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gao_GAO-12-33 | gao_GAO-12-33_0 | Except for individual returns, those rates were far from the 80 percent goal. IRS is implementing the e-file mandate in two phases. In 2012, the e-file requirement will apply to paid preparers who reasonably expect to file more than 10 individual, estate, or trust tax returns. E-filed tax returns provide IRS with digital information. 2.) The preparers we talked with who were new to e-filing said they experienced increased costs and administrative burdens as a result of the mandate. We interviewed 26 prepare who were members of national preparer groups. Several preparers who had been e-filing prior to the mandate said they experienced some of these same problems when they first e-filed, but do not any longer. Three of the preparers we interviewed noted that their software automatically generated the new forms needed to comply with the mandate (e.g., Form 8948), and two preparers said that they heard about the mandate through their software companies. .
IRS Is Developing ith Plans to Deal w Noncompliant Preparers and Study Lessons Learne E-file Mandate Implementation
IRS Does Not Know Extent of Preparer Noncompliance with t Mandate or Have the Authority to Issue Monetary Penalties
IRS officials believe there are potentially three types of p may not comply with the e-file mandate: Preparers who the mandate or do not fully understand the requirements; know about the mandate, sign the tax return, but intentionally choose not to e-file; or complete tax returns, but do not sign the returns or submit them electronically. Sanctions can include censure, suspension from practic before IRS, or disbarment. IRS already has authority under the IRC to impose penalties in other, similar circumstances. Without such penalty authority, IRS may be limited in its ability to deter noncompliance and enforce the e-file mandate. In addition, as previously noted, IRS has a policy of posting the same information from electronic and paper returns to its databases, so that similar paper and electronic returns have equal chances of being selected for audit. However, IRS officials told us that IRS does not have funding at this time to transcribe all the remaining data lines from paper returns. IRS Does Not Have a Complete List of Forms That Cannot Be Accepted Electronically Nor Does It Have a Time Line for Adding Them to the E-file System
Preparers and taxpayers wanting to e-file may not be able to because some forms have not been added to IRS’s e-file systems. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider amending the Internal Revenue Code to authorize IRS to assess penalties on preparers for failure to comply with section 6011(e)(3). Recommendations for Executive Action
To help increase electronic filing and to better target IRS’s efforts, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct the appropriate officials to take the following five actions: develop a plan for and schedule to conduct a study that identifies and documents lessons learned from the implementation of the e-file mandate; determine whether and to what extent the benefits of bar-coding would outweigh the costs; determine the relative costs and benefits of transcribing different individual lines of tax return data; develop and prioritize a list of forms that still need to be added to the Modernized e-File system; and create a timetable to add additional forms to the Modernized e-File system, particularly for high-volume forms, such as the 1040-X and 1040-NR. To assess IRS’s analysis of options for digitizing more data from paper returns, we reviewed IRS’s 2008 proposal, Modernized Submission Processing: Solution Concept Briefing, to add a bar coding system to process paper returns and analyzed IRS’s priority transcription list developed by IRS’s Deputy Commissioner’s Office for Service and Enforcement (Service and Enforcement). To determine whether there are any tax forms IRS cannot accept electronically and assess IRS’s plans for adding them to the e-filing system, we compared a list and time line of all tax forms that Submission Processing planned to add to the e-file system to a list of all existing IRS forms obtained from the Forms and Publications division. For 2012, when the mandate threshold is lowered to more than 10 returns, IRS officials project that e-file applications will increase by 38 percent over the average annual applications based on prior years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) goal is to receive 80 percent of all major types of tax returns electronically by 2012. Legislation passed in November 2009 supports the 80 percent goal for individual income tax returns by requiring tax return preparers who file more than 10 individual returns per year to file them electronically, or e-file. GAO was asked to review IRS's implementation of this e-file mandate. Specifically, GAO (1) described e-file rates and preparers' experiences implementing the mandate, (2) assessed IRS's plans to enforce the mandate, (3) assessed IRS's analysis of options for digitizing more data from paper returns, and (4) determined whether there are any tax forms IRS cannot accept electronically and assessed IRS's plans for adding them to the e-file system. To conduct these analyses, GAO reviewed IRS processing data and e-file planning documents, and interviewed IRS officials and 26 members of national preparer organizations.
What GAO Found
In 2011, 79 percent of all individual tax returns were e-filed, a noticeable increase over prior years. Both preparer and self-prepared e-file rates increased, which IRS officials attributed to different factors. They said the e-file mandate was one key factor in the growth of preparer e-filing. Preparers GAO interviewed who were new to e-filing said they experienced increased costs and administrative burdens due to the mandate. Several preparers who had been e-filing prior to the mandate said they experienced some of these same problems when they first e-filed, but they now find that e-filing helps their business--for example, by reducing the time needed to file returns. IRS's plans to identify preparers who are not complying with the mandate are not fully developed because IRS does not know the extent of noncompliance and it may be low. Nonetheless, officials stated some noncompliance likely exists and may increase in 2012 when the mandate applies to more preparers. Regardless of the extent, IRS does not have authority under the IRC to assess penalties on preparers who fail to comply. IRS may be able to impose sanctions under Department of Treasury regulations that govern practice before IRS. However, the process is costly and the penalties, which could include suspension of practice, may be harsher than needed. IRS is considering pursuing two options to digitize more data--bar coding and additional transcription. IRS does not transcribe all lines from paper returns. IRS's policy is to post the same information from electronic and paper returns to its databases, so that similar paper and electronic returns have equal chances of being audited. IRS has not analyzed the costs and benefits of these options, which could support informed funding decisions. Some forms cannot be e-filed, including two relatively high-volume forms for amended returns and nonresident aliens. IRS has not developed a complete list of forms that cannot currently be e-filed nor does it have a time line for adding them to the e-file system. Without adding forms such as these to the system, IRS will limit e-filing's growth potential. Congress should consider amending the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to provide IRS with penalty authority for preparer noncompliance with the mandate. GAO also recommends, among other things, that IRS conduct analyses on the costs and benefits of implementing bar coding and additional transcription and create a time line and list of forms to be added to the e-file system. IRS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-829 | gao_GAO-05-829_0 | Achieving GLI’s objective to have consistent water quality standards for controlling point sources of toxic pollutants may prove difficult, however, because of flexible implementation procedures that allow discharge of pollutants at levels greater than GLI water quality standards. States Have Largely Completed Adopting GLI Standards in Their Regulatory Programs, but Measuring Some Pollutants at GLI Levels Is a Significant Challenge
By 1998, the Great Lakes states largely completed adopting GLI provisions in their regulatory programs by incorporating GLI standards in their environmental regulations and NPDES permit programs. Upon reviewing state regulations, however, EPA found that several states had either failed to adopt some GLI provisions or adopted provisions that were inconsistent with GLI guidance. However, in Wisconsin, the GLI provisions promulgated by EPA have not been implemented because state officials believe provisions that are not explicitly supported by Wisconsin law cannot be implemented and because material disagreements exist between state officials and EPA over the GLI provisions. EPA Has Not Ensured Consistent Implementation of GLI Standards or Taken Adequate Steps Toward Measuring Progress in Achieving GLI Goals
To ensure the eight Great Lakes states implement GLI consistently, EPA stated in GLI that it would undertake certain activities, including issuing a mercury permitting strategy and developing and operating a Clearinghouse for the sharing of information by states to facilitate the development and implementation of GLI water quality standards. Although EPA believed that there was sufficient flexibility in GLI to handle the unique problems posed by mercury, such as variances and TMDLs, it intended to develop a mercury permitting strategy to provide a holistic, comprehensive approach by the states for addressing this pollutant. Conclusions
While GLI has limited potential to improve overall water quality in the Great Lakes Basin because of its focus on point source pollution, it is important that GLI’s goals be achieved because they assist in the virtual elimination of toxic pollutants called for in the GLWQA. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the full and consistent implementation of the Great Lakes Initiative and improve measures for monitoring progress toward achieving GLI’s goals, we are recommending that the EPA Administrator direct EPA Region 5, in coordination with Regions 2 and 3, to take the following three actions: issue a permitting strategy that ensures a more consistent approach to controlling mercury by the states, ensure the GLI Clearinghouse is fully developed, maintained, and made available to the Great Lakes states to assist them in developing water quality standards for pollutants covered by GLI, and gather and track information that can be used to assess the progress of implementing GLI and the impact it has on reducing pollutant discharges from point sources in the Great Lakes Basin. GLI was an effort by the United States to further control these substances. | Why GAO Did This Study
The virtual elimination of toxic pollutants in the Great Lakes is a goal shared by the United States and Canada. While some progress has been made, pollution levels remain unacceptably high. The Great Lakes Initiative (GLI) requires stringent water quality standards for many pollutants in discharges regulated by states administering National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit programs. As requested, this report examines the (1) GLI's focus and potential impact on water quality in the Great Lakes Basin, (2) status of GLI's adoption by the states and any challenges to achieving intended goals, and (3) steps taken by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for ensuring full and consistent implementation of GLI and for assessing progress toward achieving its goals.
What GAO Found
GLI has limited potential to improve overall water quality in the Great Lakes Basin because it primarily focuses on regulated point sources of pollution, while nonpoint sources, such as air deposition and agricultural runoff, are greater sources of pollution. GLI's potential impact is further limited because it allows the use of flexible implementation procedures, such as variances, whereby facilities can discharge pollutants at levels exceeding stringent GLI water quality standards. Finally, many of the chemical pollutants regulated by GLI have already been restricted or banned by EPA and have a limited presence in point source discharges. By 1998, the eight Great Lakes states had largely adopted GLI water quality standards and implementation procedures in their environmental regulations and NPDES programs. However, EPA determined that some states had failed to adopt some GLS provisions or had adopted provisions that were inconsistent with GLI and EPA promulgated rules imposing GLI standards. Wisconsin officials, however, believe that the state cannot implement standards that are not explicitly supported by state law, and disagreements with EPA over the rules remain unresolved. As a result, GLI has not been fully adopted or implemented in the state. Finally, a major challenge to fully achieving GLI's goals remains because methods for measuring many pollutants at the low levels established in GLI do not exist. Consequently, some pollutants cannot be regulated at these levels. EPA has not ensured consistent GLI implementation by the states nor has the agency taken adequate steps toward measuring progress. For example, EPA did not issue a mercury permitting strategy to promote consistent approaches to the problems posed by mercury as it stated in GLI. In the absence of a strategy, states developed permits for mercury that vary from state to state. Attempts by EPA to assess GLI's impact have been limited because of inadequate data or information that has not been gathered for determining progress on dischargers' efforts to reduce pollutants. |
gao_GAO-05-238 | gao_GAO-05-238_0 | Under the Denial of Federal Benefits Program, judges in federal and state courts may deny a range of federal licenses, contracts, and grants to persons convicted of controlled substances drug trafficking and drug possession offenses. In addition, 9 PHAs reported that they acted on 21,996 applications for admission into the HCV Program and that less than 1.5 percent of applicants were denied admission for reasons of drug-related criminal activities. This amounted to an average of fewer than 600 offenders per year. Eighteen States Fully Implement the Federal Ban on TANF, as the Remainder Have Enacted Legislation to Exempt Some or All Convicted Drug Felons
A total of 32 states have enacted laws that exempt all or some convicted drug felons from the federal ban on TANF benefits. In States That Fully Implement the Ban on TANF, about 15 Percent of All Drug Offenders Released from Prison in 2001 Were Estimated to Meet TANF Eligibility Criteria
Using Bureau of Justice Statistics survey data on the family and economic characteristics of drug offenders in prison and state-level data on the number of drug offenders released from prison during 2001 in 14 of the 18 states that fully implement the ban on TANF, we estimated that about 15 percent of those released from prison were parents of minor children, lived with their children, and had earned income below the maximum levels permitted by their states of residence. In States That Fully Implement the Ban on Food Stamps, About One- Fourth of Drug Offenders Released from Prison in 2001 Were Parents Who Could Have Been Eligible for Food Stamps
At the time of our review, 15 states fully implemented the federal ban on food stamp benefits to convicted drug felons, and 35 states had passed laws to exempt all or some convicted drug felons in their own states from the federal ban on food stamps. Our estimates indicate that denial of benefit laws potentially affect relatively small percentages of drug offenders, although the numbers potentially affected in given years may be large. This is because they are more likely to be custodial parents with low incomes and thus otherwise eligible for the benefits. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Federal law provides that certain drug offenders may or must be denied selected federal benefits, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, federally assisted housing, postsecondary education grants and loans, and certain federal contracts and licenses. (2) What factors affect whether drug offenders would have been eligible to receive TANF and food stamp benefits, but for their drug offense convictions, and for a recent year, what percentage would have been eligible to receive these benefits? Assessing How Many Drug Offenders Were Estimated to Be Denied Federal Postsecondary Education and Federally Assisted Housing Benefits and Certain Grants and Contracts
To estimate how many or what percentage of drug offenders were reported to be denied federal postsecondary education and federally assisted housing benefits and certain grants and contracts under the Denial of Federal Benefits Program, we obtained and analyzed data from agency officials. From a nonprobability sample of some of the largest public housing agencies (PHA) in the United States, we obtained information about reported actions taken in 2003 in these PHAs to deny persons federally assisted housing benefits for reasons of drug-related criminal activities. Estimating the Percentage of Convicted Drug Felons That Would Have Been Eligible to Receive TANF or Food Stamps and the Factors Contributing to These Estimates
Data limitations concerning the actual number of persons denied TANF and food stamp benefits required us to develop estimates of the drug offenders that could be denied these benefits in that they had characteristics that would have allowed them to qualify to receive the benefits except for their drug offense convictions. Methods for Estimating the Percentage of Drug Felons Potentially Affected by the TANF and Food Stamp Bans
To assess the potential impacts of the bans on TANF and food stamps, we estimated the percentage of a population of drug felons released from prison that would be eligible to receive TANF, and but for their drug offense conviction could receive the benefit. The data are provided annually for academic years 2001-2002 through 2003-2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Several provisions of federal law allow for or require certain federal benefits to be denied to individuals convicted of drug offenses in federal or state courts. These benefits include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, federally assisted housing, postsecondary education assistance, and some federal contracts and licenses. Given the sizable population of drug offenders in the United States, the number and the impacts of federal denial of benefit provisions may be particularly important if the operations of these provisions work at cross purposes with recent federal initiatives intended to ease prisoner reentry and foster prisoner reintegration into society. GAO analyzed (1) for selected years, the number and percentage of drug offenders that were estimated to be denied federal postsecondary education and federally assisted housing benefits and federal grants, contracts, and licenses and (2) the factors affecting whether drug offenders would have been eligible to receive TANF and food stamp benefits, but for their drug offense convictions, and for a recent year, the percentage of drug offenders released who would have been eligible to receive these benefits. Several agencies reviewed a draft of this report, and we incorporated the technical comments that some provided into the report where appropriate.
What GAO Found
For the years for which it obtained data, GAO estimates that relatively small percentages of applicants but thousands of persons were denied postsecondary education benefits, federally assisted housing, or selected licenses and contracts as a result of federal laws that provide for denying benefits to drug offenders. During academic year 2003-2004, about 41,000 applicants (or 0.3 percent of all applicants) were disqualified from receiving postsecondary education loans and grants because of drug convictions. For 2003, 13 of the largest public housing agencies in the nation reported that less than 6 percent of 9,249 lease terminations that occurred in these agencies were for reasons of drug-related criminal activities--such as illegal distribution or use of a controlled substance--and 15 large public housing agencies reported that about 5 percent of 29,459 applications for admission were denied admission for these reasons. From 1990 through the second quarter of 2004, judges in federal and state courts were reported to have imposed sanctions to deny benefits such as federal licenses, grants, and contracts to about 600 convicted drug offenders per year. Various factors affect which convicted drug felons are eligible to receive TANF or food stamps. This is because state of residence, income, and family situation all play a role in determining eligibility. Federal law mandates that convicted drug felons face a lifetime ban on receipt of TANF and food stamps unless states pass laws to exempt some or all convicted drug felons in their state from the ban. At the time of GAO's review, 32 states had laws exempting some or all convicted drug felons from the ban on TANF, and 35 states had laws modifying the federal ban on food stamps. Because of the eligibility requirements associated with receiving these benefits, only those convicted drug felons who, but for their conviction, would have been eligible to receive the benefits could be affected by the federal bans. For example, TANF eligibility criteria include requirements that an applicant have custodial care of a child and that income be below state-determined eligibility thresholds. Available data for 14 of 18 states that fully implemented the ban on TANF indicate that about 15 percent of drug offenders released from prison in 2001 met key eligibility requirements and constitute the pool of potentially affected drug felons. Proportionally more female drug felons than males may be affected by the ban, as about 27 percent of female and 15 percent of male drug offenders released from prison in 2001 could be affected. |
gao_GAO-16-176 | gao_GAO-16-176_0 | Agencies also have a responsibility to monitor and maintain accurate records on the status of our recommendations. We will close the recommendation as not implemented if TSA has indicated that it was not taking action or we determined that it was unlikely that TSA would take action to close these recommendations. TSA Has Implemented 51 of 58 Recommendations Relating to the Acquisition of Security-Related Technology Aimed at Improving Agency Planning and Analysis
TSA has implemented 51 of the 58 recommendations we made from October 1, 2003, through July 31, 2015, intended to improve TSA’s acquisition of security-related technology, and has not implemented the remaining 7 recommendations (see fig. 1). TSA has not implemented 7 recommendations we made from fiscal year 2003 through July 31, 2015. The 3 open recommendations are focused on improving AIT operations, while the 4 closed recommendations were related to establishing the effectiveness of canine screening, conducting technical assessments to strengthen airport perimeter security, and AIT operations. TSA concurred with this recommendation. However, we continue to believe that the recommendation has merit and should be fully implemented. TSA’s Implementation of GAO Recommendations Has Resulted in Financial Benefits and Other Programmatic and Process Improvements
Since fiscal year 2003, we have identified approximately $1.7 billion in financial benefits, largely representing funds that TSA used to support other programs and activities, based on implementation of our recommendations as well as findings from our related reports and testimonies on security-related technology acquisitions. We have also identified additional benefits, including programmatic and process improvements to TSA’s programs stemming from implementation of our recommendations and related work. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS did not provide formal comments but provided technical comments from TSA which we incorporated as appropriate. Product Title
Recommendation To assist TSA in further strengthening the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary of TSA to fully implement the provisions in the program’s risk management plan to include developing an inventory of risks with prioritization and mitigation strategies, report the status of risks and progress to management, and maintain documentation of these efforts. Product Number GAO-14-357
Issue Date March 31, 2014 To help ensure that TSA improves Screening Officers’ (SO) performance on Advanced Imaging Technology systems equipped with Automated Targeted Recognition (AIT- ATR) and uses resources effectively, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration should establish protocols that facilitate the capturing of operational data on secondary screening of passengers at the checkpoint to determine the extent to which AIT-ATR system false alarm rates affect operational costs once AIT-ATR systems are networked together. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within DHS, TSA is the federal agency responsible for securing domestic transportation systems. The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (TSARA) contains a provision for GAO to submit a report to Congress containing an assessment of TSA's implementation of GAO recommendations regarding the acquisition of security-related technology. This report addresses (1) the status of TSA's implementation of relevant GAO recommendations since 2003 and the characteristics of those recommendations and (2) benefits realized by TSA in implementing those recommendations.
GAO determined the number and status of recommendations made to TSA from October 1, 2003, after TSA had become a part of the newly created DHS, through July 31, 2015, as well as the benefits derived from the recommendations TSA implemented, using an internal database that GAO maintains on the status of recommendations it makes. GAO specifically identified recommendations related to the acquisition of technology that helps TSA prevent or defend against threats to domestic transportation systems. TSA concurred with GAO's list of recommendations. TSA also provided technical comments on a draft of this report which GAO incorporated as appropriate. DHS did not provide formal comments.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has implemented 51 of the 58 recommendations GAO made from October 1, 2003, through July 31, 2015, to improve TSA's acquisition of security-related technology. GAO's recommendations generally directed TSA to develop a plan; conduct an analysis; or implement a program, policy, or procedure. For example, in March 2014, GAO recommended that TSA establish protocols to capture operational data on secondary screening of passengers at the checkpoint, to help ensure screening officers' performance.
TSA has not implemented 7 of the 58 recommendations. GAO closed 4 of the 7 recommendations because TSA stated that it would not take action or GAO determined that it was unlikely that TSA would take action. These recommendations were related to establishing the effectiveness of canine screening, conducting technical assessments to strengthen airport perimeter security and Advanced Imaging Technology. The remaining 3 open recommendations are focused on improving Advanced Imaging Technology operations. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid and should be fully addressed.
Since fiscal year 2003, GAO has identified approximately $1.7 billion in financial benefits, largely representing funds that TSA used to support other programs and activities, based on implementation of GAO's recommendations as well as findings from related GAO reports and testimonies on security-related technology acquisitions. GAO has also documented additional benefits, including programmatic and process improvements to TSA's programs, such as improvements to TSA's Electronic Baggage Screening Program's cost estimating processes. |
gao_GAO-06-442T | gao_GAO-06-442T_0 | Leadership, Planning, Exercises, and Capabilities Underpin Catastrophic Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Four key themes, based on our preliminary work, underpin many of the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane Katrina and reflect certain lessons learned from past catastrophes. They include the central importance of (1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels in advance of a catastrophic disaster, (2) clarifying the procedures for activating the National Response Plan and applying them to emerging catastrophic disasters, (3) conducting strong advance planning and robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in advance of a real disaster, and (4) strengthening response and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic disaster, including those such as emergency communications, continuity of essential government services, and logistics and distribution systems underpinning citizen safety and security. Planning for a Catastrophic Disaster Calls for a Risk Management Approach
It is vital to have in place a risk management decision making approach to develop federal capabilities and the expertise to use them to respond to a catastrophic disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress should consider using such an approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. Hurricane Katrina was the first major test of the NRP. Organizational Placement Has Been Raised as a Key FEMA Performance Factor
Because of FEMA’s mission performance during Hurricane Katrina, concerns have been raised regarding the agency’s organizational placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or again become an independent agency. Importantly, other factors, such as the experience of and training provided to FEMA leadership and adequacy of resources may be more important to FEMA’s future success than its organizational placement. Long Term Rebuilding Efforts Raise Issues for Congressional Consideration
Madame Chairman, the federal government will be a major partner in the longer-term rebuilding of the Gulf Coast because of the widespread damage and economic impact. In support of state and local efforts, the federal role in rebuilding will be particularly important for transportation and health infrastructures and federal facilities. In addition, federal programs will face financial difficulties and there is uncertainty concerning the impact of catastrophic disasters on the availability and affordability of insurance. The Federal Role and Involvement Will Raise Ongoing Issues
As we move forward, long-term rebuilding in the Gulf Coast raises issues concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding should be done, where and based on what standards, who will pay for what, and what oversight is needed to ensure federal funds are spent for their intended purposes. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts. Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The size and strength of Hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history. Hurricane Katrina raised major questions about our nation's readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters. Hurricane Rita increased demands on an already stressed response and recovery effort by all levels of government. The two hurricanes provided a sobering picture of the overwhelming strains on response and recovery if there are back-to-back catastrophic disasters in the same area. GAO has a large body of ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What GAO Found
Significant government and private resources were mobilized to respond to the hurricanes. However, these capabilities were clearly overwhelmed and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the results. Many of the lessons emerging from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are similar to those we identified more than a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which leveled much of South Florida. Four major issues have emerged from our preliminary work. The preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina are similar to lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters. These include the critical importance of (1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for catastrophic response in advance of such events, (2) clarifying the procedures for activating the National Response Plan and applying them to emerging catastrophic disasters, (3) conducting strong advance planning and robust training and exercise programs, and (4) strengthening response and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. A risk management decision making approach is vital to develop the nation's capabilities and expertise to respond to a catastrophic disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress should consider using such an approach in deciding how best to invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. Because of FEMA's mission performance during Hurricane Katrina, concerns have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or become an independent agency. However, other factors such as leadership and resources may be more important to FEMA's future success than organizational placement. Lastly, the federal government will be a major partner in the longer-term rebuilding of the Gulf Coast, supporting state and local efforts. The federal role in rebuilding will be particularly important for transportation and health infrastructures and federal facilities. In addition, federal programs will face financial difficulties and there is uncertainty about catastrophic losses affecting the availability and affordability of insurance. Long term rebuilding raises issues concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding should be done, who will pay for what, and what oversight is needed to ensure federal funds are spent for their intended purposes. |
gao_GAO-09-1040T | gao_GAO-09-1040T_0 | DLA is DOD’s largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime to the military services as well as civilian agencies and foreign countries. DLA supplies almost every consumable item the military services need to operate. Sound Practices Vital to Ensuring DLA Receives Value When Acquiring Commodities
Proper Requirements Definition Is Essential to Obtaining Value
DLA determines what and how many items it buys based on requirements from its military service customers. Without a good understanding of customers’ projected needs, DLA is not assured it is buying the right items in the right quantities at the right time. Our prior work has identified instances where problems in properly defining requirements can lead to ineffective or inefficient management of commodities. Similarly, while DLA had a model to forecast supply requirements for contingencies, this model did not produce an accurate demand forecast for all items, including Meals Ready-to-Eat. As a result, they underestimated the demand for some items. Some combat support units came within a day or two of exhausting their Meals Ready-to-Eat rations, putting Army and Marine Corps units at risk of running out of food if the supply distribution chain was interrupted. Selecting the appropriate type is important because certain contracting arrangements may increase the government’s cost risk whereas others transfer some of that cost risk to the contractor. We have previously testified before this committee that once the decision has been made to use contractors to support DOD’s missions or operations, it is essential that DOD clearly defines its requirements and employs sound business practices, such as using appropriate contracting vehicles. Similarly we noted in a 2007 report on the Army Corps of Engineers Restore Iraqi Oil Contract that DLA’s Defense Energy Support Center was able to purchase fuel and supply products for the forces in Iraq more cheaply than the contractor because the Defense Energy Support Center was able to sign long-term contracts with the fuel suppliers, an acquisition strategy the contractor did not pursue because of the incremental funding provided by the Army. As we reported in 2006, DLA has recognized that the prime vendor concept may not be suitable for all commodities and has begun adjusting acquisition strategies to reassign programs to a best procurement approach. Proper Contract Oversight and Management Key to Obtaining Value
In addition to ensuring requirements for contracts awarded through DLA have been properly defined and the appropriate type of contract has been put in place, proper contract oversight and management is essential to ensure DOD gets value for taxpayers’ dollars and obtains quality commodities or services in a cost-efficient and effective manner. Failure to provide adequate oversight hinders the department’s ability to address poor contractor performance and avoid negative financial and operational impacts. Our prior work has found while these challenges have affected DLA’s ability to obtain value, in some cases DLA has also taken actions to address these challenges. While much of our work on contract management has been focused on weapons system acquisition and service contractors, we have found similar challenges with DOD’s acquisition of commodities. In June 2006, we found that DLA officials were not conducting required price reviews for the prime vendor contracts for food service equipment and construction and equipment commodities. Both logistics agency and supply center officials acknowledged that these problems occurred because management at the agency and supply center level were not providing adequate oversight to ensure that contracting personnel were monitoring prices. DLA has established contracting officer’s representative training requirements to ensure these individuals are properly trained to carry out their responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective logistics. As the Department of Defense's (DOD) largest combat support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies almost every consumable item the military services need to operate, from Meals Ready-to Eat to jet fuel. Given current budgetary pressures and the crucial role DLA plays in supporting the military service in the United States and overseas, it is vital that DOD ensure DLA is getting value for the commodities and services it acquires. The committee asked GAO to identify the challenges DOD faces in ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. This testimony focuses on sound practices GAO has identified regarding obtaining value when contracting and how they can also apply to DLA's acquisition of commodities. GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving DOD's management and oversight of contractors, and DOD has concurred with many of them. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
DOD faces challenges ensuring DLA gets value for the taxpayer's dollar and obtains quality commodities in a cost-efficient and effective manner. GAO's previous testimonies before this committee on weapons system acquisition and service contracts highlighted how essential it is that DOD employ sound practices when using contractors to support its missions or operations to ensure the department receives value regardless of the type of product or service involved. These practices include clearly defining its requirements, using the appropriate contract type, and effectively overseeing contractors. With regard to DLA, GAO's prior work has identified the following challenge areas: (1) Accurate Requirements Definition - Without a good understanding of customers' projected needs, DLA is not assured it is buying the right items in the right quantities at the right time. GAO's prior work has identified instances where problems in properly defining requirements can lead to ineffective or inefficient management of commodities. For example, GAO reported in 2005 that while DLA had a model to forecast supply requirements for contingencies, this model did not produce an accurate demand forecast for all items, including Meals Ready-to-Eat. As a result, the demand for these items was underestimated and some combat support units came within a day or two of exhausting their Meals Ready-to-Eat rations. (2) Sound Business Arrangements - Selecting the appropriate type is important because certain contracting arrangements may increase the government's cost risk where others transfer some of that cost risk to the contractor. For example, GAO noted in 2007 that DLA's Defense Energy Support Center was able to purchase fuel and supply products for the forces in Iraq more cheaply than an Army Corps of Engineers contractor because DLA was able to sign long-term contracts with the fuel suppliers. (3) Proper Contract Oversight and Management - Failure to provide adequate contract oversight and management hinders DOD's ability to address poor contractor performance and avoid negative financial and operation impacts. For example, in June 2006, GAO found that DLA officials were not conducting required price reviews for the prime vendor contracts for food service equipment and construction and equipment commodities. Agency officials acknowledged that these problems occurred because management at the agency and supply center level were not providing adequate oversight to ensure that contracting personnel were monitoring prices. DLA has taken some actions to address these challenges. For example, DLA has begun adjusting acquisition strategies to reassign programs to a best procurement approach. DLA has also established contracting officer's representative training requirements to ensure these individuals are properly trained to carry out their responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-13-652T | gao_GAO-13-652T_0 | Industry Is Addressing the Risks of Using Foreign- Manufactured Equipment
Companies Address Supply Chain Risk through Procurement and Testing Practices
The network providers and equipment manufacturers we met with told us they address the potential security risks of using foreign-manufactured equipment through voluntary risk management practices. Nonetheless, the companies we spoke with told us that security is a high priority because their brand image and profitability depends, in part, on avoiding any type of breach of security or disruption of service. Network providers and equipment manufacturers told us that their voluntary risk management practices are in the areas of vendor selection, vendor security requirements, and equipment testing and monitoring, as described below and in figure 4. They said these practices are often a part of their company’s overall security plans and procurement processes and are applied throughout the entire life cycle of their equipment. Communications Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC)
In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the CSCC is an industry-led group that represents the viewpoints from the U.S. communications sector and facilitates coordination between industry and the federal government on improving physical and cyber security of the communications critical infrastructure., Representatives from the CSCC told us that the CSCC began meeting with the federal government in March 2011 to discuss supply chain security, which led to the creation of a CSCC working group to facilitate dialogue, planning, and coordination among the government and industry on supply chain risk management. Federal Government Has Begun Efforts to Address the Risks of Using Foreign- Manufactured Equipment
The White House released an Executive Order in February 2013 that is likely to have an impact on communications supply chain security. We identified other federal efforts, such as the Interim Telecommunications Sector Risk Management Task Force, that could impact communications supply chain security, but the results of those efforts are considered sensitive, so we do not include them here. Executive Order on Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure
An Executive Order released in February 2013 calls for NIST to develop a framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure and for DHS and others to spearhead increased information sharing between the federal government and owners and operators of critical infrastructure including communications networks. In February 2013, NIST published a request for information (RFI) in which NIST stated it is conducting a comprehensive review to develop the framework and is seeking stakeholder input. According to NIST officials, the extent to which supply chain security of commercial communications networks will be incorporated into the framework is largely dependent on the input it receives from stakeholders. Other Approaches to Supply Chain Risk Management
Risk Management Approaches from Selected Countries
Australian Reform Proposal
The Australian government is considering a reform proposal to establish a risk-based regulatory framework to better manage national security challenges to Australia’s telecommunications infrastructure. Specifically, the proposal requires carriers and carriage service providers to be able to demonstrate competent supervision and effective controls over their networks. The government would also have the authority to use enforcement measures to address noncompliance, as described in table 1. Under this framework, the government would provide guidance to inform carriers and carriage service providers how they can maintain competent supervision and effective control over their networks and educate carriers and carriage service providers on national security risks. Potential Issues Related to Use of These Approaches
While these approaches are intended to improve supply chain security of communications networks, they may also create the potential for trade barriers, additional costs, and constraints on competition. We also spoke with federal entities that have a role in addressing cybersecurity, international trade, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). We focused this work on the five wireless and five wireline network providers with the highest revenue, the eight manufacturers of routers and switches with the highest market shares in the U.S. market, and two cable network providers. To identify how the federal government is addressing the potential risks of foreign-manufactured equipment that is used in commercial communications networks, we asked federal agencies to identify statutes and regulations to identify potential sources of the federal government’s legal and regulatory authority over how communications network providers ensure the security of their U.S. commercial networks. To determine other approaches, including those of foreign countries, for addressing the potential risks of using foreign-manufactured equipment in commercial communications networks, we conducted a literature review and interviewed stakeholders. We reviewed documents and interviewed officials from governmental entities in Australia, India, and the UK to describe the approaches and issues that could arise from using these approaches. DHS has not identified specific authorities that would permit it to take action to ensure the security of the supply chain of commercial networks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is increasingly reliant on commercial communications networks for matters of national and economic security. These networks, which are primarily owned by the private sector, are highly dependent on equipment manufactured in foreign countries. Certain entities in the federal government view this dependence as an emerging threat that introduces risks to the networks. GAO was requested to review actions taken to respond to security risks from foreign-manufactured equipment.
This testimony addresses (1) how network providers and equipment manufacturers help ensure the security of foreign-manufactured equipment used in commercial communications networks, (2) how the federal government is addressing the risks of such equipment, and (3) other approaches for addressing these risks and issues related to these approaches.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2013. Information deemed sensitive has been omitted. For the May 2013 report, GAO reviewed laws and regulations and interviewed officials from federal entities with a role in addressing cybersecurity or international trade, the five wireless and five wireline network providers with the highest revenue, and the eight manufacturers of routers and switches with the highest U.S. market shares. GAO obtained documentary and testimonial evidence from governmental entities in Australia, India, and the United Kingdom, because of their actions to protect their networks from supply chain attacks
What GAO Found
The network providers and equipment manufacturers GAO spoke with reported taking steps in their security plans and procurement processes to ensure the integrity of parts and equipment obtained from foreign sources. Although these companies do not consider foreign-manufactured equipment to be their most pressing security threat, their brand image and profitability depend on providing secure, reliable service. In the absence of industry or government standards on the use of this equipment, companies have adopted a range of voluntary risk-management practices. These practices span the life cycle of equipment and cover areas such as selecting vendors, establishing vendor security requirements, and testing and monitoring equipment. Equipment that is considered critical to the functioning of the network is likely to be subject to more stringent security requirements, according to these companies. In addition to these efforts, companies are collaborating on the development of industry security standards and best practices and participating in information-sharing efforts within industry and with the federal government.
The federal government has begun efforts to address the security of the supply chain for commercial networks. In 2013, the President issued an Executive Order to create a framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)--a component within the Department of Commerce--is responsible for leading the development of the cybersecurity framework, which is to provide technology-neutral guidance to critical infrastructure owners and operators. NIST published a request for information in which NIST stated it is conducting a comprehensive review to obtain stakeholder input and develop the framework. NIST officials said the extent to which supply chain security of commercial communications networks will be incorporated into the framework is dependent in part on the input it receives from stakeholders. GAO identified other federal efforts that could impact communications supply chain security, but the results of those efforts were considered sensitive.
There are a variety of other approaches for addressing the potential risks posed by foreign-manufactured equipment in commercial communications networks, including those approaches taken by foreign governments. For example, the Australian government is considering a proposal to establish a risk-based regulatory framework that requires network providers to be able to demonstrate competent supervision and effective controls over their networks. The government would also have the authority to use enforcement measures to address noncompliance. In the United Kingdom, the government requires network and service providers to manage risks to network security and can impose financial penalties for serious security breaches. While these approaches are intended to improve supply chain security of communications networks, they may also create the potential for trade barriers, additional costs, and constraints on competition, which the federal government would have to take into account if it chose to pursue such approaches. |
gao_GAO-10-31 | gao_GAO-10-31_0 | In recent years, automatic enrollment has been advocated as a way to encourage greater participation in 401(k) plans among the portion of the workforce who have access to such plans but opt not to participate. Employers may also adopt an automatic escalation policy, under which an employee’s contribution rates would be automatically increased at periodic intervals, such as annually. Other proposals have been put forth with the intent of broadening the practice of saving for retirement among workers whose employers do not sponsor a retirement plan. Automatic Enrollment Raises Plan Participation, but Some Plan Sponsors Have Not Adopted Plan Features That Could Further Facilitate Retirement Savings
Existing studies show that automatic enrollment significantly increases participation rates in 401(k) plans, although beneficial effects of automatic enrollment may depend on accompanying policies designed to ensure adequate savings and appropriate investment. While defined contribution plan sponsors have increasingly adopted automatic enrollment in recent years, this approach may not be suitable for all plan sponsors, and available data show that some plan sponsors have not augmented automatic enrollment policies with other policies designed to ensure adequate savings. The high level of participation rates under automatic enrollment appears to persist after such policies are adopted, according to two of the studies in our review. Further, the widespread adoption of target-date funds (TDF)—funds that allocate investments among various asset classes and automatically shift to lower-risk, income-producing investments as a “target” retirement date approaches—as default investments for plans with automatic enrollment has raised concerns about investment risk and transparency of investments of TDFs for participants nearing retirement. Data from Fidelity Investments show that the percentage of defined contribution plans adopting automatic enrollment grew from about 1 percent in December 2004 to about 16 percent in March of 2009. Automatic IRA and State-Assisted Retirement Savings Plan Proposals Could Improve Access to Retirement Savings Vehicles for Uncovered Workers, but Each Proposal Faces Challenges
In order to promote retirement savings among the 40 percent of the workforce whose employer does not sponsor a plan, members of Congress, in recent years, have introduced bills for federally required “automatic IRAs” that would be implemented nationwide. Automatic IRAs offer the potential benefit of expanding retirement coverage but some have expressed concerns that automatic IRAs may not result in significant retirement savings, and raised questions about the costs of such a program for employers and the federal government. However, some experts agree that the automatic enrollment component of automatic IRAs has the potential to significantly increase the number of workers saving for retirement by including workers that currently do not have access to an employer-sponsored plan. Program Participation: Little is known about the extent to which employers and employees would participate in a state-assisted retirement savings program. Automatic IRAs may hold promise for workers who do not have access to an employer-sponsored plan. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what is known about the effect of automatic enrollment policies among the nation’s defined contribution plans, as well as the extent of and prospects for such policies, we first reviewed reports examining the impact of automatic enrollment, default contribution rates, and default investment funds on participation rates and saving patterns. To determine the potential benefits and limitations of automatic IRA proposals and state-assisted retirement savings plan proposals, we analyzed the Automatic IRA Acts of 2006 and 2007 as well as state-assisted retirement savings proposals from four states. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although employer-sponsored retirement plans can be an important component of income security after retirement, only about half of all workers participate in such plans. To foster greater participation among workers who have access to such plans, Congress included provisions that facilitate plan sponsors' adoption of automatic enrollment policies in the Pension Protection Act of 2006. To foster greater retirement savings among workers who do not have access to an employer-sponsored plan, proposals have been made at the federal level for an "automatic IRA" and at the state level for state-based programs. Because of questions about the extent of retirement savings and prospects for a sound retirement for all Americans, GAO was asked to determine (1) what is known about the effect of automatic enrollment policies among the nation's 401(k) plans, and the extent of and future prospect for such policies; and (2) the potential benefits and limitations of automatic IRA proposals and state-assisted retirement savings proposals. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed available reports and data, and interviewed plan sponsors, industry groups, investment professionals, and relevant federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Automatic enrollment appears to significantly increase participation in 401(k) plans according to existing studies, but may not be suitable for all plan sponsors. Some studies found that participation rates can reach as high as 95 percent under automatic enrollment. Available data indicate that the percentage of plans with automatic enrollment policies increased from about 1 percent in 2004 to more than 16 percent in 2009, with higher rates of adoption among larger plan sponsors. In most cases, these plans automatically enroll only new employees, rather than all employees. We also found that automatic enrollment may not be suitable for all plan sponsors, such as those with a high-turnover workforce. Further, some data show that while automatic escalation policies--which automatically increase saving rates over time--are increasingly common, they lag behind adoption of automatic enrollment. In combination with low initial contribution rates, this could depress savings for some workers. Also, the emergence of target-date funds--funds that allocate investments among various asset classes and shift to lower-risk investments as a "target" retirement date approaches--as the typical default investment raises questions in light of the substantial losses such funds experienced in the past year. Other proposals could expand the portion of the workforce saving for retirement, but these proposals could face challenges. Under a federally mandated automatic IRA, certain employers could be required to enroll eligible employees in payroll-deduction IRAs, unless the worker specifically opted out. Such a proposal could broaden the population that saves for retirement at minimal cost to employers. However, this proposal faces a number of challenges, including uncertainty about the extent to which it would help low-income workers accumulate significant retirement savings. Proposals for state-assisted retirement savings programs could raise coverage and, ultimately, savings by involving state governments in facilitating retirement savings for workers without access to an employer-sponsored plan. However, such programs face uncertainty about employer and worker participation levels, as well as legal and regulatory issues. |
gao_GAO-08-862 | gao_GAO-08-862_0 | IMBRA establishes federal criminal and civil penalties for IMBs that violate these provisions. Agencies Have Implemented Some, Not All, IMBRA Requirements
USCIS, DOS, and DOJ have implemented some, but not all of the IMBRA requirements that are designed to inform visa applicants about the persons petitioning for them to immigrate to the United States. DOS also issued IMBRA implementation guidance to its consular officers. Although DOS’s guidance does provide for the mailing of criminal history information to beneficiaries, the guidance does not specifically require DOS to mail beneficiaries a copy of the approved I-129F petitions, as required by IMBRA. USCIS officials told us that they do not check every petitioner against USCIS’s application management information system, called CLAIMS, to determine if the petitioner has previously filed a fiancé(e) petition. As shown in Table 1, USCIS adjudicators are to routinely check CLAIMS if the petitioner self-attests that he or she has previously filed a petition. As a result, by limiting USCIS checks to those petitioners that acknowledge prior filings, USCIS increases its risk that it will approve more fiancé(e) petitions than allowed under IMBRA, including petitions filed by persons with a record of violent criminal offenses, who are not entitled to a waiver of IMBRA’s filing limits except in extraordinary circumstances. In addition, after a second approval, upon filing of a third petition within 10 years of the first filing, USCIS is to notify both the petitioner and beneficiary of the number of previously approved petitions filed by the petitioner. USCIS officials told us that initially they attempted to notify beneficiaries, as required. However, USCIS no longer tries to notify beneficiaries because of the reported difficulty in obtaining accurate overseas mailing addresses. USCIS Has Not Finalized the Information Pamphlet Designed to Inform Beneficiaries about Their Legal Rights and Resources
IMBRA requires that USCIS, in consultation with DOS and DOJ, develop an information pamphlet for beneficiaries to include information on the visa application process; the illegality of domestic violence, sexual assault, and child abuse in the U.S.; the legal rights of immigrant victims and the resource services available to them; child support; marriage fraud; a warning that some U.S. citizens with a history of violence may not have a criminal record; and information on requirements for IMBs under IMBRA. USCIS officials told us they did not know when the pamphlet would be finalized, nor did they have a specific time frame for finalizing the pamphlet. Until the pamphlet is finalized, translated, and distributed USCIS increases the risk that beneficiaries are not being made aware of their rights or the resources that are available should they encounter domestic violence. The Chief Administrative Hearing Officer within EOIR had drafted IMBRA-related regulations regarding how civil penalties would be administered, but these regulations cannot be finalized until the agencies decide who will be responsible for investigating, referring, and ultimately prosecuting potential violations at a hearing before DOJ’s Chief Administrative Hearing Officer. Without a framework for enforcement of the IMBRA provisions, it will be difficult for IMBRA violators to be prosecuted and assessed applicable penalties. Most of the USCIS Data Required for GAO Study Are Not in a Summary or Reportable Form; Other Required Data Are Not Collected
As part of our study on the impact of IMBRA on the K nonimmigrant visa process, IMBRA mandated that USCIS and DOS collect and maintain specific data for us to report. Although IMBRA mandated that USCIS and DOS collect and maintain the data necessary for us to conduct such a study, the data we are requested to report on are essentially petition- driven data for which USCIS would have responsibility to collect and maintain. Conclusions
The purpose of IMBRA is to address issues of domestic violence and abuse against beneficiaries by petitioners, including those who met their foreign- born spouses through an international marriage broker. We could not determine the reason a petitioner was denied or granted a waiver or the extent to which petitioners with a criminal history or history of violence have filed K nonimmigrant petitions, including how many of those petitioners used the services or an IMB or received waivers of IMBRA’s filing limits, because USCIS did not collect and maintain this data in a summary or reportable format for this study. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State and the Attorney General. | Why GAO Did This Study
The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 (IMBRA) was enacted to address issues of domestic violence and abuse against noncitizens (beneficiaries) married or engaged to U.S. citizens (petitioners) who have petitioned for them to immigrate to the U.S., including those who met through an international marriage broker (IMB). IMBRA mandated that GAO study the act's impact on the visa process for noncitizen spouses and fiance(e)s. This report addresses the extent to which the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Department of State (DOS); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have implemented IMBRA, and the extent to which USCIS and DOS have collected and maintained data for this GAO report as required by IMBRA. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the act and related legislation, analyzed IMBRA implementation guidance and available data on applications filed, and interviewed officials at USCIS, DOS, and DOJ.
What GAO Found
USCIS, DOS, and DOJ have implemented two of seven key IMBRA requirements identified by GAO, but five key provisions intended to provide beneficiaries with information about the petitioners seeking to bring them to the United States have yet to be completed. First, although IMBRA requires DOS to mail a copy of the approved petition to each beneficiary, the agency is not currently fulfilling this requirement. Second, IMBRA limits the number of petitions a person may file for a noncitizen fiance(e) unless USCIS grants a waiver of the filing limits. However, USCIS officials told GAO that they do not check all petitioners against records to determine if a petitioner has previously filed a fiance(e) petition. USCIS adjudicators are required to check the record if the petitioner self-attests that he or she has previously filed a petition. By limiting its checks to those petitioners who acknowledge prior filings, USCIS increases the risk that it will approve more fiance(e) petitions than allowed under IMBRA. Third, IMBRA mandates that after two approved petitions, upon filing of a third petition within 10 years of the first, USCIS is to notify both the petitioner and beneficiary of previously approved petitions filed by the petitioner. USCIS officials told GAO that they no longer try to notify beneficiaries because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate overseas mailing addresses. Thus, beneficiaries are left without all required information for making a decision about the person petitioning on his or her behalf. USCIS officials told GAO that they plan to ask DOS to notify beneficiaries during their visa interview with a DOS consular officer. Fourth, the requirement to provide beneficiaries with a pamphlet that discusses the visa application process and available resources if the beneficiary encounters domestic violence or abuse is not being met. USCIS has drafted the pamphlet, but has not established time frames for finalizing the pamphlet. Until the pamphlet is finalized, translated, and distributed, USCIS increases the risk that beneficiaries are not being made aware of their rights or the resources that are available should they encounter domestic violence. Lastly, IMBRA establishes federal criminal and civil penalties for IMBs who violate its provisions. Although DOJ has drafted IMBRA-related regulations regarding how civil penalties would be administered, these regulations cannot be finalized until DOJ, USCIS, and DOS decide which agencies will be responsible for investigating, referring, and prosecuting potential IMBRA violations. Until the agencies resolve these issues and establish an enforcement framework, it will be difficult for IMBRA violators to be penalized. USCIS is collecting and maintaining some of the data for this report as required by IMBRA; however, most of the data are not in a summary or reportable form and other required data have not been collected. For example, GAO could not determine the extent to which petitioners with a criminal history or history of violence have filed petitions because USCIS does not capture this data electronically. USCIS officials told GAO that they are considering modifying their data management system to collect data that is currently not being collected. However, no decisions have been made. |
gao_GAO-09-581 | gao_GAO-09-581_0 | FDA’s medical product responsibilities include oversight of the safety and effectiveness of medical products marketed for sale in the United States, regardless of whether they are manufactured domestically or overseas. FDA’s Medical Product Oversight Responsibilities
As part of its oversight responsibilities, FDA reviews applications submitted by manufacturers for medical products they wish to market in the United States to ensure that new products are safe and effective, inspects establishments producing medical products to ensure manufacturing processes meet quality standards, reviews reports of adverse events to monitor the safety of marketed medical products, and examines advertising and other promotional materials to ensure they are not false and misleading. Driven by User Fees, Funding and Staffing for Medical Product Programs Have Increased, Although FDA Is Concerned about Staffing Levels
Funding and staffing for FDA’s medical product programs have increased mostly as a result of user fee funding, which is primarily directed toward the agency’s review of new medical products. Medical product program funding increased 112 percent overall, from about $562 million in fiscal year 1999 to about $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2008. Although total funding increased, FDA officials reported that the decline in the portion of funding available to activities not funded by user fees has seriously limited the agency’s ability to fulfill its oversight responsibilities in some areas. FDA Faced Challenges Fulfilling and Managing Its Growing Medical Product Oversight Responsibilities, Citing Resource Constraints
New laws and a growing workload increased FDA’s medical product oversight responsibilities. However, agency officials said that this training results in less time available for staff to perform their routine duties. FDA Officials Cited Resource Constraints as Hindering the Agency’s Ability to Fulfill Its Oversight Responsibilities in Some Areas between Fiscal Years 2004 and 2008
FDA officials told us that resource constraints hindered the agency’s ability to fulfill all of its medical product oversight responsibilities between fiscal years 2004 and 2008, but the agency also lacked information to manage some of these oversight responsibilities and estimate current and future resource needs. FDA officials also told us that the funding amounts requested for FDA and provided by Congress during the past 2 years will permit the agency to respond to its most urgent needs and priorities, although officials also noted that they did not receive enough resources to meet some statutory requirements. Furthermore, FDA officials also noted that the agency continues to face significant challenges fulfilling its mission. FDA could not provide data showing its workload and accomplishments in some areas. Appendix I: Funding and Staffing Resources for FDA Medical Product Programs, Fiscal Years 1999 through 2008
Funding resources for the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) medical product programs increased 112 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2008. Over the same period, funding resources for FDA’s process for reviewing NDAs and BLAs, an activity that receives both user fee funding and fiscal year appropriations, increased 58 percent. Drugs. However, FDA could not provide data on the number of draft or final materials staff examined during this time. Biologics. Devices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Twenty years ago, GAO reported that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was concerned that it lacked resources to fulfill its mission, which includes oversight of the safety and effectiveness of medical products--human drugs, biologics, and medical devices--marketed for sale in the United States. Since then, FDA, GAO, and others have raised concerns regarding FDA's ability to meet its oversight responsibilities. GAO was asked to review the resources supporting FDA's medical product oversight responsibilities. GAO examined trends in (1) FDA's funding and staffing resources for its medical product oversight responsibilities from fiscal years 1999 through 2008, and (2) FDA's medical product oversight responsibilities during this same period. GAO analyzed FDA data on the agency's resources and workload, reviewed relevant federal laws, and interviewed FDA officials. GAO also examined more-detailed data on FDA's fiscal year 2004 through 2008 resources and workload in four key areas, representing a range of FDA's oversight responsibilities, both before and after a medical product is marketed in the United States.
What GAO Found
Funding and staffing resources for FDA's medical product programs increased between fiscal years 1999 and 2008, primarily as a result of increased user fees paid by industry, which are made available through appropriations acts to support the agency's processes for reviewing new medical products. Total funding increased from about $562 million in fiscal year 1999 to about $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2008, with user fee funding accounting for more than half of this increase. A large and growing portion of funding supported activities for which user fees are collected, resulting in a declining share of funding available for other activities. FDA officials said that this has seriously limited the agency's ability to fulfill its oversight responsibilities in some areas, particularly those not funded with user fees. FDA faced challenges fulfilling and managing its growing medical product oversight responsibilities, which agency officials attributed to resource constraints. FDA's statutory responsibilities grew during this period and a growing number of medical products subject to FDA oversight and establishments manufacturing these products for the U.S. market also added to the agency's workload. However, FDA could not provide data showing its workload and accomplishments in some areas, such as its review of reports identifying potential safety issues with specific medical products. Without such information, FDA cannot develop complete and reliable estimates of its resource needs. While FDA officials said that the funding amounts requested for and provided to FDA during the past 2 years will permit the agency to respond to its most urgent needs and priorities, officials also noted that they did not receive enough resources to meet some statutory requirements, such as biennially inspecting certain manufacturing establishments. Furthermore, officials said that the agency faces significant challenges fulfilling its mission to oversee the safety and effectiveness of medical products. |
gao_GAO-08-1082 | gao_GAO-08-1082_0 | Companies operating in the downstream segment include firms that refine crude oil as well as firms that market refined petroleum products. Petroleum marketing involves purchasing refined petroleum products from refiners and selling them to wholesaler and retail firms. markets. More than 1,000 U.S. Mergers Occurred in the Petroleum Industry between 2000 and 2007, and Market Concentration Changed Little but Varied by Market Region and Industry Segment
More than 1,000 U.S. mergers occurred in the petroleum industry between 2000 and 2007. We also found in our analysis of the upstream crude oil production segment of the industry and the downstream refining and wholesale gasoline supply segments of the industry that, in most regions, petroleum industry market segments were moderately concentrated. A key reported driver of U.S. mergers in the upstream segment was the increasing challenge associated with exploring and producing oil in extreme physical environments. This activity was also driven out of concern for reliable access to oil, since Canada is considered more politically stable than many other regions of the world with oil reserves. 8). Under these circumstances, the crude supplier market would be more concentrated, and there could be more potential for the crude producers to raise prices. In our analysis of downstream wholesale gasoline suppliers, we found that most states had a moderately concentrated number of wholesale gasoline suppliers between 2000 and 2007. Fewer states were unconcentrated or highly concentrated, and this overall trend was fairly stable over time (see fig. In addition, we found that eight states in 2007 were highly concentrated: Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (see fig. FTC Primarily Reviews Proposed Mergers to Maintain Petroleum Industry Competition, While FTC and Other Agencies Also Have Roles in Monitoring Petroleum Industry Markets
FTC primarily reviews proposed mergers to maintain competition in the petroleum industry, while other federal and state agencies, including FTC, have roles in monitoring petroleum industry markets. FTC does a review to predict the effects of proposed mergers on competition, but generally does not look back to evaluate the actual effects after the merger has been completed, even though experts and FTC agree that postmerger reviews would allow the agency to better inform future merger reviews and to better measure its success in maintaining competition. The unifying theme in the guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to enhance a firm’s market power or to make it easier for a firm to exercise market power. For example, some mergers have the potential to make the merged firms more efficient in their daily operations by allowing them to achieve economies of scale, and this may result in lower prices for consumers. However, we found that after reviewing proposed mergers, FTC does not regularly look back at past decisions to determine the actual effects of the merger on competition or prices. A number of petroleum industry experts, industry participants, and FTC all view retrospective merger reviews as a potentially valuable part of FTC’s efforts to maintain competition in the petroleum industry. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) mergers in the U.S. petroleum industry and changes in market concentration since 2000 and (2) the steps that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses to maintain competition in the U.S. petroleum industry, and the roles other federal and state agencies play in monitoring petroleum industry markets. We used a single global market to calculate HHI in this segment because, according to experts with whom we spoke, crude oil prices are set on world markets. We worked with EIA to identify these and then used data from company publications to account for the gasoline production capacity of these refineries. We conducted interviews with several federal officials from the aforementioned federal agencies. Our report, therefore, indicates that there are regions that may have more or less potential for firms to exercise market power, and we did not draw further conclusions about the impact of market concentration on competition in any given region. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the late 1990s, many petroleum companies merged to stay profitable while crude oil prices were low, and in recent years mergers have continued. Congress and others have concerns about the impact mergers might be having on competition in U.S. petroleum markets. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority to maintain competition in the petroleum industry and reviews proposed mergers to determine whether they are likely to diminish competition or increase prices, among other things. GAO was asked to examine (1) mergers in the U.S. petroleum industry and changes in market concentration since 2000 and (2) the steps FTC uses to maintain competition in the U.S. petroleum industry, and the roles other federal and state agencies play in monitoring petroleum industry markets. In conducting this study, GAO worked with petroleum industry experts to delineate regional markets and to develop estimates of refinery gasoline production capacity in order to calculate market concentration. GAO used public and private data as well as interviews for its analyses.
What GAO Found
More than 1,000 U.S. mergers occurred in the petroleum industry between 2000 and 2007, mostly between firms involved in crude oil exploration and production. According to experts and industry officials, mergers in this segment were generally driven by the challenges associated with producing oil in extreme physical environments, such as deepwater, as well as increasing concerns about competition with national oil companies and access to oil reserves in regions of relative political instability. Industry officials from the segments of the petroleum industry that transport, refine, and sell petroleum products reported that mergers were generally driven by the desire for greater efficiency and cost savings. Despite these gains, mergers have the potential to enhance a firm's ability to exercise "market power," which potentially allows it to raise prices without being undercut by other firms. GAO measured market concentration with an index that FTC uses, where market regions with few, large firms are considered to be highly concentrated and have a greater potential for market power. Conversely, market regions with many smaller firms are considered to have low or moderate concentration and generally have less potential for firms to exercise market power. GAO found that market concentration changed little but varied by industry segment and market region. GAO found that market concentration among firms involved in crude oil exploration and production was low and stable between 2000 and 2006, while concentration among refiners was generally moderate across those years. Regarding wholesale gasoline suppliers on a state-by-state basis, 35 states were moderately concentrated in their number of wholesale gasoline suppliers in 2007, and this number was fairly stable from 2000. GAO found that the following 8 states had highly concentrated wholesale gasoline supplier markets in 2007: Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. While FTC reviews evidence and considers a number of competitive factors to predict a merger's potential effects on competition in its analyses of proposed mergers, it does not regularly look back at past merger decisions to assess the actual effects of the merger on competition or prices after the merger has been completed. Although these reviews can be resource intensive, experts, industry participants, and FTC agree that regular retrospective reviews would allow the agency to better inform future merger reviews and to better measure its success in maintaining competition. In addition to FTC's efforts in reviewing proposed mergers, other federal agencies, including FTC, and some states also monitor aspects of petroleum industry markets. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission monitors petroleum product pipeline markets and regulates pipeline rates accordingly. |
gao_GAO-08-1032T | gao_GAO-08-1032T_0 | NNSA and DOD Have Not Established Clear, Long-Term Requirements for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
The United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile comprises nine nuclear weapons types, all of which were designed during the Cold War. In May 2008, we reported that, over the past few years, NNSA and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for the future composition of the nuclear stockpile that would be based on different stockpile sizes and the degree to which the stockpile would incorporate new RRW designs. NNSA Has Had Difficulty Developing Realistic Cost Estimates for Large, Complex Projects
Once a decision is made about the size and composition of the stockpile, NNSA should develop accurate estimates of the costs of transforming the nuclear weapons complex. In September 2007, a contractor provided NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex Transformation alternatives. As a result, the contractor stated that its estimates should not be used to predict a budget-level project cost. For example, in March 2007, we found that 8 of the 12 major construction projects that DOE and NNSA were managing had exceeded their initial cost estimates. In addition, NNSA’s cost estimate for constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility has more than doubled—from $838 million to over $2 billion—since our April 2006 testimony. Finally, the preliminary results of our ongoing review of NNSA’s Life Extension Program for this Subcommittee show that NNSA’s cost estimate for refurbishing each B61 nuclear bomb has doubled since 2002. NNSA Will Need to Develop a Transformation Plan with Clear, Realistic Milestones
NNSA does not expect to issue a record of decision on Complex Transformation until later this year. We expect that once NNSA makes this decision, NNSA will put forward a transformation plan with specific milestones to implement its decision. Without such a plan, NNSA will have no way to evaluate its progress, and the Congress will have no way to hold NNSA accountable. However, over the past decade, we have repeatedly documented problems with NNSA’s process for planning and managing its activities. However, in February 2006, we reported similar problems with how NNSA is managing the implementation and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. These programs are responsible for setting the requirements for the computer codes and experimental data needed to assess and certify the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads. It was our view that the Office of Transformation should (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; (2) be given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement its recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real change within the weapons complex. In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex Transformation efforts. This office has been involved in overseeing early activities associated with Complex Transformation, such as the issuance of the December 2007 draft report on the potential environmental impacts of alternative Complex Transformation actions. In this respect, we are concerned that the Office of Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear nonproliferation programs. Because NNSA’s ultimate decision on the path forward for Complex Transformation has not yet been made, it remains to be seen whether the office has sufficient authority to enforce transformation decisions or whether it will be held accountable within NNSA for these decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. In December 2007, NNSA issued a draft report on potential environmental impacts of alternative actions to transform the nuclear weapons complex, which NNSA refers to as Complex Transformation. NNSA's preferred action is to establish a number of "distributed centers of excellence" at sites within the existing nuclear weapons complex, including the Los Alamos National Laboratory for plutonium capabilities, the Y-12 Plant for uranium capabilities, and the Pantex Plant for weapons assembly, disassembly, and high explosives manufacturing. NNSA would continue to operate these facilities to maintain and refurbish the existing nuclear weapons stockpile as it makes the transition to a smaller, more responsive infrastructure. GAO was asked to discuss NNSA's Complex Transformation proposal. This testimony is based on previous GAO work.
What GAO Found
Transforming the nuclear weapons complex will be a daunting task. In April 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, House Committee on Appropriations, GAO identified four actions that, in its view, were critical to successfully achieving the transformation of the complex. On the basis of completed and ongoing GAO work on NNSA's management of the nuclear weapons complex, GAO remains concerned about NNSA's and the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to carefully and fully implement these four actions. For this reason, GAO believes that the Congress must remain vigilant in its oversight of Complex Transformation. Specifically, NNSA and DOD have not established clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear weapons stockpile. While NNSA and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for the future composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, no requirements have been issued. It is GAO's view that NNSA will not be able to develop accurate cost estimates or plans for Complex Transformation until stockpile requirements are known. Further, recent GAO work found that the absence of stockpile requirements is affecting NNSA's plans for manufacturing a critical nuclear weapon component. NNSA has had difficulty developing realistic cost estimates for large, complex projects. In September 2007, a contractor provided NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex Transformation alternatives. However, the contractor stated that (1) its analysis was based on rough order-of-magnitude estimates and (2) NNSA should not use its cost estimates to predict budget-level project costs. In addition, in March 2007 GAO reported that 8 of 12 major construction projects being managed by DOE and NNSA had exceeded their initial cost estimates. NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear, realistic milestones. GAO expects that once NNSA decides the path forward for Complex Transformation later this year, NNSA will put forward such a plan. However, GAO has repeatedly documented problems with NNSA's ability to implement its plans. For example, in February 2006 GAO reported problems with the planning documents that NNSA was using to manage the implementation of its new approach for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Successful transformation requires strong leadership. In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex Transformation activities. However, GAO is concerned that the Office of Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear nonproliferation programs. |
gao_T-GGD-97-184 | gao_T-GGD-97-184_0 | The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) requires that all executive branch agencies submit their plans to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by September 30, 1997. Specifically, my statement will focus on the August plan’s compliance with the Act’s requirements and on the extent to which it covered crosscutting program activities, management challenges, and Justice’s capacity to provide reliable performance information. As a result, the August plan includes, to some degree, a discussion on five of the six required elements—a mission statement, goals and objectives, key external factors, a program evaluation component, and strategies to achieve the goals and objectives. The August plan does not include a required discussion of a sixth element—the relationship between Justice’s long-term goals/objectives and its annual performance plans. Over the years, we as well as others, including the Justice Inspector General and the National Performance Review (NPR), have addressed many management challenges that Justice faces in carrying out its mission. Justice’s August strategic plan contains little discussion about its capacity to provide performance information for assessing its progress toward its goals and objectives over the next 5 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Justice's August 1997 draft strategic plan developed in compliance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, focusing on the plan's compliance with the Act's requirements and on the extent to which it covered crosscutting program activities, management challenges, and Justice's capacity to provide reliable performance information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Justice's plan discusses, to some degree, five of the six required elements--mission statement, goals and objectives, key external factors, a program evaluation component, and strategies to achieve the goals and objectives; (2) the plan does not include a required discussion on the relationship between Justice's long-term goals/objectives and its annual performance plans; (3) the draft plan could better address how Justice plans to: (a) coordinate with other federal, state, and local agencies that perform similar law enforcement functions, such as the Defense and State Departments regarding counter-terrorism; (b) address the many management challenges it faces in carrying out its mission, such as internal control and accounting problems; and (c) increase its capacity to provide performance information for assessing its progress in meeting the goals and objectives over the next 5 years. |
gao_GAO-06-96 | gao_GAO-06-96_0 | The Bay Program’s Measures Have Not Been Integrated to Assess Overall Restoration Progress
Although the Bay Program has established 101 measures, it has not yet developed an integrated approach that would allow it to translate these individual measures into an assessment of overall progress toward achieving the five broad restoration goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. The Bay Program has recognized that it may need an integrated approach to assess the overall progress of the restoration effort and established a task team to undertake this effort. For example, the Bay Program has measures for determining trends in individual fish and shellfish populations, such as crabs, oysters, and rockfish, but it has not yet devised a way to integrate those measures to assess the overall progress made in achieving its Living Resource Protection and Restoration goal; the acres of bay grasses in the bay, the acres of wetlands restored, and the miles of forest buffers restored, but it has not developed an approach for integrating those measures to assess the overall progress made in achieving its Vital Habitat Protection and Restoration goal; and attributes of water quality—such as levels of dissolved oxygen, water clarity, and chlorophyll a—but has not developed an approach for combining these measures to determine progress toward achieving its goal of Water Quality Protection and Restoration. The Bay Program’s Reports Do Not Effectively Communicate the Status of the Bay’s Health
Mirroring the shortcomings in the program’s measures, the Bay Program’s primary mechanism for reporting on the health status of the bay—the State of the Chesapeake Bay report—does not provide an effective or credible assessment on the bay’s current health status. However, the State of the Chesapeake Bay report does not effectively communicate the current health status of the bay because instead of providing information on a core set of ecosystem characteristics it focuses on the status of individual species or pollutants. The Bay Program recognizes that improvements in its current reporting approach are needed. We believe this lack of independence in reporting has led to the Bay Program projecting a rosier view of the health of the bay than may have been warranted. An additional $1.9 billion in indirect funding was also provided for activities that affect the restoration effort. Direct Funding for Restoration Activities
Eleven key federal agencies; the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and the District of Columbia provided almost $3.7 billion in direct funding from fiscal years 1995 through 2004 to restore the bay. The Bay Program Has Not Always Effectively Coordinated and Managed the Restoration Effort
Although Chesapeake 2000 provides the overall vision and strategic goals for the restoration effort along with short- and long-term commitments, the Bay Program lacks a comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy that will enable it to achieve the goals laid out in the agreement. Although the Bay Program has adopted 10 keystone commitments to focus the partners’ efforts and developed several planning documents, these plans are sometimes inconsistent with each other. However, as various partners have acknowledged, several of these strategies are either not being used by the Bay Program or are believed to be unachievable within the 2010 time frame. EPA, Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the Chesapeake Bay Commission generally concurred with the report’s findings and recommendations. Specifically, we were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Bay Program has established appropriate measures for assessing restoration progress, (2) the extent to which the reporting mechanisms the Bay Program uses clearly and accurately describe the bay’s overall health, (3) how much funding was provided for restoring the Chesapeake Bay for fiscal years 1995 through 2004 and for what purposes, and (4) how effectively the restoration effort is being coordinated and managed. Goals and Commitments in Chesapeake 2000
Chesapeake 2000 contains five broad goals and 102 commitments that the partners have agreed to accomplish. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chesapeake Bay Program (Bay Program) was created in 1983 when Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, the Chesapeake Bay Commission, and EPA agreed to establish a partnership to restore the Chesapeake Bay. Their most recent agreement, Chesapeake 2000, sets out an agenda and five broad goals to guide these efforts through 2010 and contains 102 commitments that the partners agreed to accomplish. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which appropriate measures for assessing restoration progress have been established, (2) the extent to which current reporting mechanisms clearly and accurately describe the bay's overall health, (3) how much funding was provided for the effort for fiscal years 1995 through 2004, and (4) how effectively the effort is being coordinated and managed.
What GAO Found
The Bay Program has over 100 measures to assess progress toward meeting certain restoration commitments and providing information to guide management decisions. However, the program has not yet developed an integrated approach that would allow it to translate these individual measures into an assessment of overall progress toward achieving the five broad restoration goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. For example, while the Bay Program has appropriate measures to track crab, oyster, and rockfish populations, it does not have an approach for integrating the results of these measures to assess progress toward the agreement's goal of protecting and restoring the bay's living resources. The Bay Program has recognized that it may need an integrated approach for assessing overall progress in restoring the bay and, in November 2004, a task force began working on this effort. The State of the Chesapeake Bay reports are the Bay Program's primary mechanism for reporting the current health status of the bay. However, these reports do not effectively communicate the bay's current conditions because they focus on the status of individual species or pollutants instead of providing information on a core set of ecosystem characteristics. Moreover, the credibility of these reports has been negatively impacted because the program has commingled various kinds of data such as monitoring data, results of program actions, and the results of its predictive model without clearly distinguishing among them. As a result, the public cannot easily determine whether the health of the bay is improving or not. Moreover, the lack of independence in the Bay Program's reporting process has led to negative trends being downplayed and a rosier picture of the bay's health being reported than may have been warranted. The program has recognized that improvements are needed and is developing new reporting formats. From fiscal years 1995 through 2004, the restoration effort received about $3.7 billion in direct funding from 11 key federal agencies; the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and the District of Columbia. These funds were used for activities that supported water quality protection and restoration, sound land use, vital habitat protection and restoration, living resource protection and restoration, and stewardship and community engagement. During this time period, the restoration effort also received an additional $1.9 billion in indirect funding. The Bay Program does not have a comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy to better enable it to achieve the goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. Although the program has adopted 10 key commitments to focus partners' efforts and developed plans to achieve them, some of these plans are inconsistent with each other or are perceived as unachievable by program partners. The limited assurances about the availability of resources beyond the short term further complicate the Bay Program's ability to effectively coordinate restoration efforts and strategically manage its resources. |
gao_GAO-02-886T | gao_GAO-02-886T_0 | Moreover, in a recent report to Congress on initial concerns about organizing for homeland security since September 11th, GAO indicated that a definition of homeland security should be developed, preferably in the context of the Administration’s issuance of a national strategy for homeland security, in order to improve the effectiveness and coordination of relevant programs. Organizational Principles and Criteria
The Congress faces a challenging and complex job in its consideration of DHS. The President created OHS via executive order. Congress passed legislation creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to better secure transportation and the USA Patriot Act to improve our capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist acts. On June 6th, President Bush announced a new proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security and submitted draft legislation to Congress on June 18th. The homeland security proposal is silent on the relationship between those entities that will be consolidated and their role in coordinating with the entities left out of the new department, and Congress should consider addressing this important issue. These questions are relevant for DHS and every other federal agency and activity. The President has taken a significant first step by establishing a transition planning office in the Office of Management and Budget. The proposed legislation provides for the new department to reach out to state and local governments and the private sector to coordinate and integrate planning, communications, information, and recovery efforts addressing homeland security. Maintenance of effort provisions can be included to protect against such risk. | What GAO Found
Since September 11, the President and Congress have taken aggressive steps to protect the nation, including creating an Office of Homeland Security (OHS); passing new laws, such as the USA Patriot Act and an emergency supplemental spending bill; establishing a new agency to improve transportation security; and working with federal, state, and local governments, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations and other countries to prevent future terrorist acts and to bring those individuals responsible to justice. More recently, Congress and the President have proposed greater consolidation and coordination of various agencies and activities. The President has proposed establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and has sent draft legislation to Congress. This testimony focuses on two major issues: (1) the need for reorganization and the principles and criteria to help evaluate what agencies and missions should be included in or left out of the new DHS and (2) issues related to the transition, cost, and implementation challenges of the new department. |
gao_GAO-15-664T | gao_GAO-15-664T_0 | Homeland security presidential directives (HSPD) have called for HHS, USDA, DHS, and other federal agencies to take action to strengthen biosurveillance, including food and agriculture disease surveillance. The Homeland Security Council was maintained as the principal venue for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the homeland, such a biosurveillance. In May 2009, the staff serving the Homeland Security Council We have previously reported that in an era of rapid transit and global trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease and accidental exposure to biological threats. The White House Has Developed a National Biosurveillance Strategy, but More Action Is Needed to Enhance Federal and Nonfederal Capabilities
The National Biosurveillance Strategy Does Not Yet Identify Resource and Investment Needs
Although the White House developed the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 2012, this strategy does not include information that identifies resource and investment needs as we previously recommended. In June 2010, we found that there was no integrated approach to help ensure an effective national biosurveillance capability and to provide a framework to help identify and prioritize investments. Specifically, we found there was neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a designated focal point with the authority and resources to guide the effort to develop a national biosurveillance capability. The National Biosurveillance Strategy Does Not Address Key Challenges for Nonfederal Efforts or the Need to Leverage Nonfederal Resources
The National Strategy for Biosurveillance also does not address issues we raised related to state and local biosurveillance efforts, and that we previously recommended. In addition, we noted that the federal government had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of state and local jurisdictions’ ability to contribute to a national biosurveillance capability. We further reported in October 2011 that state and local officials identified common challenges to developing and maintaining their biosurveillance capabilities such as (1) state policies in response to state budget constraints that restricted hiring, travel, and training; (2) obtaining and maintaining resources, such as adequate workforce, equipment, and systems; and (3) the lack of strategic planning and leadership to support long-term investment in crosscutting core capabilities, integrated biosurveillance, and effective partnerships. More Oversight and Coordination Are Needed to Ensure That Federal Food and Agriculture Surveillance Efforts Align with National Policy
Federal Oversight and Coordination of the Nation’s Food and Agriculture Defense Policy Could Be Enhanced
As part of the national biosurveillance capability, the maintenance of effective animal and plant surveillance systems is critical to detecting and enhancing the situational awareness of biological events that might disrupt agriculture and food production systems, such as highly pathogenic avian influenza. In August 2011, we found that there was no centralized coordination to oversee the federal government’s overall progress implementing HSPD-9 on the nation’s food and agriculture defense policy, responsibilities for which are distributed across several agencies. Prior to 2011, the White House’s Homeland Security Council had conducted some coordinated activities to oversee federal agencies’ HSPD-9 implementation by gathering information from agencies about their progress. We also reported in August 2011 that USDA’s component agencies had taken steps to implement the department’s HSPD-9 responsibilities, but USDA did not have a department-wide strategy for implementing its numerous HSPD-9 responsibilities. APHIS Developed a New Approach for Livestock and Poultry Surveillance, but Has Not Integrated These Efforts into an Overall Strategy with Performance Measures
We reported in May 2013 that APHIS had developed a new approach for its livestock and poultry surveillance activities, but had not yet integrated these efforts into an overall strategy with goals and performance measures aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance policy. We reported in 2013 that under its new approach APHIS had begun to broaden its approach by monitoring the overall health of livestock and poultry and using additional sources and types of data to better detect and control new or reemerging diseases. We concluded that without integrating its new approach to livestock and poultry surveillance activities into an overall strategy with goals and measures aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human health. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each product. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Naturally-occurring infectious disease or the intentional use of a biological agent to inflict harm could have catastrophic consequences. For example, the recent outbreak of naturally-occurring highly pathogenic avian influenza affecting wild birds and poultry in the Midwest and on the Pacific coast presents a serious threat to the economy and trade, and underscores the importance of maintaining effective food and agriculture disease surveillance systems. Biosurveillance aims to detect such events as early as possible and to enhance situational awareness related to human, animal, and plant health.
Since 2010, GAO has issued a number of reports that discuss the importance of effectively conducting biosurveillance across the human, animal, and plant domains. This statement discusses prior GAO reports and the status of recommendations related to (1) federal, state, and local biosurveillance efforts, and (2) efforts related to food and agriculture disease surveillance.
This testimony is based on previous GAO products issued from 2010 through 2013 related to biosurveillance, along with selected updates conducted from November 2014 through June 2015. For these updates, GAO reviewed agency responses and documents provided in response to its recommendation follow-up efforts, such as the July 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance .
What GAO Found
In June 2010, GAO reported that there was neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a designated focal point with the authority and resources to guide development of a national biosurveillance capability. Further, in October 2011, GAO reported that states and local agencies faced challenges in developing and maintaining their biosurveillance capabilities, such as obtaining resources for an adequate workforce, and that the federal government had not conducted an assessment of state and local jurisdictions' ability to contribute to a national biosurveillance capability. To help ensure the successful implementation of a complex, intergovernmental undertaking, GAO recommended in 2010 that the White House's Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Council Staff to develop a national biosurveillance strategy, and further recommended in 2011 that the strategy consider nonfederal capabilities. The White House issued the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 2012, which describes the U.S. government's approach to strengthening biosurveillance. However, the strategy did not fully respond to the challenges GAO identified. For example, it did not establish a framework to prioritize resource investments or address the need to leverage nonfederal resources. The White House was to issue an implementation plan within 120 days of publishing the strategy. GAO has reported that it is possible that the implementation plan could address issues previously identified, such as resource investment prioritization; however, the plan has not been released as of June 2015.
In August 2011, GAO reported that there was no centralized coordination to oversee federal agencies' efforts to implement Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) on the nation's food and agriculture defense policy, which includes food and agriculture disease surveillance. GAO also found that the Department of Agriculture (USDA) had no department-wide strategy for implementing its HSPD-9 responsibilities. Therefore, GAO recommended that the National Security Council Staff and the Department of Homeland Security resume their efforts to coordinate and oversee implementation, and that USDA develop a department-wide strategy. In response, the National Security Council Staff began hosting interagency working group meetings, and DHS has worked to develop a report on agencies' HSPD-9 implementation efforts, which officials stated will be finalized by late summer 2015. As of February 2015, USDA had conducted a gap analysis of its HSPD-9 implementation efforts but had not yet developed a department-wide strategy. Further, GAO reported in May 2013 that USDA's Animal and Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) had broadened its previous disease-by-disease surveillance approach to an approach in which the agency monitors the overall health of livestock and poultry, but had not yet integrated this approach into an overall strategy aligned with the nation's larger biosurveillance efforts, such as efforts called for in HSPD-9. GAO recommended that APHIS integrate its new approach into an overall strategy aligned with national homeland security efforts, and develop goals and measures for the new approach. In June 2015, officials stated that APHIS has begun to develop some measures, but noted that resource constraints limit their ability to assess their new approach to disease surveillance. Fully integrating its new approach into an overall strategy aligned with broader homeland security efforts, as GAO recommended, will better position APHIS to support national efforts to address threats to animal and human health. |
gao_GAO-10-100 | gao_GAO-10-100_0 | Based on a review of the FDIC and Federal Reserve recommendations, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President, may make a systemic risk determination authorizing FDIC to take action or provide assistance that does not meet the least-cost requirements. Such announcements can affect market expectations and contribute to moral hazard, but the announcements alone—absent a Treasury determination— do not trigger requirements established by Congress for documentation and communication of the agencies’ use of the systemic risk exception. Also as required by the FDI Act, Treasury sent letters to Congress to notify the relevant committees of all three determinations. Announcements of Emergency Actions without a Systemic Risk Determination Diminish the Level of Transparency and Accountability Intended by Congress
In all five cases, planned emergency actions were announced by regulators, but Treasury did not make an immediate determination for three of these announcements and still has not made a determination to date in two of them. FDIC could have effected a least-cost resolution of Wachovia Bank, N.A. Systemic Risk Determinations and Related Federal Assistance Raise Concerns about Moral Hazard and Market Discipline That May Be Addressed by Potential Regulatory Reforms
While the systemic risk determinations and associated federal assistance may have helped to contain the crisis by mitigating potential systemic adverse effects, they may have induced moral hazard—encouraging market participants to expect similar emergency actions in future crises, thereby weakening their incentives to properly manage risks and also creating the perception that some firms are too big to fail. Furthermore, uncertainty in these situations can arise because there is no requirement for Treasury to communicate that it will not make a systemic risk determination for an announced action. Legislators and regulators currently are considering regulatory proposals to subject systemically important institutions, including those whose market discipline is likely to have been weakened by the recent exercises of the systemic risk exception, to stricter regulatory standards such as higher capital and stronger liquidity and risk management requirements. Legislation has been proposed to expand resolution authority to large financial holding companies deemed systemically important that is intended to impose greater market discipline and limit moral hazard by forcing market participants to face significant costs from their risk-taking decisions. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To describe the steps taken by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to make the recommendations and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to make determinations in some cases, we reviewed documentation of recommendations that FDIC and the Federal Reserve made for Wachovia, the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), Citigroup, Bank of America, and the Public-Private Investment Programs proposed Legacy Loans Program (LLP) as well as documentation of Treasury’s determination for Wachovia, TLGP, and Citigroup. We agree there is some support for the agencies’ position that the statute authorizes systemic risk assistance of some type under TLGP facts, as well as for their position that the exception permits assistance to the entities covered by TLGP. What is clear, however, is that the systemic risk exception overrides important statutory restrictions designed to minimize costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund, and, in the case of TLGP, that the agencies used it to create a broad-based program of direct FDIC assistance to institutions that had never before received such relief—”healthy” banks, bank holding companies, and other bank affiliates. (iv) GAO review The Comptroller General of the United States shall review and report to the Congress on any determination under clause (i), including— (I) the basis for the determination; (II) the purpose for which any action was taken pursuant to such clause; and (III) the likely effect of the determination and such action on the incentives and conduct of insured depository institutions and uninsured depositors. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008 and 2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided emergency assistance that required the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to make a determination of systemic risk under the systemic risk exception of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act). The FDI Act requires GAO to review each determination made. For the three determinations made to date, this report examines (1) steps taken by FDIC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and Treasury to invoke the exception; (2) the basis of the determination and the purpose of resulting actions; and (3) the likely effects of the determination on the incentives and conduct of insured depository institutions and uninsured depositors. To do this work, GAO reviewed agency documentation, relevant laws, and academic studies; and interviewed regulators and market participants.
What GAO Found
Treasury, FDIC, and the Federal Reserve collaborated before the announcement of five potential emergency actions that would require a systemic risk determination. In each case, FDIC and the Federal Reserve recommended such actions to Treasury, but Treasury made a determination on only three of the announced actions. Although two recommendations have not resulted in FDIC actions to date, their announcement alone could have created the intended effect of increasing confidence in institutions, while similarly generating negative effects such as moral hazard. However, because announcements without a determination do not trigger FDI Act requirements for documentation and communication, such as Treasury consultation with the President and notification to Congress, such de facto determinations heightened the risk that the decisions were made without the level of transparency and accountability intended by Congress. Further, uncertainties can arise because there is no requirement for Treasury to communicate that it will not be invoking a systemic risk determination for an announced action. Two of Treasury's systemic risk determinations--for Wachovia and Citigroup--were made to avert the failure of an institution that regulators determined could exacerbate liquidity strains in the banking system. A third determination was made to address disruptions to bank funding affecting all banks. Under this latter determination, FDIC established the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), which guaranteed certain debt issued through October 31, 2009, and certain uninsured deposits of participating institutions through December 31, 2010, to restore confidence and liquidity in the banking system. While there is some support for the agencies' position that the statute authorizes systemic risk assistance of some type under TLGP facts and that it permits assistance to the entities covered by the program, there are questions about these interpretations, under which FDIC created a broad-based program of direct assistance to institutions that had never before received such relief--"healthy" banks, bank holding companies, and other bank affiliates. Because these issues are matters of significant public interest and importance, the statutory requirements may require clarification. Regulators' use of the systemic risk exception may weaken market participants' incentives to properly manage risk if they come to expect similar emergency actions in the future. The financial crisis revealed limits in the current regulatory framework to restrict excessive risk taking by financial institutions whose market discipline is likely to have been weakened by the recent use of the systemic risk exception. Congress and regulators are considering reforms to the current regulatory structure. It is important that such reforms subject systemically important financial institutions to stricter regulatory oversight. Further, legislation has been proposed for an orderly resolution of financial institutions not currently covered by the FDI Act. A credible resolution regime could help impose greater market discipline by forcing participants to face significant costs from their decisions and preclude a too-big-to-fail dilemma. |
gao_GAO-15-594T | gao_GAO-15-594T_0 | USDA Has Taken Steps to Help Identify and Prevent Ineligible Participants from Receiving Benefits
In May 2014, we reported that USDA had taken several steps to implement or enhance controls to identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving school-meals benefits. USDA worked with Congress to develop legislation to automatically enroll students who receive SNAP benefits for free school meals; SNAP has a more-detailed certification process than the school-meals program. The number of school districts directly certifying SNAP-participant children increased from the 2008 through 2013 school years. Starting in the 2013–2014 school year, USDA increased the frequency with which state agencies complete administrative reviews from every 5 years to every 3 years. As part of this process, state agencies are to conduct on-site reviews of school districts to help ensure that applications are complete and that the correct eligibility determinations were made based on applicant information. USDA Could Explore Options to Enhance the Verification Process to Further Strengthen Integrity While Ensuring Legitimate Access
In our May 2014 report, we identified opportunities to strengthen oversight of the school-meals programs while ensuring legitimate access, including clarifying use of for-cause verification, studying the feasibility of electronic data matching to verify income, and verifying a sample of households that are categorically eligible for assistance. Income Verification
In addition to for-cause verification, school districts are required to annually verify a sample of household applications approved for free or reduced-price school-meals benefits to determine whether the household has been certified to receive the correct level of benefits—we refer to this process as “standard verification.”limited to approved applications considered “error-prone.” Error-prone is statutorily defined as approved applications in which stated income is within $100 of the monthly or $1,200 of the annual applicable income- eligibility guideline. In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved civilian federal-employee household applications for our May 2014 report, we found that 9 of 19 households that self-reported household income and size information were not eligible for free or reduced-price-meal benefits they were receiving because their income exceeded eligibility guidelines. In May 2014, we recommended that USDA develop and assess a pilot program to explore the feasibility of computer matching school-meal participants with other sources of household income, such as state income databases, to identify potentially ineligible households—those with income exceeding program-eligibility thresholds—for verification. USDA concurred with our recommendations and told us in January 2015 that direct-verification computer matching is technologically feasible with data from means-tested programs, and that data from SNAP and other programs are suitable for school-meals program verification in many states. Verification of Categorical Eligibility
In May 2014, we found that ineligible households may be receiving free school-meals benefits by submitting applications that falsely state that a household member is categorically eligible for the program due to participating in certain public-assistance programs—such as SNAP—or meeting an approved designation—such as foster child or homeless. In May 2014, we recommended that USDA explore the feasibility of verifying the eligibility of a sample of applications that indicate categorical eligibility for program benefits and are therefore not subject to standard verification. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, 30.4 million children participated in the National School Lunch Program and 13.6 million children participated in the School Breakfast Program, partly funded by $15.1 billion from USDA. In May 2014, GAO issued a report on (1) steps taken to help identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving benefits in school-meal programs and (2) opportunities to strengthen USDA's oversight of the programs.
This testimony summarizes GAO's May 2014 report ( GAO-14-262 ) and January 2015 updates from USDA. For the May 2014 report, GAO reviewed federal school-meals program policies, interviewed program officials, and randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample that included 25 approved applications from civilian federal-employee households out of 7.7 million total approved applications in 25 of 1,520 school districts in the Dallas, Texas, and Washington, D.C., regions. GAO performed limited eligibility testing using civilian federal-employee payroll data from 2010 through 2013 due to the unavailability of other data sources containing nonfederal-employee income. GAO also conducted interviews with households. GAO referred potentially ineligible households to the USDA Inspector General.
In its 2014 report, GAO recommended that USDA explore the feasibility of (1) using computer matching to identify households with income that exceeds program-eligibility thresholds for verification and (2) verifying a sample of categorically eligible households. USDA generally agreed with the recommendations and has actions under way to address them.
What GAO Found
In May 2014, GAO reported that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had taken several steps to implement or enhance controls to identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving school-meals benefits. For example:
USDA worked with Congress to develop legislation to automatically enroll students who receive Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program benefits for free school meals; this program has a more-detailed certification process than the school-meals program.
Starting in the 2013–2014 school year, USDA increased the frequency with which state agencies complete administrative reviews of school districts from every 5 years to every 3 years. As part of this process, state agencies review applications to determine whether eligibility determinations were correctly made.
In its May 2014 report, GAO identified opportunities to strengthen oversight of the school-meals programs while ensuring legitimate access, such as the following:
If feasible, computer matching income data from external sources with participant information could help identify households whose income exceeds eligibility thresholds. As of May 2014, school districts verified a sample of approved applications deemed “error-prone”—statutorily defined as those with reported income within $1,200 of the annual eligibility guidelines—to determine whether the household is receiving the correct level of benefits (referred to as standard verification in this testimony). In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved applications from civilian federal households, GAO found that 9 of 19 households that self-reported household income and size information were ineligible and only 2 could have been subject to standard verification.
Verifying a sample of categorically eligible applications could help identify ineligible households. GAO reported that school-meal applicants who indicate categorical eligibility (that is, participating in certain public-assistance programs or meeting an approved designation, such as foster children) were eligible for free meals and were generally not subject to standard verification. In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved applications, 6 households indicated categorical eligibility, but GAO found 2 were ineligible. |
gao_GAO-12-857 | gao_GAO-12-857_0 | Because of the mechanism through which the Recovery Act increased the federal share of funding for Medicaid through an increased FMAP, any provider that received Medicaid reimbursements during 2009 received Recovery Act funds. Federal law does not prohibit providers with unpaid federal taxes from enrolling in or receiving payments from Medicaid. A provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 authorizes IRS to continuously levy (typically using an automated process) certain federal payments made to delinquent taxpayers in order to collect tax debt, but Medicaid reimbursements have never been collected using this provision of the law. About 7,000 Medicaid Providers in the Selected States Owed Approximately $791 Million in Federal Tax Debt
Our analysis found that, as of September 30, 2011, about 7,000 Medicaid providers in the three selected states had approximately $791 million in unpaid federal taxes from 2009 or earlier. These providers represent about 5.6 percent of the approximately 125,000 Medicaid providers reimbursed by the selected states during 2009. These 7,000 Medicaid providers with unpaid federal taxes received a total of about $6.6 billion in Medicaid reimbursements during 2009, which included Recovery Act funds. The amount of unpaid federal taxes we identified among Medicaid providers is likely understated because the IRS taxpayer data reflect only the amount of unpaid taxes either reported by the taxpayer on a tax return or assessed by IRS through its various enforcement programs, and generally the unpaid federal taxes amount does not include entities that did not file tax returns or underreported their income. These 40 providers received a total of $235 million in Medicaid reimbursements. The amount of unpaid federal taxes associated with these case studies is about $26 million in total, ranging from approximately $100,000 (the minimum threshold used to draw our sample) to over $6 million individually. IRS may levy a taxpayer’s property to satisfy a tax debt, but IRS currently may only subject Medicaid reimbursements to a onetime levy instead of a continuous levy, because Medicaid reimbursements are not considered “federal payments.” We estimate that if IRS were able to continuously levy Medicaid reimbursements, it could collect from $22 million to $330 million from the three selected states for 2009, depending on the circumstances of the levy and certain provider behaviors. The states that we spoke to expressed concerns over the use of continuous levies and also described problems related to the enforcement of onetime levies. For example, several states experienced customer service–related challenges when working with IRS including difficulty using the IRS customer service hotline, difficulty reaching the IRS revenue officer, or problems with IRS sending levies to the wrong address. III), IRS concurred with our recommendation to explore opportunities to enhance collection of unpaid federal taxes from Medicaid providers and noted that previous efforts have revealed significant operational challenges. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to: (1) determine the magnitude of unpaid federal taxes owed by Medicaid providers receiving reimbursements during 2009 in selected states, (2) provide examples of Medicaid providers who have significant unpaid federal taxes, and (3) evaluate opportunities and challenges related to collecting unpaid federal taxes through a levy process designed to offset Medicaid reimbursements. Appendix II: Additional Cases of Medicaid Providers with Sizeable Outstanding Federal Tax Debt
The following table provides 30 additional examples of 2009 Medicaid providers who received American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds, with sizeable outstanding federal tax debt. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Recovery Act increased the federal share of Medicaid funding. Federal law does not prohibit providers with tax debt from enrolling in Medicaid, but GAOs prior work found that thousands of Medicaid providers do have unpaid federal taxes. Since any provider who received Medicaid reimbursements during 2009 received Recovery Act funds, GAO was asked to (1) determine the magnitude of unpaid federal taxes owed by Medicaid providers reimbursed during 2009 in selected states; (2) provide examples of Medicaid providers who have sizeable unpaid federal taxes; and (3) evaluate opportunities and challenges related to collecting unpaid federal taxes through a levy process designed to offset Medicaid reimbursements.
GAO compared Medicaid reimbursement information from three states to known IRS tax debts as of September 30, 2009. These states were among those that received the largest portion of Recovery Act Medicaid funding. To provide examples of Medicaid providers who have sizeable unpaid federal taxes, GAO conducted a detailed review of 40 Medicaid providers from the three states that had over $100,000 of federal tax debt. GAOs sample of three states and 40 cases cannot be generalized to all states and all Medicaid providers. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and reports and interviewed federal and state officials.
What GAO Found
About 7,000 Medicaid providers in three selected states (Florida, New York, and Texas) had approximately $791 million in unpaid federal taxes from calendar year 2009 or earlier. This represents about 5.6 percent of the Medicaid providers reimbursed by the selected states during 2009. These 7,000 Medicaid providers with unpaid federal taxes received a total of about $6.6 billion in Medicaid reimbursements during 2009 (including American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [Recovery Act] funds). The amount of unpaid federal taxes GAO identified is likely understated because Internal Revenue Service (IRS) taxpayer data reflect only the amount of unpaid taxes either reported on a tax return or assessed by IRS through enforcement; it does not include entities that did not file tax returns or underreported their income.
The 40 Medicaid providers GAO reviewed received a total of $235 million in Medicaid reimbursements (including Recovery Act funds) in 2009 and had unpaid federal taxes of about $26 million through 2010. The amount of unpaid federal taxes ranged from approximately $100,000 to over $6 million. In addition, IRS records indicate that providers in two of GAOs cases are currently, or have previously been, under criminal investigation. For example, in one case a provider was caught participating in a medical billing fraud.
IRS may levy, or seize, a taxpayers property to satisfy a tax debt and, in some instances, is authorized to use an automated process to continuously levy federal payments made to delinquent taxpayers. Medicaid reimbursements have never been continuously levied using this provision of the law because the IRS determined that these reimbursements do not qualify as federal payments. However, if such a process could be used, GAO estimates that IRS could have collected between $22 million and $330 million in the selected states in 2009. States we spoke to expressed concerns about implementing continuous levies, given the challenges they encounter with processing onetime IRS levies. For example, states have had difficulty reaching IRS revenue officers and problems with IRS sending levies to the wrong address.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS explore opportunities to enhance collection of unpaid taxes from Medicaid providers, including the use of continuous levies. IRS agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-342 | gao_GAO-09-342_0 | To augment its declining in-house acquisition workforce, DOD has relied more heavily on contractor personnel. In addition to the overall decline in its in-house acquisition workforce and an increased workload, DOD faces shifting workforce demographics and a changing strategic environment. DOD Lacks the Information Needed to Determine the Sufficiency of Its Acquisition Workforce
DOD lacks critical departmentwide information in several areas necessary to assess, manage, and oversee the acquisition workforce and help ensure it has a sufficient acquisition workforce to meet DOD’s national security mission. Omitting these data from DOD’s assessments not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD’s ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions. Because contractor personnel likely comprise a substantial part of all personnel supporting program offices, AT&L is missing information on a key segment of the department’s total acquisition workforce (in-house and contractor personnel). DOD also lacks information on factors driving program offices’ decisions to use contractor personnel rather than hire in-house personnel. Instead, 25 cited staffing limits, the speed of hiring, or both as main factors in their decisions to use contractor personnel. AT&L Lacks Key Pieces of Information Necessary to Conduct Gap Analyses
AT&L’s lack of key pieces of information hinders its ability to determine gaps in the number and skill sets of acquisition personnel needed to meet DOD’s current and future missions. With regard to information on the personnel it has, AT&L not only lacks information on contractor personnel, but it also lacks complete information on the skill sets of the current acquisition workforce and whether these skill sets are sufficient to accomplish its missions. Recent Initiatives May Not Yield the Information Needed to Assess, Manage, and Oversee DOD’s Total Acquisition Workforce
AT&L has begun to respond to recent legislative requirements aimed at improving DOD’s management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, including developing data, tools, and processes to more fully assess and monitor its acquisition workforce. Each service has also recently initiated, to varying degrees, additional efforts to assess its own workforce at the service level. AT&L has also developed some tools and begun initiatives designed to help with its management of the acquisition workforce, such as its competency assessment that is scheduled to be completed in March 2010. However, these efforts may not provide the comprehensive information DOD needs to manage and oversee its acquisition workforce. Practices of Leading Organizations Could Provide Insights for DOD’s Acquisition Workforce Efforts
As DOD continues to develop and implement departmentwide initiatives aimed at providing better oversight of the acquisition workforce, some of the practices employed by leading organizations for managing their workforces could provide insights for DOD’s efforts. These practices include: identifying gaps in the current workforce by assessing the overall competencies needed to achieve business objectives, compared to current competencies; establishing mechanisms to track and evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives to close workforce gaps; taking a strategic approach in deciding when and how to use contractor personnel to supplement the workforce; and tracking and analyzing data on contractor personnel. Table 6 provides examples of recruiting and retention metrics used by the companies we reviewed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that DOD’s acquisition workforce is the right size with the right skills and that the department is making the best use of its resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: Collect and track data on contractor personnel who supplement the acquisition workforce—including their functions performed, skill sets, and length of service—and conduct analyses using these data to inform acquisition workforce decisions regarding the appropriate number and mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel the department needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has more than doubled to $388 billion in 2008, while the number of civilian and military acquisition personnel has remained relatively stable. To augment its in-house workforce, DOD relies heavily on contractor personnel. If it does not maintain an adequate workforce, DOD places its billion-dollar acquisitions at an increased risk of poor outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOD's ability to determine whether it has a sufficient acquisition workforce, (2) assess DOD initiatives to improve the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce, and (3) discuss practices of leading organizations that could provide insights for DOD's acquisition workforce oversight. To do this, GAO analyzed key DOD studies, obtained data from 66 major weapon system program offices across DOD, and interviewed officials from 4 program offices. GAO also met with representatives from six companies recognized as leaders in workforce management.
What GAO Found
DOD lacks critical departmentwide information to ensure its acquisition workforce is sufficient to meet its national security mission. First, in its acquisition workforce assessments, DOD does not collect or track information on contractor personnel, despite their being a key segment of the total acquisition workforce. DOD also lacks information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to augment the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. GAO found that program office decisions to use contractor personnel are often driven by factors such as quicker hiring time frames and civilian staffing limits, rather than by the skills needed or the nature or criticality of the work. Second, DOD's lack of key pieces of information limits its ability to determine gaps in the acquisition workforce it needs to meet current and future missions. For example, DOD lacks information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel, and lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house personnel. Omitting data on contractor personnel and needed skills from DOD's workforce assessments not only skews analyses of workforce gaps, but also limits DOD's ability to make informed workforce allocation decisions and determine whether the total acquisition workforce--in-house and contractor personnel--is sufficient to accomplish its mission. DOD has initiated several recent actions aimed at improving the management and oversight of its acquisition workforce. For example, DOD is developing a plan for managing the civilian acquisition workforce and is establishing practices for overseeing additional hiring, recruiting, and retention activities. It has also taken actions to develop some of the data and tools necessary to monitor the acquisition workforce, such as a competency assessment scheduled to be completed in March 2010. Each military service and agency has also begun, to varying degrees, efforts to assess its workforce at the service level. In addition, some efforts aimed at improving DOD's overall workforce may also provide additional information to support acquisition workforce efforts. However, these initiatives may not provide the comprehensive information DOD needs to manage and oversee its acquisition workforce. To manage their workforces, the leading organizations GAO reviewed (1) identify gaps in their current workforces by assessing the overall competencies needed to achieve business objectives; (2) establish mechanisms to track and evaluate the effectiveness of their initiatives to close these gaps; (3) take a strategic approach in deciding when to use contractor personnel to supplement the workforce, such as limiting the use of contractor personnel to performing noncore-business functions and meeting surges in work demands; and (4) track and analyze data on contractor personnel. These practices could provide insights to DOD as it moves forward with its acquisition workforce initiatives. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-118 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-118_0 | In 1991, we reported that continued problems in the program indicated that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical stockpile should be expected. Stockpile Program’s Cost and Schedule Are Uncertain but Will Exceed Current Estimates
The stockpile program will likely exceed its $12.4 billion estimate and take longer than the legislative completion date of December 2004. This is because reaching agreement on site-specific disposal methods has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Public concerns about the safety of incineration have (1) resulted in additional environmental requirements, (2) slowed the permitting of new incinerators, and (3) required the Army to research disposal alternatives. Reaching Agreement on Environmental Issues Has Been a Lengthy Process
Predicting the disposal schedule for the various sites is difficult. Nonstockpile Program’s Cost and Schedule Are Also Uncertain
Through fiscal year 1997 the Congress has appropriated $221 million for the nonstockpile program. Proposed Disposal Systems Are Not Yet Proven Effective and Acceptable by the Public
Although Army officials are confident that the proposed disposal systems will function as planned, the Army needs more time to prove that the systems will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile materiel and be accepted by the affected states and communities. In December 1994, DOD designated the Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of program oversight. Army officials estimated that the initial cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, could potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. The current process of individual states establishing their own environmental laws and requirements and the prevalent public attitude that the Army’s disposal facilities should not be located in their vicinity have been obstacles to the stockpile disposal program and are also likely to affect the nonstockpile program. Conclusions
In summary, implementation of the disposal programs has been slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and the affected states and localities over the process to dispose of chemical munitions and materiel. Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns with the disposal of chemical munitions, suggestions have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the Army’s basic approach to destruction. However, these suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in legal requirements. The Army issued the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. It also required the Army to report on (1) disposal alternatives to the baseline incineration method and (2) plans for destroying U.S. nonstockpile chemical weapons and materiel identified in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Related GAO Products
Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Under its basic legislative responsibilities, GAO assessed the Department of Defense's (DOD) chemical weapons and related materiel disposal programs, focusing on: (1) the key factors affecting the costs and schedules; (2) actions the Army has taken to improve the programs; and (e) alternatives for improving the programs' effectiveness and efficiency.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used; (2) as a result, the costs and schedules for the disposal programs are uncertain; (3) however, they will cost more than the estimated $23.4 billion above current appropriations and take longer than currently planned; (4) the key factors affecting the programs include the public concerns about the safety of incineration, the environmental process, the legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies; (5) the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile sites; (6) based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated; (7) until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy; (8) moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program; (9) in addition, more time is needed for the Army to prove that its proposed disposal method for the nonstockpile program will be safe and effective and accepted by the affected states and localities; (10) in December 1994, DOD designated the Army's chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition program; (11) the objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of program oversight; (12) in addition, Army officials have identified cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, that could reduce program costs by $673 million; (13) recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the programs' basic approach to destruction; and (14) however, the suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in the existing legal requirements. |
gao_GAO-08-183T | gao_GAO-08-183T_0 | NOAA is also planning the next generation of satellites, known as the GOES-R series, which are planned for launch beginning in 2014. However, this change has delayed a key decision to proceed with the acquisition, which was planned for September 2007. Further, independent estimates are higher than the program’s current $7 billion cost estimate and convey a low level of confidence in the program’s schedule for launching the first satellite by 2014. As NOAA works to reconcile the independent estimate with its own program office estimate, costs are likely to grow and schedules are likely to be delayed. NOAA is Taking Steps to Address Key Risks, but More Remains to Be Done
To address cost, schedule, and technical risks, the GOES-R program established a risk management program and has taken steps to identify and mitigate selected risks. Specifically, the program has multiple risk watchlists and they are not always consistent. Further, key risks are missing from the risks lists, including risks associated with unfilled executive positions, limitations in NOAA’s insight into NASA’s deliverables, and insufficient funding for unexpected costs (called management reserve) on a critical sensor. As a result, the GOES-R program is at increased risk that problems will not be identified or mitigated in a timely manner and that they could lead to program cost overruns and schedule delays. As another example, the program office considers the lack of an integrated master schedule to be its highest priority risk. Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Improve NOAA’s Ability to Effectively Manage the GOES-R Procurement
To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the procurement of the GOES-R system, we recommended in our accompanying report that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere to take the following two actions: Ensure that the GOES-R program office manages, mitigates, and reports on risks using a program-level risk list that is reconciled with and includes risks from its flight and operations project offices that could impact the overall program. Over the last year, NOAA has completed preliminary design studies of its GOES-R system and decided to separate the space and ground elements of the program into two contracts and have NASA oversee the system integration effort. However, independent studies show that the program’s cost could increase by about $2 billion and that the first launch could be delayed by at least 2 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to summarize its report on the GOES-R series. This report (1) assesses the status and revised plans for the GOES-R procurement and (2) evaluates whether NOAA is adequately mitigating key technical and programmatic risks facing the program. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and NASA.
What GAO Found
NOAA has made progress in planning its GOES-R procurement--which is estimated to cost $7 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2014--but cost and schedules are likely to grow. Specifically, the agency completed preliminary design studies of GOES-R and recently decided to separate the space and ground elements of the program into two separate development contracts. However, this change in strategy has delayed a planned September 2007 decision to proceed with the acquisition. Further, independent estimates are higher than the program's current cost estimate and convey a low level of confidence in the program's schedule. Independent studies show that the estimated program could cost about $2 billion more, and the first satellite launch could be delayed by 2 years. As NOAA works to reconcile the independent estimate with its own program office estimate, costs are likely to grow and schedules are likely to be delayed. To address cost, schedule, and technical risks, the GOES-R program has established a risk management program and has taken steps to mitigate selected risks. For example, as of July 2007, the program office identified the lack of an integrated master schedule to be its highest priority risk and established plans to bring this risk to closure. However, more remains to be done to fully address risks. Specifically, the program has multiple risk watchlists that are not always consistent and key risks are missing from the watchlists, including risks associated with unfilled executive positions, limitations in NOAA's insight into NASA's deliverables, and insufficient funds for unexpected costs--called management reserves. As a result, the GOES-R program is at risk that problems will not be identified or mitigated in a timely manner and could lead to program cost overruns and schedule delays. |
gao_GAO-06-294 | gao_GAO-06-294_0 | Federal agencies use different criteria as to what constitutes a rural area. Federal agencies and regional commissions and authorities that administer financial assistance programs are required to report quarterly to FAADS on the financial assistance awards they make. As agreed with your office, we based our framework on our prior work, a review of other research studies, and discussions with federal officials and rural development groups. Further, computer software programs can now geocode federal funding data below the county level. Due to data limitations that only allowed us to identify subcounty level recipients for about half of the funding, we chose to use a system developed in 2001 which relies on both population and commuting patterns of census tracts to classify each county as rural or urban based on the counties dominant commuting patterns. Although this approach does not fully resolve all the classification problems inherent in county-based systems that are based on political boundaries rather than demographic characteristics, it allowed us to geocode most of the data and was most comparable to census population data. As a result, the classifications are heavily skewed toward urban. Some use census tracts (about 62,000) or other geographic areas smaller than counties (about 3,000) that can better reflect rural-urban differences. The Amount of Economic Development Funding Rural Areas Received Varied across Programs, Agencies, States, and Regions
The 86 economic development programs we identified that met one or more of the criteria from our list of economic development activities provided about $200 billion in funding to the 50 states and Washington, D.C. for fiscal years 2002 through 2004. We found that for 44 of the 86 economic development programs included in our analysis, the administering agencies either did not report any funding data or reported incomplete or inaccurate data to FAADS during all or part of fiscal years 2002 through 2004. Total obligations that were reported to Census during those years for these programs were off by more than $11 billion, including obligations of about $4.5 billion for 19 programs (22 percent) that had not been reported at all, and a total of about $7 billion for 25 programs that was either over- or underreported. Even though the FAADS reporting requirement has been in place since 1982, for the agencies we reviewed, several factors affected the extent of compliance with the FAADS requirements. These factors included: a lack of controls and resources at Census to determine whether agencies were actually submitting the data, a lack of knowledge among program officials about the FAADS poor oversight and coordination at the agencies responsible for ensuring both compliance with the reporting requirement and the accuracy of the data submitted. We found that the amount of economic development funding provided to rural areas varied widely by program, agency, state, and region. Scope and Methodology
To examine the share of federal economic development funds that support rural areas today, we (1) developed a framework for identifying federal economic development funding; (2) determined the most informative classification system for differentiating between rural and urban areas; (3) used the economic development framework and classification system to identify rural areas and report the amount and share of economic development funding these areas have received; and (4) examined federal agencies’ reporting of economic development funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to update its 1989 report on the distribution of economic development funding using newer tools now available for measuring the distribution of federal funds to rural areas. GAO agreed to (1) identify federal economic development programs, (2) determine the best way to identify rural areas for this report, (3) determine the amount and share of economic development funding that rural areas receive, and (4) discuss the way federal agencies report data on economic development funding.
What GAO Found
Based on prior GAO reports, other research studies, and information provided by federal program officials and external rural development groups, GAO developed a list of activities as criteria to identify economic development programs. This list included job creation, infrastructure development, and other activities that are generally acknowledged to directly affect overall economic growth. Using this list, GAO identified 86 federal programs in 10 federal agencies and 3 regional commissions and authorities that provide economic development funding. Because federal agencies use different criteria as to what constitutes rural, determining how much funding has targeted rural areas required determining which method of defining rural was the best for tracking funding. Classification systems that can track funding data at the census tract level or below can better differentiate between rural and urban areas because they better reflect the economic and social diversity than do county-based systems that are based on political boundaries. Because limitations in the data did not allow tracking all the funding data to local levels, GAO used a system that used population and commuting relationships to classify census tracts and then classify each county as rural or urban based on the county's dominant commuting pattern. The 86 programs in 2002-2004 provided approximately $200 billion in total economic development funding, about $150 billion of which could be tracked to the county level or below. However, the amount of funding provided to rural areas varied widely by program, agency, state, and region. These calculations were complicated by significant problems with the data from the programs that federal agencies were reporting to Census. Although all federal agencies are required to submit obligations data for their programs quarterly, 44 of the programs GAO analyzed did not report any data or reported incomplete or inaccurate data for all or part of fiscal years 2002, 2003, or 2004. As a result, the reported obligations were off by more than $11 billon. Further, some 19 programs provided no information on obligations of about $4.5 billion, and another 25 programs reported amounts that varied significantly from actual obligations. The FAADS reporting requirement has been in place since 1982. But a lack of knowledge among program officials about the requirement and poor oversight has affected compliance with it. |
gao_GAO-05-518 | gao_GAO-05-518_0 | As previously mentioned, these key practices are allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination, performance measurement and testing, aligning assets to mission, and strategic management of human capital. Furthermore, the Park Police obligated funds during this time for security personnel and equipment support, such as X-ray machines, body armor, and vehicles. Department of Agriculture
USDA has obligated about $25 million for physical security enhancements for its facilities on or adjacent to the National Mall since September 11. Agencies are required to coordinate with reviewing organizations and consider aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental impacts when implementing physical security enhancements. National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Steps That Can Make the Review Process More Efficient
Several agency officials, along with the review organizations, stated that early and frequent consultation helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient review process. As a result, NCPC has praised the Smithsonian on its efforts to balance necessary security enhancements with public access and aesthetics. Furthermore, although visitors reported that current levels of public access and appearance are satisfactory, the survey results also suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important priorities when adding security measures to the National Mall. However, none of the federal agencies reported using one key practice—aligning assets to mission—to implement physical security enhancements because they do not believe that they have excess or underutilized facilities on the National Mall or elsewhere or consider the practice applicable to properties under their jurisdiction. Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses Common Challenge
Although we found that agencies on the National Mall are using most of the key practices we identified for the protection of facilities, officials from most of these agencies identified a common challenge in using these practices and, in fact, in implementing all types of physical security enhancements. On the National Mall, federal agencies are in the early stages of designing and implementing permanent perimeter security barriers to protect their facilities and the visiting public. Officials from the other agencies also provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated into this report where appropriate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics in designing and approving physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and how issues of access and aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and any challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices. In addition, we conducted a 3-minute intercept survey of visitors to the National Mall to determine (1) the extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel that security measures on the National Mall affect access to sites on the National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall; (2) the extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel that additional security measures are needed; (3) the priority that National Mall visitors would assign access to the National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall, in the event that additional security measures are added; and (4) whether security measures affect the likelihood that National Mall visitors will return. We requested official comments on this report from the Smithsonian, the Department of the Interior, USDA, and the National Gallery. National Capital Planning Commission. Washington, D.C.: September 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of our country's most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering place for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space Museum, for example, was the most visited museum worldwide in 2003, hosting 9.4 million visitors. Federal agencies with facilities on the National Mall have begun implementing physical security enhancements to protect their facilities and the visiting public. This report responds to Congressional interest in the efforts and expenditures pertaining to these security enhancements and discusses (1) the physical security enhancements that have been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics into the design and approval of these security enhancements, and how issues of access and aesthetics are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and (3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to implement the enhancements, and any challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which were incorporated into this report where appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies on the National Mall have obligated about $132 million for physical security enhancements, with the National Park Service and the Smithsonian accounting for about 75 percent of the total obligations. Security enhancements include additional security personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and technology. Planned enhancements include the installation of permanent security barriers to protect against vehicle bombs. Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design and approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal agencies must coordinate with reviewing organizations, such as the National Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental effects when implementing security enhancements. Although federal agencies reported that the review process can be time-consuming, review organizations noted that early and frequent consultation with them helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and expeditious review process. GAO's survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall, and reports from federal agencies, indicate that visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and generally find the current level of security enhancements acceptable. GAO's survey results also suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as important priorities when adding security enhancements to the National Mall. Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of the six key practices identified by GAO--allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination, performance management and testing, and strategic management of human capital--in implementing physical security enhancements. However, none of the federal agencies on the National Mall reported using the key practice of aligning assets to mission in implementing security measures because they believe they do not have excess or underutilized facilities or consider the practice applicable to property under their jurisdiction. Agencies identified balancing ongoing mission priorities with the need for security as a common challenge in using key practices to implement physical security enhancements. |
gao_GAO-02-871 | gao_GAO-02-871_0 | Creditor Claims and Ownership Interests Were Not Likely to Have Been Satisfied if Amtrak Had Been Liquidated
If Amtrak had been liquidated on December 31, 2001, secured and unsecured creditors, including the federal government and Amtrak’s employees, and stockholders (preferred and common) would have had about $44 billion in potential claims against and ownership interests in Amtrak’s estate. It is not likely that secured and unsecured creditors’ claims and would have been fully satisfied, because Amtrak’s assets—other than the Northeast Corridor—available to satisfy these claims and interests (such as equipment and materials and supplies) are old, have little value, or might not have a value equal to the claims against them. Liquidation Would Have Adversely Affected the Railroad Retirement and Unemployment Systems
The Railroad Retirement Board estimated that Amtrak’s liquidation would have caused the railroad retirement system to run out of funds in 2024 if all Amtrak employees had lost their jobs and were not reemployed in the railroad industry. A loss of Amtrak’s contribution would have had a significant financial impact on the system. The Board estimated that, if Amtrak had been liquidated on December 31, 2001, and no action had been taken to increase tier II payroll taxes beyond that already planned or to reduce benefit levels, the railroad retirement account would start to decline in 2006 and would first have a negative balance (of $742 million) in 2024. Adverse Effects on Railroad Unemployment System Would Be Short- Term
Finally, participants in the railroad unemployment system would also have been adversely affected by an Amtrak liquidation. Financial effects would have been immediate, but short-term. The cash reserves of the unemployment system would have been exhausted in 2002, and a total of $338 million would have to have been borrowed from the railroad retirement account, as permitted by statute, from 2002 through 2004 to make these benefit payments. According to the Board, between 2002 and 2004, the average tax rate would have had to increase from about 4 percent to 12.5 percent—before decreasing to 9.6 percent in 2005. Appendix II: Comments from the National Railroad Passenger Corporation | What GAO Found
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), the nation's intercity passenger rail operator, was created by Congress in 1970 after the nation's railroads found passenger service to be unprofitable. It is a private corporation. Its financial situation has never been strong, and it has been on the edge of bankruptcy several times. Early this year, Amtrak stated that federal financial assistance would have to more than double for the corporation to survive. Given Amtrak's worsening financial condition and the potential for intercity passenger rail to play a larger role in the nation's transportation system, there is growing agreement that the mission, funding, and structure of the current approach to providing intercity passenger rail merits reexamination. If Amtrak had been liquidated on December 31, 2001, secured creditors and unsecured creditors--including the federal government and Amtrak employees--and stockholders would have had $44 billion in potential claims against and ownership interests in Amtrak's estate. It is unlikely that secured and unsecured creditors' claims would have been fully satisfied, because Amtrak's assets available to satisfy these claims and interests are old, have little value, or appear unlikely to have a value equal to the claims against them. An Amtrak liquidation would have adversely affected participants in the railroad retirement and unemployment systems. If all the Amtrak employees had lost their jobs on December 31, 2001, and were not reemployed in the railroad industry, the railroad retirement system would have lost over $400 million in annual contributions from Amtrak payroll taxes. The Railroad Retirement Board estimated that the railroad retirement account would being to decline in 2006 and would be in a deficit by 2024 if no actions were taken to increase payroll taxes or reduce benefits. The financial impact on the railroad unemployment system would have been immediate, but short term. According to the Board, the unemployment account would have been exhausted in 2002, the unemployment account would have had to borrow $338 million from the railroad retirement account, and unemployment taxes would have had to increase from 4 percent to 12.5 percent between 2002 and 2004 for the system to maintain its financial health. |
gao_GAO-02-866T | gao_GAO-02-866T_0 | The act required the Comptroller General to convene a panel of experts to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial activities for the federal government from government to contactor personnel. Steps Taken to Ensure a Representative Panel and a Fair and Balanced Process
In establishing the Panel, a number of steps were taken to ensure representation from all major stakeholders as well as to ensure a fair and balanced process. To ensure a broad array of views on the panel, we used a Federal Register notice to seek suggestions on the Panel’s composition. Principles, Findings, and Recommendations
As the Panel began its work, it recognized early on the need for a set of principles that would provide a framework for sourcing decisions. Those principles, as they were debated and fleshed out, provided an important vehicle for assessing what does or does not work in the current A-76 process, and provided a framework for identifying needed changes in the process. Savings result regardless of whether the public or the private sector wins the cost comparison. Implementation Strategy
Many of the Panel’s recommendations can be accomplished administratively under existing law, and the Panel recommends that they be implemented as soon as practical. The Panel also recognizes that some of its recommendations would require changes in statutes or regulations and that making the necessary changes could take some time. Any legislative changes should be approached in a comprehensive and considered manner rather than a piecemeal fashion in order for a reasonable balance to be achieved. | What GAO Found
The Commercial Activities Panel is a congressionally mandated panel to study, and make recommendations for improving, the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial activities from government to contractor personnel. The growing controversy surrounding competitions under the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76 to determine whether the government should obtain commercially available goods and services from the public or private sectors led to the establishment of this Panel. In establishing the Panel, several steps were taken to ensure representation from all major stakeholders as well as to ensure a fair and balanced process. To ensure a broad range of views on the Panel, a Federal Register notice was used to seek suggestions for the Panel's composition. As the Panel began its work, it recognized the need for a set of principles for sourcing decisions. These principles provide for an assessment of what does or does not work in the current A-76 process and provide a framework for identifying needed changes. Many of the Panel's recommendations can be accomplished administratively under existing law, and the Panel recommends that they be implemented as soon as practical. The Panel also recognizes that some of the recommendations would require changes in statutes or regulations that could take some time. Any legislative changes should be comprehensive and considered to achieve a reasonable balance. |
gao_GAO-14-144 | gao_GAO-14-144_0 | Included among the VEI Task Force’s changes to the program are: an extended curriculum with segments on translating military skills to civilian job requirements, financial planning, and individual counseling and assessment with the goal of each servicemember developing an Individual Transition Plan; an updated employment workshop and briefings on federal veteran benefits divided into two sessions.embed information relevant for those who have or think they have a service-connected disability rather than as part of a separate Disabled Transition Assistance Program component; The VA benefits I and II briefings a series of 2-day, career-specific tracks that focus on (1) pursuing college education, (2) entering a technical skills training program, or (3) starting a business. TAP serves as a gateway to additional information and services that are available, either while servicemembers are on active duty or after they have separated from the military. According to the revised plan, agencies now expect to implement virtually all components by the end of March 2014, with full implementation planned by June 2014. In addition to implementing the key components of TAP at military installations, the services continue to update physical infrastructure at a number of locations to provide an optimal experience for servicemembers participating in TAP components. Agencies’ Efforts for TAP Adequately Address Three of Five Key Elements Associated with Effective Program Implementation and Evaluation
Agencies have efforts underway to address three of the five key elements associated with effective program implementation and evaluation for TAP. Agencies Are Adequately Addressing Three Elements
Element 1: Tracking Attendance
Effective training programs have systems to track data, and we found that DOD and the services have systems to collect and report on attendance rates and are taking steps to improve the reliability of these data. It also measures participants’ According to agency officials, the agencies plan to use the results from the assessment to monitor the performance and outcomes for the redesigned TAP, assess trends, determine areas of improvement, and modify TAP components as appropriate. DOD is leading this effort. The agencies also monitor their respective TAP components through site visits or plan to do so. According to the DOD capstone report, to address this challenge, the agencies are taking actions, such as the services implementing a training program for their TAP staff and planning efforts to educate commanders and servicemembers on the requirements, purpose, and importance of the capstone event. Agencies’ Efforts to Address the Remaining Two Elements are Mixed
Element 4: Ensuring Participation and Completion
Effective training programs encourage participation and hold both individuals and their leaders responsible. In contrast, the Navy and the Marines do not have such systems. basic end-of-course evaluations to higher level impact evaluations.agencies plan to evaluate TAP at lower levels. Their evaluation plan includes (1) gauging participant reaction to all TAP components through end-of-course evaluations and (2) determining whether servicemembers met the career readiness standards prior to separation. Higher level evaluations are also important to help gauge the effectiveness of TAP, and the agencies have not demonstrated a strategic approach to planning such evaluations. Despite the modular nature of TAP, this report did not specify whether this type of higher level evaluation would assess all of TAP or certain components. DOD Lacks a Process to Assess the TAP Experience of National Guard and Reserve Members
Based on GAO’s prior work and interviews with stakeholders, we identified a key remaining challenge; namely, that DOD lacks a process to assess the TAP experience of National Guard and Reserve members. For example, the agencies tailored the content of TAP components to better suit the needs of National Guard and Reserve members after However, only one analyzing the results of feedback from pilots of TAP.of the steps taken directly addresses the concerns of stakeholders related to the location and timing of TAP. To better ensure servicemember participation in and completion of TAP, direct the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness to require that all services provide unit commanders and their leaders information on TAP participation levels of servicemembers under their command, similar to that provided by the Army and Air Force. However, we continue to believe that our recommendation is needed. According to DOD, the military life cycle transition model may help address some of the challenges related to the timing and location of program delivery. As we note in the report, full implementation of the military life cycle transition model is planned by October 2014. Elements and Relevant Attributes and the Extent to Which They Have Been Addressed
For each of the five elements that we identified as important for the effective implementation and evaluation of TAP, we identified relevant attributes that we used to determine the extent to which the elements were addressed in the revamped TAP (see table 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next few years, over a million military servicemembers are expected to transition to civilian life and some may face challenges such as finding employment. To help them, TAP provides departing servicemembers employment assistance and information on VA benefits, among other things. Begun in 2011, efforts to revamp TAP are underway based on the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 and the administration's recommendations. The act also mandated GAO to review TAP. This report addresses: 1) the status of TAP implementation; 2) the extent to which elements of effective implementation and evaluation of TAP have been addressed; and 3) any challenges that may remain. To do this GAO identified five elements of effective implementation and evaluation based on relevant federal laws and previously established GAO criteria for training programs; reviewed related GAO work; assessed reports, plans, and policies provided by agencies that administer TAP; interviewed officials from entities that support servicemembers and veterans; and conducted four nongeneralizable discussion groups with servicemembers who had taken TAP at three military installations.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), and Veterans Affairs (VA) have implemented most of the key components of the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), a gateway to information and services available to servicemembers transitioning to civilian life. However, the agencies are still in the process of implementing other key components of TAP. While originally planned for October 2013, agencies now plan to implement virtually all components by the end of March 2014, with full implementation expected by June 2014.
Agencies' efforts are underway to adequately address three of five elements that GAO identified as important for effective implementation and evaluation of TAP:
1-Track attendance : DOD has systems to collect and report on attendance, which help measure the extent to which TAP achieves its attendance goals.
2-Ensure training quality : The agencies collect and plan to use participant feedback on instruction, content, and facilities to improve training. Each agency also plans to monitor its respective TAP components through site visits.
3-Assess career readiness : The agencies developed standards to assess servicemembers' career readiness. During a capstone assessment, commanders are expected to verify and document whether standards were met.
Agencies' efforts to address the remaining two elements are mixed:
4-Ensure participation and completion : DOD has assigned commanders the responsibility for overseeing participation and has required the services to schedule training and communicate its importance to servicemembers. While the Army and Air Force gauge participation at the command level, the Navy and Marines lack a similar oversight mechanism.
5-Measure performance and evaluate results : The agencies have established certain measures to assess program performance, but their TAP evaluation approach is incomplete. For example, the agencies have established measures to track program outputs, such as the percentage of servicemembers who have participated in TAP. However, the agencies' efforts to evaluate TAP results have focused on basic end-of-course evaluations and gauging servicemembers' readiness prior to separation instead of higher impact program evaluations, such as assessing the effectiveness of TAP on servicemembers 6 months after they have separated from the military. According to agency officials, such evaluations are being considered for certain components of TAP, but they could not provide GAO with a justification for including or excluding specific components of TAP in their evaluation planning efforts.
Based on GAO's prior work and according to officials from the agencies and organizations GAO spoke with, a key remaining challenge for TAP may be the unfavorable timing and location of program delivery for National Guard and Reserve members. Unlike active duty servicemembers, National Guard and Reserve members receive TAP services closer to their transition and in locations that are generally neither where they work nor live. As a result, they may be distracted and have less time to benefit from TAP services. DOD is not well positioned to verify these concerns because it is not collecting data about these members' experiences with the timing and location of TAP service delivery.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve oversight and implementation of TAP, including actions to gauge participation for all of the services and collect data about National Guard and Reserve members' experiences. DOD disagreed with two of GAO's three recommendations. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are needed as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-16-327 | gao_GAO-16-327_0 | According to the Army’s force development regulation, the Army seeks to develop a balanced and affordable force structure that can meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy and defense planning guidance tasks. Between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2018, the Army’s planned end strength is projected to decline by 132,000 positions (12 percent), from about 1.11 million soldiers in fiscal year 2011 to 980,000 soldiers in fiscal year 2018, as shown in figure 1. The Army Prioritized Retaining Combat Units and Plans to Reduce a Greater Proportion of Enabler Units to Make End Strength Reductions
The Army prioritized retaining combat units, as well as other segments of its force structure, when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000 soldiers and as a result will take proportionately more position reductions from its enabler units. Army Prioritized Retaining Combat Units
are responsible for fighting enemy forces in a contested environment and include the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams (Armored, Infantry, and Stryker) and combat aviation brigades. The Army Plans to Reduce a Greater Proportion of Enabler Units
Given the focus on retaining combat units and the constraints senior leaders placed on changing the Army’s generating force; its trainees, transients, holdees, and students accounts; and its reserve components, the Army will take proportionately more positions from its enabler units than from its combat units as it reduces end strength to 980,000 soldiers. Army officials told us that, based on senior leaders’ professional military judgment, concentrating reductions in enabler units is more acceptable than further reducing the Army’s combat units because combat unit shortfalls are more challenging to resolve than enabler unit shortfalls. The Army Did Not Comprehensively Assess Mission Risk Associated with Its Planned Force Structure
The Army did not comprehensively assess mission risk (risk to the missions in DOD’s defense planning guidance) associated with its planned force structure because it did not assess mission risk for its enabler units. Army Assessed Mission Risk for Its Combat Forces
In assessing its requirements for aviation brigades and BCTs, the Army determined where combat units in its planned force structure would be unable to meet mission requirements given current Army practices in deploying forces to meet mission demands. Notably, the analysis assumed that sufficient enabler capability would be available. Army Assessed Risk to the Force for Enabler Units, but Did Not Assess Mission Risk
In contrast to the mission risk assessment the Army conducted for its combat units (risk to the Army’s ability to meet the missions in DOD’s defense planning guidance), the Army assessed risk to the force for its enabler units in its most recent TAA (risk to the health of the Army’s enabler units). Similarly, the Army assumed that it could deploy its reserve component enabler units more frequently than DOD’s current policy allows. Army officials told us that assessing risk to the force for its enablers is useful because the Army can identify the units it would use the most and those that it would use least. The Commission recommended that the Army complete a risk assessment and assess plans and associated costs of reducing or eliminating these shortfalls. TAA Does Not Routinely Assess Mission Risk for Both Combat and Enabler Force Structure
Army guidance indicates that the Army’s TAA process should assess mission risk for its combat and enabler force structure, but the Army did not complete a mission risk assessment during its most recent TAA. According to the Army’s force development regulation, the Army’s TAA process is intended to determine the requirements for both the Army’s combat and enabler force structure to meet the missions specified in defense planning guidance, document unresourced requirements, and analyze risk given resource constraints. Without an assessment of the mission risk associated with the planned enabler force structure documented in the Army’s October 2015 Army Structure Memorandum, the Army has an incomplete understanding of the risks that may arise from the potential shortfalls in its enabler inventory. Furthermore, the Army is required to complete TAA every year and as currently implemented its TAA process does not include the modeling and analyses needed to routinely prepare a mission risk assessment for its combat and enabler force structure. Without expanding the TAA process to routinely require a mission risk assessment for the Army’s combat and enabler force structure as part of future iterations of TAA, the Army will continue to not be well positioned to identify mission risk and develop mitigation strategies when making future force structure decisions. With respect to our second recommendation that the Army expand its TAA process to routinely require a mission risk assessment and an assessment of mitigation strategies for its combat and enabler force structure, the Army stated that it recognizes the need to routinely conduct these types of assessments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army plans to reduce its end strength to 980,000 active and reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2018, a reduction of nearly 12 percent since fiscal year 2011. According to the Army, this reduction will require reductions of both combat and supporting units. Army leaders reported that reducing the Army to such levels creates significant but manageable risk to executing the U.S. military strategy and that further reductions would result in unacceptable risk.
The Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO examine the factors that the Army considers and uses when it determines the size and structure of its forces. This report (1) describes the Army's priorities and planned force structure reductions and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Army comprehensively assessed mission risk associated with its planned combat and enabler force structure. GAO examined the Army's force development regulations and process, DOD and Army guidance, and Army analysis and conclusions; and interviewed DOD and Army officials.
What GAO Found
The Army prioritized retaining combat units, such as brigade combat teams (BCT) and combat aviation brigades, when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000 soldiers, and as a result plans to eliminate proportionately more positions from its support (or “enabler”) units, such as military police and transportation units. The Army's force planning process seeks to link strategy to force structure given available resources through quantitative and qualitative analyses. The Army completed analyses showing that it could reduce its BCTs from 73 in fiscal year 2011 to a minimum of 52 in fiscal year 2017; however, the Army plans to retain 56 BCTs. Moreover, by redesigning its combat units, the Army plans to retain 170 combat battalions (units that fight the enemy)—3 fewer battalions than in fiscal year 2011. Given the focus on retaining combat units, and senior Army leaders' assessment that shortfalls in combat units are more challenging to resolve than shortfalls in enabler units, the Army plans to reduce proportionately more positions from its enabler units than from its combat units.
GAO found that the Army performed considerable analysis of its force structure requirements, but did not assess mission risk for its enabler units.
Combat Forces: The Army's analysis of BCT requirements entailed an assessment of mission risk—risk resulting from units being unable to meet the missions specified in Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance. The mission risk assessment used current Army deployment practices and assumed that sufficient enabler forces would be available to sustain combat units over a multi-year scenario. The result of this analysis, and a similar analysis of the Army's aviation brigades, showed that the Army's proposed combat force structure would be sufficient to meet most mission demands.
Enabler Forces: The Army's analysis of its enabler units entailed an assessment of risk to the force—how frequently and for how long units need to deploy to meet as many demands as possible. Army officials said this analysis is useful because it enables the Army to identify the units it would use the most. However, the analysis overstated the availability of the Army's enabler units because it assumed they could deploy more frequently and for longer duration than DOD's policies allow. The Army did not identify enabler unit shortfalls, or the risk those shortfalls pose to meeting mission requirements.
According to Army guidance, the Army's planning process should assess mission risk for both combat and enabler units. The Army did not complete this type of assessment for its enabler units during its most recent force planning process because the Army assessed the risk operational demands pose to the health of the Army's force, not mission risk. Without a mission risk assessment for both the Army's planned combat and enabler force structure, the Army has an incomplete understanding of mission risk and is not well-positioned to develop mitigation strategies. Furthermore, as currently implemented, its process does not include analyses needed for the Army to routinely prepare a mission risk assessment for both its combat and enabler force structure. Without expanding its force planning process to routinely require a mission risk assessment for the Army's combat and enabler force structure as part of future planning processes, the Army will not be well-positioned to comprehensively assess risk and develop mitigation strategies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army complete a mission risk assessment of its planned enabler force structure, and revise its process to routinely require a mission risk assessment for its combat and enabler force structure. The Army agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-628 | gao_GAO-11-628_0 | The legislation for telework provided both OPM and GSA with leadership roles in the implementation of telework in the federal government. OPM, GSA, FEMA, and FPS Have Provided Agencies with Guidance Related to Using Telework during Emergencies
OPM, GSA, FEMA, and FPS offer a host of guidance on telework or telework-related emergency planning. Several of these guidance documents have expanded significantly in recent years, broadening the scope of the topics that they address and describing broader responsibilities for the lead agencies. According to an OPM official, its dismissal and closure procedures are updated annually. Current Governmentwide Guidance Does Not Provide a Definition or Set of Practices for Incorporating Telework into Continuity and Emergency Planning
Our review of the OPM, GSA, FEMA, and FPS governmentwide guidance on telework and telework-related emergency planning found that none of the documents provided a definition of what constitutes incorporating telework into continuity and emergency planning or operations, or a cohesive set of practices that agencies could use to achieve this type of incorporation. This lack of a definition or description calls into question the reliability of the survey results for assessing agencies’ progress. In reviewing several current OPM, GSA, FEMA, and FPS guidance documents, we found a number of practices that could help agencies incorporate telework into aspects of their continuity or emergency planning. These practices address a variety of operational areas, such as human capital, training, facilities, testing, and technology infrastructure. However, it would be difficult for an agency to use these practices to help achieve telework incorporation and assess their progress. Moreover, according to their 2003 MOU, OPM and GSA agreed to work together to help agencies use IT to support telework and facilitate the CIOs involvement in related planning. Following the extended closings of federal agencies in the Washington, D.C., area during the February 2010 snowstorms, OPM updated the Dismissal Guide to introduce “unscheduled telework,” a new option for federal employees to telework, to the extent possible, when severe weather conditions or other circumstances disrupt commuting. In addition, OPM officials said they consulted with unions, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, and the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination, among others. FEMA also provided updated guidance in 2010 to agencies on developing their continuity plans. In September and October 2010, NCP officials e- mailed more than 100 members of the interagency community, including both continuity coordinators and continuity planners, requesting comments on the updated template draft. Consequently, GSA officials did not offer any governmentwide guidance on ways to address infrastructure limitations or provide direct assistance to agencies regarding the adequacy of their IT infrastructure. Conclusions
The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 requires agencies to incorporate telework into their COOP plans. In addition, these guidance documents suggest practices drawn from other lead agencies’ guidance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the guidance that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Federal Protective Service (FPS) have issued pertaining to the use of telework during emergencies; (2) assesses the extent to which OPM’s recent reviews of the agencies’ telework policies and programs address the incorporation of telework into continuity plans, and the extent to which OPM, FEMA, GSA, and FPS offer guidance on incorporating telework into emergency and continuity planning; and (3) assesses the extent to which OPM and FEMA coordinated with other agencies on the development of their recently released guidance documents pertaining to the use of telework during emergencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
When historic snowstorms forced lengthy closings of federal offices in the National Capital Region in 2010, thousands of employees continued to work from their homes, making clear the potential of telework in mitigating the effects of emergencies. GAO was asked to (1) describe the guidance lead agencies have issued pertaining to the use of telework during emergencies; (2) describe Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other assessments related to agencies' incorporation of telework into emergency or continuity planning, and the extent to which the lead agencies have provided definitions and practices to support agency planning; and (3) assess the extent to which OPM and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinated with other agencies on recent guidance documents. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, guidance documents, and OPM's telework survey methodology, and interviewed key officials of agencies providing telework and telework-related emergency guidance.
What GAO Found
OPM, the General Services Administration (GSA), FEMA, and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) offer a host of telework and telework-related emergency guidance. These lead agencies provide advice to other federal agencies through regulations, directives, guides, bulletins, and other documents. Several of these guidance documents have expanded significantly in recent years, broadening the scope of the topics that they address and describing broader responsibilities for the lead agencies. The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 requires agencies to incorporate telework policies into their continuity of operations plans, but recent OPM reviews and other agency reports identify potential problems agencies may face in achieving this incorporation in various operational areas. GAO's review of the OPM, GSA, FEMA, and FPS governmentwide guidance on telework or telework-related emergency planning found that none of the documents provide a definition of what constitutes incorporating telework into continuity and emergency planning or a cohesive set of practices that agencies could use to achieve this type of incorporation. Additionally, this lack of a definition or description calls into question the reliability of the results of a survey OPM annually conducts to assess agencies' progress. In reviewing several lead-agency guidance documents, GAO found a number of practices, in areas such as information technology (IT) infrastructure and testing, that could help agencies incorporate telework in aspects of their continuity or emergency planning. However, because the practices are scattered among various documents principally concerned with other matters, it would be difficult for an agency to use these practices to help achieve telework incorporation and assess its progress. Both OPM and FEMA coordinated the development of their recent guidance. OPM updated its Washington, D.C., area dismissal and closure procedures to introduce "unscheduled telework," a new option for federal employees to telework when emergencies disrupt commuting. While developing these procedures, OPM officials reported coordinating with GSA, agency human-capital officials, FEMA, unions, and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, among others. However, OPM and GSA did not work together to reach out to agency chief information officers regarding potential agency capacity limitations. Consequently, officials did not offer any governmentwide guidance on ways to address IT infrastructure limitations or provide direct assistance to agencies regarding the adequacy of their IT infrastructure. In February 2011, FEMA provided agencies with more-detailed guidance for developing continuity plans. According to FEMA officials, in 2010 they shared a draft of the guidance with the interagency community, including both continuity coordinators and continuity planners, and GSA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM consult with other lead agencies to develop a definition and cohesive set of practices for incorporating telework into emergency and continuity planning; improve its related data collection; and establish an interagency coordination process for guidance. OPM concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-75 | gao_GAO-13-75_0 | The National Association of Insurance Commissioners committee responsible for life insurance and annuities products has determined CDAs to be life insurance products subject to state law and regulation for annuities. According to SEC officials, existing CDAs have been registered as securities with SEC, and therefore are covered by both federal securities laws and regulations, and state insurance regulations. Features of VA/GLWBs and CDAs May Benefit Consumers but also Pose Risks to Consumers and Insurers
VA/GLWBs and CDAs share a number of features, but they also have some important structural differences. For example, both provide consumers with access to investment assets and the guarantee of lifetime income, but while VA/GLWB assets are held in a separate account of the insurer for the benefit of the annuity purchaser, the assets covered by a CDA are generally held in an investment account owned by the CDA purchaser. In part because of their shared features, these products can provide similar benefits to consumers. Yet as complex instruments that require consumers to make multiple important decisions, they also present certain risks to consumers. 1). That is, for a fee, they can ensure that consumers receive a minimum annual payment until they die, regardless of how long they live or how their investment assets might perform. A unique benefit of these products is that they allow consumers to receive income guarantees while still maintaining ownership of and access to their funds during the accumulation and withdrawal phases. Consequently, once these assets are annuitized the consumer does not have access to these assets. As a result, consumers can withdraw any or all of their funds at any time. This can benefit consumers should they need funds for unexpected uses, such as medical or other expenses. Consumers Face Risks When Purchasing and Withdrawing Funds from VA/GLWBs and CDAs
Several insurers and regulators we spoke with said that VA/GLWBs and CDAs are complex products, and emphasized the importance of obtaining professional financial advice before purchasing these products and making key decisions. These risks include purchasing an unsuitable product, paying too much, making withdrawal decisions that decrease benefits, and having an insurer become insolvent before benefits are received. However, SEC officials have said that CDAs currently being offered in the retail market are being registered as securities and are therefore covered by federal securities law and state insurance regulations. According to SEC officials, issuers of CDAs have been registering offerings of their CDA products with SEC, and SEC is reviewing the disclosures associated with these products. NAIC Has Developed Annuity Disclosure and Suitability Regulations, but State Adoption and Protection Levels Vary
The NAIC committee responsible for life insurance and annuities issues considers CDAs to be insurance products and has developed annuity disclosure and suitability model regulations for use by state insurance regulators. Consumers in states that have not adopted NAIC’s model regulations may not be benefitting from available disclosure and suitability protections. Some industry participants suggest state insurance regulation and existing actuarial guidance may adequately address risks to insurers offering CDAs and to consumers. Another industry review by the NOHLGA, NAIC, and state insurance regulators aims to address whether CDA consumers are protected by state insurance guaranty funds in the event of an insurer’s insolvency. Officials noted that even when the committee has reached a determination on guaranty fund protections, each state will have to reach its own conclusion about whether their particular guaranty fund laws allow for CDA coverage. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of the report to SEC and NAIC and relevant excerpts to FINRA. Each provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To compare the features of variable annuities with guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefits (VA/GLWB) and contingent deferred annuities (CDA), we analyzed specific insurance company products to obtain information on how the products function, including how investment gains and losses are treated, how withdrawal amounts are determined, and what happens when a consumer’s investment account is depleted. To identify potential benefits and risks to consumers, we analyzed the product information we obtained and also interviewed insurers, consumer advocates, and state insurance regulators. We also obtained data from industry organizations on the sale of annuity products with guaranteed lifetime withdrawals. To determine how VA/GLWBs and CDAs are regulated and the extent to which regulation addresses identified concerns, we identified regulations and processes used by federal and state regulators, as well as any proposed regulations, and compared them with the risks to consumers that we identified as part of the work under the previous objective. We also interviewed other stakeholder groups, such as consumer advocates and industry organizations, to gain their perspective on issues related to regulation of lifetime income products considered in our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
As older Americans retire, they may face rising health care costs, inflation, and the risk of outliving their assets. Those entering retirement today typically face greater responsibility for managing their retirement savings than those who retired in the past. Lifetime income products can help older Americans ensure they have income throughout their retirement. VA/GLWBs and CDAs, two such products, may provide unique benefits to consumers. According to industry participants, while annuities with GLWBs have been sold for a number of years, CDAs are relatively new and are not widely available. GAO was asked to review issues relating to these financial products. This report (1) compares the features of VA/GLWBs and CDAs and examines potential benefits and risks to consumers and potential risks to insurers, and (2) examines the regulation of these products and the extent to which regulations address risks to consumers. GAO analyzed insurance company product information, proposed and final rules and regulations, and studies and data related to retirement and product sales. GAO also interviewed federal and state regulators and selected insurers, consumer advocates, and industry organizations.
GAO provided a draft of this report to NAIC and SEC. Both provided technical comments, which have been addressed in the report, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Annuities with guaranteed lifetime withdrawals can help older Americans ensure they do not outlive their assets, but do present some risks to consumers. Two such products, variable annuities with guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefits (VA/GLWB) and contingent deferred annuities (CDA), share a number of features but have some important structural differences. For example, both provide consumers with access to investment assets and the guarantee of lifetime income, but while VA/GLWB assets are held in a separate account of the insurer for the benefit of the annuity purchaser, the assets covered by a CDA are generally held in an investment account owned by the CDA purchaser. Consumers can benefit from these products by having a steady stream of income regardless of how their investment assets perform or how long they live, while at the same time maintaining access to their assets for unexpected or other expenses. VA/GLWBs and CDAs are complex products that present some risks to consumers and require them to make multiple important decisions. For example, consumers might purchase an unsuitable product or make withdrawal decisions that could negatively affect their potential benefits. Several insurers and regulators GAO spoke to said it was important for consumers to obtain professional financial advice before purchasing these products and making key decisions. These products can also create risks for insurers which, if not addressed, could ultimately affect insurers' ability to provide promised benefits to consumers.
VA/GLWBs are considered to be both securities and insurance products, and are therefore covered by both federal securities regulations and state insurance regulations. For CDAs, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners committee responsible for life insurance and annuities products has determined CDAs to be life insurance products subject to state law and regulation for annuities. According to SEC officials, existing CDAs have been registered as securities with SEC, and therefore are covered by both federal securities laws and regulations, and state insurance regulations. At the state level, NAIC has developed state disclosure and suitability regulations for annuity products. However, states differ on the extent to which they have adopted these annuity regulations, and some do not have protections at all. As a result, consumers in states that have adopted different regulations may benefit from different levels of protection. NAIC and state regulators told GAO that they are currently reviewing the regulations of CDAs. In March 2012, NAIC began reviewing existing annuity regulations to determine whether any changes are needed to address the unique product design features of CDAs, including potential modifications to annuity disclosure and suitability standards. It is also reviewing what kinds of capital and reserving requirements may be needed to help insurers manage product risk. In addition, NAIC and the National Organization of Life and Health Guaranty Associations are each working to determine whether state insurance guaranty funds, which protect consumers in the event insurers become insolvent, cover CDA products. Both agree that each state will have to reach its own conclusion about whether their particular state guaranty fund laws allow for CDA coverage. Until these regulatory issues are resolved, consumers may not be fully protected. |
gao_GAO-05-967 | gao_GAO-05-967_0 | DOE Has Increased Emphasis on Its Source Recovery Project and Begun Assessing Options for Disposing of GTCC Waste
DOE has placed increased emphasis on its source recovery project and has begun to assess disposal options for GTCC waste. Finally, DOE has begun preparing an environmental impact statement to assess possible disposal options for GTCC waste. Further, DOE has not yet determined when a permanent GTCC waste disposal facility will be available. As of June 7, 2005, DOE had recovered 10,806 of these sources. DOE Expanded the Scope of Its Source Recovery Project to Include Non-GTCC Waste, Which Could Increase Project Expenditures
DOE has expanded its source recovery efforts to include all sealed radiological sources that could present a threat, a change that could increase project expenditures. Further, DOE may need to recover even more non- GTCC waste from unwanted sealed radiological sources in the future if licensees in many states lose access to the only commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal site where they can currently dispose of higher radioactive non-GTCC waste (classes B and C waste). DOE’s current policy does not include using DOE sites to permanently dispose of this waste because, among other reasons, it does not want to undermine the authority the Congress gave to the states to provide disposal availability for non-GTCC waste. Under the expanded scope of the source recovery project, DOE has developed a priority scheme for deciding which sources to recover and when to do so. It cost DOE approximately $581,000 to recover hundreds of these sources that had accumulated at a bankrupt firm in Pennsylvania and to commercially dispose of them. DOE Lacks Information to Better Identify Unwanted Sealed Radiological Sources That May Need Recovery
DOE lacks information that would assist in its efforts to identify and recover unwanted sealed radiological sources that pose a safety or security risk. This, in turn, might lead to increased costs for DOE’s source recovery efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in collaboration with the Task Force on Radiation Source Protection and Security, evaluate and report on the cost implications of a potential expansion of DOE’s recovery and disposal of non-GTCC waste from sealed radiological sources, options for DOE to recoup these costs from licensees that may have no commercial waste disposal options, the feasibility of disposing of this waste at DOE sites, and how a national source tracking system can be designed and implemented to improve DOE’s ability to identify and track sealed radiological sources that may need DOE recovery and disposal. The radioactivity of an individual source is clearly one measure of its potential safety and security risk. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
In our review, we examined (1) the status of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) efforts to recover unwanted sealed radiological sources and develop a disposal option for greater-than-class C (GTCC) waste, (2) DOE actions taken to recover and dispose of unwanted non-GTCC waste from sealed radiological sources, and (3) the extent to which DOE can identify and track unwanted sealed radiological sources for recovery and disposal. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns remain over the control of sealed radiological sources, widely used in many industrial and medical devices and applications. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and states have responsibilities for ensuring the safe and secure use and eventual disposal of these sources as low-level radioactive wastes. DOE must ensure disposal availability for greater-than-class C (GTCC) waste; states must do so for non-GTCC waste, that is, classes A, B, and C waste. NRC and DOE also collaborate to identify and recover unwanted sources that are not safe or secure. GAO examined DOE's (1) efforts to recover unwanted sources and develop a GTCC waste disposal option, (2) actions to recover and dispose of non-GTCC source waste, and (3) ability to identify sources for recovery and disposal.
What GAO Found
DOE has increased emphasis on its source recovery project and begun the process of identifying disposal options for GTCC waste. DOE transferred project responsibilities to another office that has given the project higher priority and accelerated DOE's recovery efforts. DOE exceeded an earlier goal for recovering sources and has now collected over 10,800 of them. This recovery has been facilitated by additional project funding support and DOE's resolving a shortage of storage space for certain sources. In May 2005, DOE issued a notice of intent to prepare an environmental impact statement to assess GTCC waste disposal options; however, DOE has not yet determined when a disposal site might be made available. DOE has expanded the scope of its recovery effort to include non-GTCC waste from sealed radiological sources, a change that could increase DOE expenditures. DOE recovered and commercially disposed of 443 of these sources from a bankrupt firm, at a cost to DOE of about $581,000. Given that unwanted sources in storage present higher vulnerabilities, DOE might need to recover more of them in the future if the commercial disposal site that currently accepts this non-GTCC waste from most states ceases to do so as planned in 2008. Lacking a commercial disposal option, DOE anticipates storing this waste, rather than disposing of it at DOE sites, because, among other reasons, it does not want to undermine the responsibility the Congress gave the states to provide disposal availability for non-GTCC waste. DOE lacks information that would assist its efforts to identify and recover unwanted sealed radiological sources that may pose a safety and security risk. DOE has useful information on the sources in its possession, including recovered sources. However, DOE does not know how many sources might need recovery and how much disposal capacity is needed for GTCC waste. NRC is developing a national source tracking system that would not be useful for DOE's source recovery efforts because it is only designed to track individual sources with high radioactivity. According to DOE, nearly all of the sites where it has recovered sources contained individual sources with lesser radioactivity than would be tracked by NRC, but their combined radioactivity posed enough of a risk to warrant their recovery by DOE. |
gao_GAO-02-313 | gao_GAO-02-313_0 | Some DCIA-authorized debt collection tools are mandatory, while others are discretionary. The package includes a Letter to Employer & Important Notice to Employer, Wage Garnishment Order, Wage Garnishment Worksheet, and Employer Certification. In February 1999, FMS issued “Instructions to Federal Agencies for Preparing AWG Forms.”
As is the case with other debt collection tools, Treasury’s regulations dealing with AWG provide for due process for debtors. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine the extent to which certain CFO Act agencies use or plan to use AWG as authorized by DCIA to collect delinquent nontax federal debts. Agencies gave various reasons for the delay in implementing AWG, including their need to focus priorities on the mandatory provisions of DCIA, to develop the required AWG regulations, and to complete the systems changes necessary to implement AWG. FMS’s Use of AWG Could Be Limited
Depending on the nature of an agency’s delinquent debt, relying on FMS to apply AWG as part of cross-servicing may be the best approach. More than 5 years after the enactment of DCIA, which authorized but did not mandate use of AWG, and more than 3 years after Treasury issued implementing regulations for AWG, however, none of the large CFO Act agencies we surveyed had begun using AWG as authorized by DCIA, either in-house or through FMS. By failing to implement AWG, agencies have clearly missed opportunities to maximize collection of delinquent debts. Even when agencies do begin implementing AWG, those that rely primarily on FMS may find that the tool’s effectiveness—particularly its usefulness in leveraging full or compromise payments from debtors who wish to avoid wage garnishment—is limited because agencies have in the past failed to promptly refer a significant portion of eligible debts to FMS for cross- servicing and because FMS intends to use AWG as a collection tool of last resort, thus allowing debts (that may already be more than 180 days delinquent) to age significantly before sending an AWG notice to the debtor. Moreover, agencies are not required to send debts to FMS until they are more than 180 days delinquent. Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
To improve federal debt collection, the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 established a framework of debt collection tools, including administrative wage garnishment (AWG). This report discusses the extent to which nine agencies use or plan to use AWG to collect delinquent nontax federal debt and provides GAO's perspective on ways to make AWG more widespread and effective.
What GAO Found
GAO found that none of the nine agencies had yet implemented AWG. Although AWG is not mandatory, by failing to use this tool--more than five years after the act's enactment and more than three years after the Department of the Treasury issued implementing regulations--agencies have missed an opportunity to maximize collection of delinquent debt. Agencies identified various reasons for not yet implementing AWG or for deciding not to do so, including the need to focus their resources on implementing the act's mandatory provisions. Although some agencies or programs may have valid reasons for not implementing wage garnishment, all of the larger programs that deal with individuals and that have a demonstrated risk of financial loss resulting from unpaid debt should have AWG as a viable debt collection option. Reliance on the Financial Management Service (FMS) to perform AWG as part of cross-servicing might be prudent for some agencies, provided the collection tool is used as early as practicable to maximize its collection potential. However, the act does not require that agencies refer debts for cross-servicing until they are more than 180 days delinquent, and FMS, which views wage garnishment as a tool of last resort, does not contemplate initiating AWG in most cases until the debt has been with FMS for at least 90 days. As a result, FMS's use of AWG could be significantly limited and delayed. |
gao_GAO-13-309 | gao_GAO-13-309_0 | Background
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is a joint, multinational acquisition intended to develop and field an affordable, highly common family of next generation strike fighter aircraft for the United States Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. In March 2012, DOD established a new acquisition program baseline for the F-35 program that incorporated the numerous positive and more realistic restructuring actions taken since 2010. Furthermore, software management practices improved, but this area continued to require more time and effort than planned. While the F-35 program made progress in The program made 2012, the bulk of development testing and evaluation is ahead, is planned to continue into 2016, and is expected to identify additional deficiencies impacting aircraft design and performance. The program achieved 7 of the 10 primary objectives (70 percent) it established for 2012 and made substantial progress on one other. The F-35 program made considerable progress in 2012 to address these major technical risks:
The helmet mounted display (which provides flight data, targeting, and other sensor data to the pilot) is integral to the mission systems architecture, to reduce pilot workload, and to achieve the F-35’s concept of operations. These recent management actions are positive and encouraging, but overall, software development activities in 2012 lagged behind plans. After a Slow Start, Aircraft Manufacturing and Deliveries Are Beginning to Catch Up to Plans
While initial F-35 production overran target costs and delivered late, there are several encouraging signs indicating better outcomes in the coming years. Overall, manufacturing and supply operations are improving with the latest data showing labor hours to build the aircraft decreasing, deliveries accelerating, quality measures improving, and parts shortages declining. That said, the program is working through the continuing effects from the F-35’s highly concurrent acquisition strategy. For example, the program is continuing to incur substantial costs for rework to fix deficiencies discovered in testing, but the amount per aircraft is dropping. DOD’s substantial reductions in near-term procurement quantities have decreased–but not eliminated– the risk from investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft before testing proves the aircraft design and verifies that its performance and reliability meet requirements. According to the new acquisition baseline and flight test schedule, DOD will procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before the end of developmental flight testing (see table 4). Costs and Funding for Acquisition and Sustainment Remain Very Challenging Moving Forward
Ensuring that the acquisition costs of the F-35 are affordable so that aircraft can be bought in the quantities and time required by the warfighter will be of paramount concern to the Congress, U.S. military, and international partners. These actions place the F-35 program on firmer footing, but aircraft are expected to cost more and deliveries to warfighters will take longer than in previous baselines. The rebaselined program will require an average of $12.6 billion annually through 2037, an unprecedented demand on the defense procurement budget. Because of F-35 delays and uncertainties, the military services are extending the service life of legacy aircraft to bridge the gap in F-35 deliveries and mitigate projected shortfalls in fighter aircraft force requirements. Many of the restructuring actions—more time and resources for development flight testing, reduced annual procurements, the recognition of concurrency risks, independent cost and software assessments, and others—are responsive to our past recommendations. As a result, we are not making new recommendations in this report. DOD concurred with the report’s findings and conclusions. To assess manufacturing and supply performance indicators, production results, and design changes, we obtained and analyzed manufacturing contract cost, aircraft delivery, and work performance data through the end of calendar year 2012 to assess progress against plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike Fighter, is DOD's most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition. The program is developing and fielding three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The F-35 is critical to long-term recapitalization plans as it is intended to replace hundreds of existing aircraft. This will require a long-term sustained funding commitment. Total U.S. investment is nearing $400 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft through 2037. Fifty-two aircraft have been delivered through 2012. The F-35 program has been extensively restructured over the last 3 years to address prior cost, schedule, and performance problems. GAO's prior reviews of the F-35 made numerous recommendations to improve outcomes, such as increasing test resources and reducing annual procurement quantities.
This report, prepared in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010, addresses (1) F-35 program performance during 2012, including testing, technical risks, and software; (2) manufacturing performance indicators, production results, and design changes; and (3) acquisition and sustainment costs going forward. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The F-35 program achieved 7 of 10 key management objectives for 2012 and made substantial progress on one other. Two objectives on aircraft deliveries and a corrective management plan were not met. Also in 2012, the program conducted more developmental flight tests than planned and made considerable progress in addressing critical technical risks, such as the helmet-mounted display. With about one-third of development flight testing completed, much testing remains to demonstrate and verify F-35 performance. Software management practices are improved, but with significant challenges ahead as software integration and testing continue to lag behind plans.
Manufacturing and supply processes are also improving--indicators such as factory throughput, labor efficiency, and quality measures are all positive. While initial F-35 production overran target costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest data shows labor hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating. The program is working through the continuing effects from its concurrent acquisition strategy that overlapped testing and manufacturing activities. For example, the program is continuing to incur substantial costs for rework to fix deficiencies discovered in testing, but the amount of rework needed on each aircraft is dropping.
Going forward, ensuring affordability--the ability to acquire aircraft in quantity and to sustain them over the life cycle--is of paramount concern. With more austere budgets looming, F-35 acquisition funding requirements average $12.6 billion annually through 2037. The new F-35 acquisition baseline incorporates the Department of Defense's (DOD) positive restructuring actions taken since 2010, including more time and funding for development and deferred procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future years. These actions place the F-35 program on firmer footing, although aircraft will cost more and deliveries to warfighters will take longer. The program continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before completing development flight testing. Meanwhile, the services are spending about $8 billion to extend the life of existing aircraft and to buy new ones to mitigate shortfalls due to F-35 delays.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD's restructuring of the F-35 program and other actions are responsive to many prior recommendations. DOD agreed with GAO's report findings and conclusions. |
gao_GAO-15-32 | gao_GAO-15-32_0 | Background
Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required DOD to report on various regional BMD topics, including the eight specific elements presented in table 1, by June 24, 2014. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report indicates that the United States would pursue a phased, adaptive approach to missile defense within each region that is tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to each region. In the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, DOD also discussed the development of regional phased, adaptive approaches to BMD in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. DOD, Report to Congress: Regional Ballistic Missile Defense. DOD’s Report Addressed or Partially Addressed the Required Reporting Elements, but Did Not Provide Additional Key Details
DOD’s Report Addressed or Partially Addressed All Eight of the Required Reporting Elements
Compared to the statutory reporting requirements, DOD’s June 2014 regional BMD report addressed five of the eight required reporting elements, and partially addressed the remaining three elements. DOD addressed elements that describe the overall risk assessment from the Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment, the role of regional missile defenses in the homeland defense mission, the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and two elements on the roles and contributions of allies. DOD partially addressed the remaining three reporting elements, regarding the alignment of regional approaches to missile defense with combatant command integrated priorities, the concept of operations for EPAA, and the testing and development of key EPAA elements. DOD’s Report Did Not Provide Additional Key Details
Additionally, through interviews with DOD officials and from our application of generally accepted standards that define a sound and complete defense research study, we found that DOD’s report did not include key details for some required reporting elements that we believe could have benefitted congressional defense committees’ oversight of DOD’s regional BMD programs. However, DOD’s report does not consistently meet this standard, based on GAO’s review. We believe that by not including these details, although not required, DOD reduced the report’s usefulness to the congressional defense committees and to their oversight of DOD’s regional BMD programs. Combatant Command Force Structure Deployment Options Lacked Both Detail and a Comparison with Integrated Priorities
In support of element B, regarding the combatant commands’ deployment options, as stated earlier, we determined that DOD’s report partially addressed the required reporting element because it did not include key details about U.S. European Command’s and U.S. Pacific Command’s planned options to increase BMD capability in response to an imminent threat, nor did the report provide a comprehensive analysis regarding how the various regional approaches to BMD will meet combatant command integrated priorities. Report Did Not Describe Key C2BMC or Aegis BMD Issues in Describing EPAA Testing and Development
In support of element D, regarding the development and testing of BMD systems that are part of EPAA, DOD’s report did not include details about C2BMC and Aegis BMD testing and development issues, and the lack of such detail may limit Congress’ ability to understand the extent to which the EPAA system can be integrated:
C2BMC: The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report and MDA’s acquisition and system engineering documentation underscore the importance of C2BMC for all regional approaches, since it is the system that enables system-level capabilities. Furthermore, they explained that they regularly provide more detailed analysis on some of these topics to congressional defense committees via periodic briefings, and that they did not want to provide duplicative or unnecessary information. Although we recognize the need for professional judgment by DOD officials when preparing the report, our review concluded that DOD’s report did not include details that we believe could have made the report more useful to Congress in its oversight of DOD’s regional BMD programs. However, DOD’s report was prepared in response to a onetime, nonrecurring mandate, and therefore we are not making any recommendations to amend the report and provide additional detail. | Why GAO Did This Study
Regional BMD constitutes an essential element in deterring enemies from using ballistic missiles and supporting defense commitments to U.S. allies and partners. DOD's 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report noted that the United States would pursue phased, tailored, and adaptive approaches to regional BMD in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle East. A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated DOD to submit within 180 days a report to the congressional defense committees on eight elements related to the status and progress of regional BMD programs and efforts. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the NDAA mandated that GAO provide its views on DOD's report. Separately, GAO was requested to provide its results in a written, publicly releasable form.
This report assesses the extent to which DOD's report addressed the required reporting elements and provides views on other key information, if any, that DOD could have included in the report. GAO used a scorecard methodology to compare the required reporting elements to the information in DOD's BMD report. Further, GAO reviewed the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report , combatant commander integrated priority lists, and other DOD documents and policy, and interviewed DOD officials to gain further insight on DOD's regional BMD efforts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) June 2014 regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) report addressed five of the eight required reporting elements, and partially addressed the remaining three required reporting elements.
DOD's report addressed elements relating to a BMD risk assessment, the role that regional missile defenses play in the homeland defense mission, the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and two elements on the roles and contributions of allies.
DOD's report partially addressed the required reporting elements regarding the alignment of regional approaches to missile defense with combatant command-integrated priorities, the concept of operations for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and the testing and development of key EPAA elements.
Additionally, GAO determined that DOD's report did not include key details for some elements that would have benefitted the congressional defense committees' oversight of DOD's regional BMD efforts. Generally accepted research standards for preparing sound and complete defense studies include providing complete, accurate, and relevant information. However, DOD's report does not consistently meet this standard, based on GAO's review. For example, the explanation in DOD's report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's transfer of authority process did not include sufficient detail to clearly convey the process. DOD's report also did not include details regarding the combatant commands' requirements, nor did it fully describe issues affecting the testing and development of key regional BMD systems (see fig.). DOD officials told GAO that the report was intended to address each of the eight required reporting elements concisely, that DOD regularly provides more detailed analysis on some of these topics to Congress via periodic briefings, and that they did not want to provide duplicative information in this report. GAO recognizes that judgment is needed in preparing reports to Congress; however, DOD's report did not include details on key BMD assets and risks to the EPAA schedule, which limits the report's utility to the congressional defense committees in their oversight of DOD's regional BMD programs.
What GAO Recommends
Because DOD prepared its report in response to a nonrecurring mandate, GAO is not making recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-501T | gao_GAO-07-501T_0 | SCHIP Allotments to States
SCHIP allotments to states are based on an allocation formula that uses (1) the number of children, which is expressed as a combination of two estimates—the number of low-income children without health insurance and the number of all low-income children, and (2) a factor representing state variation in health care costs. Under federal SCHIP law and subject to certain exceptions, states have 3 years to use each fiscal year’s allocation, after which any remaining funds are redistributed among the states that had used all of that fiscal year’s allocation. SCHIP Enrollment Has Grown Rapidly; States’ Rates of Uninsured Children Vary Significantly
SCHIP enrollment increased rapidly over the first years of the program, and has stabilized for the past several years. Of these 6.1 million enrollees, 639,000 were adults. Many states adopted innovative outreach strategies and simplified and streamlined their enrollment processes in order to reach as many eligible children as possible. States’ SCHIP Programs Reflect a Variety of Approaches to Providing Health Care Coverage
States’ SCHIP programs reflect the flexibility allowed in structuring approaches to providing health care coverage, including their choice among three program designs—Medicaid expansions, separate child health programs, and combination programs, which have both a Medicaid expansion and a separate child health program component. In fiscal year 2005, 41 states used SCHIP funding to cover children in families with incomes up to 200 percent of FPL or higher, including 7 states that covered children in families with incomes up to 300 percent of FPL or higher. Most SCHIP Programs Require Cost-Sharing, but Amounts Charged Vary Considerably
In 2005, most states’ SCHIP programs required families to contribute to the cost of care with some kind of cost-sharing requirement. As of February 2007, we identified 14 states with approved waivers to cover at least one of three categories of adults: parents of eligible Medicaid and SCHIP children, pregnant women, and childless adults. States’ SCHIP Spending Was Initially Low but Now Threatens to Exceed Available Funding
SCHIP program spending was low initially, as many states did not implement their programs or report expenditures until 1999 or later, but spending was much higher in the program’s later years and now threatens to exceed available funding. But as spending has grown, the pool of funds available for redistribution has shrunk. To cover projected shortfalls that several states faced, Congress appropriated an additional $283 million for fiscal year 2006. States that have outspent their annual allotments over the 3-year period of availability have also relied on redistributed SCHIP funds to cover excess expenditures. In fiscal years 2000 and 2003, Congress amended statutory provisions for the redistribution and availability of unused SCHIP allotments from fiscal years 1998 through 2001, reducing the amounts available for redistribution and allowing states that had not exhausted their allotments by the end of the 3-year period of availability to retain some of these funds for additional years. Some States Consistently Spent More than Their Allotted Funds
Some states consistently spent more than their allotted funds, while other states consistently spent less. Moreover, 18 states were projected to face shortfalls—that is, they were expected to exhaust available funds, including current and prior-year allotments—in at least 1 of the final 3 years of the program. In contrast, none of the 4 states that began covering adults with SCHIP funds in the period from fiscal year 2004 through 2006 faced shortfalls. These include the following: Maintaining flexibility without compromising the goals of SCHIP. Considering the federal financing strategy, including the financial sustainability of public commitments. Assessing issues associated with equity. Appendix I: SCHIP Upper Income Eligibility by State, Fiscal Year 2005
Appendix I: SCHIP Upper Income Eligibility by State, Fiscal Year 2005 expressed as a percentage of FPL 200 expressed as a percentage of FPL While Tennessee has not had a SCHIP program since October 2002, in January 2007, CMS approved Tennessee’s SCHIP plan, which covers pregnant women and children in families with incomes up to 250 percent of FPL. According to state information, the program will be implemented in early 2007. Related GAO Products
Children’s Health Insurance: State Experiences in Implementing SCHIP and Considerations for Reauthorization. GAO-07-447T. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) with the goal of significantly reducing the number of low-income uninsured children, especially those who lived in families with incomes exceeding Medicaid eligibility requirements. Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP is not an entitlement to services for beneficiaries but a capped allotment to states. Congress provided a fixed amount--approximately $40 billion from fiscal years 1998 through 2007--to states with approved SCHIP plans. Funds are allocated to states annually. Subject to certain exceptions, states have 3 years to use each year's allocation, after which unspent funds may be redistributed to states that have already spent all of that year's allocation. GAO's testimony addresses trends in SCHIP enrollment and the current composition of SCHIP programs across the states, states' spending experiences under SCHIP, and considerations GAO has identified for SCHIP reauthorization. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work, particularly testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on February 1, 2007 (see GAO-07-447T). GAO updated this work with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) January 2007 approval of Tennessee's SCHIP program.
What GAO Found
SCHIP enrollment increased rapidly during the program's early years but has stabilized over the past several years. As of fiscal year 2005, the latest year for which data are available, SCHIP covered approximately 6 million enrollees, including about 639,000 adults, with about 4 million enrollees in June of that year. Many states adopted innovative outreach strategies and simplified and streamlined their enrollment processes in order to reach as many eligible children as possible. States' SCHIP programs reflect the flexibility federal law allows in structuring approaches to providing health care coverage. As of July 2006, states had opted for the following from among their choices of program structures allowed: a separate child health program (18 states), an expansion of a state's Medicaid program (11), or a combination of the two (21). In addition, 41 states opted to cover children in families with incomes at 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) or higher, with 7 of these states covering children in families with incomes at 300 percent of FPL or higher. Thirty-nine states required families to contribute to the cost of their children's care in SCHIP programs through a cost-sharing requirement, such as a premium or copayment; 11 states charged no cost-sharing. As of January 2007, GAO identified 15 states that had waivers in place to cover adults in their programs; these included parents and caretaker relatives of eligible Medicaid and SCHIP children, pregnant women, and childless adults. SCHIP spending was initially low, but now threatens to exceed available funding. Since 1998, some states have consistently spent more than their allotments, while others spent consistently less. States that earlier overspent their annual allotments over the 3-year period of availability could rely on other states' unspent SCHIP funds, a portion of which were redistributed to cover other states' excess expenditures. By fiscal year 2002, however, states' aggregate annual spending began to exceed annual allotments. As spending has grown, the pool of funds available for redistribution has shrunk. As a result, 18 states were projected to have "shortfalls" of SCHIP funds--meaning they had exhausted all available funds--in at least one of the final 3 years of the program. To cover projected shortfalls faced by several states, Congress appropriated an additional $283 million for fiscal year 2006. SCHIP reauthorization occurs in the context of debate on broader national health care reform and competing budgetary priorities, highlighting the tension between the desire to provide affordable health insurance coverage to uninsured individuals, including low-income children, and the recognition of the growing strain of health care coverage on federal and state budgets. As Congress addresses reauthorization, issues to consider include (1) maintaining flexibility within the program without compromising the primary goal to cover children, (2) considering the program's financing strategy, including the financial sustainability of public commitments, and (3) assessing issues associated with equity, including better targeting SCHIP funds to achieve certain policy goals more consistently nationwide. |
gao_GAO-15-397 | gao_GAO-15-397_0 | CASIS, however, has not been able to coordinate with the ISS National Laboratory Advisory Committee (INLAC), as required, because NASA has yet to staff the committee. CASIS Took Steps to Implement Management Activities
CASIS has taken steps to fulfill its responsibilities contained in its cooperative agreement with NASA, and has initiated the activities required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.the activities contained in the 2010 act as well as the corresponding Table 1 summarizes responsibilities for CASIS and NASA outlined in the cooperative agreement. NASA Has Not Staffed Advisory Committee with Which CASIS Is Required to Interact
The one required activity in the cooperative agreement that CASIS has been unable to address is its interaction with the ISS National Laboratory Advisory Committee (INLAC) because the committee has not been staffed by NASA. We assessed CASIS’s fiscal year 2015 metrics, and found that the metrics met almost all of these key attributes. We have previously reported that performance metrics should have quantifiable, numerical targets or other measurable values, which help assess whether overall goals and objectives were achieved.it is unclear how NASA objectively assesses CASIS’s performance. CASIS officials initially told us in July 2014 that establishing targets would be arbitrary because CASIS processes and metrics are still evolving. The Chairman of the CASIS Board of Directors told us that measurable targets should be developed and that this is a priority for the Board. However, CASIS has not established a date by which measurable targets will be developed. NASA Assesses CASIS Annually, but Performance Assessment Is Not Documented
NASA performs an annual assessment of CASIS’s performance consistent with its responsibilities in the cooperative agreement, but this assessment is not documented. Both CASIS and NASA officials told us that NASA does not document its annual program review of CASIS performance. While NASA does not document this annual assessment, NASA officials told us that they were generally satisfied with CASIS performance. CASIS officials, however, said that the results of the annual review should be reported in some sort of formal manner to make the information more actionable. As a result, CASIS is not able to fulfill its responsibility as outlined in the cooperative agreement that requires it to coordinate with INLAC as established under the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 and review recommendations originated by the INLAC. Not documenting the results of the annual program assessment is a practice contrary to good internal controls, which call for information to be recorded and communicated to management and others who need it to carry out their responsibilities, to include taking appropriate corrective actions. NASA partially concurred and CASIS non-concurred with one of our recommendations and both NASA and CASIS concurred with the other two recommendations. We continue to believe our recommendation is valid. Once complete, this action should address our recommendation to develop and approve measurable targets for CASIS’s metrics. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which (1) the Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS) has initiated and implemented the required management activities for research aboard the International Space Station (ISS) National Laboratory, and (2) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and CASIS measure and assess CASIS’s performance. We reviewed the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, which designated the U.S. Operating Segment of the ISS as a National Laboratory; the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, which directed NASA to establish an ISS National Laboratory Advisory Committee; and the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which required NASA to enter into a cooperative agreement with a nonprofit organization to manage the activities of the ISS National Laboratory. Appendix IV: Assessment of the (CASIS) FY 2014 Metrics Against GAO’s Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures
Performance Metric (18) Number of total flight projects manifested as a result of solicited proposals or investments (20) Describe intended impacts/ outcomes of ISS NL research and development to life on Earth (21) Report scientific or technological breakthroughs related to use of the ISS NL (22) Report transformational/ translational science (23) Report projects or activities contributing to national scientific, educational, or technology initiatives (26) Report new initiatives to solicit interest in/engagement with CASIS toward broader utilization of the ISS (27) Number of awards given to unsolicited proposals (28) Dollar ($) amount given to unsolicited proposals (29) Number and dollar ($) amount of awards by type of responding organization (other government agencies, academic, individual, commercial, other) (30) Dollar ($) amount contributed to projects by non-CASIS sources, and their origins (including targeted giving, commercial entities, private investments) (31) Dollar ($) amount and description of flight projects provided by other government agencies (32) Describe actual impacts of ISS NL research and development to life on Earth (specific examples, as they occur)
Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Appendix VI: Comments from the Center for the Advancement of Science in Space
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant Director; Richard A. Cederholm; Virginia Chanley; Maria Durant; Laura Greifner; Ralph Roffo; Sylvia Schatz; and Roxanna T. Sun made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. has spent almost $43 billion to develop, assemble, and operate the ISS over the past two decades. The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 required NASA to enter into a cooperative agreement with a not-for-profit entity to manage the ISS National Laboratory and in 2011 did so with CASIS. CASIS is charged with maximizing use of the ISS for scientific research by executing several required activities. Recently, questions have arisen about the progress being made to implement the required activities and the impact it has had on ISS's return on the investment.
GAO was asked to report on the progress of CASIS's management of the ISS National Laboratory. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) CASIS has implemented the required management activities, and (2) NASA and CASIS measure and assess CASIS's performance. To perform this work, GAO reviewed the cooperative agreement between NASA and CASIS, CASIS's annual program plans, and other documentation and interviewed ISS, CASIS, and NASA officials.
What GAO Found
The Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS), manager of the International Space Station (ISS) National Laboratory, has taken steps to fulfill its management responsibilities contained in its cooperative agreement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and has initiated the activities required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. GAO found that CASIS implemented procedures for prioritizing research; evaluated 206 proposals and awarded approximately $20 million in grants to 77 research projects through January 2015; and cultivated relationships with academic institutions, research-specific organizations, and other entities. CASIS, however, has not been able to fulfill its responsibility in the cooperative agreement to interact with the ISS National Laboratory Advisory Committee, which NASA was statutorily required to establish under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, because NASA has yet to staff the committee as required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2008. As a result, CASIS is not able to fulfill its responsibility in the cooperative agreement that requires it to coordinate with this committee and review any report or recommendations it originates.
CASIS has established fiscal year 2015 metrics that meet most of GAO's key attributes for successful performance measures (see figure below); however, NASA and CASIS did not establish measurable targets for these performance metrics, and NASA's annual assessment of CASIS was not documented.
Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-15-397
GAO's work on best practices for measuring program performance has found that performance metrics should have quantifiable targets to help assess whether goals and objectives were achieved by easily comparing projected performance and actual results. CASIS officials told GAO in July 2014 that setting measurable targets would be arbitrary because CASIS processes and metrics are still evolving. In January 2015, however, the Chairman of the CASIS Board of Directors told GAO that setting measurable targets is a priority for the board. CASIS, however, has yet to establish a date by which measurable targets will be developed. Using the established metrics, NASA is required by the cooperative agreement to perform an annual program review of CASIS's performance. This review is informal and not documented as ISS program officials provide the results to CASIS orally. This approach is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which call for information to be recorded and communicated to those who need it to manage programs, including monitoring performance and supporting future decision making. Although NASA officials reported that they were generally satisfied with CASIS's performance, CASIS officials said a formal summary of the results would make the information more actionable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends NASA fully staff the ISS National Laboratory Advisory Committee; NASA and CASIS work together to develop measurable targets for CASIS's metrics; and NASA begin documenting its annual review of CASIS's performance. NASA partially concurred and CASIS did not concur with the first recommendation, but concurred with the other two. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed further in the report. |
gao_GAO-10-400 | gao_GAO-10-400_0 | Ports
According to the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, over 9.3 million passengers departed from a U.S. port on North American cruises in 2008, on a total of almost 3,900 cruises from 30 ports. National laws, regulations, and guidance direct federal agencies and vessel and facility operators on a nationwide basis. The Coast Guard Assesses Risk to Cruise Ships and Facilities in Accordance with DHS’s Risk Assessment Guidance; Concerns Associated with Waterside Attacks Remain
Risk Assessment
The Coast Guard uses a tool, known as the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model, to assess risk for various types of vessels and port infrastructure, including cruise ships and cruise ship facilities, which is in accordance with the guidance on assessing risk from DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Risk to Cruise Ships and Their Facilities
Although in January 2010 intelligence officials working at the National Maritime Intelligence Center stated there has been no credible terrorist threat against cruise ships identified in at least the preceding 12 months, stakeholders generally agreed that waterside attacks are a concern for cruise ships, and if attacks were successfully carried out, they could have extensive consequences. Despite the lack of evidence identifying recent threats, maritime intelligence officials identified the presence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship, even though they have not identified any intent. As a result of an attack, damage to the cruise ship could occur and the extent of the loss of life would depend on the severity of the attack, according to various studies. Stakeholders Have Taken Various Actions Pursuant to Laws, Regulations, and Guidance Designed to Enhance the Security of Cruise Ship Operations and Additional Actions Are Being Considered
Stakeholders’ Actions
In their efforts to secure cruise ships and their attendant port facilities, the responsible stakeholders—including the Coast Guard, CBP, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS, as well as cruise ship owners and cruise ship facility operators—have taken various actions to implement applicable key maritime federal laws, regulations, and guidance designed to help ensure the security of cruise ships and cruise ship facilities. The Coast Guard has also taken various operational actions designed to secure cruise ships. CBP reviews passenger and crew lists for terrorist and criminal connections. Although the Coast Guard has identified security-related deficiencies for cruise ship facilities and cruise ships, agency officials stated that cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators generally maintain good security measures. In 2006, the Coast Guard asked advisory committee members to specifically review and make recommendations regarding cruise ship security measures. CBP’s Collection of Additional Passenger Data Could Enhance Cruise Ship Security
Detailed information regarding these cases is security sensitive information. Our previous work identified evaluations as a way for agencies to explore the benefits of a program. In addition, CBP’s 2005-2010 Strategic Plan states that the agency should seek to improve the identification and targeting of potential terrorists and terrorist weapons, through risk management and automated advanced and enhanced information. By conducting a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide automated Passenger Name Record data on a systematic basis is cost effective and addresses privacy implications, CBP would be in a better position to determine whether additional actions should be taken to augment security through enhanced screening of cruise ship passengers. Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. GAO was asked to review cruise ship security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at seven ports. GAO selected these locations based on factors such as the number of sailings from each port. Results of the visits provided additional information on security, but were not projectable to all ports.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard has assessed the risks to cruise ships in accordance with DHS guidance--which requires that the agency analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--and, with other maritime stakeholders, identified some concerns. Specifically, agency officials reported in January 2010 that there had been no credible threats against cruise ships in the prior 12 months, but also noted the presence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship. The Coast Guard, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement officials generally believe waterside attacks are a concern for cruise ships. Agency officials and terrorism researchers also identified terrorists boarding a cruise ship as a concern. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which would include potential loss of life and economic effects. Federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken various actions to enhance the security of cruise ships and their facilities and implement related laws, regulations, and guidance, and additional actions are under way. DHS and component agencies have taken security measures such as the Coast Guard providing escorts of cruise ships during transit, and CBP's review of passenger and crew data to help target passenger inspections. Cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans, among other things. The Coast Guard is also in the process of expanding a program to deter and prevent small vessel attacks, and is developing additional security measures for cruise ships. In addition, CBP's 2005-2010 Strategic Plan states that CBP should seek to improve identification and targeting of potential terrorists through automated advanced information. CBP, however, has not assessed the cost and benefit of requiring cruise lines to provide passenger reservation data, which in the aviation mode, CBP reports to be useful for the targeting of passengers for inspection. GAO's previous work identified evaluations as a way for agencies to explore the benefits of a program. If CBP conducted a study to determine whether collecting additional passenger data is cost effective and addressed privacy implications, CBP would be in a better position to determine whether additional actions should be taken to augment security. |
gao_RCED-96-252 | gao_RCED-96-252_0 | Some advanced detection technologies are commercially available to serve aviation security applications. However, only one technology is currently deployed in the United States. Two general groups of technologies, with modifications, can be used to detect both explosives and narcotics. Spending on Detection Technologies
Since 1978, the federal government has spent about $246 million for research and development (R&D) on explosives detection technologies, including over $7 million for ongoing demonstration testing at the Atlanta, San Francisco, and Manila airports. Congressional Direction
The spending on detection technologies that has occurred since 1990 has been due in large part to congressional direction. Characteristics and Limitations of Detection Technologies
Both aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies, which can partially substitute for each other in terms of characteristics, strengths, and limitations. The Customs’ drug interdiction task has an analogous set of procedures and technologies and trade-offs. Relevant trade-offs in selecting detection technologies for a given application involve their characteristics and costs, including issues of their effectiveness in detecting explosives or narcotics, safety risks to users of the technology, and impacts on the flow of commerce. For example, some highly effective technologies could be deployed now, but they are expensive, raise safety concerns, or slow the flow of commerce. IV for additional information about technologies for screening cargo and containers.) Current Deployments of Detection Technologies
Despite the limitations of currently available detection technologies, other countries have deployed some of these technologies to detect explosives and narcotics because of differences in their perception of the threat and their approaches to counter the threat. With a combination of the best available technologies and procedures, including the use of the certified system for screening checked baggage, FAA estimates the incremental cost of the most effective security system for U.S. air travellers to be $6 billion over the next 10 years. On a per-passenger basis, FAA estimates the equivalent cost to be about $1.30 per one-way ticket. Achieved Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification in December 1994. A foreign government and contractor are supporting development of this technology. Expensive, slow, and bulky. Under development. Prototypes are available. Prototype being evaluated by DOD and Customs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on explosives and narcotics detection technologies that are available or under development, focusing on: (1) funding for those technologies; (2) characteristics and limitations of available and planned technologies; and (3) deployment of these technologies by the United States and foreign countries.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex and costly mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies; (2) since 1978, federal agencies have spent about $246 million for research and development on explosives detection technologies and almost $100 million on narcotics detection technologies; (3) most of this spending has occurred since 1990, in response to congressional direction, and has been for technologies to screen checked baggage, trucks, and containers; (4) difficult trade-offs must be made when considering whether to use detection technologies for a given application; (5) chief among those trade-offs are the extent to which intelligence-gathering and procedures can substitute for technology or reduce the need for expensive technology; (6) decisionmakers also need to evaluate technologies in terms of their characteristics and limitations; (7) some technologies are very effective and could be deployed now, but they are expensive, slow the flow of commerce, and raise issues of worker safety; (8) other technologies could be more widely used, but they are less reliable; (9) still others may not be available for several years at the current pace of development; (10) despite the limitations of the currently available technology, some countries have already deployed advanced explosives and narcotics detection equipment because of differences in their perception of the threat and their approaches to counter the threat; (11) should the United States start deploying the currently available technologies, lessons can be learned from these countries regarding their approaches, as well as capabilities of technology in operating environments; and (12) the Federal Aviation Administration estimates that use of the best available procedures and technology for enhancing aviation security could cost as much as $6 billion over the next 10 years or alternatively about $1.30 per one-way ticket, if the costs were paid through a surcharge. |
gao_GAO-13-472 | gao_GAO-13-472_0 | NTIA manages spectrum for federal government users and acts for the President with respect to spectrum management issues as governed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act. Some Agencies Underestimated 1710- 1755 MHz Band Relocation Costs, Although Auction Revenues Appear to Exceed Those Costs
Some Federal Agencies Underestimated Relocation Costs
Actual costs to relocate communications systems for 12 federal agencies from the 1710-1755 MHz band have exceeded original estimates by about $474 million, or 47 percent, as of March 2013. OMB and NTIA officials expect the final relocation cost to be about $1.5 billion compared with the original estimate of about $1 billion. In addition, NTIA expects agencies to complete the relocation effort between 2013 and 2017. In December 2006, NTIA reported that DOD’s estimate to relocate systems would be about $355.4 million. Both NTIA and OMB are taking steps to ensure that agencies improve their cost estimates for a future relocation from the 1755-1850 MHz band. Auction Revenues Appear to Exceed Agency Relocation Costs
The Advanced Wireless Services auction of the 1710-1755 MHz band raised almost $6.9 billion in gross winning bids from the sale of licenses to use these frequencies.actual relocation costs suggests that the auction of the 1710-1755 MHz band raised $5.4 billion for the U.S. Treasury. DOD’s Preliminary Cost Estimate Substantially or Partially Met GAO’s Identified Best Practices, but Changes in Assumptions May Affect Future Costs
DOD’s Preliminary Cost Estimate for Relocating from the 1755-1850 MHz Band Substantially or Partially Met GAO’s Identified Best Practices
To prepare the preliminary cost estimate portion of its study to determine the feasibility of relocating DOD’s 11 major radio systems from the 1755- 1850 MHz band, DOD officials said the agency implemented the following methodology:
DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) groupthe effort and provided guidance to management at the respective military services regarding the data needed to support each system’s relocation cost estimate and how they should be gathered to maintain consistency across the services. Overall, we found that DOD’s cost estimate was consistent with the purpose of the feasibility study, which was to inform the decision making process to reallocate 500 MHz of spectrum for commercial wireless broadband use. As noted in the table above, we observed that DOD’s estimate included complete information about systems’ life cycles and was generally well-documented. We found that DOD properly applied appropriate inflation rates and made no apparent calculation errors, and that the estimated costs agree with DOD’s prior relocation cost estimate for this band conducted in 2001. However, DOD did not fully or substantially meet the accurate and credible characteristics because it was not clear if the estimate considered the most likely costs and because some sensitivity analyses and risk assessments were only completed at the program level for some programs, and not at all at the summary level. According to DOD officials, any change to key assumptions about the bands to which systems would move and the relocation start date could substantially change relocation costs. For example:
Relocation bands: Decisions about which comparable or alternate spectrum bands federal agencies, including DOD, should relocate to are still unresolved. No Government Revenue Forecasts Exist for a Potential Auction of the 1755- 1850 MHz Band, and a Variety of Factors Could Influence Auction Revenues
Federal Agencies Have Not Produced a Revenue Forecast for the 1755-1850 MHz Band
No official government revenue forecast has been prepared for a potential auction of 1755-1850 MHz band licenses, but some estimates might be prepared once there is a greater likelihood of an auction. For example, it assumed that the band would generally be cleared of federal users. A Variety of Factors Ultimately Influence Auction Revenue
Like all goods, the price of licensed spectrum, and ultimately the auction revenue, is determined by supply and demand. FCC and NTIA, with direction from Congress and the President, jointly influence the amount of spectrum allocated for federal and nonfederal users, including the amount to be shared by federal and nonfederal users. This represents a significant increase in the supply of spectrum available for licensing in the marketplace. Demand. The expected, potential profitability of a spectrum license influences the level of demand for it. FCC agreed with the report’s findings, and Commerce, DOD, and FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the differences, if any, between estimated and actual federal relocation costs and auction revenues from the 1710-1755 MHz band; (2) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) followed best practices to prepare its preliminary cost estimate for vacating the 1755-1850 MHz band, and any limitations of its analysis; and (3) what government or industry revenue forecasts for the 1755-1850 MHz band auction exist, if any, and what factors, if any, could influence actual auction revenue. To determine the extent to which DOD followed best practices to prepare its preliminary cost estimate for vacating the 1755-1850 MHz band, we assessed DOD’s preliminary cost estimate against the best practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide), which has been used to evaluate cost estimates across the government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Allocating radio-frequency spectrum is a challenging task because of competing commercial and government demands. In 2006, FCC auctioned spectrum licenses in the 1710-1755 MHz band that had previously been allocated for federal use. To meet the continued demand for commercial wireless services, NTIA assessed the viability of reallocating the 1755-1850 MHz band to commercial use; this band is currently assigned to more than 20 federal users, including DOD. In March 2012, NTIA reported that it would cost $18 billion over 10 years to relocate most federal operations from the band, raising questions about whether relocating federal users is a sustainable approach.
GAO was directed to review the costs to relocate federal spectrum users and revenues from spectrum auctions. This report addresses (1) estimated and actual relocation costs, and revenue from the previously auctioned 1710-1755 MHz band; (2) the extent to which DOD followed best practices to prepare its preliminary cost estimate for vacating the 1755-1850 MHz band; and (3) existing government or industry forecasts for revenue from an auction of the 1755-1850 MHz band. GAO reviewed relevant reports; interviewed DOD, FCC, NTIA, and OMB officials and industry stakeholders; and analyzed the extent to which DOD's preliminary cost estimate met best practices as identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide). FCC agreed with the report's findings and DOD, FCC, and NTIA provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Some federal agencies underestimated the costs to relocate communication systems from the 1710-1755 megahertz (MHz) band, although auction revenues appear to exceed relocation costs by over $5 billion. As of March 2013, actual relocation costs have exceeded estimated costs by about $474 million, or 47 percent. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) expects agencies to complete the relocation effort between 2013 and 2017, with a final relocation cost of about $1.5 billion. Actual relocation costs have exceeded estimated costs for various reasons, including unforeseen challenges and some agencies not following NTIA's guidance for developing cost estimates. However, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to complete its relocation for about $71 million less than its estimate of about $355 million. NTIA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are taking steps to ensure that agencies improve their cost estimates by, for example, preparing a cost estimation template and guidelines for reporting reimbursable costs. The auction of spectrum licenses in the 1710-1755 MHz band raised almost $6.9 billion.
DOD's preliminary cost estimate for relocating systems out of the 1755-1850 MHz band substantially or partially met GAO's best practices for cost estimates, but changes in key assumptions may affect future costs. Adherence with GAO's Cost Guide reduces the risk of cost overruns and missed deadlines. GAO found that DOD's preliminary estimate of $12.6 billion substantially met the comprehensive and well-documented best practices. For instance, it included complete information about systems' life cycles, and the baseline data were consistent with the estimate. However, GAO found that some information on the tasks required to relocate some systems was incomplete. GAO also determined that DOD's estimate partially met the accurate and credible best practices. For example, DOD applied appropriate inflation rates and made no apparent calculation errors. However, DOD did not complete some sensitivity analyses and risk assessments at the program level, and not at all at the summary level. DOD officials said that changes to key assumptions could substantially change relocation costs. Most importantly, decisions about which spectrum band DOD would relocate to are still unresolved, and relocation costs vary depending on the proximity to the 1755-1850 MHz band. Nevertheless, DOD's preliminary cost estimate was consistent with its purpose--informing the decision-making process to make additional spectrum available for commercial wireless services.
No government revenue forecast has been prepared for a potential auction of the 1755-1850 MHz band, and a variety of factors could influence auction revenues. One private sector study in 2011 forecasted $19.4 billion in auction revenue for the band, assuming that federal users would be cleared and the nationwide spectrum price from a previous auction, adjusted for inflation, would apply to this spectrum. Like for all goods, the price of spectrum, and ultimately the auction revenue, is determined by supply and demand. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NTIA jointly influence the amount of spectrum allocated to federal and nonfederal users (the supply). The potential profitability of a spectrum license influences its demand. Several factors would influence profitability and demand, including whether the spectrum is cleared of federal users or must be shared. |
gao_NSIAD-96-49 | gao_NSIAD-96-49_0 | The AV-8B program office does not have a current cost estimate for producing additional radar aircraft. Then, using DOD data on potential savings from a multiyear procurement strategy for engines, we determined that the cost of new aircraft would be about $23.6 million per aircraft, without having provided the contractor the additional $11.3 million worth of reused, government-furnished components and assemblies. According to program documents, under the REMAN acquisition strategy, the Navy expects to pay between $23 million and $29.5 million for each aircraft, exclusive of the value of reused government-furnished equipment. This increase in staff hours causes increases in costs and delays in schedule for the program. If this is the case, the aircraft would not be mission capable until the radar sets were made available. Recommendation
In light of the availability of a more cost-effective strategy to buy new radar AV-8B aircraft, instead of modifying the day attack AV-8B, we recommend that you direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a current cost estimate for producing new radar model aircraft and (1) revise the acquisition strategy for acquiring upgraded AV-8B aircraft for the Marine Corps so that after the existing annual contract expires, the Marine Corps acquires new radar models rather than remanufactured models and (2) take advantage of the savings available through multiyear procurement. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier Remanufacture program, focusing on whether it would be more cost-effective to rebuild older aircraft or procure new aircraft with increased capabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the: (1) Navy estimates that it would cost between $23 million and $29.5 million to rebuild each AV-8B aircraft using refurbished parts; (2) Marines could procure new AV-8B radar attack aircraft for about $23.6 million each; (3) Navy does not have the ability to rebuild AV-8B aircraft as quickly as new aircraft can be produced; (4) Navy could revise its procurement strategy to procure new radar aircraft, since the remanufacture program is conducted under single-year contracts; (5) Navy is having difficulty disassembling older aircraft and acquiring replacement components in a timely and cost-effective manner; and (6) surplus radar equipment intended for use in rebuilding the aircraft may not be available as soon as anticipated, which could cause delays in the remanufacture program. |
gao_GAO-10-703T | gao_GAO-10-703T_0 | About 90 Percent of NICS Transactions Involving Individuals on the Terrorist Watchlist Have Been Allowed to Proceed Because There Was No Legal Basis Identified to Deny the Transactions
In May 2009, we reported that from February 2004 through February 2009, a total of 963 NICS background checks resulted in valid matches with individuals on the terrorist watchlist. Of these transactions, approximately 90 percent (865 of 963) were allowed to proceed because the checks revealed no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions, illegal immigrant status, or other disqualifying factors. No transactions involving explosives background checks were denied. Specifically, from March 2009 through February 2010, FBI data show that 272 NICS background checks resulted in valid matches with individuals on the terrorist watchlist. In total, individuals on the terrorist watchlist have been involved in firearm and explosives background checks 1,228 times since NICS started conducting these checks in February 2004, of which 1,119 (about 91 percent) of the transactions were allowed to proceed while 109 were denied, as shown in table 1. FBI Has Taken Actions to Use Information from NICS Checks to Support Counterterrorism Efforts
The FBI has taken additional actions to use information obtained from NICS background checks to support investigations and other counterterrorism activities. The FBI did not maintain specific data on the number of such denials. In response to a recommendation made in our January 2005 report, FBI headquarters provided guidance to its field offices in April 2005 on the types of additional information available to a field office and the process for obtaining that information if a known or suspected terrorist attempts to obtain a firearm from a gun dealer or a firearm or explosives license or permit. Regarding gun purchases, the guidance notes that if requested by an FBI field office, NICS personnel have been instructed to contact the gun dealer to obtain additional information about the prospective purchaser—such as the purchaser’s residence address and the government-issued photo identification used by the purchaser (e.g., drivers license)—and the transaction, including the make, model, and serial number of any firearm purchased. According to the guidance, any information that FBI field offices obtain related to NICS background checks can be shared with other law enforcement, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence agencies, including members of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force that are from other federal or state law enforcement agencies. FBI is Analyzing and Sharing Information from NICS Checks
The FBI is analyzing and sharing information on individuals matched to the terrorist watchlist to support investigations and other counterterrorism activities. If the Attorney General Is Given Statutory Authority to Deny Transactions, Guidelines Would Help to Ensure Accountability and Civil Liberties Protections
In our May 2009 report, we noted that the Department of Justice (DOJ) provided legislative language to Congress in April 2007 that would have given the Attorney General discretionary authority to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of a firearm or explosives license or permit under certain conditions. At the time of our 2009 report, neither DOJ’s proposed legislative language nor then pending related legislation included provisions for the development of guidelines further delineating the circumstances under which the Attorney General could exercise this authority. We suggested that Congress consider including a provision in any relevant legislation to require that the Attorney General establish such guidelines, and this provision was included in a subsequent legislative proposal. Such a provision would help DOJ and its component agencies provide accountability and a basis for monitoring to ensure that the intended goals for, and expected results of, the background checks are being achieved. Guidelines would also help to ensure compliance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, which requires that terrorist-related screening— including use of the terrorist watchlist—be done in a manner that safeguards legal rights, including freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy guaranteed by federal law. At the time of our May 2009 report, DOJ was noncommittal on whether it would develop guidelines if legislation providing the Attorney General with discretionary authority to deny firearms or explosives transactions involving individuals on the terrorist watchlist was enacted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from possessing firearms or explosives under current federal law. However, for homeland security and other purposes, the FBI is notified when a firearm or explosives background check involves an individual on the terrorist watchlist. This statement addresses (1) how many checks have resulted in matches with the terrorist watchlist, (2) how the FBI uses information from these checks for counterterrorism purposes, and (3) pending legislation that would give the Attorney General authority to deny certain checks. GAO's testimony is based on products issued in January 2005 and May 2009 and selected updates in March and April 2010. For these updates, GAO reviewed policies and other documentation and interviewed officials at FBI components involved with terrorism-related background checks.
What GAO Found
From February 2004 through February 2010, FBI data show that individuals on the terrorist watchlist were involved in firearm or explosives background checks 1,225 times; 1,116 (about 91 percent) of these transactions were allowed to proceed because no prohibiting information was found--such as felony convictions, illegal immigrant status, or other disqualifying factors--and 109 of the transactions were denied. In response to a recommendation in GAO's January 2005 report, the FBI began processing all background checks involving the terrorist watchlist in July 2005--including those generated via state operations--to ensure consistency in handling and ensure that relevant FBI components and field agents are contacted during the resolution of the checks so they can search for prohibiting information. Based on another recommendation in GAO's 2005 report, the FBI has taken actions to collect and analyze information from these background checks for counterterrorism purposes. For example, in April 2005, the FBI issued guidance to its field offices on the availability and use of information collected as a result of firearm and explosives background checks involving the terrorist watchlist. The guidance discusses the process for FBI field offices to work with FBI personnel who conduct the checks and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to obtain information about the checks, such as the purchaser's residence address and the make, model, and serial number of any firearm purchased. The guidance states that any information that FBI field offices obtain related to these background checks can be shared with other counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies. The FBI is also preparing monthly reports on these checks that are disseminated throughout the FBI to support counterterrorism efforts. In April 2007, the Department of Justice proposed legislative language to Congress that would provide the Attorney General with discretionary authority to deny the transfer of firearms or explosives to known or suspected "dangerous terrorists." At the time of GAO's May 2009 report, neither the department's proposed legislative language nor related proposed legislation included provisions for the development of guidelines further delineating the circumstances under which the Attorney General could exercise this authority. GAO suggested that Congress consider including a provision in any relevant legislation that would require the Attorney General to establish such guidelines; and this provision was included in a subsequent legislative proposal. If Congress gives the Attorney General authority to deny firearms or explosives based on terrorist watchlist concerns, guidelines for making such denials would help to provide accountability for ensuring that the expected results of the background checks are being achieved. Guidelines would also help ensure that the watchlist is used in a manner that safeguards legal rights, including freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy guaranteed by federal law and that its use is consistent with other screening processes. For example, criteria have been developed for determining when an individual should be denied the boarding of an aircraft. |
gao_GAO-14-226T | gao_GAO-14-226T_0 | Progress and Challenges in Coordinating Geospatial Data
FGDC Had Not Made Fully Implementing Key Activities for Coordinating Geospatial Data a Priority
While the FGDC had made progress in some areas to improve coordination in geospatial activities, our November 2012 report identified a number of areas in which little progress had been made. However, despite this progress, we found that FGDC had not fully implemented key aspects of activities needed for coordinating investments in geospatial data. Third, FGDC’s strategic plan was missing key components and had not been kept up-to-date. As we reported in November 2012, according to FGDC officials, they had not yet fully implemented policies and procedures for coordinating geospatial investments because these efforts had not been made a priority. As a result, we determined in 2012 that efforts to acquire data were uncoordinated and the federal government acquired duplicative geospatial data. For example, a National Geospatial Advisory Committee representative told us that, at that time, a commercial provider was leasing the same proprietary parcel data to six federal agencies; the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Small Business Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve. Departments Had Not Fully Implemented Important Activities for Coordinating and Managing Geospatial Data
Our November 2012 report also showed that none of the three federal departments in our review—the Departments of Commerce, the Interior, and Transportation—had fully implemented activities needed for effectively coordinating and managing geospatial activities within their respective departments. We concluded in November 2012 that unless the federal agencies were to decide that completing activities to coordinate geospatial investments was a priority, the potential for duplication would continue to exist. OMB Did Not Have Complete and Reliable Information to Identify Duplicative Geospatial Investments
OMB has oversight responsibilities for federal IT systems and acquisition activities—including geographic information systems—to help ensure their efficient and effective use. According to OMB Office of E- Government staff members, OMB relies primarily on the annual budget process to identify potentially duplicative geospatial investments. Implementing GAO Recommendations Can Reduce Duplication and Provide Cost Savings
Our November 2012 report made numerous recommendations aimed at improving coordination and reducing duplication of geospatial data. In addition, we recommended that the Secretaries of Commerce, the Interior, and Transportation implement the relevant executive order requirements and OMB guidance that apply to their departments and agencies: designate a senior agency official with departmentwide accountability, authority, and responsibility for geospatial information issues; prepare, maintain, publish, and implement a strategy for advancing geographic information and related geospatial data activities appropriate to its mission; develop a policy that requires the department to make its geospatial metadata available on the clearinghouse; develop and implement internal procedures to ensure that the department accesses the NSDI clearinghouse before it expends funds to collect or produce new geospatial data to determine (1) whether the information has already been collected by others and (2) whether cooperative efforts to obtain the data are possible; prepare goals relating to all datasets within the relevant theme that develop and implement a plan for the nationwide population of the relevant theme that addresses all datasets within the theme and that includes (1) the development of partnership programs with states, tribes, academia, the private sector, other federal agencies, and localities that meet the needs of users; (2) human and financial resource needs; (3) standards, metadata, and the clearinghouse needs; and (4) a timetable for the development for the theme; and create and implement a plan to develop and implement relevant theme standards. In addition, the federal departments we reviewed have taken some steps to implement our recommendations. In summary, it was slightly over a year ago that we reported that the key players in ensuring coordination on geospatial data investments—FGDC, federal departments and agencies, and OMB—had not fully implemented policies and procedures for coordinating geospatial investments because these efforts were not made a priority. As a result, efforts to acquire data were uncoordinated and the federal government was acquiring duplicative geospatial data. Until FGDC, federal departments and agencies, and OMB decide that investments in geospatial information are a priority, these investments will remain uncoordinated, and the federal government will continue to acquire duplicative geospatial information and waste taxpayer dollars. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government collects, maintains, and uses geospatial information--information linked to specific geographic locations--to support many functions, including national security and disaster response. In 2012, the Department of the Interior estimated that the federal government was investing billions of dollars on geospatial data annually, and that duplication was common.
In November 2012, GAO reported on efforts to reduce duplicative investments in geospatial data, focusing on OMB, FGDC, and three agencies: the Departments of Commerce, the Interior, and Transportation.
This statement summarizes the results of that November 2012 report on progress and challenges in coordinating geospatial information and includes updates on the implementation of recommendations made in that report.
What GAO Found
The President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have established policies and procedures for coordinating investments in geospatial data, however, in November 2012, GAO reported that governmentwide committees and federal departments and agencies had not effectively implemented them. The committee that was established to promote the coordination of geospatial data nationwide--the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC)--had developed and endorsed key standards and had established a clearinghouse of metadata. GAO found that the clearinghouse was not being used by agencies to identify planned geospatial investments to promote coordination and reduce duplication. In addition, the committee had not yet fully planned for or implemented an approach to manage geospatial data as related groups of investments to allow agencies to more effectively plan geospatial data collection efforts and minimize duplicative investments, and its strategic plan was missing key elements.
Other shortfalls have impaired progress in coordinating geospatial data. Specifically, none of the three federal departments in GAO's review had fully implemented important activities such as preparing and implementing a strategy for advancing geospatial activities within their respective departments. Moreover, the agencies in GAO's review responsible for governmentwide management of specific geospatial data had implemented some but not all key activities for coordinating the national coverage of specific geospatial data.
While OMB has oversight responsibilities for geospatial data, GAO reported in November 2012 that according to OMB staff, the agency did not have complete and reliable information to identify potentially duplicative geospatial investments. GAO also reported that FGDC, federal departments and agencies, and OMB had not yet fully implemented policies and procedures for coordinating geospatial investments because these efforts had not been a priority. As a result, efforts to acquire data were uncoordinated and the federal government acquired duplicative geospatial data. For example, a National Geospatial Advisory Committee representative stated that a commercial provider leases the same proprietary parcel data to six federal agencies. GAO concluded that unless the key entities determined that coordinating geospatial investments was a priority, the federal government would continue to acquire duplicative geospatial information and waste taxpayer dollars.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. In November 2012, GAO recommended that to improve coordination and reduce duplication, FGDC develop a national strategy for coordinating geospatial investments; federal agencies follow federal guidance for managing geospatial investments; and OMB develop a mechanism to identify and report on geospatial investments. Since that time, FGDC and several agencies have taken some steps to implement the recommendations. However, additional actions are still needed. |
gao_GAO-09-256 | gao_GAO-09-256_0 | The Army National Guard exceeded its goals in fiscal years 2006 and 2008 and fell within the allowable margin of variance for meeting its goals in the other 2 fiscal years. The Army Has Almost Met Its Overall Growth Goal, and Two Components Have Exceeded Their Annual Goals under the Accelerated Growth Plan
By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army as a whole had met 99 percent of its overall growth goal, whereas it had initially planned to complete the growth by fiscal year 2013 under the original Grow the Force plan and by 2010 under the accelerated plan. Since fiscal year 2005, all three components have made steady progress toward meeting their recruiting goals. The Army Has Dramatically Increased Bonus Expenditures but Does Not Use Available Research to Calculate the Most Cost-Effective Bonus Amounts
Since fiscal year 2005—the last year in which the Army failed to meet its end-strength mission—it has dramatically increased expenditures for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. The Army Has Not Used Research to Calculate What Bonus Amounts Would Be Most Cost- Effective
While the Army has conducted extensive research on the use of cash and other incentives such as choice of branch or graduate school, this research has been focused on comparing different incentive plans. It has not been directed at determining the most cost-effective bonus amounts. The Army Has Fallen Short of Its Quality Goals and Has Taken Steps to Expand Its Recruiting Market
The Army components have not consistently met their quality goals for the percentage of new recruits who have high-school diplomas and who score in the upper half on the AFQT. In fiscal year 2005, none of the Army’s components met DOD’s 90 percent benchmark for recruits with high- school diplomas (see table 6). The Army Has Continued to Grant Conduct Waivers for New Recruits and Analyzes the Outcomes of Recruits Entering with Conduct Waivers
The Army has continued to grant conduct waivers to recruits who do not meet some of the Army’s entrance standards for reasons such as prior criminal misconduct. Initial analyses conducted by the Army and the RAND Corporation have shown that, while those with conduct waivers tend to perform as well as those without conduct waivers, they are more likely to be separated for adverse reasons, such as behavioral issues.All of these studies, however, examined accessions with waivers from fiscal years 2002 through 2007, years when, according to Army officials, the waiver data were subject to certain data reliability problems, including the overcounting of conduct waivers and the miscoding of some misdemeanors as felonies. The Army Has Experienced Shortages of Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels
The Army’s efforts to grow the force have exacerbated preexisting shortages in the officer corps, and the Army projects that some shortages will continue until fiscal year 2018. An Army official stated that the Army has not offered incentives to majors or lieutenant colonels because officials do not believe there is a retention problem with majors or lieutenant colonels. To determine the extent to which the Army is directing the growth in its enlisted force to areas of most critical need, we obtained data from the Army’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, on how much the components spent on enlistment and reenlistment bonuses given to Army recruits and soldiers for fiscal years 2005 through 2008. Additionally, we obtained information on the numbers and types of enlistment waivers granted by the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard in fiscal years 2005 through 2008. To assess the extent to which the Army is directing the growth in its officer force to areas of need and the extent to which it has determined whether short-term tradeoffs to alleviate shortages will have long-term effects on its officer corps, we analyzed various data related to officer demand, strength levels, promotions, and retention. | Why GAO Did This Study
To ease the pace of overseas deployments, the President announced a plan in 2007 to grow the Army's end strength by about 7 percent by 2013. GAO was asked to evaluate the Army's management of this growth. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which the Army has (1) made progress in growing the force, (2) awarded cost-effective bonuses to attract and retain enlistees, (3) maintained the quality of its enlisted force, and (4) directed growth in its officer force to areas of need and determined whether trade-offs it has made to alleviate shortages will have long-term effects. GAO reviewed the Army's growth plans, bonuses, waivers, and officer promotions, and interviewed Defense and Army officials.
What GAO Found
Although the Army's Grow the Force plan originally called for growth to be completed by fiscal year 2013, the Army had met 99 percent of this growth goal by the end of fiscal year 2008. Since fiscal year 2005, when none of the Army components met recruiting goals, all have made steady progress. To achieve this growth, the Army substantially increased its number of recruiters and its funding of incentives. In addition, the active Army and Army Reserve exceeded their retention goals from fiscal years 2005 through 2008; the Army National Guard exceeded its goals in fiscal years 2006 and 2008 and achieved retention within the allowable margin in fiscal years 2005 and 2007. While the Army has increased its expenditures for bonuses by almost 75 percent since fiscal year 2005, it has not used available research to set bonuses at dollar amounts that are most cost-effective. Although a substantial body of research exists on how to cost-effectively use recruiting resources, the Army has not used this research to calculate bonus amounts. During GAO's review, Army officials stated that the main proof of success of the bonus program was that the Army had met its goals for accessions and retention. Also, because Defense guidance allows the Army to offer bonuses to enlistees in any occupation, the Army has been able to award and often has awarded bonuses to occupations that are not considered priority. Further, because each component makes decisions on bonuses independently, the amounts of bonuses awarded by different components vary widely. Since GAO completed its audit work, the Army states, however, that it has been reducing the numbers and amounts of bonuses offered enlistees. In fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the Army did not consistently meet quality goals for new recruits, as measured by the percentage who have high-school diplomas and who score in the upper half on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The Army implemented some new programs to increase the market of eligible recruits, such as programs for overweight individuals or those without high-school diplomas. In addition, the Army has continued to use conduct waivers for candidates who fall short of entrance standards for reasons such as prior criminal misconduct. Existing analyses have shown that recruits with conduct waivers perform similarly to those without conduct waivers-- although they are more likely to be separated for adverse reasons; the Army lacks data on the cost of enlisting persons who require conduct waivers. The Army is experiencing shortages of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels and projects that these shortages will continue. The Army has offered bonuses to captains; however, it has not offered incentives to majors or lieutenant colonels because those ranks are not considered to have retention problems. While the Army has research focused on incentive packages, this research has not been directed at calculating the most cost-effective bonus amounts. Also, the Army has no method of determining whether actions it has taken that deviate from congressional benchmarks will have any effect on the future Army officer corps. |
gao_GAO-13-500T | gao_GAO-13-500T_0 | F-35 Program Performance Improved in 2012
The F-35 program made progress in 2012 on several fronts. Most Management and Development Testing Objectives Were Achieved
The F-35 program met or substantially met most of its key management objectives established for calendar year 2012. The F-35 development flight test program also substantially met 2012 expectations with some revisions to original plans. Progress Made in Addressing Key Technical Risks
In 2012, the F-35 program also made considerable progress in addressing four areas of technical risk that could substantially degrade the F-35’s capabilities and mission effectiveness. 2. Manufacturing Process Metrics Improved
Key manufacturing metrics and discussions with defense and contracting officials indicate that F-35 manufacturing and supply processes improved during 2012. While initial F-35 production overran target costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest data through the end of 2012 shows labor hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating. F-35 Program Still Faces Risks
Ensuring that the F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities and time frames required by the warfighter will be of paramount concern to the Congress, U.S. military and international partners. The acquisition funding requirements for the United States alone are currently expected to average $12.6 billion per year through 2037, and the projected costs of operating and sustaining the F-35 fleet, once fielded, have been deemed unaffordable by DOD officials. In addition, the program faces challenges with software development and continues to incur substantial costs for rework to fix deficiencies discovered during testing. As testing continues additional changes to design and manufacturing processes will likely be required, while production rates continue to increase. Long-Term Affordability Remains a Concern
The March 2012 acquisition program baseline places the F-35 program on firmer footing, but aircraft are expected to cost more and deliveries to warfighters will take longer than previously projected. The new baseline projects the need for a total of $316 billion in development and procurement funding from 2013 through 2037, or an average of $12.6 billion annually over that period (see figure 2). Software Development Challenges Remain
Over time, F-35 software requirements have grown in size and complexity and the contractor has taken more time and effort than expected to write computer code, integrate it on aircraft and subsystems, conduct lab and flight tests to verify it works, and to correct defects found in testing. While most of the aircraft’s software code has been developed, a substantial amount of integration and test work remain before the program can demonstrate full warfighting capability. Thus far, the program has made little progress on block 3.0 software. Design Changes and Rework Continue to Add Cost and Risk
Although F-35 manufacturing, cost, and schedule metrics have shown improvement, the aircraft contractor continues to make major design and tooling changes and alter manufacturing processes while development testing continues. Going forward, ensuring affordability is of paramount concern as more austere budgets are looming. The program continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before completing development flight testing. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability Is a Major Concern. GAO-13-309. Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. Joint Strike Fighter: Implications of Program Restructuring and Other Recent Developments on Key Aspects of DOD’s Prior Alternate Engine Analyses. GAO-10-382. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike Fighter, is DOD's most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition. The program is developing and fielding three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The F-35 is critical to long-term recapitalization plans as it is intended to replace hundreds of existing aircraft. This will require a long-term sustained funding commitment. Total U.S. investment is nearing $400 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft through 2037. Fifty-two aircraft have been delivered through 2012. The F-35 program has been extensively restructured over the last 3 years to address prior cost, schedule, and performance problems. DOD approved a new acquisition program baseline in March 2012. GAO's prior reviews of the F-35 made numerous recommendations to improve outcomes, such as increasing test resources and reducing annual procurement quantities.
This testimony is largely based on GAO's recently released report, GAO-13-309 . This testimony discusses (1) progress the F-35 program made in 2012, and (2) major risks that program faces going forward. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The new F-35 acquisition baseline reflects positive restructuring actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) since 2010, including more time and funding for development and deferred procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future years. Overall, the program progressed on several fronts during 2012 to further improve the current outlook. The program achieved 7 of 10 key management objectives and made substantial progress on one other. Two objectives on aircraft deliveries and a corrective management plan were not met. The F-35 development test program substantially met expectations with some revisions to flight test plans and made considerable progress addressing key technical risks. Software management practices and some output measures improved, although deliveries to test continued to lag behind plans. Manufacturing and supply processes also improved--indicators such as factory throughput, labor efficiency, and quality measures were positive. While initial F-35 production overran target costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest data shows labor hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating.
The F-35 program still faces considerable challenges and risks. Ensuring that the F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities and time required by the warfighter will be a paramount concern to the Congress, DOD, and international partners. With more austere budgets looming, F-35 acquisition funding requirements average $12.6 billion annually through 2037. Once fielded, the projected costs of sustaining the F-35 fleet have been deemed unaffordable by DOD officials; efforts to reduce these costs are underway. Software integration and test will be challenging as many complex tasks remain to enable full warfighting capability. The program is also incurring substantial costs for rework-currently projected at $1.7 billion over 10 years of production-to fix problems discovered during testing. With two-thirds of development testing still to go, additional changes to design and manufacturing are likely. The program continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before completing development flight testing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made prior recommendations to help reduce risk and improve outcomes, which DOD has implemented to varying degrees. |
gao_GAO-10-324 | gao_GAO-10-324_0 | The Bureau is not planning to use CCM to adjust the 2010 Census. The Bureau Has Finalized Decisions in Some Key Areas Since Our 2008 Report
Since our April 2008 report, the Bureau has finalized its plans in key areas of the CCM program including CCM’s goals, the timing of operations, and the timing and types of results to be produced. Planning continues in other areas, such as developing estimation methods, evaluating the CCM program, and implementing its Master Trace Project. In addition, while the deadlines for finalizing CCM estimation methods have not yet passed, the Bureau has many of its default plans already in place. Table 1 shows the status of the Bureau’s plans for the design of CCM in each of these areas. Still, in some cases, it will be important for the Bureau to take additional actions to help ensure the results of CCM are as useful as they could be to inform Bureau decisions on improving future censuses and coverage measurement efforts. These early planning efforts are described in a series of decision memorandums issued in the summer of 2009, and include milestones leading up to a census test in April 2014, descriptions of planning phases, and a list of the various organizational components that conduct the census. Importantly, by creating a “roadmap” that describes, for example, what the Bureau might learn from CCM or how the results might feed into early 2020 Census planning, the Bureau will better ensure that there are no gaps or overlaps in the use of CCM in early 2020 planning. The Master Trace Project is intended to ensure that these datasets and systems can be used together, or linked, to support detailed research into the causes of census coverage problems and facilitate research on the possible interactions of future operations. In particular, the Bureau has not yet completed an inventory of the census databases that might be of potential interest for future research, identified which archived versions might be most useful, or mapped out how they might be archived and linked. Doing this quickly will also be important as Census 2010 is underway and it could become increasingly difficult to make changes to database structures or archival and data storage plans if the Bureau’s assessments determine that changes are necessary. In June 2009, the Bureau decided to keep the originally scheduled start on August 14, 2010. Furthermore, parts of this census operation are new in 2010, and end later than similar operations did in 2000. Moving forward, additional research on the trade-offs between recall bias and contamination errors could help the Bureau more fully understand the implications of choosing various start times for PI on the resulting estimates of coverage error and better determine the optimal timing of PI in future censuses. Conclusions
Assessing the accuracy of the census is an essential step in improving current and future censuses. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce require the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau to take the following three actions to improve the usefulness of CCM for 2020: To help the Bureau achieve its goal of using CCM to improve the 2020 Census, better document links between the 2010 CCM program and 2020 Census planning, integrating the goal of using the CCM program to improve Census 2020, such as with CCM results and data, into those broader plans for 2020. | Why GAO Did This Study
Assessing the accuracy of the census is essential given that census data are used to apportion seats in Congress, to redraw congressional districts, and for many other public and private purposes. The U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) Census Coverage Measurement program (CCM) is to assess the accuracy of the 2010 Census and improve the design of operations for the 2020 Census. In April 2008, GAO recommended that the Bureau identify how it would relate CCM results--where the 2010 Census was accurate and inaccurate--to census operations to improve future censuses. Knowing where the 2010 Census was inaccurate can help inform research to improve the 2020 Census. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of CCM planning and (2) the effects of design decisions since GAO issued its April 2008 report. GAO reviewed Bureau documents related to CCM design and National Academy of Sciences reports, and interviewed responsible Bureau officials.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's April 2008 report, the Bureau has finalized plans for 2010 CCM goals, the timing of operations, and the types of results to be produced. Planning continues in other areas, such as developing estimation methods, evaluating the CCM program, and implementing its Master Trace Project, which would enable the Bureau to link its datasets and systems to support a broad range of research. The deadlines for some of these plans have not yet passed, but the Bureau already has default plans in place in case further changes do not occur. In mid-December, the Director decided to make some additional changes to the CCM program to improve the quality of CCM results. GAO found that additional actions on Bureau decisions may make CCM more useful in informing Bureau decisions on future census and coverage measurement efforts: (1) The Bureau's 2020 planning efforts are described in a series of decision memoranda issued in the summer of 2009. However, the Bureau has not yet taken steps to integrate CCM results with early 2020 planning to prepare for a census test in 2014. By describing, for example, what the Bureau might learn from CCM or how the results might feed into 2020 Census planning, the Bureau will better ensure that there are no gaps or overlaps in the use of CCM for early 2020 planning. (2) In September 2009, the Bureau began its Master Trace Project, which is intended to ensure that its datasets and systems can be used together to support detailed research into the causes of census coverage problems and facilitate research on the possible interactions of future operations. At the time of this review, the Bureau had not yet completed an inventory of the census databases that might be of potential interest for future research, identified which archived versions might be most useful, or mapped out how they might be archived and linked. Doing this quickly will be important as the census is already underway and it will be difficult to make changes to database structures or archival and data storage plans if the Bureau's assessments determine that changes are necessary. (3) The Bureau reviewed its previous decision to start CCM's Person Interviewing operation later than it did in 2000, and decided in June 2009 not to change it. However, the Bureau does not have a plan to assess the trade-offs in error between earlier and later start dates. Additional research on the trade-offs of different start dates could help the Bureau more fully understand the implications of CCM timing decisions on the resulting estimates of coverage error and better determine the optimal timing of Person Interviewing in future censuses. |
gao_GAO-17-450 | gao_GAO-17-450_0 | For example, under enhanced-surface-traffic operations, a service provided by FAA’s Data Communications program allows an air traffic controller to send flight-departure clearance instructions to aircraft electronically, which can expedite clearances and reduce communication errors. FAA Is Implementing NextGen Incrementally and Has Taken Various Actions to Address Challenges
FAA is implementing NextGen incrementally through six NextGen-related areas—communications, automation, navigation, surveillance, weather, and foundational programs. FAA has faced challenges in including stakeholders and in measuring and reporting on NextGen progress. Navigation programs that use more efficient routes and procedures to save fuel, reduce flight times, increase traffic flow and capacity, and reduce exhaust emissions. For example, Data Communications departure clearance services have been deployed at 55 airports—all of the locations for the first phase of the Data Communications program, including 39 of the 40 busiest commercial airports in the United States. FAA Plans to Complete the Majority of Planned NextGen Implementation by 2025 and within Earlier Cost Estimates
FAA Plans to Implement Most NextGen Concepts by 2025, but Has Deferred Some Activities Until after 2030
According to FAA officials, current segments of NextGen programs are generally on schedule, and FAA documents indicate that FAA plans to implement the concepts that will complete the transformation of the NAS to a NextGen system by 2025. The Current Cost Estimate for NextGen is Within Earlier Estimates, But NextGen Has Changed Over Time
FAA’s current total cost estimate for implementing NextGen through 2030 is within the JPDO’s 2007 estimates. FAA also estimated $15.1 billion in costs for the aviation industry—also within the range of the 2007 estimate. FAA Faces Various Challenges to Implementing NextGen
FAA faces several remaining challenges as it continues to implement NextGen, such as uncertainties regarding future funding, leadership stability, aircraft equipage, and cybersecurity issues. FAA is taking some actions to address these challenges by, for example, prioritizing and segmenting NextGen improvements into smaller pieces that each require less funding. While it is not possible to eliminate all uncertainties, FAA is adopting Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as a tool to help it anticipate and manage risks across NextGen programs, and plans to use ERM to mitigate future risks. FAA is Taking Steps to Address Challenges to NextGen Implementation
Uncertain Funding
Most of the aviation stakeholders we interviewed (22 of 34) told us that uncertain funding has been a challenge and has affected FAA’s efforts to implement NextGen. This proposal could affect the implementation of NextGen. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to assess the status of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). For our review, we addressed (1) how FAA has implemented NextGen and addressed implementation challenges; and (2) the challenges, if any, that remain for implementing NextGen, and FAA’s actions to mitigate these challenges. Additionally, to determine actions FAA is taking to address risks to NextGen, we reviewed FAA’s risk management documents and interviewed FAA’s NAS Systems Engineering Services Office, an organization within the Office of NextGen responsible for designing and maintaining the FAA’s NAS Enterprise Architecture and providing systems engineering related to NextGen, which has established a process to manage risks to NextGen. We further developed the list of stakeholders by identifying industry stakeholders that have made NextGen-related recommendations to FAA, conducting a literature review of NextGen issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAA is leading the implementation of NextGen, which is designed to transition the nation's ground-based air traffic control system to one that uses satellite navigation, automated position reporting, and digital communications. Planning for NextGen began in 2003 and in 2007 the effort was estimated to cost between $29 and $42 billion by 2025. NextGen is intended to increase air transportation system capacity, enhance airspace safety, reduce delays, save fuel, and reduce adverse environmental effects from aviation.
Given the cost, complexity, and length of the project, GAO was asked to review FAA's NextGen implementation efforts. This report examines: 1) how FAA has implemented NextGen and addressed implementation challenges; and 2) the challenges, if any, that remain for implementing NextGen, and FAA's actions to mitigate those challenges.
GAO reviewed FAA documents, advisory group reports, and NextGen-related recommendations made to FAA by GAO and others. GAO interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 34 U.S. aviation industry stakeholders, including airlines, airports, aviation experts and research organizations, among others, to obtain their views on NextGen challenges and FAA's efforts to address them. Stakeholders were selected based on GAO's knowledge of the aviation industry and includes those that have made NextGen-related recommendations to FAA, among other things. GAO also interviewed FAA officials regarding NextGen implementation and stakeholders' views.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) incrementally and has taken actions to address challenges to implementation. NextGen has enhanced surface traffic operations at 39 of the 40 busiest airports in the United States by providing electronic communications to clear planes for departure, technology that can expedite clearances and reduce errors. FAA has taken steps to address challenges such as limited stakeholder inclusion that affected early implementation of NextGen. For example, FAA established groups of industry stakeholders and government officials, who worked together to develop implementation priorities. By 2025, FAA plans to deploy improvements in all NextGen areas—communications, navigation, surveillance, automation, and weather. While specific NextGen initiatives and programs have changed over time, FAA's 2016 cost estimates for implementing NextGen through 2030 for 1) FAA and 2) industry—$20.6 and $15.1 billion, respectively—are both within range of 2007 cost estimates.
FAA's challenges as it continues to implement NextGen include uncertainties regarding future funding; whether aircraft owners equip their aircraft to use NextGen improvements; potential air traffic control restructuring; FAA's leadership stability; and cybersecurity issues. FAA is taking actions to address challenges within its control by, for example, prioritizing NextGen improvements and segmenting them into smaller pieces that each require less funding. While it is not possible to eliminate all uncertainties, FAA has adopted an enterprise risk management approach to help it identify and mitigate current and future risks that could affect NextGen implementation. Moreover, FAA has implemented most of GAO's related recommendations. |
gao_RCED-99-27 | gao_RCED-99-27_0 | The agency has developed a strategy for eliminating the backlog of nonconstruction grants and preventing a future backlog. To avert a future grant backlog, the agency developed a strategy that includes identifying the required closeout documents for individual grants before the grants are awarded, requiring each grants management office to develop a closeout strategy, and streamlining closeout procedures to improve the effectiveness of the closeout process. Closeout Procedures and Plans for Nonconstruction Grants Were Not Consistently Followed or Implemented
EPA did not always follow its procedures when closing out nonconstruction grants. The strategy to avert a future backlog was also not consistently implemented. The plan stated that 497 of the 5,860 original remaining construction grants would not be closed out by the end of fiscal year 1997 and that a concerted effort would be required to close out these grants to prevent additional delays after fiscal year 1997. EPA Has Taken Efforts to Reduce the Number of Inactive Contracts Needing Closeout
EPA took several actions to reduce the number of contracts that require closeout after we and the Office of Inspector General reported on the number of contracts that required closeout. As of October 1998, EPA did not know if this goal had been attained. Inactive Grants and Contracts and Expected Closeout Time Frames
EPA has made significant reductions in the number of inactive grants and contracts. For nonconstruction grants, the backlog was reduced from approximately 18,000 in 1996 to approximately 4,100 as of June 30, 1998, and the number of inactive construction grants was about 500 as of March 1998—reduced from about 5,900 at the end of fiscal year 1990. The backlog of inactive nonconstruction grants will likely be eliminated by 2000, but it is uncertain when the backlogs of construction grants and contracts will be eliminated. Current Status of Nonconstruction Grants Requiring Closeout
EPA has made significant progress in reducing the backlog of nonconstruction grants, and, as of June 30, 1998, had reduced the initial backlog of nearly 18,000 identified in 1996 to approximately 4,100. It is unlikely, however, that this goal will be met either. Estimates from EPA’s regional offices that are responsible for closing out grants indicate that not all projects will be closed out by that date. In 1990, we testified that EPA had almost 2,400 inactive contracts that needed to be closed, and in 1994, the Office of Inspector General reported that almost 2,000 needed to be closed. By August 1998, EPA had reduced that number to 1,028. All contracting locations were required to estimate an inventory level and a date by which they would attain this level. Unliquidated Obligation Amounts
Significant amounts of unliquidated moneys remain available for grants and contracts that are awaiting closeout. Using EPA’s data systems and information from the agency’s regional offices, we identified inactive grants and contracts with unliquidated obligations of approximately $612.1 million that may no longer be needed for the intended purposes. For wastewater treatment construction grants, we requested that EPA obtain information on the number of inactive grants as of March 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) progress in closing completed grants and contracts, focusing on: (1) EPA's efforts to close out inactive grants and contracts; (2) the progress that EPA has made in reducing the number of inactive grants and contracts, the number of remaining inactive grants and contracts, and the dates by which they are expected to be closed out; and (3) the amount of unliquidated obligations for inactive grants and contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over the last 8 years, EPA has taken several initiatives to reduce the backlogs of inactive grants and contracts needing closeout; (2) in 1992, EPA developed a policy specifying procedures for closing out nonconstruction grants, and in 1998, the agency developed a strategy for eliminating the existing backlog of inactive nonconstruction grants and preventing a future backlog; (3) however, closeout procedures and strategies for nonconstruction grants were not consistently followed, and strategies at the regional level frequently did not include specific actions for implementation; (4) EPA also developed automated systems to improve the monitoring of the nonconstruction grant closeout process; (5) in 1990 and 1997, EPA developed strategies to reduce the backlog of wastewater treatment construction grants; (6) in fiscal year (FY) 1994, EPA established goals for closing out a specific number of inactive contracts; (7) EPA has made significant progress in closing out inactive grants and contracts, but a considerable number remain to be closed; (8) in 1996, the agency had a backlog of nearly 18,000 nonconstruction grants, but by June 1998, the backlog was reduced to approximately 4,100; (9) EPA estimated in 1996 that the backlog of nonconstruction grants would be eliminated by July 2000; (10) with closeouts progressing at the current rate, it is likely that this goal will be attained; (11) the number of inactive wastewater treatment construction grants needing closeout was about 500 as of March 1998--reduced from about 5,900 at the end of FY 1990; (12) while the construction grant backlog was initially projected to be eliminated by the end of FY 1997, this goal was not attained, and in December 1996, EPA revised its projection to eliminate the backlog by 2002; (13) recent estimates from EPA's offices implementing the closeout strategy for construction grants indicate that this goal is unlikely to be attained; (14) in March 1993, EPA had approximately 2,000 inactive contracts needing closeout, and by August 1998, that number had been reduced to 1,028; (15) significant amounts of unliquidated obligations remain for inactive grants and contracts and could potentially be allocated for other EPA projects and programs; (16) the unliquidated obligations for construction and nonconstruction grants totalled about $612.1 million, and for about $423.8 million of this total amount, there are no statutory time restrictions on the use of funds; and (17) therefore, a large portion of these funds is potentially available for recovery and could be used for other approved projects. |
gao_RCED-99-39 | gao_RCED-99-39_0 | Our reviews have shown that the Superfund cleanup process can be long and expensive. Some of these state programs can handle highly contaminated sites, whose risks could qualify them for the Superfund program, as well as less dangerous sites. States accomplish cleanups under three programs: (1) voluntary cleanup programs that allow parties to clean up their sites without enforcement action, often to increase the site’s economic value; (2) brownfields programs that encourage the voluntary cleanup of sites in urban industrial areas to reuse the sites and avoid the expansion of industry into “greenfields,” that is, undeveloped land; and (3) enforcement programs that oversee the cleanup of the most serious sites and force uncooperative responsible parties to clean up their sites.States generally use their voluntary and brownfields programs to clean up less complex sites by offering various incentives to responsible parties, such as reduced state oversight. State Practices That Officials Believe May Facilitate Faster, Less Costly Hazardous Waste Cleanups
Hazardous waste officials in each of the seven states we contacted identified practices used at sites sufficiently contaminated to be included in the Superfund program that they believe achieve faster and less costly cleanups than would occur under the Superfund program. Two states have adopted practices that reduce the liability of parties who might be responsible for cleanup costs under Superfund’s liability rules. State officials said that these practices have been applied to some state program sites that are sufficiently contaminated to qualify for the NPL. Although the officials described instances in which these practices have yielded benefits, none could formally document the time and cost savings of the practices. According to state officials, containment remedies remain protective of human health and the environment if properly controlled and maintained. EPA and Other Stakeholders Identified Potential Disadvantages of Applying State Practices to the Superfund Program
Environmental policy stakeholders that we interviewed, including EPA, state and national environmental organizations, and representatives of state and local government associations, generally did not dispute that the state practices had the efficiency benefits described by state officials. Some of the environmental organizations and a local government organization, however, identified potentials risks of applying these practices to the Superfund program. Since the state practices can reduce cleanup costs, they are generally advantageous for businesses and others responsible for cleaning up sites. Stakeholder’s Views on Practices That Could Lead to Lower-Cost Remedies
The representatives of the environmental groups and others that we contacted, such as the Sierra Club, John Snow Institute, RFF, and EPA regions, generally believed that the states’ lack of preference for permanent cleanup remedies and their greater readiness to consider that sites will not be used for residential purposes in the future tend to weaken the long-term effectiveness of site remediation programs. Scope and Methodology
To identify practices that may facilitate cleanups of hazardous waste sites that are faster or less costly in comparison with the federal Superfund program, we selected seven states—Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas—with cleanup programs that are among the largest in the nation and that were recommended by various stakeholders—including EPA, industry organizations, and environmental groups—as states that had implemented time- and cost-saving practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) identified practices that are both used in selected state programs at sites that may be contaminated enough to qualify for long-term cleanup under the Superfund program and that are believed by state officials to reduce the time and expense of cleanups; and (2) obtained the views of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), environmentalists, and other stakeholders about whether the states' practices may be applicable to the Superfund program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) state hazardous waste program officials identified cleanup practices that they believe lead to faster or less costly cleanup of sites and that have been applied at sites that qualify for the Superfund Program, and said that the practices facilitated cleanups in that: (a) some practices promoted faster decisionmaking about how to clean up sites, that is, decisions about which cleanup remedies to use; (b) their programs allow less costly cleanup remedies than the Superfund law requires, which are nevertheless, they believe, protective of health and the environment; and (c) two state programs reduce litigation costs, speed up cleanups, and improve the fairness of the cleanup process by not holding some parties responsible for cleanup who would be liable under the Superfund law; (2) although the officials provided some anecdotal evidence illustrating the benefits of these practices, none could provide a formal assessment of time and cost savings; (3) environmental policy stakeholders that GAO interviewed, including EPA, state and national environmental organizations, and representatives of local governments, generally did not dispute that the state practices identified can facilitate faster or less costly cleanups; (4) because they can reduce costs, the state practices are generally advantageous to private companies and others responsible for cleaning up sites; (5) however, EPA and environmental and local government groups said that applying some of the practices to the Superfund program could have disadvantages; (6) environmental groups, as well as representatives of state and local officials, noted that containment remedies leaving contamination at sites would require control over the use of the sites, such as restrictive zoning, to reduce human exposure to the contaminants; (7) a number of stakeholders, including state officials, said that a lessening of the Superfund program's more rigorous cleanup requirements or liability standards could negatively affect the state programs; (8) they noted that states can refer sites at which parties responsible for cleanup refuse to comply with state requirements to EPA for possible action under the Superfund program; and (9) the belief of responsible parties that the Superfund requirements are more onerous than the states' is a powerful incentive for cooperation with state authorities that might be weakened if the Superfund program became more like the state programs. |
gao_GAO-15-134T | gao_GAO-15-134T_0 | VA Does Not Maintain Reliable Data on the Number of Land-Use Agreements and Their Associated Revenues
In August 2014, we reported that, on the basis of our review of land-use agreement data for fiscal year 2012, VA does not maintain reliable data on the total number of land-use agreements and VA did not accurately estimate the revenues those agreements generate. According to the land- use agreement data provided to us from VA’s Capital Asset Inventory (CAI) system—the system VA utilizes to record land-use agreements— VA reported that it had over 400 land-use agreements generating over $24.8 million in estimated revenues for fiscal year 2012. Examples of these corrections include the following: at one medical center, one land-use agreement was recorded 37 times, once for each building listed in the agreement; and
VHA also noted that 13 agreements included in the system should have been removed because those agreements were terminated prior to fiscal year 2012. By implementing a mechanism that will allow it to assess whether medical centers have timely entered the appropriate land-use agreement data into CAI, and working with the medical centers to correct the data, as needed, VA would be better positioned to reliably account for land-use agreements and the associated revenues that they generate. Additional Monitoring at Three VA Medical Centers Could Improve the Billing and Revenue- Collection Process for Land-Use Agreements
In our August 2014 report, we also found weaknesses in the billing and collection processes for land-use agreements at three selected VA medical centers due primarily to ineffective monitoring. For most of these errors, we found that VA did not adjust the revenues it collected for inflation. VA officials stated that the department did not perform systematic reviews of the billings and collections practices at the three medical centers, which we discuss in more detail later. This assignment of roles and responsibilities for one office is not typical of the sites we examined. We found problems with unenforced agreement terms, expired agreements, and instances where land-use agreements did not exist. Examples include the following: In West Los Angeles, VA waived the revenues in an agreement with a nonprofit organization—$250,000 in fiscal year 2012 alone—due to financial hardship. However, VA policy does not allow revenues to be waived. In New York, one sharing partner—a local school of medicine—with seven expired agreements remained on the property and occupied the premises without written authorization during fiscal year 2012. The City of Los Angeles has used 12 acres of VA land for recreational use since the 1980s without a signed agreement or payments to VA. An official said that VA cannot negotiate agreements in this case due to an ongoing lawsuit brought on behalf of homeless veterans about its land-use agreement authority. VA officials stated that they had not performed systematic reviews of these agreements and had not established mechanisms to enable them to do so. Specifically, we recommended that VA develop a mechanism to independently verify the accuracy, validity, and completeness of VHA data for land-use agreements in CAI; develop mechanisms to monitor the billing and collection of revenues for land-use agreements to help ensure that transactions are promptly and accurately recorded at the three medical centers; develop mechanisms to foster collaboration between key offices to improve billing and collections practices at the New York and North Chicago medical centers; develop mechanisms to access and monitor the status of land-use agreements to help ensure that agreement terms are enforced, agreements are renewed as appropriate, and all agreements are documented in writing as required, at the New York and West Los Angeles selected medical centers; develop a plan for the West Lost Angeles medical center that identifies the steps to be taken, timelines, and responsibilities in implementing segregation of duties over the billing and collections process; and develop guidance on managing expiring agreements at the three medical centers. After reviewing our draft report, VA concurred with all six of our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA manages one of the nation's largest federal property portfolios. To manage these properties, VA uses land-use authorities that allow VA to enter into various types of agreements for the use of its property in exchange for revenues or in-kind considerations. GAO was asked to examine VA's use of land-use agreements.
This report addresses the extent to which VA (1) maintains reliable data on land-use agreements and the revenue they generate, (2) monitors the billing and collection processes at selected VA medical centers, and (3) monitors land-use agreements at selected VA medical centers. GAO analyzed data from VA's database on its land-use agreements for fiscal year 2012, reviewed agency documentation, and interviewed VA officials. GAO also visited three medical centers to review the monitoring of land-use agreements and the collection and billing of the associated revenues. GAO selected medical centers with the largest number of agreements or highest amount of estimated revenue. The site visit results cannot be generalized to all VA facilities.
What GAO Found
According to the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Capital Asset Inventory system—the system VA utilizes to record land-use agreements and revenues—VA had hundreds of land-use agreements with tens of millions of dollars in estimated revenues for fiscal year 2012, but GAO's review raised questions about the reliability of those data. For example, one land-use agreement was recorded 37 times, once for each building listed in the agreement, 13 agreements terminated before fiscal year 2012 had not been removed from the system, and more than $240,000 in revenue from one medical center had not been recorded. VA relies on local medical center staff to enter data timely and accurately, but lacks a mechanism for independently verifying the data. Implementing such a mechanism and working with medical centers to make corrections as needed would better position VA to reliably account for its land-use agreements and the associated revenues they generate.
GAO found weaknesses in the billing and collection processes for land-use agreements at three selected VA medical centers due primarily to ineffective monitoring. For example, VA incorrectly billed its sharing partners for 14 of 34 agreements at the three centers, which resulted in VA not billing $300,000 of the nearly $5.3 million owed. In addition, at the New York center, VA had not billed a sharing partner for several years' rent that totaled over $1 million. VA began collections after discovering the error; over $200,000 was outstanding as of April 2014. VA stated that it did not perform systematic reviews of the billing and collection practices at the three centers and had not established mechanisms to do so. VA officials at the New York and North Chicago centers stated that information is also not timely shared on the status of agreements with offices that perform billing due to lack of collaboration. Until VA addresses these issues, VA lacks assurance that it is collecting the revenues owed by its sharing partners.
VA did not effectively monitor many of its land-use agreements at two of the centers. GAO found problems with unenforced agreement terms, expired agreements, and instances where land-use agreements did not exist. Examples include the following:
In West Los Angeles, VA waived the revenues in an agreement with a nonprofit organization—$250,000 in fiscal year 2012 alone—due to financial hardship. However, VA policy does not allow revenues to be waived.
In New York, one sharing partner—a local School of Medicine—with seven expired agreements remained on the property and occupied the premises without written authorization during fiscal year 2012.
The City of Los Angeles has used 12 acres of VA land for recreational use since the 1980s without a signed agreement or payments to VA. An official said that VA cannot negotiate agreements due to an ongoing lawsuit brought on behalf of homeless veterans about its land-use agreement authority.
VA does not perform systematic reviews and has not established mechanisms to do so, thus hindering its ability to effectively monitor its agreements and use of its properties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to VA including recommendations to improve the quality of its data, foster collaboration between key offices, and enhance monitoring. VA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-157 | gao_GAO-03-157_0 | For example, HUD instituted full-time GTR positions in its program offices to assist in contract administration. HUD Does Not Employ Certain Processes and Practices that Would Facilitate Effective Contractor Monitoring
Holding contractors accountable for results requires processes and procedures to facilitate effective monitoring. HUD’s Monitoring of Contractors Is Not Systematic
HUD does not employ a systematic process for monitoring its contractors that consistently uses plans and risk-based strategies needed to guide its monitoring; nor does HUD track contractor performance needed for such plans and strategies. Weaknesses in Monitoring Limit HUD’s Ability to Prevent Contractor Fraud, Waste, or Abuse
Weaknesses in HUD’s monitoring processes limit the department’s ability to identify and correct contractor performance problems, hold contractors accountable, and assure itself that it is receiving the services for which it pays. HUD does not strategically manage its acquisition workforce to ensure that individuals have the appropriate workload, skills, and training that allows them to effectively perform their jobs. HUD’s centralized contract management information system and several financial management information systems lack complete, consistent, and accurate information—thus, these systems do not adequately support the department’s efforts to manage and monitor contracts. HUD’s Financial Management Information Systems Do Not Readily Provide Contracting Obligation and Expenditure Data
HUD’s program offices also record contracting obligation and expenditure information in various financial management information systems. HUD has already taken steps toward improving its acquisition management; however, weaknesses remain in HUD’s monitoring processes, management of its acquisition workforce, and programmatic and financial management systems that support its contracting. Appendix II: Sampling Methodology for GAO Survey of HUD’s Acquisition Management Reforms
Objectives
Our primary objectives in the survey were to (1) assess the acquisition workforce workload, (2) assess the availability of training and the perceived usefulness of the training that the staff receive, (3) determine the extent to which HUD’s data systems are used to support its contract management and monitoring, and (4) determine the ways in which the acquisition workforce monitor HUD’s contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 1990s the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) dramatically downsized its staff, however, its mission did not decrease. As a consequence, HUD relies more heavily on private contractors, and needs to hold its contractors accountable for results. GAO was asked to determine if HUD has processes and practices in place to effectively oversee contractors, strategically manages its acquisition workforce, and has management information systems that support its acquisition workforce.
What GAO Found
HUD's contracting has increased significantly in recent years. Although HUD has taken actions to improve its acquisition management--such as instituting full-time contract monitoring positions and improving its contracting information system--weaknesses remain that limit HUD's ability to identify and correct contractor performance problems, assure that it is receiving the services for which it pays, and hold contractors accountable for results. HUD, in particular, its multifamily housing program, does not employ processes and practices that could facilitate effective monitoring. For example, HUD's monitoring process does not consistently include the use of contract monitoring plans or risk-based strategies, or the tracking of contractor performance. HUD has not ensured that individuals responsible for managing and monitoring contracts have the appropriate workload, skills, and training that would enable them to effectively perform their jobs. For example, according to HUD's records, over half of the staff who are directly responsible for monitoring contractor performance have not received required acquisition training. HUD's management information systems do not adequately support its acquisition workforce in their efforts to manage and monitor contracts. Specifically, key information in HUD's contracting system is not reliable and HUD's financial systems do not readily provide complete and consistent contracting obligation and expenditure data. |
gao_GAO-08-966 | gao_GAO-08-966_0 | These contractors provide security services for a variety of U.S. government agencies in Iraq; however, they principally are hired by DOD and the State Department. DOD and the State Department Have Increased Oversight Efforts Regarding PSCs, but Staffing and Training Challenges Remain for DOD
DOD and the State Department have both taken action to increase their oversight efforts over PSCs in Iraq, however, staffing and training challenges remain for DOD. However, senior military staff as well as units may not be aware of their increased responsibilities because DOD has not incorporated information on the revised guidance and increased responsibilities in its training program. Further, while DOD has increased the number of personnel in Iraq devoted to providing contract oversight and management over private security contracts it is not clear based on our current and past work whether DOD can sustain the increased number of contract oversight and management personnel it has sent to Iraq since late 2007. In addition, the State Department has implemented 11 of the 18 recommendations made by a panel appointed by the Secretary of State to review the agency’s oversight of PSCs in Iraq. However the Department may be challenged to continue to provide the increased number of personnel needed to sustain the additional oversight. To assist in its greater role in Iraq to provide contract award, administration and oversight, JCC-I/A plans to add additional personnel in Iraq while DCMA has increased its number of oversight personnel in Iraq and hopes to add additional personnel. DCMA has approximately doubled the number of oversight personnel in the CENTCOM area of responsibility by shifting personnel from other areas. The State Department has acknowledged that it does not have sufficient numbers of diplomatic security agents to meet the agency’s security requirements and as a result relies on and will continue to rely on private security contractors to provide additional capacity. For example, since the Nisour Square incident in late 2007, the agencies have increased interagency coordination of their PSC movements in Iraq through liaison officers and other means. MNF-I’s Armed Contractor Oversight Division has also been coordinating efforts related to PSC oversight and accountability among DOD, the State Department, the Government of Iraq, and the PSC community in Iraq. Interagency Coordination Has Improved between DOD and the Department of State and between the U.S. Government and the Government of Iraq
Prior to the Nisour Square incident, DOD and the State Department did not maintain regular communication or coordination on the departments’ efforts related to PSCs in Iraq, and neither DOD nor the State Department coordinated on a regular basis with the Government of Iraq on issues related to PSCs. An Overview of the Legal Framework for Holding Private Security Contractor Employees Accountable for Their Actions in Iraq
Various laws exist to hold PSC employees accountable for criminal acts committed in a wartime environment beyond the borders of the United States. These laws include U.S. criminal laws that may be applied extraterritorially, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), international law, as well as Iraqi laws. DOD stated that it is actively incorporating contractors and contract support into the exercise schedules. Additionally, we met with military officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Central Command; and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; officials from the State Department, including the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Acquisitions Management, and the Office of the Legal Advisor, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to discuss oversight, coordination, and accountability of PSCs in Iraq. Appendix II: Implementation Status of Recommendations from the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq
According to State Department officials, the department has also begun to implement other recommendations made by the panel including the installation of audio and video recording equipment in security vehicles and the creation of an eight person unit to investigate any reported and alleged incidents involving State Department PSCs including those involving injuries or death. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government relies extensively on private security contractors (PSC) for a variety of security services. However, incidents involving PSCs have raised concerns about oversight and legal accountability. Under the authority of the Comptroller General and in response to continuing congressional interest, GAO performed this review to examine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State have strengthened (1) oversight and (2) coordination of private security contractors in Iraq. GAO is also providing information on the legal framework used to hold private security contractor employees legally accountable for their actions in Iraq. GAO reviewed DOD and State Department policies and guidance, and their memorandum of agreement on PSCs; observed operations in Iraq and met with DOD officials there and in the U.S.; and met with officials from the Departments of Justice and State, and private security contractors.
What GAO Found
Both DOD and the State Department have taken steps to strengthen oversight of private security contractors in Iraq since September 2007. However, staffing and training challenges remain for DOD. DOD has increased the number of personnel in Iraq assigned to provide oversight for DOD's PSCs but has not developed plans or a strategy to sustain this increase. An Army-commissioned report has specifically raised concerns about the lack of personnel available to provide sufficient contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime missions. In the short term, DOD has increased the number of oversight personnel in Iraq by shifting existing oversight personnel from other locations into Iraq. However, without developing and implementing a strategy for providing and sustaining an increased number of personnel dedicated to oversight of PSCs, it is not clear whether DOD can sustain this increase because of the limited number of oversight personnel in the workforce. Moreover, while DOD has provided some training on PSCs for units deploying, the training has not been updated to reflect the changes made by DOD since September 2007 to increase oversight. As a result, military units may be unaware of their expanded oversight and investigative responsibilities. The State Department has implemented 11 of 18 actions recommended in October 2007 by a panel tasked by the Secretary of State with reviewing that agency's use of private security contractors in Iraq. For example, the State Department has increased the number of diplomatic security personnel stationed in Iraq to provide oversight of contractor activities and has requested and received funding to hire and train 100 additional agents to replace those who were transferred from other State Department programs in the United States to Iraq. According to State Department officials, the additional personnel will help sustain the increased number of agents in Iraq. In addition, as of June 2008, the State Department has equipped 140 of its security vehicles with video recording equipment and plans to equip an additional 93 vehicles. Coordination among DOD, the State Department, and the government of Iraq has significantly improved since September 2007. The State Department coordinates its PSC movements with DOD through liaison officers, and by providing a daily briefing to Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) on upcoming PSC activities. MNF-I 's Armed Contractor Oversight Division facilitates coordination for PSC matters among DOD, State Department, the government of Iraq, and the PSC community. Further, DOD and the State Department signed a memorandum of agreement detailing coordination activities to be undertaken. Various laws hold PSC employees accountable for their actions in Iraq, including U.S. criminal laws that may be applied extraterritorially, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The applicability of these laws depends on the circumstances--e.g., the nature and location of the alleged crime and the nationality of the accused--of any specific incident. The legal framework for holding PSCs accountable also includes Iraqi and international law and contract provisions. |
gao_GAO-05-14 | gao_GAO-05-14_0 | HUD Has Strengthened Its Criteria for Placing Appraisers on Its Roster, but Has Limited Assurance that These Criteria Are Being Implemented
HUD issued guidance and regulations in order to help ensure that appraisers it approves to perform appraisals under its Single-Family Mortgage Insurance programs are qualified to be placed on the appraiser roster. Although HUD has strengthened its criteria for approving appraisers to perform appraisals, quality control over the approval process is limited. Before 1999, HUD relied largely on the states’ licensing processes to ensure that appraisers were qualified to perform appraisals. However, the states’ minimum licensing standards did not include proficiency in HUD appraisal requirements. According to HUD’s new guidance, in order to be eligible for placement on the roster, an appraiser must (1) pass an examination on HUD appraisal methods and reporting; (2) be state licensed or state certified, with credentials based on the minimum criteria issued by the Appraiser Qualifications Board of the Appraisal Foundation; and (3) not be listed on the General Services Administration’s Suspension and Debarment List, HUD’s Limited Denial of Participation List, or HUD’s Credit Alert Interactive Voice Response System. An appraiser whose licensing or certification in a state has been revoked, suspended, or surrendered as a result of a state disciplinary action is automatically removed from the roster. In 1999, we reported that HUD’s guidance called for random reviews of 10 percent of all appraisals. Because the HOCs do not maintain a permanent record of the data used to identify appraisers for review each quarter, we could not verify that the appraisers they placed on their target lists were actually those that met HUD’s criteria. However, the HOCs did not review every appraiser to the extent called for in the guidance. The HOCs performed, on average, about 5.6 desk reviews for each appraiser reviewed during fiscal year 2003 and the first half of 2004. We found that HUD staff do not routinely visit appraised properties to verify the work of the field review contractors. HUD reviews and quantifies appraisers’ work by using a Web-based tool, the Appraisal Review Process, a system that scores each appraiser on several appraisals, weighting the scores to capture violations that pose the greatest risk to FHA’s mortgage insurance fund. As figure 5 illustrates, for the 1,004 appraisers field reviewed by HUD in fiscal year 2003 and the first half of fiscal year 2004, 620 sanctions were imposed, with 180 appraisers having been removed from the appraiser roster. Conclusions
The importance of accurate appraisals to HUD’s Single-Family Mortgage Insurance programs underscores the need for effective appraiser oversight. Since our April 1999 report, HUD has taken a number of steps designed to ensure the qualifications of appraisers on its roster; improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its oversight, specifically by revising its guidance to focus on appraisers (rather than appraisals) and incorporating a risk-based monitoring approach; and facilitate enforcement actions by empowering HOCs and developing a scoring system to promote consistency. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce the financial risks assumed by HUD and to further enhance its oversight of appraisers participating in HUD’s Single-Family Mortgage Insurance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the Assistant Secretary for Housing-Federal Housing Commissioner to institute reasonable controls on the process of placing appraisers on the appraiser roster to ensure that applicants’ conformance to eligibility criteria is verified; consider a requirement to include, when targeting appraisers for review, those appraisers who have recently completed a sanction period in order to ensure that these appraisers have corrected their relevant deficiencies; maintain the historical information, particularly early loan default information, used to target appraisers for review in order to ensure that the HOCs target and review appraisers based on the criteria in HUD guidance; and implement a cost-effective field review contractor oversight process that includes on-site monitoring. With respect to HUD’s adoption of a new risk-based approach for monitoring appraisers, we reported that HUD’s process for monitoring appraisers is risk based and that HUD modified its approach to target for review appraisers who are associated with known risks to FHA’s mortgage insurance fund. In turn, this limits HUD’s ability to determine, over time, the effectiveness of its targeting criteria in reducing risk to the mortgage insurance fund. To examine HUD’s efforts to take enforcement actions against appraisers it identifies as not complying with its requirements, we reviewed HUD’s guidance regarding enforcement actions taken against poorly performing appraisers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Incomplete or inaccurate appraisals resulting in property overvaluations may expose the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Single-Family Mortgage Insurance programs--which insured about 3.7million single-family mortgage loans with a total value of about $425 billion in fiscal years 2001 through 2003--to greater financial risks. In 1999, GAO reported on the need for improvements in HUD's oversight of appraisers, which has historically been a challenge for the department. Also, in the past, GAO reported that, due in part to poor oversight of appraisers, HUD's Single-Family Mortgage Insurance programs remained a high-risk area. GAO conducted this review as a follow up to the 1999 report. This report examines (1) how HUD ensures that appraisers it approves are qualified to perform FHA appraisals, (2) the extent to which HUD employs a risk-based monitoring approach, and (3) HUD's efforts to take enforcement action against noncompliant appraisers.
What GAO Found
Through new guidance and regulation, HUD has strengthened its criteria for placing appraisers on its appraiser roster--which establishes their eligibility to participate in HUD programs. Before 1999, HUD relied largely on the states' licensing processes to ensure that appraisers were qualified, but the states' minimum licensing standards did not specifically include proficiency in HUD's appraisal requirements. HUD's 1999 guidance requires appraisers to, among other things, pass an examination on HUD appraisal methods and reporting. Further, a 2003 regulation provides for, among other things, removing from the roster appraisers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked. However, HUD has limited quality control over the approval process, limiting the department's assurance that its criteria are being effectively implemented. HUD has adopted an oversight approach that focuses on appraisers it believes pose risks to FHA's mortgage insurance fund, but certain weaknesses exist in its implementation. HUD's guidance calls for its homeownership centers (HOCs)--which are largely responsible for appraiser oversight--to develop quarterly targeting lists of appraisers for review based on certain criteria, or risk factors. The primary factor is the rate of defaults in certain loans associated with the appraiser; others include large numbers of appraisals as well as appraisals for loans made under one of HUD's programs known to be at higher risk of fraud and abuse. However, the HOCs do not maintain a permanent record of the data used to identify the targeted appraisers--even though HUD's automated system would enable them to--which limits HUD's ability to verify that those targeted were those that met the criteria and to determine the effectiveness of its targeting criteria in reducing risk to the mortgage insurance fund. GAO found that during fiscal year 2003 and the first half of fiscal year 2004 the HOCs generally reviewed the appraisers they identified as high risk and targeted for review. However, they reviewed fewer appraisals for each targeted appraiser than HUD's guidance prescribes: on average, about 5.6 appraisals instead of the 10 called for. GAO also found that HOC staff did not routinely visit appraised properties to verify the work of contractors whoconduct field reviews of selected appraisers. To facilitate enforcement actions against appraisers, HUD expanded the HOCs' authority to sanction appraisers and developed a new appraisal scoring system. According to HUD, the number of actions taken to remove appraisers from its roster has increased from 25 at a cost of over $10 million in 1998 to 132 at a cost of under $300,000 in 2003. HUD also developed a tool that scores each appraiser on several appraisals, weighting the scores to capture violations that pose the greatest risk to FHA's mortgage insurance fund. According to HUD, this tool allows the department to sanction appraisers more consistently. |
gao_NSIAD-97-188 | gao_NSIAD-97-188_0 | According to a THAAD project office representative, the teams’ results are to be used to revise the THAAD acquisition plan. Acquiring Significant Quantities of Hardware Before Key Performance Requirements Are Tested in an Operational Environment Increases Risk
BMDO’s current schedule calling for award of the low-rate initial production contract almost 2 years before the start of operational testing and evaluation increases the risk associated with the THAAD program. Figure 2 shows the most current approved THAAD schedule for operational testing and production of units for deployment. If the production line prove-out and ramp-up were delayed until after the completion of sufficient independent testing in an operational environment, initial quantities of unproven systems would be reduced and additional funding would become available to buy the proven systems at more efficient rates. A suitable longer range target does not exist. However, funding to develop and produce a longer range target for the system is not currently contained in DOD’s future years funding plan for fiscal years 1999 through 2003. Conclusions and Recommendations
The current THAAD program review and evaluation provides DOD with an opportunity to (1) reduce risk in the acquisition program and minimize the number of initial quantities of unproven systems by reexamining the schedules for operational testing and production and (2) ensure that realistic targets will be used for testing. Implementing our recommendation could also reduce the number of THAAD systems that may have to be modified based on the results of operational testing and evaluation thus allowing full-rate production of more THAAD systems with demonstrated performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program to determine whether: (1) planned testing would demonstrate operational effectiveness before a significant number of units are produced for deployment; and (2) missile target resources are adequate to support testing plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the current THAAD program review and evaluation provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with the opportunity to: (a) reduce risk and minimize the number of initial quantities of unproven system hardware by reexamining the schedule for operational testing and production; and (b) ensure that realistic targets will be used for testing; (2) the last approved THAAD acquisition plan calls for significant production of deployment hardware almost 2 years before beginning independent operational testing to assess the system's operational effectiveness; (3) the Army maintains that it needs to buy a number of THAAD systems during low-rate initial production to "ramp-up" to the full rate of production; (4) delaying production until after completing sufficient testing that provides assurance that key performance requirements can be met reduces the risk of buying unproven systems and facilitates production of proven systems at more efficient rates; (5) a suitable target for testing the THAAD system against longer range missiles does not exist, and funds have not been requested for target development and production; and (6) without a longer range test target to represent the more formidable, higher velocity missiles that THAAD could face, the system's operational effectiveness will remain in doubt and DOD will not have reasonable assurance that it could rely on THAAD in an actual conflict. |
gao_GAO-15-385 | gao_GAO-15-385_0 | We reported on the EFV program in 2006 and 2010. ACV Acquisition Approach Prioritizes Protected Land Mobility over Amphibious Capabilities
Since we reported on the ACV acquisition in 2014, the USMC has adopted a new ACV acquisition approach consisting of three concurrent efforts that emphasize the requirement for protected land mobility in the near term and seek improved amphibious capabilities over time. According to USMC officials, the first effort is the AAV Survivability Upgrade Program that plans to upgrade legacy AAV protection and mobility. The second effort subdivides into two increments, ACV 1.1 and 1.2. The AAV Survivability Upgrade Program plans to upgrade 392 of the fleet’s 1058 AAVs. ACV Acquisition Emphasizes Protected Land Mobility in the Near Term and Improved Amphibious Capabilities in the Second Iteration
The first increment of ACV development—ACV 1.1—is a wheeled vehicle that is intended to provide enhanced protected land mobility and limited amphibious capability. ACV 1.1 is a continuation of the previously suspended Marine Personnel Carrier program.speed of five knots, ACV 1.1 intends to offer swim speeds comparable to the AAV and is expected to swim from shore to shore, crossing obstacles such as rivers, rather than from ship to shore. According to program officials, the ACV acquisition will be informed by both a 2008 analysis of alternatives done for the Marine Personnel Carrier program as well as the 2012 ACV analysis of alternatives. Technology Exploration Is Underway for High Water Speed Capability for Use in a Possible ACV 2.0
The third effort, referred to as ACV 2.0, focuses on technology exploration to attain high water speed capability. According to DOD officials, the results of this high water speed research, knowledge gained from fielding the ACV 1.1 and 1.2, and information from the naval surface connector strategy are expected to inform the development of a replacement for the AAV fleet. Upcoming Activities Will Permit Further Analysis to Determine Use of Best Practices
Our prior work on best practices has found that successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their production processes are in control.the right knowledge at the right time, enabling leadership to make informed decisions about when and how best to move into various acquisition phases. The ACV 1.1 acquisition has yet to reach the first knowledge point, limiting our ability to determine how fully the acquisition will adopt the best practices knowledge-based framework. However, our review of the planned acquisition approach for ACV 1.1 has identified both the use of— and a deviation from—best practices. The ACV acquisition’s incremental approach to development is consistent with best practices. The adoption of an incremental approach has helped the program progress towards striking the balance between customer needs and resources (e.g., technologies, cost and schedule) that is sought at Knowledge Point 1. The ACV acquisition’s pursuit of high water speed capabilities via technology exploration is also aligned with best practices. In previous reports, we have found that DOD should separate technology development from product development, and fully develop technologies before introducing them into the design of a system. The ACV 1.1 acquisition is planning to hold its preliminary design review 90 days after the Milestone B decision. According to DOD officials, the review will be held after Milestone B because no contracts will have been awarded prior to that time. In addition, they stated that the use of non-developmental technology will reduce acquisition risks and result in a high level of knowledge prior to the Milestone B decision. We have identified a number of best practices for the development of analyses of alternatives. Other documents completed recently include an acquisition strategy, results of a system requirements review, and the finalized document providing key acquisition requirements. These documents will permit us to conduct a more robust analysis and assessment of the ACV acquisition’s use of best practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts on this program are aligned with our best practices and it will continue to monitor the program and ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. Given that we have not been able to conduct a robust analysis of key documents, including the analysis of alternatives, we cannot yet assess how well the program is aligned with best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to review and report annually to the congressional defense committees on the ACV program until 2018. In April 2014 GAO produced the first of the mandated reports describing the status of the Marine Corps' efforts to initiate an ACV program. This second mandated report discusses (1) the current ACV acquisition approach and (2) how the ACV acquisition approach compares to acquisition management best practices.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed program documentation and other materials for the ACV acquisition, including Acquisition Decision Memorandums, relevant analyses of alternatives, and a briefing on the most recent analysis of alternatives update. GAO also reviewed documentation and budget information for the AAV Survivability Upgrade Program and the Marine Personnel Carrier program. GAO identified acquisition best practices based on its prior body of work in that area and DOD guidance. GAO also interviewed program and agency officials.
What GAO Found
Since GAO reported on the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) acquisition in 2014, the Marine Corps has adopted a new ACV acquisition approach consisting of three concurrent efforts that emphasize the requirement for improved protection from threats such as improvised explosive devices in the near term with improved amphibious capabilities over time. The first of the three efforts, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Survivability Upgrade Program, plans to upgrade legacy AAV protection and mobility. The second effort subdivides into two increments, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2. ACV 1.1 is a continuation of a previously suspended Marine Personnel Carrier program that intends to provide enhanced protected land mobility and limited amphibious capability. Testing on the ACV 1.1 will inform the development of the ACV 1.2, with the intent that the ACV 1.2 will demonstrate improved amphibious capability and at a minimum, achieve parity with the legacy AAV. The third effort, referred to as ACV 2.0, focuses on technology exploration to attain high water speed capability. Results of this high water speed research are intended to further inform the development of a replacement for the AAV fleet.
GAO's analysis of the ACV 1.1 planned acquisition approach has demonstrated the Marine Corps’ use of, and deviation from, best practices; however, ACV 1.1 is still in the initial stages of the acquisition process, limiting our ability to determine how fully this approach will adopt a best practices knowledge-based framework. GAO’s prior work on best practices has found that successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their production processes are in control. The knowledge-based acquisition framework involves achieving the right knowledge at the right time, enabling leadership to make informed decisions about when and how best to move into various acquisition phases. Specifically, the Marine Corps' incremental approach for the ACV acquisition is consistent with best practices and can increase the likelihood of success. The adoption of an incremental approach has helped the program progress towards achieving the balance—that is sought in accordance with best practices—between customer needs and resources (e.g., technologies, cost, and schedule). In addition, the ACV acquisition’s pursuit of high water speed capabilities via technology exploration is also aligned with best practices. In previous reports, GAO has found that DOD should separate technology development from product development, and fully develop technologies before introducing them into the design of a system. In contrast, the program plans to hold the ACV 1.1 preliminary design review after Milestone B—the decision point allowing entry into system development—which is a deviation from best practices that can increase technical risk. According to DOD officials, this approach was selected because no contracts will have been awarded prior to Milestone B and the use of non-developmental technology will reduce acquisition risks and result in a high level of knowledge prior to the Milestone B decision. The recent completion of key documents—including an updated analysis of alternatives—will permit a more robust analysis and assessment of the ACV program’s use of additional acquisition best practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts on this program are aligned with GAO's best practices and it will continue to monitor the program and ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. In GAO's upcoming review, additional analysis will assess how well the program is aligned with best practices. |
gao_GAO-01-146 | gao_GAO-01-146_0 | Immigration services, which involve regulating permanent and temporary immigration to the United States, include granting legal permanent residence status, nonimmigrant status (e.g., tourists and students), and naturalization. In particular, the Clinger-Cohen Act requires that the head of each agency implement a process for maximizing the value of the agency's IT investments and for assessing and managing the risks of its acquisitions. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) INS is effectively managing its IT investments and (2) the Department of Justice is effectively promoting, guiding, and overseeing INS' investment management activities. These comments are presented in chapter 5 and are reprinted in appendix I.
INS Lacks Foundation Capabilities Upon Which to Build IT Investment Management Maturity
The primary purpose of ITIM stage two maturity is to attain repeatable, successful IT project-level investment control processes and basic selection processes. INS Is Not Managing Its IT Investments as a Complete Portfolio
An IT investment portfolio is a collection of investments that are assessed and managed based on common criteria. Further, it disagreed with our finding that Justice is not guiding and directing INS' investment management approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) invests hundreds of millions of dollars each year in information technology (IT) to help (1) prevent aliens from entering the United States illegally and remove aliens who succeed in doing so and (2) provide services or benefits to facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization to legal immigrants. The Clinger-Cohen Act requires agency heads to implement a process for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of its IT investments. GAO examined leading private and public sector IT management practices to determine whether INS is effectively managing its IT investments and whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) is effectively promoting, guiding, and overseeing INS' investment management activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that INS lacks the basic capabilities upon which to build IT investment management maturity. Furthermore, INS is not managing IT investments as a complete portfolio. By managing its IT investments as individual projects, INS will not be able to determine which investments contribute most to the agency mission. GAO also found that DOJ is not guiding and overseeing INS' investment management approach. |
gao_RCED-99-6 | gao_RCED-99-6_0 | 1.1.) How Much Is the Project Likely to Cost? To what extent are projected costs for the Deepwater Project consistent with the Coast Guard’s overall budget for its capital projects? We analyzed the Coast Guard’s documents depicting this need, such as the Deepwater Mission Analysis Report and the Mission Needs Statement, and compared the information that these documents presented with other Coast Guard data, such as engineering studies on the condition of Coast Guard ships and aircraft, planned upgrades for extending the service life of ships and aircraft, and records of actual usage. The Coast Guard’s Formal Justification Did Not Accurately or Fully Depict Modernization or Replacement Needs
When it initially proposed the Deepwater Project in 1995, the Coast Guard indicated that most classes of deepwater ships and aircraft would begin reaching the end of their service life within the next 2 to 9 years and would largely need to be phased out by 2010. Delays in providing updated information to the contractor teams could adversely affect the quality of the proposals submitted, in that, the teams could be disadvantaged in developing the most effective economical proposals for the Deepwater Project. Because these ships and aircraft were acquired over a period of years, the DMAR indicated that the oldest of these would need replacement or modernization generally starting from 1998 through 2003. 2.2.) If the Coast Guard ensures that the contractors that are developing the initial deepwater proposals have current, complete information on the condition and capabilities of the agency’s ships and aircraft, potential problems in this area could be minimized and the project could proceed as planned. At this size, the budget would take virtually all of the Coast Guard’s projected spending for its capital projects, thus leaving little room for ongoing and future projects that amount to at least $300 million a year. Absent such fees, the money would most likely need to come from additional appropriations. 3.1.) The Coast Guard currently provides these services but does not charge for them. In July 1998, in their deliberations on the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 1999 budget request, the Subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations with jurisdiction over the Coast Guard’s budget cited their opposition to the new user fees proposed by the administration, and in addition, the House and Senate have prohibited the Coast Guard from planning or implementing any new user fees. Reassessing the Acquisition and Funding Plan for the Deepwater Project Could Reduce the Risk of Cost Increases Later
Now that the Coast Guard knows that many of its deepwater ships and aircraft will have a longer useful life than originally thought, it may be in a position to reassess whether the funding strategy for the Deepwater Project should be changed. The agency’s “system of systems” approach seems logical as a way to avoid a costly one-for-one replacement of assets, and its use of multiple contractors is an attempt to leverage technology and to identify cost-effective alternatives. Contractors have just begun work on developing their proposals for the Deepwater Project. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which the Coast Guard has: (1) accurately depicted the need to replace or modernize its deepwater ships and aircraft; and (2) aligned the estimated cost of its Deepwater Project with its overall budget for capital projects.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although the Coast Guard is correct in starting now to explore how best to modernize or replace its deepwater ships and aircraft, the Deepwater Project's only formal justification developed to date does not accurately or fully depict the need for replacement or modernization; (2) this justification concluded that most deepwater ships and aircraft would need to be phased out starting in the next 2 to 9 years; (3) however, subsequent analyses by the Coast Guard and others have shown that deepwater aircraft likely have a much longer life; (4) the justification asserted that these ships and aircraft were incapable of performing future missions or meeting future demand, but GAO was unable to validate these assertions from the information available; (5) the Coast Guard withdrew the justification on the basis of concerns expressed by the Office of Management and Budget and is now developing more accurate and updated information; (6) several of these studies are still under way, even as contracting teams have already begun work on developing their initial deepwater proposals; (7) any delays in communicating this updated information to the contractors could adversely affect the quality of the proposals submitted; (8) while the Coast Guard's acquisition approach seems an appropriate way to avoid a costly one-for-one replacement of ships and aircraft, the agency could face major financial obstacles in proceeding with a Deepwater Project costing as much as initially proposed for planning purposes; (9) at a projected $500 million a year, expenditures for the project would take virtually all of the Coast Guard's projected spending for all capital projects, which currently include the construction of new buoy tenders and motorized lifeboats; (10) the Coast Guard expects more than $165 million of the annual funding to come from new user fees for domestic ice-breaking and navigational services that the Coast Guard currently provides; (11) however, the congressional subcommittees with jurisdiction over the Coast Guard's budget have expressed opposition to such fees, and the House and Senate have prohibited the Coast Guard from planning or implementing any new user fees; (12) if hoped-for funding does not occur, the Coast Guard may be left having either to reduce the scope of the project or to stretch out the procurement period; and (13) many other government procurement projects have demonstrated that when agencies attempt to address a problem by stretching out the procurement period, administrative and other costs increase, resulting in lower value for the amount of money spent. |
gao_GAO-03-3 | gao_GAO-03-3_0 | The act charges the Postal Service with binding the nation together through the personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people and providing reliable and efficient mail services to all areas of the country. The Postal Service is now facing a financial crisis brought about by declining revenues and growing operating expenses and capital needs, including the cost of existing and new investments in information technology (IT). This approach enables the organization to consider the relative cost, benefit, and risk of newly proposed investments along with those previously funded and to identify the optimal mix of IT investments to meet its mission, strategies, and goals. However, many key practices still need to be executed before the Postal Service can effectively manage its IT investments from a portfolio perspective. However, it does not regularly capture lessons learned from post-implementation reviews, the performance of its portfolio, or benchmarking in order to improve its investment processes. Until it implements stage four and five critical processes, the Postal Service will not be positioned to effectively improve its IT investment management processes and successfully leverage IT to improve business outcomes. While there have been some efforts to identify best practices from best-in-class organizations and incorporate these practices into the Postal Service’s IT investment management processes (such as the CTO organization’s use of lessons learned in benchmarking to develop the BCS), the Postal Service has not defined policies and procedures for improving the IT investment management process using benchmarking. The Postal Service has in place most of the foundational practices required to ensure that IT investments are being selected and monitored to support its overall objectives. The Postal Service shows mixed progress in managing its IT investments as a portfolio. At a minimum, the plan should specify an approach to develop comprehensive guidance that defines and describes the complete investment management process, unifies existing processes enterprisewide, and reflects changes in processes as they occur; develop additional process guidance, as needed, to completely define the operations and decision-making processes of investment boards and other management entities involved in managing IT investments; ensure that cost, benefit, schedule, and risk expectations are set and approved in the original business case for each investment; that accurate and complete actual cost, benefit, schedule, and risk data are tracked against these expectations; and that status information on these four criteria is periodically reported to executive-level investment boards; and establish a structured, transparent, and documented portfolio selection process that assesses, prioritizes, selects, and funds investments according to established portfolio selection criteria, including explicit cost, benefit, schedule, and risk criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service invests hundreds of millions of dollars in information technology (IT) each year to support its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and efficient mail service to all areas of the country. It must support these operations through the revenues it earns for its services. Growing operating expenses and capital needs in the face of reduced revenues highlight the need for the Postal Service to invest its IT dollars wisely. Accordingly, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services asked GAO to evaluate how well the Postal Service manages its IT investments.
What GAO Found
The Postal Service has in place many of the foundational capabilities required for managing IT investments described in GAO's IT Investment Management framework, illustrated below. Proposed major projects go through established review processes and must be approved at a high level before being implemented. Control processes also are in place. Although the Postal Service evaluates proposed IT projects before investing in them, it does not fully manage these investments from a portfolio perspective by assessing projects on the basis of indicators that clearly link performance to initial selection criteria. Such a portfolio approach would enable the Postal Service to consider proposed projects along with those that have already been funded and to select the mix of investments that best meets its mission needs. The Postal Service has not yet attained the key attributes associated with most capable organizations, such as evaluating the performance of investments as a whole, capturing "lessons learned," and institutionalizing these lessons to benefit the organization. Until it addresses areas such as these, the Postal Service will not be in a position to continually improve its investment process and leverage its IT capabilities for strategic outcomes. |
gao_GAO-04-115 | gao_GAO-04-115_0 | Background
DOD’s IT budget submission for fiscal year 2004 totaled about $28 billion. The IT-1 spreadsheet is submitted to the Congress. These inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and omissions are attributable in part to insufficient management attention to the reliability of the reports as well as ambiguities in DOD’s Financial Management Regulation (FMR) and a lack of supporting systems and control processes for ensuring consistency between reports. Without sufficient information, decision makers could approve or deny funding for programs that might otherwise have been treated differently. DOD’s Exhibit 300s Are Not Consistent with Its IT-1 Budget Spreadsheet
Information in DOD’s Exhibit 300 Capital Investment Reports, reported for its major IT initiatives as part of the fiscal year 2004 budget submission, is not consistent with funding information in DOD’s fiscal year 2004 IT budget summary, which DOD submits to the Congress in the form of the IT-1 spreadsheet and to OMB in the form of the Exhibit 53. DOD’s fiscal year 2004 IT budget submission does not consistently use the same appropriations accounts to fund the same types of activities. That is, defense components used two different appropriations—the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and O&M—to fund the same types of activities (the cost of civilian personnel and other costs for performing or managing development/modernization activities). At a minimum, we recommend that revisions to policies, procedures, and supporting systems ensure that Exhibit 300s and IT-1 spreadsheets are consistent in terms of (1) the major initiatives that are included in each report (unless otherwise explained) and (2) the funding reported for each of these initiatives; Exhibit 300s are complete, accurate, and internally consistent, in that (1) funding information is provided for each life cycle phase for each initiative; (2) total amounts reported for each initiative equal the sum of the individual line items for the initiative; and (3) the format used to display the funding information clearly shows the total funding amount for each initiative; amounts are properly categorized as development/modernization or current services in the IT budget submission, so that OMB and congressional decision makers are provided with accurate information on the funding required to (1) develop new systems or significantly improve existing systems and (2) operate and maintain existing systems; budget submissions are consistent in the costs that are funded with the RDT&E appropriation and those that are funded with the O&M appropriation; and budget submissions fully account for all relevant costs, including military personnel costs and indirect costs, to the extent that these costs can be identified and properly allocated to each initiative, so that OMB and congressional decision makers are provided with complete budget information for each initiative. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the fiscal year 2004 information technology (IT) budget submission for the Department of Defense (DOD) was reliable, including identifying opportunities to improve its reliability in the future. To identify inconsistencies between the reports, we assessed the Exhibit 300 Capital Investment Reports and the IT-1 budget summary spreadsheet. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends more on information technology (IT) annually than any other department or agency, accounting for about half of the $59 billion governmentwide IT budget in fiscal year 2004. It is thus important that consistent, accurate, and complete DOD IT budget information is available to the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) so that they can make informed decisions among competing demands for funds. Accordingly, GAO reviewed the department's fiscal year 2004 IT budget submission to determine whether it was reliable, including identifying opportunities for future improvement.
What GAO Found
DOD's IT budget submission for fiscal year 2004 contains material inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or omissions that limit its reliability. Two primary parts of the submission--the IT budget summary report and the detailed Capital Investment Reports on each IT initiative--are inconsistent. In particular, 15 initiatives that appear in the budget summary do not appear in the Capital Investment Reports, and discrepancies exist between the two types of reports in the amounts requested for 73 major initiatives. These discrepancies total about $1.6 billion. Major initiatives do not consistently use the same type of appropriations to fund the same activities. That is, to fund the same types of activities, some DOD organizations used the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation appropriations and others used the Operation and Maintenance appropriations. The IT budget summary does not include all the costs of the IT initiatives, which is contrary to federal guidance. For example, the IT budget reports do not always include the costs of military personnel working on the initiatives. These problems are largely attributable to insufficient management attention and limitations in departmental policies and procedures, such as guidance in DOD's Financial Management Regulation, and to shortcomings in systems that support budget-related activities. The result is that OMB and the Congress are constrained in their ability to make informed IT funding decisions and conduct effective oversight and control, which could cause decision makers to approve or deny funding for programs that they might otherwise have treated differently, as well as increasing the chances of funds in an appropriation not being sufficient to cover obligations. |
gao_GAO-14-308 | gao_GAO-14-308_0 | The five projects selected for our study included one project from each project type, with the applicable controls depending in part on the type of project. SSA agreed with the Inspectors General’s recommendations and has taken steps to address the weaknesses. Selected IT Projects Did Not Fully Adhere to SSA’s Investment Management Controls or Demonstrate Improved Services
The five IT projects that we reviewed did not fully implement project management controls consistent with SSA guidance and industry practices. Most of the control documents developed had limitations, such as a lack of traceability (which is needed to trace and track the history of projects and demonstrate that the projects met requirements) and inaccurate or incomplete information. The limitations could be attributed, in part, to the use of oversight systems that did not include all needed data or have the capability to fully support traceability and a quality assurance function that was limited in scope and, thus, inadequate to assess control documents effectively. Further, while SSA indicated that its projects have resulted in improvements to services, it was unable to demonstrate how the selected projects had contributed such improvements. Specifically, while project team members produced documentation that identified certain risks to the project, the documentation did not include mitigation plans, which are essential for avoiding, reducing, and controlling the probability of the occurrence of identified risks. SSA has stated that its projects have contributed to improved services. In addition, the project did not establish a performance baseline against which to measure improvements. SSA’s IT Human Capital Program Has Identified Skills and Competencies to Support Certain Needs, but Lacks Adequate Planning for the Future
Key to an agency’s success in modernizing its IT systems is sustaining a workforce with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute a range of management functions that support the agency’s mission and goals. Specifically, while the five projects developed most of the project documentation needed to show adherence to management controls, the majority had limitations. Given the hundreds of IT projects SSA manages each year, ensuring that management controls are consistently and effectively implemented is critical to the efficient use of agency resources. In particular, the agency has not identified IT-specific human capital needs to support its future goals and it does not have a current IT succession plan for replacing experienced staff. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address SSA’s project management and human capital deficiencies for its IT modernization efforts, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security direct the Deputy Commissioner for Systems/Chief Information Officer to take the following three actions:
Perform effective oversight to ensure that key management control documents for ongoing and future projects are developed, complete, accurate, and readily accessible in oversight systems to better support management, traceability, and project analysis of IT investments. Identify future IT needs, including skills needed to support long-term goals and priorities, in the agency’s updated human capital operating plan and associated analysis. For example, the agency stated that it will continue to improve its governance process by requiring both process and product reviews of selected IT projects, improve its work to identify performance measures, and include a comprehensive assessment of IT human capital needs in its updated IT Human Capital Plan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess selected information technology (IT) investments to determine the extent to which they adhere to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) investment management controls and are improving services; and (2) determine how SSA’s IT human capital program, including the identification and implementation of critical skills and competencies, is supporting its current and future modernization efforts. We also analyzed SSA policies and guidance to determine key documents associated with the agency’s IT project management directive and quality assurance processes to identify the types of management control documents, such as project proposals, cost-benefit analyses, and project schedules, that SSA relies on for managing its investments. The best practices and standards call for control documentation to, among other things, be traceable, accurate, consistent, and effectively implemented. To address the second objective, we obtained and analyzed SSA human capital plans and data, including its Information Resources Management (IRM) Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2012 through 2016 and the most recent updated plan for fiscal years 2014 through 2017, 2-year IT skills inventory gap reports, IT staffing data for fiscal years 2008-2014, agency- wide succession plan, and its agency-wide human capital plan. SSA developed all 11 documents; however, 6 had limitations. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA relies on IT for delivering Social Security services to virtually every American. The agency reportedly spent about $1.5 billion for IT in fiscal year 2013, and it plans to continue modernizing its aging systems. Management controls and human capital are critical in helping ensure effective and efficient IT project implementation.
GAO was asked to examine SSA's IT modernization efforts. The study (1) assessed selected IT investments to determine the extent to which they adhere to SSA's investment management controls and are improving services and (2) determined how SSA's IT human capital program, including the identification and implementation of critical skills and competencies, is supporting its current and future modernization efforts. To do so, GAO reviewed key management controls for one project from each of five SSA-defined project types, including one project with the highest resources for its type and four randomly selected projects; compared human capital planning documents with relevant guidance; and interviewed relevant SSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration’s (SSA) selected information technology (IT) projects did not fully adhere to management controls called for by its IT project management guidance, which are essential to effectively oversee and monitor IT investments. Such controls include, among others, a cost-benefit analysis, risk mitigation plan, and project schedule. For the five projects selected, SSA developed the majority of the documents required to demonstrate adherence to management controls; however, most had limitations. One project that was required to complete 11 control documents had developed 5 without limitations, but the remaining 6 had limitations. For example, while certain risks to the project were identified, the documentation did not include risk mitigation plans, which are essential for avoiding, reducing, and controlling the probability of the occurrence of identified risks. Across the five projects, the most common limitations included a lack of traceability (which is needed to track project history and demonstrate that requirements are met) and inaccurate or incomplete information, such as project schedules that had inaccuracies in key milestone dates. The limitations could be attributed to, among other things, IT oversight systems that did not include all needed data or fully support traceability, and a quality assurance process that was not effectively implemented. The agency recently took steps that should help improve its quality assurance process.
Further, while SSA stated that its projects have resulted in improved services, it was not able to demonstrate this. In particular, while three of the five projects identified performance measures, these measures generally were not specific enough to determine projects’ contributions to improved services, and baselines against which to measure improvement were not established. Ensuring that management controls are consistently and effectively implemented would help ensure the efficient use of agency resources.
SSA’s IT human capital program has identified skills and competencies to support certain workforce needs, but lacks adequate planning for the future. The agency has developed IT human capital planning documents, such as its recent Information Resources Management plan and skills inventory gap reports, which identified near-term needs, such as skill sets for the following 2 years. Nevertheless, SSA has not adequately planned for longer-term needs because its human capital planning and analysis are not aligned with long-term goals and objectives and the agency does not have a current succession plan for its IT efforts. The agency has recognized challenges with regard to employee retirements and a recent hiring freeze, which have put constraints on resources for certain investments. While SSA officials stated that an updated human capital operating plan will be completed in June 2014, they could not specify how it would address future IT human capital needs. Until these needs are identified, SSA may lack critical plans for addressing IT resources and skills to support agency-wide IT investment goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that SSA (1) perform effective oversight to ensure control documents are developed, complete, and accurate and that oversight systems include needed data and support traceability; (2) ensure project control documents identify specific performance measures and baselines; and (3) identify long-term IT needs in its updated human capital operating plan. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-386T | gao_GAO-17-386T_0 | Background
Under the Medicaid program’s federal-state partnership, CMS is responsible for overseeing the program, while state Medicaid agencies are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the program. Specifically, our work has identified four key program integrity issues for the Medicaid program—enrollment verification, managed care, provider screening, and coordination between Medicaid and the exchanges—along with CMS’s progress in addressing them, and additional necessary actions. For example, in response to PPACA, CMS established a more rigorous approach to verifying financial and nonfinancial information needed to determine Medicaid beneficiary eligibility. Despite CMS’s efforts, there continue to be gaps in the agency’s efforts to ensure that only eligible individuals are enrolled into Medicaid. In another study, we found that CMS also had gaps in ensuring that Medicaid expenditures for enrollees—including enrollees eligible as a result of the PPACA expansion—are matched appropriately by the federal government. Oversight of beneficiary eligibility is important to program integrity. Improving Oversight of Managed Care
CMS has taken steps to provide states with additional guidance on their oversight of Medicaid managed care organizations. Oversight of Medicaid managed care is increasing in importance as states’ use of managed care plans to deliver services has been growing. The estimated improper payment rate for managed care is currently less than one percent; however, this estimate is based on a review of the payments made to managed care organizations and does not review any underlying medical documentation. In particular, we and the HHS Office of Inspector General have identified incomplete and untimely managed care encounter data. Encounter data are data that managed care organizations are expected to report to state Medicaid programs, allowing states to track the services received by beneficiaries enrolled in managed care. PPACA included multiple provisions aimed at strengthening the screening of providers who enroll to participate in Medicaid. While the act requires that all providers and suppliers be subject to licensure checks, it gave CMS discretion to establish a risk-based application of other screening procedures. This requirement may address some of the potentially fraudulent or improper payments. Additionally, CMS regulations now require that the state Medicaid agency enroll all Medicaid managed care providers, which has the potential to improve oversight of providers in managed care. Our work, which was based on 2 states and 16 health plans, found that these states and health plans used information that was fragmented across 22 databases managed by 15 different federal agencies to screen providers—and that these databases did not always have unique identifiers. Minimizing Duplicate Coverage between Medicaid and the Exchanges
Regarding coordination between Medicaid and the exchanges, CMS implemented policies and procedures to ensure that individuals do not have duplicate coverage (enrolled in Medicaid and in subsidized exchange coverage). In response, CMS has conducted three checks to identify individuals with duplicate coverage. CMS has also reported that the agency intends to complete these checks at least two times per coverage year, which has the potential to save federal—as well as beneficiary—dollars. CMS has not developed a plan for assessing whether the checks and other procedures are sufficient to prevent and detect duplicate coverage. We are continuing to monitor CMS’s efforts in this area, particularly whether CMS develops a plan, including thresholds for the level of duplicate coverage it deems acceptable, to routinely monitor the effectiveness of the checks and other planned procedures to prevent and detect duplicate coverage. In closing, Medicaid represents significant expenditures for the federal government and states, and is the source of health care for tens of millions of Americans. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: CMS Should Act to Strengthen Enrollment Controls and Manage Fraud Risk. Appendix II: Selected Recommendations Related to Medicaid Program Integrity
The following table lists selected recommendations GAO has made to the Department of Health and Human Services regarding Medicaid program integrity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a joint federal-state health care program, is a significant component of federal and state budgets, with estimated outlays of $576 billion in fiscal year 2016. The program's size and diversity make it particularly vulnerable to improper payments. In fiscal year 2016, improper payments were an estimated 10.5 percent ($36 billion) of federal Medicaid expenditures, an increase from an estimated 9.8 percent ($29 billion) in fiscal year 2015.
States, which are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Medicaid program, are the first line of defense against improper payments. Specifically, states must implement federal requirements to ensure the qualifications of the providers who bill the program, detect improper payments, recover overpayments, and refer suspected cases of fraud and abuse to law enforcement authorities. At the federal level, CMS is responsible for supporting and overseeing states' Medicaid program integrity activities.
This testimony highlights key program integrity issues in Medicaid, the progress CMS has made improving its oversight of program integrity, and the related challenges the agency and states continue to face. This testimony is based on 10 products and 11 recommendations. Of these 11 recommendations, 3 have been implemented based on agency action.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has identified four Medicaid program integrity issues—where the program is vulnerable to improper payments such as those made for services that were not covered, were not medically necessary, or were not provided—as well as actions taken by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to address the issues and additional actions that should be taken.
Enrollment Verification: In response to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), CMS established a more rigorous approach for verifying financial and nonfinancial information needed to determine Medicaid beneficiary eligibility. Despite CMS's efforts, however, there continue to be gaps in efforts to ensure that only eligible individuals are enrolled into Medicaid, and that Medicaid expenditures for enrollees—particularly those eligible as a result of the PPACA expansion—are matched appropriately by the federal government.
Oversight of Medicaid Managed Care: CMS has provided states with additional guidance on their oversight of Medicaid managed care. Oversight of managed care is increasing in importance and improvements in measuring the improper payment rate are needed. For example, the estimated improper payment rate for managed care is based on a review of payments made to managed care organizations, and does not review any underlying medical documentation. GAO and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General have identified incomplete and untimely managed care encounter data—data that managed care organizations are expected to report to state Medicaid programs, allowing states to track the services received by beneficiaries enrolled in managed care.
Provider Eligibility: PPACA included multiple provisions aimed at strengthening the screening of providers who enroll to participate in Medicaid. While the act requires that all providers and suppliers be subject to licensure checks, it gave CMS discretion to establish a risk-based application of other screening procedures, such as fingerprint-based criminal-background checks for high-risk providers. Also, CMS regulations now require that all Medicaid managed care providers enroll with the state Medicaid agency, which has the potential to improve oversight of providers in managed care. However, GAO's work based on 2 states and 16 health plans identified challenges screening providers for eligibility, partially due to fragmented information.
Coordination between Medicaid and the Exchange: CMS implemented a number of policies and procedures to ensure that individuals do not have duplicate coverage (enrolled in both Medicaid and in subsidized coverage through an exchange, which is a marketplace where eligible individuals may compare and purchase private health insurance). CMS has conducted checks to identify individuals with duplicate coverage, and plans to complete these checks at least two times per coverage year, which has the potential to save federal—as well as beneficiary—dollars. However, CMS has not developed a plan for assessing whether the checks and other procedures—such as thresholds for the level of duplicate coverage deemed acceptable—are sufficient to prevent and detect duplicate coverage. |
gao_GAO-05-419T | gao_GAO-05-419T_0 | Background
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD has launched three major military operations requiring significant military personnel: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military operations related to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Iraq. Many congressional and military observers have expressed concern that the current operations tempo, combined with the level of casualties in Iraq, might lead to lower recruiting and retention rates, thereby raising questions about DOD’s ability to sustain long-term force requirements. In addition, there are growing concerns that a number of stress factors, such as back-to-back and/or lengthy overseas deployments and heavier reliance on the reserve components in the Army and Marine Corps, may significantly hinder DOD’s overall ability to effectively recruit and retain forces. Military Components Generally Met Overall Recruiting and Retention Goals for the Past 5 Fiscal Years (2000-2004), but Some Components Have Missed Early 2005 Goals
The military components generally met their overall recruiting and retention goals over the past 5 fiscal years. However, some are beginning to experience difficulties in meeting their overall recruiting and retention goals for fiscal year 2005. However, it should be noted that the “stop loss” policy implemented by several components shortly after September 11, 2001, might have facilitated these components in meeting their overall recruiting goals for fiscal year 2002 and beyond. A “stop loss” policy requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation or retirement date. The Marine Corps missed its January goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 2.6 percent, and narrowly missed its goal again in February. This is significant, given that the Army has also called members of the Individual Ready Reserve into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its delayed entry program into basic training ahead of schedule. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 87 and 80 percent of their overall recruiting goals, respectively. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly challenged, since more active Army soldiers are staying in the active force, and of those leaving, fewer are joining the reserve components. Most Overall Retention Goals Met for Past 5 Years
According to DOD data, the four active components generally met their enlisted aggregate retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004. Table 3 shows that the Army is the only active component that met all of its retention goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. The Air Force also missed two of its reenlistment goals for active duty enlisted personnel in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005. Aggregate Recruitment and Retention Data Do Not Identify Over- or Under-staffing within Certain Military Occupations
Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not provide a complete representation of occupations that are either over- or under-filled. We requested the active, reserve, and Guard components provide us with their list of hard-to-fill occupations. On the basis of data for 7 of 10 components, we identified several hundred occupations that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill because the components had not been able to successfully recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel in these areas to meet current or projected needs. Of these, we identified 73 occupations as being consistently hard to fill. Further analysis of the data shows that 7 of the Army’s occupations (infantry, fire support specialist, cavalry scout, chemical operations specialist, motor transport operator, petroleum supply specialist, and food service specialist) and 6 of the Air Force’s occupations (airborne linguist; combat control; imagery analysis; linguist; SERE [survival, evasion, resistance, escape operations]; pararescue, and explosive ordnance disposal) are on both the services’ “hard to recruit” and “hard to retain” lists. DOD, for example, expanded the pool of servicemembers who are eligible to receive a selective reenlistment bonus. The Army, for instance, increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hard-to-fill military occupations up to $20,000. The Army increased the maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000, while the Army National Guard doubled the amount it will provide to repay a recruit’s student loan to $20,000. The Army plans to add 965 recruiters to its recruiter force in fiscal year 2005, for a total force of 6,030 recruiters, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 recruiters to its recruiter force by fiscal year 2007, bringing its total recruiter force to 3,025 recruiters. | Why GAO Did This Study
To meet its human capital needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) must convince several hundred thousand people to join the military each year while, at the same time, retain thousands of personnel to sustain its active duty, reserve, and National Guard forces. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has launched three major military operations requiring significant military personnel--Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The high pace of military operations combined with the level of casualties in Iraq and other factors, such as lengthy overseas deployments, have raised concerns about DOD's ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel who possess the skills and experience needed. This testimony presents GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the extent to which the active duty, reserve, and Guard components have met their overall recruiting and retention goals, (2) the degree to which the components have met their recruiting and retention goals for selected hard-to-fill critical occupations, and (3) steps the components have taken to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. This testimony focuses on enlisted personnel. In continuing its work, GAO will assess the reliability of DOD-provided data and plans to issue a report on these issues this fall.
What GAO Found
DOD's 10 military components generally met their overall recruitment and retention goals for each of the past 5 fiscal years (FY), but some of the components experienced difficulties in meeting their overall goals in early FY 2005. However, it should be noted that several components introduced a "stop loss" policy shortly after September 11, 2001. The "stop loss" policy requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation date, which may reduce the number of personnel the components must recruit. During FY 2000-2004, each of the active components met or exceeded their overall recruiting goals. However, for January 2005, the Marine Corps missed its overall active duty recruiting goal by 84 recruits and narrowly missed its goal again for February 2005. The Army also missed its overall recruiting goal for February 2005 by almost 2,000 recruits. This is significant, given that the Army has also already called up members from the Individual Ready Reserve and moved new recruits from its delayed entry program into basic training earlier than scheduled. Four of the six reserve components mostly met their overall recruiting goals for FYs 2000 through 2004, but many experienced difficulties in early FY 2005. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly challenged, since fewer active Army soldiers leaving active duty are joining the reserves. In terms of retention, the active components generally met their overall retention goals for the past 5 FYs. The Army, for example, met or exceeded overall retention goals from FY 2000 through FY 2004. The Army and the Air Force, however, missed retention goals in the first quarter of FY 2005. Overall recruitment and retention data do not provide a complete representation of military occupations that are either over- or under-staffed. For example, GAO's analysis of early FY 2005 data shows that 63 percent of the Army's active component specialties are overfilled and 32 percent are underfilled. Also, several hundred hard-to-fill occupations exist within the 10 DOD components. GAO identified 73 occupations that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. GAO's analysis also shows that 7 of the Army's current occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout) and 6 of the Air Force's current occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist) are on both their "hard-to-recruit" and "hard-to-retain" lists. DOD's components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. For example, DOD has expanded eligibility for selective reenlistment bonuses and has also begun offering reenlistment bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces personnel with 19 or more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. The Army increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hard-to-fill military occupations to as much as $20,000. The Army also increased its maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000. In addition, the Army plans to add 965 recruiters in FY 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 recruiters by FY 2007. |
gao_GAO-16-363 | gao_GAO-16-363_0 | The statutory rate of tax on net corporate income ranges from 15 to 35 percent, depending on the amount of income earned. A Schedule M-3 filer is required to report the worldwide income of the entity represented in its financial statements and then follow a well- defined series of steps—subtracting out income and losses of foreign and U.S. entities that are included in the financial statements but not in consolidated tax returns; adding in the income and losses of entities that are included in consolidated tax returns but not in financial statements; and making other adjustments to arrive at the book income of entities included in the federal tax return. This report focuses on average corporate effective tax rates, which are generally computed as the ratio of taxes paid or tax liabilities accrued in a given year over the net income the corporation earned that year. Average effective tax rates attempt to measure taxes paid as a proportion of economic income. Meanwhile, statutory rates determine the amount of tax liability (before any credits) relative to taxable income, which is defined by tax law and reflects tax benefits and subsidies built into the law. In Each Year from 2006 to 2012, Most Corporations Had No Federal Income Tax Liability, but a Majority of Large Corporations Did
In each tax year from 2006 to 2012 at least two-thirds of active U.S. corporations had no federal income tax liability after credits (see figure 2). Among large corporations for 2012, less than half—42.3 percent, or 17,882 returns—had no federal income tax after accounting for tax credits. Corporations that did have a federal corporate income tax liability for tax year 2012 owed $267.5 billion. Corporations may pay no federal income tax for a number of reasons. Average ETRs for Large Corporations, Which Differed Significantly from Their Statutory Rates, Increased Slightly from 2010 to 2012
Average ETRs for Large Profitable Corporations Were Well Below Statutory Rates, Even When Deductions for Prior-Year Losses Were Excluded
For tax year 2012, the actual U.S. federal income taxes paid by profitable large corporations amounted to 16.1 percent of the income that those corporations reported in their financial statements (for those entities included in their tax returns); this federal effective tax rate averaged 14 percent from tax years 2008 to 2012 (see the first panel of figure 3). The subject matter experts with whom we spoke suggested it would be of interest to estimate what profitable large corporations would have paid in the current year if one did not take into account the deductions that corporations are allowed to take for losses carried forward from prior years. The Inclusion of Large Corporations with Current- Year Losses Raises the Average Effective Tax Rates but Makes Those Rates Difficult to Interpret
In tax year 2012, all corporate returns with a Schedule M-3, including those with current-year losses, paid actual U.S. federal income taxes amounting to 21.2 percent of the income that they reported. On average, over tax years 2008 to 2012, all large corporations actually paid 25.9 percent of their pretax net income in U.S. federal income taxes. Over those tax years, ETRs averaged 40 percent when foreign and state and local taxes are included. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for review and comment. IRS provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. The second set of estimates covers a more comprehensive population of firms; however, an ETR is not meaningful for a corporation in a year in which it has a net loss. This results in U.S. corporations paying federal income tax on foreign-source income only to the extent that the federal income tax on that income exceeds the foreign tax credit. 1. Data are presented for all active corporations as well as all and profitable large corporations that filed a Schedule M-3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and the administration continue to express interest in reforming the U.S. corporate income tax and the rate at which U.S. corporations' income is taxed. Currently, the top statutory corporate income tax rate is 35 percent. GAO's 2013 report on corporate ETRs found that in tax year 2010, whether for all large corporate filers or only profitable ones, the average ETRs were significantly below the statutory rate.
To provide an update, GAO was asked to assess the extent to which U.S. corporations pay federal income tax and the percentage that had no federal income tax liability. In this report, GAO estimates (1) the percentage of all and large corporations that had no federal income tax liability and (2) average ETRs based on financial statement reporting and tax reporting. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed economic literature, analyzed IRS data for tax years 2006 to 2012 (the most recent data available), including the financial and tax information that large corporations report on Schedule M-3, and interviewed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials and subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
In each year from 2006 to 2012, at least two-thirds of all active corporations had no federal income tax liability. Larger corporations were more likely to owe tax. Among large corporations (generally those with at least $10 million in assets) less than half—42.3 percent—paid no federal income tax in 2012. Of those large corporations whose financial statements reported a profit, 19.5 percent paid no federal income tax that year. Reasons why even profitable corporations may have paid no federal tax in a given year include the use of tax deductions for losses carried forward from prior years and tax incentives, such as depreciation allowances that are more generous in the federal tax code than those allowed for financial accounting purposes. Corporations that did have a federal corporate income tax liability for tax year 2012 owed $267.5 billion.
These reasons also explain why corporate effective tax rates (ETR) can differ substantially from statutory tax rates. ETRs attempt to measure taxes paid as a proportion of economic income, while statutory rates indicate the amount of tax liability (before any credits) relative to taxable income, which is defined by tax law and reflects tax benefits built into the law. The statutory tax rate on net corporate income ranges from 15 to 35 percent, depending on the amount of income earned. For tax years 2008 to 2012, profitable large U.S. corporations paid, on average, U.S. federal income taxes amounting to about 14 percent of the pretax net income that they reported in their financial statements (for those entities included in their tax returns).
When foreign and state and local income taxes are included, the average ETR across all of those years increases to just over 22 percent. GAO also computed ETRs that combine large profitable corporations and those large corporations with current year losses, which pay little if any actual tax. Over tax years 2008 to 2012, all large corporations—profitable and those that reported current year losses—paid 25.9 percent of their pretax net income in U.S. federal income taxes, and 40.1 percent when foreign and state and local taxes are included. Including corporations with losses results in a more comprehensive estimate, but makes the results difficult to interpret because ETR is not meaningful for a corporation in a year in which it has a net loss. GAO could not examine the variation in ETRs across corporations with the aggregated data available, although GAO's prior work suggests that ETRs are likely to vary considerably.
What GAO Recommends
GAO does not make recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to IRS for review and comment. IRS provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-238 | gao_GAO-07-238_0 | HHS Has Initiated Actions to Identify Solutions for Protecting Personal Health Information but Has Not Defined an Overall Approach for Addressing Privacy
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting health information. Specifically, HHS awarded several health IT contracts that include requirements for developing solutions that comply with federal privacy and security requirements, consulted with the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) to develop recommendations regarding privacy and confidentiality in the Nationwide Health Information Network, and formed the American Health Information Community (AHIC) Confidentiality, Privacy, and Security Workgroup to frame privacy and security policy issues and identify viable options or processes to address these issues. However, HHS is in the early stages of identifying solutions for protecting personal health information and has not yet defined an overall approach for integrating its various privacy-related initiatives and for addressing key privacy principles. In summer 2006, the privacy and security solutions contractor selected 33 states and Puerto Rico as locations in which to perform assessments of organization-level privacy- and security-related policies and practices that affect interoperable electronic health information exchange and their bases, including laws and regulations. Conclusions
As the use of health IT and the exchange of electronic health information increases, concerns about the protection of personal health information exchanged electronically within a nationwide health information network have also increased. HHS’s current initiatives are intended to address many of these challenges. This approach should (1) identify milestones and the entity responsible for integrating the outcomes of its privacy-related initiatives, including the results of its four health IT contracts and recommendations from the NCVHS and AHIC advisory committees; (2) ensure that key privacy principles in HIPAA are fully addressed; and (3) address key challenges associated with legal and policy issues, disclosure of personal health information, individuals’ rights to request access and amendments to health information, and security measures for protecting health information within a nationwide exchange of health information. HHS stated that the department is committed to ensuring that health information is protected as part of its efforts to achieve nationwide health information exchange. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to describe the steps the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is taking to ensure privacy protection as part of the national health information technology (IT) strategy and identify challenges associated with meeting requirements for protecting personal health information within a nationwide health information network. | Why GAO Did This Study
The expanding implementation of health information technology (IT) and electronic health information exchange networks raises concerns regarding the extent to which the privacy of individuals' electronic health information is protected. In April 2004, President Bush called for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop and implement a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of health IT. The plan is to recommend methods to ensure the privacy of electronic health information. GAO was asked to describe HHS's efforts to ensure privacy as part of its national strategy and to identify challenges associated with protecting electronic personal health information. To do this, GAO assessed relevant HHS privacy-related initiatives and analyzed information from health information organizations.
What GAO Found
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting personal health information through several contracts and with two health information advisory committees. For example, in late 2005, HHS awarded several health IT contracts that include requirements for addressing the privacy of personal health information exchanged within a nationwide health information exchange network. Its privacy and security solutions contractor is to assess the organization-level privacy- and security-related policies, practices, laws, and regulations that affect interoperable health information exchange. Additionally, in June 2006, the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics made recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on protecting the privacy of personal health information within a nationwide health information network, and in August 2006, the American Health Information Community convened a work group to address privacy and security policy issues for nationwide health information exchange. While these activities are intended to address aspects of key principles for protecting the privacy of health information, HHS is in the early stages of its efforts and has therefore not yet defined an overall approach for integrating its various privacy-related initiatives and addressing key privacy principles, nor has it defined milestones for integrating the results of these activities. GAO identified key challenges associated with protecting electronic personal health information in four areas. |
gao_GAO-07-262T | gao_GAO-07-262T_0 | Tax Preferences Differ from Title IV Assistance in Timing, Distribution, and Students’ and Families’ Responsibility for Obtaining Benefits
Postsecondary student financial assistance provided through programs authorized under title IV of the Higher Education Act and the tax code differ in timing of assistance, the populations that receive assistance, and the responsibility of students and families to obtain and use the assistance. Students and Families Have More Responsibility for Obtaining Benefits of Tax Preferences in Comparison to Title IV Aid
The federal government and postsecondary institutions have significant responsibilities in assisting students and families in obtaining assistance provided under title IV programs but only minor roles with respect to tax filers’ use of education-related tax preferences. Unlike title IV programs, users must understand the rules, identify applicable tax preferences, understand how these tax preferences interact with one another and with federal student aid, keep records sufficient to support their tax filing, and correctly claim the credit or deduction on their return. Some Tax Filers May Not Effectively Use Postsecondary Tax Preferences, Possibly Due to Complexity
According to our analysis of IRS data on the use of Hope and Lifetime tax credits and the tuition deduction in our 2005 report, some tax filers appear to make less-than-optimal choices among them. However, about 27 percent of those returns, representing about 374,000 tax filers, failed to use the any of them. The amount by which these tax filers failed to reduce their tax averaged $169; 10 percent of this group could have reduced their tax liabilities by over $500. Tax policy analysts have frequently identified postsecondary tax preferences as a set of tax provisions that demand a particularly large investment of knowledge and skill on the part of students and families or expert assistance purchased by those with the means to do so. Research on Effectiveness of Federal Postsecondary Assistance Is Incomplete
Little is known about the effectiveness of federal grant and loan programs and education-related tax preferences in promoting attendance, choice, and the likelihood that students either earn a degree or continue their education (referred to as persistence). Given its limited resources, should the government further target title IV programs and tax provisions based on need or other factors? Appendix I: Postsecondary Aid Programs
The federal government helps students and families save, pay for, and repay the costs of postsecondary education through grant and loan programs authorized under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and through tax preferences—reductions in federal tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions in the tax code, such as exemptions and exclusions from taxation, deductions, credits, deferrals, and preferential tax rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal assistance helps students and families pay for postsecondary education through several policy tools--grant and loan programs authorized by title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and more recently enacted tax preferences. This testimony summarizes and updates our 2005 report on (1) how title IV assistance compares to that provided through the tax code (2) the extent to which tax filers effectively use postsecondary tax preferences, and (3) what is known about the effectiveness of federal assistance. This hearing is an opportunity to consider whether any changes should be made in the government's overall strategy for providing such assistance or to the individual programs and tax provisions that provide the assistance. This statement is based on previously published GAO work and reviews of relevant literature.
What GAO Found
Title IV student aid and tax preferences provide assistance to a wide range of students and families in different ways. While both help students meet current expenses, tax preferences also assist students and families with saving for and repaying postsecondary costs. Both serve students and families with a range of incomes, but some forms of title IV aid--grant aid, in particular--provide assistance to those whose incomes are lower, on average, than is the case with tax preferences. Tax preferences require more responsibility on the part of students and families than title IV aid because taxpayers must identify applicable tax preferences, understand complex rules concerning their use, and correctly calculate and claim credits or deductions. While the tax preferences are a newer policy tool, the number of tax filers using them has grown quickly, surpassing the number of students aided under title IV in 2002. Some tax filers do not appear to make optimal education-related tax decisions. For example, among the limited number of 2002 tax returns available for our analysis, 27 percent of eligible tax filers did not claim either the tuition deduction or a tax credit. In so doing, these tax filers failed to reduce their tax liability by $169, on average, and 10 percent of these filers could have reduced their tax liability by over $500. One explanation for these taxpayers' choices may be the complexity of postsecondary tax provisions, which experts have commonly identified as difficult for tax filers to use. Little is known about the effectiveness of title IV aid or tax preferences in promoting, for example, postsecondary attendance or school choice, in part because of research data and methodological challenges. As a result, policymakers do not have information that would allow them to make the most efficient use of limited federal resources to help students and families. |
gao_GAO-10-911T | gao_GAO-10-911T_0 | DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Management Functions, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Strengthen These Functions
DHS has made progress in implementing its acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital management functions, but continues to face obstacles and weaknesses in these functions that could hinder the department’s transformation and implementation efforts. Acquisition management. However, while the Acquisition Review Board reviewed 24 major acquisition programs in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, more than 40 major acquisition programs had not been reviewed, and programs had not consistently implemented review action items identified as part of the review by established deadlines. Information technology management. DHS has undertaken efforts to establish information technology management controls and capabilities, but in September 2009 we reported that DHS had made uneven progress in its information technology management efforts to institutionalize a framework of interrelated management controls and capabilities. DHS has made progress in addressing its financial management and internal controls weaknesses, but has not yet addressed all of them or developed a consolidated departmentwide financial management system. Since its establishment, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements (i.e., prepare a set of financial statements that are considered reliable). For fiscal year 2009, the independent auditor issued a disclaimer on DHS’s financial statements and identified eight deficiencies in DHS’s internal control over financial reporting, six of which were so significant that they qualified as material weaknesses. Human capital management. DHS’s scores on the 2008 Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Human Capital Survey—a tool that measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency—and the Partnership for Public Service’s 2010 rankings of the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government improved from prior years. In addition, in 2010, DHS was ranked 28 out of 32 agencies in the Best Places to Work ranking on overall scores for employee satisfaction and commitment. DHS Has Taken Action to Integrate Its Management Functions and Develop Performance Measures, but Could Strengthen Its Integration and Performance Measurement Efforts
DHS has taken actions to integrate its management functions and to strengthen its performance measures to assess progress in implementing these functions, but the department has faced challenges in these efforts. Management integration. In November 2009, we reported that DHS had not yet developed a strategy for management integration as required by the 9/11 Commission Act and with the characteristics we recommended in our 2005 report. Since our November 2009 report, DHS has taken action to develop a management integration strategy. Specifically, DHS developed and provided us with an initial management integration plan in February 2010. The initial plan identified seven priority initiatives for achieving management integration: Enterprise governance. We noted that, for example: the action plans lacked details on how the seven initiatives contribute to departmentwide management integration and links to the department’s overall strategy for transformation; the performance measures contained in the plans did not identify units of measure, baseline measurements, or target metrics that would be used to measure progress; the impediments and barriers described in the plans did not align with identified risks and the strategies for addressing these impediments and barriers; and the plans did not identify planned resources for carrying out these initiatives. DHS Has Taken Actions to Transform into an Integrated Department, but Has Not Yet Fully Addressed Its Transformation Challenges
Since we first designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk in 2003, the department has made progress in its transformation efforts in relation to the five criteria we established in November 2000 for removing agencies from the high-risk list, but has not yet fully addressed its transformation, management, and mission challenges, such as implementing effective management policies and deploying capabilities to secure the border and other sectors. In January 2009, we reported that DHS had developed its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management outlining the department’s overall approach for managing its high-risk areas and the department’s processes for assessing risks and proposing initiatives and corrective actions to address its risks and challenges. We recommended that for DHS to successfully transform into a more effective organization, it needed to (1) revise its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management and related corrective action plans to better define root causes, include resources required to implement corrective actions, and identify key performance measures to gauge progress; and (2) continue to identify, refine, and implement corrective actions to improve management functions and address challenges. Since our 2009 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to address the high-risk designation. Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454 (Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2007). | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, GAO has designated implementing and transforming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with significant management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its mission and management risks could have serious consequences for national and economic security. This high-risk area includes challenges in management functional areas, including acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital management; the impact of those challenges on mission implementation; and management integration. GAO has reported that DHS's transformation is a significant effort that will take years to achieve. This testimony discusses DHS's progress and actions remaining in (1) implementing its management functions; (2) integrating those functions and strengthening performance measurement; and (3) addressing GAO's high-risk designation. This testimony is based on GAO's prior reports on DHS transformation and management issues and updated information on these issues obtained from December 2009 through September 2010.
What GAO Found
DHS has made progress in implementing its management functions, but additional actions are needed to strengthen DHS's efforts in these areas. (1) DHS has revised its acquisition management oversight policies, and its senior-level Acquisition Review Board reviewed 24 major acquisition programs in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. However, more than 40 major programs had not been reviewed, and DHS does not yet have accurate cost estimates for most of its major programs. (2) DHS has undertaken efforts to establish information technology management controls and capabilities, but its progress has been uneven and major information technology programs, such as the SBInet virtual fence, have not met capability, benefit, cost, and schedule expectations. (3) DHS has developed corrective action plans to address its financial management weaknesses. However, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements, and for fiscal year 2009, the independent auditor identified six material weaknesses in DHS's internal controls. Further, DHS has not yet implemented a consolidated departmentwide financial management system. (4) DHS has issued plans for strategic human capital management and employee development. Further, its scores on the Partnership for Public Service's 2010 rankings of Best Places to Work in the Federal Government improved from prior years, yet DHS was ranked 28 out of 32 agencies on scores for employee satisfaction and commitment. DHS has also taken action to integrate its management functions by, for example, establishing common policies within management functions. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required DHS to develop a strategy for management integration. In a 2005 report GAO recommended that a management integration strategy contain priorities and goals. DHS developed an initial plan in February 2010 that identified seven initiatives for achieving management integration. While a step in the right direction, among other things, the plan lacked details on how the initiatives contributed to departmentwide management integration. DHS is working to enhance its management integration plan, which GAO will review as part of the 2011 high-risk update. DHS also has not yet developed performance measures to fully assess its progress in integrating management functions. Since GAO first designated DHS's transformation as high risk, DHS has made progress in transforming into a fully functioning department. However, it has not yet fully addressed its transformation, management, and mission challenges, such as implementing effective management policies and deploying capabilities to secure the border and other sectors. In 2009 GAO reported that DHS had developed a strategy for managing its high-risk areas and corrective action plans to address its management challenges. While these documents identified some root causes and corrective actions, GAO reported that they could be improved by DHS identifying resources needed for implementing corrective actions and measures for assessing progress. This testimony contains no new recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made over 100 recommendations to DHS since 2003 to strengthen its management and integration efforts. DHS has implemented many of these recommendations and is in the process of implementing others. |
gao_GAO-12-904 | gao_GAO-12-904_0 | The guidance also calls for such corrective efforts to be defined and documented. Our analysis of the cost and schedule performance for DHS’s 68 major IT investments shows that approximately two-thirds of these investments and their subsidiary projects were meeting cost and schedule commitments; the remaining one-third had at least one subsidiary project that was not meeting its commitments. The remaining 21 investments had one or more subsidiary projects that were not meeting cost and/or schedule commitments; the total planned cost for all projects in development for the 21 investments is approximately $1 billion. Causes of Investment Cost and Schedule Shortfalls Vary
The primary causes of the shortfalls in cost and schedule associated with DHS’s 21 major IT investments were (in descending order of frequency): inaccurate preliminary cost and schedule estimates, technical issues in the development phase, changes in agency priorities, lack of understanding of user requirements, and dependencies on other investments that had schedule shortfalls. A summary of these causes by investment and the associated component are shown in table 3 and are followed by (1) our analysis of these causes by category and (2) discussion of our past work on the department’s major investments and related IT management processes where we identified some of these same causes and made recommendations to strengthen management in these areas. According to investment officials, this was due in part to project staff developing the cost estimates very quickly and not fully validating them before proceeding with the project. Technology issues in the development phase: Technical issues in the development phase caused cost or schedule slippages in six investments. Specifically, the handheld devices used for scanning license plates used a wireless spectrum that had interference problems at certain sites, and resolving this issue took more time than had been planned for. In particular, GAO’s Information Technology Investment Management framework calls for agencies to develop and document corrective efforts for underperforming projects. In addition, DHS policy requires corrective actions when cost or schedule variances exceed 8 percent. DHS developed and documented corrective efforts for 12 of the 21 major investments with a shortfall, but the remaining 9 did not have documented corrective efforts. DHS took corrective actions to address investment shortfalls in 12 investments. With regard to the remaining nine investments, three were unable to provide us with documentation, even though project officials stated that they had developed some corrective efforts, and six did not engage in corrective efforts to address shortfalls. This is inconsistent with the direction of OMB, which requires agencies to report (via the IT Dashboard) on the cost and schedule performance of their projects and considers those projects with a 10 percent or greater variance to be at an increased level of risk of not being able to deliver promised capabilities on time and within budget, and thus they require special attention from management. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the appropriate officials to:
Establish guidance that provides for developing corrective efforts for major IT investment projects that are experiencing cost and schedule shortfalls of 10 percent or greater, similar to those identified in this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the (1) extent to which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) IT investments are meeting their cost and schedule commitments, (2) primary causes of any commitment shortfalls, and (3) adequacy of DHS’s efforts to address these shortfalls and causes. To address our first objective, we analyzed how each of DHS’s 68 major investments under development was performing against its cost and schedules commitments, as reported by the agency to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for inclusion on OMB’s federal IT Dashboard. Appendix III: List of DHS Major IT Investments and Subsidiary Projects with Shortfalls
Table 6 lists the DHS major IT investments with cost and/or schedule shortfalls, their costs and subsidiary projects, whether or not they had a cost and/or schedule shortfall, and their planned costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has responsibility for the development and management of the IT systems for the 22 federal agencies and offices under its jurisdiction. Of its 363 IT investments, 68 are in development and are classified by DHS as a major investment that requires special management attention because of its mission importance. Given the size and significance of these investments, GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent to which DHS IT investments are meeting their cost and schedule commitments, (2) primary causes of any commitment shortfalls, and (3) adequacy of DHSs efforts to address these shortfalls and their associated causes.
To address these objectives, GAO analyzed recent cost and schedule performance for DHSs major IT investments, as reported to OMB. To identify the primary cause(s) of any shortfalls and whether any corrective efforts were being taken to address them, GAO analyzed project plans and related documentation and interviewed responsible DHS officials and compared the corrective efforts to applicable criteria to assess their adequacy.
What GAO Found
Approximately two-thirds of the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) major information technology (IT) investments are meeting their cost and schedule commitments (i.e., goals). Specifically, out of 68 major IT investments in development, 47 were meeting cost and schedule commitments. The remaining 21which total about $1 billion in spendinghad one or more subsidiary projects that were not meeting cost and/or schedule commitments (i.e., they exceeded their goals by at least 10 percent, which is the level at which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considers projects to be at increased risk of not being able to deliver planned capabilities on time and within budget.)
The primary causes for the cost and schedule shortfalls were (in descending order of frequency):
inaccurate preliminary cost and schedule estimates,
technology issues in the development phase,
changes in agency priorities,
lack of understanding of user requirements, and
dependencies on other investments that had schedule shortfalls.
Eight investments had inaccurate cost and schedule estimates. For example, DHSs Critical Infrastructure Technology investment had a project where actual costs were about 16 percent over the estimated cost, due in part to project staff not fully validating cost estimates before proceeding with the project. In addition, six investments had technical issues in the development phase that caused cost or schedule slippages. For example, DHSs Land Border Integration investment had problems with wireless interference at certain sites during deployment of handheld devices used for scanning license plates, which caused a project to be about 2.5 months late. In past work on DHS investments, GAO has identified some of the causes of DHSs shortfalls and made recommendations to strengthen management in these areas (e.g., cost estimating, requirements), and DHS has initiated efforts to implement the recommendations.
DHS often did not adequately address shortfalls and their causes. GAOs investment management framework calls for agencies to develop and document corrective efforts to address underperforming investments. DHS policy requires documented corrective efforts when investments experience cost or schedule variances. Although 12 of the 21 investments with shortfalls had defined and documented corrective efforts, the remaining 9 did not. Officials responsible for 3 of the 9 investments said they took corrective efforts but were unable to provide plans or any other related documentation showing such action had been taken. Officials for the other 6 investments cited criteria in DHSs policy that excluded their investments from the requirement to document corrective efforts. This practice is inconsistent with the direction of OMB guidance and related best practices that stress developing and documenting corrective efforts to address problems in such circumstances. Until DHS addresses its guidance shortcomings and ensures each of these underperforming investments has defined and documented corrective efforts, these investments are at risk of continued cost and schedule shortfalls.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the appropriate officials to address the guidance shortcomings and develop corrective actions for all major IT investment projects having cost and schedule shortfalls. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-00-80 | gao_NSIAD-00-80_0 | The locations of the nonstockpile chemical materiel, as of January 31, 2000, are shown in figure 2. Most Chemical Weapons and Materiel Could Be Destroyed Before the Convention’s 2007 Deadline
The Army has destroyed approximately 17.7 percent of the original chemical weapons stockpile and could destroy 90 percent of its stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and most of its nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel before the Chemical Weapons Convention’s 2007 deadline, given its recent progress and projected plans. However, because of the additional time required to develop and select disposal methods that are acceptable to the state regulatory agencies and local communities in Kentucky and Colorado, which store the remaining 10 percent of the original stockpile, the Army will not meet the 2007 deadline at these sites. The disposal method for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile stored in Kentucky and Colorado has not yet been selected because the 1997 Defense Appropriations Act requires an examination of alternative disposal methods under the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program. Program Costs Will Likely Exceed $14.9 Billion Estimate
The Chemical Demilitarization Program has a long-standing history of experiencing significant cost growth. The Army Has Not Adequately Managed the Liquidation of Program Funds
The Army has experienced problems in recent years in managing its liquidations of program funds. We found that the program had more than $3.1 billion in budget authority from fiscal years 1993-98 appropriations as of September 30, 1999, of which a reported $498 million (16.1 percent) was unliquidated. Our review of $382.1 million (62.6 percent) of the reported $610.5 million in unliquidated obligations for fiscal years 1992-98 showed that $150.6 million (39.4 percent of our sample) had already been spent but was not recorded in accounting records or included in financial reports prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). Of the remaining $432 million in unliquidated obligations, most was for work completed but not yet billed by the contractor or verified by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), or for work being done but not yet completed. Procedural Delays
Procedural delays have accounted for the accumulation of some of the unliquidated obligations. Program Management Has Been Hindered by Complex Structure and Ineffective Coordination
Effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective coordination among program offices and with state and local officials. In addition, accountability for program performance has been unclear, and coordination and communication among certain program elements and state and local officials have been inadequate. Further, officials of the Departments of Defense and the Army have not agreed on whether or when management roles, responsibilities, and accountability should be consolidated for destruction of the chemical stockpiles at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. Consequently, state and local officials have raised concerns that no single office is accountable for achieving the desired results of the program’s various elements. Evolution of the Management Structure
As provided for in the original legislation establishing the Chemical Demilitarization Program, the Army, as executive agent for the program, established a Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization who was responsible for management of the destruction of the stockpile. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the financial management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Chemical Demilitarization Program, focusing on whether: (1) the program will meet the Chemical Weapons Convention timeframes within the costs projected; (2) obligations and liquidations of funds appropriated for the program have been adequately managed; and (3) the management structure of the program allows for coordinated accountability of the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army had destroyed approximately 17.7 percent of the chemical weapons stockpile as of January 31, 2000, and could destroy about 90 percent of the stockpile by the convention's 2007 deadline, given its recent progress and projected plans; (2) however, the Army may not meet the deadline for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile because the incineration method of destruction has not been acceptable to two of the states where the chemical stockpile is located; (3) additionally, some of the nonstockpile materiel may not be destroyed before the deadline because the proposed method of destruction has not been proven safe and effective and accepted by state and local communities; (4) the Army's $14.9 billion estimate for program costs will likely increase due to: (a) the additional time required to develop and select disposal methods for the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile and for some of the nonstockpile chemical materiel; and (b) possible delays in demolition of a former chemical weapons production facility; (5) the Army has experienced significant problems in recent years in effectively managing the use of funds appropriated for the Chemical Demilitarization Program; (6) the Army reported that as of September 30, 1999, $498 million of the $3.1 billion appropriated for the program in fiscal years 1993 through 1998 was unliquidated; (7) in an assessment of interagency orders that account for $495.1 million of the unliquidated obligations, GAO found that $63.1 million had been liquidated but was not recorded in accounting records or included in financial reports prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service; (8) of the remaining $432 million, most was for work completed but not yet billed by the contractor or verified by the Defense Contract Audit Agency or for work in progress but not yet completed; (9) effective management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been hindered by its complex management structure and ineffective coordination among program offices and with state and local officials; (10) coordination and communication among officials responsible for elements of the program have been inadequate, thus causing confusion about what actions would be taken at certain sites; (11) DOD and Army officials have not agreed on whether or when management roles, responsibilities, and accountability should be consolidated for destruction of the chemical stockpiles in Kentucky and Colorado; and (12) consequently, state and local officials have expressed concern that no single office is accountable for achieving the desired results of the Chemical Demilitarization Program. |
gao_GAO-04-282 | gao_GAO-04-282_0 | Background
Technological advances continue to transform the U.S. workforce, and workers must improve their skills to meet employers’ changing needs. Nearly Half of All States Used Employer Taxes to Fund Their Own Employment Placement and Training Programs, and States Most Often Provided Job-Specific Training
Twenty-three states reported using employer tax revenues in 2002 from a variety of employer taxes to fund their own employment placement and training programs. States most often provided job-specific training for workers. These states reported spending a total of $278 million on their workforce programs. Most States with Employment Placement and Training Programs Funded through Employer Taxes Reported Some Coordination with Federal Workforce Programs
Twenty-one of the 23 states with employment placement and training programs funded through employer taxes reported some coordination with federal workforce programs in 2002. The most common coordination activity reported by states was the joint promotion of state and federally funded workforce programs through outreach or referrals (see fig. Other state programs coordinated with many federal partners. 12). In addition, some state officials noted that coordination had improved service quality and availability. However, none of the states used sufficiently rigorous research designs to allow them to make conclusive statements about the impact of their programs. Almost All States Reported Regularly Assessing the Performance of Their Programs in 2002
Twenty-two of the 23 states with employer-funded employment placement and training programs reported assessing the performance of their programs in 2002. Concluding Observations
To help close the gap between employer needs and employee skills, both federal- and state-funded workforce programs are providing skills training to employees and helping employers find qualified employees. However, the impact of these programs is unknown because states have not adequately studied them. Because these programs contribute to our nation’s ability to provide comprehensive workforce development services to meet employers’ needs for skilled workers, it would be helpful to have information on the impact of these efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to determine (1) How many states use employer taxes to fund their own employment placement and training programs, and what type of services do they provide; (2) The extent to which these state employment placement and training programs are coordinating with federal workforce programs; and (3) How states are assessing the performance of their employment placement and training programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
As technological and other advances transform the U.S. economy, many of the nation's six million employers may have trouble finding employees with the skills to do their jobs well. Some experts indicate that such a skill gap already affects many employers. To help close this skill gap, both federal- and state-funded programs are providing training and helping employers find qualified employees. In 2002, the federal government spent about $12 billion on workforce programs, and there are various studies on these programs. States also raised revenues in 2002--from taxes levied on employers--to fund their own workforce programs. However, little is known about these state programs. GAO was asked to provide information on how many states use these employer taxes to fund their own employment placement and training programs, what services are provided, the extent to which these state programs coordinate with federal programs, and how states assess the performance of these programs.
What GAO Found
Twenty-three states reported using employer tax revenues in 2002 to fund their own employment placement and training programs, and states most often provided job-specific training for workers. States used various types of employer taxes and reported spending a total of $278 million to address state-specific workforce issues. States invested in a variety of industries, but manufacturing was the most frequently targeted. Most states with employment placement and training programs funded through employer taxes reported some coordination with federal workforce programs in 2002. States were most likely to coordinate with federal workforce programs by jointly promoting programs through outreach and referrals. According to most state officials, coordination with federal workforce programs raised awareness of their state-funded programs. Some state officials also reported that coordination improved the quality and availability of services. Twenty-two of the 23 states reported assessing the performance of their programs in 2002. However, none have used sufficiently rigorous research designs to allow them to make conclusive statements about the impact of their programs, such as their effect on worker wages or company earnings. Because these programs contribute to our nation's ability to provide comprehensive workforce development services to meet employers' needs for skilled workers, it would be helpful to have information on the impact of these efforts. The Department of Labor has valuable resources that might help states evaluate the impact of their programs. |
gao_GAO-01-436 | gao_GAO-01-436_0 | Conclusions
Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of truck driver training, especially at Fort Leonard Wood. The end result is that student drivers are not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when they graduate. If formal schools had enough instructors on-hand, they would presumably be able to teach the entire instruction program. If the annual student load were more equally distributed between the two schools, student graduates from Fort Leonard Wood might receive more complete training. The formal schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which calls for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Further, no training is provided in how to pull equipment. Similarly, students are not being trained to drive under different weather and surface conditions. Because annual check rides and sustainment training are not always being performed, unsafe driving habits may go undetected. Although performing and recording check rides and sustainment training may be time-consuming, these procedures can save lives. The Safety Center’s accident database could be used to identify trends that may show the need for greater training emphasis in certain driving maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the database could assist school officials, instructors, and supervisors in adjusting instruction programs or mentoring drivers. However, such analysis would prove more useful if all fields of information contained in the database were complete. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command to review and modify, as needed, instructor levels for the formal training programs to ensure that the programs are adequately staffed to teach the anticipated class size; balance the student load between the two schools by bringing the Fort Bliss school up to fuller capacity and/or increasing the number of classes annually taught there, thereby reducing the student load and associated problems created by such at Fort Leonard Wood; enforce the instruction program used by the two formal schools to ensure that students receive hands-on training in driving trucks loaded with cargo and also modify the program to include driving when pulling equipment— two essential skills in performing the primary mission of the 5-ton tactical fleet; and consider using simulators at the two formal schools to safely teach known training shortfalls such as driving under hazardous conditions, with the understanding that simulators not be used to replace hands-on driving conducted under less risky conditions. | What GAO Found
Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of Army truck driver training. Fort Leonard Wood, which trains about 90 percent of truck drivers, is especially affected by the instructor shortage. The result is that student drivers are not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when they graduate. If formal schools had enough instructors, they would presumably be able to teach the entire instruction program. The student imbalance between the schools at Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Bliss creates an ineffective use of resources. If the annual student load were more equally distributed between the two schools, student graduates from Fort Leonard Wood might receive more complete training. The formal schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which calls for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Furthermore, no training is provided on how to pull equipment. Similarly, students are not being trained to drive under different weather and surface conditions. Because annual check rides and sustainment are not always being performed, unsafe driving habits may go undetected. Although performing and recording check rides and sustainment may be time-consuming, these procedures can save lives. The Army Safety Center's accident database could be used to identify trends that may show the need for greater training emphasis in certain driving maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the database could assist school officials, instructors, and supervisors to adjust instruction programs or mentor drivers. However, such analysis would be more useful if information in the database were complete. |
gao_GAO-07-781 | gao_GAO-07-781_0 | In addition to these tools and guidance, other actions included HHS grant awards totaling $350 million to state and local governments for pandemic planning and more than $1 billion to accelerate development and production of new technologies for influenza vaccines within the United States. Federal Government Leadership Roles and Responsibilities Need Clarification and Testing
While the Strategy and Plan describe the broad roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic influenza, they do little to clarify existing emergency response roles and responsibilities. However, since a pandemic extends well beyond health and medical boundaries, to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and security considerations, it is not clear when, in a pandemic, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would be in the lead and when the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. Additionally, the Plan states that the Secretary of Homeland Security would be responsible for coordinating the overall response to the pandemic; implementing policies that facilitate compliance with recommended social distancing measures; providing for a common operating picture for all departments and agencies of the federal government; and ensuring the integrity of the nation’s infrastructure, domestic security, and entry and exit screening for influenza at the borders. In addition, although DHS and HHS officials emphasize that they are working together on a frequent basis, these roles and responsibilities have not been thoroughly tested and exercised. DHS is taking steps to further clarify federal leadership roles and responsibilities. However, the Strategy and Plan do not address all of the characteristics of an effective national strategy as we identified in our prior work. The extent to which these documents, that are to provide an overall framework to ensure preparedness and response to a pandemic influenza, fail to adequately address key areas, could have critical impact on whether the public and key stakeholders have a clear understanding and can effectively execute their roles and responsibilities. However, they only partially address four and do not address one of the characteristics at all. Although the Strategy states that it will be consistent with the National Security Strategy and the Strategy for Homeland Security, it does not specify how they are related. We found that the Strategy and Plan address this characteristic by describing the potential problems associated with a pandemic as well as potential threats and vulnerabilities. The Plan also did not describe a process for monitoring and reporting on the action items. Most of the Plan’s performance measures are focused on activities such as disseminating guidance, but the measures are not always clearly linked with intended results. The administration has taken an active approach to this potential disaster by establishing an information clearinghouse for pandemic information; developing numerous planning guidelines for governments, businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals; issuing the Strategy and Plan; completing many action items contained in the Plan; and continuing efforts to complete the remaining action items. Initial actions may help limit the spread of an influenza virus, reflecting the importance of a swift and effective response. Therefore, the effective exercise of shared leadership roles and responsibilities could have substantial consequences, both in the short and long term. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to review the extent to which (1) federal leadership roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic are clearly defined and (2) the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Strategy) and the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Plan) address the characteristics of an effective national strategy. To review the extent to which the Strategy and Plan address the characteristics of an effective national strategy, we analyzed the Strategy and Plan; reviewed key relevant sections of major statutes, regulations, directives, national strategies, and plans discussed in the Plan; and interviewed officials in agencies that the Strategy and Plan identified as lead agencies in preparing for and responding to a pandemic. Financial Market Preparedness: Significant Progress Has Been Made, but Pandemic Planning and Other Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
An influenza pandemic is a real and significant potential threat facing the United States and the world. Pandemics occur when a novel virus emerges that can easily be transmitted among humans who have little immunity. In 2005, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) issued a National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and, in 2006, an Implementation Plan. Congress and others are concerned about the federal government's preparedness to lead a response to an influenza pandemic. This report assesses how clearly federal leadership roles and responsibilities are defined and the extent to which the Strategy and Plan address six characteristics of an effective national strategy. To do this, GAO analyzed key emergency and pandemic-specific plans, interviewed agency officials, and compared the Strategy and Plan with the six characteristics GAO identified.
What GAO Found
The executive branch has taken an active approach to help address this potential threat, including establishing an online information clearinghouse, developing planning guidance and checklists, awarding grants to accelerate development and production of new technologies for influenza vaccines within the United States, and assisting state and local government pandemic planning efforts. However, federal government leadership roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic continue to evolve, and will require further clarification and testing before the relationships of the many leadership positions are well understood. The Strategy and Plan do not specify how the leadership roles and responsibilities will work in addressing the unique characteristics of an influenza pandemic, which could occur simultaneously in multiple locations and over a long period. A pandemic could extend well beyond health and medical boundaries, affecting critical infrastructure, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and security considerations. Although the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Secretary is to lead the public health and medical response and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secretary is to lead overall nonmedical support and response actions, the Plan does not clearly address these simultaneous responsibilities or how these roles are to work together, particularly over an extended period and at multiple locations across the country. In addition, the Secretary of DHS has designated a national Principal Federal Official (PFO) to facilitate pandemic coordination as well as five regional PFOs and five regional Federal Coordinating Officers. Most of these leadership roles and responsibilities have not been tested under pandemic scenarios, leaving it unclear how they will work. Because initial actions may help limit the spread of an influenza virus, the effective exercise of shared leadership roles and responsibilities could have substantial consequences. However, only one national multisector pandemic-related exercise has been held and that was prior to the issuance of the Plan. While the Strategy and Plan are an important first step in guiding national preparedness, they do not fully address all six characteristics of an effective national strategy. Specifically, they fully address only one of the six characteristics, by reflecting a clear description and understanding of problems to be addressed, and do not address one characteristic because the documents do not describe the financial resources needed to implement actions. Although the other characteristics are partially addressed, important gaps exist that could hinder the ability of key stakeholders to effectively execute their responsibilities, including state and local jurisdictions that will play crucial roles in preparing for and responding to a pandemic were not directly involved in developing the Plan, relationships and priorities among actions were not clearly described, performance measures focused on activities that are not always linked to results; insufficient information is provided about how the documents are integrated with other key related plans, and no process is provided for monitoring and reporting on progress. |
gao_GAO-02-376 | gao_GAO-02-376_0 | The Single Audit Act, as amended, established the concept of the single audit to replace multiple grant audits with one audit of the recipient as a whole. The objectives of the Single Audit Act, as amended, are to promote sound financial management, including effective internal controls, with respect to federal awards administered by nonfederal entities; establish uniform requirements for audits of federal awards administered by nonfederal entities; promote the efficient and effective use of audit resources; reduce burdens on state and local governments, Indian tribes, and ensure that federal departments and agencies, to the maximum extent practicable, rely upon and use audit work done pursuant to the act. Agency Uses of Single Audits
At 22 of the agencies, officials in at least one of the CFO, IG, and/or program offices responded that they use single audits as a tool to monitor compliance with administrative and program requirements addressed in the OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement and to monitor the adequacy of internal controls. Those agencies that do not use the database reported that they rely on the FAC to send them the single audit reports and that they review the hard copy reports to obtain information on the agency’s programs instead of the database. Briefing Section III—How Agencies Use Single Audits Agency Uses of Single Audits Review of the surveys indicated that one or more offices at 22 agencies use single audits as a tool to monitor compliance with administrative and program requirements and to monitor the adequacy of recipients’ compliance with internal controls. For example, 11 agencies indicated that they use the database to identify recipients that have incurred questioned costs, have made improper payments, or both. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government awards $300 billion to state and local governments and nonprofit groups each year. The Single Audit Act promotes sound financial management, including effective internal controls, over these federal awards. Before the act, government relied on audits of individual grants to determine if the money was spent properly. The act replaced these grant audits with a single audit--one audit of an entity as a whole. GAO surveyed the 24 federal agencies subject to the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act and found that they have developed processes and assigned responsibilities to meet the requirements of the Single Audit Act.
What GAO Found
Agencies reported that they are using single audits to monitor compliance with administrative and programs requirements and to determine the adequacy of recipients' internal controls. One or more offices at 22 of the 24 agencies used single audits to monitor compliance with administrative and program requirements in the Circular A-133 Compliance Statement and to monitor recipients' compliance with internal controls. Eleven agencies reported that they routinely use the Federal Audit Clearinghouse database to identify recipients that incurred questionable costs or programs that have significant findings, to identify recipients with recurring findings, or to study subrecipient findings. Individuals at four agencies were unaware of the database or how to use it. Agencies that do not use the database rely on the Federal Audit Clearinghouse to send them the single audit report, which they review for information on their programs. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-212 | gao_T-HEHS-98-212_0 | Furthermore, Labor may debar contractors in the construction industry under the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act for “repeated willful or grossly negligent” violations of safety and health standards issued under the OSH Act. Most firms—regardless of whether they are federal contractors—must comply with safety and health standards issued under the OSH Act of 1970, which was enacted “to assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women.” The Secretary of Labor established OSHA to carry out a number of responsibilities, including developing and enforcing safety and health standards; educating workers and employers about work place hazards; and establishing responsibilities and rights for both employers and employees for the achievement of better safety and health conditions. FPDS does not contain information on contractors’ safety and health or labor relations’ practices. Labor-Management Relations Law Violators Received Over $23 Billion in Federal Contracts in Fiscal Year 1993
A total of 80 firms that violated the NLRA received over $23 billion from more than 4,400 federal contracts during fiscal year 1993—about 13 percent of total fiscal year 1993 contract dollars. Most of the violators were large firms. In 24 cases, firms were ordered to stop threatening employees with the loss of their jobs or the shutdown of the firm. Contractors With OSHA Violations Received $38 Billion in Fiscal Year 1994
We found 261 federal contractors that were the corporate parents of facilities that had received proposed penalties of $15,000 or more from OSHA for violations of safety and health regulations in fiscal year 1994. About 75 percent of the total dollar value of these contracts was awarded by the Department of Defense, with large amounts of contract dollars also awarded by the Department of Energy and NASA. A majority of the 345 work sites (56 percent) penalized for safety and health violations were engaged in manufacturing. NLRB Implemented GAO Recommendations, but OSHA Has Not Yet Taken Action
Management Services Department, which is developing its comprehensive database on federal contractors. In our report on federal contractors who violated OSHA regulations, we concluded that contracting agencies could use information on a contractor’s safety and health record during the procedure for the awarding of federal contracts as a vehicle to encourage a contractor to undertake remedial measures to improve work place conditions.However, agency contracting authorities have not done so, at least partially because they did not have the information to determine those federal contractors who are violating safety and health regulations, even when they have been fined significant penalties for willful or repeated violations. Worker Protection: Federal Contractors and Violations of Labor Law (GAO/HEHS-96-8, Oct. 24, 1995). National Labor Relations Board: Action Needed to Improve Case-Processing Time at Headquarters (GAO/HRD-91-29, Jan. 7, 1991). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed federal contractors' noncompliance with federal labor laws, focusing on: (1) federal contractors' noncompliance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during fiscal years (FY) 1993 and 1994 and with the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act during FY 1994; and (2) the status of recommendations GAO made to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in those reports involving the use of information on federal contractors to enhance workplace health and safety and workers' rights to bargain collectively.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal contracts worth many billions of dollars had been awarded to employers who had been found in violation of NLRA or the safety and health regulations issued under the OSH Act; (2) the 80 firms that had violated the NLRA during FY 1993 and FY 1994 had received $23 billion, or about 13 percent of the total dollar value of federal contracts awarded during FY 1993; (3) there were 261 federal contractors that had work sites at which OSHA had assessed proposed penalties of $15,000 or more for noncompliance with health and safety regulations; (4) these firms received $38 billion in federal contracts awarded during FY 1994; (5) both of these totals probably underestimate the number of violators and contract dollars received during both years; (6) in both cases, most of the contract dollars were awarded to violators that were large firms, and a majority of these firms were in manufacturing industries; (7) about 75 percent of the dollar value of these awards came from the Department of Defense, although many dollars also came from the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; (8) although agencies can consider employers' labor-management relations and health and safety records in the awarding of contracts under current procurement regulations, agency officials responsible for awarding contracts and debarring contractors from receiving future contracts have generally not taken actions against contractors with safety and health or labor-relations law violations; (9) this is at least partially because they do not have adequate information to determine those federal contractors in noncompliance with these laws, even when the contractors have been assessed severe penalties or remedies under the respective acts; (10) in its reports, GAO made recommendations to both NLRB and OSHA that could enhance the effectiveness of their enforcement through the use of information on federal contractors; and (11) although NLRB has taken action in implementing GAO's recommendations, OSHA has not yet done so. |
gao_HEHS-95-36 | gao_HEHS-95-36_0 | A Variety of Organizations Work to Improve the Quality of Family Child Care
Many organizations sponsor initiatives to improve the quality of family child care. Research on child care quality shows that the types of activities support networks conduct contribute to enhancing the level of professionalism of the provider and, thus, improve the quality of child care. The Family-to-Family project focused on improving the quality of care in family child care settings in 40 communities nationwide (see app. Family Child Care Quality Initiatives Are Financed With Public and Private Funds
Federal Child Care Funds Are Primarily for Subsidies
The federal government’s role in child care has been primarily one of helping parents pay for child care. Of the $8 billion, approximately $156 million was for quality support activities, such as training and monitoring, in all types of child care settings. USDA’s Food Program Is the Second Most Frequently Used Federal Funding Source
The other federal funding source most often used to support quality initiatives for family child care was USDA’s Child and Adult Care Food Program. Given that research shows that quality child care settings particularly benefit poor children, the need for quality in this care will also grow. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, and to other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed family child care, focusing on: (1) public and private initiatives to enhance the quality of family child care; (2) the financing of family care initiatives; (3) the federal role in supporting quality initiatives; and (4) the implications of these initiatives for welfare reform.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) many national initiatives seek to improve family child care quality and are financed both from public and private sources; (2) although most of the $8 billion in federal child care support in 1993 went to subsidies to help parents pay for child care, approximately $156 million was used to improve the quality of child care through 195 different initiatives; (3) the two child care quality initiatives that are used most often are the Department of Health and Human Services' Child Care and Development Block Grant and the Department of Agriculture's Child and Adult Care Food Program; (4) research shows that child care quality improvement activities are critical to enhancing the quality of care in all types of child care settings; (5) family child care is expected to grow and is particularly important to poor children; and (6) these initiatives can provide information on ways to improve quality in family child care settings. |
gao_GAO-03-238 | gao_GAO-03-238_0 | These waivers apply to a number of the provisions, including (1) the methods for designating joint specialty officers, (2) the posteducation assignments for joint specialty officers, (3) the assignment of joint specialty officers to critical joint duty positions, and (4) the promotions of officers to the general and flag officer pay grades. DOD has implemented these recommendations. Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education, Assignments, and Promotions
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that address the education of officers in joint matters, officers’ assignments to joint organizations, and the promotion of officers who are serving or who have served in joint positions. However, DOD has also relied on waivers allowable under the law to comply with the provisions. In addition, DOD has experienced difficulties in implementing some of its programs and policies that address joint officer development. Because of these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint education program. DOD has met this requirement and has designated 808 positions as critical joint duty positions. DOD has increasingly used its waiver authority to meet this requirement. In fiscal year 2001, DOD was not able to fill 311 of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had the requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades than it did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. This means that most officers, in addition to completing a full tour of duty in a joint position, will also have to complete DOD’s joint education program as well. Our analysis of the 124 officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 officers, or 47 percent, had not fulfilled the joint specialty officer requirements. Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing to DOD’s Difficulties to Fully Respond to the Act’s Intent
A significant impediment affecting DOD’s ability to fully realize the cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. In addition, DOD has not yet, within a total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations—despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. However, it has not developed a strategic plan that establishes clear goals for officer development in joint matters and links those goals to DOD’s overall mission and goals. Data—including some that we have already presented—however, suggest that the four services continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their own service needs and vary in the degree of importance that they place on joint education, assignments, and promotions. However, DOD has not taken a strategic approach toward joint officer development and, without a strategic plan that will address the development of the total force in joint matters, it is more than likely that DOD will continue to experience difficulties in the future in meeting the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While DOD has made progress in implementing provisions of the law, it has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs. The act set expectations that these officers be promoted at a rate not less than the promotion rate of their peers. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions that address the education, assignment, and promotion of officers serving in joint positions. However, DOD has relied on waivers allowable under the law to comply with the provisions and has experienced difficulties implementing some of its programs. Because of these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. (1) Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop officers through education by establishing a two-phased joint education program, but has not determined how many officers should complete both phases. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions had completed both phases of the program. (2) Assignment. DOD has increasingly not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have both prior education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year 2001, DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers. (3)Promotion. DOD has promoted more officers with prior joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior levels. Beginning in fiscal year 2008, most officers promoted to these senior levels will also have to complete DOD's joint education program or otherwise meet the requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our analysis of officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of 124 officers promoted to the general and flag level did not meet these requirements. DOD has promoted mid-grade officers who serve in joint organizations at rates equal to or better than the promotion rates of their peers. However, DOD has had difficulty meeting this objective for colonels and Navy captains. DOD's ability to respond fully to these provisions has been hindered by the absence of a strategic plan that (1) establishes clear goals for officer development in joint matters and (2) links those goals to DOD's overall mission and goals. DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs and, without this information, cannot determine if its joint education programs are properly structured. The services vary in the emphasis they place on joint officer development and continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their own service needs. DOD has also not fully addressed how it will develop reserve officers in joint matters--despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. Finally, DOD has not tracked meaningful data consistently to measure progress in meeting the act's provisions. |
gao_T-GGD-98-184 | gao_T-GGD-98-184_0 | Background
The 7(a) loan program, SBA’s largest lending program, is intended to serve small business borrowers who cannot otherwise obtain financing under suitable terms and conditions from the private sector. Secondary Loan Markets Generate Benefits
A secondary loan market is a resale market for loans originated in the primary market. A number of benefits are associated with secondary markets. Secondary loan markets generally link borrowers and lenders in local markets to national capital markets, which can provide liquidity for lenders and thereby reduce regional imbalances in loanable funds and possibly increase the overall availability of credit to the primary market and lower interest rates for borrowers. The share of loans in a primary market that are sold in a secondary market depends on the benefits generated by the secondary market. For example, secondary markets allow interest rate risk to be diversified among investors with access to funding sources that help them manage such risks. Prepayment risk is the risk that borrowers will pay off their loans before maturity. Thus, secondary market sales can be impeded if investors lack information on lenders, borrowers, and loan characteristics to estimate their exposure to prepayment risks. Due to competitive forces in the primary market and as a result of increased access to additional sources of funds for lenders, this secondary market has contributed to lower interest rates paid by borrowers on federally insured mortgages. Characteristics of the Guaranteed 7(a) Secondary Market Differ From Those of the Ginnie Mae MBS Market
sheets. In 1997, SBA 7(a) secondary market sales of pooled guaranteed portions was approximately $2.6 billion. In contrast to Ginnie Mae guaranteed MBS that are backed by cash flows from whole loans, 7(a) loans are divided into separate guaranteed and unguaranteed portions for secondary market sales. The 7(a) market does not benefit from the incentive for lenders to sell on the secondary market to mitigate interest rate risk, because the 7(a) program consists mainly of variable-rate loans without interest rate caps. Residential mortgages are all backed by residential property. Because of the heterogeneous nature of 7(a) loans, analysts are less able to accurately estimate prepayment risks. In summary, secondary market volume for both the guaranteed portions of 7(a) loans and federally insured residential mortgage loans is a market outcome that depends on the relative benefits provided by the respective secondary markets compared to other methods of finance. For the most part, SBA has few if any means to change factors that, through market forces, limit the relative size of the secondary market. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) guaranteed loans secondary market, focusing on the: (1) benefits generally provided by secondary loan markets; (2) characteristics of the secondary market for federal government guaranteed mortgage loans; and (3) characteristics of the guaranteed 7(a) secondary market in relation to those of the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) mortgage-backed securities (MBS) secondary market.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the 7(a) loan program, SBA's largest lending program, is intended to serve small business borrowers who cannot otherwise obtain financing under suitable terms and conditions from the private sector; (2) secondary loan markets link borrowers and lenders in local markets to national capital markets, thus reducing dependence on local funds availability; (3) the secondary market in residential mortgages is recognized for creating this link; (4) this secondary market has reduced regional imbalances in the availability of loanable funds; (5) other benefits, which include tapping additional sources of funds, have also helped to lower interest rates paid by borrowers; (6) in addition, this secondary market allows interest rate risk inherent in holding fixed-rate loans to become diversified among investors that might be better able to hedge against such risks than loan originators; (7) in contrast to Ginnie Mae guaranteed MBS that are backed by cash flows from whole loans, 7(a) loans are divided into separate guaranteed and unguaranteed portions for secondary market sales; (8) preliminary results indicate that the guaranteed 7(a) secondary market has also linked borrowers and lenders in local markets to national capital markets, and thus generated some of the benefits generally created by other secondary markets; (9) however, the guaranteed 7(a) secondary market has characteristics that limit its size in relation to the primary 7(a) market; (10) in particular, most 7(a) loans are variable-rate loans with almost no interest rate risk, which reduces incentives for some lenders to use the secondary market; (11) in addition, 7(a) secondary market investors, relative to MBS investors, have less information to accurately estimate their exposure to risks associated with borrowers paying off their loans before they are due (prepayment risks), which may limit whether or how much they are willing to participate; (12) secondary market volume for both the guaranteed portions of 7(a) loans and federally insured residential mortgage loans is a market outcome that depends on the relative benefits provided by the respective secondary markets compared to other methods of finance; and (13) for the most part, SBA has few if any means to change factors that, through market forces, limit the relative size of the secondary market. |
gao_GAO-17-703 | gao_GAO-17-703_0 | In the agreement development phase, for an FMS case, the implementing agency, with input from the partner country, develops an assistance agreement called a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). DOD Has Improved the Timeliness of the FMS Process but Has Not Met Its Goals or Sufficiently Analyzed Performance Data
DSCA has established three measures of performance relating to FMS case duration but has not met its goals for two of these metrics and does not collect information on the third. The first metric tracks the time taken from the receipt of a partner country’s request to the transmission of a completed LOA to the partner country for approval. DOD’s timeliness has improved, but it is not meeting this metric’s goal of 85 percent of LOAs sent to partner countries within established time frames. The second metric is the time taken for the review of FMS cases as they are processed through DSCA headquarters. The third metric is the time taken for DOD to deliver the first item or service on an FMS case to the recipient country. The Military Departments’ Workload and Workforce Have Increased While DSCA’s Workforce Has Declined, and DSCA Has Not Developed a Workforce Plan
During fiscal year 2009 through 2016, the military departments’ FMS workload and workforce generally increased; over the same time period, DSCA, which does not have workload measures for its FMS workforce as a whole, experienced a decrease in its workforce. DSCA officials said that the drop in personnel has not adversely affected their capacity to process FMS and pseudo-FMS. DSCA Has Not Developed a Workforce Plan or Workload Measures for its FMS Workforce As A Whole
DSCA has not developed a workforce plan, although it is required to do so. DOD Has Taken Steps to Address Recommendations Made by GAO and Others to Improve the FMS Process
DOD has taken some steps to address long-standing concerns about the timeliness of FMS delivery. GAO, DOD’s Inspector General, and others have made numerous prior recommendations to improve the FMS process. DOD has taken steps to address three of the recommendations GAO made in 2012 but has yet to implement the fourth—the establishment of a performance measure to assess timeliness for the acquisition phase of the security assistance process. However, as discussed earlier in this report, information provided by DSCA did not include timeliness data for the delivery phase of the process, and DSCA officials reported that they are not collecting data for this performance metric. We found that DOD had implemented one recommendation and partially implemented 16 recommendations, as summarized in table 7. In that time, the FMS workforce and workloads of the three military departments have grown significantly, while the DSCA workforce has decreased. For the third metric established to monitor the timeliness of the delivery phase, DSCA is not collecting data and therefore does not know how it is performing against this goal. In partially concurring with our first recommendation, DOD stated that it intends to rescind or replace, in the near future, the metric established to measure the time DOD takes to deliver the first items to recipient countries. DOD commented that collecting data on when the first spare part or support equipment is delivered does not provide meaningful data. While we agree that these actions are useful for DOD to oversee the execution of security assistance, we continue to believe that DOD needs to improve its analysis of performance data in order to identify the root causes of any delays and determine the steps needed to improve the timeliness of the process. This report assesses (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has met performance goals with respect to the timeliness of the FMS process, (2) DOD’s FMS workforce planning efforts and fiscal year 2009 through 2016 FMS workload and workforce trends, and (3) the actions DOD has taken to address recommendations made since 2009 to improve FMS. To assess the extent to which established performance goals have been met, we reviewed and summarized performance data and interviewed officials from DSCA. Foreign partners may pay the U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on their behalf through the FMS program. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) did not provide a breakout of official sales data by military department but did provide these data in the aggregate. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. national security benefits from the timely provision of military equipment and services that enable foreign partners and allies to build or enhance their security capability. State has overall responsibility for the FMS program, while DOD administers the program through DSCA and implementing agencies in the military departments. Since 2009, DSCA has taken steps to improve the timeliness of the FMS process, but concerns remain that the delivery of FMS equipment is not timely, leaving foreign partners waiting for items needed to achieve security objectives.
House and Senate committees requested that GAO assess the FMS process. This report assesses (1) the extent to which DOD has met FMS timeliness goals, (2) FMS workload and workforce trends, and (3) actions DOD has taken to address recommendations to improve the FMS process made by GAO and others. GAO analyzed performance data for FMS from 2012 to 2016; workforce and workload data from the military departments; reviewed relevant DOD regulations and policies for FMS; and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) performance on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) has improved, but DOD is not meeting two out of three performance metrics for the timely processing of FMS requests and does not collect data for the third metric. The first metric tracks the time taken from the receipt of a country's request for an item to when a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is sent to the partner country for approval. As shown in the table, this metric is based on the complexity of the requests, and although DOD's timeliness has improved, it is still short of the 85 percent goal. The second missed metric is the time the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) takes to review and approve FMS cases. The review time in 2016 was more than the 1 day goal. The third metric is the time DOD takes to deliver the first item to the recipient country; however, DSCA does not collect data on this metric and therefore does not know if it is meeting the goal. DOD officials cited several factors that adversely affect their ability to meet the timeliness goals, such as changing customer requirements or delays due to policy concerns regarding particular sales. However, because DOD has not collected data on one metric and has not identified the underlying causes for not meeting its goals, it does not know the extent to which these or other factors are impacting program delivery.
During fiscal years 2009 through 2016, the FMS workload increased and while the three military services' FMS workforces generally increased, DSCA's FMS workforce decreased. DSCA officials do not believe the size of their workforce has impacted timeliness; but the data provided to GAO shows that DSCA's timeliness has decreased as the size of its FMS workforce has decreased. A key principle of strategic workforce planning is that an agency's workforce must be aligned with its workload. However, DSCA lacks workload measures for its FMS workforce as a whole, and therefore cannot ensure that its workforce is sufficient to meet programmatic goals. Moreover, despite a DOD requirement, DSCA has not yet developed a workforce plan that could help identify any skill or competency gaps in its workforce. Officials said they planned to do so by the end of May 2018.
DOD has a taken some steps to address recommendations to improve the FMS process, but additional actions are still needed. For example, DOD implemented three of GAO's prior recommendations, such as establishing performance metrics, but has yet to establish a metric to assess timeliness of the acquisition phase. DOD has partially implemented several of the recommendations made by an internal DOD task force. For example, DOD has partially implemented the recommendations to enhance the skills of the FMS workforce. In addition, DSCA's efforts to standardize data that are maintained separately by the military services on a new information system have fallen behind schedule.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DSCA (1) collect data on delivery of items or services, (2) analyze FMS performance metric data to determine why goals have not been met, (3) develop a DSCA workforce plan, and (4) develop DSCA workload measures. DOD partially concurred with the first two recommendations, concurred with the third, and did not concur with the fourth. GAO continues to believe action is needed as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-889 | gao_GAO-07-889_0 | Under this provision, Medicaid applicants and beneficiaries who are undergoing redeterminations of eligibility must provide “satisfactory documentary evidence” of citizenship. Under the regulations issued by CMS, states must provide applicants and Medicaid beneficiaries a “reasonable opportunity” to document their citizenship before denying or terminating Medicaid eligibility. States that reported a decline in enrollment varied in their views of the effects on access to Medicaid coverage after the first year of implementation. State enrollment policies and whether an individual is an applicant or a beneficiary at redetermination are two factors that may have influenced the effect of the requirement on individuals’ access. Of the 44 states, 22 states reported a decline in enrollment due to implementing the requirement, 12 reported no change in enrollment as a result of the requirement, and 10 reported that they did not know the effect of the requirement on enrollment (see fig. Overall, these denials and terminations represented over 18,000 individuals, who the state generally believed were eligible citizens. For example, states that reported a previous reliance on mail-in applications and redeterminations were more likely to report a decline in Medicaid enrollment. Another enrollment policy that may have influenced the requirement’s effect on access to Medicaid coverage was the amount of time states allowed individuals to comply with the requirement—otherwise known as reasonable opportunity periods. In addition, applicants in some states were given less time than beneficiaries to meet the requirement. States Reported Investing Resources to Implement Requirement, with Fiscal Benefits Uncertain
Although states reported investing resources to implement the requirement, potential fiscal benefits for the federal government and states are uncertain. State Resources Invested to Implement the Requirement and Assist Individuals with Compliance
All 44 states reported taking a number of administrative measures to implement the requirement and assist individuals with compliance. Further, 15 states budgeted funds for implementation costs in state fiscal year 2008. Two Aspects of the Requirement Increased the Burden of Implementation
Despite investments of resources, most states reported that the requirement resulted in the state spending more time completing applications and redeterminations and individuals needing more assistance in person during the process. More than 80 percent of states (36 of 44) reported facing administrative challenges in implementing the requirement, and many attributed the challenges to two specific aspects of the requirement outlined in the regulations, namely (1) that documents must be originals and (2) that the list of acceptable documentation was complex and did not allow for exceptions. Estimates of Federal and State Fiscal Benefits May Be Overstated
Though CMS expected some savings to result from the requirement in fiscal year 2008, the estimate did not account for the cost to states and the federal government to implement the requirement. Though CMS authorized states to claim federal Medicaid matching funds for administrative expenditures related to implementing the requirement, and 15 states reported budgeting funds for 2008 in addition to the numerous other measures being taken by states, CMS’s estimate of savings did not account for any increase in administrative expenditures by states or the federal government. When asked about potential savings from the requirement, only 5 of the 44 states reported expecting the requirement to result in a decrease in their expenditures for Medicaid benefits in state fiscal year 2008, due in large part to individuals who appeared to be eligible citizens who experienced delays in or lost coverage. Absent national CMS data on the effects and because state Medicaid offices were largely responsible for implementing the requirement, we determined they were the best source for this information. Though not all states could quantify the effect of the requirement on enrollment, 22 states reported that the requirement resulted in decreases in enrollment, 12 reported that the requirement had no effect on enrollment, and 10 reported not knowing the effect of the requirement on enrollment. The report clearly indicates that these data are from a single state and further notes that the extent of the decline in Medicaid enrollment due to the requirement in some individual states and nationally is unknown. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of HHS, the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) included a provision that requires states to obtain documentary evidence of U.S. citizenship or nationality when determining eligibility of Medicaid applicants and current beneficiaries; self-attestation of citizenship and nationality is no longer acceptable. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued regulations states must follow in obtaining this documentation. Interested parties have raised concerns that efforts to comply with the requirement will cause eligible citizens to lose access to Medicaid coverage and will be costly for states to implement. GAO was asked to examine how the requirement has affected individuals' access to Medicaid benefits and assess the administrative and fiscal effects of implementing the requirement. To do this work, GAO surveyed state Medicaid offices in the 50 states and the District of Columbia about their perspectives on access issues and the administrative and fiscal effects of the requirement. GAO obtained complete responses from 44 states representing 71 percent of national Medicaid enrollment in fiscal year 2004. GAO also reviewed federal laws, regulations, and CMS guidance.
What GAO Found
States reported that the citizenship documentation requirement resulted in barriers to access to Medicaid for some eligible citizens. Twenty-two of the 44 states reported declines in Medicaid enrollment due to the requirement, and a majority of these states attributed the declines to delays in or losses of Medicaid coverage for individuals who appeared to be eligible citizens. Of the remaining states, 12 reported that the requirement had no effect and 10 reported they did not know the requirement's effect on enrollment. Not all of the 22 states reporting declines could quantify enrollment declines due specifically to the requirement, but a state that had begun tracking the effect identified 18,000 individuals in the 7 months after implementation whose applications were denied or coverage was terminated for inability to provide the necessary documentation, though the state believed most of them to be eligible citizens. Further, states reporting a decline in enrollment varied in their impressions about the requirement's effect on enrollment after the first year of implementation. States' enrollment policies and whether an individual was an applicant or a beneficiary may have influenced the requirement's effect on access to Medicaid. For example, states that relied primarily on mail-in applications before the requirement were more likely to report declines in enrollment than states where individuals usually applied in person. In addition, the requirement may have more adversely affected applicants than beneficiaries because applicants were given less time to comply in some states and were not eligible for Medicaid benefits until they documented their citizenship. Although states reported investing resources to implement the requirement, potential fiscal benefits for the federal government and states are uncertain. All 44 states reported taking administrative measures to implement the requirement and assist individuals with compliance. In addition, 10 states reported that a total of $28 million was appropriated in state fiscal year 2007, and 15 states budgeted funds for implementation costs in state fiscal year 2008. Despite these measures, states reported that the requirement has increased the level of assistance needed by individuals and amount of time spent by states during the enrollment process. States specified two aspects of the requirement as increasing the burden for them and for individuals: that documents had to be originals and the list of acceptable documents was complex and did not allow for exceptions. Further, although CMS estimated the requirement would result in savings for the federal government and states of $90 million for fiscal year 2008, states' responses indicated that this estimate may be overstated for two reasons. Specifically, CMS did not account for the increased administrative expenditures reported by states, and the agency's estimated savings from ineligible, noncitizens no longer receiving benefits may be less than anticipated. In commenting on a draft of the report, CMS raised concerns about the conclusions drawn from the survey responses as to the requirement's effect on access, mainly that states did not submit data to support their responses. |
gao_GAO-12-481 | gao_GAO-12-481_0 | Permissible Providers
The types of providers eligible to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs—referred to as permissible providers—differ. Beginning in 2011, the first year of the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs, the programs have provided incentive payments to eligible providers that met program requirements. To receive incentive payments from either the Medicare or Medicaid EHR To programs, providers must meet eligibility and reporting requirements.do so, providers report certain information to CMS, the states, or to both—a process referred to as “attestation”—by entering certain information into CMS’s or the states’ EHR program web-based attestation tools. Professionals. For the First Program Year, Processes Are Being Implemented to Verify Requirements Were Met, and CMS Has Opportunities to Improve Them
CMS and the four states we reviewed are implementing processes to verify whether providers met the Medicare or Medicaid EHR programs’ eligibility and reporting requirements and, therefore, qualified to receive incentive payments in the programs’ first year. Although CMS is taking some steps to improve the processes CMS and states use to verify whether providers have met Medicare and Medicaid EHR program requirements, we found that CMS has additional opportunities to assess and improve these processes. CMS and Selected States Are Implementing Processes to Verify Whether Providers Met Requirements to Receive Incentive Payments
For the first program year, CMS is implementing a combination of pre- and postpayment processes to verify whether providers have met all of the Medicare EHR program eligibility and reporting requirements. In 2012, according to CMS officials, the agency plans to implement additional processes to verify, on a postpayment basis, whether a sample of providers has met all three of the Medicare EHR program’s reporting requirements. Texas has not yet determined whether it will conduct additional postpayment verifications. Most Medicare Providers Exempted Themselves from Reporting Certain Measures and Many Reported Others Based on Few Patients
Most providers participating in the first year of the Medicare EHR program through December 8, 2011, exercised program flexibility to exempt themselves from reporting on at least one mandatory meaningful use measure. In addition, many providers also reported at least one clinical quality measure based on few patients. Clinical quality measures calculated using few patients may be statistically unreliable, which, according to the American Hospital Association and others, could detract from providers’ abilities to use those measures as meaningful tools for quality improvement. CMS has acknowledged that the availability of clinical quality measures that are relevant to providers’ patient populations and clinical practices is important to inform providers’ efforts to improve quality of care and to measure potential impacts of the EHR programs. It is encouraging that CMS has awarded contracts to evaluate states’ implementation of the Medicaid EHR program, including their efforts to prevent improper payments. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of processes to verify whether providers meet program requirements for the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following four actions:
Establish time frames for expeditiously implementing an evaluation of the effectiveness of the agency’s audit strategy for the Medicare EHR program. HHS disagreed with our fourth recommendation that CMS offer to collect meaningful use attestations data from Medicaid providers on behalf of the states, citing two reasons. Despite HHS’s objections, we continue to believe that our recommendation should be implemented. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of CMS, the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, and other interested parties. For certain meaningful use measures, providers may report to CMS that the measures are not relevant to them; this is referred to as claiming an exemption. Furthermore, to satisfy the requirement for one of the meaningful use measures “report clinical quality measures to CMS,” providers must report on clinical quality measures identified by CMS.the number of meaningful use measures and clinical quality measures providers must report for the first year of the Medicare EHR program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act established the Medicare and Medicaid electronic health records (EHR) programs. CMS and the states administer these programs which began in 2011 to promote the meaningful use of EHR technology through incentive payments paid to certain providersthat is, hospitals and health care professionals. Spending for the programs is estimated to total $30 billion from 2011 through 2019. Consistent with the HITECH Act, GAO (1) examined efforts by CMS and the states to verify whether providers qualify to receive EHR incentive payments and (2) examined information reported to CMS by providers to demonstrate meaningful use in the first year of the Medicare EHR program. GAO reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, and guidance; interviewed officials from CMS; interviewed officials from four states, which were judgmentally selected to obtain variation among multiple factors; and analyzed data from CMS and other sources.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the four states GAO reviewed are implementing processes to verify whether providers met the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs requirements and, therefore, qualified to receive incentive payments in the first year of the EHR programs. To receive such payments, providers must meet both (1) eligibility requirements that specify the types of providers eligible to participate in the programs and (2) reporting requirements that specify the information providers must report to CMS or the states, including measures that demonstrate meaningful use of an EHR system and measures of clinical quality. For the Medicare EHR program, CMS has implemented prepayment processes to verify whether providers have met all of the eligibility requirements and one of the reporting requirements. Beginning in 2012, the agency also has plans to implement a risk-based audit strategy to verify on a postpayment basis that a sample of providers met the remaining reporting requirements. For the Medicaid EHR Program, the four states GAO reviewed have implemented primarily prepayment processes to verify whether providers met all eligibility requirements. To verify the reporting requirement, all four states implemented prepayment processes, postpayment processes, or both. CMS officials stated that the agency intends to evaluate how effectively its Medicare EHR program audit strategy reduces the risk of improper EHR incentive payments, though the agency has not yet established corresponding timelines for doing this work. Such an evaluation could help CMS determine whether it should revise its verification processes by, for example, implementing additional prepayment processes, which GAO has shown may reduce the risk of improper payments. In addition, CMS has opportunities to improve the efficiency of verification processes by, for example, collecting certain data on states behalf.
CMS allows providers to exempt themselves from reporting certain measures if providers report that the measures are not relevant to their patients or practices. Measures calculated based on few patients may be statistically unreliable, which limits their usefulness as tools for quality improvement. CMS and others acknowledged that the availability of measures that are relevant to providers patients and practices and are statistically reliable is important to provide useful information to providers. Among participants in the first year of the Medicare EHR program, the majority of providers chose to exempt themselves from reporting on at least one meaningful use measure and many providers reported at least one clinical quality measure based on fewless than sevenpatients.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to CMS in order to improve processes to verify whether providers met program requirements for the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs, including opportunities for efficiencies. HHS agreed with three of GAOs recommendations, but disagreed with the fourth recommendation that CMS offer to collect certain information on states behalf. GAO continues to believe that this action is an important step to yield potential cost savings. |
gao_GAO-04-170T | gao_GAO-04-170T_0 | Background
Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis—that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date— either with temporary visas (generally for tourism, business, or work) issued by the Department of State or, in some cases, as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. The latter group includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the Visa Waiver Permanent program. The large majority of these visitors depart on time, but others overstay. When visiting the United States for business or pleasure, two major groups are exempt from filling out an I-94 form:
Mexicans entering the United States with a Border Crossing Card (BCC) at the Southwestern border who intend to limit their stay to less than 72 hours and not to travel beyond a set perimeter (generally, 25 miles from the border) and
Canadians admitted for up to 6 months without a perimeter restriction.Thus, the majority of Canadian and Mexican visits cannot be tracked by the current system, because the visitors have not filled out Form I-94. The Extent of Overstaying Is Significant and May Be Understated by DHS’s Estimate
Significant numbers of visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. As indicated above, many short-term overstays are not included in the 2000 census, which is the starting point of DHS’s 2.3 million estimate of the resident overstay population. Missing departure forms. One weakness is the inability to match some departure forms back to corresponding arrival forms. Because of these weaknesses, DHS has no accurate list of overstays to send to consular officials or DHS inspectors. . . interior enforcement.” Despite large numbers of overstays, current efforts to deport them are generally limited to (1) criminals and smugglers, (2) employees identified as illegal at critical infrastructure locations, and (3) persons included in special control efforts such as the domestic registration (or “call in” component) of the NSEERS program (the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System). US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, is DHS’s new tracking system intended to improve entry-exit data. Overstay Issues May Complicate Efforts to Ensure Domestic Security
Tracking System Weaknesses Encourage Overstays and Hamper Some Counterterrorism Efforts
Tracking system weaknesses may encourage overstaying on the part of visitors and potential terrorists who legally enter the United States. Additionally, a current overstay recently pled guilty to identity document fraud in connection with the 9/11 hijackers. Conclusion
Weaknesses in DHS’s current overstay tracking system and the magnitude of the overstay problem make it more difficult to ensure domestic security. Viewing our results in the context of our nation’s layered defense, we believe that improvements in the tracking system must work together with other factors—such as intelligence, investigation, and information-sharing—to help ensure domestic security. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism,business,or work) or, in some cases (2) as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. (The latter group includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on time, but others overstay. Four of the 9/11 hijackers who entered the United States with legal visas overstayed their authorized periods of admission. This has heightened attention to issues such as (1) the extent of overstaying, (2) weaknesses in our current overstay tracking system, and (3) how the tracking system weaknesses and the level of overstaying might affect domestic security.
What GAO Found
Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. The Department of Homeland Security estimates the resident overstay population at 2.3 million as of January 2000. Because the starting point for this estimate is the 2000 census, it does not cover short-term overstays who have not established residence here. It also omits an unknown number of potential long-term overstays from Mexico and Canada. Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's current system for tracking arrivals and departures (e.g.,noncollection of some departure forms and inability to match other departure forms to arrivals), there is no accurate list of overstays. Two new tracking initiatives are intended to address these weaknesses. NSEERS, the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System, does not cover most visitors. US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a more comprehensive,automated program, is being phased in. While its design and implementation face a number of challenges, evaluating US-VISIT against the weaknesses GAO identifies here would increase its potential for success. The current tracking system's weaknesses limit control options and make it difficult to monitor potential terrorists who enter the country legally. Like other illegal immigrants, overstays obtain jobs with fraudulent identity documents, including jobs at critical infrastructure locations, such as airports. Thus, tracking issues can affect domestic security and are one component of a layered national defense. Improving the tracking system could work with intelligence, investigation, information-sharing, and other factors to help counter threats from foreign terrorists. |
gao_GAO-13-429 | gao_GAO-13-429_0 | Segregated Housing Unit Population and Number of Cells Have Increased since Fiscal Year 2008
From fiscal year 2008 through February 2013, the total inmate population in segregated housing units increased approximately 17 percent—from 10,659 to 12,460 inmates. By comparison, the total inmate population in BOP facilities increased by about 6 percent since fiscal year 2008. 5 for the trends in population growth for SHUs, SMUs, and ADX from fiscal year 2008 through February 2013). BOP’s Monitoring of Segregated Housing Policies Varies by Type of Unit, and Some Facilities’ Documentation Is Incomplete BOP Monitors Compliance Differently across the Three Types of Segregated Housing
BOP Headquarters (HQ) has a mechanism in place to centrally monitor how prisons implement most segregated housing unit policies, but the degree of BOP monitoring varies depending on the type of segregated housing unit. program reviews. Also, although BOP HQ has mechanisms to monitor some procedural protections, and ADX officials locally monitor ADX-specific policies, BOP HQ lacks oversight over the extent to which ADX staff are in compliance with many ADX-specific requirements related to conditions of confinement and procedural protections to the same degree that it has for SHUs and SMUs. With such oversight, BOP headquarters would have additional assurance that inmates held in BOP’s most restrictive facility are afforded their minimum conditions of confinement and procedural protections. However, given a selection of PRD monitoring reports from 20 prisons and our independent analysis of inmate case files at two federal prisons, we identified concerns related to how facilities are documenting that inmates received their conditions of confinement and procedural protections, which are described below. As part of our review, we found PRD monitoring reports identified deficiencies, such as missing SHU forms, or incomplete documentation that inmates held in segregation for at least 22 hours per day received all their meals and exercise as required. According to BOP officials, in December 2012, BOP began using a new software program, called the SHU application in all SHUs and SMUs. BOP officials told us that this new software program could improve the documentation of the conditions of confinement in SHUs and SMUs, but acknowledged it may not address all the deficiencies that we identified. Because this new software was recently implemented, and BOP did not provide evidence to the extent that it addressed the documentation deficiencies, we cannot determine if it will mitigate the documentation concerns. BOP Has Not Evaluated the Impact of Segregated Housing Units on Institutional Safety or the Impacts of Long- Term Segregation on Inmates
BOP Has Not Assessed the Extent to Which Segregated Housing Impacts Institutional Safety
BOP has not assessed the extent to which all three types of segregated housing units—SHUs, SMUs, and ADX— impact institutional safety for inmates and staff.impact of segregation, BOP senior management and prison officials told us that they believed segregated housing units were effective in helping to maintain institutional safety. However, it is unclear to what extent the review will assess the extent that segregated housing units contribute to the safety and security of inmates and staff and ensures that BOP meets its mission goals. As of January 2013, BOP announced that the bureau is considering the development of procedures for conducting individualized mental health case reviews of inmates held in long-term segregation, i.e., inmates housed in SHUs or the ADX Control Unit for more than 12 continuous months and inmates who fail to progress through the SMU or ADX General Population Step Down phases in a timely manner. Conclusions
Over the past 5 years, the number of BOP inmates in segregated housing has grown at a faster rate than the general inmate population. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve BOP’s ability to centrally oversee the implementation of segregated housing policies, we recommend that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons take the following two actions: (1) develop ADX-specific monitoring requirements and (2) develop a plan that clarifies the objectives and goals of the new software program, with time frames and milestones, and other means, that explains the extent to which the software program will address documentation concerns we identified. To ensure that BOP’s use of segregated housing furthers BOP’s goal to confine inmates in a humane manner and contributes to institutional safety without having a detrimental impact on inmates held there for long periods of time, we recommend that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons take the following two actions: (1) ensure that any current study to assess segregated housing units also includes an assessment of the extent that segregated housing contributes to institutional safety, and consider key practices that include local and state efforts to reduce reliance on and the number of inmates held in segregated housing and (2) assess the impact of long-term segregation on inmates in SHUs, SMUs, and ADX. | Why GAO Did This Study
BOP confines about 7 percent of its 217,000 inmates in segregated housing units for about 23 hours a day. Inmates are held in SHUs, SMUs, and ADX. GAO was asked to review BOP's segregated housing unit practices. This report addresses, among other things: (1) the trends in BOP's segregated housing population, (2) the extent to which BOP centrally monitors how prisons apply segregated housing policies, and (3) the extent to which BOP assessed the impact of segregated housing on institutional safety and inmates. GAO analyzed BOP's policies for compliance and analyzed population trends from fiscal year 2008 through February 2013. GAO visited six federal prisons selected for different segregated housing units and security levels, and reviewed 61 inmate case files and 45 monitoring reports. The results are not generalizable, but provide information on segregated housing units.
What GAO Found
The overall number of inmates in the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) three main types of segregated housing units--Special Housing Units (SHU), Special Management Units (SMU), and Administrative Maximum (ADX)--increased at a faster rate than the general inmate population. Inmates may be placed in SHUs for administrative reasons, such as pending transfer to another prison, and for disciplinary reasons, such as violating prison rules; SMUs, a four-phased program in which inmates can progress from more to less restrictive conditions; or ADX, for inmates that require the highest level of security. From fiscal year 2008 through February 2013, the total inmate population in segregated housing units increased approximately 17 percent--from 10,659 to 12,460 inmates. By comparison, the total inmate population in BOP facilities increased by about 6 percent during this period.
BOP has a mechanism to centrally monitor segregated housing, but the degree of monitoring varies by unit type and GAO found incomplete documentation of monitoring at select prisons. BOP headquarters lacks the same degree of oversight of ADX-specific conditions of confinement compared with SHUs and SMUs partly because ADX policies are monitored locally by ADX officials. Developing specific requirements for ADX could provide BOP with additional assurance that inmates held at ADX are afforded their minimum conditions of confinement and procedural protections. According to a selection of monitoring reports and inmate case files, GAO also identified documentation concerns related to conditions of confinement and procedural protections, such as ensuring that inmates received all their meals and exercise as required. According to BOP officials, in December 2012, all SHUs and SMUs began using a new software program that could improve the ability to document conditions of confinement in SHUs and SMUs. However, BOP officials acknowledged the recently implemented software program may not address all the deficiencies GAO identified. Since BOP could not provide evidence that it addressed the documentation deficiencies, GAO cannot determine if it will mitigate the documentation concerns. BOP expects to complete a review of the new software program by approximately September 30, 2013, which should help determine the extent to which the software program addresses documentation deficiencies GAO identified.
BOP has not assessed the impact of segregated housing on institutional safety or the impacts of long-term segregation on inmates. In January 2013, BOP authorized a study of segregated housing; however, it is unclear to what extent the study will assess the extent to which segregated housing units contribute to institutional safety. As of January 2013, BOP is considering conducting mental health case reviews for inmates held in SHUs or ADX for more than 12 continuous months. However, without an assessment of the impact of segregation on institutional safety or study of the long-term impact of segregated housing on inmates, BOP cannot determine the extent to which segregated housing achieves its stated purpose to protect inmates, staff and the general public.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BOP (1) develop ADX-specific monitoring requirements; (2) develop a plan that clarifies how BOP will address documentation concerns GAO identified, through the new software program; (3) ensure that any current study to assess segregated housing also includes reviews of its impact on institutional safety; and (4) assess the impact of long-term segregation. BOP agreed with these recommendations and reported it would take actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-02-62 | gao_GAO-02-62_0 | In contrast, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides income support to eligible aged and disabled persons regardless of their earnings history. Funds for SSI benefits come from general revenues, not payroll taxes. To address the program’s long-term financing shortfall, a variety of proposals have been offered. Parameters of the benefit formula were automatically adjusted to reflect inflation, and the adjustments affected levels of benefits for both existing and new beneficiaries. Moreover, various amendments extended eligibility to more types of beneficiaries. No Single Measure Gives Complete Picture of Income Adequacy
Various measures have been developed to examine different aspects of income adequacy, but no single measure offers a complete picture. Social Security and Other Types of Retirement Income Have Grown Over Time
Over the same period that the income adequacy has increased for the elderly, Social Security has become the single largest source of retirement income. Percent of elderly households with income below poverty Poverty rates also vary by living situation. Income Adequacy in the Future Will Depend on Extent and Nature of Program Changes
The outlook for future Social Security benefit levels and thus their effect on income adequacy generally will depend on how the program’s long- term financing imbalance is addressed, as well as on the measures used. If disabled and survivor benefits were not reduced at all, reductions in other benefits would be deeper than shown in this analysis. Also, an SSA actuarial note observes that “policymakers are interested in replacement ratios: (1) as a means of communicating to prospective beneficiaries approximately how much they can expect to receive from Social Security, relative to their earnings; and (2) as a means of deciding if and how the Social Security program should be changed to meet the needs and desires of the public…”
Replacement rates have also been used with respect to employer- sponsored pensions and retirement income more broadly, using total income amounts in the ratio. PIA = 90% ! sources. | What GAO Found
Before Social Security, being old often meant being poor. Today, dependency on public assistance has dropped to a fraction of its Depression-era levels, and poverty rates among the elderly are now lower than for the population as a whole. At the same time, Social Security has become the single largest source of retirement income for more than 90 percent of persons aged 65 and older. Automatic adjustments were introduced in 1972 to reflect increases in the cost of living. Other program changes gradually increased social security coverage to larger portions of the workforce and extended eligibility to family members and disabled workers. Other benefit programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicare, and Medicaid, have also been added over the years. With regard to measuring income adequacy, various measures help examine different aspects of this concept, but no single measure can provide a complete picture. For various subgroups of beneficiaries that have lower lifetime earnings, poverty rates have also declined. Although the Social Security benefit formula favors lower lifetime earners, their lower earnings and work histories can leave them with incomes below the poverty level when they retire or become disabled. The outlook for future Social Security benefit levels and income adequacy depend on how the program's long-term financing imbalance is addressed, as well as on the measures used. GAO concludes that reductions in promised benefits and increases in program revenues will be needed to restore the program's long-term solvency and sustainability. Possible benefit changes might include adjustments to the benefit formula or reductions in cost-of-living increases. Possible revenue sources might include higher payroll taxes or transfers from the Treasury's general fund. |
gao_NSIAD-97-15 | gao_NSIAD-97-15_0 | The guidance directs the use of military personnel for any one or more of the following reasons:
Required training is only available in the military. These activities established staffing requirements at the time their missions were tasked to include determining which positions were military essential. Since the establishment of officer positions can be subjective and judgmental and the services generally prefer using military rather than civilian staffing, once the positions are established, neither the services nor local commanders have much incentive to revalidate the positions and these positions often remain categorized as military essential because they already are military. We used criteria based on DOD and service implementing guidance to evaluate such positions as research and development officer and systems automation officer in the Army, comptroller and oceanographer in the Navy, and acquisition management officer and civil engineer in the Air Force. DOD Could Save About $95 Million Annually by Converting About 9,500 Positions
If DOD converted all of the positions that we identified and maintained the existing grade structure, DOD could achieve annual cost savings of about $95 million in the converted positions. Also, the Army has a number of streamlining initiatives underway intended to save as much as $8 billion. However, final cost savings and the elapsed time before the full savings are realized will depend on the number of positions converted and the way conversions are carried out. Impediments Limit the Services’ Ability to Convert Positions to Civilian Status
Finally, as we reported in our 1994 report on military to civilian conversions, a number of impediments exist to military to civilian conversions. Second, local commanders may have little guarantee that funding will be provided for converted positions. These impediments are not insurmountable, but will be difficult to overcome without direction and support from DOD’s senior leadership, such as from OSD, and sustained attention to carrying out conversions by senior-level staff to overcome the impediments and develop and execute the conversion plan. Second, DOD stated that conversions run contrary to the ongoing civilian drawdown. However, conversion of support positions from military to civilian status would not affect military capability, but merely lower the cost of getting support work done, freeing up funds that could be used to enhance modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed certain military support officer positions as possible candidates for conversion to civilian status, focusing on the: (1) criteria the military services use to determine which officer positions are military essential; (2) officer positions that could be filled with civilians without harming operational capabilities; and (3) cost savings achieved through the conversion of military positions to civilian status.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1954, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1100.4 has required the services to staff positions with civilian personnel unless the services deem a position military essential for one or more reasons, including combat readiness, legal requirements, training, security, rotation, and discipline; (2) however, the DOD directive and service implementing guidance provide local commanders with wide latitude in justifying the use of military personnel in their staffing requests; (3) the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are currently staffing officers in about 9,500 administrative and support positions that civilians may be able to fill at lower cost and with greater productivity due to the civilians' much less frequent rotations; (4) examples of career fields that contain positions that might be converted are information and financial management; (5) DOD could save as much as $95 million annually by converting the roughly 9,500 positions GAO identified; (6) savings achieved through military to civilian conversions can be used to pay for needed priorities such as weapon systems modernization; (7) final cost savings and the elapsed time before all of the savings were realized would depend on how many positions DOD converted and how the conversions were carried out; (8) on the other hand, GAO recognizes that a number of impediments exist to military to civilian conversions, such as the ongoing civilian drawdown in DOD and a perceived preference by local commanders for military rather than civilian personnel in certain positions; and (9) these impediments are not insurmountable, but they will be difficult to overcome without direction and support from senior leaders at DOD, such as from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and sustained attention to overcoming the impediments and developing and executing the conversion plan. |
gao_GAO-03-914 | gao_GAO-03-914_0 | Other Countries’ Selected Practices to Manage Succession
To manage the succession of their executives and other key employees, agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are implementing succession planning and management practices that work to protect and enhance organizational capacity. In addition, leading organizations use succession planning and management to identify and develop knowledge and skills that are critical in the workplace. Achieve a More Diverse Workforce. While governments’ and agencies’ initiatives reflect their individual organizational structures, cultures, and priorities, these practices can guide executive branch agencies in the United States as they develop their own succession planning and management initiatives in order to ensure that federal agencies have the human capital capacity necessary to achieve their organizational goals and effectively deliver results now and in the future. They generally agreed with the contents of this report. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To meet our objective to identify how agencies in other countries are adopting a more strategic approach to managing the succession of senior executives and others with critical skills, we selected Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Canadian Province of Ontario based on our earlier work where we examined their implementation of results-oriented management and human capital reforms. We identified the examples illustrating the practices through the results of over 30 responses to a questionnaire sent to senior human capital officials at selected agencies. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we spoke to officials from the countries’ national audit offices, central management, and human capital agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Leading public organizations here and abroad recognize that a more strategic approach to human capital management is essential for change initiatives that are intended to transform their cultures. To that end, organizations are looking for ways to identify and develop the leaders, managers, and workforce necessary to face the array of challenges that will confront government in the 21st century. GAO conducted this study to identify how agencies in four countries--Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--are adopting a more strategic approach to managing the succession of senior executives and other public sector employees with critical skills. These agencies' experiences may provide insights to executive branch agencies as they undertake their own succession planning and management initiatives. GAO identified the examples described in this report through discussions with officials from central human capital agencies, national audit offices, and agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and a screening survey sent to senior human capital officials at selected agencies.
What GAO Found
Leading organizations engage in broad, integrated succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity. As part of this approach, these organizations identify, develop, and select their human capital to ensure that successors are the right people, with the right skills, at the right time for leadership and other key positions. To this end, agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are implementing succession planning and management initiatives that are designed to protect and enhance organizational capacity. |
gao_GAO-14-289 | gao_GAO-14-289_0 | Under FIFRA, EPA registers pesticides distributed, used, or sold, in the United States and prescribes labeling and other regulatory requirements to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on health and the environment. For example, when EPA conducts a GLP inspection, it determines, among other things, whether the laboratory is of suitable size and construction to facilitate the proper conduct of the studies. The GLP Compliance Monitoring Program selects laboratories for inspection from among the population of laboratories that have conducted studies submitted to OPP. Inspections can also be initiated at OPP’s request or that of another EPA office. EPA Has Inspected Few Laboratories for GLP Compliance and Faced Challenges in Selecting Laboratories for Inspections
EPA’s OECA has inspected few laboratories on an annual basis that test pesticides for GLP compliance for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 and faced challenges in doing so. However, our analysis showed that some laboratory information in the databases used to prioritize laboratories for inspection was either inaccurate or incomplete, and these data challenges may negatively affect prioritization. Given the concerns of some stakeholders about the infrequent GLP inspections, OECA is considering other approaches, such as charging fees or using third parties to review studies, in order to increase the number of inspections. In August 2012, OECA developed a Budget Adjustment Plan, which provided general information on potential future approaches to the GLP Compliance Monitoring Program, including ways the program could be run more efficiently given its recent budget cuts and inability to hire GLP inspectors. EPA officials told us that they have also conducted internal and informal discussions regarding the possibility of using user fees for the GLP program, but the agency has not conducted a formal evaluation of user fees. Without formally assessing the need for such fees, EPA cannot determine whether charging and retaining the fees would be possible and whether such fees could help make the inspection program self-sustaining. EPA Rarely Used GLP Inspection Results in Initial Pesticide Registration Decisions but Sometimes Used Them for Later Reexamination
EPA rarely used GLP inspection results in making its initial pesticide registration decisions. An OPP official told us that this is because most inspections occur after those decisions have been made. According to OPP officials, OPP has not denied a pesticide registration or revoked any registrations based on OECA laboratory inspection information during the past 5 years, but OPP has taken other actions because of that information, such as requiring a registrant to repeat a study or requesting that a registrant voluntarily cancel its registration. EPA and FDA Do Not Regularly Collaborate on Laboratory Inspections and May Be Duplicating Each Other’s Work
EPA and FDA do not regularly collaborate on GLP inspections and may be duplicating each other’s work by inspecting the same laboratories. In 1984, EPA and FDA entered into an interagency agreement to collaborate on GLP inspections that was last renewed in 2004. Officials from both agencies said that it would be useful to know which laboratories the other agency was planning to inspect and to have the results from those inspections. Since each agency only inspects a certain number of laboratories each year, sharing such information could help both agencies leverage resources. For fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2012, EPA and FDA conducted a total of 170 GLP inspections of the same 37 laboratories.In 38 of the 170 inspections, the agencies inspected the same laboratory during the same fiscal year (see app. Without collaboration and information- sharing on planned and completed GLP inspections, EPA and FDA may duplicate GLP inspections, and EPA will have difficulty efficiently using its limited resources to increase the number of inspections it conducts. In response to our first three recommendations, EPA agreed to assess the authority and need for a fee-based GLP inspection system; to ascertain the exact causes of inaccurate and incomplete data and ensure that the data are accurately recorded; and, that OECA and OPP should develop written procedures to coordinate and prioritize GLP inspections. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) inspects for GLP compliance laboratories that test pesticides and the challenges, if any, EPA faces in doing so, (2) EPA uses the information obtained through Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) laboratory inspections in its pesticide decision-making process, and (3) EPA and the U.S Food and Drug Administration (FDA) collaborate on GLP inspections. In addition, we interviewed EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) and OECA officials and reviewed documentation they provided to obtain further information and clarification on EPA’s pesticide registration process and how it relates to the GLP process, and we interviewed FDA officials and reviewed documentation they provided on FDA’s GLP process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pesticides used to control weeds, unwanted insects, and fungi contribute to agricultural productivity and public health by preventing crop damage and controlling pests. However, pesticides may also have adverse effects. EPA's OPP reviews applications for pesticide products and registers those that it determines do not have unreasonable adverse effects on health and the environment. EPA's OECA inspects laboratories where these pesticides are tested to ensure that the laboratories followed EPA's GLP regulations. FDA also conducts GLP laboratory inspections. GAO was asked to review EPA's GLP Compliance Monitoring Program. This report examines the extent to which EPA (1) inspects for GLP compliance laboratories that test pesticides and the challenges EPA faces in doing so, (2) uses the information obtained through GLP inspections in its pesticide decision-making process, and (3) collaborates with FDA on GLP inspections. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant agency documents and data, conducted a nongeneralizeable survey of 20 laboratories, and interviewed EPA and FDA officials and laboratory and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) inspects few laboratories that test pesticides for Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) compliance and faces challenges in selecting laboratories to inspect. For fiscal years 2009 to 2013, EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) GLP Compliance Monitoring Program inspected from 51 to 80 laboratories annually from an estimated 1,400 that conducted studies used to support applications for pesticide registrations. During the same period, EPA reduced OECA's GLP Compliance Program budget and staff by about half. Laboratory and other stakeholders told GAO that not having GLP inspections can negatively affect a laboratory's business domestically and abroad. OECA prioritizes laboratories for GLP inspections using criteria that reflect, among other things, how long it has been since the last inspection and the number of studies the laboratory has conducted that have been submitted to EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) in support of a pesticide registration application. However, GAO found that some laboratory information in the OECA database used to prioritize inspections was either inaccurate or incomplete, making it difficult to target laboratories for inspections. GAO also found that OECA is considering ways the GLP program could be run more efficiently given its recent budget cuts and concerns of stakeholders about the infrequent GLP inspections. For example, OECA officials have informally discussed the possibility of charging user fees that may be used to fund the GLP program, as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and many other countries do, but the agency has not conducted a formal evaluation of user fees. Without formally assessing the need for such fees, EPA cannot determine whether charging and retaining the fees would be possible and whether such fees could help make the inspection program self-sustaining.
EPA rarely uses GLP inspection results in making its initial pesticide registration decisions. An OPP official said that this is because most inspections occur after decisions have been made. OPP officials said they have not denied or revoked any pesticide registrations based on OECA GLP inspections during the past 5 years, but OPP has taken other actions, such as requiring that a study be repeated because of subsequent laboratory inspection information. According to EPA officials, OPP and OECA have communicated on an informal basis about OPP's inspection priorities before a pesticide registration has taken place.
EPA and FDA do not regularly collaborate on laboratory inspections and may be duplicating each other's work at some of these laboratories. In 1984, EPA and FDA entered into an agreement to collaborate on GLP inspections and met quarterly to discuss upcoming inspections; the agreement ended in 2004 although meetings continued until 2007. From fiscal year 2005 to 2012, EPA and FDA conducted a total of 170 GLP inspections of the same 37 laboratories. In 38 of 170 inspections, the agencies inspected the same laboratory during the same fiscal year. EPA and FDA have independent but similar sets of GLP regulations. Officials from both agencies said it would be useful to know which laboratories the other agency was planning to inspect and to have those inspection results, since each agency can only inspect a certain number of laboratories each year. Absent collaboration and information sharing with FDA on planned and completed GLP inspections, EPA will have difficulty efficiently using its limited resources to increase the number of inspections it conducts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA assess its authority and need for a fee-based inspection system for the GLP Program, determine why the database information to prioritize laboratories is incomplete, and that EPA and FDA develop a process to collaborate and share information on planned and completed inspections. EPA and FDA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-346 | gao_GAO-10-346_0 | Nearly Fifteen Percent of U.S. Households Were Food Insecure Sometime in 2008, According to USDA
The prevalence of food insecurity (the percentage of households with low or very low food security) hovered between 10 and 12 percent from 1998 to 2007, before rising to 14.6 percent in 2008, according to USDA’s analysis of CPS data. USDA recently reported that about 17 million households in the United States (or 14.6 percent of all U.S. households) were food insecure at some point in 2008. Among households with incomes below the poverty line, those headed by single parents, and those headed by minorities, prevalence rates for food insecurity were higher than the national average rate of 14.6 percent. were food insecure. However, in more than 4.3 million of these households, children—as well as adults—experienced food insecurity sometime during the year. The Federal Government Spent More Than $62.5 Billion on 18 Food Assistance Programs in Fiscal Year 2008
Spending on the 18 Food Assistance Programs Totaled more than $62.5 Billion in Fiscal Year 2008
The federal government spent approximately $62.7 billion on 18 domestic food and nutrition assistance programs in fiscal year 2008, with the 5 largest programs accounting for 95 percent of total spending. Spending on Most of the Large Programs— Excluding SNAP—Has Remained Stable
Since 1995 SNAP spending has fluctuated, while spending on the other large programs—the National School Lunch Program, WIC, the School Breakfast Program, and the Child and Adult Care Food Program— remained relatively stable. Economic conditions—such as unemployment or poverty—affect spending on food assistance programs. Research Shows 7 Programs Have Positive Outcomes Related to Their Goals but Little Is Known about the Remaining 11 Programs
Seven Programs— Including Four of the Five Largest—Generally Show Positive Outcomes Consistent with Many of Their Program Goals
Research suggests that participation in seven of the programs we reviewed, including four of the five largest—WIC, the National School Lunch Program, the School Breakfast Program, and SNAP—is associated with positive health and nutrition outcomes consistent with most of these programs’ goals, including raising the level of nutrition among low-income households, safeguarding the health and wellbeing of the nation’s children, improving the health of Americans, and strengthening the agricultural economy (see appendix III for summary of program goals). Little Is Known about the Health and Nutrition Outcomes of the Remaining 11 Programs
Little is known about the effectiveness of the remaining 11 programs because they have not been well studied. The System of Multiple Programs and Agencies That Provide Food Assistance Helps Address a Variety of Needs but Can Result in Overlap and Inefficiency
The 18 Food Assistance Programs Are Designed to Meet a Variety of Needs
Federal food assistance is provided through a decentralized system that involves multiple federal, state, and local providers and covers 18 different programs. By targeting various needs, the 18 food assistance programs help increase access to food for vulnerable populations, according to several agency officials and local providers we spoke with. The Multiple Food Assistance Programs Show Signs of Program Overlap, Which Can Result in Inefficient Use of Resources, and USDA Has Taken Some Steps to Address This
The federal food assistance structure—with its 18 programs—shows signs of program overlap, which can create unnecessary work and waste administrative resources, creating inefficiency. GAO has found that program overlap—having multiple programs provide comparable benefits to similar target populations—is an inefficient use of federal funds. Overlapping eligibility requirements create duplicative work for providers and applicants. We also met with federal officials and relevant experts. Other programs that have nutrition education components but primarily provide food assistance—such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), the National School Lunch Program, and the Child and Adult Care Food Program—are included in this review. These site visits also helped us better understand the implications of providing food assistance through multiple programs and agencies. Food Assistance: Research Provides Limited Information on the Effectiveness of Specific WIC Nutrition Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends billions of dollars every year on domestic food assistance programs. The U.S. Department of Agriculture administers most of these programs and monitors the prevalence of food insecurity--that is, the percentage of U.S. households that were unable to afford enough food sometime during the year. Other federal agencies also fund food assistance programs; however, comprehensive and consolidated information on the multiple programs is not readily available. Congress asked GAO to examine: 1) the prevalence of food insecurity in the United States, 2) spending on food assistance programs, 3) what is known about the effectiveness of these programs in meeting program goals, and 4) the implications of providing food assistance through multiple programs and agencies. GAO's steps included analyzing food security and program spending data, analyzing studies on program effectiveness, analyzing relevant federal laws and regulations, conducting site visits, and interviewing relevant experts and officials.
What GAO Found
The prevalence of food insecurity hovered between 10 and 12 percent over the past decade until it rose to nearly 15 percent (or about 17 million households) in 2008. Households with incomes below the poverty line, households headed by single parents, minority households, and those with children had higher than average rates of food insecurity. These households were more likely to report, for example, that they had been hungry, but didn't eat, because there wasn't enough money for food. While some households were able to protect children from the effects of food insecurity, many could not. In more than 4.3 million households, children--as well as adults--were affected by food insecurity sometime during the year. The federal government spent more than $62.5 billion on 18 domestic food and nutrition assistance programs in fiscal year 2008. The five largest food assistance programs--Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); the National School Lunch Program; the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); the Child and Adult Care Food Program; and the School Breakfast Program--accounted for 95 percent of total spending on the 18 programs. Since 1995 SNAP spending has fluctuated while spending on the other large programs has remained relatively stable. Economic conditions--such as unemployment or poverty--and other factors can affect spending on some programs, particularly SNAP. Research suggests that participation in 7 of the programs we reviewed--including WIC, the National School Lunch Program, the School Breakfast Program, and SNAP--is associated with positive health and nutrition outcomes consistent with programs' goals, such as raising the level of nutrition among low-income households, safeguarding the health and wellbeing of the nation's children, and strengthening the agricultural economy. However, little is known about the effectiveness of the remaining 11 programs because they have not been well studied. Federal food assistance is provided through a decentralized system that involves multiple federal, state, and local organizations. The complex network of 18 food assistance programs emerged piecemeal over the past several decades to meet various needs. Agency officials and local providers told us that the multiple food assistance programs help to increase access to food for vulnerable or target populations. However, the 18 food assistance programs show signs of program overlap, which can create unnecessary work and lead to inefficient use of resources. For example, some of the programs provide comparable benefits to similar target populations. Further, overlapping eligibility requirements create duplicative work for both service providers and applicants. Consolidating programs, however, entails difficult trade-offs. Such actions could improve efficiency and save administrative dollars but could also make it more difficult to achieve the goals of targeting service to specific populations, such as pregnant women, children, and the elderly. |
gao_GAO-04-779 | gao_GAO-04-779_0 | These reports allow the Defense Contract Management Agency to independently verify that Navy repair contractors have accounted for all government-furnished material shipped to them. As a result, this inventory is vulnerable to loss or theft. Navy Is Not Requiring Its Repair Contractors to Acknowledge Receipt of Government-Furnished Material
Navy repair contractors are not routinely acknowledging receipt of government-furnished material that has been shipped to them from the Navy’s supply system. By not requiring repair contractors to receipt, the Naval Inventory Control Point does not follow up with its repair contractors within 45 days—as required by DOD procedure—when these repair contractors fail to confirm receipt of government-furnished material shipped to them. Naval Inventory Control Point officials also stated that submitting notification of receipt for this material might overstate the inventory levels in the DOD Commercial Asset Visibility System—the Navy’s inventory management system—because the system would show this material as on-hand at its repair contractors’ facilities when the material is actually earmarked for immediate use in the repair of another item. For fiscal year 2002, the most recent and complete data available at the time of our review, the Naval Inventory Control Point reported that 4,229 government-furnished material shipments (representing 4,301 items valued at approximately $115 million) had been shipped to its repair contractors. We randomly selected and examined 308 government- furnished material shipments, representing 344 items that were shipped to Navy repair contractors. We estimate that 50 unclassified items may be unaccounted for, with a value of about $729,000 in inventory of aircraft-related government- furnished material for fiscal year 2002. Without such notification, the Naval Inventory Control Point cannot be assured that its repair contractors have received all shipped material. Navy Is Not Submitting Required Quarterly Reports
The Naval Inventory Control Point is also not following DOD and Navy procedures that require Naval Inventory Control Point officials to provide the Defense Contract Management Agency with quarterly status reports showing all shipments of government-furnished material that have been provided to its repair contractors. According to the procedures, these reports should include information about total shipments and their dollar value, number of shipments for which receipts are unknown, and rejected requisitions. Although a number of standard DOD and Navy inventory management control procedures stipulate the requirement to generate and distribute the quarterly reports, inventory control point officials lack recognition of this reporting requirement. Conclusion
Inventory worth millions of dollars is vulnerable to fraud, waste, or abuse because the Naval Inventory Control Point is not adhering to DOD inventory management control procedures for government-furnished material shipped to its repair contractors. Furthermore, without the Naval Inventory Control Point implementing procedures to ensure that quarterly reports for all shipments of government-furnished material to its repair contractors are generated and distributed to the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Contract Management Agency might be impaired in its ability to serve as the last line of defense in protecting government-furnished material. To assess the Naval Inventory Control Point’s and its repair contractors’ adherence to procedures for controlling government-furnished material, we took the following steps: To identify criteria for controlling shipped inventory, we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy procedures, obtained other relevant documentation related to shipped inventory, and discussed inventory management procedures with officials from the following locations: Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.; the Naval Inventory Control Point; Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; the Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, Virginia. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported in a number of products that the lack of control over inventory shipments increases vulnerability to undetected loss or theft and substantially increases the risk that million of dollars can be spent unnecessarily. This report evaluates the Navy's and its repair contractors' adherence to Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy inventory management control procedures for government-furnished material shipped to Navy repair contractors. Government-furnished material includes assemblies, parts, and other items that are provided to contractors to support repairs, alterations, and modifications. Generally, this material is incorporated into or attached onto deliverable end items, such as aircraft, or consumed or expended in performing a contract.
What GAO Found
The Naval Inventory Control Point and its repair contractors have not followed DOD and Navy inventory management control procedures intended to provide accountability for and visibility of shipped government-furnished material to Navy repair contractors. As a result, Navy inventory worth millions of dollars is vulnerable to fraud, waste, or abuse. First, Navy repair contractors are not acknowledging receipt of government-furnished material from the Navy's supply system. Although a DOD procedure states that contractors will notify the military services' inventory control points once material is received, Naval Inventory Control Point officials are not requiring its repair contractors to do so. Consequently, the Naval Inventory Control Point is not adhering to another DOD procedure that requires the military services to follow up with repair contractors within 45 days when the receipts for items are not confirmed. Naval Inventory Control Point officials stated that receipting for government-furnished material, which is earmarked for immediate consumption in the repair of another item, might overstate the inventory levels in their inventory management system. Without material receipt notification, the Naval Inventory Control Point cannot be assured that its repair contractors have received the material. For fiscal year 2002, the most recent and complete data available at the time of GAO's review, the Naval Inventory Control Point reported that 4,229 government-furnished material shipments (representing 4,301 items value at approximately $115 million) had been shipped to its repair contractors. GAO randomly selected and examined 308 government-furnished material shipments, representing 344 items that were shipped to the Navy's repair contractors. Based on this random sample, GAO estimated that 50 unclassified items may be unaccounted for, with a value of about $729,000 in aircraft-related government-furnished material. Additionally, the Naval Inventory Control Point does not send quarterly reports on the status of government-furnished material shipped to its repair contractors to the Defense Contract Management Agency. DOD and Navy procedures require that the Naval Inventory Control Point generate and distribute quarterly reports on government-furnished material shipped to repair contractors, including information on total shipments and their dollar value, number of shipments for which receipts are unknown, and rejected requisitions to the Defense Contract Management Agency. Although there are a number of DOD and Navy procedures that outline this reporting requirement, the Naval Inventory Control Point officials responsible for implementing this procedure were unaware of the requirement. The Naval Inventory Control Point lacks procedures to ensure that these reports are generated and distributed to the Defense Contract Management Agency. Without the reports, the Defense Contract Management Agency may be unable to independently verify that the Navy repair contractors have accounted for all government-furnished material shipped to them. |
gao_AIMD-98-223 | gao_AIMD-98-223_0 | Background
The District of Columbia government, acting through the Mayor, the District’s Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA), and the District of Columbia Arena, L.P. (DCALP)—a limited partnership formed by the owner of the Washington Wizards and the Washington Capitals—agreed that DCALP would build a sports arena (estimated to cost about $175 million) and that the District would be responsible for financing certain predevelopment costs. To initially finance the predevelopment costs of the sports arena, $2.5 million was advanced by the District’s Sports Commission. Predevelopment Project Costs Have Increased
Since our last report, predevelopment costs have increased from $58.6 million to about $61.5 million, which is a net amount of $2.9 million (5 percent). The District has completed almost all of its predevelopment activities and has spent $60 million, about 98 percent, of the estimated total expenditures. Table 1 shows the District’s total predevelopment activities financed for the sports arena project. The District’s project manager for the sports arena is still including in the expenditures an estimated $700,000 for the removal of concrete structures below the surface and contaminated soil on a parcel of land transferred to WMATA. The District’s Office of Corporation Counsel is actively pursuing its legal options for recouping the District’s cost for soil remediation and other related costs for the arena site. Through April 30, 1998, the District had earned about $1.5 million in interest from the funds available to pay predevelopment costs. As of June 30, 1998, the funds had not yet been returned to the District’s General Fund. Dedicated Tax Revenue Collections Have Exceeded Projections
As of April 30, 1998, collections for the 1997 Arena Tax had totaled about $9.6 million, about the same as the 1995 and 1996 collections of $9.3 million and $9.6 million, respectively. These funds were sufficient to meet 1997 principal and interest payments (about $5.9 million annually) on the bonds issued to finance the predevelopment expenses. Taxes Collected Allow Early Redemption of Bonds
Our analysis shows that if the present level of Arena Tax collections continue into the future, and if revenues from the ground lease of the arena and the $6 million in the debt service reserve, including interest earnings, are used, the sports arena bonds could be paid off in 2002, well before the 2010 maturity date of the longest term bonds. Approximately $5.7 million had been paid in interest and $6 million of the serial bonds and $2.5 million of the term bonds had been redeemed. This scenario would save about $16.4 million in interest payments (see table 4). This missed opportunity to redeem term bonds prior to their maturity date could have caused the District to incur additional interest expense for that period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the progress of the sports arena project in the District of Columbia, focusing on the project's predevelopment costs, revenue collections, and bond redemption status.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the District has spent $60 million, about 98 percent of the estimated total cost of predevelopment activities, for the sports arena; (2) as of April 30, 1998, the District estimated total predevelopment costs to be about $61.5 million, a net increase of about $2.9 million over its October 7, 1997, estimate, as reported in GAO's November 1997 report; (3) the increase is largely due to the final agreed upon price the District paid for a parcel of land included in the arena site; (4) the only known expense not under contract or agreement is the District cost for soil remediation and the removal of concrete structures below the surface for a parcel of land transferred to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; (5) the District's project manager for the sports arena has budgeted $700,000 for this activity, which is included in the total estimated cost; (6) the District's $5 million in remaining available funds for predevelopment costs for the sports arena appears to be sufficient to meet all estimated remaining expenditures; (7) as of April 30, 1998, the District had spent about $60 million and an additional $1.5 million was budgeted for the remaining predevelopment activities that will soon be completed, leaving approximately $3.5 million to pay unanticipated expenses or to redeem term bonds prior to their redemption dates; (8) collections from the dedicated arena tax have been more than sufficient to pay principal and interest of about $5.9 million annually on the bonds issued to finance the predevelopment expenses; (9) for each of the past 3 years, collections have exceeded the $9 million originally forecasted by the District, totalling about $1.6 million more than the District's forecast for the 3-year period; (10) as of April 30, 1998, the District had redeemed $6 million of the serial bonds and $2.5 million of the term bonds issued to finance the predevelopment expenses prior to their maturity date; (11) GAO's analysis shows that if the present level of collections are sustained, and revenues from the ground lease of the sports arena and the existing debt service reserve funds are used, all of the arena bonds would be paid by 2002, about 8 years before the 2010 maturity date; and (12) this redemption schedule would save the District about $16.4 million in interest costs, and allow about $7.7 million to be transferred to the District's General Fund. |
gao_GAO-08-435T | gao_GAO-08-435T_0 | Federal Oversight of Food Safety Is a High- Risk Area that Needs a Governmentwide Reexamination
While part of today’s hearing focuses specifically on FDA’s responsibilities for the oversight of food safety, it is important to note that FDA is one of 15 federal agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation is a key reason we designated federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area. While we have reported on problems with the federal food safety system— including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources—most noteworthy for today’s hearing is that federal expenditures for the oversight of food safety have not been commensurate with the volume of foods regulated by the agencies or consumed by the public. FDA Has Opportunities to Better Leverage its Resources
In response to the nation’s fiscal challenges, agencies may have to explore new approaches to achieve their missions, and we have identified options for FDA to better leverage its resources. Efficient use of resources is particularly important at FDA because, while its food safety workload has increased in the past decade, resources have not kept pace. Some of these options are presented in FDA’s Food Protection Plan. We recommended that FDA: Make it a priority to establish equivalence agreements with other countries. Such agreements would shift some of FDA’s oversight burden to foreign governments. Explore the potential for certifying third-party inspectors. Consider accrediting private laboratories to test seafood. A portion of these activities included overlapping and even duplicative inspections of 1,451 domestic food-processing facilities that produce foods regulated by both agencies. We recommended that, if cost effective, FDA enter into an agreement to commission USDA inspectors at jointly regulated facilities. We found that both FDA and USDA maintain inspectors at 18 U.S. ports of entry to inspect imported food. FDA’s Food Protection Plan Proposes Some Positive First Steps, but Additional Information on the Plan’s Strategies and Resources would Facilitate Congressional Oversight
FDA’s Food Protection Plan proposes several positive first steps that are intended to enhance food safety oversight, including requesting several authorities recommended by GAO, but more specific information about its strategies and the resources needed to implement the plan would facilitate congressional oversight. Specifically, the plan requests authority for FDA to: Order food recalls. Issue additional preventive controls for high-risk foods. While FDA officials have acknowledged that implementing the Food Protection Plan will require additional resources, FDA has not provided specific information on the resources it anticipates the agency will need to implement this plan. Similarly, the Food Protection Plan does not discuss the strategies it needs in the upcoming years to implement this plan. Without a clear description of resources and strategies, it will be difficult for Congress to assess the likelihood of the plan’s success in achieving its intended results. Tools that Agencies Can Use to Address Management Challenges
The Science Board cites numerous management challenges that have contributed to FDA’s inability to fulfill its mission, such as a lack of a coherent structure and vision, insufficient capacity in risk assessment, and inadequate human capital recruitment and retention. In light of these challenges, we have identified through other work some tools that can help agencies improve their performance, which may also be relevant to FDA. For example, we reported on the use of a Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Chief Management Officer (CMO) as one way to address longstanding management problems that are undermining agencies’ abilities to accomplish their missions and achieve results. Another tool that can help federal agencies address their management challenges is a well-designed commission that can produce specific practical recommendations that Congress can enact. Based on our recent analysis of several commissions, there are several critical success factors that can be applied to ensure a commission’s success including: A statutory basis with adequate authority. A clear purpose and timeframe. Key leadership support. An open and transparent process. A balanced and capable membership. Food safety concerns not only continue but will likely become more urgent in view of changing demographics and consumption patterns. Thus its ability to carry out those responsibilities is necessary to help ensure the safety of the nation’s food supply in the most efficient, effective, accountable, and sustainable way. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring the safety of roughly 80 percent of the U.S. food supply, including $417 billion worth of domestic food and $49 billion in imported food annually. The recent outbreaks of E. coli in spinach, Salmonella in peanut butter, and contamination in pet food highlight the risks posed by the accidental contamination of FDA-regulated food products. Changing demographics and consumption patterns underscore the urgency for effective food safety oversight. In response to these challenges, in November 2007, FDA and others released plans that discuss the oversight of food safety. FDA's Food Protection Plan sets a framework for food safety oversight. In addition, FDA's Science Board released FDA Science and Mission at Risk, which concluded that FDA does not have the capacity to ensure the safety of the nation's food supply. This testimony focuses on (1) federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area that needs a governmentwide reexamination, (2) FDA's opportunities to better leverage its resources, (3) FDA's Food Protection Plan, and (4) tools that can help agencies to address management challenges. To address these issues, GAO interviewed FDA officials; evaluated the Food Protection Plan using a GAO guide for assessing agencies' performance plans; and reviewed pertinent statutes and reports. GAO also analyzed data on FDA inspections and resources.
What GAO Found
FDA is one of 15 agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation is the key reason GAO added the federal oversight of food safety to its High-Risk Series in January 2007 and called for a governmentwide reexamination of the food safety system. We have reported on problems with this system--including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. FDA has opportunities to better leverage its resources. Efficient use of resources is particularly important at FDA because we found that its food safety workload has increased in the past decade, while its food safety staff and funding have not kept pace. GAO has recommended that FDA establish equivalence agreements with other countries to shift some oversight responsibility to foreign governments, explore the potential for certifying third party inspections, and consider accrediting private laboratories to inspect seafood, among other actions. We also reported that FDA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conduct similar inspections at 1,451 facilities that produce foods regulated by both agencies. To reduce overlaps, we recommended that, if cost-effective, FDA enter into an agreement to commission USDA inspectors at such facilities. FDA incorporated some of these recommendations in its Food Protection Plan. FDA's Food Protection Plan also proposes some positive first steps intended to enhance its oversight of food safety. Specifically, FDA requests authority to order food safety recalls and issue additional preventive controls for high-risk foods, both of which GAO has previously recommended. However, more specific information about its strategies and the resources FDA needs to implement the plan would facilitate congressional oversight. FDA officials acknowledge that implementing the Food Protection Plan will require additional resources. Without a clear description of resources and strategies, it will be difficult for Congress to assess the likelihood of the plan's success in achieving its intended results. The Science Board cites numerous management challenges that have contributed to FDA's inability to fulfill its mission, including a lack of a coherent structure and vision, insufficient capacity in risk assessment, and inadequate human capital recruitment and retention. In light of these challenges, GAO has identified through other work some tools that can help agencies improve their performance over time. For example, a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer can help an agency address longstanding management problems that are undermining its ability to accomplish its mission and achieve results. In addition, a well-designed commission can produce specific practical recommendations that Congress can enact. Critical success factors that can help ensure a commission's success include a statutory basis with adequate authority, a clear purpose and timeframe, leadership support, an open process, a balanced membership, accountability, and resources. |
gao_RCED-97-214 | gao_RCED-97-214_0 | Available Data and Changes Resulting From the 1994 Act Make It Difficult to Provide a Clear Picture of Changes in Workload
Two factors—a limited amount of available data following the implementation of the 1996 act and other changes triggered by the 1994 act—make it difficult to isolate and assess the effects of the 1996 act on workload levels in county offices. Workload data are captured at the end of the fiscal year. Changes Other Than the 1996 Act Affect FSA’s Workload
A number of factors triggered by the 1994 act have also affected workload levels in county offices, making it difficult to isolate the impact of the 1996 act. These changes include the addition of responsibilities for agricultural credit and crop insurance programs and changes to USDA’s county office structure. Determining the effect of the changes resulting from the 1996 act in this context is not possible. County executive directors acknowledged that the time spent on specific activities for the commodity programs—both enrolling farmers in the programs and ensuring compliance with the program’s requirements—has decreased since the passage of the 1996 act. However, the directors believed that this decrease was largely offset by increases in the number of contracts needed to be completed because of the increased level of participation in the program. However, because only 6 months of data for fiscal year 1997 are available, we do not have a basis for assessing the full impact on the workload for 1997 and beyond. Because of the absence of a full year of 1997 data and additional issues identified at the county office level, we cannot confirm the county executive directors’ observations or isolate the impact of the 1996 act on any workload changes that may have occurred in these offices. The data indicated that about 2 staff years of effort per office is being devoted to the activities associated with keeping the office open and functioning. Accordingly, unless additional offices are closed, any future staff reductions will probably have to be concentrated in the larger county offices. Agency Comments
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department’s Farm Service Agency for its review and comment. FSA generally concurred with the results of our review, except for the draft report’s discussion of the capabilities of the agency’s work measurement and workload systems. We met with USDA headquarters, state, and county officials to obtain their views on the impact of the 1996 act on county office workload. Profile of the 16 County Offices Visited
This appendix provides information on the county offices we visited to determine workload changes at the county office level. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the impact of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 on the Farm Service Agency's county office workload.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because of the limited availability of the Farm Service Agency's fiscal year (FY) 1997 actual workload data and changes in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's program and organizational structure resulting from the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, it is not possible to determine the impact of the 1996 act on the workload of the Farm Service Agency's county offices; (2) the agency's workload system reflects workload data at the end of the fiscal year in which the work was performed; (3) however, because only 6 months of data were available for FY 1997 at the time of GAO's review, GAO could not measure the impact of the 1996 act on county office workload; (4) furthermore, the 1994 act generated a number of changes affecting the agency's staffing and responsibilities; (5) because these changes were being implemented at the same time as the changes directed by the 1996 act, it is not possible to isolate the impact of either set of changes on the resulting workload; (6) the 1994 changes include the addition of responsibilities for agricultural credit and crop insurance programs and changes to the Department's county office structure; (7) at the 16 county offices GAO visited, county executive directors believed that the overall workload per employee has increased since the passage of the 1994 act; (8) they stated, however, that a number of factors have affected staffing and workload during this period and that the role of the 1996 act on the perceived workload increases is indeterminable; (9) because of the absence of a full year of 1997 data and additional issues identified at the county office level, GAO cannot confirm the county executive directors' observations or isolate the impact of the 1996 act on any workload changes that may have occurred in these offices; (10) while the results of GAO's work concerning the impact of the 1996 act on workload levels are inconclusive, available information generally confirms the observations of the agency's budget officials that each county office requires about 2 staff years to handle the basic administrative functions associated with keeping the office open and functioning during the day; and (11) accordingly, unless additional offices are closed, any future staff reductions will probably be concentrated in the larger offices, which, unlike smaller offices, allocate a higher proportion of their total costs for service to farmers than to overhead. |
gao_GAO-14-77 | gao_GAO-14-77_0 | Finally, we noted when a program or contract ends, DOD can make choices that would allow the government to retain value from the work completed. However, the impact of a weapon program cancellation can extend beyond the immediate program and its contractors and ultimately affect a broader industrial base and local economies, as well as other programs and agencies. However, current plans for notifying program managers of this resource may not be sufficient. In particular, its database is designed to allow officials who have experienced program cancellation to share lessons learned. Without continued contribution of lessons learned from program officials with experience shutting down canceled programs, DOD will be missing opportunities to build and share knowledge on program shutdown. Information about Whether Assets Are Being Leveraged Is Limited
We could not determine the extent to which DOD leveraged the assets in our case studies because DOD does not have a way to track all types of assets. However, both the process and the system are designed to track specific pieces of equipment, materials, and tools and are not designed to track intellectual property, such as rights to technical data and software, partially developed technologies, or even other types of assets such as real property and hazardous materials. Because there is no department- wide process or requirement for disseminating information about all assets available for reuse, DOD cannot help ensure that technologies, hardware, and other potentially useful assets can be delivered to parties who can best develop them further. Contract Termination Cost Estimates Have Limitations
Estimates of contract termination costs are sometimes perceived by program officials as a useful tool in managing a portfolio of investments and informing contract termination planning and budgeting decisions. However, there are some uncertainties about costs that cannot be addressed until a program is actually terminated, making estimates less useful for the purpose of informing the decision to terminate a contract. DAU has developed guidance that addresses the spectrum of issues faced in a cancellation, though current efforts may be insufficient to ensure that program managers who are faced with a program cancellation will be aware of this guidance. Without this awareness, program officials may lack the knowledge necessary to manage the shutdown process and leverage related investments as effectively as possible. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to ensure it is fully leveraging investments made in canceled programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following three actions: (1) Direct program officials to refer to DAU’s Smart Shutdown guidance throughout the process of shutting down the program. (3) Develop department-wide processes to improve tracking of assets, including technical data and software, and dissemination of information about assets available for reuse after programs are canceled. DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to direct program officials to submit lessons learned after cancellation, again stating that it would highly encourage, rather than direct, this action. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review and report on issues associated with contract terminations and program cancellations of major defense acquisition programs (MDAP). This report examines (1) the effects of program cancellation, (2) the adequacy of current Department of Defense (DOD) guidance on program cancellations, (3) the extent to which DOD leveraged—by transferring for further development or use on other programs—various types of assets from canceled programs, and (4) the usefulness of contract termination cost estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the face of increasing budgetary pressures, it is important that DOD continue to find ways to manage its portfolio of major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) more efficiently. In 2008, GAO concluded that program cancellations can be a valuable portfolio management tool, and found that DOD can take various steps to retain value from the work completed. The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2013 mandated GAO to review issues associated with cancellations of MDAPs. This report assesses (1) the effects of program cancellation, (2) the adequacy of DOD guidance on program cancellations, (3) the extent to which DOD leveraged or transferred to other programs various types of assets from canceled programs, and (4) the usefulness of contract termination cost estimates. To do this work, GAO reviewed the cancellation of five major DOD programs from across the military services; interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and others; and reviewed current guidance related to program cancellation.
What GAO Found
Cancellation of a major Department of Defense (DOD) weapon program can have broad effects. Cancellation of one program can affect the schedules or budgets for related programs as well as the industrial base and local economies. For example, the cancellation of one program has impacted the schedule for the Army's network modernization efforts. DOD stakeholders can provide input to program officials on the potential effects of a cancellation.
DOD has developed an online resource, Smart Shutdown, to offer tools for program managers related to program cancellations. In 2013, a guidebook was added that addresses the spectrum of cancellation effects. However, current efforts to publicize this online resource may not be sufficient and program officials may lack the knowledge necessary to leverage investments as effectively as possible. Furthermore, while this resource is designed to allow officials to share lessons learned about program cancellation, there have been few contributions to date. Without increased sharing of lessons learned, DOD will miss opportunities to build and share knowledge on program shutdown.
GAO could not determine the extent to which DOD leveraged the assets in its case studies because DOD does not have a way to track all types of assets from canceled programs.
DOD relies on a government-wide process for tracking disposal of government property, such as computer hardware and equipment, but this process is not tailored to weapon systems and was not designed to track other types of assets such as rights to technical data and software, or partially-developed technologies. Because there is no department-wide process for disseminating information about all assets available for reuse, DOD cannot ensure that technologies go to parties who can best use or develop them further.
Estimates of contract termination costs are sometimes perceived as a useful tool in managing a portfolio of investments and informing contract termination and budgeting decisions. However, the usefulness of these estimates is limited by, among other factors, inherent uncertainties about costs that cannot be addressed until a program is actually terminated.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD direct program officials to refer to Smart Shutdown guidance and to provide lessons learned, and that DOD develop department-wide processes to improve tracking and dissemination of information about assets available. DOD partially concurred with these recommendations, but stated use of and contribution to Smart Shutdown should be encouraged rather than directed. GAO maintains direction would be more effective. |
gao_GAO-16-442 | gao_GAO-16-442_0 | USAID Has Issued Antiterrorism Policies and Procedures for Program Assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and Developed a Key Antiterrorism Compliance Review Process
In March 2006, the USAID West Bank and Gaza mission approved and issued various antiterrorism policies and procedures for program assistance for the West Bank and Gaza in a document known as Mission Order 21, which it last updated in October 2007. This process is reflected in formal mission notices. The antiterrorism certification is generally an attachment to the award documentation that certifies, in part, that the “recipient did not provide…and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts.”
Mandatory Provisions
Mission Order 21 requires that all prime awards and subawards for contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements contain two mandatory provisions (which are included as clauses in award documents): a provision prohibiting support for terrorism and a provision restricting funding to facilities that recognize or honor an individual or entity that commits or has committed terrorism. USAID Developed a Key Antiterrorism Compliance Review Process in 2008 That Is Reflected in Formal Mission Notices
USAID Developed a Key Compliance Review Process in 2008
In July 2008, the USAID mission established a post-award compliance review function under the Office of Contracts Management to assess implementing partners’ compliance with the requirements of the antiterrorism procedures contained in Mission Order 21 when making subawards. 2). That review and GAO’s examination of prime awards and a generalizable sample of subawards from fiscal years 2012–2014 found that USAID generally complied with requirements for vetting as well as inclusion of required antiterrorism certification and mandatory provisions in awards. GAO’s review of 48 prime awards and a random generalizable sample of 158 subawards associated with these prime awards, covering the period of fiscal years 2012–2014. In the universe of 14,436 subawards assessed by the compliance review reports provided by USAID, 1 prime awardee failed to vet a subawardee. These prime awardees were required to address all noncompliance weaknesses and obtain the proper vetting approvals for the subawardee and all applicable trainees, according to USAID. In addition, 3 prime awardees conducted similar late vetting for 219 USAID-funded trainees. The compliance review reports identified a single instance where a prime awardee failed to obtain an antiterrorism certificate from a subawardee. According to USAID officials, this prime awardee was required to amend the subaward paperwork to include the antiterrorism certificate. GAO’s review found that prime awards and subawards were in compliance with antiterrorism certification requirements. The reports identified 9 prime awardees that collectively made a total of 449 subawards without the two mandatory provisions included. GAO’s review found that prime awards were in compliance with the two mandatory provisions requirements and the subawards were generally in compliance. We found that 155 of the 158 subawards, or 98 percent, included the mandatory antiterrorism clause and facility naming clause. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which (1) the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has established antiterrorism policies and procedures for program assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and (2) USAID complied with requirements for vetting, antiterrorism certification, and mandatory provisions for program assistance for fiscal years 2012–2014. To determine the extent to which the USAID West Bank and Gaza mission complied–at the prime and subaward levels–with its vetting requirements as well as inclusion of antiterrorism certification and mandatory provisions for program assistance to provide reasonable assurance that its programs do not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, we reviewed key legal and other requirements as well as USAID’s policies and procedures for ensuring compliance with Mission Order 21. We also interviewed several of USAID’s implementing partners that had received relatively large dollar contracts from USAID. However, vetting was conducted in 1 instance after the award was signed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Program assistance for development is a key part of the United States' commitment to a negotiated two-state solution to promote peace in the Middle East, and program funding is primarily administered by USAID.
Congress included a provision in the law for GAO to conduct an audit of all funds provided for programs in the West Bank and Gaza, including the extent to which programs comply with certain antiterrorism requirements. This report examines the extent to which (1) USAID has established antiterrorism policies and procedures for program assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and (2) USAID complied with requirements for vetting, antiterrorism certification, and mandatory provisions for program assistance for fiscal years 2012–2014.
GAO reviewed antiterrorism laws, policies, procedures, and USAID documents that pertain to assistance programs and interviewed USAID and State officials. GAO also assessed a random generalizable sample of 158 awards to USAID's implementing partners using funds provided in fiscal years 2012–2014 from the Economic Support Fund account to determine the extent to which the awards were granted in compliance with antiterrorism policies and procedures.
What GAO Found
In 2006, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) issued key antiterrorism policies and procedures—known as Mission Order 21 (the order)—to help ensure that program assistance for the West Bank and Gaza would not inadvertently provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism. The order, updated in 2007, outlines requirements and procedures for (1) vetting, or investigating a person or entity for links to terrorism; (2) obtaining an antiterrorism certification from awardees; and (3) including in awards two mandatory provisions that prohibit support for terrorism and restrict funding to facilities named after terrorists. In 2008, USAID West Bank and Gaza established a post-award compliance review process to identify weaknesses in compliance with applicable requirements in the order, which USAID works to resolve. This process is a key function that allows USAID to provide reasonable assurance that all prime awards and subawards are in compliance with the order. The compliance review process is described in notices issued by the mission from 2008 to 2012. For the purposes of this report, a prime awardee is an organization that directly receives USAID funding to implement projects, while a subawardee is an organization that receives funding from prime awardees.
USAID's compliance reviews and GAO's examination of prime awards and subawards for fiscal years 2012-2014 found that USAID generally complied with requirements for vetting and inclusion of antiterrorism certification and mandatory provisions in awards. Regarding vetting, the compliance review reports—which covered more than 14,000 subawards—found, for example, one subawardee and 18 trainees for which no vetting was conducted. According to USAID, the subawardee and trainees were subsequently vetted and found eligible for program assistance. GAO's review of a random generalizable sample of 158 subawards found that 157 had applicable vetting conducted before the award. Regarding antiterrorism certification requirements, the compliance reviews identified one instance where a prime awardee failed to obtain an antiterrorism certification from a subawardee. GAO's review found that both prime awards and subawards were in compliance with antiterrorism certification requirements. Regarding mandatory provisions, the compliance reviews identified nine prime awardees that made a total of 449 subawards without including the two provisions. GAO's review found that 155 subawards (98 percent) had included the provisions in the award documentation. USAID required noncompliant awardees to provide antiterrorism certification and mandatory provisions for active awards, according to USAID.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-17-23 | gao_GAO-17-23_0 | Supply Chains
Supply chains are the end-to-end process of producing and distributing a product or commodity from raw materials to the final customer. The goals of this policy include increasing the economic competitiveness of the United States, reducing freight congestion, and improving the safety, reliability, and efficiency of the freight network, among other goals. In response to global shipping changes, infrastructure projects have been completed or are planned at all major West Coast ports, though some projects have been deferred indefinitely. Port Stakeholders’ Efforts to Address Infrastructure and Operational Constraints Are Hampered by Competing Priorities and Limited Data
Port stakeholders interviewed as part of our case studies highlighted some key challenges to mitigating infrastructure and operational constraints stemming from global shipping changes. Some state and local government officials from our case studies of port complexes said that information on port performance and supply chains would be helpful to help target operational and infrastructure efforts. However, about one-third, or 6 industry groups, said some shippers had difficulty making such modifications due to specific firm or commodity attributes or prohibitively high costs. Impacts on Selected Shippers from Port Disruptions and Shippers’ Responses Varied
Almost all of our 21 selected industry groups said that shippers in their respective industries using major West Coast ports were affected by recent port disruptions. DOT Has Made Progress Including Ports in Freight Efforts, but DOT’s Data Strategy Could Be Improved by Including Supply- Chain Information
DOT’s freight-related activities have grown increasingly multi-modal and inclusive of ports since 2012. However, there are substantive gaps in the supply chain information DOT (and state and local governments) have available to them to support freight efforts. Disruptions at ports can have ramifications throughout industry supply chains. Based on leading practices in capital decision making, we previously recommended that DOT develop a freight-data improvement strategy to address gaps related to, among other things, local impacts of freight congestion. The report also notes that while the movement of goods between ports and foreign countries is tracked continuously, the movement of international trade between ports and domestic origin for exports and domestic destinations for imports is not measured. Federal guidance and practices highlight the need for quality information for planning and effective decision making and achieving agency objectives. DOT has also taken steps to gather supply chain information from other federal agencies, but it is unclear how the department will use this information to inform its freight efforts. Including information on supply chains as part of DOT’s existing effort to develop a written freight data strategy provides an opportunity for the agency to think more comprehensively about the information needed to support its freight efforts including further refining the objectives and goals in its National Freight Strategic Plan. Recommendation
To inform DOT’s development of its national freight strategy and associated freight efforts, such as states’ development of freight plans, newly established freight funding programs, and advancing DOT’s efforts to implement national freight policies, we recommend that in the development of the freight data strategy the Secretary of Transportation include a specific plan to identify: appropriate freight data sources, information, and analytic tools for transportation modes involved in the freight network and supply chains; data gaps that could help both the agency and states and local governments in the development of their freight plans, and an approach for addressing obstacles to developing high-quality, reliable supply chain information; current and planned efforts that can provide insights into supply chains and their impacts on freight networks; and how DOT plans to use the supply chain information and analytical tools to inform freight planning and programming. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) how recent changes in global shipping have impacted the movement of cargo at major U.S. West Coast ports and how these ports and their stakeholders have responded; (2) how selected shippers have been impacted by and responded to disruptions at West Coast ports during 2014-2015 as well as other recent or potential disruptions; and (3) how the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) current freight-related efforts support cargo movement through ports and whether these effort can be improved. To assess how shippers have been impacted by and responded to port disruptions, we conducted semi-structured interviews with one or more representatives of 21 industry trade groups representing shippers. We did not evaluate activities outside of DOT. West Coast ports account for a large share of U.S. trade. i denotes port, p denotes product category at the two-digit Harmonized System (HS) code level, t denotes quarter c denotes country of origin or destination ln (y+1)iptc, the dependent variable, is the natural log of the dollar value of either exports or imports plus one, in order to account for zeroes in the data, passing through port i (which will be identified as being on one of the three coasts), for product category p, during quarter t, and coming from or destined for country c port disruption is a dummy variable designed to capture whether there was any shift in the volume of trade during the entire time frame of the port disruption—2014q3-2015q1—or, alternatively, for each of those three quarters separately as well as the quarters following the port disruption, up to and including 2016q1 trendt is a linear time trend that controls for trends in trade overtime, Recessiont is an indicator equal to one during the quarters that the pattern of which is likely related to trends in overall economic ∝q, are quarter of the year indicators to control for seasonality correspond to the great recession, 2007q4-2009q2, to account for any activity and other factors that may influence the underlying pattern of ERct is the exchange rate for country c in time t (included in only changes in trade during that period related to the economic downturn trade growth. GAO-13-80. Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and Financing Limitations. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. West Coast ports are critical to the national transportation freight network and global supply chains. Changes in global shipping and disruptions at ports can create congestion and economic hardship for shippers with resulting effects throughout supply chains. The 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act provides freight policy goals, including increasing U.S. economic competitiveness; reducing freight congestion; and improving the safety, reliability, and efficiency of the freight network. The act also established new DOT freight funding programs.
This report addresses: (1) how major U.S. West Coast ports have responded to recent changes in global shipping; (2) how selected shippers have been impacted by and responded to a recent port disruption, and (3) how DOT's efforts support port cargo movement and whether they can be improved. GAO conducted case studies of the three major port regions on the West Coast; interviewed key stakeholders—such as port authorities and state and local transportation agencies—for each region and 21 industry representatives, and evaluated DOT's freight efforts relative to criteria on using quality information to support decision-making.
What GAO Found
Some infrastructure and operations at major West Coast ports are strained in the face of recent changes in global shipping, but port stakeholders are attempting to address these constraints. For example, as the shipping industry deploys larger vessels capable of delivering more cargo, some port terminals lack big enough cranes, or other infrastructure, needed to handle these vessels. All major West Coast ports have planned or completed port-related infrastructure projects and implemented operational changes. For example, in Long Beach, California, the Gerald Desmond Bridge is being heightened to enable larger vessels to pass underneath. Port stakeholders also noted that efforts to address constraints at ports can be hampered by competing priorities and limited data. For example, most state and local government officials said that having information on ports' performance and industry supply chains—the end-to-end process of producing and distributing a product or commodity from raw materials to the final customer—would be helpful to target efforts to address constraints at ports.
Selected shippers were impacted by and responded to one recent port disruption in various ways. In July 2014, the labor agreement that covers most West Coast port workers expired and was not renewed until February 2015. During this period, as widely reported, ports remained open, but vessels backed up in harbors, and loading and unloading of cargo were delayed. In response to this disruption, 13 of 21 selected industry groups representing shippers of some of the top commodities moving through West Coast ports said at least some of their members modified their supply chains by, for example, diverting shipments to ports outside the West Coast or to alternate modes of transportation. All 13 said shippers' costs increased or revenues declined. Six industry groups said some members had difficulty altering shipping plans because of commodity attributes, such as perishability or prohibitive costs.
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) freight-related activities are increasingly multi-modal and inclusive of ports, but gaps exist in the information available to DOT and state and local governments about important aspects of supply chains. For example, a 2015 DOT report notes that movements of international trade between ports and domestic origin for exports and domestic destinations for imports are not measured. This report further states that this information could help DOT to assess international trade flows within the United States and strengthen the role of freight transportation in U.S. economic competitiveness. Federal guidance and leading practices in capital planning emphasize that good information is essential to sound decision making and achieving agency objectives. A few current DOT initiatives may help address some information gaps, but they are in the early stages. DOT has also articulated the need for supply chain information in its draft National Freight Strategic Plan , but does not outline how DOT will obtain this information or how it will be used. Based on a 2014 GAO recommendation, DOT is in the early stages of developing a written freight data strategy to improve the availability of national data on freight trends, among other things. Broadening its freight data strategy to include supply chain information could help DOT to think more strategically about the specific supply chain information needed to support its freight efforts and advance national freight policy goals.
What GAO Recommends
In developing a freight data strategy, DOT should identify: what supply chain information is needed, potential sources of that information, data gaps, and how it intends to use this information to inform freight efforts. DOT concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-894T | gao_GAO-05-894T_0 | Map Modernization Intends to Use Advanced Technologies to Produce More Accurate and Accessible Digital Flood Maps:
Through map modernization, FEMA intends to produce more accurate and accessible flood maps by using advanced technology to gather accurate data and make the resulting information available on the Internet. As a result, at the time of our review, nearly 70 percent of the nation’s approximately 92,222 flood maps were more than 10 years old and many contain inaccurate data, according to FEMA. Over time, physical conditions in watersheds and floodplains can change, and improvements in the techniques for assessing and displaying flood risks are made. GIS technology provides the foundation for achieving FEMA’s goals of melding different types and sources of data to create the new digital flood maps and making the new digital flood maps available to a variety of users over the Internet. By their nature, paper flood maps have limited accessibility as compared with a digital map that can be made available on the Internet. Third, the data and infrastructure developed by map modernization is also expected to help national, state, and local officials mitigate and manage risk from multiple hazards, both natural and man-made. The accuracy of the new maps should better identify at-risk property owners who would be best served by obtaining flood insurance whether or not the owners would be required to purchase insurance under the NFIP’s mandatory purchase requirement. Map Modernization Is Expected to Improve Multi-Hazard Mitigation and Risk Management Capabilities
FEMA expects that the data developed, collected, and distributed through map modernization will help national, state, and local emergency managers mitigate and manage risk posed by other natural and man-made hazards. Accurate digital base maps provide more precise data to state and national officials for planning, such as the location of hazardous material facilities, power plants, utility distribution facilities, and other infrastructure (bridges, sewage treatment plants, buildings, and structures). In Its Efforts to Establish a New Data System, FEMA Had Not Yet Established Data Standards for Different Levels of Risk
The goal of FEMA’s objective to develop a new data system using the latest technology is more efficient production, delivery and, thereby, the use of flood maps. As a result, we recommended that FEMA develop and implement data standards that would enable FEMA, its contractor, and its state and local partners to identify and use consistent data collection and analysis methods for communities with similar risk. In November 2004, FEMA issued its Multi-Year Flood Hazard Identification Plan. The plan describes FEMA’s strategy for updating flood maps used for NFIP purposes and discusses the varying types of data collection and analysis techniques the agency plans to use to develop flood hazard data in order to relate the level of study and level of risk for each county. FEMA had established performance measures for all four of its program objectives. Nonetheless, without developing such a measure (or measures), we concluded that FEMA would be less able to ensure that its map modernization program will have resulted in one of FEMA’s primary intended benefits. In response to our recommendation, FEMA’s set goals in its November 2004 Multi-year Flood Hazard Identification Plan to improve public safety through the availability of reliable flood risk data. To achieve this goal, FEMA has set targets for key performance indicators (KPI) through fiscal year 2009 (production is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2010). FEMA’s four KPIs are (1) Population with Digital GIS Flood Data Available Online, (2) Population with Adopted Maps that Meet Quality Standards, (3) Percent of Effort Leveraged; that is, state and local resources provided for map modernization as a percentage of FEMA resources provided, and (4) Appropriated Funds Sent to CTPs. To track its progress of map modernization annually, FEMA set target percentages for achieving these performance indicators in fiscal years 2006 through 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
Floods inflict more damage and economic losses upon the United States than any other natural disaster. During the 10 years from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, flooding resulted in approximately $55 billion in damages. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for managing the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The program uses flood maps to identify the areas at greatest risk of flooding and make insurance available to property owners to protect themselves from flood losses. According to FEMA, many of the nation's flood maps are more than 10 years old and no longer reflect current flood hazard risks because of erosion and changes in drainage patterns. Moreover, because many flood maps were created or last updated, there have been improvements in the techniques for assessing and displaying flood risks. This testimony is based on GAO's findings and recommendations in its March 2004 report related to (1) how map modernization intended to improve the accuracy and accessibility of the nation's flood maps, (2) what the expected benefits of more accurate and accessible flood maps are, and (3) to what extent FEMA's strategy for managing the map modernization program support the achievement of these benefits.
What GAO Found
Through map modernization, FEMA intends to produce more accurate and accessible flood maps by using advanced technology to gather accurate data and make the flood maps available on the Internet. For example, displaying map data in digital Geographic Information Systems format permits consistent, accurate display, and ready electronic retrieval of a variety of map features, including elevation data and the location of key infrastructure, such as utilities. FEMA expects that by producing more accurate and accessible digital flood maps through map modernization, the nation will benefit in three ways. First, communities can use more accurate digital maps to reduce flood risk within floodplains by more effectively regulating development through zoning and building standards. Second, accurate digital maps available on the Internet will facilitate the identification of property owners who are statutorily required to obtain or who would be best served by obtaining flood insurance. Third, accurate and precise data will help national, state, and local officials to accurately locate infrastructure and transportation systems (e.g., power plants, sewage treatment plants, railroads, bridges, and ports) to help mitigate and manage risk for multiple hazards, both natural and man-made. At the time of GAO's review, FEMA had not yet established clear standards for the types, quantity, and specificity of data collection and analysis associated with different levels of flood risk. We recommended that FEMA develop standards to better ensure that data collection and analysis is consistent for all communities with similar risk and that it is using its resources efficiently while producing maps that are accurate and useful for communities at different levels of flood risk. In November 2004, FEMA issued its Multi-Year Flood Hazard Identification Plan. The plan describes FEMA's strategy for addressing GAO's recommendation by using varying types of data collection and analysis techniques to develop flood hazard data in order to relate the level of study and level of risk for each county. GAO concluded that FEMA's performance measures would not effectively measure the extent to which the agency's map modernization program would result in its primary intended benefits. As a result, GAO recommended that FEMA develop and implement useful performance measures. In response to GAO's recommendation, FEMA has set target percentages in its Multi-Year Flood Hazard Identification Plan for four key performance indicators in fiscal years 2006 through 2009. FEMA's four indicators are (1) Population with Digital GIS Flood Data Available Online, (2) Population with Adopted Maps that Meet Quality Standards, (3) Leveraged Digital GIS Flood Data, and (4) Appropriated Funds Sent to Coordinating Technical Partners. |
gao_GAO-02-451T | gao_GAO-02-451T_0 | In response to these problems, the Congress, in Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, created a new semiautonomous agency within DOE—the National Nuclear Security Administration. While the Administrator promised a solution to these problems by October 2001, NNSA’s report to the Congress on the organization and operations of the NNSA was not expected until February 25, 2002. NNSA’s major programs—Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors—and each of NNSA’s headquarters support offices have drafted program integrated plans. NNSA managers and human resource officials with whom we spoke had mixed reactions to the excepted service authority granted by Title 32. In addition, in response to congressional direction, NNSA is preparing a plan for using the remainder of the 300 authorized excepted service positions. | What GAO Found
Created to correct long-standing and widely recognized management and security problems at the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Although NNSA announced a new headquarters organization in May 2001, it did not meet the Administrator's promise of implementing a new structure for the entire organization by October 2001. Furthermore, NNSA lost momentum during the summer in its effort to implement a comprehensive planning, programming, and budgeting process. NNSA has used only 19 of the 300 excepted service positions authorized by Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. NNSA expects to report to Congress next month on its plans for using its excepted service authority. However, NNSA lacks a long-term strategic approach to ensure a well-managed, properly sized, and skilled workforce over the long run. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-221 | gao_T-AIMD-98-221_0 | How Is Federal Debt Measured? There are two main measures of federal debt—gross debt and debt held by the public. Figure 1 in the attachment shows the gross debt. It captures all of the federal government’s outstanding debt, and totaled $5.4 trillion at the beginning of fiscal year 1998. The debt held by the public is the measure used to reflect how much wealth has been used by the federal government to finance its obligations and best represents the cumulative effect of past federal borrowing on the economy. Treasury estimated that as of September 1997, foreign investors held about 33 percent of debt held by the public. Social Security and civil and military retirement trust funds comprise 72 percent of the total debt held by government accounts. Federal Debt: Context and Measures
Federal debt held by the public was $3.8 trillion at the beginning of fiscal year 1998, an amount more than five times greater than it was in 1980, without adjusting for inflation. To get a better sense of its burden, debt should be viewed in relation to the nation’s income, which often is measured by its gross domestic product (GDP). At the beginning of the current fiscal year, debt held by the public was about 47 percent of GDP. The unified budget is the most comprehensive measure of annual fiscal policy and represents the net amount of all federal spending and revenue. With some minor exceptions, it generally approximates the amount of annual federal borrowing from the public. The only way to actually reduce the nominal level of debt held by the public would be to run a unified budget surplus. Balancing the budget would not reduce the amount of debt because the government does not retire a portion of its principal each year, as individuals do with a typical home mortgage. Rather, it pays only the interest costs of its debt. The main economic effect is the impact of federal deficits/surpluses on national saving and private investment. A low national saving rate can have serious implications for the long-term growth of the economy. To service its debt, the federal government pays interest to holders of Treasury securities. A large interest burden can significantly reduce budgetary flexibility because, unlike any other part of the budget, it is not directly controlled by policymakers. Soon after 2013, when Social Security’s tax revenues no longer exceed Social Security benefit payments, the budget will turn from surplus to deficit. Without additional action by policymakers, the deficits will reemerge leading to higher debt levels and higher interest expenditures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed issues related to federal debt, focusing on: (1) how debt is defined in its various forms; (2) how it is measured; (3) how much it has grown up to now and could be reduced in the future; (4) who holds federal debt; and (5) why is it important to the national economy.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there are two main measures of federal debt--gross debt and debt held by the public; (2) the gross debt captures all of the federal government's outstanding debt, and totalled $5.4 trillion at the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1998; (3) the debt held by the public is the measure used to reflect how much wealth has been used by the federal government to finance its obligations and best represents the cumulative effect of past federal borrowing on the economy; (4) the Department of the Treasury estimated that, as of September 1997, foreign investors held about 33 percent of debt held by public; (5) Social Security and civil military retirement trust funds comprise 72 percent of the total debt held by government accounts; (6) federal debt held by the public was $3.8 trillion at the beginning of FY 1998, an amount more than five times greater than it was in 1980, without adjusting for inflation; (7) to get a better sense of its burden on taxpayers, debt should be viewed in relation to the nation's income, which is often measured by its gross domestic product (GDP); (8) at the beginning of the current fiscal year, debt held by the public was about 47 percent of GDP; (9) the unified budget is the most comprehensive measure of annual fiscal policy and represents the net amount of all federal spending and revenue; (10) with some minor exceptions, it generally approximates the amount of annual federal borrowing from the public; (11) the only way to actually reduce the nominal level of debt held by the public would be to run a unified budget surplus; (12) balancing the budget would not reduce the amount of debt because the government does not retire a portion of its principal each year, as individuals do with a typical home mortgage; (13) rather, it pays only the interest costs of its debt; (14) the federal debt's main economic effect is the impact of federal deficits/surpluses on national saving and private investment; (15) a low national saving rate can have serious implications for the long-term growth of the economy; (16) to service its debt, the federal government pays interest to holders of Treasury securities; (17) a large interest burden can significantly reduce budgetary flexibility because it is not directly controlled by policymakers; (18) soon after 2013, when social security's tax revenues no longer exceed social security benefit payments, the budget will turn from surplus to deficit; and (20) without additional action by policy makers, the deficits will reemerge leading to higher debt levels and higher interest expenditures. |
gao_GAO-04-516 | gao_GAO-04-516_0 | If Energy determines that the worker was not employed by one of its facilities or did not have an illness that could be caused by exposure to toxic substances, the agency finds the claimant ineligible. Energy Has Processed Few Cases, and Insufficient Strategic Planning and Data Collection Complicate Program Management
As of December 31, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the more than 23,000 cases that had been filed, and the majority of all cases filed were associated with facilities in 9 states. Energy had begun processing on nearly 35 percent of cases, but processing had not begun on nearly 60 percent of the cases. Further, these limitations make it difficult to assess the achievement of goals related to program objectives, such as the quality of the assistance given to claimants in filing for state workers’ compensation. A Shortage of Qualified Physicians to Issue Determinations Delays Filing of Workers’ Compensation Claims, and Claimants May Receive Inadequate Information to Prepare Them to Pursue These Claims
Energy was slow in implementing its initial case processing operation, but it is now processing enough cases so that there is a backlog of cases awaiting physician panel review. Claimants have experienced lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers’ compensation claims and have received little information about claims status as well as what they can expect from this process. Energy has taken some steps intended to reduce the backlog of cases. With modest staffing increases, the program quickly outgrew the office space used for this function. While Workers’ Compensation Claims for a Majority of Cases Are Not Likely to Be Contested, Actual Compensation Is Not Certain
Our analysis shows that a majority of cases associated with Energy facilities in 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of all Subtitle D cases filed are not likely to be contested. However, the remaining 20 percent of cases lack willing payers and are likely to be contested. These percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers and are not a prediction of actual benefit outcomes for claimants. In these cases, self-insured contractors will not contest the claims for benefits as ordered by Energy. Another 25 percent of the cases, while not technically having a willing payer, have workers’ compensation coverage provided by an insurer that has stated that it will not contest these claims and is currently processing several workers’ compensation claims without contesting them. Because of data limitations, these percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers. These estimates could change as better data become available or as circumstances change, such as new contractors taking over at individual facilities. Several Issues Could Be Considered in Evaluating Options for Improving the Likelihood of Willing Payers
Various options are available to improve payment outcomes for the cases that receive a positive determination from Energy, but lack willing payers under the current program. In particular, the cost implications of these options for the federal government should be carefully considered in the context of the current and projected federal fiscal environment. Table 2 arrays the relevant issues to provide a framework for evaluating the range of options in a logical sequence. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve Energy’s effectiveness in assisting Subtitle D claimants in obtaining compensation for occupational illnesses, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy: in order to reduce the backlog of cases waiting for review by a physician panel, take additional steps to expedite the processing of claims though its physician panels and focus its efforts on initiatives designed to allow the panels to function more efficiently. To determine the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for state workers’ compensation benefits, we reviewed Energy’s regulations, policies, procedures, and communications with claimants. To estimate the number of claims for which there will not be willing payers of workers’ compensation benefits, we reviewed the provisions of workers’ compensation programs in the 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of the cases filed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Subtitle D of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 allows the Department of Energy (Energy) to help its contractors' employees file state workers' compensation claims for illnesses determined by a panel of physicians to be caused by exposure to toxic substances while employed at an Energy facility. This report examines the effectiveness of the benefit program under Subtitle D and focuses on four key areas: (1) the number, status, and characteristics of claims filed with Energy; (2) the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for these state benefits; (3) the extent to which there will be a "willing payer" of workers' compensation benefits, that is, an insurer that--by order from or agreement with Energy--will not contest these claims; and (4) a framework that could be used for evaluating possible options for changing the program.
What GAO Found
During the first 2 1/2 years of the program, ending December 31, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the more than 23,000 cases that had been filed. Energy had begun processing nearly 35 percent of the cases, but processing had not yet begun on nearly 60 percent of the cases. Further, insufficient strategic planning and systems limitations complicate the assessment of Energy's achievement of goals related to case processing, as well as goals related to program objectives, such as the quality of the assistance provided to claimants in filing for state workers' compensation. While Energy got off to a slow start in processing cases, it is now processing enough cases that there is a backlog of cases waiting for review by a physician panel. Energy has taken some steps intended to reduce this backlog, such as reducing the number of physicians needed for some panels. Nonetheless, a shortage of qualified physicians continues to constrain the agency's capacity to decide cases more quickly. Consequently, claimants will likely continue to experience lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers' compensation claims. In the meantime, Energy has not kept claimants sufficiently informed about the delays in the processing of their claims as well as what claimants can expect as they proceed with state workers' compensation claims. GAO estimates that more than half of the cases associated with Energy facilities in 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of all Subtitle D cases filed are likely to have a willing payer of benefits. Another quarter of the cases in these 9 states, while not technically having a willing payer, have workers' compensation coverage provided by an insurer that has stated that it will not contest these claims. However, the remaining 20 percent of the cases in these 9 states lack willing payers and are likely to be contested. This has created concerns about program equity in that many of these cases may be less likely to receive compensation. Because of data limitations, these percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers. These estimates could change as better data become available or as circumstances change, such as new contractors taking over at individual facilities. The estimates are not a prediction of actual benefit outcomes for claimants. Various options are available to improve payment outcomes for the cases that receive a positive physician panel determination, but lack willing payers. While not recommending any particular option, GAO provides a framework that includes a range of issues to help the Congress assess options if it chooses to change the current program. One of these issues in particular--the federal cost implications--should be carefully considered in the context of the current and projected federal fiscal environment. Please note that the recommendations for this report are identical to the recommendations in GAO-04-515 . |
gao_GAO-02-412 | gao_GAO-02-412_0 | Background
In its July 1999 Morton decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ruled that the VA did not have a duty to assist in developing claims unless they were “well-grounded” as required by federal statute. VBA’s Efforts To Implement the VCAA Have Not Resulted in Full Compliance with the Law
To implement the VCAA, VBA has issued guidance, obtained and responded to regional office staff questions, conducted an informal review of cases, and issued clarifying instructions based on the questions it received and the results of its review. VBA Is Focusing on Increasing Production to Address Its VCAA-Related Slowdown
VBA is addressing its claims processing slowdown by taking steps to increase production and reduce its claims inventory. To meet this goal, VBA plans to complete about 839,000 rating-related claims during the fiscal year. Conclusions
To its credit, VBA has taken a number of steps over the last year and a half to provide guidance to its regional offices on the proper application of the VCAA requirements for both new and pending veterans’ claims. | What GAO Found
The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 was passed in response to concerns expressed by veterans, veterans service organizations, and Congress over a 1999 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that held that the VA did not have a duty to assist veterans in developing their claims unless they were "well-grounded." The Veterans' Benefits Administration (VBA) has taken a number of steps, including issuing guidance, revising and supplementing this guidance based on questions raised by regional offices, and reinforcing the guidance based on the results of its accuracy reviews. Despite these efforts, VBA has found problems with consistent regional office compliance with the law. While taking steps to implement the act, VBA is also focusing on significantly increasing production and reducing the claims inventory to manage the slowdown in case processing. In fiscal year 2002, VBA plans to complete 839,000 claims to reduce its inventory to 316,000 claims. |
gao_GAO-01-4 | gao_GAO-01-4_0 | Public health experts and state and federal officials view influenza vaccine as the cornerstone of efforts to prevent and control annual epidemic influenza as well as pandemic influenza. Vaccine Availability May Be Limited in a Pandemic
Vaccines are considered the first line of defense against influenza to prevent infection and control the spread of the disease. The ability to successfully use vaccines to prevent influenza-related illness and death during the first wave of a pandemic, however, relies on certain conditions that have not been realized in the past, and may not occur in the future. Plans Incomplete to Purchase, Distribute, and Administer Vaccines and Drugs
Federal and state pandemic response plans are in various stages of completion and do not completely or consistently address the problems related to the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public health experts have raised concerns about the ability of the nation's public health system to detect and respond to emerging infectious disease threats, such as pandemic influenza.
What GAO Found
Although vaccines are considered the first line of defense to prevent or reduce influenza-related illness and death, GAO found that they may be unavailable, in short supply, or ineffective for some portions of the population during the first wave of a pandemic. Federal and state influenza pandemic plans are in various stages of completion and do not completely or consistently address key issues surrounding the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and antiviral drugs. Inconsistencies in state and federal policies could contribute to public confusion and weaken the effectiveness of the public health response. |
gao_HEHS-96-140 | gao_HEHS-96-140_0 | Number and Size of Job Corps Centers Determine State Capacity
Job Corps program capacity differs widely among the states because the number of centers in each state differs, and the size of individual centers within the states varies substantially. 1). Extent of Out-of-State Assignments Differed Among States
Considerable variation existed among the states in the extent to which Job Corps participants were assigned to out-of-state centers (see fig. 3). 3.) Out-of-State Assignments Are Distant
Job Corps participants assigned to centers outside their state of residence were sent to centers that were, on average, over 4 times as distant as the in-state center closest to a participant’s residence. 5). Participants Employed in State of Residence
Regardless of where Job Corps participants were assigned, those who found jobs usually did so in their home state. 6). 7.) Planned Expansion Will Increase Capacity in Some States
The Job Corps program’s plan to establish nine new centers over the next 2 years will provide some additional capacity that is needed in states with existing centers, but will increase capacity in three other states to about twice the in-state demand. Comparison of Key Data for Program Years 1994 and 1993
Percentage assigned to centers in home state Percentage sent to centers in other states Percentage of state residents assigned to out-of-state centers Number of states assigning 0-24 percent of state residents out of state Number of states assigning 25-49 percent of state residents out of state Number of states assigning 50-74 percent of state residents out of state Number of states assigning 75%+ state residents out of state Percentage of Job Corps participants assigned to centers in same region as residence Average distance traveled (in miles) by participants assigned to out-of-state centers Average distance (in miles) to nearest in-state center for those participants assigned to out-of-state centers Percentage of center participants from out of state Number of centers having 0-24 percent of participants from out of state Number of centers having 25-49 percent of participants from out of state Number of centers having 50-74 percent of participants from out of state Number of centers having 75+ percent participants from out of state Number of participants obtaining jobs Number of participants obtaining jobs in home state Percentage obtaining jobs in home state Number of participants that were or could have been trained in state (continued)
States Within Job Corps Regions, Program Year 1994
Comparison of State Program Capacity With In-State Demand, Program Year 1994
Percentage of Participants Assigned Out of State, Program Years 1994 and 1993
Percentage of Participants Assigned Out of State, Program Year 1994
Percentage of Participants Assigned Out of State, Program Year 1993
Number of Nonresidents Brought Into States Compared With Number of Residents Sent Out of State, Program Years 1994 and 1993
Number of participants who were Brought in from other states (continued)
Number of participants who were Brought in from other states Number of participants who were Brought in from other states (continued)
Number of participants who were Brought in from other states The centers in Alaska and North Dakota (one in each state) were not fully operational in program year 1993. GAO Comments
1. 2. 4. 8. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) locations of Job Corps centers and their capacity by state; (2) extent to which Job Corps participants are trained and placed in jobs in the state in which they reside; and (3) reasons why participants are sent to centers outside their state of residence.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Job Corps program capacity differs among states because the number of centers in each state differs and the size of individual centers within each state differs; (2) in 1994, 41 percent of the 64,000 participants who lived in states with Job Corps centers were assigned to centers outside their home state; (3) the extent of out-of-state assignments varied among states; (4) participants assigned to centers outside their home state were sent to centers that were, on average, over 4 times as distant as the closest in-state center; (5) in many states, Job Corps residents were sent to out-of-state centers, while nonresidents were enrolled at in-state centers; (6) the number of nonresidents varied among individual Job Corps centers during 1994; (7) regardless of where participants were assigned, those who found jobs usually did so in their home state; (8) participants were assigned to centers outside their home state to fully utilize centers or to satisfy particular vocational preferences; (9) the recent trend has been to assign program residents to in-state centers; (10) in 1994, most in-state Job Corps centers had sufficient capacity to accommodate almost all in-state Job Corps participants; and (11) the nine new centers will provide some needed additional capacity in some states and increase capacity in three states to about twice the in-state demand. |
gao_GGD-98-48 | gao_GGD-98-48_0 | Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the enterprises’ charters and relevant statutes to examine the enterprises’ legal authority for making nonmortgage investments and regulatory oversight of that activity. We reviewed literature on the role of the housing enterprises in the residential mortgage market to examine the extent to which the enterprises have undertaken nonmortgage investments for arbitrage profits. The Enterprises’ Nonmortgage Investments Have Not Created a Safety and Soundness Concern
OFHEO has concluded that each housing enterprise’s nonmortgage investment policies and practices have not constituted a safety and soundness concern. FCA has general regulatory authority that would allow oversight of Farmer Mac’s investment activities. HUD’s plan is to monitor investment trends so that it can determine if the investments are consistent with the enterprises’ missions and purposes as defined in their charters. In October 1997, FCA indicated that, for now, it did not have concerns that Farmer Mac’s nonmortgage investment activity is inconsistent with its charter mission. However, FCA also stated that the debt issuance strategy associated with the investments is intended to be temporary and to develop over a reasonable period of time. Therefore, according to FCA, its position could change if over time evidence does not show that such investments play a role in helping Farmer Mac achieve its mission. All three enterprises have committees that set policy and make recommendations concerning compensation. Long-Term, Fixed-Rate Nonmortgage Investments by the Housing Enterprises Generate Arbitrage Profits, and Their Relationship to Mission Is Less Clear
Freddie Mac officials indicated that nonmortgage investments are an integral tool for carrying out its housing finance mission and are held for three principal reasons: (1) cash management purposes; (2) as an investment vehicle that could make capital available (i.e., to employ capital) to help fund future anticipated demand to fund residential mortgages; and (3) as an investment vehicle to employ capital for future unexpected demand to fund residential mortgages. This activity is consistent with how Fannie Mae employs its short-term nonmortgage investments. Nonetheless, some arbitrage profits are generated from these investments. The enterprises have investment policies that specify permissible credit ratings, maturities, and concentration limits and describe the relationship of investments to earnings and to achievement of mission. The various nonmortgage investments appear to fall along a continuum representing the degree to which they relate to the housing enterprises’ missions. Such an approach was used in a study commissioned by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to evaluate the implications of severing government sponsorship of the housing enterprises on the enterprises’ debt costs. 3. Freddie Mac’s nonmortgage investments, in contrast, directly serve our statutory purposes of providing liquidity and stability to the mortgage market.” Here, we again note that the relationship between the various nonmortgage investments and mission achievement is less clear for the longer term than the shorter term nonmortgage investments. 4. GAO Comments
1. As a result, they are less useful in facilitating liquidity in the agricultural mortgage market than short-term investments. 2. 3. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the nonmortgage investment activities at 3 government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)--the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac)--focusing on the: (1) enterprises' legal authority for making nonmortgage investments and federal regulatory oversight of that activity; (2) relationship between nonmortgage investment policies and practices and missions of the enterprises; and (3) extent to which the enterprises have undertaken nonmortgage investments for arbitrage profits--using the funding advantage from government sponsorship to purchase nonmortgage investments that generate profits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) legally, the enterprises have broad investment authority; (2) to date, regulatory oversight activities for the three enterprises have focused on whether nonmortgage investments are safe and sound and not on whether the nonmortgage investment policies and practices are mission-related; (3) the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has not developed criteria to determine if nonmortgage investments are consistent with enterprise charter purposes; (4) in October 1997, the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) indicated that it did not have concerns that Farmer Mac's nonmortgage investment activity is inconsistent with its charter mission, but FCA also stated that the debt issuance strategy associated with the investments is intended to be temporary and to develop over a reasonable period of time; (5) therefore, according to FCA, its position could change if over time evidence does not show that such investments play a role in helping Farmer Mac achieve its mission; (6) enterprises have invested in nonmortgage assets to varying degrees with somewhat different rationales for how these investments further their charter purposes; (7) each enterprise has an investment policy that specifies permissible credit ratings, maturities, and concentration limits and describes the relationship of investments to earnings and to achievement of the enterprise's mission; (8) Freddie Mac officials indicated that its nonmortgage investments have been held for cash management purposes and as an investment vehicle, which could make capital available to help fund future anticipated demand for residential mortgages; (9) the relationship between longer term nonmortgage investments and the enterprises' mission goals is not always clear, because long-term nonmortgage investments may not facilitate liquidity in the residential mortgage market as well as short-term investments; (10) however, it is clear that nonmortgage investments generate arbitrage profits; (11) in its analysis, GAO found that the various nonmortgage investments fall along a continuum representing the degree to which they facilitate liquidity in the residential mortgage market and thus are more clearly related to the enterprises' missions; and (12) GAO's review of compensation practices and board member responsibilities at the enterprises suggests that individual incentives to generate corporate profits are structured in a manner that is fairly typical of major corporations and financial institutions without federal charters limiting their activities. |
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