process puts states and local jurisdictions at increased risk of using a version of a system during an election that differs from the certified version. Under its voting system testing and certification program, EAC has broadly described an approach for tracking problems with certified voting systems and using this information to improve its certification program. While this approach is consistent with some aspects of relevant guidance, key elements are either missing or inadequately defined. According to EAC officials, while they intend to address some of these gaps, they do not have documented plans for doing so. In addition, even if EAC defines and implements an effective approach, it would not affect the vast majority of voting systems that are to be used in the 2008 elections. This is because the commission's approach only applies to those voting systems that it has certified, and it is unlikely that any voting systems will be certified in time to be used in the upcoming elections. Moreover, because most states do not currently require EAC certification for their voting systems, it is uncertain if this situation will change relative to future elections. As a result, states and other election jurisdictions are on their own to discover, disclose, and address any shared problems with these noncertified systems. |
gao_GAO-02-361 | gao_GAO-02-361_0 | The subtitle establishes restrictions and requirements relating to a financial institution’s disclosure of nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties and calls upon federal regulators to promulgate and enforce regulations implementing those provisions. In addition, the federal regulators are to establish standards for safeguarding the security and confidentiality of financial institution customer records and information. Under Subtitle A, a financial institution generally is prohibited from disclosing a consumer’s protected information to nonaffiliated third parties unless the institution provides the consumer with a privacy notice and an opportunity to opt out of such disclosures. A privacy notice must describe the institution’s policies and practices for disclosing nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties. All of the States Have Taken Action to Implement Subtitle A’s Disclosure-Related Provisions
All of the states and the District of Columbia have by statute, regulation, or insurance bulletin advised the insurance institutions they regulate that the institutions must comply with Subtitle A’s disclosure-related provisions. Although the 1982 Model Act contains additional protections not provided by Subtitle A, a number of the Model Act states modified some of the more protective provisions of their laws to obtain greater consistency with the less restrictive requirements of Subtitle A.
NAIC issued the Model Act in 1982 to address privacy concerns relating to the collection and disclosure of insurance information by insurance institutions, insurance agents, and organizations that assemble and provide information to insurers. Most States Have Not Established Standards for Safeguarding Insurance Customer Information
As of March 1, 2002, only one state—New York—has satisfied the Subtitle A mandate that state insurance authorities establish standards for safeguarding insurance customer records and information. An additional state—California—has proposed regulations containing such standards. In contrast, the federal regulators charged with implementing Subtitle A, with the exception of FTC, issued final standards much earlier. FTC has received comments on proposed standards and is developing final rules. | What GAO Found
Subtitle A of Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 requires that each financial institution, which is defined to include most insurance providers or companies, has "an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information." This prohibits the disclosure of consumers' nonpublic personal information to any entity that is not an affiliate of, or related by common ownership or control, to the institution unless the consumer is given an opportunity to opt out of such disclosure. Also, financial institutions must provide consumers with privacy notices that explain the institution's policies and practices for disclosure. Subtitle A calls upon federal regulators to (1) issue regulations implementing disclosure-related requirements and (2) establish standards for safeguarding the privacy and integrity of customer information and records. The act also requires state insurance authorities to enforce its provisions by adopting regulations for both information disclosure and information safeguards. As of March 2002, all of the states and the District of Columbia have acted to ensure that insurance companies under their jurisdiction meet Subtitle A's disclosure and notice requirements. In addition, some states have included or retained provisions in their regulations or laws that they believe provide greater protections or more restrictive requirements than those contained in Subtitle A. Only New York has established standards for protecting the security and confidentiality of insurance customer information as of March 2002. Another state, California, has issued proposed regulations establishing such standards. In contrast, as of March 2002, the federal regulators charged with implementing Subtitle A--with the exception of the Federal Trade Commission--have issued their final standards. FTC has received comments on proposed standards and is developing its final rule. |
gao_GAO-02-634 | gao_GAO-02-634_0 | Background
The diversion and abuse of prescription drugs are associated with incalculable costs to society in terms of addiction, overdose, death, and related criminal activities. State PDMPs
PDMPs are designed to facilitate the collection, analysis, and reporting of information on the prescribing, dispensing, and use of prescription drugs within a state. In addition to helping law enforcement identify and prevent prescription drug diversion, state programs may include education objectives to provide information to physicians, pharmacies, and the public. Finally, the cost of the program varies according to differences in these design and operational factors. Program Objectives Include Education as Well as Law Enforcement
Although the primary objective of PDMPs is to assist law enforcement in detecting and preventing drug diversion, states have also used the programs for educational purposes. PDMPs have also provided physicians with information on addiction treatment options for patients identified as drug abusers or diverters. One challenge is the lack of awareness of the extent to which prescription drug abuse and diversion is a significant public health and law enforcement problem. States also face concerns about the confidentiality of the information gathered by the PDMP, voiced by patients who are legitimately using prescription drugs and by physicians and pharmacists who are legitimately prescribing and dispensing them. Securing Program Funding Is a Critical Challenge
According to officials from the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, the National Association of Drug Diversion Investigators, and the DEA, securing program funding is a critical challenge faced by states that choose to develop, maintain, or expand a PDMP. National Efforts Have Focused on Providing Guidance and Technical Assistance
Efforts at the national level to assist states in addressing illegal diversion have focused on providing guidance and technical assistance. It recommended that PDMPs cover all schedules of controlled substances, use some form of an electronic monitoring system, safeguard the confidentiality of the prescription data collected, analyze the data to provide information for law enforcement and medical professionals, provide education to health professionals regarding the monitoring system and pain management, and include an evaluation component to assess its costs and benefits. Concluding Observations
Illegal diversion and abuse of prescription drugs and the associated criminal activity are growing problems in many states. | What GAO Found
Prescription drug diversion is the channeling of pharmaceuticals for illegal purposes or abuse. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), increased prescription drug abuse and emergency room admissions, as well as the theft and illegal resale of prescription drugs, indicate that drug diversion is a growing problem associated with addiction, overdose, and death. All 15 state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMP) collect information about the prescribing, dispensing, and use of prescription drugs and distribute it to medical practitioners, pharmacies, and state law enforcement and regulatory agencies. However, the programs differ in terms of objectives, design, and operations. In addition to helping law enforcement identify and prevent prescription drug diversion, program objectives also include education of the public, physicians, and pharmacists about the nature and extent of the problem, and medical treatment options for abusers of diverted drugs. The programs' designs vary by specific drugs covered and by the type of state agency in which they are housed. Some programs use the prescription data proactively to identify trends or patterns of use and to respond to law enforcement requests. Others use it only to respond to requests. States with PDMPs improve the timeliness of law enforcement and regulatory investigations. States considering establishing a PDMP, or expanding an existing one, face several challenges. These include educating the public and policymakers about prescription drug diversion and abuse and the benefits of a PDMP, responding to the concerns of physicians, patients, and pharmacists regarding the confidentiality of prescription information, and funding for program development and operations. National efforts to assist states in addressing illegal diversion have focused on providing guidance and technical assistance. |
gao_NSIAD-99-194 | gao_NSIAD-99-194_0 | This process, based on the IMF’s analysis of country data and projections of future economic performance, gives the IMF wide latitude in establishing an actual or potential balance-of-payments need, the amount and timing of resource disbursements, and the conditions for disbursements; and in monitoring and, in some cases, modifying the arrangements. Its Process for Establishing and Monitoring Programs Gives IMF Latitude
Under its Articles of Agreement, as amended, the IMF provides financial assistance only to those countries with a balance-of-payments need. This framework has provided the IMF with wide latitude to consider countries’ individual circumstances and changes in the international monetary system in its financial assistance decisions. Korea and Argentina exemplify the differences that can exist between countries’ financial arrangements with the IMF. The approach is designed to incorporate data on a country’s economic performance as well as the judgment of the IMF Executive Board and staff. For example, in response to the Argentine government’s request, the IMF staff recommended, and the Executive Board approved, a waiver on the basis of the IMF’s judgment that there was sufficient overall progress in implementing the program and that the deviation from meeting the required condition was minor. Access to funding was not delayed. Disbursements Have Been Delayed Until Satisfactory Progress Occurred
In some cases, the IMF determined that the countries had not made sufficient overall progress in meeting program conditions. In these cases, no additional funds were made available until, in the IMF’s judgment, satisfactory progress had been achieved. Trade policies were not the major focus of IMF conditions for structural reform in the four borrowers we studied that are important U.S. trade partners. As we noted earlier, the IMF seeks to address the immediate and underlying problems that contributed to a country’s balance-of-payments problem; restrictive trade policies were not major factors contributing to the countries’ needs for IMF assistance. As such, countries that have borrowed from the IMF sometimes have liberalized their trade systems within the context of their financial arrangements. Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea have undertaken some trade liberalization within the context of their recent IMF financial arrangements. Nevertheless, their overall conditionality has focused primarily on macroeconomic and structural reforms other than trade reform because restrictive trade policies per se were not major causes of their balance-of- payments difficulties, according to the Treasury Department and the IMF. Some U.S. Imports From the Four Countries Have Increased Markedly in the Past Year, but Impact Is Difficult to Measure
The large macroeconomic changes in these four countries caused by their recent financial crises greatly complicate predicting and measuring the trade policies’ impact on the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the International Monetary Fund (IMF), focusing on the: (1) conditions IMF negotiates with its borrower countries; and (2) trade policies of borrower countries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IMF has a process for establishing and monitoring financial arrangements with member countries and it generally followed the process for the six countries in GAO's study; (2) the process encompasses data collection and analysis as well as judgment by the IMF Executive Board and staff, and gives IMF wide latitude in assessing a country's initial request for assistance, negotiating terms and conditions for that assistance, and determining the country's continued access to IMF resources; (3) under its charter, IMF limits financial assistance to members with a balance-of-payments need; IMF has broadly interpreted this to encompass a wide range of financial difficulties; (4) IMF has continued to make disbursements to a country that had not met all conditions when it decided that the country was making satisfactory progress; this decision was based on IMF's analysis of data on the country's progress and IMF's judgment; (5) when IMF determined that the country's progress in meeting key conditions was insufficient, disbursements have been delayed, and have not resumed unless or until satisfactory progress was achieved, in IMF's judgment; (6) IMF financial arrangements in four borrower countries that are important trading partners of the United States focus primarily on macroeconomic and structural reforms rather than trade reform because restrictive trade policies were not major causes of the countries' financial problems leading to the request for IMF assistance, according to the Department of the Treasury and IMF; (7) nevertheless Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea have undertaken some trade liberalization within the context of their most recent IMF arrangements; (8) according to Treasury, Thailand's recent IMF financial arrangements have had no trade liberalization commitments because trade policies were not the root causes of its financial crisis, and also because Thailand's trade system was more open than the other three countries' systems; (9) the large macroeconomic changes in these four borrower countries caused by their recent financial crises have probably been a more important source of changes in their trade policies; (10) this greatly complicates the task of measuring the impact of the trade policies on the United States; and (11) the countries' trade policies can distort trade in specific sectors, however, which could contribute to import surges. |
gao_GAO-07-1065 | gao_GAO-07-1065_0 | Compliance with Legislative Conditions
The US-VISIT expenditure plan, including related program documentation and program officials’ statements, satisfies or partially satisfies some, but not all, of the legislative conditions. DHS has partially implemented this recommendation. Recommendation: Define performance standards for US-VISIT that are measurable and reflect the limitations imposed on US-VISIT capabilities by relying on existing systems. DHS has had ample opportunity to address these many issues, but it has not. As a result, there is no reason to expect that its newly launched exit endeavor, for example, will produce results different from past endeavors—namely, DHS will not have an operational exit solution despite expenditure plans allocating about a quarter of a billion dollars to various exit activities. Similarly, on the basis of past efforts, there is no reason to believe that the program’s disproportionate investment in management- related activities represents a prudent and warranted course of action. However, we do not agree with the department’s position relative to the scope of US-VISIT’s security strategy in that it does not address known vulnerabilities associated with a US-VISIT component system—TECS. meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including Circular A-11, part 7;
complies with DHS’s enterprise architecture; complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition management practices of the federal government; includes a certification by the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) that an independent verification and validation (IV&V) agent is currently under contract for the project; is reviewed and approved by the DHS Investment Review Board (IRB), the Secretary of Homeland Security, and OMB; is reviewed by GAO; includes a comprehensive US-VISIT strategic plan; and includes a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. As agreed, our objectives were to
1. determine whether the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan satisfies 2. determine the status of our oldest open recommendations pertaining to US- 3. provide observations about the expenditure plan and management of the program. DHS data show that the US-VISIT prime contract is being executed according to cost and schedule expectations, as defined and measured by a well- accepted progress measurement technique known as earned value management. DHS continues to propose disproportionately heavy investment in US-VISIT program management-related activities without adequate justification or full disclosure, to the point of spending $1.25 on management for every dollar invested in new development. DHS continues to propose spending tens of millions of dollars on exit projects that are not well-defined, planned, or justified on the basis of costs, benefits and risks. Condition 2. The plan satisfies the requirement that it be reviewed by GAO. The plan does not satisfy the condition that it include a comprehensive US-VISIT strategic plan. While the US-VISIT program is not required to explicitly follow these guidelines, the guidelines nonetheless provide a framework for effectively developing strategic plans and the basis for program accountability. The plan, including related program documentation and program officials’ statements, does not satisfy the condition that it include a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. However, the scope of this strategy does not extend to all the systems that comprise US-VISIT. Without such information, the expenditure plan does not provide Congress with enough information to exercise effective oversight and hold the department accountable. However, the benefits are broadly stated. Both the legislative conditions and our open recommendations are aimed at accomplishing these improvements, and thus they need to be addressed quickly and completely. Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program known as U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on certain foreign nationals who travel to the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO reviewed the plan to (1) determine if the plan satisfied these conditions, (2) follow up on certain recommendations related to the program, and (3) provide any other observations. To address the mandate, GAO assessed plans and related documentation against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed the appropriate DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The US-VISIT expenditure plan, including related program documentation and program officials' statements, satisfies or partially satisfies some but not all of the legislative conditions required by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007. For example, the department satisfied the condition that it provide certification that an independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract for the program and partially satisfied the condition that US-VISIT comply with DHS's enterprise architecture. However, the department did not satisfy the conditions that the plan include a comprehensive US-VISIT strategic plan and a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. DHS partially implemented GAO's oldest open recommendations pertaining to US-VISIT. For example, while the department partially completed the recommendation that it develop and begin implementing a US-VISIT system security plan, the scope of the plan does not extend to all the systems that comprise US-VISIT. In addition, while the expenditure plan provides some information on US-VISIT's cost, schedule, and benefits associated with planned capabilities, the information provided is not sufficiently defined and detailed to address GAO's recommendation and provide a reasonable basis for measuring progress and holding the department accountable for results. GAO identified several additional observations. On the positive side, DHS data show that the US-VISIT prime contract is being executed according to cost and schedule expectations. However, DHS continues to propose disproportionately heavy investment in US-VISIT program management-related activities without adequate justification or full disclosure. Further, DHS continues to propose spending tens of millions of dollars on US-VISIT exit projects that are not well-defined, planned, or justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks. Overall, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan and other available program documentation do not provide a sufficient basis for effective program oversight and accountability. Both the legislative conditions and GAO's open recommendations are aimed at accomplishing both, and thus they need to be addressed quickly and completely. However, despite ample opportunity to do so, DHS has not done so and the reasons why are unclear. Until these recommendations are addressed, GAO does not believe that the program's disproportionate investment in management-related activities represents a prudent and warranted course of action or to expect that the newly launched exit endeavor will produce results different from past results--namely, no operational exit solution despite expenditure plans allocating about a quarter of a billion dollars to various exit activities. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-316 | gao_T-AIMD-00-316_0 | We have not evaluated the effectiveness of state and foreign government CIOs or equivalent positions; however, these positions appear to apply some of these same principles. State CIOs are usually in charge of developing statewide IT plans and approving statewide technical IT standards, budgets, personnel classifications, salaries, and resource acquisitions although the CIO’s authority depends on the specific needs and priorities of the governors. . . needs to inspire the leaders to dedicate political capital to the IT agenda.”
National governments in other countries have also established a central information technology coordinating authority and, like the states, have used different implementation approaches in doing so. 4670, the Chief Information Officer of the United States Act of 2000, and H.R. 5024, the Federal Information Policy Act of 2000—share a common call for central IT leadership from a federal CIO, although they differ in how the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the position would be established. Central and Effective Federal Information Resources and Technology Management Leadership Is Needed
Regardless of approach, we agree that strong and effective central information resources and technology management leadership is needed in the federal government. A central focal point such as a federal CIO can play the essential role of ensuring that attention in these areas is sustained. Although the respective departments and agencies should have the primary responsibility and accountability to address their own issues—and both bills maintain these agency roles— central leadership has the responsibility to keep everybody focused on the big picture by identifying the agenda of governmentwide issues needing attention and ensuring that related efforts are complementary rather than duplicative. Another task facing central leadership is serving as a catalyst and strategist to prompt agencies and other critical players to come to the table and take ownership for addressing the agenda of governmentwide information resources and technology management issues. In particular, a federal CIO could provide sponsorship, direction, and sustained focus on the major challenges the government is facing in areas such as critical infrastructure protection and security, e-government, and large-scale IT investments. Consensus has not been reached within the federal community on the need for a federal CIO. 4670 and H.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the creation of a federal chief information officer (CIO), focusing on the: (1) structure and responsibilities of existing state and foreign governmentwide CIO models; (2) federal CIO approaches proposed by two bills; and (3) type of leadership responsibilities that a federal CIO should possess.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO has not evaluated the effectiveness of state and foreign government CIOs or equivalent positions--however, these positions appear to apply some of the same principles outlined in GAO's CIO executive guide; (2) state CIO are usually in charge of developing statewide information technology (IT) plans and approving statewide IT standards, budgets, personnel classifications, salaries, and resource acquisitions; (3) national governments in other countries have also established a central IT coordinating authority and have different implementation approaches in doing so; (4) Congress is considering legislation to establish a federal CIO; (5) two proposals--H.R. 4670, the Chief Information Officer of the United States Act of 2000, and H.R. 5024, the Federal Information Policy Act of 2000--share a common call for central IT leadership from a federal CIO, although they differ in how the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the position would be established; (6) regardless of approach, strong and effective central information resources and technology management leadership is needed in the federal government; (7) a central focal point such as a federal CIO can play the essential role of ensuring that attention in these areas is sustained; (8) although the respective departments and agencies should have the primary responsibility and accountability to address their own issues--and both bills maintain these agency roles--central leadership has the responsibility to keep everybody focused on the big picture by identifying the agenda of governmentwide issues needing attention and ensuring that related efforts are complementary rather than duplicative; (9) another task facing central leadership is serving as a catalyst and strategist to prompt agencies and other critical players to come to the table and take ownership for addressing the agenda of governmentwide information resources and technology management issues; (10) a federal CIO could provide sponsorship, direction, and sustained focus on the major challenges the government is facing in areas such as critical infrastructure protection and security, e-government, and large-scale IT investments; and (11) consensus has not been reached within the federal community on the need for a federal CIO. |
gao_GAO-14-108 | gao_GAO-14-108_0 | While there is no requirement to limit reverse auctions to commercial items, agencies generally used them to acquire commercial products and services—primarily for information technology (IT) products and the lease or rental of equipment. DLA’s guidance, issued in June 2012, states that the reverse auction pricing tool should be used for all competitive purchases over $150,000. However, we found that about 95 percent of the acquisitions using reverse auctions resulted in awards of $150,000 or less. About 86 percent of fiscal year 2012 acquisitions using reverse auctions—16,906 of 19,688—went to small businesses, in keeping with the FAR requirement that acquisitions of supplies or services with expected values of more than $3,000 but not over $150,000 are reserved for small businesses, with some exceptions.accounted for $661 million (80 percent) of the dollar value of all reverse auction awards. Most Agencies Use the Same Fee-Based Contractor and Are to Follow Established Contracting Procedures to Conduct Their Reverse Auctions
Four of the five agencies included in our review used the same service provider, FedBid, to conduct their reverse auctions. Agencies pay a variable fee to conduct reverse auctions through FedBid, which is no more than 3 percent of the winning bid. Four of the Five Selected Agencies Used the Same Reverse Auction Contractor
The Army, DHS, DOI, and VA contracted with a company called FedBid to conduct their reverse auctions during fiscal year 2012. DOD, in its September 2010 Better Buying Power initiative memorandum, referred to competitive procurements for which only one offer was received as “ineffective competition.”
Over a third of the fiscal year 2012 reverse auctions conducted by FedBid for the agencies in our review had no interactive bidding—where vendors engage in multiple rounds of bids against each other to drive prices lower. Accordingly, the federal government publishes uniform policies and procedures for federal acquisitions in the FAR, which provides guidance to federal agencies and that the public, to include vendors, may read to better understand the federal acquisition process. However, as noted above, the FAR does not specifically address reverse auctions. In addition, factors that could be considered in government-wide guidance to help ensure that the intended benefits of reverse auctions are maximized include: steps, if any, contracting officers should take when only one bid is received; factors contracting officers should consider when deciding whether to use a reverse auction to place orders under certain contract vehicles, such as the GSA Schedule; and whether contracting officers should be urged to examine whether the lowest price, plus any applicable fee(s), actually results in a savings below the target price when deciding to follow through with an award. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help mitigate confusion about the use of reverse auctions in federal acquisitions, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget take the following two actions: (1) Take steps to amend the FAR to address agencies’ use of reverse auctions. (2) Issue guidance advising agencies to collect and analyze data on the level of interactive bidding and, where applicable, fees paid, to determine the cost effectiveness of using reverse auctions, and disseminating best practices from agencies on their use of reverse auctions related to maximizing competition and savings. They indicated that, before taking concrete steps to amend the FAR, they would discuss our findings and conclusions with the FAR and Chief Acquisition Officers Councils. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what agencies are buying through reverse auctions and trends in their use; (2) how agencies are conducting reverse auctions; and (3) the extent to which the potential benefits of reverse auctions are being maximized. We were not able to perform detailed analysis of DLA data for fiscal year 2012, because the agency collected only summary level information. To determine to what extent agencies are maximizing the potential benefits of reverse auctions, we analyzed the data obtained from FedBid, identifying the government’s target price for the product or service, the number of vendors and bids for each auction, the lowest bid submitted, the savings estimated from the use of reverse auctions, and the type of contract used to acquire the products and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reverse auctions are one tool used by federal agencies to increase competition and reduce the cost of certain items. Reverse auctions differ from traditional auctions in that sellers compete against one another to provide the lowest price or highest-value offer to a buyer. GAO was asked to review issues related to agencies' use of reverse auctions. This report examines (1) what agencies are buying through reverse auctions and trends in their use; (2) how agencies are conducting reverse auctions; and (3) the extent to which the potential benefits of reverse auctions are being maximized. GAO identified five agencies conducting about 70 percent of government reverse auctions. GAO analyzed available data and guidance and interviewed agency officials and contractors. GAO also reviewed a random sample of contract files to understand agency procedures; the results of this analysis are generalizable to all reverse auctions for four of the five agencies in our review.
What GAO Found
The Departments of the Army, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs used reverse auctions to acquire predominantly commercial items and services--primarily for information technology products and medical equipment and supplies--although the mix of products and services varied among agencies. Most--but not all--of the auctions resulted in contracts with relatively small dollar value awards--typically $150,000 or less--and a high rate of awards to small businesses. The four agencies steadily increased their use of reverse auctions from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, with about $828 million in contract awards in 2012 alone. GAO was not able to analyze data from a fifth agency, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), because it collected only summary level information during fiscal year 2012. DLA guidance states that the reverse auction pricing tool should be used for all competitive purchases over $150,000.
Four agencies used the same commercial service provider to conduct their reverse auctions and paid a variable fee for this service, which was no more than 3 percent of the winning bid amount. DLA conducts its own auctions through a purchased license. Regardless of the method used, according to agency officials, contracting officers are still responsible for following established contracting procedures when using reverse auctions.
GAO found that the potential benefits of reverse auctions--competition and savings--had not been maximized by the agencies. GAO found that over one-third of fiscal year 2012 reverse auctions had no interactive bidding, where vendors bid against each other to drive prices lower. In addition, almost half of the reverse auctions were used to obtain items from pre-existing contracts that in some cases resulted in agencies paying two fees--one to use the contract and one to use the reverse auction contractor's services. There is a lack of comprehensive governmentwide guidance and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is the primary document for publishing uniform policies and procedures related to federal acquisitions, does not specifically address reverse auctions. As a result, confusion exists about their use and agencies may be limited in their ability to maximize the potential benefits of reverse auctions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) take steps to amend the FAR to address agencies' use of reverse auctions and issue government-wide guidance to maximize competition and savings when using reverse auctions. OMB generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, noting that FAR coverage should be considered and that, before taking concrete steps to amend the FAR, they would discuss GAO's findings and conclusions with the FAR and Chief Acquisition Officers Councils. |
gao_GAO-14-613T | gao_GAO-14-613T_0 | Funding autism research on the same topic may be appropriate and necessary—for example, for purposes of replicating or corroborating results—but in some instances, funding similar autism research may lead to unnecessary duplication and inefficient use of funds. Most agency officials we spoke with said that they consider the research funded by their agencies to be different than autism research funded by other agencies; however, we found that each research area included projects funded by at least four agencies. NIH funded a majority of the autism research projects in five of the seven research areas. 1.) The IACC’s and Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Coordinate and Monitor Federal Autism Activities Were Limited
We noted in our November 2013 report that the IACC and federal agencies may have missed opportunities to coordinate federal autism activities and reduce the risk of duplication of effort and resources. Although the CAA requires the IACC to coordinate HHS autism activities and monitor federal autism activities, OARC officials stated that the prevention of duplication among individual projects in agency portfolios is not specified in the CAA as one of the IACC’s statutory responsibilities and therefore is not a focus of the IACC. In our November 2013 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the IACC and NIH, in support of the IACC, to identify projects through their monitoring of federal autism activities— including OARC’s annual collection of data for the portfolio analysis, and the IACC’s annual process to update the strategic plan—that may result in unnecessary duplication and thus may be candidates for consolidation or elimination; and identify potential coordination opportunities among agencies. Further, we found that the IACC’s efforts to coordinate HHS autism research and monitor all federal autism activities were hindered due to limitations with the data it collects. HHS did not concur with these recommendations. This plan included the number of research projects funded from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 under each objective, and the corresponding funding amounts, which may help identify those objectives that have received more funding than others. Detailed project information is needed to effectively coordinate and monitor autism research across the federal government and avoid duplication. DOD concurred with our recommendation to improve coordination among federal agencies, and comments from Education, HHS, and NSF suggested that these agencies support improving the coordination of federal autism research activities. However, Education, HHS, and NSF disputed that any duplication occurs. However, the fact that research is categorized to the same objectives suggests that there may be duplicative projects being funded. | Why GAO Did This Study
Autism—a developmental disorder involving communication and social impairment—is an important public health concern. From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, 12 federal agencies awarded at least $1.4 billion to support autism research and other autism-related activities. The Combating Autism Act directed the IACC to coordinate HHS autism activities and monitor all federal autism activities. It also required the IACC to develop and annually update a strategic plan for autism research. This plan is organized into 7 research areas that contain specific objectives.
This statement is based on GAO's November 2013 report, GAO-14-16 , with selected updates. It discusses federal autism activities, including (1) the extent to which federal agencies fund potentially duplicative autism research, and (2) the extent to which IACC and agencies coordinate and monitor federal autism activities. GAO analyzed agencies' data and documents, and interviewed federal agency officials.
What GAO Found
Eighty-four percent of the autism research projects funded by federal agencies had the potential to be duplicative. Of the 1,206 autism research projects funded by federal agencies from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, 1,018 projects were potentially duplicative because the projects were categorized to the same objectives in the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee's (IACC) strategic plan. Funding similar research on the same topic is sometimes appropriate—for example, for purposes of replicating or corroborating results—but in other instances funding similar research may lead to unnecessary duplication. Each agency funded at least 1 autism research project in the same strategic plan objective as another agency and at least 4 agencies funded autism research in the same research area.
The IACC and federal agencies may have missed opportunities to coordinate and reduce the risk of duplicating effort and resources. GAO found that the IACC is not focused on the prevention of duplication, and its efforts to coordinate the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) autism research and monitor all federal autism activities were hindered by limitations with the data it collects. Apart from federal agencies' participation on the IACC, there were limited instances of agency coordination, and the agencies did not have robust or routine procedures for monitoring federal autism activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended in November 2013 that HHS improve IACC data to enhance coordination and monitoring. HHS disagreed and stated its efforts were already adequate. GAO also recommended that DOD, Education, HHS, and NSF improve coordination. The agencies supported improved coordination, but most disputed that duplication occurs. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are warranted and actions needed. |
gao_NSIAD-99-45 | gao_NSIAD-99-45_0 | Background
Believing DOD’s efforts to reduce its infrastructure, including the size of its headquarters activities, lagged behind cuts in operational forces, Congress directed DOD to reduce positions in OSD, including Washington Headquarters Services and other defense support activities, by 25 percent from fiscal year 1994 levels by the end of fiscal year 1999. In the November 1997 Defense Reform Initiatives (DRI) report, the Secretary of Defense directed OSD to reduce the number of personnel. Temporary staff are not to be used to perform continuing office functions. OSD and Its Support Activities Expect to Have Over 25 Percent Fewer Personnel by the End of Fiscal Year 1999
DOD plans to cut 1,373 positions in OSD and its support activities by the end of fiscal year 1999. These reductions would be 2 percentage points more than the 25-percent cut mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Although the number of positions has been reduced, civilian salary costs (in constant dollars) have not decreased. As of the end of fiscal year 1998, DOD had cut 1,123 positions, or 82 percent of the planned reductions—858 positions in OSD and 265 positions in Washington Headquarters Services (see table 2). Salary costs did not decline commensurate with the personnel reductions partly because many of the positions eliminated were vacant and annual civilian pay raises exceeded the inflation rate. DOD Does Not Have a Plan to Reduce Headquarters Activities by 25 Percent
DOD does not have a plan to reduce management headquarters and headquarters support personnel DOD-wide by 25 percent by the end of fiscal year 2002, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for 1998. The act requires DOD to cut about 13,300 positions in its headquarters activities. In November 1998, the military departments proposed the establishment of a task force, chaired by the Under Secretary of the Army, to develop alternatives for reducing DOD’s headquarters structure. Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine the number and purpose of all personnel temporarily assigned to OSD by other DOD components. V), DOD concurred with our recommendation and noted that it is developing a system to account for all personnel detailed to OSD from other DOD components. Specifically, DOD said the report does not include (1) the reason it requested relief from the 25-percent reduction required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 and (2) the principal reason civilian pay costs did not come down between fiscal year 1994 and 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce the size and cost of its headquarters activities, focusing on DOD's: (1) efforts to reduce headquarters positions and associated costs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Washington Headquarters Services, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; (2) efforts to reduce headquarters positions across DOD as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998; and (3) reporting of personnel on temporary assignment to OSD from other DOD components.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to comply with the requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, DOD plans to reduce OSD and its support activities by about 1,373 positions, or 27 percent, from its fiscal year (FY) 1994 levels by the end of FY 1999; (2) as of the end of FY 1998, DOD had cut 1,123 positions; (3) the majority of the cuts were based on DOD's November 1997 Defense Reform Initiatives report, which recommended that some offices be reorganized and that operational and program management functions be transferred to other DOD activities; (4) although the positions in OSD and its support activities have been reduced, civilian salary costs have not decreased because many of the positions eliminated were vacant and annual civilian pay raises have exceeded the inflation rate; (5) DOD plans to eliminate the remaining 250 positions in FY 1999; (6) DOD may not be accurately accounting for all personnel assigned to OSD; (7) some personnel temporarily assigned to OSD by other DOD components are functioning more as permanent staff and are not being reported as OSD personnel; (8) DOD has plans to cut about 5,600 positions across its headquarters activities by the end of FY 2002; (9) this is less than half of 13,300 cuts required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998; (10) according to OSD officials, DOD did not develop plans consistent with the legislation because the Secretary of Defense had sought relief from the 1998 legislative requirement; and (11) however, when Congress did not repeal the provision, the services proposed that a task force be established to develop alternatives for reducing the headquarters' structure. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-256 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-256_0 | In contrast, estimates of the agreement’s impact on aggregate employment are widely divergent. Recent Studies of NAFTA’s Economic Impact
Mr. Chairman, let me now summarize the findings from three major reports on NAFTA’s impact: (1) the in-depth June 1997 ITC study of NAFTA;(2) the President’s July 1997 report on the operations and effect of NAFTA;and (3) a June 1997 study by some of the major critics of NAFTA. Because of the intense interest in NAFTA’s impact on U.S. labor and the difficulty in calculating such impact, analysts have used NAFTA-TAA data as a proxy for job dislocations attributable to NAFTA. In addition, NAFTA certifications represent potential job losses, not the actual number of jobs lost. While NAFTA-TAA is fully operational, little evaluation has been done of how effectively the program serves to provide retraining and adjustment assistance to affected workers. Comments on Methodology
It is very difficult to evaluate the impact of NAFTA since the agreement’s provisions are generally being phased in over a 10- to 15-year period, and it is hard to isolate the impact of the agreement from contemporaneous economic trends and other unique events. While recent studies offer valuable insights into the initial effects of NAFTA, in reviewing the studies we encountered methodological issues that need to be kept in perspective. While separating the crisis’ impact from that of NAFTA has merit, events in Mexico leading to the financial crisis and the response to the crisis are intertwined with NAFTA. Mechanisms for Avoiding and Settling Disputes
NAFTA contains mechanisms to help avoid trade disputes and settle them effectively when they do arise. U.S., Mexican, and Canadian private sector and government officials with whom we spoke were generally supportive of NAFTA’s dispute settlement process over the past 3 years. Implementation Progress
According to U.S., Mexican, and Canadian government officials, changes in NAFTA member countries’ trade laws precipitated by the agreement have increased the level of transparency in countries’ trade remedy determinations, particularly in Mexico. After 3-1/2 years of implementation, it is too early to say what definitive effect these side agreements will have on the environment and labor. However, implementation issues involving the focus of the commission’s cooperative work programs, transparency of the enforcement mechanisms, and the governments’ commitment to the agreement remain. Similar reactions were also expressed by some other environmental experts reviewing implementation of the environmental agreement. This includes a dispute settlement mechanism to address lack of enforcement by a party of certain labor law standards. The funding limitations are causing concern on the part of some observers that the commission does not have adequate resources to meet its obligations. International Trade: Implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (GAO/GGD-93-21, Oct. 10, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the impact and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), focusing on: (1) its review of three major studies of NAFTA's economic impacts and a brief overview of NAFTA's adjustment programs; (2) the implementation of NAFTA's mechanisms to both avoid and resolve disputes among the parties; and (3) the implementation of NAFTA's supplemental agreements on environmental and labor cooperation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is difficult to evaluate the impacts of NAFTA since the agreement's provisions are generally being phased in over a 10-15 year period, and it is hard to isolate the impact of the agreement from other trends and events; (2) while recent studies by the International Trade Commission, the President, and the Economic Policy Institute offer valuable insights into the initial effects of NAFTA, in reviewing the studies GAO encountered methodological issues that need to be kept in perspective; (3) based on GAO's review of these studies and other work: (a) while NAFTA is not yet fully implemented, U.S. trade with NAFTA members has accelerated; (b) at the sectoral level, there are diverse impacts from NAFTA; (c) estimates of the agreement's impact on aggregate employment are widely divergent, ranging from gains of 160,000 jobs to losses of 420,000 jobs, but GAO believes that neither of these are reliable estimates of actual labor effects due to methodological limitations; and (d) while there is wide conceptual agreement on the contribution of trade liberalization to improvement in the standard of living through increased productivity and lower prices, estimating the extent to which NAFTA specifically furthers these goals presents a major empirical challenge that may never be overcome; (4) Mexico's response to its financial crisis of 1994-95 and the recent agreement to accelerate tariff reductions suggest that Mexico has been committed to meeting its NAFTA obligations; (5) while data on the use of the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program (NAFTA TAA) provides sectoral and geographic information on potential job dislocations, NAFTA-TAA certifications should not be used as a proxy for the number of jobs lost; (6) NAFTA's system for avoiding and settling disputes among the member countries is a critical element of the agreement; (7) according to government and private sector officials, these mechanisms have helped the governments resolve important trade issues and have kept the number of formal dispute settlement cases relatively low; (8) U.S., Mexican, and Canadian government officials with whom GAO met were generally supportive of NAFTA's dispute settlement process over the past 3 years, noting especially the professionalism and lack of national bias of the panelists reviewing the cases; (9) it is too early to determine what definitive effect the supplemental agreements will have on the North American environment and labor; and (10) U.S., Canadian, and Mexican government officials have also expressed some concerns about the agreements' implementation. |
gao_GAO-17-105 | gao_GAO-17-105_0 | VA Has No Standardized Way for Facilities to Record and Calculate Official Time, Which Hampers Its Ability to Accurately Track the Amount of Official Time Used Agency- Wide
There Is No Standardized Way for VA Facilities to Record the Use of Official Time, but VA Is Implementing a New Time and Attendance System That Could Standardize This Process
There is no standardized way for VA facilities to record the amount of official time employees use for representational activities because there are currently two time and attendance systems being used across the agency that capture this information differently. VA began implementing its new time and attendance system, the Veterans Affairs Time and Attendance System (VATAS), at some facilities in 2013 to replace its older system, the Enhanced Time and Attendance (ETA) System. VA expects to complete its rollout of VATAS in July 2018. The inconsistent recording of information raises questions about VA’s ability to monitor the use of official time and ensure that public resources are being used effectively. VA Has Not Provided Consistent Training on How to Record Official Time in VATAS, but It Has Taken Steps to Provide Better Guidance
VATAS could help standardize the way individual facilities record information on official time and provide better information on the different purposes for which official time is used; however, we found that VA has not provided consistent training to employees on how to record official time in the new system. VA Allows Facilities to Use a Range of Methods to Calculate Official Time and May Continue to Do So After It Implements VATAS
To provide agency-wide official time data to OPM, which reports on the use of official time for representational activities government-wide, VA’s Office of Labor-Management Relations (LMR) annually collects and compiles data from individual facilities and shares the aggregated data with OPM. Fiscal year 2015 data collected through the LMR system show that employees spent approximately 1,057,000 hours on official time for union representational activities, and according to VA officials, unions represented almost 290,000 bargaining unit employees across the agency during this time. Without reliable information from facilities on official time, VA management does not have what it needs to monitor the use of official time and manage its resources effectively. Designated Space for Union Representational Activities Comprised Less Than 1 Percent of the Overall Space at Selected Facilities
At the five selected facilities GAO visited, VA provided unions with designated space for union representational activities. VA does not collect or track data from individual facilities on the amount of designated space used by unions, but officials at selected facilities were able to provide us with information on the amount of designated space for representational activities. Union officials from three of five groups we interviewed said that limited space for representational activities was a challenge. A VA official from the Office of LMR said that, in general, certain VA facilities may have space constraints depending on where they are located, the types of services provided, and the number of veterans served. VA Managers and Union Officials at Selected Facilities Cited Similar Benefits of Official Time, but Cited Different Challenges Associated with Its Use
VA Managers and Union Officials at Most Selected Facilities Said Employees’ Use of Official Time Improves Decision Making and Provides Other Benefits
VA managers and union officials from groups we interviewed at selected facilities cited similar benefits of employees’ use of official time for representational activities. In addition, VA has not provided consistent training to facilities on how to record official time in VATAS, and some facilities are still not aware of VA’s updated guidance on how to record official time in the system, despite recent efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve VA’s ability to accurately track employees’ use of official time, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Administration to: 1. increase efforts to ensure timekeepers at all facilities receive training and consistent guidance on recording official time in VATAS; 2. standardize the methods used by facilities for determining the amount of official time used prior to the agency-wide implementation of VATAS by encouraging facilities to rely on time and attendance records when calculating the amount of official time used at the facility level; and 3. in preparation for the full implementation of VATAS, take steps to transition from using the LMR system to VATAS to collect and compile information on the amount of official time used agency-wide. In its written comments, VA agreed with all three of our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, there were over 250,000 bargaining unit employees at VA, and these employees spent about 1.1 million hours performing union representational activities on official time, according to an OPM report. The ways in which VA manages its human resources, including the use of official time, have received increased scrutiny in recent years. GAO was asked to review the amount of official time used by VA employees as well as the amount of space designated for representational activities.
This report examines (1) the extent to which VA tracks official time, (2) what is known about the amount of designated space used for union representational activities at selected VA facilities, and (3) the views of VA managers and union officials on the benefits and challenges of employees using official time.
GAO reviewed VA's fiscal year 2014 and 2015 data on official time—the most recent data available; analyzed information on designated union space and held group interviews with VA managers and union officials at a nongeneralizable sample of five VA facilities selected based on the number of bargaining unit employees and other factors; and interviewed officials at VA, OPM, and from national unions.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) cannot accurately track the amount of work time employees spend on union representational activities, referred to as official time, agency-wide because it does not have a standardized way for its facilities to record and calculate official time. Specifically:
Recording official time —VA uses two separate time and attendance systems that capture official time differently. VA's new system (VA Time and Attendance System, or VATAS), which VA began rolling out at some facilities in 2013, has specific codes to record official time, but the older system does not. The inconsistent recording of official time raises questions about VA's ability to monitor its use, but VATAS could help to standardize this process. In rolling out the new system, which VA expects to complete agency-wide in 2018, VA has provided inconsistent training and guidance on how to use the codes in VATAS. While VA has taken steps to provide better training and guidance on recording official time, GAO recently found that timekeepers at two of three selected facilities where VATAS has been rolled out were still not using the codes. Without consistent guidance and training, personnel may not know how to properly record official time in the new system.
Calculating official time —VA provides its facilities with a range of options for calculating the amount of official time used. VA annually collects and compiles these data agency-wide using the Labor-Management Relations (LMR) Official Time Tracking System—separate and distinct from VA's time and attendance systems. In calculating official time, facilities may use records, estimates, or other methods, which results in inconsistent data. VA officials told GAO that all facilities will eventually be able to rely on VATAS time and attendance records to calculate official time when submitting data in the LMR system. The full implementation of VATAS will provide VA with an alternative to using the LMR system to collect and compile more reliable official time data. Without reliable data, VA cannot monitor the use of official time agency-wide or share reliable data with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which reports on the government-wide use of official time.
At all five selected VA facilities, designated space for representational activities comprised less than 1 percent of the overall square footage at each location, according to GAO's analysis. VA does not collect or track data from individual facilities on the amount of space designated for representational activities. Union officials at three of the five facilities GAO visited said that limited space for representational activities made it difficult to provide privacy for employees. A VA official said that certain VA facilities may have space constraints depending on where they are located and the number of veterans served, for example.
At most selected VA facilities, VA managers and union officials GAO interviewed cited similar benefits of employees using official time, such as improving decision-making and resolving problems. However, they had differing views on challenges associated with employees' use of official time, such as when and how much official time may be used.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to VA including that it provide consistent guidance and training on how to record official time in VATAS and that it take steps to collect more reliable data from facilities. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that it would take action to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-149 | gao_GAO-06-149_0 | VBA has acknowledged the need to improve the timeliness and accuracy of claims processing. VBA Has Used Limited Field Restructuring and Staff Redeployment to Improve Compensation and Pension Performance
Since 2001, VBA has made a number of changes to its field structure and staff deployment in an effort to provide veterans with faster decisions and reduce its rating-related claims inventory. In October 2001, VBA established a Tiger Team, including experienced rating specialists, to complete very old claims and claims from elderly veterans. Also, to supplement regional offices’ claims processing capacity, VBA established nine resource centers, where teams of rating specialists decided claims developed at the regional offices of jurisdiction. Further, VBA has consolidated specific types of work, including pension maintenance work (such as annual means testing for VA pension beneficiaries) at three regional offices, in an effort to free up staff at other offices to concentrate on rating-related claims. VBA also consolidated in-service dependency and indemnity compensation claims at its Philadelphia regional office; created an Appeals Management Center in Washington, D.C., to process appeals remanded from VA’s Board of Veterans Appeals; and is consolidating the rating of Benefits Delivery at Discharge claims at the Salt Lake City and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, regional offices. VBA expects this consolidation to help improve decision efficiency and consistency. VBA Continues to Face Challenges as It Realigns Its Compensation and Pension Field Structure
While VBA has done limited field restructuring and claims processing staff reallocation, it has not changed the basic field structure for processing claims for disability compensation and pension benefits and still faces challenges in improving performance. VBA continues to process claims at 57 regional offices, which experience large performance variations and questions about the consistency of their decisions. Several studies by VA and outside groups have suggested that VBA could improve claims processing efficiency and consistency by consolidating claims processing into fewer offices as well as other strategic changes. Average completion times ranged from 99 days at the Salt Lake City regional office to 237 days at the Honolulu, Hawaii, regional office. In November 2004, we reported that to achieve its claims processing performance goals in the face of increasing workloads and decreased staffing levels, VBA would have to rely on productivity improvements. Conclusions
VBA has taken limited actions to realign its field structure and redeploy staff resources as part of its effort to improve overall claims processing performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman, former Chairman, and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs asked GAO to review the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) efforts to realign its compensation and pension claims processing field structure to improve performance. This report (1) identifies the actions VBA has taken to realign its compensation and pension claims processing field structure to improve performance, and (2) examines whether further changes to its field structure could improve performance.
What GAO Found
Since 2001, VBA has made a number of changes to its field structure and staff deployment in an effort to improve compensation and pension claims processing performance, in particular, to improve the timeliness of claims decisions and reduce inventories. VBA created a Tiger Team to complete very old claims, and claims from elderly veterans; created nine resource centers to decide claims developed at the regional offices of jurisdiction; consolidated pension maintenance work at three regional offices to free up staff at other offices to concentrate on other work; consolidated in-service dependency and indemnity compensation claims at one office; consolidated processing of appeals remanded from VA's Board of Veterans Appeals at one office; and is consolidating decision making on Benefits Delivery at Discharge (BDD) claims at two regional offices. While VBA has taken these steps to improve its claims processing performance through targeted realignments of its field structure and workload, VBA has not changed the basic field structure for processing claims for disability compensation and pension benefits, and it still faces performance challenges. VBA continues to process these claims at 57 regional offices, where large performance variations and questions about decision consistency persist. For example, in fiscal year 2004 the average time to decide a rating-related claim ranged from 99 days at one office to 237 days at another, and accuracy varied across regional offices. Furthermore, productivity improvements are necessary to maintain performance in the face of greater workloads and relatively constant staffing resources. VBA and others who have studied claims processing have suggested that consolidating claims processing into fewer regional offices could help improve claims processing efficiency, save overhead costs, and improve decision accuracy and consistency. |
gao_GAO-03-712T | gao_GAO-03-712T_0 | Background
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity passenger rail service because existing railroads found such service unprofitable. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states and the District of Columbia. Amtrak owns 650 miles of track, primarily on the Northeast Corridor, which runs between Boston, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. On some portions of the Corridor, Amtrak provides high-speed rail service (up to 150 miles per hour). Amtrak has reported that just doing that will require nearly $2 billion annually over the next several years—about twice the amount provided annually over the last 5 years. Amtrak’s financial struggles have become even more acute in recent years. This is about twice the approximately $1 billion in federal funding Amtrak has received annually over the last 5 years. Amtrak has indicated that it will require $2 billion annually in federal contributions over the next few years, with a focus on stabilizing its system. For example, in January 2000, Amtrak estimated that about $12 billion (in 2000 dollars) would be needed between fiscal years 2001 and 2025 to improve the Northeast Corridor between New York City and Washington, D.C., in order to increase the reliability of the Corridor and make enhancements that permit higher speed service. Amtrak’s identified funding requests do not address the future needs that might be required to expand or enhance service or develop high-speed rail corridors. According to Amtrak, additional federal and state investment— over and above the $2 billion per year—would be required to address these issues and begin developing high-speed rail corridors. Framework for Creating a National Intercity Passenger Rail Policy
Based on GAO’s analyses of federal investment approaches across a broad stratum of national activities, we have found several key components of a framework for evaluating federal investments. Congress may find this framework useful to consider as it develops a national intercity passenger rail policy. A systemwide approach to transportation planning and funding, as opposed to focusing on a single mode or type of travel, could improve the focus on outcomes and the contribution to customer or community needs. Establishing Roles of Governmental and Private Sector Entities Will Better Ensure That Goals Are Achieved
Establishing the relative roles of federal, state, and local governments and private sector entities, to the extent practicable, could better ensure that goals are achieved. Regarding structures and organizations as they pertain to intercity passenger rail travel, the Congress will need to pose and resolve such questions as: Should there be a government-established entity, such as Amtrak, with a monopoly over intercity passenger rail, or could federal and state governments allow private operators to receive government assistance on a competitive basis to provide intercity passenger rail service? Choice and Design of Financing Mechanisms Will Have Important Consequences for Performance, Transparency, and Accountability
The choice and design of financing mechanisms, including mechanisms used to provide federal assistance, will have important consequences for performance, transparency, and accountability. How should it be paid for? Amtrak’s market share decreases rapidly as travel time and distance increases. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity passenger rail service because existing railroads found such service unprofitable. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states and the District of Columbia. Most of Amtrak's passengers travel on the Northeast Corridor, which runs between Boston, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. On some portions of the Corridor, Amtrak provides high-speed rail service (up to 150 miles per hour). Since its inception, Amtrak has struggled to earn revenues and run an efficient operation. Recent years have seen Amtrak continue to struggle financially. In February 2003, Amtrak reported that it would need several billion dollars from the federal government over the next few years to sustain operations. However, some have indicated that there needs to be a fundamental reassessment of how intercity passenger rail is structured and financed. Options raise questions about whether or not Amtrak should be purely an operating company, whether competition should be introduced for providing service, and if states should assume a greater financial role in the services that are provided.
What GAO Found
Compared to current levels of federal funding, substantially higher federal investment will be required in the future to stabilize and sustain Amtrak's existing network. Amtrak will be seeking about $2 billion per year over the next several years to stabilize its system and begin addressing its deferred maintenance needs and to cover operating losses. This is about twice the federal funding Amtrak has received annually over the last 5 years. However, Amtrak's identified funding requests do not address potential future needs to enhance or expand service or develop high-speed rail corridors, which Amtrak has previously estimated at up to $70 billion over the next 20 years. According to Amtrak, this will require additional federal and state investment--over and above the $2 billion annually in identified needs. Based on analyses of federal investment approaches across a broad stratum of national activities, we have identified several key components of a framework for evaluating federal investments. The Congress might find this framework useful as it deliberates the future of intercity passenger rail. At the outset, clearly defined goals would provide the foundation for making other decisions. For example, if reducing air and highway congestion were a goal, this may only be achievable in limited markets, because Amtrak's market share decreases rapidly as travel time and distance increase. To improve the focus on outcomes, it will be important for Congress to consider a systemwide approach, as opposed to a focus on one mode or type of travel. Establishing the roles of governmental and private entities could better ensure that goals are achieved. Finally, the choice and design of financing mechanisms will also have important consequences for performance as well as transparency and accountability. |
gao_GGD-99-157 | gao_GGD-99-157_0 | Weaknesses in the Countries’ Financial Systems
The financial systems of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand are different from systems in many industrialized countries in several ways. Weaknesses in the Financial Systems of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand
Prior to their financial crises, all three countries we studied fell short of meeting several of the criteria for a robust financial system and the principles for effective bank supervision. While these three countries’ economies relied heavily on debt financing, they had inadequate procedures for the enforcement of loan contracts and workouts, according to IMF and World Bank documentation. Countries Are Taking Steps to Improve Operation of Their Financial Sectors
The governments of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand have taken or are taking a variety of actions in response to their ongoing financial crises. Financial sector restructuring in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand has involved efforts to restore confidence in the countries’ banking system by guaranteeing deposits, strengthening regulatory structures, adopting internationally accepted accounting standards, and creating legal frameworks for bankruptcy and governance. Each of the countries moved to close and/or merge failing institutions. For example, prior to the crisis, Indonesia did not have an agency with the authority to resolve failing financial institutions. Decisions on bank closures and recapitalization have been made on the basis of these audits. International Bank Supervisory Principles Partially Implemented
All three of the countries we examined have begun changing their bank supervisory and regulatory systems to meet international standards. Further, some of the changes in supervision and regulation are inherently long term. In the financial sector the World Bank played an especially important role in formulating and implementing the strategy for dealing with commercial banks, finance companies, and for specialized institutions; assessing the solvency of the banking system and the standing of main institutions, based on bank audits; developing plans for dealing with insolvent institutions, for disposing of the assets of closed banks, and for handling the nonperforming assets of banks that were to be publicly supported; improving the overall financial infrastructure including strengthening bank supervision and redesign of prudential regulation according to the Basel standards; providing expertise on instituting deposit insurance schemes; updating banking laws to include provisions that had been lacking, including limitations on cross-ownership between banks and enterprises; and stengthening the development of money markets and capital markets through the encouragement of new institutional investors, asset securitization, standardization of government bond issues, and improvement of securities market prudential regulation and self- regulation. Conclusion
Full implementation of the reform agenda will take many years to accomplish due to the extent of the problems and the enormity of the changes required. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the nature of weaknesses in the financial sectors of the three countries, (2) the extent to which the countries have reformed their financial systems, (3) the extent to which international principles for banking supervision have been implemented by the countries, and (4) U.S. government and multilateral efforts to effect changes in the financial sectors of these emerging markets. Additional copies are $2 each. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO analyzed the efforts to improve the financial sectors of the emerging market countries of Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand, focusing on: (1) the nature of weaknesses in the countries' financial sectors; (2) the extent to which the countries have achieved reforms in their financial systems; (3) the extent to which the countries have implemented international principles for banking supervision; and (4) U.S. government and multilateral institutions' efforts to effect changes in the financial sectors of these emerging markets.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the governments of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand are implementing multiple changes to reform their financial institutions and markets and banking supervisory structures; (2) many of these changes are being undertaken in response to a financial crisis; (3) some regulatory and legal changes have been implemented in the short term, while other objectives may take many years to accomplish due to the extent of the problems and the enormity of the changes required; (4) how robust the countries' financial systems are to future disruptions is an open question, given the risks to the financial systems posed by the continued weaknesses of the corporate sectors of all three countries; (5) the economies of each country relied heavily on debt financing and restricted the access of foreign financial institutions; (6) at the same time, the countries' legal systems did not provide adequately for the enforcement of contracts or provide mechanisms for resolving defaulted corporate debt; (7) the countries did not have adequate legal and institutional frameworks ensuring their bank supervisors' independence and enforcement authority; (8) the countries did not have deposit insurance systems that forestalled runs on bank deposits; (9) Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand have made or are making changes to address banking system and related weaknesses, with early priority given to resolving nonviable banks and debtor companies; (10) some insolvent or weak banks have been closed or merged; (11) ongoing efforts include the sale of assets of failed banks and the recapitalization of banks, with the latter partially dependent on the corporate debt workout process; (12) all three countries are changing laws to expedite resolution of loans in default; (13) Korea and Thailand have changed or strengthened accounting practices by adopting internationally accepted accounting standards; (14) each of the three countries has partially implemented international principles for effective bank supervision, but it is too early to determine the effect of this on actual management or supervisory practices; and (15) efforts of the U.S., the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank to effect changes in emerging markets have focused on the countries' immediate needs to resolve nonviable banks and debtor companies as well as long-term goals to improve financial systems. |
gao_GAO-07-275 | gao_GAO-07-275_0 | However, we cautioned that this estimate could grow because it was largely based on preliminary assessments. The Ethics Officer reviewed the disclosure and concluded that the interest did not represent a conflict under the Smithsonian’s Standards of Conduct or a prohibited financial interest under federal law because SBV’s Chief Executive Officer did not have a general partnership interest in the Sundance Channel and was not participating in negotiations concerning the sale of interests in the channel. GAO’s Ethics Officer reviewed the documentation and the Smithsonian’s decision and concurred with the findings. The Smithsonian Traded Semiexclusive Commercial Distribution Rights to Produce and Distribute Certain Audiovisual Programs Using Smithsonian Content for 30 Years for National Exposure and a New Revenue Stream
The Smithsonian granted the new venture a 30-year, semiexclusive right to produce and commercially distribute certain audiovisual programs using Smithsonian trademarks and/or content in exchange for national television exposure and a new revenue stream. The new channel is projected to reach more than 31 million households by 2010, which the Smithsonian hopes will increase its brand recognition and have a synergistic effect on other revenues by increasing memberships, merchandise sales, and concession sales through increased visitation to the museums. Showtime was attracted to the vast amount of Smithsonian content and the Smithsonian’s good reputation and widely recognized brand name. The contract contains no restrictions on public access to the collections. However, the noncompete clauses generally prohibit the Smithsonian from entering into agreements or engaging in activities that would compete with the new venture. The Smithsonian Has Been Working to Implement the Contract, but It Has Provided Insufficient Information to Interested Parties
Since the contract became effective in January 2006, the Smithsonian has been working to put in place policies and procedures necessary to implement the contract, but the information it has provided about the contract’s impact to interested parties has been insufficient. As a result, decisions on some filming requests received in early 2006 were delayed until March 2006 when the Smithsonian established a central review committee in the Office of Public Affairs to review filming requests for compliance with the contract and began informing its PIOs about the changes to the filming application process. A review committee member mentioned that the committee directs filmmakers to the Smithsonian’s Web site for answers to “Frequently Asked Questions,” but it provides little information about Smithsonian on Demand. Aside from direct potential impacts on filmmakers, larger concerns have been raised about damage to the Smithsonian’s image and goodwill. The Smithsonian’s Historical Analysis of Filming Contracts Is Unreliable and It Should Not Be Used to Estimate the Contract’s Potential Impact
On the basis of a historical analysis of filming contracts over a 6-year period from 2000 through 2005, the Smithsonian contends that it will be able to accommodate the same level of filming activity as it has in the past. Concerns have been raised by filmmakers, curators, and other interested parties regarding the appropriateness of the Smithsonian limiting the use of the collections held in trust for the American public for the direct benefit of a single commercial enterprise, as well as other potential impacts of the contract. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) evaluate the extent to which the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) followed its internal guidelines with respect to competition, oversight, and protecting against conflicts of interest when negotiating the contract with Showtime Networks Inc., (Showtime); (2) identify what the Smithsonian gave up and received in return under the contract; (3) evaluate the Smithsonian’s implementation of the contract; and (4) identify what, if any, impacts the contract has had on outside parties. To evaluate the extent to which the Smithsonian followed its internal guidelines for competition, oversight, and conflicts of interest, we obtained and reviewed bylaws and meeting minutes for the Smithsonian’s Board of Regents and Smithsonian Business Venture’s (SBV) Board of Directors, documentation related to a potential conflict of interest, and Smithsonian guidelines regarding contracting and conflicts of interest. We also interviewed the Smithsonian and Showtime officials involved in negotiating the contract. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2006, the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) announced that it had entered into a 30-year contract with Showtime Networks Inc., (Showtime) to create a digital on-demand television channel. Members of Congress and other interested parties, particularly filmmakers, raised issues about the contract's potential effects on public access to and use of the Smithsonian's collections, its confidential nature, and the process by which the Smithsonian negotiated it. This report discusses (1) the extent to which the Smithsonian followed its internal contracting guidelines, (2) what the Smithsonian gave up and received in return under the contract, (3) the Smithsonian's implementation of the contract, and (4) the contract's potential impact on outside parties. GAO reviewed the contract and pertinent documents, and interviewed Smithsonian and Showtime officials.
What GAO Found
The Smithsonian followed its internal contracting guidelines regarding competition, oversight, and conflicts of interest. When it began exploring a television venture in 2002, it approached 18 major media companies and negotiated with two before reaching a deal with Showtime. The process was overseen by Smithsonian Business Ventures' (SBV) Board of Directors and the Smithsonian's Board of Regents, who approved the contract in November 2005. When SBV's Chief Executive Officer disclosed a potential conflict of interest, the Smithsonian's Ethics Officer reviewed the disclosure in accordance with Smithsonian policies and concluded that no conflict existed. GAO's Ethics Officer concurred with the Smithsonian's decision. The Smithsonian granted the new venture a 30-year, semiexclusive right to produce and commercially distribute audiovisual programs using Smithsonian trademarks and/or content in exchange for national television exposure and new revenue. The Smithsonian projects that the new channel will reach more than 31 million households by 2010 and will have a total value of over $150 million after 10 years. The Smithsonian's major concession is a noncompete clause that generally prohibits it from engaging in activities that would compete with the new venture. The Smithsonian negotiated exceptions for various news and educational programs. The Smithsonian has been working to implement policies and procedures necessary under the contract since it became effective in January 2006, but the information that it has provided to interested parties has been insufficient. The Smithsonian and Showtime waited until March 2006 to publicly announce the new venture and did not implement internal processes to review filming requests for compliance with the contract until after the public announcement. The Smithsonian has created a committee to review filming requests, but does not document in detail its rationale for key decisions or attempt to synthesize these decisions over time. Also, the "Frequently Asked Questions" on the Smithsonian's Web site provides little information for filmmakers about the new contract. It is too early to determine the long-term impact of the contract. Access to the Smithsonian's collections and staff for research purposes remains unchanged, but the direct impact on filmmakers will depend largely on how many request permission to use a substantial amount of Smithsonian content. So far, 6 of 117 filming requests have involved a substantial amount of Smithsonian content--2 were denied and 4 were approved as exceptions. The Smithsonian contends that it will be able to accommodate the same level of filming activity as it has in the past based on its historical analysis of filming contracts. GAO found that this analysis was unreliable because it was based on incomplete data and oversimplified criteria. In addition, concerns have been raised about damage to the Smithsonian's image and the appropriateness of limiting the use of the collections held in trust for the American public. |
gao_GAO-11-227 | gao_GAO-11-227_0 | According to NSC officials, this document serves as a governmentwide strategy for the 4-year initiative. Interagency Strategy for the 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative Lacks Key Implementation Details, and the Initiative’s Overall Costs, Time Frames, and Scope Are Uncertain
We found that the interagency strategy for the 4-year global nuclear material security initiative lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of and details regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. The future of these efforts in Russia could be jeopardized by an uncertain high-level Russian political commitment to further nuclear security cooperation with the United States. In particular, because of the challenges facing the MPC&A program, NNSA is unlikely to meet the deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will likely need to continue in Russia beyond 2012. NNSA Program Securing Russian Nuclear Warhead and Material Facilities Has Made Progress, while NNSA Programs to Consolidate Russian HEU and Convert Russian Research Reactors Have Produced More Limited Results
While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress in improving the security of Russia’s nuclear warheads and material facilities, the other two programs—MCC and GTRI—have had more limited success in achieving their objectives in Russia. The MPC&A program in particular faces two principal challenges to completing its efforts in Russia by the end of 2012, as required under U.S. law, including (1) successfully completing upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and (2) developing both Russian national-level infrastructure and practices and procedures at Russian sites to ensure effective long-term sustainability of MPC&A systems for nuclear materials. NNSA’s Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Security in Other Countries Are Under Way, but Progress Is Mixed
In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In two countries that are believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles— China and India—NNSA’s efforts have been primarily limited to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects, rather than working to develop a program of security improvements at nuclear material facilities in those countries. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon- usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA take the following three actions: to assist Congress in its decision whether and for how long to extend the current deadline, clarify in a written plan the scope of remaining MPC&A work in Russia beyond the current program deadline, including information on remaining MPC&A activities by site or facility, timelines, and estimated costs of completing MPC&A program work in that country; to enhance NNSA nuclear nonproliferation program planning, and provide a clearer picture of Russia’s willingness and ability to support and sustain MPC&A and other nuclear security investments the United States has made in Russia, strengthen cooperation with the Russian government regarding the transparency of its current and future spending plans on nuclear security programs and activities; and reevaluate NNSA strategies—with an eye toward new incentives, inducements, or other sources of leverage—to persuade Russia to expand its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the conversion of Russian HEU-fueled research reactors and related facilities. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide.
What GAO Found
NSC officials have approved a governmentwide strategy for the President's 4-year global nuclear material security initiative that describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support the initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame, and scope of planned work. Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs GAO reviewed--the MPC&A program, the Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)--have made varying degrees of progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress securing Russia's nuclear warhead and material facilities, the MCC and GTRI programs have had more limited success achieving their objectives in Russia. Moreover, the future of these efforts in Russia is unclear because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Each of these three programs also faces implementation challenges. The MPC&A program, in particular, faces challenges in successfully completing upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and in transitioning responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A systems. Because of the time required to address these challenges, NNSA is unlikely to meet a deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will need to continue in Russia beyond the statutory deadline. In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In two countries believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles--China and India--political sensitivities have limited NNSA's efforts in both nations to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects instead of implementing MPC&A activities directly at nuclear sites. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. In particular, NNSA officials reported progress in negotiations with several nations--including Ukraine and South Africa--following the summit for the removal of some highly enriched uranium located in those countries. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program activities in Russia.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-40 | gao_GAO-10-40_0 | Assessments of CoreFLS
The department’s first attempt to replace its financial and asset management systems, CoreFLS, began in 1998. The FLITE program includes two main projects to acquire the integrated asset and financial management system: an asset management component, referred to as the Strategic Asset Management (SAM) initiative, and the financial management component, referred to as the Integrated Financial Accounting System (IFAS). This 2-month schedule slip was a consequence of the contractor falling behind in its efforts to perform tasks and deliver products that are necessary to implement the pilot system. Specifically, of the 34 tasks planned to be undertaken by mid- September, the contractor reported that 11 had not yet been started— including conducting a security assessment and predeployment testing— and that of 23 tasks that had been initiated, 16 were behind schedule. VA attributed the project being 2 months behind schedule to a shortage of FLITE program office human capital resources and poor project management by the contractor. A contract for the IFAS pilot is planned for award in late October 2009. VA Has Recently Filled FLITE Program Staff Positions but Has Not Yet Fully Established Other Program Management Capabilities
VA has taken steps to institute effective management of the FLITE program; however, the department has not yet fully established key capabilities needed to ensure that system components will be implemented as planned. Until VA completes efforts to develop and reconcile its cost estimate; comply with EVM system standards; implement performance measures for its schedule; include all relevant federal and system requirements; and perform effective, independent verification and validation, it will have increased risk that FLITE will experience cost overruns and schedule delays and will not provide the capabilities that users need. VA has not yet established a schedule for the program that is reliable. Program officials recognize the importance of reconciling their cost estimate, ensuring compliance with EVM system standards, establishing a reliable schedule, ensuring all relevant federal and system requirements are identified and traceable, and addressing all independent verification and validation findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested, the objectives of our study were to (1) determine the status of the Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise’s (FLITE) pilot system development and (2) evaluate key program management processes, including the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) efforts to institute effective human capital management, develop a reliable program cost estimate, use earned value management, establish a realistic program schedule, employ effective requirements development and management, and perform independent verification and validation. To evaluate key program management processes, we compared program staffing plans with the program’s staffing resource reports to determine the extent to which program human capital needs have been met; compared the program cost estimate and estimating activities to Office of Management and Budget guidance and GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide to determine the estimate’s completeness and the effectiveness of the estimating activities; reviewed department documentation, such as the program’s plan for earned value management implementation, and compared them to federal policy and GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide to determine the department’s preparedness for conducting reliable earned value management; reviewed the program schedule and compared it to planned activities, deliverables, and practices described in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide to assess the schedule’s reliability; analyzed program documentation, including the department’s business requirements, concept of operations for FLITE, traceability matrix, and requirements management plan, to determine the extent to which they reflect practices such as those recognized by SEI and include federal financial management system requirements; and reviewed program documentation, such as the software quality assurance plan, quality management plan, and technical review reports, to determine the extent to which the program has addressed independent verification and validation findings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2005, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has been undertaking an initiative to develop an integrated financial and asset management system known as the Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise (FLITE). FLITE is the successor to an earlier initiative known as the Core Financial and Logistics System (CoreFLS) that the department undertook in 1998 and discontinued in 2004 because it failed to support VA's operations. In light of the past performance of CoreFLS and the Office of Management and Budget's designation of FLITE as high risk, GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of pilot system development and (2) evaluate key program management processes, including VA's efforts to institute effective human capital management, develop a reliable program cost estimate, use earned value management (a recognized means for measuring program progress), establish a realistic program schedule, employ effective requirements development and management, and perform independent verification and validation. To do so, GAO reviewed program documentation and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
Contract award and performance of work tasks had been started for one of two planned pilot systems--the Strategic Asset Management system. However, as of mid-September, the project had fallen behind (by 2 months) and the contractor had missed the deadline for initiating and completing planned tasks and delivering work products such as a system security plan. In particular, the contractor had not started 11 of 34 tasks, including conducting a security assessment, and was behind schedule on 16 of the remaining 23 tasks, including analyzing business processes. Program officials generally attributed the delays to VA having insufficient program and acquisition staff to perform necessary activities associated with awarding and executing the pilot contract and to poor project management by the pilot system contractor. A second project--for the Integrated Financial Accounting System pilot--is expected to start in October 2009. VA has taken steps to institute effective management of FLITE; however, the department has not yet fully established capabilities needed to ensure that the program will be successfully implemented. Specifically, VA has (1) recently filled long-standing staff vacancies, and only one program office staff opening remains; (2) not developed a cost estimate that includes total program costs or reconciled its estimate with an independent estimate; (3) not performed key actions necessary for reliable earned value management; (4) not yet established a schedule that is reliable; (5) not identified all mandatory federal financial management system requirements and ensured that system requirements are based on business requirements; and (6) not addressed all of the findings of its independent verification and validation organization in a timely manner. Until VA reconciles its cost estimate, ensures compliance with earned value management system standards, establishes a reliable schedule, ensures all relevant federal and system requirements are identified and traceable, and addresses all independent verification and validation findings, it could continue to experience schedule delays and further increase its risk of not providing the financial and asset management capabilities that users need. |
gao_GAO-17-186 | gao_GAO-17-186_0 | Without easily accessible customer service information, taxpayers are less likely to be informed on what to expect when requesting services from IRS. IRS Improved Aspects of Service but Inefficiencies and Potentially Weak Internal Controls Reduce IRS’s Ability to Serve IDT Victims and Protect Federal Dollars
IRS Reduced Time to Resolve IDT Cases, but Inefficient Processes Contribute to Delays
IRS opens IDT cases when (1) it identifies potential IDT through its automated filters and other reviews of taxpayer returns, or (2) taxpayers alert IRS to potential IDT, such as when they are unable to file a tax return electronically because a fraudster already filed one for that taxpayer. In 3 of 16 cases we reviewed, file retrieval and scanning contributed to delays and unnecessary requests for documents. For cases 10 and 13, resolution was delayed by at least 1 month while the assistor waited for another unit to retrieve and scan documents into IRS’s inventory system to use in reviewing the case. According to IRS assistors and managers who participated in our discussion groups, some assistors may release refunds that could be paid to fraudsters in spite of having a refund hold in place on the taxpayer’s account. This can occur even when indicators on the account show that the tax return is under review for identity theft or that two returns have been filed for that taxpayer’s account (duplicate return filing). IRS Does Not Notify Taxpayers When Any Dependents’ Information Appears on a Fraudulent Tax Return
IRS notifies primary and secondary taxpayers when it learns that either have been a victim of IDT refund fraud, but it does not notify taxpayers that their dependents’ information may have been used to commit fraud. However, this is not the case when a dependent’s identity is used as a dependent on a fraudulent return, as we observed in case 11. IRS has previously provided guidance to taxpayers when a dependent was a victim of identity theft. In the letter, IRS provided information on actions that parents or guardians could take to protect a minor’s identity. However, by not notifying the taxpayers that their dependents’ information may have been used to commit fraud, IRS is limiting taxpayers’ ability to take action to protect the dependent’s identity. However, we found instances where IRS’s processes for document retrieval and scanning delayed case resolution. IRS agreed with our recommendations to develop and maintain an online dashboard to convey customer service standards and performance information; review its document retrieval and scanning processes to provide additional training and guidance to ensure documents are not requested unnecessarily; and revise its notices to IDT victims to alert taxpayers of the need to protect dependent accounts from potential fraud and supplement information on its website. IRS disagreed with the finding that it does not know the extent to which its internal control processes prevent the release of fraudulent refunds and with the related recommendation that it improve existing data and collect new data to effectively monitor how often IRS issues refunds before closing an IDT or duplicate return case. Further, IRS maintains that its current methods are sufficient for detecting such errors and the problem is not widespread. In response to our draft report, in January 2017 officials provided another analysis of IRS data that they said showed this type of error does occur but may not be as widespread as the discussion group participants suggested. We will continue to work with IRS to determine if these additional data are sufficient to address our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to assess how well the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided customer service compared to its performance in prior years and describe what is known about the cost of calls on selected IRS telephone lines; how well IRS processed individual income tax returns compared to its performance in prior years; and IRS’s efforts to improve customer service for (IDT) victims, including selected internal control processes. To answer the first two objectives, we obtained and analyzed IRS documents and data, including performance, budget, and workload data for taxpayer services and return processing, and used this information to compare IRS’s performance in 2016 to 2011 through 2015, which allowed us to identify trends and anomalies over a 6-year period; collected data and interviewed IRS officials who manage IRS toll-free telephone lines to understand how IRS plans and allocates its resources managing its telephone service, and what data IRS has available to achieve this, such as the average cost per call; interviewed officials from IRS’s Wage and Investment division (which is responsible for managing filing season operations) and external stakeholders to obtain contextual information about IRS’s performance. We held three discussion groups with assistors and two groups with managers that oversee assistors who handle IDT cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to review IRS's 2016 filing season. This report assesses, among other things, how well IRS provided service to taxpayers compared to its performance in prior years, and its efforts to improve service for IDT victims, including selected internal control processes.
GAO analyzed IRS documents and data for fiscal years 2011 through 2016 and reviewed 16 randomly selected IDT cases open or closed during a 10-month period in 2015 and 2016. GAO also conducted 5 discussion groups with 15 IRS assistors and 13 managers who handle IDT cases, and interviewed IRS officials and external stakeholders, such as representatives from the tax preparation industry. The results of the case studies and discussion groups are not generalizable. GAO compared IRS actions to federal standards for evaluating performance and internal control.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided better telephone service to callers during the 2016 filing season—generally between January and mid-April—compared to 2015. However, its performance during the full fiscal year remained low. IRS does not make this nor other types of customer service information easily available to taxpayers, such as in an online dashboard. Without easily accessible information, taxpayers are not well informed on what to expect when requesting services from IRS.
IRS has improved aspects of service for victims of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud. However, inefficiencies contribute to delays, and potentially weak internal controls may lead to the release of fraudulent refunds. In turn, this limits IRS's ability to serve taxpayers and protect federal dollars. While IRS has reduced its backlog of IDT cases and formed a team to improve its handling of these cases, GAO has identified areas for potential improvement. Specifically:
File retrieval and scanning processes contributed to delays and unnecessary requests for documents. For example, in 2 of 16 cases, resolution was delayed by at least 1 month while an assistor waited for another unit to retrieve and scan documents into IRS's system. In one of those cases, plus one other, the document request was unnecessary because the assistor closed the case without the document. Inefficient processes and unnecessary requests to retrieve and scan documents can delay case resolution and refunds to the legitimate taxpayer.
Potential weaknesses in IRS's internal control processes could lead to IRS paying refunds to fraudsters. In discussion groups with GAO, IRS assistors and managers said some assistors may release refunds even if indicators on the account show that the tax return is under review for IDT, or two returns have been filed for that taxpayer. Some participants said assistors answering telephone calls can release these holds because they do not understand the codes on the taxpayer's account. IRS officials said that these errors are not widespread and provided data to support their position. However, GAO identified weaknesses in those data, which IRS officials acknowledged. In response to this report, in January 2017 officials provided another analysis of IRS data that they said showed this type of error does occur but may not be as widespread as staff and managers suggested. GAO will continue to work with IRS to determine if these additional data are sufficient to address its recommendation.
IRS does not notify taxpayers when a dependent's identity appears on a fraudulent return. According to IRS officials, the agency does not consider a dependent to be a victim if his or her Social Security number had been used as a dependent on a fraudulent return. However, IRS has previously provided guidance to taxpayers when a dependent was a victim of identity theft. After one data breach in 2015, IRS notified taxpayers and provided information on actions that parents could take to protect a minor's identity when their dependents were also victims. By not notifying taxpayers that their dependents' information may have been used to commit fraud, IRS is limiting taxpayers' ability to take action to protect their dependents' identity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends IRS display customer service standards and performance online; review its retrieval and scanning processes; improve existing data or collect new data to monitor how and why assistors release refunds before closing an IDT or duplicate return case; and revise its notices to IDT victims.
IRS disagreed with GAO's recommendation to improve data for monitoring refund releases, stating that the problem is not widespread and current processes are sufficient. GAO maintains that the data IRS uses are not sufficient to make such a determination. IRS agreed with the remaining three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-558 | gao_GAO-14-558_0 | Television Stations Are Increasingly Sharing Services through a Variety of Broadcaster Agreements, but Data on the Prevalence of These Agreements Are Limited
Television Stations Can Share a Variety of Services through Broadcaster Agreements
Television stations can enter into agreements with other stations to share or provide a variety of services. Common services that can be shared or provided between stations include:
News resources. In some cases, FCC has established regulatory definitions for these agreements; in other cases, it is a common industry term that may be used to characterize an agreement, but there is no regulatory definition. While Data Are Limited on the Number and Nature of Broadcaster Agreements, Stakeholders Report That Agreements Are Becoming More Prevalent
Data Limitations
Broadcast stations are required to maintain a “public file” that contains information about each station’s operations and service. Broadcasters and financial analysts told us that one factor contributing to the greater use of agreements in small to medium markets is that stations in these markets receive less advertising revenue than stations in large markets. Thus, broadcasters in small- and medium-sized markets are more likely to enter into agreements to share or reduce costs. own or control locally and nationwide. Station owners counter that these agreements do not necessarily lead to duplicative local news programming and can, in fact, better serve residents by providing news at different times. They added that the agreements have also provided localism and diversity benefits by allowing some stations that previously did not provide news to begin doing so, or to add additional local programming. However, comprehensive data on the extent to which these agreements affect retransmission consent fees are not available, because retransmission consent fee negotiations are subject to non-disclosure agreements. FCC Has Not Completed a Review of the Use and Impacts of Broadcaster Agreements
FCC Evaluates Individual Broadcaster Agreements as Part of Its Review of Mergers and Acquisitions
FCC’s Media Bureau will also review agreements if they are challenged by an outside party. Station owners told us that by limiting the number of stations an entity can own in a local market, the media ownership rules have led companies to enter into broadcaster agreements as a means of realizing economic efficiencies that they are unable to achieve through acquisitions. FCC has stated that it is unable to determine the extent to which broadcaster agreements affect its media ownership rules and policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity. Yet federal standards for internal control, which provide the overall framework for identifying and addressing major performance and management challenges, note the importance of obtaining information from external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on an agency achieving its goals. To some extent, this uncertainty exists because FCC has not collected data or completed a review to understand how broadcaster agreements are being used and the potential impacts with respect to its media ownership rules and the corresponding policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity. Specifically, FCC has not collected comprehensive data to determine the number of agreements, the services provided through the agreements, and other relevant data to provide useful context, such as the market and station characteristics associated with the use of agreements. Broadcasters, station owners, and consumer groups have provided counterarguments about the effect of broadcaster agreements on FCC’s media ownership rules and its policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity. However, without conducting a fact-based analysis of how agreements are being used, FCC cannot ensure its current and future policies on broadcaster agreements serve the public interest. Recommendation for Executive Action
FCC should determine whether it needs to collect additional data to understand the prevalence and context of broadcaster agreements. FCC should also evaluate whether broadcaster agreements affect its media policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity. FCC also noted that it has taken initial steps to address the recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the uses and prevalence of broadcaster agreements in the television industry; (2) stakeholders’ views on the effects of broadcaster agreements on programming and the subscription video industry; and (3) the extent, if at all, that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has regulated these agreements. We defined a broadcaster agreement as any instance where two or more independently owned stations within the same DMA have entered into any of the following agreements: time brokerage agreement/local marketing agreement, shared service agreement, joint sales agreement, and local news service agreement. To determine stakeholders’ views on the effects of broadcaster agreements on programming and the subscription video industry, we reviewed FCC dockets and interviewed representatives of broadcast networks; local television station owners; cable, satellite, and other subscription video service providers; trade associations; labor groups; consumer groups; financial analysts; and other individuals with knowledge of the broadcast industry to obtain their views and identify any supporting studies and data on the effects of broadcaster agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Local television stations play an important role in educating, entertaining, and informing the citizens they serve. FCC limits the number of television stations an entity can own or control to advance its media policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity. Competing television stations are entering into agreements to share or outsource services, and some policymakers are concerned about the effects of these agreements on competition and programming.
GAO was asked to review issues related to broadcaster agreements. This report examines (1) the uses and prevalence of broadcaster agreements; (2) stakeholders' views on the effects of broadcaster agreements; and (3) the extent, if at all, that FCC has regulated these agreements.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant FCC proceedings; conducted a literature review; interviewed officials from FCC, industry, and consumer associations; and conducted nongeneralizable case studies in 6 markets (3 with agreements and 3 without) selected from small and medium-sized markets.
What GAO Found
Local television stations use broadcaster agreements to share services with one another, but data are limited on the prevalence of these agreements. Stations use agreements to share or outsource a range of services, such as selling advertising time and producing local news. Agreements are referred to by a variety of names and two—joint sales agreements and local marketing agreements—have regulatory definitions; other types of agreements have commonly been referred to as shared service agreements or local news service agreements. Stations may participate in more than one type of agreement. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officials and industry representatives could not identify a central data source that tracks all broadcaster agreements. Station owners and financial analysts said that agreements are more prevalent in small markets because they have lower advertising revenues than large markets. Further, FCC officials and stakeholders said that agreements are becoming more prevalent, and stakeholders stated that economic factors, including declining advertising revenues, drive the use of agreements.
Stakeholders expressed mixed views on the effects of broadcaster agreements. Consumer groups raised concerns that agreements in which stations share news resources can lead to duplicative content in local newscasts. Station owners counter that the agreements are needed to allow some stations to continue providing news and allow other stations that previously did not provide news to begin doing so. In addition, some agreements include provisions that allow stations to jointly negotiate for their signals to be carried by cable and satellite providers. Cable and satellite providers argue that these agreements increase stations' negotiating leverage and thereby contribute to higher prices for cable and satellite service. In contrast, station owners counter that these concerns are overstated. Comprehensive data are not available to evaluate this issue, because the negotiations are subject to nondisclosure agreements, and there is no data source identifying which stations participate in agreements.
FCC evaluates broadcaster agreements that occur in the context of a merger or acquisition, but it has not collected data or completed a review to understand the use and effects of broadcaster agreements. FCC's recent regulatory approach has been to evaluate broadcaster agreements that occur as part of a merger or acquisition and to propose specific remedies as needed. To promote its media policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity, FCC established media ownership rules that limit the number of stations an entity can own or control in a local market. Station owners and consumer groups said that broadcaster agreements are used in situations where common ownership of stations is prohibited by FCC's media ownership rules. FCC has stated that it is unable to determine the extent to which broadcaster agreements affect its policy goals and media ownership rules. Specifically, FCC does not collect data and has not completed a review on the prevalence of agreements, how they are used, or their effects on its policy goals and media ownership rules. Yet federal standards for internal control note the importance of agencies' having information that may affect their goals. Without data and a fact-based analysis of how agreements are used, FCC cannot ensure that its current and future policies on broadcaster agreements serve the public interest.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should determine whether it needs to collect additional data to understand the prevalence and context of broadcast agreements and whether broadcaster agreements affect its media policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity. FCC agreed with the recommendation and noted that it has taken initial steps to address the recommendation, including proposing disclosure of sharing agreements. |
gao_NSIAD-96-232 | gao_NSIAD-96-232_0 | The European countries’ Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have raised a number of issues regarding the pricing of the MLU contracts. Rates and Factors Used to Price MLU Contracts
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman proposed and Air Force negotiators used rates and factors to price the two MLU prime contracts that were different from those used to price contemporaneous U.S. government contracts. Also, Air Force negotiators used two incorrect rates in pricing the Northrop Grumman prime contract. These two conditions increased the prime contract prices by a total of $9.4 million. . . that the applicable FPRA rates and factors used in the MLU program are the same as all other programs negotiated between the LFWC and the U.S. Government.” However, contrary to the Commander’s certification, the Air Force negotiated two other contracts with Lockheed Martin on the same day the MLU contract was negotiated using lower FPRA rates and factors. In responding to a draft of this report, the Air Force agreed a special set of rates and factors was used to price the MLU contract, but it believed the use of those rates and factors was in the best interest of the European participating governments. Northrop Grumman
Northrop Grumman proposed and the Air Force accepted a G&A overhead rate established for pricing foreign military sales contracts rather than a lower domestic rate established for pricing U.S. government contracts. DCAA also reported large amounts of proposed subcontract costs as unresolved because several subcontractor price proposals had not been audited at the time of its preaward audits. Air Force negotiators accepted the proposed and negotiated subcontract prices as fair and reasonable based on the prime contractors’ evaluation and negotiation efforts. There are indications that material is overpriced by as much as $947,000 under the two prime contracts because the prime contractors did not provide government negotiators with accurate, complete, and current data available for the items at the time of the contract price agreement dates. Lockheed Martin concluded Hazeltine’s proposed price was fair and reasonable and awarded the subcontract. Honeywell
Lockheed Martin used the same safeguard techniques in negotiating the Honeywell subcontract that are required to be used in negotiating subcontracts under U.S. government prime contracts. SAIs also selected two subcontracts for review. Both were awarded under the prime contract to Lockheed Martin. To determine whether the rates and factors used to price the two MLU prime contracts were the same as those used to price U.S. government contracts, we reviewed Air Force negotiation records to identify the rates and factors used for the MLU contracts. To determine how Air Force officials used DCAA audit recommendations in negotiating prices for the prime contracts, we reviewed the DCAA preaward audit reports and recommendations. To determine whether subcontract and material costs included in the contract prices were fair and reasonable, we compared the pricing safeguard techniques used by the contractors with those required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the pricing of selected contracts and subcontracts awarded under the F-16 Aircraft Mid-Life Update (MLU) Program, designed to develop, produce, and install upgrades to F-16 fighter aircraft owned by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, focusing on: (1) differences between the rates and factors used to price two selected prime contracts and those used to price contemporaneous U.S. contracts; (2) how the Air Force used Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) recommendations in negotiating prime contract prices; and (3) whether the prime contracts' prices for material and subcontract costs were fair and reasonable.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the prime contractors proposed and Air Force negotiators accepted rates and factors to price the two MLU contracts that were different from those used to price contemporaneous U.S. government contracts; (2) the contract prices for the European participating governments were $9.4 million higher due to the use of different rates and factors; (3) the Defense Plant Representative Office Commander certified that the forward pricing rate agreement (FPRA) rates and factors used to price the Lockheed Martin MLU contract were the same as those used to price all other contracts awarded to Lockheed Martin during the effective period of the agreement; (4) despite this certification, a special set of higher rates and factors was used to price the MLU contract rather than those called for in the FPRA; (5) for the Northrop Grumman contract, Air Force negotiators used a general and administrative overhead rate established for use in pricing foreign military sales rather than a lower domestic rate established for pricing U.S. government contracts; (6) Air Force negotiators also used two incorrect rates in pricing the MLU contract; (7) DCAA conducted preaward audits of the prime contractors' price proposals, questioned various costs, and reported large amounts of unresolved costs because audits had not been made of several subcontractor price proposals; (8) except for the rates and factors used for the Lockheed Martin contract, Air Force negotiators used DCAA's audit results to assist them in negotiating lower prices for the prime contracts; (9) Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman employed safeguard techniques required by U.S. procurement regulations to evaluate and negotiate subcontract and material prices for the prime contracts, and Air Force negotiators accepted the proposed and negotiated subcontract prices as fair and reasonable; (10) there are indications that material in the two prime contracts may be overpriced by as much as $947,000; (11) as for the two subcontracts selected by the European countries' Supreme Audit Institutions for review, Lockheed Martin awarded the Hazeltine subcontract competitively and the Honeywell subcontract noncompetitively; (12) in negotiating the price of the Honeywell subcontract, Lockheed Martin used rates and factors recommended by the cognizant U.S. government contract administration activity and employed the required safeguard techniques; and (13) the Air Force accepted the prices of these two subcontracts as fair and reasonable. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-206 | gao_T-HEHS-98-206_0 | To remedy these problems, SSA decided to rereview all children whose benefits were terminated or denied on the basis of mental retardation. SSA Is Taking Steps to Improve the Quality of Decisions on Children
SSA’s quality assurance statistics on childhood cases show uneven accuracy rates across the states. Moreover, we noted the need to revise the listings 3 years ago. SSA also needs to continue its efforts to improve decisionmaking for childhood cases to better ensure that adjudicators apply the new eligibility criteria accurately and consistently. In view of the fact that many of SSA’s medical listings for children are outdated and allow eligibility to be based upon multiple standards of severity, our May 1998 report recommended that the Commissioner act immediately to update and modify its medical listings to incorporate advances in medicine and science and to reflect a uniform standard of severity. We will continue to monitor SSA’s implementation of the new eligibility criteria, including the agency’s actions to update its medical listings for children, as part of our mandate to report to the Congress by 1999 on the impact of the changes to the SSI program enacted by welfare reform. As part of that effort, we are monitoring what SSA is doing to ensure the accuracy and consistency of childhood disability decisions made under the new eligibility criteria. Related GAO Products
Supplemental Security Income: SSA Needs a Uniform Standard for Assessing Childhood Disability (GAO/HEHS-98-123, May 6, 1998). 5, 1996). 2, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) implementation of the new eligibility criteria for childhood disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA has made considerable progress in implementing the welfare reform changes in eligibility for SSI children; (2) SSA has taken important steps to safeguard fairness by identifying children whose benefits may have been terminated inappropriately and establishing remedial action to rereview their cases; (3) however, because SSA's medical listings reflect multiple levels of severity, SSA also needs to expedite updating and modifying its medical listings to ensure that all children are assessed against a uniform severity standard; (4) the need to revise the listings is a long-standing problem that GAO reported on in 1995; (5) moreover, SSA needs to take concerted action to follow through on its plan for monitoring and continually improving the quality of decisions regarding children; and (6) consistent with a legislative mandate, GAO will continue to focus its work on SSA's efforts to provide reasonable assurance that it can administer the program consistently and improve the accuracy of childhood disability decisions. |
gao_GAO-05-1041T | gao_GAO-05-1041T_0 | VA’s Charleston medical facility is affiliated with MUSC. VA Determined That the Charleston Facility Is in Good Condition and Is Currently Investing in Minor Renovations
VA and the CARES Commission concluded that the Charleston facility is in overall good condition and, with relatively minor renovations, can continue to meet veterans’ health care needs in the future. According to VA officials, the facility’s current condition is a result of targeted capital investments. In particular, VA invested about $11.6 million in nonrecurring maintenance projects over the last 5 years. The CARES Commission did not recommend replacing VA’s facility in Charleston as it did with facilities in some other locations. VA officials at the Charleston medical facility have a number of ongoing and planned capital maintenance and improvement projects to address the CARES Commission recommendations and to maintain the condition of the current medical center. VA officials estimate that the total cost for all planned capital maintenance and improvement projects is approximately $62 million. Limited Collaboration between VA and MUSC on a Joint Venture Facility Characterized Negotiations until Recently
VA and MUSC have collaborated and communicated to a limited extent on a proposal for a joint venture medical center over the past 3 years. As a result of the limited collaboration, negotiations over the proposal stalled. In August 2005, however, initial steps were taken to move the negotiations forward. Specifically, four workgroups were created—which include both VA and MUSC officials—and tasked with examining critical issues related to the proposal. In November 2002, the President of MUSC sent a proposal to the Secretary of VA about partnering with MUSC in the construction and operation of a new medical center in phase II of MUSC’s construction project. Under MUSC’s proposal, VA would vacate its current facility and move to a new facility located on MUSC property to the south of phase I. MUSC also indicated that sharing medical services would be a component of the joint venture—that is, VA and MUSC would enter into sharing agreements to buy, sell, or barter medical and support services. 3 for MUSC’s proposal and VA’s counterproposal.) In particular, before this summer, VA and MUSC had not exchanged critical information that would help facilitate negotiations. Recent Events Have Spurred Discussion and Collaboration Between VA and MUSC
On August 1, 2005, a congressional delegation visited Charleston to meet with VA and MUSC officials to discuss the joint venture proposal. After this visit, VA and MUSC agreed to establish workgroups to examine key issues associated with the joint venture proposal. Joint Venture Proposal Raises a Variety of Issues
The possibility of participating in the joint venture raises a number of issues for VA to consider. Some of these issues will be directly addressed by the workgroups, while others, such as the concerns of stakeholders, will not. In addition, some issues can be addressed through collaboration between VA and MUSC, while others may require VA to seek legislative remedies. Nevertheless, exploring the potential costs and benefits of a joint venture gives VA an opportunity to reexamine how it delivers health care services to the nation’s veterans and uses its affiliations with medical universities now and in the future. The prospect of establishing a joint venture medical center with MUSC presents a good opportunity for VA to study the feasibility of one method—expanding its relationships with university medical school affiliates to include the sharing of medical services in an integrated facility. VA Health Care: Framework for Analyzing Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services Decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) maintains partnerships, or affiliations, with university medical schools to obtain medical services for veterans and provide training for medical residents. In 2002, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC)--which is affiliated with VA's medical facility in Charleston--proposed that VA and MUSC enter into a joint venture for a new VA facility as part of MUSC's plan to expand its medical campus. Under the proposal, MUSC and VA would jointly construct and operate a new medical center in Charleston. In 2004, the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) Commission, an independent body charged with assessing VA's capital asset requirements, issued its recommendations on the realignment and modernization of VA's capital assets. Although the Commission did not recommend a replacement facility for Charleston, it did recommend, among other things, that VA promptly evaluate MUSC's proposal. This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary findings on the (1) current condition of the Charleston facility, (2) extent to which VA and MUSC collaborated on the joint venture proposal, and (3) issues for VA to consider when exploring the opportunity to participate in the joint venture. VA concurred with GAO's preliminary findings.
What GAO Found
The most recent VA facility assessment and the CARES Commission concluded that the Charleston medical facility is in overall good condition and, with some renovations, can continue to meet veterans' health care needs in the future. VA officials attribute this to VA's continued capital investments in the facility. For example, over the last 5 years, VA has invested approximately $11.6 million in nonrecurring maintenance projects, such as replacing the fire alarm system and roofing. To maintain the facility's condition over the next 10 years, VA officials from the Charleston facility have identified a number of planned capital maintenance and improvement projects, totaling approximately $62 million. VA and MUSC have collaborated and communicated to a limited extent over the past 3 years on a proposal for a joint venture medical center. For example, before this summer, VA and MUSC had not exchanged critical information that would help facilitate negotiations, such as cost analyses of the proposal. As a result of the limited collaboration, negotiations over the proposal stalled. However, after a congressional delegation visit in August 2005, VA and MUSC took steps to move the negotiations forward. Specifically, VA and MUSC established four workgroups to examine critical issues related to the proposal. The MUSC proposal for a new joint venture medical center presents an opportunity for exploring new ways of providing health care to Charleston's veterans, but it also raises a variety of complex issues for VA. These include the benefits and costs of investing in a joint facility compared with other alternatives, legal issues associated with the new facility such as leasing or transferring property, and potential concerns of stakeholders, including VA patients and employees. The workgroups established by VA and MUSC are expected to examine some, but not all, of these issues. Additionally, some issues can be addressed through collaboration between VA and MUSC, but others may require VA to seek legislative remedies. |
gao_GAO-06-174T | gao_GAO-06-174T_0 | However, as we have reported, the program, by design, is not actuarially sound because Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made available for policies covering some properties to encourage communities to join the program. As a result, the program does not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet the long-term future expected flood losses. FEMA has statutory authority to borrow funds from the Treasury to keep the NFIP solvent. Until the 2004 hurricane season, FEMA had been generally successful in keeping the NFIP on sound financial footing. As of August 2005, the program had borrowed $300 million to cover an estimated $1.8 billion in claims from the major disasters of 2004, including hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jean, which hit Florida and other East and Gulf Coast states. Following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, legislation was enacted that increased FEMA’s borrowing authority from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2008. Premium Subsidies and Repetitive-Loss Properties Affect NFIP’s Actuarial Soundness
In reauthorizing the NFIP in 2004, Congress noted that “repetitive-loss properties”—those that had resulted in two or more flood insurance claims payments of $1,000 or more over 10 years—constituted a significant drain on the resources of the NFIP. While these properties make up only about 1 percent of the properties insured under the NFIP, they account for 25 to 30 percent of all claims losses. It will be important in future studies of the NFIP to continue to analyze data on progress being made to reduce the inventory of subsidized NFIP repetitive loss properties, how the reduction of this inventory contributes to the financial stability of the program, and whether additional FEMA regulatory steps or congressional actions could contribute to the financial solvency of the NFIP, while meeting commitments made by the authorizing legislation. Data Inconclusive on Compliance with Requirements for Mandatory Purchase of NFIP Policies
In 1973 and 1994, Congress enacted requirements for mandatory purchase of NFIP policies by some property owners in high risk areas. In June 2002, we reported that the extent to which lenders were enforcing the mandatory purchase requirement was unknown. As a result of limitations in the sampling processes, FEMA cannot project the results of these monitoring and oversight activities to determine the overall accuracy of claims settled for specific flood events or assess the overall performance of insurance companies and their adjusters in fulfilling their responsibilities for the NFIP—actions necessary for FEMA to meet our internal control standard that it have reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved and that its operations are effective and efficient. FEMA Has Not Fully Implemented NFIP Program Changes Mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004
As of September 2005, FEMA had not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. The 6-month statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004. We are recommending in today’s report that FEMA developed documented plans with milestones for implementing requirements of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to provide policyholders a flood insurance claims handbook that meets statutory requirements, to establish a regulatory appeals process, and to ensure that flood insurance agents meet minimum NFIP education and training requirements. FEMA did not agree with our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The disastrous hurricanes that have struck the Gulf Coast and Eastern seaboard in recent years--including Katrina, Rita, Ivan, and Isabel--have focused attention on federal flood management efforts. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968, provides property owners with some insurance coverage for flood damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing the NFIP. This testimony offers information from past GAO work on (1) the financial structure of the NFIP; (2) why the NFIP insures properties for repetitive flood losses and the impact on NFIP resources; and (3) compliance with requirements for mandatory purchase of NFIP policies. The testimony also discusses recommendations from a report GAO is issuing today on FEMA's oversight and management of the NFIP.
What GAO Found
As GAO has reported, the NFIP, by design, is not actuarially sound. The program does not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet long-term future expected flood losses, in part because Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made available for some properties. FEMA has generally been successful in keeping the NFIP on a sound financial footing, but the catastrophic flooding events of 2004 (involving four separate hurricanes) required FEMA, as of August 2005, to borrow $300 million from the U.S. Treasury to help pay an estimated $1.8 billion on flood insurance claims. Following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, legislation was enacted to increase FEMA's borrowing authority from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2008. Properties that suffer repeated flooding but generally pay subsidized flood insurance rates==so-called repetitive-loss properties--constitute a significant drain on NFIP resources. These properties account for roughly 1 percent of properties insured under the NFIP, but account for 25 percent to 30 percent of all claim losses. The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 established a pilot program requiring owners of repetitive-loss properties to elevate, relocate, or demolish houses, with NFIP bearing some of those costs. Future studies of the NFIP should analyze the progress made to reduce the inventory of subsidized repetitive-loss properties, and determine whether additional regulatory or congressional action is needed. In 1973 and again in 1994, legislation was enacted requiring the mandatory purchase of NFIP policies by some property owners in high-risk areas. In June 2002, GAO reported that the extent to which lenders were required to enforce mandatory purchase requirements was unknown. While FEMA officials believed that many lenders often were noncompliant, neither side could substantiate its claims regarding compliance. FEMA did not use a statistically valid method for sampling files to be reviewed in its monitoring and oversight activities. As a result, FEMA cannot project the results of these reviews to determine the overall accuracy of claims settled for specific flood events or assess the overall performance of insurance companies and their adjusters in fulfilling responsibilities for the NFIP-actions necessary for FEMA to have reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved. FEMA has not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 requiring the agency to develop new materials to explain coverage and the claims process to policyholders when they purchase and renew policies, establish an appeals process for claimants, and provide insurance agent education and training requirements. The statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004, and as of September 2005 FEMA had not developed documented plans with milestones for meeting the provisions of the act. |
gao_GAO-11-957T | gao_GAO-11-957T_0 | DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA have taken actions to coordinate and collaborate in their efforts to develop and deploy technologies for aviation security. DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges in Developing and Meeting Key Performance Requirements for Various Technologies
Our past work has found that technology program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. For example, in June 2010, we reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines. In addition, our past work has found that TSA faces challenges in identifying and meeting program requirements in a number of its programs. For example: In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised its explosive detection system (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and plans to implement these requirements in a phased approach. However, we reported that some number of the EDSs in TSA’s fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005 requirements. When TSA established the 2005 requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the requirements. DHS and TSA Have Encountered Challenges in Overseeing and Testing New Technologies
Our prior work has also shown that not resolving problems discovered during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later date. DHS concurred and reported actions underway to address them. In July 2011, we reported that TSA experienced challenges in collecting explosives data on the physical and chemical properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software. TSA and S&T have experienced these challenges because of problems associated with safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The challenges related to data collection for certain explosives have resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high installation costs. Our prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives, and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. For example, we have reported that TSA has not consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision making. In June 2011, DHS reported to us that it is taking steps to strengthen its investment and acquisition management processes across the department by implementing a decision-making process at critical phases throughout the investment life cycle. The actions DHS reports taking or has underway to address the management of its acquisitions and the development of new technologies are positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the department address many of these challenges. Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions. Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland security needs. TSA's acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments including technologies used to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. GAO's testimony addresses three key challenges identified in past work: (1) developing technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new technologies, and (3) incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology acquisition decisions. This statement also addresses recent DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition processes. This statement is based on reports and testimonies GAO issued from October 2009 through September 2011 related to TSA's efforts to manage, test, and deploy various technology programs.
What GAO Found
GAO's past work has found that TSA has faced challenges in developing technology program requirements on a systemic and individual basis. Program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. In June 2010, GAO reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs (including 3 TSA programs) GAO reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines. At the program level, in July 2011, GAO reported that in 2010 TSA revised its explosive detection systems (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and plans to implement these requirements in a phased approach. However, GAO reported that some number of the EDSs in TSA's fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005 requirements and TSA did not have a plan with time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the current requirements. GAO has also reported DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing new technologies. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that TSA experienced challenges in collecting data on the physical and chemical properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software and needed by TSA before procuring and deploying EDSs to airports. TSA and DHS Science and Technology Directorate have experienced these challenges because of problems associated with safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The challenges related to data collection for certain explosives have resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. In addition, in October 2009, GAO reported that TSA deployed explosives trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high installation costs. GAO's prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives, and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO has reported that TSA has not consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision making. In June 2011, DHS reported that it is taking steps to strengthen its investment and acquisition management processes by implementing a decision-making process at critical phases throughout the investment life cycle. The actions DHS reports taking to address the management of its acquisitions and the development of new technologies are positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the department address many of these challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address challenges related to deploying EDS to meet requirements, overseeing and conducting testing of new technologies, and incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology acquisition decisions. DHS and TSA concurred and described actions underway to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-511 | gao_GAO-03-511_0 | Investment banks’ duties to their clients depend on the activities in which the investment banks engage. SPEs may also create certain tax advantages for the participating parties. Investment banks played key roles in each of the transactions discussed in this report. (See appendix II for a detailed description of these transactions and the roles played by investment banks.) In a publicly available Chase document related to the design of the Slapshot transaction, Chase indicated that an advantage of one aspect of the structure of the transaction was that it provided “no road map for Revenue Canada.” If Chase knowingly and substantially assisted Enron in evading taxes, resulting in the reporting of incorrect information in Enron’s financial statements, and such reporting was a violation of the securities laws, SEC would have the authority to bring an enforcement action against Chase for aiding and abetting Enron’s securities fraud. Section 705 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that we review investment bank involvement in the failure of Global Crossing, “including with respect to transactions involving swaps of fiber optic cable capacity.” It has been reported in the press, and plaintiffs have alleged in civil actions, that Global Crossing improperly reported as revenue the proceeds it received from sales of fiber optic capacity and services in transactions with counterparties; however, to our knowledge, no investment banks were involved in these transactions. Investment Banks and Federal Financial Regulators Have Begun Strengthening Their Oversight of Structured Finance Transactions Since Enron’s Collapse
According to the investment banks we spoke with, the transactions discussed here were vetted through their internal risk management processes. For example, one investment bank told us that it had been engaging in prepay transactions with Enron for about a decade and that it had closely reviewed the initial transactions but not subsequent prepays, which were not seen as a new type of transaction. Bank regulators said that these are positive steps toward strengthening internal processes but noted that it is too early to evaluate how well the changes will work. Each regulator is responsible for specific activities. Federal financial regulators noted that prior to Enron’s collapse they had not viewed reputation risk from structured transactions as a high-risk area, primarily because (1) the risk focus was on traditional market, credit, and operational risks; (2) the size and volume of transactions were small relative to the total capital of relevant financial institutions; (3) many such transactions are conducted with investment-grade firms; and (4) with respect to securities firms, many of the activities may have taken place in affiliates outside of the SEC-regulated broker-dealer. Federal Financial Regulators Have Made Changes to Their Oversight Processes As a Result of the Enron Scandal
Federal financial regulators said that since the Enron scandal they have refined their approach to supervising certain operational aspects of the institutions that are involved in complex structured transactions. Based on the results of these reviews, the agencies intend to develop consistent guidance and best practices for the entities within their respective regulatory jurisdictions that they believe are necessary to clarify their expectations for sound control and oversight mechanisms. Conflicts of Interest Reportedly Affected Research Analysts’ Ratings of Enron and Global Crossing
According to some allegations, some research analysts at investment banks recommended Enron and Global Crossing securities to investors in order to get lucrative investment bank deals for their firms. The primary one is the adequacy and effectiveness of barriers between the research and investment banking functions of investment banks. SEC, NASD, and NYSE will examine investment banks for compliance with Regulation AC and self-regulatory organization rules on such conflicts of interest. We are encouraged that investment banks are beginning to strengthen their risk management practices by, among other things, gaining additional assurances of the underlying intent behind and the anticipated accounting treatment and presentation of complex structured finance transactions they facilitate for their clients. Investment banks are not typically responsible for their client’s accounting. Since investment banks might be tempted to participate in profitable but questionable transactions when successful SEC prosecution is in doubt, it is especially important that regulators be alert to this possibility and be ready to use the rest of their enforcement tools to deter such actions. We did not have sufficient public information to determine the extent of investment bank involvement in the latter transactions. As noted, there are currently ongoing and extensive litigation and investigations involving Enron and Global Crossing generally. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of a series of recent corporate scandals and bankruptcies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated that GAO study the involvement of investment banks with two companies, Enron and Global Crossing. In this report, the term "investment bank" includes not only securities firms but also those bank holding companies with securities affiliated or business divisions that assist clients in obtaining funds to finance investment projects. Since the activities identified in this report are the subject of ongoing and extensive investigations and litigation by competent authorities, it is not our role to determine the propriety of any of the parties' activities. To help the Congress better understand the activities of investment banks with respect to these companies we agreed to provide publicly available information on the roles investment banks played in designing, executing, and participating in certain structured finance transactions, investment banks' and federal regulators' oversight of these transactions, and the role that the banks' research analysts played with Enron and Global Crossing.
What GAO Found
Certain investment banks facilitated and participated in complex financial transactios with Enron despite allegedly knowing that the intent of the transactions was to manipulate and obscure Enron's true financial condition. The investment banks involved in the transactions we reviewed contended that their actions were appropriate and that Enron had not revealed its true purpose in obtaining their assistance. While investment banks are not responsible for the financial reporting of their clients, if it is proven that the investment banks knowingly assisted Enron in engaging in securities law violations, SEC has the authority to take legal action against them. Oversight responsibility for the investment banks' part in these transactions lay with both the banks themselves and the federal regulators. Investment banks told us that they had vetted transactions involving Enron through their risk management and internal control systems. Since Enron's collapse, these firms reportedly have been taking some steps to strengthen their internal controls, in part because they are now more sensitive to reputation risk. Federal financial regulators noted that before Enron's collapse they had not viewed structured transactions with investment-grade counterparties as particularly high risk in their exams. They subsequently are refining their approach to supervising structured transactions, and bank regulators now plan to include more transactions in their exams. Regulators are currently conducting targeted reviews of structured finance transactions at large firms and plan to develop guidance or best practices that clarify their expectations for sound control and oversight mechanisms. In the wake of the scandals, research analysts at investment banks who made favorable recommendations for failed firms have also come under public scrutiny. Investment banks allegedly pressured analysts covering Enron and Global Crossing to give investors favorable or misleading investment recommendations in order to keep or win lucrative work from the companies, creating serious conflicts of interest. Although the investment banks denied the allegations, several have been investigated by regulators and involved in litigation about conflicts of interest between their research and investment banking departments. Certain federal regulators and self-regulatory organizations have all adopted additional regulations addressing such conflicts. Although investment banks are not typically responsible for their client's accounting, it is a violation of law to facilitate transactions that an investment bank knows will materially misstate the client's financial statements. Since investment banks may be tempted to participate in profitable but questionable transactions, it is especially important that regulators be alert to this and be ready to use their enforcement tools to deter such actions. We are encouraged that investment banks and regulators are strengthening their oversight of the appropriateness of transactions, but it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of reforms. |
gao_GAO-09-174 | gao_GAO-09-174_0 | Excluded Parties Continue to Do Business with the Government
Businesses and individuals that have been excluded for egregious offenses are continuing to receive federal contracts and other funds. We developed case studies on several of these excluded parties and found that they continued to receive contracts and other federal payments in part because agency officials failed to search EPLS or because their searches did not reveal that the entity was excluded as a result of system deficiencies. In other cases, these searches did not reveal exclusions because the excluded businesses and individuals were fraudulently operating under different identities. Case 7: The Navy initially contracted with this engineering company to replace 500 “brittle fasteners” on steam pipes on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. According to documents provided by Navy officials, if these pipes had ruptured as a result of faulty fasteners, those aboard the carrier could have suffered lethal burns. Although the Army had several options for terminating its contract with the company, it is not clear if the Army considered these options because the officials we spoke with were not sure of the exact circumstances surrounding the decision. In July 2005, the Army debarred the company and its president based on the president’s 2004 attempt to illegally ship dual use aluminum tubes, which can be used to develop nuclear bombs, to North Korea. In its decision to debar the company, Army officials stated that because the president “sold potential nuclear bomb making materials to a well-known enemy of the United States,” the United States has “a compelling interest to discontinue any business with this morally bankrupt individual” and that continuing to do business with the company would be “irresponsible.” The contractor notified the Command of the proposed debarment in May 2005, but the Command decided that the action did not prohibit it from continuing to do business with the company. Thus, the Command continued to pay the company millions of dollars, even though the Army had determined that doing business with the company would be “irresponsible.”
Ineffective EPLS Management or Agency Control Weaknesses Lead to Improper Awards and Other Payments
Most of the improper awards and payments we identified can be attributed to ineffective management of the EPLS database or to control weaknesses at both excluding and procuring agencies. Incorrect DUNS numbers prevent contracting officers and other agency officials from readily identifying debarred or suspended parties when making awards. Nonetheless, these GSA Schedule listings can result in agencies purchasing items from unscrupulous vendors. To verify that no warnings exist to alert agencies that they are making purchases from excluded parties, we used our own GAO purchase card to acquire body armor worth over $3,000 from a Supply Schedule company that had been debarred for falsifying tests related to the safety of its products. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of the suspension and debarment process, we recommend that the Administrator of General Services take the following five actions: issue guidance to procurement officials on the requirement to check EPLS prior to awarding contracts and to suspension and debarment officials on the 5-day entry and contractor identification number requirements; ensure that the EPLS database requires contractor identification numbers for all actions entered into the system; strengthen EPLS search capabilities to include common search operators, such as AND, NOT, and OR; take steps to ensure that the EPLS points of contact list is updated; and place a warning on the Federal Supply Schedule Web site indicating that prospective purchasers need to check EPLS to determine whether vendors are excluded and explore the feasibility of removing or identifying excluded entities that are listed on the GSA Schedule. We focused our efforts on identifying parties that (1) were excluded governmentwide for egregious offenses such as fraud, false statements, theft, and violations of selected federal statutes and (2) received new contracts in excess of $1,000 during the period of their exclusion. | Why GAO Did This Study
To protect the government's interests, any agency can exclude (i.e., debar or suspend) parties from receiving federal contracts or assistance for a range of offenses. Exclusions of companies or individuals from federal contracts or other funding are listed in the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), a Web-based system maintained by GSA. Recent allegations indicate that excluded parties have been able to receive federal contracts. As a result, GAO was asked (1) to determine whether these allegations could be substantiated and (2) to identify the key causes of any improper awards and other payments detected. GAO investigated parties that were excluded for offenses such as fraud, theft, and violations of federal statutes and received awards in excess of $1,000.
What GAO Found
Businesses and individuals that have been excluded for egregious offenses ranging from national security violations to tax fraud are improperly receiving federal contracts and other funds. GAO developed cases on a number of these parties and found that they received funding for a number of reasons, including because agency officials failed to search EPLS or because their searches did not reveal the exclusions. GAO also identified businesses and individuals that were able to circumvent the terms of their exclusions by operating under different identities. GAO's cases include the following: (1)The Army debarred a German company after its president attempted to ship nuclear bomb parts to North Korea. As part of the debarment, Army stated that since the president "sold potential nuclear bomb making materials to a well-known enemy of the United States," there was a "compelling interest to discontinue any business with this morally bankrupt individual." However, Army told GAO it was legally obligated to continue the contract and paid the company over $4 million in fiscal 2006. In fact, the Army had several options for terminating the contract, but it is not clear if these options were considered. (2) The Navy suspended a company after one of its employees sabotaged repairs on an aircraft carrier by using nonconforming parts to replace fasteners on steam pipes. If these pipes had ruptured as a result of faulty fasteners, those aboard the carrier could have suffered lethal burns. Less than a month later, the Navy improperly awarded the company three new contracts because the contracting officer did not check EPLS. Most of the improper contracts and payments GAO identified can be attributed to ineffective management of the EPLS database or to control weaknesses at both excluding and procuring agencies. For example, GAO's work shows that entries may contain incomplete information, the database has insufficient search capabilities, and the points of contact for information about exclusions are incorrect. GAO also found several agencies that did not enter exclusions and others that did not check EPLS prior to making awards. Finally, GAO found that excluded parties were still listed on GSA's Federal Supply Schedule, which can result in agencies purchasing items from unscrupulous companies. To verify that no warnings exist to alert agencies that they are making purchases from excluded parties, GAO used its own purchase card to buy body armor worth over $3,000 from a company that had been debarred for falsifying tests related to the safety of its products. |
gao_GAO-17-260 | gao_GAO-17-260_0 | The purpose of the medical examination—or screening—is to assess whether these conditions were a mitigating factor in the behavior that resulted in the misconduct charge. Many Servicemembers Separated for Misconduct Had PTSD, TBI, or Certain Other Conditions; About a Quarter Were Potentially Ineligible for VA Benefits and Services
Our analysis of DOD data shows that 91,764 servicemembers were separated for misconduct from fiscal years 2011 through 2015; of these servicemembers, 57,141—62 percent—had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to their separation with PTSD, TBI, or certain other conditions that could be associated with misconduct. Looking at the conditions individually, 8 percent had been diagnosed with PTSD and 11 percent had been diagnosed with TBI, while other conditions, such as adjustment and alcohol-related disorders were more common. Further, of these servicemembers, 23 percent, or 13,283, received an “other than honorable” characterization of service, making them potentially ineligible for VA benefits and services, including health care. Our assessment was based on the following requirements set forth in DOD’s screening policy, which align with applicable statutory requirements: 1. do the military services’ screening policies apply to servicemembers diagnosed with PTSD or TBI by a physician, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, licensed clinical social worker, or psychiatric advanced practice registered nurse; 2. do the military services’ screening policies apply to servicemembers facing administrative separation under conditions other than honorable, including those separating in lieu of trial by court-martial; and 3. do the military services’ screening policies identify an appropriate official to review the results of the screening before deciding whether the servicemember’s service was “other than honorable?”
We did not assess the military services’ consistency with DOD’s screening policy regarding the types of providers eligible to perform screenings because at the time of our review, DOD’s policy was inconsistent with the law in one respect. We found that two of the four military services’ TBI training policies are inconsistent with DOD policy. This is consistent with DOD policy. Army and Marine Corps May Not Have Adhered to Their Own Policies Related to PTSD and TBI Screening, Training, and Counseling
In our review of separation documents and interviews with installation- level Army and Marine Corps officials we found that the Army and Marine Corps may not have adhered to their own screening, training, and counseling policies. In 11 of the 48 packets included in our analysis of Army servicemembers who requested separation in lieu of trial by court-martial, we found that there was no documented evidence or the evidence was unclear as to whether the servicemembers were counseled on their potential ineligibility for VA benefits and services. DOD, Army, and Marine Corps Do Not Routinely Monitor Adherence to Policies to Address the Impact of PTSD and TBI on Servicemembers
DOD does not routinely monitor the military services’ adherence to policies for screening servicemembers for PTSD and TBI prior to separating them for misconduct, training officers on how to identify symptoms of TBI in the deployed setting, and counseling servicemembers on eligibility for VA benefits and services. While both Army and Marine Corps have some data available that could make it possible for them to monitor whether their screening, training, and counseling policies are being adhered to as required, the two military services are not routinely using these data to do so because of limited resources in some instances, according to an official. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to establish activities to monitor internal control systems and evaluate results. However, we found that Air Force and Navy’s pre-separation screening and training policies are inconsistent with DOD policy. Furthermore, we found that the Army and Marine Corps may not always be adhering to their own policies and that monitoring of the policies—which could include a review of documentation, data analyses, or other oversight mechanisms—by DOD, Army, and Marine Corps is limited. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase its assurance that PTSD and TBI are appropriately considered prior to separating certain servicemembers from the military for misconduct, the Secretary of Defense should take the following five actions: Direct the Air Force and Navy to address inconsistencies with DOD policy in their policies related to screening certain servicemembers, including servicemembers separating in lieu of trial by court-martial, for PTSD and TBI and reviewing the results prior to separation for misconduct; and training servicemembers, including officers, on how to identify mild TBI symptoms in the deployed setting. Appendix IV: Characterization of Service for Servicemembers Separated for Misconduct from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2015 and Previously Diagnosed with PTSD, TBI, or Certain Other Conditions
Tables 9 and 10 provide information on characterization of service for servicemembers who were administratively separated for misconduct or administratively separated in lieu of trial by court-martial from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 and diagnosed within the 2 years prior to separation with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), or certain other conditions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 contains a provision that GAO examine the effect of PTSD, TBI, and certain other conditions on separations for misconduct. This report examines (1) the number of servicemembers separated for misconduct who were diagnosed with PTSD, TBI, or certain other conditions and were potentially ineligible for VA benefits and services; (2) the extent to which military services' policies to address the impact of PTSD and TBI on separations for misconduct are consistent with DOD's policies; (3) the extent to which Army and Marine Corps have adhered to their policies; and (4) the extent to which DOD, Army, and Marine Corps monitor adherence to the policies. GAO analyzed DOD data; reviewed applicable policies; interviewed DOD, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy officials; visited two Army and one Marine Corps sites selected on factors such as separation rates; and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of Army and Marine Corps servicemember misconduct separation documents.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data show that 62 percent, or 57,141 of the 91,764 servicemembers separated for misconduct from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to separation with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), or certain other conditions that could be associated with misconduct. Specifically, 16 percent had been diagnosed with PTSD or TBI, while the other conditions, such as adjustment and alcohol-related disorders, were more common. Of the 57,141 servicemembers, 23 percent, or 13,283, received an “other than honorable” characterization of service, making them potentially ineligible for health benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
GAO found that the military services' policies to address the impact of PTSD and TBI on separations for misconduct are not always consistent with DOD policy. For example, contrary to DOD policy, Navy policy does not require a medical examination—or screening—for certain servicemembers being separated in lieu of trial by court-martial to assess whether a PTSD or TBI diagnosis is a mitigating factor in the misconduct charged. This type of separation occurs when a servicemember facing a trial by court-martial requests, and is approved, to be discharged administratively. In addition, GAO found that two of the four military services have TBI training polices that are inconsistent with DOD policy.
GAO also found that the Army and Marine Corps may not have adhered to their own screening, training, and counseling policies related to PTSD and TBI. For example, GAO found that 18 of the 48 nongeneralizable sample separation packets reviewed for Marine Corps servicemembers administratively separated for misconduct lacked documentation showing that the servicemember had been screened for PTSD and TBI. During interviews with Army officers, GAO found that some officers may not have received training to identify mild TBI symptoms, despite Army policy that all servicemembers should be trained. Further, GAO found instances in which both Army and Marine Corps may not have adhered to their counseling policies, which require that servicemembers, specifically prior to requesting separation in lieu of trial by court-martial, be counseled about their potential ineligibility for VA benefits and services. For 11 of the 48 separation packets included in GAO's analysis of Army servicemembers who requested separation in lieu of trial by court-martial, there was no documented evidence—or the evidence was unclear—as to whether the servicemembers received counseling.
Finally, while Army and Marine Corps have some available data on servicemembers' screenings, training, and counseling, the military services do not use these data to routinely monitor whether they are adhering to relevant policies. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to establish monitoring activities to ensure internal control systems and evaluate results. Without monitoring adherence to these policies, the military services cannot provide assurance that servicemembers with PTSD and TBI are receiving adequate consideration of their conditions as well as the services DOD has established for them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that DOD direct the Air Force and Navy to address inconsistencies in their screening and training policies and ensure that the military services monitor adherence to their screening, training, and counseling policies. DOD agreed with four of GAO's recommendations, but did not agree to address inconsistencies in training policies. GAO maintains inconsistencies should be addressed, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-03-545T | gao_GAO-03-545T_0 | Figure 1 also shows that DOD, the Department of State (State), GSA, and USPS lease the most space. A set of federal laws, regulations, executive orders, and executive memorandums direct federal facility managers to reduce the energy and environmental impacts of the buildings they manage. In enacting the Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988 (FEMIA), Congress recognized, among other things, that the federal government is the largest single energy consumer in the nation, and that the cost of meeting the federal government’s energy requirements is substantial. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) was intended to further enhance federal energy management practices. Several executive orders direct agencies to employ green practices in facility and fleet management, and executive memorandums encourage agencies to use energy saving performance contracts and environmentally friendly landscaping practices. Alternative fuels include ethanol, methanol, natural gas, propane, and electricity. Examples of Agency Efforts to Apply Green Principles
By using the principles of sustainable, green design, agencies are trying to improve energy efficiency, reduce life-cycle costs, and reduce environmental impacts in the design, construction, and operation of federal facilities. Some examples of facilities where these approaches have been applied are the White House, the Pentagon, and the Zion Canyon National Park Visitor Center. Some Agencies Have Identified Obstacles to Using Energy Efficient, Green Approaches
Despite the possible benefits of using energy efficient, green approaches in federal construction and renovation projects, available data indicate that some agencies believe they face significant obstacles in implementing these approaches. Some of the benefits of green buildings are difficult to quantify. Agencies’ Use of Alternative Fuel Vehicles
In addition to efforts to make federal facilities more energy efficient, other initiatives have attempted to reduce the nation’s consumption of petroleum fuels in transportation through the use of alternative fuels in the federal vehicle fleet. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO testified that constructing and operating buildings requires enormous amounts of energy, water, and materials and creates large amounts of waste. How agencies manage their facilities, along with the vehicles they use to accomplish their missions, has significant cost implications and greatly affects the environment. According to the Department of Energy, energy management is one of the most challenging tasks facing today's federal facilities manager, and sound energy management includes using energy efficiently, ensuring reliable supplies, and reducing costs whenever possible. The federal role in energy conservation was also highlighted in the President's National Energy Policy, in which the President directed heads of executive departments and agencies to "take appropriate actions to conserve energy use at their facilities to the maximum extent consistent with the effective discharge of public responsibilities."
What GAO Found
With approximately 3.3 billion feet of facility space and over one-half million automobiles, the federal government is the largest single energy consumer in the nation. Various laws, regulations, and executive memorandums direct federal facility managers to reduce energy consumption and environmental impacts of the buildings they manage. Agencies also must follow other requirements for the acquisition and use of alternative fuel vehicles, which use fuels like methanol, propane, and natural gas, to name a few. In constructing and renovating facilities, agencies have begun using "green" design approaches, which are intended to result in energy efficiency and minimal impact on the environment. Such approaches have been used at the White House, Pentagon, and the Zion National Park Visitor Center. Despite the possible benefits, some agencies believe they face obstacles in employing green practices in construction and renovation projects. These include key stakeholders--architects, engineers, agency staff--who are not familiar with green approaches, higher initial costs of green projects, difficulty getting agency management buy-in, and difficulty quantifying the benefits of green facility designs. In addition to efforts to make federal facilities more energy efficient, the federal government has also attempted to reduce the nation's consumption of petroleum fuels in transportation through the use of alternative fuel vehicles in the federal vehicle fleet. |
gao_GAO-04-641 | gao_GAO-04-641_0 | Background
DHS and Justice reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments on the substance of the draft. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. Smuggled cigarettes, which include counterfeit and genuine brand cigarettes, also pose a public health risk as all cigarettes do; though, no studies have been done to determine whether counterfeit cigarettes pose a greater health risk than genuine brand cigarettes. Intelligence Indicates Cigarette Smuggling Is a High Profit Crime with Possible Terrorism Connections
The smuggling of cigarettes into the United States is part of the worldwide illegal cigarette traffic, but the full extent of such smuggling is unknown. According to an ATF intelligence official, U.S. and European law enforcement information shows that illicit cigarette trafficking has become a multibillion dollar a year, worldwide crime phenomenon. Cigarette Smuggling Results in Lost Revenues and Public Health Risk
Cigarette smuggling into the United States results in lost federal and state revenue. Federal Agencies Increased Efforts to Thwart Cigarette Smuggling into the United States and Increased Seizures
ICE, ATF, and CBP are responsible for law enforcement activities to combat the smuggling of cigarettes into the United States, as part of their multifaceted missions. ICE and ATF officials said they have been conducting more cigarette smuggling investigations in recent years and described the agencies’ current investigations as generally larger, more complex, and longer-term than previous investigations. ICE investigates organized international cigarette smuggling, including illegal activities related to the smuggling of cigarettes into the United States. Legal Initiatives Being Pursued to Help Thwart Cigarette Smuggling
Two legal initiatives have been proposed to enhance efforts to thwart the cigarette smuggling problem. Justice Suggested Three Legal Initiatives to Combat Cigarette Smuggling
In October 2003, Justice suggested that Congress could strengthen the enforcement tools for combating cigarette smuggling by: (1) lowering the threshold for violating CCTA (a felony violation) from 60,000 to 30,000 cigarettes, (2) giving ATF authority to use money generated during undercover sting operations to offset investigative expenses, and (3) increasing ATF’s authority to enter premises to enforce federal cigarette laws. The fourth measure requires actions aimed at eliminating illicit trade in tobacco products. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what is known about the nature and scope of the problem of smuggled cigarettes, including counterfeit cigarettes, entering the United States, we obtained information from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). To determine federal law enforcement agencies’ efforts to thwart the smuggling of cigarettes into the United States, we interviewed ICE, ATF, and CBP headquarters officials in Washington, D.C., and we collected and reviewed pertinent documentation, including data on the number of ICE cigarette-related investigations and ATF tobacco investigations initiated and closed and CBP and ICE cigarette seizures for selected fiscal years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Illegal trafficking in cigarettes can generate enormous profits and is purportedly a multibillion dollar a year enterprise. As cigarette taxes increase, so do the incentives for criminal organizations to smuggle cigarettes into the United States. Cigarette smuggling results in lost tax revenues, undermines government health policy objectives, can attract sophisticated and organized criminal groups, and could be a source of funding for terrorists. Because of these concerns, GAO examined (1) the nature and scope of the problem of smuggled cigarettes entering the United States, including federal tax revenue losses and potential health risks; (2) federal law enforcement agencies'--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)--efforts to thwart the smuggling of cigarettes into the United States; and (3) legal initiatives being pursued to enhance law enforcement efforts to thwart the smuggling of cigarettes into the United States.
What GAO Found
United States is impossible to measure with any certainty. According to ICE and ATF, investigations and intelligence collected indicate cigarette smuggling is a significant problem, particularly the smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes. According to ATF, illegal cigarette trafficking worldwide is a multibillion dollar a year crime phenomenon, with some cigarette smugglers having ties to terrorist groups. Moreover, because smuggled cigarettes are not taxed, federal and state revenues are lost. Smuggled cigarettes, which include counterfeit and genuine brand cigarettes, also pose a public health risk as all cigarettes do, but no studies have been done to determine whether counterfeit cigarettes pose any additional health risk. ICE and ATF have been conducting more cigarette smuggling investigations in recent years. Their investigations are generally larger, more complex, and longer-term than previous investigations. Also, CBP and ICE have been seizing an increasing number of cigarettes, particularly counterfeit cigarettes, as criminals attempt to smuggle them into the United States. Two proposed legal initiatives are intended to enhance law enforcement efforts to thwart the smuggling of cigarettes into the United States. For example, a bill known as the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act would lower the threshold for a cigarette smuggling violation (a felony) from 60,000 to 10,000 cigarettes, increase ATF's authority to enter premises to enforce federal cigarette laws, and provide ATF the authority to use money generated during undercover sting operations to offset investigative expenses. In addition, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a proposed international treaty, includes provisions that seek to eliminate the illicit trade in tobacco products, including cigarette smuggling. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice reviewed a draft of this report and had no substantive comments. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-579T | gao_GAO-08-579T_0 | Background
The EPA library network was established in 1971 to provide staff and the public with access to environmental information in support of EPA’s mission to protect human health and the environment. Furthermore, some of these libraries have digitized, dispersed, or disposed of their materials. As part of the library reorganization, each library in the network that was planning to close access to walk-in services independently decided which materials would be retained at their library or be selected for digitization, dispersal to EPA or non-EPA libraries, or disposal. EPA Did Not Effectively Justify Its Decision to Reorganize Its Library Network
EPA reorganized its library network primarily to save costs by creating a more coordinated library network and increasing the electronic delivery of library services. According to EPA officials, EPA decided to reorganize its libraries without fully completing the recommended analyses in order to reduce its fiscal year 2007 funding for the OEI headquarters and regional office libraries by $2 million. By not completing a full assessment of its library resources and not conducting a benefit-cost analysis of various approaches to reorganizing the network, EPA did not justify the reorganization actions in a way that fully considered and ensured adequate support for the mission of the library network, the continuity of services provided to EPA staff and the public, the availability of EPA materials to a wider audience, and the potential cost savings. EPA Did Not Fully Inform or Solicit Views from the Full Range of Stakeholders on the Reorganization but Is Now Increasing Its Outreach Efforts
Communicating with and soliciting views from staff and other stakeholders are key components of successful mergers and transformations. As a result, EPA libraries varied considerably in the information they provided to staff on library changes. In addition, EPA generally did not communicate with and solicit views from external stakeholders before and during the reorganization because it was moving quickly to make changes in response to proposed funding cuts. EPA Lacks a Strategy to Ensure Continuity of Library Services and Does Not Know Whether Its Actions Have Impaired Access to Environmental Information
EPA does not yet have a strategy to ensure that library services will continue and does not know the full effect of the reorganization on library services. While EPA’s library plan describes the reorganization effort as a “phased approach,” it does not provide specific goals, timelines, or feedback mechanisms so that the agency can measure performance and monitor user needs to ensure a successful reorganization while maintaining quality services. Several changes that EPA made to its library network may have impaired the continued delivery of library materials and services. EPA Program Offices Are Responsible for Funding Their Libraries and Their Reorganization Through Their Support Budgets
The program offices responsible for the EPA libraries in the network generally decide how much of their available funding to allocate to their libraries out of larger accounts that support multiple activities. For fiscal year 2007, OEI management decided to reduce funding for the OEI headquarters and regional office libraries by $2 million, from $2.6 million in enacted funding for fiscal year 2006—a 77- percent reduction for these libraries and a 28-percent reduction in total library funding. The $2 million reduction for the libraries was included in the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget proposal for EPA. According to EPA, OEI restored $500,000 to the library budget in fiscal year 2007 to support reorganization activities. However, EPA did not allocate funds specifically to help the closing libraries manage their collections. As a result, the program or regional office responsible for the library used its usual library funding available at the end of fiscal year 2006 to pay for closing costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1971, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) library network provides access to critical environmental information that the agency needs to fulfill its mission of protecting human health and the environment. The library network also provides information and services to the public. In fiscal year 2006, the network included 26 libraries across headquarters, regional offices, research centers, and laboratories. These libraries were independently operated by several different EPA program offices, depending on the nature of the libraries' collections. In 2006, facing proposed budget cuts, EPA issued a plan to reorganize the network beginning in fiscal year 2007. The plan proposed a phased approach to closing libraries and dispersing, disposing of, and digitizing library materials. GAO was asked to summarize the findings in its report being released today, Environmental Protection: EPA Needs to Ensure That Best Practices and Procedures Are Followed When Making Further Changes to Its Library Network (GAO-08-304). GAO made four recommendations in this report aimed at best practices and procedures that EPA should follow when continuing to reorganize its library network. The agency agreed with the recommendations.
What GAO Found
Since 2006, EPA has implemented its library reorganization plan and has closed physical access to the Office of Environmental Information (OEI) headquarters library and three regional office libraries. In the same period, six other libraries in the network independently changed their operations. Some of these libraries digitized, dispersed, or disposed of their materials before EPA had drafted a common set of agencywide library procedures for doing so. Until these procedures are completed, EPA plans no further changes to the library network. EPA reorganized its library network primarily to generate cost savings through a more coordinated library network and more electronic delivery of services. However, GAO found that EPA did not effectively justify its reorganization decision. According to EPA officials, OEI decided to reorganize its libraries without fully completing the recommended analyses in order to reduce its fiscal year 2007 funding in response to the President's fiscal year 2007 budget proposal. EPA did not systematically inform the full range of stakeholders on the final configuration of the library network. In addition, EPA libraries varied considerably in the extent to which they communicated with and solicited views from staff, external stakeholders, and experts before and during the reorganization effort. EPA is currently reaching out to stakeholders, including EPA staff and library experts, by holding and attending stakeholder meetings and conferences. EPA does not yet have an effective strategy to ensure the continuity of library services following the reorganization and does not know the full effect of the reorganization on library services. EPA's library plan describes the reorganization effort as a "phased approach," but it does not provide specific goals, timelines, or feedback mechanisms that allow the agency to measure performance and monitor user needs to ensure a successful reorganization while maintaining quality services. EPA did not follow key practices for a successful transformation, even though the agency made several changes to the library network that could have impaired the continued delivery of library materials and services to its staff and the public. The several different program offices responsible for the EPA libraries in the network each generally decide how much of their available funding to allocate to their libraries and how to fund their reorganization. However, when faced with a proposed budget reduction of $2 million in fiscal year 2007, rather than following its normal procedures, OEI directed the regional and headquarters offices to reduce funding for OEI libraries--a reduction of 77 percent for these libraries from the previous fiscal year. EPA did not allocate funds to help closing libraries manage their collections; instead, the responsible program or regional office used its annual funding to pay for these costs. |
gao_GAO-17-485 | gao_GAO-17-485_0 | Individuals receiving disability benefits, including transition-age youth on SSI, are generally presumed eligible for VR services and considered individuals with a significant disability. Schools’ Role in Transition Planning for Youth with Disabilities
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides formula grants to states, which pass them to eligible local education agencies to assist in providing special education and related services. SSA’s Efforts to Encourage Employment Reach Few Transition-Age Youth and SSA Does Not Consistently Convey Information About Working
SSA Administers Work Incentives, but Few Transition-Age Youth Benefit from Them
SSA’s role in encouraging employment for transition-age youth on SSI as they move into adulthood is focused on administering work incentives and other employment supports that allow them to keep at least some of their benefits even if they have earnings. Few transition-age youth on SSI benefit from SEIE—the only SSA- administered work incentive targeted specifically to younger SSI recipients. SSA data show that few transition-age youth benefit from SEIE, in part, because few have earned income. However, our analysis of SSA data found that even among those transition-age youth with earned income, most often less than half benefited from SEIE. 1.) However, SSA officials were unable to provide data on the number of individuals who applied for and ultimately did not benefit because the agency does not maintain these data in a format that would allow for this type of analysis. SSA Misses Opportunities to Convey Information to Encourage Work and Allay Fears that Work May Result in Loss of Benefits
According to SSA officials, VR staff, and other stakeholders with whom we spoke, transition-age youth and their families are often unaware of or do not understand SSA-administered work incentives and supports, and may fear that working will negatively affect their SSI or Medicaid benefits. In addition, some stakeholders, including WIPA project and VR staff, told us that written material, such as a brochure, may not be sufficient to convey complex information on work incentives and how working affects benefits. SSA Does Not Have a Systematic Way to Connect Transition- Age Youth on SSI to Vocational Rehabilitation Services and Data Sharing is Limited
SSA Does Not Have a Systematic Way to Connect Transition-Age Youth to Vocational Rehabilitation Services
Having access to individualized training and employment services provided by VR agencies helps transition-age youth on SSI develop the skills they need to transition to adulthood and the workforce. Specifically, in four of the five states, the percentage of transition-age youth ages 14 to 17 on SSI with open VR service records was less than 1 percent. Without direct referrals from SSA and access to the Ticket to Work program, the primary way that youth on SSI are connected to VR is through their schools. 2). Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should use quality information to achieve their objectives. Absent data on whether youth on SSI have IEPs that can help them connect to transition services or additional options for connecting youth to VR services, SSA cannot ensure that these youth are receiving or have access to services they need to help them prepare for adulthood and the workforce. However, SSA is well positioned to work with Education to determine the extent to which transition-age youth on SSI are not being connected to VR services for which they are eligible, and to assess options to better ensure they receive them, as appropriate. SSA disagreed with our recommendation that it analyze options to improve communication about SSA-administered work incentives and the implications of work on SSI benefits. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines 1) how the Social Security Administration (SSA) encourages employment for transition-age youth on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) as they move toward adulthood, and the effectiveness of these efforts, and 2) the extent to which SSA helps ensure transition-age youth on SSI receive vocational rehabilitation services. To determine the extent to which youth benefit from SSA- administered work incentives or other employment supports, we reviewed or analyzed available data from SSA on the number of transition-age youth benefiting from various work incentives, as follows:
For the Student Earned Income Exclusion (SEIE), the Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS), Impairment-Related Work Expenses (IRWE), and Blind Work Expenses (BWE), we analyzed data provided by SSA from its Disability Analysis File (DAF) for SSI recipients ages 14 to 17 for calendar years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. To determine how youth on SSI and their families are informed about SSI program rules, work incentives, eligibility for VR, and other supports, we reviewed relevant procedures and information and notices provided by SSA to SSI recipients, their families, and their representative payees. We also collected data from state VR agencies in the five states on the number of transition-age youth on SSI with open VR service records in calendar year 2015, to analyze the extent to which youth were receiving VR services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of individuals with disabilities under age 18 receiving SSI benefits increased by about 44 percent from 2000 through 2016. Youth ages 14 to 17 with disabilities face many challenges achieving self-sufficiency as they transition to adulthood. GAO was asked to examine SSA's efforts to encourage employment for these transition-age youth.
This report examines 1) SSA efforts to encourage employment for transition-age youth on SSI as they move toward adulthood and their effectiveness; and 2) the extent to which SSA helps ensure these youth receive vocational rehabilitation services. GAO analyzed SSA data on work incentives for calendar years 2012-2015, the most recent available, and data from five state VR agencies for calendar year 2015; reviewed relevant laws, policies, and research; and interviewed SSA staff and state VR officials in several states chosen for their SSI youth populations and VR outcomes.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) primary approach for encouraging employment for transition-age youth (ages 14 to 17) with disabilities who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is work incentives that allow them to keep at least some of their SSI benefits and Medicaid coverage while they work. But few transition-age youth benefit from these incentives. SSI is a means-tested program that provides cash benefits to eligible low-income aged, blind, and disabled individuals. SSA administers several work incentives that allow SSI recipients to exclude some income and expenses when calculating SSI benefits. The work incentive targeted specifically to younger SSI recipients is the Student Earned Income Exclusion (SEIE), which allows income to be excluded from benefits calculations if a recipient is a student under age 22. However, less than 1.5 percent of all transition-age youth—and generally less than half of those with earnings—benefited from SEIE in 2012 through 2015. SSA does not analyze these data, and thus cannot determine why the majority of youth with earnings are not benefiting from SEIE, when they may be eligible. SSA data also show that almost no youth benefited from other incentives that allow them to exclude earnings used for specific purposes, such as the Impairment-Related Work Expenses incentive. The effectiveness of SSA-administered work incentives may be further limited because, according to SSA and other officials, youth and their families are often unaware of or do not understand them, and may fear that work will negatively affect their benefits or eligibility. SSA policy requires staff to provide accurate and meaningful information about relevant SSI policies to claimants and recipients. However, GAO found that SSA does not have sufficient procedures in place to ensure that information on work incentives and how work affects benefits and eligibility is consistently communicated to youth and their families. As a result, SSA may miss opportunities to promote work incentives and other supports, allay fears, and potentially reduce dependence of transition-age youth on SSI benefits.
SSA does not have a systematic way to connect transition-age youth on SSI to state Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) agencies that provide training and employment services under the VR State Grants program administered by the Department of Education (Education). Although youth receiving SSI are generally presumed to be eligible for VR services, GAO found that less than 1 percent had an open VR service record in 2015 in four of the five states from which GAO collected VR data. Legislation in 1999 created the Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency program, which expanded the number and types of employment service providers for individuals with disabilities. However, SSA limited eligibility to recipients age 18 and older. While transition-age youth receiving special education services can be connected to VR agencies through their schools, the extent to which this happens—and whether they are on SSI—is unknown because data to make such determinations are not systematically collected by SSA or schools. Federal standards for internal control call for agencies to use quality information to achieve their objectives. Without relevant data or additional options for connecting youth to VR services, SSA cannot ensure that transition-age youth on SSI are being connected to these services, which can help to prepare them for adulthood and the workforce.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends SSA 1) analyze why youth on SSI with earnings did not benefit from SEIE, 2) improve communication about work incentives and rules, 3) work with Education to determine how many youth on SSI are not connected to VR services, and 4) explore options to further connect them. SSA agreed in whole or in part with three recommendations. SSA disagreed that its communication on work incentives and rules needs to be improved, stating field staff provides information to youth, and it has created new written material. GAO maintains SSA's communication could be improved as presented in this report. |
gao_GAO-07-94 | gao_GAO-07-94_0 | Taken together, these acts anchor the federal government’s role in the freight rail industry by establishing numerous goals for regulating the industry, including to allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and demand for services to establish reasonable rates for transportation by rail; minimize the need for federal regulatory control over the rail transportation system and require fair and expeditious regulatory decisions when regulation is required; promote a safe and efficient rail transportation system by allowing rail carriers to earn adequate revenues, as determined by STB; ensure the development and continuation of a sound rail transportation system with effective competition among rail carriers and with other modes to meet the needs of the public and the national defense; foster sound economic conditions in transportation and ensure effective competition and coordination between rail carriers and other modes: maintain reasonable rates where there is an absence of effective competition and where rail rates provide revenues that exceed the amount necessary to maintain the rail system and attract capital; prohibit predatory pricing and practices to avoid undue concentrations of provide for the expeditious handling and resolution of all proceedings. Railroad Industry Increasingly Healthy and Rates Generally Down Since Enactment of the Staggers Rail Act, but Concerns about Competition and Captivity Remain
The changes that have occurred in the railroad industry since the enactment of the Staggers Rail Act are widely viewed as positive. Rail rates generally declined between 1985 and 2000 but increased slightly from 2001 through 2004. Concerns about competition and captivity in the industry remain because traffic is concentrated in fewer railroads. This situation may reflect reasonable economic practices by the railroads in an environment of excess demand, or it may represent an abuse of market power. 3). It is difficult to determine the number of captive shippers, because proxy measures can overstate or understate captivity, but our analysis of available measures indicates that the extent of captivity is dropping. Some Areas with Access to One Railroad Have Higher Percentages of Traffic Traveling at Rates That Exceed the Threshold for Rate Relief
Some economic areas with access to one Class I railroad also have more than half of their traffic traveling at rates that exceed the statutory threshold for rate relief. When combined with comments from participants on our expert panel and interviews with shipper and railroad groups, the results of our analysis suggest that shippers in selected markets may be paying excessive rates, meriting further inquiry and analysis. Despite STB’s actions, there is little effective relief for captive shippers because STB’s standard rate relief process is largely inaccessible. While our analysis of available measures shows that the extent of captivity appears to be dropping in the freight railroad industry, shippers that may be captive are paying substantially over the statutory threshold for initiating a rate relief case. These approaches each have potential costs and benefits. As a result, the public sector has increasingly been investing in freight rail projects. In contrast, STB has the statutory authority to inquire into and report on railroad practices and could conduct a rigorous analysis of competition in the freight rail industry that would rely on more than sample data and could determine whether the inappropriate exercise of market power is occuring in specific markets. Should STB find evidence of abuse, it could consider several methods for creating the balance envisioned by the Staggers Rail Act. Additional investment in freight rail infrastructure can produce public benefits, and many state and local governments are involved in freight rail infrastructure projects. DOT’s draft National Freight Policy represents a good start in this direction. To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of our nation’s freight system, we are making the following recommendation to the Secretary of Transportation: As DOT continues to develop a national freight policy and a possible federal policy response, consider strategies to (1) sustain the role of competitive market forces by creating a level playing field for all freight modes and (2) recognize the fiscally constrained federal funding environment by developing mechanisms to assess and maximize public benefits from federally financed freight transportation investments. Our study included a broad focus on changes in the freight railroad industry since the Staggers Rail Act, the actions STB has taken to address concerns about competition and captivity, and future freight demand and capacity. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Staggers Rail Act deregulated the freight rail industry, relying on competition to set rates, and allowed for differential pricing (charging higher rates to those more dependent on rail). The act gave the Surface Transportation Board (STB) authority to develop remedies for shippers "captive" to one railroad and set a threshold for shippers to apply for rate relief. GAO was asked to review (1) changes in the railroad industry since the Staggers Rail Act, including rates and competition; (2) STB actions to address competition and captivity concerns and alternatives that could be considered; and (3) freight demand and capacity projections and potential federal policy responses. GAO examined STB data, conducted interviews, and held an expert panel.
What GAO Found
Changes in the railroad industry since the Staggers Rail Act are widely viewed as positive, as the industry's financial health has improved and most rates have declined; however, concerns over competition and captivity remain. Rail rates generally declined between 1985 and 2000, then increased slightly from 2001 through 2004. Concerns about competition and captivity remain as traffic is concentrated in fewer railroads. It is difficult to determine the number of "captive" shippers as proxy measures can overstate or understate captivity. Nevertheless, GAO's analysis of limited available measures indicates that the extent of captivity appears to be dropping, but the percentage of traffic traveling at rates substantially over the threshold for rate relief has increased. Also, some areas with access to only one major railroad have higher percentages of traffic traveling at rates above the threshold. These findings may reflect reasonable economic practices by the railroads or a possible abuse of market power. GAO's analysis is limited by available data and proxy measures but suggests that shippers in selected markets may be paying excessive rates, meriting further inquiry and analysis. While STB has taken action, further efforts to improve its rate relief processes and assess competition could help address competition and captivity concerns and inform the merits of proposed alternative approaches. STB's rate relief processes are largely inaccessible and rarely used. STB recognizes this and is taking steps to improve its processes. STB has broad statutory authority to inquire into and report on railroad industry practices and, given a reasonable possibility that some shippers may be paying excessive rates, an assessment of competition could determine whether there is sufficient evidence that market power is being abused in specific markets. While competition between railroads may not always be feasible, alternative approaches have costs and benefits that should be carefully considered to ensure the balance envisioned in the Staggers Rail Act--including the railroads' need for adequate revenues. Significant increases in freight traffic are forecast, and the industry's ability to meet them is largely uncertain. Investments in rail projects can produce public benefits, such as reducing highway congestion. As a result, federal and state governments have increasingly participated in freight rail projects. In 2005, for example, Congress provided $100 million for rail improvements in the Chicago area. Congress faces additional decisions about potential federal policy responses in years ahead. Responses should recognize that the freight transportation system includes many modes that are treated differently by the federal government and functions in a competitive marketplace and a constrained federal funding environment. In developing a National Freight Policy, the Department of Transportation (DOT)has made a good start by providing context for those decisions and DOT can help sustain the role of the competitive marketplace through strategies that promote a level playing field for freight transportation decision making and acknowledge the constrained federal fiscal environment by focusing federal involvement where demonstrable, wide-ranging public benefits exist. |
gao_GAO-07-643 | gao_GAO-07-643_0 | According to the Navy’s fiscal year 2007 budget, the Navy Working Capital Fund will earn about $23.4 billion in revenue during fiscal year 2007. What Is Carryover and Why Is It Important? NAWC’s Reported Actual Carryover Information Was Unreliable
Our analysis of accounting data that provide information on customer orders and discussions with NAWC officials determined that the reported carryover information was not reliable for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 as a result of (1) NAWC’s conversion to a new accounting system in fiscal year 2003 and (2) the divisions not performing reviews of obligations including the required DOD triannual reviews—as discussed later in this report. To try to better manage carryover, improve the reliability of the carryover information, and avoid exceeding the ceiling, beginning in fiscal year 2005 and continuing into fiscal year 2006, NAWC (1) issued guidance on the acceptance of orders at year end and (2) started to review orders to correct its old financial records and reduce carryover. While the reliability of carryover information improved in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we determined that data reliability problems still exist. For example, we found that funds on some customer orders totaling $19.5 million were deobligated at the end of the fiscal year and then reobligated at the beginning of the next fiscal year on these same orders. This artificially lowered carryover at the end of the fiscal year. NAWC Reports Showed that It Exceeded Its Carryover Ceiling from Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2005
Since DOD changed its carryover policy in December 2002, NAWC exceeded its carryover ceiling by tens of millions of dollars from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005. NAWC Did Not Perform the Required Triannual Reviews Until Fiscal Year 2006
NAWC did not perform the triannual reviews of its financial information until fiscal year 2006, even though DOD guidance had long required NAWC and all other fund holders to conduct these reviews of their financial data (outstanding commitments, obligations, and accrued expenditures). These reviews would likely have improved the reliability of carryover information and the underlying financial data. Further, as of September 2006, the two divisions were still not fully complying with several of the 16 specific DOD tasks that they were required to accomplish during their reviews. Because the two divisions did not always effectively review some obligations, particularly dormant obligations (i.e., those over 120 days old), (1) their reported actual carryover was overstated and (2) they sometimes returned unneeded funds to customers after the funds had expired. If effectively implemented, the triannual reviews could help NAWC validate its financial records before it implements a new system that is scheduled to be installed in October 2007. To determine if NAWC was utilizing the required triannual review process to improve the reliability of its carryover information and underlying financial data, we reviewed the policies and procedures the Naval Air Systems Command and NAWC used to implement the Department of Defense’s (DOD) triannual review guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2007 budget estimates, working capital fund activity groups (depot maintenance, ordnance, and research and development) will have about $6 billion of funded work that will be carried over from fiscal year 2007 into fiscal year 2008. The congressional defense committees recognize that these groups need some carryover to ensure a smooth work flow from one fiscal year to the next. However, the committees have previously raised concern that the amount of carryover may be more than is needed. GAO was asked to determine if (1) the Naval Air Warfare Center's (NAWC) reported actual carryover was reliable for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 and (2) NAWC was utilizing the required triannual review process to improve the reliability of its carryover information and underlying financial data.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of NAWC reports determined that NAWC's reported carryover information was not reliable. Since DOD changed its carryover policy in December 2002, NAWC reports showed that while under the ceiling for fiscal year 2006, it exceeded its carryover ceiling by tens of millions of dollars from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, as shown in the following table. To the extent that carryover is too high, Congress can redirect the customers' funds for other priorities. GAO's analysis of accounting information on customer orders and discussions with NAWC officials determined that its fiscal year 2003 and 2004 carryover information was unreliable due to (1) NAWC converting to a new accounting system in fiscal year 2003 and (2) NAWC not performing reviews of obligations, including the required DOD triannual reviews. To better manage carryover and improve the reliability of carryover information, starting in fiscal year 2005, NAWC (1) issued guidance on the acceptance of orders at year end and (2) began reviewing orders to correct its old financial records. While the reliability of carryover information improved in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, GAO determined that problems still exist. For example, GAO found that funds on some customer orders totaling $19.5 million were deobligated at fiscal year end and then reobligated at the beginning of the next fiscal year on these same orders. This artificially lowered reported NAWC carryover at fiscal year end. Further, even though DOD's 1996 guidance required NAWC as well as other activities to conduct triannual reviews of its financial information, NAWC did not perform these reviews until fiscal year 2006. If implemented properly, these reviews would improve the reliability of reported carryover information and the underlying financial data. In addition, as of September 2006, the two NAWC divisions were still not fully complying with several of the 16 specific DOD tasks required as part of the triannual reviews. For example, because the two divisions were not always effectively reviewing some obligations, especially dormant obligations (obligations over 120 days old), their reported actual carryover was overstated. Also, effective triannual reviews would help NAWC validate its financial records before it implements a new system that is scheduled to be installed in October 2007. |
gao_GAO-16-784 | gao_GAO-16-784_0 | PPACA requires marketplaces to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, determine eligibility for the income-based subsidies or Medicaid. These verification steps include validating an applicant’s Social Security number, if one is provided; verifying citizenship, status as a U.S. national, or lawful presence by comparison with Social Security Administration (SSA) or Department of Homeland Security records; and verifying household income by comparison with tax-return data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), data on Social Security benefits from SSA, and other available current income sources. Under the marketplace process, applicants will be asked to provide additional information or documentation for the marketplaces to review to resolve the inconsistency. The Marketplaces Approved Subsidized Coverage for All 15 of Our Fictitious Applicants, Including Those Who Had Not Filed Required Tax Returns
Our undercover testing for the 2016 coverage year found that the eligibility determination and enrollment processes of the federal and state marketplaces we reviewed remain vulnerable to fraud, as we previously reported for the 2014 and 2015 coverage years. Results of Applications
For each of our 15 fictitious applications, the federal or state-based marketplaces approved coverage at time of application—specifically, 14 applications for qualified health plans, and 1 application for Medicaid. Marketplaces Approved Subsidies for Fictitious Applicants Who Had Previously Obtained Subsidized Coverage but Did Not File Required Tax Returns
CMS announced that beginning with the open-enrollment period for 2016 coverage, APTC and CSR subsidies would be discontinued for 2016 coverage for enrollees who received APTC in 2014 but did not comply with the requirement to file a 2014 federal income-tax return and reconcile APTC received. For one of these applicants, a federal Marketplace representative initially told us that we were not approved for subsidies, for tax-related reasons. CMS officials told us they chose to allow applicant attestations of tax filing, rather than rely solely on IRS failure-to-file data, for two reasons:
Time lag between when tax returns are filed and when filings are reflected in information IRS provides to marketplaces. Those who obtained previous coverage through Covered California can readily be identified, they said. According to Officials, Federal Marketplace Outcomes Appear to Be as Expected
CMS officials told us that for the federal Marketplace there generally appeared to be reasons to explain the outcomes our fictitious applicants experienced. The state officials noted that under PPACA the marketplace is required to accept paper applications. The officials said they did not have information on the number of such attestations provided. All But One of Our Fictitious Enrollees Maintained Subsidized Coverage, Even Though We Sent Fictitious Documents, or No Documents, to Resolve Application Inconsistencies
We retained subsidized coverage for 10 of the 11 qualified-health-plan applicants through August 2016, even though supporting documentation we submitted was fictitious, and in some cases we submitted none or only some of the documentation we were directed to send. Among the 11 applications for which we were directed to send documentation, we submitted all requested documentation for five applications, partial documentation for three applications, and no documentation for the remaining three applications. In two of the cases, in which we provided only partial documentation, our applicants were nevertheless able to clear inconsistencies through conversations with marketplace phone representatives. The information our applicant provided over the phone, however, did not match documentation our applicant had filed previously. In each case, we were directed to provide proof of immigration status and income, and in both cases, we did not provide any documentation. In one case we lost coverage, while in the other we retained it. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report is to describe, by means of undercover testing and related work, potential vulnerabilities to fraud in the application, enrollment, and eligibility-verification controls of the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace) and a selected state marketplace, for the third open-enrollment period under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, for 2016 coverage. The identity or citizenship/immigration status of the applicant, or whether the applicant had sought enrollment in multiple plans. Specifically, we selected two states—Virginia and West Virginia—that elected to use the federal Marketplace rather than operate a marketplace of their own. The results cannot, however, be generalized to the overall population of applicants or enrollees. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Appendix III: Comments from Covered California
GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health-insurance marketplaces where consumers can, among other things, select private health-insurance plans. States may operate their own health-care marketplace or rely on the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace). The Congressional Budget Office estimates subsidies and related spending under PPACA at $56 billion for fiscal year 2017.
GAO was asked to review marketplace enrollment and verification controls for the act's third open-enrollment period ending in January 2016.This report provides results of GAO undercover testing of potential vulnerabilities to fraud in the application, enrollment, and eligibility-verification of the federal Marketplace and one selected state marketplace.
GAO submitted 15 fictitious applications for subsidized coverage through the federal Marketplace in Virginia and West Virginia and through the state marketplace in California. GAO's applications tested verifications related to (1) applicants' making required income-tax filings, and (2) applicants' identity or citizenship/immigration status. The results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of enrollees. GAO discussed results with CMS, IRS, and state officials. Written comments from HHS and California are included in the report.
GAO currently has eight recommendations to CMS to strengthen its oversight of the federal Marketplace (see GAO-16-29 ). CMS concurred with the recommendations and implementation is pending.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires health-insurance marketplaces to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, determine eligibility for income-based subsidies. Verification steps include validating the applicant's Social Security number, if one is provided; citizenship or immigration status; and household income. PPACA requires the marketplaces to grant eligibility while identified inconsistencies between the information provided by the applicant and by government sources are being resolved. The 2016 coverage year was the first year in which a key eligibility requirement—verification of whether applicants who previously received one type of federal subsidy under the act filed federal tax returns, as a requirement to retain that benefit—went into effect.
As previously reported for the 2014 and 2015 coverage years, GAO's undercover testing for the 2016 coverage year found that the health-care marketplaces' eligibility determination and enrollment processes remain vulnerable to fraud. The marketplaces initially approved coverage and subsidies for GAO's 15 fictitious applications. However, three applicants were unable to put their policies in force because their initial payments were not successfully processed. GAO focused its testing on the remaining 12 applications.
For four applications, to obtain 2016 subsidized coverage, GAO used identities from its 2014 testing that had previously obtained subsidized coverage. Although none of the fictitious applicants filed a 2014 tax return, all were approved for 2016 subsidies. Marketplace officials told GAO that they allowed applicants to attest to filing taxes if information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicated that the applicant did not file tax returns. Marketplace officials said one reason they allow attestations is a time lag between when tax returns are filed and when they are reflected in IRS's systems. CMS officials said they are rechecking 2014 tax-filing status.
For eight applications, GAO used new fictitious identities to test verifications related to identity or citizenship/immigration status and, in each case, successfully obtained subsidized coverage.
When marketplaces directed 11 of the 12 applicants to provide supporting documents, GAO submitted fictitious documents as follows:
For five applications, GAO provided all documentation requested and the applicants were able to retain coverage.
For three applications, GAO provided only partial documentation and the applicants were able to retain coverage. Two of these applicants were able to clear inconsistencies through conversations with marketplace phone representatives even though the information provided over the phone did not match the fictitious documentation that GAO previously provided.
For three applications, GAO did not provide any of the requested documents, and the marketplaces terminated coverage for one applicant but did not terminate coverage for the other two applicants.
According to officials from the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (CMS), some of GAO's application outcomes could be explained by decisions to extend document filing deadlines. |
gao_HEHS-96-126 | gao_HEHS-96-126_0 | Of the 130 programs, 69 were wholly targeted (targeted exclusively) to people with disabilities; the others were partially targeted—that is, they provided services to a wider clientele but nonetheless gave some priority or preference to people with disabilities. Employment-focused programs in 1994 provided between $2.5 billion and $6.1 billion in services targeted to people with disabilities. Indirect - Government Agencies Only (Nonfederal)
Variety of Program Funding Mechanisms Influences the Distribution of Funds to States
Although many federal programs have decentralized the provision of services to state governments, the programs have adopted a variety of funding mechanisms to do so, including funding formulas based on different criteria as well as varying procedures for awarding grants. Limited Communication Exists Among Agencies Serving People With Disabilities
Although federal assistance to people with disabilities is dispersed among many programs and service delivery agencies at the state and local level, limited informational coordination exists among agencies about these programs and how they fit together. Federal and State Agencies Apply a Wide Range of Eligibility Criteria
Eligibility coordination is similarly limited among federal programs and agencies. For example, in California, one rural county we visited appeared to be improving services and reducing program costs. Many of the agencies administering these 26 employment-focused programs did not require or collect data on program outcomes—specifically, data on whether participants got jobs and kept them, what wages they received, and whether they received employee benefits such as health insurance. In 1994, the federal government provided a broad range of services to people with disabilities through 130 different programs, 19 federal agencies, and a multitude of public and private agencies at the state and local levels. (2) To what extent are information, eligibility, and services coordinated under these programs? To analyze in more detail those programs that affect employment issues, we divided these federal programs into three groups: (1) employment- focused programs that provide services such as job training, supported employment, job placement, and employment counseling; (2) employment-related programs that provide services that could reduce barriers to employment—such as transportation, health care, or assistive technology; (3) programs unrelated to employment that provide services that are unconnected (or could have only a remote connection) to employment—such as services to infants and toddlers. In fiscal year 1994, this program funded 11 new grants and 87 continuation projects in supported employment. Social Security: Disability: SSA Needs to Improve Continuing Disability Review Program (GAO/HRD-93-109, July 8, 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal programs targeted to disabled persons, focusing on: (1) how many of the programs provide employment-related services; (2) coordination of information, eligibility criteria, and services among various programs; and (3) the programs' effectiveness in promoting employment among disabled persons.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 130 federal programs provide services to disabled persons; (2) in fiscal year 1994, federal agencies spent over $60 billion on 69 programs exclusively targeted to disabled persons and between $81 billion and $184 billion on 61 other programs targeted to a wider clientele that gave special consideration to disabled persons; (3) most program expenditures supported income maintenance and health care programs; (4) employment-oriented programs constituted only 26 of the 130 programs and received only 2.5 to 4 percent of total federal funding for such programs in 1994; (5) 57 other programs provided indirect employment assistance; (6) most programs provide services through states and local governments, and nonprofit and private organizations; (7) various program funding mechanisms affect the distribution of program funds among states; (8) the federal government funds a wide range of services to address major employment barriers; (9) disabled persons who need services from more than one program find the programs' differing eligibility criteria and numerous service providers burdensome; (10) the lack of program coordination and information sharing leads to service duplication and gaps, and past efforts to improve service coordination have only been marginally successful; (11) some state and local agencies have improved service delivery to disabled persons and reduced program costs; and (12) few programs have been evaluated for their effectiveness, since many agencies do not require or collect data on program outcomes. |
gao_GAO-13-475T | gao_GAO-13-475T_0 | Title III authorizes the use of a portion of the payments for certain purposes related to wildland fire and emergency services on federal lands. The Forest Service and BLM are responsible for carrying out certain parts of the Secure Rural Schools Act. Both agencies calculate the amounts that counties are to receive each year, and both agencies are required by the act to review the counties’ certification of Title III expenditures as the agencies determine to be appropriate. The act also requires the agencies to issue regulations to implement the act, although it does not describe what the regulations are to address or establish a deadline for issuing them. Federal Agencies Had Provided Limited Oversight of County Spending at the Time of Our Report, and Some County Expenditures May Have Been Inconsistent with the Provisions of the Act
In our July 2012 report, we found that the Forest Service and BLM had taken few actions to oversee county spending under Title III of the Secure Rural Schools Act and that the guidance they provided was limited and, in some cases, did not appear consistent with the act. We also found that some expenditures by selected counties we contacted may have been inconsistent with the act—which may have resulted in part from the limited guidance available from the agencies—and that counties we reviewed did not consistently follow Title III’s administrative requirements. Oversight by Federal Agencies
In July 2012, we reported that neither the Forest Service nor BLM had issued regulations under the act and that the guidance the agencies had issued was limited and sometimes unclear. We expressed particular concern that the agencies had not developed regulations or clear guidance because the act itself does not define key terms. For example, the act authorizes counties to use Title III funds for “search and rescue and other emergency services, including firefighting, that are performed on federal land” but does not specify the types of activities covered by this phrase.certain provisions open to varying interpretations, and available guidance from the agencies had done little to clarify this language, counties had generally been left to make their own interpretations about which types of expenditures are allowable under Title III and which are not. However, because the agencies did not have a process to ensure an accurate accounting of the amounts of Title III funds spent and unspent, we concluded that it was unclear whether the amounts were accurate and that it would be difficult to ensure that counties return to the U.S. Treasury any funds that remain unobligated upon the act’s expiration, as the act requires. Consistency of County Expenditures
We also found that expenditures by counties we contacted for our 2012 report did not in all cases appear consistent with the act. These counties reported using Title III funds for projects that were generally aligned with the three broad purposes of Title III—wildland fire preparedness, emergency services on federal land, and community wildfire protection planning— and some counties reported expenditures that were clearly authorized by the act. Nevertheless, we identified various expenditures by some counties that may not have been consistent with specific requirements of the act, such as the following examples:
Wildland fire preparedness. In addition, some counties reported that, to maintain access to federal lands, they used Title III funds to help rebuild flood-damaged roads, and some reported using funds to purchase equipment, such as radios and GPS equipment, sonar equipment, watercraft, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and trucks for patrols. Administrative Requirements
We also found that counties we reviewed did not consistently follow Title III’s administrative requirements. Title III requires counties to certify expenditures to the Forest Service or BLM annually and provide 45-day notification to the public and any applicable resource advisory committee before spending funds. Project initiation. The Forest Service and BLM Have Taken Action to Strengthen Oversight
In response to our recommendation that the agencies strengthen their oversight by issuing regulations or clear guidance specifying the types of allowable county uses of Title III funds, the Forest Service and BLM provided additional guidance to counties, which clarifies the types of allowable uses of county funds. In addition, the agencies reported that they plan to update their expenditure reporting requirements for Title III funds, so that counties report not only funds expended the previous year but also amounts remaining unobligated. Regarding guidance, soon after our report was issued in July 2012,agencies updated their websites to provide substantial additional information on allowable expenditures under the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Secure Rural Schools Act, counties with federal lands may elect to receive payments to help stabilize revenues lost because of declining federal timber sales. Under Title III of the act, counties are authorized to use these funds for certain projects related to wildland fire and emergency services on federal lands. The act provides oversight roles for the Forest Service and BLM, requiring them to review counties certification of their Title III expenditures as the agencies determine to be appropriate and to issue regulations to carry out the acts purposes. GAO reported to this committee in July 2012 that the agencies had provided limited oversight of county spending under Title III and that, although the projects for which counties reported using Title III funds were generally aligned with the broad purposes of Title III, county spending did not in all cases appear consistent with specific provisions of the act.
This testimony describes (1) key findings of GAOs July 2012 report on oversight and implementation of the act (GAO-12-775) and (2) actions the agencies have taken to strengthen oversight of county spending since the July 2012 report was issued. The testimony is based primarily on GAOs 2012 report and includes selected updates conducted in March 2013 on actions the agency has taken in response to that report.
GAO is making no recommendations in this testimony. In July 2012 GAO recommended that the agencies strengthen their oversight by issuing regulations or clear guidance. The agencies concurred, and took action to implement this recommendation.
What GAO Found
In July 2012 GAO reported that the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had taken few actions to oversee county spending under Title III of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act, and that the guidance they provided was limited and in some cases did not appear consistent with the act. GAO also reported that some expenditures by selected counties may have been inconsistent with the act--which may have resulted in part from the limited guidance available from the agencies--and that reviewed counties did not consistently follow Title III's administrative requirements. Specifically, GAO found the following:
Neither the Forest Service nor BLM had issued regulations under the act, and the guidance the agencies had issued was limited and sometimes unclear. Forest Service guidance, for example, did little to clarify language in the act, neither defining terms from the act nor specifying which types of expenditures were allowed under the act and which were not. The absence of clear guidance or regulations was of particular concern to GAO because the act itself does not define key terms. For example, the act authorizes counties to use Title III funds for "emergency services" but does not specify the types of activities covered by this term. Moreover, the agencies did not have assurance that they had an accurate accounting of the amounts of Title III funding spent and unspent by the counties, which is important because the act requires unobligated funds to be returned to the U.S. Treasury upon the act's expiration.
The counties GAO reviewed reported using Title III funds for projects that were generally aligned with the three broad purposes of Title III--wildland fire preparedness, emergency services on federal land, and community wildfire protection planning--but GAO identified certain expenditures by some counties that may not be consistent with specific requirements of the act. Such expenditures included funding for activities such as clearing vegetation along evacuation routes, updating 9-1-1 systems, and conducting routine law enforcement patrols on federal land. Some counties GAO reviewed reported using funds to purchase equipment, such as radios and GPS equipment, sonar equipment, watercraft, all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, and trucks for patrols.
Counties also did not consistently follow Title III's administrative requirements, which include annual certification of expenditures, 45-day notification periods to the public and others before spending funds, and deadlines for project initiation. For example, some counties did not submit a certification for certain years when they spent funds, some counties submitted their certifications late, and some counties did not consistently follow notification and project initiation requirements.
Since GAO's report was issued, the Forest Service and BLM have provided additional guidance to counties, which clarifies allowable uses of Title III funds. In addition, the agencies reported that they plan to change their requirements for annual reporting of expenditures to obtain additional information regarding the extent to which counties have obligated their Title III funds. The additional guidance addresses the recommendation in GAO's July 2012 report. |
gao_GAO-06-516 | gao_GAO-06-516_0 | The panel’s report noted that WMATA—unlike almost all other large transit systems—does not have a substantial dedicated source of revenue, such as a local sales tax, whose receipts are directed to the transit authority. As a result, the panel concluded that the Washington, D.C., region needs to develop a dedicated source of funding for WMATA, and recommended specifically that a regionwide sales tax be implemented. Dedicated Funding Is an Important Part of Transit Agencies’ Overall Funding and Commonly Includes a Basket of Revenue Sources Used for Both Operations and Capital Expenditures
Definition of Dedicated Funding Has Some Common Characteristics, but There Is Variation in How It Is Structured
Using the definition in FTA’s National Transit Database (NTD), we identified the following characteristics of dedicated funding: (1) specific revenue sources are designated, (2) the revenue is designated to be provided to the transit agency, and (3) the revenue is not subject to appropriations. As of April 2006, this legislation had not been enacted. Although the NTD provides a description of dedicated funding, the revenue that transit agencies report as dedicated may or may not have the characteristics described by the NTD. Having the flexibility to spend dedicated revenues on operations or capital has advantages for transit agencies, according to agencies and transportation experts we spoke with. 3496), state and local officials are faced with two main issues, should they choose to enact dedicated funding for WMATA: (1) which revenue source or sources to dedicate to WMATA and (2) whether and how to address a WMATA budgetary shortfall. State and local governments could establish a dedicated funding source for WMATA without increasing their revenue collections. For example, H.R. Legislation that would amend the WMATA Compact as required by H.R. Such legislation was introduced in the Maryland General Assembly in February 2006, but was later withdrawn. Currently, the jurisdictions are more focused on enacting legislation to establish dedicated funding. WMATA Funding Partners Have Yet to Resolve Several Issues Related to Dedicated Funding
WMATA’s funding partners face a number of issues that will need to be resolved should they choose to provide WMATA with dedicated funding. In addition to addressing this fundamental issue, the jurisdictions must also resolve the following issues: what proportion of the jurisdictions’ payments to WMATA would come from dedicated sources and how to mitigate the risk associated with dependence on these sources; whether dedicated funding would result in a net increase in the amount WMATA receives from the Compact jurisdictions and what portion of the total amount dedicated to WMATA each jurisdiction would pay; whether dedicated funding should be used exclusively for WMATA’s capital or operating needs, or both; and whether increased oversight of WMATA is needed to ensure adequate accountability for dedicated funds. Agency Comments
We provided copies of a draft of this report to WMATA and the U.S. Department of Transportation for their review and comment. These officials also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated in the report, as appropriate. We will also make copies available to others upon request. We analyzed financial data for the 25 largest transit agencies using information in the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) National Transit Database (NTD). The NTD contains financial data reported to FTA by transit agencies. To compare potential revenue sources that could be used as dedicated funding for WMATA, we reviewed literature on the economics of state and local public finance and mass transit funding and the Metro Funding Panel report, and met with experts in state and local public finance and the financing of transportation and with staff from the Metro Funding Panel. Based on that review and those discussions, we identified year-to-year revenue stability, longer-run revenue adequacy, and the tax or fee rate necessary to yield a specified amount of revenue as key considerations for choosing a revenue source to dedicate to WMATA; identified equity, efficiency, and administrative cost as additional considerations that could be affected if there are tax and fee increases to provide additional funding to WMATA; identified the sales tax, the payroll or income tax, the motor vehicle fuel tax, the property tax, access fees, and vehicle registration fees as revenue sources that we would compare; and assessed these revenue sources based on the considerations identified. To determine the major actions required to establish dedicated funding for WMATA, what progress on these actions has been made so far, and what issues related to dedicated funding have emerged, we interviewed the following state, local, and regional officials, including the chief administrative officers or other appropriate official from each of the eight local Compact jurisdictions or their representatives; the Director of Transportation from the District of Columbia and the Secretaries of Transportation from Maryland and Virginia; members of the Maryland General Assembly, the Virginia General Assembly, and the City Council of the District of Columbia—we selected officials who sit on committees that would be involved in dedicated funding legislation; officials from the Offices of the Parliamentarian at the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate; representatives from the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission; and WMATA officials, including representatives from the Board of Directors, the Office of Policy and Intergovernmental Relations, and the Office of General Counsel. | Why GAO Did This Study
A regional panel estimated that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)--Washington, D.C.'s, transit system--will have total budgetary shortfalls of $2.4 billion over 10 years. The panel and others have noted that WMATA's lack of a significant dedicated revenue source may affect its ability to keep the system in good working order. Proposed federal legislation would make $1.5 billion available to WMATA if the local governments established dedicated funding. This report addresses (1) the characteristics of dedicated funding and its effects on transit agencies and governments; (2) how potential revenue sources compare in terms of stability, adequacy, and other factors; (3) major actions needed to establish dedicated funding for WMATA and the progress made to date; and (4) issues that dedicated funding poses for the region and WMATA. To address these issues, GAO reviewed financial data for the nation's 25 largest transit agencies, interviewed officials from 6 transit agencies and from the state and local governments that support WMATA, and reviewed literature on the financing of mass transit. GAO provided a draft of this report to WMATA and the Department of Transportation for review. Officials from these agencies provided technical clarifications that were incorporated in the report, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Dedicated funding, an important source of revenue for many transit agencies, is described by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) as a specific revenue source--such as a sales or gas tax--that is designated to be used for transit and is not subject to appropriations. According to data transit agencies report to FTA, 23 of the 25 largest transit agencies have dedicated funding, although the transit agencies GAO spoke with vary in the extent to which their dedicated funding corresponds to FTA's description. Most transit agencies with dedicated funding receive such funding from multiple sources and use it on both operations and capital expenses. Generally, dedicated funding is subject to the same oversight as other expenditures and is viewed by transit agencies as having a positive effect on their financial health, particularly with regard to long-range planning. However, dedicated funding has potential drawbacks: For example, it is vulnerable to economic cycles, and it limits the budgetary flexibility of state and local governments. Selecting a dedicated funding source for WMATA involves consideration of the funding source's year-to-year stability and its longer-run adequacy. For state and local governments, another consideration is the political feasibility of the tax or fee rate required to collect a specified amount of revenue from a particular funding source. Revenue sources that GAO analyzed--the sales tax, payroll or income tax, motor vehicle fuels tax, property tax, access fees, and vehicle registration fees--have different characteristics when assessed using these considerations. If governments increase their overall tax and fee revenues to provide additional funding for WMATA, there may be equity, efficiency, and administrative cost issues for their tax systems. To establish dedicated funding and conform to the requirements of the proposed federal legislation, WMATA's supporting jurisdictions would need to enact separate legislation to direct a specific revenue source to WMATA and to amend the WMATA Compact. As of April 2006, legislation to dedicate a portion of sales tax revenues to WMATA had been enacted in the District of Columbia, but neither Maryland nor Virginia had enacted comparable legislation. The only jurisdiction to introduce a bill to amend the Compact has been Maryland, and this legislation was later withdrawn. The District of Columbia and Virginia have not begun steps to amend the Compact. The federal government and the jurisdictions that support WMATA will need to resolve several issues should they choose to provide WMATA with dedicated funding, including (1) the proportion of the jurisdictions' payments to WMATA that come from dedicated funding and how to mitigate its risks; (2) whether dedicated funding will result in a net increase in payments to WMATA and how the size of each jurisdiction's payment will be determined; (3) whether dedicated funding should be used for operations, capital expenditures, or both; and (4) whether increased oversight of WMATA is needed to ensure dedicated funds are properly accounted for. |
gao_GAO-14-452 | gao_GAO-14-452_0 | On March 26, 2013, Congress and the President enacted the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, which provided full-year appropriations to federal agencies and had the effect of reducing the sequestered amount for fiscal year 2013 from $85.3 billion to $80.5 billion.on total sequestered amounts for programs that are funded by permanent The final sequestered amount for fiscal year 2013 is dependent indefinite budget authority, such as entitlement programs like Medicare payments where obligations depend on the number of eligible beneficiaries receiving benefits. Sequestration Reduced Selected Federal Components’ Services to the Public and Increased Some Partners’ and Recipients’ Reliance on Other Funding Sources
The selected components and their partners reduced or delayed some services to the public and operations in 2013 as a result of sequestration. For example, CBP officials reported that sequestration reductions did not leave them with sufficient funds to provide the overtime necessary to fully staff inspection booths, which resulted in increased average wait time for international passengers. From fiscal years 2012 to 2013, wait times increased from 19.7 minutes to 22.8 minutes at one airport and from 20.9 minutes to 26.8 minutes at another. For example, to implement sequestration reductions, CMS reported reducing the frequency of surveys to determine the quality of care and compliance with federal standards at psychiatric hospitals from once every 3 years to once every 4 to 5 years. Surveys of specialized organ transplant centers were reduced from once every 3 years to once every 4 to 6 years. Officials from one of the districts specifically reported an average increase of two or three students per elementary school class from the prior school year. DOD reduced military training and readiness activities, such as canceling or limiting training, which the agency reported could increase the number of non-deployable units, decrease surge capacity to meet additional requirements with ready forces, and lead to skills gaps. In some instances, the effects of sequestration compounded other reductions in federal, state, and local funding sources. Similarly, some PHAs used funding However, we found that in some cases the effects of sequestration were unknown because it is difficult to isolate the effects for some programs and activities that receive funding from multiple sources. For example, the effects of the 2 percent sequestration of Medicare payments are difficult to quantify due to difficulty in isolating the effects of sequestration from other factors that increased or decreased payments to providers, as well as possible changes in provider behavior to compensate for the sequestration reductions. Similarly, it is difficult to isolate the specific effects of sequestration on Title I school districts because Title I funding typically makes up a small portion of the school district’s total funding compared to state and local sources. Specifically, CMS had difficulty determining all of the types of provider payments that would need to be cut and which funding was subject to special sequestration rules. Similarly, CBP budget officials told us that applying sequestration to fee accounts was more difficult than other accounts due to uncertainty over whether fee accounts would be exempt from sequestration, as well as uncertainty about how to apply sequestration cuts to fee accounts. In addition, uncertainty surrounding the timing and amount of sequestration limited the components’ ability to provide substantive communication to its program partners and recipients. Recipients of PIH Indian Housing Block grants told us that uncertainty surrounding the fiscal year 2013 federal budget process presented challenges because they did not receive the full amount of their grants from HUD until several months into the calendar year. Officials from OESE and PIH told us that they had few options for implementing sequestration because some of their largest programs are based on eligibility formulas—established by law in some cases—or the funds are disbursed to program partners to fund various services to the public. In cases where officials did have some discretion in applying sequestration reductions, components reported that they had to make trade-offs to protect higher priority activities in their resource allocation decisions. Similarly, within DOD, the military services sought to protect training requirements for deployed and next-to-deploy forces. To do this, DOD took actions such as canceling or limiting training for forces not preparing to deploy in fiscal year 2014. Similarly, according to CMS officials, an initiative to improve the efficiency of its facility inspections that began in 2011 helped CMS plan for the fiscal year 2013 sequestration. Consistent with our March 2014 report, we found that actions components took to mitigate the effects of sequestration on mission priorities will not be available to the same extent, if at all, in future years. In addition, these case studies provide further evidence that the uncertainty surrounding the timing and amount of sequestration hampered communication with program partners and recipients. OMB’s implementation of the recommendations in our March 2014 report would facilitate agencies’ planning and implementation for a potential future sequestration by documenting federal agencies’ and OMB’s decisions and principles for planning for and implementing sequestration. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this product to the Secretaries of DHS, Education, HHS, and HUD, and the Director, OMB for comment. DHS, Education, HHS, and HUD provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. OMB did not provide comments. Related to reductions to other federal programs and activities, officials from one district reported that in addition to Impact Aid, the district also experienced funding cuts to other federal programs due to sequestration such as special education, vocational education, Indian education, and Title I, among others. For example officials from one of the districts reported increasing elementary school classes by an average of two or three students. Appendix IV: Fiscal Year 2013 Sequestration at the Office of Public and Indian Housing
Sequestration Reduced the Number of Households Receiving Rental Assistance, Housing Agencies’ Reserves, and Maintenance and Other Housing Services
The Number of Households Receiving Vouchers Declined Even As PHAs Used Voucher Reserves to Mitigate Effects
HUD data indicated that about 1.86 million very low-income households were receiving rental housing assistance through the Housing Choice Voucher program at the end of calendar year 2013, a decline of about 41,000 (2.2 percent) compared to the end of calendar year 2012, primarily due to sequestration (see figure 9). Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) the effects of fiscal year 2013 sequestration on the operations, performance, and services to the public for selected components within federal agencies; and (2) how selected components planned and prepared for and implemented fiscal year 2013 sequestration. This report builds off of our previously issued report that evaluated how 23 federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense (DOD), Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), prepared for and implemented the fiscal year 2013 sequestration at the agency level, and the effects of sequestration on agencies’ operations, performance, and services to the public. Case Study Selection
To achieve these objectives, we selected six case study components within federal agencies for review. Based on these criteria, which are discussed in more detail below, we selected the following components:
DOD’s Operation and Maintenance accounts;
DOD’s Procurement accounts;
DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
Education’s Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE);
HHS’s Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS); and
HUD’s Public and Indian Housing (PIH). Overall, these six case study components accounted for roughly $48 billion, or more than 56 percent, of the total sequestration ordered on March 1, including roughly 77 percent of sequestered defense spending and almost 36 percent of sequestered nondefense spending. Results from selected case studies, however, cannot be generalized. We reviewed additional documents—provided by agency officials at the selected components—related to planning for and implementing sequestration in fiscal year 2013. To examine the extent to which selected components identified their PPAs in accordance with the criteria set out in section 256(k)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, we reviewed a purposeful sample of five PPAs from each of the four nondefense components discussed in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
On March 1, 2013 the President ordered a sequestration of $85.3 billion across federal government accounts. Final appropriations enacted on March 26, 2013 reduced this amount to $80.5 billion. Under current law, a sequestration of direct spending will occur through fiscal year 2024 and another sequestration of discretionary appropriations could occur in any fiscal year through 2021.
GAO was asked to evaluate how agencies prepared for and implemented sequestration in fiscal year 2013. GAO's March 2014 report broadly examined fiscal year 2013 sequestration at 23 large federal agencies. This report examines in greater depth: (1) the effects of fiscal year 2013 sequestration on the operations, performance, or services to the public for selected components within federal agencies; and (2) how those selected components planned for and implemented the fiscal year 2013 sequestration.
GAO reviewed programs and activities operated by four components of federal agencies: CBP, CMS, OESE, and PIH. GAO selected these case studies based on factors such as the share of total sequestered funds and level of direct services provided to the public. GAO also incorporated findings from a November 2013 report that addressed similar objectives for select operations at DOD. GAO's case study selections account for about 77 percent of the total defense funding sequestered and 36 percent of the total nondefense funding sequestered in fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Found
Fiscal year 2013 sequestration reduced funding to selected components of federal agencies and their program partners—such as state and local governments—that assist in carrying out agency missions. As a result, the selected components and their partners reduced or delayed some services to the public and operations in 2013. For example:
Public housing authorities reported providing rental assistance to about 41,000 fewer very low-income households compared to 2012—a 2.2 percent reduction—because the authorities received less program funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH).
The Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) reported reducing the frequency of surveys to determine quality of care and compliance with federal standards at psychiatric hospitals from once every three years to once every four to five years and specialized organ transplant centers from once every three years to once every four to six years.
The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported that sequestration reductions did not leave them with sufficient funds to provide the overtime necessary to fully staff inspection booths which resulted in increased average wait times for international passengers. From fiscal years 2012 to 2013, wait times increased from 19.7 minutes to 22.8 minutes at one airport and from 20.9 minutes to 26.8 minutes at another.
School districts GAO spoke with reported that reduced funding from the Department of Education's Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE) resulted in less resources for specialists providing extra instruction to students and an increase in the average number of students per elementary school class. For example, one district reported an average increase of two or three students per elementary school class from the prior school year.
The Department of Defense (DOD) reported that canceled or limited military training and readiness activities could increase the number of nondeployable units, decrease surge capacity to meet additional requirements with ready forces, and lead to skills gaps.
In some cases, program partners reported increasing reliance on other federal, state, and local funding sources, where available, to mitigate sequestration's effects on their services to the public. Certain state agencies reported that they relied on additional state funds to inspect and investigate health care facilities on behalf of CMS. However, in other cases, program partners reported that reductions in other funding sources magnified sequestration's effects on services to the public. For example, officials at 7 school districts that receive federal education grants reported that sequestration compounded prior-year reductions in state funding.
However, GAO found in some cases the effects of sequestration could not be isolated from the effects of other changes in funding. For example:
The effects of the 2 percent sequestration of Medicare payments are difficult to quantify due to the challenge of isolating the effects of sequestration from other factors that increased or decreased payments to providers, as well as possible changes in provider behavior to compensate for the sequestration reductions.
It is difficult to isolate the specific effects of sequestration on Title I school districts because Title I funding typically makes up a small portion of the school district's total funding compared to state and local sources. A district's Title I formula allocation could also be reduced as a result of factors other than sequestration.
GAO found that sequestration planning and implementation varied among the selected components. In some cases, agencies directed components' efforts, while in others components provided guidance and set priorities for program offices. Consistent with GAO's March 2014 report, officials from all federal agency components reported that uncertainty regarding the timing and amount of sequestration and technical questions about how to apply sequestration to certain complex accounts presented challenges for planning and implementation. For example:
CMS officials had difficulty determining all of the types of provider payments that would need to be cut and which funding was subject to special sequestration rules.
According to CBP budget officials, applying sequestration to fee-based accounts was more difficult than applying sequestration to other accounts.
In addition, uncertainty surrounding the timing and amount of sequestration limited some components' ability to substantively communicate with program partners and recipients, making it difficult for partners to plan and execute their budgets during the fiscal year. For example, recipients of Indian Housing Block grants from PIH did not receive the full amount of funds until several months into the calendar year.
Components that had initiated efficiency efforts prior to sequestration reported that they were better positioned to plan for and implement sequestration in fiscal year 2013. For example, CMS officials reported that savings from a 2011 initiative to improve the efficiency of its facility inspections helped the component plan for and implement sequestration.
In reviewing how agencies implemented sequestration, GAO also selected five programs, projects, and activities (PPAs) from each of the four nondefense case study components based on the specific programs or activities reviewed within each component and other factors and found that components complied with the provision in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 that specifies how PPAs should be identified for the purpose of sequestration.
In cases where officials had some discretion in implementing sequestration reductions, components reported that they sought to protect higher priority activities, either by using funding flexibilities or modifying or canceling contracts or other ongoing activities. For example, within DOD, the military services sought to protect training requirements for deployed and next-to-deploy forces by canceling or limiting training for forces not preparing to deploy in fiscal year 2014.
However, for some programs, officials reported having limited options to implement sequestration. For example, some of the case study components' largest programs—such as HUD's Housing Choice Voucher Program and Education's Title I grants—are based on eligibility formulas and the funds are disbursed to program partners to provide services to the public. As a result, these program partners had to identify specific actions—such as limiting the number of housing vouchers issued and increasing classroom size—to absorb the reductions and mitigate their effects on the public.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report.
We provided a draft of this product to the selected case study agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for comment. DHS, Education, HHS, and HUD provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. OMB did not provide comments. |
gao_T-GGD-98-146 | gao_T-GGD-98-146_0 | A-76 provides federal policy for the government’s performance of commercial activities. In summary, Mr. Chairman, A-76 has shown itself to be an effective management tool in increasing the efficiency of the federal government and saving scarce funds. However, despite its proven track record, A-76 is seldom used in civilian agencies. OMB has not consistently sent strong messages to the agencies that A-76 is a priority management initiative. While OMB’s May 12, 1998, memorandum is an encouraging first step, thorough implementation and follow-through will be needed to get A-76 on track. In addition, agencies will need to continue their efforts to ensure both that they have the sound program cost data needed to make comparisons and that mechanisms are in place to monitor and oversee contracts. Finally, we believe that agencies’ development and Congress’ use of annual performance plans under the Results Act provide an opportunity to consider A-76 and other competition issues within the context of the most efficient means to achieve agency goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the purpose and usefulness of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-76 in the current federal environment; (2) why A-76 is not being used extensively by civilian agencies; (3) the effectiveness of OMB's efforts to lead the implementation of A-76, which, in GAO's view, could be enhanced; and (4) observations regarding the necessary elements of a more active A-76 program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OMB Circular A-76 has shown itself to be an effective management tool in increasing the efficiency of the federal government and saving scarce funds; (2) despite its proven track record, A-76 is seldom used in civilian agencies; (3) OMB has not consistently sent strong messages to the agencies that A-76 is a priority management initiative; (4) while OMB's May 12, 1998, memorandum is an encouraging first step, thorough implementation and follow-through will be needed to get A-76 on track; (5) in addition, agencies will need to continue their efforts to ensure both that they have the sound program cost data needed to make comparisons and that mechanisms are in place to monitor and oversee contracts; and (6) agencies' development and Congress' use of annual performance plans under the Government Performance and Results Act provide an opportunity to consider A-76 and other competition issues within the context of the most efficient means to achieve agency goals. |
gao_GAO-15-414 | gao_GAO-15-414_0 | The CMP was initially intended to be implemented between 2006 and 2014. CMP Is Approximately 3 Years Behind Schedule
While renovation work on three of the five buildings in the UN Headquarters Complex is substantially complete, the CMP project is behind schedule. The UN General Assembly Has Authorized Financing for the CMP Cost Overrun
In resolutions passed in December 2013 and April 2015, the UN General Assembly approved a strategy to pay for the CMP’s projected $379.2 million cost overrun. UN Is Applying Some Lessons Learned from the CMP but Has Not Made Them Standard Practice for All Capital Improvements
Throughout the renovation of the UN Headquarters Complex, the UN General Assembly has requested that lessons learned from the CMP inform the planning and implementation of all future UN capital projects. The three options the Secretary- General deemed viable by that study include a new building on the north lawn of the UN campus, a new building south of the campus known as the UN Consolidation Building (DC-5), and maintaining the status quo— relying on leased space. UN Assumptions Justifying Determinations on Future Office Space Needs Could Be Better Documented
In April 2013, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution requesting that the Secretary-General submit a report on its future office space needs at the UN Headquarters Complex, which it stressed should include details on several factors, including total UN workforce requirements and the impact of implementing flexible workplace policies on the capacity of the buildings in the UN Headquarters Complex. The UN Strategic Heritage Plan in Geneva has adopted some of these lessons learned, but if they are not incorporated into UN policies and procedures, UN member states will have little assurance the lessons will continue to be applied to future capital projects. The UN is basing its assessment of options on various assumptions about its workforce and long-term office rental costs, but without a clear understanding of the methodology and calculations underlying the assumptions, UN decision makers may have difficulties deciding which options will achieve the most efficient and effective allocation of resources in the coming years. Permanent Representative to the United Nations work with other member states to take the following two actions: 1. Ensure that lessons learned during implementation of the CMP are used to develop documented guidance for future capital projects funded by UN member states. Clearly justify assumptions used to estimate future office space needs, for example, by documenting the underlying factors, data, and analyses. State concurred with our recommendations. Specifically, we examine (1) the extent to which the CMP is on schedule and achieving its originally planned scope of work within budget, (2) the UN’s application of lessons learned from the CMP to other UN capital projects, and (3) how the UN determines and plans to address future office space needs at its headquarters. Additionally, we discussed the progress, plans, risks, and costs of the CMP and the UN’s efforts to address its future office space needs with officials from Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organizations, the U.S. Mission to the UN, and UN offices, including the CMP office and Central Support Services. Update on the United Nations’ Capital Master Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2006, the UN approved a $1.88 billion plan to modernize its headquarters by 2014 (the CMP project), including renovating five buildings. In a separate effort, the UN is considering options to address its future needs for office space. As the UN's largest financial contributor, the United States has a significant interest in these projects.
GAO was asked to review progress on these efforts. GAO examined (1) the extent to which the CMP is on schedule and achieving its originally planned scope of work within budget, (2) the UN's application of lessons learned from the CMP to other UN capital projects, and (3) how the UN determines and plans to address future office space needs at its headquarters. To perform this work, GAO reviewed CMP schedule, planning, budget, and cost documents; examined relevant UN General Assembly resolutions; and met with officials from the Department of State and relevant UN offices.
What GAO Found
The Capital Master Plan (CMP) intended to modernize, secure, and restore the United Nations (UN) Headquarters Complex, is substantially complete. However, the project is 3 years behind schedule primarily due to unplanned security upgrades and is projected to be over budget, while the UN has removed two buildings from its scope due to lack of a feasible solution to security concerns. As of February 2015, the UN estimated that the CMP will cost about $379 million more than originally planned. In resolutions passed in December 2013 and April 2015, the UN General Assembly authorized financing of the CMP cost overrun through various means, including an additional member state assessment.
UN internal and external auditors have identified lessons learned from the CMP that could be applied to future capital projects, such as including all foreseeable costs at a project's outset. The UN is applying some of these lessons to a new capital improvement project in Geneva. However, the UN has not made these lessons standard practice as called for by federal and UN standards for internal control. As a result, the UN could miss the opportunity to apply its experience to help achieve long-term savings and efficiencies in future capital improvement efforts.
The UN has identified as viable three options to address its future office space needs in New York, including a new building within the UN Headquarters Complex, a new building south of the UN Complex, and the status quo—relying on leased space. However, GAO found the assumptions upon which the UN bases these options—including UN workforce projections and the potential impact of flexible workplace policies such as teleworking or desk sharing—are not well supported and documented. Without an understanding of the methodology and calculations underlying the assumptions, UN decision makers may have difficulties deciding which options will achieve the most efficient and effective allocation of resources in the coming years.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations should work with other member states to (1) ensure that lessons learned during the CMP are used to develop documented guidance for future capital projects and (2) clearly justify assumptions used to estimate future office space needs, for example, by documenting the underlying factors, data, and analyses.
The Department of State concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-740 | gao_GAO-15-740_0 | Two federal agencies are primarily responsible for investigating GA accidents and ensuring aviation safety: FAA and NTSB. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) within DOT is responsible for ensuring that commercial air carriers meet minimum liability insurance coverage amounts for liability, as required under federal law, and FAA has assumed this role pursuant to a memorandum of understanding with OST. The Majority of States Have No GA Liability Insurance or Related Financial- Responsibility Requirements, Although Other Entities May Impose Such Requirements
Eleven States Impose Either Liability Insurance or Aircraft Financial- Responsibility Requirements Applicable to Some GA Aircraft Owners and Operators
Based on our survey of state aviation officials and analysis of state statutes and regulations identified by such officials, as of April 2015, the majority of the states do not have liability insurance requirements applicable to GA aircraft owners and operators (see fig. Minnesota is the only state that has a liability insurance requirement applicable to nearly all GA aircraft owners. premiums for aircraft with certain characteristics. For example, for a Cessna 172 aircraft, owned and operated by a pilot who has achieved at least a private pilot’s certificate, the range of premiums was estimated from $200 to $550 annually for the $1 million/$100K policies and $500 to $1250 annually for the $1 million smooth policies, according to the three nationwide brokers we interviewed. From these interviews, we identified the five most frequently cited factors, which include considering: 1) the costs borne by victims and the public in the absence of a liability insurance requirement; 2) the extent of the problem; 3) the cost impact on the GA community if a requirement were adopted; 4) implementation and administration issues of a potential requirement; and 5) the potential public safety benefits of a requirement. Extent of the Problem
Forty-five of the 73 aviation stakeholders who responded to us—including state aviation officials, GA association representatives, and aviation insurers—mentioned the importance of understanding the extent of the problem—namely the number of GA aircraft owners and operators who do not have liability insurance and the extent to which the absence of liability insurance has precluded accident victims from receiving compensation—as a factor that should be considered in determining whether to adopt a liability insurance requirement. That is, the aircraft owner or pilot involved in an accident had liability insurance; however, the liability insurance’s limit–often $100,000 per passenger—was, according to the aviation attorneys, frequently insufficient to compensate victims or their families in accidents involving death or serious injury. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to describe (1) existing liability insurance requirements for general aviation (GA) aircraft owners and operators in the United States; (2) available data on the range of premiums charged by selected insurance providers for GA liability insurance and factors that influence those costs; and (3) factors that selected stakeholders stated should be considered in determining whether to adopt a federal liability insurance requirement for GA aircraft owners and operators. The selection of representatives from GA trade associations was based on prior GAO reports that identified the GA associations and recommendations from FAA, NTSB, and selected state aviation officials. Six states—California, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Virginia—have some type of aircraft financial-responsibility requirements, which require GA aircraft owners to demonstrate financial ability to cover potential losses incurred in an accident. | Why GAO Did This Study
A substantial proportion of all domestic aviation accidents and fatalities that occur each year involve GA, which includes all aviation except commercial and military. Under federal law, the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for ensuring that commercial air carriers carry liability insurance. However, no such federal requirements exist for GA aircraft owners. In some cases, accidents involving uninsured or underinsured GA aircraft owners have occurred where individuals (passengers or third parties) who incurred losses received little or no compensation.
GAO was asked to look at the feasibility and costs associated with adopting federal liability insurance requirements for GA aircraft owners. This report examines (1) existing liability insurance requirements for GA aircraft owners, (2) premiums for GA liability insurance, and (3) factors that selected stakeholders cited which should be considered in determining whether to adopt a federal liability insurance requirement. GAO surveyed aviation officials in 50 states, analyzed state statutes identified in the surveys, collected insurance premium information from three nationwide aviation insurance brokers, and interviewed a diverse group of 73 aviation stakeholders—including FAA and NTSB officials, GA associations, and attorneys representing accident victims—selected based on GAO's prior work that identified the GA associations and recommendations from FAA, NTSB, and other aviation stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's 50-state survey of state aviation officials and analysis of state statutes and regulations identified by such officials, the vast majority of states do not have liability insurance requirements for general aviation (GA) aircraft owners and operators (i.e., pilots). As of April 2015, 11 states have some variation of a liability insurance requirement or aircraft financial-responsibility requirements, which require GA aircraft owners to demonstrate financial ability to cover potential losses incurred in an accident (see figure below). Minnesota is the only state that requires almost all GA aircraft owners to have a minimum liability insurance coverage: the required minimum coverage is $100,000 per passenger seat.
Annual premiums for liability insurance vary depending on the type of aircraft insured and a pilot's experience. For example, three nationwide brokers GAO contacted noted that an annual premium for a common 4-seat GA aircraft, a Cessna 172, can range from $200 to $550 for a policy that provides $1 million in coverage per accident, with a limit of $100,000 for each accident victim.
GAO interviewed 73 aviation stakeholders who most frequently cited five factors that they felt should be considered in determining whether to adopt a federal liability insurance requirement. Understanding the extent of the problem—both the number of GA aircraft owners who are uninsured and underinsured and the extent to which accident victims received little or no compensation from such owners—was one such factor. However, data on the extent of this problem are not available and, according to FAA and NTSB officials, could be challenging to collect. Four other factors cited include: (1) costs to victims and the public in the absence of liability insurance; (2) costs to the GA community if such a requirement were adopted; (3) issues related to the implementation and administration of such a requirement; and (4) the potential public-safety benefits. |
gao_GAO-07-894T | gao_GAO-07-894T_0 | Crude Oil Prices and Other Factors Affect Gasoline Prices
Crude oil prices are a major determinant of gasoline prices. In other words, if the demand for gasoline increases faster than the ability to supply it, the price of gasoline will most likely increase. Refining capacity and utilization rates also play a role in determining gasoline prices. Refinery capacity in the United States has not expanded at the same pace as demand for gasoline and other petroleum products in recent years. This could mean that gasoline prices remain high until the imported supplies can reach the market. As have a number of other industries, the petroleum industry has adopted so-called “just-in-time” delivery processes to reduce costs leading to a downward trend in the level of gasoline inventories in the United States. Mergers in the 1990s Increased Market Concentration and Led to Small But Significant Increases in Wholesale Gasoline Prices; However the Impact of More Recent Mergers is Unknown
During the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum industry experienced a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, several of them between large oil companies that had previously competed with each other for the sale of petroleum products. These mergers contributed to increases in market concentration in the refining and marketing segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. For the four mergers that we modeled for reformulated gasoline, two— Exxon-Mobil and Marathon-Ashland—led to increased prices of about 1 cent per gallon, on average. The increases were for branded gasoline only and were about 7 cents per gallon, on average. Concluding Observations
Our past work has shown that, the price of crude oil is a major determinant of gasoline prices along with changes in demand for gasoline. In addition, merger activity can influence gasoline prices. While we have not performed modeling on mergers that occurred since 2000, and thus cannot comment on any potential effect on wholesale gasoline prices at this time, these mergers would further increase market concentration nationwide since there are now fewer oil companies. We are currently in the process of studying the effects of the mergers that have occurred since 2000 on gasoline prices as a follow up to our previous report on mergers in the 1990s. Also, we are working on a separate study on issues related to petroleum inventories, refining, and fuel prices. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Few issues generate more attention and anxiety among American consumers than the price of gasoline. The most current upsurge in prices is no exception. According to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the average retail price of regular unleaded gasoline in the United States has increased almost every week this year since January 29th and reached an all-time high of $3.21 the week of May 21st. Over this time period, the price has increase $1.05 per gallon and added about $23 billion to consumers' total gasoline bill, or about $167 for each passenger car in the United States. Given the importance of gasoline for the nation's economy, it is essential to understand the market for gasoline and the factors that influence gasoline prices. In this context, this testimony addresses the following questions: (1) what key factors affect the prices of gasoline and (2) what effects have mergers had on market concentration and wholesale gasoline prices?
What GAO Found
The price of crude oil is a major determinant of gasoline prices. However, a number of other factors also affect gasoline prices including (1) increasing demand for gasoline; (2) refinery capacity in the United States that has not expanded at the same pace as the demand for gasoline; (3) a declining trend in gasoline inventories and (4) regulatory factors, such as national air quality standards, that have induced some states to switch to special gasoline blends. Petroleum industry consolidation plays a role in determining gasoline prices too. The 1990s saw a wave of merger activity in which over 2600 mergers occurred in all segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. This wave of mergers contributed to increased market concentration in U.S. refining and marketing segments. Econometric modeling GAO performed on eight of these mergers showed that, after controlling for other factors including crude oil prices, the majority resulted in higher wholesale gasoline prices--generally between 1 and 7 cents per gallon. While these price increases seem small, they are not trivial--according to FTC's standards for merger review in the petroleum industry, a 1-cent increase is considered to be significant. Additional mergers occurring since 2000 are expected to increase the level of industry concentration further, and because GAO has not yet performed modeling on these mergers, we cannot comment on any potential price effects at this time. We are currently studying the effects of the mergers that have occurred since 2000 as a follow up to our previous work on mergers in the 1990s. Also, we are working on a separate study on issues related to petroleum inventories, refining, and fuel prices. |
gao_GAO-11-281 | gao_GAO-11-281_0 | Replacing the $1 Note with a $1 Coin Could Save the Government Approximately $5.5 Billion in Interest Expense over 30 Years
Replacing $1 Notes with $1 Coins Would Increase the Net Benefit to the Government over 30 Years
We estimate that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a net benefit to the government of approximately $5.5 billion over 30 years, amounting to an average yearly discounted net benefit of about $184 million. However, this benefit would not be achieved evenly over the 30 years. Our Current Estimate of the Yearly Net Benefit of Replacing the $1 Note with a $1 Coin Is Lower than Previous Estimates for a Variety of Reasons
In 2000, we estimated that the yearly net benefit to the government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would be roughly $522 million per year, after the replacement was complete. Lower replacement ratio. We did not include such costs in our estimate because counterfeiting of U.S. coins is currently minimal, both domestically and internationally, according to the U.S. Secret Service. Furthermore, we have noted in those reports that past $1 coin initiatives—such as changes to the color of the $1 coin and new coin designs—have not led to widespread public acceptance and use, in part because the $1 note was not simultaneously eliminated. Stakeholders Identified Near- and Long-Term Challenges to the Private Sector Should the $1 Coin Replace the Note
Stakeholders representing a variety of retail and manufacturing industries and organizations that would be affected by a replacement identified two kinds of associated challenges and costs: (1) those that would result in the near term from the transition and (2) those that would result in the longer term from structural changes to the cost of doing business. Some of the transitional costs and challenges may be more formidable than others. Concluding Observation
As in the past, our analysis indicates that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a financial benefit to the government if production of the $1 note ceased. While the public initially resisted these transitions, opposition dissipated over time with no alternative to the note. Both the Federal Reserve and Treasury maintained that an assessment of the benefits and costs to the U.S. economy––that included the net benefits to the government as we reported as well as the benefits and costs to the private sector––is important in any evaluation of whether to replace the $1 note with a $1 coin. (2) What other effects did stakeholders suggest such a replacement could have? To estimate the net benefit to the government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin, we constructed an economic model, which we based on our analyses of past reports of GAO and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) that used an economic model to develop such an estimate, together with information obtained from reviews of agency documents and interviews with experts in government and academia. We also interviewed officials from Canada and the United Kingdom (UK), both of which have replaced notes with coins, to gain information useful in determining certain key assumptions in our model. To determine the various effects replacement could have on stakeholders, we identified industries and organizations that might be affected by changes to notes and coins. For our replacement scenario, we assume a 4-year transition period during which the production of $1 notes stops immediately; no $1 notes are withdrawn from circulation, but due to their short life, they would naturally fall out of circulation within a few years; the 1 billion coins currently stored with the Federal Reserve are released into circulation in the first year; 1 billion $1 coins that were inactive and held by the public enter active circulation in the first year; and the Mint expands its production of $1 coins during the first 4 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since coins are more durable than notes and do not need replacement as often, many nations have replaced lower-denomination notes with coins to obtain a financial benefit. GAO has estimated the annual net benefit to the U.S. government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin four times over the past 20 years, most recently in April 2000. Asked to update its estimate, GAO (1) estimated the net benefit to the government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin and (2) examined other effects stakeholders suggested such a replacement could have. To perform its work, GAO constructed an economic model and interviewed officials from the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, the U.S. Secret Service, outside experts, and officials from Canada and the United Kingdom. To determine the effects on stakeholders, GAO interviewed officials from industries and organizations that might be affected by changes to currency.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's analysis, replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin could save the government approximately $5.5 billion over 30 years. This would amount to an average yearly discounted net benefit--that is, the present value of future net benefits--of about $184 million. However, GAO's analysis, which assumes a 4-year transition period beginning in 2011, indicates that the benefit would vary over the 30 years. The government would incur a net loss in the first 4 years and then realize a net benefit in the remaining years. The early net loss is due in part to the up-front costs to the U.S. Mint of increasing its coin production during the transition. GAO's current estimate is lower than its 2000 estimate, which indicated an annual net benefit to the government of $522 million. This is because some information has changed over time and GAO incorporated some different assumptions in its economic model. For example, the lifespan of the note has increased over the past decade, and GAO assumed a lower ratio of coins to notes needed for replacement. GAO has noted in past reports that efforts to increase the circulation and public acceptance of the $1 coin have not succeeded, in part, because the $1 note has remained in circulation. Other countries that have replaced a low-denomination note with a coin, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, stopped producing the note. Officials from both countries told GAO that this step was essential to the success of their transition and that, with no alternative to the note, public resistance dissipated within a few years. Stakeholders representing a variety of cash-intensive entities in the private sector identified potential shorter- and longer-term effects of a replacement. For example, some stakeholders said that they would initially incur costs to modify equipment and add storage and that later their costs to process and transport coins would go up. Others, however, such as some transit agencies, have already made the transition and would not incur such initial costs. As in the past, GAO's analysis indicates that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a financial benefit to the government if production of the $1 note ceased. GAO previously recommended replacement of the $1 note and continues to support this recommendation. The Federal Reserve and Treasury reviewed a draft of this report and both noted the importance of societal effects in deciding on such a replacement and offered technical comments. |
gao_GAO-17-80 | gao_GAO-17-80_0 | In fiscal year 2015, DeCA received $1.3 billion in appropriations. DeCA’s Board of Directors annually recommends the patron savings rate that is to be the price differential commissary patrons are to obtain by shopping in commissaries rather than at commercial grocery stores. According to DeCA officials, the pilot would help DeCA to more accurately compare the cost of shopping at commissaries with commercial grocery stores. DeCA officials stated that the agency plans to assess and revise the savings methodology, which may include addressing some limitations such as weighted average calculations. By contrast, pricing at commercial grocery stores is sensitive to the cost of business operations, competition in their specific market, and the need to generate a profit. DeCA Tracks Products Sold but Does Not Manage Products in a Manner Consistent with Practices Generally Employed in Commercial Grocery Stores
DeCA tracks the sale of products at all commissaries but does not assess the contribution of the sale of each product to a given store’s total sales in determining which products to sell. According to DeCA officials, because commissaries are focused on providing a benefit rather than on maximizing profitability or sales like commercial grocery stores, commissaries do not have clear goals or objectives related to customer demand. For example, commissaries do not always adjust products that commissaries carry based on customer demand. DeCA officials said that they would like to be more efficient and improve product management based on store sales and customer demand, but DeCA does not have a plan with time frames and could not provide additional information about how it would achieve this goal. Without conducting a cost-benefit analysis to guide decisions about using in- house or contractor staff for stocking and custodial services at its commissaries, DeCA is not positioned to determine whether it is using its resources efficiently and effectively and is reducing operational costs. DeCA Lacks Reasonable Assurance That It Is Using the Most Cost-Effective Product Distribution System
DeCA has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis to fully understand the costs associated with different product distribution options across all commissaries and to use in selecting the most cost-effective option available for each commissary. First, DeCA states it is achieving its desired 30 percent savings rate for commissary patrons; however, DeCA’s methodology for calculating this rate has certain limitations. In particular, DeCA has not focused on improving the management of products based on consumer demand and consequently may be missing potential opportunities to improve sales, leverage efficiencies, and achieve savings in commissary operations. For example, DeCA uses service contracts for stocking at most commissaries, even though in-house stocking has been shown to be less costly. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide greater assurance that defense commissaries are achieving the desired savings rate for patrons, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief Executive Officer of DeCA, as DeCA revises its methodology for calculating the savings rate, to address the limitations that we identified, including those related to seasonal differences in prices, the sampling methodology for overseas commissaries, geographic differentiation, and the calculation of the weighted average. To improve operational efficiencies and reduce costs related to product management and services that support commissary operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief Executive Officer of DeCA to take the following two actions:
Develop a plan with objectives, goals, and time frames on how it will improve efficiency in product management, such as offering products based on store sales or customer demand. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation is valid and that DOD should use a data-driven approach and conduct a cost-benefit analysis to fully understand the costs associated with stocking and custodial services contracts and its different distribution options. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address both objectives of this report, we conducted site visits to a nongeneralizable sample of 12 commissaries to identify information on commissary operations at the local level. To evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has assurance it is maintaining the savings rate for patrons that represents the nonpay cash benefit, we reviewed DeCA’s current savings methodology that calculates the savings rate that patrons realize by using commissaries instead of private retailers from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, the latter being the most recent available fiscal year for which data were available at the time of our review. To identify differences in business practices between commissary operations and commercial grocery store practices, we reviewed (1) DOD’s pricing method, (2) management of products, and (3) cost-benefit analyses of service contracts and transportation distribution costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD operates 238 commissaries worldwide to provide groceries and household goods at reduced prices as a benefit to military personnel, retirees, and their dependents. Since 2010, Congress appropriated an average $1.4 billion annually to help fund commissary operations.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to review aspects of commissary operations. This report (1) determines the extent to which DOD has assurance it is maintaining its desired savings rate for patrons and (2) identifies differences in business practices between commissary operations and commercial grocery store practices. GAO analyzed data on savings, sales, and costs. GAO also reviewed leading practices relevant for commissary operations; assessed the costs for service contracts and product distribution options; and conducted site visits to a nongeneralizable sample of 12 commissaries based on, among other things, location and sales.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) lacks reasonable assurance that it is maintaining its desired savings rate for commissary patrons. The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), which manages the commissaries, has a methodology for calculating the annual savings rate that patrons realize by shopping at commissaries rather than commercial grocery stores. In fiscal year 2015, the most recent data available at the time of our review, DeCA's Board of Directors approved a desired average savings rate of 30 percent based on savings calculated for prior years using the methodology. However, GAO found weaknesses in this methodology. For example, the methodology does not use a random sample of overseas commissaries or account for seasonal and geographic variations in item prices. Because of these weaknesses, DOD's methodology can potentially result in an inaccurate calculation of the actual savings rate that commissary patrons experience. DeCA officials stated that the agency plans to revise the savings methodology to address the limitations GAO identified. Because this effort is underway, it is too early to know whether the revisions will address the limitations GAO identified.
Differences exist between certain business processes used at the commissaries and those of commercial grocery stores.
First, DeCA tracks the sale of products at all commissaries but does not assess the contribution of the sale of each product to a given store's total sales in determining which products to sell. According to DeCA officials, because commissaries are focused on providing a benefit rather than on maximizing profits like commercial grocery stores, commissaries do not always adjust products they carry based on customer demand. DeCA officials said that they would like to be more efficient, but have not developed a plan with achievable objectives, goals, and time frames regarding how to improve product management based on sales and customer demand. Without improving the management of products based on sales and customer demand as is done in commercial grocery stores, DeCA may be missing opportunities to increase sales, leverage efficiencies, and achieve savings in commissary operations. Second, DeCA has not conducted cost-benefit analyses for costs associated with (1) the use of stocking and custodial service contracts as compared with the use of in-house staff and (2) product distribution options across all commissaries. For example, DeCA uses services contracts at most commissaries, totaling about $137 million in fiscal year 2015, even though our analysis suggests that using in-house personnel for stocking may be more cost effective. Commercial grocery stores are generally sensitive to the cost of business operations, competition in their market, and the need to generate a profit. In addition, different product distribution options could result in significant savings impacting the price a commissary patron pays for a product. According to DeCA officials, DOD does not require cost-benefit analyses to compare alternative options for service contracts or for the distribution of products to commissaries. However, without conducting such analyses to guide its decision making on these business processes, DeCA is not positioned to determine whether it is using its resources most efficiently.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations, including that DOD address limitations identified in its savings rate methodology; develop a plan with objectives, goals, and time frames to improve efficiency in product management; and conduct comprehensive cost-benefit analyses for service contracts and distribution options. DOD concurred with GAO's first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third recommendation. GAO continues to believe the cost-benefit analysis recommendation is valid. |
gao_GAO-12-699 | gao_GAO-12-699_0 | Sources of Retirement Income
Although the composition of retirement income—the proportion of income coming from different sources—varies greatly for individual households, Social Security benefits, pension income, and earnings make up the bulk of income for the U.S. population age 65 and over. Working Women’s Access to and Participation in Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans Have Improved Relative to Men
From 1998 to 2009, working women surpassed men in their likelihood of having an employer that offered a pension plan, but were slightly less likely to be eligible for and to participate in those plans. While Income Composition Changed Only Slightly for Women Age 65 and Over, They Continue to Have Less Retirement Income Than Men
The composition of women’s and men’s retirement income did not vary greatly over the last decade despite changes in the economy and pension system, largely because their main income sources—Social Security and DB plans—were shielded from fluctuations in the financial market. However, women, especially widows and those 80 years and over, depended on Social Security benefits for a larger percentage of their income than men. Women age 65 and over also had less retirement income on average and higher rates of poverty than men in that age group. Specifically, for the population age 65 and over, women’s median income was approximately 25 percent lower than men in the same age group for all years. Moreover, women in this age group were nearly twice as likely to be living in poverty than men. In fact, in 2010, 16 percent of women age 65 and over depended solely on Social Security for income compared to 12 percent of men. At the same time, the share of income from earnings increased slightly for men and women, but was consistently lower for women than for men. Divorce, Widowhood, and Unemployment Had a Detrimental Effect on Older Women’s Income Security
When women nearing or in retirement—women over age 50—became divorced, widowed or unemployed, the effects on their households’ total assets and income were detrimental, according to our analysis (see table 1). Further, divorce and widowhood had more pronounced effects for women than for men. For example, while men’s income fell 22 percent after widowerhood, women’s income fell by an even greater amount—37 percent. 16).income decline by about 7 to 9 percent. For example, some options would expand the use of existing tax incentives, encouraging women to save more. All of the options have cost implications that would need to be considered prior to implementation. Since women have lower earnings than men, on average, and are more likely to take time out of the workforce to care for family members, women may especially benefit from these options. These options could address a variety of challenges women face, including their lower levels of income in retirement. There are also a number of policy options that could enhance Social Security benefits for vulnerable groups at risk of not having sufficient income or assets in retirement, including widows, divorced women, low- income women and women age 85 and over (see table 8).increasing the Social Security Survivor’s benefit to 75 percent of the deceased worker’s benefit would provide widows with more monthly income, helping to keep some women out of poverty. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the Social Security Administration for review and comment. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methods
To analyze factors that affect women’s retirement security, we examined (1) how women’s access to and participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans compare to men’s and how they have changed over time; (2) how women’s retirement income compares to men’s and how the composition of their income has changed with economic conditions and trends in pension design; (3) how events occurring later in life affect women’s retirement income; and (4) what policy options are available to help increase women’s retirement income security. Section 1: Information Sources
To answer our questions, we obtained information from a variety of sources including two nationally representative surveys—the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)—the academic literature on retirement security, and a range of experts in the area of women’s retirement security. First, the SIPP collects separate information on defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans. Section 2: Methods for Comparing Working Women’s and Men’s Access to and Participation in Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans
To determine the proportion of men and women that (1) work for an employer that offers a plan, (2) are eligible for a plan, and (3) participate in a plan, we used data from the SIPP topical module on retirement and pension plan coverage. The rate of health decline was similar for women and men. | Why GAO Did This Study
Elderly women, who comprise a growing portion of the U.S. population, have historically been at greater risk of living in poverty than elderly men. Several factors contribute to the higher rate of poverty among elderly women including their tendency to have lower lifetime earnings, take time out of the workforce to care for family members, and outlive their spouses. Other factors could affect older womens financial insecurity. These include the economic downturn and changing trends in pension plan offerings. In light of these circumstances, GAO was asked to examine (1) how womens access to and participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans compare to mens and how they have changed over time, (2) how womens retirement income compares to mens and how the composition of their incomethe proportion of income coming from different sourceschanged with economic conditions and trends in pension design, (3) how later-in-life events affect womens retirement income security, and (4) what policy options are available to help increase womens retirement income security. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed data from two nationally representative surveys, conducted a broad literature review, and interviewed a range of experts in the area of retirement security.
GAO is making no recommendations. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury and the Social Security Administration, and incorporated them, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Over the last decade, working womens access to and participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans have improved relative to men. Indeed, from 1998 to 2009, women surpassed men in their likelihood of working for an employer that offered a pension plan, largely because the proportion of men covered by a plan declined. Furthermore, as employers have continued to terminate their defined benefit (DB) plans and have switched to defined contribution (DC) plans, the proportion of women who worked for employers that offered a DC plan increased. Correspondingly, womens participation rates in DC plans increased slightly over this same period while mens participation fell, thereby narrowing the participation difference between men and women to 1 percentage point. At the same time, however, women contributed to their DC plans at lower levels than men.
Although the composition of income for women age 65 and over did not vary greatly over the perioddespite changes in the economy and pension system women continued to have less retirement income on average and live in higher rates of poverty than men in that age group. The composition of womens income varied only slightly, in part, because their main income sourcesSocial Security and DB benefitswere shielded from fluctuations in the market. Women, especially widows and those age 80 and over, depended on Social Security benefits for a larger percentage of their income than men. For example, in 2010, 16 percent of women age 65 and over depended solely on Social Security for income compared to 12 percent of men. At the same time, the share of household income women received from earnings increased over the period, but was consistently lower than for men. Moreover, womens median income was approximately 25 percent lower than mens over the last decade, and the poverty rate for women in this age group was nearly two times higher than mens in 2010.
For women approaching or in retirement, becoming divorced, widowed or unemployed had detrimental effects on their income security. Moreover, divorce and widowhood had more pronounced effects for women than for men. For example, womens household income, on average, fell by 41 percent with divorce, almost twice the size of the decline that men experienced. For widowhood, womens household income fell by 37 percentwhile mens declined by only 22 percent. Unemployment also had a detrimental effect on income security, though the effects were similar for women and men; household assets and income fell by 7 to 9 percent.
A range of existing policy options could address some of the income security challenges women face in retirement. For example, some would expand existing tax incentives to save for retirement while others would improve access to annuities. All of these options have advantages and disadvantages that would need to be evaluated prior to implementation. For example, increasing Social Security benefits for widows could provide additional income for women who have few options to increase their retirement savings. However, increasing benefits would also increase costs to the Social Security program and have implications for its long-term solvency. |
gao_GAO-15-725T | gao_GAO-15-725T_0 | Ineffective protection of these information systems and networks can result in a failure to deliver these vital services, and result in loss or theft of computer resources, assets, and funds; inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, such as national security information, PII, and proprietary business information; disruption of essential operations supporting critical infrastructure, national defense, or emergency services; undermining of agency missions due to embarrassing incidents that erode the public’s confidence in government; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch attacks on other systems; damage to networks and equipment; and high costs for remediation. Federal Agencies Face Ongoing Cybersecurity Challenges
Given the risks posed by cyber threats and the increasing number of incidents, it is crucial that federal agencies take appropriate steps to secure their systems and information. We and agency inspectors general have identified challenges in protecting federal information and systems, including those in the following key areas:
Designing and implementing risk-based cybersecurity programs at federal agencies. 2.) GAO and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies aimed at improving their implementation of these information security controls. Enhancing oversight of contractors providing IT services. Improving security incident response activities. Responding to breaches of PII. Implementing security programs at small agencies. DHS has implemented this recommendation. Until federal agencies take actions to address these challenges— including implementing the hundreds of recommendations we and inspectors general have made—federal systems and information will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats. Government-Wide Cybersecurity Initiatives Present Potential Benefits and Challenges
In addition to the efforts of individual agencies, DHS and OMB have several initiatives under way to enhance cybersecurity across the federal government. Personal Identity Verification: In August 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 ordered the establishment of a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for federal government employees and contractor personnel who access government-controlled facilities and information systems. Subsequently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined requirements for such personal identity verification (PIV) credentials based on “smart cards”—plastic cards with integrated circuit chips to store and process data—and OMB directed federal agencies to issue and use PIV credentials to control access to federal facilities and systems. In February 2015, OMB reported that, as of the end of fiscal year 2014, only 41 percent of agency user accounts at the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies required PIV cards for accessing agency systems. Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM): According to DHS, this program is intended to provide federal departments and agencies with capabilities and tools that identify cybersecurity risks on an ongoing basis, prioritize these risks based on potential impacts, and enable cybersecurity personnel to mitigate the most significant problems first. DHS, in partnership with the General Services Administration, has established a government-wide contract that is intended to allow federal agencies (as well as state, local, and tribal governmental agencies) to acquire CDM tools at discounted rates. We made several recommendations to improve the implementation of the iPost program, and State partially agreed. The EINSTEIN capabilities of NCPS are described in table 1. Our final report is expected to be released later this year, and our preliminary observations include the following:
DHS appears to have developed and deployed aspects of the intrusion detection and intrusion prevention capabilities, but potential weaknesses may limit their ability to detect and prevent computer intrusions. The intrusion prevention In conclusion, the danger posed by the wide array of cyber threats facing the nation is heightened by weaknesses in the federal government’s approach to protecting its systems and information. While recent government-wide initiatives hold promise for bolstering the federal cybersecurity posture, it is important to note that no single technology or set of practices is sufficient to protect against all these threats. A “defense in depth” strategy is required that includes well-trained personnel, effective and consistently applied processes, and appropriately implemented technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective cybersecurity for federal information systems is essential to preventing the loss of resources, the compromise of sensitive information, and the disruption of government operations. Federal information and systems face an evolving array of cyber-based threats, and recent data breaches at federal agencies highlight the impact that can result from ineffective security controls.
Since 1997, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area, and in 2003 expanded this area to include computerized systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure. This year, in GAO's high-risk update, the area was further expanded to include protecting the privacy of personal information that is collected, maintained, and shared by both federal and nonfederal entities.
This statement summarizes (1) challenges facing federal agencies in securing their systems and information and (2) government-wide initiatives, including those led by DHS, aimed at improving cybersecurity. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published and ongoing work in this area.
What GAO Found
GAO has identified a number of challenges federal agencies face in addressing threats to their cybersecurity, including the following:
Designing and implementing a risk-based cybersecurity program.
Enhancing oversight of contractors providing IT services.
Improving security incident response activities.
Responding to breaches of personal information.
Implementing cybersecurity programs at small agencies.
Until federal agencies take actions to address these challenges—including implementing the hundreds of recommendations GAO and agency inspectors general have made—federal systems and information, including sensitive personal information, will be at an increased risk of compromise from cyber-based attacks and other threats.
In an effort to bolster cybersecurity across the federal government, several government-wide initiatives, spearheaded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), are under way. These include the following:
Personal Identity Verification: In 2004, the President directed the establishment of a government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of ID for federal employees and contractor personnel who access government facilities and systems. Subsequently, OMB directed agencies to issue personal identity verification credentials to control access to federal facilities and systems. OMB recently reported that only 41 percent of user accounts at 23 civilian agencies had required these credentials for accessing agency systems.
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation: DHS, in collaboration with the General Services Administration, has established a government-wide contract for agencies to purchase tools that are intended to identify cybersecurity risks on an ongoing basis. These tools can support agencies' efforts to monitor their networks for security vulnerabilities and generate prioritized alerts to enable agency staff to mitigate the most critical weaknesses. The Department of State adopted a continuous monitoring program, and in 2011 GAO reported on the benefits of the program and challenges the department faced in implementing its approach.
National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS): This system, also referred to as EINSTEIN, is to include capabilities for monitoring network traffic and detecting and preventing intrusions, among other things. GAO has ongoing work reviewing the implementation of NCPS, and preliminary observations indicate that implementation of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities may be limited and DHS appears to have not fully defined requirements for future capabilities.
While these initiatives are intended to improve security, no single technology or tool is sufficient to protect against all cyber threats. Rather, agencies need to employ a multi-layered, “defense in depth” approach to security that includes well-trained personnel, effective and consistently applied processes, and appropriate technologies.
What GAO Recommends
In previous work, GAO and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to assist agencies in addressing cybersecurity challenges. GAO has also made recommendations to improve government-wide initiatives. |
gao_GAO-08-259T | gao_GAO-08-259T_0 | Role of IT in the Decennial Census
The Bureau estimates that it will spend about $3 billion on automation and IT for the 2010 Census, including four major systems acquisitions that are expected to play a critical role in improving coverage, accuracy, and efficiency. During the Dress Rehearsal period, which runs from February 2006 through June 2009, the Bureau plans to conduct development and testing of systems, run a mock Census Day, and prepare for Census 2010, which will include opening offices and hiring staff. Decennial IT Acquisitions Were at Various Stages of Development and Showed Mixed Progress against Schedule and Cost Baselines
As of October 2007, three key decennial systems acquisitions were in process and a fourth contract had recently been awarded. As a result, Dress Rehearsal operational testing will not address the full complement of systems and functionality that was originally planned, and the Bureau has not yet finalized its plans for further system tests. Delaying functionality increases the importance of operational testing after the Dress Rehearsal to ensure that the decennial systems work as intended. The project life-cycle costs had increased. For example, three of the four project teams had developed strategies to identify the scope of the risk management effort. However, three project teams had weaknesses in identifying risks, establishing adequate mitigation plans, and reporting risk status to executive-level officials. Still, the magnitude of handheld computers performance issues throughout the Dress Rehearsal remains unclear. In addition, the Bureau has not fully specified how it will measure performance of the handheld computers, even though the FDCA contract anticipates the Bureau’s need for data on the performance of the handheld computers. Further, the Bureau’s project teams for each of the four acquisitions had implemented many practices associated with establishing sound and capable risk management processes, but they were not always consistent: the teams had not always identified risks, developed complete risk mitigation plans, or briefed senior-level officials on risks and mitigation plans. Until the project teams and the Decennial Management Division implement appropriate risk management activities, they face an increased probability that decennial systems will not be delivered on schedule and within budget or perform as expected. Appendix I: Key 2010 Census Information Technology Acquisitions
To be determined September 2007 This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
For Census 2010, automation and information technology (IT) are expected to play a critical role. The Census Bureau plans to spend about $3 billion on automation and technology that are to improve the accuracy and efficiency of census collection, processing, and dissemination. From February 2006 through June 2009, the Bureau is holding a ''Dress Rehearsal'' during which it plans to conduct operational testing that includes decennial systems acquisitions. In October 2007, GAO reported on its review of four key 2010 Census IT acquisitions to (1) determine the status and plans, including schedule and cost, and (2) assess whether the Bureau is adequately managing associated risks. This testimony summarizes GAO's report on these key acquisitions and describes GAO's preliminary observations on the performance of handheld mobile computing devices used during the Dress Rehearsal.
What GAO Found
As of October 2007, three key systems acquisitions for the 2010 Census were in process, and a fourth contract had recently been awarded. The ongoing acquisitions showed mixed progress in meeting schedule and cost estimates. Two of the projects were not on schedule. The award of the fourth contract, originally scheduled for 2005, was awarded in September 2007. In addition, one project had incurred cost overruns and increases to its projected life-cycle cost. As a result of the schedule changes, the full complement of systems and functionality that were originally planned will not be available for upcoming Dress Rehearsal operational testing. This limitation increases the importance of further system testing to ensure that the decennial systems work as intended. The Bureau's project teams for each of the four IT acquisitions had performed many practices associated with establishing sound and capable risk management processes, but critical weaknesses remained. Three project teams had developed a risk management strategy that identified the scope of the risk management effort. However, not all project teams had identified risks, established mitigation plans, or reported risks to executive-level officials. For example, one project team did not adequately identify risks associated with performance issues experienced by handheld mobile computing devices, even though Census field staff reported slow and inconsistent data transmissions with the device during the spring Dress Rehearsal operations. The magnitude of these difficulties is not clear, and the Bureau has not fully specified how it plans to measure the performance of the devices. Until the project teams implement key risk management activities, they face an increased probability that decennial systems will not be delivered on schedule and within budget or perform as expected. |
gao_GAO-04-610 | gao_GAO-04-610_0 | As a result, SBA suspended the loan monitoring system development effort. A credit risk loan and lender monitoring system—based on industry best practices for infrastructure, methodologies, and policies—would be an effective way to address credit risk in the SBA portfolio and to facilitate the oversight of SBA’s lending partners. Based on our assessment of best practices and our understanding of SBA’s oversight and programmatic responsibilities, SBA needs a credit risk loan and lender monitoring service that will enable the agency to efficiently and effectively analyze various aspects of its overall portfolio, its individual lenders, and their portfolios. According to the statement of work prepared by FEDSIM, SBA wanted a loan monitoring capability that would apply monitoring and evaluation services to existing loan data, apply industry standards and best practices for loan and lender monitoring, and enable SBA to identify high- risk lenders. The Dun & Bradstreet Loan Monitoring Service Appears to Provide Appropriate Infrastructure and Methodologies, but SBA’s Lack of Comprehensive Policies Could Hamper Effective Oversight
Combined with appropriate SBA policies, the Dun & Bradstreet service could enable the agency to conduct the type of monitoring and analyses typical among major lenders and recommended by financial regulators. Although SBA has obtained a useful service, it does not yet have comprehensive policies on par with industry best practices to support the loan monitoring service. Comprehensive policies based on best practices would enable the agency to effectively carry out its public mission, especially regarding its need to address any findings of noncompliance with enforcement actions. SBA’s Mission and Loan Program Structure Would Affect Its Use of Credit Risk Management Tools
SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of risk it will tolerate but do so within the context of the public purposes of its loan guarantee programs, their budget constraints, and their structures. Nevertheless, many private sector risk management best practices are relevant to SBA. SBA’s Mission and Loan Guarantee Program Structure Would Affect How SBA Uses the New Loan Monitoring Capability
Although SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of risks it will tolerate in the loans it guarantees, its mission obligations will drive its credit risk management policies. For example, different loan products in the 7(a) program have different levels of guarantees, and guarantees on 504 program loans have a different structure from 7(a) guarantees. These differences influence the mix of loans in SBA’s portfolio and, consequently, would impact how SBA manages its credit risk. The structures of SBA’s loan guarantee programs may also account for some of the differences in risk management policies and practices between SBA and major lenders. This lender-level emphasis contrasts with how major private sector lenders manage credit risk, which is at the loan level. Because SBA relies on private lenders to originate and service the majority of the loans it guarantees, SBA is primarily managing the credit risk in its portfolio at the lender level. In the event that the Dun & Bradstreet contract is discontinued, SBA would not have the capability on its own to duplicate the loan monitoring service provided by Dun & Bradstreet. However, SBA does not have a formal contingency plan in place. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has been challenged in the past in developing a lender oversight capability and a loan monitoring system to facilitate its oversight. While SBA has made progress in its lender oversight program, its past efforts to develop a loan monitoring system were unsuccessful. In 2003, SBA obtained loan monitoring services from Dun & Bradstreet. GAO evaluated SBA's loan monitoring needs, how well those needs are met by the new service, and the similarities and differences for the purposes of credit risk management between SBA and private sector best practices.
What GAO Found
Largely because SBA relies on lenders to make the loans it guarantees, the agency needs a loan and lender monitoring capability that will enable it to efficiently and effectively analyze its overall portfolio of loans, its individual lenders, and their portfolios of loans. SBA, along with Dun & Bradstreet, essentially identified these same needs as they obtained the loan monitoring service. In addition, they identified the importance of applying industry standards and best practices for loan and lender monitoring and the need to identify high-risk lenders. Based on our assessment of best practices, SBA's credit risk management efforts need to include a comprehensive infrastructure, appropriate methodologies, and policies. The loan monitoring service could enable SBA to conduct the type of monitoring and analyses typical of best practices among banks and recommended by financial institution regulators, if SBA develops and implements appropriate policies. SBA's newly obtained service provides a credit risk management infrastructure and methodology that appear to be on par with those of many private sector lenders. For example, the database affords analytical capabilities based on common financial models that are used by major financial institutions. Although SBA obtained a useful service, it does not have comprehensive policies needed to implement best practices and address its needs as an agency with a public mission, especially regarding its need to use enforcement actions to address noncompliance. In addition, SBA does not have a contingency plan in the event the Dun & Bradstreet service is discontinued. SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of risk it will tolerate, but it must do so within the context of its mission and its programs' structures, which may consequently translate into different uses of its Dun & Bradstreet loan monitoring service. Since SBA is a public agency with a public mission, its mission obligations will drive its credit risk management policies. For example, different loan products in the 7(a) program have different levels of guarantees, and guarantees on 504 program loans have a different structure from 7(a) guarantees. These differences influence the mix of loans in SBA's portfolio and, consequently, would impact how SBA manages its credit risk. Furthermore, the structure of SBA's loan guarantee programs may also result in different credit risk management policies between SBA and major lenders. Private sector lenders manage credit risk at the loan level and the portfolio level. Since SBA relies on private lenders to originate and service the majority of the loans it guarantees, it also needs to manage the credit risk in its portfolio at the lender level. |
gao_GAO-10-77 | gao_GAO-10-77_0 | Executives at 10 Companies Received Approximately $350 Million in Compensation
Executives at 10 companies received approximately $350 million in pay and other benefits in the years leading up to the termination of their companies’ underfunded pension plans. We identified the salaries, bonuses, and benefits provided to small groups of high-ranking executives at these companies. We also found that some executives at these companies received millions of dollars combined in other financial benefits such as income tax reimbursements, retention bonuses, severance packages, split-dollar life insurance, and supplemental retirement plans. We did not find any illegal activity related to executive compensation on the part of either the 10 companies or the 40 executives under review. We spoke to several retirees, including one pilot who lost two-thirds of his monthly pension payments when his pension plan was turned over to PBGC. In the 5 years leading up to the company’s failure, five executives received a total of nearly $70 million in salary, bonuses, and benefits. PBGC Has Limited Recovery Ability Regarding Executive Compensation
During our review of case studies, we noted that PBGC has little to no oversight authority regarding executive compensation. Any executive compensation paid during the course of a bankruptcy must be approved by the court, and once approved, cannot be recovered. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine pay and other compensation received by executives in the years preceding their company’s termination of an underfunded defined benefit pension plan, we first obtained a database from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) identifying companies that had terminated underfunded pension plans from 1999 to 2008. Of the 1,246 underfunded plans terminated from 1999 to 2008, we selected 10 companies from approximately 30 companies that sponsored plans which met our criteria. We reviewed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and PBGC documents disclosing plan underfunding at the time of termination and missed contributions. We also interviewed PBGC and company officials, as well as plan participants. Because some companies and executives did not provide information, declined to be interviewed, and/or did not consent to granting GAO access to copies of their tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service, we were not able to document all details concerning pay and benefits received beyond the details available in public documents or otherwise voluntarily provided. To assess the reliability of PBGC data related to the termination of defined benefit pension plans from 1999 through 2008, we (1) interviewed PBGC officials familiar with the data related to terminated pension plans and (2) matched the data provided by PBGC for the pension plans in each case study against records available on the agency’s Web site to verify that the data we were provided were exported correctly. | Why GAO Did This Study
When sponsors terminate underfunded plans during bankruptcy, it can deplete resources of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which protects the pensions of almost 44 million American workers and retirees who participate in over 29,000 defined benefit pension plans. In 2009, PBGC reported an estimated deficit of over $30 billion. GAO was asked to determine what pay and other compensation executives received in the years preceding their company's termination of an underfunded defined benefit pension plan. To identify case study examples GAO analyzed a listing of the 1,246 underfunded plans that were terminated from 1999 to 2008 and selected public companies with large unfunded liabilities, large unfunded liabilities per participant, and a large number of plan participants. GAO reviewed documents provided by companies and executives, and interviewed PBGC and company officials. GAO also reviewed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and PBGC documents disclosing plan underfunding at the time of termination and missed contributions. Executive compensation figures may be understated because some company executives could not be located, did not respond to document requests, declined interviews, and did not give GAO access to their tax records.
What GAO Found
GAO found that 40 executives for 10 companies received approximately $350 million in pay and other compensation in the years leading up to the termination of their companies' underfunded pension plans. GAO identified salaries, bonuses, and benefits provided to small groups of high-ranking executives at these companies during the 5 years leading up to the termination of their pension plans. For example, beyond the tens of millions in base salaries received, GAO found that executives also received millions of dollars in stock awards, income tax reimbursements, retention bonuses, severance packages, and supplemental executive-only retirement plans. In some cases, plan participants had their benefits reduced due to the underfunding of the plan when it was terminated. For example, a retired pilot saw his monthly pension payment reduced by two-thirds. The reduction in benefits occurred because federal law caps the benefits PBGC can guarantee when it takes over an underfunded pension plan. In addition, PBGC has no oversight power with regard to executive compensation prior to a company's bankruptcy. During bankruptcy, executive compensation must be approved by the bankruptcy court, and after this approval PBGC has extremely limited ability to recover those payments to executives. GAO did not find any illegal activity with respect to executive compensation on the part of either the 10 companies or the 40 executives under review. |
gao_T-GGD-00-2 | gao_T-GGD-00-2_0 | U.S. I will also discuss other major postal oversight issues related to work that we have completed during the past year. Overview of Financial and Service Delivery Performance
The Service has continued to report improvements in the areas of financial and service delivery performance and has undertaken a number of initiatives to respond to the four major challenges that we identified. And, although the Service has made progress and is continuing to make significant changes, time appears to be growing short for the Service to successfully address these challenges so that it can sustain and improve current performance levels and remain competitive into the 21st century. The Service and other stakeholders agree that growth in the Service’s core business of delivering First-Class Mail has already been affected by the rapid growth of the Internet, electronic communications, and electronic commerce. appears to be on track for achieving record delivery service performance for this year. Challenges Facing the Service
We have identified four major challenges facing the Postal Service as the 21st century quickly approaches: (1) maximizing performance in the face of increasing customer demands and choices, (2) managing employees— the Service’s most valuable asset—to maximize attainment of agency goals and continuous improvement of employee performance, (3) maintaining financial viability by controlling costs and enhancing revenues, and (4) adapting to a rapidly changing communications and delivery environment with a growing number of competitors. Therefore, we are recommending that the Postmaster General report to the congressional oversight subcommittees on the actions taken and planned to improve the quality of data used in ratemaking. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial position and delivery performance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USPS may be nearing the end of an era; (2) during the past 5 years, USPS has made notable improvements in its financial position and delivery performance; (3) USPS has recorded positive net income and has maintained or improved the overall delivery of certain specific classes of mail; (4) however, USPS expects declines in its core business in the coming years; (5) the growth of the Internet, electronic communications, and electronic commerce has the potential to substantially affect USPS' mail volume; (6) as a result, USPS may experience growing difficulty in maintaining its position in a dynamic communications and delivery environment; (7) these developments make it imperative for USPS to resolve four long-standing performance challenges which include: (a) maximizing performance; (b) managing employees; (c) maintaining financial viability; and (d) adapting to competition; (8) GAO is highlighting the need for USPS to take action to address long-standing issues related to the quality of data used in ratemaking and recommending that the Postmaster General report to congressional oversight subcommittees on the actions taken and planned in this area; (9) in recent years, USPS has progressed in addressing various challenges and is continuing to initiate significant changes that respond to the challenges; and (10) however, as long as USPS stands on the brink of the twenty first century, time appears to be growing short for USPS to successfully address its challenges so that it can sustain and improve current performance levels and remain competitive in a rapidly changing communications environment. |
gao_GGD-00-41 | gao_GGD-00-41_0 | Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide information on (1) analyses that have been conducted on racial profiling of motorists by law enforcement; and (2) federal, state, and local data currently available, or expected to be available soon, on motorist stops. Few Studies of Racial Profiling
We found no comprehensive, nationwide source of information on motorist stops to support an analysis of whether race has been a key factor in law enforcement agencies’ traffic stop practices. Although inconclusive, the cumulative results of the analyses indicate that in relation to the populations to which they were compared, African Americans in particular, and minorities in general, may have been more likely to be stopped on the roadways studied. A key limitation of the available analyses is that they did not fully examine whether the rates and/or severity of traffic violations committed by different groups may have put them at different levels of risk for being stopped. Such data would help determine whether minority motorists are stopped at the same level that they commit traffic law violations that are likely to prompt stops. The studies compared the racial composition of these groups against that of motorists who were stopped. Federal Efforts to Collect Data on Motorist Stops
Although the federal government has a limited role in making motorist stops, several federal activities currently planned or under way represent the first efforts to collect national level information. In addition, to help determine whether federal law enforcement agencies engage in racial profiling, three federal departments are under a presidential directive to collect information on the race, ethnicity, and gender of individuals whom they stop or search. Several States Proposed Traffic Stop Data Collection Legislation, but Few Bills Passed
Most traffic stops are made by state and local law enforcement officers. Consequently, state and local agencies are in the best position to collect law enforcement data on the characteristics of stopped motorists. However, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will produce the type and quality of information needed for answering questions about racial profiling. Justice states that it disagrees with the “draft report’s conclusion that the only ‘conclusive empirical data indicating’ the presence of racial profiling would be data that proved the use of race to a scientific certainty.” Our conclusion, however, was that the “available research is currently limited to five quantitative analyses that contain methodological limitations; they have not provided conclusive empirical data from a social science standpoint to determine the extent to which racial profiling may occur” (page 1). For the Florida data, the validity of the comparisons made is questionable. Federal, state, and local efforts to collect data on motorist stops should increase the amount of information on law enforcement practices on the roadways. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the racial profiling of motorists, focusing on the: (1) findings and methodologies of analyses that have been conducted on racial profiling of motorists; and (2) federal, state, and local data available, or expected to be available, on motorist stops.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO found no comprehensive, nationwide source of information that could be used to determine whether race has been a key factor in motorist stops; (2) the available research is limited to five quantitative analyses that contain methodological limitations; (3) they have not provided conclusive empirical data from a social science standpoint to determine the extent to which racial profiling may occur; (4) however, the cumulative results of the analyses indicate that in relation to the populations to which they were compared, African American motorists in particular, and minority motorists in general, were proportionately more likely than whites to be stopped on the roadways studied; (5) data on the relative proportion of minorities stopped on a roadway, however, is only part of the information needed from a social science perspective to assess the degree to which racial profiling may occur; (6) a key limitation of the available analyses is that they did not fully examine whether different groups may have been at different levels of risk for being stopped because they differed in their rates or severity of committing traffic violations; (7) although GAO has no reason to expect that this occurred, such data would help determine whether minority motorists are stopped at the same level that they commit traffic law violations that are likely to prompt stops; (8) several analyses compared the racial composition of stopped motorists against that of a different population, but the validity of these comparison groups was questionable; (9) federal, state, and local agencies are in various stages of gathering data on motorist stops, and these efforts should augment the empirical data available from racial profiling studies; (10) the federal government, which has a limited role in making motorist stops, is undertaking several efforts to collect data; (11) in accordance with a presidential directive, three federal departments are preparing to collect data on the race, ethnicity, and gender of individuals whom they stop or search; (12) state and local agencies are in the best position to provide law enforcement data on motorist stops because most motorist stops are made by state and local law enforcement officers; (13) a number of state legislatures are considering bills to require state or local police to collect race and other data on motorist stops; (14) several local jurisdictions are also making efforts to collect motorist stop data; and (15) whether the efforts that are underway will produce the type and quality of information needed to answer the questions about racial profiling remains to be seen. |
gao_GAO-14-257T | gao_GAO-14-257T_0 | Limitations in the Inventory Undermine Ability to Determine Extent of Civilian IC Elements’ Reliance on Contractors
Limitations in the core contract personnel inventory hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements used these personnel in 2010 and 2011 and to identify how this usage has changed over time. However, we found a number of limitations with the inventory, including changes to the definition of core contract personnel, the elements’ use of inconsistent methodologies and a lack of documentation for calculating FTEs, and errors in reporting contract costs. Additionally, IC CHCO did not clearly explain the effect of the limitations when reporting the information to Congress. We identified several issues that limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole including:
Changes to the definition of core contract personnel. IC CHCO explained in both documents that this civilian IC element’s rebaselining had an effect on the element’s reported number of contractor personnel for fiscal year 2010 but did not explain how this would limit the comparability of the number and costs of core contract personnel for both this civilian IC element and the IC as a whole. Most of the civilian IC elements did not maintain readily available documentation of the information used to calculate the number of FTEs reported for a significant number of the records we reviewed. As a result, these elements could not easily replicate the process for calculating or validate the reliability of the information reported for these records. For example, we found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the 287 records we reviewed. Inventory Provides Limited Insight into Functions Performed by Contractors and Reasons for Their Use
The civilian IC elements have used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, including human capital, information technology, program management, administration, collection and operations, and security services, among others. However, the aforementioned limitations we identified in the obligation and FTE data precluded us from using the information on contractor functions to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function category. Further, the civilian IC elements could not provide documentation for 40 percent of the contracts we reviewed to support the reasons they cited for using core contract personnel. Limited Progress Has Been Made in Developing Policies and Strategies on Contractor Use to Mitigate Risks
CIA, ODNI, and the executive departments that are responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the six civilian IC elements within those departments have generally made limited progress in developing such policies. Further, the eight civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use and may be missing opportunities to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight. Within the IC, core contract personnel perform the types of functions that may affect an IC element’s decision-making authority or control of its mission and operations. DHS and State had issued policies and guidance that addressed generally all of OFPP Policy Letter 11-01’s requirements related to contracting for services that closely support inherently governmental functions. We also found that decisions to use contractors were not guided by strategies on the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. ICD 612 directs IC elements to determine, review, and evaluate the number and uses of core contract personnel when conducting strategic workforce planning but does not reference the requirements related to determining the appropriate workforce mix specified in OMB’s July 2009 memorandum or require elements to document the extent to which contractors should be used. In our September 2013 report, we concluded that without complete and accurate information in the core contract personnel inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific functions, the civilian IC elements may be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight. To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their contractors and mitigate associated risks, we also recommended that IC CHCO revise ICD 612 to require IC elements to identify their assessment of the appropriate workforce mix on a function-by-function basis, assess how the core contract personnel inventory could be modified to provide better insights into the functions performed by contractors, and require the IC elements to identify contracts within the inventory that include services that are critical or closely support inherently governmental functions. IC CHCO generally agreed with these recommendations and indicated it would explore ways to address the recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could significantly influence the government's decision making.
In September 2013, GAO issued a classified report that addressed (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a nongeneralizable sample of 287 contract records. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials. In January 2014, GAO issued an unclassified version of the September 2013 report, GAO-14-204 . This statement is based on the information in the unclassified GAO report.
What GAO Found
Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the records GAO reviewed. GAO also found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without complete and accurate information in the inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific functions, the elements may be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight.
What GAO Recommends
In the September 2013 and January 2014 reports, GAO recommended that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability, revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1059 | gao_GAO-08-1059_0 | A&A Workload Trends for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007
USAID’s total obligations for A&A instruments doubled from about $5 billion to about $10 billion from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2007. USAID Lacks Human Capital Data Needed for a Strategic A&A Workforce Plan That Could Help Address Its Overseas Workload Imbalances
USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan because it lacks two key elements: (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date overseas A&A staff level data and (2) comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A specialists, who play a critical role in assisting COs and CTOs in overseas missions. The Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) does not systematically track the number of overseas A&A specialists, and its data on overseas A&A staff levels are out of date. USAID Has Not Matched A&A Staff to Workload at Missions We Visited
At the USAID missions we visited, we found that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workload. While at some missions the numbers of A&A staff with the necessary competencies were considerably less than adequate, at other missions they were more than adequate, according to mission officials. The mission director and A&A staff in Kazakhstan—a regional mission responsible for A&A activities at missions in Kazakhstan and four other Central Asian countries that do not have on-site A&A specialists—told us that they could not adequately support A&A activities at the four missions that do not have on-site A&A specialists. Officials noted that without such guidance from A&A staff, CTOs may be more likely to incorrectly manage A&A instruments. For example, they said they had delayed time-sensitive seasonal agricultural projects because the CO was not available when needed to approve contracts. For example, about 70 percent of A&A respondents overseas reported that it was somewhat or very difficult to alter staffing patterns to meet the demands of changing workloads. Taken together, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. USAID Has Not Implemented the Evaluation Mechanism of Its A&A Function
USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight of its A&A function. OAA’s Evaluation Division is responsible for providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing the agency’s A&A operations worldwide. However, the division has yet to implement this evaluation mechanism. OAA’s Evaluation Division Is Responsible for Evaluating the A&A Function but Did Not Meet Its Previous Target for A&A Evaluations
Among other responsibilities, OAA’s Evaluation Division is to conduct evaluations of worldwide A&A operations to ensure USAID’s compliance with an executive order and certify the effectiveness of USAID’s A&A function. Although the division had set a goal of conducting evaluations at all of the approximately 85 missions every 3 years, the OIG found that for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the division had evaluated A&A operations at only 9 missions—about 11 percent of the number of missions at the time. However, agency officials informed us that the Evaluation Division currently lacks the staff level and systems needed to implement the scorecard evaluation to meet its goal. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the agency’s management and oversight of its A&A function, we are recommending that the Administrator of USAID develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan that matches resources to priority needs, such as the evaluation of the A&A function. Specifically, we recommend that the strategic A&A workforce plan includes a process to collect, analyze, and maintain (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on the agency's A&A staff levels and (2) comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A staff. To determine A&A staff levels, we analyzed and compared staffing data that USAID’s Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) and the Office of Human Resources (OHR) made available to us. To examine the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A function, we analyzed USAID documents and interviewed relevant USAID agency officials. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) over the years has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition and assistance (A&A) instruments--contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements--awarded to and implemented by mainly nongovernmental entities. For fiscal years 2002 through 2007, USAID's A&A obligations doubled from about $5 billion to $10 billion. A&A staff--contracting officers (CO) and A&A specialists--are primarily responsible for managing A&A instruments. GAO was asked to examine (1) USAID's capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and (2) the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A function. GAO analyzed USAID documents and data, interviewed officials, visited missions in seven countries, and administered a survey to A&A staff.
What GAO Found
USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan because it is missing two key elements: (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and (2) comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A staff. Data on the number of overseas A&A specialists collected by two USAID offices--the Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) and the Office of Human Resources (OHR)--are unreliable or out of date. GAO found significant discrepancies between these offices' data sets, and officials acknowledged that their A&A staff level data are neither reliable nor up-to-date. In addition, USAID has not collected comprehensive competency information on its overseas A&A specialists. GAO's model of strategic human capital planning notes the importance of these data in developing a strategic A&A workforce plan that could enable the agency to better match staff levels to changing workloads. At the missions GAO visited, GAO found that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workloads. The number of A&A staff with the necessary competencies was less than adequate at some missions, while at others it was more than adequate, according to agency officials. For example, officials at the mission in Mali said they have delayed time-sensitive projects because key A&A staff were not available when needed to approve contracts, while officials at the mission in Indonesia said the current number of A&A staff may be more than adequate. Most of the A&A survey respondents overseas also reported difficulty in altering staffing patterns to meet A&A workload demands. Although USAID has made some efforts to address its A&A workforce issues, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. Without accurate and reliable A&A staff data, USAID does not have adequate information to address current workload imbalances. USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight of its A&A function. OAA's Evaluation Division is responsible for providing oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing the agency's A&A operations worldwide. However, for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, it conducted on-site evaluations at only 9 of its targeted 85 missions. In fiscal year 2007, the Evaluation Division developed a new evaluation mechanism that is expected to use scorecard evaluations, in which COs self-assess their A&A operations, and a risk-based approach to determine locations for further on-site visits. The division has completed piloting these scorecard evaluations at four missions and identified weaknesses in A&A operations. For example, the division found that 1 mission lacked resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division's goal is to implement this evaluation mechanism, including on-site visits to at least 5 missions, within 2 years. However, agency officials informed GAO that the Evaluation Division currently does not have the staff level needed to fully implement this evaluation mechanism. Without implementing the evaluation mechanism, USAID cannot certify the overall adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function. |
gao_GAO-05-322T | gao_GAO-05-322T_0 | However, many of the ad hoc procedures used to keep soldiers in pay status circumvented key internal controls in the Army payroll system—exposing the Army to the risk of significant overpayment, did not provide for medical and other benefits for the soldiers dependents, and sometimes caused additional financial problems for the soldier. Further details on these case studies are included in our related report. The Army Lacks an Effective Control Environment and Management Controls
The Army has not provided (1) clear and comprehensive guidance needed to develop effective processes to manage and treat injured and ill reserve component soldiers, (2) an effective means of tracking the location and disposition of injured and ill soldiers, and (3) adequate training and education programs for Army officials and injured and ill soldiers trying to navigate their way through the ADME process. Lack of Clear Processes Contributed to Pay Gaps and Loss of Benefits
The Army lacks customer-friendly processes for injured and ill soldiers who are trying to extend their active duty orders so that they can continue to receive medical care. While effectively keeping a soldier in pay status, this work- around circumvented key internal controls—putting the Army at risk of making improper and potentially fraudulent payments. In addition, because these soldiers are not on official active duty orders they are not eligible to receive other benefits to which they are entitled, including health coverage for their families. The Army’s New Medical Retention Program Will Not Solve All the Problems Associated with ADME
The Army’s new MRP program, which went into effect May 1, 2004, and takes the place of ADME for soldiers returning from operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, has resolved many of the front-end processing delays experienced by soldiers applying for ADME by simplifying the application process. Finally, because the MRP program is designed such that soldiers may be treated and released from active duty before their MRP orders expire, weaknesses in the Army’s processes for updating its pay system to reflect an early release date have resulted in overpayments to soldiers. As discussed previously, assembling this documentation was one of the primary reasons ADME orders were not processed in a timely manner. Not surprisingly, the Army does not know how many soldiers have been released from active duty before their 179-day MRP orders had expired. Concerned that some of these soldiers may have inappropriately continued to receive pay after they were released from active duty, we verified each soldier’s pay status in DJMS-RC and found that 15 soldiers were improperly paid past their release date— totaling approximately $62,000. Actions to Improve the Accuracy, Timeliness, and Availability of Entitled Pay and Benefits
A complete and lasting solution to the pay problems and overall poor treatment of injured soldiers that we identified will require that the Army address the underlying problems associated with its all-around control environment for managing and treating reserve component soldiers with service-connected injuries or illnesses and deficiencies related to its automated systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the Global War on Terrorism, GAO was asked to determine if the Army's overall environment and controls provided reasonable assurance that soldiers who were injured or became ill in the line of duty were receiving the pay and other benefits to which they were entitled in an accurate and timely manner. This testimony outlines pay deficiencies in the key areas of (1) overall environment and management controls, (2) processes, and (3) systems. It also focuses on whether recent actions the Army has taken to address these problems will offer effective and lasting solutions.
What GAO Found
Injured and ill reserve component soldiers--who are entitled to extend their active duty service to receive medical treatment--have been inappropriately removed from active duty status in the automated systems that control pay and access to medical care. The Army acknowledges the problem but does not know how many injured soldiers have been affected by it. GAO identified 38 reserve component soldiers who said they had experienced problems with the active duty medical extension order process and subsequently fell off their active duty orders. Of those, 24 experienced gaps in their pay and benefits due to delays in processing extended active duty orders. Many of the case study soldiers incurred severe, permanent injuries fighting for their country including loss of limb, hearing loss, and back injuries. Nonetheless, these soldiers had to navigate the convoluted and poorly defined process for extending active duty service. The Army's process for extending active duty orders for injured soldiers lacks an adequate control environment and management controls--including (1) clear and comprehensive guidance, (2) a system to provide visibility over injured soldiers, and (3) adequate training and education programs. The Army has also not established user-friendly processes--including clear approval criteria and adequate infrastructure and support services. Many Army locations have used ad hoc procedures to keep soldiers in pay status; however, these procedures often circumvent key internal controls and put the Army at risk of making improper and potentially fraudulent payments. Finally, the Army's nonintegrated systems, which require extensive errorprone manual data entry, further delay access to pay and benefits. The Army recently implemented the Medical Retention Processing (MRP) program, which takes the place of the previously existing process in most cases. MRP, which authorizes an automatic 179 days of pay and benefits, may resolve the timeliness of the front-end approval process. However, MRP has some of the same issues and may also result in overpayments to soldiers who are released early from their MRP orders. Out of 132 soldiers the Army identified as being released from active duty, 15 improperly received pay past their release date--totaling approximately $62,000. |
gao_GAO-07-480 | gao_GAO-07-480_0 | Our March 2006 report found that many large wastewater facilities have discontinued, or are planning to discontinue using chlorine gas as a disinfectant in favor of alternative disinfection methods such as sodium hypochlorite delivered in bulk to the facility. The Clean Air Act requires wastewater facilities that use or store more than 2,500 pounds of chlorine gas to submit to EPA a risk management plan that lays out accident prevention and emergency response activities. Costs of Preparing Vulnerability Assessments and Risk Management Plans among Large Wastewater Facilities Vary Widely
Although accurate information on the costs of vulnerability assessments and risk management plans is limited, available estimates suggest that their costs vary considerably. A factor contributing to the cost differential was whether they were contracted to third parties (such as engineering consulting firms) or prepared in-house with existing staff. Despite higher costs, some facilities preferred using contractors because their expertise and independence lent credibility to their assessments, which may be useful in obtaining support for security-related upgrades. Costs generally did not relate to facility size, as measured by million of gallons of wastewater treated per day. Vulnerability Assessment Costs Depend Primarily on Whether a Contractor Is Used
The reported cost of preparing vulnerability assessments at the 20 large wastewater facilities where we interviewed officials ranged from $1,000 to $175,000. Wastewater facility managers cited several reasons for using contractors to complete vulnerability assessments. According to a wastewater security official, contractor expertise and independence can give contractor findings and recommendations greater credibility with utility governing boards that determine spending priorities. Risk Management Plan Costs Also Influenced by Use of Contractors
Costs to prepare risk management plans ranged from less than $1,000 for facilities that completed the plan in-house to over $31,000 for facilities that used contractors. Costs of Converting to Alternative Disinfection Methods at Large Wastewater Facilities Depend on the Method Used and Other Factors
Large wastewater facilities that convert from chlorine gas disinfection to alternative disinfection processes incur widely varying capital costs, which generally depend on the alternative treatment chosen and facility size. Officials with several of these facilities told us they considered ultraviolet disinfection, but chose delivered sodium hypochlorite because of its lower capital conversion costs. The remainder converted or plan to convert to sodium hypochlorite generated on-site or ultraviolet light. The decision tool was designed to provide water and wastewater utilities with the means to conduct assessments of alternatives to chlorine gas disinfection. According to facility managers, the facility temporarily converted from chlorine gas to delivered sodium hypochlorite in April 2002 at a cost of $500,000, primarily for storage tanks, pumps, piping, and related instrumentation. Reported costs included both actual and estimated costs. Reported costs were not adjusted for inflation. To identify the costs incurred by wastewater facilities in converting from gaseous chlorine to an alternative disinfection process, we conducted structured telephone interviews with a nonprobability sample of 26 of the 38 large facilities identified in the March report as having recently converted or planning to convert from chlorine gas to an alternative disinfection process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, GAO reported that many large wastewater facilities have responded to this risk by voluntarily conducting vulnerability assessments and converting from chlorine gas to other disinfection methods. The Clean Air Act requires all wastewater facilities that use threshold quantities of chlorine gas to prepare and implement risk management plans to prevent accidental releases and reduce the severity of any releases. In this study, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the range of costs large wastewater treatment facilities incurred in preparing vulnerability assessments and risk management plans, and (2) the costs large wastewater treatment facilities incurred in converting from chlorine gas to alternative disinfection processes. To answer these questions, GAO conducted structured telephone interviews with a number of facilities surveyed for the 2006 report. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreed with the report and provided several technical changes and clarifications.
What GAO Found
Among the large wastewater facilities GAO examined, the costs reported to prepare vulnerability assessments ranged from $1,000 to $175,000, while costs to prepare risk management plans ranged from less than $1,000 to over $31,000. Whether the documents were prepared in-house or contracted to third parties such as engineering firms was a factor in cost differences. Despite higher costs, some facilities preferred to use contractors due to their expertise and independence. According to one wastewater security official, these attributes can give contractor findings and recommendations greater credibility with utility governing boards that determine spending priorities. One facility that used a contractor to complete a vulnerability assessment in 2002 did so because, at the time, vulnerability assessment software and training were not widely available. Since that time, EPA has increased funding for the development and dissemination of risk assessment software and related training. Overall, cost estimates for vulnerability assessments and risk management plans did not relate to facility size, as measured by millions of gallons of wastewater treated per day. For the large wastewater facilities GAO examined, reports of actual and projected capital costs to convert from chlorine gas to alternative disinfection methods range from about $650,000 to just over $13 million. Most facilities converted, or planned to convert, to delivered sodium hypochlorite (essentially a concentrated form of household bleach shipped in bulk to the facility). Managers of these facilities told GAO they considered other options, but chose delivered sodium hypochlorite because its capital conversion costs were lower than those associated with other alternatives, such as generating sodium hypochlorite on-site or using ultraviolet light. Overall, the primary factors associated with facilities' conversion costs included the type of alternative disinfection method chosen and the size of the facility. Other cost factors facility managers cited included (1) whether existing buildings and related infrastructure could be used in the conversion, (2) labor and building supply costs, which varied considerably among locations, (3) the cost of sodium hypochlorite relative to chlorine gas, and (4) the extent to which training, labor, and regulatory compliance costs were reduced for utilities that no longer had to rely on chlorine gas. |
gao_AIMD-98-32 | gao_AIMD-98-32_0 | If they are adopted, the standards are published as Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS) by OMB and by GAO. We also reviewed congressional committee reports that requested ammunition disposal cost information. DOD Has Not Implemented SFFAS No. 5. In addition, the DOD Comptroller, who is responsible for developing and issuing guidance on accounting standards, and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), who is responsible for the operational activities associated with ammunition disposal, have not provided implementation guidance to the services to assist them in estimating the disposal costs for ammunition. 5 for reporting of a liability is that an amount be reasonably estimable. Although a number of critical factors would have to be considered, including the reliability of the historical data as discussed in the following section, the cost estimates developed for the MIDAS families can be used as a starting point to estimate the ammunition disposal liability. In commenting on our recent report on the aircraft disposal liability, DOD agreed to implement SFFAS No. This guidance should address the key liability estimation factors identified in this report, including data reliability, data completeness, and the need for updated information. For this reason, Defense officials stated that it will not be feasible to report the estimated ammunition disposal liability in the DOD’s financial statements prior to fiscal year 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of the requirement to disclose the liability associated with the disposal of various types of assets, specifically conventional ammunition.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has not yet implemented the federal accounting standard that requires recognizing and reporting liabilities such as those associated with ammunition disposal, nor has it provided guidance to the military services; (2) in commenting on GAO's recent report on the aircraft disposal liability, DOD agreed with GAO's recommendation to incorporate statements of federal financial accounting standard (SFFAS) No. 5 in its Financial Management Regulation; (3) ammunition disposal is an ongoing process that results from materials with a limited shelf-life or that otherwise will not be used in operations, and the cost can be reasonably estimated; (4) accordingly, these activities meet the criteria for a reportable liability; (5) the cost information that DOD developed in response to requests from congressional committees can be used as a starting point to estimate the ammunition disposal liability; and (6) a number of additional factors will have to be addressed, including data reliability, data completeness, and the need for periodic updates. |
gao_GAO-14-279 | gao_GAO-14-279_0 | 1.) Private Entities Selected a Range of Measures and Benchmarks to Assess Physician Group Performance, and Provided Feedback More than Once a Year
Private entities we reviewed provided feedback mostly to groups of primary care physicians practicing within newer delivery models. Largely relying on claims data, health insurers spent from 4 to 6 months to produce the annual reports. Private Entities Focused Their Feedback Efforts on Groups of Primary Care Physicians Practicing within Newer Delivery Models
The private entities in our review had discretion in determining the number and type of physicians to be included in their performance reporting initiatives, and their feedback programs generally included only physician groups participating in newer delivery models—medical homes and ACOs—with which they contract. Entities further limited their physician feedback programs to groups participating in medical homes with a sufficient number of attributed enrollees to ensure the reliability of the reported measures. Private Entities Decided Which Measures to Report and Compared Physician Performance to Various Benchmarks, Leading to Differences in Report Content across Entities
Because each private entity in our study determined the number and types of measures on which it evaluated physician performance, the measures used in each feedback program differed. In addition to feedback on the total cost of care per enrollee, some reports given to groups of primary care physicians contained information on the cost of care provided by specialists in the entity’s network. Some entities compared each physician group’s performance results to that of a peer group (e.g., others in the entity’s network or others in the collaborative’s state or region); some entities compared physician groups’ results to a pre-established target; and others gauged physician groups’ progress relative to their past performance. 6.) Private entities told us that physicians valued frequent feedback on their performance so that they have time to make practice changes that may result in better performance by the end of the measurement period. Interim reports typically covered a 1-year performance period, and were commonly issued on a rolling monthly, quarterly, or semiannual schedule. Each medical group’s chosen method of quality data submission determined the quality measures included in its report, to which CMS added health care costs and certain outcomes measures. Therefore, the agency faces certain challenges not faced by private entities as it has expanded its feedback program to reach increasing numbers of physicians. Both CMS and private entities focused on preventive care and management of specific diseases. Quality measures under this method pertain to care coordination, disease management, and preventive services. Cost Measures
CMS included cost measures—several of which differed from the measures private entities in our study reported to physicians—in all 2013 feedback reports (see fig. CMS Spent 9 Months to Produce the 2013 Feedback Reports, and Did Not Provide Interim Reports
CMS’s report generation process took longer than that of most private entities in our study because it required more steps. Although they are not uniform in their approaches, the entities in our study used their discretion to select a limited number of quality and utilization/cost measures, calculated them using claims data, and used them to assess performance against a variety of benchmarks. CMS’s use of a single nationwide benchmark to compare performance on quality and cost ignores richer benchmarking feedback that could benefit physicians. CMS’s reliance on a national average as the sole benchmark precludes providers from gauging their performance relative to their peers in the same geographic area. Additionally, CMS disseminates feedback reports only once a year (for example, September 2013). Recommendations for Executive Action
As CMS implements and refines its physician feedback and VM programs, the Administrator of CMS should consider taking the following two actions to help ensure physicians can best use the feedback to improve their performance:
Develop performance benchmarks that compare physicians’ performance against additional benchmarks such as state or regional averages; and
Disseminate performance reports more frequently than the current annual distribution—for example, semiannually. As we noted, such benchmarks reflect more local patterns of care that may be more relevant to physicians than comparisons to national averages alone. We followed the same methodology for comparing how private entities and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conduct performance feedback reporting for hospitals as we did for examining physician-focused feedback programs. We interviewed representatives of the nine selected private entities about their feedback reporting to hospitals, if any, with regard to report recipients, data sources used, types of performance measures and benchmarks, frequency of reporting, and efforts to enhance the utility of performance reports. These entities used their discretion to determine which measures to include in their reports. Medicare Physician Payment: Private-Sector Initiatives Can Help Inform CMS Quality and Efficiency Incentive Efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health care payers—including Medicare—are increasingly using VBP to reward the quality and efficiency instead of just the volume of care delivered. Both traditional and newer delivery models use this approach to incentivize providers to improve their performance. Feedback reports serve to inform providers of their results on various measures relative to established targets. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 mandated that GAO compare private entity and Medicare performance feedback reporting activities.
GAO examined (1) how and when private entities report performance data to physicians, and what information they report; and (2) how the timing and approach CMS uses to report performance data compare to that of private entities. GAO contacted nine entities—health insurers and statewide collaboratives—recognized for their performance reporting programs. Focusing on physician feedback, GAO obtained information regarding report recipients, data sources used, types of performance measures and benchmarks, frequency of reporting, and efforts to enhance the utility of performance reports. GAO obtained similar information from CMS about its Medicare feedback efforts.
What GAO Found
Private entities GAO reviewed for this study selected a range of measures and benchmarks to assess physician group performance, and provided feedback reports to physicians more than once a year. Private entities almost exclusively focused their feedback efforts on primary care physician groups participating in medical homes and accountable care organizations, which hold physicians responsible for the quality and cost of all services provided. They limited their feedback reporting to those with a sufficient number of enrollees to ensure the reliability of reported measures. The entities decided on the number and type of measures for their reports, and compared each group's performance to multiple benchmarks, including peer group averages or past performance. All the entities used quality measures, and some also used utilization or cost measures. Because of the variety of quality measures and benchmarks, feedback report content differed across the entities. Some entities noted that in addition to national benchmarks, they compared results to state or regional level rates to reflect local patterns of care which may be more relevant to their physicians. Most health insurers spent from 4 to 6 months to generate their performance reports, a period that allowed them to amass claims data as well as to make adjustments and perform checks on the measure calculations. Commonly, private entities issued interim feedback reports, covering a 1-year measurement period, on a rolling monthly, quarterly, or semiannual schedule. They told GAO that physicians valued frequent feedback in order to make changes that could result in better performance at the end of the measurement period.
Feedback from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) included quality measures determined by each medical group, along with comparison to only one benchmark, and CMS did not provide interim reports to physicians. The agency has phased in performance feedback in order to meet its mandate to apply value-based payment (VBP) to all physicians in Medicare by 2017, a challenge not faced by private entities. In September 2013, CMS made feedback reports available to 6,779 physician groups. While private entities in this study chose the measures for their reports, CMS tied the selection of specific quality measures to groups' chosen method of submitting performance data. Although both CMS and private entities focused their feedback on preventive care and management of specific diseases, CMS's reports contained more information on costs and outcomes than some entities. While private entities employed multiple benchmarks, the agency only compared each group's results to the national average rates of all physician groups that submitted data on any given measure. CMS's use of a single benchmark precludes physicians from viewing their performance in fuller context, such as relative to their peers in the same geographic areas. CMS's report generation process took 9 months to complete, several months longer than health insurers in the study, although it included more steps. In contrast to private entity reporting, CMS sent its feedback report to physicians once a year, a frequency that may limit physicians' opportunity to make improvements in advance of their annual payment adjustments.
The Department of Health and Human Services generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and asked for additional information pertaining to the potential value of using multiple benchmarks to assess Medicare physicians' performance.
What GAO Recommends
The Administrator of CMS should consider expanding performance benchmarks to include state or regional averages, and disseminating feedback reports more frequently than the current annual distribution. |
gao_GGD-98-161 | gao_GGD-98-161_0 | We reviewed the supporting documentation of the fee reviews to determine whether the reviews (1) indicated that direct and indirect costs were determined (if the fee was based on cost recovery) or current market value was determined (if the fee was based on market value) and (2) included an assessment of other programs within the agency to identify potential new user fees. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and asked the Chief Financial Officers of the 24 agencies included in the review to verify the accuracy of their agencies’ data used in the report. Agencies reported that 397 of their fees were based on cost recovery, 35 were based on market value, and 114 were set by legislation. Of the 24 CFO agencies with 546 reported user fees, 6 agencies reviewed all of their reported fees at least biennially as required by Circular A-25 during fiscal years 1993 through 1997, 3 reviewed all of their reported fees at least once, 11 reviewed some of their reported fees, and 4 did not review any of their reported fees during this period. Fifteen of the 24 CFO agencies had not reviewed 94 user fees at all during the 5-year period. The agencies provided various reasons for not conducting the reviews. Documentation Indicated That Generally Both Direct and Indirect Costs or Current Market Value Was Considered
OMB Circular A-25 provides that the user fee review include assurance that existing charges reflect costs or current market value. Of the 20 agencies that conducted user fee reviews, documentation indicated that seven agencies considered new fees, five agencies did not consider new fee opportunities because they did not provide a service for which a fee was not already charged, and eight agencies where the potential for new fees existed did not consider new fee opportunities. Many Agencies Did Not Report User Fee Review Results in CFO Reports
OMB Circular A-25 provides that agencies should discuss the results of the user fee reviews and any resultant proposals in the CFO annual reports required by the CFO Act. The other 11 agencies reported that they had not reported the results of their biennial reviews, or lack thereof, in any of the CFO annual reports for fiscal years 1993 through 1997. As shown in table 3, eight agencies said they did not report the review results because either the total amount of fees was considered to be minimal and not material or the reporting requirements were confusing and not consistent with OMB guidance for the form and content of annual financial statements. OMB agreed that Circular A-25 user fee reporting instructions need to be clarified and plans to address this during 1998, by updating Circular A-11, Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates. Fees Authorized to Cover Agency Expenses Generally Were Not More Likely to Be Reviewed Than Fees That Were Not
It did not appear that agencies placed significantly less emphasis on reviewing fees that went to Treasury’s general fund than on fees of which all or a portion were authorized to cover agency expenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed agencies' adherence to the user fee review and reporting requirements in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-25, focusing on whether the agencies: (1) reviewed their user fee rates biennially during fiscal years (FY) 1993 through 1997; (2) determined both direct and indirect costs when reviewing fees based on costs or current market value for fees based on market value; (3) reviewed other programs within the agency to identify potential new user fees; and (4) reported the results of the user fee reviews in their CFO annual reports.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) six of the 24 CFO agencies reviewed all of their reported user fees at least every 2 years as required by OMB Circular A-25 during FY 1993 through FY 1997, 3 reviewed all of their reported fees at least once, 11 reviewed some of their reported fees, and 4 did not review any of their reported fees during this period; (2) the 24 agencies reported 546 user fees, of which 418 were reviewed either annually or biennially; (3) the agencies provided various reasons for not reviewing fees, including insufficient cost data and because some of the fees set by legislation could not be changed without new legislation; (4) it appeared that agencies did not place significantly less emphasis on reviewing fees that went to the Department of the Treasury's general fund than on fees authorized to cover agency expenses; (5) documentation provided by the agencies indicated that of the reviewed fees that were based on cost recovery, 99 percent included both direct and indirect costs; (6) fee review documentation indicated that of the 23 reviewed fees that were based on market value, 14 reviews included a determination of current market value; (7) GAO did not verify these cost data or market evaluations; (8) agency documentation also indicated that of the 20 agencies that conducted user fee reviews, 8 agencies that had the potential for new fees did not consider new fee opportunities in their reviews; (9) twelve of the 20 agencies either looked for potential new fees or reported that they did not provide a service for which a fee was not already charged; (10) eleven of the 24 agencies had not reported the results of their biennial reviews, or lack thereof, in their CFO annual reports for FY 1993 through FY 1997; (11) only six agencies reported the review results two or more times during the 5-year period; (12) most of the agencies not reporting their user fee reviews said they did not do so either because the total amount of the fees was considered to be minimal and not considered material or because they found the reporting requirements confusing; and (13) OMB agreed that reporting instructions for the user fee review need to be clarified and plans to address this matter during 1998, as it revises its instructions. |
gao_NSIAD-99-9 | gao_NSIAD-99-9_0 | This report discusses (1) the rationale for differences in difficulty among the military services physical fitness standards, (2) how the services adjust the standards for gender and age, and (3) DOD’s oversight of the fitness program. Lack of Adherence to DOD Policy and Confusion Over Multiple Objectives Contribute to Differences in Service Requirements
Physical fitness programs enacted by the services are a mixture of different requirements, lacking a clear rationale for marked differences in difficulty. These differences occur in all three testing areas—cardiovascular endurance, muscular strength and endurance, and body composition. However, all services adjust program standards for physiological differences between the sexes in all three testing areas, and for age in the case of cardiovascular and muscular strength and endurance standards. Table 2.3 shows that each of the services uses different weight-for-height values. Although the references to additional objectives in the guidance has apparently led to some confusion, the Office of the Secretary of Defense official responsible for overseeing the fitness program stated that physical fitness standards are intended only to set a minimum level of general fitness and health for military personnel and are not directly related to job performance. This leads to questions about the fairness of standards applied to men and women. Researchers found that service equations predict different body fat values when applied to the same woman, the subject population used to develop the equations is becoming increasingly less representative, and existing calculation approaches do not account for racial differences in bone density. To reflect these and other gender-based physiological differences, DOD guidance directs that testing standards be adjusted. The degree of gender difference varied by service. However, according to discussions with Navy officials, command concerns about appearance resulted in lowering the female standard to 30 percent. Consequently, they were also unable to tell us the basis for adjustments to the standards for gender. Procedures for Determining Body Fat May Not Accurately Account for Gender and Racial Differences
The basic approach used by each service to determine the percentage of body fat has been to first develop a set of measures of the circumference of various body sites, such as the waist and neck for men, and the neck, waist, and hips for women. Moreover, DOD has not enforced the annual reporting requirement or identified a common set of statistics needed to assess fitness. Comparisons of limited data we were able to obtain raised questions about program effectiveness. Failure rates among the services appear to be markedly different, with women failing at significantly higher rates than men. Problems Have Persisted for Years
Problems, such as confusion over multiple fitness program objectives and failure to enforce key policy requirements, have persisted since at least the early 1980s. Similarly, DOD’s requirement that all personnel, regardless of age, be tested for physical fitness is clearly spelled out in DOD’s 1981 directive, and DOD’s 1981 report on fitness in the military notes that the Navy and the Marine Corps were already exempting older personnel from fitness testing at that time. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense revise the physical fitness guidance to establish a mechanism for providing policy and research coordination of the military services’ physical fitness and body fat programs and define the statistical information needed to monitor fitness trends and ensure program effectiveness, and require that this information be maintained by all services and provided in the currently required annual reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the military services' physical fitness and body fat standards to determine if: (1) differences exist among the military services in physical fitness standards and tests and the basis for any difference; (2) the services have a sound basis for adjusting the standards for gender and age; and (3) the Department of Defense (DOD) exercises adequate oversight of the fitness program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) significant differences exist in the tests and standards that the military services use to measure physical fitness; (2) these differences reflect varying levels of difficulty in required performance in all testing areas--cardiovascular endurance, muscular strength and endurance, and percentage of allowable body fat--and occurred for different reasons; (3) specifically, services did not always adhere to DOD guidance for fitness testing or, in some cases, interpreted the guidance differently; (4) service officials stated that confusion over the program's objectives, stemming from conflicting statements in DOD's guidance, contributed to differences among the services; (5) adjustments to account for physiological differences by age and gender are, according to experts, appropriate for general fitness and health standards, and DOD guidance requires that gender-based adjustments be made; (6) although each of the services adjusts for gender, the degree of adjustment varies considerably; (7) inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary approaches to adjusting the standards have contributed to questions concerning the fairness of the standards applied to military men and women; (8) body fat standards are also questionable due to: (a) differences in each service's equations for estimating body fat, resulting in estimates ranging between 27 and 42 percent for the same woman; (b) outdated measurement approaches that did not account for racial differences in bone density; and (c) changes in ethnicity and other population characteristics of the current military that question whether the populations used to develop the equations represent the populations in today's military; (9) despite a clear requirement for all services to test all personnel regardless of age, the Navy and, until recently the Marine Corps, have exempted older personnel from fitness testing for years because of concerns about being able to retain senior leaders; (10) DOD's guidance and oversight of the service physical fitness programs are not adequate; (11) multiple program objectives and lack of DOD monitoring of service compliance with key policies, have persisted since at least the early 1980s without resolution; (12) DOD has not enforced annual reporting requirements or identified a common set of statistics to use in monitoring the services' fitness programs; (13) the statistics currently maintained by the services lack standardization; and (14) the limited data available raise questions about program effectiveness because failure rates appear to be markedly different among the services and women appear to fail at significantly higher rates than men. |
gao_GAO-17-411 | gao_GAO-17-411_0 | Initially, physicians go through GME training for a specialty—such as internal medicine, family medicine, pediatrics, anesthesiology, radiology, or general surgery. Physician Shortages
Studies of the physician workforce and associated shortages vary in the assumptions they make about physician supply and demand, resulting in different conclusions about the nature and extent of shortages. Federal GME Funding
The federal government invests significantly in GME training. Over time, a number of federal efforts have been created that provide funding to increase GME training in rural areas and in primary care. Locations and Types of GME Training Were Largely Unchanged from 2005 through 2015, but Growth Was Notable in Certain Areas
Residents Remained Concentrated in Urban Areas and in the Northeast, Despite Growth in Other Parts of the Country
From 2005 through 2015, 99 percent of residents in GME programs trained in urban areas, despite some growth in rural areas. While the Northeast maintained the highest concentration of residents from 2005 through 2015, the resident growth rate was higher in the other regions. 2.) 3.) Most Residents Trained in Specialties, of Which Nearly Half Were in Primary Care, but Growth Was More than Twice as Fast for Residents in Subspecialties
From 2005 through 2015, most residents in GME programs were training in one of the specialties that all residents are required to complete before choosing whether to practice or subspecialize. For example, in 2015, over 80 percent of all residents were training in a specialty, with the remaining residents training in a subspecialty. As previously noted, research has shown that many primary care residents who trained in internal medicine go on to subspecialize rather than practice in primary care. As a result, the percentage of all residents in AOA programs grew from 3 percent to 6 percent. Use of Federal Efforts Intended to Increase GME Training in Rural Areas Was Often Limited, and Officials Reported Challenges
Hospitals’ use of three Medicare payment incentives—the primary federal efforts we identified intended to increase GME training in rural areas— was often limited. Federal Efforts Intended to Increase Primary Care GME Training Were Relatively Small, and the Number of New Residents Added May Not Be Sustained
Efforts Funded Residents in Primary Care and Other Specialties, Many of Whom Trained in Underserved Areas
We identified four federal efforts intended to increase primary care GME training. To varying degrees, the four federal efforts funded residents in regions of the country that have disproportionally low numbers of residents relative to the population. Efforts Represent a Relatively Small Investment in Primary Care GME Training, and New Positions May Not Continue in the Future
Despite increasing the number of primary care residents, the four federal efforts still represent a relatively small investment in primary care GME training when compared with overall federal GME spending and the number of primary care residents nationally. Specifically, average annual funding for the Teaching Health Center program, the Primary Care Residency Expansion program, and the VA GME expansion accounted for less than 1 percent of the more than $15 billion in estimated annual federal spending on GME training, and the Medicare GME redistribution accounted for less than 1 percent of the approximately 79,000 IME and 83,000 DGME FTEs that hospitals reported being able to claim for Medicare payment in fiscal year 2013. However, officials acknowledged that the efforts account for a small percentage of overall primary care residents being added to the physician workforce. In a 2015 report, we recommended that, to ensure that HHS workforce efforts meet national needs, HHS should develop a comprehensive and coordinated planning approach to guide its health care workforce development programs. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. While nurse practitioners and physician assistants can furnish some of the care provided by physicians, the extent to which they can provide this care independently varies based on state laws. Specifically, we reviewed government and nongovernmental reports on funding for health care workforce training and interviewed officials from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). | Why GAO Did This Study
A well-trained physician workforce adequately distributed across the country is essential for providing Americans with access to quality health care services. While studies have reached different conclusions about the nature and extent of physician shortages, the federal government has reported shortages in rural areas and projects a deficit of over 20,000 primary care physicians by 2025. GME training is a key factor affecting the supply and distribution of physicians. Federal funding for this training is significant, more than $15 billion per year, according to the Institute of Medicine. Given the federal investment and concerns about physician supply, GAO was asked to review aspects of GME training.
This report describes (1) changes in number of residents in GME training by location and type of training from academic years 2005 through 2015, (2) federal efforts intended to increase GME training in rural areas, and (3) federal efforts intended to increase GME training in primary care. To determine changes in the locations and types of residents in GME training, GAO analyzed resident data from the accrediting bodies overseeing GME training. To identify and describe relevant federal efforts, GAO also reviewed federal laws, reports, and data, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The locations and types of physicians in graduate medical education (GME) training—known as residents—generally remained unchanged from 2005 through 2015, but there was notable growth in certain areas. As shown in the table below, residents in GME training remained concentrated in the Northeast. At the same time, the number of residents grew more quickly in other regions, though this was somewhat tempered by regional population growth. Residents also remained concentrated in urban areas, which continued to account for 99 percent of residents, despite some growth in rural areas. From 2005 through 2015, over 80 percent of residents were receiving training in a medical specialty, which is required for initial board certification. In 2015, nearly half of these residents were in a primary care specialty (internal medicine, family medicine, and pediatrics), versus other specialties, such as anesthesiology. While this represented a slight increase from 2010, research has shown that many primary care residents will go on to receive additional GME training in order to subspecialize, rather than practice in primary care. Subspecialty training accounted for less than 20 percent of residents from 2005 through 2015, though the number of residents in subspecialties grew twice as fast as for specialties.
GAO found that the primary federal efforts intended to increase GME training in rural areas were incentives within the Medicare program that can provide hospitals with higher payments for such training. However, hospitals' use of these incentives was often limited, and certain Medicare GME payment requirements could present barriers to greater use.
GAO identified four federal efforts intended to increase primary care GME training. Each effort added new primary care residents and provided funding in areas of the country with disproportionally low numbers of residents or physicians, though to varying degrees. The four efforts accounted for a relatively small percentage of primary care residents and overall federal GME funding, about 3 percent and less than 1 percent, respectively. In addition, the extent to which the residents added by these efforts will be maintained or continue to grow is uncertain, in part because federal funding for some of the efforts has ended. As a result, the efforts may not be sufficient to meet projected primary care workforce needs. Further, GAO recommended in 2015 that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) develop a comprehensive and coordinated plan for its health care workforce programs, which is critical to identifying any other efforts necessary to meet these needs, and has not yet been implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to believe that action is needed on a 2015 recommendation for HHS to develop a plan to guide its health care workforce programs. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-11-379 | gao_GAO-11-379_0 | According to DOE officials, a number of factors explain why energy- efficiency retrofits, financial incentive programs, and buildings and facilities programs account for such a large portion of all EECBG-funded projects. However, in April 2010 DOE determined that many recipients were not on a trajectory to obligate and spend all of their funds within this time frame. However, many recipients have had difficulty meeting these new milestones. Table 5 shows the frequency of DOE’s planned monitoring activities. Some recipients also used EECBG funds to help fund rebate programs. However, officials stated that DOE does not gather specific information on recipient monitoring practices except during on-site visits. DOE Officials and Recipients Reported Technical, Staffing, and Expertise Challenges That Hinder Efforts to Ensure Requirements Are Met
DOE officials and some recipients reported experiencing technical, staffing, and expertise challenges that hinder the ability of both DOE and recipients to provide oversight to ensure that Recovery Act and program requirements are met, but DOE is taking steps to address many of these challenges. Staffing and Expertise Challenges
Some DOE officials, monitoring staff, and grant recipients, as well as all stakeholders we contacted, stated that some recipients are also encountering staffing and expertise challenges that have limited their ability to monitor the use of Recovery Act funds and ensure effective and efficient use of funds while also meeting Recovery Act and other federal requirements. DOE Has Faced Challenges in Determining the Extent to Which the EECBG Program is Meeting Recovery Act and Program Goals for Energy Savings
EECBG program recipients reported using EECBG grant funding to develop projects designed to achieve a variety of benefits in line with Recovery Act and program goals, including reducing total energy use and increasing energy savings for local governments and residents. These officials said that instead of collecting actual energy- savings data, most recipients report estimates to comply with program reporting requirements. While DOE officials said they believe that estimates calculated with the current version of this tool are more accurate than those calculated with previous versions, DOE does not require that recipients who use its estimating tool to use the most updated version when calculating and reporting estimates. Another factor that affects DOE officials’ ability to assess reasonableness is the fact that the agency recommends but does not require, that recipients report the methods or tools used to calculate estimates, so DOE officials do not know which recipients are using older versions of DOE’s estimation tool or other methods to estimate energy-related impact metrics. As a result, DOE officials reported that some recipients have had difficulty developing their estimates. Oversight of Recipient Reporting Data Quality Continues for the Sixth Round of Reporting
To meet our mandate to comment on recipient reports, we have continued monitoring data that recipients reported for Recovery.gov, including data on jobs funded. As we noted in September, some confusion may have existed about the acceptability and use of some methods for calculating FTEs over the course of the reporting periods. DOE officials indicated that they continue to assess compliance with and encourage recipients to follow the DOE and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on how to correctly report FTEs. Because of this limited assessment, DOE is not always able to identify when recipients’ monitoring practices are sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable federal requirements. Solicit information from recipients regarding the methodology they used to calculate their energy-related impact metrics and verify that recipients who use DOE’s estimation tool use the most recent version when calculating these metrics. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
We took a number of steps to address our objectives, which were to determine (1) how Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) funds are being used, and what challenges, if any, do EECBG recipients face in obligating and spending their funds; (2) actions Department of Energy (DOE) officials and EECBG recipients are taking to provide oversight of EECBG funds and challenges, if any, they face in meeting Recovery Act and other requirements; (3) the extent to which EECBG program recipients and the EECBG program are meeting Recovery Act and EECBG program goals for energy savings, and what challenges, if any, have recipients encountered in measuring and reporting energy savings; and (4) how the quality of estimates of jobs created and retained reported by Recovery Act recipients, particularly EECBG recipients, has changed over time. To update the status of open recommendations from previous bimonthly and recipient reporting reviews, we obtained information from agency officials on actions taken in response to the recommendations. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided $3.2 billion for the Department of Energy's (DOE) Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program (EECBG) to develop and manage projects to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy use and fossil fuel emissions. The Recovery Act requires GAO to review funds made available under the act and to comment on recipients' estimates of jobs created or retained. GAO examined (1) how EECBG recipients used EECBG funds and challenges they faced, if any; (2) DOE and recipients' oversight and monitoring activities and challenges, if any; (3) the extent to which the EECBG program is meeting Recovery Act and program goals for energy savings; and (4) the quality of jobs data reported by Recovery Act recipients, particularly EECBG recipients. GAO also updates the status of open recommendations from previous bimonthly and recipient reporting reviews. GAO analyzed DOE recipient data and interviewed DOE officials and a nonprobability sample of EECBG recipients, among other things.
What GAO Found
According to DOE data, EECBG recipients primarily used funds for 3 of the 14 activities eligible for EECBG funding. These activities are energy-efficiency retrofits, financial incentive programs, and buildings and facilities projects. Some DOE officials, recipients, and others identified challenges in obligating and spending funds due to local jurisdictional requirements and staff and resource limitations. In addition, in April 2010 DOE determined that many recipients were not on a trajectory to obligate and spend funds within specified time frames, so DOE issued new milestones for obligating and spending funds. Many recipients reported having had difficulty meeting the new milestones. DOE is taking steps to address these difficulties. According to DOE officials and documentation, DOE follows a programwide monitoring plan to oversee the use of Recovery Act funds and uses a variety of techniques to monitor recipients. Overall, recipients also use various methods to monitor contractors and subrecipients, but DOE does not always collect information on recipients' monitoring activities. As a result, DOE does not always know whether the monitoring activities of recipients are sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance with federal requirements. Some DOE officials, recipients, and others have reported to GAO that some DOE staff and recipients faced challenges with overseeing the use of funds, including (1) technical challenges with a Web-based reporting application DOE uses as a primary oversight tool and (2) staffing and expertise limitations, such as some recipients' unfamiliarity with federal grant procedures. Recipients contacted and some DOE officials reported to GAO that recipients are using EECBG funds to develop projects designed to reduce energy use and increase energy savings in line with Recovery Act and program goals. However, DOE officials have experienced challenges in assessing the extent to which the EECBG program is meeting those goals. Because actual energy savings data are generally available only after a project is completed, DOE officials said that most recipients report estimates to comply with program reporting requirements. DOE takes steps to assess the reasonableness of these estimates but does not require recipients to report the methods or tools used to develop estimates. In addition, while DOE provides recipients with a tool to estimate energy savings, DOE does not require that recipients use the most recent, updated version of its estimating tool. GAO's analysis of the Recovery.gov data that recipients reported, including jobs funded, shows data quality this quarter reflects minor amounts of inconsistencies or illogical data. The portion of EECBG recipients reporting some jobs funded has continued to increase. DOE headquarters and field officials continue to address data quality concerns, including ensuring that recipients and reviewers had the updated Office of Management and Budget guidance on narrative descriptions. However, data across reporting periods may not be comparable because, in earlier periods, some confusion existed about methods for calculating jobs funded.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1) explore a means to capture information on recipients' monitoring activities, and (2) solicit information on recipients' methods for estimating energy-related impact metrics and verify that recipients use the most recent version of DOE's estimating tool. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-97-16 | gao_HEHS-97-16_0 | In implementing the law’s rate-setting provisions, HCFA estimates a county’s average per-beneficiary cost and multiplies the result by 0.95.The product is the county adjusted average per capita cost rate. Much has been written about the inadequacy of Medicare’s risk adjuster to account for the tendency of HMOs to experience favorable selection. HCFA Could Improve Its Rate-Setting Method by Including HMO Enrollees in Its Calculations of County Average Cost
Independent of risk adjustment, modifying the method for calculating county rate would help reduce Medicare’s excess HMO payments. However, in counties where there are cost disparities between Medicare’s FFS and HMO enrollee populations, this method can either overstate the average costs of all Medicare beneficiaries and lead to overpayment or understate average costs and lead to underpayment. Therefore, we developed a method to estimate HMO enrollees’ expected FFS costs using information available to HCFA. This new average produced a county rate that reflected the costs of all Medicare beneficiaries. We found that our method could have reduced excess payments by more than 25 percent. Substantially better risk adjustment, which appears to be years away from implementation, would target the remaining 75 percent of excess payments. Applying our method for setting county rates would have reduced the excess by about $276 million. Our analysis did not support the hypothesis, put forward by the HMO industry and others, that the excess payment problem will be mitigated as more beneficiaries enroll in Medicare managed care and HMOs progressively enroll a more expensive mix of beneficiaries. Our data—from counties with up to a 39-percent HMO penetration—indicated that excess payments as a percentage of total HMO payments were higher in counties with higher Medicare penetration. However, to the extent that the health care costs of Medicare’s HMO enrollee population are lower, on average, than those of beneficiaries in FFS, the exclusion of HMO enrollees’ costs (that is, what they would have cost Medicare in FFS) causes SAC and, ultimately, the capitation rate, to be too high. 1. Calculating County-Rate Excess Payments That Are Due to Using Only FFS Beneficiaries’ Experience to Set Rates
After estimating the average expected costs of serving all of a county’s beneficiaries in FFS (SACALL), we could estimate the excess capitation payments that resulted from HCFA’s method of calculating SAC and the county rate. Adjustments for Regression Toward the Mean and Death-Related Costs in Estimating Excess Payments to Medicare HMOs
As explained in appendix I, establishing the Medicare capitation rate for HMOs on the basis of the cost of serving beneficiaries hinges on estimating the expected FFS costs of HMO enrollees (SACHMO). Studies have generally found that, after a beneficiary enrolls in an HMO, his or her service use and costs rise. 1. 2. 4. 2. 3. This amount represents about 16 percent of Medicare’s payments to California HMOs under the risk contract program in 1995. This is not accurate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Medicare's rate-setting method for paying risk contract health maintenance organizations (HMO), focusing on: (1) the conditions under which Medicare's method can yield payment rates that are too high; and (2) a practical improvement to Medicare's method directed at the problems fostering excess payments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) contrary to the expectations built into Medicare law for paying risk contract HMOs, these HMOs have not produced savings for Medicare; (2) however, Medicare-sponsored research and other studies have found that the program has actually spent more for HMO enrollees than their costs would have been under fee-for-service (FFS); (3) researchers attribute this outcome to favorable selection, or the tendency for healthier-than-average individuals to be enrolled in HMOs; (4) GAO has identified a modification to Medicare's current HMO rate-setting method that could help reduce excess HMO payments; (5) central to the current method is an estimate of the average cost, county by county, of serving Medicare beneficiaries in the FFS sector; (6) the actual rates are set by adjusting the county averages up or down on the basis of each enrollee's likelihood of incurring higher or lower costs, a process known as risk adjustment; (7) although considerable attention has focused on problems with this process, GAO's work centers on a largely overlooked problem regarding the estimates of average county costs, that is, the county rate, commonly known as the AAPCC (adjusted average per capita cost); (8) HCFA's method of determining the county rate excludes HMO enrollees' costs in estimating per-beneficiary average cost; (9) the result is that in counties experiencing favorable selection, HCFA's method overstates the average costs of all Medicare beneficiaries and leads to overpayments; (10) GAO's proposed modification estimates HMO enrollees' expected FFS costs using information available to HCFA; (11) GAO's approach produces a county rate that more accurately represents the costs of all Medicare beneficiaries; (12) in examining the rates HCFA determined for California's 58 counties in 1995, GAO found that applying its approach would have reduced excess payments by about 25 percent, or $276 million; (13) substantially better risk adjustment, which appears to be years away from implementation, would have targeted the remaining 75 percent; (14) GAO also found that Medicare's current method produced a greater overstatement of county average costs in counties with higher Medicare HMO penetration, up to 39 percent; and (15) this finding calls into question the hypothesis put forth by HMO industry advocates and others that the excess payment problem will be mitigated as more beneficiaries enroll in Medicare managed care and HMOs contain a more expensive mix of beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-17-129 | gao_GAO-17-129_0 | Selected States Have Practices to Support the Prescribing Process and Educate Stakeholders on the Appropriate Use of Psychotropic Medications
Selected States Have Practices to Support Appropriate Treatment Decisions and Monitor the Child
Officials we spoke with in the seven selected states told us they developed a variety of practices to better support appropriate mental health diagnoses and treatments for children in foster care in their states. They must then submit results to mental health specialists for review. Selected States Have Taken Steps to Increase Stakeholders’ Mental Health Knowledge and Access to Related Services, but Concerns about Limited Access to These Services Remain
State officials in all seven of the selected states said they work to educate relevant stakeholders on mental health conditions and treatments. To increase children’s access to mental health services, state and county officials in five of the selected states said they provide remote consultation services. While Some Selected States Reduced the Use of Psychotropic Medications, They All Focused on Other Measures to Gauge the Results of Their Efforts
Some Selected States Reduced Psychotropic Medication Use, though Mental Health and Foster Care Stakeholders Said Reducing Medications May Not Be Appropriate for Every Child
Our analysis of available data from the seven selected states show that four of these states—California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington— reduced the percentage of children in foster care on psychotropic medications from 2011 through 2015. Two other selected states— Arizona and Maryland—had steady rates of medication use. Ohio did not have data for this time period. Because states use different methodologies to collect data, these data cannot be compared across states. They said data on psychotropic medications and other mental health services for children in foster care can involve data systems from state child welfare, Medicaid, and mental health agencies. These officials said matching such data can be difficult and time-consuming, and state child welfare and Medicaid officials in three selected states discussed limitations with data gathering due to resource and time constraints, given other competing priorities. Child welfare and Medicaid officials in two of the five states that expressed privacy concerns also discussed concerns about sharing data with managed care organizations. State child welfare and Medicaid officials in some selected states that were able to share data said they overcame privacy concerns through negotiating written agreements and educating stakeholders about sharing data consistent with state and federal privacy requirements. HHS Has Supported Some State Collaboration on Medication Oversight, and Selected States Said More Federal Assistance Would Help
Although HHS has a variety of efforts to assist states in overseeing psychotropic medication use among children, since 2014 the agency has not convened meetings with all the relevant stakeholder groups needed to share information and work together on these issues. Officials we spoke with said it helped them develop prescribing guidelines and expand reporting on psychotropic medications. While HHS has made efforts to help support states in their oversight activities, additional support from HHS to convene state child welfare and Medicaid agencies and other stakeholders could create opportunities for state agencies to learn from one another’s experience, collaboratively develop solutions to mitigate common challenges, strengthen oversight practices for psychotropic medications, and more effectively ensure appropriate treatments for children in foster care. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help states effectively address ongoing challenges related to ensuring the appropriate use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care, the Secretary of HHS should consider cost-effective ways to convene state child welfare, Medicaid, and other stakeholders to promote collaboration and information sharing within and across states on psychotropic medication oversight. Finally, HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing three research questions: (1) how child welfare and Medicaid agencies in selected states work to ensure the appropriate use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care; (2) what is known about the results of their efforts, and (3) the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) helps states support the appropriate use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care. To address these questions, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance. We interviewed HHS officials, and state officials in seven selected states and county officials in two of those states as well as officials in nine national professional and research organizations. Foster Children: HHS Guidance Could Help States Improve Oversight of Psychotropic Prescriptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO previously reported that children in foster care in five selected states were prescribed psychotropic medications at higher rates than other children on Medicaid. GAO also reported that some prescriptions were not supported by research and could pose health risks. GAO was asked to study efforts to oversee psychotropic medications for children in foster care since GAO last reported on the issue in 2014.
GAO examined (1) how child welfare and Medicaid agencies in selected states ensure the appropriate use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care, (2) what is known about the results of their efforts, and (3) the extent to which HHS helps states support appropriate medication use. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; visited a nongeneralizable group of seven states and five counties in two of those states, selected by foster care population and diversity of location; analyzed selected states' data on medication use in foster care populations; and interviewed officials from federal, state, and county child welfare, Medicaid, and other agencies, as well as officials from nine relevant national organizations selected to represent a variety of views.
What GAO Found
State child welfare and Medicaid officials in seven selected states reported a variety of practices to support the appropriate use of psychotropic medications, which affect mood, thought, or behavior, for children in foster care. Practices include screening for mental health conditions, developing prescription guidelines, and monitoring a child's health while on medication. Additional state efforts aim to increase mental health knowledge among stakeholders and improve access to mental health services. However, officials in four selected states and from five national mental health organizations said limited access to mental health services was a challenge. Five of the selected states have begun offering remote consultation services that connect patients with mental health specialists. State officials said strong interagency collaboration and outreach to stakeholders helped them implement practices more effectively.
While some selected states have reduced medication use among these children, states focused on other measures to gauge the results of their efforts. Four of the seven selected states reduced medication use from 2011 through 2015, two states had steady rates, and the remaining state did not have data during this time period. These data, however, cannot be compared across states because states use different methodologies to collect data. Officials in three selected states said reducing medication use may not be appropriate for every child, and officials in all seven states said they focus instead on measures such as tracking the use of medications that can have negative side effects and the use of psychosocial services (e.g., therapy) for children in foster care. Officials in most selected states discussed limitations with gathering data needed to oversee medication use, such as disparate data systems, resource constraints, and privacy concerns related to data sharing among state child welfare and Medicaid agencies and with managed care organizations. Officials in some states that shared data said they overcame privacy concerns through written interagency agreements and educating stakeholders.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has taken steps to help state child welfare and Medicaid agencies support the appropriate use of psychotropic medications and identify mental health needs and treatments for children in foster care. HHS has focused its efforts on practices for prescribing, screening and diagnosis, and access to trauma-related services. HHS is also working with states to implement voluntary measures to track medication use, other mental health treatments, and a child's overall health. In 2012, HHS hosted a meeting for state leaders to help them establish effective medication oversight practices. Despite the positive outcomes resulting from this meeting, and HHS guidance that says an agency goal is to facilitate cross-system collaborations, such as in the oversight of psychotropic medications, it has not convened meetings with all stakeholders together since 2012. Though HHS has conducted webinars, created learning communities, and convened smaller meetings, HHS officials said it has no plans to convene all stakeholders as it did in 2012 due to resource constraints. Officials in three selected states said more federal support to bring together state stakeholders could help address ongoing issues, such as privacy concerns around data sharing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS consider cost-effective ways to convene state child welfare, Medicaid, and other stakeholders to promote collaboration and information sharing on psychotropic medication oversight. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation and provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-07-573 | gao_GAO-07-573_0 | All States Use Mail and About Half of States Use or Have Begun Developing On- line Services and Call Centers to Provide Access to the Food Stamp Program
According to our survey, almost all states allow households to submit applications, report changes, and submit recertifications through the mail, and 26 states have implemented or are developing systems to allow households to perform these tasks on-line. States have taken a variety of actions to help households use on-line services and call centers, such as sending informational mailings, holding community meetings, and using community partners to assist households. Mail-In Procedures. On-line services available (14)
Not using on-line services (25)
Almost Half of States Are Using or Developing Call Centers and Using Telephone Interviews as an Alternative to Visiting the Local Assistance Office
Many states are using call centers, telephone interviews, or other technologies to help households access food stamp benefits or information without visiting a local assistance office. Few evaluations have been conducted that identify the effect of alternative methods on food stamp program access, decision accuracy, or administrative costs. Few evaluations have been conducted in part because evaluating the effectiveness of alternative methods is challenging, given that limited data are available, states are using a combination of methods, and studies can be costly to conduct. Federal and State Officials Report Alternative Methods Help Some Households Access Food Stamp Benefits, but Technology and Staffing Can Present Challenges
Despite the limited information on the effects of alternative methods, federal and state officials report that alternative methods, such as the availability of telephone interviews, can help many types of households by making it easier for them to complete the food stamp application or recertification process. Increased flexibility. However, some state and local officials and community partners we interviewed said certain types of households may have difficulty using certain alternative methods. Officials in the five states we reviewed did not believe that the use of alternative methods had increased fraud in the program. Finger imaging. Our limited analysis of FNS data for the five states we reviewed found no considerable fluctuations in the rate of procedural denials between fiscal years 2000 and 2005. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To understand what alternatives states are using to improve program access and what is known about the results of using these methods, we examined: (1) what alternative methods to the traditional application and recertification process are states using to increase program access; (2) what is known about the results of these methods, particularly on program access for target groups, decision accuracy, and administrative costs; and (3) what actions have states taken to maintain program integrity while implementing alternative methods. | Why GAO Did This Study
One in 12 Americans participates in the federal Food Stamp Program, administered by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). States have begun offering individuals alternatives to visiting the local assistance office to apply for and maintain benefits, such as mail-in procedures, call centers, and on-line services. GAO was asked to examine: (1) what alternative methods states are using to increase program access; (2) what is known about the results of these methods, particularly on program access for target groups, decision accuracy, and administrative costs; and (3) what actions states have taken to maintain program integrity while implementing alternative methods. GAO surveyed state food stamp administrators, reviewed five states in depth, analyzed FNS data and reports, and interviewed program officials and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
All states use mail and about half of states use or have begun developing on-line services and call centers to provide access to the food stamp program. Almost all states allow households to submit applications, report changes, and submit recertifications through the mail, and 26 states have implemented or are developing systems for households to perform these tasks on-line. Almost half of the states are using or developing call centers and states also are allowing households to participate in telephone interviews instead of an in-office interview. States have taken a variety of actions to help households use on-line services and call centers, such as sending informational mailings, holding community meetings, and using community partners. Insufficient information is available to determine the results of using alternative methods. Few evaluations have been conducted identifying the effect of alternative methods on program access, decision accuracy, or administrative costs. Evaluating the effectiveness of alternative methods is challenging in part because limited data are available, states are using a combination of methods, and studies can be costly to conduct. Federal and state officials reported that while they believe alternative methods can help households in several ways, such as increasing flexibility and efficiency in the application process, certain types of households may have difficulty using or accessing alternative methods. In addition, technology and staffing challenges may hinder the use of alternative methods. To maintain program integrity while implementing alternative methods, the states GAO reviewed used a variety of strategies, such as using software to verify the information households submit, communicating with other states to detect fraud, or using finger imaging. Although there has been some concern that without frequent in-person interaction with caseworkers, households may not submit required documents on time and thus be denied benefits on procedural grounds ("procedural denials"), GAO's limited analysis of FNS data found no considerable fluctuations in the rate of procedural denials in the five states between fiscal years 2000 and 2005. The states GAO reviewed have instituted several approaches to prevent procedural denials. |
gao_GAO-13-413T | gao_GAO-13-413T_0 | Background
The use of information technology (IT) to electronically collect, store, retrieve, and transfer clinical, administrative, and financial health information has great potential to help improve the quality and efficiency of health care. Making such records electronic can help ensure that complete health care information is available for most military service members and veterans at the time and place of care, no matter where it originates. Although they have identified many common health care business needs, both departments have spent large sums of money to develop and operate separate electronic health record systems that they rely on to create and manage patient health information. These have included efforts to: share viewable data in existing (legacy) systems; link and share computable data between the departments’ modernized health data repositories; establish interoperability objectives to meet specific data-sharing needs; develop a virtual lifetime electronic health record to track patients through active service and veteran status; and implement IT capabilities for the first joint federal health care center. The department subsequently revised the strategy for GCPR and, in May 2002, narrowed the scope of the initiative to focus on enabling DOD to electronically transfer service members’ electronic health information to VA upon their separation from active duty. Further, in March 2004, the departments began an effort to develop an interface linking VA’s Health Data Repository and DOD’s Clinical Data Repository, as part of a long-term initiative to achieve the two-way exchange of health information between the departments’ modernized systems—known as CHDR. In September 2005, we testified that the departments had improved the management of the CHDR program, but that this program continued to face significant challenges—in particular, with developing a project management plan of sufficient specificity to be an effective guide for the program. Efforts to Comply with 2008 Mandate to Achieve Fully Interoperable Health Records Capabilities Lacked Project Plans and Measures of Effectiveness
To increase the exchange of electronic health information between the two departments, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 included provisions directing VA and DOD to jointly develop and implement, by September 30, 2009, fully interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities. Even with these actions, however, we identified a number of challenges the departments faced in managing their efforts in response to the 2008 NDAA. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD and VA take action to develop such goals and performance measures to be used as a basis for providing meaningful information on the status of the departments’ interoperability initiatives. In July 2009, we reported that the IPO had not fulfilled key management responsibilities identified in its charter, such as the development of an integrated master schedule and a project plan for the department’s efforts to achieve full interoperability. VLER is intended to enable access to all electronic records for service members as they transition from military to veteran status, and throughout their lives. However, in a February 2011 report on the departments’ efforts to address their common health IT needs, we noted that although VA and DOD identified a high-level approach for implementing VLER and designated the IPO as the single point of accountability for the effort, they had not developed a comprehensive plan identifying the target set of capabilities that they intended to demonstrate in the pilot projects and then implement on a nationwide basis at all domestic VA and DOD sites by the end of 2012. Among other things, the Executive Agreement specified three key IT capabilities that VA and DOD were required to have in place by the FHCC’s opening day, in October 2010, to facilitate interoperability of their electronic health record systems: medical single sign-on, which would allow staff to use one screen to access both the VA and DOD electronic health record systems; single patient registration, which would allow staff to register patients in both systems simultaneously; and orders portability, which would allow VA and DOD clinicians to place, manage, and update clinical orders from either department’s electronic health records systems for radiology, laboratory, consults (specialty referrals), and pharmacy services. VA and DOD Recently Changed Their Approach to Developing an Integrated Electronic Health Record
Beyond the aforementioned initiatives, in March 2011 the Secretaries of VA and DOD committed the two departments to developing a new common integrated electronic health record (iEHR), and in May 2012 announced their goal of implementing it across the departments by 2017. In addition, because it would involve both departments using the same system, this approach would largely sidestep the challenges they have encountered in trying to achieve interoperability between separate systems. The Secretaries offered several reasons for this new direction, including cutting costs, simplifying the problem of integrating VA and DOD health data, and meeting the needs of veterans and service members sooner rather than later. In summary, while VA and DOD have made progress in increasing interoperability between their health information systems over the past 15 years, these efforts have faced longstanding challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA and DOD operate two of the nation's largest health care systems-- systems that serve populations of veterans and active service members and their dependents. To better serve these populations, VA and DOD have been collaborating for about 15 years on a variety of initiatives to share data among the departments' health information systems. The use of IT to electronically collect, store, retrieve, and transfer such data has the potential to improve the quality and efficiency of health care. Particularly important in this regard is developing electronic health records that can be accessed throughout a patient's military and veteran status. Making such information electronic can ensure greater availability of health care information for service members and veterans at the time and place of care. Although they share many common business needs, both VA and DOD have spent large sums of money to develop and maintain separate electronic health record systems that they use to create and manage patient health information.
GAO was asked to testify on (1) the departments' efforts, and challenges faced, in electronically sharing health information and (2) the recent change in their approach to developing an integrated electronic health record. In preparing this statement, GAO relied primarily on previously published work in this area.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD) have undertaken a number of patchwork efforts over the past 15 years to achieve interoperability (i.e., the ability to share data) of records between their information systems; however, these efforts have faced persistent challenges. The departments' early efforts to achieve interoperability included enabling DOD to electronically transfer service members' electronic health information to VA; allowing clinicians at both departments viewable access to records on shared patients; and developing an interface linking the departments' health data repositories. As GAO reported, however, several of these efforts were plagued by project planning and management weaknesses, inadequate accountability, and poor oversight, limiting their ability to realize full interoperability.
To further expedite data sharing, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 directed VA and DOD to jointly develop and implement fully interoperable electronic health record capabilities by September 30, 2009. The departments asserted that they met this goal, though they planned additional work to address clinicians' evolving needs. GAO identified weaknesses in the departments' management of these initiatives, such as a lack of defined performance goals and measures that would provide a comprehensive picture for managing progress. In addition, the departments' Interagency Program Office, which was established to be a single point of accountability for electronic health data sharing, had not fulfilled key management responsibilities.
In 2009, the departments began work on the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record initiative to enable access to all electronic records for service members transitioning from military to veteran status, and throughout their lives. To carry this out, the departments initiated several pilot programs but had not defined a comprehensive plan that defined the full scope of the effort or its projected cost and schedule. Further, in 2010, VA and DOD established a joint medical facility that was, among other things, to have certain information technology (IT) capabilities to facilitate interoperability of the departments' electronic health record systems. Deployment of these capabilities was delayed, however, and some have yet to be implemented.
In 2011, the VA and DOD Secretaries committed to developing a new common integrated electronic health record system, with a goal of implementing it across the departments by 2017. This approach would largely sidestep the challenges in trying to achieve interoperability between separate systems. However, in February 2013, the Secretaries announced that the departments would focus on modernizing their existing systems, rather than developing a single system. They cited cost savings and meeting needs sooner rather than later as reasons for this decision. Given the long history of challenges in achieving interoperability, this reversal of course raises concerns about the departments' ability to successfully collaborate to share electronic health information. Moreover, GAO has identified barriers to the departments jointly addressing their common needs arising from deficiencies in key IT management areas, which could continue to jeopardize their pursuits. GAO is monitoring the departments' progress in overcoming these barriers and has additional ongoing work to evaluate their activities to develop integrated electronic health record capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
Since 2001, GAO has made numerous recommendations to improve VA's and DOD's management of their efforts to share health information. |
gao_GAO-12-605 | gao_GAO-12-605_0 | To electronically transmit prescription drug data between a health care provider and a pharmacy, an electronic health record can be used to obtain information about the health of an individual or the care provided by a health practitioner. These reports and other related information are required by the HITECH Act to be made publicly available on HHS’s website. HHS Has a Framework for Protecting Medicare Beneficiaries’ Prescription Drug Use Information but Has Not Issued Required Guidance or Implemented Required Oversight Capabilities
In response to requirements set forth in HIPAA and the HITECH Act, HHS, through OCR, has established a framework for protecting the privacy and security of individually identifiable health information, including Medicare beneficiaries’ prescription drug use information used for purposes other than directly providing clinical care. However, OCR has not issued required guidance to assist entities in de-identifying individually identifiable health information due to—according to officials—competing priorities for resources and internal and external reviews. Furthermore, although it has recently initiated a pilot audit program, the office has not implemented periodic compliance audits as required by the HITECH Act. The expert determination method requires a qualified statistician or other appropriate expert, using generally accepted statistical and scientific principles, to determine that the risk is very small that an individual could be identified from the information when used alone or in combination with other reasonably available information. Specifically, to implement provisions of the HITECH Act, the Secretary was required to (1) issue breach notification regulations to require covered entities and business associates under HIPAA to provide notification to affected individuals and the Secretary concerning the unauthorized use and disclosure of unsecured PHI; (2) establish enforcement provisions for imposing an increased tiered structure for civil money penalties for violations of the Privacy and Security Rules; and (3) extend certain Privacy and Security Rule requirements to business associates of covered entities. OCR Provides Guidance and Outreach on the Use of PHI, but Has Not Issued Required De-identification Guidance
The HITECH Act also requires HHS to educate members of the public about how their PHI, which may include Medicare beneficiaries’ prescription drug use information, may be used. According to OCR officials, competing priorities for resources and internal reviews have delayed the issuance of the guidance. Specifically, HHS has authority to enforce compliance with the Privacy and Security Rules in response to, among other things, (1) complaints reporting potential privacy and security violations and (2) data breach notifications submitted by covered entities. OCR receives thousands of complaints and breach notifications each year. In June 2011, OCR initiated efforts to conduct pilot audits of 150 covered entities by the end of December 2012. OCR officials anticipate that this review will help determine how the office can fully implement an audit function. Conclusions
Through its issuance of regulations, outreach, and enforcement activities, HHS has established a framework for protecting the privacy and security of Medicare beneficiaries’ prescription drug use information when used for purposes other than directly providing clinical care. It has also promoted public awareness on the uses and disclosures of PHI through its education and outreach activities. Specifically, OCR has yet to establish plans for a sustained audit capability upon completion of its pilot program at the end calendar year 2012 and has yet to determine how to include auditing business associates. Without a plan for deploying a sustained audit capability on an ongoing basis, OCR will have limited assurance that covered entities and business associates are complying with HIPAA regulations, including whether Medicare beneficiaries’ prescription drug use information, when used for purposes other than directly providing clinical care, is being appropriately safeguarded from compromise. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the department’s guidance and oversight efforts for ensuring the privacy and security of protected health information, including Medicare beneficiaries’ prescription drug use information, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the Director of the Office for Civil Rights to take the following two actions: Issue guidance on properly implementing the HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements for the de-identification of protected health information. Until such implementation guidance is issued, increased risk exists that covered entities are not properly adhering to the standards set by the HIPAA Privacy Rule and that PHI is not properly stripped of all identifiers that would identify an individual. Regarding our recommendation that OCR establish plans for conducting periodic audits to ensure covered entities and business associates are complying with the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules and breach notification standards, the Assistant Secretary stated the department did not agree with our report’s conclusion that without such a plan, OCR will lack the ability to ensure that covered entities and business associates are complying with the HIPAA rules. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has established a framework to ensure the privacy and security of Medicare beneficiaries’ protected health information (PHI) when data on prescription drug use are used for purposes other than their direct clinical care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prescribing medications and filling those prescriptions increasingly relies on the electronic collection of individuals health information and its exchange among health care providers, pharmacies, and other parties. While this can enhance efficiency and accuracy, it also raises privacy and security concerns. Federal law establishes the authority for the Secretary of HHS to develop standards for protecting individuals health information (which includes Medicare beneficiaries) and to ensure that covered entities (such as health care providers and pharmacies) and their business associates comply with these requirements.
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 required GAO to report on prescription drug use data protections. GAOs specific objective for this review was to determine the extent to which HHS has established a framework to ensure the privacy and security of Medicare beneficiaries protected health information when data on prescription drug use are used for purposes other than direct clinical care. To do this, GAO reviewed HHS policies and other related documentation and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
While the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has established a framework for protecting the privacy and security of Medicare beneficiaries prescription drug use information when used for purposes other than direct clinical care through its issuance of regulations, outreach, and enforcement activities, it has not issued all required guidance or fully implemented required oversight capabilities. HHS has issued regulations including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules to safeguard protected health information from unauthorized use and disclosure. Through its Office for Civil Rights (OCR), HHS has undertaken a variety of outreach and educational efforts to inform members of the public and covered entities about the uses of protected health information. Specifically, OCR has made available on its website guidance and other materials informing the public about the uses to which their personal information may be put and the protections afforded to that information by federal laws. It has also made available guidance to covered entities and their business associates that is intended to promote compliance with the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.
However, HHS has not issued required implementation guidance to assist entities in de-identifying personal health information including when it is used for purposes other than directly providing clinical care to an individual. This means ensuring that data cannot be linked to a particular individual, either by removing certain unique identifiers or by applying a statistical method to ensure that the risk is very small that an individual could be identified. According to OCR officials, the completion of the guidance, required by statute to be issued by February 2010, was delayed due to competing priorities for resources and internal reviews. Until the guidance is issued, increased risk exists that covered entities are not properly implementing the standards set forth by federal regulations for de-identifying protected health information.
Additionally, in enforcing compliance with the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, OCR has established an investigations process for responding to reported violations of the rules. Specifically, the office annually receives thousands of complaints from individuals and notices of data breaches from covered entities, and initiates investigations as appropriate. If it finds that a violation has occurred, the office can require covered entities to take corrective action and pay fines and penalties.
HHS was also required by law to implement periodic compliance audits of covered entities compliance with HHS privacy and security requirements; however, while it has initiated a pilot program for conducting such audits, it does not have plans for establishing a sustained audit capability. According to OCR officials, the office has completed 20 audits and plans to complete 95 more by the end of December 2012, but it has not established plans for continuing the audit program after the completion of the pilots or for auditing covered entities business associates. Without a plan for establishing an ongoing audit capability, OCR will have limited assurance that covered entities and business associates are complying with requirements for protecting the privacy and security of individuals personal health information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS issue de-identification guidance and establish a plan for a sustained audit capability. HHS generally agreed with both recommendations but disagreed with GAOs assessment of the impacts of the missing guidance and lack of an audit capability. In finalizing its report, GAO qualified these statements as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-728 | gao_GAO-08-728_0 | IRS Collects or Otherwise Resolves Unpaid Tax Debt through a Complex, Three-Phase Process
IRS’s process for collecting unpaid debt has three phases. As shown in figure 2, the collection process for debt treated as potentially collectible is a complex set of programs administered by several IRS units handling a large workload that can take multiple routes based on about 70 decision rules that IRS has created in response to a variety of factors, including the characteristics of a given debt or taxpayer and the results of the process itself. The Process Is High- Volume and Spread among IRS Subunits
A part of the complexity of the process stems from having a very large debt workload and limited resources spread across multiple units, which contribute to the numerous decisions that IRS makes on how to handle these debt cases. At the end of fiscal year 2007, IRS had $79.3 billion worth of debt in the three phases of the process. These increases, however, may not result in the total dollars actually collected growing annually at rates similar to the growth in the inventory defined as collectible or active. However, not all potentially collectible debt has a high potential for collection. Abatements can occur years after an original tax assessment was made. IRS-Wide Collection Performance Measures Cover the Collection Process and Some Outcomes
As shown in table 2, two of the IRS-wide collection performance measures cover all phases of the collection process and focus on the extent to which debt cases were closed and the efficiency in using staff resources for those closures. Our previous work has identified material weaknesses in IRS’s controls over unpaid tax assessments and over the collection of tax revenues due the federal government. Although IRS has made some progress on these weaknesses, progress has not been sufficient to resolve them. Over the last 3 years, IRS has employed various approaches, including sophisticated computer modeling and risk assessment techniques, to assist it in more effectively identifying the tax debt cases with the greatest collection potential and to facilitate prioritizing of these cases for collection. IRS has also employed these techniques to identify the most effective collection approach to take for the various types of outstanding tax debt. Although IRS has ongoing projects to expand the use of these models and techniques, it does not yet have an agencywide, systematic approach to managing the collection of unpaid taxes across the scope of IRS’s responsibilities. In response, IRS created a council of IRS collection officials, for example, to coordinate various collection activities and review how potential changes in one part of the process could affect another part of the process. Further, IRS has a number of ongoing projects to improve aspects of the collection process. However, some of these projects will take a few years to be implemented, as indicated in appendix III. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the process the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses to attempt to collect or resolve unpaid tax debts, we interviewed IRS officials and reviewed IRS documents. To identify the trends in unpaid tax debt, including the size and composition of the inventory, collections, and other resolutions of unpaid debt in fiscal years 2002 through 2007, we obtained and analyzed data from IRS’s unpaid assessments database, including how IRS categorized the debt. To determine the performance measures and related goals that are available to assess how well the collection process works overall, we requested and reviewed the highest-level available, IRS-wide measures of collection performance. In addition, for context on the debt inventory and collection process, we also asked IRS to provide (1) data and analysis on the inflow and outflow of debt, and the status of debt identified in fiscal year 2002, from fiscal years 2002 through 2007 and (2) a list of IRS efforts to improve the management of the inventory and collection process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated that $33 billion in income tax assessments was not paid in 2001. If not collected, annual unpaid taxes keep accumulating each year along with penalty and interest charges to create an inventory of "tax debts," which approached $300 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007. IRS has shelved or delayed collection of billions of dollars of this tax debt. Congress and others have questioned IRS's collection process's effectiveness. As requested, GAO is reporting on (1) the process IRS uses to collect unpaid tax debts; (2) trends in the unpaid tax debt inventory, collections, and other resolutions from fiscal years 2002 through 2007; and (3) the performance measures and goals available to assess how well the collection process works overall. To meet these objectives, GAO interviewed IRS officials and reviewed IRS's unpaid assessments database, documentation on the collection process and factors used in managing it, and IRS's highest-level collection measures.
What GAO Found
IRS has a complex process to collect unpaid tax debts by contacting taxpayers through notices, telephone calls, and in person. Because IRS has a very large debt workload and limited resources spread across multiple units, it must make numerous decisions about how best to handle debt cases. The complexity also arises because debt cases can take various routes based on about 70 IRS decision rules used for handling cases. The rules respond to a wide variety of debt characteristics, information known about the taxpayer, and the results of attempts to contact the taxpayer or take enforcement action. From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, increases occurred in the unpaid tax debt inventory, the percentages of debt classified as potentially collectible and in active collection status, and the dollars IRS collected. It is unclear whether dollars collected will continue to grow at rates similar to the growth in debt classified as collectible or active because, for example, those categories do not mean that the debt has a high potential for collection and will be actively pursued or that debt resolution will necessarily result in dollars collected. IRS-wide collection performance measures cover three outcomes of the three-phase process with an emphasis on closing more debt cases in less staff time. IRS did not indicate why more measures for the whole collection process were lacking. For each of the phases, IRS had more performance measures such as on debt resolutions, time spent, satisfaction, and quality, which phase managers said were sufficient for them. GAO has identified material weaknesses in IRS's controls over unpaid tax assessments and collections partly due to the lack of agencywide cost-benefit data and related performance measures. Although IRS has made some progress on these weaknesses, progress has not been sufficient to resolve them. For example, over the past 3 years, IRS has employed various approaches, including sophisticated computer modeling and risk assessment techniques, to assist it in more effectively identifying the tax debt cases with the greatest collection potential, and to facilitate prioritizing of these cases for collection. IRS has also employed these techniques to identify the most effective collection approach to take for the various types of outstanding tax debt. Although IRS has ongoing projects to expand the use of these models and techniques, it does not yet have an agencywide, systematic approach to managing the collection of tax debts across IRS. In response, IRS has created a council of IRS collection officials to coordinate various collection activities across IRS and potential changes across the parts of the collection process. Further, IRS has a number of ongoing projects to improve aspects of the collection process. However, some of these projects will take a few years to be implemented. |
gao_GAO-07-877 | gao_GAO-07-877_0 | The five agencies’ focus on ongoing efforts was consistent with SBA’s and OMB’s views that several provisions of the order duplicated program requirements under existing legislation. Specific to advertising, Treasury officials indicated that the agency was building on existing relationships with trade associations in order to identify advertising contracting for SDBs. Some Agencies Planned New Activities to Direct Federal Advertising Contracts to 8(a)s, SDBs, or Minority-Owned Businesses
Although agency officials at all five agencies indicated that their current small business programs broadly addressed procuring services from 8(a)s, SDBs, and minority-owned businesses, including advertising-related services, three of the five agencies we reviewed—HHS, Treasury, and Interior—planned new activities to increase federal advertising contracting opportunities for these businesses. Advertising Obligations and Contract Actions Awarded to 8(a), Small Disadvantaged, and Minority-Owned Businesses Varied across Agencies
Overall, from fiscal years 2001 through 2005, 8(a), small disadvantaged, and minority-owned businesses received about 5 percent of the $4.3 billion in advertising-related obligations awarded by DOD, Interior, HHS, Treasury, and NASA. These businesses accounted for 12 percent of the contract actions that the five agencies awarded, but the percentages the agencies awarded varied substantially. For example, Treasury awarded less than 2 percent of its advertising-related dollars to 8(a)s, SDBs, and minority-owned businesses over the 5-year period, while HHS awarded about 25 percent to these business types. Advertising dollars also varied from one year to the next at individual agencies, sometimes significantly, primarily because of large advertising campaigns that the respective agencies undertook to publicize new programs or promote their mission (e.g., public health). The extent to which agencies’ yearly increases in overall advertising obligations affected obligations to 8(a), small disadvantaged, and minority-owned firms also varied. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we describe (1) strategies that the Departments of Defense (DOD), Interior, Health and Human Services (HHS), Treasury, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) used to address section 4 of Executive Order 13170, and (2) the total obligations, the number of contract actions, and the percentage of total obligations represented by these contract actions that each of the five agencies awarded to businesses in the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) and federal small disadvantaged business (SDB) programs and to minority- owned businesses for advertising-related services. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, federal spending on advertising exceeded $1 billion. Five agencies--DOD, Treasury, HHS, Interior, and NASA--together made up over 90 percent of this spending from 2001 to 2005. Executive Order 13170, signed in October 2000, directs agencies to take an aggressive role in ensuring substantial participation in federal advertising contracts by businesses in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) and small disadvantaged business (SDB) programs and minority-owned businesses. This report describes (1) strategies DOD, HHS, Treasury, Interior, and NASA used to address Executive Order 13170, and (2) the total obligations, number of contract actions, and percentage of total obligations represented by these actions that each agency awarded to 8(a)s, SDBs, and minority-owned businesses for advertising services. In conducting this study, GAO analyzed agency contracting data and executive order implementation plans and interviewed agency procurement officials.
What GAO Found
Because much of Executive Order 13170 was consistent with existing legislation, the five agencies we reviewed generally addressed the order's emphasis on advertising contracts by continuing existing programs designed to identify potential contracting opportunities with all types of small businesses. The five agencies' focus on ongoing efforts was consistent with SBA's and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) views that several provisions of the order paralleled procurement program requirements under the Small Business Act. Three agencies--HHS, Treasury, and Interior--also planned additional activities that targeted the agency's contracting efforts for advertising services. For example, one of Treasury's additional activities was to work with trade associations to identify opportunities for SDBs in advertising. From fiscal years 2001 through 2005, 8(a), SDB, and minority-owned businesses received about 5 percent of the $4.3 billion in advertising-related obligations of DOD, Treasury, HHS, Interior, and NASA and 12 percent of the contract actions that these agencies awarded; the percentages varied substantially among each of the five agencies. For example, Treasury awarded less than 2 percent of its advertising-related dollars to 8(a)s, SDBs, and minority-owned businesses collectively over the 5-year period, while NASA awarded about 89 percent to these types of businesses. Overall advertising obligations also varied from one year to the next at individual agencies, sometimes significantly. Year-to-year increases were driven by large campaigns that the respective agencies undertook to publicize new programs or promote their mission (e.g., public health). Agencies varied in the extent to which year-to-year increases in overall advertising obligations had a similar effect on obligations to 8(a), small disadvantaged, and minority-owned firms. |
gao_GAO-15-45 | gao_GAO-15-45_0 | In the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress mandated that we examine the potential benefits and problems of amending Section 112 to apply the preference to all of the countries within the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which includes countries bordering the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf, as shown in figure 2. The DOD contracting agencies responsible for implementing the U.S. contractor preference include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which manages DOD’s construction in the Middle East and the Kwajalein Atoll, and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, which manages DOD’s construction on U.S. territories in the Pacific. Contractor Preference to Contracts in Countries Different from Those Required by Section 112 Due to an Outdated Regulation but Took Action to Correct DFARS
We found that DOD did not apply the U.S. contractor preference in accordance with the current Section 112 from October 2010 through May 2014. The U.S. Contractor Preference Potentially Affected 2 of 35 Military Construction Contracts Awarded in the Arabian Gulf Countries and in the Pacific
Based on our analysis, there were 35 contracts awarded from October 2010 and May 2014 that were subject to the U.S. contractor preference in accordance with DFARS. DOD and State Officials Identified Potential Benefits and Problems with Expanding Section 112 to Include All of the Countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility
Officials Identified Some Potential Benefits to Expanding the U.S. Contractors May Have More Familiarity with U.S. Officials Identified Some Potential Problems with Expanding the U.S. These officials said a policy that provides a preference to U.S. contractors could be in conflict with these existing U.S. policy goals. Agency Comments
DOD and State Department reviewed a draft of this report but did not provide any comments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has awarded military construction contracts in accordance with Section 112 since fiscal year 2011, we reviewed Section 112 and DOD’s implementing guidance, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), to identify and develop criteria for assessing the department’s actions. Using the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation and in coordination with DOD officials, we identified the DOD military construction contracts that were awarded from October 2010 through May 2014 that were valued over $1 million and either were awarded in countries bordering the Arabian Sea, as mandated by Section 112, or were awarded in countries bordering the Arabian Gulf, as implemented by DOD in DFARS. For the 29 contracts that were subject to the preference in accordance with DFARS, we then obtained and analyzed contract documentation for those awards to determine (1) whether DOD included the preference language, (2) whether the 20 percent preference was applied to the proposed offers of competing non-U.S. firms, (3) whether the preference affected the award.the preference in accordance with DFARS, we found a military construction–operations and maintenance contract that the Army Corps of Engineers had incorrectly applied the preference to; however, we did not include this contract in our analysis since this type of contract was not covered by either Section 112 or the DFARS provision—and was thus outside of the scope of our engagement. To identify the potential benefits and problems of expanding the preference, we interviewed officials from DOD, State, and and asked a private-sector association with knowledge about this issue,them about the effect of the preference on those guiding principles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1980s, Congress has mandated a preference for U.S. contractors for military construction contracts in certain overseas countries. In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Congress mandated that GAO examine the potential benefits and problems of expanding this preference to the countries that make up the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
This report (1) examines the extent to which DOD has awarded military construction projects in accordance with the U.S. contractor preference and (2) describes DOD and State Department officials' views on the potential benefits and problems with expanding the U.S. contractor preference to include all countries within CENTCOM.
To examine the extent to which DOD awarded contracts in accordance with the U.S. contractor preference, GAO analyzed information concerning the contracts awarded from October 2010 to May 2014 subject to the preference to determine whether DOD applied the preference and whether the preference affected the contract award. To identify the potential benefits and problems with expanding the preference, GAO interviewed officials with knowledge of this issue.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Defense (DOD) did not apply the U.S. contractor preference in accordance with the current statute from October 2010 through May 2014. The fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs that military construction contracts valued over $1 million and located in countries bordering the Arabian Sea, U.S. territories in the Pacific, and the Kwajalein Atoll, be awarded to a U.S. contractor unless their price is 20 percent higher than the price from a competing non-U.S. contractor with an equally responsive and responsible bid. However, DOD incorrectly applied the preference to countries bordering the Arabian Gulf, which is geographically distinct from the Arabian Sea (see figure). DOD officials were unaware the statute changed the preference from “Arabian Gulf” to “Arabian Sea” in 2002 and therefore had not updated DOD's acquisition guidance. DOD's application, however, included the geographic area in which the majority of military construction in the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf locations took place from October 2010 through May 2014. GAO also found that due to other factors that are also considered, such as a contractor's experience, the preference potentially only affected 2 of the 35 award decisions for military construction contracts since fiscal year 2011. DOD updated its guidance during GAO's review, but it could become outdated, again, if a congressional bill becomes effective, as the bill would change the locations subject to the preference in fiscal year 2015.
GAO also found that DOD and State Department officials identified potential benefits and problems with expanding the statute to include all of the countries within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. For example, according to the officials, one potential benefit of contracting with U.S. firms would be greater familiarity with U.S. contracting and construction procedures. However, these officials also told GAO the 20 countries in the CENTCOM area vary widely in their local capacities, economies, and strategic concerns. Therefore, an expansion may run counter to specific U.S. policy goals in certain locations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD and State Department reviewed the draft of the report but did not provide any comments. |
gao_GAO-09-150 | gao_GAO-09-150_0 | DOD released the “to-be” roadmap, now known as the Logistics Roadmap, in July 2008. DOD’s latest roadmap includes a number of initiatives and programs that involve the implementation of IUID and RFID, two technologies that enable electronic identification and tracking of equipment and supplies and that DOD expects will improve its asset visibility. DOD’s Logistics Roadmap Documents Numerous Initiatives and Programs, but Falls Short of Providing a Comprehensive, Integrated Strategy
Although DOD intended that its Logistics Roadmap would provide a comprehensive and integrated strategy to address logistics problems department-wide, we found that the roadmap falls short of this goal. First, the roadmap does not identify the scope of logistics problems or gaps in logistics capabilities, information that could allow the roadmap to serve as a basis for establishing priorities to improve logistics and address any gaps. Second, the roadmap lacks outcome-based performance measures that would enable DOD to assess and track progress toward meeting stated goals and objectives. Finally, DOD has not clearly stated how it intends to integrate the roadmap into its decision- making processes and who will be responsible for this integration. Roadmap Lacks Key Elements Needed by Decision Makers to Identify and Address Logistics Problems across DOD
In its current form, the Logistics Roadmap lacks three elements that are needed in order for it to serve as a more useful tool for DOD’s senior logistics leaders in guiding, measuring, and tracking progress toward achieving DOD logistics goals and objectives—one of the key stated purposes of the roadmap. DOD officials stated that they plan to remedy some of these weaknesses in their future efforts to update and expand the roadmap. Roadmap Lacks Outcome- Based Performance Measures
The roadmap lacks outcome-based performance measures that would enable DOD to assess and track progress toward meeting stated goals and objectives. As noted previously, DOD decided to delay development of the roadmap until the capability portfolio management test cases had been completed; however, they had committed to Members of Congress that the roadmap would be released by the summer of 2008. A comprehensive integrated strategy to address logistics problems department-wide is critical, in part, because of the diffuse organization of DOD logistics. Responsibility for logistics within DOD is spread across multiple components with separate funding and management of logistics resources and systems. Until the roadmap provides a basis for determining priorities and identifying gaps, incorporates performance measures, and is integrated into decision- making processes, it is likely to be of limited use, beyond the current processes and information available, to senior DOD decision makers as they seek to improve supply chain management. DOD May Face Challenges Achieving Widespread Implementation of IUID and Passive RFID
DOD has taken several steps toward implementing IUID and passive RFID but may face challenges achieving widespread implementation because it is unable to fully demonstrate the return on investment associated with these efforts to the military components that have primary responsibility for determining how and where these technologies are implemented. DOD Does Not Collect Information Needed to Fully Demonstrate Return on Investment for IUID and Passive RFID
Although implementation of IUID and passive RFID will require significant funding commitments and staff resources from the military components, DOD does not gather the cost and performance information needed to fully demonstrate return on investment for the technologies to the military components that have primary responsibility for determining how and where these technologies are implemented. However, they lacked key data to quantify the extent of the time savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to guide logistics initiatives and programs across the department and to demonstrate the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of its efforts to resolve supply chain management problems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) take the following three actions necessary to have a comprehensive, integrated strategy for improving logistics: Identify the scope of logistics problems and capability gaps to be addressed through the Logistics Roadmap and associated efforts. We also reviewed memoranda directing components to conduct assessments for specific objectives included in the roadmap. To obtain information on the progress DOD has made implementing item unique identification (IUID) and passive radio frequency identification (RFID), we reviewed DOD’s overall concept of operations and implementation plan for automatic identification technology, which includes IUID and passive RFID. | Why GAO Did This Study
Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused attention on the performance of the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. According to DOD, it spent approximately $178 billion on its supply chain in fiscal year 2007. As a result of weaknesses in DOD's management of its supply chain, this area has been on GAO's list of high-risk federal government programs since 1990. DOD released its Logistics Roadmap in July 2008 to guide, measure, and track logistics improvements. DOD has identified two technologies included in this roadmap, item unique identification (IUID) and passive radio frequency identification (RFID), as having promise to address weaknesses in asset visibility. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the roadmap serves as a comprehensive, integrated strategy to improve logistics; and (2) the progress DOD has made implementing IUID and passive RFID. GAO reviewed the roadmap based on DOD statements about its intended purposes and visited sites where IUID and passive RFID were implemented.
What GAO Found
The Logistics Roadmap falls short of meeting DOD's goal to provide a comprehensive and integrated strategy to address logistics problems department-wide. The roadmap documents numerous initiatives and programs that are under way and aligns these with goals and objectives. However, the roadmap lacks key information in three areas necessary for it to be a more useful tool that DOD's senior leaders can use to guide and track logistics improvement efforts toward achieving stated goals and objectives. First, the roadmap does not identify the scope of logistics problems or gaps in logistics capabilities, information that could allow the roadmap to serve as a basis for establishing priorities to improve logistics and address any gaps. Second, the roadmap lacks outcome-based performance measures that would enable DOD to assess and track progress toward meeting stated goals and objectives. Third, DOD has not clearly stated how it intends to integrate the roadmap into DOD's logistics decision-making processes or who within the department is responsible for this integration. DOD officials stated they plan to remedy some of these weaknesses in their follow-on efforts. For instance, DOD has begun to conduct gap assessments for individual objectives in the roadmap and hopes to complete these by July 2009. They stated that they recognized the need for these assessments; however, they had committed to Members of Congress to release the roadmap by the summer of 2008 and were unable to conduct the assessments prior to the release of the roadmap. A comprehensive, integrated strategy that includes these three elements is critical, in part, because of the diffuse organization of DOD logistics, which is spread across multiple DOD components with separate funding and management of logistics resources and systems. Until the roadmap provides a basis for determining priorities and identifying gaps, incorporates performance measures, and is integrated into decision-making processes, it is likely to be of limited use to senior DOD decision makers as they seek to improve supply chain management. DOD has taken initial steps to implement two technologies included in the Logistics Roadmap-IUID and passive RFID-that enable electronic identification and tracking of equipment and supplies; but has experienced difficulty fully demonstrating return on investment for these technologies to the military components that have primary responsibility for determining how and where these technologies are implemented. Although DOD has undertaken initial implementation efforts of these technologies at several locations, at present, it does not collect data on implementation costs or performance-based outcome measures that would enable the department to quantify the return on investment associated with these two technologies. Without this information, it may be difficult for DOD to gain the support needed from the military components to make significant commitments in funding and staff resources necessary to overcome challenges to widespread implementation of these technologies. As a result, full implementation of these technologies is impeded and the realization of potential benefits to asset visibility DOD expects may be delayed. |
gao_GAO-03-1158 | gao_GAO-03-1158_0 | Most Respondents Were Satisfied with Their Auditor, Had Long-term Relationships, and Used Their Auditor for a Variety of Services
Most of the survey respondents said they were satisfied with their current auditor. Moreover, half of the respondents reported that they have had the same auditor of record for 10 or more years. Almost all respondents said that they used their auditor of record for more than audit and attest functions, including tax-related services and assistance with company debt and equity offerings. Respondents Cited Varied Reasons for Changing Auditors and Factors for Selecting a New Auditor
Respondents gave a variety of reasons for switching, including concerns about the reputation of their auditor, the need to retain an auditor that could meet companies’ new demands, concerns about the level of fees charged for audit and attest services, and increased demands resulting from a corporate merger or change in company ownership. Respondents Had Differing Views about Past Consolidation’s Influence on Audit Fees but Most Agreed That It Had Little or No Influence on Audit Quality or Auditor Independence
Respondents had differing views about the impact of past consolidation among the largest accounting firms on audit fees, but most agreed that it had little or no influence on audit quality or auditor independence. According to one respondent, “The change in the depth and quality of the audit process is due to a more rigorous regulatory and litigation environment and not to audit firm consolidation.” Another respondent noted, “Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Andersen’s downfall, other firms are increasing the level of work they do and the depth of the audit.” Finally, we received comments about the skills and experience of the audit team. While most respondents said that they would be able to use another Big 4 firm as their auditor of record if they had to change, they also said that they would prefer more large firms from which to choose. As shown in figure 7, nearly all the respondents cited three factors as being of great or very great importance in determining why their companies would not use a non-Big 4 firm: (1) auditor’s technical skills and knowledge of the company’s industry (91 percent or 126 of 138); (2) the reputation of the accounting firm (91 percent or 126 of 138); and (3) the capacity of the firm (90 percent or 125 of 138). sample of public companies. If your company was founded in the past decade, in what year was it founded? 1% 11. 2. 3. 30. A number of respondents mentioned concerns about further consolidation in the accounting profession, cost and quality, and other issues such as the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley act and proposals for mandatory audit firm rotation. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site daily. | Why GAO Did This Study
The largest accounting firms, known as the "Big 4," currently audit over 78 percent of U.S. public companies and 99 percent of public company annual sales. To address concerns raised by this concentration and as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, on July 30, 2003, GAO issued a report entitled Public Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation and Competition, GAO-03-864 . As part of that study, GAO surveyed a random sample of 250 public companies from the Fortune 1000 list; preliminary findings were included in the July report. This supplemental report details more comprehensively the 159 responses we received through August 11, 2003, focusing on (1) the relationship of their company with their auditor of record in terms of satisfaction, tenure relationship, and services provided; (2) the effects of consolidation on audit fees, quality, and independence; and (3) the potential implications of consolidation for competition and auditor choice.
What GAO Found
Most of the 159 respondents said that they were satisfied with the current auditor, and half had used their current auditor for 10 years or more. Generally, the longer a respondent had been with an auditor, the higher the overall level of satisfaction. Consistent with high levels of satisfaction, GAO found that, aside from former clients of Arthur Andersen, few respondents had switched auditors in the past decade. When they did, they switched because of reputation, concerns about audit fees, and corporate mergers or management changes. In looking for a new auditor, the most commonly cited factors the respondents gave were quality of service, industry specialization, and "chemistry" with the audit team. Finally, almost all respondents used their auditor of record for a variety of nonaudit services, including tax-related services and assistance with company debt and equity offerings. Respondents had differing views about whether past consolidation had some influence on audit fees, but most believed that consolidation had little or no influence on audit quality or independence. Respondents commented that other factors--such as new regulations deriving from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changing auditing standards--have had a greater impact on audit price, quality, and independence. While half of the respondents said that past consolidation had little or no influence on competition and just over half said they had a sufficient number of auditor choices, 84 percent also indicated a preference for more firms from which to choose as most would not consider using a non-Big 4 firm. Reasons most frequently cited included (1) the need for auditors with technical skills or industry-specific knowledge, (2) the reputation of the firm, and (3) the capacity of the firm. Finally, some expressed concerns about further consolidation in the industry and the limited number of alternatives were they to change auditors under existing independence rules. |
gao_GAO-10-969T | gao_GAO-10-969T_0 | National Response Framework’s Criteria for Response Planning
The National Response Framework discusses several elements of effective response and response planning. A plan is acceptable if it can meet the requirements of anticipated scenarios, can be implemented within the costs and time frames that senior officials and the public can support, and is consistent with applicable laws. Adequacy. A plan is complete if it incorporates major actions, objectives, and tasks to be accomplished. Consistency and standardization of products. Standardized planning processes and products foster consistency, interoperability, and collaboration, therefore, emergency operations plans for disaster response should be consistent with all other related planning documents. Feasibility. Flexibility. FEMA has developed standards—the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101—that call for validation, review, and testing of emergency operations plans (EOP),. Exercises offer the best way, short of emergencies, to determine if an EOP is understood and “works.” Further, conducting a “tabletop” exercise involving the key representatives of each tasked organization can serve as a practical and useful means to help validate the plan. FEMA’s guidance also suggests that officials use functional and full-scale emergency management exercises to evaluate EOPs. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act transferred preparedness responsibilities to FEMA, and we recommended in April 2009 that FEMA should improve its approach to developing policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities and planning processes by developing a program management plan, in coordination with DHS and other federal entities, to ensure the completion of the key national preparedness policies and plans called for in legislation, presidential directives, and existing policy and doctrine; to define roles and responsibilities and planning processes; as well as to fully integrate such policies and plans into other elements of the national preparedness system. FEMA concurred with our recommendation and is currently working to address this recommendation. Other national standards reflect these practices as well. For example, according to Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) standards, the development, coordination and implementation of operational plans and procedures are fundamental to effective disaster response and recovery. EMAP standards call for a program of regularly scheduled drills, exercises, and appropriate follow-through activities—designed for assessment and evaluation of emergency plans and capabilities—as a critical component of a state, territorial, tribal or local emergency management program. Status of National Disaster Planning Efforts
We reported in April 2009 that FEMA lacked a comprehensive approach to managing the development of emergency preparedness policies and plans. Specifically, we reported that FEMA had completed many policy and planning documents, but a number of others were not yet completed. In February 2010, DHS’s Office of Inspector General reviewed the status of these planning efforts and reported that the full set of plans for any single scenario had not yet been completed partly because of the time required to develop and implement the Integrated Planning System. The Integrated Planning System, required by Annex 1 to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (December 2007), is intended to be a st comprehensive approach to national planning. Operational Response Plans for Oil Spill Responses
Oil spills are a special case with regard to response. The National Response Framework has 15 functional annexes, such as search and rescue, which provide the structure for coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an incident. Emergency Support Function #10, the Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex, governs oil spills. As described in Emergency Support Function #10, in general, the Environmental Protection Agency is the lead for incidents in the inland zone, and the U.S. Coast Guard, within DHS, is the lead for incidents in the coastal zone. The difference in responding to oil spills and the shared responsibility across multiple federal agencies underscores the importance of including clear roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities in developing operational response plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Among the lessons learned from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was that effective disaster response requires planning followed by the execution of training and exercises to validate those plans. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for disaster response planning. This testimony focuses on (1) criteria for effective disaster response planning established in FEMA's National Response Framework, (2) additional guidance for disaster planning, (3) the status of disaster planning efforts, and (4) special circumstances in planning for oil spills. This testimony is based on prior GAO work on emergency planning and response, including GAO's April 2009 report on the FEMA efforts to lead the development of a national preparedness system. GAO reviewed the policies and plans that form the basis of the preparedness system. GAO did not assess any criteria used or the operational planning for the Deepwater Horizon response.
What GAO Found
FEMA's National Response Framework identifies criteria for effective response and response planning, including (1) acceptability (meets the requirement of anticipated scenarios and is consistent with applicable laws); (2) adequacy (complies with applicable planning guidance); (3) completeness (incorporates major actions, objectives, and tasks); (4) consistency and standardization of products (consistent with other related documents); (5) feasibility (tasks accomplished with resources available); (6) flexibility (accommodating all hazards and contingencies); and (7) interoperability and collaboration (identifies stakeholders and integrates plans). In addition to the National Response Framework, FEMA has developed standards that call for validation, review, and testing of emergency operations plans. According to FEMA, exercises offer the best way, short of emergencies, to determine if such plans are understood and work. FEMA's guidance also suggests that officials use functional and full-scale emergency management exercises to evaluate plans. Other national standards reflect these practices as well. For example, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program standards call for a program of regularly scheduled drills, exercises, and appropriate follow-through activities, as a critical component of a state, territorial, tribal, or local emergency management program. GAO reported in April 2009 that FEMA lacked a comprehensive approach to managing the development of emergency preparedness policies and plans. Specifically, GAO reported that FEMA had completed many policy and planning documents, but a number of others were not yet completed. In February 2010, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General reviewed the status of these planning efforts and reported that the full set of plans for any single scenario had not yet been completed partly because of the time required to develop and implement the Integrated Planning System. The Integrated Planning System, required by Annex 1 to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (December 2007), is intended to be a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. Oil spills are a special case with regard to response. The National Response Framework has 15 functional annexes that provide the structure for coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an incident. Emergency Support Function #10--Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex--governs oil spills. Under this function, the Environmental Protection Agency is the lead for incidents in the inland zone, and the U.S. Coast Guard, within DHS, is the lead for incidents in the coastal zone. This difference underscores the importance of including clear roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities in developing operational response plans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony but has made recommendations to FEMA in previous reports to strengthen disaster response planning, including the development of a management plan to ensure the completion of key national policies and planning documents. FEMA concurred and is currently working to address this recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-95-48 | gao_NSIAD-95-48_0 | Carrier Liability for Domestic Shipments Increased in 1987
In mid-1987, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)—DOD’s traffic manager—increased carrier liability for DOD domestic household goods shipments. Domestic Claims Costs Reduced and Carrier Performance Improved
DOD claims costs declined after DOD increased carrier liability on domestic household goods shipments in 1987. Carrier performance on domestic shipments also improved. Table 2.3 illustrates the impact of increased recovery on Air Force constant dollar claims costs and shows (1) how overall Air Force costs for domestic shipments declined from about $8.7 million in fiscal year 1986 to between $4 million and $5 million in fiscal years 1990 and 1991, (2) how much the Air Force paid carriers for the increased liability, and (3) how the increased liability adjusted the percentage of overall claims costs paid by the Air Force and household goods carriers. Only the Air Force met REVAL expectations. Comments From the Department of Defense
DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation. In commenting on this report, the AMC said that carrier liability should not be increased to the $1.25 rate on international shipments because nothing was achieved by increasing carrier liability on domestic shipments except that liability for shipment loss and damage was transferred from DOD to the carrier. MTMC officials do not have adequate information with which to evaluate individual carrier performance. We found that MTMC claims data has major omissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed changes proposed by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) regarding carrier liability for loss and damage on Department of Defense (DOD) domestic shipments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) carrier performance has improved since DOD increased carrier liability on domestic household goods shipments; (2) although DOD claims costs declined by an estimated $18.9 million between fiscal years 1987 and 1991, only the Air Force achieved the expected level of cost recovery from carriers; (3) DOD needs to increase carrier liability on DOD international shipments so that DOD can recover the cost of damages and improve carrier performance; (4) industry officials believe that changes in carrier liability on international shipments could cause major industry disruptions unless carriers are compensated in exchange for the increased liability; and (5) MTMC does not have adequate claims information to assess individual carrier performance or the costs associated with increased carrier liability. |
gao_GAO-08-325 | gao_GAO-08-325_0 | DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Global Strike, but Its Concept Is Interpreted Differently by Key Stakeholders
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning, execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have different interpretations of the scope, range, and potential use of capabilities needed to implement global strike and under what conditions global strike would be used in U.S. military operations. Several factors affect understanding and communication of the global strike concept among key stakeholders, including the extent to which DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike into joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities with key stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and other training involving global strike. DOD Is Assessing Several Potential Offensive Strike Weapons Systems for Global Strike but Has Not Fully Assessed Related Enabling Capabilities
DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems it may need in the near, mid, and long term, particularly those for prompt global strike. However, DOD has not fully assessed the requirements for various enabling capabilities it needs for global strike or coordinated its efforts to improve these capabilities with potential offensive systems it intends to develop. Since DOD has not fully assessed the required enabling capabilities or coordinated various department efforts to improve enabling capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and command and control, for future strike systems, DOD might not make the best decisions regarding which enabling capabilities to pursue. DOD Has Identified and Tracked Some Investments Related to Global Strike but Has Not Developed a Prioritized Global Strike Investment Strategy
While DOD plans investments in a range of global-strike-related capabilities, it has not yet begun to develop a prioritized investment strategy that considers the breadth of current efforts and future plans to develop capabilities for global strike, integrates these efforts to assess global strike options, and makes choices among alternatives in light of the department’s long-term fiscal challenges. Our prior work has shown that a long-term and comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations. Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) conduct a comprehensive assessment of enabling capabilities (intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment); (2) provide guidance on how the results of its studies to identify potential strike systems for global strike would be integrated into a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike; (3) perform a comprehensive review of all capabilities being developed within DOD’s FYDP to determine the extent to which these capabilities contribute or can be leveraged for global strike; and (4) determine the appropriateness of using a portfolio management approach for global strike. We also obtained information on DOD’s efforts to identify funding requirements and develop an investment strategy for global strike. | Why GAO Did This Study
To increase the range of options available to the President, the Department of Defense (DOD) is taking steps to develop a portfolio of capabilities, referred to as global strike, to rapidly plan and deliver limited duration and extended range precision strikes against highly valued assets. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether DOD has clearly defined and instilled a common understanding and approach for global strike throughout the department, (2) the extent to which DOD has developed capabilities needed for global strike, and (3) the extent to which DOD has identified the funding requirements and developed an investment strategy for acquiring new global strike capabilities. GAO reviewed and analyzed plans and studies within DOD, the services, and several commands on global strike implementation and capabilities development.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken a number of steps to implement its global strike concept and has generally assigned responsibilities for the planning, execution, and support of global strike operations. However, key stakeholders, particularly the geographic combatant commanders, have different interpretations of the concept, scope, range, and potential use of capabilities needed to implement global strike. Several factors affect the understanding and communication of DOD's global strike concept among key stakeholders, including the extent to which DOD has (1) defined global strike, (2) incorporated global strike into joint doctrine, (3) conducted outreach and communication activities with key stakeholders, and (4) involved stakeholders in joint exercises and other training involving global strike. GAO's prior work examining successful organizational transformations shows the necessity to communicate to stakeholders often and early with clear and specific objectives on what is to be achieved and what roles are assigned. Without a complete and clearly articulated concept that is well communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD could encounter difficulties in fully implementing its concept and building the necessary relationships for carrying out global strike operations. DOD has underway or completed several global strike assessments to identify potential conventional offensive strike weapons systems, particularly those for prompt global strike, which would provide capabilities sometime after 2018. However, DOD has not fully assessed the requirements or coordinated improvements for related enabling capabilities that are critical to the planning and execution of successful global strike operations. These critical enabling capabilities include intelligence collection and dissemination, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control, communications, and battlefield damage assessment. Furthermore, DOD has not coordinated its efforts to improve these capabilities with potential offensive systems it intends to develop. Without fully assessing the enabling capabilities required or coordinating with other DOD studies, DOD might not make the best decision of which enabling capability to pursue in meeting global strike requirements. DOD has not yet established a prioritized investment strategy that integrates its efforts to assess global strike options and makes choices among alternatives given the department's long-term fiscal challenges. GAO's prior work has shown that a long-term and comprehensive investment approach is an important tool in an organization's decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. While DOD studies and officials recognize a need for a broad, holistic view of global strike development, DOD has not identified and assessed all global-strike-related capabilities and technologies and has not explained how its plans to link long-term studies to identify potential weapons systems will result in a comprehensive prioritized investment strategy for global strike. |
gao_GAO-05-727 | gao_GAO-05-727_0 | Each Level of Government and the Private Sector Play a Role in Developing Intermodal Capabilities at U.S. The federal government has not established specific goals or funding programs to develop intermodal capabilities at airports, but it does provide oversight and funding when projects fit the criteria for funding programs focused on one or more individual modes. State and Local Governments Have the Primary Responsibility for Developing Intermodal Capabilities
In line with federal transportation legislation’s focus on state and local government decisionmaking, intermodal capabilities at U.S. airports are typically initiated and developed by state and local transportation agencies, including some combination of state departments of transportation, local transportation planning bodies (i.e., metropolitan planning organizations), airports, and local transit agencies. The second theme we found is that local transit agencies are heavily involved in intermodal connections that are part of a new or existing transit system. Most Major U.S. Airports Have Direct Connections to Local Transportation Services, but Very Few Have Direct Connections to Nationwide Rail or Bus Systems
Based on our survey of all large and medium and certain small hub U.S. airports, most airports have direct connections to rail or bus systems, with some airports having direct connections to more than one type of ground transportation. 4.) Nationwide Ground Transportation Options from Airports are Limited
While most major U.S. airports are located in metropolitan areas that have stations for nationwide transportation systems such as Greyhound or Amtrak, only 19 airports reported having direct connections to these stations. The potential reduction of short-haul flights could allow airlines to reallocate airport capacity to long-distance flights, which generally have lower costs per mile. Barriers Impede the Development and Use of Intermodal Capabilities
A significant barrier to the development of intermodal capabilities is the lack of specific national goals or funding programs to develop intermodal capabilities at airports, as mentioned earlier in this report. A number of other barriers also impede the development of intermodal capabilities at airports, including the difficulty of securing funding, disincentives for airport support, and geographical and physical land constraints at airports. Two Key Strategies Could Help Address Intermodal Transportation Planning and Financing Limitations
Using our past work and our analysis of information obtained from government and transportation officials in the United States and Europe, we identified two strategies that could help public decision makers improve intermodal options at airports, particularly direct connections to local and nationwide rail systems. It would most likely lead to a continued focus on the development of local intermodal connections rather than a fully integrated nationwide system. The second strategy would involve a fundamental shift in federal transportation policy’s long-time focus on state and local decisionmaking by increasing the role of the federal government in planning and funding intermodal projects in order to develop more integrated air and rail networks, either nationwide or along particularly congested corridors. These alternatives include: Increasing the flexibility of current programs. Benefits Likely to Be Focused on Local, Not Nationwide Travel
While this strategy of encouraging a more systemwide approach to transportation planning and development could address a number of barriers to developing intermodal services at airports, it would likely support the development of connections to local transit networks instead of to a nationwide rail network. Such a strategy would involve a fundamental shift in federal transportation policy’s focus on state and local decisionmaking for transportation projects and would be closer to the intermodal development strategy followed by the European Union (and several European countries) with the goal of promoting rail as a complement to air transportation. However, only where both the private and the public benefits are large would the appropriate subsidy be sufficient to cover the difference between what users would be willing to pay and the substantial cost of the facility. Agency Comments
We provided drafts of this report to DOT and Amtrak for their review and comment. Overall, DOT generally concurred with this report. Amtrak had no comments on this report. (3) What benefits, costs, and barriers exist for developing additional intermodal capabilities at U.S. airports? To address these questions, we used a variety of methods and sources of information. Local rail: Passengers can access the local rail transit system at both of the airport’s terminals. | Why GAO Did This Study
With the number of airplane passengers using U.S. airports expected to grow to almost 1 billion by the year 2015, ground access to U.S. airports has become an important factor in the development of our nation's transportation networks. Increases in the number of passengers traveling to and from airports will place greater strains on our nation's airport access roads and airport capacity, which can have a number of negative economic and social effects. U.S. transportation policy has generally addressed these negative economic and social effects from the standpoint of individual transportation modes and local government involvement. However, European transportation policy is increasingly focusing on intermodal transportation as a possible means to address congestion without sacrificing economic growth. This report addresses the development of intermodal capabilities at U.S. airports, including (1) the roles of different levels of government and the private sector; (2) the extent such facilities have been developed; (3) benefits, costs, and barriers to such development; and (4) strategies to improve these capabilities. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Amtrak. DOT generally concurred with the report, and Amtrak had no comments.
What GAO Found
State and local government agencies have primary responsibility for developing intermodal capabilities at U.S. airports. Generally airports and local transit agencies are heavily involved, especially if these projects are part of a local transit system. The federal government has not established specific goals or funding programs to develop intermodal capabilities at airports. However, it provides funding for projects fitting the criteria of other programs. The private sector may undertake a variety of roles. Most major U.S. airports have direct connections to local transit systems rather than to nationwide rail or bus systems. For example, 64 out of 72 airports have connections to local bus systems, and 27 airports have connections to local rail systems. At the same time, only 19 airports have connections to nationwide rail or bus systems. A number of airports have plans to enhance their connections to local rail and bus systems. U.S. and European transportation officials and experts cited the benefits for intermodal capabilities at airports to include increased transportation options, reduced road congestion, and reduced short-haul flights. The costs of intermodal projects using rail are typically significant. Barriers cited include the difficulty of securing needed funding, disincentives for airport support such as potential reductions in airport parking revenue, geographical and physical land constraints, limitations of the existing nationwide rail network, and inconveniences in comparison to using cars that limit consumer demand. Two differing strategies developed from our prior work would help public decision makers improve intermodal capabilities at airports. The first strategy would increase flexibility within current federal transportation programs to encourage a more systemwide approach to transportation planning and development. The second strategy would involve a fundamental shift in federal transportation policy's focus on local decision making by increasing the role of the federal government in order to develop more integrated air and rail networks and would be closer to the strategy followed in Europe. While the first strategy would most likely lead to a continued focus on the development of intermodal connections to local transit systems, the second strategy could develop more integrated air and rail networks, either nationwide or along particularly congested corridors. The second strategy would be costly, and high benefits, which would be difficult to achieve, would be needed to justify this investment. |
gao_GAO-05-521 | gao_GAO-05-521_0 | Instead, DOD has recorded billions of dollars in suspense and other accounts that were set up to temporarily hold disbursements and collections until the proper appropriation account could be identified. It is important that DOD charge transactions to appropriation accounts promptly and accurately because these accounts provide the department with legal authority to incur and pay obligations for various kinds of goods and services. DOD has hundreds of current and closed appropriation accounts that were authorized by law over the years. In some ways, appropriation accounts are similar to an individual’s checking account— the funds available in DOD’s appropriation accounts must be reduced or increased as the department disburses money or receives collections that it is authorized to retain. Just as an individual who maintains multiple checking accounts must be sure that transactions are recorded to the proper account, DOD also must ensure that the proper appropriation account is charged or credited for each specific disbursement and receipt. Therefore, DOD management requested and received statutory authority to write off these problem transactions. The legislation specified that the write-offs include only suspense account disbursement and collection transactions that occurred prior to March 1, 2001, and that were recorded in suspense accounts F3875, F3880, or F3885; include only check payment differences identified by Treasury for checks issued prior to October 31, 1998; be supported by a written determination from the Secretary of Defense that the documentation necessary for correct recording of the transactions could not be located and that further research attempts were not in the best interest of the government; be processed within 30 days of the Secretary’s written determination; be accomplished by December 2, 2004. Actual Amount of Write-offs Cannot Be Calculated
DOD officials estimated the value of the suspense account and check payment write-offs to be an absolute amount of nearly $35 billion, or a net amount of $629 million. However, neither of these amounts accurately represented the total value of all the individual transactions that DOD could not correctly record to appropriations and, therefore, left in suspense for years. Over time, amounts might even have been netted more than once. Check Payment Differences Write-off Process
Although DOD did not establish a multilayered review process for check payment differences, the department did comply with legislative requirements for the write-offs with one exception—the Secretary of Defense did not provide the required written determination prior to Treasury’s recording of the write-off amounts. DOD will never identify which, if any, of the aged underlying transactions in suspense would have resulted in Antideficiency Act violations had they been correctly charged. The suspense account transactions had already been charged to the federal surplus or deficit in the specific year that DOD reported the related collection and disbursement transactions to Treasury. Current DOD Policies Are Not Being Enforced
We found that, even though DOD policies require that most suspense account transactions and check differences be resolved within 60 days, DFAS centers were reporting an absolute value of $1.3 billion in aged suspense account amounts and an absolute value of $39 million in aged check differences as of December 31, 2004. Until DOD enforces its own guidance for reconciling and resolving its suspense accounts and check differences regularly, balances will likely grow. Unless DOD complies with existing laws and its own regulations, its appropriation accounts will remain unreliable and another costly write-off process may eventually be required. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As required by the conference report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. L. No. Our objectives were to determine (1) what amount DOD wrote off using the legislative authority, (2) whether DOD had effective procedures and controls to provide reasonable assurance that amounts were written off in accordance with the legislation, (3) how the write-offs affected Treasury and DOD financial reports, and (4) what aged DOD suspense account balances and check payment differences remain after the write-offs have been accomplished. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has recorded billions of dollars of disbursements and collections in suspense accounts because the proper appropriation accounts could not be identified and charged. DOD has also been unable to resolve discrepancies between its and Treasury's records of checks issued by DOD. Because documentation that would allow for resolution of these payment recording problems could not be found after so many years, DOD requested and received legislative authority to write off certain aged suspense transactions and check payment differences. The conference report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-772) that accompanied the legislation (Pub. L. No. 107-314) required GAO to review and report on DOD's use of this write-off authority.
What GAO Found
After decades of financial management and accounting weaknesses, information related to aged disbursement and collection activity was so inadequate that DOD was unable to determine the true value of the write-offs. While DOD records show that an absolute value of $35 billion or a net value of $629 million of suspense amounts and check payment differences were written off, the reported amounts are not reliable. Many of the write-offs represented transactions that had already been netted together (i.e., positive amounts offsetting negative amounts) at lower level accounting sites before they were recorded in the suspense accounts. This netting or summarizing of transactions misstated the total value of the write-offs and made it impossible for DOD to locate the support needed to identify what appropriations may have been under- or overcharged or determine whether individual transactions were valid. In particular, DOD could not determine whether any of the write-off amounts, had they been charged to the proper appropriation, would have caused an Antideficiency Act violation. It is important that DOD accurately and promptly charge transactions to appropriation accounts since these accounts provide the department with legal authority to incur and pay obligations for goods or services. DOD has hundreds of current and closed appropriation accounts that were authorized by law over the years. Similar to a checking account, the funds available in DOD's appropriation accounts must be reduced or increased as the department spends money or receives collections that it is authorized to retain for its own use. Just as an individual who maintains multiple checking accounts must be sure that transactions are recorded to the proper account, DOD also must ensure that the proper appropriation account is charged or credited for each specific disbursement and collection. Our review found that DOD's guidance and processes developed to ensure compliance with the legislation provided reasonable assurance that amounts were written off properly except that check payment differences did not have the required written certification. The write-off process did not correct underlying records and significant DOD resources were needed to ensure that write-off amounts were properly identified and handled. Also, using staff resources to process old transactions resulted in fewer staff to research and clear current problems. At December 31, 2004, DOD reports showed that after the write-offs, more than $1.3 billion (absolute value) of suspense amounts and $39 million of check differences remained uncleared for more than 60 days. However, DOD has acknowledged that its suspense reports are incomplete and inaccurate. Until DOD complies with existing laws and enforces its own guidance for reconciling, reporting, and resolving amounts in suspense and check differences on a regular basis, the buildup of current balances will likely continue, the department's appropriation accounts will remain unreliable, and another costly write-off process may eventually be required. |
gao_GAO-15-214 | gao_GAO-15-214_0 | IOM also found that price is a major determinant of geographic variation in the private sector, and estimated that, after adjusting for underlying costs, price accounted for 70 percent of the geographic variation in private sector spending. In addition, IOM found that private sector utilization varied more for some service types than others. Variation in the prices and volume of physician and other services together accounted for less than one-tenth of the variation in episode spending. Episode Spending Was 74 to 94 Percent Higher in Highest- Compared with Lowest-Spending Areas, with High- Spending Areas Generally High for All Three Procedures Episode Spending Was 74 to 94 Percent Higher in the Highest- Compared with Lowest-Spending Areas, Depending on Procedure
We noted variation in episode spending across MSAs for all three procedures, even after adjusting for geographic differences in the cost of doing business and differences in demographics and health status of enrollees in each MSA. Average adjusted episode spending for MSAs in the highest-spending quintile was about 84 percent and 74 percent higher than for MSAs in the lowest-spending quintile, respectively. High-Spending Areas Generally Were High- Spending for All Three Procedures
MSAs with higher spending on one procedure generally had higher spending on the other two procedures. 2.) Price per Initial Inpatient Admission Was Largest Contributor to Geographic Differences in Episode Spending
The price of the initial hospital inpatient admission was the largest contributor to differences in private sector episode spending across MSAs. Differences in the price of the initial admission accounted for 91 percent or more of the difference in average adjusted episode spending between the lowest- and highest-spending quintiles. First, the price of the initial admission represented the largest percentage of adjusted episode spending. For example, for total hip replacement, the price of the initial admission was $17,134, representing 76 percent of the $22,463 in total episode spending for MSAs in the lowest-spending quintile and $30,332, representing 82 percent of the $36,969 in total episode spending for MSAs in the highest-spending quintile. Second, the average price of the initial inpatient admission varied considerably across MSAs.difference in the price of the initial inpatient admission in MSAs in the lowest- and highest-spending quintiles ranged from 77 percent to 121 percent, depending on the procedure. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this product to the Department of Health and Human Services, which did not comment on our findings but provided technical comments. Creating Episodes of Care from Private Health Insurance Claims Data
We created episodes of care based on inpatient admissions for three procedures—coronary stent placement, laparoscopic appendectomy, and total hip replacement—using private health insurance claims and enrollment data from the Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® Commercial Claims and Encounters Database for 2009 and 2010. We also examined whether MSAs in the lowest- and highest-spending quintile were concentrated in particular regions of the nation. Analyzing Volume, Intensity, and Price of Services
To examine how the other components of spending contribute to variation in episode spending for private payers, we analyzed volume, intensity, and price of services for hospital inpatient and professional services. Appendix III: Distribution of Episode Spending
Number of metropolitan statistical areas (MSA)
Appendix IV: Episode Spending, by Procedure, for Metropolitan Statistical Areas in Lowest- and Highest-Spending Quintiles
This appendix presents average adjusted episode spending for each of the three procedures we analyzed—coronary stent placement, laparoscopic appendectomy, and total hip replacement—by service category for metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) in the lowest- and highest-spending quintiles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research shows that spending on health care varies by geographic area and that higher spending in an area is not always associated with better quality of care. While a substantial body of research exists on geographic variation in spending in Medicare, less research has been done on variation in private sector health care spending, although this spending accounts for about a third of overall health care spending. As U.S. health expenditures continue to rise, policymakers and others have expressed interest in better understanding spending variation and how health care systems can operate efficiently—that is, providing equivalent or higher quality care while maintaining or lowering current spending levels.
GAO was asked to examine geographic variation in private sector health care spending. GAO examined (1) how spending per episode of care for certain high-cost procedures varies across geographic areas for private payers, and (2) how the mix of service types, and the volume, intensity, and price of services contribute to variation in episode spending across geographic areas for private payers. Using a large private sector claims database for 2009 and 2010, GAO examined spending by MSA for episodes of care for three commonly performed inpatient procedures and examined spending by hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, postdischarge, professional, and ancillary service categories. For inpatient and professional services, GAO examined the volume, intensity, and price of services. GAO's findings may not be generalizable to all private insurers due to data limitations.
What GAO Found
Spending for an episode of care in the private sector varied across metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) for coronary stent placement, laparoscopic appendectomy, and total hip replacement, even after GAO adjusted for geographic differences in the cost of doing business and differences in enrollee demographics and health status. MSAs in the highest-spending quintile had average adjusted episode spending that was 74 to 94 percent higher than MSAs in the lowest-spending quintile, depending on the procedure. MSAs with higher spending on one procedure generally had higher spending on the other two procedures. High- or low-spending MSAs were not concentrated in particular regions of the nation.
The price of the initial hospital inpatient admission accounted for 91 percent or more of the difference in episode spending between MSAs in the lowest- and highest-spending quintiles. The price of the initial admission was the largest contributor to the difference for two reasons. First, it represented the largest percentage of adjusted episode spending. For example, for total hip replacement, the average price of the initial admission was $17,134, representing 76 percent of the $22,463 in total episode spending for MSAs in the lowest-spending quintile and $30,332, representing 82 percent of the $36,969 in total episode spending for MSAs in the highest-spending quintile. Second, the price of the initial admission varied considerably across MSAs. For MSAs in the highest-spending quintile, the average price of the initial admission for total hip replacement was 77 percent higher than for MSAs in the lowest-spending quintile. Professional services—office visits and other services provided by a physician or other health professional—were the second largest contributor to geographic differences in episode spending, but accounted for 7 percent or less of the difference in episode spending between MSAs in the lowest- and highest-spending quintiles. (See table.) MSAs in the highest-spending quintile had higher average prices and intensity (a measure of the resources needed to provide a service) but fewer services (volume) than MSAs in the lowest-spending quintile for all three procedures.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_RCED-97-1 | gao_RCED-97-1_0 | That satellite system and one to provide safety and rescue at sea were developed and implemented by governments that joined together to form INTELSAT and the International Mobile Satellite Organization (Inmarsat). 1.1.) This is particularly useful in television/video service. The U.S. signatory, the private corporation COMSAT, is subject to U.S. government regulation in its responsibilities in this capacity. Intergovernmental and Regulatory Framework for a Global System
With passage of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, the United States set a goal for the nation, and the world, to create a commercial communications satellite system that would, among other things, “serve the communications needs of the United States and other countries and . At the same time, these international satellite organizations believe that they have certain disadvantages in competing with private companies. We found that competition developed differently in two primary markets for international communications services. In the international television/video market, the restrictions on satellite systems were less pronounced. A Variety of Factors May Influence Competition
The institutional framework that defines the market for commercial international satellite services provides an array of factors that may influence competition within the market. On the other hand, many members of INTELSAT and Inmarsat believe that the organizations themselves are disadvantaged because they are obligated to provide universal service at nondiscriminatory prices and because their intergovernmental structure can cause sluggish decision-making in a rapidly changing market. In the market for international phone service, where policies by the U.S. government, INTELSAT, and other countries’ licensing authorities impeded U.S. satellite firms from providing service, competition emerged primarily from an alternative to satellites: fiber-optic cables. In the segment of the market for regional broadcasts, a few U.S. and foreign satellite companies have become viable competitors. However, in the segment of the market for international and/or transoceanic broadcasts, INTELSAT remains dominant because of its extensive network and capacity. The Impact of Competitive Factors Causes Concerns About Competition in the Emerging Market for Mobile Services
Inmarsat is currently the dominant provider of global mobile satellite communications services, with 70 percent of its business providing maritime services. We believe that our discussions of likely competitive advantages for the intergovernmental organizations and selected satellite markets accurately reflect the potential impact of attributes of the institutional framework for providing satellite services and the current market activity:
Many experts we spoke with believe that the signatories, as the investors in INTELSAT and Inmarsat, have a financial interest in the success of the organizations. Options for Resolving Competitive Issues
A variety of options for resolving the competitive issues discussed in chapter 3 have been suggested by interested parties, and many are being pursued. Depending on what changes are made and how they are implemented, changes in the status of the intergovernmental organizations could potentially address most of the concerns about competition held by both the companies and the intergovernmental organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the institutional framework for providing international communications satellite services, focusing on: (1) the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the International Mobile Satellite Organization (Immarsat); (2) elements of that framework that appear to hinder competition; and (3) key options that could resolve the competitive issues.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) with the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, the United States initiated the creation of a framework for providing an international commercial satellite system; (2) the United States joined other countries to form INTELSAT and Inmarsat and establish their respective satellite systems for basic telecommunications services and safety at sea; (3) each country names a signatory, usually a telecommunications entity, to participate as an investor in the systems; (4) the signatory for the United States is COMSAT Corporation, a private corporation that was created by the 1962 act; (5) three U.S. agencies have primary responsibility for overseeing U.S. membership in the organizations and for instructing the U.S. signatory in its representational role; (6) this institutional framework creates an array of factors that may hinder competition in the market for commercial international satellite services; (7) at the same time, many signatories of INTELSAT and Inmarsat believe that their obligations to provide universal service at nondiscriminatory prices, as well as their intergovernmental structure, hinder their ability to compete in a rapidly changing market; (8) GAO's analysis showed that the development of competition differed in two primary markets for international communications services; (9) in the market for international telephone service, where separate U.S. satellite systems were largely restricted from providing service, competition emerged primarily from an alternative medium: fiber-optic cables; (10) in the market for certain types of international television/video service, such as regional broadcasting, U.S. satellite companies, as well as other international, regional, and domestic systems, have become viable competitors; (11) for other types of television/video service, such as transoceanic transmissions, INTELSAT remains dominant because of its extensive network and capacity and its access to many markets; (12) Inmarsat is currently the dominant provider of global mobile satellite communications services, with 70 percent of its business providing maritime services; (13) a variety of options for resolving the concerns about competition have been suggested, and many are being pursued; (14) changes that would eliminate the intergovernmental organizations could potentially resolve many competitive issues but are not likely to be adopted because such proposals lack support; (15) more likely are changes in the role of the intergovernmental organizations, such as the creation of one or more private companies, or affiliates, with little or no intergovernmental ownership; and (16) these proposals have the potential to address many of the concerns about competition held by both the other satellite companies and the intergovernmental organizations. |
gao_GAO-13-456T | gao_GAO-13-456T_0 | FEMA Has Taken or Proposed Actions to Address Potential Duplication Issues Identified by GAO, but Challenges Remain
FEMA Needs Better Coordination and Improved Data Collection to Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Duplication in Four Grant Programs
In February 2012, we identified multiple factors that contributed to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative projects across four of the largest grant programs—the Port Security Grant Program, the State Homeland Security Program, the Transit Security Grant Program, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative. Specifically, we found that FEMA made award decisions with differing levels of information and lacked a process to coordinate application reviews. FEMA Has Taken Actions to Enhance Preparedness Grant Management, But Challenges Remain
Since we issued our February 2012 report, FEMA officials have identified actions they believe will enhance management of the four grant programs we analyzed; however, FEMA still faces challenges to enhancing preparedness grant management. The fiscal year 2013 President’s Budget proposed the establishment of the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), a consolidation of 16 grant programs (including the 4 grants we analyzed in our February 2012 report) into a comprehensive single program. As of March 2013, FEMA officials reported that the agency was drafting guidance for the execution of the NPGP based on stakeholder feedback and direction from Congress pending the fiscal year 2013 appropriations bill. If approved, and depending on its final form and execution, the consolidated NPGP could help reduce redundancies and mitigate the potential for unnecessary duplication, and may address the recommendation in our February 2012 report to enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the programs. Second, in March 2013, FEMA officials reported that the agency intends to start collecting and analyzing project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014; however, FEMA has not yet finalized specific data requirements and has not fully established the vehicle to collect these data—a new data system called the Non-Disaster Grants Management System (ND Grants). Collecting appropriate data and implementing ND Grants with project- level enhancements as planned, and as recommended in our February 2012 report, would better position FEMA to identify potentially unnecessary duplication within and across grant programs. FEMA Has Made Progress in Establishing National Preparedness Capabilities, but Challenges Remain in Establishing Performance Measures That Could Assist in Prioritizing Grant Funding
FEMA Has Faced Challenges Developing a National Assessment of Preparedness
According to DHS and FEMA strategic documents, national preparedness is the shared responsibility of the “whole community,” which requires the contribution of a broad range of stakeholders, including federal, state, and local governments, to develop preparedness capabilities to effectively prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from a major disaster. However, we have previously found that DHS and FEMA have faced challenges in developing and implementing such an assessment. Challenges Remain in Establishing Capability Requirements and Performance Measures That Could Assist in Prioritizing Preparedness Grant Funding
While FEMA issued the first National Preparedness Report, the agency has not yet established clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures that are needed to identify capability gaps in a national preparedness assessment, as recommended in our March 2011 report. Third, the report’s final finding notes that while many programs exist to build and sustain preparedness capabilities across all mission areas, challenges remain in measuring progress over time. According to the report, in many cases, measures do not yet exist to gauge performance, either quantitatively or qualitatively. However, FEMA officials stated that they have efforts under way to assess regional, state, and local capabilities to provide a framework for completing a national preparedness assessment. For example, in April 2012, FEMA issued guidance on developing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA), which were initially required to be completed by state and local governments receiving homeland security funding by December 31, 2012. The outcome of the THIRA process is intended to be a set of national capability performance requirements and measures, which FEMA officials stated they intend to incorporate into future National Preparedness Reports. While the recently completed THIRAs and 2012 National Preparedness Report are positive steps in the initial efforts to assess preparedness capabilities across the nation, capability requirements and performance measures for each level of government that are clear, objective, and quantifiable have not yet been developed. As a result, it is unclear what capability gaps currently exist, including at the federal level, and what level of resources will be needed to close such gaps through prioritized preparedness grant funding. We will continue to monitor FEMA’s efforts to develop capability requirements and performance measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2002 through 2012, the Congress appropriated about $39 billion to a variety of DHS preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state and local governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters. DHS allocated more than $21.3 billion through four of the largest preparedness programs--the Port Security Grant Program, the State Homeland Security Program, the Transit Security Grant Program, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
In February 2012, GAO identified factors that contribute to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily duplicative projects across the four grant programs. In March 2011, GAO reported that FEMA has faced challenges in developing and implementing a national preparedness assessment, which inhibits its abilities to effectively prioritize preparedness grant funding. This testimony updates GAO's prior work and describes DHS's and FEMA's progress over the past year in (1) managing preparedness grants and (2) measuring national preparedness by assessing capabilities. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from March 2011 to February 2012 and selected updates in March 2013. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed FEMA officials.
What GAO Found
Officials in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--have identified actions they believe will enhance management of the four preparedness programs GAO analyzed; however, FEMA still faces challenges. In February 2012, GAO found that FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews and made award decisions with differing levels of information. To better identify potential unnecessary duplication, GAO recommended that FEMA collect project-level information and enhance internal coordination and administration of the programs. DHS concurred. The fiscal year 2013 President's Budget, proposed the establishment of the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), a consolidation of 16 FEMA grant programs into a single program. However, Members of Congress raised concerns about the NPGP and have not approved the proposal. As a result, FEMA officials reported that the agency was drafting new guidance for the execution of the NPGP based on pending Congressional direction on fiscal year 2013 appropriations. If approved, and depending on its final form and execution, the NPGP could help mitigate the potential for unnecessary duplication and address GAO's recommendation to improve internal coordination. In March 2013, FEMA officials reported that FEMA intends to start collecting and analyzing project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014; but has not yet finalized data requirements or fully implemented the data system to collect the information. Collecting appropriate data and implementing project-level enhancements as planned would address GAO's recommendation and better position FEMA to identify potentially unnecessary duplication.
FEMA has made progress addressing GAO's March 2011 recommendation that it develop a national preparedness assessment with clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures; but continues to face challenges developing a national preparedness system that could assist FEMA in prioritizing preparedness grant funding. For example, in March 2012, FEMA issued the first National Preparedness Report, which describes progress made to build, sustain, and deliver capabilities. FEMA also has efforts underway to assess regional, state, and local preparedness capabilities. In April 2012, FEMA issued guidance on developing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) to self-assess regional, state, and local capabilities and required states and local areas receiving homeland security funds to complete a THIRA by December 2012. However, FEMA faces challenges that may reduce the usefulness of these efforts. For example, the National Preparedness Report notes that while many programs exist to build and sustain preparedness capabilities, challenges remain in measuring progress over time. According to the report, in many cases, measures do not yet exist to gauge performance, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Further, while FEMA officials stated that the THIRA process is intended to develop a set of national capability performance requirements and measures, such requirements and measures have not yet been developed. Until FEMA develops clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures, it is unclear what capability gaps currently exist and what level of federal resources will be needed to close such gaps. GAO will continue to monitor FEMA's efforts to develop capability requirements and performance measures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and FEMA in prior reports. DHS and FEMA concurred with these recommendations and have actions underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-02-547T | gao_GAO-02-547T_0 | While only the federal government is empowered to wage war and regulate interstate commerce, state and local governments have historically assumed primary responsibility for managing emergencies through police, fire-fighting, and emergency medical personnel. One of the areas that the Office of Homeland Security will be reviewing is the coordination among federal agencies and programs. Second, the lack of leadership has resulted in the federal government’s development of programs to assist state and local governments that were similar and potentially duplicative. The Office of Homeland Security announced the new warning system on March 12, 2002. In addition, the capability of state and local governments to respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks is uncertain. Regulations
Federal, state and local governments share authority for setting standards through regulations in several areas, including infrastructure and programs vital to preparedness (for example, highways, water systems, public health). Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today - a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an establishment of goals and performance measures, and a selection of appropriate tools— is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from terrorist attacks. Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000. | What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. |
gao_GAO-15-127 | gao_GAO-15-127_0 | For example, in FLC’s 2009 annual report to the President and Congress, FLC defined its mission as to help federal labs transfer technologies developed through the federal government’s R&D efforts. FLC Has Not Fully Communicated with and Obtained Feedback from Potential Customers when Designing and Implementing Clearinghouse Initiatives
FLC has taken steps to communicate with potential customers, including small business and entrepreneurs, but has not fully communicated with and obtained feedback from them to assess potential customers’ needs and incorporate leading practices when designing and implementing technology transfer clearinghouse initiatives, resulting in missed opportunities to better meet potential customer needs. Currently, FLC is developing a third initiative—FLCBusiness—to provide additional information on available technology transfer opportunities. However, FLC did not assess the information needs of potential customers of federal lab technologies to ensure the Available Technologies tool would provide relevant information in a format that customers consider useful, as called for by leading practices. For example, FLC officials said that when designing the Available Technologies tool, they conducted testing to make sure searches on the site functioned as intended, but that potential customers were not involved in this testing. Moreover, after developing the tool, FLC did not communicate with potential customers to collect feedback from them consistent with leading practices regarding the extent to which the tool met customers’ needs or how it might be improved before implementing it. FLC faces challenges in its ability to more fully communicate with potential customers to facilitate technology transfer from federal labs without also engaging FLC’s agency and lab members. Representatives from some other organizations that provide information on federal technology transfer opportunities said they only have information about technology at a small number of federal labs, and one organization said it charges users or labs a fee for use of its tools. FLC Has Not Measured the Performance of Its Clearinghouse Initiatives
Although FLC collects some data related to the use of its clearinghouse initiatives, it has not used performance goals and measures consistent with federal agency leading practices to measure results and does not have the information necessary to determine the extent to which its efforts help achieve FLC’s overall strategic goals. FLC also collects data on the general use of the Available Technologies tool, such as the number of unique views of web pages and the average time spent on a web page. initiatives, FLC has not established performance measures for these initiatives that would help it assess the extent to which the initiatives are achieving FLC’s goals of outreach and networking or how performance might be improved. Officials from federal agencies told us that any improvements to FLC’s initiatives based on customer feedback would require a significant collaborative effort on the part of FLC and its agency and lab members, given the relatively small size of FLC’s annual budget and available staff. By working collaboratively with agency and lab members to collect feedback on its web-based initiatives’ usefulness, FLC can take full advantage of its members’ collective knowledge and expertise to better communicate with potential customers consistent with federal internal control standards and leading practices to determine those customers’ needs, enhancing the clearinghouse initiatives in achieving their technology transfer goals. Without performance measures, FLC cannot fully demonstrate in its annual report to Congress its progress toward the achievement of its goals of outreach and networking, limiting the information that the administration and Congress receive on the effectiveness of FLC’s initiatives. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively fulfill its expanded role in providing a clearinghouse of information on available federal technology transfer opportunities, we recommend that the Chair of FLC, in coordination with the other members of the Executive Board, take the following four actions:
Work collaboratively with agency and lab members to take steps to better communicate with potential customers during the design and implementation of FLC’s clearinghouse initiatives, including conducting customer needs assessments, conducting customer testing of current and future web-based initiatives, and collecting customer feedback on all FLC initiatives to make the initiatives more useful. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends about one-third of its annual $145 billion research and development budget at hundreds of federal agency labs. Technology generated by this research may have application beyond agencies' immediate goals if commercialized by the private sector. For example, federal research has contributed to innovative products, including antibiotics and the Internet. FLC—a nationwide consortium of federal labs—helps labs transfer technology to the private sector. In recent years, FLC created new initiatives to provide a clearinghouse—a central point for collecting and disseminating information—for technology transfer opportunities.
GAO was asked to review FLC's efforts to provide information on technology transfer opportunities. This report assesses (1) the extent to which FLC has communicated with potential customers when designing and implementing its clearinghouse initiatives, and (2) how FLC measured the results of those initiatives. GAO reviewed relevant laws and FLC guidance, and interviewed a nonprobability sample of officials from four federal agencies with the highest research budgets, and a spectrum of eight customer groups, among others.
What GAO Found
The Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer (FLC) has taken steps to communicate with potential customers, including small businesses and entrepreneurs, but has not obtained feedback from them to assess their needs when designing and implementing technology transfer clearinghouse initiatives. This resulted in missed opportunities to better meet potential customer needs. For example, in 2012, when developing a web-based search tool to help potential customers identify relevant federal technology transfer opportunities across federal laboratories (labs), FLC discussed how to implement the tool with its federal member labs and agencies. However, FLC did not assess the information needs of potential customers to ensure the tool would provide relevant information in a format that customers consider useful, as called for by leading practices and federal internal control standards on communicating with and obtaining information from stakeholders. FLC officials said they conducted testing to ensure the new website functioned as intended before launching it, but did not involve potential customers in these tests. Moreover, after developing the tool, FLC did not communicate with potential customers to collect feedback from them consistent with leading practices regarding the extent to which the tool met their needs or how it might be improved before implementing it. Potential customers of FLC's initiatives expressed concerns about the extent to which FLC's recent web-based search tool would meet their needs, specifically noting that the tool:
affords customers limited ability to compare technologies across labs; and
FLC faces challenges in communicating with potential customers without also engaging its agency and lab members, given the relatively small size of FLC's annual budget and available staff. By working collaboratively with agency and lab members to collect feedback, FLC can enlist their help in enhancing the information provided through its initiatives.
FLC collects data on the use of its clearinghouse initiatives but has not developed and used performance goals and measures consistent with federal agency leading practices. For example, FLC collects data on the general use of its clearinghouse initiatives, such as the number of technology transfer inquiries it receives, the number of unique views of its web pages, and the average time spent on a web page. However, FLC has not developed performance goals or measures related to the key strategic goals to which its clearinghouse initiatives contribute. Without performance measures, FLC is unable to determine whether its initiatives are having their desired effect or how their performance might be improved. FLC also cannot fully demonstrate in its annual report to Congress its progress toward the achievement of its relevant strategic goals, limiting the information that the administration and Congress receive on the effectiveness of FLC's initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that FLC work collaboratively with agency and lab members to increase communication with potential customers to obtain feedback and improve its clearinghouse initiatives, and develop performance measures. FLC generally agreed with the report's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1092 | gao_GAO-07-1092_0 | The Service Has Received at Least 1,400 Farmlands Covering 132,000 Acres, but the Actual Number Is Unknown
The Service’s records indicate that it has received at least 1,400 easement and fee-simple farmlands from the Farm Service Agency since 1986, but the actual number is unknown. The farmlands cover more than 132,000 acres and range in size from less than 1 acre to more than 2,200 acres. Third, the Service is operating with constrained resources and declining refuge staff and therefore the staff are not able to complete all the activities they believe are necessary to manage the farmlands. From our survey, however, we estimate that only 13 percent of the farmlands, on average, have been annually inspected (see fig. Several Factors Affect the Extent of the Service’s Management Activities
We found that several factors affect the extent to which the Service’s refuge offices conduct management activities on their farmlands. For an estimated 88 percent of farmlands, the refuge managers believe that they have not had enough resources to manage their farmlands over the past 5 years. Farmlands That Align Closely with Refuges’ Goals Receive More Management Attention
While the Service is generally not managing the majority of its farmlands, in some instances we identified farmlands that refuge offices are devoting significant management attention to, largely because these farmlands more closely align with the refuges’ goals. The alternatives include (1) resetting refuge priorities to ensure that farmlands are given management attention, (2) requesting additional resources, and (3) paying little or no management attention to the farmlands. Refuge lands have never been transferred or disposed of in this manner, however. The Service is now responsible for managing a significant number of both conservation easement and fee-simple farmlands across most of the continental United States. Under current law, the Service has very few alternatives for reducing or removing management responsibilities for lands received from the Farm Service Agency that are not significantly contributing to the mission and goals of the National Wildlife Refuge System. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service’s management of its farmlands, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Service to take the following two actions: ensure that the Service’s records for all of its farmlands are accurate and complete by reconciling regional and refuge office records and property records to determine which farmlands were transferred from the Farm Service Agency, and develop a proposal to Congress seeking the authority for additional flexibility with regard to the farmlands the Service determines may not be in the best interest to continue to include as part of the National Wildlife Refuge System. The Department of Agriculture provided no comments. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Farmland Management
To further examine the extent to which the Department of the Interior’s U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades, provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985, among others, have allowed the Department of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency in partnership with the Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) to add farmlands found to have important resources to the National Wildlife Refuge System. The Farm Service Agency transferred such farmlands to the Service through outright ownership ("fee simple") or through conservation easements. Individual farmlands are managed by the nearest refuge office. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent of farmland received by the Service, (2) the extent to which the Service is currently managing its farmlands, and (3) alternatives for managing these lands. To answer these objectives, GAO visited five refuges and surveyed managers responsible for a random sample of 98 farmlands.
What GAO Found
Since 1986, the Service reports that it has received at least 1,400 conservation easement and fee-simple farmlands covering 132,000 acres, but the actual number is unknown because the Service's records are incomplete. Scattered across 38 states, these farmlands range in size from less than 1 acre to more than 2,200 acres; most are smaller than 50 acres. In addition, GAO identified farmlands that were not reported by the Service headquarters or regional offices. Therefore, the numbers reported here represent a conservative estimate of the total acreage received from the Farm Service Agency. The Service is generally not managing a majority of its farmlands. In the past 5 years, only 13 percent have been inspected annually, on average. The Service is thus not adequately ensuring landowners' compliance with easement restrictions. GAO observed ongoing easement violations, including farming encroachment. Few refuge offices track changes in land ownership, and basic maintenance has seldom been completed. Several factors have hindered the Service's farmland management. First, refuge officials do not emphasize managing most of the lands because they do not believe they contribute to the refuges' mission. Second, uncertainty about the extent or scope of some easements makes management activity difficult. Third, constrained resources and declining staff hinder completion of management activities. Nevertheless, GAO found that farmlands most closely aligned with refuge goals receive considerably more attention. The Service possesses limited alternatives for managing its farmlands. Alternatives include (1) resetting refuge priorities to ensure that farmlands are given management attention, (2) requesting additional resources, and (3) paying little or no management attention to the farmlands. The Service has in most cases chosen the third alternative, and refuge officials indicated that this approach is unlikely to change. Because these lands are part of the National Wildlife Refuge System, under current law the Service cannot dispose of unwanted farmlands, regardless of their value to the refuge system's mission. Consequently, the Service may need additional flexibility on a limited and short-term basis to resolve the issue of unwanted farmlands. |
gao_HEHS-97-10 | gao_HEHS-97-10_0 | Federal regulations implementing title IX became effective in 1975 and specifically required gender equity in intercollegiate athletics. Less Emphasis on Compliance Reviews
OCR’s title IX activities have focused recently more on policy development, technical assistance, and complaint investigations and less on assessing schools’ compliance with title IX through compliance reviews. Following the 1992 NCAA Gender Equity Study, which showed that women represented 30 percent of all student athletes and received 23 percent of athletic operating budgets, NCAA created a task force to further examine gender equity in its member colleges’ athletic programs. Studies Show Some Advances in Gender Equity but Women’s Athletic Programs Still Are Not Comparable With Men’s Programs in Some Respects
The eight studies on gender equity in intercollegiate athletics that we identified showed that women’s athletic programs have made slight advances since 1992 toward gender equity as measured by the number of sports available to female students, the number of females participating in athletics, and the percentage of scholarship expenditures for women’s sports. Scope and Methodology
To determine the actions the Department of Education has taken to promote gender equity in intercollegiate athletics since 1992, we interviewed the National Coordinator for Title IX Athletics and analyzed information from the Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Summary of Responses to GAO’s Survey of State Efforts to Promote Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics
This appendix contains the responses to questions we asked higher education officials in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (referred to in this appendix as 51 states) about gender equity in intercollegiate athletics efforts. It also reported the percentage of NCAA schools offering each type of sports program. It identified a slight increase in the proportion of female student athletes and their share of athletic scholarship funds; however, participation opportunities and scholarship funds continued to lag behind those for men, even though women constituted over half of the colleges’ undergraduates. 4. 1, 1996). National Collegiate Athletic Association. 1994 Survey of WBCA Division I Head Coaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Department of Education and National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) efforts to promote gender equity in intercollegiate athletics by implementing title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, focusing on: (1) steps taken by states to promote gender equity in college athletic programs; and (2) what existing studies show about progress made since 1992 in promoting gender equity in intercollegiate athletics.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1992, the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has focused on prevention of title IX violations by clarifying its policies on title IX compliance and increasing technical assistance to help colleges meet title IX requirements while it continues to investigate the relatively few complaints filed each year; (2) NCAA created a task force to examine gender equity issues and now requires certification that athletic programs at all Division I schools meet NCAA-established gender equity requirements; (3) state efforts to promote or ensure gender equity in intercollegiate athletics vary considerably; (4) of the 22 states that reported having laws or other requirements to specifically address gender equity in intercollegiate athletics, 13 reported having full- or part-time staff responsible for gender equity issues; and (5) results from 8 national gender equity studies show gains in the number of women's sports that schools offer, number of female students participating in athletics, and percentage of scholarship funds available to female students, but many women's athletics programs lag behind those for men in the percentage of female head coaches, salaries paid to coaches, and proportion of women athletes to total undergraduate enrollment. |
gao_T-RCED-99-122 | gao_T-RCED-99-122_0 | Fatalities From Large Truck Crashes Are Increasing, While Fatalities Per Mile Traveled Have Leveled Off
The annual number of fatalities from crashes involving large trucks increased by 20 percent from 4,462 in 1992 to 5,355 in 1997 (see fig. The recent increases in annual fatalities reflect, in part, increases in truck travel: the number of miles traveled increased by 25 percent from 1992 through 1997. If truck travel continues to increase at this rate, and nothing is done to reduce the fatality rate, the annual number of fatalities could increase to 5,800 in 1999 and to more than 6,000 in 2000 (see fig. 2). The Federal Highway Administration has established a goal for OMCHS for 1999 to reduce the number of fatalities from truck crashes to fewer than 5,126—the number of fatalities in 1996. This goal is substantially below our projected figure of 5,800 for 1999. 3). In fatal crashes between cars and large trucks in 1997, 98 percent of the fatalities were occupants of the car. OMCHS Needs Better Information on Factors That Contribute to Large Truck Crashes
While no reliable information exists on the causes of crashes involving large trucks nationwide, some information exists on factors that may contribute to these crashes. Without this information, OMCHS cannot effectively tailor its activities to address the factors that are most likely to contribute to truck crashes. Furthermore, it does not include a comprehensive list of factors nor does it rely on a thorough investigation of the crash scene to pinpoint factors that contributed most heavily to the crash. On the basis of data from FARS and several studies involving in-depth crash investigations, OMCHS estimates that truck driver fatigue contributes to 15 to 33 percent of crashes that are fatal to the truck occupant(s) only. Because of the lack of complete and precise information on factors that contribute to crashes, OMCHS recently began to design a data base that contains more detailed information on these factors. While these activities could have a positive effect on truck safety issues over the long term, their effectiveness is limited because (1) OMCHS’ initiative to target high-risk carriers for safety improvements depends on data that are not complete, accurate, or timely; (2) major components of several of its activities will not be completed within the next several years; and (3) OMCHS cannot tell whether its campaign to educate car drivers about the limitations of large trucks is working. In addition, representatives from trucking associations and safety groups agree that the effectiveness of OMCHS’ activities is hampered by its slowness in implementing measures to improve truck safety. OMCHS’ activities are just one of many factors that affect the level of truck safety. To identify high-risk carriers for these reviews, OMCHS uses a safety status measurement system known as SafeStat. For 1997, OMCHS estimated that about 38 percent of all reportable crashes and 30 percent of the fatal crashes involving large trucks were not reported to MCMIS. Data problems also exist at the state level. The Federal Highway Administration has not issued a proposed rule. This campaign is intended to reduce crashes between large trucks and cars by educating car drivers about how to safely share the road with large trucks and about trucks’ limitations, such as reduced maneuverability, longer stopping distances, and blind spots. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the safety of large commercial trucks on the nation's highways, focusing on: (1) recent increases in the number of crashes involving large trucks; (2) the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety's (OMCHS) need to better understand the factors that contribute to such crashes; and (3) OMCHS' need for better data and quicker action on implementing improvements to truck safety to be more effective.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) of the nearly 42,000 people who died on the nation's highways in 1997 (the latest year for which data are available), about 5,400 died in crashes involving large trucks; (2) this represents a 20-percent increase from 1992; (3) at the same time, the annual number of miles travelled by large trucks increased by 25 percent; (4) if this trend of increasing truck travel continues, the number of fatalities could increase to 5,800 in 1999; (5) this figure is substantially more than the goal that the Federal Highway Administration established for 1999 of reducing fatalities from truck crashes to below the 1996 level of 5,126; (6) while trucks are involved in fewer crashes per mile travelled than are cars, crashes involving trucks are more likely to result in a fatality; (7) in 1997, 98 percent of the fatalities from crashes between trucks and cars were occupants of the car; (8) while no reliable nationwide information exists on the causes of crashes involving large trucks, one existing database does provide some indication of the extent to which factors such as driver behavior, vehicle mechanical condition, the roadway, and the environment contribute to these crashes; (9) however, the existing database includes data from only fatal truck crashes, and does not rely on a thorough investigation of the crash scene; (10) to better tailor its activities to address the factors that are most likely to contribute to truck crashes, OMCHS plans to design and fund the development of a database that contains more detailed information on these factors; (11) in addition, several states plan to collect their own data on contributing factors based on in-depth crash investigations; (12) while many actions outside OMCHS' authority influence truck safety, OMCHS had undertaken a number of activities to improve truck safety, such as identifying high-risk carriers for safety improvements and educating car drivers about how to share the road with large trucks; (13) however, the effectiveness of these activities is limited by: (a) data that are incomplete, inaccurate, or untimely; (b) the length of time it will take to complete several activities; and (c) the unknown effect of OMCHS' campaign to educate car drivers about the limitations of large trucks; (14) for example, OMCHS' effort to identify high-risk carriers for safety improvements depends in part on having complete data on the number of crashes experienced by carriers; and (15) however, OMCHS estimated that about 38 percent of all crashes and 30 percent of the fatal crashes involving large trucks were not reported to OMCHS in 1997. |
gao_T-GGD-99-34 | gao_T-GGD-99-34_0 | According to SEC, the growing number of frauds committed over the Internet are types that are generally well-established in the securities industry. The Internet Provides a New Medium to Perpetrate Traditional Securities Frauds
SEC officials told us that the Internet provides a new medium for perpetrating fraudulent schemes that are well-established violations in the securities industry. SEC Has Established a Unit to Coordinate Efforts to Combat Internet Securities Fraud
SEC established the Office of Internet Enforcement (OIE) to coordinate the agency’s response to increasing reports of Internet securities frauds.OIE has several responsibilities, including developing policies and procedures for Internet surveillance, managing the E-mail complaint system, and providing guidance for conducting Internet securities fraud investigations. SEC staff also may obtain information on potential Internet securities frauds from sources other than OIE. SEC Has Concluded About One-Half of the Internet Securities Fraud Cases Initiated Since 1995
SEC initiated a total of 66 judicial and administrative actions since 1995 to combat Internet securities fraud, and about one-half of these cases had largely been concluded by February 1999. However, state or federal criminal enforcement authorities have also initiated criminal proceedings in 2 of these 66 cases, which have resulted in criminal convictions or prison sentences for 7 individuals. In 21 of the 32 cases that have largely been concluded, violators were required to pay some form of civil money penalty. Many states have also initiated enforcement actions to penalize individuals who use the Internet to violate state securities laws. Nearly One-Half of All the States Have Implemented Programs To Combat Internet Securities Fraud
In 23 of the 50 states we surveyed, officials from regulatory agencies reported establishing specific programs to control Internet securities fraud and penalize violators of state securities laws. Regulatory Challenges in Combating Internet Securities Fraud
Although SEC and state regulatory agencies have initiated programs to combat Internet securities frauds, these programs are new, and it is too early to predict their long-term effectiveness. In particular, the potential exists that the rapid growth in reported Internet securities frauds could ultimately place a significant burden on the regulators’ limited investigative staff resources and thereby limit the agencies’ ability to respond effectively to credible fraud allegations. The Rapid Growth of Reported Internet Securities Frauds Poses Challenges to Limited Regulatory Investigative Resources
The rapid expansion of the Internet and the growth of securities-related activities over the past several years pose potential challenges to SEC and state regulatory agencies to control securities fraud on the Internet. State securities regulatory agencies face similar challenges in developing a coordinated approach to Internet fraud investigations and enforcement. Regulators Face Challenges in Educating the Investing Public on the Risks Associated with Internet Securities Frauds
According to SEC, investor education is a critical defense against Internet securities frauds given the fact that regulatory resources to combat the problem are limited. SEC’s capacity to educate investors and disseminate widely relevant information about the potential risks of Internet securities frauds may be limited. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed Internet securities fraud and regulatory efforts to combat this growing problem, focusing on: (1) information about the incidence and types of securities frauds perpetrated over the Internet; (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives to combat Internet securities fraud; (3) information on the penalties that have been imposed on individuals found to have committed Internet securities frauds; (4) information from state securities regulators about state efforts to control Internet securities fraud; and (5) potential challenges facing SEC and state regulatory initiatives in combating securities fraud over the Internet.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SEC and state regulatory officials generally agree that as the Internet continues to expand rapidly, opportunities for securities frauds are growing as well; (2) an indicator of the growth in Internet securities frauds is the number of public electronic mail complaints that are submitted to SEC's Internet website; (3) according to SEC, the Internet provides a new medium to perpetrate traditional investor frauds; (4) however, some securities frauds appear unique to the Internet environment; (5) SEC has responded to the growing Internet fraud problem by, among other things, creating the Office of Internet Enforcement to coordinate the agency's efforts to combat Internet fraud, providing training to SEC investigative staff on monitoring the Internet, and preparing guidance for SEC staff who are investigating potential Internet frauds; (6) SEC has established programs to educate investors about the risks associated with Internet securities frauds; (7) since 1995, SEC initiated a total of 66 enforcement actions against alleged perpetrators of Internet securities frauds; (8) as of February 1999, 32 of the 66 cases had largely been concluded, with violators generally required to: (a) pay civil money penalties; or (b) refrain from further violations of the securities laws; (9) however, in 2 of the 32 concluded cases, state or federal criminal enforcement authorities prosecuted violators and obtained criminal convictions or prison sentences for 7 individuals; (10) over the past several years, nearly half of all state regulatory agencies have established specific programs to combat Internet frauds that violate state securities laws; (11) although many state agencies have initiated enforcement actions to prevent further violations of state law, officials from these agencies told GAO that in some cases violators may continue committing the fraudulent activity in other states; (12) SEC and state regulatory agency programs to combat Internet securities fraud are new and face significant challenges that could limit their effectiveness in the long-term; (13) in particular, the potential exists that the rapid growth in reported Internet securities frauds could ultimately place a significant burden on the regulators' limited investigative staff resources and thereby limit the agencies' capacity to respond effectively to credible fraud allegations; and (14) the regulators face challenges in developing a coordinated approach to combating Internet fraud and educating a wide audience about the risks associated with Internet investing. |
gao_GAO-10-192T | gao_GAO-10-192T_0 | NTIA and RUS Have Taken Steps to Address Scheduling, Staffing, and Data Challenges; However, Some Risks Remain
NTIA and RUS face scheduling, staffing, and data challenges in evaluating applications and awarding funds. The agencies have taken steps to meet these challenges, such as adopting a two-step evaluation process, utilizing nongovernmental personnel, and publishing information on the applicant’s proposed service area. While these steps address some challenges, the agencies lack the needed time to apply lessons learned from the first funding round and face a compressed schedule to review new applications. The agencies have 18 months to establish their respective programs, solicit and evaluate applications, and award all funds. RUS will also use contractors to evaluate and score applications. If this information raises eligibility issues, RUS may send field staff to the proposed service area to conduct a market survey. As mentioned previously, NTIA and RUS initially proposed to utilize three separate funding rounds during the 18-month window to award the $7.2 billion. For the PSIC program, NTIA and DHS completed application reviews in roughly 6 months. Continued lack of broadband data and plan. NTIA and RUS Face Staffing Challenges in Overseeing Funded Projects, and Despite Steps Taken, Several Risks to Project Oversight Remain
NTIA and RUS will need to oversee a far greater number of projects than in the past, including projects with large budgets and a diversity of purposes and locations. In doing so, the agencies face the challenge of monitoring these projects with far fewer staff per project than were available in similar grant and loan programs they have managed. To address this challenge, NTIA and RUS procured contractors to assist with oversight activities and will require funding recipients to complete quarterly reports and, in some cases, obtain annual audits. These risks include insufficient resources to actively monitor funded projects beyond fiscal year 2010 and a lack of updated performance measures for NTIA and RUS. In addition, NTIA has yet to define annual audit requirements for commercial entities funded under BTOP. The Recovery Act requires BTOP funding recipients to report quarterly on their use of funds and NTIA to make these reports available to the public. Recipients of funding for infrastructure projects must report on a number of metrics, such as the number of households and businesses receiving new or improved access to broadband as a result of the project, and the advertised and averaged broadband speeds and the price of the broadband services provided. Yet, the Recovery Act provides funding through September 30, 2010. Our future work, which we expect to complete in November, will provide additional information on the implementation and oversight of the broadband programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to broadband service is seen as vital to economic, social, and educational development, yet many areas of the country lack access to, or their residents do not use, broadband. To expand broadband deployment and adoption, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act) provided $7.2 billion to the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) for grants or loans to a variety of program applicants. The agencies must award all funds by September 30, 2010. This testimony provides preliminary information on the challenges NTIA and RUS face; the steps taken to address challenges; and the remaining risks in (1) evaluating applications and awarding funds and (2) overseeing funded projects. This statement is based on related ongoing work that GAO expects to complete in November. To conduct this work, GAO is reviewing relevant laws and program documents and interviewing agency officials and industry stakeholders. While this testimony does not include recommendations, GAO expects to make recommendations in its November report.
What GAO Found
Application evaluation and awards. NTIA and RUS face scheduling, staffing, and data challenges in evaluating applications and awarding funds. NTIA, through its new Broadband Technology Opportunities Program, and RUS, through its new Broadband Initiatives Program, must review more applications and award far more funds than the agencies formerly handled through their legacy telecommunications grant or loan programs. NTIA and RUS initially proposed distributing these funds in three rounds. To meet these challenges, the agencies have established a two-step application evaluation process that uses contractors or volunteers for application reviews and plan to publish information on applicants' proposed service areas to help ensure the eligibility of proposed projects. While these steps address some challenges, the upcoming deadline for awarding funds may pose risks to the thoroughness of the application evaluation process. In particular, the agencies may lack time to apply lessons learned from the first funding round and to thoroughly evaluate applications for the remaining rounds. Oversight of funded projects. NTIA and RUS will oversee a significant number of projects, including projects with large budgets and diverse purposes and locations. In doing so, the agencies face the challenge of monitoring these projects with far fewer staff per project than were available for their legacy grant and loan programs. To address this challenge, NTIA and RUS have hired contractors to assist with oversight activities and plan to require funding recipients to complete quarterly reports and, in some cases, obtain annual audits. Despite these steps, several risks remain, including a lack of funding for oversight beyond fiscal year 2010 and a lack of updated performance measures to ensure accountability for NTIA and RUS. In addition, NTIA has yet to define annual audit requirements for commercial entities funded under the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program. |
gao_GAO-17-124 | gao_GAO-17-124_0 | State Has Established Policies Related to Transportation Security, but Gaps Exist in Guidance and Monitoring
State has established policies related to transportation security for overseas U.S. personnel, but gaps exist in guidance and monitoring. However, the policies at 22 of the 26 posts were missing elements required by State, due in part to fragmented guidance on what such policies should include. State also lacks a clear armored vehicle policy for overseas posts and effective procedures for monitoring whether posts are assessing their armored vehicle needs at least annually, as required by State. These gaps limit State’s ability to ensure that posts develop policies that are clear and consistent with State requirements and that vehicle needs for secure transit are met. According to DS, transportation security and travel notification policies are required to include additional standard elements so that U.S. personnel and their families are aware of the potential transportation-related security risks they may face while at post. State Provides Several Types of Transportation Security Training, but Weaknesses Exist in Refresher Training and State’s Tracking of Armored Vehicle Driver Training
State provides several types of training related to transportation security, but weaknesses exist in post-specific refresher training and State’s tracking of armored vehicle driver training. RSOs receive required training related to transportation security in special agent courses, and nonsecurity staff reported receiving relevant training before departing for posts and new arrival briefings at posts. Staff at most of the posts we visited either had difficulty remembering certain key details covered in the new arrival briefings or described the one-time briefings as inadequate. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training covers several topics relevant to transportation security, such as defensive driving, route analysis, and the importance of taking personal responsibility for one’s security and varying routes and times to reduce one’s predictability. Posts Use Various Systems to Communicate Time- Sensitive Information Related to Transportation Security, but Several Factors Can Hinder Their Effectiveness
State has a variety of systems for RSOs to communicate threat information to personnel and for personnel to report travel plans to RSOs. Timely communication is critical for managing transportation security risks, and failure to communicate important transportation-related information and receive such information promptly could leave overseas personnel facing avoidable security risks. However, we learned of instances at four of the nine posts in which personnel did not receive important threat information in a timely manner. The personnel subsequently traveled through the restricted area, resulting in an embassy vehicle being attacked with rocks while on unauthorized travel through the area. Personnel at Several Posts Reported Difficulty Using Travel Notification Systems or Were Unaware of Travel Notification Requirements
All nine of the posts we visited had post-specific travel policies requiring personnel to notify the RSO—and in some cases to obtain approval— before traveling to certain locations. As many serious and even fatal attacks over the last few decades have shown, personnel and their dependents are especially vulnerable when traveling outside the relative security of embassies, consulates, or residences. 4. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to evaluate the extent to which the Department of State (State), with regard to transportation security, has (1) established policies, guidance, and monitoring; (2) provided personnel with training; and (3) communicated time-sensitive information. The findings from our judgmental sample of 26 posts are not generalizable to all posts. We also conducted fieldwork at 9 of these 26 posts. This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that was issued on September 9, 2016, copies of which are available upon request for official use only by those with the appropriate need to know. Related GAO Products
Diplomatic Security: State Should Enhance Management of Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas U.S. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. diplomatic personnel posted overseas continue to face threats to their security. According to State, personnel and their families are particularly vulnerable when traveling outside the relative security of diplomatic work facilities or residences. In many serious or fatal attacks on U.S. personnel over the last three decades, victims were targeted while in motorcades, official vehicles, or otherwise in transit.
GAO was asked to review how State manages transportation-related security risks to U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which State, with regard to transportation security at overseas posts, has (1) established policies, guidance, and monitoring; (2) provided personnel with training; and (3) communicated time-sensitive information. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with key officials in Washington, D.C. GAO also reviewed policies from a judgmental sample of 26 posts—primarily higher-threat, higher-risk locations—and conducted fieldwork and met with officials at 9 of these posts. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in September 2016.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) has established policies related to transportation security for overseas U.S. personnel, but gaps exist in guidance and monitoring. GAO reviewed 26 posts and found that all 26 had issued transportation security and travel notification policies. However, policies at 22 of the 26 posts lacked elements required by State, due in part to fragmented implementation guidance on what such policies should include. State also lacks a clear armored vehicle policy for overseas posts and procedures for monitoring if posts are assessing their armored vehicle needs at least annually as required by State. These gaps limit State's ability to ensure that posts develop clear policies that are consistent with State's requirements and that vehicle needs for secure transit are met.
While State provides several types of training related to overseas transportation security, weaknesses exist in post-specific refresher training. Regional security officers (RSO) receive required training related to transportation security in special agent courses, and nonsecurity staff reported receiving relevant training before departing for posts—including on topics such as defensive driving and the importance of taking personal responsibility for one's security—as well as new arrival briefings at posts. At most of the 9 posts GAO visited, however, staff had difficulty remembering key details covered in new arrival briefings or described the one-time briefings as inadequate. State's requirements for providing refresher briefings are unclear, potentially putting staff at greater risk.
State uses various systems at overseas posts to communicate time-sensitive information related to transportation security, but several factors hinder its efforts. RSOs and other post officials are responsible for communicating threat information to post personnel. However, at 4 of the 9 posts it visited, GAO learned of instances in which staff did not receive important threat information in a timely manner for various reasons. In one case, this resulted in an embassy vehicle being attacked with rocks and seriously damaged while traveling through a prohibited area. In addition, while all 9 of the posts GAO visited require that personnel notify the RSO before traveling to certain locations, personnel at more than half of the 9 posts said they were unaware of these requirements or had difficulty accessing required travel notification systems. Timely communication is critical for managing transportation security risks, and failure to communicate important transportation-related information and receive such information promptly could leave overseas personnel facing avoidable security risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations in this report to help State improve its management of transportation-related security risks by enhancing associated policies, guidance, and monitoring; clarifying its requirements for refresher briefings; and better communicating time-sensitive information. State agreed to take steps for all but one recommendation—the need to clarify its requirements for refresher briefings. GAO continues to believe this is needed as discussed in the report. |
gao_NSIAD-96-177 | gao_NSIAD-96-177_0 | Attack helicopter inventories have fallen only 4 percent—1,811 to 1,732. Similarly, DOD has enhanced the capabilities of specialized support aircraft and long-range missiles and plans further improvements to these systems. 3.3). Conclusions
Although potential adversaries possess capabilities that constitute a threat to the ability of U.S. air power to accomplish its objectives, the severity of these threats, particularly in relation to the formidable capability of U.S. forces to counter them, appears to be limited. These programs, which are likely to be a significant challenge to pay for, are proceeding even though DOD has not sufficiently assessed joint mission requirements. In other cases, there are viable and less costly alternatives to planned investments. Planned Investments Pose a Financial Challenge
Each military service has major acquisition programs to modernize its combat air power forces. Based on our past reviews of individual air power systems and available information we collected on our six mission reviews, we believe that DOD is proceeding with some major investments without clear evidence that the programs are justified. Despite this level of capability, the services are modifying current platforms and developing new weapon systems that will provide new and enhanced interdiction capabilities over the next 15 to 20 years at a total estimated cost of over $200 billion. This is being done despite the services’ unmatched capabilities in air-to-air combat. 5.2). Conclusions
DOD has not been adequately examining its combat air power force structure and its modernization plans and programs from a joint perspective. However, DOD’s decision support systems do not provide sufficient information from a joint perspective to enable the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other decisionmakers to prioritize programs, objectively weigh the merits of new air power investments, and decide whether current programs should continue to receive funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to modernize its combat air capabilities, focusing on whether DOD has sufficient information from a joint perspective to: (1) prioritize its air power programs; (2) objectively weigh the merits of new program investments; and (3) decide whether existing programs should receive continued funding.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although DOD believes that its modernization plans are affordable, it faces a major challenge in attempting to fund the services' air modernization programs; (2) DOD has not sufficiently assessed joint mission requirements or compared these requirements to the services' aggregate capabilities; (3) DOD is proceeding with some major air modernization programs without clear evidence that the programs are justified; (4) the services plan to acquire numerous advanced weapons systems over the next 15 to 20 years to enhance their interdiction capabilities despite the availability of viable, less costly alternatives; (5) reductions in combat aircraft inventories have been largely offset by improvements in night-fighting and targeting capabilities and increases in advanced long-range missile inventories; (6) although potential adversaries possess capabilities that could threaten U.S. air power, the severity of these threats appears to be limited; and (7) DOD has taken steps to enhance information on joint combat requirements, but these efforts have had little impact in identifying duplication in existing air combat capabilities. |
gao_HEHS-95-175 | gao_HEHS-95-175_0 | 1.) Because of the Medicaid expansion, however, the decline in employment-based insurance for children did not lead to an increase in the proportion of uninsured children. 2.) Poor children had a smaller decline in employment-based insurance than near-poor children and a large increase in Medicaid coverage. As a result, the percentage of poor children who were uninsured actually declined from 25 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 1993. The Medicaid Expansion Increased the Number of Medicaid Children in Working and Non-AFDC Families, Among Other Changes
Because of policy changes to expand children’s eligibility, Medicaid has become a more important source of insurance for children who were less likely to get Medicaid in the past, such as children in working families. By 1993, more than half the children on Medicaid had a working parent, and almost half did not depend on AFDC. 3.) 4.) Despite this decline, the South remains the region with the highest percentage of uninsured children and the largest number of poor, uninsured children. The expansion in Medicaid coverage for children in working families did not decrease the percentage of uninsured children with a working parent. 5.) 6.) 7). At least one-quarter of uninsured children in 1993—2.3 million—had family incomes that should have made them eligible for Medicaid. Another 16.9 percent—2.3 million children—were uninsured. Growth in Medicaid Enrollment for Children Greatest in the South
Between 1989 and 1993, the number of children on Medicaid increased in all regions, but the greatest increase occurred in the South. When Medicaid coverage became mandated by age and poverty, the greatest number of children benefiting were in the South. Either parent worked full time/full year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of health insurance for children, focusing on: (1) the impact of the Medicaid expansion on children's health insurance coverage since 1989; (2) changes in the demographic profile of children enrolled in the Medicaid program and uninsured children since the Medicaid expansion; and (3) the number of uninsured children who might be eligible for Medicaid.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) policy changes helped increase the number of children enrolled in Medicaid by 4.8 million between 1989 and 1993, but the overall number of uninsured children did not decline because employment-based coverage for adults and children declined during the same period; (2) children were not as affected by the loss of employment-based insurance as adults because of expanded Medicaid coverage; (3) the percentage of poor children who were uninsured declined from 25 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 1993, while the percentage of near-poor children who were uninsured increased during that time; (4) the Medicaid expansion increased the enrollment of children less likely to be on Medicaid and by 1993, more than half of Medicaid children had a working parent and almost half were not receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits; (5) the greatest increase in coverage was among children with at least one full-time working parent; (6) the South region had the greatest increase in the number of children enrolled in Medicaid, although it still has the greatest number of uninsured children; and (7) at least 2.3 million uninsured children were eligible but not enrolled in Medicaid because their parents were unaware of their eligibility or had difficulty in applying for Medicaid coverage. |
gao_GAO-06-274 | gao_GAO-06-274_0 | Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004
The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004—-8 months after that initial requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that provided the required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438 trucks armored during the second phase. Figure 1 shows Marine Corps production and installation of the interim armor protection over the 2- month period taken to address the initial requirement. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had completed installation of integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning of its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this truck with armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces
Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in Identifying Truck Armor Requirements and Developing Solutions May Have Affected Armor Availability For Deploying Units
A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in identifying truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution from industry may have limited the Marine Corps’ ability to field interim armor that met IED protection requirements and may have contributed to the time to provide the second phase armor protection to deployed Marine Corps forces. As a result, as an interim solution to meet deployment deadlines, they purchased the best armor steel available, although it did not provide sufficient IED protection. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations. Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability
The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to address the availability of truck armor for future operations. However, it is unclear whether this policy applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new technology solutions. The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations. Instead, the Army identified its first truck armor requirements and began developing solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not begin its program until January 2004. To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time to provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck armor for deployed forces. However, the armor did not provide sufficient IED protection. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a series of engagements under the Comptroller General's authority to address these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the production and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the production and installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.
What GAO Found
The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after the requirements were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps installed interim armor that did not provide sufficient IED protection, which Marine Corps officials acknowledged, stating that their intent was to field some level of protection until a more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided enhanced IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading to integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle. They expect to complete installation by May 2006. Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army. Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004--2 months after the Army began its truck armor program in November 2003. According to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor. The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine Corps is alsotaking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new technology solutions. |
gao_GAO-15-54 | gao_GAO-15-54_0 | SBA’s Office of Government Contracting administers the WOSB program by publishing regulations for the program, conducting eligibility examinations of businesses that received contracts under the WOSB or EDWOSB set-aside, deciding protests related to eligibility for a WOSB program contract award, conducting studies to determine eligible industries, and working with other federal agencies in assisting WOSBs and EDWOSBs. When using the self-certification option, businesses must provide documents supporting their status to the online document repository for the WOSB program that SBA maintains. For third-party certification, businesses submit documentation to approved certifiers. SBA’s Oversight of Certifiers Has Been Minimal and Does Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That Only Eligible Businesses Obtain Set-Aside Contracts
SBA generally has not overseen third-party certifiers and lacks reasonable assurance that only eligible businesses receive WOSB set- aside contracts. SBA Generally Has Not Reviewed Certifier Performance
To date, SBA generally has not conducted performance reviews of third- party certifiers and does not have procedures in place for such reviews. Third-party certifiers agree to be subject to performance reviews by SBA at any time to ensure that they meet the requirements of the agreement with SBA and program certification regulations—including requirements related to the certification process, obtaining supporting documents, informing businesses about the no-cost option for WOSB program certification, and reporting to SBA on certifier activities. But SBA has not yet estimated when it would complete written procedures for certifier oversight or the SOP. Without ongoing monitoring and oversight of the activities and performance of third-party certifiers, SBA cannot reasonably ensure that certifiers have fulfilled the performance requirements of their agreement with SBA—including informing businesses about no-cost certification. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should have documented procedures, conduct monitoring, and ensure that any review findings and deficiencies are brought to the attention of management and are resolved promptly. According to SBA officials, both self- and third-party certified businesses were found ineligible at the time of review. In turn, this would continue to expose the program to the risk that ineligible businesses may receive set-aside contracts. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the General Services Administration (GSA) accounted for the majority of these obligations. The WOSB program set-asides represented less than 1 percent of total federal awards to women-owned small businesses. Contracting officers, WOSBs, and others with whom we spoke suggested a number of program changes that might increase use of the WOSB program, including increasing awareness, allowing for sole-source awards, and expanding the list of eligible industries for the set-aside program. For example, some noted that allowing sole-source contracts could increase program use. To provide reasonable assurance that only eligible businesses obtain WOSB set-aside contracts, the Administrator of SBA should enhance examination of businesses that register to participate in the WOSB program, including actions such as: promptly completing the development of procedures to conduct annual eligibility examinations and implementing such procedures; analyzing examination results and individual businesses found to be ineligible to better understand the cause of the high rate of ineligibility in annual reviews, and determine what actions are needed to address the causes; and implementing ongoing reviews of a sample of all businesses that have represented their eligibility to participate in the program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB) program of the Small Business Administration (SBA). More specifically, the report (1) describes how WOSBs and economically disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs) are certified as eligible for the program, (2) examines the extent to which SBA has implemented internal control and oversight procedures of WOSB program certifications, and (3) discusses the effect the program has had on federal contracting opportunities available to WOSBs or EDWOSBs. We interviewed SBA officials from the Office of Government Contracting. To determine what effect, if any, the WOSB program has had on federal contracting opportunities available to WOSBs, we identified set-aside contract obligations in FPDS-NG from April 2011 through May 2014 to identify trends in program participation by contracting agencies included in both FPDS-NG and SBA goaling reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, Congress authorized the WOSB program to increase contracting opportunities for WOSBs by allowing contracting officers to set aside procurements to such businesses. SBA, which administers the program, issued implementing regulations that became effective in 2011. GAO was asked to review the WOSB program. This report examines (1) how businesses are certified as eligible for the WOSB program, (2) SBA's oversight of certifications, and (3) the effect the program has had on federal contracting opportunities available to WOSBs or EDWOSBs. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and program documents; analyzed federal contracting data from April 2011 through May 2014; and interviewed SBA, officials from contracting agencies selected to obtain a range of experience with the WOSB program, third-party certifiers, WOSBs, and organizations that represent their interests.
What GAO Found
Businesses have two options to certify their eligibility for the women-owned small business (WOSB) program. Whether self-certifying at no cost or using the fee-based services of an approved third-party certifier, businesses must attest that they are a WOSB or an economically disadvantaged WOSB (EDWOSB). Businesses also must submit documents supporting their attestation to a repository the Small Business Administration (SBA) maintains (required documents vary depending on certification type), and, if they obtain a third-party certification, to the certifier.
SBA performs minimal oversight of third-party certifiers and has yet to develop procedures that provide reasonable assurance that only eligible businesses obtain WOSB set-aside contracts. For example,
SBA generally has not reviewed certifier performance or developed or implemented procedures for such reviews, including determining whether certifiers inform businesses of the no-cost self-certification option, a requirement in the agency's agreement with certifiers.
SBA also has not completed or implemented procedures to review the monthly reports that third-party certifiers must submit.
Without ongoing monitoring and oversight of the activities and performance of third-party certifiers, SBA cannot reasonably assure that certifiers fulfill the requirements of the agreement. Moreover, in 2012 and 2013, SBA found that more than 40 percent of businesses (that previously received contracts) it examined for program eligibility should not have attested they were WOSBs or EDWOSBs at the time of SBA's review. SBA officials speculated about possible reasons for the results, including businesses not providing adequate documentation or becoming ineligible after contracts were awarded, but SBA has not assessed the results of the examinations to determine the actual reasons for the high numbers of businesses found ineligible. SBA also has not completed or implemented procedures to conduct eligibility examinations. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should have documented procedures, conduct monitoring, and ensure that any review findings and deficiencies are resolved promptly. As a result of inadequate monitoring and controls, potentially ineligible businesses may continue to incorrectly certify themselves as WOSBs, increasing the risk that they may receive contracts for which they are not eligible.
The WOSB program has had a limited effect on federal contracting opportunities available to WOSBs. Set-aside contracts under the program represent less than 1 percent of all federal contract obligations to women-owned small businesses. The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and the General Services Administration collectively accounted for the majority of the $228.9 million in set-aside obligations awarded under the program between April 2011 and May 2014. Contracting officers, business owners, and industry advocates with whom GAO spoke identified challenges to program use and suggested potential changes that might increase program use, including allowing sole-source contracts rather than requiring at least two businesses to compete and expanding the list of 330 industries in which WOSBs and EDWOSBs were eligible for a set-aside.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA, among other things, establish and implement procedures to monitor certifiers and improve annual eligibility examinations, including by analyzing examination results. SBA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-494 | gao_GAO-03-494_0 | Consumer Information in Call Records Was Limited, Sometimes Difficult to Interpret, and Not Consistently Recorded
The information about reported adverse events in the 14,684 health-related call records we examined was limited. Information about age, sex, weight, height, the amount of product used, and the duration of use was frequently not recorded. Handwritten call records were difficult to read and interpret. In some cases the evidence for a report of an adverse event was a single health-related word on the call record, such as “seizure” or “stroke.” In addition, demographic and medical history information was not consistently recorded in the call records. Both the amount of product used and duration of use were recorded for 60 percent of the calls reporting adverse events. Metabolife International Had Thousands of Call Records Reporting Adverse Events Associated with Metabolife 356
We found that 14,684 of the Metabolife International call records reported at least one adverse event. Other adverse events reported included significant elevation of blood pressure, abnormal heart rhythm, loss of consciousness, and systemic rash. Reports of Adverse Events Identified as Serious in FDA’s Proposed Label Warning
We counted 92 reports of heart attack, seizure, stroke, or death—the serious adverse events identified in FDA’s proposed label warning for dietary supplements containing ephedra (see table 2). Causal Role of Metabolife 356 Cannot Be Established
We cannot establish that any of the adverse events reported in the Metabolife International call records were caused by the use of Metabolife 356. As we noted earlier, adverse event reports by themselves are generally not sufficient to establish that a health problem was caused by the use of a particular product. None of the reviews reported identical tabulations of these events. For the set of adverse events that Metabolife International counted—heart attack, stroke, seizure, death, and cardiac arrest—our counts are similar to those of the other reviews (see table 4). In total, we counted 96 such events, Metabolife International counted 78, and the counts of the other reviews ranged from 65 to 107. FDA asked us to clarify that it has not conducted its own review of the Metabolife International call records, that we only reviewed reports of adverse events contained in the Metabolife International call records, and that we did not review other reports of adverse events among users of Metabolife 356 that have been received by FDA. Another contact and major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology for Categorizing the Call Records
We reviewed call records and supplementary information voluntarily provided to us by Metabolife International to (1) determine the extent to which information was comprehensive, interpretable, and consistently recorded in the call records, and (2) count the number of call records reporting health-related problems associated with Metabolife 356, and how many of them were serious. Most of these records were from calls made to the company’s consumer health information phone line from May 1997 through July 2, 2002. Nurses on the staff of Metabolife International documented the calls to the consumer HealthLine in a variety of formats. We did, however, count the number of all but 1 of the 24 other types of adverse events that were described as serious or potentially serious in FDA’s June 4, 1997, proposed rule on dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dietary supplements containing ephedra, such as Metabolife 356, have been associated with serious adverse health-related events. In a February 28, 2003, announcement, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed that dietary supplements containing ephedra include a statement on their label warning that "Heart attack, stroke, seizure, and death have been reported after consumption of ephedrine alkaloids." GAO was asked to review health-related call records that Metabolife International--the manufacturer of Metabolife 356--collected from consumers from May 1997 through July 2002. Most of the records were from calls to a consumer phone line the company maintained. Metabolife International voluntarily provided the call records to GAO. Specifically, GAO (1) examined the extent to which consumer information in the call records was comprehensive, interpretable, and consistently recorded, (2) counted the number of call records reporting types of adverse events that FDA had identified in 1997 as serious or potentially serious, and (3) compared GAO's findings to those of six other reviews of the call records, including one by Metabolife International.
What GAO Found
Adverse event reports generally are not sufficient on their own to establish that reported problems are caused by the use of a particular product, but can signal potential health problems that deserve investigation. The information in the Metabolife International call records was limited. Call records were sometimes difficult to understand, and consumer information was not consistently recorded. In some cases, the evidence for a report of an adverse event was limited to a single word on the record. Most call records also did not record complete information about potentially relevant items such as the consumer's age, sex, weight, and height. Information about both the amount of product used and the duration of use was recorded for 60 percent of the call records. Handwritten call records were difficult to read and understand. By GAO's categorization, 14,684 of the call records contained reports of at least one adverse event. GAO found that there were 92 reports of the serious adverse events identified in FDA's proposed label warning--18 reported heart attacks, 26 reported strokes, 43 reported seizures, and 5 reported deaths. Other types of adverse events identified as serious or potentially serious by FDA in 1997 that were reported in the call records included significant elevation in blood pressure, abnormal heart rhythm, loss of consciousness, and systemic rash. Because of the inherent limitations of adverse event reports and the incomplete nature of these call records, it can not be established from the information available to GAO that the adverse events reported were caused by Metabolife 356. All of the reviews of Metabolife International call records--one by Metabolife International; three by consultants commissioned by Metabolife International; one by the minority staff of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives; one by the RAND Corporation; and one by GAO--found reports of serious adverse events, although none reported identical results. For the set of adverse events counted by Metabolife International--heart attack, stroke, seizure, death, and cardiac arrest--GAO's counts were similar to those of the other reviews. GAO counted 96 such reports and the counts of the other reviews ranged from 65 to 107. In commenting on a draft of this report, FDA discussed the value of reports of adverse events in helping to understand the causes of such events. |
gao_GAO-05-769 | gao_GAO-05-769_0 | Background
Before commercialization, air navigation services under government control faced increasing strains. All five ANSPs are responsible for providing air navigation services to both civil and military aviation. Second, despite differences in ownership structures, all operate as businesses rather than as government organizations and are self-financing. Third, all are largely monopoly providers that are subject to some form of price- setting constraint achieved through economic review or procedural guidelines. The Five Commercialized ANSPs Continue to Focus on Safely Moving Aircraft
For all five commercialized ANSPs, the safe movement of aircraft remains the primary goal. All five ANSPs are subject to external safety regulation. The ANSPs Make and Execute Their Own Decisions, Involve Stakeholders, and Follow Corporate Practices
Each ANSP makes and carries out its own strategic, operating, and financial decisions. The Five Commercialized ANSPs Undergo Some Form of Economic Review or Follow Price-Setting Process Guidelines
Each of the five commercialized ANSPs is its country’s sole provider of en route services and, as such, functions as a monopoly. Since Commercialization, the Five ANSPs Have Maintained Safety, Controlled Operating Costs, and Achieved Efficiencies
According to information from each of the ANSPs we reviewed, air navigation safety has not declined since commercialization, and all five ANSPs have taken steps to control costs. In addition, the ANSPs have improved the efficiency of their operations by implementing new technologies and equipment. Similarly, data from Airways Corporation of New Zealand indicate a downward trend in incidents involving loss of separation for the years following commercialization. Airways Corporation of New Zealand also reportedly reduced its personnel costs by eliminating some middle management and administrative positions. The Five ANSPs Said They Have Improved Efficiency through Modernization
All five ANSPs said they have improved productivity through modernization—that is, through investments in upgrading or replacing air navigation facilities and equipment. 2). Airservices Australia, for example, reported lower unit costs resulting from the increases in controllers’ productivity that followed the introduction of TAAATS. For general aviation operators, however, commercialization has sometimes meant an increase in fees. Some governments have provided for air navigation services at small, remote general aviation and regional airports, viewing such services as a public good. Lessons Learned about the Commercialization of Air Navigation Services
We have derived a number of lessons from our research on the commercialization of air navigation services in the five countries we selected. The Commercialized ANSPs Must Be Prepared to Mitigate the Effects of an Industry Downturn
Because commercialized ANSPs rely primarily on user fees to cover their costs, an industry downturn presents a fundamental financial risk for such ANSPs that they must be prepared to mitigate, whether through a reserve fund, cost-cutting measures, user fee increases, additional borrowing, restructuring, or some combination of these or other options that will be sufficient to offset the decline in air traffic and the concomitant decline in revenue. Continuing to provide air navigation services to small or remote locations may require special efforts to balance community needs and business interests. Appropriately Assessing the Value of Assets Is Essential for Sound Pricing and Cost Accounting
To protect taxpayers’ interests, Canada and the UK needed to have an appropriate valuation of their facilities and equipment before wholly or partially selling these assets to their newly established ANSP. CAA managers with responsibilities for regulating the safety of NATS’s operations also raised concerns about recruiting staff. Scope and Methodology
We developed a descriptive analysis of selected foreign countries’ commercialized, performance-based air navigation services providers (ANSP) by reviewing the characteristics and performance of five such organizations, which we selected as illustrative of similarities and differences in ownership, length of experience with commercialization, and size and scope of operations. To describe how the safety, cost, and efficiency of foreign air navigation services have changed since commercialization, we conducted interviews and reviewed documents obtained during our site visits. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the past, governments worldwide owned, operated, and regulated air navigation services, viewing air traffic control as a governmental function. But as nations faced increasing financial strains, many governments decided to shift the responsibility to an independent air navigation service provider (ANSP) that operates as a business. As of March 2005, 38 nations worldwide had commercialized their air navigation services, fundamentally shifting the operational and financial responsibility for providing these services from the national government to an independent commercial authority. GAO selected five ANSPs--in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--to develop, as requested, a descriptive analysis of commercialized ANSPs that illustrated similarities and differences in ownership, length of experience with commercialization, and size and scope of operations. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What are common characteristics of commercialized ANSPs in selected foreign countries? (2) What do available data show about how the safety, cost, and efficiency of air navigation services have changed since commercialization? (3) What are some key lessons learned about the commercialization of air navigation services?
What GAO Found
The five commercialized ANSPs that GAO selected have a number of common characteristics: All five have the safe movement of aircraft as their primary goal and are subject to some external safety regulation. All five operate as businesses, making and carrying out their own strategic, operational, and financial decisions. As businesses, all five are self-financing, assessing fees on users of air navigation services (e.g., major commercial air carriers; regional air carriers; and, in some cases, general aviation operators) and, as necessary, borrowing funds from capital markets. Finally, all five are largely monopoly providers of air navigation services and undergo some form of constraint in setting prices, such as economic review or procedural guidelines. Available data from the five ANSPs indicate that since commercialization, the safety of air navigation services has remained the same or improved; each ANSP has taken steps to control costs; and each ANSP has reportedly lowered costs and improved efficiency through investments in new technologies and equipment. Despite concerns about the possibility that commercialization could potentially compromise safety, data from all five indicate that safety has not eroded. For example, data from New Zealand and Canada show fewer incidents involving loss of separation (the required distance between aircraft). All five ANSPs have taken steps to control their operating costs, whether by eliminating some administrative positions or by consolidating facilities. All five ANSPs have also invested in new technologies and equipment, which the ANSPs say have lowered their costs by increasing controllers' productivity and produced operating efficiencies, such as fewer or shorter delays. However, the ANSPs have also increased fees for general aviation operators. GAO's research points to a number of lessons. For example, commercialized ANSPs must be prepared to mitigate the effects of an industry downturn, whether through reserves, higher fees, cost-cutting, or other measures. Involving stakeholders in modernizing (i.e., upgrading or replacing) ANSP facilities and equipment can benefit both the ANSP and the stakeholders. Special measures may be needed to protect service to small or remote communities. Finally, when a government sells an ANSP's assets, appropriate valuation is necessary to protect taxpayers' interests. |
gao_GGD-95-230 | gao_GGD-95-230_0 | Long before the recent mutual fund boom, the relative importance of bank loans as a source of finance had been declining. Scope and Methodology
In this report, discussion of the “impact of mutual funds on deposits” or of the “movement of money from deposits to mutual funds” refers not merely to direct withdrawal of deposits by customers for the sake of investing in mutual fund shares but also to customers’ diversion into mutual funds of new receipts that otherwise might have been placed in deposits. At year-end 1994, the amount of money in mutual funds ($2,172 billion) was considerably less than that in bank deposits ($3,462 billion). The total net flows into mutual funds from all sources during 1990 through 1994 were $1,067 billion. Total Supply of Loanable and Investable Funds Should Not Be Affected Despite Shifts Among Intermediaries
The movement of money from bank deposits to mutual funds should have little if any effect on the total supply of loanable and investable funds available to the economy, even though this movement may have shifted the intermediaries through which finance flows. Both types of intermediaries (banks and mutual fund companies) generally invest a substantial portion of the funds they receive. Impact on Different Sectors Not Quantifiable
Availability of finance for the three different borrower sectors—residential, consumer, and business—could be disproportionally affected by the movement of funds out of bank deposits and into mutual funds, even when the total supply of loanable and investable funds is not affected. Because mutual funds invest mainly in securities, it is possible that those who issue securities might increase their access to finance at the expense of those who do not. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether the movement of funds from bank deposits into mutual funds affects the availability of credit for residential, consumer, or commercial purposes.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the amount of money in mutual funds grew from $994 billion at year-end 1989 to $2,172 billion at year-end 1994, mainly due to an increase of net customer inflows; (2) during the same period, bank deposits declined from $3.55 billion to $3.46 billion; (3) as much as $700 billion of the growth in mutual funds may have come at the expense of bank deposits between 1990 and 1994; (4) the movement of money into mutual funds has resulted partly from the relatively lower interest rates paid on bank deposits, but this should have little effect on the total supply of loanable and investable funds, since mutual funds also lend or invest a major portion of the funds they receive; (5) there was insufficient data on whether the different categories of borrowers were affected by the shift of money from bank deposits to mutual funds; (6) all categories of borrowers have recently increased their access to financing obtained through the securities markets; and (7) flows of deposits out of smaller banks could reduce the availability of finance for small businesses whose primary source of finance is loans from such banks. |
gao_GAO-06-519 | gao_GAO-06-519_0 | The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively Assessed
Tsunamis pose the greatest hazard to the coastal areas of the five states bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S. territories in the Caribbean, but for many of these areas reliable, comprehensive assessments of potential tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have not been completed. Some high-hazard coastal areas do not have tsunami inundation maps— the foundation for evaluating potential tsunami impacts on communities— showing the extent to which a tsunami would penetrate inland and flood communities, while others have maps that may not be reliable. The Coastal Areas of the Pacific United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Face the Greatest Tsunami Hazards
According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant and local tsunami hazards are Hawaii and the west coast states of California, Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska and the Caribbean Islands of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened primarily by local tsunamis, as shown in table 1. According to NOAA, the Atlantic and Gulf state coasts are relatively low- hazard areas for distant or local tsunamis, with few reliable reports of tsunami waves of any size ever reaching either coast. NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Inundation Mapping Efforts at its Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory assists the modelers and the states in their efforts. Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning Systems Have Limitations
NWS’s two tsunami warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and issue warnings, but the effectiveness of these warnings has been hampered by frequent false alarms and limitations in the federal systems that transmit warnings to the local level. Experts warn that false alarms may generate unnecessary and costly evacuations and cause people to ignore future warnings. No destructive tsunami has reached U.S. shores following any of the 16 warnings—primarily for local tsunamis—issued to states by the warning centers since 1982. State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way, although Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations
The 12 coastal communities in the six at-risk states and territories that we visited are taking actions to mitigate tsunami impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education, and some infrastructure protection efforts, although the level of implementation varies considerably among locations. While state and local tsunami mitigation plans and warning systems have largely been developed, limitations exist that have raised concerns about their effectiveness. In addition, key public education efforts have not been consistently implemented in all coastal communities we visited, and only a few communities have taken steps to protect critical infrastructure from potential tsunami damage. Local emergency managers echoed these challenges. Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning
A significant expansion of federal tsunami detection, warning, and related activities, as well as the NTHMP, is under way; however, the future direction of these efforts is unclear because NOAA has not developed long-range strategic plans to guide them. Some of NOAA’s activities designed to strengthen the tsunami program are scheduled in a manner that raises questions about the extent to which they are risk-based. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve national tsunami preparedness, we are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take the following six actions: work with the FEMA Director and the USGS Director to create standardized tsunami loss estimation software to help communities determine the potential impact of tsunamis and identify appropriate mitigation actions; reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms by (1) completing the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, (2) reexamining NWS’s rules dictating when a warning will be issued and to which areas, (3) establishing a routine process for other federal and state experts to formally review and comment on the centers’ use of seismic data, and (4) setting performance goals to guide improvements; work with the states to conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a tsunami emergency; evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to participation and what modifications are needed to encourage more high-risk communities to participate; evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well in the past and what high priority activities remain to be completed and to help inform strategic planning efforts, and; develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program that consider input from states and federal partners and include metrics for measuring progress toward achieving program goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S. preparedness for such an event. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. detection and warning efforts and partners with federal and state agencies in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to reduce tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental funding to enhance these efforts. This report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential impacts have been assessed, (2) discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs.
What GAO Found
NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami hazard. The east and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While high-hazard areas have been identified, limited information exists on the likely impacts of a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack inundation maps showing the potential extent of tsunami flooding in communities, and others have maps that may be unreliable. State assessments of likely tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have been limited, in part, due to a lack of tsunami loss estimation software, as exists for floods and other hazards. Although federal warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and issue warnings, false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their effectiveness. Some state and local emergency managers have raised concerns about false alarms--the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not followed by destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores--potentially causing citizens to ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede timely warnings to communities. For example, signal coverage for these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and failure to properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed or not transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false alarms but, according to agency officials, lacking the states' permission elsewhere, has only conducted "live" end-to-end testing of the warning systems in Alaska to identify problems. The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public education, and infrastructure protection, but the level of implementation varies considerably by location. Most of the states and some communities GAO visited have basic mitigation plans identifying tsunami hazards. While all of these locations have multiple warning mechanisms in place, disruptions to key infrastructure such as telephone lines may hamper timely warnings. Furthermore, key educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps and developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure from tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions. Emergency managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need to focus on more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding limitations. Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA's preparedness program, according to NOAA officials, because they perceive the threat of a tsunami to be low. The nationwide expansion of NOAA's tsunami-related activities and NTHMP is under way; however, the future direction of these efforts is uncertain because they lack long-range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to identify long-range goals, establish risk-based priorities, and define performance measures to assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are achieving the desired results. |
gao_GAO-07-784T | gao_GAO-07-784T_0 | Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA to Implement and Manage NextGen, but Further Work Remains
During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in implementing businesslike processes and procedures for managing and acquiring air traffic control systems. The implementation of these businesslike operations has improved FAA’s management of the current system and should better position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. However, further work remains to fully address past problems and institutionalize these changes throughout the agency, especially given the changing leadership within both FAA and ATO. One outcome of the implementation of the changes in program management and operations is that for the past three fiscal years, FAA has reported exceeding system acquisition goals. FAA’s air traffic control modernization program has been on GAO’s high-risk list since 1995. JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face Challenges with Its Organization
JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning documents, but still faces challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative practices. As we previously testified, JPDO is focusing on the right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning. Nonetheless, according to a JPDO official, as of May 4, 2007, the MOU has been signed by the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but remains unsigned by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. These types of efforts will be critical to JPDO’s ability to leverage its partner agency resources for continued JPDO planning efforts. As we noted in our November 2006 report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process that would allow OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. FAA and JPDO Continue to Face a Number of Challenges in Moving Toward NextGen
FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges as they move toward the implementation of NextGen systems and procedures, including assessing FAA’s technical and contract management expertise, sustaining the current air traffic control system, identifying which entities will handle necessary research and development, addressing JPDO’s leadership challenges, conducting human factors research, and ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders. In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the transition to NextGen. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion. While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA’s NextGen investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All Key Stakeholders
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to the success of NextGen. The Next Generation Air Transportation System Institute (the Institute) was created by an agreement between the National Center for Advanced Technologies and the Federal Aviation Administration to meet Vision 100’s requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult with the public. 3). | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's current air traffic control system is reaching its capacity limits as demand for air transportation grows. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) represents a new system that will use state-of-the-art technologies and procedures. Transitioning to NextGen will require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to continue to sustain the current air traffic control system while acquiring new systems on schedule and on budget. In 2003, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan NextGen and coordinate the transition. GAO's testimony focuses on the progress FAA is making in implementing businesslike operations that could provide a foundation for managing the transition to NextGen, the status of JPDO's planning and facilitation of NextGen, and some key challenges that FAA and JPDO need to address in moving toward NextGen. This statement is based on GAO's November 2006 report and recent testimonies as well as ongoing work. GAO's November report recommended that FAA study its technical and contract management expertise and that JPDO take actions to institutionalize its collaborative practices. FAA and JPDO said they would consider our recommendations.
What GAO Found
During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in implementing businesslike operations and procedures for managing and acquiring air traffic control systems. These operations and procedures have improved FAA's management of the current system and should better position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. One outcome of these changes is that FAA has reported exceeding its system acquisition goals for the past 3 fiscal years. However, further work remains to fully address past problems in acquiring systems and institutionalizing changes throughout the agency. JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning documents. JPDO has experienced delays in the release of key documents, but currently plans to have initial versions of these documents released by July 2007. JPDO has been working since 2005 to establish a memorandum of understanding between its partner agencies, although as of May 4, 2007, the memorandum had been signed by the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but was not yet signed by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. JPDO is also working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish mechanisms to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program for funding decisions. FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward NextGen, including questions about FAA's technical and contract management expertise; FAA's ability to maintain a number of existing systems, including monitoring and addressing equipment outages to ensure the safety of these existing systems as it transitions to NextGen; and conducting necessary human factors research. In addition, while JPDO recently estimated that the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion, questions remain about which entities will fund and conduct the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. Also, JPDO faces a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders, such as active air traffic controllers and system technicians, in its NextGen planning efforts. |
gao_GAO-02-350 | gao_GAO-02-350_0 | Then, in November 1999, Education began offering a 0.25- percentage point reduction in the interest rate to borrowers who agreed to repay their loans this way. Education Has Not Informed Borrowers about the Possible Cost Implications of EDA Participation or Prepayment Options
Education has not informed borrowers of the possible cost implications of EDA participation nor has it systematically informed borrowers of their prepayment options. To continue their prepayments, such borrowers would have to send a check for any prepayment or make arrangements to continue making prepayments through EDA. Education saved an estimated $1.5 million in fiscal year 2001 as a result of generating and mailing fewer bills to EDA borrowers. Conclusions
Regardless of the conclusions Education reached in its cost justification, borrowers who enroll in EDA will benefit from paying a reduced interest rate on their loans and the federal government will achieve administrative cost savings. Education does not make clear that, in spite of the 0.25 percentage-point interest rate reduction, borrowers might incur more interest cost over the life of their loans under EDA than they would if they continued to sometimes make payments in excess of the scheduled amount due. | What GAO Found
Since 1999, the Department of Education (Education) has offered a 0.25 percent interest rate reduction to borrowers who agree to an electronic debit (EDA) program. Borrowers pay a lower interest rate, while the federal government receives fewer late payments. Any revenue loss to the federal government from a reduced interest rate would be more than offset by a gain in revenue because some EDA borrowers who had previously paid by check would stop making periodic payments in excess of their scheduled amount due. By ceasing to make these prepayments, these borrowers would not pay off their loans as soon as they would have without signing up for EDA and, therefore, incur additional interest costs over the life of their loans. Although actual EDA enrollments have exceeded original estimates, Education lacks data on prepayment patterns after borrowers enroll in the program. Education has not informed borrowers of the cost implications of EDA participation, nor has it systematically informed borrowers of their prepayment options. GAO estimates that Education saved $1.5 million in administrative costs in fiscal year 2001 because it did not have to mail bills to EDA borrowers. |
gao_GAO-14-121 | gao_GAO-14-121_0 | When developing its budget justification, BOP estimates costs for budget accounts using three steps, as described below. According to BOP officials, FMIS is BOP’s primary tool for cost reporting and budget execution. budget justification, BOP projected a net growth in its inmate population of 5,400 (2.4 percent) for fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Institution Security and Inmate Care Constitute the Majority of BOP’s Salaries and Expenses Account Costs as Presented in Its Budget Justifications
BOP’s largest account—its S&E account— is composed mainly of costs associated with Inmate Care and Programs and Institution Security and Administration, both of which have grown steadily since 2008, predominantly because of increases in prison populations, which are the primary cost driver of BOP’s budget. The other two PPAs in the S&E account are associated with the care and custody of federal offenders in contract facilities and maintenance and administration. BOP’s budget justification for fiscal year 2014 reflected the President’s budget request of a total of $6.9 billion, including $6.8 billion for its S&E account. Below is a description of the four PPAs that compose BOP’s S&E account. BOP Could Enhance the Transparency of Its Budget Justification by Providing Additional Data on Cost Components within the Program, Project, and Activity Levels
We found that BOP is collecting more detailed quantitative cost data on the components that constitute each PPA, which could be useful to congressional decision makers when reviewing BOP’s budget justification. In accordance with departmental and OMB guidance, BOP’s budget justifications summarize amounts by PPA, so BOP is not required to provide additional funding data below the PPA level in its budget justification. Providing more comprehensive information could help clarify BOP’s proposed spending on specific categories and subcategories reflected in its budget justification. For example, BOP’s budget justification for fiscal year 2014 included $2.5 billion for the Inmate Care and Programs PPA element and included narrative information for categories such as Medical Services, Food Service, Education and Occupational Training, Psychology Services, and Religious Services, as well as narrative summaries for various subcategories, but did not include proposed funding amounts for these categories. Our analysis shows that this additional information can be useful in identifying trends and cost drivers that may affect future costs, which could be particularly helpful given the 33 percent growth in BOP’s budget request from fiscal years 2008 through 2014. For example, BOP includes narrative in the budget justification to describe costs related to categories such as Medical Services and Food Service, among others. The results of our analysis show that BOP’s proposed spending for the Inmate Care and Programs PPA has continually increased from fiscal years 2008 through 2013; however, BOP’s FMIS data showed variations in the dollar amounts associated with the cost components that constitute the PPA. In an era of scarce federal resources and given BOP’s projected growth in inmate population and substantial increased costs in recent years, this additional detail could be helpful to congressional decision makers when reviewing BOP’s budget justification and making determinations about where to increase or decrease BOP funding. Consulting with congressional decision makers to determine if it would be helpful to include this information in its annual budget justification would help provide reasonable assurance that BOP is fully meeting congressional stakeholders’ needs. This could enhance the transparency of BOP’s budget justification and the President’s budget request and better inform congressional decision making. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance the transparency of BOP’s cost information as presented in DOJ’s annual congressional budget justifications, we recommend that the Attorney General consult with congressional decision makers on providing additional BOP funding detail below the PPA level in future budget justifications, and in conjunction with BOP, provide the data as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
BOP, a component of DOJ, is responsible for the custody and care of over 219,000 federal inmates--a population that has grown by 27 percent over the past decade. BOP had a fiscal year 2013 operating budget of about $6.5 billion, and BOP projects that its costs will increase as the federal prison population grows. According to officials, BOP's biggest challenge is managing the increasing federal inmate population, and related responsibilities, within budgeted levels. Generally, BOP is appropriated funds through two accounts: S&E and B&F. To prepare its annual congressional budget justification for DOJ, BOP estimates its costs and resource requirements and sends its requested amounts to DOJ. GAO was asked to review BOP's budget justifications.
This report (1) identifies the types of costs that compose BOP's budget accounts as presented in its budget justifications, and (2) assesses the extent to which opportunities exist to enhance the transparency of information in BOP's budget justifications for congressional stakeholders and decision makers. GAO analyzed DOJ and BOP budget justification documents for fiscal years 2008 through 2014 and interviewed officials to determine how they develop budget justifications.
What GAO Found
The largest account in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP) budget justification--its Salaries and Expenses (S&E) account-- is composed mainly of costs associated with Inmate Care and Programs and Institution Security and Administration, both of which have grown steadily since 2008. This growth is due predominantly to increases in prison populations, which are the primary cost driver of BOP's budget. The other two program, project and activity (PPA) elements in the S&E account are associated with the care and custody of federal offenders in contract facilities and maintenance and administration. BOP's Buildings and Facilities (B&F) account, which makes up on average less than 3 percent of its budget, pays for costs associated with site planning; acquisition; and construction of new facilities and costs of remodeling and renovating existing facilities, and related costs. In fiscal year 2014, the budget justification reflected a total of $6.9 billion; of which over 95 percent ($6.8 billion) was for BOP's S&E account.
GAO found that BOP is collecting more detailed quantitative cost data on the components that constitute each PPA, which could be useful to congressional decision makers when reviewing BOP's budget justification. In accordance with departmental and Office of Management and Budget guidance, BOP's budget justifications summarize amounts by PPA, so BOP is not required to provide additional funding data below the PPA level in its budget justification. Providing this information to Congress could help clarify what BOP proposes to spend on specific categories and subcategories reflected in its budget justification. For example, BOP's budget justification for fiscal year 2014 included $2.5 billion for the Inmate Care and Programs PPA element and included narrative information for categories such as Medical Services, Food Service, Education and Vocational Training, Psychology Services, and Religious Services, as well as narrative summaries for various subcategories. However the budget justification did not include proposed funding amounts for each of these categories. GAO's analysis shows that this additional information can be useful in identifying trends and cost drivers that may affect future costs. For example, GAO's analysis identified variations in the dollar amounts associated with the cost components that constitute the PPA, such as drug abuse treatment and education, which could affect decision making for that PPA. However, BOP's current budget justification does not include this detail. Congressional decision makers have previously requested additional information about BOP's budget presentations and data below the PPA level. BOP's budget requests for its S&E account have increased 33 percent since fiscal year 2008, which makes transparency in its budget justifications even more crucial. Consulting with congressional decision makers to determine if it would be helpful to include in its budget justifications the additional cost information that DOJ already collects would help provide reasonable assurance that BOP is fully meeting congressional decision makers' needs and would enhance the transparency of its budget justifications. BOP also provides narrative summaries of its initiatives, services, and organizational units in categories and subcategories under each PPA. BOP officials said that they include these narrative descriptions to provide additional information to congressional decision makers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Attorney General consult with congressional decision makers on providing additional BOP funding detail in future budget justifications, and in conjunction with BOP, take action as appropriate. DOJ concurred. |
gao_GAO-05-855T | gao_GAO-05-855T_0 | Background
Although jointly financed by the states and the federal government, Medicaid is administered directly by the states and consists of 56 distinct state-level programs. As program administrators, states have primary responsibility for conducting program integrity activities that address provider enrollment, claims review, and case referrals. Various states individually attributed cost savings or recoupments to these efforts valued in the millions of dollars. In addition, CMS performs oversight of states’ Medicaid fraud and abuse control activities. CMS Expends Limited Resources and Lacks Coherent Plan to Improve States’ Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Control Activities
A wide disparity exists between the level of resources CMS expends to support and oversee states’ fraud and abuse control activities and the amount of federal dollars at stake in Medicaid benefit payments. In fiscal year 2005, CMS’s Medicaid staff resources allocated to supporting or overseeing states’ anti-fraud and abuse operations was an estimated 8.1 FTEs—3.6 FTEs at headquarters and 4.5 FTEs in the regional offices. Canvassing the 10 regional CMS offices, we found that 7 regions each have a fraction of an FTE and the rest each have less than 2 FTEs devoted to providing assistance on fraud and abuse issues. For example, Region IV—which covers eight states and accounted for $33 billion of federal funds for Medicaid benefits in fiscal year 2004— reported having 1 FTE devoted to Medicaid fraud and abuse control activities. As CMS’s distribution of these funds varies from year to year, the level of support for fraud and abuse control initiatives is uncertain and depends on the priorities set by the agency. CMS Structure and Lack of Planning Suggest Weak Commitment to Supporting States’ Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Control Efforts
The placement of Medicaid’s antifraud and abuse function in CMS’s organizational structure and a lack of stated goals and objectives suggests a limited institutional commitment to Medicaid fraud and abuse control activities. Under this organizational structure, the Medicaid fraud and abuse staff in CMSO are not in an optimal position to leverage the resources allocated to the office with responsibility for developing tools and strategies for combating fraud and abuse. From 1997 to 2003, the leadership and funding of CMS’s support for states’ antifraud and abuse efforts resided in a consortium of two regional offices. CMS’s distribution of resources may require some activities to be scaled back and others to be eliminated. Since January 2000, CMS’s Medicaid staff from headquarters and regional offices have been conducting compliance reviews of about seven to eight states a year. Nevertheless, at the currently scheduled pace, states’ programs will be reviewed once in 7 years at the earliest. Concluding Observations
Relatively few and questionably aligned resources and an absence of strategic planning underscore the limited commitment CMS has made to strengthening states’ ability to curb fraud and abuse. Despite the millions of dollars CMS receives annually from a statutorily established fund for fraud and abuse control, the agency has not allocated these resources to sufficiently fund initiatives that can help states increase the effectiveness of their Medicaid fraud and abuse control efforts. Developing a strategic plan for Medicaid fraud and abuse control activities would give CMS a basis for providing resources that reflect the financial risk to the federal government. We discussed facts in this statement with a relevant CMS official. He noted that CMS does not view fraud and abuse control activities as separate from its financial management responsibilities. He indicated that CMS has invested substantial resources in program integrity activities that focus on the financial oversight of the Medicaid program. While we agree that financial oversight of Medicaid is a key component of program integrity, we maintain that the other component—fraud and abuse control activities—warrants a greater commitment than it currently receives. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today's hearing addresses fraud and abuse control in Medicaid, a program that provides health care coverage for eligible low-income individuals and is jointly financed by the federal government and the states. In fiscal year 2003, Medicaid covered nearly 54 million people and the program's benefit payments totaled roughly $261 billion, of which the federal share was about $153 billion. States are primarily responsible for ensuring appropriate payments to Medicaid providers through provider enrollment screening, claims review, overpayment recoveries, and case referrals. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for supporting and overseeing state fraud and abuse control activities. Last year, GAO reported that CMS had initiatives to assist states, but the dollar and staff resources allocated to oversight suggested that CMS's level of effort was disproportionately small relative to the risk of federal financial loss. Concerned about the stewardship of federal Medicaid funds, Congress has raised questions about CMS's commitment to Medicaid fraud and abuse control. This statement focuses on (1) the level of resources CMS currently applies to helping states prevent and detect fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program and (2) the implications of this level of support for CMS fraud and abuse control activities.
What GAO Found
Since GAO reported last year, the resources CMS expends to support and oversee states' Medicaid fraud and abuse control activities remain out of balance with the amount of federal dollars spent annually to provide Medicaid benefits. In fiscal year 2005, CMS's total staff resources allocated to these activities was about 8.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing units--approximately 3.6 FTEs at headquarters and 4.5 FTEs in the regional offices. Among CMS's 10 regional offices--each of which oversees states whose Medicaid outlays include billions of federal dollars--7 offices each have a fraction of an FTE and the rest each have less than 2 FTEs allocated to Medicaid fraud and abuse control efforts. Moreover, the placement of the Medicaid fraud and abuse control staff at headquarters--apart from the agency's office responsible for other antifraud and abuse activities--as well as a lack of specified goals for Medicaid fraud and abuse control raise questions about the agency's level of commitment to improve states' activities in this area. CMS's support and oversight initiatives include a pilot project for states to enhance claims scrutiny activities by coordinating with the Medicare program. Despite the project's positive results in several states, less than one-fifth of the states currently participate in the project and resource constraints may require CMS to scale back these efforts instead of expanding them to additional states that are seeking to participate. Similarly, CMS's support activities--such as conducting national conferences, regional workshops, and training--have been terminated altogether. The frequency of CMS's on-site reviews of states' fraud and abuse control activities--about seven to eight visits a year--has not changed since GAO reported on this last year. This means that federal oversight of a state's Medicaid program safeguards will not occur, at best, more than once every 7 years. Relatively few and questionably aligned resources and an absence of strategic planning underscore the limited commitment CMS has made to strengthening states' ability to curb fraud and abuse. Despite the millions of dollars CMS receives annually from a statutorily established fund for fraud and abuse control, the agency has not allocated these resources to sufficiently fund initiatives that can help states increase the effectiveness of their Medicaid fraud and abuse control efforts. Developing a strategic plan for Medicaid fraud and abuse control activities would give CMS a basis for providing resources that reflect the financial risk to the federal government. In discussing the facts in this statement with a CMS Medicaid official, he stated that the agency does not view antifraud and abuse initiatives as separate from financial oversight, an area that has received substantial resources in recent years. While we agree that financial management is important to program integrity, we believe that an increased commitment to helping states fight fraud and abuse is warranted. |
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