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gao_T-NSIAD-98-104 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-104_0 | The federal government, primarily through DOD and VA, has sponsored a variety of research on Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. Government Was Not Proactive in Researching Causes of Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses
Although Gulf War veterans’ health problems began surfacing in the early 1990s, the vast majority of research was not initiated until 1994 or later. The government’s 3-year delay complicated the researchers’ tasks and limited the amount of completed research available. Private Sector Pursued Variety of Hypotheses
A substantial body of research suggests that low-level exposures to chemical warfare agents or chemically related compounds, such as certain pesticides, are associated with delayed or long-term health effects. Formidable Methodological Problems Have Hampered Research
Our review indicated that most of the epidemiological studies have been hampered by data problems and methodological limitations and consequently may not provide conclusive answers in response to their stated objectives, particularly in identifying risk factors or potential causes. also focused on identifying symptom clusters. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its evaluation of the federal strategy to research Gulf War illnesses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the government was not proactive in researching Gulf War illnesses; (2) the government's early research emphasized stress as a cause for Gulf War veterans' illnesses and gave other hypotheses, such as multiple chemical sensitivity, little attention; (3) in contrast, the private sector pursued research on the health effects of low-level exposures to certain chemical warfare agents or industrial chemical compounds; (4) government research used an epidemiological approach, but little research on treatment was funded; and (5) most of the ongoing epidemiological research focusing on the prevalence or causes of Gulf War-related illnesses will not provide conclusive answers, particularly in identifying risk factors or potential causes due to formidable methodological and data problems. |
gao_GAO-08-209 | gao_GAO-08-209_0 | The Constitution gives Congress the power to levy taxes and raise revenue for the government, to finance government operations through appropriation of federal funds, and to prescribe the conditions governing the use of those appropriations. This power is generally referred to as the congressional “power of the purse.” The linchpin of congressional control over federal funds is found in article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Thus, no officer or employee of the government may draw money out of the Treasury to fund agency operations unless Congress has appropriated the money to the agency. At its most basic level, this means that it is up to Congress to decide whether to provide funds for a particular program or activity and to fix the level of that funding. It is also well established that Congress can, within constitutional limits, determine the terms and conditions under which an appropriation may be used. In this manner, Congress may use its appropriation power to accomplish policy objectives and to establish priorities among federal programs. This does not mean agencies are free to ignore clearly expressed legislative history applicable to the use of appropriated funds. And of course, we hardly need to note that an agency’s decision to ignore congressional expectations may expose it to grave political consequences.”
Recent Guidance to Agencies on Collecting Data on Earmarks
There have been numerous calls in and out of Congress for earmark reform. Both Houses of Congress have taken steps to increase disclosure requirements. In addition, OMB directed agencies to plan on providing information on earmarks in authorizing and other bills that are identified based on consultation with OMB. OMB’s guidance to agencies excludes from its definition of earmarks funds requested in the President’s Budget. These program officials told us that their ability to accomplish their strategic goals has been limited because congressional directives make up a large percentage of their budget and it is often difficult to align the outcomes of congressional directives with these goals. In addition to responding to specific requests from congressional committees, DOT also communicates some general funding information on congressional directives to Congress. According to Corps budget officials, congressional directives are defined by the agency as any of the following changes to requests made in the President’s Budget: an increase or decrease in funding levels for a budgeted project, the funding of a project that was not included in the President’s Budget, and any project that has language in a committee or conference report or in statute that restricts or directs the Corps on how to spend funds. The program manager responsible for responding to OMB identified the fiscal year 2005 earmarks using appropriations bills and conference reports. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify for selected agencies (1) the process for identifying and categorizing congressional directives; (2) the process for tracking, implementing, and reporting on congressional directives; and (3) agency officials’ views on the trends and impact of congressional directives. The selected agencies were the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil Works programs (Corps). These agencies cover a range of characteristics concerning congressional directives, including the number of congressional directives. At DOD, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller’s office and budget officials from components to obtain information on how congressional directives are implemented as well as to obtain their views on the impact of congressional directives on their budget and program execution. To obtain their views on the trends and impact of congressional directives on agency programs, we spoke with knowledgeable agency officials from the selected agencies using similar questions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, congressional concern and public debate have increased about the nature and growing number of earmarks. This report seeks to provide Congress and the public with an understanding of how agencies respond to congressional funding directions by examining how selected executive branch agencies translate these directions from Congress into governmental activities. There have been numerous calls in and out of Congress for earmark reform in response to concerns about the nature and number of earmarks. Both Houses of Congress have taken steps to increase disclosure requirements. The President has also called for earmark reform. In January 2007, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to collect and submit data to it on fiscal year 2005 earmarks in appropriations bills and certain authorization bills. GAO collected and analyzed information on four agencies' processes (i.e., the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works programs). Our objectives were to identify, for these agencies, (1) their processes for identifying and categorizing congressional directives; (2) their processes for tracking, implementing, and reporting on congressional directives; and (3) agency officials' views on the trends and impact of congressional directives.
What GAO Found
Congress or its committees may use formal vehicles to provide written funding instructions for agencies or to express preferences to agencies on the use of funding. These formal vehicles include statutes (i.e., authorization or appropriations acts) or House, Senate, and conference reports comprising significant parts of the legislative history for a given statute. Often referred to as "earmarks," these written instructions range from broad directions on policy priorities to specific instructions. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to levy taxes, to finance government operations through appropriations, and to prescribe the conditions governing the use of those appropriations. This power is referred to generally as the congressional "power of the purse" and derives from various provisions of the Constitution. Government agencies may not draw money out of the Treasury to fund operations unless Congress has appropriated the money. At its most basic level, this means that it is up to Congress to decide whether to provide funds for a particular program or activity and to fix the level of that funding. It is also well established that Congress can, within constitutional limits, determine the terms and conditions under which an appropriation may be used. In this manner, Congress may use its appropriation power to accomplish policy objectives and to establish priorities among federal programs. Our review of four federal agencies' processes for responding to written directives from Congress regarding the use of funds found that each of the selected agencies responds to congressional directives in a manner consistent with the nature of its programs and operations and in response to the desires of its own authorizing and appropriations committees in Congress. Agencies differ in terms of the specific processes followed to respond to congressional directives, and they have also adopted their own approaches for responding to the 2007 request for data on earmarks from OMB. OMB's guidance to agencies excludes from its definition of earmarks funds requested in the President's Budget. With a few exceptions, officials representing the selected agencies generally expressed the view that the number of congressional directives had increased over time. Agency officials provided a range of views on the impact of congressional directives on budget and program execution. Some agency officials said that congressional directives had a limited impact on their mission requirements or ability to accomplish their goals. Other agency officials reported that implementation of these directives can displace agencies' program priorities as the agencies redirect resources to comply with these directives. Some told us that congressional directives provided money for projects they wanted but had been unable to get funded through budget requests. Agency officials also reported that directives can add uncertainty as agencies respond to congressional priorities identified months later than their planning for items in the President's Budget |
gao_GAO-16-693 | gao_GAO-16-693_0 | Digitalgov.gov Requirements for Federal Websites
Digitalgov.gov contains a checklist of requirements for federal websites and digital services that are based on relevant statutes, regulations, executive orders, or policy documents. Further, OMB and the PIC track 18 of 24 recommended performance measures, but have not set goals for those measures. In addition, our prior work identified several areas where OMB is not fully meeting GPRAMA requirements for Performance.gov. OMB and GSA Conducted a Usability Test, but Key Actions Remain Unaddressed
GSA, on behalf of OMB, conducted a usability test on Performance.gov and issued the findings in September 2013. Purpose. Data visualizations. Search. Our prior recommendation remains open. In particular, our work identified several areas where OMB was not fully meeting APG and CAP goal public reporting requirements. PIC staff took steps to address this recommendation. GPRAMA requires OMB to make this information publicly available on Performance.gov. OMB and PIC officials have told us that they are focused on ensuring Performance.gov is GPRAMA compliant and are aware that the website is not fully consistent with GPRAMA requirements. OMB Does Not Have a Strategic Plan for the Future of Performance.gov
OMB does not have a strategic plan for the website that will help guide officials in the future. Agency-wide strategic planning practices required under GPRA, and enhanced by GPRAMA, can serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as individual programs or initiatives. Among other things, strategic plans should contain goals and objectives, approaches, and resources needed to achieve those long-term goals and objectives. When we began our review, OMB staff said that they had not developed a strategic plan for Performance.gov because a new contractor, eKuber, had just started a few months prior, and they wanted to allow time for the contractor to transition into its new role. The Digital Services Director’s responsibilities include developing a strategic plan and managing the long-term development of Performance.gov. However, without a plan for the future, OMB will not know what resources it will need or steps it needs to take to ensure all requirements are met and incorporated on Performance.gov. Specifically, we identified three areas where Performance.gov did not have a customer outreach strategy that incorporates, as appropriate, information about how OMB intends to (1) inform users of changes on Performance.gov, (2) use social media as a method of communication, and (3) use mobile devices and applications. While OMB, GSA, and the PIC have taken several steps to improve Performance.gov, their actions do not fully meet Digitalgov.gov requirements or completely address our prior recommendations. For example, while OMB and GSA conducted a usability test of the website, they have not addressed all of the test’s findings. Without improving usability and fully implementing GPRAMA requirements, Performance.gov will have difficulty serving its intended purpose as a central website where users can find government-wide performance information easily. Ensure the information presented on Performance.gov consistently complies with GPRAMA public reporting requirements for the website’s content. Analyze and, where appropriate, implement usability test results to improve Performance.gov. Among other things, this plan should include: the goals, objectives, and resources needed to consistently meet Digitalgov.gov and GPRAMA requirements; a customer outreach plan that considers how (1) OMB informs users of changes in Performance.gov, (2) OMB uses social media as a method of communication, and (3) users access Performance.gov so that OMB could, as appropriate, deploy mobile applications to communicate effectively; and a strategy to manage and archive the content and data on Performance.gov in accordance with NARA guidance. OMB staff agreed with the recommendations in the report. The agency has not yet provided reporting on Cross Agency Priority (CAP) goal progress, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), working with the Performance Improvement Council (PIC), take the following action: report on Performance.gov the actions that CAP goal teams are taking, or plan to take, to develop performance measure and quarterly targets. According to OMB and PIC staff in August 2015 and May 2016, they have taken some actions to address the recommendations. This report assesses the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) (1) efforts to ensure the usefulness of Performance.gov, and (2) strategic plan for Performance.gov. We assessed OMB’s efforts (in collaboration with the Performance Improvement Council (PIC) and the General Services Administration (GSA)) to ensure the usefulness of Performance.gov and OMB’s strategic plan by comparing steps taken and documentation for each to the selected requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress took steps to improve federal performance reporting through GPRAMA by requiring that OMB provide performance information via a publicly available central website, Performance.gov. In June 2013, GAO reported on the initial development of Performance.gov. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to periodically review its implementation. This report assesses OMB's (1) effort to ensure Performance.gov's usefulness, and (2) strategic plan for the website. GAO compared elements of Performance.gov to GSA's Digitalgov.gov requirements for federal websites. GAO summarized prior work on OMB's implementation of selected GPRAMA requirements. GAO also interviewed OMB, PIC, and GSA staff about recommendations GAO made on developing the website and Performance.gov's strategic plan.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), General Services Administration (GSA), and the Performance Improvement Council (PIC) took several steps to improve the usefulness of Performance.gov, a website intended to serve as the public window to the federal government's goals and performance. However, their actions do not fully meet selected Digitalgov.gov requirements for federal websites (which are based on relevant statutes, regulations, and executive orders) and do not fully meet provisions of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA):
In accordance with Digitalgov.gov, GSA, on behalf of OMB, issued a usability test in September 2013. The test identified issues with the website's accessibility, purpose, data visualizations, and search function. However, OMB and GSA have not addressed all of the test's findings.
OMB and the PIC are tracking 18 of 24 website performance measures required by Digitalgov.gov, but have not set goals for those measures. In June 2013, GAO recommended they track measures and set goals for those measures. However, those recommendations remain open.
OMB has not met all of the GPRAMA public reporting requirements for Performance.gov. In particular, GAO identified several areas where OMB is not fully meeting agency priority and cross-agency priority goal public reporting requirements. OMB and PIC staff told GAO they are aware that Performance.gov is not fully GPRAMA compliant, but in moving forward, are focused on ensuring its compliance.
According to OMB and PIC staff, limited resources have prevented them from taking actions to address the 2013 usability test and setting goals for measures. By not fully implementing Digitalgov.gov requirements and GAO's recommendations on GPRAMA requirements, Performance.gov will continue to have difficulty serving its intended purpose as a central website where users can easily locate government-wide performance information.
OMB does not have a strategic plan for the website that will help guide staff in the future. Specifically, OMB does not have a customer outreach strategy that incorporates, as appropriate, information about how OMB intends to (1) inform users of changes on Performance.gov, (2) use social media as a method of communication, and (3) use mobile devices and applications. OMB also lacks an archiving plan to retain data and content on Performance.gov. Agency-wide strategic planning practices required under law can serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as individual programs or initiatives. Consistent with these practices, strategic plans should contain goals and objectives, approaches, and resources. OMB staff said they had not developed a strategic plan for Performance.gov because they wanted to allow transition time for the operations and website maintenance contractor hired in August 2015. OMB staff also said that, in February 2016, they hired a Digital Services Director to develop a strategic plan and manage the website's long-term development. Without a strategic plan, OMB will not know the resources it needs or the steps to take to meet requirements, and to ensure the site provides useful information to the public.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations that OMB work with GSA and the PIC to 1) ensure the information presented on Performance.gov consistently complies with GPRAMA public reporting requirements for the website's content; 2) analyze and, where appropriate, implement usability test results to improve Performance.gov; and 3) develop a strategic plan for the future of Performance.gov that includes goals, objectives, and resources needed to meet website requirements; a customer outreach plan; and a strategy to manage and archive data. OMB staff agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-5 | gao_GAO-03-5_0 | The organization’s budget for calendar year 2002 is about $54 million. In early 2002, the United States and other member states to the convention raised concerns that the organization was not fulfilling its mandate because of a number of management weaknesses. The budgets also include inaccurate expense projections. OPCW’s inaccurate income and expense estimates contributed to a budget deficit in 2000, and a potential deficit for 2002, despite plans to achieve balanced budgets in those years. As of June 2002, those states possessing chemical weapons–related facilities, including the United States, owed OPCW more than $2 million in reimbursable inspection expenses from the previous 2 years. However, the budgets underestimated this increase. Unless the organization can obtain additional funding, it will have to further reduce its inspections in 2002. The Secretariat plans to reduce the number of inspections for 2002 to compensate for the potential deficit of $5.2 million. OPCW and State Department Have Taken Steps to Improve Budget Practices, but Problems Remain
The organization has taken some preliminary steps to address its budgeting problems, but it lacks a comprehensive strategy to overcome the inherent weaknesses in its budgeting process. Also, limited oversight resources have affected the organization’s efforts to improve its budgeting process. Conclusions
The OPCW has consistently overestimated its income and underestimated its expenses, and thus has planned more inspections than it is financially able to conduct. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the current budget problems of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with the representatives of other member states and the new Director-General to develop a comprehensive plan to improve the organization’s budgetary practices. Member States in Arrears of Contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (as of August 31, 2002)
$60,127 $163,958 $253,143 $71,155 The Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons preceded the OPCW and carried out the initial implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. GAO Comments
1. We reported that weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization’s ability to perform its primary inspection and international cooperation activities, as outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the use of chemical weapons and requires their elimination. The United States and other member states have raised concerns that a number of management weaknesses may prevent the organization from fulfilling its mandate. As requested, GAO assessed the accuracy of the organization's budget and the impact of budget shortfalls on program activities. GAO also reviewed efforts to improve the organization's budget planning.
What GAO Found
Since its establishment in 1997, the ability of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to carry out key inspection functions has been hindered by inaccurate budget projections and, more recently, budget deficits. The organization has consistently overestimated its income and underestimated its expenses. Its budgets have recorded as income nearly $1 million in unpaid assessments owed by 30 member states. The budgets have also overestimated reimbursement payments for inspections conducted in member states with chemical weapons-related facilities. As of June, 2002, these states owed the organization more than $2 million. Furthermore, the budgets for 2000 through 2002 underestimated personnel expenses. The organization's inaccurate income and spending estimates contributed to a $2.8 million deficit in 2000 and a potential deficit of $5.2 million in 2002. Weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization's ability to perform inspection activities as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The organization had to reduce the number of inspections it conducted in 2001 and plans to reduce the number it conducts in 2002. Although the organization and the State Department have taken some steps to address the budget problems, the organization has not developed a comprehensive plan to overcome its inherent weaknesses. Unless the organization improves its planning, budget shortfalls will continue to affect its ability to conduct inspections. |
gao_GAO-05-563 | gao_GAO-05-563_0 | Minimal Federal Restriction of Competitive Foods
Competitive foods are those foods sold in schools, during the school day, that are not part of the federal school meal programs—that is, they compete with the nutritionally regulated school meal programs. Almost All Schools Sold Competitive Foods in 2003-2004, and Middle School Availability Has Increased over the Last 5 Years
Nearly 9 out of 10 schools sold competitive foods to students in 2003-2004, and over the last 5 years, the availability of competitive foods has increased both in middle schools and in a la carte lines in many schools. High schools and middle schools were more likely to sell competitive foods than elementary schools. Types of Competitive Foods Ranged from Nutritious to Less Nutritious, with High and Middle Schools Selling a Wider Variety of Items
Competitive foods available through a la carte lines, vending machines, and school stores ranged from nutritious items, such as vegetables and salad, to less nutritious items, such as soda and candy. Many People Made Decisions about Competitive Food Sales, but No One Person Commonly Had Responsibility over All Sales in a School
Many people, including district and school officials as well as members of groups selling foods in schools, made decisions about competitive food sales, but no one person consistently had responsibility for all competitive food sales at the school level. Moreover, principals also made decisions about competitive food policies in their schools. Many Different Groups Were Directly Involved in Deciding What to Sell and Selling Competitive Foods
In addition to the district and school officials involved in decisions related to competitive food policy, myriad individuals and groups were directly involved in the sale of competitive foods. Many Schools Raised a Substantial Amount of Revenue through Competitive Food Sales and Used It to Support Food Service Operations and Student Activities
Many schools generated substantial revenue through competitive food sales in 2003-2004, often using this revenue to support food service operations and student activities. In particular, we estimate that about 30 percent of all high schools generated more than $125,000 per school through competitive food sales in 2003-2004, while about 30 percent of all elementary schools generated more than $5,000 per school through these sales (see fig. School Districts We Visited Substituted Healthy Competitive Foods for Less Nutritious Items while Overcoming Obstacles to Change, and the Effects on Revenue Were Unclear
The six school districts we visited all recently took steps to substitute healthy competitive foods for less nutritious items while overcoming several obstacles to change, and in the end, the effects of these changes on revenue were unclear. Although the districts we visited increased the availability of healthy competitive foods and decreased less nutritious items through differing approaches, perseverant and committed individuals took actions in each district to initiate and lead the process of change while also taking steps to involve and obtain support from those affected. In particular, officials in almost all of the districts visited cited opposition because of concerns about future revenue losses as a barrier to changing the availability of competitive foods. However, these data did not account for other factors that may also have affected revenues. In addition, several of the schools reported increases in school meal participation. GAO-04-673. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent increases in child obesity have sparked concerns about competitive foods--foods sold to students at school that are not part of federally reimbursable school meals. The nutritional value of these foods is largely unregulated, and students can often purchase these foods in addition to or instead of school meals. In our April 2004 report on competitive foods (GAO-04-673), we reported that several states had enacted competitive food policies that were more restrictive than federal regulations. However, these policies differed widely in the type and extent of restrictions. In addition, it was unclear how and to what extent states were monitoring compliance with these policies. GAO was also asked to provide a national picture of competitive foods in schools, as well as strategies that districts and schools themselves are taking to limit the availability of less nutritious competitive foods. This report provides information from two nationally representative surveys about the prevalence of competitive foods in schools, competitive foods restrictions and groups involved in their sale, and the amounts and uses of revenue generated from the sale of competitive foods. It also provides information about strategies schools have used to limit the availability of less nutritious competitive foods, based on visits to a total of six school districts in California, Connecticut, Mississippi, Missouri, and South Carolina.
What GAO Found
Nearly 9 out of 10 schools sold competitive foods to students in school year 2003-2004, and the availability of competitive foods sold in middle schools and through a la carte lines has increased over the last 5 years. Schools often sold these foods in or near the cafeteria and during lunch, and the competitive foods available ranged from nutritious items such as fruit and milk to less nutritious items such as soda and candy. High and middle schools were more likely to sell competitive foods than elementary schools. Many different people made decisions about competitive food sales, but no one person commonly had responsibility for all sales in a school. In a majority of schools, district officials made competitive food policies, while school food authority directors and principals made decisions about specific sales. Other groups, such as student clubs and booster groups, also made competitive food decisions through their direct involvement in sales. Many schools, particularly high schools and middle schools, generated substantial revenues through competitive food sales in 2003-2004. Specifically, the nearly 30 percent of high schools generating the most revenue from these sales raised more than $125,000 per school. Food services, responsible for providing federal school meals, generally spent the revenue they generated through a la carte sales on food service operations. Other school groups often used revenues for student activities. The six school districts visited all recently took steps to substitute healthy items for less nutritious competitive foods. In each district, committed individuals took actions to initiate and lead change while also involving those affected. However, districts faced several barriers to change, including opposition due to concerns about revenue losses. In the districts visited, the effects of changes on revenues were often unclear because of limited data. |
gao_GAO-01-697 | gao_GAO-01-697_0 | We found that about $108 million of the adjustments resulted in charging appropriation accounts that had closed before the disbursements were made. Conclusion
Because DOD had not established the requisite systems, controls, and managerial attention required to properly account for its disbursements consistent with the 1990 account closing law, DOD made at least $615 million of illegal or otherwise improper adjustments during fiscal year 2000 alone. DOD was aware of the limitations the account closing law placed on the availability of canceled appropriations and that the law was enacted because of previous abuses by DOD’s use of old appropriations. The department also knew that a major system used to control its use of appropriations allowed for disbursements to be charged in a way that was inconsistent with that law. However, it did nothing to fix the system, although it estimated the cost to do so to be minimal. The $615 million of adjustments we identified in this report as illegal or otherwise improper must be immediately reversed. Furthermore, at a minimum, DOD will need to effect changes to its systems, policies, procedures, and the overall weak control environment that fostered these practices and served to perpetuate this problem. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) handling of appropriated funds from expired appropriation accounts. In 1990, Congress changed the law governing the use of appropriation accounts because it concluded that controls over them were not working. Without adequate controls, Congress was concerned that agencies could disburse money in amounts and for purposes that it had not approved.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD improperly charged appropriation accounts after they were closed. GAO also found that DOD did not establish the requisite systems, controls, and managerial attention required to properly account for its disbursements consistent with the 1990 account closing law. As a result, DOD made at least $615 million of illegal or otherwise improper adjustments during fiscal year 2000 alone. DOD was aware of the limitations the account closing law placed on the availability of canceled appropriations and that the law was enacted because of previous abuses by DOD. DOD also knew that a major system used to control its use of appropriations allowed for disbursements to be charged in a way that was inconsistent with the law. However, DOD did nothing to fix the system, even though the cost to do so was minimal. The $615 million of adjustments GAO identified as illegal or otherwise improper must be immediately reversed. Also, at a minimum, DOD will need to change its systems, policies, and procedures, along with the weak control environment that fostered these practices, and served to perpetuate the problem. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress (GAO-01-994T). |
gao_GAO-01-816 | gao_GAO-01-816_0 | Conclusions
Congress and HCFA recognized that certain services needed to be excluded from the SNF PPS rate to help ensure beneficiary access to appropriate care and to financially protect the SNFs that take care of high- cost patients. The criteria used to identify services— high cost, infrequently provided during a SNF stay, and not likely to be overprovided—and the services currently excluded appear reasonable. Although the criteria and current exclusions appear reasonable, questions remain about whether beneficiaries have appropriate access to services that are covered in the rate or whether additional services should have been excluded. A second concern is that Medicare coverage for excluded facility services has been shifted from part A to part B, which will increase beneficiary liability and limit the services considered for exclusion. In addition, beneficiary liability and program spending may increase because certain services are excluded only when provided in hospital settings, thus discouraging the use of less expensive, clinically appropriate sites of service. Finally, though providing important broad protection for beneficiaries, excluding services from the PPS rate when they are provided in emergency rooms may lead to overuse of this setting and could unnecessarily increase Medicare spending. CMS does not plan to collect data on all services provided to beneficiaries during their SNF stays. Without these data, CMS will be hampered in its efforts to update the exclusions over time. The lack of information about services provided to beneficiaries during their SNF stays will also severely limit efforts to refine the payment system. An analysis of which settings (for example, SNF, hospital outpatient department, ambulatory care, and emergency department) are used to deliver services to SNF patients is also important to ensure that services are provided at the most efficient and appropriate site. | What GAO Found
Congress and the Health Care Financing Administration recognized that certain services needed to be excluded from the skilled nursing facility (SNF) prospective payment system (PPS) rate to help ensure beneficiary access to appropriate care and to financially protect the SNFs that take care of high-cost patients. The criteria used to identify services--high cost, infrequently provided during a SNF stay and likely to be overprovided--and the services currently excluded appear reasonable. Even so, questions remain about whether beneficiaries have appropriate access to services that are covered in the rate or whether additional services should have been excluded. A second concern is that Medicare coverage for excluded facility services has been shifted from part A to part B, which will increase beneficiary liability. and program spending might increase because certain services are excluded only when provided in hospital settings, thus discouraging the use of less expensive, clinically appropriate sites of service. Finally, excluding services from the PPS rate when they are provided in emergency rooms may lead to overuse of emergency rooms, unnecessarily increasing Medicare spending. The Centers for Medicare and Medicare Services (CMS) does not plan to collect data on all services provided to beneficiaries during their SNF stays. Without these data, CMS will have difficulty updating the exclusions over time. The lack of information about services provided to beneficiaries during their SNF stays will also severely limit efforts to refine the payment system. An analysis of which settings (for example, SNF hospital outpatient department, ambulatory care, and emergency department) are used to deliver services to SNF patients is also important to help ensure that services are provided at the most efficient and appropriate site. |
gao_GAO-05-205 | gao_GAO-05-205_0 | 1.) Long-term Decline in Employment-Based Retiree Health Coverage Has Leveled Off, with Retirees Paying an Increasing Share of the Costs
The percentage of employers offering health benefits to retirees, including those who are Medicare-eligible, has decreased since the early 1990s, according to employer benefit surveys, but offer rates have leveled off in recent years. Meanwhile, employment-based retiree health plans experienced increased costs to provide coverage, with one employer benefit survey citing double-digit annual average increases from 2000 through 2003. Financial statements we reviewed for a random sample of 50 Fortune 500 employers showed that over 90 percent of the employers that offered retiree health coverage had increased postretirement benefit obligations from 2001 through 2003. Prescription drug benefits represent a large share of plan sponsors’ retiree health costs, particularly for Medicare-eligible retirees. For example, many plan sponsors have increased cost sharing through increased copayments, coinsurance, and premium shares; restricted eligibility for benefits based on retirement or hiring date; implemented financial caps or other limits on plan sponsors’ contributions to coverage; and made changes to prescription drug benefits, such as creating tiered benefit structures and increasing retiree out-of-pocket contributions. Employers and Plan Sponsors Considering MMA Options for Prescription Drug Coverage, Often Considering Subsidy as Primary Option for Some or All Medicare- Eligible Retirees
At the time of our review, many employers and plan sponsors said they had not decided which MMA options they would implement for their Medicare-eligible retirees, but the primary option many sponsors were considering was the subsidy. Ten of the 15 plan sponsors we interviewed said that while undecided, they were considering the federal subsidy option for some or all of their Medicare-eligible retirees, while 2 other plan sponsors had chosen the subsidy option for all their Medicare-eligible retirees. In our random sample of 50 Fortune 500 employers, most that reported obligations for retiree health benefits indicated that they would choose the federal subsidy or other options, but others had not reported their final MMA decisions on their financial statements filed with the SEC as of November 2004. In addition, 2 plan sponsors we interviewed were considering Medicare Advantage plans, but these plan sponsors were waiting to see how the market for these developed. If employers were not already providing prescription drug benefits to retirees, most benefit consultants and other experts we interviewed said that the MMA was not likely to prompt employers to begin providing coverage or supplementing the Medicare benefits. Plan Sponsors We Interviewed Were Considering MMA Options for Prescription Drug Coverage, but Few Had Made Final Decisions
The 15 private and public sector sponsors of retiree health benefit plans we interviewed were considering their MMA options for prescription drug coverage, but few had decided which MMA options they would choose for all their Medicare-eligible retirees. OPM had not made any decisions at the time of our interview, but in written comments on a draft of this report it indicated that it did not expect to choose the federal subsidy for FEHBP. Plan sponsors would offer coverage wrapping around Medicare part D rather than providing their own comprehensive prescription drug coverage. Sponsors of Retiree Health Benefit Plans We Interviewed Unlikely to Reduce Current Drug Benefits for Medicare Retirees in Response to the MMA
In interviews, sponsors of health plans that included prescription drug benefits for Medicare-eligible retirees told us they did not expect to reduce these benefits in response to the new Medicare part D benefit and the MMA options. The MMA Is Not Likely to Induce Employers Not Already Offering Retiree Health Coverage to Begin Doing So
Few employers, if any, that were not sponsoring retiree prescription drug benefits were expected to begin sponsoring them in response to the MMA. We agree that as noted in the report, these changes contribute to an overall erosion in the value and availability of retiree health benefits. To supplement the trend and financial data and to identify which options for prescription drug coverage provided under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) sponsors of employment-based retiree health benefits said they planned to implement, we interviewed benefit consultants, private and public sector sponsors of employment-based retiree health benefits, officials at associations and groups representing large and small employers and others. We obtained data on the sources of coverage for all health care expenditures and for prescription drug expenditures for retired Medicare beneficiaries from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), sponsored by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) created a prescription drug benefit for beneficiaries, called Medicare part D, beginning in January 2006. The MMA included incentives for sponsors of employment-based retiree health plans to offer prescription drug benefits to Medicare-eligible retirees, such as a federal subsidy when sponsors provide benefits meeting certain MMA requirements. Plan sponsors cannot receive a subsidy for retired Medicare beneficiaries who enroll in part D. In response to an MMA mandate, GAO determined (1) the trends in employment-based retiree health coverage prior to the MMA and (2) which MMA prescription drug options plan sponsors said they would pursue and the effect these options might have on retiree health benefits. GAO identified trends using data from federal and private sector surveys of employers' health benefit plans and financial statements of 50 randomly selected Fortune 500 employers. Where data for Medicare-eligible retirees were not available, GAO reported data for all retirees, including Medicare-eligible retirees. To obtain plan sponsors' views about options they were likely to pursue, GAO reviewed the 50 employers' financial reports and interviewed benefit consultants; private and public sector plan sponsors, including the Office of Personnel Management for federal employees' health benefits; and other experts.
What GAO Found
A long-term decline in the percentage of employers offering retiree health coverage has leveled off in recent years, but retirees face an increasing share of costs, eligibility restrictions, and benefit changes that contribute to an overall erosion in the value and availability of coverage. Although the percentages and time frames differed, two employer benefit surveys showed that the percentage of employers offering health coverage to retirees has declined since the early 1990s; this trend, however, has leveled off. The cost to provide retiree health coverage, including coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, has increased significantly: one employer benefit survey cited double-digit increases each year from 2000 through 2003. Prescription drugs for Medicare-eligible retirees constituted a large share of retiree health costs. Employers and other plan sponsors have used various strategies to limit overall benefit cost growth that included increasing retiree cost sharing and premiums, restricting eligibility for benefits, placing financial caps on health care expenditures, and revising prescription drug benefits. Many plan sponsors had not made final decisions about which MMA prescription drug options they would choose for their Medicare-eligible retirees at the time of GAO's review. Specifically, 13 of the 15 private and public plan sponsors GAO interviewed were undecided for some or all retirees. However, most plan sponsors interviewed had chosen the federal subsidy option for some or all retirees or were considering the subsidy as one of several options. Alternatively, some plan sponsors that had set caps on their retiree health benefit obligations were considering supplementing (known as "wrapping around") the new Medicare prescription drug benefit for some or all retirees rather than providing their own comprehensive prescription drug coverage in lieu of the Medicare drug benefit. Also, some plan sponsors and benefit consultants said they were waiting to see how the market for other MMA options, such as Medicare Advantage plans, develops. About two-thirds of financial statements GAO reviewed for Fortune 500 employers reporting obligations for retiree health benefits had begun to reflect reduced obligations resulting from the MMA options. While plan sponsors contacted said they did not anticipate reducing their drug coverage in view of new coverage offered through the MMA, increasing health care costs might cause them to do so in the future. Benefit consultants and other experts interviewed said that the MMA was not likely to induce employers to begin to provide prescription drug coverage or to supplement the Medicare drug benefit if they had not previously offered retiree health coverage. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and four experts generally agreed with the report's findings. The Office of Personnel Management indicated that it has not made final decisions about which MMA prescription drug option it would choose for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, but it does not expect to choose the subsidy option. |
gao_GAO-13-535 | gao_GAO-13-535_0 | For example, DOD’s approach assigns each installation to only one mission category, even though most installations support more than one mission. DOD’s Method for Estimating Excess Capacity in 1998 and 2004
DOD based its 1998 and 2004 estimates of 23 percent and 24 percent excess capacity, respectively, on a method that compared measures of force structure projected to be in place at the end of the 5-year Future Years Defense Programs that were current at the time of each estimate, to associated indicators of capacity. DOD’s 1998 and 2004 technique consisted of three major steps: (1) categorizing bases according to their primary missions and defining indicators of capacity, (2) developing ratios of capacity-to-force structure for DOD’s baseline year of 1989, and (3) aggregating these various excess capacity indicators that were calculated at the installation level to the military service level and then department- wide. The Methods DOD Used to Estimate Excess Capacity in 1998 and 2004 Have Limitations
DOD recognized some limitations within its method for estimating excess capacity, stating in both its 1998 and 2004 reports to Congress that the analysis it performed provided an indication of the type and amount of excess capacity within the department, but recognizing that the analyses lacked the precision to identify specific installations or functional configurations for realignment or closure. In addition, our current review of DOD’s method for estimating excess capacity outside of a congressionally-authorized BRAC process identified a number of limitations. This approach effectively excluded significant portions of a base’s infrastructure from the analysis. Another limitation associated with DOD’s method is that the services measured capacity for some similar functions differently. These differences make it difficult for DOD to assess excess capacity across the department. A third limitation is that, in using 1989 as a baseline, DOD assumed that the bases and facilities as they existed in 1989 were appropriately sized to support missions, and DOD did not identify any excess capacity or capacity shortfall that may have existed at that time. It is therefore uncertain to what extent DOD’s estimates of excess capacity are overstated or understated. Finally, in both the 1998 and 2004 analyses, in instances where DOD’s analysis indicated that projected capacity was less than needed capacity—indicating a capacity shortage—within a specific installation category, DOD treated these cases as having zero or no excess capacity. Despite the data showing capacity shortages, DOD used this data to aggregate the results of its analysis across the department. If DOD had treated those installation categories as having capacity shortages, DOD’s estimates would have resulted in a lower number of excess bases and consequently a lower percentage of excess capacity across the department than DOD reported to Congress. DOD’s Statements about Remaining Excess Capacity in 2012 and 2013 Relied on Two Earlier Calculations
DOD’s testimony in March 2012 and March 2013, that by its estimates DOD had about 20 percent excess capacity remaining after the end of BRAC 2005, relied on earlier calculations that the department made in 2004 and 2005. However, because DOD’s pre-BRAC excess capacity estimate, which is expressed as a percentage of bases, and plant replacement value, which is expressed in dollars, are not measured in the same units, they are not comparable measures. In March 2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) testified that the method upon which DOD’s current estimate of 20 percent excess capacity is based is helpful in making a broad assessment in determining whether an additional BRAC round is justified, but it cannot identify specific installations or functional configurations for realignment or closure. He further stated that only through the BRAC process is the Department able to determine excess capacity by installation and by mission or function in a process that is thorough and fair. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, DOD stated that we properly highlighted the limitations of its approach used to estimate excess capacity. Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due in part to challenges DOD faces in reducing excess infrastructure, DOD's Support Infrastructure Management is on GAO's High Risk List of program areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DOD has relied on the BRAC process as a primary means of reducing excess infrastructure or capacity and realigning bases to meet changes in the size and structure of its forces. In 1998 and 2004, Congress required DOD to submit reports that, among other things, estimated the amount of DOD's excess capacity at that time. Also, in March 2012, DOD testified that it had about 20 percent excess capacity. The methods used to develop such preliminary excess capacity estimates differ from the data-intensive process--supplemented by military judgment--that DOD has used to formulate specific base closure and realignment recommendations.
A Senate Armed Services Committee report directed GAO to review how DOD identifies bases or facilities excess to needs. The objective of this report is to discuss how DOD has estimated its excess capacity, outside of the BRAC process. To do so, GAO reviewed excess capacity estimates from 1998, 2004, and 2012; analyzed DOD's data; reviewed supporting documentation; assessed assumptions and limitations of DOD's analysis; and interviewed DOD officials.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that GAO had properly highlighted the limitations of its approach to estimating excess capacity and contrasted it with the method used to develop BRAC recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) methods for estimating excess capacity outside of a congressionally-authorized Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process have limitations. DOD used similar processes in its excess capacity analyses conducted in 1998 and 2004. This process included three major steps: (1) categorizing bases according to their primary missions and defining indicators of capacity; (2) developing ratios of capacity-to-force structure for DOD's baseline year of 1989; and (3) aggregating the analysis from the installation level across the military services and department-wide.
In both its 1998 and 2004 reports, DOD recognized some limitations with its methods for estimating excess capacity and stated that its analyses lacked the precision necessary to identify specific installations or functional configurations for realignment or closure. In addition, GAO's review of DOD's methods for estimating excess capacity outside of a congressionally-authorized BRAC process identified a number of limitations. First, DOD's approach assigns each installation to only one mission category, even though most installations support more than one mission. This approach effectively excluded significant portions of some bases' infrastructure from the analysis. Second, the services measured capacity for some similar functions differently such as test and evaluation facilities, which makes it difficult for DOD to evaluate excess capacity across the department. Third, DOD did not attempt to identify any excess capacity or capacity shortfall that existed in 1989; hence it is uncertain to what extent DOD's estimates of excess capacity may be overstated or understated. Finally, in instances where DOD's analysis indicated that projected capacity was less than needed capacity--indicating a capacity shortage--within an installation category, DOD treated these cases as having zero or no excess capacity when aggregating the results of its analysis. If DOD had treated those installation categories as having a capacity shortages, DOD's method would have calculated a lower number of bases and consequently a lower percentage of excess capacity across the department than DOD reported to Congress.
DOD's testimony in March 2012 and again in March 2013, that it had about 20 percent excess capacity remaining after the end of BRAC 2005, relied on earlier calculations that the department made in 2004 and 2005. Specifically, these estimates were reached by subtracting DOD's estimate of the amount of capacity that would be eliminated by the approved recommendations from BRAC 2005--3 to 5 percent of plant replacement value--from DOD's 2004 estimate that it had 24 percent excess capacity. However, pre-BRAC estimates of the percentage of bases that may be excess to needed capacity, which is expressed as a percentage of bases, and plant replacement value, which is measured in dollars, are not comparable measures. In March 2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) testified that the method upon which DOD's current estimate is based is helpful in determining whether an additional BRAC round is justified, but only through the BRAC process is the Department able to determine specifically which installations or facilities are excess. |
gao_RCED-99-3 | gao_RCED-99-3_0 | In DOE’s fiscal year 1997 Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act report accompanying its financial statements, the Department indicated that it had extensive inventories of real and personal property that is no longer necessary and that disposal of this property could save future storage, security, and maintenance costs. Federal Regulations Provide Guidelines for Real Property but DOE’s Guidance Does Not Include Criteria for Determining When Personal Property Is Excess
The federal property management regulations specify that executive agencies should dispose of real and personal property that is excess to their needs and include guidelines for determining when real property is unneeded or underutilized. The regulations then describe the disposal process to be used for any property determined to be excess. DOE’s Property Records Do Not Consistently Reflect When Property Is Excess
DOE’s recently revised guidance on property records requires contractors to record property already identified as excess. However, for personal property, without further guidance, these records will not provide information to help identify other personal property that is no longer needed. This database contains information such as the location, size, age, and acquisition cost of the property and the percentage of a facility being used. In July 1998, DOE added a new requirement to its real property records system by adding an “excess indicator” to show whether a property has been determined to be excess. The challenges cited by DOE officials include a lack of funding for the decontamination and decommissioning of excess real property and the existence of few incentives for program and field offices to identify property as excess. Among the problems noted in the report were that (1) DOE lacks policies and criteria for determining when materials are excess to the Department’s needs and (2) the function of declaring materials excess usually rests with program managers at DOE’s sites, who have little or no incentive to address the problem and who lack the resources and funding to identify and dispose of excess materials. However, without the program managers’ knowing the actual costs to maintain their property, there is little incentive to spend the resources necessary to dispose of it. Examples of Innovative Approaches to Identifying and Disposing of Excess Property
Innovative approaches to the identification and disposal of excess property have been developed at the field and program office levels. DOE generally disagreed with our assessment of the extent to which criteria exist. However, these regulations are general in nature and do not provide any specific guidance similar to that found in the real property regulations. Scope and Methodology
To determine what criteria DOE uses to guide the identification and disposal of excess property and whether DOE’s property records reflect what is no longer needed to carry out its missions, we reviewed the federal property management regulations and DOE’s property management regulations and guidance. 6, 1998). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to identify and dispose of property that is excess to its needs, focusing on the: (1) criteria the Department uses to guide the identification and disposal of excess property; (2) extent to which the Department's property records reflect what is no longer needed to carry out its missions; and (3) challenges the Department believes exist in identifying excess property and the innovative approaches being used to dispose of this property.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal property management regulations include criteria to determine when real property is excess to an agency's needs; (2) however, neither federal property management regulations nor DOE's regulations and guidance include specific criteria to determine when personal property is no longer needed; (3) when property has been identified as excess, guidelines for the disposal process are well defined for both real and personal property; (4) DOE's property records do not consistently provide information that would help identify property that is no longer needed; (5) recent changes to DOE's regulations require that property records identify property that has already been determined to be excess; (6) in July 1998, DOE modified its real property records system to identify property that has been determined to be excess; (7) this system also provides additional information, such as the percentage of a facility currently in use, that could be used to identify other property that is no longer needed; (8) similarly, in May 1998, DOE revised its personal property management regulations to require that contractors' records include information on current usage, such as categorizing property as active, in storage, or excess; (9) however, these regulations do not provide criteria for determining when personal property should be placed in these categories; (10) DOE acknowledges problems with its identification and disposal of excess real and personal property; (11) Department officials cited, for example, a lack of funding for the environmental cleanup of the current inventory of excess real property and a lack of incentives to identify property as excess; (12) because the costs associated with the maintenance and storage of unneeded property are generally not separately identified, little incentive exists to spend the resources necessary to dispose of it; and (13) regardless of the problems, field and program offices have developed some innovative approaches to dispose of property, such as including a performance-based incentive in the site management contract to encourage the contractor operating the site to dispose of excess property during the fiscal year. |
gao_NSIAD-98-143 | gao_NSIAD-98-143_0 | Avoidance of multiple transitions and personnel turbulence. Workload stability. We identified significant weaknesses in both the logic and economic rationale presented to support combining workloads at the Sacramento and San Antonio depots into single solicitations at each location. According to the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, alternatives that appear logical and potentially cost-effective should have been evaluated. The Air Force’s position that realizing efficiencies from shared personnel and facilities at Sacramento and San Antonio is best achieved with a single solicitation for combined workloads is questionable. The Air Force data does not support the conclusion that the inherent inefficiencies of the commodity workload are improved by combining it with the more predictable and consistent aircraft workload. Incomprehensive or Inconsistent Comparative Cost Analyses
The Air Force analyses stated that workload combination would save $22 million to $130 million at Sacramento and $92 million to $259 million at San Antonio. Also, the possibility of the cost benefits of increased competition resulting from solicitations for individual workloads was not recognized. Transition costs. Conclusions
The Air Force’s support for DOD’s determinations that it is more logical and economical to combine the workloads being competed at the closing depots is based on a wide variety of information accumulated during the acquisition strategy development process started in September 1995. We also recognize that the determinations ultimately represent a management judgment based on various qualitative and quantitative factors. Consequently, DOD’s determinations may well be appropriate, but its rationale is not well supported. To analyze the rationale for DOD’s determination, we reviewed (1) information contained in the reports; (2) documentation and other data supporting the reports; (3) discussions with Air Force officials responsible for preparing the reports and managing depot maintenance workloads; (4) discussions with contractor officials who are planning to participate in the competitions for workloads currently performed at the Sacramento and San Antonio depots; (5) discussions with Air Force Audit Agency officials who provided advice on the preparation of the Sacramento white paper and San Antonio report; (6) a review of related Air Force studies, reports, and data; (7) our prior work regarding related depot maintenance issues; and (8) a review of applicable laws and regulations. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) supporting rationale for combining certain depot-level maintenance and repair workloads.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force's support for DOD's determinations that it is more logical and economical to combine the workloads being competed at the closing depots is based on a wide variety of information accumulated during the acquisition strategy development process started in September 1995; (2) while GAO recognizes that the determinations ultimately represent a management judgment based on various qualitative and quantitative factors and that DOD's determinations may well be appropriate, the rationale presented in the February 24, 1998, Sacramento white paper and San Antonio report for combining the workloads in single solicitations at each location is not well supported; (3) GAO's assessment indicates that there are significant weaknesses in logic, assumptions, and data; (4) DOD did not consider other alternatives that appear to be logical and potentially cost-effective, and its assumption that efficiencies from shared personnel and facilities are best achieved with a single solicitation for combined workloads at each location is questionable; (5) also, the Air Force's claim that the effects of sequential personnel reductions and transition delays can be problematic is questionable in view of DOD's demonstrated success in the past handling multiple transitions and sequential reductions; (6) in addition, the workload stability rationale for Sacramento is questionable because the inherent inefficiencies of the commodity workload are not likely to be improved by combination with the more predictable and consistent aircraft workload; and (7) finally, the Air Force's cost analysis, which concluded that workload combination would save $22 million to $130 million at Sacramento and $92 million to $259 million at San Antonio, is questionable because it did not consider all cost factors, such as the cost benefits of increased competition resulting from solicitations for individual workloads. |
gao_NSIAD-95-64 | gao_NSIAD-95-64_0 | Background
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), service headquarters, and inventory control points are responsible for managing secondary inventory. Opportunities Exist to Reduce Inventory and Storage Space
According to DLA, DOD’s secondary inventory occupies about 360 million cubic feet of storage space and has an actual volume of about 300 million cubic feet. This work showed that DOD has a substantial number of items that (1) have over a 20-year supply beyond the levels needed to meet war reserve and operational needs, (2) are for weapon systems no longer in use, (3) are no longer usable, and (4) are not needed. Substantial Amounts of Stored Inventory Exceed 20 Years of Supply
To estimate the years of supply for each of the types of items, we divided the on-hand inventory by past or projected demand data. We had demand data for about 488,000 of the 2.2 million items that were not needed to satisfy current war reserves or operating requirements. DOD Has Made Progress Reducing Its Inventory
DOD has implemented several programs—some DOD-wide and others service specific—to reduce secondary inventory. This charge should be an incentive for item managers to dispose of material that is not needed. The Secretary could begin by instructing inventory control points and program managers to focus their inventory reduction efforts on the material that occupies a great deal of storage space and has more than 20 years of supply on hand. GAO Comments
1. 2. As we stated in our report, many of these items may have potential future use and should be retained. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. The statement that inventory disposals have been insufficient to offset increases in material returns is from DOD officials. This reduced our calculation of the space occupied by secondary inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory management system, focusing on the: (1) size and space occupied by DOD secondary inventory; (2) cost of storing this inventory; and (3) efforts taken to reduce DOD secondary inventory.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD secondary inventory occupies about 218.8 million cubic feet; (2) 60 percent of the secondary inventory is not needed to satisfy current war reserve or operating requirements, however, many items may have potential future use; (3) the inventory not currently needed consists of 2.2 million different types of items; (4) DOD has more than a 20-year supply for some items, but many others have deteriorated or become obsolete; (5) DOD should get rid of unneeded items that occupy space and exceed more than 20 years of supply; (6) although DOD has begun programs to reduce the secondary inventory, its efforts have been partially offset by decreasing inventory demands and increasing returns of materials by deactivated forces; (7) DOD disposed of secondary inventory items valued at $43 billion during the past 3 fiscal years; and (8) the Defense Logistics Agency is implementing a pricing procedure that should increase inventory managers' incentives for disposing of unneeded items. |
gao_GAO-16-324 | gao_GAO-16-324_0 | Background
American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are five territories of the United States. Additionally, federal Medicaid funding in states is not subject to a limit, provided the states contribute their share of program expenditures for services provided. In contrast, federal Medicaid funding in each territory is subject to a statutory cap. According to CMS officials, this funding can be used once territories expend their Medicaid and CHIP funding each year. For example, although not required, they can establish program integrity units, which are tasked with identifying and recovering improper payments. For example, territories must establish Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU), which are tasked with investigating Medicaid fraud and other health care law violations, or receive an exemption from CMS from establishing one. The territories are also required to implement a Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS), which is a claims processing and information retrieval system that includes capabilities for reporting claims data, enrollee encounter data, and conducting pre- and post-payment review. Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility and Benefits Reflect the Territories’ Unique Circumstances
Due to the flexibility territories have in administering their Medicaid and CHIP programs, the territories’ program eligibility and benefits not only reflect their unique circumstances, but also differ from one another and from the states. Specifically, Guam covers all of the 17 mandatory Medicaid benefits; CNMI and the U.S. Virgin Islands cover nearly all of the benefits; and American Samoa and Puerto Rico cover 10 of the 17 benefits. 1.) Officials from the four territories that do not cover all mandatory Medicaid benefits cited multiple reasons for not doing so, including limited funding and a lack of infrastructure. In particular, officials from Puerto Rico and American Samoa said that their programs do not cover nursing facility services due to insufficient funding and because they do not have nursing homes;
CNMI officials noted that its program does not cover freestanding birth center services because there are no such facilities in the territory; and due to the lack of available providers, certain specialty services covered by American Samoa, CNMI, and Guam are only available off- island. 2.) Temporary Funding Has Enabled the Territories to Increase Medicaid and CHIP Spending, although Future Shortfalls Remain a Concern
The recent temporary increases in federal funding have enabled the territories to increase Medicaid and CHIP spending, and avoid federal funding shortfalls. Most notably, PPACA’s appropriation of an additional $7.3 billion in Medicaid funding for the territories—available for expenditure through at least fiscal year 2019—provided them flexibility in terms of when they choose to draw down the additional funds. As a result, the territory officials noted that the territories may run out of the temporary funding early, have to make program cuts once the funding is exhausted, or both. Limited Territory and Federal Oversight Efforts Provide Little Assurance of Medicaid and CHIP Program Integrity
Territory and federal oversight efforts provide little assurance that the territories’ Medicaid and CHIP funds are protected from fraud, waste, and abuse. Federal Officials Reported Making Limited Program Integrity Efforts, Citing the Small Amount of Medicaid Spending in the Territories
With regard to program oversight, CMS’s general practice has been to conduct comprehensive program integrity reviews in all of the states; however, of the five territories, it has conducted such reviews only in Puerto Rico, the most recent of which was released in January 2012 and produced multiple findings. While Medicaid spending in the territories is small as a proportion of total Medicaid spending, such limited federal oversight efforts provide little assurance that Medicaid is protected from fraud, waste, and abuse, and are inconsistent with federal internal control standards regarding the identification, analysis, and response to relevant risks as part of achieving program objectives. Additionally, until recently, CMS regulations exempted territories from the requirement to develop an MMIS, which could provide more detail on the territories’ Medicaid and CHIP spending, including increasing the level of detail on the territories’ CMS-64 reporting. Such limited federal efforts in the territories are inconsistent with federal internal control standards regarding identifying and responding to relevant risks when conditions change, such as when PPACA significantly increased territories’ federal Medicaid funding. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure the appropriate level of Medicaid program integrity oversight in the territories, we recommend that the Acting Administrator of CMS reexamine CMS’s program integrity strategy and develop a cost-effective approach to enhancing Medicaid program integrity in the territories. Such an approach could select from a broad array of activities, including—but not limited to—establishing program oversight mechanisms, such as requiring territories to establish a MFCU or working with them to obtain necessary exemptions or waivers from applicable program oversight requirements; assisting territories in improving their information on Medicaid and CHIP program spending; and conducting additional program assessments of program integrity as warranted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Notable differences exist in the funding and operation of Medicaid and CHIP—joint federal-state health financing programs for low-income and medically needy individuals—in the territories versus the states. For example, the territories are subject to certain funding restrictions, such as capped annual federal funding, that are not applicable to the states. Further, certain federal requirements regarding eligibility, benefits, and program integrity do not apply to the territories' programs, and certain otherwise applicable requirements have not been enforced. In recent years, various laws—such as PPACA—have increased funding for Medicaid and CHIP in the territories.
This report examines (1) eligibility and benefit characteristics of the territories' Medicaid and CHIP programs, (2) Medicaid and CHIP spending in the territories, and (3) Medicaid and CHIP program integrity efforts in the territories. GAO reviewed laws and regulations, data on five territories' Medicaid and CHIP spending, and federal internal control standards. GAO also interviewed CMS and territory Medicaid officials.
What GAO Found
Eligibility and benefits for Medicaid and the state Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in five U.S. territories—American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, Puerto Rico and the U. S. Virgin Islands—differ from one another and from the states, generally reflecting the territories' unique circumstances. For example, Guam is the only territory that covers all 17 mandatory Medicaid benefits, while American Samoa and Puerto Rico cover 10 of the 17 benefits. Officials from the territories that do not cover all mandatory benefits cited multiple reasons for not doing so, including limited funding and a lack of infrastructure, and, in some cases, exercised available flexibility to exclude certain benefits.
Temporary increases in federal funding have enabled the territories to increase Medicaid and CHIP spending. Unlike the states, whose Medicaid funding is not subject to a capped allotment—provided they contribute their share—territories are subject to a capped allotment, and historically have exhausted available federal Medicaid and CHIP funds each year. Most notably, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provided the territories an additional $7.3 billion through at least fiscal year 2019. Officials in four territories cited positive effects of the additional funding, such as the ability to enroll more providers and cover more services; however, some officials also expressed concerns about the temporary nature of the funding, noting that they may have to make program cuts once the funding is exhausted—and that future shortfalls remain a concern.
Despite temporary increases in Medicaid funding, GAO found little assurance that territory Medicaid funds are protected from fraud, waste, and abuse.
Program oversight mechanisms : Only Puerto Rico has developed a program integrity unit, which, although not required, is tasked with identifying and recovering improper payments and is a management best practice. Additionally, no territory has established a Medicaid Fraud Control Unit—which identify and prosecute Medicaid fraud—or received an exemption from doing so, as required by federal law.
Program information : Territories lack detail on the types and volume of services they provide, contrary to federal reporting requirements, resulting in limited information on how territories spend their federal Medicaid funding. Until recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), exempted the territories from the requirement to implement a claims processing and information retrieval system with program integrity capabilities, although the U.S. Virgin Islands has established a partnership to use such a system.
Program assessments : CMS has performed assessments on Medicaid program integrity effectiveness and compliance only for Puerto Rico. Although not required, such assessments have been conducted on all states.
CMS does provide technical assistance, with the activities of CMS officials varying across the territories. Officials from CMS noted that funding for program integrity would count against the territories' capped allotments. Nonetheless, such limited efforts by the territories and federal government are inconsistent with federal internal control standards regarding identifying and responding to risks, particularly in light of increased federal Medicaid spending in the territories as a result of PPACA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Acting Administrator of CMS examine and select from a broad array of activities—such as establishing program oversight mechanisms, assisting in improving program information, and conducting program assessments—to develop a cost-effective approach to protecting territories' Medicaid programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-483 | gao_GAO-16-483_0 | To facilitate determining if a MCDV record or protection order would prohibit an individual from receiving or possessing a firearm, state and local criminal justice agencies can identify (“flag”) prohibiting records from among all the other records that they provide to the III and NCIC. The Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, and ATF regulations establish the types of MCDV convictions and domestic violence protection orders that prohibit a person from possessing a firearm under federal law. States Vary in Their Use of Indicators That Identify Domestic Violence Records That Prohibit a Firearm Transfer
22 States Use Indicators to Identify Criminal History Records That Prohibit Firearm Transfers, Which Include Domestic Violence Records
MCDV records in the Interstate Identification Index
Twenty-two states voluntarily participate in the Identification for Firearms Sales (IFFS) program and flag criminal records in the III that prohibit an individual from receiving or possessing a firearm. FBI officials noted that it is not possible to identify all of the domestic violence records in the III because there is no automatic process that can disaggregate these records from the 88 million other criminal records. Most States Submit a Limited Number of Domestic Violence Records to the NICS Index, Because Such Records Are More Often Made Available to Other Systems Checked by NICS
States can submit pre-validated, firearm disqualifying MCDV records and protection orders to the NICS Index for use solely during NICS checks. Most NICS Checks Involving Domestic Violence Records Are Completed before Firearm Transfers Take Place, but About 6,700 Firearms Were Transferred to Prohibited Individuals Since 2006; DOJ Could Analyze Denial Data to Help Establish Priorities
About 70 Percent of MCDV-Related Denials Were Completed within 3 Business Days, Which Is a Lower Percentage than for Other Prohibiting Categories
FBI data show that about 70 percent of NICS checks involving prohibiting MCDV records were denied within 3 business days. More than 500 Firearms Transferred Each Year to Individuals with Prohibiting Domestic Violence Records Because Denial Determinations Were Made after 3 Business Days
According to FBI data, more than 500 firearms were transferred to individuals with prohibiting MCDV records or prohibiting protection orders each year from fiscal years 2006 through 2015—about 6,700 total transfers—because the FBI denial determination was made after 3 business days, which resulted in the FBI referring these cases to ATF for firearm retrieval. Under federal law, firearm dealers may transfer a firearm to an individual if the dealer has not received a response from the NICS Section after 3 business days. FBI Does Not Analyze Some Available Data to Monitor the Timeliness of NICS Checks and Share Results to Help Set Priorities
DOJ and the FBI have taken steps to help improve the timely completion of NICS checks but have not established procedures to assess or monitor how long it takes to complete checks for each prohibiting category, which could help inform FBI and other DOJ entities on which areas they should prioritize resources, such as grant funding and training. Ongoing monitoring or analysis similar to the analysis we conducted could help the FBI determine if specific prohibiting categories present greater challenges in completing determinations than other categories and, in turn, the FBI could use the results and provide them to other DOJ entities to help establish priorities. State and local governments often rely on DOJ’s guidance, grants, and identification of practices that can help mitigate challenges in conducting background checks. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the extent to which states identify domestic violence records for use during National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) checks, we analyzed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data on the number of domestic violence records that states identified and made available to NICS, including those protection orders flagged with the Brady Indicator, provided by states and territories from 2006 through 2015. To determine the extent to which NICS checks involving domestic violence records are completed before firearm transfers take place, we analyzed DOJ documentation and data to identify trends in total number of NICS checks, denials, delayed denials, firearm retrievals, and days required to determine the outcome of a check. For example, Oregon has five statutorily prohibiting categories of misdemeanor convictions in addition to domestic violence. The Brady Indicator flags protection orders related to domestic violence that prohibit the individual from receiving or possessing firearms under federal law. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FBI and designated state and local criminal justice agencies use the FBI's NICS to conduct background checks on individuals seeking to obtain firearms. Persons prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms include individuals who have domestic violence records that meet federal disqualifying criteria. Under federal law, firearm dealers may transfer a firearm to an individual if the FBI has not made a proceed or denial determination within 3 business days.
GAO was asked to review NICS checks involving domestic violence records. This report (1) describes the extent to which states identify domestic violence records that prohibit an individual from obtaining a firearm and (2) evaluates the extent to which NICS checks involving domestic violence records are completed before firearm transfers take place and any related challenges in completing these checks.
GAO reviewed laws and regulations; analyzed FBI data from 2006 through 2015 on domestic violence records that states submitted to the FBI, FBI total checks and denial determinations, and DOJ firearm retrieval actions; and interviewed officials from DOJ and eight states (chosen based on number of domestic violence records submitted to NICS and other factors). State interview results are not generalizable but provide insights on state practices.
What GAO Found
Most of the 50 states submit domestic violence records—misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) convictions and domestic violence protection orders—to the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for use during National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) checks, but states vary in their efforts to identify (“flag”) such records that prohibit an individual from obtaining a firearm under federal law. For example, in 2015, 22 states voluntarily participated in a program to identify criminal history records that prohibit individuals from obtaining firearms, which can include domestic violence records. FBI data also show that 47 states identified domestic violence protection orders that prohibit firearm purchases. Since not all domestic violence records that states submit to the FBI meet federal prohibiting criteria, flagging prohibiting records can help expedite NICS checks. The total number of prohibiting domestic violence records that states submit to the FBI is generally unknown because states are not required to flag prohibiting records and there is no automated process to disaggregate such records from other records checked by NICS.
For fiscal years 2006 to 2015, FBI data show that most NICS checks involving domestic violence records that resulted in denials were completed before firearm transfers took place (see table). However, about 6,700 firearms were transferred to individuals with prohibiting domestic violence records, which resulted in the FBI referring these cases to DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives for firearm retrieval. Under federal law, firearm dealers may (but are not required to) transfer a firearm to an individual if the dealer has not received a response (proceed or denial) from the FBI after 3 business days.
FBI data also show that during fiscal year 2015, the FBI completed 90 percent of denials that involved MCDV convictions within 7 business days, which was longer than for any other prohibiting category (e.g., felony convictions). The FBI completed 90 percent of denials that involved domestic violence protection orders in fewer than 3 business days. According to federal and selected state officials GAO contacted, the information needed to determine whether domestic violence records—and in particular MCDV convictions—meet the criteria to prohibit a firearm transfer is not always readily available in NICS databases and can require additional outreach to state agencies to obtain information. DOJ has taken steps to help states make prohibiting information more readily available to NICS—such as through training and grant programs—but does not monitor the timeliness of checks that result in denials by prohibiting category. Ongoing monitoring could help the FBI determine if specific prohibiting categories present greater challenges in making determinations than other categories and, in turn, the FBI could provide the results to other DOJ entities to help them establish priorities, such as for grants, state outreach, or training.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FBI monitor the timeliness of NICS checks to assist DOJ entities in establishing priorities for improving the timeliness of checks. FBI agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-01-752 | gao_GAO-01-752_0 | For most of the key goals that VA did not achieve, it explained why the goals were not achieved. Processing Veterans’ Benefit Claims
VA reported making little progress toward achieving its key outcome of processing compensation and pension benefit claims timely and accurately in fiscal year 2000. Comparison of VA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes improvements or remaining weaknesses in VA’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report, and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. Comparison of Performance Plans for Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002
VA made several improvements to its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. VA’s Efforts to Address Major Management Challenges Identified by GAO
VA addressed all six of the major management challenges identified by GAO, and generally described goals or actions that VA is taking or plans to take in response to them. VA has established strategies for achieving strategic goals and objectives for human capital management and information security. VA has established a performance goal and identified milestones for implementing certain strategies to address information security. For example, VA cited our statement that it has not identified performance goals and measures for human capital management linked to achieving programmatic results. Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to assess VA's process in achieving selected key outcomes that are important to its mission.
What GAO Found
VA reported making mixed progress towards achieving its key outcomes. For example, VA reported that it made good progress in providing high-quality care to patients, but it did not achieve its goal of processing veterans' benefits claims in a timely manner. GAO found out that VA made several improvements to its fiscal year 2000 performance report and 2002 performance plan. These improvements resulted in clearer discussions of VA's management challenges and additional performance measures for assessing program achievement. Furthermore, VA addressed all six of the major management challenges previously identified by GAO, and generally described goals or actions that VA is taking or plans to take in response to them. VA has established strategies for achieving strategic goals and objectives for two of these challenges: human capital management and information security. VA has established a performance goal and identified milestones for implementing certain strategies to address information security. However, VA has not identified performance goals and measures for human capital management linked to achieving programmatic results. |
gao_HEHS-95-134 | gao_HEHS-95-134_0 | ORI’s Procedures Conform to Generally Accepted Standards
ORI developed procedures for handling scientific misconduct cases and implemented them in November 1992. Specifically, ORI procedures meet the PCIE standards by containing explicit statements on the qualifications of staff needed to handle investigations; independence required to conduct investigations; due professional care needed for the work; and other qualitative standards, such as planning, executing, and reporting investigation results. We observed delays in ORI’s handling of misconduct cases. The IG’s report made a number of other recommendations designed to improve ORI’s productivity. The report concluded that implementing such a system would greatly aid in determining whether ORI needs additional investigative staff. Such a plan—particularly if it includes (1) a comprehensive assessment of ORI’s workload and staffing requirements and (2) measures to reduce the case backlog and close cases more quickly—should help ensure an optimum use of resources. Among its fiscal year 1995 management initiatives, ORI has started work on a strategic plan and will begin setting specific performance measures. Conclusion
Since its inception, ORI has made progress in improving its handling of scientific misconduct cases. Scope and Methodology
To assess ORI’s process for handling misconduct cases, we reviewed its written guidance and examined how it screens allegations and conducts investigations and oversight functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined whether the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Research Integrity (ORI): (1) has the appropriate policies, procedures, and investigative practices for handling misconduct allegations in a timely; and (2) has any staffing issues that may adversely affect ORI responsiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) ORI has developed and implemented procedures for handling misconduct cases by assessing the qualifications of its investigative staff, the level of independence and professional care needed to conduct investigations, and other qualitative standards for planning, executing, and reporting investigation results; (2) the techniques ORI uses in handling misconduct cases raises a few concerns; (3) despite ORI success in implementing procedures for handling misconduct cases, it continues to experience delays in closing cases; (4) ORI needs a comprehensive assessment of its resources since it faces a substantial case backlog; and (5) ORI has initiated a number of actions to improve productivity and plans to refine its planning processes during fiscal year 1995. |
gao_GAO-06-143 | gao_GAO-06-143_0 | In 2003, the APWU plan became the first CDHP offered to federal employees. A savings account to pay for services under the deductible. The FEHBP has recently begun to offer CDHPs to federal employees. The APWU CDHP
Administered by Definity Health Plan, the APWU CDHP is a high- deductible PPO plan coupled with an HRA. APWU CDHP Enrollees Included Few Retirees and Elderly and Were Younger than Other FEHBP Enrollees
Fewer retirees and elderly people selected the APWU CDHP compared to the national PPO plans, a phenomenon also found among the other new plans. The average age of APWU CDHP enrollees was comparable to that of enrollees in other new plans, but lower than enrollees in the national PPO plans by about 15 years—47 each in both the APWU CDHP and the other new plans compared to 62 for the PPO plans. Excluding the elderly and retirees, the average ages of enrollees in the APWU CDHP, the other new plans, and the national PPO plans were more similar—45, 43, and 47, respectively. APWU CDHP Enrollees Were Healthier, Better Educated, and More Likely to Enroll in Individual Plans
Excluding enrollees over age 65, the proportion of APWU CDHP enrollees who reported on annual satisfaction surveys being in “excellent” or “very good” health status was higher than among the other new plan and PPO plan enrollees. The proportion of APWU CDHP enrollees under the age of 65 who reported having a 4-year or higher college degree was higher than among the other new plan and the PPO plan enrollees. APWU CDHP Enrollee Satisfaction with Overall Plan Performance Was Mixed Compared to Other Plans
On the overall plan performance measure included in annual consumer satisfaction surveys, APWU CDHP enrollees were more satisfied than other new plan enrollees, but less satisfied than national PPO plan enrollees—67 percent versus 53 and 76 percent, respectively. APWU CDHP Enrollees Were Generally as Satisfied as Other Plan Enrollees on Four of Five Specific Performance Measures
For four of five specific plan performance measures—access to health care, timeliness of health care, provider communications, and claims processing—APWU CDHP enrollee satisfaction was generally comparable to that of other enrollees. Moreover, for three of the components that constitute the customer service performance measure, APWU CDHP enrollees were less satisfied than national PPO plan enrollees. The components are satisfaction with finding or understanding information, satisfaction with getting help when calling customer service, and satisfaction with the health plan paperwork. APWU CDHP Enrollee Access to Provider Networks and Discounts Was Generally Comparable to Other FEHBP Plans
Provider networks appeared to provide APWU CDHP enrollees with similar access to health care providers compared to networks of other FEHBP plans. In the remaining 9 states, accounting for approximately 16 percent of total plan enrollment, the APWU CDHP used networks that were either nationally accredited, or were comparable in size to networks used by other FEHBP plans based on counts of hospitals or physicians included in the network. Across all states, the average hospital inpatient and physician discounts for the APWU CDHP and another national PPO plan differed by no more than 2 percentage points. Agency Comments and Comments from APWU
We received comments on a draft of this report from OPM (see app. I) and APWU. Both generally concurred with our findings. Regarding the potential for CDHPs to disproportionately attract healthier enrollees, OPM said that while enrollment in the APWU CDHP is growing, the plan accounted for a small fraction of total FEHBP enrollment and that OPM did not anticipate any harm accruing to other FEHBP enrollees as a result of its enrollment trends. Nevertheless, OPM said it would continue to monitor enrollment trends and take appropriate action to eliminate or minimize any adverse effects. Appendix I: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) has offered "consumer-directed" health plans (CDHP) to federal employees. A CDHP is a high-deductible health plan coupled with a savings account enrollees use to pay for health care. Unused balances may accumulate for future use, providing enrollees the incentive to purchase health care prudently. However, some have expressed concern that CDHPs may attract younger and healthier enrollees, leaving older, less healthy enrollees to drive up costs in traditional plans. They also question whether enrollees are satisfied with the plans, and have sufficient access to health care providers and discounts on health care services. GAO was asked to study the first FEHBP CDHP, offered by the American Postal Workers Union (APWU). GAO compared the number, characteristics, and satisfaction of APWU enrollees to those of FEHBP enrollees in other recently introduced (new) non-CDHP plans, and national preferred provider organization (PPO) plans. GAO also compared the APWU CDHP provider networks and discounts to those of other FEHBP plans.
What GAO Found
The APWU CDHP is a small but growing FEHBP health plan whose enrollees were younger than PPO plan enrollees, and healthier and better educated than other new plan and PPO enrollees. The average age of APWU CDHP and other new plan enrollees was the same (47 years), but younger than that of PPO plan enrollees (62 years), largely because fewer retirees and elderly people selected the new plans. Excluding retirees and the elderly, the average age of enrollees was more similar across the plans. A larger share of nonelderly enrollees in the APWU CDHP reported being in "excellent" or "very good" health status compared to the other new plan and PPO plan enrollees--73 percent versus 64 and 58 percent, respectively. Similarly, a larger share of nonelderly enrollees in the APWU CDHP reported having a 4-year or higher college degree compared to enrollees in the other new plans and PPO plans--49 percent versus 42 and 36 percent, respectively. Enrollee satisfaction with the APWU CDHP was mixed compared to enrollee satisfaction with the other FEHBP plans. For overall plan performance, APWU enrollees were more satisfied than other new plan enrollees, but less satisfied than PPO plan enrollees. For four of five specific quality measures--access to health care, timeliness of health care, provider communication, and claims processing--APWU enrollees were as satisfied as other enrollees. On the fifth measure, customer service, APWU enrollees were more satisfied than other new plan enrollees, but less satisfied than PPO plan enrollees. In particular, a lower share of APWU enrollees were satisfied with their ability to find or understand written or online plan information, the help provided by customer service, and the amount of paperwork required by the plan. The APWU CDHP provider networks and discounts were comparable to other FEHBP PPO plans. In 21 states, the APWU CDHP used the same networks used by other national PPO plans. In the remaining states, the APWU CDHP networks were among the most commonly used networks nationwide, or were large, nationally accredited, or comparable in size to networks used by other FEHBP plans. Across all states the average hospital inpatient and physician discounts obtained by the APWU CDHP were within 2 percentage points of the discounts obtained by another large national FEHBP PPO plan. GAO received comments on a draft of this report from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and APWU. Both generally concurred with our findings. Regarding the potential for CDHPs to disproportionately attract healthier enrollees, OPM said it would continue to monitor the enrollment trends and take appropriate action to eliminate or minimize any adverse effects. |
gao_GAO-06-775 | gao_GAO-06-775_0 | The grouped answers approach is designed to reduce this threat when asking about immigration status. Respondents are told, in effect: If the specific category that applies to you is in Box B, we don’t want to know which one it is, because right now we are focusing on Box A categories. 3. 4). An independent statistical expert believed that the grouped answers approach would be generally usable with survey respondents. Additional costs might apply for flash cards and foreign-language interviews. National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)
YES. The Census Bureau conducts field work.No. The Census Bureau conducts field work.YES. Takes names. Takes both names and Social Security numbers. Potentially, no. In conclusion, we did not find a large-scale survey that would be an appropriate vehicle for “piggybacking” the grouped answers question series. Additionally, this report has established that The grouped answers approach is acceptable to most foreign-born respondents tested (thus far) in surveys fielded by private sector organizations; it is also acceptable—with some conditions, such as private sector fielding of the survey—to the immigrant advocates and other experts we consulted. A new survey aimed at obtaining grouped answers data on immigration status would require roughly 6,000 (or more) personal, self-report interviews with foreign-born adults. Question 2: What further tests of the grouped answers method, if any, should be conducted before planning and fielding a new survey? On one hand, advance testing could assess response validity (that is, whether respondents pick—or intend to pick—the correct box) before committing funds for a survey and in time to allow adjustments to the question series; further delineate respondent acceptance and explore the impact on acceptance of factors such as government funding—or funding by a particular agency—in order to inform decisions about whether or how to conduct a survey; and as suggested in DHS’s comments on a draft of this report, help determine the cost of a full-scale survey. Then we identified surveys that met those criteria, collected documents concerning the surveys, and interviewed officials and staff at federal agencies that sponsored or conducted those surveys. Appendix II: Estimating Characteristics, Costs, and Contributions of the Undocumented Population
Key Characteristics Can Be Estimated
Logically, grouped answers data can be used to estimate subgroups of the undocumented population, using the following procedures: 1. isolate survey data for (a) the subsample 1 respondents who are in the desired subgroup, based on a demographic or other question asked in the survey (for example, if the survey included a question on each respondent’s employment, data could be isolated for foreign-born who are employed), and (b) subsample 2 respondents in that subgroup; 2. calculate (a) the percentage of the subsample 1 subgroup respondents who are in each box of immigration status card 1 and (b) the percentage of subsample 2 subgroup respondents who are in each box of immigration status card 2; and 3. carry out the subtraction procedure (percentage in Box B, Card 1, minus percentage in Box A, Card 2), thus estimating the percentage of the subgroup who are undocumented. Therefore, a statement is needed to convey this information. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
As greater numbers of foreign-born persons enter, live, and work in the United States, policymakers need more information--particularly on the undocumented population, its size, characteristics, costs, and contributions. This report reviews the ongoing development of a potential method for obtaining such information: the "grouped answers" approach. In 1998, GAO devised the approach and recommended further study. In response, the Census Bureau tested respondent acceptance and recently reported results. GAO answers four questions. (1) Is the grouped answers approach acceptable for use in a national survey of the foreign-born? (2) What further research may be needed? (3) How large a survey is needed? (4) Are any ongoing surveys appropriate for inserting a grouped answers question series (to avoid the cost of a new survey)? For this study, GAO consulted an independent statistician and other experts, performed test calculations, obtained documents, and interviewed officials and staff at federal agencies. The Census Bureau and DHS agreed with the main findings of this report. DHS agreed that the National Survey of Drug Use and Health is not an appropriate survey for inserting a grouped answers question series.
What GAO Found
The grouped answers approach is designed to ask foreign-born respondents about their immigration status in a personal-interview survey. Immigration statuses are grouped in Boxes A, B, and C on two different flash cards--with the undocumented status in Box B. Respondents are asked to pick the box that includes their current status and are told, "If it's in Box B, we don't want to know which specific category applies to you." The grouped answers approach is acceptable to many experts and immigrant advocates--with certain conditions, such as (for some advocates) private sector data collection. Most respondents tested did not object to picking a box. Research is needed to assess issues such as whether respondents pick the correct box. A sizable survey--roughly 6,000 or more respondents--would be needed for 95 percent confidence and a margin of error of (plus or minus) 3 percentage points. The ongoing surveys that GAO identified are not appropriate for collecting data on immigration status. (For example, one survey takes names and Social Security numbers, which might affect acceptance of immigration status questions.) Whether further research or implementation in a new survey would be justified depends on how policymakers weigh the need for such information against potential costs and the uncertainties of future research. |
gao_GAO-13-145 | gao_GAO-13-145_0 | Among other things, the environmental group asserted that EPA had overused conditional registrations and did not appear to have a reliable tracking system to identify the status of conditionally registered pesticides to ensure that registrants submitted, and EPA reviewed, additional data in a timely manner. Total Number of Conditional Registrations Granted Is Unclear, as EPA Found Data to Be Inaccurate
The number of active conditional registrations EPA has granted is unclear, according to OPP officials who, as a result of a 2011 EPA review, found the agency’s registration data to be inaccurate and the basis for granting some of these registrations to be inappropriately classified. Specifically, an internal review of OPP’s conditional registration program found that OPPIN does not allow officials to change a pesticide’s registration status from conditional to unconditional once the registrant has satisfied all data requirements, and the basis for many registration decisions was mischaracterized as conditional. As of July 2013, OPP officials told us that the office has taken or is planning to take several actions to more accurately account for conditional registrations. Second, according to OPP’s internal review, there was limited, organized management oversight to ensure that regulatory actions not subject to the narrow scope of section 3(c)(7) were not mischaracterized by OPP staff as conditional registrations. To more accurately report on the number of pesticide products that are conditionally registered, OPP officials told us that the office has taken or planned to take the following actions:
Beginning in the fall of 2010, representatives of the OPP divisions that deal with pesticide registrations began meeting with OPP management at least quarterly to, among other things, review proposed conditional registrations for pesticide products with new active ingredients to ensure that (1) any new conditional registrations granted for these products meet the circumstances outlined in FIFRA Section 3(c)(7)(C); (2) the additional data that would be requested as a part of the conditional registration are really needed; and (3) if the data are needed, EPA is still able to make the determination that the information available concerning the pesticide demonstrates that the FIFRA safety standard will be met, which requires that the use of the product during the time needed to generate the necessary data will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. In particular, OPP does not have a reliable system, such as an automated data system, designed specifically to track key information related to conditional registrations, including whether registrants submitted additional data within required time frames and OPP reviewed these data. While these program operations may help to identify some situations where required data are missing, they fall short of what is needed because they are neither comprehensive nor do they ensure the timely submission of these data. A state may be more stringent in registering a pesticide for use in that state, but its registration requirements generally may not be less stringent than the federal requirements. Respondents Generally Reported That EPA Needs to Improve Its Conditional Registration Process
In responding to our questionnaire, respondents in the consumer, environmental, industry, legal, science, and state government stakeholder groups generally reported concerns with submission or review of required data as follows:
Of the 19 respondents in the consumer, environmental, legal, producer, science, and state government groups, 17 reported concerns related to registrants not submitting additional required data on time, including concerns about pesticides that remain in the marketplace when their environmental and health impacts have not been fully evaluated. Of the 5 respondents from industry, 3 stated that there are cases when EPA grants a conditional registration for a pesticide that should have qualified for an unconditional registration. Seven of these 14 respondents also generally stated that conditional registrations promote innovation by bringing new technologies and products to the marketplace faster. According to OPP officials and documents, weaknesses in guidance and training, management oversight, and data management contributed to the misclassification of other pesticide-related activities as conditional registrations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve EPA’s management of the conditional registration process, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA direct the Director of the Office of Pesticide Programs to take the following three actions:
Complete plans to automate data related to conditional registrations to more readily track the status of these registrations and related registrant and agency actions and identify potential problems requiring management attention,
Pending development of an automated data system for tracking the status of conditional registrations, develop guidance to ensure that product managers use a uniform methodology to track and document this information, including when data are submitted by registrants and reviewed by EPA, in the files maintained by each pesticide product manager. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the (1) number of conditional pesticide registrations the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has granted and the basis for granting these registrations; (2) extent to which EPA ensures that registrants submit the additional data EPA required as part of conditional registrations and reviews these data; and (3) views of relevant stakeholders on EPA’s use of conditional registrations, including ways, if any, to improve the conditional registration process. Pesticides: EPA’s Information Systems Provide Inadequate Support for Reregistration. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of September 2010, more than 16,000 pesticides were registered for use in the United States, according to EPA. EPA reviews health and environmental effects data submitted by a company and may register a pesticide or, alternatively, grant a "conditional registration" for a pesticide under certain circumstances, even though some of the required data may not have been submitted or reviewed. The company must provide the missing data within a specified time. In 2010, environmental and other groups charged that EPA had overused conditional registrations and did not appear to have a reliable system to identify whether the required data had been submitted. GAO was asked to examine issues related to EPA's use of conditional registrations for pesticides. This report examines the (1) number of conditional registrations EPA has granted and the basis for these, (2) extent to which EPA ensures that companies submit the required additional data and EPA reviews the data, and (3) views of relevant stakeholders on EPA's use of conditional registrations. GAO reviewed EPA data and surveyed stakeholders, among other things.
What GAO Found
The total number of conditional registrations granted is unclear, as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that its data are inaccurate for several reasons. First, the database used to track conditional registrations does not allow officials to change a pesticide's registration status from conditional to unconditional once the registrant has satisfied all requirements, thereby overstating the number of conditional registrations. Second, EPA staff have misused the term "conditional registration," incorrectly classifying pesticide registrations as conditional when, for example, they require a label change, which is not a basis in statute for a conditional registration. According to EPA documents and officials, weaknesses in guidance and training, management oversight, and data management contributed to these misclassification problems. For example, according to EPA documents, there was limited, organized management oversight to ensure that regulatory actions were not misclassified as conditional registrations. As of July 2013, EPA officials told GAO that the agency has taken or is planning to take several actions to more accurately account for conditional registrations, including beginning to design a new automated data system to more accurately track conditional registrations.
The extent to which EPA ensures that companies submit additional required data and EPA reviews these data is unknown. Specifically, EPA does not have a reliable system, such as an automated data system, to track key information related to conditional registrations, including whether companies have submitted additional data within required time frames. As a result, pesticides with conditional registrations could be marketed for years without EPA's receipt and review of these data. In the absence of a reliable system for managing conditional registrations, EPA relies on a variety of routine program operations, such as its review of a company's changes to a pesticide registration, to discover that data are missing. However, these methods fall short of what is needed because they are neither comprehensive nor do they ensure timely submission of these data. According to federal internal control standards, EPA's lack of a reliable system for managing conditional registrations constitutes an internal control weakness because the agency lacks an effective mechanism for program oversight and decision making.
Stakeholders GAO surveyed--representatives of consumer, environmental, industry, legal, producer, science, and state government groups--generally said EPA needs to improve its conditional registration process. For example, some stated EPA should improve its data systems for tracking conditional registrations to ensure that required data are submitted and reviewed in a timely manner. However, stakeholder views varied on the benefits and disadvantages of conditionally registering pesticides. For example, some consumer, industry, legal, producer, and state government stakeholders stated that the conditional registration process promotes innovation by bringing new technologies to the marketplace more quickly. In contrast, some consumer, environmental, legal, science, and state government stakeholders voiced concerns that conditional registration allows products with safety that has not been fully evaluated into the marketplace.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, in part, that EPA consider and implement options for an automated system to better track conditional registrations. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted specific actions it will take to implement them. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-214 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-214_0 | DOD Inventory Management Overview
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the primary manager of DOD’s consumable items and acts as the custodian of military aircraft, ship, and vehicle parts. Ordering supplies only as they are needed, combined with quick logistics response times, enable companies to reduce or eliminate inventory levels, buy only the items that are currently needed, reduce or eliminate the possibility of inventory spoilage or obsolescence, and reduce overall supply system costs. DOD Has Achieved Success With Medical and Food Prime Vendor Programs
Starting in 1993, DOD has successfully applied the prime vendor concept to its management of medical supplies. 1). Food and Clothing Prime Vendor Programs
As with medical supplies, DLA’s use of prime vendors for food has reduced DOD logistics costs and improved customer service. This test is expected to continue for 2 more years. DOD Uses Inefficient and Ineffective Management Techniques for Hardware Items
DOD’s use of best practices is least advanced for hardware items (such as bearings, valves, and bolts), which represent 97 percent of DLA’s inventory items. DOD continues to use outdated and inefficient business practices that require DOD to buy and store hardware items in DLA warehouses and base-level supply systems in an attempt to ensure that inventory will be available to customers. When hardware supplies and other parts are not immediately available to mechanics, it delays the timely repair of weapon systems and their components. DOD Could Build on Efforts to Adopt Best Practices for Hardware Items
To its credit, DLA has tried new inventory practices for managing hardware items. However, the efforts are limited in scope and represent only a small part of its logistics operations. To attain the same level of success that DOD has achieved with the medical prime vendor program and to realize the dramatic inventory reductions and infrastructure savings we have seen in the private sector, we believe DOD should expand the prime vendor concept and fully use the services offered by prime vendor and integrated supplier programs. This percentage has not varied much since 1992. We estimate these demonstration projects will account for about 2 percent of DLA’s $3.1 billion annual sales of hardware items. Figure 5 illustrates the potential impact an integrated supplier program could have on the traditional DOD supply system for hardware supplies. Objectives of Recently Introduced Legislation Can Be Met Through the Use of Best Practices
Several legislative proposals have been introduced this year in Congress relating to inventory management and the adoption of best commercial practices. If DOD were to aggressively pursue best practices in the form of an integrated supplier concept for consumable items, DOD could reduce its work force involved in procurement, storage, and distribution of consumable items. However, DOD has accomplished the goal for medical supplies through the use of the prime vendor program in that DLA reduced the rate for medical supplies from 21.7 in fiscal year 1992 to 7.9 percent in fiscal year 1997. Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress in Using Best Practices to Achieve Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-95-142, Aug. 4, 1995). 13, 1994). Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of innovative business practices to improve inventory management and the opportunities GAO sees for further application of best practices to DOD's operations, focusing on: (1) the success DOD has had in using prime-vendor-type programs for medical, food, and clothing items; (2) the feasibility of using prime vendor systems for hardware items (such as bearings, valves, and bolts); and (3) recently introduced legislation that pertains to improving DOD's inventory management practices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has successfully applied best practices to improve the management of medical and food items, which account for 2 percent of the consumable items DOD manages; (2) DOD's prime vendor program for medical supplies, along with other DOD inventory reduction efforts, has resulted in savings that GAO estimates exceed $700 million; (3) more importantly, this program has moved DOD out of the inventory storage and distribution function for these supplies, emptying warehouses, eliminating unnecessary layers of inventory, and reducing the overall size of the DOD supply system; (4) also, DOD buys only the items that are currently needed because consumers can order and receive inventory within hours of the time the items are used; (5) despite the success of its prime vendor program for medical supplies and, to a lesser extent, food items, DOD has made little progress in adopting best practices for hardware supplies, which account for 97 percent of the consumable items; (6) DOD continues to manage hardware items using inefficient and outdated business practices, which have resulted in excessive inventory levels, poor customer service, and delays in the repair of expensive military equipment; (7) although the private sector has developed solutions to these problems, DOD's efforts to adopt such practices are limited in scope and represent only a small part of its logistics operations; (8) since 1991, GAO has issued a series of reports highlighting best practices GAO believes have direct application to DOD's operations; (9) however, DOD has not applied these best practices to the majority of DOD consumable items, and inefficiencies in DOD's logistics systems remain; (10) in this context, proposed legislative initiatives, if enacted, would encourage DOD to change its inventory management practices; (11) also, congressional oversight will continue to be a critical element as DOD establishes plans, goals, objectives, and milestones for addressing its inventory management processes; (12) GAO strongly supports the need to improve DOD's business practices and further reduce the logistics infrastructure; and (13) because of the potential impact improved business practices would have on DOD inventory levels, operating costs, and the repair of weapon systems and component parts, GAO believes DOD must be more aggressive in expanding the use of new management techniques for these items. |
gao_GAO-09-649 | gao_GAO-09-649_0 | 1). Federally Subsidized School Meal Programs
Federally subsidized school meal programs, such as the National School Lunch Program, are administered by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), but several other USDA agencies are involved in procuring foods for the programs. However, both FSIS and FDA can request that a company recall a product and, in most cases, the company complies. 2). Despite Its Efforts, FNS Did Not Always Ensure that States and Schools Received Timely and Complete Information about Potentially Dangerous Commodity Products in Three Companies’ Recalls
As a result of a number of factors, FNS did not always ensure in our three recall cases that states and schools received timely and complete notification about suspect food products provided to schools through the federal commodity program. FNS Notifications to States about the Westland/Hallmark Recall Did Not Always Provide Complete Information, Particularly on Processed Products
In the Westland/Hallmark case, FNS officials said that they notified states on the same day they learned of the recall affecting commodity products, but FNS’s initial recall communication did not provide states with complete and accurate information that was needed by schools to identify all affected products on their shelves. Because they stopped serving any beef products after the recall announcement, these school districts did not risk serving products, including processed products, that were later identified as the recall unfolded and expanded. Figure 3 shows a large quantity of beef from one school district at a transfer station, prior to being transported to a landfill for disposal. Some State and School Officials Said They Were Not Reimbursed for All Costs Incurred in Disposal and Found the Process Difficult
Some school officials told us they were not reimbursed for all costs incurred due to recalls. In an overall review of FSIS and FDA food recalls, we also previously reported that the agencies’ procedures for selecting the sample of companies to check did not ensure that all segments of a food distribution chain are included, as well as problems with the timeliness of the checks. FDA officials said that they conducted audit checks for the PCA peanut product recalls, and field staff were instructed to give priority to schools in making their selections for the audit checks, but only schools that procured the products commercially were included because the audit checks specifically excluded schools that received affected peanut products only through the school meals program. FSIS did ask FNS to provide names of schools and states affected by the Westland/Hallmark recall of commodity beef and received a list of over 7,000 affected school districts, but FSIS officials did not use this information to include the schools in its effectiveness checks. FNS Did Not Monitor the Effectiveness of Recalls or its Own Administrative Holds for Commodity Products in Schools
Although FSIS and FDA procedures direct them to monitor the effectiveness of recalls, they told us that they relied on FNS to conduct checks of schools affected by recalls of USDA commodity products; however, FNS does not conduct such effectiveness checks. Conclusions
Protecting school children from food-borne illnesses in schools depends on the efforts of many local, state, and federal entities. We recommend the Secretary of Agriculture direct FNS to: develop guidelines, in consultations with AMS and FSA, to be used for determining whether or not to institute an administrative hold on suspect commodities for school meal programs; work with states to explore ways for states to speed notification to improve the timeliness and completeness of direct communication between FNS and schools about holds and recalls, such as through the commodity alert system; take the lead among USDA agencies to establish a time frame in which it will improve the USDA commodity hold and recall procedures to address the role of processors and determine distributors’ involvement with processed products, which may contain recalled ingredients, to facilitate providing more timely and complete information to schools; revise its procedures to provide states with more specific instructions for schools on how to dispose of recalled commodities and obtain timely reimbursement; and institute a systematic quality check procedure to ensure that FNS holds on foods and products used by schools are carried out effectively. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past few years, several food recalls, such as for beef and peanut products, have affected schools. It is especially important that recalls affecting schools be carried out efficiently and effectively because young children have a higher risk of complications from food-borne illnesses. GAO was asked to determine how federal agencies (1) notified states and schools about food recalls, (2) advised states and schools about disposal and reimbursement of recalled food, and (3) ensured that recalls were being carried out effectively. To do this, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and interviewed federal and state officials, as well as officials from 23 school districts that had experience with at least one of four recent cases involving the safety of food in the school lunch program.
What GAO Found
Despite its efforts, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), which oversees federal school meals programs, did not always ensure that states and schools received timely and complete notification about suspect food products provided to schools through the federal commodity program. The federal commodity program provides food to schools at no cost to the schools, and accounts for 15 to 20 percent of food served in school meals. During 3 recent recalls, FNS notified states, but in only one case did it inform schools to hold and not serve suspect foods prior to an official recall of commodity products. When a videotape aired by the media showed inhumane treatment of cattle at a plant that provided beef to the commodity program, FNS told states to have schools stop serving the company's beef weeks before the official recall of commodity beef was announced. However, when the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recalled suspect peanut products and canned vegetables in two other cases, FNS did not inform states and schools to hold and not serve the companies' commodity products until the recalls were expanded to include the companies' commodity products--weeks later. FNS's initial notification to states regarding recalls did not provide complete information on the full range of products affected. Instead, states and schools continued to receive information on multiple other recalled products over time. It sometimes took states and schools a week or more to determine what additional products were subject to a recall, during which time they unknowingly served affected products. FNS provided instructions for disposal and reimbursement of recalled products to states who, in turn, provided instructions to schools but, nonetheless, some schools experienced problems. Some schools reported to GAO problems in finding landfills that would accept large quantities of recalled products. Some schools also reported that reimbursement instructions were not clear, reimbursement was delayed for months, and that all of their expenses related to the recalls were not reimbursed. Although both USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) and the FDA procedures direct them to conduct recall quality checks, neither included thousands of schools that had received recalled USDA-commodities products for the beef and peanut recalls because they thought FNS conducted these checks. As a result, they were unable to ensure that the recalls were being carried out effectively by schools. FNS officials said that they did not conduct any kind of systematic quality checks of schools receiving recalled commodities, because they relied on FSIS and FDA to conduct such checks. FDA did include schools in its canned vegetable recall audit checks, and some may have received recalled-commodity canned vegetables. However, because FDA does not systematically sample for schools or analyze results of the quality checks for the group, the agency cannot be assured that the recall was carried out effectively in schools. |
gao_T-RCED-99-116 | gao_T-RCED-99-116_0 | However, proceeding with the project without a clear understanding of the current condition of its ships and aircraft and whether they are deficient in their capabilities and service demands increases the risk that the contractors, now developing proposals for the project, could develop alternatives or designs that would not be the most cost-effective to meet the Coast Guard’s needs for the Deepwater Project. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation and has made progress in developing data on the condition of its ships and aircraft; however, other data on its roles and missions and any shortfalls in its performance capabilities will not be available until later this year or early next year. Our report also raised concerns about the project’s affordability. The estimated cost of the Deepwater Project could consume nearly all of the agency’s projected spending for its capital projects. However, until the Coast Guard develops its revised mission analysis in early 2000 and the contractors provide their cost estimates for various alternatives, it will not be known whether the affordability issue has been adequately addressed. Furthermore, the Coast Guard will have additional time to demonstrate that it has put in place a prudent strategy for dealing with the cost of the project within probable funding levels—a practice that becomes highly critical during this time of fiscal constraint. Coast Guard Faces Potential Funding Shortages for Capital Projects Unless It Develops Better Plans and Strategies
The ability of the Coast Guard to meet its future capital needs depends largely on the funding requirements for the Deepwater Project. For example, if the Coast Guard’s funding needs for the Deepwater Project and other new projects amount to $300 million annually beginning in 2002, the Coast Guard will experience a funding gap of about $100 million in fiscal year 2002 but little or no gap in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. If, on the other hand, funding requirements for the Deepwater Project approach its initial estimate of $500 million annually beginning in 2002, then the Coast Guard will face a substantial funding gap— exceeding $200 million in 2002 and beyond. Status of the Coast Guard’s Capital Planning Efforts
The Coast Guard is developing a new capital planning process that, when implemented, could improve its ability to set priorities and manage its capital projects and ultimately provide a workable approach for acquiring the ships and aircraft it needs within its approved budget. Begun in 1997, this effort is directed at aligning capital needs with probable levels of funding. This plan is linked to OMB budget targets and used to make programming and budgeting decisions over a 5-year budget cycle. To be successful, the agency must first satisfactorily justify the need for modernizing or replacing its deepwater ships and aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Coast Guard's plans for modernizing its ships, aircraft, and other capital assets needed to carry out its missions, as well as the agency's plans and strategies to fund these needs, focusing on the Coast Guard's progress in: (1) justifying the Deepwater Capability Replacement Project and addressing GAO's concerns about its affordability; and (2) developing strategies and plans for funding its capital needs within a constrained fiscal environment.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Coast Guard has not yet sufficiently justified the Deepwater Project, in that accurate and complete information is lacking on the performance shortcomings of its ships and aircraft and the resource hours needed to fulfill its missions; (2) proceeding without these key data increases the risk that contractors will develop alternatives that are not the most cost-effective to meet the needs of the project; (3) the Coast Guard and its contractors are developing this information, but some of it will not be available until later this year; (4) GAO also reported that if the cost of the Deepwater Project approaches the agency's initial estimate of $500 million annually, it would consume more than the agency now spends for all capital projects and leave little funding for other critical needs; (5) Coast Guard officials believe that competition among contractors will reduce the cost of the Deepwater Project and more closely align its potential cost with probable funding levels; (6) however, until the Coast Guard develops its new justification for the project in early 2000 and contractors provide their cost estimates for various alternatives, the Coast Guard will not know whether the affordability issue has been adequately addressed; (7) the costs of the Deepwater Project, together with funds needed to complete all other ongoing capital projects, may outstrip the Coast Guard's ability to pay for them; (8) the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposes freezing the Coast Guard's budget for capital spending at $485 million annually through fiscal year 2004; (9) if the Deepwater Project requires annual funding levels of $500 million, this cost, coupled with the costs of ongoing capital projects, would exceed the OMB target by about $300 million in 2002; (10) with good planning, renewed efforts to reduce costs, and better information on the useful life of its ships and aircraft, the Coast Guard may be able to prioritize its needs and minimize future capital needs; and (11) the Coast Guard is now developing a new plan and budget strategies for dealing with its capital funding needs in an environment of fiscal constraint, but putting these approaches in place may take several years and their effectiveness is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-16-471T | gao_GAO-16-471T_0 | Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, had grown 116 percent as of our latest review, and its first satellite was launched over 3.5 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High), a missile warning satellite program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Last year, we reported that contract costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative 6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline. Table 1 below provides more details on the current status of DOD’s major space programs. Given the problems we have identified in the GPS program, however, it is clear that more needs to be done to improve the management of space acquisitions. Our past work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we typically see in space programs. Challenges in Addressing Future Needs
Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities. For satellites, our reports since 2013 have described efforts such as: disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft. Together, these reports highlight several major challenges facing DOD as it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. First, though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions about the future of various programs, our preliminary work suggests there are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of changes to space systems. Second, most changes being considered today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems continue to be very troubled by cost and schedule overruns. Third, leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which may hamper the implementation of changes, especially those that stretch across satellites, ground systems and user equipment. Competitive Launch Acquisition. DOD concurred with this recommendation in its review of our draft report. Space Leadership. Our preliminary findings indicate that the structure of space system acquisitions and oversight continues to be complicated. Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition Improvements. Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is shifting its traditional approach to space acquisitions, bolstering its protection of space systems, and engaging with more commercial providers. Given the time and resource demands of DOD's space systems and today's budget environment, challenges that hinder these transitions must be addressed.
This statement focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions, and (2) challenges and barriers DOD faces in addressing future space-based mission needs. This statement highlights the results of GAO's work on space acquisitions over the past year and presents preliminary observations from ongoing work. We obtained comments from DOD on a draft of preliminary findings contained in this statement.
What GAO Found
Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, have grown 116 percent as of our latest review, and its first satellite was launched more than 3 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System High, a missile warning satellite program, costs grew almost 300 percent and its first satellite was launched roughly 9 years late. Last year, we reported that contract costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative 6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline. Though steps have been taken to improve acquisition management in space, problems with GPS show that much more work is needed, especially since DOD is considering going in new directions for space programs.
Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities, such as: disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft.
This year, GAO's work on space acquisitions continued to show that DOD faces several major challenges as it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. Our work assessed a range of issues including DOD's analysis supporting its decisions on future weather satellites, space leadership, and the introduction of competition into space launch acquisitions. These and other studies surfaced several challenges:
First, though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions about the future of space programs, there are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of changes to space systems.
Second, most changes being considered today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems continue to be troubled by management and development issues.
Third, leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which will likely hamper the implementation of new acquisition approaches, especially those that stretch across satellites, ground systems and user equipment.
What GAO Recommends
Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices. DOD has generally agreed and taken actions to address these recommendations. Consequently, GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement. |
gao_GAO-13-5 | gao_GAO-13-5_0 | LOA 5—Facilities: Responsible for addressing issues relating to military and VA medical facilities. Additional Efforts by DOD and VA to Address Problems Facing Recovering Servicemembers and Veterans
In addition to the Senior Oversight Committee’s efforts, DOD, its military services, and VA developed or modified a number of programs and initiatives to assist recovering servicemembers and veterans in navigating the recovery care continuum. DOD and VA Have Not Fully Resolved Persistent Problems with Case Management and Care Coordination, Disability Evaluation Systems, and Electronic Sharing of Health Records
Recovering Servicemembers and Veterans Do Not Always Have Access to the Case Management and Care Coordination Programs Designed to Assist Them
Recovering servicemembers’ access to case management and care coordination programs has been impeded by two main factors—(1) the limited ability to identify and refer those servicemembers who could benefit from enrollment in the programs along with officials’ reluctance to refer them, and (2) variations in eligibility criteria among the military services’ wounded warrior programs, resulting in access disparities for similarly situated recovering servicemembers. Delays in DOD’s and VA’s Integrated Disability Evaluation System Persist, Limiting Recovering Servicemembers’ Ability to Plan for Their Future
Although IDES provides improved timeliness over the separate DOD and VA disability evaluation systems, processing times have continued to increase since its implementation in November 2007, resulting in frustration and uncertainty for servicemembers going through the process. DOD and VA Have Not Fully Resolved Long-standing Problems Due to Deficiencies in Leadership and Oversight, Resources, and Collaboration
Lack of Leadership and Oversight Has Limited DOD’s and VA’s Ability to Effectively Manage Programs for Recovering Servicemembers and Veterans
The lack of leadership and program oversight has limited DOD’s and VA’s ability to effectively manage programs created to serve recovering servicemembers and veterans. Whether the Joint Executive Council can effectively address the issues once managed by the Senior Oversight Committee has yet to be seen. This lack of central oversight over the wounded warrior programs has been one of the main reasons for the large discrepancies between these programs. Despite Repeated Attempts, DOD and VA Have Failed to Effectively Collaborate to Align Their Care Coordination Programs; New Efforts Are Under Way
According to DOD and VA officials, the departments have identified 54 joint capabilities that will be implemented by the end of fiscal year 2017. will depend upon achieving cooperation between the departments—which has been elusive for many years—as well as with the military services. Conclusions
The deficiencies exposed at Walter Reed in 2007 served as a catalyst compelling DOD and VA to address a host of problems that complicate the course of a wounded, ill, and injured servicemember’s recovery, rehabilitation, and return to active duty or civilian life. Initially, departmental leadership exhibited focus and commitment— through the Senior Oversight Committee—to addressing problems related to case management and care coordination, disability evaluation systems, and data sharing between DOD and VA. However, to date, these efforts have not fully resolved key issues, and our nation’s recovering servicemembers and veterans continue to face obstacles and challenges, especially as they transition from DOD’s to VA’s health care system. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that servicemembers have equitable access to the military services’ wounded warrior programs, including the RCP, and to establish central accountability for these programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish or designate an office to centrally oversee and monitor the activities of the military services’ wounded warrior programs to include the following:
Develop consistent eligibility criteria to ensure that similarly situated recovering servicemembers from different military services have uniform access to these programs. DOD concurred with specific components of our first recommendation regarding the establishment of central accountability for the military services’ wounded warrior programs. However, DOD only partially concurred with other components of our first recommendation—that DOD develop consistent eligibility criteria for enrollment in wounded warrior programs and that DOD establish a common mechanism to systematically monitor the performance of these programs. The Joint Executive Council’s strategic planning and annual reports focus on joint efforts between the departments and do not report on the performance of the military services’ wounded warrior programs. DOD and VA both concurred with our second recommendation that the departments ensure that care coordination, disability evaluation, and electronic health record sharing receive sustained leadership attention and collaboration at the highest levels, with a singular focus on what is best for the individual servicemember or veteran to ensure continuity of care and a seamless transition from DOD to VA. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Enrollment and Populations for Select Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs Programs
Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operate care coordination and case management programs designed to assist servicemembers and veterans as they navigate the recovery care continuum, from acute medical treatment and stabilization, through rehabilitation, to reintegration—either back to active duty or to the civilian community as a veteran. The FRCP was established in January 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD and VA to jointly develop and implement policy on the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. It also required GAO to report on DOD's and VA's progress in addressing these requirements. This report specifically examines (1) the extent to which DOD and VA have resolved persistent problems facing recovering servicemembers and veterans as they navigate the recovery care continuum, and (2) the reasons DOD and VA leadership have not been able to fully resolve any remaining problems. To address these objectives, GAO visited 11 DOD and VA medical facilities selected for population size and range of available resources and met with servicemembers and veterans to identify problems they continue to face. GAO also reviewed documents related to specific DOD and VA programs that assist recovering servicemembers and veterans and interviewed the leadership and staff of these programs to determine why problems have not been fully resolved.
What GAO Found
Deficiencies exposed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 2007 served as a catalyst compelling the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) to address a host of problems for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and veterans as they navigate through the recovery care continuum. This continuum extends from acute medical treatment and stabilization, through rehabilitation to reintegration, either back to active duty or to the civilian community as a veteran. In spite of 5 years of departmental efforts, recovering servicemembers and veterans are still facing problems with this process and may not be getting the services they need. Key departmental efforts included the creation or modification of various care coordination and case management programs, including the military services' wounded warrior programs. However, these programs are not always accessible to those who need them due to the inconsistent methods, such as referrals, used to identify potentially eligible servicemembers, as well as inconsistent eligibility criteria across the military services' wounded warrior programs. The departments also jointly established an integrated disability evaluation system to expedite the delivery of benefits to servicemembers. However, processing times for disability determinations under the new system have increased since 2007, resulting in lengthy wait times that limit servicemembers' ability to plan for their future. Finally, despite years of incremental efforts, DOD and VA have yet to develop sufficient capabilities for electronically sharing complete health records, which potentially delays servicemembers' receipt of coordinated care and benefits as they transition from DOD's to VA's health care system.
Collectively, a lack of leadership, oversight, resources, and collaboration has contributed to the departments' inability to fully resolve problems facing recovering servicemembers and veterans. Initially, departmental leadership exhibited focus and commitment--through the Senior Oversight Committee--to addressing problems related to case management and care coordination, disability evaluation systems, and data sharing between DOD and VA. However, the committee's oversight waned over time, and in January 2012, it was merged with the VA/DOD Joint Executive Council. Whether this council--which has primarily focused on long-term strategic planning--can effectively address the shorter-term policy focused issues once managed by the Senior Oversight Committee remains to be seen. Furthermore, DOD does not provide central oversight of the military services' wounded warrior programs, preventing it from determining how well these programs are working across the department. However, despite these shortcomings, the departments continue to take steps to resolve identified problems, such as increasing the number of staff involved with the electronic sharing of health records and the integrated disability evaluation process. Additionally, while the departments' previous attempts to collaborate on how to resolve case management and care coordination problems have largely been unsuccessful, a joint task force established in May 2012 is focused on resolving long-standing areas of disagreement between VA, DOD, and the military services. However, without more robust oversight and military service compliance, consistent implementation of policies that result in more effective case management and care coordination programs may be unattainable. GAO recommends that DOD provide central oversight of the military services' wounded warrior programs and that DOD and VA sustain high-level leadership attention and collaboration to fully resolve identified problems. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation for central oversight of the wounded warrior programs, citing issues with common eligibility criteria and systematic monitoring. DOD and VA both concurred with the recommendation for sustained leadership attention.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD provide central oversight of the military services wounded warrior programs and that DOD and VA sustain high-level leadership attention and collaboration to fully resolve identified problems. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation for central oversight of the wounded warrior programs, citing issues with common eligibility criteria and systematic monitoring. DOD and VA both concurred with the recommendation for sustained leadership attention. |
gao_GAO-03-790 | gao_GAO-03-790_0 | SEC is responsible for regulating securities market participants, including SROs such as NASD and NYSE. Both NASD and NYSE Have Policies and Procedures Intended to Promote Fair Arbitration for all Cases
In most employment disputes, arbitration is mandatory, although for discrimination cases NYSE rules strictly limit its use and NASD has instituted additional requirements. Both SROs have procedures designed to ensure that the arbitrators selected to hear cases do not have conflicts and have procedures for evaluating arbitrator performance. NYSE followed EEOC’s recommendation and only arbitrates discrimination claims when all parties agree to arbitration after the dispute occurs. NASD, on the other hand, no longer requires that employees arbitrate employment discrimination disputes, but will arbitrate these disputes, based on agreements employees have made before or after the dispute occurs. The arbitrator chairing a discrimination case at NASD must hold a law degree, have 10 years of legal experience, have substantial familiarity with employment law, and must not have primarily represented employers or employees in the last 5 years. Both SROs Have Similar Qualifications for Arbitrators and Neither Verify the Qualifications of All Applicants
Both SROs require that all applicants for the arbitrator roster provide information on their affiliation with the securities industry, have 5 years of work experience, supply two letters of recommendation, and complete training in basic arbitration procedures. In addition, arbitrators must update their profile, which includes information on their employment history and affiliation with the securities industry. Officials from both SROs said that if no information is received about an arbitrator on a case, they assume the arbitrator performed adequately. Over the Last 10 Years, Relatively Few Employment Disputes Involved Discrimination, and Some Variations Existed between These Cases and Other Employment Disputes
Of the 1,546 employment cases decided by arbitrators at NASD and NYSE over the last 10 years, 261 (17 percent) included at least 1 discrimination claim. Cases with discrimination claims required more hearing sessions and took longer to complete than those with no discrimination claims. NASD arbitrated 202 of the cases that involved discrimination allegations. The median number of hearing sessions in cases that did not involve discrimination ranged from 4 to 5 at NASD and 5 to 11 at NYSE. In its most recent inspections, in addition to problems with procedures both SROs used to ensure arbitrators are qualified, SEC found that one or both SROs did not record information on arbitrator performance in a central database or disqualify all arbitrators who were poor performers from hearing cases. SEC Has Made a Variety of Recommendations to Improve SRO Procedures
In recent inspections, SEC staff identified a number of ways NASD and NYSE could improve their procedures for ensuring that arbitrators are qualified and for tracking arbitrator performance. Conclusions
SEC oversees NYSE and NASD, which regulate their member firms in the securities industry. Securities industry employees must use NASD and NYSE arbitration programs to resolve most employment disputes. Other contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides a detailed description of the scope and methodology we used to determine (1) the characteristics and outcomes of arbitrated employment and employment discrimination disputes in the securities industry; (2) who evaluates arbitrators and what performance ratings they receive; and (3) how the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) responds to complaint letters it receives concerning arbitration of employment and employment discrimination cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Employees in the securities industry must submit to binding arbitration in most employment disputes. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for overseeing these arbitration programs--the largest being run by NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The Congress asked GAO to examine (1) the circumstances under which NASD and NYSE will arbitrate employment and employment discrimination disputes, and their procedures for selecting and evaluating their arbitrators; (2) the characteristics and outcomes of arbitrated employment and employment discrimination disputes at NASD and NYSE over the last 10 years; and (3) how SEC oversees the arbitration programs at NASD and NYSE and the results of these oversight activities.
What GAO Found
Arbitration is generally required for most employment disputes, except those dealing with discrimination claims. NYSE will only arbitrate discrimination cases when parties involved agree to arbitrate after the dispute occurs. NASD will arbitrate employment discrimination cases based on agreements entered into between employees and firms before or after a dispute occurs. NASD has instituted additional requirements, however, for these cases, such as requiring that arbitrators not be affiliated with the securities industry. In addition, those chairing hearings for employment discrimination cases must hold a law degree, have 10 years of legal experience, have substantial familiarity with employment laws, and must not have primarily represented employers or employees in the last 5 years. To qualify to hear cases, NASD and NYSE require that arbitrators have at least 5 years of work experience, supply two letters of recommendation, and complete training in basic arbitration procedures. Arbitrators must also provide information on their complete employment history, including any affiliation with the securities industry, as well as information on whether they have any regulatory or criminal history. Neither organization independently verifies the qualifications for applicants not associated with the securities industry. In addition NASD and NYSE have standard procedures for ensuring that arbitrators selected to hear cases do not have conflicts and for evaluating arbitrator performance. However, evaluations of arbitrators by staff, parties in disputes and other arbitrators on cases are not always completed. Officials at NASD and NYSE noted that if they receive no information about an arbitrator's performance on a case, they assume that the arbitrator's performance was adequate. Over the last 10 years, 261 (17 percent) of the 1,546 employment disputes arbitrated at NASD or NYSE included a discrimination claim. Discrimination cases differed from cases with disputes that did not involve discrimination in the following ways: (1) discrimination cases required more hearing sessions; (2) employees won discrimination cases less often than cases not involving discrimination claims; and (3) in cases that employees won, the monetary award in discrimination cases was generally larger than in cases not involving discrimination. SEC periodically inspects NASD and NYSE arbitration programs. On the basis of its inspections, SEC has recommended improvements. In its most recent inspections of NASD and NYSE, SEC made various recommendations concerning procedures for ensuring that arbitrators are qualified. In addition, SEC recommended that one or both improve procedures for recording information on arbitrator performance in a central database and for disqualifying arbitrators who are poor performers. |
gao_GGD-99-164 | gao_GGD-99-164_0 | Which Federal, State, and Local Agencies Receive Taxpayer Information? According to IRS, there were 37 federal and 215 state and local agencies that received, or maintained records containing, taxpayer information under provisions of IRC section 6103 during 1997 or 1998. The information can include such things as the taxpayers’ names, Social Security numbers, addresses, or wages. Some agencies receive this information on a regular schedule—for example, monthly, quarterly, or annually. Other agencies receive it on an as-needed basis—for example, while conducting criminal investigations. How Is the Taxpayer Information Being Used? We asked the agencies we surveyed to indicate how they use taxpayer information. What Policies and Procedures Are Agencies Required to Follow to Safeguard Taxpayer Information? Before receiving taxpayer information from IRS, agencies are required to provide IRS with a detailed Safeguard Procedures Report (SPR) that describes the procedures established and used by the agency for ensuring the confidentiality of the information received. Agencies are expected to submit a new SPR every 6 years or whenever significant changes occur to their safeguard program. In addition to the SPRs and annual SARs that are sent to IRS, agencies’ OIGs may also review agency programs for safeguarding taxpayer information. How Frequently Is IRS to Monitor Agencies’ Adherence to the Safeguarding Requirements? IRS is supposed to conduct on-site reviews every 3 years to ensure that agencies’ safeguard procedures fulfill IRS requirements for protecting taxpayer information. IRS’ National Office of Governmental Liaison and Disclosure, Office of Safeguards, has overall responsibility for safeguard reviews to assess whether taxpayer information is properly protected from unauthorized inspection, disclosure, or use as required by the IRC and to assist in reporting to Congress. What Are the Results of IRS’ Monitoring Efforts? IRS’ safeguard reviews over the last 5 years have identified discrepancies in agency safeguard procedures and made recommendations for corrections. The reviews have uncovered deficiencies with agency safeguarding procedures, ranging from inappropriate access of taxpayer information by contractor staff to administrative matters, such as the failure to properly document the disposal of information. Possible use Tax administration and tax withholding purposes Criminal investigation and litigation Reporting criminal activities Judicial or administrative procedures Enforce federal criminal or civil statutes Locate fugitives from justice Conducting government program audits Statistical purposes Offsets Storing and maintaining data for IRS Administration of welfare and public assistance programs Collection and enforcement of child support Verify taxpayer filed original or amended return and initiate state audit Initiate state penalty investigation Audit selection Provide listing of alleged violators of criminal tax laws Verify or update addresses Skip tracing Sales tax matching Identify nonfilers Determine discrepancies in reporting of income Identify S corporation shareholders who avoid state tax by taking dividends in lieu of wages Statistical and revenue forecasting Identify payers and employers not reporting to state and determine underreporters Identify partnerships with changes in number of partners to detect possible sale of partnership interest Compare officers’ salaries and total wages paid on corporate returns to withholding tax filed Compare federal tax withheld to state tax withheld Locate delinquent taxpayers Identify out-of-state income (Continued)
Summary of Tax Information Security Guidelines for Federal, State, and Local Agencies
As a condition of receiving taxpayer information, agencies must show, to the satisfaction of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), that their policies, practices, controls, and safeguards adequately protect the confidentiality of the taxpayer information they receive from IRS. Agencies receiving taxpayer information from IRS are also required to conduct internal inspections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the disclosure practices and safeguards employed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and other federal, state, and local agencies to protect taxpayer information, focusing on: (1) which federal, state, and local agencies receive taxpayer information from IRS; (2) what type of information they receive; (3) how the taxpayer information is being used; (4) what policies and procedures the agencies are required to follow to safeguard taxpayer information; (5) how frequently IRS is to monitor agencies' adherence to the safeguarding requirements; and (6) the results of IRS' most recent monitoring efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there were 37 federal and 215 state and local agencies that received, or maintained records containing, taxpayer information under provisions of section 6103 during 1997 or 1998; (2) the information that agencies received included, among other things, the taxpayers' names, Social Security numbers, addresses, and wages; (3) the information came in a variety of formats; (4) some agencies received the information on a regular schedule; (5) others received the information on an as-needed basis, such as while conducting criminal investigations; (6) federal, state, and local agencies said they used taxpayer information for one of several purposes, such as administering state tax programs, assisting in the enforcement of child support programs, verifying eligibility and benefits for welfare and public assistance programs, and conducting criminal investigations; (7) before receiving taxpayer information from IRS, agencies are required to advise IRS how they intend to use the information and to provide IRS with a detailed safeguard plan that describes the procedures established and used by the agency for ensuring the confidentiality of the information they want to receive; (8) these safeguard plans are supposed to be updated every 6 years or if significant changes are made to the agencies' procedures; (9) agencies are also required to submit annual reports to IRS summarizing their efforts to safeguard taxpayer information and any minor changes to their safeguarding procedures; (10) in addition to providing IRS with safeguarding plans and annual reports, agencies' Offices of Inspector General may also review internal agency programs for safeguarding restricted or classified information; (11) IRS conducts on-site reviews to ensure that agencies' safeguard procedures fulfill IRS requirements for protecting taxpayer information; (12) IRS' National Office of Governmental Liaison and Disclosure, Office of Safeguards, has overall responsibility for safeguard reviews to assess whether taxpayer information is properly protected from unauthorized use or access as required by the Internal Revenue Code and to assist in reporting to Congress; (13) IRS' safeguard reviews have identified discrepancies in agency safeguard procedures and made recommendations for corrections; and (14) the reviews have uncovered problems with agency safeguarding procedures, ranging from inappropriate access to taxpayer information by contractor staff to administrative matters, such as the failure to properly document the disposal of information. |
gao_GAO-09-561 | gao_GAO-09-561_0 | The Federal Government Supported Disaster Case Management Programs for the First Time after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but Breaks in Federal Funding May Have Hindered Assistance to Victims
Through Varied Funding Mechanisms, FEMA, HUD, and HHS Supported a Variety of Disaster Case Management Programs for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Since the hurricanes nearly 4 years ago, more than $209 million of FEMA and HHS funds have been used to support disaster case management programs to assist victims of Hurricanes of Katrina and Rita, one of which was administered by HUD. As a result of ongoing budget negotiations between FEMA and Mississippi, the state-managed DCM-P program in Mississippi did not begin until August 2008, approximately 2 months after it was scheduled to, according to officials from the Mississippi Commission for Volunteer Services. FEMA and HUD Provided Some Oversight of Disaster Case Management Programs, but Monitoring of KAT Was Limited and Coordination Challenges May Provide Lessons for Future Disasters
Although Initial Oversight of KAT Was Limited, FEMA and HUD Used a Variety of Methods to Monitor Subsequent Disaster Case Management Programs
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in the absence of explicit authority to fund disaster case management, FEMA believed it had limited responsibility for overseeing international donations allocated to UMCOR and limited authority to ensure all aspects of the grant proposal for KAT were carried out. FEMA reviewed reports from the Mississippi state agency that administered the state-managed DCM-P program. As a result, some victims may not have received case management services while others may have received services from multiple providers. Case Management Agencies Experienced a Range of Service- Delivery Challenges, and As A Result, Those Most in Need of Services May Not Have Been Helped
Staff Turnover and Large Caseloads Were Barriers to Meeting Clients’ Needs
According to various sources, some case management agencies experienced high turnover in case managers, which made it difficult to meet clients’ needs. Case managers said that client needs also included employment and transportation, but these community resources were limited. Case Managers Faced Challenges in Meeting Client Needs Due to Federal Funding Rules on Direct Assistance and Difficulties in Accessing Needed Resources Through the Long-Term Recovery Committee Process
Case management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial assistance for items such as home repairs, clothing, or furniture as key to helping clients with their basic needs; yet such assistance was not always available. FEMA Plans to Use Evaluations of Pilot Programs to Inform the Development of a Federal Disaster Case Management Program for Future Disasters; However, Some Evaluations Have Limitations
FEMA and other agencies are conducting evaluations of disaster case management pilot programs. Based on its evaluation and those already provided by HHS and HUD, FEMA will not have information on program outcomes for its DCM-P program, the HHS pilot, or DHAP case management services, which could provide information on the results of the various programs such as the extent to which clients’ disaster-related needs were met. However, a FEMA official said FEMA does not have a time line or goal for developing this program. This lack of coordination contributed to a lack of timely information sharing and uncoordinated outreach, which was exacerbated by incompatible databases. In addition, absent sufficient coordination, case management agencies experienced challenges in delivering services. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what steps the federal government took to support disaster case management programs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, (2) how federal agencies oversaw the implementation of these disaster case management programs, (3) the challenges case management agencies experienced in delivering disaster case management services under federally funded programs, and (4) how previous or existing federally funded disaster case management programs will be used to inform the development of a federal case management program for future disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a result of the unprecedented damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the federal government, for the first time, funded several disaster case management programs. These programs help victims access services for disaster-related needs. GAO was asked to review (1) steps the federal government took to support disaster case management programs after the hurricanes, (2) the extent to which federal agencies oversaw the implementation of these programs, (3) challenges case management agencies experienced in delivering disaster case management services, and (4) how these programs will inform the development of a federal case management program for future disasters. GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, obtained data from two programs, conducted site visits to Louisiana and Mississippi, and interviewed case management providers and officials from federal and state agencies involved in disaster case management.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies provided more than$209 million for disaster case management services to help thousands of households cope with the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but breaks in federal funding adversely affected services to some hurricane victims. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) awarded a grant of $66 million for initial case management services provided by Katrina Aid Today (KAT) shortly after the hurricanes made landfall. When this program ended in March 2008, FEMA provided funds for additional programs to continue services. As a result of ongoing budget negotiations between FEMA and Mississippi, the state-managed Disaster Case Management Pilot (DCM-P) program in Mississippi did not begin until August 2008, approximately 2 months after it was scheduled to, and FEMA's DCM-P program in Louisiana was never implemented. Consequently, some victims most in need may not have received case management services. FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided some oversight of disaster case management programs, but monitoring of KAT was limited and coordination challenges may provide lessons for future disasters. As recovery continued, FEMA and HUD provided additional monitoring of subsequent programs. Coordination challenges contributed to implementation difficulties, such as a lack of timely information sharing. For example, client information provided by FEMA to the Mississippi state agency implementing the DCM-P program was invalid or out-of-date for nearly 20 percent of eligible clients. As a result of incompatible databases and inconsistent outreach efforts, some victims may have received services from multiple agencies while others may not have been reached. Case management agencies experienced challenges in delivering federally-funded disaster case management services due to large caseloads, limited community resources, and federal funding rules. Some case management agencies experienced high turnover, and some case managers had caseloads of more than 100 clients, making it difficult to meet client needs. KAT and HUD data indicated that the most frequently occurring needs among clients included housing and employment, but these resources were limited following the hurricanes. Further, case management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial assistance for items such as home repair, clothing, or furniture as key to helping victims, yet only one federally funded program allowed case management agencies to use federal funds for direct assistance. FEMA and other agencies are evaluating disaster case management pilot programs to inform the development of a federal disaster case management program for future disasters, but some of the evaluations have limitations. For example, some evaluations will not assess program outcomes, such as whether clients' needs were met. In addition, FEMA did not include stakeholder input in designing its evaluation of multiple pilot programs. According to FEMA officials, the agency does not have a time line for developing the federal disaster case management program. |
gao_GAO-13-754 | gao_GAO-13-754_0 | HHS’s HRSA reported that in 2011, over 4 million patients used dental services at federally funded health centers. National Survey Data Show That Rates of Dental Coverage and Use of Dental Services Remained Generally Unchanged from 1996 to 2010
The rate of individuals with dental coverage remained largely unchanged from 1996 to 2010; around 62 to 63 percent of the population had private or Medicaid or CHIP dental coverage. Coverage of Dental Services Remained Relatively Unchanged from 1996 to 2010
Our analysis of MEPS data showed that overall, the rate of dental coverage—the percentage of individuals reporting that they had dental coverage through private insurance or Medicaid or CHIP—remained relatively unchanged from 1996 to 2010.62 percent of individuals reported having dental coverage, and in 2010, 63 percent reported having dental coverage. For about 10 to 12 percent Specifically, in 1996, of the population, including many individuals covered by Medicare and other federal health programs, dental coverage status is unknown. 1). The percentage of individuals reporting that they did not have dental coverage decreased from 28 percent in 1996 to 25 percent in 2010, leaving at least one in four individuals with no dental coverage—approximately 76 million people—in 2010. 2). 3). This increase reflects an increase in the number of children with Medicaid coverage who had a dental visit, although these children still had dental visits at lower rates than privately insured children (58 percent). Average annual inflation-adjusted dental payments increased 26 percent from $520 per year in 1996 to $653 per year in 2010 (see table 5). The average annual payments made—including out-of-pocket payments and payments by other payers—increased 24 percent for the privately insured, 39 percent for individuals with Medicaid, and 38 percent for those without dental coverage. Specifically, average annual out-of-pocket payments made by individuals with private coverage increased 21 percent from 1996 to 2010—from $242 to $294. Individuals with no dental coverage experienced the greatest increase in average annual out-of-pocket payments, from $392 to $518, a 32 percent increase. Dental fees also varied between local dentists and health centers that serve residents of the same community, but all health centers are required to offer sliding fee schedules for low-income individuals. Upper-end fees were at least double the midpoint fees in at least one community for 8 of the 24 common procedures we examined (see table 6). For example, in Miami, Florida, half of the fees charged by dentists for a periodic oral examination of an established patient were $62 or less, but 5 percent of fees charged for that procedure were $150 or more, a 142 percent difference. Dental fees also varied between midpoint fees of local dentists billing private insurers and the full fees of the federally funded health centers that serve residents of the same community. IV for additional information on local dentist fees and health center dental fees.) Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 9). Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
To provide information on the trends in dental coverage rates, use of dental services, and payments by individuals and other payers for dental services, we analyzed nationwide data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). To determine the extent to which dental fees varied between and within selected communities, we analyzed dental insurance claims data and dental fees charged by selected health centers in nine states corresponding to the nine U.S. Census Bureau divisions. For each selected dental procedure, we extracted from the FAIR Health data set the midpoint dental fee (the 50th percentile) and the upper-end fee (the 95th percentile). Oral Health: Dental Disease Is a Chronic Problem Among Low-Income Populations. | Why GAO Did This Study
High rates of dental disease remain prevalent across the nation, especially in vulnerable and underserved populations. According to national surveys, 42 percent of adults with tooth or mouth problems did not see a dentist in 2008 because they did not have dental insurance or could not afford the out-of-pocket payments, and in 2011, 4 million children did not obtain needed dental care because their families could not afford it.
In 2011, the Institute of Medicine reported that there is strong evidence that dental coverage is positively tied to access to and use of oral health care. For families without dental coverage, federally funded health centers may offer an affordable dental care option. Health centers are required to offer sliding fee schedules with discounts of up to 100 percent for many low-income patients.
GAO was asked to examine dental services in the United States. This report describes (1) trends in coverage for, and use of, dental services; (2) trends in payments by individuals and other payers for dental services; and (3) the extent to which dental fees vary between and within selected communities across the nation. To do this work, GAO examined HHS national health survey data and national dental expenditure estimates, dental insurance claims data, and health center dental fees in 18 selected communities (based on census region, population, and dental claims volume). GAO also interviewed HHS officials and academic experts.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Overall, trends in dental coverage show little change from 1996 to 2010--around 62 percent of individuals had coverage. The percentage of the population with private dental coverage decreased from 53 to 50 percent. Dental coverage through Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which was established in 1997, rose from 9 to 13 percent. The increase was due primarily to an increase in the number of children covered by these federal-state health programs with mandated pediatric dental coverage. Individuals with no dental coverage decreased from 28 to 25 percent, and coverage for 10 to 12 percent of the population was unknown. Use of dental services--the percentage of individuals who had at least one dental visit--also remained relatively unchanged at around 40 percent from 1996 to 2010. Medicaid and CHIP beneficiaries, children in particular, showed increases in the use of dental services (from 28 to 37 percent), but still visited the dentist less often than privately insured children (58 percent in 2010).
GAO's analysis showed that average annual dental payments--the total amount paid out of pocket by individuals and by other payers--increased 26 percent, inflation-adjusted, from $520 in 1996 to $653 in 2010. Average annual out-of-pocket payments increased 21 percent, from $242 to $294, for individuals with private insurance and 32 percent, from $392 to $518, for individuals with no dental coverage.
Dental fees charged by local dentists and health centers varied widely. For 8 of 24 common procedures GAO examined, reported upper-end fees (the 95th percentile of the range in local dentist fees) were at least double the midpoint fees (the 50th percentile of the range in local dentist fees) in several communities. For example, in Miami, Florida, the upper-end fee of $150 for a periodic oral examination was more than twice the midpoint dental fee of $62. Dental fees also varied between local dentists billing private insurers and health centers serving residents of the same community. In general, most health centers in GAO's review offered a 100 percent discount--resulting in no fee--to the lowest-income patients for many, but not all, dental services. |
gao_GGD-98-18 | gao_GGD-98-18_0 | Also, as an additional means of enhancing public visibility, FinCEN presented its fiscal year regulatory priorities in annual plans, pursuant to Executive Order 12866 requirements. This strategy emphasized frequent interaction and consultation with affected public and private sector representatives in the law enforcement, regulatory, and financial services communities. A majority of the members commented that FinCEN’s process, rather than focusing on timeliness, was properly focused on quality—specifically, on developing and issuing substantively effective regulations. As of December 1997, FinCEN had not issued final rules for five regulatory initiatives related to the MLSA. For example, FinCEN’s fiscal year 1995 regulatory agenda did not provide estimated dates for issuing final rules for any of the eight MLSA-related regulatory initiatives we reviewed. Another mechanism that FinCEN has used to inform Congress of its regulatory agenda has been congressional hearings. Conclusions
FinCEN’s process for developing and issuing BSA regulations was generally designed to reflect applicable procedures set forth in the APA and Executive Order 12866. We note in this report that the intended law enforcement benefits of the MLSA amendments cannot be fully achieved until all of the regulations are implemented. FinCEN also said that it communicated the agency’s regulatory plans through various other means, including testimony at congressional hearings. Thus, congressional committees have not been in a good position to assess FinCEN’s regulatory program, including the agency’s prioritization of regulatory initiatives, the time lines for issuing final regulations, and the allocation of resources necessary for completing these initiatives. Purposes and Membership of the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group
The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (1992 Act) directed that the Secretary of the Treasury establish (within 90 days after the date of the act’s enactment) a Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Advisory Group consisting of representatives from the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and other interested persons and financial institutions subject to the currency reporting requirements of the BSA or section 6050I of the Internal Revenue Code. As agreed with the requesters’ offices, we focused our work on the following questions, particularly in reference to the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (MLSA) amendments to the BSA:
What process did FinCEN follow for developing and issuing BSA regulations? What is the current status of FinCEN’s efforts to develop and issue BSA regulations? Scope and Methodology of Our Work Regarding FinCEN’s Regulatory Process
As a preparatory step, we familiarized ourselves with selected portions of the Administrative Procedure Act and Executive Order 12866 that prescribe procedures federal agencies are to follow when developing and issuing regulations. In determining the status of FinCEN’s efforts to develop and issue relevant regulations, we (1) interviewed appropriate FinCEN officials, (2) reviewed applicable Federal Register notices of proposed and final rulemaking, and (3) developed a time line of FinCEN’s regulatory issuances. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the regulatory role of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), focusing on the: (1) process FinCEN followed for developing and issuing Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations; and (2) status of FinCEN's efforts to develop and issue BSA regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FinCEN's process for developing and issuing regulations generally consisted of determining what regulations were required or needed, establishing priorities for which regulations it would promulgate first, and then promulgating the regulations within the context of applicable statutory and executive branch guidance; (2) overall, FinCEN's regulatory process was designed to reflect the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standardized procedures that federal agencies are to follow when developing and issuing regulations; (3) moreover, FinCEN follows a partnership strategy, which emphasizes frequent consultations with representatives of the law enforcement, regulatory, and financial services communities; (4) regarding the status of FinCEN's efforts to develop and issue regulations, as of December 1997, more than 3 years since passage of the Money Laundering Suppression Act (MLSA), FinCEN had not promulgated final regulations for five of eight regulatory initiatives related to the 1994 BSA amendments; (5) FinCEN has issued final regulations for three initiatives, has proposed regulations for four initiatives, and has not yet taken regulatory action on one initiative; (6) generally, until final regulations are promulgated, many of the intended benefits of the MLSA cannot be fully achieved; (7) FinCEN officials said that they recognized that the emphasis on issuing quality regulations has the effect of extending the time needed to develop and issue regulations; (8) thus, FinCEN followed a regulation-development process that emphasized quality over timeliness; (9) a majority of the members of the BSA Advisory Group with whom GAO spoke generally concurred with this characterization of FinCEN's regulatory process; (10) GAO believes that FinCEN could better inform appropriate congressional committees of its rulemaking plans, especially when those plans will result in FinCEN's failing to meet statutory completion dates; (11) although GAO found that FinCEN had presented its fiscal year regulatory priorities in annual plans, which were published in the Federal Register, these plans did not provide stakeholders with FinCEN's estimated dates for issuing final rules for all MLSA-related amendments to the BSA; (12) FinCEN communicated the agency's regulatory plans to Congress by various means, including testimony at congressional hearings; and (13) congressional committees were not in a good position to assess FinCEN's regulatory initiatives, the time lines for issuing final regulations, and the allocation of resources necessary for completing these initiatives. |
gao_GGD-96-64 | gao_GGD-96-64_0 | Background
Federal law enforcement agencies pursue fugitives wanted for crimes that fall within their jurisdictions. FBI, USMS, and ATF policies for entering fugitives onto the wanted person file required entry shortly after the arrest warrant, notice of escape, or other document authorizing detention was issued: the FBI and USMS required immediate entry, meaning within 24 hours; ATF allowed up to 10 days for entry if the delay served a law enforcement purpose. Customs Service policy called for entry after reasonable efforts to locate the fugitive had failed and essentially defined “reasonable” as being after all investigative leads on the fugitive’s location have been exhausted. Figure 2 illustrates the entry times for the 7,864 FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service fugitive records with a caution notation on the wanted person file as of April 6, 1994, and the entry times for the 1,838 of these caution-noted records that were entered after September 30, 1993. However, our comparison of NCIC entries with arrest warrant dates revealed that only 31 percent of the FBI’s entries overall and 34 percent of caution fugitive entries were made on the same day of the arrest warrant, and 48 percent and 50 percent, respectively, were made by the end of the next day. Nor did they have information on the reasons for delays in entering fugitives. Moreover, it seems reasonable that timely entries would be of concern to law enforcement organizations in other federal agencies. Specifically, we sought to identify (1) how long federal agencies took to enter fugitives onto the wanted person file; (2) what information the agencies had on entry times and the means used to monitor entry times; and (3) what actions agencies took, considered, or could take to reduce any entry delays. We focused on the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) wanted person file, focusing on the: (1) length of time it takes federal law enforcement agencies to enter fugitives onto the file; (2) information that agencies have on data entry times and the means used to monitor entry times; and (3) agencies' plans to reduce entry delays.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) require that fugitives be entered onto the wanted persons file within one day after an arrest warrant is issued; (2) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) allows up to ten days for data entry if the delay serves a valid law enforcement purpose; (3) the Customs Service requires data entry after reasonable efforts to locate a fugitive have failed; (4) the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has no policy regarding the timeliness of data entry; (5) 28 percent of FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs' entries are made one day after issuance of the arrest warrant, 54 percent within one week, and 70 percent within four weeks; (6) data entry times for dangerous fugitives do not differ substantially from overall data entry times; (7) ATF and Customs do not monitor their data entry times or know the reasons for delays in entering fugitives on the wanted persons file; (8) FBI found that there are delays in between 30 and 50 percent of its data entries, with a median delay of about one week; and (9) all the federal law enforcement agencies plan to take action to minimize data entry delays. |
gao_RCED-99-38 | gao_RCED-99-38_0 | In addition, (1) OCR’s new program cases are often missing interim milestones and are not on track for being closed in a timely manner and (2) employment cases are continuing to exceed EEOC time frames. Substantial Backlogs Remain, and OCR Has Extended Deadlines for Closure Several Times
As of October 1, 1998, OCR had closed only 477 (or 44 percent) of its backlog of 1,088 program cases and 1,381 (or 64 percent) of its backlog of 2,142 employment cases. OCR’s goal was to close all remaining backlog cases by December 31, 1998—its fourth deadline for backlog program cases and its third deadline for backlog employment cases. As with program complaints, July 1, 1997, was the initial target date for resolving backlog employment cases. As of October 1, 1998, 69 cases had exceeded the 180-day goal for closing new program cases. Several Factors Hinder Efforts to Improve Timeliness
Although USDA has taken a number of actions to strengthen its civil rights processes, such as providing additional resources for its program complaint process, several problems are impeding its efforts to process complaints more efficiently. First, conditions that caused delays in the past continue to undermine current efforts—continuing management turnover and reorganizations in OCR; inadequate staff and management expertise; a lack of clear, up-to-date guidance and procedures; and poor working relationships and communication within OCR and between OCR and other USDA entities. These problems are long-standing. Furthermore, they had virtually no knowledge of the complexities of USDA programs. USDA’s Use of ADR in Addressing Workplace and Other Disputes Has Been Sporadic
USDA is not consistently using ADR techniques to address workplace and other disputes. Recent laws and regulations have supported the use of ADR in resolving federal workplace disputes. On December 21, 1998, the Secretary of Agriculture issued a conflict management policy. To facilitate the resolution of program discrimination complaints, develop and implement a program for using alternative dispute resolution early in the program complaint process. To determine the timeliness of USDA’s processing of program and employment complaints, we reviewed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, laws and regulations concerning discrimination in USDA’s conducted and assisted programs, and OCR’s operations manuals for processing conducted program complaints and employment complaints. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efforts to process discrimination complaints, focusing on: (1) the timeliness of USDA's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) processing and closing of program and employment discrimination complaints; and (2) the reasons for delays in the processes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USDA's efforts to process discrimination complaints are falling short of its goals for closing its complaint backlog--one of the Secretary's top priorities; (2) the dates USDA established for closing its backlogs of program and employment discrimination complaints have been extended several times beyond its initial target date of July 1, 1997; (3) as of October 1, 1998, USDA had closed only 44 percent of its 1,088 backlog program cases and 64 percent of its 2,142 backlog employment cases; (4) its most recent goal was to close all remaining backlog cases by December 31, 1998--the fourth deadline it has set for backlog program cases and its third deadline for backlog employment cases; (5) in addition: (a) many of USDA's new program cases are missing interim milestones and are therefore not on track for being closed in a timely manner; and (b) the time spent processing its employment cases continues to far exceed federally mandated time frames; (6) for example, on October 1, 1998, 82 percent of the 397 employment cases being investigated by USDA had already exceeded the 180-day mandated time frame for investigations; (7) although USDA has provided additional resources to enhance its capabilities to address discrimination complaints, a number of problems are impeding its efforts to process complaints more expeditiously; (8) these problems include such long-standing issues as: (a) continuing management turnover and reorganizations in OCR; (b) inadequate staff and managerial expertise; (c) a lack of clear, up-to-date guidance and procedures; and (d) poor working relationships and communication within OCR and between the office and other USDA entities; (9) furthermore, the Department is not consistently using alternative dispute resolution techniques, such as mediation, to address workplace and other disputes before they become formal employment complaints; and (10) federal law and regulations encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution in resolving federal workplace and other disputes. |
gao_GAO-09-615 | gao_GAO-09-615_0 | CERP Program Management and Project Oversight Is Hindered by Insufficient and Inadequately Trained Personnel
U. S. efforts to enhance Afghanistan’s development is costly and requires some complex projects, underscoring the need to effectively manage and oversee the CERP program, including effectively managing and overseeing contracting as well as contractor efforts. Availability of Personnel
Although DOD has used CERP funds to construct roads, schools, and other projects that commanders believe have provided benefits to the Afghan people, DOD faces significant challenges in providing adequate management and oversight of CERP because of an insufficient number of trained personnel to execute and manage the program. We have frequently reported on several long-standing problems facing DOD as it uses contractors in contingency operations including inadequate numbers of trained management and oversight personnel. Our previous work has shown that high-performing organizations routinely use current, valid, and reliable data to make informed decisions about current and future workforce needs, including data on the appropriate number of employees, key competencies, and skill mix needed for mission accomplishment, and appropriate deployment of staff across the organization. DOD has not conducted a workforce assessment of CERP to identify how many military personnel are needed to effectively and efficiently execute and oversee the program. Rather, commanders determine how many personnel will manage and execute CERP. Personnel at all levels, including headquarters and unit personnel that we interviewed after they returned from Afghanistan or were in Afghanistan in November 2008, expressed a need for more personnel to perform CERP program management and oversight functions. Due to a lack of personnel, key duties such as performing headquarters staff assistance visits to help units to improve contracting procedures and site visits to monitor project status and contractor performance were either not performed or not consistently performed. Sufficiency of Training
According to DOD policy, members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective, individual, collective, and staff training, conducted in a safe manner, to enable performance to standard during operations. The training consisted of a 1-hour briefing, which included a detailed discussion of CERP guidance but did not provide detailed information on the duties of the PPO. As we have reported in the past, poorly written contracts and statements of work can increase the department’s cost risk and could result in the department paying for projects that do not meet project goals or objectives. He went on to state “it would appear that even a small amount of contract training provided through command channels and some basic ground-level oversight that does not impinge on the CERP’s objective would lower the risk in this susceptible area.”
DOD Lacks Visibility of Development Projects Being Undertaken By USAID
DOD and USAID participate in various mechanisms to facilitate coordination, but lack information that would provide greater visibility on all U.S. government development projects in Afghanistan. Further, a USAID representative is located at the CJTF-101 headquarters and acts as a liaison to help coordinate projects costing $200,000 or more. Also, in November 2008, the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group which consists of representatives from the Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan was established at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to help unify U.S. efforts in Afghanistan through coordinated planning and execution, according to a document provided by USAID. While USAID officials have conducted some assessments for the development of the centralized database, as of yet no specific milestones have been established for when that database will be complete. Without clear goals and a method to judge the progress of this initiative it is unclear how long this project might take or if it will ever be completed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has the capacity to provide adequate management and oversight of the CERP in Afghanistan, we reviewed guidance from DOD, Combined Joint Task Force-101 (CJTF-101), and Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) to identify roles and responsibilities of CERP personnel, how personnel are assigned to the CERP, the nature and extent of the workload related to managing and executing the CERP, and the training curriculum provided to familiarize personnel with the CERP. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have spent billions of dollars to develop Afghanistan. From fiscal years 2004 to 2008, DOD has reported obligations of about $1 billion for its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which enables commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. As troop levels increase, DOD officials expect the program to expand. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed DOD's (1) capacity to manage and oversee the CERP in Afghanistan and (2) coordination of projects with USAID. Accordingly, GAO interviewed DOD and USAID officials, and examined program documents to identify workload, staffing, training, and coordination requirements. In Afghanistan, GAO interviewed key military personnel on the sufficiency of training, and their ability to execute assigned duties.
What GAO Found
Although DOD has used CERP to fund projects that it believes significantly benefit the Afghan people, it faces significant challenges in providing adequate management and oversight because of an insufficient number of trained personnel. GAO has frequently reported that inadequate numbers of management and oversight personnel hinders DOD's use of contractors in contingency operations. GAO's work also shows that high-performing organizations use data to make informed decisions about current and future workforce needs. DOD has not conducted an overall workforce assessment to identify how many personnel are needed to effectively execute CERP. Rather, individual commanders determine how many personnel will manage and execute CERP. Personnel at all levels, including headquarters and unit personnel that GAO interviewed after they returned from Afghanistan or who were in Afghanistan in November 2008, expressed a need for more personnel to perform CERP program management and oversight functions. Due to a lack of personnel, key duties such as performing headquarters staff assistance visits to help units improve contracting procedures and visiting sites to monitor project status and contractor performance were either not performed or inconsistently performed. Per DOD policy, DOD personnel should receive timely and effective training to enable performance to standard during operations. However, key CERP personnel at headquarters, units, and provincial reconstruction teams received little or no training prior to deployment which commanders believed made it more difficult to properly execute and oversee the program. Also, most personnel responsible for awarding and overseeing CERP contracts valued at $500,000 or less received little or no training prior to deployment and, once deployed, received a 1-hour briefing, which did not provide detailed information on the individual's duties. As a result, frequent mistakes occurred, such as the omission of key clauses from contracts, which slowed the project approval process. As GAO has reported in the past, poorly written contracts and statements of work can increase DOD's cost risk and could result in payment for projects that do not meet project goals or objectives. While mechanisms exist to facilitate coordination, DOD and USAID lack information that would provide greater visibility on all U.S. government development projects. DOD and USAID generally coordinate projects at the headquarters and unit level as well as through military-led provincial reconstruction teams which include USAID representatives. In addition, in November 2008, USAID, DOD and the Department of State began participating in an interagency group composed of senior U.S. government civilians and DOD personnel in Afghanistan to enhance planning and coordination of development plans and related projects. However, complete project information is lacking, because DOD and USAID use different databases. USAID has been tasked to develop a common database and is coordinating with DOD to do so, but development is in the early stages and goals and milestones have not been established. Without clear goals and milestones, it is unclear how progress will be measured or when it will be completed |
gao_GAO-17-111 | gao_GAO-17-111_0 | States Reported Conducting Numerous Data Matches for SNAP and the Matches They Find Most Useful Provide Real- Time Access to Recent Data
All States Conduct a Range of Data Matches for SNAP, and Most States Have Implemented the Recently Required New Hire Data Match
In response to our survey, all states reported conducting multiple data matches for income information that they use to determine SNAP eligibility. Data matches that do not have the characteristics that states found particularly useful can be used as leads to detect income that households may not have reported. States Reported Challenges with Following Up on Data Matches, Using Data Matches for Multiple Programs, and Costs
Necessary Follow-Up on Data Matches Is Challenging, Especially Related to Earnings and Out-of-State Benefits
In our survey, we asked states about overall challenges for the income- related data matches they use, and the issue the most states found very or extremely challenging was following up to verify information provided by those matches. These secondary data sources are often collected for multiple purposes and thus may not be sufficiently recent, accurate, or complete for SNAP eligibility determinations. Unlike several data matches for unearned income, all data matches for earned income lack one or more characteristics that are useful for determining SNAP eligibility. More states reported that costs associated with The Work Number were very or extremely challenging than they did for other national data sources. Some states limit their use of The Work Number or do not use it at all due to costs, according to interviews with state and FNS officials and comments from states in response to our survey. FNS Has Efforts Underway to Promote the Use of Data Matching to Improve SNAP, but May Be Missing Some Opportunities
FNS Efforts Include Initiating Demonstration Projects and Pilots, Promoting Program Integration, and Working with CMS to Reduce Duplicative Processes
SNAP Demonstration Projects and Pilots
FNS has initiated several demonstration projects or pilots aimed at using data matching to improve client access, program integrity, or program efficiencies for SNAP (see table 5). FNS Has Not Widely Disseminated Promising Practices for Data Matching or Assessed Options to Reduce Commercial Data Costs
Despite FNS’ current efforts, 32 states reported that more information from FNS on promising data matching practices, such as on the use of different data matches or on ways to filter data to streamline worker follow-up, would be extremely or very useful, according to our survey. Likewise, officials we interviewed from three of the six states said that it would be useful for FNS to facilitate additional information sharing on state practices, such as implementation issues, so they could be aware of how other states were implementing data matches:
Officials from one state said FNS could provide information about whether other states were effectively using data matches that they found challenging to implement in their state. Further, although FNS is beginning to explore ways to reduce the costs of The Work Number for state SNAP agencies by working with CMS to expand its use through the Hub, it has not yet systematically analyzed spending and SNAP data needs for this service and more thoroughly considered how various factors would affect costs. Without such an approach, FNS will not be able to identify the best ways to leverage the government’s buying power through strategic sourcing practices and potentially reduce costs and improve performance. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture: 1. Take additional steps to collect and disseminate information on promising practices that could help improve data matching processes among state SNAP agencies, including broad and timely dissemination of information on results of recent relevant pilots or demonstrations. Work with HHS (as appropriate) to analyze spending and understand data needs for SNAP across federal and state contracts and in relation to other programs as FNS explores ways to potentially reduce the costs of using commercial data services. | Why GAO Did This Study
During fiscal year 2015, state SNAP agencies provided about 46 million low-income individuals approximately $70 billion in federally funded benefits, and an additional $7.6 billion in federal and state funds was spent in administering the program in fiscal year 2014, according to the most recent data. SNAP agencies use data matching to verify eligibility information about applicant or recipient households, including their incomes, as well as to help detect improper payments. GAO was asked to review issues related to data matching in administering SNAP.
This report examines (1) the extent to which states use data matching to obtain income information and find these matches useful for SNAP eligibility, (2) challenges states experience using data matching, and (3) actions FNS has taken to promote data matching for SNAP. GAO surveyed all state SNAP directors for a 100 percent response rate and interviewed state officials in six states that varied in caseload size, geography, and other criteria, and visited local offices in three of these states. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
In administering the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), all state SNAP agencies verify household income by conducting multiple data matches, which they find useful for detecting potential discrepancies related to SNAP eligibility (see figure below), according to GAO's survey of all state SNAP directors. Most states reported that particularly useful data matches provided current information, can be accessed in real-time (i.e., immediately), and are from original sources. Some data sources for unearned income, including from the Social Security Administration, have all these characteristics. Data matches for earned income lacked one or more of these useful characteristics, but can be used as leads to follow up on with households or employers.
States identified challenges with following up on data matches and with the costs of data matching. The issue states cited most often in GAO's survey as very or extremely challenging was the need to conduct follow-up for data that are not sufficiently recent, accurate, or complete, which can be cumbersome and time-consuming. Officials GAO interviewed in several states were implementing ways to manage follow-up. Over one-third of states also reported that costs associated with accessing certain commercial data to verify earnings were very or extremely challenging, with some states limiting their use of these data due to costs.
The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), which oversees the SNAP program, has efforts underway to promote data matching to improve program administration, but may be missing some opportunities. For example, FNS has initiated pilot or demonstration projects to improve program integrity or service to households. However, FNS has not actively collected or disseminated information on promising data matching practices, consistent with federal internal controls. Further, 32 states reported in GAO's survey that more information from FNS on promising data matching practices would be extremely or very useful. With more information, states will have increased awareness of other potentially useful or cost-effective practices. In addition, FNS has begun to explore ways to help states reduce the cost of using commercial data, but has not systematically analyzed spending and SNAP needs for these data to consider how to best leverage government buying power through strategic sourcing practices. Without this analysis, FNS may not be able to identify the best ways to lower data matching costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FNS disseminate information on promising practices to state SNAP agencies, and analyze spending and data needs as it explores ways to reduce costs of using commercial data. FNS agreed with these recommendations |
gao_HEHS-96-117 | gao_HEHS-96-117_0 | According to NIH, these institutes and grantee institutions know the nature and objectives of the trials and are therefore in the best position to develop monitoring procedures to ensure safety and data integrity. Fiscal Oversight Policies and Controls Are Consistent Among Institutes and Grantees
Although each institute independently oversees the clinical trials it sponsors, the controls established to prevent and detect fiscal misconduct were consistent among the institutes in our review. The control procedures must conform with federal requirements and policies on the expenditure of federal funds. Independent auditors review grantee compliance annually in a required financial audit. Controls That Protect Trial Data Integrity Are Not Always Consistently Applied
Clinical trials have controls that safeguard against scientific misconduct, including direct data verification to ensure data integrity. One control designed to safeguard trials against scientific misconduct is the use of clinical monitors to review trial data. Furthermore, NIH has not adopted its internal committee’s recommendations to develop agencywide guidance on quality assurance measures and data monitoring procedures for institutes to use in managing clinical trials. NIH Conducts Limited Central Oversight and Monitoring of Phase III Clinical Trials
Even though NIH’s Office of Extramural Research is responsible for centralized activities concerning oversight of extramural research, such as developing policy on the review, funding, and management of clinical trials, it has limited knowledge of and data on the Phase III clinical trials NIH funds and the performance of individual institutes and grantees. NIH has decided not to adopt any of the committee’s recommendations agencywide. ORI monitors compliance with this requirement. This applies also to all NIH-sponsored research. The data coordinating centers we visited differed in how they were funded. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) oversight of the clinical trials it sponsors, focusing on NIH internal controls to prevent misuse of federal funds and safeguard the integrity of clinical trial data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) individual NIH institutes and grantee institutions oversee and monitor NIH-funded Phase III clinical trials; (2) internal controls to guard against fiscal misconduct in extramural research must comply with regulations and policies on federal funds expenditures and be consistently applied; (3) independent auditors review grantees' compliance with these internal control regulations during annual audits; (4) NIH imposes sanctions on offending grantees when scientific misconduct occurs; (5) internal controls to guard against scientific misconduct and ensure participants' safety are generally consistent, but they vary slightly among trials due to differences in the sponsoring institute's management philosophy and past experience, the trial's size, nature, and complexity, and the way the trial is funded; (6) NIH institutes and grantees use clinical monitors and data coordinating centers to ensure data integrity, but these controls are not consistently applied; (7) one institute provides direct funding for certain data verification functions which ensures prompt reporting of data concerns and potential misconduct to NIH, but this is not an agencywide policy for multisite trials; (8) central NIH oversight and monitoring of clinical trials is limited; and (9) NIH has not adopted on an agencywide basis, any of its study committee's recommendations to improve clinical trial oversight because it believes agencywide monitoring policies are inappropriate. |
gao_GAO-10-237 | gao_GAO-10-237_0 | Trusted Internet Connections
In November 2007, OMB announced the TIC initiative. Agencies may implement TIC by serving as their own access provider or by obtaining services from another source. Agencies Have Made Progress toward Consolidating and Reducing Connections, but Inconsistent Communication from OMB and DHS Has Led to Challenges
OMB and DHS established requirements to meet the initiative’s goals of securing agencies’ external connections and improving the government’s incident response capability. Throughout their efforts, agencies have experienced benefits and challenges as well as learned lessons. Agencies Were Required to Develop and Implement Plans to Consolidate and Secure External Connections
To achieve these objectives, agencies were required to: Inventory agency external connections. Identify and justify target number of external access points. Implement security capabilities. The 74 security capabilities include technical capabilities, such as encryption of Internet traffic and the use of firewalls; capabilities related to availability, such as the presence of an uninterrupted power source; physical access controls; and capabilities that describe how an access provider maintains an acceptable level of service. Demonstrate consolidation of connections and implementation of TIC security capabilities. Agencies Have Not Fully Implemented All Requirements of TIC and Progress Has Been Slower Than Planned
None of the 23 agencies has met all of the requirements of the TIC initiative, and most agencies have experienced delays in their plans for reducing and consolidating connections. However, most agencies reported that they have made progress toward reducing and consolidating their external connections and implementing security capabilities. However, in their September 2009 plans of action and milestones, these agencies reported that they had consolidated to a maximum of 1,753 connections—225 more than they had planned. TIC will improve security at agencies by reducing the number of access points that have to be monitored. Improved Network Management. However, in some circumstances, agencies have been unable to effectively plan for implementing the initiative because OMB did not always consistently communicate the number of TIC access points for which agencies had been approved in a timely manner and DHS did not always promptly respond to agencies’ questions about the required security capabilities. As indicated earlier, the 16 access provider agencies in our review are reporting that they are reducing and consolidating from 3,286 external connections. DHS Has Deployed Einstein to Six Agencies, but Faces Challenges with Meeting Program Goals
Einstein is intended to provide DHS with an increased awareness of activity, including possible security incidents, on federal networks. As of September 2009, fewer than half of the 23 agencies had executed the required agreements with DHS, and Einstein 2 had been deployed to six agencies. Agencies that participated in Einstein 1 improved identification of incidents and mitigation of attacks, but DHS continues to face challenges with meeting the goals of the initiative. Although one of the objectives of Einstein is to improve situational awareness of activity across the federal government, DHS will be challenged in understanding the extent to which this objective is being met because it lacks performance measures for Einstein 2 that address whether or not agencies report that the alerts represent actual incidents. For each initiative, our objectives were to (1) identify their goals, objectives, and requirements; (2) determine the status of the actions federal agencies have taken, or plan to take, to implement them; and (3) identify the benefits, challenges, and lessons learned in implementing each initiative. For TIC, to address the first objective, we obtained and reviewed applicable policies and memorandums issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and guidance, reports, and other documentation provided by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
To reduce the threat to federal systems and operations posed by cyber attacks on the United States, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) launched, in November 2007, the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, and later, in 2008, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), operationally known as Einstein, became mandatory for federal agencies as part of TIC. For each of these initiatives, GAO was asked to (1) identify their goals, objectives, and requirements; (2) determine the status of actions federal agencies have taken, or plan to take, to implement the initiatives; and (3) identify any benefits, challenges, and lessons learned. To do this, GAO reviewed plans, reports, and other documents at 23 major executive branch agencies, interviewed officials, and reviewed OMB and DHS guidance.
What GAO Found
The goals of TIC are to secure federal agencies' external network connections, including Internet connections, and improve the government's incident response capability by reducing the number of agencies' external network connections and implementing security controls over the connections that remain. In implementing TIC, agencies could either provide their own access points by becoming an access provider or seek service from these providers or an approved vendor. To achieve the initiative's goals, agencies were required to (1) inventory external connections, (2) establish a target number of TIC access points, (3) develop and implement plans to reduce their connections, (4) implement security capabilities (if they chose to be an access provider) addressing such issues as encryption and physical security, and (5) demonstrate to DHS the consolidation of connections and compliance with the security capabilities (if they chose to be an access provider). As of September 2009, none of the 23 agencies had met all of the requirements of the TIC initiative. Although most agencies reported that they have made progress toward reducing their external connections and implementing critical security capabilities, most agencies have also experienced delays in their implementation efforts. For example, the 16 agencies that chose to become access providers reported that they had reduced their number of external connections from 3,286 to approximately 1,753. Further, agencies have not demonstrated that they have fully implemented the required security capabilities. Throughout their reduction efforts, agencies have experienced benefits, such as improved security and network management. However, they have been challenged in implementing TIC because OMB did not promptly communicate the number of access points for which they had been approved and DHS did not always respond to agency queries on security capabilities in a timely manner. Agencies' experiences with implementing TIC offered OMB and DHS lessons learned, such as the need to define program requirements before establishing deadlines and the usefulness of sponsoring collaborative meetings for agencies' implementation efforts. Einstein is intended to provide DHS with an increased awareness of activity, including possible security incidents, on federal networks by providing intrusion detection capabilities that allow DHS to monitor and analyze agencies' incoming and outgoing Internet traffic. As of September 2009, fewer than half of the 23 agencies had executed the required agreements with DHS, and Einstein 2 had been deployed to 6 agencies. Agencies that participated in Einstein 1 improved identification of incidents and mitigation of attacks, but DHS will continue to be challenged in understanding whether the initiative is meeting all of its objectives because it lacks performance measures that address how agencies respond to alerts. |
gao_GAO-11-283 | gao_GAO-11-283_0 | These officials used worksheets to aid in assessing application completeness and determining whether applicants and proposed projects were eligible to receive funds. On January 28, 2010, DOT announced the selections. However, its rationales for selecting projects were typically too general to determine how it applied the additional selection criteria. When asked for more information on certain applications, FRA provided specific reasons for its selection decisions, but, in our opinion, creating a detailed, comprehensive record alongside the final selections is preferable. FRA Applied Its Established Criteria to Determine Eligibility and Assess Technical Merit
We found that FRA applied eligibility criteria established in its funding announcement when determining whether applications were eligible. This level of information, which provides some insight into the merits of projects, was not included in the department’s record of its decisions. Other descriptions were similar. Documentation of agency activities is a key part of accountability for decisions. This application was later recommended for selection. FRA substantially followed these practices, including communicating key information to applicants, planning for the competition, using a technical merit review panel with desirable characteristics, assessing applicants’ ability to account for funds, and notifying applicants of awards decisions. FRA issued a funding announcement that included information on the $8 billion in available funding, key dates, the competition rules, the funding priorities and relative importance for each one, and the types of projects FRA would consider for federal grants. For example, officials from several states indicated that FRA officials participated in biweekly conference calls, which were helpful in understanding the technical aspects of how to apply. Document rationale for awards decisions. According to FRA, officials used lessons from a number of other government programs when developing the method for evaluating and selecting projects. FRA Publicly Communicated at Least as Much Outcome Information as Other Competitively Awarded Recovery Act Grant Programs
FRA publicly communicated outcome information, such as a list of awards and the award amounts, at a level similar to or greater than most other Recovery Act competitive grant programs that we examined. Only one of the programs that we examined—the Department of Education’s State Innovation grants (known as Race to the Top)—publicly communicated the results of its technical review, which include technical scores and comments; however, this program used a much different approach for selecting awardees than the HSIPR program. We also did not find any non-Recovery Act requirement or guidance instructing federal programs to publicly disclose the reasons for their selection decisions. FRA publicly communicated at least as much outcome information as all but one Recovery Act competitive grant programs we reviewed. According to FRA officials, the results of the technical review were not communicated because department officials were concerned that associating technical review scores and comments with a specific reviewer could discourage reviewers from participating in future department competitive grant evaluations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure accountability over federal funds, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration to create additional records that document the rationales for award decisions in future HSIPR funding rounds, including substantive reasons (1) why individual projects are selected or not selected and (2) for changes made to requested funding amounts. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for its review and comment. The department also offered technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Extent to Which Recovery Act Projects Align with Statutory and Other Goals
We examined the extent to which American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) projects selected by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) align with legislative and the administration’s goals to develop high speed and conventional rail networks. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
Criteria Used to Select Projects
To determine the extent to which FRA applied its established criteria to select projects, we identified the criteria that it planned to use from its June 23, 2009, funding announcement outlining its evaluation and selection approach. Specifically, we identified six recommended practices relating to (1) communicating with potential applicants prior to the competition, (2) planning for administering the review of applications, (3) developing a technical review panel with certain characteristics, (4) assessing applicants’ abilities to manage grant funds, (5) notifying applicants of decisions, and (6) documenting reasons for award decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) appropriated $8 billion for high and conventional speed passenger rail. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), within the Department of Transportation (the department), was responsible for soliciting applications, evaluating them to determine program eligibility and technical merits, and selecting awards, which were announced in January 2010. This report examines the extent to which FRA (1) applied its established criteria to select projects, (2) followed recommended practices for awarding discretionary grants, and (3) communicated outcomes to the public, compared with selected other Recovery Act competitive grant programs. To address these topics GAO reviewed federal legislation, FRA documents, and guidance for other competitive grant programs using Recovery Act funds. GAO also analyzed data resulting from the evaluation and selection process and interviewed a cross-section of FRA officials and applicants.
What GAO Found
FRA applied its established criteria during the eligibility and technical reviews, but GAO could not verify whether it applied its final selection criteria because the documented rationales for selecting projects were typically vague. Specifically, FRA used worksheets and guidebooks that included the criteria outlined in the funding announcement to aid in assessing the eligibility and technical merit of applications. FRA also recorded general reasons for selecting applications and publicly posted broad descriptions of the selected projects. However, the documented reasons for these selection decisions were typically vague or restated the criteria listed in the funding announcement. In addition, there were only general reasons given for the applications not selected or for adjusting applicants' requested funding amounts. FRA subsequently provided GAO with more detailed reasons for several of its selection decisions, but this information was not included in the department's record of its decisions. Documentation on the rationales for selection decisions is a key part of ensuring accountability and is recommended by the department as well as other federal agencies. Without a detailed record of selection decisions, FRA leaves itself vulnerable to criticism over the integrity of those decisions--an important consideration, given that passenger rail investments have a very public profile. FRA also substantially followed recommended practices when awarding grants, including communicating key information to applicants prior to the competition, planning for the competition, using a merit review panel with certain characteristics, assessing whether applicants were likely to be able to account for grant funds, notifying applicants of awards decisions, and documenting the rationale for awards decisions (albeit generally). For example, FRA issued a funding announcement that communicated key pieces of information, such as eligibility, technical review, and selection criteria. FRA officials also conducted extensive outreach to potential applicants, including participating in biweekly conference calls, providing several public presentations on the program, and conducting one-on-one site visits with potential applicants. According to FRA, officials used lessons from a number of other grant programs when developing its approach to reviewing and selecting projects. FRA publicly communicated outcome information similar to other Recovery Act competitive grant programs we examined, including projects selected, how much money they were to receive, and a general description of projects and their intended benefits. Only one of the programs GAO examined communicated more outcome information on technical scores and comments; however, this program used a much different approach to select awards than FRA used to select intercity passenger rail awards. According to officials, FRA did not disclose outcome information from the technical reviews because officials were concerned that releasing reviewers' names and associated scores could discourage them from participating in future grant application reviews.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FRA create additional records to document the substantive reasons behind award decisions to better ensure accountability for its use of federal funds. In commenting on a draft of this report, the department agreed to consider our recommendation. The department also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-464T | gao_GAO-07-464T_0 | In the wake of these events, Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). Beginning in 1995, EPA allowed facilities to use a 2-page Certification Statement (Form A) to certify that they are not subject to Form R reporting for a given non-PBT chemical provided that they (1) did not release more than 500 total pounds and (2) did not manufacture, process, or otherwise use more than one-million total pounds of the chemical. EPA Does Not Appear to Have Followed Internal Guidelines in All Respects When Developing TRI Rule
Although we have not yet completed our review, our preliminary observations are that EPA does not appear to have followed its own rulemaking guidelines in all respects when developing the new TRI reporting requirements. Nevertheless, we discovered several significant differences between the guidelines and the process EPA followed in this case: (1) late in the rulemaking process, senior EPA management directed consideration of a burden reduction option that the TRI workgroup had considered but which had subsequently been dropped from consideration; (2) EPA developed this option on an expedited schedule that appears to have provided a limited amount of time for conducting various impact analyses; and (3) the expedited schedule afforded little, if any, time for internal stakeholders to provide input to senior EPA management about the impacts of the proposal during Final Agency Review. Impact of Reporting Changes on Information Available to the Public is Likely to be Significant
We believe that the impact of EPA’s changes to the TRI reporting requirements will likely have a significant impact on environmental information available to the public. In addition, preliminary results from our January 2007 survey of state TRI coordinators indicate that they believe EPA’s changes to TRI reporting requirements will have, on balance, a negative impact on various aspects of TRI, including environmental information available to the public. We estimated that a total of nearly 22,200 Form R reports could convert to Form A if all eligible facilities choose to take advantage of the opportunity to report under the new Form A thresholds. That means that approximately 3,565 facilities would not have to report any quantitative information about their chemical releases and other waste management practices to the TRI, according to our estimates. The number of facilities ranges from 5 in Alaska to 302 in California. Although the facility’s releases totaled about 5,000 pounds, it released less than 2,000 pounds of each chemical. As figure 5 shows, more than 10 percent of facilities in each state except Idaho would no longer have to report any quantitative information to the TRI. We also asked for their beliefs about how EPA’s increase in the Form A eligibility threshold would affect TRI-related aspects in their state, such as information available to the public, efforts to protect the environment, emergency planning and preparedness, and costs to facilities for TRI reporting. EPA estimated that the TRI reporting changes will result in an annual cost savings of approximately $5.9 million. Perchlorate has been found in 35 states, the District of Columbia, and 2 commonwealths of the United States, where the highest concentrations ranged from 4 parts per billion to more than 3.7 million parts per billion. We concluded that EPA needed more reliable information on the extent of sites contaminated with perchlorate and the status of cleanup efforts, and recommended that EPA work with the Department of Defense, other federal agencies and the states to establish a formal structure for better tracking perchlorate information. In December 2006, EPA reiterated its disagreement with the recommendation stating that perchlorate information already exists from a variety of other sources. We continue to believe that the inconsistency and omissions in the available data that we found during the course of our study underscore the need for a more structured and formal system, and that such a system would serve to better inform the public and others about the locations of perchlorate releases and the status of clean ups. Preliminary Observations
Contrary to EPA’s assertions, in our view EPA’s recent changes to the Toxics Release Inventory significantly reduce the amount of information available to the public about toxic chemicals in their communities. Appendix I: GAO Estimates of the Impact of Reporting Changes on TRI Data
We analyzed 2005 TRI data provided by EPA to estimate the number of Form Rs that could no longer be reported in each state and determine the possible impacts that this could have on data about specific chemicals and facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. industry uses billions of pounds of chemicals to produce the nation's goods and services. Releases of these chemicals during use or disposal can harm human health and the environment. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 requires facilities that manufacture, process, or otherwise use more than specified amounts of nearly 650 toxic chemicals to report their releases to water, air, and land. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) makes this data available to the public in the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Since 1995, facilities may submit a brief certification statement (Form A), in lieu of the detailed Form R report, if their releases of specific chemicals do not exceed 500 pounds a year. In January 2007, EPA finalized a proposal to increase that threshold to 2,000 pounds, quadrupling what facilities can release before they must disclose their releases and other waste management practices. Today's testimony addresses (1) EPA's development of the proposal to change the TRI Form A threshold from 500 to 2,000 pounds and (2) the impact these changes may have on data available to the public. It also provides an update to our 2005 report recommendations on perchlorate. GAO's preliminary observations on TRI are based on ongoing work performed from June 2006 through January 2007.
What GAO Found
Although we have not yet completed our evaluation, our preliminary observations indicate that EPA did not adhere to its own rulemaking guidelines in all respects when developing the proposal to change TRI reporting requirements. We have identified several significant differences between the guidelines and the process EPA followed. First, late in the process, senior EPA management directed the inclusion of a burden reduction option that raised the Form R reporting threshold, an option that the TRI workgroup charged with analyzing potential options, had dropped from consideration early in the process. Second, EPA developed this option on an expedited schedule that appears to have provided a limited amount of time for conducting various impact analyses. Third, the decision to expedite final agency review, when EPA's internal and regional offices determine whether they concur with the final proposal, appears to have limited the amount of input they could provide to senior EPA management. We believe that the TRI reporting changes will likely have a significant impact on information available to the public about dozens of toxic chemicals from thousands of facilities in states and communities across the country. First, we estimate that detailed information from more than 22,000 Form Rs could no longer be reported to the TRI if all eligible facilities choose to use Form A, affecting more than 33 percent of reports in California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Second, we estimate that states could lose all quantitative information about releases of some chemicals, ranging from 3 in South Dakota to 60 in Georgia. Third, we estimate that 3,565 facilities--including 50 in Oklahoma, 101 in New Jersey, and 302 in California--would no longer have to report any quantitative information to the TRI. In addition, preliminary results from our survey of state TRI coordinators indicate that many believe the changes will negatively impact information available to the public and efforts to protect the environment. Finally, EPA estimates facilities could save a total of $5.9 million as a result of the increased Form A eligibility--about 4 percent of the total annual cost of TRI reporting. According to our estimates, facilities will save less than $900 a year, on average. Because not all eligible facilities will utilize the increased eligibility, actual savings to industry are likely to be less. In our May 2005 perchlorate report, we identified over 400 sites in 35 states where perchlorate has been found in concentrations ranging from 4 parts per billion to more than 3.7 million parts per billion. We concluded that EPA needed more reliable information on the extent of contaminated sites and the status of cleanup efforts, and recommended that EPA work with the Department of Defense and the states to establish a way to track perchlorate information. In December 2006, EPA reiterated its disagreement with our recommendation. We continue to believe that the inconsistency and omissions in available perchlorate data underscore the need for a tracking system to better inform the public and others about the locations of perchlorate releases and the status of cleanups. |
gao_GAO-16-9 | gao_GAO-16-9_0 | Background
The HVBP program affects Medicare payments to approximately 3,000 acute care hospitals for the inpatient services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. The percentage increases added back are based on a hospital’s performance on each quality measure included in the HVBP payment formula. Most Hospitals Received Bonuses or Penalties of Less than Half of One Percent Each Year, with Generally Similar Results for Small and Safety Net Hospitals
Most hospitals received a bonus or penalty from the HVBP program of less than 0.5 percent of applicable Medicare payments in each of the first three years of the program. Small rural and small urban hospitals had similar or better results than hospitals overall. 2.) Compared to Hospitals Overall, Safety Net Hospitals Received Lower Payment Adjustments and Small Urban Hospitals Received Higher Payment Adjustments
Safety net hospitals consistently had lower median payment adjustments—that is, smaller bonuses or larger penalties—than hospitals overall. In contrast, small urban hospitals had higher median payment adjustments—that is, larger bonuses or smaller penalties—than hospitals overall during the program’s first three years. No Shift in Trends Was Apparent for the HVBP’s Quality Measures in the Program’s Initial Years, but Such Shifts Could Emerge Over Time As the Program Implements Planned Changes
While the HVBP program aims to provide an incentive to improve hospitals’ quality of care, preliminary analysis of information from 2013 and 2014—the two years of quality measure results after the program’s implementation that were available at the time of our analysis—shows that it did not noticeably alter the existing trends in hospitals’ performance on any of the quality measures used to determine HVBP payment adjustments that we examined. 3.) Second, the HVBP program has evolved substantially over time and will continue to do so, and therefore its effects on quality may also be different. Quality Measures Not Included in the HVBP Program Also Showed No Apparent Shift in Trends During the Same Initial Years, Except for Readmissions
Most of the IQR quality measures we examined that were not included in the HVBP program had trends that were similar to those in the program. Nonetheless, the conjunction of the drop in hospital readmission rates and the introduction of a financial incentive program targeting those rates provides some additional indication that financial incentives of the sort broadly offered by programs like the HVBP program and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction program may, under certain circumstances, promote enhanced quality of care. However, a clear understanding of the extent of that impact, and the circumstances under which it may be maximized, will depend on the results of future research. Hospital Officials Reported That the HVBP Program Helped Reinforce Ongoing Quality Improvement Efforts but Did Not Lead to Major Changes
Officials from selected hospitals reported that the HVBP program reinforced their ongoing quality improvement programs without leading to major changes. Hospital officials pointed in particular to the outcome measures in the HVBP program as influencing efforts to expand their hospitals’ ongoing quality improvement efforts beyond the traditional focus on clinical process measures. A Variety of Factors Affected Selected Hospitals’ Capacity to Make Quality Improvements, Which Were Not Directly Affected by the HVBP Program
The issue that officials from most of the selected hospitals we contacted frequently identified as a barrier to quality improvement efforts was the hospital’s information technology (IT) system, especially its electronic health record. Others said that their IT systems helped them to better manage their quality performance efforts, such as through built-in clinical process reminders in their electronic health record systems or by facilitating the collection of the patient clinical data needed for quality measures. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for review, which includes CMS. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: Quality Measures Included in the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2017
Measure Included in Fiscal Year
Description Heart attack patients received fibrinolytic agent within 30 minutes of hospital arrival Heart attack patients received percutaneous coronary intervention within 90 minutes of hospital arrival Heart failure patients received discharge instructions Blood culture performed in the emergency department prior to first antibiotic received in hospital for pneumonia patients Appropriate initial antibiotic selection for community acquired pneumonia patient Prophylactic antibiotic received within 1 hour prior to surgical incision Received prophylactic antibiotic consistent with recommendations for surgical patients Prophylactic antibiotics discontinued within 24 hours after surgery end time (48 hours for cardiac surgery)
Patient Experience
Measure Included in Fiscal Year
Efficiency
Appendix III: Median Hospital Value-based Purchasing Payment Adjustments by Bed Size, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015
Appendix IV: Median Hospital Value-based Purchasing Payment Adjustments by Net Income, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015
Appendix V: Median Hospital Value-based Purchasing Domain Scores by Hospital Type, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015
Appendix VI: Bonuses and Penalties under Hospital Value-based Purchasing by Hospital Type, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Will Simerl, Assistant Director; Zhi Boon; Krister Friday; Colbie Holderness; Eric Peterson; David Plocher; Vikki Porter, and Steve Robblee made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The HVBP program, which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administers, annually evaluates individual hospital performance on a designated set of quality measures related to inpatient hospital services and, based on those results, adjusts Medicare payments to hospitals in the form of bonuses and penalties. The HVBP program was enacted in 2010 as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). The first HVBP payment adjustments occurred in fiscal year 2013.
PPACA included a provision for GAO to assess the HVBP program's impact on Medicare quality and expenditures, including the HVBP program's effects on small rural, small urban, and safety net hospitals. This report evaluates the initial effects of the HVBP program on: (1) Medicare payments to hospitals, (2) quality of care provided by hospitals, and (3) selected hospitals' quality improvement efforts. To determine these initial effects of the HVBP program, GAO analyzed CMS data on bonuses and penalties given to hospitals in fiscal years 2013 through 2015 as well as data on hospital quality measures collected by CMS from 2005 through 2014, the most recent year available. GAO also interviewed officials with eight hospitals that participated in the HVBP program. Hospitals were selected to include safety net, small urban, and small rural hospitals, as well as those that were not part of any of these subgroups.
The Department of Health and Human Services, which includes CMS, reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The bonuses and penalties received by most of the approximately 3,000 hospitals eligible for the Hospital Value-based Purchasing (HVBP) program amounted to less than 0.5 percent of applicable Medicare payments each year. GAO found that safety net hospitals, which provide a significant amount of care to the poor, consistently had lower median payment adjustments—that is, smaller bonuses or larger penalties—than hospitals overall in the program's first three years. However, this gap narrowed over time. In contrast, small urban hospitals had higher median payment adjustments each year than hospitals overall, and small rural hospitals' median payment adjustments were similar to hospitals overall in the first two years and higher in the most recent year.
GAO's analysis found no apparent shift in existing trends in hospitals' performance on the quality measures included in the HVBP program during the program's initial years. However, shifts in quality trends could emerge in the future as the HVBP program continues to evolve. For example, new quality measures will be added, and the weight placed on clinical process measures—on which hospitals had little room for improvement—will be substantially reduced. For many quality measures not included in the HVBP program, GAO also found that trends in hospitals' performance remained unchanged in the period GAO reviewed, but there were exceptions in the case of three measures that are part of a separate incentive program targeting hospital readmissions. This program focuses exclusively on readmissions and imposes only penalties. The timing of changes in readmission trends provides some indication that the use of financial incentives in quality improvement programs may, under certain circumstances, promote enhanced quality of care. However, understanding the extent of that impact depends on the results of future research.
Officials from selected hospitals GAO interviewed reported that the HVBP program generally reinforced ongoing quality improvement efforts, but did not lead to major changes in focus. In addition, hospital officials cited a variety of factors that affected their capacity to improve quality. For example, officials from most hospitals GAO contacted reported challenges related to using information technology (IT) systems—including electronic health records—to make quality improvements. In contrast, other hospital officials said their IT systems aided their quality performance efforts, such as by helping to collect clinical data needed to track progress on quality measures. Hospital officials described such factors as affecting their hospital's quality improvement efforts as a whole, rather than being specifically linked to implementation of the HVBP program. |
gao_GAO-06-356 | gao_GAO-06-356_0 | DOD has set major expectations for the program. According to DOD, these technologies represent a quantum leap over legacy tactical aircraft capabilities. Starting production before ensuring the design is mature through flight testing significantly increases the risk of costly design changes that will push the program over budget and behind schedule. Key Testing Events Will Not Be Completed before Significant Procurement Investments Are Made
The JSF program plans to begin low-rate initial production of the aircraft before many of JSF’s technology advances and basic flying qualities are flight-tested and to produce substantial quantities of aircraft before initial operational testing is completed. By the time testing is planned to be completed, in 2013, DOD will have procured more than double that amount—424 aircraft at an estimated cost of about $49 billion. Cost reimbursement contracts place substantial risk on the buyer—in this case DOD—because the contractor’s responsibility for performance costs is minimized or reduced. Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy Provides a Less Risky Alternative for the JSF Program
The JSF acquisition strategy currently plans a single-step approach to deliver a quantum leap in tactical fighter capability by 2013 and has already felt the negative cost and schedule impacts from the executing this approach. This evolutionary approach is actually the preferred approach in DOD’s acquisition policy for acquiring new systems for more rapid delivery of incremental capabilities to the warfighter. JSF Program Is Designed to Deliver Full Required Capability in a Single-Step Development Program
Instead of establishing time-phased requirements for aircraft to be delivered in sequence that could first meet DOD’s need to recapitalize its aging fleet of aircraft and then evolve the aircraft to eventually achieve improved capabilities in future system development increments, DOD chose a single-step development approach to deliver the full required capability by the end of system development in 2013. Since the program’s start, development cost has increased 84 percent, the development schedule has increased by almost 5 years, and planned delivery of capabilities to the warfighter has been delayed. As a result, DOD’s buying power has been significantly reduced—program acquisition unit costs have increased by 28 percent, or $23 million, since first estimates. The F-16 fighter program, the Air Force’s JSF predecessor, successfully evolved capabilities over the span of about 30 years, delivering increases of capabilities quickly and often, as technologies became available. 4). 5). DOD has an alternative. With 90 percent of DOD’s remaining planned investment in JSF, it can adopt a knowledge- driven and evolutionary acquisition approach to reduce JSF program risks, recapitalize its aging tactical air force sooner, and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter more quickly. Without changes, the acquisition plan will put at risk $50 billion for procuring JSF aircraft at the same time the program develops and tests the aircraft’s expected performance capabilities over a 7-year, 12,000 hour flight test program. Significant efforts remain in the JSF program to demonstrate the aircraft will perform as expected. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is DOD's most expensive aircraft program. The program represents 90 percent of the remaining planned investment for recapitalizing DOD's aging tactical aircraft fleet. GAO is required by law to review the program annually for 5 years, beginning in fiscal year 2005. This is our second report and GAO assessed the program's acquisition approach--in terms of capturing knowledge for key investment decisions--and identified an alternative to improve outcomes.
What GAO Found
DOD is investing heavily in procuring JSF aircraft before flight testing proves it will perform as expected. For example, the JSF program plans to produce 424 low-rate initial production aircraft, at a total estimated cost of more than $49 billion, by 2013--the same time at which the program plans to complete initial operational testing. Producing aircraft before testing demonstrates the design is mature increases the likelihood of design changes that will lead to cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. Because the program will lack key design and testing knowledge, DOD plans to use cost reimbursement contracts to procure early production aircraft. This type of contract places a substantially greater cost risk on DOD and the taxpayers. Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as expected. At the same time, the JSF program has not adopted an evolutionary approach to acquiring the aircraft--despite DOD policy that prefers such an approach. Instead, the JSF program has contracted to develop and deliver the aircraft's full capability in a single-step, 12-year development program--a daunting task given the need to incorporate the technological advances that, according to DOD, represent a quantum leap in capability. DOD's buying power has already been reduced. Since initial estimates, program acquisition unit costs have increased by 28 percent, or $23 million. Development costs have increased 84 percent, planned purchases have decreased by 535 aircraft, and the completion of development has slipped 5 years, delaying delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. With more than 90 percent of the JSF investment remaining, DOD officials have the opportunity to adopt a knowledge-based and evolutionary acquisition strategy that would maximize DOD's return on its investment. The acquisition approach used for the F-16 fighter, the Air Force's JSF predecessor, could provide a model for delivering JSF capabilities to the warfighter sooner and recapitalizing tactical aircraft forces more quickly while lowering risk. The F-16 program successfully evolved capabilities over the span of about 30 years, with an initial capability delivered to the warfighter about 4 years after development started. |
gao_AIMD-95-73 | gao_AIMD-95-73_0 | In total, we reviewed the propriety and accuracy of payroll payments made to about 80 percent of the 281,000 civilians employed by the Navy in 1993. As shown in table 1, we confirmed overpayments of $62,500 were made to Navy civilians. These overpayments were caused, at least in part, because (1) DFAS and Navy Personnel did not reconcile discrepancies between personnel and payroll records and (2) DFAS staff did not compare payments from the various payroll databases to detect unauthorized payments to a single civilian employee. Reconciliations Between Personnel and Payroll Inadequate
Comparisons between the payroll and personnel systems and reconciliations of discrepancies were not routinely done. Control Weaknesses Leave DCPS Vulnerable to Improper Payments
In addition to the need for stronger controls to prevent overpayments, DCPS was also vulnerable to improper payments as a result of weaknesses in controls relied on to regulate access to data, document transaction processing, and perform file maintenance. Inactive Payroll Accounts Remain on DCPS
The Navy’s civilian payroll was also at risk of fraud and abuse because many payroll accounts of former employees, who should no longer receive pay checks—called inactive payroll accounts—remained on the system. Recommendations
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service direct appropriate officials to:
Complete follow-up on the 134 overpaid employees we identified and referred to DFAS and Navy Personnel officials to determine the full extent of overpayment, collect amounts due, and identify and correct systemic causes of the overpayments. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy's civilian payroll operations, focusing on the: (1) propriety and accuracy of payments made to civilian personnel; and (2) vulnerability of the internal control system to prevent fraud and abuse.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 134 of 225,000 Navy civilians were overpaid a total of at least $62,500 in 1 year; (2) these overpayments were due to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service's (DFAS) failure to determine if individual civilian employees were paid from multiple databases for the same time period and infrequent reconciliations between civilian payroll and personnel systems; (3) the Navy's civilian payroll operations are susceptible to additional improper payments as a result of many personnel having unrestricted access to payroll data, DFAS inability to identify database changes, and DFAS maintenance of inactive payroll accounts on the active payroll database; and (4) the rapid consolidation of civilian payroll accounts into the Defense Civilian Payroll System could exacerbate control weaknesses if vulnerabilities are not adequately addressed. |
gao_GAO-04-628T | gao_GAO-04-628T_0 | The benefits have been enormous. What Are Control Systems? In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection discussed the potential damaging effects on the electric power and oil and gas industries of successful attacks on control systems. In February 2003, the President clearly demonstrated concern about “the threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy, or national security,” noting that “disruption of these systems can have significant consequences for public health and safety” and emphasizing that the protection of control systems has become “a national priority.”
Several factors have contributed to the escalation of risk to control systems, including (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other networks, (3) insecure remote connections, and (4) the widespread availability of technical information about control systems. I will now discuss potential and reported cyber attacks on control systems, as well as challenges to securing them. Securing Control Systems Poses Significant Challenges
The control systems community faces several challenges to securing control systems against cyber threats. Efforts to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Control Systems Under Way, but Lack Adequate Coordination
Government, academia, and private industry have independently initiated multiple efforts and programs focused on some of the key areas that should be addressed to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. Our March 2004 report includes a detailed discussion of many initiatives. Increased awareness of security and sharing of information about the implementation of more secure architectures and existing security technologies. In February 2003, the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace established a role for DHS to coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector to improve the cybersecurity of control systems. DHS’s coordination of these efforts could accelerate the development and implementation of more secure systems to manage our critical infrastructures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Computerized control systems perform vital functions across many of our nation's critical infrastructures. For example, in natural gas distribution, they can monitor and control the pressure and flow of gas through pipelines. In October 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection emphasized the increasing vulnerability of control systems to cyber attacks. At the request of the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, this testimony will discuss GAO's March 2004 report on potential cyber vulnerabilities, focusing on (1) significant cybersecurity risks associated with control systems (2) potential and reported cyber attacks against these systems (3) key challenges to securing control systems, and (4) efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems.
What GAO Found
In addition to general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing, several factors have contributed to the escalation of the risks of cyber attacks against control systems. These include the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities and the increased connectivity of control systems to other systems. Control systems can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, examples of which have already occurred. Successful attacks on control systems could have devastating consequences, such as endangering public health and safety. Securing control systems poses significant challenges, including limited specialized security technologies and lack of economic justification. The government, academia, and private industry have initiated efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. The President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace establishes a role for DHS to coordinate with these entities to improve the cybersecurity of control systems. While some coordination is occurring, DHS's coordination of these efforts could accelerate the development and implementation of more secure systems. Without effective coordination of these efforts, there is a risk of delaying the development and implementation of more secure systems to manage our critical infrastructures. |
gao_GAO-16-645 | gao_GAO-16-645_0 | About A Half Million Women and Girls in the United States Estimated to Be at Risk of or Have Been Subjected to FGM/C
CDC published a report in 2016 estimating that 513,000 women and girls in the United States were at risk of or may have been subjected to FGM/C in 2012. Estimate does not include countries where it is known that FGM/C is practiced, but for which there are no data. Protections Are Available through the U.S. Immigration System to Women and Girls at Risk of or Who Have Been Subjected to FGM/C; Investigations and Prosecutions Are Few
Women and girls at risk of or who have been subjected to FGM/C in their home country may seek federal protection on that basis through avenues in the U.S. immigration system. Law enforcement and child protection officials we spoke with said this may be due, in part, to instances not being reported. Federal Agencies and Others Provide Education and Assistance Related to FGM/C, but Gaps Exist and Federal Agencies Lack Documented Plans for Future Efforts
Federal agencies and others have provided education and assistance related to FGM/C in immigrant communities, but such efforts made before immigrants’ arrival in the United States are limited by the gaps in how State makes FGM/C-related information available to certain visa recipients. Nevertheless, several NIVs permit stays in the United States for multiple years. As discussed previously, federal agencies have made efforts to increase stakeholders’ awareness of FGM/C, and agency officials identified additional activities they have planned for the near future. However, the agencies have not documented their previous and planned education and outreach efforts. Since the Department of State does not provide a fact sheet on FGM/C directly to NIV recipients or to any visa recipients from countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced but who apply elsewhere, these recipients may be unaware of the health and legal consequences of FGM/C and choose to participate in this practice. Absent a documented plan for each agency’s education and outreach efforts, the federal government may be unable to ensure that its activities to increase awareness of FGM/C are meeting the needs of and communicated effectively to external parties, such as key stakeholder groups, or that it is making the best use of federal resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase awareness of the health and legal consequences of FGM/C among visa recipients, we recommend that the Secretary of State update the Foreign Affairs Manual to require posts located in countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced to directly provide information about FGM/C to nonimmigrant visa recipients in the same manner as is done for immigrant visa recipients; and posts located outside of the countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced to directly provide information on FGM/C to immigrant and nonimmigrant visa recipients who are nationals of countries where FGM/C is commonly practiced. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we examine 1. what is known about the number of women and girls in the United States at risk of or who have been subjected to female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); 2. the protections available and actions taken, if any, by federal and selected state and local agencies to protect women and girls in the United States at risk of or who have been subjected to FGM/C; and 3. the extent to which federal agencies and others have taken action to educate and assist immigrant communities and key stakeholders about FGM/C. Specifically related to the asylum process, we spoke with officials from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. We also spoke with officials from ICE regarding investigations. We also assessed federal agency actions against the relevant standards for internal control in the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
FGM/C comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other harm to the female genitals for non-medical reasons. The rationale for FGM/C often includes cultural, religious, and social factors in families and communities. In the United States, women and girls believed to be most at risk of FGM/C are those from immigrant families from countries where FGM/C is practiced.
GAO was asked to review the federal response to address FGM/C in the United States. In this report, GAO examines (1) what is known about the number of women and girls at risk of or subjected to FGM/C, (2) the protections available and actions taken to protect women and girls, and (3) the extent to which actions are taken to educate and assist immigrant communities and key stakeholders. GAO analyzed documents and spoke to officials from five relevant federal agencies; spoke with officials from local law enforcement, health care, education, and social services sectors; and assessed agency actions against federal internal control standards.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that 513,000 women and girls in the United States were at risk of or had been subjected to female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) in 2012, a threefold increase from its 1990 estimate. CDC attributes this change primarily to increased immigration from countries where FGM/C is practiced, rather than an increase in the occurrence of FGM/C. Agency estimates were not able to distinguish between those who have already been subjected to FGM/C and those who are at risk.
Women and girls at risk of or who have been subjected to FGM/C in their home country may seek federal protection in the United States through different avenues of the immigration process, and GAO found that there have been few U.S. investigations and prosecutions. According to Department of Homeland Security officials, protection is most commonly provided through the asylum process, where individuals must demonstrate that they have been persecuted or fear persecution in their home country on account of protected grounds such as religion or nationality. While FGM/C is a crime under federal and many state laws, law enforcement officials identified few investigations and prosecutions related to FGM/C. Officials said that this may be due, in part, to underreporting.
Federal agencies and others provide education and assistance regarding FGM/C, but gaps exist and agencies lack documented plans for future efforts. The Department of State (State) directly provides information on FGM/C in a fact sheet only to certain types of visa recipients who apply in countries where FGM/C is practiced. State does not provide the fact sheet to nonimmigrant visa recipients as these visas are for temporary stays; however, some of these visas permit stays in the United States for multiple years. In addition, State does not directly provide the fact sheet to visa recipients who are nationals of countries where FGM/C is common, but apply at posts in other countries. Visa recipients who do not directly receive the fact sheet may be unaware of the health and U.S. legal consequences of FGM/C. Federal agencies have made efforts to increase awareness of FGM/C among stakeholder groups, including hosting roundtables and developing educational materials. However, the agencies lack documented plans for future efforts. Internal controls state that agencies should establish plans and document activities. Absent this, the federal government may be unable to ensure that its activities meet the needs of and that it communicates effectively with external parties, such as key stakeholder groups.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State provide information to additional visa recipients and that each federal agency document its domestic FGM/C awareness efforts. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations; however, State disagreed with documenting its awareness efforts, noting that it is not responsible for domestic outreach and education. GAO maintains that the recommendation is valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_NSIAD-99-17 | gao_NSIAD-99-17_0 | As a result, the Congress enacted section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, which required that the Secretary of Defense provide the Congress with a comprehensive report on a range of BRAC issues and described the manner in which the data were to be presented in the report. Accordingly, the Secretary requested two additional BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005. The Secretary also noted DOD’s assistance in facilitating economic growth and development for communities affected by BRAC actions. DOD looked to a number of indicators and studies to determine whether any operational and readiness problems could be linked to BRAC actions. For example, while DOD’s analysis shows no increase in the excess capacity between 1989 and 2003 in the category of Army depots, our previous work has shown—and DOD officials have agreed—that depots have excess capacity. Our prior and ongoing work also found indications of economic recovery in many communities, although some are faring better than others. DOD’s report indicates that future BRAC procedures and methodologies would be similar to those used in prior rounds. Further, DOD’s conclusion that military capability has not suffered adverse long-term effects because of BRAC actions appears to be reasonable. In addition, DOD agreed that the process used to conduct prior BRAC rounds is a good starting point for considering future BRAC legislation. Copies will also be made available to others upon request. Assessment of Limitations in DOD’s Response to Legislative Requirements
DOD’s report provides most, but not all, of the information required by section 2824. In selected instances, certain information is either not provided or not provided in the level of specificity required. Costs and Savings of Prior BRAC Rounds
DOD responded to the requirement to provide costs and savings data in four different categories: (1) costs and savings of bases already closed or realigned during the previous four BRAC rounds, (2) costs and savings during the implementation periods for each of the four previous BRAC rounds, (3) net savings on an annual recurring basis after the BRAC implementation period, and (4) estimated costs and savings from two future BRAC rounds. DOD’s report indicates that net savings will be $3.7 billion in fiscal year 1999. DOD’s Estimates of Prior Costs and Savings Data
For its report, DOD assessed its costs and savings data from several vantage points to affirm its position that prior BRAC rounds are saving billions of dollars in operating costs. However, DOD’s conclusions did not reflect the following key factors. Our observations below indicate that DOD’s analysis provides only a rough indication of excess capacity that continues to exist. GAO Comments
1. 2. 5. 6. 8. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To provide our analysis of DOD’s report on base realignment and closure, we made an overall assessment of DOD’s responsiveness to the individual section 2824 reporting requirements and assessed individual reporting topics, including the costs and savings from prior BRAC rounds and estimated costs and savings from future BRAC rounds, the impact of prior BRAC rounds on military capabilities, excess capacity, base reuse and economic recovery of communities affected by BRAC actions, and processes DOD would use to select bases for closure or realignment should further BRAC rounds be authorized. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) report on the costs and savings attributable to the rounds of base realignments and closures (BRAC), focusing on: (1) the costs and savings of prior BRAC rounds and estimated costs and savings of future BRAC rounds; (2) the impact of prior BRAC rounds on military capabilities, excess capacity, base reuse and economic recovery of communities affected by BRAC actions; and (3) processes DOD would use to select bases for closure and realignments should further BRAC rounds be authorized.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's report to Congress provided most, but not all, of the information required in section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998; (2) in selected instances, usually because data were not available, DOD either did not provide the information required or did not provide it in the level of specificity required; (3) DOD's report concludes that the four prior BRAC rounds, taken in aggregate, are saving DOD billions of dollars annually; (4) GAO's prior work examining BRAC cost and savings and related issues affirms that past BRAC recommendations will result in substantial savings once implementation costs have been offset and net savings begin to accrue; (5) however, because of data and records weaknesses, DOD's report should be viewed as providing a rough approximation of costs and savings rather than a precise accounting; (6) DOD's data systems do not capture all savings associated with BRAC actions, nor has DOD established a separate system to track BRAC savings; (7) DOD's estimates of costs and savings for future BRAC rounds should also be viewed as rough estimates because there is no assurance that the cost and savings experiences from prior BRAC rounds will be precisely replicated in the future; (8) because the methodology used to identify excess capacity has a number of limitations, DOD's report gives only a rough indication that excess capacity has increased relative to force structure since 1989; (9) however, other DOD studies, statements by DOD officials, and GAO's prior work support the report's general conclusion that DOD continues to retain excess capacity; (10) GAO's work has shown this to be the case, particularly in maintenance depots and in research, development, test, and evaluation facilities; (11) DOD's analysis of operational and readiness indicators have shown no long-term problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to BRAC actions; (12) this general conclusion is also consistent with GAO's prior work; (13) DOD's report emphasizes that communities affected by prior BRAC actions appear to be rebounding economically; (14) GAO also found this to be the case, although its work also shows that some communities are faring better than others; (15) DOD's report suggests that proposed BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005 would be conducted like prior rounds; and (16) DOD's legislative proposal requesting authority to conduct two additional BRAC rounds provides a good starting point for considering future legislation, should Congress decide to authorize additional rounds. |
gao_GAO-14-723T | gao_GAO-14-723T_0 | In comparing the GS system to these key attributes, during our ongoing work we found a number of examples of how the current system’s design reflects some of these key attributes but falls short of achieving them in implementation. Agency officials assign a grade level to a position after analyzing the duties and responsibilities according to the factor evaluation system.occupation and grade level across different agencies, providing simplicity and internal equity to the system, and may help employees move across agencies. Making clear distinctions between these occupations may be nuanced, as the basis for them hinges on, for example, how agency officials determine the degree of complexity of the work. 2. 3. Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Performance Management and Deal with Poor Performers
Efforts to Improve Performance Management
Our past work has shown that a long-standing challenge for federal agencies has been developing credible and effective performance management systems that can serve as a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve results. In 2011, various federal agencies, labor unions, and other organizations developed the Goals-Engagement- Accountability-Results (GEAR) framework to help improve performance management by articulating a high-performance culture; aligning employee and organizational performance management; implementing accountability at all levels; creating a culture of engagement; and improving supervisor assessment, selection, development, and training. However, OPM officials said that while they will continue working with the CHCO Council to promote GEAR and to encourage other agencies to adopt the framework, it is unclear if any additional agencies have formally adopted GEAR to date. Efforts to Address Poor Performers
As our past work has demonstrated, effective performance management systems can help create results-oriented organizational cultures by providing objective information to allow managers to make meaningful distinctions in performance in order to reward top performers and deal with poor performers. Sustained Attention Is Needed to Address Current and Emerging Critical Skills Gaps
Since we first narrowed the strategic human capital high-risk area to focus on identifying and addressing government-wide mission critical skills gaps in February 2011, executive agencies and Congress have continued their efforts to ensure the government takes a more strategic and efficient approach to recruiting, hiring, developing, and retaining individuals with the skills needed to cost-effectively carry out the nation’s business. At the same time, we have recommended numerous actions individual agencies should take to address their specific human capital challenges, and we have also made recommendations to OPM to address government-wide human capital issues. For example, in September 2011 OPM and the CHCOs—as part of ongoing discussions between OPM, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO on the steps needed to address the federal government’s human capital challenges—established the Chief Human Capital Officers Council Working Group (Working Group) to identify and mitigate critical skills gaps. As we reported in February 2013, extent to which OPM and agencies develop the infrastructure to sustain their planning, implementation, and monitoring efforts. These refinements can include further progress will depend on the identifying ways to document and assemble lessons learned, leading practices, and other useful information for addressing skill gaps into a clearinghouse or database so agencies can draw on one another’s experiences and avoid duplicating efforts; examining the cost-effectiveness of delivering tools and shared services such as online training for workforce planning to address issues affecting multiple agencies; reviewing the extent to which new capabilities are needed to give OPM and other agencies greater visibility over skills gaps government-wide to better identify which agencies may have surpluses of personnel in those positions and which agencies have gaps, as well as the adequacy of current mechanisms for facilitating the transfer of personnel from one agency to another to address those gaps as appropriate; and determining whether existing workforce planning and other tools can be used to help streamline the processes developed by the Working Group. that these were important areas for consideration and is taking steps to implement them. Management Challenges and Strategies to Help Agencies Meet Their Missions in an Era of Highly Constrained Resources
In addition to mission critical skills gaps, our recent work has identified other management challenges that, collectively, are creating fundamental capacity problems that could undermine the ability of agencies to effectively carry out their missions. Although the way forward will not be easy, agency officials said these same challenges have created the impetus to act and a willingness to consider creative and nontraditional strategies for addressing issues in ways that previously may not have been organizationally or culturally feasible. The strategies included the following: Strengthening collaboration to address a fragmented human capital community. Using enterprise solutions to address shared challenges. Creating more agile talent management to address inflexibilities in the current system. Through a variety of initiatives, Congress, OPM, and individual agencies have strengthened the government’s human capital efforts since we first identified strategic human capital management as a high-risk area in 2001. Still, while much progress has been made over the last 13 years in modernizing federal human capital management, the job is far from over. | Why GAO Did This Study
Strategic human capital management plays a critical role in maximizing the government's performance and assuring its accountability to Congress and to the nation as a whole.
GAO designated strategic human capital management as a government-wide high-risk area in 2001 because of a long-standing lack of leadership. Since then, important progress has been made. However, retirements and the potential loss of leadership and institutional knowledge, coupled with fiscal pressures underscore, the importance of a strategic and efficient approach to acquiring and retaining individuals with needed critical skills. As a result, strategic human capital management remains a high-risk area.
This testimony is based on preliminary findings of GAO's ongoing work on the classification system and a body of GAO work primarily from 2012 to 2014 and focuses on the progress made by OPM and executive branch agencies in key areas of human capital management, including: (1) how the GS classification system compares to the attributes of a modern, effective classification system, (2) the status of performance management and efforts to address poor performance, (3) progress addressing critical skills gaps, and (4) strategies to address human capital challenges in an era of highly constrained resources.
What GAO Found
Serious human capital shortfalls can erode the capacity of federal agencies and threaten their ability to cost-effectively carry out their missions. While progress has been made, continued attention is needed to ensure agencies have the human resources to drive performance and achieve the results the nation demands. Specifically, additional areas needing to be addressed include:
Classification
GAO's preliminary work has found eight key attributes of a modern, effective classification system, such as: internal and external equity, transparency, and simplicity. The attributes require trade-offs and policy choices to implement. In concept, the General Schedule's (GS) design reflects some of the eight attributes, but falls short of achieving them in implementation. For example, the GS system's grade levels provide internal equity by making it easy to compare employees in the same occupation and grade level across different agencies. However, the number of grade levels can reduce transparency because making clear distinctions between the levels may be nuanced, as the basis for them hinges on, for example, how officials determine the complexity of the work.
Performance management
Effective performance management systems enable managers to make meaningful distinctions in performance in order to reward top performers and deal with poor performers. In 2011, five agencies piloted the Goals-Engagement-Accountability-Results (GEAR) framework to help improve performance management. GEAR addressed important performance management practices, such as aligning individual performance with organizational goals. However, while Office of Personnel Management (OPM) officials said they are working with the Chief Human Capital Officer's Council to promote GEAR, it is unclear if any additional agencies have adopted the GEAR framework.
Critical skills gaps
Since GAO included identifying and addressing government-wide critical skills gaps as a high-risk area in 2011, a working group led by OPM identified skills gaps in six government-wide mission critical occupations including cybersecurity and acquisition, and is taking steps to address each one. To date, officials reported meeting their planned level of progress for three of the six occupations. Additional progress will depend on the extent to which OPM and agencies develop the infrastructure needed to sustain their planning, implementation, and monitoring efforts for skills gaps, and develop a predictive capacity to identify newly emerging skills gaps.
Strategies for an era of highly constrained resources
Agency officials have said that declining budgets have created the impetus to act on management challenges and a willingness to consider creative and nontraditional strategies for addressing human capital issues. GAO identified strategies related to (1) strengthening coordination of the federal human capital community, (2) using enterprise solutions to address shared challenges, and (3) creating more agile talent management that can address these challenges.
What GAO Recommends
Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations to agencies and OPM to improve their strategic human capital management efforts. This testimony discusses some actions taken to implement key recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-509 | gao_GAO-16-509_0 | PIC. GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 Requirements for Reporting on Cross-Agency Priority Goal Progress Make available on the website Performance.gov: 1. 7. Provide ongoing guidance and assistance to CAP goal teams. Another way OMB and the PIC are increasing leadership attention of CAP goal implementation is by committing to hold regularly scheduled senior-level meetings to review CAP goal progress. Selected CAP Goal Teams Have Met Many GPRAMA Reporting Requirements, but Most Have Not Established Quarterly Targets
Based on GPRAMA requirements, we identified five broad actions that CAP goal teams follow to implement a goal: (1) establish the goal, (2) identify goal leaders and contributors, (3) develop strategies and performance measures, (4) use performance information to make decisions and improve performance, and (5) report results. Smarter IT Delivery CAP goal. People and Culture CAP goal. Selected CAP Goal Teams Can Be More Transparent about the Status of Their Efforts to Develop Performance Measures
All of the goal teams we reviewed reported efforts to develop performance measures as part of their strategy to improve performance of these complex and crosscutting issues. We found that OMB’s updated guidance to CAP goal teams and the quarterly reporting template have assisted goal teams in managing implementation of the goals and in meeting the GPRAMA reporting requirements. We found that CAP goal teams are meeting a number of GPRAMA reporting requirements, including identifying contributors and reporting quarterly results and milestones. We generally found that the goal teams are aligning their quarterly activities with longer-term strategies to achieve the desired goal outcomes. Further, all of the selected CAP goal teams reported that they are working to develop performance measures, and are at various stages of the process. Given OMB’s, the PIC’s, and CAP goal teams’ emphasis on developing measures that are relevant and well defined, greater transparency is needed to track goal team’s efforts quarterly. With improved performance information, the CAP goal teams will be better positioned to demonstrate the progress that they are making, and will help ensure goal achievement at the end of the 4-year goal period in 2018. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the transparency of public reporting on CAP goal progress, we recommend that the Director of OMB, working with the PIC, take the following action:
Report on Performance.gov the actions that CAP goal teams are taking, or plan to take, to develop performance measures and quarterly targets. OMB staff generally agreed with the recommendation in the report, and provided us with technical clarifications, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The objectives of this report are to assess (1) the extent to which lessons learned from implementing the interim cross- agency priority (CAP) goals were incorporated into the governance of the current CAP goals; (2) the extent to which GPRAMA requirements for reporting on CAP goal progress are included in the selected CAP goal quarterly progress updates; and (3) the initial reported progress in implementing the selected CAP goals. In September 2015, we reported on lessons learned from the interim CAP goal period—which ended in March 2014—and provided an assessment of CAP goal teams’ initial reported progress implementing the current set of 2014-2018 CAP goals. We randomly selected four of the seven CAP goals including Open Data, STEM Education, Job-Creating Investment, and Lab-to-Market. We interviewed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Performance Improvement Council (PIC) staff responsible for the management and implementation of the current CAP goals, as well as agency officials and staff, including CAP goal leaders and members of the seven CAP goal teams. To determine the extent to which selected CAP goals met this requirement, we reviewed the published lists of contributors in the quarterly progress updates, and interviewed CAP goal teams and OMB staff responsible for managing the CAP goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given the significance and complexity of the CAP goals, it is important that CAP goal contributors, Congress, and the public are able to track how CAP goal teams are making progress.
This report is one in a series in response to a statutory provision to review GPRAMA implementation. It assesses (1) the extent to which lessons learned from implementing the interim CAP goals were incorporated into the governance of the current CAP goals; (2) the extent to which GPRAMA requirements for reporting on CAP goal progress are included in the selected CAP goal quarterly progress updates; and (3) the initial progress in implementing the selected CAP goals.
GAO selected 7 of the 15 CAP goals to review (Customer Service, Job-Creating Investment, Lab-to-Market, Open Data, People and Culture, Smarter IT Delivery, and STEM Education). GAO assessed those goals' quarterly progress updates against relevant GPRAMA requirements, reviewed OMB and PIC guidance to CAP goal teams, and interviewed OMB, PIC, and CAP goal staff.
What GAO Found
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to coordinate with agencies to develop cross-agency priority (CAP) goals, which are 4-year outcome-oriented goals covering a number of complex or high-risk management and mission issues.
For the current set of CAP goals covering the period from 2014-2018, OMB and the interagency Performance Improvement Council (PIC) incorporated lessons learned from the 2012-2014 interim CAP goal period to improve the governance and implementation of these cross-cutting goals. For example, OMB and the PIC changed the CAP goal governance structure to include agency leaders, and holds regular senior-level reviews on CAP goal progress. They also provide ongoing assistance to CAP goal teams, such as by helping teams develop milestones and performance measures. Based in part on prior GAO recommendations, OMB and the PIC updated its guidance to assist CAP goal teams in managing the goals and in meeting GPRAMA reporting requirements. CAP goal teams told GAO that the CAP goal designation increased leadership attention and improved interagency collaboration on these issues.
GAO's assessment of the selected CAP goals' quarterly progress updates—published on Performance.gov—determined that CAP goal teams are meeting a number of GPRAMA reporting requirements, including identifying contributors, reporting strategies for performance improvement and quarterly results. However, most of the selected CAP goal teams have not established quarterly targets as required by GPRAMA, but are consistently reporting the status of quarterly milestones to track goal progress.
GAO found that the selected goal teams are aligning their quarterly milestones with strategies to achieve the desired goal outcomes. Further, all of the selected CAP goal teams reported that they are working to develop performance measures, and are at various stages of the process. However, the selected CAP goal teams were not consistently reporting on their efforts to develop performance measures. Given OMB, the PIC, and CAP goal teams' emphasis on developing measures that are relevant and well-defined, greater transparency is needed to track goal team's efforts on a quarterly basis. With improved performance information the CAP goal teams will be better positioned to demonstrate goal progress at the end of the 4-year goal period.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB, working with the PIC, report on Performance.gov the actions that CAP goal teams are taking to develop performance measures and quarterly targets. OMB staff generally agreed with GAO's recommendation and provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-146 | gao_GAO-14-146_0 | Clinicians Cited Their Clinical Expertise and Patient Need as the Most Important Factors Influencing Their Decision of Which Surgical Implant to Use
Many clinicians we interviewed at the four selected VAMCs stated that the specific needs of the patient were one of the two main factors that influenced their decision of which surgical implant to purchase and use. Implants’ Availability on Certain Purchase Contracts Influenced Clinicians’ Decisions
Clinicians who performed surgical procedures for which implants were available on a national committed-use contract stated that they typically used one of the implants available on this type of contract, unless the use of these items was not appropriate, for example, for certain complex clinical indications. Clinicians at the four VAMCs we visited were often not aware of what surgical implants were available on an FSS contract, even though these contracts are preferred to open market purchases under the VAAR. Selected VAMCs Did Not Fully Comply with VHA Requirements for Documenting Surgical Implant Purchases from the Open Market
We found that among the four VAMCs we visited: (1) none fully complied with requirements for obtaining waivers for open-market purchases of surgical implants; (2) none fully complied with additional requirements for documenting open-market purchases, which are part of VHA’s new process for surgical implant purchases over $3,000; and (3) three of the four did not comply with a requirement related to consignment agreements with surgical implant vendors. Again, no timelines have been established to complete streamlining efforts, according to VHA officials. Three of Four VAMCs Did Not Comply with a VHA Requirement Pertaining to Consignment Agreements with Surgical Implant Vendors
Officials at three of the four VAMCs we visited told us that the VAMCs had purchasing agreements with open-market vendors to provide surgical implants to the VAMCs on consignment, but that these agreements were not always in compliance with a VHA requirement that consignment agreements be authorized by a VHA contracting officer. VA and VHA Found Noncompliance with Requirements for Surgical Implant Purchases over $3,000 but Neither Took Steps to Ensure that Corrective Actions Were Taken
Oversight of VAMCs’ and NCOs’ compliance with VHA’s new process for surgical implant purchasing over $3,000 includes efforts by both VA’s Office of Acquisition and Logistics and VHA’s Office of Procurement and Logistics. According to VHA prosthetics officials, VHA’s assessments cover the following metrics: the extent to which VAMCs purchased surgical implants from a national committed-use contract or obtained a waiver allowing clinicians to use an alternative item; the extent to which VAMCs entered the serial number and lot number for each surgical implant purchase; the timeliness of each surgical implant purchase—that is, the time from which a clinician requests a surgical implant to the time the item is purchased; the extent to which clinicians’ purchase requests for surgical implants have been fulfilled; and the extent to which amounts obligated for surgical implant purchases have been recorded in the prosthetics purchasing system. As of November 2013, VHA did not have a policy governing how deficiencies identified through these assessments should be addressed. Conclusions
To its credit, VHA has established national committed-use contracts for a number of surgical implants, which can help VHA effectively leverage its purchasing power. Furthermore, steps could be taken to improve clinicians’ awareness of high quality surgical implants available on FSS contracts, which may also lead to a further reduction in open-market purchases. VA’s and VHA’s oversight of compliance with surgical implant purchasing requirements does not ensure that corrective action is taken to address identified noncompliance, which could lead to potentially serious issues remaining unaddressed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To expand the volume of surgical implants purchased from existing, higher-priority contracts and to improve compliance and oversight related to purchasing requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs take the following five actions:
Create a plan that includes timelines for evaluating the benefits of developing additional national committed-use contracts for surgical implants and establishing these contracts. We selected these four VAMCs because they are all classified by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) as surgically complex facilities, serve large veteran populations and are located in different regional networks (See table 2). To examine VA and VHA’s oversight of compliance with surgical implant purchasing requirements, we obtained and analyzed VA and VHA documentation on existing or planned monitoring activities, including audit plans and reports documenting deficiencies in VAMCs’ purchasing of surgical implants; interviewed VA and VHA procurement and prosthetics officials; and assessed VA and VHA’s monitoring activities in the context of federal standards for internal control. | Why GAO Did This Study
VHA spending on surgical implants--such as stents and bone and skin grafts--has increased to about $563 million in fiscal year 2012. Clinicians at VAMCs determine veterans' needs and request implant purchases either from a contract or from the open market (i.e., not from an existing contract). VHA requirements--which implement relevant federal regulations--include providing justifications for open-market purchases.
GAO was asked to evaluate implant purchasing by VHA. This report examines (1) factors that influence clinicians' decisions to use particular implants when multiple, similar items are available; (2) selected VAMCs' compliance with pertinent VHA requirements for documenting open- market purchases; and (3) VA's and VHA's oversight of VAMC compliance with implant purchasing requirements. GAO visited four VAMCs that serve large veteran populations and are dispersed geographically. GAO interviewed clinicians at the VAMCs, reviewed pertinent statutes, regulations, and policies and reviewed a sample of implant purchases from different vendors. These results cannot be generalized to all VAMCs but provide insights. GAO also interviewed VA and VHA officials and reviewed agency documents.
What GAO Found
Clinicians at the four Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Centers (VAMC) GAO visited said that patient need and their clinical expertise were the main factors influencing their decisions of which surgical implants to use. Also, clinicians in certain specialties said they typically used one of the implants available on VA-negotiated national committed-use contracts, which generally establish a fixed price for several models of nine types of surgical implants that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) commits to using nationally. VHA recognizes the need for expanding items covered under these contracts to fully leverage its purchasing power but, as of October 2013, had not identified additional implants to include on such contracts or established timelines for doing so. GAO also found that the availability of implants on VA-negotiated federal supply schedule (FSS) contracts rarely influenced clinicians' decisions on which implant to use. Clinicians were often not aware of the availability of surgical implants on FSS contracts, which are negotiated by one of VA's contracting offices, but for which VHA clinicians have little or no input. Clinicians told GAO that in some cases they may avoid implants on FSS contracts due to their concerns about the quality of these items.
In regard to compliance with VHA's requirements for justifying open-market purchases of surgical implants, which VHA adopted to promote adherence to relevant federal regulations, GAO found the following:
None of the four VAMCs fully complied with requirements for obtaining waivers for open-market purchases of surgical implants because they were focusing on other priorities or lacked awareness of the requirements, among other factors.
None of the four VAMCs fully complied with additional requirements for documenting open-market purchases that are part of a new process VHA implemented in fiscal year 2013 for surgical implant purchases over $3,000. VAMC and regional office officials attributed noncompliance mainly to insufficient VHA guidance and VA staff's inexperience in completing these requirements.
Three of the four VAMCs did not comply with a VHA requirement pertaining to agreements with vendors that provided surgical implants to them on consignment. These agreements, which clinicians likely established to ensure timely access to implants, do not comply with a VHA requirement that consignment agreements must be authorized by a VHA contracting officer.
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and VHA have begun conducting oversight of surgical implant purchases over $3,000 to assess compliance with VHA's new requirements. However, VHA officials told GAO that VA and VHA have not ensured that corrective action has been taken to address identified noncompliance because of poor communication between VA and VHA and insufficient staffing to follow up on identified issues. Furthermore, VHA assesses each VAMC's performance on metrics established for surgical implant purchasing, but it does not have a policy governing how any identified deficiencies should be addressed nor the corrective actions to be taken by VAMCs and VHA's regional networks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA identify implants and establish a timeline to expand the volume that can be purchased from VA-negotiated contracts and improve compliance with and oversight of purchasing requirements. VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-99-13 | gao_HEHS-99-13_0 | The permanency planning hearing is a special type of court proceeding designed to reach a decision concerning the permanent placement of the child. Possible permanent placements include the child’s return home and the child’s adoption. We found two key problems to varying degrees in all five states we visited: (1) a lack of cooperative working relationships between the courts and other participants involved in the child welfare system, including conflict over how courts and child welfare agencies resolve issues, and (2) difficult personnel and data management issues, such as inadequate numbers of judges and attorneys to handle large caseloads; frequent turnover among judges and attorneys; inadequate training of judges and attorneys in the area of child welfare; and a lack of efficient, automated information systems for tracking case data. Despite this shared involvement in handling child maltreatment cases, the courts and agencies often do not work well together. These reforms can be divided into two categories: those that seek to improve the overall operation and infrastructure of the courts, such as convening multidisciplinary advisory committees and developing automated information systems, and those that target improving decision-making in individual cases, primarily by using information-gathering and dispute-resolution techniques in addition to formal court hearings. As a result, states and localities currently do not know which interventions have improved their courts and which have not. Circuit officials believe the juvenile dependency court system has become less adversarial and that the focus has shifted away from winning or losing a case. Finally, two of the five local sites we visited have increased the length of the preliminary protective hearing. During our field work, state and local officials that have undertaken reforms identified three ingredients that are key to successful reform efforts: (1) the presence of judicial leadership and collaboration among child welfare system participants, (2) the availability of timely information on how the court is currently operating and processing cases, and (3) the availability of financial resources to initiate and sustain reform. For example, in 1995 the ABA reported on reforms undertaken in the Kent County, Michigan, juvenile dependency court. Similarly, the ABA’s 1995 report on the model juvenile court in Kent County, Michigan, found that the court’s interdisciplinary efforts to resolve individual cases as well as systemic problems was a key element in its successful reform. The high level of animosity between the court and the child welfare agency has diminished, and dialogue between court participants has increased. Concluding Observations
The juvenile dependency courts face numerous systemic problems that hinder their ability to oversee, monitor, and guide decision-making to protect children and ensure that they are placed in an appropriate, permanent home. To address these problems, states and localities have initiated reforms aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of judicial decisions, in order to minimize the amount of time children spend in the foster care system. Finally, for the states we visited, we reviewed assessments of foster care and adoption laws and judicial processes in child maltreatment proceedings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' and local agencies' efforts to improve the timeliness of judicial decisions concerning the permanent placement of foster children, focusing on: (1) the key problems in the juvenile dependency court system; and (2) state and local responses to these problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) serious systemic problems continue to plague the juvenile dependency court system; (2) states GAO visited reported a lack of cooperation between the courts and child welfare agencies as well as difficult personnel and data management issues that jeopardize the courts' ability to ensure that a child's stay in the foster care system is as brief as possible and that the permanent placement decided upon is in the best overall interest of the child; (3) despite their shared involvement in the child welfare system, courts and child welfare agencies often do not work well together; (4) for example, some judges mistrust the judgments of caseworkers and routinely order additional clinical assessments to compensate for what the judges perceive as professional inadequacies; (5) in addition, courts face numerous difficulties, including increased caseloads, short tenures for judges and attorneys assigned to juvenile dependency courts, insufficient training of judges and attorneys in child welfare law and concepts, and information systems that do not adequately track the progress of individual cases or monitor the courts' compliance with statutory timeframes for achieving permanent placements; (6) in response to these problems, some states have initiated court reforms that they believe reduce the length of time children spend in foster care and improve the quality of the decisions made by the courts; (7) these reforms generally fall into two categories: (a) reforms which are designed to improve the overall operation and infrastructure of the courts, including convening multidisciplinary advisory committees to resolve differences that exist between the courts and the organizations involved in court proceedings as well as developing juvenile dependency court information systems; and (b) reforms focused on improving the quality of decisionmaking on individual cases; (8) these reforms include holding mediation sessions in which all relevant parties meet to resolve issues in dispute in a non-adversarial setting outside the courtroom, as well as increasing the time allotted for specific hearings; (9) regardless of the nature of the reform, state and local officials at the sites GAO visited identified three ingredients that successful reform efforts have in common; and (10) these essential reform components are the presence of judicial leadership and collaboration among court participants, the availability of timely information on case processing performance, and the availability of financial resources to initiate and sustain reforms. |
gao_GAO-05-759T | gao_GAO-05-759T_0 | Background
ATP, which began funding projects in fiscal year 1990, was intended to fund high-risk research and development (R&D) projects with broad commercial and societal benefits that would not be undertaken by a single company or group of companies, either because the risk was too high or because the economic benefits of success would not accrue to the investors. The three projects that we reviewed received funding through the ATP competitions announced in 1990 and 1992. Three ATP Projects Addressed Similar Research Goals to Projects in the Private Sector
The three completed projects that we reviewed addressed research goals that were similar to goals the private sector was addressing at about the same time. Each of the three projects was from a different sector of technology—computers, electronics, and biotechnology. The projects include (1) an on-line handwriting recognition system for computer input, (2) a system to increase the capacity of existing fiber optic cables for the telecommunications industry, and (3) a process for turning collagen into fibers for human prostheses use. ATP Project on Handwriting Recognition
Both the ATP project and several private sector projects had a similar research goal of developing an on-line system to recognize natural or cursive handwritten data without the use of a keyboard. CIC used its ATP funding of $1.2 million from 1991 to 1993 to build its own algorithms and models for developing its handwriting recognition system. ATP’s Award Selection Process Is Unlikely to Avoid Funding Similar Research
Two factors in ATP’s award selection process could result in ATP’s funding research similar to research that the private sector would fund in the same time period. Also, the information available about private sector research is limited because of the private sector practice of not disclosing research results. Therefore, it is difficult for the reviewers to identify other cutting-edge research. To minimize possible conflicts of interest, the technical reviewers are generally federal government employees who are experts in the specific technology of the research proposal but are not directly involved with the proposed research area. Although this approach helps to guard against conflict of interest, it has inherent limitations on the program’s ability to identify similar research efforts. Our retrospective look at the three ATP research projects showed that their goals were similar to research goals already being funded by the private sector. Examining the process that ATP uses to select projects, we found two inherent factors—the need to guard against conflicts of interest and the need to protect proprietary information—that limit ATP’s ability to identify similar research efforts in the private sector. These two factors have not changed since the beginning of the program. However, we believe that it may be impossible for the program to ensure that it is consistently not funding existing or planned research that would be conducted in the same time period in the absence of ATP financial assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) supports research that accelerates the development of high-risk technologies with the potential for broad-based economic benefits for the nation. Under the program, administrators at the National Institute of Standards and Technology are to ensure that they do not fund research that would be conducted in the same period without ATP funding. Between 1990 and September 2004, ATP funded 768 projects at a cost of about $2.3 billion. There is a continuing debate over whether the private sector has sufficient incentives to undertake research on high-risk, high-payoff emerging technologies without government support, such as ATP. This testimony discusses the results of GAO's April 2000 report, Advanced Technology Program: Inherent Factors in the Selection Process Could Limit Identification of Similar Research (GAO/RCED-00-114) and provides updated information. GAO determined (1) whether ATP had funded projects with research goals that were similar to projects funded by the private sector and (2) if ATP did, whether its award selection process ensures that such research would not be funded in the future.
What GAO Found
The three completed ATP-funded projects GAO reviewed, which were approved for funding in 1990 and 1992, addressed research goals that were similar to those already funded by the private sector. GAO chose these 3 projects from among the first 38 completed projects, each representing a different technology sector: computers, electronics, and biotechnology. These three technology sectors represent 26 of the 38 completed ATP projects, or 68 percent. The projects included an on-line handwriting recognition system, a system to increase the capacity of existing fiber optic cables for the telecommunications industry, and a process for turning collagen into fibers for human prostheses use. In the case of the handwriting recognition project, ATP provided $1.2 million to develop a system to recognize cursive handwriting for pen-based (i.e., without a keyboard) computer input. GAO identified several private firms that were conducting similar research on handwriting recognition at approximately the same time the ATP project was funded. In fact, this line of research began in the late 1950s. In addition, GAO identified multiple patents, as early as 5 years prior to the start of the ATP project, in the field of handwriting recognition. GAO found similar results in the other two projects. Two inherent factors in ATP's award selection process--the need to guard against conflicts of interest and the need to protect proprietary information--make it unlikely that ATP can avoid funding research already being pursued by the private sector in the same time period. These factors, which have not changed since 1990, make it difficult for ATP project reviewers to identify similar efforts in the private sector. For example, to guard against conflicts of interest, the program uses technical experts who are not directly involved with the proposed research. Their acquaintance with ongoing research is further limited by the private sector's practice of not disclosing its research efforts or results so as to guard proprietary information. As a result, it may be impossible for the program to ensure that it is consistently not funding existing or planned research that would be conducted in the same time period in the absence of ATP financial assistance. GAO made no recommendations in its April 2000 report. |
gao_GAO-14-157T | gao_GAO-14-157T_0 | The Overall Personnel Security Clearance Process
Multiple executive-branch agencies have key roles and responsibilities for different steps of the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct these investigations for most of the federal government using federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for collecting background information on applicants. OPM provides the resulting investigative reports to the requesting agencies for their internal adjudicators, who use the information along with the federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, known as the Joint Reform Team, to improve the security clearance process government-wide. Steps in the Personnel Security Clearance Process
In the first step of the personnel security clearance process, executive branch officials determine the requirements of a federal civilian position, including assessing the risk and sensitivity level associated with that position, to determine whether it requires access to classified information and, if required, the level of access. We recommended that the DNI issue policy and guidance for the determination, review, and validation of requirements, and ODNI concurred with those recommendations, stating that it recognized the need to issue or clarify policy. Currently, OPM and ODNI are in the process of issuing a joint revision to the regulations guiding requirements determination. Once an applicant is selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance, the applicant must obtain a security clearance in order to gain access to classified information. Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as long as they remain in a position that requires access to classified national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. For example, top secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 5 years, and secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 10 years. To promote oversight and positive outcomes, such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely, we have emphasized, since the late 1990s, the need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process. However, we have previously reported that executive branch agencies have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the personnel security clearance process, including: (1) investigative reports; (2) adjudicative files; and (3) the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative executive branch agency. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing at least one type of documentation required by federal investigative standards. We also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 investigative reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. As a result of the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD personnel, we recommended in May 2009 that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports and take corrective actions. For example, we estimated in our 2009 review that 22 percent of the adjudicative files for about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were adjudicated favorably did not contain all the required documentation, even though DOD regulations require that adjudicators maintain a record of each favorable and unfavorable adjudication decision and document the rationale for granting clearance eligibility to applicants with security concerns revealed during the investigation. In November 2009, DOD subsequently issued a memorandum that established a tool to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically, the DOD memorandum stated that it would use a tool called the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales, or RADAR, to gather specific information about adjudication processes at the adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative documentation. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of 2012, a DOD official stated that RADAR had been used in fiscal year 2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011 due to funding shortfalls. DOD restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal year 2012. We also noted DOD’s efforts to develop and implement tools to evaluate the quality of investigations and adjudications. Failing to do so increases the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of classified information. | Why GAO Did This Study
A high-quality personnel security clearance process is necessary to minimize the associated risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances. Personnel security clearances allow individuals access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2012, the DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a security clearance. GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations (in support of security clearances and suitability determinations--the consideration of character and conduct for federal employment) in fiscal year 2011.
This testimony addresses the (1) overall security clearance process, including roles and responsibilities; and (2) extent that executive branch agencies have metrics to help determine the quality of the security clearance process. This testimony is based on GAO work issued between 2008 and 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and governmentwide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed statutes, federal guidance, and processes, (2) examined agency data on the timeliness and quality of investigations and adjudications, (3) assessed reform efforts, and (4) reviewed samples of case files for DOD personnel.
What GAO Found
Multiple executive branch agencies are responsible for different steps of the multi-phased personnel security clearance process that includes: determination of whether a position requires a clearance, application submission, investigation, and adjudication. Agency officials must first determine whether a federal civilian position requires access to classified information. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are in the process of issuing a joint revision to the regulations guiding this step in response to GAO's 2012 recommendation that the DNI issue policy and guidance for the determination, review, and validation of requirements. After an individual has been selected for a federal civilian position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators--often contractors--from OPM conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and consider federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. Further, individuals are subject to reinvestigations at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. For example, top secret and secret clearance holders are to be reinvestigated every 5 years and 10 years, respectively.
Executive branch agencies have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality throughout the personnel security clearance process. For more than a decade, GAO has emphasized the need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. For example, GAO reported in May 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for the Department of Defense (DOD), documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance eligibility decisions were missing some required documentation, such as the verification of all of the applicant's employment. GAO also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 reports did not contain the required personal subject interview. In 2009, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards in order to improve the quality of investigation documentation. As of August 2013, however, OPM had not implemented this recommendation. GAO's 2009 report also identified issues with the quality of DOD adjudications. Specifically, GAO estimated that 22 percent of about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were adjudicated favorably did not contain all the required documentation. As a result, in 2009 GAO recommended that DOD measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet requirements. In November 2009, DOD issued a memorandum that established a tool called the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR) to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. According to a DOD official, RADAR had been used in fiscal year 2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011 due to funding shortfalls. DOD restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal year 2012. |
gao_NSIAD-96-138 | gao_NSIAD-96-138_0 | Purchase Card Has Enabled Agencies to Support Missions at Reduced Costs and Time
Agency officials have used the purchase card and the micropurchase authority provided in FASA to move simple purchases from procurement offices to program offices. Purchase Card Program Has Significant Growth Potential
Since the beginning of the purchase card program, the use of the cards has skyrocketed. However, there is still significant growth potential for card use. In fiscal year 1995, the average purchase card transaction, which could include purchases of several items, was $375. We found no evidence of increased abuse. In fact, with the controls required by the purchase card contract and some tools that agencies have developed, purchase card use can be closely monitored. Such weaknesses included noncompliance with procedures and failure to record purchases of accountable property. Agency officials told us they were emphasizing card use, reengineering their processes, and developing automated tools to improve their programs. Agencies Lack an Effective System for Sharing Innovations and Experiences
Most of the agencies in our review have identified the potential to increase their savings or efficiencies gained from card use by reengineering their programs or using automated tools to improve their processes. Agencies have found that their improvement efforts can be useful to other agencies. We therefore recommend that the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy ensure, in conjunction with the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, that the FAR provides clear guidance on the appropriate uses of the purchase card as a means for making payments, purchases, and orders from established contracts and establish a site on one of the government’s electronic media, such as the Acquisition Reform Net on the Internet, to facilitate agencies’ efforts to exchange information about problems or progress with purchase card use. To determine the extent to which card use has resulted in administrative savings or other benefits, we interviewed purchase card program coordinators, officials from agency finance and procurement offices, and officials from GSA, NPR, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed federal agencies' progress in using purchase cards, focusing: (1) the extent to which card use has led to administrative savings or other benefits; (2) the potential for growth in card use; (3) agencies' management controls; and (4) opportunities to improve agencies' purchase card programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the use of purchase cards for small purchases can reduce agencies' mission support, labor, and payment processing costs 50 percent by moving simple purchases from procurement offices to program offices and consolidating payments; (2) some agencies have found that purchase card use has helped them absorb the impact of administrative staff reductions and improve service delivery; (3) although the use of purchase cards has increased since 1990, there is potential for greater card use; (4) in fiscal year 1995, the average purchase card transaction was $375, well below the micropurchase threshold of $2,500; (5) there is no evidence of increased abusive use of purchase cards despite tremendous growth in the purchase card program; (6) electronic records of all purchase card transactions allow close and detailed monitoring of card use; (7) agencies' management controls are adequate to protect the government's interest and agencies are addressing control weaknesses and failures to follow proper procurement procedures; (8) most agencies are trying to improve their card programs by emphasizing card use, reengineering their processes, and increasing their use of automation; and (9) opportunities to improve the card program include revising the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to address card use more thoroughly and establishing a mechanism so agencies can share their innovations and experiences. |
gao_GAO-14-578 | gao_GAO-14-578_0 | In 2011, federal spending on Medicare Part D totaled approximately $55.2 billion, accounting for about 65.9 percent of total federal drug expenditures. Medicaid Paid Lower Net Prices Than DOD and Medicare Part D, Largely Due to Differences in Post- Purchase Price Adjustments
Medicaid paid a lower average net unit price—that is, the price after subtracting any beneficiary-paid amounts and post-purchase price adjustments—than DOD and Medicare Part D across the entire sample of 78 prescription drugs and the subsets of brand-name and generic drugs. Specifically, Medicaid’s average net price for the entire sample was $0.62 per unit, while Medicare Part D paid an estimated 32 percent more ($0.82 per unit) and DOD paid 60 percent more ($0.99 per unit). When we examined the net prices that each program paid for the individual drugs in the sample after subtracting all reported beneficiary- paid amounts and post-purchase price adjustments, we found that Medicaid paid the lowest prices for 25 brand-name and 3 generic drugs, while DOD paid the lowest net price for 5 brand-name and 22 generic drugs, and Medicare Part D paid the lowest estimated net price for 3 brand-name and 20 generic drugs. Of these, a key factor for the entire sample and for the brand-name subset was the amount of manufacturer post-purchase price adjustments received. On average across the entire sample, these price adjustments ranged from about 15 percent of the gross price for Medicare Part D to about 31 percent for DOD, and nearly 53 percent for Medicaid. The gross unit prices paid to retail pharmacies by each program and the magnitude of beneficiary-paid amounts also contributed to the differences in net prices, although to a lesser degree than post-purchase price adjustments. Beneficiary-paid amounts also affected the net prices paid by each program; larger beneficiary payments contributed to lower net prices paid by the agency. For the subset of brand-name drugs in our sample, beneficiary-paid amounts ranged from 6 percent of the gross price for DOD to 17 percent for Medicare Part D, while for the subset of generic drugs these amounts ranged from 14 percent of the gross price for DOD to 21 percent for Medicare Part D.
Market dynamics—such as manufacturer responses to offset discounts, the number of competitors for a given drug, and varying utilization of specific drugs by different programs—can also affect the net prices paid by these and other drug programs and thus the amount of savings the programs might be able to achieve. Agency Comments
We provided a copy of the draft report to DOD and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for comment. DOD stated that it had no comments. HHS provided a technical comment, which was incorporated. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this appendix we describe our data sources, the selection of the drug sample, and calculations of gross and net unit prices paid by the Department of Defense (DOD), Medicaid, and Medicare Part D for prescription drugs dispensed to their beneficiaries at retail pharmacies. We calculated gross unit prices by first adding the program-paid and beneficiary-paid amounts for each drug, then dividing these expenditures by total utilization. We interviewed DOD and CMS officials and reviewed literature describing factors that affect drug prices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011, federal spending for prescription drugs by DOD, Medicaid, and Medicare Part D totaled $71.2 billion—representing about 85 percent of all federal prescription drug expenditures—for about 114.4 million beneficiaries. Each program reimbursed retail pharmacies for outpatient prescriptions filled at these pharmacies by their beneficiaries.
GAO was asked to compare prices paid for prescription drugs across federal programs. This report compares retail reimbursement prices paid by DOD, Medicaid, and Medicare Part D for a sample of prescription drugs and describes factors affecting these prices. Using agency data for the third quarter of 2010 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's analysis), GAO selected a sample of 50 high-utilization and 50 high-expenditure drugs; after accounting for overlap between the two groups, the final sample contained 78 drugs. GAO calculated average gross unit prices paid to pharmacies by each program by adding total program-paid and beneficiary-paid amounts and dividing by total utilization for each drug, the entire sample, and the subsets of brand-name and generic drugs. GAO calculated net unit prices paid by each program by subtracting all agency-reported beneficiary-paid amounts, rebates, refunds, and other price concessions from the gross unit prices. GAO also interviewed DOD, Medicaid, and Medicare Part D officials and reviewed literature describing factors affecting drug prices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Medicaid paid the lowest average net prices across a sample of 78 high-utilization and high-expenditure brand-name and generic drugs when compared to prices paid by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Medicare Part D. Specifically, Medicaid's average net price for the entire sample was $0.62 per unit, while Medicare Part D paid an estimated 32 percent more ($0.82 per unit) and DOD paid 60 percent more ($0.99 per unit). Similarly, Medicaid paid the lowest net price for the subset of brand-name drugs in the sample, while DOD paid 34 percent more and Medicare Part D paid an estimated 69 percent more. Medicaid also paid the lowest net price for the subset of generic drugs, while Medicare Part D paid 4 percent more and DOD paid 50 percent more.
GAO found that multiple factors affected the net prices paid by each program. Specifically, a key factor for the entire sample and the brand-name subset was the amount of any post-purchase price adjustments, which are the refunds, rebates, or price concessions received by each program from drug manufacturers after drugs have been dispensed to program beneficiaries. These price adjustments ranged from about 15 percent of the gross price for Medicare Part D to about 31 percent for DOD, and nearly 53 percent for Medicaid across the entire sample. The gross prices each program negotiated with pharmacies and the magnitude of beneficiary-paid amounts also contributed to differences in net prices paid by the three programs, but to a lesser degree.
GAO provided a copy of the draft report to DOD and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for comment. DOD stated that it had no comments. HHS provided a technical comment, which was incorporated. |
gao_GAO-12-479 | gao_GAO-12-479_0 | Electronic warfare and cyberspace operations are complementary and have potentially synergistic effects. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DOD’s electronic warfare strategy for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015. The key characteristics of an effective strategy can aid As illustrated in Figure 3, we found that DOD’s reports addressed two key characteristics, but only partially addressed four other key characteristics of a strategy. For example, the strategy reports to Congress included elements of characteristics, such as a goal and objectives, but did not fully identify implementing parties, delineate roles and responsibilities for managing electronic warfare across the department, or identify outcome- related performance measures that could guide the implementation of electronic warfare efforts and help ensure accountability. Our past work has shown that such characteristics can help shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations, and standards in a manner that is conducive to achieving intended results. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: Partially Addressed. DOD Has Not Established an Effective Departmentwide Governance Framework for Managing and Overseeing Electronic Warfare
DOD has taken some steps to address a critical leadership gap identified in 2009, but it has not established a departmentwide governance framework for planning, directing, and controlling electronic warfare activities. DOD is establishing a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center (JEMSCC) under Strategic Command in response to the leadership gap for electronic warfare. In addition, DOD has not updated key guidance to reflect recent policy changes regarding electronic warfare management and oversight roles and responsibilities. However, because DOD has yet to define specific objectives for the center, outline major implementation tasks, and define metrics and timelines to measure progress, it is unclear to what extent the center will address the identified existing leadership deficiencies. DOD has yet to define objectives and issue an implementation plan for the JEMSCC; however, officials from Strategic Command stated that they anticipated continuity between the command’s previous role as an electronic warfare advocate and its new leadership role, noting that advocacy was, and remains, necessary because electronic warfare capabilities are sometimes undervalued in comparison to other, kinetic capabilities.Command’s previously assigned advocacy role, in part, by continuing to advocate for electronic warfare via the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process—DOD’s process for identifying and developing capabilities needed by combatant commanders—and by For example, the JEMSCC will likely build off Strategic providing electronic warfare expertise. DOD Policy Documents Have Not Been Updated to Include All Oversight Roles and Responsibilities for Electronic Warfare
GAO-12-175 and GAO-12-342SP. DOD’s two primary directives that provide some guidance for departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare are:
DOD Directive 3222.4 (Electronic Warfare and Command and Control Warfare Countermeasures)—Designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (now Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) as the focal point for electronic warfare within the department. According to cognizant DOD officials, electronic warfare capabilities may permit use of the electromagnetic spectrum as a maneuver space for cyberspace operations. Without additional steps to define the purpose and activities of the JEMSCC, DOD lacks reasonable assurance that this center will provide effective departmentwide leadership for electronic warfare capabilities development and ensure the effective and efficient use of its resources. Updating electronic warfare directives and policy documents to clearly define oversight roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare— including any roles and responsibilities related to managing the relationship between electronic warfare and information operations or electronic warfare and cyberspace operations, specifically computer network operations—would help ensure that all aspects of electronic warfare can be developed and integrated to achieve electromagnetic spectrum control. Resources and investments necessary to implement the strategy, including those related to key activities, such as developing electronic warfare organizational structures and leadership. Regarding our recommendation that DOD include in future strategy reports for electronic warfare, at a minimum, information on (1) performance measures to guide implementation of the strategy, (2) resources and investments necessary to implement the strategy, and (3) parties responsible for implementing the strategy, the department stated that it continues to refine the annual strategy reports for electronic warfare and will expand upon resourcing plans and organization roles; however, the department stated that the strategy was not intended to be prescriptive with performance measures. We therefore continue to believe this recommendation has merit. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage electronic warfare we evaluated DOD’s fiscal year 2011 and 2012 electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress against prior GAO work on strategic planning, that indentified six desirable characteristics of a strategy. The characteristics GAO previously identified are: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation. In addressing both of our objectives, we obtained relevant documentation from and/or interviewed officials from the following DOD offices, combatant commands, military services, and combat support agencies:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland
U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii
U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska Joint Electronic Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, Plans, and Training, Electronic Warfare Division
Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center Electronic Warfare Proponent Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
U.S. Air Force—Electronic Warfare Division
U.S. Marines Corps—Headquarters, Electronic Warfare Branch
U.S. Navy
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance Electronic and Cyber Warfare Division
Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Naval Sea Systems Command, Program Executive Office for
Navy Fleet Forces Cyber Command, Fleet Electronic Warfare Center, Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia
Defense Information Systems Agency—Defense Spectrum
National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has committed billions of dollars to developing, maintaining, and employing warfighting capabilities that rely on access to the electromagnetic spectrum. According to DOD, electronic warfare capabilities play a critical and potentially growing role in ensuring the U.S. militarys access to and use of the electromagnetic spectrum. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD (1) developed a strategy to manage electronic warfare and (2) planned, organized, and implemented an effective governance structure to oversee its electronic warfare policy and programs and their relationship to cyberspace operations. GAO analyzed policies, plans, and studies related to electronic warfare and cyberspace operations and interviewed cognizant DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) developed an electronic warfare strategy, but it only partially addressed key characteristics that GAO identified in prior work as desirable for a national or defense strategy. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on DODs electronic warfare strategy for each of fiscal years 2011 through 2015. DOD issued its fiscal year 2011 and 2012 strategy reports to Congress in October 2010 and November 2011, respectively. GAO found that DODs reports addressed two key characteristics: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology and (2) problem definition and risk assessment. However, DOD only partially addressed four other key characteristics of a strategy, including (1) resources, investments, and risk management and (2) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. For example, the reports identified mechanisms that could foster coordination across the department and identified some investment areas, but did not fully identify implementing parties, delineate roles and responsibilities for managing electronic warfare across the department, or link resources and investments to key activities. Such characteristics can help shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocation, and standards in a manner that is conducive to achieving intended results and can help ensure that the department is effectively managing electronic warfare.
DOD has taken steps to address a critical electronic warfare management gap, but it has not established a departmentwide governance framework for electronic warfare. GAO previously reported that effective and efficient organizations establish objectives and outline major implementation tasks. In response to a leadership gap for electronic warfare, DOD is establishing the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center under U.S. Strategic Command as the focal point for joint electronic warfare. However, because DOD has yet to define specific objectives for the center, outline major implementation tasks, and define metrics and timelines to measure progress, it is unclear whether or when the center will provide effective departmentwide leadership and advocacy for joint electronic warfare. In addition, key DOD directives providing some guidance for departmentwide oversight of electronic warfare have not been updated to reflect recent changes. For example, DODs primary directive concerning electronic warfare oversight was last updated in 1994 and identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the focal point for electronic warfare. The directive does not define the centers responsibilities in relation to the office, including those related to the development of the electronic warfare strategy and prioritizing investments. In addition, DODs directive for information operations, which is being updated, allocates electronic warfare responsibilities based on the departments previous definition of information operations, which had included electronic warfare as a core capability. DODs oversight of electronic warfare capabilities may be further complicated by its evolving relationship with computer network operations, which is also an information operations-related capability. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities and updated guidance regarding oversight responsibilities, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that its management structures will provide effective departmentwide leadership for electronic warfare activities and capabilities development and ensure effective and efficient use of its resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD should (1) include in its future electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress certain key characteristics, including performance measures, key investments and resources, and organizational roles and responsibilities; (2) define objectives and issue an implementation plan for the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center; and (3) update key departmental guidance to clearly define oversight roles, responsibilities, and coordination for electronic warfare management, and the relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations, except that the strategy should include performance measures. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit. |
gao_GAO-12-337 | gao_GAO-12-337_0 | CMRR’s Initial Cost Estimate Has Significantly Increased and Its Schedule Has Been Delayed
The estimated cost to construct the CMRR, according to estimates prepared in April 2010, is nearly six times higher than the project’s initial cost estimate that was prepared in 2005. In February 2012, after we had provided NNSA with a draft of this report for its comments, NNSA announced that it had decided to defer CMRR construction by at least an additional 5 years, bringing the total delay from NNSA’s original plans to 8 to 12 years. Namely, according to our guide, a high-quality schedule requires a schedule risk analysis that uses already identified risks, among other things, to predict the level of confidence in meeting a project’s completion date and the amount of contingency time needed to cover unexpected delays. CMRR project officials identified and documented hundreds of risks to the project, but these risks were not used in preparing a schedule risk analysis. However, without a schedule risk analysis that contains risks identified by CMRR project officials, NNSA cannot be fully confident, once it decides to resume CMRR construction plans, that sufficient schedule contingency is established to ensure that the project will be completed on time and within estimated costs. As a result, overall project costs could potentially exceed NNSA’s April 2010 estimate of between $3.7 billion and $5.8 billion and NNSA had not yet determined the impact to the project’s costs of its recent decision to defer CMRR construction for at least 5 years. NNSA Considered Several Options to Preserve Plutonium- Related Research Capabilities, but Ultimately Chose to Build a Minimally Sized Facility at Los Alamos
To replace the plutonium-related research capabilities in Los Alamos’s deteriorating Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility, NNSA considered several options. In the end, NNSA decided to build a minimally sized CMRR facility at Los Alamos with a broad suite of capabilities to meet nuclear weapons stockpile needs over the long-term. These capabilities would also be used to support plutonium-related research needs of other departmental missions. To house these needed capabilities, NNSA assessed three potential sizes for a new facility—22,500 square feet, 31,500 square feet, and 40,500 square feet. NNSA officials told us that cost was the primary driver of this decision. As part of NNSA’s decision to consolidate plutonium research at Los Alamos, NNSA also decided that the CMRR would be used to support plutonium-related research needs of other non-weapons activities, including nuclear nonproliferation activities; homeland security activities, such as nuclear forensics and nuclear counterterrorism; waste management; and material recycle and recovery programs. NNSA’s CMRR Plans Focus on Meeting Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Requirements, But Some Plutonium-Related Work for the Stockpile May Not Be Accommodated
NNSA’s plans to construct the CMRR primarily focus on maintaining plutonium-related research capabilities that are necessary for meeting nuclear weapons stockpile requirements. CMRR May Not Meet Other Plutonium-Related Research and Storage Needs As DOE and NNSA Have Not Fully Analyzed Programs Outside of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Work
DOE and NNSA conduct important plutonium-related research in other mission areas outside of nuclear weapons stockpile work, and it is unclear whether the CMRR as designed will be large enough to accommodate these nonweapons activities because they have not comprehensively studied their long-term research and storage needs. As a result, expansion of CMRR or construction of costly additional plutonium research, storage, and testing facilities at Los Alamos or elsewhere may be needed sometime in the future. Therefore, we clarified our recommendation to specify that NNSA should take action to ensure that the CMRR’s schedule risk analysis is appropriately revised to account for all project risks when NNSA resumes the project and before it establishes a new cost and schedule baseline. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) changes in the cost and schedule estimates for the construction of the facility and the extent to which its most recent estimates reflect best practices, (2) options the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) considered to ensure that plutonium-related research activities could continue as needed, and (3) the extent to which NNSA’s plans to construct the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR) and its consideration of options reflected changes in nuclear weapons stockpile requirements and other plutonium-related research needs. We also visited Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. | Why GAO Did This Study
Plutoniuma man-made element produced by irradiating uranium in nuclear reactorsis vital to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Much of the nations current plutonium research capabilities are housed in aging facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. These facilities pose safety hazards. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has decided to construct a multibillion dollar Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR) to modernize the laboratorys capabilities to analyze and store plutonium. GAO was asked to examine (1) the cost and schedule estimates to construct CMRR and the extent to which its most recent estimates reflect best practices, (2) options NNSA considered to ensure that needed plutonium research activities could continue, and (3) the extent to which NNSA's plans reflected changes in stockpile requirements and other plutonium research needs. GAO reviewed NNSA and contractor project design documents and visited Los Alamos and another plutonium facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.
What GAO Found
The estimated cost to construct the CMRR has greatly increased since NNSAs initial plans, and the projects schedule has been significantly delayed. According to its most recent estimates prepared in April 2010, NNSA determined that the CMRR will cost between $3.7 billion and $5.8 billionnearly a six-fold increase from the initial estimate. Construction has also been repeatedly delayed and, in February 2012 after GAO provided its draft report to NNSA for comment, NNSA decided to defer CMRR construction by at least an additional 5 years, bringing the total delay to between 8 and 12 years from NNSAs original plans. Infrastructure-related design changes and longer-than-expected overall project duration have contributed to these cost increases and delays. GAOs review of NNSAs April 2010 cost and schedule estimates for CMRR found that the estimates were generally well prepared, but important weaknesses remain. For example, a high-quality schedule requires a schedule risk analysis that incorporates known risks to predict the level of confidence in meeting a projects completion date and the amount of contingency time needed to cover unexpected delays. CMRR project officials identified hundreds of risks to the project, but GAO found that these risks were not used in preparing a schedule risk analysis. As a result of these weaknesses, NNSA cannot be fully confident, once it decides to resume the CMRR project, that the project will be completed on time and within estimated costs.
NNSA considered several options to preserve its plutonium-related research capabilities in its decision to build CMRR at Los Alamos. NNSA assessed three different sizes for a new facility22,500, 31,500, and 40,500 square feet. In 2004, NNSA chose the smallest option. NNSA officials stated that cost was the primary driver of the decision, but that building a smaller facility would result in trade-offs, including the elimination of contingency space. In the end, NNSA decided to build a minimally-sized CMRR facility at Los Alamos with a broad suite of capabilities to meet nuclear weapons stockpile needs over the long-term. These capabilities would also be used to support plutonium-related research needs of other departmental missions.
NNSAs plans to construct CMRR focused on meeting nuclear weapons stockpile requirements, but CMRR may not meet all stockpile and other plutonium-related research needs. NNSA analyzed data on past workload and the expected need for new weapon components to help ensure CMRRs design included the necessary plutonium-related research capabilities for maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. However, some plutonium research, storage, and environmental testing capabilities that exist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory may no longer be available after NNSA consolidates plutonium-related research at Los Alamos. Furthermore, NNSA conducts important plutonium-related research in other areas such as homeland security and nuclear nonproliferation, but it has not comprehensively analyzed plutonium research and storage needs of these other programs outside of its nuclear weapons stockpile work and therefore cannot be sure that the CMRR plans will effectively accommodate these needs. As a result, expansion of CMRR or construction of more plutonium research and storage facilities at Los Alamos or elsewhere may be needed in the future, potentially further adding to costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to improve CMRRs schedule risk analysis and to conduct an assessment of plutonium research needs. NNSA agreed with GAOs recommendations to assess plutonium research needs, but disagreed that its schedule risk analysis should be revised, citing its recent decision to defer the project. GAO clarified the recommendation to specify that NNSA should take action when it resumes the project. |
gao_GAO-01-711 | gao_GAO-01-711_0 | Until more types of federal payments are available, the current continuous levy program results in unequal treatment of delinquent taxpayers depending on whether their federal payments are made by FMS on behalf of other agencies or directly by the agencies themselves. Delinquent taxpayers receiving payments from FMS generally are subject to the continuous levy program; those receiving payments directly from federal agencies are not and IRS is limited to using its general levy authority in order to levy some of these non-FMS payments. Although practical issues may impede achieving similar treatment of all delinquent taxpayers receiving federal payments, progress could be made and substantial additional revenues could be collected—in fairness to those who properly pay their taxes. Similar plans do not exist, however, for including all vendor payments from USPS, DOD, and CMS in the continuous levy program. Discussions among FMS, IRS, and the agencies have the potential to ensure that all of these payments are included in the continuous levy program as soon as practical, and for possibly accelerating the inclusion of certain types or categories of vendor payments. Further, the effectiveness of the current continuous levy program and its expansion to other payments could be enhanced if IRS were to begin sharing the different names that businesses use for tax purposes with FMS. DOD and CMS have available data that could be shared with IRS to increase IRS’ ability to identify those taxpayers’ whose federal payments could be practically and effectively levied under the general levy program. Key contributors to this work are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to (1) determine the number of delinquent taxpayers receiving federal payments from the United States Postal Service (USPS), Department of Defense (DOD), and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) that would be affected and the tax debt that might be recovered if they were to be included in the continuous levy program; (2) determine whether these types of payments could be included in the continuous levy program and the timeframes for doing so; and (3) identify other actions that could be taken to enhance IRS’ ability to manually levy federal payments to delinquent individuals and businesses that are not currently included in the continuous levy program. | What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeks to apply the law fairly to all taxpayers. Under the continuous levy program, however, taxpayers who receive federal payments are treated differently depending on whether the payments are made by the Federal Management Service (FMS) on behalf of other agencies or directly by the agencies themselves. Delinquent taxpayers receiving payments from FMS generally are subject to continuous levy, while those receiving payments directly from federal agencies are not. Although it may prove impractical to treat similarly all delinquent taxpayers who receive federal payments, progress--and substantial additional revenues--could be achieved in this area. FMS plans to include salaries at the U.S. Postal Service and salaries and retirement payments at the Defense Department (DOD) in the continuous levy program. There are similar plans to include all vendor payments from the Postal Service, DOD, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Discussions among FMS, IRS, and the agencies could ensure that all of these payments all included in the continuous levy program as soon as possible. These discussions could also speed the inclusion of some categories of vendor payments. The continuous levy program could also benefit if IRS were to begin sharing with FMS the different names that businesses use for tax purposes--an approach that IRS already uses for individual taxpayers in the program. In the meantime, until the program is expanded to include more direct payments from agencies, IRS could take steps to ensure that all delinquent taxpayers receiving payments are subject to potential collection activity. DOD and CMS have data on hand that they could share with IRS to strengthen IRS' ability to identify taxpayers whose federal payments could be levied under the program. |
gao_GAO-13-453T | gao_GAO-13-453T_0 | 1). In recent years, VA compensation claims processing timeframes have increased. Specifically, the average days pending increased from 116 days in fiscal year 2009 to 254 days in fiscal year 2012. 2). In fiscal year 2011, VA completed over 1 million compensation rating claims, a 6 percent increase from fiscal year 2009. 3). As a result, the number of backlogged claims—defined as those claims awaiting a decision for more than 125 days—has increased substantially since 2009. One factor that contributed to the substantial increase in claims received was the commencement in October 2010 of VBA’s adjudication of 260,000 previously denied and new claims when a presumptive service connection was established for three additional Agent Orange diseases. VBA officials in one regional office we spoke to said that all claims processing staff were assigned solely to developing and rating Agent Orange claims for 4 months in 2011, and that no other new and pending claims in the regional office’s inventory were processed during that time. According to VBA, other factors that contributed to the growing number of claims include an increase in the number of veterans from the military downsizing after 10 years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, improved outreach activities and transition services to servicemembers and veterans, and difficult financial conditions for veterans during the economic downturn. However, the number of Statements of the Case that were processed by VBA was only 76,685. According to VBA officials, staff shortages represent a primary reason that appeals timeliness at VA regional offices has worsened. According to VBA officials, delays in obtaining military service and medical treatment records, particularly for National Guard and Reserve members, have significantly lengthened the evidence gathering phase. If a veteran submits a disability claim and reports receiving SSA disability benefits, VA is required to help the veteran obtain relevant federal records, including certain SSA medical records, to process the claim. VBA’s work processes, stemming mainly from its reliance on a paper- based claims system, can lead to misplaced or lost documents, and contribute to lengthy processing times. VBA Is Taking Steps to Improve Claims and Appeals Processing, but Future Impact Is Uncertain
Based on a review of VA documents and interviews with VBA officials, we identified 15 efforts with a stated goal of improving claims and appeals timeliness. Contractor staff are required to complete their work within 135 days of receiving the file and provide VBA with status reports that include several measures of timeliness, including the time it took to receive medical evidence from providers and to return a claim to VBA for rating. Specifically, VBA provided us with several documents, including a PowerPoint presentation and a matrix that provided a high-level overview of over 40 initiatives, but, at the time of our review, could not provide us with a robust plan that tied together the group of initiatives, their inter- relationships, and subsequent impact on claims and appeals processing times. Implementation of Recommendations Could Help Improve Evidence Gathering and Ensure Better Strategic Management of Improvement Initiatives
In our December 2012 report, we recommended that VBA seek improvements for partnering with relevant federal and state military officials to reduce the time it takes to gather military service records from National Guard and Reserve sources. We also recommended that VBA develop improvements for partnering with Social Security Administration officials to reduce the time it takes to gather medical records. Lastly, we recommended that VBA develop a robust backlog reduction plan for its initiatives that, among other best practice elements, identifies implementation risks and strategies to address them and performance goals that incorporate the impact of individual initiatives on processing timeliness. VA generally agreed with our conclusions and concurred with our recommendations, and summarized efforts that are planned or underway to address them. For example, VA stated it has recently initiated several interagency efforts to the timeliness of record exchanges between VBA and DOD. VA also agreed with our recommendation to develop a robust backlog plan for VBA’s initiatives and, subsequent to our report, published the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Strategic Plan to Eliminate the Compensation Claims Backlog. In conclusion, for years, VA’s disability claims and appeals processes have received considerable attention as VA has struggled to process disability compensation claims in a timely fashion. VBA is currently taking steps to improve the timeliness of claims and appeals processing; however, prospects for improvement remain uncertain because timely processing remains a daunting challenge. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability benefits program, which provides monetary support to veterans with disabling conditions that were incurred or aggravated during military service. In fiscal year 2013, VA estimates it will provide $59.6 billion in compensation benefits to 3.98 million veterans and their families. For years, the disability claims process has been the subject of concern and attention by VA, Congress, and Veterans Service Organizations (VSO), due in part to long waits for decisions and the large number of pending claims. For example, the average length of time to complete a claim increased from 161 days in fiscal year 2009 to 260 days in fiscal year 2012. Moreover, VA's backlog of claims--defined as claims awaiting a decision for over 125 days--has more than tripled since September 2009. In August 2012, approximately two-thirds of the 568,043 compensation rating claims--which include pension and disability rating claims--were backlogged. In addition, timeliness of appeals processing at VA regional offices has also slowed by 56 percent over the last several years.
This testimony is based on a GAO report released on December 21, 2012, titled Veterans' Disability Benefits: Timely Processing Remains a Daunting Challenge, and, also include information updated to reflect the status of improvement efforts. This testimony focuses on (1) factors that contribute to lengthy disability claims and appeals processing times at VA regional offices and (2) status of the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) recent improvement efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found a number of factors--both external and internal to VBA--have contributed to the increase in processing times and subsequent growth in the backlog of veterans' disability compensation claims. For example, the number of claims received by VBA has increased as the population of new veterans has swelled in recent years. Moreover, due to new regulations that established eligibility for benefits for new diseases associated with Agent Orange exposure, VBA adjudicated 260,000 previously denied and new claims for related impairments. Beyond these external factors, issues with the design and implementation of the program have also contributed to timeliness challenges. For example, the law requires VA to assist veterans in obtaining records that support their claim. However, VBA officials said that delays in obtaining military records--particularly for members of the National Guard and Reserve--and Social Security Administration (SSA) medical records impact VA's duty to assist, possibly delaying a decision on a veteran's disability claim. Further, VBA's paper-based claims processing system involves multiple hand-offs, which can lead to misplaced and lost documents and cause unnecessary delays. Concerning timeliness of appeals, VBA regional offices have in recent years shifted resources away from appeals and towards claims, which has led to lengthy appeals timeframes.
VBA has a number of initiatives underway to improve the timeliness of claims and appeals processing. Such efforts include leveraging VBA staff and contractors to manage workload, modifying and streamlining procedures, improving records acquisition, and redesigning the claims and appeals processes. According to VBA officials, these efforts will help VA process all veterans' claims within VA's stated target goal of 125 days by 2015. However, the extent to which VA is positioned to meet its ambitious processing timeliness goal remains uncertain. VBA provided us with several planning documents, but, at the time of our review, could not provide us with a plan that met established criteria for sound planning, such as articulating performance measures for each initiative, including their intended impact on the claims backlog. GAO has recommended that VBA (1) partner with military officials to reduce timeframes to gather records from National Guard and Reserve sources, (2) work with SSA to reduce timeframes to gather SSA medical records, and (3) develop a robust plan for its improvement initiatives that identifies performance goals that include the impact of individual initiatives on processing timeliness. VA generally agreed with our conclusions and concurred with our recommendations, and identified efforts that it has planned or underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-15-44 | gao_GAO-15-44_0 | In addition to a company’s own internal audit department, companies that provide goods and services to the Department of Defense may be audited by DCAA. Required Documentation Is Incomplete for Selected Cases
None of the eight requests for company internal audit reports we selected in a random, nongeneralizable sample contained all documentation required by the NDAA provisions and DCAA’s guidance. Guidance Revisions Define Physical Safeguards for Internal Audit Reports, but Not for Unauthorized Use
In accordance with section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, DCAA revised its contract audit guidance to include language on safeguarding companies’ internal audit reports noting that the act states that the safeguards should prevent the agency from using the reports for purposes other than evaluating and testing (1) the efficacy of internal controls and (2) the reliability of business systems. The revised guidance, for example, outlines physical safeguards such as identifying and protecting companies’ proprietary information as well as assigning responsibility for safeguarding companies’ information. Although DCAA’s revisions acknowledge responsibility to provide physical safeguards, the guidance does not provide examples of authorized use or describe or define unauthorized use. Second, DCAA officials also said they are exploring an electronic storage system to maintain copies of companies’ internal audit reports and related documentation, if provided. However, the revisions to the Contract Audit Manual alone are not sufficient to assure that sharing companies’ internal audit reports is necessary to DCAA’s work and that DCAA will use the reports only in order to evaluate business systems or to assess risk associated with a particular audit. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the process for requesting company internal audit reports, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, DCAA, to take the following two actions: 1. clarify the guidance in the Contract Audit Manual to further define, with examples, the specific details that should be in the requests for company internal audits including how such internal audits are specifically tied to DCAA’s work and provide a definition of authorized use and examples of such use; 2. establish and monitor internal controls for a reporting cut-off date, identifying major contractors, and ensuring information has been reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 required that the Comptroller General review the documentation applicable to the act’s requirement that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) revise its audit guidance to include directions for appropriate documentation of its requests to contractors for their internal audit reports. We assessed (1) the extent to which DCAA’s revised guidance complied with the act and whether selected requests for company internal audit reports were documented in accordance with the requirements, and (2) the extent to which DCAA’s revised guidance contains safeguards to help ensure that internal audit reports obtained from companies are used only for authorized purposes. To address our objectives, we compared the provisions of the act to the revised audit guidance to determine whether the revisions included directions for documenting requests for company internal audits, the connections to DCAA’s work and the company’s responses and safeguards for the internal audits. | Why GAO Did This Study
DCAA audits play a critical role in oversight of companies that provide goods and services to the Department of Defense. These defense companies also conduct their own internal audits. Section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (Pub. L. No.112-239) required DCAA, among other things, to revise its audit guidance on documenting its requests for defense contractors' internal audit reports and ensuring the reports are used only for evaluating and testing the strength of internal audit controls.
The act required GAO to assess the revised guidance. This report assesses the extent to which DCAA's revised guidance (1) complied with the act, and whether selected requests for company internal audit reports were documented in accordance with requirements, and (2) contains safeguards to help ensure that companies' internal audit reports are used only for authorized purposes. GAO compared DCAA's revised guidance to the provisions of the act and examined a nongeneralizable, random sample of eight recent DCAA requests for companies' internal audits.
What GAO Found
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) revised its guidance in the Contract Audit Manual to address the documentation requirements mandated by section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, but implementation has been inconsistent. The revisions include provisions for DCAA auditors to document (1) that access to company internal audit reports is necessary to an ongoing DCAA audit, (2) the request sent to the company, and (3) the company's response. However, based on GAO's review of selected cases, implementing the changes has been inconsistent across the agency. GAO randomly selected eight requests for companies' internal audits and compared them to the mandated requirements and DCAA instructions provided to its auditors as criteria to test whether or not the three documentation requirements had been properly recorded. None of eight cases sampled had complete records for the three required documents. The figure below shows the results of GAO's examination of the eight requests.
DCAA's revised guidance is specific about physical safeguards for companies' internal audit information. For example, the Contract Audit Manual contains extensive guidance for physically securing proprietary information and specifies that the working papers should not include a copy of the companies' internal audit reports. However, the guidance is less specific about safeguards to prevent unauthorized use of internal audit reports; that is, using the reports for purposes other than evaluating the efficacy of internal controls or the reliability of the business systems. In particular, the guidance does not define authorized use, provide examples of authorized use, or identify a specific approach for implementing safeguards. Officials stated that plans for an electronic storage system for safeguarding companies' internal audits from unauthorized use are in process as well as guidance for using them. The planned electronic storage capability would provide limited access rights to companies' internal audit reports and thus help ensure better tracking and limit the potential for unauthorized use.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DCAA clarify its guidance and establish and monitor internal controls to help ensure that requests for company internal audits are fully documented in accordance with the act, and that the guidance defines authorized use. DCAA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-66 | gao_GAO-15-66_0 | Part D Program Integrity
Program integrity responsibilities in Medicare Part D are shared by plan sponsors, CMS’s Center for Program Integrity (CPI) and Center for Medicare, and CMS’s program integrity contractors. CMS’s Oversight
CMS’s CPI oversees Part D program integrity and coordinates with other groups within CMS’s Center for Medicare that monitor plan sponsor compliance with the Part D program. We Identified Multiple Prevention, Detection, and Investigation Practices to Address Prescription Drug Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
We identified a total of 23 practices for addressing prescription drug fraud, waste, and abuse that fall within one or more of the three categories based on the Fraud Prevention Framework: (1) prevention, (2) detection and monitoring, and (3) investigation and prosecution. Investigation and Prosecution
We identified six practices related to the investigation and prosecution of prescription drug fraud, waste, and abuse, as shown in table 3. Practices include having investigative staff knowledgeable of prescription drug schemes and experienced in investigating them, as well as having the ability to take actions to enforce prescription drug rules. CMS, with Its Contractors, Has Implemented Many Program Integrity Practices, Particularly within the Categories of Detection and Monitoring and Investigation and Prosecution
CMS activities to address prescription drug fraud, waste, and abuse reflect 14 of the 23 total practices we identified, based on interviews with officials and review of agency documents. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for comment and HHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II. We determined that CMS had implemented a practice if the agency required or documented at least one activity within that practice, that CMS planned a practice if documentation or officials described activities as pilots or in the process of development, and that CMS was not pursuing practices based on reviews of documentation and interviews with officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent media reports and law enforcement actions have highlighted the problem of prescription drug fraud, waste, and abuse in the United States. Medicare, and the Part D prescription drug benefit, are susceptible to such fraud—a risk made greater by Medicare's size, scope, and complexity. GAO and others have raised questions about CMS's oversight of its activities to address fraud, waste, and abuse in Part D, as well as oversight of the contractors tasked with this work.
GAO examined (1) practices for promoting prescription drug program integrity, and (2) the extent that CMS's oversight of Medicare Part D program integrity, including the program integrity contractors, reflects these practices. To develop a list of practices, GAO interviewed 14 stakeholder groups involved in various aspects of prescription drug program integrity, including provider, beneficiary, and anti-fraud groups; identified and reviewed related documents; and conducted a search of eight bibliographic databases that included peer-reviewed articles and government documents. GAO organized the practices based on the three categories of GAO's Fraud Prevention Framework. To determine how CMS's oversight reflects these practices, GAO analyzed agency documents, such as contracts, manuals, work products, and CMS audits of contractors; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 23 practices for addressing prescription drug fraud, waste, and abuse that fall within three categories based on GAO's Fraud Prevention Framework—prevention, detection and monitoring, and investigation and prosecution.
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) activities to address prescription drug fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare Part D prescription drug program reflect 14 of these 23 identified practices, some of which are in multiple categories, and the agency plans to implement 3 additional practices.
a practice if documentation or officials described activities as pilots or in the process of development, and that CMS was not pursuing a practice based on reviews of documentation and interviews with officials.
HHS generally agreed with our findings. |
gao_T-GGD-98-7 | gao_T-GGD-98-7_0 | Postal Service: Little Progress Made in Addressing Persistent Labor-Management Problems
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the efforts of the Postal Service, the four major labor unions, and the three management associations to improve employee working conditions and overall labor-management relations. Specifically, this report provides information on three topics: (1) the extent to which the Service, the four unions, and the three management associations have progressed in addressing persistent labor-management relations problems since our 1994 report was issued; (2) the implementation of various improvement efforts, referred to in the report as initiatives, some of which were intended to help these eight organizations deal with the problems that we identified in our 1994 report; and (3) approaches that might help the eight organizations improve labor-management relations. which the Service was using a third party to serve as a facilitator in labor-management discussions, which we recommended in our 1994 report. However, little progress has been made in improving persistent labor-management relations problems. Finally, at the time our 1997 report was issued, the Postal Service and the other seven organizations had been unable to convene a labor-management relations summit. The Postmaster General (PMG) proposed the summit over 2 years ago to, among other things, address our recommendation to establish a framework agreement of common goals and approaches that could help postal, union, and management association officials improve labor-management relations and employee working conditions. Recently, according to an FMCS official, a summit occurred on October 29, 1997, that was attended by various officials from the eight organizations, including the Postal Service, the four major unions, and the three management associations. Such meetings can provide the participants a means of working toward reaching agreement on common approaches for addressing labor-management relations problems. Actions to Implement Initiatives Have Been Taken, but Little Information Was Available on Results
September 1996) on Delivery Redesign, have not endorsed the testing of the revised processes. Efforts to continue implementing this initiative were hampered primarily by disagreements among the Service and the other involved participants over how best to use the initiative to help improve the postal work environment. Continued Need to Improve Labor-Management Relations
As discussed in our report, we continue to believe that to sustain and achieve maximum benefits from any improvement efforts, it is important for the Service, the four major unions, and the three management associations to agree on common approaches for addressing labor-management relations problems. In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act provides an opportunity for joint discussions. Under the Results Act, Congress, the Postal Service, its unions, and its management associations as well as other stakeholders with an interest in postal activities can discuss not only the mission and proposed goals for the Postal Service but also the strategies to be used to achieve desired results. Under this proposed legislation, a temporary, presidentially appointed seven-member Postal Employee-Management Commission would be established. We continue to believe that such an agreement is needed to help the Service, the unions, and the management associations reach consensus on the appropriate goals and approaches for dealing with persistent labor-management relations problems and improving the postal work environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its report on the efforts of the Postal Service, the four major labor unions, and the three management associations to improve employee working conditions and overall labor-management relations, focusing on: (1) the extent to which the Postal Service, the four unions, and the three management associations have progressed in addressing persistent labor-management relations problems since GAO's 1994 report was issued; (2) the implementation of various improvement efforts, or initiatives, some of which were intended to help these eight organizations deal with problems identified in the 1994 report; and (3) approaches that might help the eight organizations improve labor-management relations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) little progress has been made in improving persistent labor-management relations problems at the Postal Service since 1994; (2) although the Postal Service, the four major unions, and the three management associations generally agreed that improvements were needed, they have been unable to agree on common approaches to solving such problems; (3) these parties have not been able to implement GAO's recommendation to establish a framework agreement that would outline common goals and strategies to set the stage for improving the postal work environment; (4) in a recent report, GAO described some improvement initiatives that many postal, union, and management association officials believed held promise for making a difference in the labor-management relations climate; (5) despite actions taken to implement such initiatives, little information was available to measure results, as some initiatives: (a) had only recently been piloted or implemented; or (b) were not fully implemented or had been discontinued because postal, union, and management association officials disagreed on the approaches used to implement the initiatives or on their usefulness in making improvements; (6) efforts to resolve persistent labor-management relations problems pose an enormous challenge for the Postal Service and its unions and management associations; (7) with assistance from a third-party facilitator, the Postal Service and leaders from the four unions and the three management associations convened a summit, aimed at providing an opportunity for all the parties to work toward reaching agreement on how best to address persistent labor-management relations problems; (8) another such opportunity involves the strategic plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act, which can provide a foundation for all major postal stakeholders to participate in defining common goals and identifying strategies to be used to achieve these goals; (9) a proposal was included in pending postal reform legislation to establish a presidentially appointed commission that could recommend improvements; (10) GAO continues to believe that it is important for the eight organizations to agree on appropriate strategies for addressing labor-management relations problems; (11) various approaches exist that can be used to help the organizations attain consensus; and (12) without such consensus, the ability to sustain lasting improvements in the postal work environment may be difficult to achieve. |
gao_GAO-06-997T | gao_GAO-06-997T_0 | During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to develop compliant programs that addressed FTA’s requirements. Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. As the program administrator, FTA is responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies
In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. Finally, one state, New York, has given its oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). In the program, oversight agencies are responsible for the following: Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail transit agency responsibilities, providing “guidance to the regulated rail transit properties concerning processes and procedures they must have in place to be in compliance with the State Safety Oversight program.”
Reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security plans and annual reports. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), passed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, including authority to issue security regulations. Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress. Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security
The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and security in their organizations. In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit systems’ safety and security. FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does Not Have the Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security
One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight program’s impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. Although the audits provide detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together information from these audits to provide information on the safety and security of transit systems across the country. A second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that many transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how security issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail transit security. Specifically, officials from 18 of 24 oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they believed additional training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and security oversight. Officials from 10 of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend. Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA’s Emerging Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program
Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail transit. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program, interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country.
What GAO Found
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort. |
gao_GAO-04-1069 | gao_GAO-04-1069_0 | This 2-year eligibility includes those Reserve and National Guard members who have left active duty and returned to their units. DOD Uses Two Approaches to Identify Servicemembers At Risk for PTSD
DOD uses two approaches to identify servicemembers who may be at risk of developing PTSD: the combat stress control program and the post- deployment health assessment questionnaire. DOD uses the post-deployment health assessment questionnaire to screen servicemembers for physical ailments and mental health issues commonly associated with deployments, including PTSD. DOD Trains Servicemembers to Identify Symptoms That Could Lead to PTSD
DOD’s combat stress control program identifies servicemembers at risk for PTSD by training all servicemembers to identify the early onset of combat stress symptoms, which if left untreated, could lead to PTSD. To assist servicemembers in the combat theater, teams of DOD mental health professionals travel to units to reinforce the servicemembers’ knowledge of combat stress symptoms and to help identify those who may be at risk for combat stress or PTSD. The DD 2796 includes the following four screening questions that VA and DOD mental health experts developed to identify servicemembers at risk for PTSD: Have you ever had any experience that was so frightening, horrible, or upsetting that, in the past month, you have had any nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not want to? tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid situations that remind you of it? were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled? VA Lacks Information Needed to Determine Whether It Can Meet an Increase in Demand for PTSD Services
VA does not have all the information it needs to determine whether it can meet an increase in demand for VA PTSD services. VA does not have a count of the total number of veterans currently receiving PTSD services at its medical facilities and Vet Centers. Without this information, VA cannot estimate the number of veterans its medical facilities and Vet Centers could treat for PTSD. However, predicting which veterans will seek VA care and at which facilities is inherently uncertain, particularly given that the symptoms of PTSD may not appear for years. Veterans who are receiving VA PTSD services may be counted in both reports, only counted in the NEPEC report, or not included in either report. By assuming that 15 percent or more of returning servicemembers will eventually develop PTSD, based on the predictions of mental health experts, VA could use the demographic information to broadly estimate the number of returning servicemembers who may need VA PTSD services and the VA facilities located closest to servicemembers’ homes. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help VA estimate the number of additional veterans it could treat for PTSD and to plan for the future demand for VA PTSD services from additional veterans seeking these services, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to determine the total number of veterans receiving VA PTSD services and provide facility-specific information to VA medical facilities and Vet Centers. To determine whether VA facilities have the information needed to determine whether they can meet an increase in demand for PTSD services, we interviewed officials at 7 VA medical facilities, and 15 Vet Centers located near the medical facilities to discuss the number of veterans currently receiving VA PTSD services and the impact that an increase in demand would have on these services. 4. Felt numb or detached from others, activities, or your surroundings? | Why GAO Did This Study
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is caused by an extremely stressful event and can develop after the threat of death or serious injury as in military combat. Experts predict that about 15 percent of servicemembers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan will develop PTSD. Efforts by VA to inform new veterans, including Reserve and National Guard members, about the expanded availability of VA health care services could result in an increased demand for VA PTSD services. GAO identified the approaches DOD uses to identify servicemembers at risk for PTSD and examined if VA has the information it needs to determine whether it can meet an increase in demand for PTSD services. GAO visited military bases and VA facilities, reviewed relevant documents, and interviewed DOD and VA officials to determine how DOD identifies servicemembers at risk for PTSD, and what information VA has to estimate demand for VA PTSD services.
What GAO Found
DOD uses two approaches to identify servicemembers at risk for PTSD: the combat stress control program and the post-deployment health assessment questionnaire. The combat stress control program trains servicemembers to recognize the early onset of combat stress, which can lead to PTSD. Symptoms of combat stress and PTSD include insomnia, nightmares, and difficulties coping with relationships. To assist servicemembers in the combat theater, teams of DOD mental health professionals travel to units to reinforce the servicemembers' knowledge of combat stress symptoms and to help identify those who may be at risk for combat stress and PTSD. DOD also uses the post-deployment health assessment questionnaire to identify physical ailments and mental health issues commonly associated with deployments, including PTSD. The questionnaire includes the following four screening questions that VA and DOD mental health experts developed to identify servicemembers at risk for PTSD: Have you ever had any experience that was so frightening, horrible, or upsetting that, in the past month, you (1) have had any nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not want to; (2) tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid situations that remind you of it; (3) were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled; and/or (4) felt numb or detached from others, activities, or your surroundings? VA lacks the information it needs to determine whether it can meet an increase in demand for VA PTSD services. VA does not have a count of the total number of veterans currently receiving PTSD services at its medical facilities and Vet Centers--community-based VA facilities that offer trauma and readjustment counseling. Without this information, VA cannot estimate the number of new veterans its medical facilities and Vet Centers could treat for PTSD. VA has two reports on the number of veterans it currently treats, with each report counting different subsets of veterans receiving PTSD services. Veterans who are receiving VA PTSD services may be counted in both reports, one of the reports, or not included in either report. VA does receive demographic information from DOD, which includes home addresses of servicemembers that could help VA predict which medical facilities or Vet Centers servicemembers may access for health care. By assuming that 15 percent or more of servicemembers who have left active duty status will develop PTSD, VA could use the home zip codes of servicemembers to broadly estimate the number of servicemembers who may need VA PTSD services and identify the VA facilities located closest to their homes. However, predicting which veterans will seek VA care and at which facilities is inherently uncertain, particularly given that the symptoms of PTSD may not appear for years. |
gao_GAO-17-322 | gao_GAO-17-322_0 | Most Selected MAIS Programs Had Changes in Their Planned Cost or Schedule Estimates, and Half Met Their Technical Performance Targets
The majority of the 18 selected MAIS programs that we reviewed had experienced changes in their planned cost estimates and in their planned schedule estimates when comparing the first acquisition program baseline to the most recent acquisition program baseline estimate. Further, nine of the programs had met all of their technical performance targets, while four of the programs had partially met the performance targets. The remaining five programs had not yet conducted testing activities. In addition, 11 of the 16 programs had experienced cost increases. Among the 11 programs that reported an increase, the average increase was $457.2 million. Two of the Five MAIS Programs Had Not Fully Implemented All Practices for Managing Requirements
Leading requirements management practices include establishing an agreed-upon set of requirements, ensuring traceability between requirements and work products, and managing any changes to the requirements in collaboration with stakeholders. Three of the five programs had fully implemented the requirements management practices, while the other two had partially implemented some practices. Two of the Five MAIS Programs Had Not Fully Implemented All Practices for Managing Risk
According to leading practices, an effective risk management process identifies potential problems before they occur, so that risk-handling activities may be planned and invoked, as needed, across the life of the project in order to mitigate the potential for adverse impacts. Three of the five programs had fully implemented the risk management practices, while two had partially implemented some practices. On the other hand, the program did not define thresholds or bounds for mitigation or management action. Four of the Five MAIS Programs Had Fully Implemented All Practices for Managing Systems Testing and Integration
According to leading practices for managing systems testing and integration activities, roles and responsibilities should be established and test-related plans, schedules, and reports should be developed. Although the program had established roles and responsibilities to manage testing and integration activities, a chief developmental tester to oversee testing activities had not been identified. While a number of leading practices for risk, requirements, and systems testing and integration had been fully or partially implemented by five programs that we reviewed in- depth—the Air Force’s AOC WS Inc 10.2, BITI Wired and JMS Inc 2 programs; and the Army’s GCSS-A Inc 1 and IPPS-A Inc 2 programs— three programs lacked practices to better manage the development of systems. In addition, the program office for AOC-WS Inc 10.2 did not have an overall Risk Mitigation Plan to guide the implementation of individual risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. Unless this position is filled, it will be difficult for the program to effectively manage risks and verify compliance with certain operational requirements throughout the acquisition. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the management of DOD’s MAIS programs, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the program manager for GCSS-A Inc 1 to establish standard operating procedures for managing risks that include guidance for establishing thresholds and bounds for key risk areas. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that we select, assess, and report on Department of Defense’s (DOD) major automated information system (MAIS) programs annually through March 2018. Our objectives were to: (1) describe the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned cost and schedule estimates and met technical performance targets and (2) assess the extent to which selected MAIS programs have used leading IT acquisition practices, including requirements and risk management, and systems testing and integration. The IPPS-A Inc 2 program was still early in development and system performance data was not available. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's MAIS programs include systems that are intended to help the department sustain its key operations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 includes a provision for GAO to select, assess, and report on the department's MAIS programs annually through March 2018. This is GAO's fifth report and (1) describes the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned cost and schedule estimates and met technical performance targets and (2) assesses the extent to which selected MAIS programs have used leading IT acquisition practices, including risk management.
GAO selected and reviewed cost, schedule, and performance data for 18 of DOD's MAIS programs that were non-classified and had an acquisition performance baseline. In addition, GAO performed an in-depth review of 5 of the programs, comparing selected IT management practices used by them to leading practices for requirements and risk management and systems testing and integration. The five selected programs were from at least two military services and had not been assessed by GAO in the past year. GAO also interviewed relevant program officials.
What GAO Found
Most of the 18 selected Department of Defense (DOD) major automated information system (MAIS) programs that GAO reviewed had experienced changes in their planned cost and schedule estimates and half of the programs had met their technical performance targets. Specifically, 16 programs experienced changes in their cost estimates ranging from a 39 percent decrease ($1.47 billion) to a 469 percent increase ($1.63 billion). The average cost increase was $457.2 million among the 11 programs reporting an increase. Fourteen programs experienced schedule delays, which ranged from 2 months to over 13 years. Finally, half of the MAIS programs fully met all of their technical performance targets. Of the remaining nine programs, 4 four had partially met their target because each was still conducting tests. The other five programs were in the early stages of system development and had not begun testing.
In addition, for the five MAIS programs GAO selected for in-depth review, all had either fully or partially applied leading practices for managing requirements, risks, and for conducting systems testing and integration.
Managing requirements. Three of the five programs had fully implemented the practices for managing requirements, while the other two had partially implemented some practices. Leading practices in this area include establishing requirements and ensuring traceability between requirements and work products.
Managing risks. Three of the five programs had fully implemented the risk management practices, while two had partially implemented some practices. An effective risk management process identifies potential problems before they occur. For example, one Army program did not have standard operating procedures for defining thresholds or bounds to manage risk. Unless such procedures are defined, the program will not have the tools needed to define risk management activities, including whether and how certain risks are prioritized. Further, programs should include practices to identify potential problems so that risk-handling activities may be planned and invoked across the project to mitigate the potential for adverse impacts. However, one Air Force program did not develop an overall risk mitigation plan to guide the implementation of individual risk mitigation activities. Without an overall risk plan to guide individual development efforts, those efforts cannot be managed cohesively.
Testing and integration. Four of the five programs had fully implemented practices for systems testing and integration. Programs should, among other activities, establish roles and responsibilities to manage testing and integration activities, including a chief developmental tester to oversee testing activities. However, one Air Force program reported difficulty in hiring a qualified individual to perform these duties. Until this position is filled, the program may not effectively manage risks and verify compliance with system acquisition and operational requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve the management of specific MAIS programs, including establishing procedures for defining risk thresholds, developing an overall risk mitigation plan, and filling a key test management position. DOD concurred with all of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-649 | gao_GAO-17-649_0 | Furthermore, according to CBP officials, the FTZ program aims to encourage companies to maintain and expand their operations in the United States. To encourage such expansion, FTZs provide benefits to companies that import foreign goods for distribution or for incorporation into manufactured products. Companies using FTZs include both warehouse distributors and manufacturers (see fig. Leading industry sectors by value of foreign and domestic goods admitted into FTZs include petroleum refining, vehicles, and consumer electronics. 3. CBP resumes supervision when goods are removed from zones and enter U.S. customs territory or are exported. The FTZ Program Provides a Range of Financial Benefits to FTZ Operators, and Duties Collected from FTZs Increased over the Past 10 Years
The FTZ program provides a range of financial benefits to FTZ operators by allowing them, in certain circumstances, to reduce, eliminate, or defer duty payments on goods manufactured or stored in FTZs. For example, FTZ operators that admit foreign components to manufacture final products for import can pay the duty rate of either the component part or the final product, whichever is lower—resulting in reduced or eliminated duty payments. Indefinite Storage of Goods in FTZs and Duty Deferral
Among FTZ operators we interviewed, those engaged in warehousing and distribution discussed the importance of the ability to store goods in the zone indefinitely and thereby defer duty payments until the goods enter U.S. commerce. FTZs Were Created to Provide Public Benefits, but Little Is Known about Their Economic Impact
While FTZs were created to provide benefits to the American public, little is known about their economic impact. For example, few economic studies have focused on FTZs, and those that have do not quantify economic impacts or address the question of what the economic activity, such as employment, would have been in the absence of companies having FTZ status. CBP’s Methods for Collecting Compliance and Enforcement Information Impair Its Ability to Assess and Respond to Compliance Risks across the FTZ Program
CBP has not assessed compliance risk across the FTZ program, and its methods for collecting compliance and enforcement data impair its ability to assess and respond to program-wide risks. According to federal internal control standards, management should obtain relevant data and assess and respond to identified risks associated with achieving agency goals. CBP Conducts Compliance Reviews of FTZ Operators to Identify Compliance Risks but Does Not Centrally Compile Compliance Reviews and FTZ Enforcement Data
CBP Conducts Compliance Reviews of FTZ Operators to Identify Risks
CBP conducts compliance reviews of individual FTZ operators to ensure compliance with U.S. customs laws, regulations, and CBP policies. Incorrect determinations about risk level may impact program effectiveness and revenue collection for the FTZ program, which accounted for 11 percent of U.S. imports in 2015. Without a program-wide assessment of the frequency and significance of problems identified during compliance reviews, risk levels determined, and enforcement actions taken, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that the FTZ program is at low risk of noncompliance. Centrally compile information from FTZ compliance reviews and associated enforcement actions so that standardized data are available for assessing compliance and internal control risks across the FTZ program. In its comments, CBP concurred with our recommendations and identified actions it intends to take in response to the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the benefits that the Foreign Trade Zones (FTZ) program provides to companies operating FTZs and revenues that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has collected from FTZs, (2) what is known about the economic impact of FTZs on the U.S. and local economies, and (3) CBP’s ability to assess and respond to compliance risks across the FTZ program. We selected five FTZs in Maryland, Texas, and Virginia for site visits based on factors including trade volume, industry sector, and FTZ activity. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FTZ program was established in 1934 to expedite and encourage international trade and commerce. FTZs provide benefits to companies that import foreign goods for distribution or for manufacturing in order to encourage them to maintain and expand their operations in the United States. The total value of foreign and domestic goods admitted to FTZs in 2015 was about $660 billion. CBP is responsible for oversight and enforcement in FTZs, including revenue collection and assessing risk of noncompliance with U.S. laws and regulations.
GAO was asked to review CBP's oversight of FTZs and FTZs' economic impact. This report examines (1) the benefits of the FTZ program to companies operating FTZs and revenues collected from FTZs, (2) what is known about FTZs' economic impact, and (3) CBP's ability to assess and respond to compliance risks across the FTZ program. GAO analyzed CBP documents and data, interviewed agency officials and FTZ operators, and visited five FTZs based on trade volume, industry sector, and FTZ activity.
What GAO Found
The Foreign Trade Zones (FTZ) program provides a range of financial benefits to companies operating FTZs by allowing them to reduce, eliminate, or defer duty payments on goods manufactured or stored in FTZs before they enter U.S. commerce or are exported. FTZs are secure areas located throughout the United States that are treated as outside U.S. customs territory for duty assessments and other customs entry procedures. Companies using FTZs may be warehouse distributors or manufacturers (see figure). A manufacturer, for example, that admits foreign components into the FTZ can pay the duty rate on either the foreign components or the final product, whichever is lower—resulting in reduced or eliminated duty payments. Distributors can also benefit by storing goods in FTZs indefinitely and thereby deferring duty payments until the goods enter U.S. commerce. In 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) collected about $3 billion in duties from FTZs.
While FTZs were created to provide public benefits, little is known about FTZs' economic impact. For example, few economic studies have focused on FTZs, and those that have do not quantify FTZs' economic impacts. In addition, these studies do not address the question of what the economic activity, such as employment, would have been in the absence of companies having FTZ status.
CBP has not assessed compliance risks across the FTZ program, and its methods for collecting compliance and enforcement data impair its ability to assess and respond to program-wide risks. While CBP regularly conducts compliance reviews of individual FTZ operators to ensure compliance with U.S. customs laws and regulations, it does not centrally compile FTZ compliance and enforcement information to analyze and respond to compliance and internal control risks across the program. Federal internal control standards state that management should obtain relevant data and assess and respond to identified risks associated with achieving agency goals. Without a program-wide assessment of the frequency and significance of problems identified during compliance reviews, risk levels determined, and enforcement actions taken, CBP cannot verify its assertion that the FTZ program is at low risk of noncompliance. Incorrect determinations about program risk level may impact program effectiveness and revenue collection for the FTZ program, which accounted for approximately 11 percent of U.S. imports in 2015.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes three recommendations to CBP to strengthen its ability to assess and respond to compliance risks across the FTZ program, including actions to centrally compile FTZ compliance and enforcement data, and to conduct a risk analysis of the FTZ program. CBP concurred with these recommendations and identified steps it will take to address them. |
gao_GAO-13-375 | gao_GAO-13-375_0 | In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS to integrate EAS and other public-alerting systems into a larger, more comprehensive public-alerting system. IPAWS Capabilities Have Improved, but Barriers to Implementation Exist
FEMA has Increased Federal, State, and Local Alerting Capabilities Since 2009
Since we reported on these issues in 2009, FEMA has taken actions to improve IPAWS capabilities. As of January 2012, public-alerting authorities can disseminate CAP-formatted EAS alerts through the alert aggregator to television and radio stations. Starting in April 2012, public-alerting authorities can use IPAWS to transmit alerts via the CMAS interface to disseminate mobile alerts, which are geo-targeted, text-like messages to mobile phones. Internet services. State and local alerting systems. Adopted CAP standard. Barriers Remain to Fully Implementing and Using IPAWS
Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an integrated alerting system, barriers exist that may impede IPAWS implementation at the state and local level. For example, officials in one state said that while they are prepared to use IPAWS, they have not yet integrated their state and local alerting systems with IPAWS, citing a need for additional guidance from FEMA and communication within the state to determine what systems and policies should be put in place to integrate IPAWS with public-alerting systems in the state’s 128 counties and cities. Nevertheless, in the absence of additional FEMA guidance, some states are reluctant to fully implement IPAWS, a reluctance that decreases the capability for an integrated, interoperable, and nationwide alerting system. Most Reporting EAS Participants Received and Retransmitted the Test Alert, but Federal Efforts to Address Identified Weaknesses Are Limited
Results of the Nationwide EAS Test
Our analysis of FCC data found that approximately 82 percent of reporting broadcasters (radio and television) and cable operators received the November 2011 nationwide test alert. As shown in figure 3, the reception of the alert ranged from approximately 6 percent (in Oregon) to 100 percent (in Delaware) among the states. Without a PEP station, broadcasters and cable operators in Oregon were directed to monitor a Portland-based public radio station, which reported receiving poor audio quality of the alert from its designated monitoring source—the National Public Radio satellite network. FCC also reported that poor audio quality of the national-level alert signal resulted in problems ranging from some broadcasters’ receiving a garbled and degraded audio message to others’ receiving a duplicate alert tone that caused equipment to malfunction. Outdated monitoring assignments. Equipment failures. Limited Federal Efforts to Address Identified Issues
At the time of our review, FCC and FEMA had taken limited steps to address problems identified in the nationwide EAS test. According to FEMA officials, the poor audio quality that was experienced during the test is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a dedicated PEP satellite network, but the remaining issues have yet to be resolved. Concerning future tests, FCC rules require a nationwide EAS test to be conducted periodically, but it is uncertain when the next test will occur. Without ongoing, regular nationwide testing of the relay distribution system, there is no assurance the EAS would work should the President need to activate it to communicate with the American people. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that IPAWS is fully functional and capable of distributing alerts through multiple pathways as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take the following four actions: In conjunction with FCC, establish guidance (e.g., procedures, best practices) that will assist participating state and local alerting authorities to fully implement and test IPAWS components and ensure integration and interoperability. In conjunction with FCC, develop and implement a strategy for regularly testing the national-level EAS, including examining the need for a national test code, developing milestones and time frames, improving data collection efforts, and reporting on after-action plans. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, FCC, and the Department of Commerce for their review and comment. In response, DHS concurred with all of the report’s recommendations to improve IPAWS capabilities. The Department of Commerce provided technical comments from its component agency NOAA, and we incorporated them as appropriated. Specifically, the report examines (1) how the capabilities of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) have changed since 2009 and what barriers, if any, are affecting its implementation and (2) the results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts under way to address identified weaknesses. Specifically, we examined FCC’s and FEMA’s preliminary reports on the nationwide EAS test results; FCC orders and rules on EAS; FCC’s website on the nationwide EAS test; FEMA’s EAS Best Practices Guide; and briefing documents from FEMA and NOAA. | Why GAO Did This Study
An effective system to alert the public during emergencies can help reduce property damage and save lives. In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS with the goal of integrating the nation's EAS and other public-alerting systems into a comprehensive alerting system. In 2009, GAO reported on long-standing weaknesses with EAS and FEMA's limited progress in implementing IPAWS. Subsequently, FEMA and FCC conducted the first-ever nationwide EAS test in November 2011. GAO was asked to review recent efforts to implement IPAWS and improve EAS. GAO examined: (1) how IPAWS capabilities have changed since 2009 and what barriers, if any, affect its implementation and (2) results of the nationwide EAS test and federal efforts to address identified weaknesses. GAO reviewed FEMA, FCC, and other documentation, and interviewed industry stakeholders and alerting authorities from six locations that were selected because they have public-alerting systems in addition to EAS and experienced problems during the nationwide EAS test.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken actions to improve the capabilities of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) and to increase federal, state, and local capabilities to alert the public, but barriers remain to fully implementing an integrated system. Specifically, IPAWS has the capability to receive and authenticate Internet-based alerts from federal, state, and local public authorities and disseminate them to the public through multiple systems. For example, since January 2012, publicalerting authorities can disseminate Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages through IPAWS to television and radio stations. Beginning in April 2012, alerting authorities have used IPAWS to transmit alerts via the Commercial Mobile Alert System interface to disseminate text-like messages to mobile phones. FEMA also adopted alert standards and increased coordination efforts with multiple stakeholders. Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an integrated system, state and local alerting authorities we contacted cited a need for more guidance from FEMA on how to integrate and test IPAWS capabilities with their existing alerting systems. For example, an official with a state alerting authority said that additional guidance from FEMA is needed to determine what systems and policies should be put in place before integrating and testing IPAWS with other public alerting systems in the state's 128 counties and cities. In the absence of sufficient guidance from FEMA, states we contacted are reluctant to fully implement IPAWS. This reluctance decreases the capability for an integrated, interoperable, and nationwide alerting system.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required all EAS participants (e.g., broadcast radio and television, cable operators, satellite radio and television service providers, and wireline video-service providers) to submit a report to FCC by December 27, 2011, on the results of the nationwide EAS test. As of January 2013, 61 percent of broadcasters and cable operators had submitted the required report. Of those, 82 percent reported receiving the nationwide test alert, and 61 percent reported successfully retransmitting the alert to other stations, as required. Broadcasters' and cable operators' reception of the alert varied by state, from 6 percent in Oregon to 100 percent in Delaware. Key reasons for reception or retransmission difficulties included poor audio quality, outdated broadcaster-monitoring assignments, and equipment failure. For example, poor audio quality of the test alert resulted in some broadcasters' receiving a garbled and degraded audio message and others' receiving a duplicate alert that caused equipment to malfunction. According to FEMA officials, the poor audio quality is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a dedicated satellite network that will become fully operational by fall 2013. However, at the time of our review, FEMA and FCC had taken few steps to address other problems identified in the nationwide test. Furthermore, while FCC rules call for periodic nationwide EAS testing, it is uncertain when the next test will occur. Without a strategy for regular nationwide testing of the relay distribution system, including developing milestones and timeframes and reporting on after-action plans, there is no assurance that EAS would work as intended should the President need to activate it to communicate with the American people.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA work in conjunction with FCC to establish guidance for states to fully implement and test IPAWS components and implement a strategy for regular nationwide EAS testing. In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided examples of actions aimed at addressing the recommendations. DHS, FCC, and the Department of Commerce also provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-RCED-99-71 | gao_T-RCED-99-71_0 | As the electric utility industry is deregulated, operating and maintenance costs will affect the competitiveness of nuclear power plants. NRC Has Not Resolved Many Issues Needed to Implement a Risk-Informed Regulatory Approach
NRC staff estimate that it could take 4 to 8 years to implement a risk-informed regulatory approach and are working to resolve many issues to ensure that the new approach does not endanger public health and safety. Although NRC has issued guidance for utilities to use risk assessments to meet regulatory requirements for specific activities and has undertaken many activities to implement a risk-informed approach, more is needed to ensure that utilities have current and accurate documentation on the design of the plant and structures, systems, and components within it and final safety analysis reports that reflect changes to the design and other analyses conducted after NRC issued the operating license. Furthermore, NRC has not developed a comprehensive strategy that would move its regulation of nuclear plant safety from its traditional approach to an approach that considers risk. Utilities Do Not Have Accurate and Reliable Design Information for Some Plants
Design information provides one of the basis for NRC’s safety regulation. Yet, neither NRC nor the industry has a standard or guidance that defines the quality, scope, or adequacy of risk assessments. NRC Has Not Determined Whether Compliance With Risk-Informed Regulations Would Be Mandatory or Voluntary
NRC has not determined whether compliance with revised risk-informed regulations would be mandatory or voluntary for utilities. In December 1998, NRC’s staff provided its recommendations to the Commission. Rather, NRC has developed an implementation plan, in conjunction with its policy statement on considering risk, that is a catalog of about 150 separate tasks and milestones for their completion. Although NRC’s implementation plan sets out tasks and expected completion dates, it does not ensure that short-term efforts are building toward NRC’s longer-term goals; does not link the various ongoing initiatives; does not help the agency determine appropriate staff levels, training, skills, and technology needed and the timing of those activities to implement a risk-informed approach; does not provide a link between the day-to-day activities of program managers and staff and the objectives set out in the policy statement; and does not address the manner in which it would establish baseline information about the plants to assess the safety impact of a risk-informed approach. The Status of NRC’s Assessment and Enforcement Processes: Many Unanswered Issues Remain
For many years, the nuclear industry and public interest groups have criticized NRC’s plant assessment and enforcement processes because they lacked objectivity, consistency, and predictability. In January 1999, NRC proposed a new process to assess overall plant performance based on generic and plant-specific safety thresholds and performance indicators. Beginning in June 1999, NRC expects to pilot test the use of risk-informed performance indicators at eight plants, by January 2000 to fully implement the process, and by June 2001 to complete an evaluation and propose any adjustments or modifications needed. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
In January 1999, we provided the Congress with our views on the major management challenges that NRC faces. We believe that the management challenges we identified have limited NRC’s effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the actions the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken to move from its traditional regulatory approach to an approach that considers risk in conjunction with engineering analyses and operating experience-termed risk-informed regulation, focusing on the: (1) issues that NRC needs to resolve to implement a risk-informed regulatory approach; (2) status of NRC's efforts to make two of its oversight programs--overall plant safety assessments and enforcement-risk-informed; and (3) major management challenges that NRC faces.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since July 1998, NRC has accelerated some activities needed to implement a risk-informed regulatory approach and has established and set milestones for others; (2) however, NRC has not resolved the most basic of issues; (3) that is, that some utilities do not have current and accurate design information for their nuclear power plants, which is needed for a risk-informed approach; (4) also, neither NRC nor the nuclear utility industry have standards or guidance that define the quality or adequacy of the risk assessments that utilities use to identify and measure the risks to public health and the environment; (5) furthermore, NRC has not determined if compliance with risk-informed regulations will be voluntary or mandatory for the nuclear utility industry; (6) more fundamentally, NRC has not developed a comprehensive strategy that would move its regulation of the safety of nuclear power plants from its traditional approach to an approach that considers risk; (7) in January 1999, NRC released for comment a proposed process to assess the overall safety of nuclear power plants; (8) the process would establish generic and plant-specific safety thresholds and indicators to help NRC assess overall plant safety; (9) NRC expects to phase in the new process over the next 2 years and evaluate it by June 2001, at which time NRC would propose any adjustments or modifications needed; (10) in addition, NRC has been examining the changes needed to its enforcement program to make it consistent with, among other things, the proposed plant safety assessment process; (11) for many years, the nuclear industry and public interest groups have criticized the enforcement program as subjective; (12) in the spring of 1999, NRC staff expect to provide the Commission recommendations for revising the enforcement program; (13) in January 1999, GAO identified major management challenges that limit NRC's effectiveness; (14) the challenges include the lack of a definition of safety and lack of aggressiveness in requiring utilities to comply with safety regulations; and (15) NRC's revised plant safety assessment and enforcement initiatives may ultimately help the agency address these management challenges and carry out its safety mission more effectively and efficiently. |
gao_GAO-05-479 | gao_GAO-05-479_0 | FAR Provides Governmentwide Policies, and Agencies Make Specific Exclusion Decisions
The FAR prescribes general policies governing the circumstances under which contractors may be excluded from federal contracting, requires agencies to establish a process for determining exclusions, and allows agencies the flexibility to supplement the FAR to implement the process. To initiate a debarment, an agency must have evidence of conviction or civil judgment for certain offenses, a preponderance of evidence that the party has committed certain offenses, such as serious failure to perform to the terms of a contract, or any other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the contractor’s present responsibility. Table 2 shows specific actions reported by the six agencies we reviewed during fiscal year 2004. Agency officials said that reaching administrative agreements with contractors can serve the government’s interest by improving contractor responsibility, ensuring compliance through monitoring the requirements of the agreement, and maintaining competition among contractors. While administrative agreements provide an alternative to exclusion, agencies can continue to do business with excluded contractors in limited circumstances through the use of waivers by making a determination that there is a compelling reason to award a contract to an excluded party. In fiscal year 2004, the Air Force issued one waiver for sole- source reasons, and the Army issued four waivers based on urgent need. Further, information on administrative agreements and compelling reason waivers is not routinely shared among agencies or captured centrally in a database such as EPLS. For the 6 agencies we reviewed in depth, about 99 percent of records in the EPLS database as of November 2004 did not have DUNS contractor identification numbers. To ensure that excluded contractors do not unintentionally receive new contracts during the period of exclusion, the FAR and NCR require contracting officers and awarding officials to consult EPLS and identify any competing contractors that have been suspended or debarred. Because EPLS lacks unique identifiers for most of the cases for the six agencies we reviewed in depth, contracting officers use the competing contractor’s name to search the system to determine whether a prospective contractor has been excluded from doing business with the federal government. Recommendations
To improve the effectiveness of the suspension and debarment process, we are making two recommendations that the Administrator of General Services modify the EPLS database to require contractor identification numbers for all actions entered into the system and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget require agencies to collect and report data on administrative agreements and compelling reason determinations to the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee and ensure that these data are available to all suspension and debarment officials. We selected GSA because of its central role in federal procurement and in maintaining the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS). Together, these agencies accounted for about 67 percent of fiscal year 2003 federal contract spending, as reported in the FPDS. To describe the general guidance on the suspension and debarment process and how selected agencies have implemented the process, we examined the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Nonprocurement Common Rule (NCR), and the regulations and guidance of the 24 agencies that have issued supplements to the FAR governing suspension and debarment procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal government purchases of contracted goods and services have grown to more than $300 billion annually. To protect the government's interests, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides that agencies can suspend or debar contractors for causes affecting present responsibility--such as serious failure to perform to the terms of a contract. The FAR provides flexibility to agencies in developing a suspension or debarment process. GAO was asked to (1) describe the general guidance on the suspension and debarment process and how selected agencies have implemented the process, and (2) identify any needed improvements in the suspension and debarment process. We examined the FAR and the regulations of 24 agencies that have FAR supplements governing suspension and debarment procedures. We selected 6 defense and civilian agencies representing about 67 percent of fiscal year 2003 federal contract spending for in-depth review.
What GAO Found
The FAR prescribes policies governing the circumstances under which contractors may be suspended or debarred, the standards of evidence that apply to exclusions, and the usual length of these exclusions. To implement these policies, 24 agencies developed FAR supplementation. In fiscal year 2004, the 6 agencies we reviewed in depth suspended a total of 262 parties and debarred a total of 590 parties. Five agencies entered into a total of 38 administrative agreements, which permit contractors that meet certain agency-imposed requirements to remain eligible for new contracts. Agency officials said that such agreements can help improve contractor responsibility, ensure compliance through monitoring, and maintain competition. In certain circumstances, agencies can continue to do business with excluded contractors, such as when there is a compelling need for an excluded contractor's service or product. In fiscal year 2004, two of the agencies we reviewed in depth--the Air Force and the Army--issued compelling reason waivers to continue doing business with excluded parties. To help ensure excluded contractors do not unintentionally receive new contracts during the period of exclusion, the FAR requires contracting officers to consult the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS)--a governmentwide database on exclusions--and identify any competing contractors that have been suspended or debarred. However, the data in EPLS may be insufficient for this purpose. For example, as of November 2004, about 99 percent of records in EPLS for the 6 agencies we reviewed in depth did not have contractor identification numbers--a unique identifier that enables agencies to conclude confidently whether a contractor has been excluded. In the absence of these numbers, agencies use the company's name to search EPLS, which may not identify an excluded contractor if the contractor's name has changed. Further, information on administrative agreements and compelling reason determinations is not routinely shared among agencies. Such information could help agencies in their exclusion decisions and promote greater transparency and accountability. |
gao_RCED-99-20 | gao_RCED-99-20_0 | This three-meal allowance is a change in the program made by the Welfare Reform Act. Number and Characteristics of Sponsors Participating in and Dropping Out of the Program Since the Reimbursements Were Reduced
Since the reduced reimbursements went into effect in 1997, the number of sponsors participating in the program has increased by 8 percent overall. Of those sponsors leaving the program, fewer than 10 percent left in each of the 2 years, and of these sponsors, few left because of the rate reduction, according to state officials. In both years, a small percentage of the sponsors provided most of the meals. Few Sponsors Left Because of the Reduced Reimbursements
After the first year’s experience with the reduced reimbursements, both USDA and some state officials expressed concern that more sponsors would drop out of the program in the future than did in 1997 because of the reduced rates. Some Children Lost Access to the Program
Despite the overall increase in the number of children served between 1996 and 1997, some children lost access to program benefits because the sponsors serving them dropped out, and the children were not served by other sponsors. Other children may have lost access when continuing sponsors reduced the number of sites they operated because of the rate reduction. The Number of Meals Served Increased Slightly
The number of meals served by sponsors increased by over 2 percent—from over 125 million meals in fiscal year 1996 to over 128 million meals in 1997—the year after the reimbursements were reduced. Nevertheless, more sponsors reported operating costs that exceeded their reimbursements in 1997 than in 1996. The limited impact on the number of sponsors, children, and meals served that has been observed to date is due in part to sponsors’ continuing to contribute funds to offset the decreased reimbursements. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Because of questions raised about the impact that the reduction in the meal reimbursement rate might have had on the Summer Food Service Program, the Chairman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce asked us to report on (1) the number and characteristics of sponsors participating in and dropping out of the program before and after the decrease in reimbursements, (2) the number of children and meals served by the program before and after the reduction, and (3) the changes sponsors made to their program as a result of the reduced reimbursements. We conducted in-depth, in-person interviews with these sponsors to determine the changes they had made to their programs in response to rate reductions. Information on the Dropout Rates for Various Types of Sponsors in Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997
This appendix provides information for 1996 and 1997 on the total number of sponsors and the percent of sponsors that dropped out of the program in terms of the (1) number of children served, (2) number of meals served, and (3) type of sponsor. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Summer Food Service Program and the impacts the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 had on the program, focusing on the: (1) number and characteristics of sponsors participating in and dropping out of the program before and after the decrease in the reimbursements; (2) number of children and meals served by the program before and after the reduction; and (3) changes sponsors made to their programs as a result of the reduced reimbursements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the reduction in meal reimbursements that resulted from the 1996 Welfare Reform Act had a minimal impact on the number and characteristics of the sponsors of the Summer Food Service Program; (2) since the reduction went into effect in 1997, the number of sponsors participating in the program increased by 8 percent overall, from 3,753 to 4,046; (3) the characteristics of the sponsors providing meals remained about the same between 1996 and 1997; (4) in both years, a relatively small percentage of sponsors--5 percent--served most of the children in the program; (5) most sponsors continued to be schools and camps; (6) in terms of the sponsors that dropped out after the welfare reform changes, fewer than 10 percent left the program in each of the 2 years since the reduced reimbursements have been in effect; (7) however, only a small percentage of these dropouts left because of the reduction, according to officials in the 50 states; (8) after the reduced reimbursements were mandated, USDA and some states took actions to maintain the level of participation of sponsors and children; (9) the number of children and meals served in fiscal year (FY) 1997 was greater than in previous years; (10) the total number of children participating in the program increased by over 2 percent after the reimbursements were reduced, to almost 2.3 million, in 1997; (11) the number of meals served rose by 2 percent, to over 128 million, despite a new restriction on the number of meals for which some sponsors could receive reimbursements; (12) state officials identified a small number of sponsors that left the program because of the reduced reimbursements; (13) over 820 children lost access to the program in FY 1997 because sponsors that had served them in 1996 did not participate in 1997 as a result of the reduction, and no other sponsor was available; (14) at least 780 children lost access in FY 1998; (15) other children may have lost access when continuing sponsors reduced the number of sites they operated because of the rate reduction; (16) in response to the reduced meal reimbursements, some sponsors reported making changes to their program operations; (17) even with the changes, more sponsors reported that their operating costs exceeded the amount they received in federal reimbursements in FY 1997 than in 1996; and (18) the limited impact on the number of sponsors, children, and meals served that has been observed to date is due in part to sponsors' continuing to contribute funds to offset the decreased reimbursements. |
gao_HEHS-97-1 | gao_HEHS-97-1_0 | DI and SSI Beneficiaries Due for CDRs Have Similar Characteristics
The DI and SSI programs have about 4.3 million beneficiaries due or overdue for a CDR in fiscal year 1996. SSA Primarily Selects Beneficiaries for CDRs on the Basis of the Likelihood Their Benefits Will Be Terminated
SSA does not include in its selection process all DI and SSI beneficiaries. First, SSA plans to obtain Medicare and Medicaid data and integrate the data into the statistical formulas to increase the validity of the estimated likelihood of benefit termination. Incorporating Additional Required CDRs Into Its Plan and Implementing Process Improvements Are Among the Challenges SSA Must Address
In the past year, new legislation has increased authorized funding for CDRs to about $3 billion by 2002, but has also required CDRs for some SSI beneficiaries for whom the reviews were previously elective. However, others believe that it could create a large backlog of disability claims when those who are terminated because of the time limit reapply for benefits. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Social Security
We recommend that, to the extent SSA is authorized to act, the Commissioner of SSA replace the routine scheduling for CDRs of all who receive DI and SSI program benefits with a more cost-effective process that would (1) select for review beneficiaries with the greatest potential for medical improvement and subsequent benefit termination, (2) correct a weakness in SSA’s CDR process by conducting CDRs on a random sample from all other beneficiaries, and (3) help ensure program integrity by instituting contact with beneficiaries not selected for CDRs. For the sample of SSI beneficiaries, we obtained information on characteristics from SSA’s Supplemental Security Income Record Description (SSIRD) and OD’s CDR database. Calculation of number of beneficiaries expected to be dropped from the programs Beneficiaries due or overdue for CDRs in fiscal year 1996 Less: planned financial eligibility redeterminations for those who are not receiving a CDR Beneficiaries not contacted during the year Multiplied by: percentage of beneficiaries who fail to cooperate Total beneficiaries expected to be dropped from the program Per-beneficiary savings and offsetting costs Gross savings to DI trust fund/SSI program Gross savings to Medicare/federal portion of Medicaid Less: offsetting costs of additional food stamps Net savings per beneficiary dropped from the program Total estimated savings to the federal government Net program savings (number of beneficiaries dropped multiplied by net savings per beneficiary)
Less: cost of sending scannable mailer (number of beneficiaries contacted at $25)
Total estimated net savings from proposed initiative (combined total = $1,477,236,040)
How SSA Conducts Continuing Disability Reviews
This appendix provides details on SSA’s procedures for conducting CDRs. Not available. 2. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how to improve the Social Security Administration's (SSA) continuing disability reviews (CDR) process for Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries, focusing on: (1) the number and characteristics of individuals who are due for CDR; (2) how SSA selects individuals for and conducts CDR; (3) whether available resources are adequate for conducting required CDR; and (4) potential options for improving the CDR process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) about 4.3 million DI and SSI beneficiaries are due or overdue for CDR in fiscal year 1996; (2) SSA selects beneficiaries for CDR on the basis of the likelihood that their benefits will be terminated; (3) SSA plans to improve its CDR selection process by obtaining Medicare and Medicaid data and mailing questionnaires to beneficiaries' physicians; (4) funding for CDR could exceed $4 billion by 2002; (5) SSA must incorporate additional CDR required by legislation into the agency's workload and conduct CDR for beneficiaries whose CDR were previously done at the agency's discretion; (6) SSA should conduct CDR on a random sample of beneficiaries normally excluded from the selection process to improve program integrity; (7) SSA proposal for time-limited benefits may increase the agency's workload when beneficiaries who are terminated from the program reapply for benefits; (8) the formula used by SSA to select beneficiaries for CDR excludes approximately half of those who are due or overdue for CDR; and (9) SSA could utilize CDR to strengthen its return-to-work initiatives. |
gao_GAO-09-288 | gao_GAO-09-288_0 | The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new technology. The Army will be challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary to warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone review. Actual demonstrations (versus modeling and simulation) of the FCS concept, including its critical survivability aspects, have been limited to date; demonstrated network performance is particularly limited with many key questions yet to be answered. Table 1 illustrates both the actual progress the Army has made maturing FCS critical technologies and projected progress through the production decision. While full details are not yet available, the Army is considering plans to request additional funds for FCS beyond the current cost estimate of $159 billion. This tension seems only likely to worsen, as indications are that FCS costs are about to increase again at the same time competition for funds—both between near-term and far-term needs within DOD and between defense and other needs within the federal government—is intensifying. On several scores, the current FCS program falls short. Its acquisition strategy is more schedule-driven than it is knowledge–based and is unlikely to be executable, with a significant amount of development and demonstration yet to be completed. While an incremental approach is generally preferable, it would represent the fourth different strategy for the FCS program that DOD and the Congress will be asked to evaluate and oversee. By the time of that decision, in fiscal 2013, the Army plans to have invested about $12 billion in FCS procurement funds and more than $50 billion for FCS overall. A final version of that sensor will not be available until February 2010. These include: establishment of configuration steering boards that are tasked to review all requirements changes and any significant technical configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and schedule impacts to the program; a post-preliminary design review assessment to be conducted where the results of the PDR and the program manager’s assessment are considered to determine whether remedial action is necessary to achieve the program’s objectives; a critical design review, which is an opportunity to assess design maturity by measures such as completion of subsystem critical design reviews, the percentage of software and hardware product specifications and drawings completed, planned corrective actions to hardware and software deficiencies; adequate developmental testing, the maturity of critical manufacturing processes, and an estimate of system reliability based on demonstrated reliability rates; a post-critical design review, which assesses the program manager’s report on the critical design review to determine whether the program can meet its approved objectives or if adjustments should be made; and before production, a demonstration that the system meets requirements in its intended environment using a production- representative article, manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot line environment, and industrial capabilities are reasonably available. At this point, there are at least three programmatic directions, or some combination thereof, that DOD could take at the milestone review to shape investments in combat systems for the Army, each of which presents challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the investment program that emerges from the 2009 milestone review be conformed with current DOD acquisition policy, particularly regarding technology maturity, critical design reviews, and demonstrating production-representative prototypes before making production commitments; direct the Secretary of the Army to convene, following the preliminary design reviews and in time to inform the 2009 FCS milestone review, an FCS Configuration Steering Board to provide assistance in formulating acceptable trade-offs to bridge the gaps between the FCS requirements and the system designs; ensure that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first increments are justifiable on their own as worthwhile capabilities that are not dependent on future increments for their value, particularly regarding the order in which the information network and individual manned ground vehicles will be developed; ensure that FCS systems to be spun out to current forces have been successfully tested in production-representative form before they are approved for initial production; and reassess the appropriate role of the LSI in the FCS program, particularly regarding its involvement in production. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Future Combat System (FCS) program is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. By law, GAO is to report annually on the FCS program. Also, law requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to hold a milestone review of the FCS program, now planned for 2009. This report addresses (1) what knowledge will likely be available in key areas for the review, and (2) the challenges that lie ahead following the review. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analysis, attended demonstrations and design reviews, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009 milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical technologies are not currently at a minimum acceptable level of maturity. Neither has it been demonstrated that emerging FCS system designs can meet specific requirements or mitigate associated technical risks. Actual demonstrations of FCS hardware and software--versus modeling and simulation results--have been limited, with only small scale warfighting concepts and limited prototypes demonstrated. Network performance is also largely unproven. These deficiencies do not necessarily represent problems that could have been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual immaturity of the program. Finally, there is an existing tension between program costs and available funds that seems only likely to worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase at the same time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and far-term needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies. DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be executed within the current $159 billion cost estimate and calls for significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to begin advancing procurement funds for FCS core systems before most prototype deliveries, critical design review, and key system tests have taken place. By the 2013 production decision, Congress will have been asked for over $50 billion in funding for FCS. Second, the program to spin out early FCS capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive schedule centered on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some surrogate systems and preliminary designs instead of fully developed items, with little time for evaluation of results. Third, the Army is currently considering an incremental FCS strategy--this is to develop and field capabilities in stages versus in one step. Such an approach is generally preferable, but would present decision makers with a third major change in FCS strategy to consider anew. While details are yet unavailable, it is important that each increment be justified by itself and not be dependent on future increments. |
gao_GAO-14-694 | gao_GAO-14-694_0 | Timeline of Key Events
PPACA required the establishment of marketplaces in each state by January 2014. Oversight Weaknesses and Lack of Adherence to Planning Requirements Compounded Acquisition Planning Challenges
CMS undertook the development of Healthcare.gov and its related systems without effective planning or oversight practices, despite facing a number of challenges that increased both the level of risk and the need for oversight. According to CMS program and contracting officials, the task of developing a first-of-its-kind federal marketplace was a complex effort that was exacerbated by compressed time frames and changing requirements. However, CMS did not use information available to provide oversight, such as quality assurance surveillance plans. As a result, key systems began development with risks that were not fully identified and assessed. Changing Requirements and Oversight Gaps Contributed to Significant Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Reduced Capabilities during FFM and Data Hub Development
CMS incurred significant cost increases, schedule slips, and reduced system functionality in the development of the FFM and data hub systems—primarily attributable to new and changing requirements exacerbated by inconsistent contract oversight. From September 2011 to February 2014, estimated costs for developing the FFM increased from an initial obligation of $56 million to more than $209 million; similarly, data hub costs increased from an obligation of $30 million to almost $85 million. In addition, required design and readiness governance reviews were either delayed or held without complete information and CMS did not receive required approvals. As a result, CMS launched the FFM system without the required verification that it met performance requirements. Moreover, CMS contract and program staff inconsistently used and reviewed contract deliverables on performance to inform oversight. In April and November 2013, CMS provided written concerns to CGI Federal regarding its responsiveness to CMS’s direction and FFM product quality issues. Ultimately, CMS declined to pay only about $267,000 of requested fee. This represented about 2 percent of the $12.5 million in fee paid to CGI Federal. This work also has experienced cost increases due to new requirements and other enhancements, with costs increasing to over $175 million as of June 2014. By early September 2013, CMS program officials told us that they became so concerned about the contractor’s performance that CMS program staff moved their operations to CGI Federal’s location in Herndon, Virginia to provide on-site direction leading up to the FFM launch. CMS Took Some Actions to Hold the FFM Contractor Accountable after the Healthcare.gov Launch
After the Healthcare.gov launch on October 1, 2013, CMS contracting officials began preparing a new letter detailing their concerns regarding contractor performance which was sent to CGI Federal in November 2013. CMS’s letter also requested that CGI Federal provide a plan to address these issues. pays the contractor’s allowable costs, plus an additional fee that was negotiated at the time of award. CMS chose to proceed with pursuing the deadline. Unless CMS takes action to improve acquisition oversight, adhere to a structured governance process, and enhance other aspects of contract management, significant risks remain that upcoming open enrollment periods could encounter challenges going forward. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the management of ongoing efforts to develop the federal marketplace, we recommend that the Secretary for Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to take the following five actions:
Take immediate steps to assess the causes of continued FFM cost growth and delayed system functionality and develop a mitigation plan designed to ensure timely and successful system performance. Provide direction to program and contracting staff about the requirement to create acquisition strategies and develop a process to ensure that acquisition strategies are completed when required and address factors such as requirements, contract type, and acquisition risks. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines selected contracts and task orders central to the development and launch of the Healthcare.gov website by assessing (1) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) acquisition planning activities; (2) CMS oversight of cost, schedule, and system capability changes; and (3) actions taken by CMS to identify and address contractor performance issues. Specifically, we selected the task orders issued to CGI Federal Inc. (CGI Federal) for the development of the federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) system and to QSSI, Inc. QSSI for the development of the federal data services hub (data hub) in September 2011—and the contract awarded to Accenture Federal Services in January 2014 to continue FFM development and enhance existing functionality. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required the establishment of health insurance marketplaces by January 1, 2014. Marketplaces permit individuals to compare and select insurance plans offered by private insurers. For states that elected not to establish a marketplace, CMS was responsible for developing a federal marketplace. In September 2011, CMS contracted for the development of the FFM, which is accessed through Healthcare.gov.
When initial enrollment began on October 1, 2013, many users encountered challenges accessing and using the website. GAO was asked to examine various issues surrounding the launch of the Healthcare.gov website. Several GAO reviews are ongoing.
This report assesses, for selected contracts, (1) CMS acquisition planning activities; (2) CMS oversight of cost, schedule, and system capability changes; and (3) CMS actions to address contractor performance. GAO selected two task orders and one contract that accounted for 40 percent of CMS spending and were central to the website. For each, GAO reviewed contract documents and interviewed CMS program and contract officials as well as contractors.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) undertook the development of Healthcare.gov and its related systems without effective planning or oversight practices, despite facing a number of challenges that increased both the level of risk and the need for effective oversight. CMS officials explained that the task of developing a first-of-its-kind federal marketplace was a complex effort with compressed time frames. To be expedient, CMS issued task orders to develop the federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) and federal data services hub (data hub) systems when key technical requirements were unknown, including the number and composition of states to be supported and, importantly, the number of potential enrollees. CMS used cost-reimbursement contracts, which created additional risk because CMS is required to pay the contractor's allowable costs regardless of whether the system is completed. CMS program staff also adopted an incremental information technology development approach that was new to CMS. Further, CMS did not develop a required acquisition strategy to identify risks and document mitigation strategies and did not use available information, such as quality assurance plans, to monitor performance and inform oversight.
CMS incurred significant cost increases, schedule slips, and delayed system functionality for the FFM and data hub systems due primarily to changing requirements that were exacerbated by oversight gaps. From September 2011 to February 2014, FFM obligations increased from $56 million to more than $209 million. Similarly, data hub obligations increased from $30 million to nearly $85 million. Because of unclear guidance and inconsistent oversight, there was confusion about who had the authority to approve contractor requests to expend funds for additional work. New requirements and changing CMS decisions also led to delays and wasted contractor efforts. Moreover, CMS delayed key governance reviews, moving an assessment of FFM readiness from March to September 2013—just weeks before the launch—and did not receive required approvals. As a result, CMS launched Healthcare.gov without verification that it met performance requirements.
Late in the development process, CMS identified major performance issues with the FFM contractor but took only limited steps to hold the contractor accountable. In April and November 2013, CMS provided written concerns to the contractor about product quality and responsiveness to CMS direction. In September 2013, CMS program officials became so concerned about the contractor's performance that they moved operations to the FFM contractor's offices to provide on-site direction. At the time, CMS chose to forego actions, such as withholding the payment of fee, in order to focus on meeting the website launch date. Ultimately, CMS declined to pay about $267,000 in requested fee. This represents about 2 percent of the $12.5 million in fees paid to the FFM contractor. CMS awarded a new contract to another firm for $91 million in January 2014 to continue FFM development. As of June 2014, costs on the contract had increased to over $175 million due to changes such as new requirements and other enhancements, while key FFM capabilities remained unavailable. CMS needs a mitigation plan to address these issues. Unless CMS improves contract management and adheres to a structured governance process, significant risks remain that upcoming open enrollment periods could encounter challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take immediate actions to assess increasing contract costs and ensure that acquisition strategies are completed and oversight tools are used as required, among other actions. CMS concurred with four recommendations and partially concurred with one. |
gao_GAO-07-1255T | gao_GAO-07-1255T_0 | The general rules governing procurement are set out in federal procurement statutes and in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). § 644) to require that all federal agencies with procurement authority establish an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization. This office is responsible for helping oversee the agency’s functions and duties related to the awarding of contracts and subcontracts to small and disadvantaged businesses. Agencies Awarded Varied Amounts of Contracting Dollars to Small Businesses, but Information on Subcontracting Plans Was Incomplete
Our March 2007 report identified the extent to which DHS, GSA, DOD, and the Corps awarded contracts directly to small businesses; the extent to which different types of small businesses received contracts; and the extent to which small businesses located in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana received contracts for Katrina-related projects. Small Businesses Received Varied Amounts of the Contracting Dollars That DHS, GSA, DOD, and the Corps Awarded
We found that small businesses received 28 percent of the $11 billion that DHS, GSA, DOD, and the Corps awarded directly for Katrina-related projects, but the percentages varied among the four agencies (see fig. 1). 2). First, primarily with respect to DHS and GSA contract actions, the official procurement data system had no information at all on whether the agencies required subcontracting plans for 70 percent or more of their contracting funds. This database should have contained information on whether the agencies required subcontracting plans in these instances. Furthermore, the lack of transparency surrounding much of the agencies’ subcontracting data—missing information on plans when contracts appear to meet the criteria for having them—may lead to unwarranted perceptions about how the federal procurement system is working, particularly in terms of the government’s stated preference for contracting with small businesses. To ensure compliance with federal contracting regulations and more transparently disclose the availability of subcontracting opportunities for small businesses, we recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense and the Administrator of General Services issue guidance reinforcing, among other things, the necessity for documenting in publicly available sources the agencies’ contracting decisions, particularly in instances when the agencies decided not to require subcontracting plans. The agencies generally agreed with our recommendations, and GSA has already implemented them. DOD and DHS officials have stated that they are working on implementing these recommendations. Some Agencies May Not Be Maximizing Their Advocacy Roles
SBA has governmentwide responsibilities for advocating that federal agencies use small businesses as prime contractors, and that prime contractors give small businesses opportunities to participate as subcontractors in federal contracts awarded to large businesses. Each federal agency that has procurement authority is required to have an OSDBU. The Small Business Act requires that OSDBU directors be responsible to and report only to agency heads or their deputy. However, none of the legal arguments that the agencies raised caused us to revise our conclusions or recommendations. Because the OSDBU directors at agencies that do not comply with this provision of the Act do not have a direct reporting relationship with their agencies’ head or deputy, the reporting relationships potentially limit their role as effective advocates for small and disadvantaged businesses. Ongoing Work to Evaluate SBA and OSDBU Advocacy Efforts
At your request, we have ongoing work evaluating the efforts of SBA and, to some extent, OSDBUs within federal agencies, to advocate on behalf of small disadvantaged businesses and those in SBA’s 8(a) business development program. Specifically, it will include assessment of the actions SBA takes to encourage that prime contracting goals for small disadvantaged businesses are met; the extent to which such goals have been met; whether federal agencies are having difficulty awarding contracts to 8(a) firms; and SBA’s efforts to advocate that small disadvantaged businesses have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate as subcontractors for prime federal contracts. In our evaluation, we also plan to assess actions by selected agency OSDBUs in serving as advocates for 8(a) firms. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's long-standing policy has been to use its buying power to maximize procurement opportunities for various types of small businesses. GAO initiated work and completed a report in March 2007 under the Comptroller General's authority describing the extent to which small businesses participated in contracting opportunities related to Hurricane Katrina. This testimony discusses (1) results from the March 2007 GAO report, including the amounts that small and local businesses received directly from federal agencies from contracts related to Hurricane Katrina and the lack of required information in official procurement data systems on subcontracting plans, (2) information from two previous GAO reports regarding the small business advocacy responsibilities of Small Business Administration (SBA) and federal agencies that award contracts, and (3) GAO work on SBA's efforts to advocate for small disadvantaged businesses, and similar efforts by entities within selected agencies. In conducting the studies discussed in this testimony, GAO analyzed agency contract data, reviewed federal acquisition regulations, and interviewed agency procurement officials; we also sent a questionnaire to agency officials regarding Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) reporting relationships; reviewed organizational charts and other pertinent information; analyzed relevant laws, legislative history, and court cases; and, updated information on agency actions on our recommendations.
What GAO Found
Small businesses received 28 percent of the $11 billion in contracts that Department of Homeland Security (DHS), General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Defense (DOD), and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) awarded directly for Katrina-related projects. Information on whether DHS and GSA required subcontracting plans was generally not available in the federal government's official procurement database for 70 percent or more of the contracting dollars each agency awarded for activities related to Hurricane Katrina. This database should have contained information on whether or not the agencies required subcontracting plans in these instances. The lack of transparency surrounding much of the agencies' subcontracting data may lead to unwarranted perceptions about how the federal procurement system is working, particularly in terms of the government's stated preference for contracting with small businesses. GAO recommended in its March 2007 report that DHS, GSA, and DOD take steps designed to ensure compliance with federal contracting regulations and more transparently disclose the extent to which subcontracting opportunities are available to small businesses. These agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. GSA has implemented them while DOD and DHS indicate they are in the process of doing so. SBA has governmentwide responsibilities for advocating that federal agencies use small businesses as prime contractors for federal contracts and set goals for and encourage the use of small businesses as subcontractors to large businesses receiving federal contracts. Similarly, within each federal agency there is an OSDBU that plays an advocacy role by overseeing the agency's duties related to contracts and subcontracts with small and disadvantaged businesses. The Small Business Act requires that the OSDBU director be responsible to and report only to agency heads or their deputies. In 2003, GAO reported that 11 of 24 agencies reviewed did not comply with this provision. While most of the agencies disagreed with our conclusion, none of the legal arguments that they raised changed GAO's recommendations. Because the OSDBU directors at these agencies do not have a direct reporting relationship with their agencies' heads or deputies, the reporting relationships potentially limit their role as effective advocates for small and disadvantaged businesses. GAO is presently evaluating SBA's and agency OSDBUs' advocacy efforts. This evaluation includes an assessment of the actions SBA takes to advocate that small disadvantaged businesses receive opportunities to participate as subcontractors under federal prime contracts and encourage that prime contracting goals for these businesses are met. Also, the evaluation addresses selected OSDBUs' actions to advocate for certain small business firms. |
gao_NSIAD-96-44 | gao_NSIAD-96-44_0 | The services are also responsible for ensuring that these simulations are able to function within the JSIMS’ domain. DOD’s Expenditures on the ALSP Confederation May Not Be Cost-Effective
Concurrent with the development of JSIMS, DOD has decided to make improvements to the ALSP Confederation, the last of which is expected to be in place in 1999—at the same time that JSIMS should reach initial operational capability. We identified about $40 million that DOD plans to spend for ALSP Confederation improvements through fiscal year 1999. As is the case with JSIMS, there is no central funding line for the ALSP Confederation improvements. Consequently, management of the improvements has been fragmented and it is questionable whether the improvement plan is cost-effective. DOD said that it could not substantiate the $40 million we identified that the services are planning to spend on ALSP improvements. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether DOD is progressing with its development of JSIMS, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, Washington, D.C.; the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.; the Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia; the JSIMS Joint Program Office, Orlando, Florida; and the services’ modeling and simulation management offices in Washington, D.C. Comments From the Department of Defense
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) development of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS), focusing on whether DOD: (1) is progressing with its development of JSIMS; and (2) decisions to improve the Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP) Confederation are cost-effective.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) JSIMS has not progressed beyond the conceptual stage due to internal disagreements within DOD; (2) further JSIMS development is contingent on the availability of about $416 million in funding; (3) DOD plans to spend at least $40 million through 1999 to improve ALSP before replacing it with JSIMS, but it is unclear whether that approach is cost-effective; (4) funding availability depends on how the services prioritize their contributions to JSIMS and ALSP; (5) the cost of ALSP improvements could increase because the planned improvements are service-specific and there is also no ALSP Central Funding; and (6) management of ALSP improvements is fragmented because DOD is not ensuring that the services will complete them and that the improvements are cost-effective. |
gao_GGD-97-165 | gao_GGD-97-165_0 | Scope and Methodology
In order to determine whether agencies used appropriate authorities and followed procedures in providing career appointments to former political appointees and legislative branch employees during the period January 1, 1996, through March 31, 1997, we first identified such cases. To determine whether proper procedures were followed in the 36 cases, we examined the steps taken in the application and appointment process. We did not independently determine whether the 36 employees were qualified for the positions to which they were appointed. From our review of the various documents that were related to the appointments (such as vacancy announcements, resumes, and official notifications of personnel actions) and our discussions with pertinent agency officials, we determined that the agencies met the requirements of the 7 appointment authorities and that they used the authorities properly in making the 36 appointments. We did note, however, that in 3 of the 36 appointments, although the appropriate appointment authorities were used, the reference citations on the effecting documents were incorrect. Personnel officials from the employing agencies stated that the incorrect citations were due to administrative error and that corrections would be made. The three appointments did not involve circumstances that, in our opinion, could give the appearance of favoritism or preferential treatment. On the basis of these comparisons, it appeared that the agencies followed proper procedures in making the 36 appointments. Circumstances Surrounding Six Appointments Could Give the Appearance of Favoritism or Preferential Treatment
Although records in OPFs and merit staffing files indicated that agencies used proper appointing authorities and procedures for all 36 appointments, in our opinion, 6 appointments involved circumstances that could lead to the appearance that the individuals received favoritism or preferences that enhanced their prospects for the appointments. The remaining 30 appointments did not raise comparable questions of the appearance of favoritism or preference. One of the applicants was the political appointee. 31, 1997)
Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary)
Comments From the Office of Personnel Management
Appointment Authorities Used in the 36 Appointments We Reviewed
Merit staffing plans of each agency An individual must (1) serve for at least 3 years in the legislative branch and be paid by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives; (2) be involuntarily separated without prejudice from the legislative branch; (3) pass a suitable noncompetitive examination (i.e., be qualified for the position being sought); and (4) transfer to the career position within 1 year of being separated from the legislative branch. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the appointments of 36 former political appointees and legislative branch employees to positions in the executive branch between January 1996 and March 1997, focusing on whether: (1) appropriate authorities were used and proper procedures were followed in appointing former political appointees and legislative branch employees; and (2) the circumstances surrounding any of the appointments gave the appearance of favoritism or preferential treatment in the appointment process, even if proper procedures were followed. GAO did not independently determine whether the 36 employees were qualified for the positions to which they were appointed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of GAO's review of relevant personnel files and documents and discussions with agency officials, GAO believes the 18 agencies that provided career appointments to the 36 former political appointees and legislative branch employees used the appropriate appointment authority to hire each of them and followed proper procedures in making the appointments; (2) although the apropriate appointment authorities were used, the reference citations on the effecting documents for 3 of the 36 appointments were incorrect; (3) personnel officials from the employing agencies stated that the incorrect citations were due to administrative error and that corrections would be made; (4) the three appointments did not involve circumstances that, in GAO's opinion, could give the appearance of favoritism or preferential treatment; (5) however, notwithstanding use of the appropriate authority and proper procedures, the circumstances surrounding six of the appointments could, in GAO's opinion, give the appearance that the appointees had received favoritism or preferences that enhanced the appointees' prospects of appointment; (6) for example, in two cases, the vacancy announcements for the positions to be filled, which outlined the qualifications (e.g., work experience) that the agencies were seeking from applicants, appeared tailored to include specific work experiences possessed by the two appointees; (7) under such circumstances, one would expect these applicants to fare very well in the qualifications review portion of the appointment process, which they did; and (8) the remaining 30 appointments did not raise comparable questions of the appearance of favoritism or preference. |
gao_GGD-99-70 | gao_GGD-99-70_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) identify the percentage of offenders who were ordered to pay fines or restitution in fiscal year 1997 and those who were not, (2) identify differences across judicial circuits and districts in the percent of offenders who were ordered to pay fines or restitution and those who were not, and (3) provide officials’ opinions about possible reasons for those differences. In performing our analysis, we first considered all federal offenders and how the likelihood of being ordered to pay fines or restitution was affected by selected demographic characteristics of the offenders (sex, race, citizenship, education, and number of dependents); the type of offense they committed (whether it involved property, drugs, firearms, fraud, immigration, a violent or other offense); characteristics of the offender’s sentence (whether it occurred before or after MVRA was enacted, whether the offender was sentenced to prison, probation, or an alternative sentence imposed, and whether there was more than a single count of conviction); and the circuit and district in which the sentencing occurred. Percent of Federal Offenders Ordered to Pay Fines or Restitution by Judicial Circuit or District
The percent of federal offenders sentenced that were ordered to pay fines and restitution varied substantially across the 12 federal circuits. Differences Among the Judicial Circuits and Districts in Ordering Fines or Restitution
While many factors influence whether an offender was ordered to pay a fine or restitution, the judicial circuit or district where the offender was sentenced was a major factor. We then performed a multivariate statistical analysis for offenders sentenced for four types of offenses— robbery, larceny, fraud, and drug trafficking—and controlled for such things, among others, as offender characteristics, type of crime committed, length of sentence, and type of sentence imposed such as prison, probation, or an alternative. We asked court officials and prosecutors in seven districts for possible explanations of why these differences might exist. While 6 percent of immigration offenders were ordered to pay a fine, almost one-third of property offenders were likewise ordered. Figures 4 and 5 show the percentage of offenders who were ordered to pay fines or restitution, by type of offense. Overall, for offenders sentenced during fiscal year 1997, 26 percent of offenders who were sentenced under the USSC Guidelines for crimes committed before MVRA went into effect were ordered to pay restitution, compared with 12 percent who were sentenced for crimes committed after MVRA went into effect (See table I.1 in app. Table I.2 shows that the percentages of offenders ordered to pay fines ranged from 7 percent to 42 percent, while the percentages of offenders ordered to pay restitution across the 12 circuits ranged from 15 percent to 32 percent. Table I.3 shows that across the 94 districts, the percentages of offenders ordered to pay fines and restitution ranged from 1 percent to 84 percent, and 3 percent to 49 percent, respectively. The odds on being ordered to pay a fine or restitution for a particular category of offender were obtained by simply dividing the number of offenders who were ordered to pay a fine or restitution by the number of offenders who were not ordered to pay. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on federal offenders who were ordered to pay criminal fines and victim restitution, focusing on: (1) the percentage of offenders who were ordered to pay fines or restitution in fiscal year (FY) 1997 and those who were not; (2) differences across judicial circuits and districts in the percent of offenders who were ordered to pay fines or restitution and those who were not; and (3) officials' opinions about possible reasons for those differences.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while many factors influenced whether an offender was ordered to pay a fine or restitution, the judicial circuit or district where the offender was sentenced was a major factor during fiscal year (FY) 1997; (2) most of the approximately 48,000 federal offenders sentenced under United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines in FY 1997 were not ordered by the courts to pay a fine or restitution; (3) the percentage of offenders who were ordered to pay fines or restitution varied greatly across the 12 federal judicial circuits and 94 federal judicial districts; (4) across districts, the percentage of offenders who were ordered to pay fines ranged from 1 percent to 84 percent, and the percentage of the offenders who were ordered to pay restitution ranged from 3 percent to 49 percent; (5) an important factor in determining whether an offender was ordered to pay a fine or restitution was the type of offense committed; (6) while 6 percent of offenders sentenced for immigration offenses were ordered to pay a fine, almost one-third of property offenders were ordered to pay; (7) besides the type of offense committed, other factors that were associated with whether an offender was ordered to pay included factors such as sex, race, education, citizenship, length of sentence, and type of sentence imposed, such as prison, probation, or an alternative; (8) even after controlling for all of these factors for four specific types of offenses in GAO's multivariate statistical analyses, the judicial circuit or district in which the offender was sentenced continued to be a major factor in determining whether an offender was ordered to pay a fine or restitution; (9) some court officials and prosecutors provided explanations of why differences existed among the districts; (10) some attributed the differences to the nature and type of offenses committed or types of offenders sentenced in the districts; (11) some officials believed that the culture in the judicial district among the prosecutors and court officials contributed to whether offenders were fined or ordered to pay restitution; and (12) since the imposition of restitution for certain offenses became mandatory with the passage of Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), the percentage of offenders, overall, who were ordered to pay restitution during FY 1997 actually declined from 26 percent of offenders sentenced for crimes committed before April 24, 1996, to 12 percent of offenders sentenced for crimes committed on or after April 24, 1996, when MVRA became effective. |
gao_GAO-08-810T | gao_GAO-08-810T_0 | Currently, the IRIS database contains assessments of more than 540 chemicals. While the process used to develop IRIS chemical assessments includes numerous individual steps or activities, major assessment steps include (1) a review of the scientific literature; (2) preparation of a draft IRIS assessment; (3) internal EPA reviews of draft assessments; (4) two OMB/interagency reviews, managed by OMB, that provide input from OMB as well as from other federal agencies, including those that may be affected by the IRIS assessments if they lead to regulatory or other actions; (5) an independent peer review conducted by a panel of experts; and (6) the completion of a final assessment that is posted to the IRIS Web site. Findings and Recommendations from Our March 2008 Report on the Productivity and Credibility of EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System
The IRIS database is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency has not been able to routinely complete timely, credible assessments or decrease a backlog of 70 ongoing assessments. In addition, the changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering at the time of our review would have added to the already unacceptable level of delays in completing IRIS assessments and further limited the credibility of the assessments. Several key factors have contributed to EPA’s inability to achieve a level of productivity that is needed to sustain the IRIS program and database: new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies; the growing complexity and scope of risk assessments; certain EPA management decisions and issues, including delaying completion of some assessments to await new research or to develop enhanced analyses of uncertainty in the assessments; and the compounding effect of delays. These time frames are problematic because of the substantial rework such cases often require to take into account changing science and methodologies before they can be completed. In addition, the OMB/interagency reviews have hindered EPA’s ability to independently manage its IRIS assessments. For example, without communicating its rationale for doing so, OMB directed EPA to terminate five IRIS assessments that for the first time addressed acute, rather than chronic exposure—even though EPA initiated this type of assessment to help it implement the Clean Air Act. These additional process steps, which would have lengthened assessment times considerably, include giving federal agencies and the public 45 days to identify additional information on a chemical for EPA’s consideration in its assessment or to correct any errors on an additional assessment draft that would provide qualitative information; giving potentially affected federal agencies 30 days to review the public comments EPA received and initiate a meeting with EPA if they want to discuss a particular set of comments; allowing potentially affected federal agencies to have assessments suspended for up to 18 months to fill a data gap or eliminate an uncertainty factor that EPA plans to use in its assessment; and allowing other federal agencies to weigh in on (1) the level of independent peer review that would be sought (that is, whether the peer reviews would be conducted by EPA Science Advisory Board panels, National Academies’ panels, or panels organized by an EPA contractor); (2) the areas of scientific expertise needed on the panel; and (3) the scope of the peer reviews and the specific issues they would address. Actions that are key to this ability include ensuring that EPA can (1) determine the types of assessments it needs to support EPA programs and (2) define the appropriate role of external federal agencies in EPA’s IRIS assessment process, and (3) manage an interagency review process in a manner that enhances the quality, transparency, timeliness, and credibility of IRIS assessments. Key Aspects of the Revised IRIS Assessment Process Implemented in April 2008 Which Is Not Responsive to GAO’s Recommendations
On April 10, 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process, effective immediately. Overall, EPA’s revised process is not responsive to the recommendations made in our March 2008 report—it is largely the same as the draft proposed process we evaluated in our March 2008 report (see app. Moreover, changes EPA did incorporate into the final process are likely to further exacerbate the productivity and credibility issues we identified in our report. However, EPA’s revised process institutionalizes a process that the agency estimates will take up to 6 years to complete. Given the importance and sensitivity of IRIS assessments, we believe it is critical that input from all parties, particularly agencies that may be affected by the outcome of IRIS assessments, be publicly available. However, under the new IRIS assessment process, EPA has further introduced policy considerations into the IRIS assessment process. In fact, it will exacerbate the problems we identified in our March 2008 report and sought to address with our recommendations—all of which were aimed at preserving the viability of this critical database, which is integral to EPA’s mission of protecting the public and the environment from exposure to toxic chemicals. This series of delays has limited EPA’s ability to conduct its mission. Appendix IV: EPA’s IRIS Assessment Process as of April 10, 2008
No, it is not mission critical. critical? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) contains EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals. Toxicity assessments in the IRIS database constitute the first two critical steps of the risk assessment process, which in turn, provides the foundation for risk management decisions. Thus, IRIS is a critical component of EPA's capacity to support scientifically sound environmental decisions, policies, and regulations. This testimony discusses (1) highlights of GAO's March 2008 report, Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA's Integrated Risk Information System, and (2) key aspects of EPA's revised IRIS assessment process, released on April 10, 2008. For the March 2008 report, GAO reviewed and analyzed EPA data and interviewed officials at relevant agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For this testimony, GAO supplemented the prior audit work with a review of EPA's revised IRIS assessment process announced on April 10, 2008.
What GAO Found
In its March 2008 report, GAO concluded that the IRIS database is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because EPA has not been able to routinely complete timely, credible assessments or decrease its backlog of 70 ongoing assessments--a total of 4 were completed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In addition, recent assessment process changes, as well as other changes EPA was considering at the time of GAO's review, further reduce the timeliness and credibility of IRIS assessments. EPA's efforts to finalize assessments have been thwarted by a combination of factors, including two new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies; EPA management decisions, such as delaying some assessments to await new research; and the compounding effect of delays-even one delay can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated. The two new OMB/interagency reviews of draft assessments involve other federal agencies in EPA's IRIS assessment process in a manner that limits the credibility of IRIS assessments and hinders EPA's ability to manage them. For example, the OMB/interagency reviews lack transparency, and OMB required EPA to terminate five assessments EPA had initiated to help it implement the Clean Air Act. The changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering, but had not yet issued at the time of our review, would have added to the already unacceptable level of delays in completing IRIS assessments and further limited the credibility of the assessments. On April 10, 2008, EPA issued its revised IRIS assessment process, effective immediately. In its February 2008 comments on GAO's draft report, EPA said it would consider the report's recommendations, which were aimed at streamlining the process and better ensuring that EPA has the ability to develop transparent, credible assessments. However, EPA's new process is largely the same as the draft GAO evaluated, and some key changes are likely to further exacerbate the productivity and credibility concerns GAO identified. For example, while the draft process would have made comments from other federal agencies on IRIS assessments part of the public record, EPA's new process expressly defines such comments as "deliberative" and excludes them from the public record. GAO continues to believe that it is critical that input from all parties--particularly agencies that may be affected by the outcome of IRIS assessments--be publicly available. In addition, the estimated time frames under the new process, especially for chemicals of key concern, will likely perpetuate the cycle of delays to which the majority of ongoing assessments have been subject. Instead of significantly streamlining the process, which GAO recommended, EPA has institutionalized a process that from the outset is estimated to take 6 to 8 years to complete. This is problematic because of the substantial rework such cases often require to take into account changing science and methodologies. Since EPA's new process is not responsive to GAO's recommendations, the viability of this critical database has been further jeopardized. |
gao_GAO-15-521 | gao_GAO-15-521_0 | Specifically, CBP’s data indicate that Border Patrol transferred 99 percent of such UAC whom agents apprehended from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, and OFO transferred about 93 percent of such UAC apprehended at land POEs from fiscal years 2012 through Further, officials at 13 of the CBP facilities and land POEs we 2014.visited stated that non-Mexican UAC are always transferred to HHS, indicating that the officials were aware of the policy. Second, although CBP repatriated most Mexican UAC under the age of 14 from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, we found that Border Patrol agents did not consistently document the basis for their decisions, as required. Our analysis of a random sample of 180 Border Patrol case files of UAC apprehended in fiscal year 2014 showed that agents did not document the rationales for their conclusions related to UAC’s independent decision-making ability. We analyzed a random sample of 180 Form 93s for Mexican UAC apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal year 2014. CBP and ICE Have Developed Policies That Are Consistent with UAC Care Requirements, but Could Improve Data Collection, Interagency Coordination, and Repatriation Efforts
CBP and ICE Policies Generally Reflect Care Requirements for UAC, and CBP Follows These Policies in Practice
CBP and ICE have policies in place to implement the Flores Agreement and care for UAC, and CBP generally follows these policies. However, other organizations have reported on inconsistent compliance with the requirements for UAC care. DHS Does Not Collect Complete or Reliable Data on Care of UAC or Their Time in the Department’s Custody
Within DHS, CBP and ICE have not collected complete or reliable data documenting (1) the care provided to UAC while in DHS custody and (2) the length of time UAC are in DHS custody. Documentation of care provided to UAC. For example, data showed the following:
Agents documented 14 of the 20 care actions for less than half of the 55,844 UAC (the remaining 6 actions were documented for more than 50 percent of the UAC). Interagency Process to Refer and Transfer UAC from DHS to HHS Shelters Is Inefficient and Does Not Have Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. UAC referral and placement process relies on e-mails and manual data entry. However, DHS and HHS do not have a documented interagency process that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each DHS component and ORR for UAC referrals and placements during normal operations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that DHS complies with TVPRA requirements for training, screening, and transferring UAC to HHS, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take the following six actions: develop and implement TVPRA training for OFO officers at airports who have substantive contact with UAC; revise the Form 93 to include indicators or questions that agents and officers should ask UAC to better assess (1) a child’s ability to make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States and (2) credible evidence of the child’s risk of being trafficked if returned to his or her country of nationality or last habitual residence; provide guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers that clarifies how they are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Mexican UAC who have fear of returning to Mexico owing to a credible fear of persecution; develop and implement guidance on how Border Patrol agents and OFO officers are to implement the TVPRA requirement to transfer to HHS all Canadian and Mexican UAC who are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons; ensure that Border Patrol agents document the basis for their decisions when assessing screening criteria related to (1) an unaccompanied alien child’s ability to make an independent decision to withdraw his or her application for admission to the United States, and (2) whether UAC are victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons; and determine which agents and officers who have substantive contact with UAC, complete the annual UAC training, and ensure that they do so, as required. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the (1) extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that all unaccompanied alien children (UAC) are screened as required and (2) DHS and the Department of State (State) developed and implemented policies and procedures to ensure that UAC are cared for as required while in DHS custody and during repatriation; and (3) costs associated with apprehending, transporting, and caring for UAC in DHS and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) custody during fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Because neither Border Patrol nor OFO has complete information on screening decisions in its database stored in an aggregate manner, we analyzed fiscal year 2014 case files of Mexican UAC Border Patrol apprehended. On the basis of our observations and interviews, we determined that CBP had implemented its care policies at these facilities if at least 80 percent of the facilities we visited were generally providing care consistent with policy requirements at the time of our visits. Appendix III: Summary Statistics for Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2014
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations (OFO), and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) apprehend, process, detain, and temporarily care for unaccompanied alien children (UAC)—individuals less than 18 years old with no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical custody. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, DHS apprehended more than 200,000 UAC, and the number of UAC apprehended in fiscal year 2014 (about 74,000) was more than four times larger than that for fiscal year 2011 (about 17,000). On the journey to the United States, many UAC have traveled thousands of miles under dangerous conditions.
The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 included a provision for GAO to, among other things, review how DHS cares for UAC. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which DHS has developed policies and procedures to (1) screen all UAC as required and (2) care for all UAC as required. GAO reviewed TVPRA and other legal requirements, DHS policies for screening and caring for UAC, fiscal year 2009 through 2014 apprehension data on UAC, and 2014 Border Patrol UAC care data. GAO also randomly sampled and analyzed case files of Mexican UAC whom Border Patrol apprehended in fiscal year 2014. GAO interviewed DHS and HHS officials in Washington, D.C., and at Border Patrol and OFO facilities in Arizona, California, and Texas selected on the basis of UAC apprehension data.
What GAO Found
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has issued policies and procedures to evaluate, or screen, unaccompanied alien children (UAC)—those under 18 years old with no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical custody—as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA). However, CBP's Border Patrol agents and Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers who screen UAC have not consistently applied the required screening criteria or documented the rationales for decisions resulting from screening. Specifically, under TVPRA, DHS is to transfer UAC to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), but may allow UAC from Canada and Mexico to return to their home countries, that is, to be repatriated, if DHS determines that UAC (1) are not victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons, (2) are not at risk of trafficking upon return, (3) do not have a fear of returning due to a credible fear of persecution, and (4) are able to make an independent decision about returning. GAO found that agents made inconsistent screening decisions, had varying levels of awareness about how they were to assess certain screening criteria, and did not consistently document the rationales for their decisions. For example, CBP policy states that UAC under age 14 are presumed generally unable to make an independent decision, but GAO's analysis of CBP data and a random sample of case files from fiscal year 2014 found that CBP repatriated about 93 percent of Mexican UAC under age 14 from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 without documenting the basis for decisions. Providing guidance on how CBP agents and officers are to assess against UAC screening criteria could better position CBP to meet legal screening requirements, and ensuring that agents document the rationales for decisions would better position CBP to review the appropriateness of these decisions.
DHS has policies in place to implement UAC care requirements, such as providing meals, and GAO's observations and interviews at 15 CBP facilities indicate that CBP generally provided care consistent with these policies at the time of GAO's visits. However, DHS does not collect complete and reliable data on care provided to UAC or the length of time UAC are in DHS custody. GAO analyzed available data on care provided to nearly 56,000 UAC apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal year 2014 and found that agents documented 14 of 20 possible care actions for fewer than half of the UAC (the remaining 6 actions were documented for more than 50 percent of the UAC). Also, OFO has a database to record UAC care, but officers at most ports of entry do not do so. Developing and implementing processes to help ensure agents and officers record UAC care actions would provide greater assurance that DHS is meeting its care and custody requirements. Further, the interagency process to refer and transfer UAC from DHS to HHS is inefficient and vulnerable to errors because it relies on e-mails and manual data entry, and documented standard procedures, including defined roles and responsibilities, do not exist. DHS and HHS have experienced errors, such as assigning a child to two shelters at once, and holding an empty bed for 14 days at a shelter while HHS officials had placed the child elsewhere. Jointly developing a documented interagency process with defined roles and responsibilities could better position DHS and HHS to have a more efficient and effective process to refer, transfer, and place UAC in shelters.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS, among other things, provide guidance on how agents and officers are to apply UAC screening criteria, ensure that screening decisions are documented, develop processes to record reliable data on UAC care, and document the interagency process to transfer UAC from DHS to HHS. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-386 | gao_GAO-12-386_0 | In turn, the civilian agencies can free up resources to send civilian personnel to teach or attend courses at Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). As one expert explained, designing a rotation so that it is a “win-win” for the individual participants and organizations involved is critical to its success. Based on our analysis of program documents, interviews with program officials, and responses to our survey of program participants and supervisors, we found that State’s POLAD and other rotation programs and Army’s CGSC Interagency Fellowship program incorporated or partially incorporated most of the policies and practices that can help achieve collaboration-related results. However, without regular feedback on the rotations from participants and their host agency supervisors, the agency may be missing opportunities to identify and address potential challenges to the effectiveness of these rotations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of the POLAD program as a tool to facilitate interagency collaboration on national security, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of the Coordinator of the Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) Program to take the following action:
Expand the scope of current efforts by routinely evaluating the effectiveness of the program to determine if desired results are being achieved for participating individuals and agencies, to identify and build on areas of strength, and to identify areas for improvement. State generally agreed with our recommendations. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand how to effectively design and implement interagency rotation programs, this report addresses the following research objectives: (1) identify desirable collaboration-related results of interagency rotation programs in terms of individual competencies and organizational results; (2) identify policies and practices that help interagency rotation programs achieve collaboration-related results; and (3) determine the extent to which interagency rotation programs we identified in our previous report, were viewed as effective and incorporated those policies and practices. Agency officials provided, among other things, their perspectives on policies and practices that can either promote or challenge the effectiveness of interagency rotation programs in improving interagency collaboration. National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to Improve Interagency Collaboration. Human Capital: A Guide for Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal government personnel must be able to collaborate across agencies to meet complex 21st century national security challenges. GAO found in a prior report that interagency rotations are a type of professional development activity that can help improve interagency collaboration. However, government officials, policy researchers, human capital experts, and others cite many challenges to successful rotation programs.
To understand how interagency rotation programs can be designed to address these challenges, GAO was asked to (1) identify desirable collaboration-related program results; (2) identify policies and practices that help rotation programs achieve those results; and (3) determine the extent to which three rotation programs were viewed as effective and incorporated those policies and practices.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the literature; reviewed rotation program documents; surveyed program participants and their supervisors; and interviewed human resources experts, agency human resources practitioners, and program officials.
What GAO Found
Effective interagency rotational assignments can achieve collaboration-related resultssuch as developing participants collaboration skills and building interagency networksbut programs must be a win-win for the individuals and organizations involved in order to be effective.
GAO found policies and practices that help interagency rotation programs achieve collaboration-related results as indicated in the figure below. The policies and practices addressed challenges to participation, and included incentives, preparation, and feedback.
Most participants and host supervisors of States Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) program, States other interagency rotations, and the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Interagency Fellowship reported that their programs were effective in contributing to improved collaboration among agencies with national security responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of State and Defense to direct State and Army Command and General Staff College officials to build on successful efforts by establishing program evaluation processes, among other actions. Officials from both agencies reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-450 | gao_GAO-14-450_0 | Operators Extol New Assets’ Performance Compared to Aging Counterparts, but These Assets Have Yet to Meet All Key Requirements
The Coast Guard’s new asset classes that we reviewed—the National Security Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, HC-144, and the C4ISR information technology system—are generally demonstrating improved mission performance over the assets they are replacing, according to Coast Guard officials who operate these assets. DHS and the Coast Guard approved both assets for full-rate production noting planned improvements, but DHS and Coast Guard acquisition guidance is not clear as to when a program needs to meet minimum performance standards. However, neither asset met all key requirements during initial operational testing. For example, DHS and Coast Guard guidance provide that the Coast Guard should determine if the capability meets the established minimum performance standards, but do not specify when this determination should be made. The Navy also examined the extent to which the Fast Response Cutter meets key requirements. The Coast Guard initially planned to test the C4ISR system separately from the operational testing of its planes and vessels, such as the HC-144 and Fast Response Cutter. Cost Increases Are Consuming Funding and Affordability Issues Have Not Been Addressed or Accurately Represented
As acquisition program costs increase across the portfolio, consuming significant amounts of funding, the Coast Guard is farther from fielding its planned fleet today than it was in 2009, in terms of the money needed to finish these programs. In 2009, we found that the Coast Guard needed $18.2 billion to field its original baseline, but it now needs $20.7 billion to finish fielding these same assets. The law does not require the Coast Guard to include total cost of its projects at planned funding levels. Future Capabilities Uncertain as Coast Guard Makes Annual Budget Decisions; Alternatives Could Improve Outlook
The Coast Guard is repeatedly delaying and reducing its capability through its annual budget process, but does not know the extent to which its mission needs can be tailored and still achieve desired results. The Coast Guard does not have a long term plan that demonstrates how it will maintain today’s service level and meet identified needs. Thus, the Coast Guard does not know what capability it will be able to provide and whether or not this capability will meet mission needs. The Coast Guard has no method in The Coast Guard’s acquisition guidance supports using a long range capital planning framework. As a result, the Navy has some knowledge of its future funding challenges. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure that it receives accurate information on the full effect of funding decisions on acquisition programs, Congress should consider amending the law that governs the 5-year Capital Investment Plan to require the Coast Guard to submit cost and schedule information that reflects the impact of the annual President’s budget request on each acquisition across the portfolio—in addition to the current practice of reporting the cost and schedule estimates in current program baselines. To help the Coast Guard improve the long-term outlook of its portfolio, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following action:
Develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources necessary to build the identified assets. In its comments, DHS concurred with all of our recommendations. Additional scope and methodology information on each objective of this report follows. To assess how selected assets are performing operationally and to what extent they are achieving desired performance levels in testing, we selected key assets that are being used in operations that were a part of the original 2007 baseline—the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (HC-144), Fast Response Cutter, National Security Cutter, and the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems—and reviewed test reports and operational data for these assets. To determine the current cost of the Coast Guard’s acquisition portfolio as well as plans to fund its assets, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s budget and capital investment plan and identified the programs that are currently in its acquisition portfolio. To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard is experiencing capability gaps, if any, given known affordability issues, we assessed the Coast Guard’s performance targets and compared these targets with acquisition plans. GAO-13-321. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard is managing a multi-billion dollar effort to modernize aging assets, including ships, aircraft, and information technology to provide new capabilities to conduct missions ranging from marine safety to defense readiness. GAO has reviewed the Coast Guard's acquisitions since 2001 and has found it faces challenges managing its portfolio. In 2007, the Coast Guard established a cost baseline of $24.2 billion for 13 assets. GAO was asked to examine the Coast Guard's current and planned acquisition portfolio.
This report assesses: (1) operational performance and testing of selected assets; (2) the current cost of the Coast Guard's portfolio and funding plans; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard is experiencing capability gaps, if any, given known affordability issues. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed the operational performance and test reports for all 4 newly fielded assets that the Coast Guard planned to test and the costs and capabilities of its major system acquisition portfolio. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard, DHS, and Navy officials.
What GAO Found
The selected Coast Guard assets that GAO reviewed are generally demonstrating improved performance—according to Coast Guard operators—but GAO found that they have yet to meet all key requirements. Specifically, two assets, the HC-144 patrol aircraft and Fast Response Cutter, did not meet all key requirements during operational testing before being approved for full-rate production, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard guidance do not clearly specify when this level of performance should be achieved. Additionally, the Coast Guard changed its testing strategy for the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system and, as a result, is no longer planning to test the system's key requirements. Completing operational testing for the C4ISR system would provide the Coast Guard with the knowledge of whether this asset meets requirements.
As acquisition program costs increase across the portfolio, consuming significant amounts of funding, the Coast Guard is farther from fielding its planned fleet today than it was in 2009, in terms of the money needed to finish these programs. In 2009, GAO found that the Coast Guard needed $18.2 billion to finish its 2007 baseline, but now needs $20.7 billion to finish these assets.
To inform Congress of its budget plans, the Coast Guard uses a statutorily required 5-year Capital Investment Plan, but the law does not require the Coast Guard to report the effects of actual funding levels on individual projects and, thus, it has not done so. For example, the Coast Guard has received less funding than planned in its annual budgets, but has not reflected the effects of this reduced funding in terms of increased cost or schedule for certain projects. Without complete information, Congress cannot know the full cost of the portfolio.
The Coast Guard has repeatedly delayed and reduced its capability through its annual budget process and, therefore, it does not know the extent to which it will meet mission needs and achieve desired results. This is because the Coast Guard does not have a long-term fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to meet mission needs over the next two decades within available resources. Without such a plan, the Coast Guard cannot know the extent to which its assets are affordable and whether it can maintain service levels and meet mission needs.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring the Coast Guard to include additional information in its Capital Investment Plan. In addition, the Secretary of DHS should clarify when minimum performance standards should be achieved, conduct C4ISR testing, and develop a long-term modernization plan. DHS concurred with the recommendations, but its position on developing a long-term plan does not fully address GAO's concerns as discussed in the report. |
gao_T-GGD-97-186 | gao_T-GGD-97-186_0 | • First, IRS has limited data on both the treatment of taxpayers and the burdens imposed on them during audits. IRS recently created a system to track taxpayers’ complaints about improper treatment but IRS does not solicit input on all improper treatment. Similarly, IRS has no comprehensive definition of, and little data on, the burden its audits impose on taxpayers. IRS has recently developed a survey that will ask individual taxpayers about their satisfaction with various parts of the audit process but results will not be available until 1998. • Second, IRS’ Examination Division has various indicators and standards on audit performance. One measure IRS uses for audit performance is how much additional tax is recommended. IRS does not have a corresponding measure on how much of the recommended tax is ultimately collected after taxpayer appeals. Without an indicator to balance taxes recommended against those collected, IRS auditors could have an incentive to recommend taxes that would be unlikely to withstand a taxpayer challenge. IRS has nine audit standards. • Third, our work on one set of audit techniques—those used in analyzing taxpayers’ financial status to identify any unreported income—provided several interesting statistics. We estimated that IRS auditors used these techniques in less than a quarter of the audits completed in the time periods covered by our review. In about one-quarter of the audits in which financial status techniques were used, IRS did not have to contact the taxpayer to obtain information on the taxpayer’s financial status beyond what was reported on the tax return. We also found that the use of financial status techniques has not increased in recent years. Regarding revenue impact, we found that in about 16 percent of the cases where they were used, these techniques did help to identify significant amounts of unreported income—$10,000 or more. • Fourth, IRS is concerned that its ability to target the potentially most noncompliant taxpayers for audits is deteriorating. IRS’ concern arises because it has not been able to rely on its past approach for developing statistically valid research data that allowed IRS to create and periodically update formulas to target the returns with the most potential for noncompliance. IRS last collected these data through audits of a random sample of taxpayers for tax year 1988. IRS subsequently abandoned that approach due to concerns about its costs and to concerns from the public and Congress about the taxpayer burden involved with those audits. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the rights of taxpayers and their treatment during audits of their tax returns by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS has limited data on both the treatment of taxpayers and the burdens imposed on them during audits; (2) IRS recently created a system to track taxpayers' complaints about improper treatment but IRS does not solicit input on all improper treatment; (3) similarly, IRS has no comprehensive definition of, and little data on, the burden its audits impose on taxpayers; (4) IRS has recently developed a survey that will ask individual taxpayers about their satisfaction with various parts of the audit process but results will not be available until 1998; (5) IRS has various indicators and standards on audit performance; (6) one measure of audit performance is how much additional tax is recommended; (7) IRS does not have a corresponding measure on how much of the recommended tax is ultimately collected after taxpayer appeals; (8) without an indicator to balance taxes recommended against those collected, IRS auditors could have an incentive to recommend taxes that would be unlikely to withstand a taxpayer challenge; (9) IRS has nine audit standards; (10) GAO's work on one set of IRS audit techniques--those used in analyzing taxpayers' financial status to identify unreported income--showed that IRS used these techniques in less than a quarter of the audits completed in the time periods covered by GAO's review; (11) in about one-quarter of the audits in which financial status techniques were used, IRS did not have to contact the taxpayer to obtain information on the taxpayer's financial status beyond what was reported on the tax return; (12) GAO also found that IRS' use of financial status techniques has not increased in recent years; (13) regarding revenue impact, GAO found that in about 16 percent of the cases where they were used, these techniques did help to identify significant amounts of unreported income--$10,000 or more; (14) IRS is concerned that its ability to target the potentially most noncompliant taxpayers for audits is deteriorating; (15) IRS' concern arises because it has not been able to rely on its past approach for developing statistically valid research data that allowed IRS to create and periodically update formulas to target the returns with the most potential for noncompliance; (16) IRS last collected these data through audits of a random sample of taxpayers for tax year 1988; and (17) IRS subsequently abandoned that approach due to concerns about its costs and to concerns from the public and Congress about the taxpayer burden involved with those audits. |
gao_RCED-95-218 | gao_RCED-95-218_0 | Watershed Projects Vary in Size, Objectives, and Funding
Nationwide, federal agencies identified 618 watershed projects that had received federal funds through early 1995. The projects ranged in size from as few as 5 acres to over 150 million acres; about 60 percent covered less than 80,000 acres. Federal Flexibility and Locally Driven Approaches Are Key to Managing Nine Agricultural Watershed Projects
The common experiences of the nine projects we looked at suggest that achieving success in watershed-based approaches depends on (1) the flexible application of federal assistance and (2) the ability of local officials to enlist broad support and to craft solutions customized to their local needs. At the local level, they identified education, stakeholders’ involvement, and a customized approach to improving water quality as the keys to a successful project. The projects’ participants also stressed the need for flexibility in the role federal agencies play in providing technical assistance to help farmers implement pollution-reduction practices. Participants Favor Locally Driven Approach
The nine innovative or successful projects we reviewed were able to adopt a locally driven approach to achieving the goals for the watersheds. This designation required the development of a comprehensive strategy to reduce pollution in the watershed. The project focuses on surface water issues and covers both rural and urban sources of nonpoint pollution. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the effects of agricultural production on water pollution, focusing on lessons learned from nine innovative, successful watershed projects that reduced such pollution.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the watershed projects ranged from 5 acres to 150 million acres and involved both surface water and groundwater resources; (2) the watershed projects have received an estimated $514 million in federal funds since 1995; (3) all nine watershed participants stressed the need for flexibility in the kinds of financial and technical assistance provided by federal agencies; (4) the watershed participants were able to adopt local approaches to watershed management, since the watersheds had different characteristics; and (5) project participants at the local level emphasized that the keys to reducing agricultural pollution are to build citizen cooperation through education, involve stakeholders in developing project goals, and tailor project strategies. |
gao_GAO-05-642 | gao_GAO-05-642_0 | In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was earmarked for soft target protection, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at overseas schools. State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to Be Resolved
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this report). Despite these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They indicated they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel
Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training to help post officials identify terrorist surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. After each investigation, State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we found that State’s hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with security requirements have not been fully implemented. State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully Defined
In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003, began developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities. 8). Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at Residences against Terrorist Threats
State’s primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences, the Residential Security program, is principally designed to deter crime, not terrorism. State officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it could provide limited or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas, despite guidance that limits their use primarily to the embassy. Some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartments or neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas Security Policy Board, take the following 11 actions: Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State’s responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial ramifications of funding security improvements to schools, places of worship, and the private sector; (3) develops programs and activities with FAM standards and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for which State is deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the embassy emergency action plan elements of the soft targets program. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats, at their homes, recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside the embassy compounds. We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the Soft Targets Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their residences.
What GAO Found
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas. |
gao_GAO-12-468 | gao_GAO-12-468_0 | Background
To ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, NNSA relies on contractors who manage and operate government-owned laboratories, production plants, and a test site. NNSA and Its M&O Contractors Use Multifaceted Strategies to Recruit, Develop, and Retain Their Workforces
NNSA and its M&O contractors have developed and implemented multifaceted strategies to recruit, develop, and retain both the federal and contractor workforces needed to preserve critical capabilities in the enterprise. NNSA focuses on attracting early career hires with competitive pay and development opportunities, and the agency is reassessing future enterprisewide workforce needs. M&O contractors’ strategies vary from site to site, but each site focuses on maintaining competitive compensation packages. NNSA generally relies on two key programs to develop its critically skilled workforce––one that identifies needs and another that identifies the qualifications necessary to meet them. NNSA is also undertaking a comprehensive reassessment to ascertain future federal workforce requirements. Their development efforts vary in approach but are also site specific and face some challenges––particularly in preserving underground nuclear testing skills. NNSA Monitors Key Human Capital Metrics to Assess the Effectiveness of Strategies to Maintain Critically Skilled Workforces
To assess the effectiveness of its strategies for recruiting, developing, and retaining the NNSA staff and M&O contractors needed to preserve critical skills in the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA monitors key human capital metrics, including the length of time to hire employees and attrition. NNSA Monitors Key Human Capital Metrics for Its Staff
To assess the effectiveness of its strategies for recruiting, developing, and retaining the federal workforce with the requisite critical skills to support and oversee M&O contractors, NNSA focuses on monitoring two key metrics—the length of time it takes them to hire an employee and its attrition rates—and tracks employees’ progress toward completing the required training and certifications through the TQP. M&O contractors assess key human capital metrics, but these metrics do not have standardized definitions. According to NNSA officials, these metrics vary from site to site, but generally provide the same key information, including acceptance rates for offers of employment, which are benchmarked on a site-specific basis but are typically around 80 percent; attrition rates, both for retirement and non-retirement reasons, which are also benchmarked on a site-specific basis; pay comparability—whether salaries are competitive with peer benefits comparability––whether benefits are competitive with peer ability to fill a critical skills position within a certain number of days–– usually 48 to 90 days. For example, one of the M&O contractors’ key metrics—acceptance rates for offers of employment—may not be consistently measured across the enterprise. NNSA and Its M&O Contractors Face Challenges in Recruiting, Retaining, and Developing Their Workforces
NNSA and its M&O contractors face challenges in recruiting, retaining, and developing their workforces and are using several tools to address these challenges. NNSA and Its M&O Contractor Work Environments, Site Locations, and High Costs of Living Pose Recruiting Challenges
Officials from NNSA site offices and M&O contractor work sites reported that their secure work environment and location make recruitment of advanced science and technology candidates more challenging. Staff typically need to acquire and maintain high-level clearances and must often work in secure areas that prohibit the use of personal cell phones, personal e-mail, and social media. Isolation. Further complicating NNSA’s recruiting efforts is the demand for qualified candidates in the private sector as well, and private sector jobs may offer a work environment that many candidates may find more desirable. Shortages of qualified candidates. National laboratory officials told us that a large percentage of students graduating from top science, technology, and engineering programs are foreign nationals. Streamlined hiring and security clearance processes. Building a pipeline of critically skilled employees. Without this information, NNSA’s ability to monitor the effectiveness of its and its M&O contractors’ strategies to recruit, develop, and retain the workforces needed to preserve critical skills may be hindered. In particular, without common enterprisewide definitions of human capital performance metrics, NNSA may not be able to collect consistent and comparable M&O contractor human capital data across all eight sites in the enterprise. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve NNSA’s ability to monitor the effectiveness of its strategies–– and its M&O contractors’ strategies––to recruit, develop, and retain the workforces needed to preserve critical skills in the enterprise, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the following action: As it develops its Enterprise Modeling Consortium and other enterprisewide systems for tracking M&O contractor human capital performance metrics, NNSA should consider developing standardized definitions across the enterprise, especially across M&O contractors, to ensure they gather consistent data using human capital metrics with consistent, uniform definitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA has primary responsibility for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nations nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA carries out these activities at three national labs, four production sites, and one test sitecollectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. Contractors operate these sites under management and operations (M&O) contracts. The enterprise workforces often possess certain critical skills that can only be developed through a minimum of 3 years of experience working in a secure, classified environment.
Because NNSA could have difficulty maintaining the critically skilled workforces necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nations nuclear weapons, GAO was asked to examine: (1) strategies NNSA and its M&O contractors use to recruit, develop, and retain critically skilled workforces; (2) how NNSA assesses the effectiveness of these strategies; and (3) challenges in recruiting, retaining, and developing this specialized workforce and efforts to mitigate these challenges. GAO reviewed NNSAs and its M&O contractors human capital documents and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its M&O contractors have developed and implemented multifaceted strategies to recruit, develop, and retain both the federal and contractor workforces needed to preserve critical skills in the enterprise. NNSAs recruiting and retention efforts for its federal staff focus on attracting early career hires with competitive pay and development opportunities. Its development efforts generally rely on two key programs to develop its critically skilled workforceone that identifies needs and another that identifies the qualifications necessary to meet them. For strategic planning purposes, NNSA is also undertaking a comprehensive reassessment and analysis of staffing requirements to ascertain future federal workforce requirements. M&O contractors recruitment and retention strategies vary from site to site, but each site focuses on maintaining competitive compensation packages. Their development efforts vary in approach and scope and face some challengesparticularly in preserving underground nuclear testing skills.
To assess the effectiveness of its ownand its M&O contractorsstrategies for recruiting, developing, and retaining the workforces needed to preserve critical skills, NNSA monitors key human capital metrics. NNSA focuses on two key metrics in assessing its own strategiesthe time it takes to hire a new employee and its attrition rates. To assess the effectiveness of its contractors strategies, NNSA monitors key human capital metrics using data that M&O contractors collect, including acceptance rates, attrition rates, comparability of pay and benefits with peer institutions, and the ability to fill a critical skills position within a certain number of days. M&O contractors assess key human capital performance measures, but these metrics do not have standardized definitions. For example, one of the M&O contractors key metricsacceptance rates for offers of employmentmay not be consistently measured across the enterprise. Without this information, NNSAs ability to monitor the effectiveness of its and its M&O contractors strategies to recruit, develop, and retain the workforces needed to preserve critical skills may be hindered. In particular, without common enterprisewide definitions of human capital performance metrics, NNSA may not be able to collect consistent and comparable data across all eight sites in the enterprise.
The enterprises work environments and site locations pose recruiting challenges, and NNSA and its M&O contractors face shortages of qualified candidates, among other challenges. For example, staff must often work in secure areas that prohibit the use of personal cell phones, e-mail, and social media, which is a disadvantage in attracting younger skilled candidates. In addition, many sites are geographically isolated and may offer limited career opportunities for candidates spouses. Critically skilled positions also require security clearancesand therefore U.S. citizenshipand a large percentage of students graduating from top science, technology, and engineering programs are foreign nationals. The pool of qualified candidates is also attractive to high technology firms in the private sector, which may offer more desirable work environments. NNSA and its M&O contractors are taking actions to address these challenges where possible, including streamlining hiring and security clearance processes and taking actions to proactively identify new scientists and engineers to build a pipeline of critically skilled candidates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NNSA consider developing standardized definitions for human capital metrics across the enterprise to ensure NNSA and its M&O contractors gather consistent contractor data. NNSA concurred with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-186T | gao_GAO-14-186T_0 | Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities in the Personnel Security Clearance Process
Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and responsibilities in the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. As such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The order also appointed the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the chair of the council.heads shall assist the Performance Accountability Council and executive agents in carrying out any function under the order, as well as implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the order. In addition, the executive order states that agency Executive branch agencies that request background investigations use the information from investigative reports to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. Two of the agencies that grant the most security clearances are DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Investigators—often contractors—from Federal Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct the investigations for most of the federal government. DHS spent more than $57 million on suitability and security clearance background investigations in fiscal year 2011. Phases of the Personnel Security Process
To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases: requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). In December 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and OPM jointly issued a revised version of the federal investigative standards for the conduct of background investigations for individuals that work for or on behalf of the federal government. Adjudication and Appeals Phases
During the adjudication phase, adjudicators from the hiring agency use the information from the investigative report along with federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a security clearance.adjudicative guidelines specify that adjudicators consider 13 specific areas that elicit information about (1) conduct that could raise security concerns and (2) factors that could allay those security concerns and To make clearance eligibility decisions, the permit granting a clearance.weighing of a number of variables, to include disqualifying and mitigating factors, known as the “whole-person” concept. The adjudication process is a careful If a clearance is denied or revoked, appeals of the adjudication decision are generally possible. Reinvestigation Phase
Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as long as they remain in a position that requires access to classified national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. Agencies Do Not Consistently Assess Quality Throughout the Personnel Security Clearance Process
Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the personnel security clearance process. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 investigative reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. As a result of the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD personnel, we recommended in May 2009 that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports and take corrective actions.recommendation. Extent of Clearance Reciprocity Not Measured
Executive branch agencies have not yet developed and implemented metrics to track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency, although some efforts have been made to develop quality metrics. For example, OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track reciprocity, but this metric only measures the number of investigations requested from OPM that are rejected based on the existence of a previous investigation and does not track the number of cases in which an existing security clearance was or was not successfully honored by the agency. In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and improve the quality of the security clearance process are imperative next steps. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, the DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a personnel security clearance. Furthermore, GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in fiscal year 2011. A high quality process is essential to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances. Security clearances may allow personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. Recent events, such as unauthorized disclosures of classified information, have illustrated the need for additional work to help ensure the process functions effectively and efficiently.
This testimony addresses the (1) roles and responsibilities of different executive branch agencies involved in the personnel security process; (2) different phases of the process; and (3) extent that agencies assess the quality of the process. This testimony is based on GAO work issued between 2008 and 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed statutes, executive orders, guidance, and processes; (2) examined agency data on timeliness and quality; (3) assessed reform efforts; and (4) reviewed samples of case files for DOD personnel.
What GAO Found
Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and responsibilities in the personnel security clearance process. Executive Order 13467 designates the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the Security Executive Agent, who is responsible for developing policies and procedures for background investigations and adjudications. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts investigations for most of the federal government. Adjudicators from agencies, such as the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security, that request background investigations use the investigative report and consider federal adjudicative guidelines when making clearance determinations. Reform efforts to enhance the personnel security process throughout the executive branch are principally driven and overseen by the Performance Accountability Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Executive branch agencies rely on a multi-phased personnel security clearance process that includes requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). In the requirements determination phase, agency officials must determine whether positions require access to classified information. After an individual has been selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators--often contractors--from OPM conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and consider federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. If a clearance is denied or revoked by an agency, appeals of the adjudication decision are possible. Individuals granted clearances are subject to reinvestigations at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance.
Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. For example, GAO reported in May 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for DOD, documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 reports did not contain the required personal subject interview. To improve the quality of investigative documentation, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its reports met federal investigative standards. OPM did not agree or disagree with this recommendation, and as of August 2013 had not implemented it. Further, GAO reported in 2010 that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is an agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency. OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track reciprocity, but this metric does not track how often an existing security clearance was successfully honored. GAO recommended that OMB develop comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity. OMB agreed with the recommendation, but has not yet fully implemented actions to implement this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-923T | gao_GAO-05-923T_0 | Such large intense fires increasingly threaten catastrophic ecosystem damage and also increasingly threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure in the wildland-urban interface. Progress in National Strategy: Priorities Have Been Clarified and Funding Has Been Increased for Identified Needs
Over the last 5 years, the federal government has been formulating a national strategy known as the National Fire Plan, composed of several strategic documents that set forth a priority to reduce wildland fire risks to communities. Moreover, appropriations for both agencies’ overall wildland fire management activities, including preparedness, fuel reduction, and suppression, tripled from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2005. Progress in Local Implementation: Data and Research, Fire Management Planning, and Coordination and Collaboration Have Been Strengthened
The agencies have strengthened local wildland fire management implementation by making significant improvements in federal data and research on wildland fire over the past 5 years, including an initial mapping of fuel hazards nationwide. Coordination among federal agencies and their collaboration with nonfederal partners, critical to effective implementation at the local level, also has been improved. Progress in Accountability: Better Performance Measures and a Results Monitoring Framework Have Been Developed
Accountability for the results the federal government achieves from its investments in wildland fire management activities also has been strengthened. Agencies Face Several Challenges to Completing a Long- Needed Cohesive Strategy for Reducing Fuels and Responding to Wildland Fire Problems
While the federal government has made important progress over the past 5 years in addressing wildland fire, a number of challenges still must be met to complete development of a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies available long-term options and funding needed to reduce fuels on the nation’s forests and rangelands. Completing and Implementing the LANDFIRE System Is Essential to Identifying and Addressing Wildland Fire Threats
The agencies face several challenges to completing and implementing LANDFIRE, so that they can more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire threats and better target fuel reduction efforts. In implementing LANDFIRE, however, the agencies will have to overcome the challenges presented by the current lack of a consistent approach to assessing the risks of wildland fires to ecosystem resources as well as the lack of an integrated, strategic, and unified approach to managing and using information systems and data, including those such as LANDFIRE, in wildland fire decision making. Fire Management Plans Will Need to Be Updated with Latest Data and Research on Wildland Fire
The agencies will need to update their local fire management plans when more detailed, nationally consistent LANDFIRE data become available. The plans also will have to be updated to incorporate recent agency fire research on approaches to more effectively address wildland fire threats. The improvements in data, modeling, and fire behavior research that the agencies have under way, together with the new cost-effectiveness focus of the Fire Program Analysis system to support local fire management plans, represent important tools that the agencies can begin to use now to provide the Congress with initial and successively more accurate assessments of long-term fuel reduction options and related funding needs. Because there is an increasingly urgent need for a cohesive federal strategy that identifies long-term options and related funding needs for reducing fuels, we recommended that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its consideration of the agencies’ fiscal year 2006 wildland fire management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps the agencies will take, together with related time frames, to complete such a cohesive strategy. However, as noted at the outset of this testimony, the window of opportunity for effectively addressing wildland fire is rapidly closing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wildland fires are increasingly threatening communities and ecosystems. In recent years, these fires have become more intense due to excess vegetation that has accumulated, partly as a result of past management practices. Experts have said that the window of opportunity for effectively responding to wildland fire is rapidly closing. The federal government's cost to manage wildland fires continues to increase. Appropriations for its wildland fire management activities tripled from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2005. This testimony discusses the federal government's progress over the past 5 years and future challenges in managing wildland fires. It is based primarily on GAO's report: Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy ( GAO-05-147 , Jan. 14, 2005).
What GAO Found
Over the last 5 years, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies in the Department of the Interior, working with the Congress, have made important progress in responding to wildland fires. Most notably, the agencies have adopted various national strategy documents addressing the need to reduce wildland fire risks, established a priority to protect communities in the wildland-urban interface, and increased efforts and amounts of funding committed to addressing wildland fire problems, including preparedness, suppression, and fuel reduction on federal lands. In addition, the agencies have begun improving their data and research on wildland fire problems, made progress in developing long-needed fire management plans that identify actions for effectively addressing wildland fire threats at the local level, and improved federal interagency coordination and collaboration with nonfederal partners. The agencies also have strengthened overall accountability for their investments in wildland fire activities by establishing improved performance measures and a framework for monitoring results. Despite producing numerous planning and strategy documents, the agencies have yet to develop a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies the long-term options and related funding needed to reduce the excess vegetation that fuels fires in national forests and rangelands. Reducing these fuels lowers risks to communities and ecosystems and helps contain suppression costs. As GAO noted in 1999, such a strategy would help the agencies and the Congress to determine the most effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire problems. Completing this strategy will require finishing several efforts now under way, each with its own challenges. The agencies will need to finish planned improvements in a key data and modeling system--LANDFIRE--to more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire threats and to better target fuel reduction efforts. In implementing LANDFIRE, the agencies will need more consistent approaches to assessing wildland fire risks, more integrated information systems, and better understanding of the role of climate in wildland fire. In addition, local fire management plans will need to be updated with data from LANDFIRE and from emerging agency research on more cost-effective approaches to reducing fuels. Completing a new system designed to identify the most cost-effective means for allocating fire management budget resources--Fire Program Analysis--may help to better identify long-term options and related funding needs. Without completing these tasks, the agencies will have difficulty determining the extent and location of wildland fire threats, targeting and coordinating their efforts and resources, and resolving wildland fire problems in the most timely and cost-effective manner over the long term. |
gao_GAO-03-274 | gao_GAO-03-274_0 | Many Facilities Remain in Deteriorated Condition, Even with Increase in Maintenance and Military Construction Funding
While the amounts of money DOD devoted to facility maintenance and military construction increased between fiscal year 1998 and 2001 and fiscal year 1998 and 2002, respectively, DOD and service officials said these amounts have to compete with other defense programs and priorities and have been insufficient to restrain the deterioration and/or obsolescence of facilities used by the active forces. Military Services’ Data on Facility Conditions Are Inconsistent
The information that the services have on the condition of their facilities is inconsistent across the services, making it difficult for Congress, DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities that are in most need of repair and to measure progress in improving facilities. Although DOD established a standard rating scale to summarize facility conditions and ability to support military mission, each service has the latitude to use its own system for developing and validating the ratings. However, these objectives are not likely to be achieved because the services do not propose to fully fund all of them or have developed funding plans that have unrealistically high rates of increase in the out-years when compared with previous funding levels and against other defense priorities. It is also developing a recapitalization funding model. However, the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan lacks comprehensive information on the specific actions, time frames, assigned responsibilities, and resources that are needed to meet DOD’s vision for facilities. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) instruct the military services to implement a departmentwide process to consistently assess and validate facility conditions; (2) revise the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan to identify specific actions needed, time frames, responsibilities, and funding levels—elements of a comprehensive strategic plan; (3) clarify DOD’s guidance by specifying the organizational level (service, major command, or installation) at which its three objectives to fully fund sustainment, achieve a 67-year average recapitalization rate, and eliminate C-3 and C-4 facility ratings, bringing them up to a minimal C-2 level, should be achieved; and (4) direct the services to develop comprehensive performance plans implementing the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan, which would provide specific metrics to measure performance and credible and realistic funding plans to sustain and recapitalize facilities. Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the historical funding trends for facility maintenance and military construction and their impact on the condition of the active forces’ facilities, we examined the Department of Defense’s (DOD) budget requests, congressional designations, and obligation data for facility operation and maintenance and military construction for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. To evaluate the consistency of the services’ information on facility conditions, we reviewed each service’s system for assessing facility conditions and compared this information within and across each service to identify differences in facility raters and procedures, assessment scopes and frequencies, appraisal scales, computation methods, and validation procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO prepared this report in response to its basic legislative responsibilities. Its objectives are threefold: (1) to examine the historical funding trends and their impact on the condition of the active forces' facilities, (2) to evaluate the consistency of the services' information on facility conditions, and (3) to assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) long-term strategic plan and objectives to improve facility conditions.
What GAO Found
While the amount of money the active forces have spent on facility maintenance has increased recently, DOD and service officials said these amounts have not been sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities. Too little funding to adequately maintain facilities is also aggravated by DOD's acknowledged retention of facilities in excess of its needs. From fiscal year 1998 to 2001, obligations for facility maintenance rose by 26 percent with increases coming from higher annual budget requests, congressional designations that exceeded those requests, supplemental appropriations, and the services' movement of funds to maintenance projects. Funding for military construction also increased during this period. However, military reports and testimonies state that these amounts have been insufficient, and GAO's recent visits to installations document the deteriorated conditions of facilities. There is a lack of consistency in the services' information on facility conditions, making it difficult for Congress, DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities where they are most needed and to accurately gauge facility conditions. Although DOD developed a standard rating scale to summarize facility conditions (C-ratings), each service has the latitude to use its own system for assessing conditions, including the types of facility raters, assessment frequencies, appraisal scales, and validation procedures. Although DOD has a strategic plan for facilities, it lacks comprehensive information on the specific actions, time frames, responsibilities, and funding needed to reach its goals. Also, DOD has set up three objectives to improve its facility conditions--to fully fund sustainment, to achieve a 67-year average recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2007, and to improve facility conditions so that deficiencies have limited effects on military mission achievement by fiscal year 2010. However, the services have not proposed to fully fund all the objectives and have developed funding plans to achieve others that have unrealistically high rates of increase during the out-years. At the same time, the services have not developed comprehensive performance plans to implement DOD's vision for facilities. |
gao_GAO-06-777T | gao_GAO-06-777T_0 | More specifically, according to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, a PIA is an analysis of how information ishandled. For example, the Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act of 2005 required each agency covered by the act to have a chief privacy officer responsible for, among other things, “assuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of information in identifiable form.” Subsequently, in February 2005, OMB issued a memorandum to federal agencies requiring them to designate a senior official with overall agencywide responsibility for information privacy issues. Agency Privacy Officers Face a Number of Challenges
The elevation of privacy officers at federal agencies reflects the growing demands that these individuals face in addressing privacy challenges on a day-to-day basis. Among these challenges, several that are prominent include (1) complying with the Privacy Act and the E-Government Act of 2002, (2) ensuring that data mining efforts do not compromise privacy protections, (3) controlling the collection and use of personal information obtained from commercial sources, and (4) addressing concerns about radio frequency identification technology. In 2003, we reported that agencies generally did well with certain aspects of the Privacy Act’s requirements—such as issuing system-of-records notices when required—but did less well at other requirements, such as ensuring that information is complete, accurate, relevant, and timely before it is disclosed to a nonfederal organization. For example, working in concert with officials from OMB and other agencies, they are in a position to identify ambiguities in guidance and provide clarifications about the applicability of the Privacy Act. Finally, a chief privacy officer could also serve as a champion for privacy awareness and education across an agency. These agencies often did not conduct PIAs because officials did not believe they were required. In the government, data mining was initially used to detect financial fraud and abuse. In August 2005, we reported on five different data mining efforts at selected federal agencies, noting that although the agencies responsible for these data mining efforts took many of the steps needed to protect the privacy and security of personal information used in the efforts, none followed all key procedures. Agency privacy offices can provide a degree of internal oversight to help ensure that privacy is fully addressed in agency data mining activities. For example, although agencies issued public notices on information collections, these did not always notify the public that information resellers were among the sources to be used, a practice inconsistent with the principle that individuals should be informed about privacy policies and the collection of information. In our report on information resellers, we recommended that the Director, OMB, revise privacy guidance to clarify the applicability of requirements for public notices and privacy impact assessments to agency use of personal information from resellers and direct agencies to review their uses of such information to ensure it is explicitly referenced in privacy notices and assessments. Until privacy requirements are better defined and broadly understood, agency privacy officers are likely to continue to face challenges in helping ensure that their agencies are providing appropriate privacy protections. RFID is an automated data-capture technology that can be used to electronically identify, track, and store information contained on a tag. The tag can be attached to or embedded in the object to be identified, such as a product, case, or pallet. RFID technology provides identification and tracking capabilities by using wireless communication to transmit data. In May 2005, we reported that major initiatives at federal agencies that use or propose to use the technology included physical access controls and tracking assets, documents, or materials. The Department of Defense was also using it to track shipments. However, the use of RFIDs by the federal government to track the movement of individuals traveling within the United States could generate concern by the affected parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Advances in information technology make it easier than ever for the federal government to obtain and process personal information about citizens and residents in many ways and for many purposes. To ensure that the privacy rights of individuals are respected, this information must be properly protected in accordance with current law, particularly the Privacy Act and the E-Government Act of 2002. These laws prescribe specific activities that agencies must perform to protect privacy, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has developed guidance on how and in what circumstances agencies are to carry out these activities. Many agencies designate officials as focal points for privacy-related matters, and increasingly, many have created senior positions, such as chief privacy officer, to assume primary responsibility for privacy policy, as well as dedicated privacy offices. GAO was asked to testify on key challenges facing agency privacy officers. To address this issue, GAO identified and summarized issues raised in its previous reports on privacy.
What GAO Found
Agencies and their privacy officers face growing demands in addressing privacy challenges. For example, as GAO reported in 2003, agency compliance with Privacy Act requirements was uneven, owing to ambiguities in guidance, lack of awareness, and lack of priority. While agencies generally did well with certain aspects of the Privacy Act's requirements--such as issuing notices concerning certain systems containing collections of personal information--they did less well at others, such as ensuring that information is complete, accurate, relevant, and timely before it is disclosed to a nonfederal organization. In addition, the E-Gov Act requires that agencies perform privacy impact assessments (PIA) on such information collections. Such assessments are important to ensure, among other things, that information is handled in a way that conforms to privacy requirements. However, in work on commercial data resellers, GAO determined in 2006 that many agencies did not perform PIAs on systems that used reseller information, believing that these were not required. In addition, in public notices on these systems, agencies did not always reveal that information resellers were among the sources to be used. To address such challenges, chief privacy officers can work with officials from OMB and other agencies to identify ambiguities and provide clarifications about the applicability of privacy provisions, such as in situations involving the use of reseller information. In addition, as senior officials, they can increase agency awareness and raise the priority of privacy issues. Agencies and privacy officers will also face the challenge of ensuring that privacy protections are not compromised by advances in technology. For example, federal agency use of data mining--the analysis of large amounts of data to uncover hidden patterns and relationships--was initially aimed at detecting financial fraud and abuse. Increasingly, however, the use of this tool has expanded to include purposes such as detecting terrorist threats. GAO found in 2005 that agencies employing data mining took many steps needed to protect privacy (such as issuing public notices), but none followed all key procedures (such as including in these notices the intended uses of personal information). Another new technology development presenting privacy challenges is radio frequency identification (RFID), which uses wireless communication to transmit data and thus electronically identify, track, and store information on tags attached to or embedded in objects. GAO reported in 2005 that federal agencies use or propose to use the technology for physical access controls and tracking assets, documents, or materials. For example, the Department of Defense was using RFID to track shipments. Although such applications are not likely to generate privacy concerns, others could, such as the use of RFIDs by the federal government to track the movement of individuals traveling within the United States. Agency privacy offices can serve as a key mechanism for ensuring that privacy is fully addressed in agency approaches to new technologies such as data mining and RFID. |
gao_GAO-14-368 | gao_GAO-14-368_0 | CBP’s Program Schedules and Life- Cycle Cost Estimates Reflect Some but Not All Best Practices
CBP’s Program Schedules Have Experienced Delays and the Three Highest- Cost Programs Meet Some but Not All Scheduling Best Practices
The Majority of the Plan’s Programs Experienced Some Delays, and Schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC Programs Are Not Fully Reliable
OTIA has developed a schedule for each of the Plan’s seven programs, and four programs will not meet their originally planned completion dates. Credible: OTIA’s schedules for the IFT and RVSS programs partially met the characteristic of being credible; the MSC program schedule minimally met this characteristic. Further, our analysis showed that none of the schedules had valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which management could track current performance. In addition, an Integrated Master Schedule that allows managers to monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take, and how the activities are related to one another is a critical management tool for complex systems that involve the incorporation of a number of different projects, such as the Plan. Because OTIA does not have an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan, it is not well positioned to understand how schedule changes in each individual program could affect implementation of the overall Plan. For example, we reported that, in terms of being comprehensive, the estimate included documented technical data. For example, CBP officials had not conducted a sensitivity analysis and a cost-risk and uncertainty analysis to determine a level of confidence in the estimate, nor did CBP compare it with an independent estimate. documented, and credible. However, this approach is not consistent with DHS’s acquisition guidance, which states that even for commercial-off-the-shelf systems, operational test and evaluation should occur in the environmental conditions in which a system will be used before a full production decision for the system is made and the system is subsequently deployed. For instance, for the 166,976 apprehension events reported by the Border Patrol across the Tucson sector during fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, an asset assist was not recorded for 115,517 (or about 69 percent) of these apprehension events. Border Patrol officials did not specify why the agency does not require the recording and tracking of data on asset assists. CBP Has Identified Mission Benefits for Surveillance Technologies under the Plan but Has Not Yet Developed Performance Metrics
In response to our November 2011 recommendation regarding the identification of mission benefits and development of key attributes for performance metrics for the surveillance technologies to be deployed as part of the Plan, CBP has identified mission benefits expected from the implementation of the surveillance technologies to be acquired or deployed as part of the Plan, but has not fully developed key attributes for In November 2011, we performance metrics for these technologies.reported that agency officials had not yet defined the mission benefits expected or quantified metrics to assess the contribution of the selected approaches in achieving their goal of situational awareness and detection of border activity using surveillance technology. Specifically, revising the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to more fully test the IFTs in the various environmental conditions in which they will be used to determine operational effectiveness and suitability, in accordance with DHS acquisition guidance, could help provide CBP with more complete information on how the IFTs will operate under a variety of conditions before beginning full production. Conducting analysis of such data, once collected, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators as appropriate, could help better position CBP to be able to determine the extent to which its technology investments have contributed to border security efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP’s deployment decisions, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following six actions:
When updating the schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs, ensure that scheduling best practices, as outlined in our schedule assessment guide, are applied to the three programs’ schedules. DHS did not concur with the other two recommendations in the report. The programs under the Plan are intended to provide Border Patrol with a combination of surveillance capabilities to assist in achieving situational awareness along the Arizona border with Mexico; and while the programs themselves may be independent of one another, the Plan’s resources are being shared among the programs. We continue to believe that developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could help provide CBP a comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP to reliably commit to when the Plan will be fully implemented and better predict whether estimated completion dates are realistic to manage programs’ performance, as noted in the report. However, as noted in this report, independently verifying the cost estimates is consistent with best practices and could help provide CBP with more insights into program costs. With regard to the fifth recommendation, that CBP require data on asset assists to be recorded and tracked within the Enforcement Integrated Database, DHS concurred and stated that Border Patrol is changing its data collection process to allow for improved reporting on asset assists for apprehensions and seizures and intends to make it mandatory to record whether an asset assisted in an apprehension or seizure. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) developed schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technologies Plan (the Plan) in accordance with best practices; (2) followed key aspects of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) acquisition management framework in managing the Plan’s three highest cost programs; and (3) assessed the performance of technologies deployed under the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), identified mission benefits, and developed performance metrics for surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan. To determine the extent to which CBP has followed best practices in developing schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Plan’s three highest-cost programs—the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC)—we obtained CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition’s (OTIA) program schedules as of March 2013, which were current at the time of our review, for the these programs and compared them against best practices for developing schedules. We characterized whether the schedules met each of the 10 best practices based on the following scale:
Not met—the program provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. Met—the program provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion. These practices are summarized into four characteristics of a reliable schedule— comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled. Minimally met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. Substantially met—the program provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. | What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) reflect some, but not all, best practices. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically updated and progress is monitored). GAO assessed CBP's schedules as of March 2013 for the three highest-cost programs that represent 97 percent of the Plan's estimated cost. GAO found that schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion), as shown in the table below. For example, the schedule for one of the Plan's programs partially met the characteristic of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis was not based on any connection between risks and specific activities. For another program, the schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in that it did not have valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP could track progress.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
Note: Not met—CBP provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally met—CBP provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—CBP provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. Substantially met—CBP provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. Met—CBP provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion.
Further, CBP has not developed an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best practices. Rather, CBP has used the separate schedules for each program to manage implementation of the Plan, as CBP officials stated that the Plan contains individual acquisition programs rather than integrated programs. However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with Mexico, and resources are shared among the programs. According to scheduling best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule is a critical management tool for complex systems that involve a number of different projects, such as the Plan, to allow managers to monitor all work activities, how long activities will take, and how the activities are related to one another. Developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could help provide CBP a comprehensive view of the Plan and help CBP better understand how schedule changes in each individual program could affect implementation of the overall Plan.
Moreover, cost-estimating best practices are summarized into four characteristics—well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. GAO's analysis of CBP's estimate for the Plan and estimates completed at the time of GAO's review for the two highest-cost programs showed that these estimates at least partially met three of these characteristics: well documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with independent cost estimates in accordance with best practices. Ensuring that scheduling best practices are applied to the three programs' schedules and verifying Life-cycle Cost Estimates with independent estimates could help better ensure the reliability of the schedules and estimates.
CBP did not fully follow key aspects of DHS's acquisition management guidance for the Plan's three highest-cost programs. For example, CBP plans to conduct limited testing of the highest-cost program—the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT: towers with cameras and radars)—to determine its mission contributions, but not its effectiveness and suitability for the various environmental conditions, such as weather, in which it will be deployed. This testing, as outlined in CBP's test plan, is not consistent with DHS's guidance, which states that testing should occur to determine effectiveness and suitability in the environmental conditions in which a system will be used. Revising the test plan to more fully test the program in the conditions in which it will be used could help provide CBP with more complete information on how the towers will operate once they are fully deployed.
CBP has identified mission benefits for technologies under the Plan, but has not yet developed performance metrics. CBP has identified such mission benefits as improved situational awareness and agent safety. Further, a DHS database enables CBP to collect data on asset assists, defined as instances in which a technology, such as a camera, or other asset, such as a canine team, contributed to an apprehension or seizure, that in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, could be used to better determine the contributions of CBP's surveillance technologies and inform resource allocation decisions. However, CBP is not capturing complete data on asset assists, as Border Patrol agents are not required to record and track such data. For example, from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, Border Patrol did not record whether an asset assist contributed to an apprehension event for 69 percent of such events in the Tucson sector. Requiring the reporting and tracking of asset assist data could help CBP determine the extent to which its surveillance technologies are contributing to CBP's border security efforts.
This is a public version of a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in February 2014. Information DHS deemed as For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, apply scheduling best practices, develop an integrated schedule, verify Life-cycle Cost Estimates, revise the IFT test plan, and require tracking of asset assist data. DHS concurred with four of six GAO recommendations. It did not concur with the need for an integrated schedule or a revised IFT test plan. As discussed in this report, GAO continues to believe in the need for a schedule and a revised test plan. |
gao_GAO-14-36 | gao_GAO-14-36_0 | DOD and GSA Do Not Know the Full Extent to Which They Are Reporting Consolidated Contracts
DOD and GSA accounted for more than 80 percent of the reported consolidated contracts in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, but DOD and GSA overstated their use of consolidated contracts in those two years. In our sample of 157 DOD and GSA contracts that were identified as consolidated in FPDS-NG, we found and agency officials confirmed that approximately 34 percent of the DOD contracts and all of the GSA contracts were miscoded and in fact were not consolidated. We also identified four consolidated DOD contracts, including one that was also bundled, that were not reported as such in FPDS-NG. Most DOD Consolidated Contracts Complied with Existing Acquisition Regulations, but Regulations Do Not Reflect Changes in the Law
Most of the 100 DOD contracts from fiscal years 2011 and 2012 that we identified as consolidated complied with existing acquisition regulations by justifying the need to consolidate contract requirements over $6 million. Most of the contracts that did not comply were justified, but the determinations were not made by an official at a level senior enough to meet defense regulation requirements. In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, existing DOD regulations also did not fully reflect the 2010 changes in the law, including those that lowered the dollar amount at which DOD consolidations must be justified from over $6 million to over $2 million if DOD failed to meet small business goals and required the agencies to identify small business impacts. DOD and GSA Are Waiting for SBA Final Rulemaking before Updating or Establishing Consolidation Guidance
While most DOD consolidated contracts were justified in accordance with existing DFARS, these regulations have not been fully updated to reflect new provisions on consolidating contract requirements in the 2010 Jobs Act. In October 2013, DOD issued instructions to lower the consolidated threshold to $2 million. However, unlike DOD, GSA was not required to justify its consolidated contracts before the Jobs Act, which enacted contract consolidation requirements for the first time for all federal agencies. DOD and SBA Officials Took Various Actions to Address the Impact of Contract Consolidation on Small Businesses
Our review of 100 consolidated and bundled contracts and orders issued by DOD found that slightly more than half—or 52—were awarded to small businesses. Of the 48 contracts and orders awarded to large businesses, DOD and SBA officials often addressed small business impacts through measures such as small business subcontracting plans. SBA Collects Incomplete Information on Bundled Contracts and Has Not Reported to Congress as Required
The Small Business Act requires SBA to track information on bundled contracts and annually report to Congress on these contracts. Specifically, SBA is required to:
Maintain a database containing data and information regarding each bundled contract awarded by a federal agency and each small business concern displaced as a prime contractor as a result of such bundling;
For bundled contracts that are recompeted as a bundled contract, determine the amount of savings and benefits achieved through the bundling of contract requirements, whether they would continue to be realized if the contract remains bundled, and whether the savings would be greater if procurement requirements were divided into separate solicitations suitable for award to small business concerns; and
Provide an annual report to the Congressional Committees on Small Business of the House and Senate each March on the number of small business concerns displaced as prime contractors as a result of bundled contracts awarded by federal agencies and provide information related to these contracts, such as the cost savings realized by bundling over the life of the contract and the extent to which they complied with the contracting agency’s small business subcontracting plan. SBA recently published the applicable final rule, which takes effect no later than December 31, 2013. According to the Federal Procurement Data System- Next Generation (FPDS-NG), DOD and the General Services Administration (GSA) accounted for more than 80 percent of the reported use of consolidated and bundled contracts and orders awarded in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. For this report, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD and GSA have consolidated contracts; (2) DOD and GSA justifications for contract consolidation complied with relevant laws and regulations; (3) DOD, GSA, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) addressed small business impacts of consolidation, including bundling; and (4) SBA collected and reported information on consolidated contracts that are considered bundled. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies sometimes can achieve savings by consolidating requirements from separate, smaller contracts into fewer, larger contracts. However, consolidation may negatively impact small businesses. Generally, when consolidation makes a contract unsuitable for small businesses, the contract is considered bundled, which is a subset of consolidation. Agencies must justify their actions for both consolidated and bundled requirements.
Recent National Defense Authorization Acts and a related committee report mandated that GAO review federal agency use of consolidated contracts. According to federal procurement data, DOD and GSA accounted for the vast majority of all contracts reported as consolidated in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD and GSA have consolidated contracts; (2) DOD and GSA justifications complied with relevant laws and regulations; (3) DOD, GSA, and SBA addressed small business impacts as required; and (4) SBA collected and reported information on bundled contracts. GAO identified relevant laws and regulations; analyzed federal procurement data from fiscal years 2011 and 2012; reviewed consolidated, bundled, and other contracts; and interviewed DOD, GSA, and SBA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the General Services Administration (GSA)--which accounted for more than 80 percent of the consolidated contracts reported by all federal agencies in fiscal years 2011 and 2012--do not know the full extent to which they are awarding consolidated contracts. This is the result of contracts being misreported in the federal procurement data system. GAO reviewed 157 contracts--more than half of all DOD and GSA contracts that were reported as consolidated--and found that 34 percent of the DOD contracts and all of the GSA contracts in fact were not consolidated. GAO also identified four DOD contracts with consolidated requirements that were not reported as such.
DOD generally justified contracts with consolidated requirements in accordance with existing regulations, but DOD and GSA have not yet implemented 2010 changes in the law. GAO found that 82 percent of the 100 DOD contracts confirmed as consolidated followed existing regulations pertaining to conducting market research, identifying alternatives, and justifying decisions. Most of the contracts that did not comply were justified, but the determinations were not made by an official at a level senior enough to meet defense regulation requirements. However, DOD regulations and guidance did not reflect the reduction in the value at which consolidated contracts must be justified--from over $6 million to over $2 million--as called for in the law. In October 2013, DOD lowered the dollar threshold. DOD and GSA are waiting for the Small Business Administration (SBA) to issue a final rule to implement all of the statutory changes before updating regulations. SBA issued a final rule on October 2, 2013, which takes effect no later than December 31, 2013.
DOD and SBA officials took a range of actions to address the impact of consolidation on small business. Federal law requires contracting agencies to facilitate the participation of small businesses on consolidated contracts. GAO found that half of the 100 DOD consolidated contracts reviewed were awarded to small businesses, most of which were awarded through small business set asides. Additionally, many of the consolidated contracts awarded to large businesses included measures, such as small business subcontracting plans, to address small businesses that were potentially affected by the consolidation. For the consolidated contracts considered to be bundled--for which agencies and SBA officials are specifically required to maximize small business contracting opportunities--DOD required subcontracting plans as well.
SBA does not collect complete information on bundled contracts and has not reported to congressional committees as required. Federal law requires SBA to take several actions for bundled contracts, including annual reporting to the small business committees on the extent of bundling, maintaining a database to track small business impacts, and determining if benefits were achieved through bundling. SBA officials said they have not sent reports to the committees since 2010 due to an administrative oversight. Further, SBA has not collected all required information, such as the number of small businesses affected by bundled contracts. SBA officials explained that they cannot fulfill some requirements because of limitations in existing data sources, such as the federal procurement data system, which do not collect the information needed to meet reporting requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD update and GSA establish guidance after SBA rulemaking is complete to reflect changes in the law and that SBA comply with congressional reporting requirements for bundled contracts. DOD, GSA, and SBA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-99-21 | gao_T-RCED-99-21_0 | DOE envisioned that two contractors would build and operate demonstration facilities that would initially treat at least 6 percent of the waste. DOE referred to this part of the waste treatment effort as phase I. DOE estimated that phase I would last at least until 2007 and cost about $3.2 billion and another $1.1 billion in contract support costs, for a total of about $4.3 billion. DOE’s Current Approach Differs Significantly From Original Project Strategy
DOE’s August 1998 contract with BNFL is a substantial departure from DOE’s original privatization strategy. Competition
Unlike DOE’s original approach, the project no longer includes competition between contractors. Financial Issues
DOE’s approach to financing the project has shifted from requiring the contractor to obtain all needed financing to a strategy of agreeing to repay BNFL’s debts above its equity, insurance, and other limited funds if BNFL defaults on its loans and DOE terminates the contract. DOE is now estimating that the first phase will last until at least 2017 and 10 percent of the waste will be processed. Design activities have been extended by 2 years, construction will take about 4 years longer, and the time to process the waste increased from 5 years to about 10 years. The total project costs for phase I, including DOE’s support costs, increased from $4.3 billion in the original estimate to $8.9 billion in the current estimate (in constant fiscal year 1997 dollars). Revised Approach Shifts Significant Financial Risk to the Government
Under the revised contract approach, DOE faces a substantial financial risk that could be in the billions of dollars. This risk comes mainly in the form of an agreement to pay BNFL for much of the debt incurred in constructing and operating the waste treatment facilities if BNFL defaults on its loan payments and DOE terminates the contract. This agreement has the same practical effect as a loan guarantee and is a dramatic departure from the original privatization strategy. DOE’s financial risks hinge on a number of factors that could potentially affect the project. Under its revised approach, DOE retains a significant part of the risk for the success of this technology. However, even with this change, construction will begin well before all of the design work is completed. DOE has had difficulty managing other large projects. At least in part to respond to these past difficulties, DOE has developed several systems and processes to manage the tank waste project at Hanford and has subjected its plans to outside review. DOE’s Director of Contract Reform and Privatization said that the Hanford unit does not have all of the technical skills necessary to ensure success in overseeing the project. The potential problem is not with DOE’s efforts to date but with its willingness to fully implement the oversight plans it has developed for the project. Mr. Chairman, in the report we are releasing today, we recommended that DOE take immediate action to fully implement the project’s management and oversight plan, and we suggested to the Congress that an additional review of the project at the end of the extended design phase would be appropriate given the many uncertainties and decisions that remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the challenges facing the Department of Energy (DOE) in cleaning up the waste in the 177 underground storage tanks at Hanford, Washington, focusing on: (1) how DOE's current approach has changed from its original privatization strategy; (2) how this change has affected the project's schedule, cost, and estimated savings over conventional DOE approaches; (3) what risks DOE is now assuming with this change in approach; and (4) what steps DOE is taking to carry out its responsibilities for overseeing the project.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the project as currently envisioned is substantially different from DOE's 1996 initial privatization strategy; (2) the most significant changes include eliminating further competition between contractors, building permanent facilities that could operate for 30 years or more instead of temporary facilities, and extending by 2 years the design phase and the dates for completing project financing arrangements and agreeing on the final contract price; (3) the revised approach extends the completion date for processing the first portion of the waste from 2007 to 2017, and total costs rise from $4.3 billion to $8.9 billion, including $2 billion in DOE's support costs; (4) the increased costs are mainly the result of DOE's decision to build permanent facilities that will take longer and cost more to design and build and the higher financing costs and contractor profits involved in operating these facilities over a longer period of time; (5) DOE estimates that this approach has the potential to save 26 to 36 percent over the contracting approaches it has used in the past; (6) the revised approach represents a dramatic departure from DOE's original privatization strategy of shifting most financial risk to the contractor; (7) the contract now calls for DOE to pay BNFL, Inc. for most of the debt incurred in building and operating the facility if BNFL should default on its loans; (8) DOE agreed to assume this risk because it did not think BNFL would be able to obtain affordable financing unless the government provided some assurance that the loans would be repaid; (9) DOE's financial risks are significant because the project has a number of technical uncertainties such as using waste treatment technology that has yet to be successfully tested at production levels on Hanford's complex and unique wastes, and other management challenges; (10) in an attempt to avoid repeating past mistakes in managing large projects, DOE has identified additional expertise it needs and has developed several management tools to strengthen its oversight of the project; (11) the success of the project, however, will depend heavily on how well DOE implements these plans; and (12) DOE has a history of not fully implementing its management and oversight plans, and there are some early indications on this project that DOE may be having difficulty ensuring that the proper expertise is in place and fully funding project support activities. |
gao_GAO-05-767 | gao_GAO-05-767_0 | Funding for GWOT in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 Was Provided in Annual and Supplemental Appropriations
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the military services received about $52.4 billion and about $62.1 billion, respectively, in supplemental appropriations for GWOT military personnel and operation and maintenance expenses. DOD described these funds as being intended to support GWOT. As shown in table 2, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the Army, Air Force, and Navy received additional funds in their annual appropriations—a total of about $7.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 and about $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2005—which DOD described as for support of military operations in the war on terrorism. For military personnel, the Navy and Marine Corps reported more in obligations than they received in supplemental appropriations, while for operation and maintenance each of the military services reported more in obligations than it received in supplemental appropriations. Variety of Actions Were Taken to Cover the Military Services’ GWOT Gaps in Fiscal Year 2004
To cover the military services’ gaps between reported fiscal year 2004 obligations and supplemental appropriations, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the military services used a number of authorities provided to them, including transferring funds and reducing or deferring planned spending for peacetime operations. However, DOD did not explicitly take into account the funds provided through its annual appropriations that it intended for support of GWOT. As discussed earlier, since DOD’s accounting systems do not separately identify the portion of the department’s annual appropriations that were described as having been requested to support GWOT and there are no reporting requirements for DOD to identify to which appropriation accounts the funds were allocated, the military services have lost visibility over these funds and do not know the extent to which they are being used to support GWOT. DOD Did Not Explicitly Account for Funds Provided through Its Annual Appropriation That It Described as for GWOT When Determining How to Cover Its Fiscal Year 2004 Gaps
In determining how to cover the gaps between the services’ supplemental appropriations and reported GWOT obligations for military personnel and operation and maintenance expenses, DOD did not explicitly take into account the almost $7.9 billion in funds the Army, Air Force, and Navy received in their annual appropriations through Program Budget Decision 736 to help fund GWOT. Fiscal Year 2005 Reported Obligations for GWOT Could Exceed Supplemental Appropriations, Requiring the Military Services to Use Authorities Provided to Them to Cover the Differences
Our analysis of the military services’ reported obligations for the first 8 months of fiscal year 2005 and the military services’ forecasts as of June 2005 of full fiscal year 2005 costs suggest the services’ military personnel and operation and maintenance GWOT obligations could exceed available supplemental appropriations for the war in some accounts. The services’ more detailed forecasts suggest a gap for military personnel expenses for the Air Force of about $500 million, and gaps for operation and maintenance expenses for the Army and Air Force of about $2.7 billion and about $1 billion, respectively. To cover any gaps and meet its GWOT needs, DOD and the services plan to take a variety of actions, including reprogramming funds from annual appropriations and reducing or deferring planned spending for peacetime operations. If counted in fiscal year 2005, the amounts potentially could reduce the need for reprogrammings from other activities and could reduce the Army’s and eliminate the Air Force’s GWOT gaps. The military services absorbed the increase into their annual appropriations and allocated it based on their judgment of where the funds were most needed. Consequently, despite having asked for the increase, DOD is not explicitly counting the more than $10 billion when considering funding for GWOT. In addition, DOD commented that the report’s focus on the Program Budget Decision results in the inaccurate conclusion that if DOD had considered these funds it could have reduced the Army’s GWOT gap and eliminated the GWOT gaps of the Air Force and Navy. Therefore, we are unable to ensure that DOD’s reported obligations for GWOT are complete, reliable, and accurate. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist the Congress in its oversight role, GAO is undertaking a series of reviews on the costs of operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In related work, GAO is raising concerns about the reliability of the Department of Defense's (DOD) reported cost data and therefore is unable to ensure that DOD's reported obligations for GWOT are complete, reliable, and accurate. In this report, GAO (1) identified funding for GWOT in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, (2) compared supplemental appropriations for GWOT in fiscal year 2004 to the military services' reported obligations, and (3) compared supplemental appropriations for GWOT in fiscal year 2005 to the military services' projected obligations.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, DOD received funding for GWOT through both funds included in its annual appropriation and supplemental appropriations. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the military services received about $52.4 billion and $62.1 billion, respectively, in supplemental appropriations for GWOT (1) military personnel and (2) operation and maintenance expenses. The Army, Air Force, and Navy also received in their annual appropriations a combined $7.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 and a combined $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2005, which DOD described as being intended to support GWOT. The military services absorbed the increase into their annual appropriations and allocated it based on their judgment of where the funds were most needed. DOD's accounting systems, however, do not separately identify these additional appropriations, and there are no reporting requirements for DOD to identify to which appropriation accounts the funds were allocated; consequently, the military services have lost visibility over these funds and do not know the extent to which they are being used to support GWOT. Despite having asked for the increase to support GWOT, DOD is not explicitly counting these additional funds when considering the amount of funding available to cover GWOT expenses. For fiscal year 2004, regarding supplemental appropriations for GWOT military personnel expenses, the Navy and Marine Corps reported more in obligations than they received in supplemental appropriations, while the Army and Air Force received more in supplemental appropriations than their reported obligations. Each of the services reported more in GWOT operation and maintenance obligations than it received in supplemental appropriations. To cover the differences (gaps), DOD and the services exercised a number of authorities provided them, including transferring funds and reducing or deferring planned spending for peacetime operations. However, in considering the amount of funding available to cover the gaps, DOD did not explicitly take into account the funds provided through its annual appropriation that as previously noted it described as for the support of GWOT. If DOD had considered these funds, it could have reduced the Army's GWOT gap and eliminated the GWOT gaps of the Air Force and Navy. For fiscal year 2005, the services' forecasts of GWOT obligations for the full fiscal year as of June 2005 suggest a potential gap of $500 million for military personnel for the Air Force and potential gaps of about $2.7 billion and about $1 billion, respectively, for operation and maintenance for the Army and Air Force. To cover expenses, DOD and the services again plan to take a variety of actions, including reprogramming funds and reducing or deferring planned spending. However, DOD is again not explicitly considering the funds provided through its annual appropriation, which it described as for the support of GWOT. If counted in fiscal year 2005, the amounts potentially could reduce the Army's and eliminate the Air Force's GWOT gaps and eliminate the need for reprogramming funds and reducing or deferring planned spending. |
gao_GAO-08-1125T | gao_GAO-08-1125T_0 | Background
NCLBA required the Secretary of the Interior to develop a definition of AYP for BIE schools, but also allows tribal groups to waive all or part of BIE’s definition of AYP and propose an alternative. BIE and BIE-Funded Schools Have Generally Used State Definitions of AYP, but BIE Has Not Taken Steps to Ensure Continued Access to All State Assessments
Almost all of the BIE schools adopted their state’s definition of AYP, content standards, and assessments, but BIE had signed MOUs that ensure access to state assessments with only 11 of the 23 states in which BIE schools are located, as of April 2008. Three Tribal Groups Have Officially Begun Developing AYP Alternatives in Part to Integrate Culture or Language, While Other Tribal Groups Have Chosen Not to Do So, in Part Because of Substantial Potential Challenges
As of March 2008, three tribal groups—the Navajo Nation, OSEC, and Miccosukee—had formally notified the BIE of their intent to develop alternatives to state definitions of AYP. These tribal groups represent BIE- funded schools in five states and include about 44 percent of BIE students (see table 3). Most remaining tribal groups have not pursued alternatives for various reasons, including the desire to maintain compatibility with public schools in their state, and potential challenges and resources required to develop alternatives. Tribal Groups Considering Alternatives and School Officials Reported a Lack of Federal Guidance and Communication, but BIE and Education Have Recently Begun Providing Some Initial Assistance
Most tribal groups, ELOs, and school officials we spoke with said they had received little guidance about the process BIE uses to help tribal groups develop alternatives and some expressed frustration with the pace and quality of communication with BIE. For example, officials from one of the BIE schools in California stated that, although BIE officials were aware that the state had not given the schools access to the state assessment, BIE had not communicated with or offered any type of assistance to the schools. Officials from BIE and Education Have Recently Begun to Offer Technical Assistance
To address tribal groups’ requests for technical assistance, BIE assigned a staff person as the primary BIE contact for tribal groups that are requesting technical assistance or seeking to develop alternatives. For example, officials from BIE and Education met with the Miccosukee and OSEC in November 2007 to assess the type of technical assistance needed in order for the tribal groups to pursue development of their alternatives. Education officials told us they have also sent a contractor to assist tribal groups as they pursue the development of alternative assessments. In written comments, the Department of the Interior agreed with our recommendations and indicated it had initiated steps to implement them. In preparation for this testimony, we requested an update on BIE’s actions. With regard to our recommendation about completing MOUs, BIE officials told us that they are in the process of working out the language for a memorandum of agreement with California state officials. In addition, BIE officials told us that the three tribal groups seeking alternatives were working closely with a contractor, and BIE intended to release some funding to them in late September 2008. With regard to the recommendation to provide guidelines and training on the process for pursuing alternative assessments, BIE officials told us that they have taken a preliminary step by developing a presentation that should be available to attendees of the National Indian Education Conference in October 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) requires states and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) to define and determine whether schools are making adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward the goal of 100 percent academic proficiency. To address tribes' needs for cultural preservation, NCLBA allows tribal groups to waive all or part of BIE's definition of AYP and propose an alternative, with technical assistance from BIE and the Department of Education, if requested. GAO is providing information on the extent of (1) BIE schools' adoption of BIE's definition of AYP; (2) tribal groups pursuit of alternatives and their reasons, as well as reasons for not pursuing alternatives; and (3) federal assistance to tribal groups pursuing alternatives. To prepare this testimony, GAO relied primarily on information from a recent GAO report, GAO-08-679 , and contacted BIE officials for updates on actions taken in response to GAO's prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
Although almost all of the 174 BIE schools have officially adopted BIE's definition of AYP--the definition of AYP of the state where the school is located--BIE had not yet completed memoranda of understanding (MOU) to delineate BIE and state responsibilities concerning BIE schools' access to the states' assessment systems for 12 of the 23 states with BIE schools. Without MOUs, states could change their policies regarding BIE schools' access to assessments and scoring services. Officials from the Navajo Nation, the Oceti Sakowin Education Consortium, and the Miccosukee Tribe have begun to develop alternatives to state AYP definitions, in part to make standards and assessments reflect their culture, while officials of other tribal groups have cited challenges, such as a lack of expertise, as reasons not to pursue alternatives. The three tribal groups developing alternatives, representing about 44 percent of the 48,000 BIE students, have requested technical assistance in developing their alternatives. Other tribal officials cited a desire to maintain compatibility with public schools and/or cited challenges, such as a lack of expertise, as reasons not to pursue alternatives. The three tribal groups pursuing alternatives reported a lack of federal guidance and communication, although they have recently received some initial technical assistance from BIE and Education officials. These tribal groups reported receiving little guidance from BIE and difficulties in communicating with BIE and the BIE did not always have internal response timelines or meet the ones it had. Moreover, BIE education line officers--the primary points of contact for information on the alternative provision--generally indicated that they had received no guidance or training on the provision. During the course of GAO's prior review, BIE and Education officials began offering technical assistance to the tribal groups working to develop alternatives. In response to GAO's recommendations in its June 2008 report that the Secretary of the Interior increase support, including technical assistance, guidance, training, and communication for tribal groups in their implementation of the provision for developing alternatives, BIE has taken several steps. In particular, BIE officials told GAO that they are in the process of working out the language for a memorandum of agreement with California state officials. In addition, BIE officials told GAO that the three tribal groups seeking alternatives were working closely with a contractor to develop proposals. With regard to the recommendation to provide guidelines and training on the process for pursuing alternative assessments, BIE officials told GAO that they have taken steps to develop a presentation on the process that they anticipated would be available in October 2008. |
gao_GAO-13-537 | gao_GAO-13-537_0 | According to the State Department, the U.S. government is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian Authority. According to State and USAID, the U.S. government provided about $3 billion in bilateral assistance for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to support education and social services, economic development, and humanitarian assistance, among other sectors. PIF was established by Palestinian Authority presidential decree in 2002 and became operational in 2003 as an investment company aimed at strengthening the Palestinian economy through strategic investments. U.S. Agencies Participate in Various Programs with PIF or PIF-owned Entities
Two U.S. agencies—OPIC and USAID—are involved in programs with PIF and a PIF-owned entity. OPIC participates in home mortgage financing and small business loan guarantee programs along with PIF. USAID provided technical assistance and training to benefit participating banks in the Loan Guarantee Facility (LGF) program and has participated in educational programs at the American International School in Gaza, which is owned by PIF through a special purpose vehicle. OPIC, PIF, and Commercial Banks Are Co-Lenders to the Affordable Mortgage and Loan Program in the West Bank
OPIC, PIF, and local and regional commercial banks are co-lenders to the for-profit Affordable Mortgage and Loan Company (AMAL) in the West Bank, which is aimed at encouraging mortgage lending to low- and medium-income borrowers. OPIC officials stated that OPIC and PIF have not yet financed any mortgage purchases under the AMAL program. Under the AMAL Common Agreement, OPIC has committed to lend $313 million to AMAL (about 65 percent of the total debt commitment), while PIF has committed to lend $72 million (about 15 percent of AMAL’s total debt commitment). June 2013. According to USAID officials, USAID provided implementing partners in support of AISG an estimated total of about $1.3 million in assistance from 2010 to 2013. OPIC’s and USAID’s Processes for Vetting PIF or Entities and Individuals in Programs Involving PIF Rely on Various Information Sources
OPIC’s and USAID’s processes for vetting PIF, a PIF-owned entity, or other entities and individuals in the AMAL, LGF, and AISG assistance programs rely on various information sources, including information provided by their implementing partners. Specifically, the banks must verify at the time the mortgage loan is approved that each borrower and guarantor does not appear on the Palestine Monetary Authority Central Bank Blacklist, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (OFAC’s list), and the Compendium of United Nations Security Council Sanctions Lists. According to OPIC, it vetted the participants in the AMAL program— including PIF’s board of directors and senior executives, non-U.S. board members of AMAL, non-U.S. AMAL shareholders, and key individuals of the banks—against the OFAC list, the FBI Terrorist Screening Center database, and other relevant databases. As the coordinating agent for the LGF program, MEII is to vet all borrowers and lenders. OPIC said it provides information about each proposed participating bank to Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes and inquires whether there is any unacceptable derogatory information in Treasury’s databases that might prevent OPIC from supporting a particular lender. OPIC said that it has vetted and cleared all nine participating banks in the LGF program. USAID’s Process for Vetting the Technical Assistance and Training and AISG Programs Was Based on Its Mission Order 21 and Relied on Various Information Sources
According to USAID officials, USAID’s process for vetting key participants of the Technical Assistance and Training program for Palestinian banks and the AISG program was based on the U.S. Mission to the West Bank and Gaza’s Mission Order 21. According to USAID and based on Mission Order 21, it vetted key individuals of PTEC, such as members of the board of directors, as well as AISG’s management, such as the principal and vice-principal of the school, against law enforcement and intelligence community systems accessed by USAID’s Office of Security and through discussions with U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, as applicable. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the nature and scope of U.S. government involvement with the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF), and (2) OPIC’s and USAID’s processes for vetting PIF and other non-U.S. entities and individuals participating in programs involving PIF and PIF- owned entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the State Department (State), the U.S. government is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian Authority. According to State, the U.S. government provided about $3 billion in total bilateral assistance for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. PIF was established by Palestinian Authority presidential decree in 2002 and became operational in 2003 as an investment company aimed at strengthening the Palestinian economy through strategic investments.
GAO was asked to provide information on U.S. involvement with the Palestine Investment Fund. This report describes (1) the nature and scope of U.S. government involvement with PIF, and (2) OPIC's and USAID's processes for vetting PIF and other non-U.S entities and individuals participating in programs involving PIF and PIF-owned entities. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, PIF, and implementing partners.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies and implementing partners participate in various programs with the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) or PIF-owned entities that include home mortgage financing, loan guarantees, and educational initiatives. First, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) along with PIF and other entities have committed to lend $485 million to the Affordable Mortgage and Loan Company (AMAL) to support mortgages for low- and medium-income borrowers in the West Bank. OPIC has committed to lend about $313 million; PIF has committed about $72 million, and two banks account for the balance of the committed lending. However, as of April 2013, OPIC and PIF had not yet disbursed any funds. Second, OPIC and PIF are co-guarantors in a Loan Guarantee Facility (LGF) program in the West Bank, guaranteeing up to $110 million and $50 million in loans, respectively, to nine regional banks to support lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Third, USAID officials stated that, in 2009, USAID provided a U.S. implementing partner $2.1 million for technical assistance and training to enhance the lending practices of participating banks in support of the LGF. Finally, according to USAID, it provided about $1.3 million from 2010 to 2013 to three U.S. implementing partners to provide technical, in-kind, and scholarship assistance to the American International School in Gaza (AISG), which is owned by the Palestine Technology and Education Complex, a PIF-owned entity. According to USAID, its involvement with AISG ended in June 2013.
OPIC's and USAID's processes for vetting PIF and other non-U.S. entities and individuals in programs involving PIF and PIF-owned entities rely on various information sources. For the AMAL program, the two banks that issue mortgages are required under the AMAL agreements to vet potential borrowers for terrorist financing against such information sources as Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (OFAC) and the Compendium of United Nations Security Council Sanctions Lists; AMAL and OPIC are to conduct additional vetting. OPIC officials stated that OPIC has vetted PIF's board of directors and senior executives, the non-U.S. board members and shareholders of AMAL, and key officials of the banks against information sources such as the FBI Terrorist Screening Center database, OFAC list, and OPIC's Information Center databases. For the LGF program, OPIC said that, based on OPIC's procedures and the LGF agreements, it has vetted all the participating banks and has vetted key officials of each borrower and guarantor before loans are approved using information sources such as Treasury's Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes and FBI's Terrorist Screening Center databases. According to USAID officials, its process for vetting key participants of the Technical Assistance and Training program and the AISG program was based on documented vetting procedures for the West Bank and Gaza Mission. USAID officials said that all banks that participated in the LGF program that received training and technical assistance from USAID were subject to USAID's formal vetting process. USAID said it vetted information about AISG's owners and management against law enforcement and intelligence community systems accessed by USAID's Office of Security and through discussions with the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, as applicable.
What GAO Recommends
This report does not contain any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-513T | gao_GAO-12-513T_0 | Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to Congress a force structure plan laying out the numbers, size, and composition of the units that constitute U.S. defense forces—for example, divisions, ships, and air wings—based on the Secretary’s assessment of the probable national security threats over the ensuing 20 year period, and an inventory of global military installations. The BRAC statute directed GAO to evaluate the need for the 2005 BRAC round. Key Factors and Challenges Affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005
GAO identified several factors and challenges that contributed to DOD’s implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved. In contrast to other BRAC rounds that were primarily focused on achieving savings by reducing excess infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense identified three goals for BRAC 2005. Specifically, BRAC 2005 was intended to transform the military, foster jointness, and reduce excess infrastructure to produce savings. These goals and the primary selection criteria’s focus on enhancing military value led DOD to identify numerous recommendations that were designed to be transformational and enhance jointness, thereby adding to the complexity the Commission and DOD faced in finalizing and implementing the BRAC recommendations. However, implementation of these BRAC recommendations led to other challenges that required significant stakeholder coordination. For the first time, OSD required the military departments to develop business plans to better inform OSD of financial and status of implementation details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations and to facilitate OSD oversight. These business plans included information such as a listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation; schedules for personnel relocations between installations; and updated cost and savings estimates by DOD based on more accurate and current information. In cases where interdependent recommendations required multiple relocations of large numbers of personnel, delays in completing one BRAC recommendation had a cascading effect on the implementation of other recommendations. Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24.7 billion in new construction or renovation. Given the complexity of these interdependent recommendations, OSD required the military services and defense agencies to periodically brief it on implementation challenges and progress. The scale of BRAC 2005 posed a number of challenges to the Commission as it did its independent review. First, the Commission reported that it assessed closure and realignment recommendations of unprecedented scope and complexity. For example, the Commission reported that it struggled to fully understand the net impact on bases that were both gaining and losing missions at the same time, as in the interdependent BRAC recommendations discussed above. The effect on communities from installation growth has led to challenges for the communities to ensure the provision of adequate services to the installation. As we have previously reported, communities experiencing growth were hindered in their ability to effectively plan for off-base support such as adequate roads and schools due to inconsistent information from DOD around the 2007 time frame. Costs to Implement BRAC 2005 Increased as Estimated Savings Decreased
Our analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress and each annual submission throughout the BRAC 2005 implementation period shows that one-time implementation costs grew from $21 billion originally estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 to In about $35.1 billion, an increase of about $14.1 billion, or 67 percent.constant 2005 dollars, costs increased to about $32.2 billion, an increase of 53 percent. 9.5 percent decrease from the Commission’s estimate. The 20-year net present value savings estimated by the Commission in 2005 for this BRAC round have decreased by 73 percent to about $9.9 billion. Some recommendations were acknowledged to be unlikely to produce savings in the 20-year net present value window. Finally, our analysis of the fiscal year 2011 BRAC budget shows that DOD will not recoup its up-front costs to implement BRAC recommendations until 2018—5 years later than the BRAC Commission estimates show it would take to pay back. GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military Construction Program. Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and Reserve Facilities. Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has faced long-term challenges in managing and halting degradation of its portfolio of facilities and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free up funds to better maintain the facilities it still uses and to meet other needs. Costs to build and maintain the defense infrastructure represent a significant financial commitment. DODs management of its support infrastructure is on GAOs high-risk list, in part because of the challenges DOD faces in reducing its unneeded excess and obsolete infrastructure. DOD plans to reduce force structure and the President will request that Congress authorize the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process for 2013 and 2015. The Secretary of Defense stated that the BRAC process is the only effective way to achieve needed infrastructure savings.
This testimony discusses (1) key factors and challenges that contributed to BRAC 2005 implementation and results and (2) the most recent estimated costs and savings attributable to BRAC 2005. To do this work, GAO reviewed its previous work and selected documents related to BRAC 2005 such as BRAC business plans that laid out the requisite actions, timing of those actions, and DODs estimated costs and savings associated with implementing each recommendation, briefings on BRAC implementation status prepared by the military services, and budget justification materials submitted to Congress. GAO also interviewed current and former officials from DOD and the BRAC Commission involved in the development, review, and implementation of BRAC recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO identified several factors and challenges that contributed to the Department of Defenses (DOD) implementation of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 and the results achieved. In contrast to other BRAC rounds that were primarily focused on achieving savings by reducing excess infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense identified three goals for BRAC 2005. Specifically, BRAC 2005 was intended to (1) transform the military, (2) foster jointness, and (3) reduce excess infrastructure to produce savings. These goals and the primary selection criterias focus on enhancing military value led DOD to identify numerous recommendations that were designed to be transformational and enhance jointness, thereby adding to the complexity the BRAC Commission and DOD faced in finalizing and implementing the recommendations. Some transformational-type recommendations needed sustained attention by DOD and significant coordination and planning among multiple stakeholders. To improve oversight of implementation of the recommendations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) required business plans for each BRAC 2005 recommendation to better manage implementation. In addition, DOD developed recommendations that were interdependent on each other. However, this led to challenges across multiple recommendations when delays in completing one recommendation led to delays in completing others. Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24.7 billion in new construction or renovation at installations. Given the complexity of some BRAC recommendations, OSD directed the services to periodically brief it on implementation challenges. Furthermore, the scale of BRAC 2005 posed a number of challenges to the Commission as it conducted its independent review. For example, it reported that DODs recommendations were of unprecedented scope and complexity, compounding the difficulty of its review. Moreover, the interdependent nature of some recommendations made it difficult for the Commission to evaluate the effect on installations that were both gaining and losing units simultaneously. Finally, the effect on communities from installation growth has led to challenges. For example, communities experiencing growth were hindered in their ability to effectively plan for off-base support such as adequate roads and schools due to inconsistent information from DOD around the 2007 time frame.
DODs fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress shows that costs to implement the BRAC recommendations grew from $21 billion originally estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 dollars to about $35.1 billion in current dollars, an increase of about $14.1 billion, or 67 percent. In constant 2005 dollars, costs increased to $32.2 billion, an increase of 53 percent. Costs increased mostly due to military construction as DOD identified the need for new and renovated facilities to enhance capabilities. In 2005, the Commission estimated net annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion and a 20-year net present value savings by 2025 of $36 billion. GAOs analysis shows annual recurring savings are now about $3.8 billion, a decrease of 9.5 percent, while the 20-year net present value savings are now about $9.9 billion, a decrease of 73 percent. As such, DOD will not recoup its up-front costs until 2018. |
gao_GAO-09-352 | gao_GAO-09-352_0 | DOD Has Made Progress in Transferring Inadequate Family Housing to Developers Although Actual Replacement Will Take Several Years
Since Congress authorized the Military Housing Privatization Initiative in 1996, DOD has made significant progress in transferring inadequate military family housing from its inventory by privatizing these homes. However, it will be several more years before developers are able to replace or renovate all of the inadequate houses as expected because developers cannot complete all needed construction and renovation at once. Developers had replaced or renovated about 67 percent of the inadequate privatized houses as of February 2009. Although a Majority of Privatization Projects Exceed DOD’s Generally Expected Occupancy Rate, Certain Projects Are Not Meeting This Rate
While the majority of DOD’s privatization projects are exceeding DOD’s generally expected occupancy rate of 90 percent, each service has some projects that are not meeting this rate. As of September 2008, about 70 percent of DOD’s privatization projects were maintaining the expected occupancy, while about 30 percent of the projects were below the 90 percent occupancy rate. These two factors have made it difficult for the project to maintain an occupancy rate sufficient to generate enough revenue to cover expenses. Several Defense Initiatives Are Adding to the Challenge in Providing Affordable and Adequate Housing and the Services Are Taking Steps to Mitigate That Challenge
Several ongoing defense force structure and infrastructure initiatives, such as implementing base realignment and closure recommendations, returning some military forces based overseas to defense installations in the United States, converting Army units to modular brigade combat teams under the Army modularity initiative, and increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps force structure, are collectively compounding the challenge DOD faces in ensuring military servicemembers and their families have affordable and adequate family housing. DOD officials explained that when an already awarded project that is being carried out by one developer is retrofitted with either a new project or another already awarded project, the Army’s total investment in the developer carrying out the combined retrofitted projects must stay below a certain percentage of the capital cost of both projects combined, not a percentage of each project separately. DOD’s most recent semiannual report to the congressional defense committees did not include information on the retrofitting model. Current Turmoil in Financial Markets Has Reduced Available Construction Funding for Some Privatization Projects
Several factors related to the current turmoil in the financial markets have reduced available funds for home construction, resulting in a larger proportion of renovations relative to new construction and reduced scope and amenities at some military family housing privatization projects. Second, more funds now need to be set aside to help ensure debt repayment. Collectively, a decline in available construction funds caused by higher interest rates, increased debt repayment reserve requirements, and lower rates of return on invested funds could have an adverse impact on the condition and amenities of military housing privatization projects, which could in turn reduce occupancy, and ultimately threaten the financial viability of those projects. Further, a House Conference Report directed DOD to include data on developers’ contributions to the recapitalization accounts of each ongoing family housing privatization project in each semiannual report on the privatization program, and the House Appropriations Committee has directed DOD to provide a semiannual report summarizing the results of DOD’s military housing privatization initiative monitoring tool and giving status reports on each privatization project underway. However, information about the impact that the recent turmoil in the financial markets is having on some projects and the resulting effects on available funds for new construction as well as on future recapitalization funds was not included in DOD’s most recent semiannual status report to the congressional defense committees in January 2009. By including this information on housing privatization projects in its semiannual report, DOD could provide Congress with a more current view of the effects of the current financial market and enhance congressional defense committees’ ability to monitor the services’ efforts to provide servicemember with quality housing over the life of each project. Including information about the changed status of retrofitted projects would assist congressional oversight of the program. To assess the progress of DOD’s housing privatization efforts we obtained and analyzed performance data on each of DOD’s privatization projects. Service officials identified some newly awarded projects that were more affected by market turmoil than others. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) was facing to repair, renovate, and construct military family housing, Congress enacted the Military Housing Privatization Initiative in 1996. The initiative enables DOD to leverage private sector resources to construct or renovate family housing. As of March 2009, DOD had awarded 94 projects and attracted over $22 billion in private financing. DOD plans to privatize 98 percent of its domestic family housing through 2012. Since GAO's last housing privatization report in 2006, major force structure initiatives have placed new demands on DOD for housing. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress of DOD's housing privatization program, (2) the occupancy rates of the housing projects, (3) the impact of various force structure initiatives and DOD's efforts to mitigate any challenges, and (4) the effect of financial market turmoil on some projects. To perform this work, GAO visited 13 installations with privatization projects; analyzed project performance data; and interviewed DOD officials, real estate consultants, and private developers.
What GAO Found
DOD has made significant progress since 1996 to remove inadequate family housing from DOD's inventory by transferring these homes to developers, but it will be several more years before all of these inadequate houses are either replaced or renovated. Developers had replaced or renovated about 67 percent of the inadequate privatized housing as of February 2009. While about 70 percent of military housing privatization projects are exceeding DOD's expected occupancy rate of 90 percent, each service has some projects below this rate. Some privatization projects with occupancy rates below 90 percent are challenged to generate enough revenue to fund construction, make debt payments, and set aside funds for recapitalization, which could negatively affect the condition and attractiveness of privatized homes and make it harder to compete with other homes in the community. Base realignment and closure actions, overseas rebasing, Army modularity, and grow-the-force initiatives are challenging DOD's ability to provide family housing at some installations, and the services are taking steps to mitigate the challenge. Among other measures, Army developed an approach where an already awarded project is retrofitted with a new or another already awarded project. Once retrofitted, Army's total investment in the developer carrying out the projects must stay below a certain percentage of the capital costs of both projects combined, not a percentage of each project separately. This practice often results in DOD investing additional funds towards retrofitted projects. The House Appropriations Committee directed DOD to report on the status of each privatization project underway on a semiannual basis. However, DOD's most recent semiannual report did not include information on the retrofitting model it is using for certain projects. Including information on the changed status of privatized projects in DOD's report would assist congressional oversight of the program. Several factors related to turmoil in the financial markets have reduced available funds for project construction, resulting in more renovations relative to new construction and reduced amenities at some newly awarded projects. First, higher interest rates in bond financing have increased the cost of some projects. Second, due to the diminished value of bond insurance, developers are having to set aside project funds to increase assurances the debt is repaid but that reduces available funds for construction. Third, financial turmoil has resulted in lower rates of return on invested funds. Consequently, as more homes are renovated given effects of today's financial markets, more recapitalization funds could be required. In H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 110-424, the conference committee expressed interest in monitoring developers' contributions to recapitalization accounts in DOD's semiannual report. However, information these effects have had on housing privatization projects was not included in DOD's most recent report. By including this information in its semiannual report, DOD could provide defense committees with a more current view of the financial market effects on these privatized projects. |
gao_GAO-07-837 | gao_GAO-07-837_0 | Specifically, it requires information security programs that, among other things, include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; subordinate plans, for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Incidents Place Sensitive Information at Risk
Since January 2006, federal agencies have reported a spate of security incidents that have put sensitive data at risk, including the theft, loss, or improper disclosure of personally identifiable information on millions of Americans, thereby exposing them to loss of privacy and potential harm associated with identity theft. As discussed later in this report, OMB has issued guidance that largely addresses these lessons. Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies in Implementing Security Policies and Practices
As illustrated by recent security incidents, significant weaknesses continue to threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of federal agencies. As a result, there is increased risk that sensitive data and personally identifiable information may be compromised. For instance, agencies did not prepare key security reports such as failed login attempt reports. For example, many agencies did not consistently configure network devices and services to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, such as installing critical software patches in a timely manner. As a result, agencies’ cannot ensure that appropriate controls are in place to protect key systems and critical information. IRS had not consistently implemented effective access controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to computing resources from within its internal network. Agencies Report Progress, but More Work Is Needed in Implementing Requirements
Federal agencies continue to report steady progress in implementing key information security requirements. However, IGs at several agencies sometimes disagreed with the information reported by the agency and have identified weaknesses in the processes used to implement these and other security program activities. In addition, agencies may not be fully aware of the security control weaknesses in their systems, thereby leaving the agencies’ information and systems vulnerable to attack or compromise. In response, OMB has taken steps to enhance its reporting instructions. However, the metrics specified in current reporting guidance do not measure how effectively agencies are performing various activities and the guidance does not address a key activity. The absence of this information could result in reporting that does not adequately reflect the status of agency implementation of required information security policies and procedures. Require agencies to report on a key activity—patch management. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In accordance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requirement that the Comptroller General report periodically to Congress, our objectives were to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies’ information security policies and practices and (2) federal agency implementation of FISMA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, GAO has reported that weaknesses in information security are a widespread problem with potentially devastating consequences--such as intrusions by malicious users, compromised networks, and the theft of personally identifiable information--and has identified information security as a governmentwide high-risk issue. Concerned by reports of significant vulnerabilities in federal computer systems, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which permanently authorized and strengthened the information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements for federal agencies. As required by FISMA to report periodically to Congress, in this report GAO discusses the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies' information security policies and practices and agencies' implementation of FISMA requirements. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed agency, inspectors general (IG), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), congressional, and GAO reports on information security.
What GAO Found
Significant weaknesses in information security policies and practices threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of most federal agencies. Recently reported incidents at federal agencies have placed sensitive data at risk, including the theft, loss, or improper disclosure of personally identifiable information on millions of Americans, thereby exposing them to loss of privacy and identity theft. Almost all of the major federal agencies had weaknesses in one or more areas of information security controls. Most agencies did not implement controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer resources. In addition, agencies did not always manage the configuration of network devices to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, such as patching key servers and workstations in a timely manner; assign incompatible duties to different individuals or groups so that one individual does not control all aspects of a process or transaction; or maintain or test continuity of operations plans for key information systems. An underlying cause for these weaknesses is that agencies have not fully implemented their information security programs. As a result, agencies may not have assurance that controls are in place and operating as intended to protect their information resources, thereby leaving them vulnerable to attack or compromise. Nevertheless, federal agencies have continued to report steady progress in implementing certain information security requirements. For fiscal year 2006, agencies generally reported performing various control activities for an increasing percentage of their systems and personnel. However, IGs at several agencies disagreed with the information the agency reported and identified weaknesses in the processes used to implement these activities. Further, although OMB enhanced its reporting instructions to agencies for preparing fiscal year 2006 FISMA reports, the metrics specified in the instructions do not measure how effectively agencies are performing various activities, and there are no requirements to report on a key activity. As a result, reporting may not adequately reflect the status of agency implementation of required information security policies and procedures. |
gao_GAO-03-355 | gao_GAO-03-355_0 | Furthermore, an item’s reorder point can move up or down over time and—depending on the item—may include one or more of the following: war reserves, unfilled requisitions, a safety level to be on hand in case of minor interruptions in the resupply process or unpredictable fluctuations in demand, minimum quantities for essential items for which demand is not normally predicted (also referred to as insurance items), inventory to satisfy demands while broken items are being repaired, inventory to satisfy demands during the period between when the need to replenish an item through a purchase is identified and when a contract is let (also referred to as administrative lead time), and inventory to satisfy demands during the period between when a contract for inventory is let and when the inventory is received (also referred to as production lead time). In addition, large imbalances in the inventory continue to exist. As of September 30, 2001, over 1.7 million items had $38 billion of inventory on hand or on order that exceeded the items’ current inventory operating requirements of $24.9 billion. We also identified 523,000 items that did not have enough inventory on hand or on order to meet the items’ current inventory operating requirements. 1 and 2). Management Changes Will Reduce the Size of the Department’s Inventory
The services are implementing management changes that will reduce the size of DOD’s reported inventory and the amount of inventory that satisfies requirements. Requirements Are Increasing, but Some of Navy’s Are Overstated
DOD’s overall inventory requirements increased by $10.6 billion, or 26 percent, between the end of fiscal years 1999 and 2001, with some of the Navy’s requirements being overstated. A large part of the Navy increase, $3.4 billion, was due to the Navy reporting change we discussed in the previous section—that is, reporting aviation parts held by ships and air squadrons as inventory that were previously not reported. However, some Navy increases were caused by inaccurate data used to compute administrative lead time requirements, and as a result, those requirements are overstated. The Navy was responsible for the largest share of DOD’s overall inventory requirements increase, with $4.7 billion of the $10.6 billion inventory change. Navy Inventory Requirements Increased for a Variety of Reasons
Navy requirements increased $4.7 billion between September 30, 1999, and September 30, 2001, primarily due to a change in how the Navy accounts for aviation inventory requirements. The remaining Navy increase was due to such reasons as price increases and increased usage of items. A large part of the Navy’s increase was due to a change in the way the Navy accounts for aviation inventory requirements for parts held by ships and air squadrons. Since 1997 the Navy has generally reduced its actual administrative lead time. For example, revised data reduced the lead time from 200 days to 183 days for medium-sized sole-source contracts for repairable items. | Why GAO Did This Study
Changes in the Department of Defense's (DOD) mission can lead to changes in inventory requirements, which, in turn, determine the size of DOD's inventory. Since 1990, GAO has identified DOD's management of inventory as a high-risk area because levels of inventory were too high and management systems and procedures were ineffective. Furthermore, DOD has attributed readiness problems to parts shortages. In this report, GAO (1) provides information on changes in and make up of the department's inventory and (2) analyzes changes in inventory requirements, focusing on the Navy.
What GAO Found
DOD reported a $5.6 billion increase in inventory on hand and a $1.7 billion increase in inventory on order between September 30, 1999, and September 30, 2001. The reported inventory increases were primarily due to the Navy reporting aviation parts held by ships and air squadrons that were previously not reported and to overall DOD inventory requirements increases. In addition, GAO identified large imbalances in the department's inventory; as of September 30, 2001, over 1.7 million items had $38 billion of inventory that exceeded the items' current inventory operating requirements of $24.9 billion. At the same time, there were 523,000 items that needed an additional $10.4 billion of inventory to meet the items' current inventory operating requirements. Generally, inventory increases are the result of increases in inventory requirements. DOD's overall inventory requirements increased by $10.6 billion, or 26 percent, between the end of fiscal years 1999 and 2001, with some of the Navy's requirements being overstated. The Navy was responsible for the largest dollar increase, $4.7 billion of the $10.6 billion increase. A large part of the Navy increase, $3.4 billion, was attributable to a change in the way the Navy accounted for aviation parts held by ships and air squadrons. The remaining Navy increase was attributable to a variety of reasons, such as price increases; increased demand and item wear-out rates; and, in some cases, inaccurate data. Also, since 1997 the Navy has reduced the amount of administrative lead time it takes to place inventory orders (the period between when the need to replenish an item through a purchase is identified and when a contract is let), yet it has not formally updated the data used to compute those requirements. For example, the Navy reduced the administrative lead time for medium-sized sole-source contracts for repairable items from 200 days to 130 days, but it did not recognize the reduction in its requirements computations. As a result, those requirements are inaccurate and overstated. |
gao_GAO-03-661 | gao_GAO-03-661_0 | The leading commercial companies we studied report achieving and expecting to achieve billions of dollars in savings by developing companywide spend analysis programs and services contracting strategies, as shown in table 2. Companies have experienced problems accumulating sufficient data from internal financial systems that do not capture all of what a company buys or are being used by different parts of the company but are not connected. Although these are the right first steps, the agency has yet to emulate the best practices of spend analysis to the same extent as the private sector. For example, DOD is subject to statutory and regulatory goals for contracting with small businesses and other socioeconomic categories, such as woman-owned small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses, that may constrain it from consolidating numerous smaller contracts into larger ones. This is an approach often taken by the companies we studied. DOD cites its lack of a single financial data system relative to procurements as another challenge. Given that DOD’s spending on services’ contracts is approaching $100 billion annually, the potential benefits of overcoming the challenges and using best practices to establish an effective spend analysis program are significant and can achieve a total-spending perspective across DOD, make the business case for collaboration in joint purchasing rather than organize an effective management structure to assign accountability and exercise oversight, identify potentially billions of dollars in procurement savings opportunities by leveraging buying power, and identify opportunities to achieve other procurement efficiencies such as reducing duplication in purchasing, supporting supplier diversity, and improving supplier performance. Key elements of DOD’s approach should address using technology to centrally automate the spend analysis process to make using accounts payable and other internal financial and procurement data to gain a comprehensive and reliable view of spending, supplementing internal data with external information such as purchase card expenditures and business intelligence to gain a more complete picture of DOD spending and to refine analysis, reviewing purchase data for accuracy and consistency, organizing the data by commodity and supplier categories in order to identify opportunities to leverage buying power, promoting enterprise collaboration aimed at gaining the best value, including the establishment of cross-functional teams to continue developing strategic-sourcing projects, and presenting relevant spending reports to appropriate decision makers to establish strategic savings and performance goals, assign accountability, and measure results. Moreover, for DOD to change management structure and business processes for services-contracting will require sustained leadership at DOD as well as the involvement and support of Congress. Thus, for purposes of accountability and transparency in support of such involvement and leadership, DOD needs to develop a plan for timely changes necessary to implement a more strategic approach to contracting. This engagement focused on (1) the best practices of leading companies as they relate to conducting and using spend analysis, and (2) the extent to which DOD can pursue similar practices. Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) spending on service contracts approaches $100 billion annually, but DOD's management of services procurement is inefficient and ineffective and the dollars are not always well spent. Recent legislation requires DOD to improve procurement practices to achieve savings. Many private companies changed management practices based on analyzing spending patterns and coordinating procurement in order to achieve major savings. This report evaluates five companies' best practices and their conduct and use of "spend analysis" and the extent that DOD can pursue similar practices.
What GAO Found
The leading commercial companies GAO studied reported achieving and expecting to achieve billions of dollars in savings by developing companywide spend analysis programs and service-contracting strategies. Spend analysis answers basic questions about how much is being spent for what services, who are the suppliers, and where are the opportunities for leveraged buying to save money and improve performance. To obtain these answers, companies extract internal financial data, supplement this data with external data, organize the data into categories of services and suppliers, and have the data analyzed by managers or cross-functional teams to plan and schedule what services will be bought on a company wide basis. The results of spend analysis are also used for broader strategic purposes--to develop reports for top management, to track financial and other benefits achieved by the company, and to further improve and centralize corporate procurement processes. DOD is in the early stages of a spend analysis pilot. Although DOD is moving in the right direction, it has not yet adopted best practices to the same extent as the companies we studied. Whether DOD can adopt these practices depends on its ability to make long-term changes necessary to implement a more strategic approach to contracting. DOD also cites a number of challenges, such as its large and complex need for a range of services, the fragmentation of spending data across multiple information systems, and contracting goals for small businesses that may constrain its ability to consolidate smaller requirements into larger contracts. Challenges such as these are difficult and deep-rooted, but companies also faced them. For DOD to change management practices for the contracting of services will require sustained executive leadership at DOD as well as the involvement and support of Congress. |
gao_GAO-10-263 | gao_GAO-10-263_0 | Historically, many formulas have relied at least in part on decennial census and related data as a source of these variables. Per capita income is used to calculate Medicaid’s FMAP. The Federal Government Obligated an Estimated $478 Billion in Fiscal Year 2009 at Least in Part Based on Census and Related Data
Our analysis showed that each of the 10 largest federal assistance programs in fiscal year 2008 and 2009 relied at least in part on decennial census and related data to determine funding. For fiscal year 2008, this totaled about $334.9 billion, representing about 73 percent of total federal assistance. For fiscal year 2009, the estimated obligations of the 10 largest federal assistance programs totaled about $478.3 billion, representing about 84 percent of total federal assistance. This amount included about $122.7 billion funded by the Recovery Act and about $355.6 billion funded by other means. To illustrate how these factors can be used in formula grant funding, we selected examples from the federal assistance programs in our review. Variables Other Than Total Population Can Affect Role of Population in Grant Funding Formulas
All of the programs in our review included one or more grants with formulas containing variables other than total population. Obviously, absent other factors, funding based on these formulas will be affected less by changes in population than those that rely solely on total population. Factors That Modify the Formula Amount Could Affect the Role of Population in Grant Funding
Some factors modify the amount that a state would otherwise receive under the funding formula and could affect the role of population in grant funding formulas. The factors include the following: (1) hold harmless provisions and caps; (2) small state minimums; and (3) funding floors and ceilings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how much the federal government obligates to the largest federal assistance programs based on the decennial census and related data and how the Recovery Act changed that amount, and (2) what factors could affect the role of population in grant funding formulas. To answer our objectives, we identified 11 federal assistance programs representing the 10 largest programs in each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 based on the dollar amounts obligated reported in the President’s budget, issued in May 2009, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010 (Fiscal Year 2010 budget), Table 8-4, Summary of Programs by Agency, Bureau, and Program. 2010 Census: Population Measures Are Important for Federal Funding Allocations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many federal assistance programs are funded by formula grants that have historically relied at least in part on population data from the decennial census and related data to allocate funds. In June 2009, the Census Bureau reported that in fiscal year 2007 the federal government obligated over $446 billion through funding formulas that rely at least in part on census and related data. Funding for federal assistance programs continues to increase. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to determine (1) how much the federal government obligates to the largest federal assistance programs based on the decennial census and related data, and how the Recovery Act changed that amount; and (2) what factors could affect the role of population in grant funding formulas. To answer these objectives, GAO identified the 10 largest federal assistance programs in each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 based on data from the President's fiscal year 2010 budget. GAO reviewed statutes, agency reports, and other sources to obtain illustrative examples of how different factors could affect the role of population data in grant funding.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis showed that each of the 10 largest federal assistance programs in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 relied at least in part on the decennial census and related data--that is, data from surveys with designs that depend on the decennial census, or statistics, such as per capita income, that are derived from these data. For fiscal year 2008, this totaled about $334.9 billion, representing about 73 percent of total federal assistance. For fiscal year 2009, the estimated obligations of the 10 largest federal assistance programs totaled about $478.3 billion, representing about 84 percent of total federal assistance. This amount included about $122.7 billion funded by the Recovery Act and about $355.6 billion funded by other means. Several factors can affect the role of population in grant funding formulas. When a formula includes variables in addition to total population, the role of population in the grant funding formula is less than if the formula relies solely on total population. All of the programs in GAO's review included one or more grants with formulas containing variables other than total population, such as the level of transit service provided. In addition, other factors can modify the amount that a state or local entity would have otherwise received under the formula. These factors include (1) hold harmless provisions and caps; (2) small state minimums; and (3) funding floors and ceilings. With the application of these factors, grant funding may be affected less or entirely unaffected by changes in population. |
gao_GAO-03-202T | gao_GAO-03-202T_0 | According to RHS documents and Treasury officials, RHS has referred all of the loans that it has reported as eligible for cross-servicing. According to RHS officials, the agency will report the entire unpaid principal balances for its direct SFH loans that have been accelerated beginning with the TROR for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2002. RHS is currently working on making the regulatory changes that are needed to refer losses on guaranteed SFH loans to Treasury’s offset program; however, the agency will not be able to refer such losses until regulatory action is completed and guaranteed loan applications are modified. After the hearing, to address these problems, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FSA to develop and implement (1) automated system enhancements to make the Program Loan Accounting System capable of identifying all judgment debts eligible for referral to Treasury for collection action, (2) oversight procedures to ensure that FSA field offices timely and routinely update the Program Loan Accounting System to accurately reflect the status of delinquent debts, including whether the debts are eligible for referral to Treasury for collection action, and (3) oversight procedures to ensure that all debts discharged through bankruptcy are promptly closed out and reported to the IRS as income to the debtor in accordance with the Federal Claims Collection Standards and OMB Circular A-129. FSA has developed an action plan to improve its process and controls for identifying and referring eligible debts to Treasury and, based upon our review of documents provided by FSA, the agency has made progress toward implementing such improvements. In addition, actions are being taken to improve field office oversight for DCIA implementation. After the hearing, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FSA to monitor effective completion of the planned automated system modifications to refer eligible debt to Treasury’s offset program on a quarterly, rather than annual, basis. Agriculture Is Working toward Departmentwide Implementation of AWG
At the December 2001 hearing, we stated that Agriculture and eight other agencies we surveyed still had not utilized AWG as authorized by DCIA to collect delinquent nontax debt even though experts had previously testified before this Subcommittee that AWG could potentially be an extremely powerful debt collection tool. Although Agriculture has completed its departmentwide AWG implementation plan, components of the plan still need to be carried out. For example, the CFO plans to obtain individual AWG implementation plans from Agriculture’s agencies that include each agency’s timetable for implementation, written policies and procedures, and types of debt subject to AWG. In addition, Agriculture still needs to work with its agencies to provide Treasury with authorization to use AWG as part of cross-servicing and to complete the agreement with Veterans Affairs to conduct AWG hearings on Agriculture’s behalf. Treasury’s Debt Collection Improvement Account Has Not Been Activated
DCIA includes a voluntary “gainsharing” provision that allows agencies to deposit a limited and defined portion of their debt collections into a special fund account maintained and managed by Treasury. The Secretary may make payments from amounts appropriated to agencies for purposes related to credit management, debt collection, and debt recovery. Treasury has established a debt collection improvement account that can be activated if its appropriations authorize the expenditure. However, the Congress made no amounts available in Treasury’s appropriations to fund the account. According to Treasury, because the debt collection improvement account has never been utilized, it is difficult to assess how effective the account could be in enhancing federal agencies’ debt collection or what changes, if any, should be made in the financial incentive area to improve debt collection governmentwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2001, GAO testified at a hearing, before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, that the Department of Agriculture, primarily the Rural Housing Service (RHS) and the Farm Service Agency (FSA), faced challenges in implementing key provisions of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (DCIA). The testimony focused on RHS's and FSA's progress in referring delinquent debt for administrative offset and cross-servicing and Agriculture's implementation of administrative wage garnishment (AWG). During the hearing, Agriculture pledged to place a higher priority on delinquent debt collection and to substantially improve its implementation of DCIA by December 31, 2002. After the hearing, GAO made recommendations The Subcommittee requested GAO to review and provide an update on actions Agriculture has taken to resolve these problems. In addition, the Subcommittee requested that GAO report on the status of Treasury's implementation of a debt collection improvement account, a vehicle authorized by DCIA to give agencies financial incentives to improve their debt collection efforts.
What GAO Found
Recent actions taken by Agriculture demonstrate increased commitment to DCIA implementation. However, it will take sustained commitment and priority by top management to fully address the problems we identified. RHS has worked to address systems limitations that hampered it from promptly referring debts to Treasury for cross-servicing and is now referring all reported eligible debt. RHS will begin reporting certain loans' entire unpaid principal balances on accelerated debt as delinquent, beginning with its report for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2002. RHS is working on making regulatory changes needed for it to refer losses on guaranteed loans to Treasury's offset program, but the changes are not expected to be completed until about August 2003. FSA has developed an action plan to improve its process and controls for identifying and referring eligible debts to Treasury. GAO's review of documents related to the plan indicates that FSA has made progress toward implementing the improvements. In addition, by December 2002, FSA expects to be able to begin reporting information for some codebtors when referring delinquent debts for collection action; to begin referring debts quarterly, rather than annually; and to be able to refer eligible losses on guaranteed loans. Agriculture has taken steps toward departmentwide implementation of AWG. Agriculture has completed its AWG implementation plan but still needs to carry out certain elements of the plan, including obtaining from its component agencies specific information on the types of debt subject to AWG and finalizing an agreement with the Department of Veterans Affairs to conduct AWG hearings on Agriculture's behalf. Agriculture has also drafted regulations necessary for implementing AWG, which may not be published until May 2003. Treasury has established a debt collection improvement account but, to date, it has not been activated because no amounts have been made available in Treasury's appropriations to fund the account. Agencies would be allowed to contribute a portion of their debt collections into the account, and amounts could be used to reimburse agencies for certain expenses related to credit management and debt collection and recovery. Because the account has not been activated, it is difficult to assess how effective it might be in improving federal debt collection beyond the debt collection improvements that have resulted directly from DCIA's major debt collection requirements for federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-03-935 | gao_GAO-03-935_0 | Despite this huge investment in buying services, our work—and the work of the DOD Inspector General—has found that DOD’s spending on services could be more efficient and more effectively managed. Pursuing such a strategic approach clearly pays off. Private sector experience demonstrates the need to change how services are acquired—by modernizing management structure and business processes—and setting performance goals, including savings, and establishing accountability for achieving them. I for a descriptive comparison of DOD and military department policies.) In response to the legislative requirement to develop an automated system to collect and analyze data, DOD has started a spend analysis pilot that views spending from a DOD-wide perspective and identifies large-scale savings opportunities. DOD has not established a strategic plan that provides a road map for transforming its services contracting process and recognizes the integrated nature of services contracting management problems and their related solutions. Given that DOD’s spending on services contracts is approaching $100 billion annually, the potential benefits for enhancing visibility and control of services spending are significant. DOD expects that various initiatives being pursued to enhance services acquisition management structures and processes—such as the management structure for reviewing individual service acquisitions valued at more than $500 million and the spend analysis pilot assessed in this report—will ultimately provide the information with which to decide what overarching joint management and business process changes are necessary. However, it is too early to tell if these early efforts will lead DOD and the military departments to make the type of long-term changes that are necessary to achieve significant results in terms of savings and service improvements. As described in the legislative history, these requirements provide tools with which the department can promote the use of best commercial practices to reform DOD’s services procurement management and oversight and to achieve significant savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on service contracts approaches $100 billion annually, but recent legislation directs DOD to manage its services procurement more effectively. Leading companies transformed management practices and achieved major savings after they analyzed spending patterns and coordinated procurement. This report evaluates DOD's implementation of the legislation in light of congressional interest in promoting the use of best commercial practices for acquiring services.
What GAO Found
DOD and the military departments each have a management structure in place for reviewing individual services acquisitions valued at $500 million or more, but that approach does not provide a departmentwide assessment of how spending for services could be more effective. Greater attention is needed by DOD management to promote a strategic orientation by setting performance goals, including savings goals, and ensuring accountability for achieving them. To support management decisions and improve visibility over spending on service contracts, DOD is developing an automated system to collect and analyze data by piloting a spend analysis. The analysis views spending from a DOD-wide perspective and identifies large-scale savings opportunities, but its scope is limited, and it is too early to tell how the department can make the best use of its results. The military departments are in the early stages of separate initiatives that may lead them to adopt a strategic approach to buying services, but DOD lacks a plan that coordinates these initiatives or provides a road map for future efforts. |
gao_GGD-99-39 | gao_GGD-99-39_0 | FCCs Were Less Likely Than USCCs to Pay U.S. Income Tax
In each year from 1989 through 1995, a majority of corporations, both foreign- and U.S.-controlled, paid no U.S. income tax. Among large corporations, the percentage of FCCs that paid no tax exceeded that for USCCs from 1989 to 1993. However, in 1994, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant, and in 1995, the percentage of large FCCs that paid no U.S. income tax was slightly less than that of large USCCs. Large FCCs Paid Less Income Tax Relative to Gross Receipts Than Large USCCs in 1995
Other ways to compare large FCCs and USCCs include examining (1) the percentage of large FCCs and USCCs that paid relatively little tax and (2) the taxes paid relative to gross receipts by large corporations, as shown in table 1. Age Differences Between Large FCCs and USCCs
From 1989 to 1993, a greater percentage of large FCCs than large USCCs were new (i.e., incorporated for 3 years or less). The IRS data that we examined for tax years 1989-95 also showed that, in each of those years, the percentage of new large corporations paying no tax exceeded the percentage of older large corporations paying no tax. The Industrial Profile of Large FCCs Differed From That of Large USCCs
Large FCCs were more heavily concentrated in the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors and less heavily concentrated in the financial services sector than were large USCCs. Cost Ratios Varied Significantly Across Industries
The ratios of the costs of goods sold and other costs to receipts varied significantly across industries, which could account for some of the difference between the amount of taxes that large FCCs paid per dollar of receipts and the amount that large USCCs paid. The ratio of taxable income per dollar of receipts should be inversely related to the ratio of costs per dollar of receipts. This pattern of differences in cost ratios across industries was similar for both all large FCCs and all large USCCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided an update to its report on the nonpayment of U.S. income taxes by foreign-controlled corporations (FCC) and U.S.-controlled corporations (USCC), focusing on comparisons of: (1) the percentages of FCCs and USCCs that filed income tax returns showing no tax liabilities for 1989 through 1995, the latest years for which data were available; and (2) selected characteristics, including age, industrial sector, and certain cost ratios, of large corporations--those with assets of $250 million or more or gross receipts of $50 million or more.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in each year between 1989 and 1995, a majority of corporations, both foreign- and U.S.-controlled, paid no U.S. income tax; (2) among large corporations, the percentage of FCCs that paid no tax exceeded that for USCCs from 1989 through 1993; (3) in 1994, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant, and in 1995, the percentage of large FCCs that paid no U.S. income tax was slightly less than that of large USCCs; (4) differences in the characteristics of large FCCs and USCCs may account for part of the differences in the amount of taxes paid by the two groups; (5) one difference was the percentage of new corporations--3 years old or less--in each group; (6) the Internal Revenue Service data GAO reviewed indicate that newer corporations were less likely than older corporations to pay taxes; (7) from 1989 to 1993, a greater percentage of large FCCs than large USCCs were new, but from 1994 to 1995, a greater percentage of large USCCs than large FCCs were new; (8) another significant difference between large FCCs and large USCCs was in their distribution across industrial sectors; (9) in 1995, in comparison to large USCCs, large FCCs were more heavily concentrated in the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors and less concentrated in the financial services sector; (10) aggregate ratios of costs to receipts for all large corporations differed significantly across industrial sectors; (11) the difference in cost ratios across industries, combined with the fact that large FCCs and USCCs were concentrated in different industries, could account for some of the difference in the amount of taxes that large FCCs paid per dollar of receipts and that large USCCs paid; and (12) the ratio of taxable income per dollar of receipts should be inversely related to the ratio of costs per dollar of receipts. |
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