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gao_GAO-13-574T | gao_GAO-13-574T_0 | Following the Social Security Act, SSA removes the state-reported records from the full DMF and provides the partial DMF to the Department of Commerce’s National Technical Information Service (NTIS), which reimburses SSA for the cost of providing the file and sells it through a subscription service. SSA’s Procedures May Allow for Erroneous Death Information in the DMF
Our work to date has identified ways in which SSA’s procedures for compiling and verifying death reports may affect the accuracy of death reports in the DMF. According to SSA officials, SSA does not collect data on the number of death reports submitted by each source. For example, if SSA first receives a death report from a family member and subsequently receives an electronic report from a state about the same individual, the original report is overridden and SSA records only the state as the source of the death report. According to SSA officials, the agency only verifies death reports for individuals currently receiving Social Security program benefits because it is essential to its mission to stop payments to deceased beneficiaries. Even then, SSA verifies only those reports from sources it considers to be less accurate, such as financial institutions and other federal agencies. Therefore, death reports for non-beneficiaries are not verified (see table 1). SSA receives a death report from a post office based on a returned Social Security benefit check noting the addressee is deceased. SSA does not verify the death before recording it in the Numident record and subsequently the DMF. Because there are a number of death reports that SSA does not verify, the agency risks having erroneous death information in the DMF, such as including living individuals in the file or not including deceased individuals. Specifically, for death reports that are not verified, SSA would not know with certainty if the individuals reported as dead are, in fact, the ones who are dead. SSA acknowledges these limitations and does not guarantee the accuracy of the file. For example, decedents who were never assigned an SSN cannot be matched to the Numident. Agencies’ Access to the DMF Depends on a Variety of Factors
A number of federal agencies access the DMF, but the conditions of access vary widely due to legal and administrative factors. Currently, SSA shares the full DMF with six federal benefit- paying agencies which have requested access and which it has determined meet the relevant legal requirements:
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Department of Defense (Defense Manpower Data Center)
Department of Veterans Affairs
Internal Revenue Service
Office of Personnel Management
Railroad Retirement Board To address administrative conditions of access, these agencies have established information exchange agreements to receive the full DMF. The Office of Personnel Management similarly does not reimburse SSA because it provides other data to SSA, and the agencies have agreed that the expenses involved in the exchanges are reciprocal. A number of other federal agencies purchase only the partial DMF that is publicly available from NTIS. Several of these pay federal benefits, including the Department of Labor’s Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, which provides compensation and health benefits to eligible Department of Energy workers and certain survivors. According to SSA officials, the partial DMF has about 10 percent fewer records than the full DMF due to the removal of state-reported deaths. As a result, any benefit-paying agency relying on the partial DMF to help identify deceased program participants may be missing death records for some of its beneficiaries because it has access to only about 87 million of the 98 million records in the full DMF. In response to agencies’ requests, SSA makes determinations about agencies’ statutory eligibility on a case-by-case basis. However, SSA officials said they were not aware of written standards or guidelines to follow in determining which federal agencies meet statutory requirements. In contrast, SSA officials said that the agency has determined that the Department of the Treasury would not be eligible to receive the full DMF for the purposes of administering the Do Not Pay Initiative. In summary, SSA’s death information can serve as a helpful tool in preventing improper payments, but can only do so if it is accurate and accessible to federal agencies that need it. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal government is accountable for safeguarding against improper payments--those that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount. One tool federal agencies can use to do this is the DMF, which is a file containing records of deceased individuals who are SSNholders. Through data matching, federal benefit-paying agencies can use the DMF to alert them of deceased benefit recipients. However, the SSA Office of Inspector General and others have identified inaccuracies in the DMF, including deceased individuals who were not listed in the file. Such inaccuracies could adversely affect its usefulness to federal agencies.
This testimony addresses preliminary observations on (1) SSA's process for handling death reports for inclusion in the DMF, and (2) federal agency access to the DMF. In addressing these objectives, we interviewed SSA officials regarding how the agency obtains death reports and maintains the DMF; reviewed applicable federal laws, SSA procedures, and reports; interviewed representatives of organizations that report deaths to SSA; and interviewed officials at other federal agencies that use the DMF.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) procedures for handling and verifying death reports may allow for erroneous death information in the Death Master File (DMF) because SSA does not verify certain death reports or record others. SSA officials said, in keeping with its mission, the agency is primarily focused on ensuring that it does not make benefit payments to deceased Social Security program beneficiaries. As a result, it only verifies death reports received for individuals who are current program beneficiaries, and even then, only for those reports received from sources it considers to be less accurate. For example, SSA officials consider death reports from states that have pre-verified decedents' name and SSN to be highly accurate, so SSA does not verify that the subjects of these reports are actually deceased. It would, however, verify a report received from a source such as a post office. SSA verifies no death reports for individuals who are not beneficiaries, regardless of source. Because there are a number of death reports that SSA does not verify, the agency risks including incorrect death information in the DMF, such as including living individuals in the file or not including deceased individuals. Specifically, for death reports that are not verified, SSA would not know with certainty if the individuals are correctly reported as dead. SSA also does not record some deaths because incorrect or incomplete information included in death reports generally prevents SSA from matching decedents to SSA records. For example, if SSA is unable to match a death report to data in its records such as name and Social Security Number (SSN), it generally does not follow up to correct the non-match and does not record the death.
A number of federal agencies access the DMF for the purpose of matching it against data in their files, but the conditions of access depend on a variety of legal and other factors. Currently SSA shares a full version of the DMF with six federal agencies that it has determined meet legal requirements for accessing the file, which include being an agency that pays federal benefits. By law, SSA can require reimbursement for the cost of sharing the data, however various factors affect what the agencies actually pay. The Department of Veterans Affairs and the Office of Personnel Management pay nothing to receive the file, whereas the Department of Defense annually pays more than $40,000. A number of other federal agencies--including several that administer programs that pay benefits-- purchase a partial version of the DMF that is publicly available through the Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service (NTIS). NTIS reimburses SSA for receipt of the file. The partial DMF does not include statereported data and, according to SSA officials, has about 10 percent fewer records than the full DMF (roughly 87 million, compared to 98 million). Thus, agencies accessing this version of the file, such as the Department of Labor's Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, may be missing deceased program participants. If agencies want access to the full DMF, they must formally request it. SSA makes determinations about their eligibility on a case-by-case basis. SSA officials said they were not aware of written standards or guidelines to follow in making these determinations.
What GAO Recommends
The work is ongoing and GAO has no recommendations at this time. GAO plans to issue its final report later in 2013. |
gao_GAO-08-608T | gao_GAO-08-608T_0 | Background
Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually, MDA’s BMDS is the largest research development program in DOD’s budget. In addition, we reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code to compare MDA’s current level of accountability with federal acquisition laws. Fielded Capability Increased, but Less than Planned at Higher Cost
MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during 2007. On the other hand, fewer assets were fielded than originally planned, some tests were delayed, and the cost of the block increased by approximately $1 billion. Such deferrals, coupled with a planning methodology too often used by some contractors that could obscure cost reporting, prevent us from determining the full cost of Block 2006. An evaluation of aggregate performance would also have to consider that (1) some parts in fielded interceptors identified as potentially problematic have not been replaced yet, and (2) tests done to date do not provide enough information for DOD’s independent test organization to fully determine if the BMDS is suitable and effective for battle. Fielding of Assets and Cost
During Block 2006, MDA increased its inventory of BMDS assets while enhancing the system’s performance. In March 2006, MDA made reductions to its block 2006 goals. Because MDA did not track the cost of the deferred work, the agency could not make an adjustment that would have matched the cost with the correct block. Earned value management does not recognize such variances in completing scheduled work and to the extent more work has to be done to complete the product, additional costs could be incurred that are not yet recognized.of their work as level of effort. Testing and Performance of Fielded Capability
Most test objectives were achieved during 2007, although several BMDS programs experienced setbacks in their test schedules. BMDS performance goals included a numerical goal for the probability of a successful BMDS engagement, a defined area from which the BMDS would prevent an enemy from launching a ballistic missile, and a defined area that the BMDS would protect from ballistic missile attacks. Key Steps Taken to Enhance BMDS Oversight, but More Can Be Done
Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility. In the past year, MDA has begun implementing two initiatives—a new block construct and a new executive board—to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight. In addition, Congress has directed that MDA begin buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs, which should promote accountability for and transparency of the BMDS. For example, the actual cost of each block can be tracked because MDA will no longer defer work planned for one block, along with its cost, to a future block. MDA has not addressed whether it will transfer assets produced during a block to a military service for production and operation at the block’s completion. The MDEB appears to be vested with more authority than its predecessor, the Missile Defense Support Group. Independent life-cycle cost estimates provide confidence that a program is executable within estimated cost. Although MDA plans to develop unit cost for selected block assets and to request that DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group verify the unit costs, the agency does not initially plan to develop a block cost estimate and therefore, cannot seek an independent verification of that cost. As noted earlier, the limited amount of testing completed, which has been primarily developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations prevent the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments. Although the charter of the MDEB includes making recommendations to MDA and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) on investment options, program priorities, and MDA’s strategy for developing and fielding an operational missile defense capability, the MDEB will not necessarily have the opportunity to review and recommend changes to BMDS blocks. This is generally true for technology development programs in DOD because they are in a period of discovery, which makes schedule and cost difficult to estimate. MDA Directed to Use Procurement Funding
In an effort to further improve the transparency of MDA’s acquisition processes, Congress has directed that MDA’s budget materials delineate between funds needed for research, development, test and evaluation; procurement; operations and maintenance; and military construction.Congress gave MDA the flexibility to field certain assets using research, development, test and evaluation funding which allowed MDA to fund the purchase of assets over multiple years. Actions Recommended in Our Recent Report
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. | Why GAO Did This Study
Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion per year, the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) effort to develop and field a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is the largest research and development program in the Department of Defense (DOD). The program has been managed in 2-year increments, known as blocks. Block 2006, the second BMDS block, was completed in December 2007. By law, GAO annually assesses MDA's progress. This testimony is based on GAO's March 2008 report that addressed MDA's progress in (1) meeting Block 2006 goals for fielding assets, completing work within estimated cost, conducting tests, and demonstrating the performance of the overall system in the field, and (2) making managerial improvements to transparency, accountability, and oversight. GAO reviewed the assets fielded; contractor cost, schedule, and performance; and tests completed during 2007. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the charter of a new missile defense board.
What GAO Found
In the past year, MDA has fielded additional and new assets, enhanced the capability of some existing assets, and achieved most test objectives. MDA did not meet the goals it originally set for the block. Ultimately, MDA fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1 billion and conducted fewer tests. Even with the cost increase, MDA deferred work to keep costs from increasing further, as some contractors overran their fiscal year 2007 budgets. Deferring work obscures the cost of the block because such work is no longer counted as part of Block 2006. The cost of the block may have been further obscured by a way of planning work used by several contractors that could underestimate the actual work completed. If more work has to be done, MDA could incur additional costs that are not yet recognized. MDA also sets goals for determining the overall performance of the BMDS. Similar to other DOD programs, MDA uses models and simulations to predict BMDS performance. GAO was unable to assess whether MDA met its overall performance goal because there have not been enough flight tests to provide a high confidence that the models and simulations accurately predict BMDS performance. Moreover, the tests that have been done do not provide enough information for DOD's independent test organization to fully assess the BMDS' suitability and effectiveness. GAO has previously reported that MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decision-making flexibility. While this flexibility has expedited BMDS fielding, it has also made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than other major programs, making oversight more challenging. MDA, with some direction from Congress, has taken significant steps to address these concerns. MDA implemented a new way of defining blocks--its construct for developing and fielding BMDS increments--that should make costs more transparent. For example, under the newly-defined blocks, MDA will no longer defer work from one block to another. Accountability should also be improved as MDA will, for the first time, estimate unit costs for selected assets and report variances from those estimates. DOD also chartered a new executive board with more BMDS oversight responsibility than its predecessor. Finally, MDA will begin buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs. This will benefit transparency and accountability, because to use procurement funding generally means that assets must be fully paid for in the year they are bought. Previously, Congress authorized MDA to pay for assets incrementally using research and development funds. Some oversight concerns remain, however. For example, MDA has not yet estimated the total cost of a block, and therefore, cannot have a block's costs independently verified--actions required of other programs to inform decisions about affordability and investment choices. However, MDA does plan to estimate block costs and have them verified at some future date. Also, the executive board faces a challenge in overseeing MDA's large technology development efforts and does not have approval authority for some key decisions made by MDA. |
gao_GAO-03-577T | gao_GAO-03-577T_0 | The rapid growth in health care spending means that an increasing share of the nation’s output, as measured by GDP, will be devoted to the production of health care services and goods. Within the next 10 years, the first baby boomers will begin to retire, putting increasing pressure on the federal budget. Demographic Trends And Expected Rise in Health Care Costs Drive Medicare’s Long-Term Financing Problem
As you know, Medicare consists of two parts—HI and SMI. Labor force growth will continue to decline and by 2025 is expected to be less than a third of what it is today. This slowing labor force growth is not always recognized as part of the Medicare debate, but it is expected to affect the ability of the federal budget and the economy to sustain Medicare’s projected spending in the coming years. HI’s Trust Fund Faces Cash Flow Problems Long before the HI Trust Fund Is Projected to Be Insolvent
Current projections of future HI income and outlays illustrate the timing and severity of Medicare’s fiscal challenge. This pressure will only increase when Social Security also experiences negative cash flow and joins HI as a net claimant on the rest of the budget. The projected exhaustion date of the HI Trust Fund is a commonly used indicator of HI’s financial condition. For example, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 modified the home health benefit, which resulted in shifting a portion of home health spending from the HI Trust Fund to SMI. To obtain budget balance, massive spending cuts, tax increases, or some combination of the two would be necessary. Neither slowing the growth of discretionary spending nor allowing the tax reductions to sunset eliminates the imbalance. In addition, while additional economic growth would help ease our burden, the projected fiscal gap is too great for us to grow our way out of the problem. As HI trust fund assets are redeemed to pay Medicare benefits and SMI expenditures continue to grow, the program will constitute a claim on real resources in the future. The Medicare benefit package, largely designed in 1965, provides virtually no outpatient drug coverage. In particular, the addition of a benefit that has the potential to be extremely expensive—such as prescription drug coverage—should be focused on meeting the needs deemed to be of the highest priority. As I continue to maintain, acting prudently means making any benefit expansions in the context of overall program reforms that are designed to make the program more sustainable over the long term instead of worsening the program’s financial future. Medicare Reforms Should Realign Incentives, Improve Transparency, and Strengthen Accountability
In recent years, leading proposals have been made to restructure Medicare that have included greater reliance on private health plans and reforms to the traditional fee-for-service program. Experience with Medicare’s private health plan alternative, called Medicare+Choice, suggests that details matter if competition is to produce enhanced benefits for enrollees and savings for the program. This means designing a program that will encourage beneficiaries to select health plan options most likely to generate program savings. For example, incentives for health plan efficiency exist, but any efficiency gains achieved do not produce Medicare savings. As we contemplate the forecast for Medicare’s fiscal condition and its implications, we must also remember that the sources of some of its problems—and its solutions—are outside the program and are universal to all health care payers. | Why GAO Did This Study
We are pleased to be here today as Congress examines Medicare's financial health and consider the budgetary and economic challenges presented by an aging society. The Comptroller General has been particularly attentive to the sustainability challenges faced by the nation's two largest entitlement programs--Medicare and Social Security--for more than a decade since he served as a public trustee for these programs in the early 1990s. The recent publication of the 2003 Trustees' annual report reminds us, once again, that the status quo is not an option for Medicare. If the program stays on its present course, in 10 years Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund outlays will begin to exceed tax receipts, and by 2026 the HI trust fund will be exhausted. It is important to note that trust fund insolvency does not mean the program will cease to exist; program tax revenues will continue to cover a portion of projected expenditures.1 However, Medicare is only part of the broader health care financing problem that confronts both public programs and private payers. The unrelenting growth in health care spending is producing a health care sector that continues to claim an increasing share of our gross domestic product (GDP).
What GAO Found
Despite the grim outlook for Medicare's financial future, fiscal discipline imposed on Medicare through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) continues to be challenged, and interest in modernizing the program's benefit package to include prescription drug coverage and catastrophic protection continues to grow. Such unabated pressures highlight the urgency for meaningful reform. As we deliberate on the situation, we must be mindful of several key points. The traditional measure of HI Trust Fund solvency is a misleading gauge of Medicare's financial health. Long before the HI Trust Fund is projected to be insolvent, pressures on the rest of the federal budget will grow as HI's projected cash inflows turn negative and grow as the years pass. Moreover, a focus on the financial status of HI ignores the increasing burden Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI)--Medicare part B--will place on taxpayers and beneficiaries. GAO's most recent long-term budget simulations continue to show that demographic trends and rising health care spending will drive escalating federal deficits and debt, absent meaningful entitlement reforms or other significant tax or spending actions. To obtain budget balance, massive spending cuts, tax increases, or some combination of the two would be necessary. Neither slowing the growth of discretionary spending nor allowing the tax reductions to sunset will eliminate the imbalance. In addition, while additional economic growth will help ease our burden, the potential fiscal gap is too great to grow our way out of the problem. Since the cost of a drug benefit would boost spending projections even further, adding drug coverage when Medicare's financial future is already bleak will require difficult policy choices that will mean trade-offs for both beneficiaries and providers. Just as physicians take the Hippocratic oath to "do no harm," policymakers should avoid adopting reforms that will worsen Medicare's long-term financial health. Our experience with Medicare--both the traditional program and its private health plan alternative--provides valuable lessons that can guide consideration of reforms. For example, we know that proposals to enroll beneficiaries in private health plans must be designed to encourage beneficiaries to join efficient plans and ensure that Medicare shares in any efficiency gains. We also recognize that improvements to traditional Medicare are essential, as this program will likely remain significant for some time to come. |
gao_GAO-17-91 | gao_GAO-17-91_0 | 1). Recently enacted legislation may change the responsibilities of some stakeholders. Selected Emergency Planners Reported That Responder Training and Railroads’ Information Sharing Affect Preparedness Emergency Planners Reported That Responder Training for Rail Hazardous Materials Accidents Is Useful, but Some Encounter Impediments to Participating in Training
Local emergency planners from almost all of the counties we contacted reported that their emergency responders participated in training, exercises, or drills (“training”) to prepare for responding to rail hazardous materials incidents. Emergency Planners from Most Counties Reported That Information from Railroads and SERCs Is Useful for Hazardous Response Planning and Preparedness
Local emergency planners from most of the selected counties reported that railroads and SERCs have provided them with a variety of information for planning and preparing for hazardous materials accidents and that this information is useful. Hazardous materials information: Local emergency planners from most counties (22 of 24) reported having been provided information about hazardous materials transported through their areas, including a few that told us their SERCs provided them with information about Bakken crude-oil shipments. Class I Railroads and Selected Class II and III Railroads Reported Supporting Preparedness for Rail Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials Class I Railroads Reported Increasing Training and Support of Emergency Responders in Recent Years
Although not required by DOT, all seven Class I railroads we surveyed reported that they have provided training in the past 5 years to local emergency responders related to emergency preparedness for and response to rail accidents involving hazardous materials. DOT expects to expand the information-sharing requirements further with proposed regulations (consistent with the FAST Act) to include all high-hazard flammable train operations, not just trains carrying crude oil from Bakken sources, steps that will affect its oversight of railroads’ actions moving forward. Information Sharing Requirements for Trains Carrying Bakken Crude Oil and Other Flammable Liquids
As previously discussed, in the wake of railroad accidents involving crude oil, DOT issued the Emergency Order in 2014 to improve information sharing between railroads and emergency planners by requiring railroads to provide advance notification of Bakken crude oil train movements through states. Specifically, local emergency planners from 17 of 21 counties reported that information about hazardous materials shipments was useful for planning and preparing for accidents. For example, DOT issued the Emergency Order to increase awareness of large shipments of Bakken crude oil. However, the extent to which local emergency planners in affected communities have received the information about these shipments is unclear because DOT has not taken steps to understand whether SERCs provided the information to local emergency planners, who in turn could use the information in preparing for potential rail accidents involving hazardous materials. Recommendation for Executive Action
To continue the agency’s efforts to improve state and local emergency preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation: after the rulemaking is finalized, develop a process for regularly collecting information from SERCs on the distribution of the railroad- provided hazardous-materials-shipping information to local planning entities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) the factors selected local emergency planners report as affecting their preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials; (2) the actions that Class I and selected other railroads report taking to support local emergency planners’ preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials; and (3) the actions that the Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken to support state and local emergency planners’ preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials and additional actions, if any, that DOT could take. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) within DOT; FEMA; EPA; and the National Transportation Safety Board to inform our understanding about the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local stakeholders in emergency preparedness and response to rail accidents involving hazardous materials. We identified the 17 SERCs to interview based on the location of the four urban and four rural counties that had the highest volumes of hazardous materials in each of the 5 PHMSA regions we selected. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent rail accidents involving hazardous materials, such as crude oil, have raised questions about local emergency responders' ability to take protective actions in the aftermath of such accidents. Along with FRA, PHMSA is responsible for ensuring the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail through issuing and enforcing railroad- and shipper-safety regulations.
GAO was asked to review efforts that enhance preparedness for hazardous materials rail accidents. This report examines: (1) the factors selected local emergency planners report affect preparedness; (2) the actions selected railroads have taken to support preparedness; and (3) the actions DOT has taken to support emergency planners.
GAO reviewed laws and regulations and surveyed (1) emergency planners representing 25 counties and 17 states with the highest volumes of hazardous materials rail shipments and (2) all seven Class I railroads and four smaller railroads selected because they operate in the counties where GAO surveyed local emergency planners.
What GAO Found
Emergency planners from most of the 25 selected counties in 17 states that GAO surveyed reported that training for responders and information about rail shipments of hazardous materials affect preparedness. Emergency planners from almost all of the selected counties reported that a majority of the emergency response personnel, such as fire fighters, who arrive first at an accident receive basic training that would enable them to take initial protective actions, including recognizing hazardous materials and calling for assistance in the event of a rail accident involving crude oil and other hazardous materials. Emergency planners from most counties reported that training related to rail hazardous materials was useful in preparing for accidents. Emergency planners reported that some factors present obstacles to responders' receiving training, such as neglecting one's professional duties to take time off for training. Emergency planners from most counties reported that railroads in their jurisdictions have provided them with information about hazardous material shipments and that this information is useful in preparing for potential accidents.
All seven of the largest railroads (called Class I railroads) and some of the four smaller railroads that GAO surveyed reported providing training and information about hazardous materials to local emergency responders and planners in recent years. The Class I railroads reported training through a variety of means, including locally delivered training exercises or off-site at industry-recognized training centers. In addition, railroads reported providing information about hazardous material shipments to state and local emergency planners in part due to a May 2014 Department of Transportation (DOT) Emergency Order requiring notification of state emergency-planning agencies about shipments of crude oil from North Dakota and Montana where the Bakken shale deposit is located. This information was intended to reach local emergency responders so that they could better prepare for rail accidents involving crude oil.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) within DOT have taken multiple actions to support emergency preparedness for rail incidents involving hazardous materials; some actions focused specifically on trains carrying Bakken crude oil. For example, PHMSA developed a web-based training curriculum on how to prepare for hazardous materials incidents, and FRA determined whether railroads provided information about Bakken crude-oil shipments to states. However, PHMSA learned that some states did not provide the information about Bakken crude oil shipments to local emergency planners, as called for in the Emergency Order. Recently enacted legislation expands FRA's oversight of railroads' actions moving forward; for example, railroads will be required to notify states of large shipments of other hazardous materials. However, FRA and PHMSA have not taken steps to understand whether the shipment information railroads are required to share with states is consistently disseminated to local emergency planners. Therefore, the extent to which DOT's information-sharing requirements have the potential to improve local preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials is unclear.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT develop a process for regularly collecting information from state emergency- planning agencies about their distribution of railroad-provided hazardous materials shipping information to local emergency planning entities. DOT concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-436T | gao_GAO-12-436T_0 | Management of Arlington Contracts Improved, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Ensure Continued Progress
The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts supporting Arlington, including improving visibility of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve acquisition processes. While significant progress has been made, we have recommended that the Army take further action in these areas to ensure continued improvement and institutionalize progress made to date. Using data from multiple sources, we identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which these contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlington’s behalf. These contracts and task orders supported cemetery operations, such as landscaping, custodial, and guard services; construction and facility maintenance; and new efforts to enhance information-technology systems for the automation of burial operations. At the time of our review, we found that ANCP did not maintain complete data on contracts supporting its operations. The Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) is the primary system used to track governmentwide contract data, including those for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army. However, some of the agreements governing these relationships do not yet fully define roles and responsibilities for contracting support. These organizations are also responsible for managing the use of contracts in support of their efforts; however, the agreement with ANCP does not specifically address roles and responsibilities associated with the use and management of these contracts supporting Arlington requirements. Army Has Made Progress in Addressing Other Management Deficiencies at Arlington, but Challenges Remain
The Army has also taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains, taking actions to better provide information- assurance, and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families’ inquiries. Nevertheless, we identified several areas where challenges remain:
Managing information-technology investments. Updating workforce plans. Developing an organizational assessment program. Coordinating with key partners. Developing written guidance for providing assistance to families. Formal Collaboration between the Army and VA Could Lead to Improvements across All National Cemeteries
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army’s two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, we identified several factors that may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlington’s unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. During our review, we identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. Since the Army IG issued its findings in June 2010, the Army and VA have taken steps to partner more effectively. Summary of Recommendations for Further Improvements at Arlington National Cemetery
The success of the Army’s efforts to improve contracting and management at Arlington will depend on continued focus in various areas. With regard to other management challenges at Arlington, we recommended that the Army implement its enterprise architecture and reassess ongoing and planned information-technology investments; update its assessment of ANCP’s workforce needs; develop and implement a program for assessing and improving cemetery operations; develop memorandums of understanding with Arlington’s key operational partners; develop a strategic plan; and develop written guidance to help determine the types of assistance that will be provided to families affected by burial errors. DOD partially agreed with our other recommendations. Finally, we recommended that the Army and VA implement a joint working group or other such mechanism to enable ANCP and VA’s National Cemetery Administration to collaborate more closely in the future. Both DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington) is the final resting place for many of our nations military servicemembers, their family members, and others. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General identified problems at the cemetery, including deficiencies in contracting and management, burial errors, and a failure to notify next of kin of errors. In response, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance creating the position of the Executive Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program (ANCP) to manage Arlington and requiring changes to address the deficiencies and improve cemetery operations. In response to Public Law 111-339, GAO assessed several areas, including (1) actions taken to improve contract management and oversight, (2) the Armys efforts to address identified management deficiencies and provide information and assistance to families regarding efforts to detect and correct burial errors, and (3) factors affecting the feasibility and advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Armys national cemeteries to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The information in this testimony summarizes GAOs recent reports on Arlington contracting (GAO-12-99) and management (GAO-12-105). These reports are based on, among other things, analyzing guidance, policies, plans, contract files, and other documentation from the Army, Arlington, and other organizations and interviews with Army and VA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlingtons behalf. These contracts supported cemetery operations, construction and facility maintenance, and new efforts to enhance information-technology systems for the automation of burial operations. The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve its acquisition processes. However, GAO found that ANCP does not maintain complete data on its contracts, responsibilities for contracting support are not yet fully defined, and dedicated contract staffing arrangements still need to be determined. The success of Arlingtons acquisition outcomes will depend on continued management focus from ANCP and its contracting partners to ensure sustained attention to contract management and institutionalize progress made to date. GAO made three recommendations to continue improvements in contract management. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred and noted actions in progress to address these areas.
The Army has taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families inquiries. Nevertheless, the Army has remaining management challenges in several areasmanaging information-technology investments, updating workforce plans, developing an organizational assessment program, coordinating with key partners, developing a strategic plan, and developing guidance for providing assistance to families. GAO made six recommendations to help address these areas. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has begun to take some corrective actions.
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Armys two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, several factors may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlingtons unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. GAO identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. GAO recommended that the Army and VA develop a mechanism to formalize collaboration between these organizations. DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
In the reports, GAO made several recommendations to help Arlington sustain progress made to date. |
gao_GAO-03-997T | gao_GAO-03-997T_0 | According to Army regulations, the Army is to meet the annual medical screening requirement by reviewing the medical certificate required of each early-deploying reservist. The Army Has Not Collected and Maintained All Required Medical and Dental Information on Early-Deploying Reservists
The Army has not consistently carried out the requirements that early- deploying reservists undergo 5- or 2-year physical examinations, and the required dental examination. At the seven Army early-deploying reserve units we visited, about 66 percent of the medical records were available for our review. At the seven early-deploying units we visited, we found that about 49 percent of the reservists whose records were available for review did not have a record of a current dental examination. Periodic Physical and Dental Examinations Are Valuable for Assessing Health Status and Provide Beneficial Information to the Army and VA
Medical experts recommend physical and dental examinations as an effective means of assessing health. Because Army early-deploying reservists need to be healthy to fulfill their professional responsibilities, periodic examinations are useful for assessing whether they can perform their assigned duties. If the Army does not know the health condition of its early-deploying reservists, and if it expects some of them to be unfit and incapable of performing their duties, the Army may be required to maintain a larger number of reservists than it would otherwise need in order to fulfill its military and humanitarian missions. However, the Army has not fully complied with statutory requirements to assess and monitor the medical and dental status of early- deploying reservists. Consequently, the Army does not know how many of them can perform their assigned duties and are ready for deployment. While our work focused on the Army’s efforts to assess the health status of its early-deploying reservists, it also has implications for veterans. Implementing our recommendations that DOD comply with the statutory requirements, which DOD has agreed to, will also be of benefit to VA. VA’s ability to perform its missions to provide medical care to veterans and compensate them for their service-connected disabilities could be hampered if the Army’s medical surveillance system contains inadequate or incomplete information. Related GAO Products
Defense Health Care: Army Needs to Assess the Health Status of All Early-Deploying Reservists. GAO-03-549T. Defense Health Care: Physical Exams and Dental Care Following the Persian Gulf War. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, health problems prevented the deployment of a significant number of Army reservists. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, GAO reported on the Army's efforts to assess the health status of its early-deploying reservists (Defense Health Care: Army Needs to Assess the Health Status of All Early-Deploying Reservists ( GAO-03-437 , Apr. 15, 2003)). GAO was asked to testify on its findings on the Army's health status assessments efforts and the implications of those assessments for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Specifically, GAO was asked to determine if the Army is collecting and maintaining information on reservists' health and review the value and advisability of providing examinations. For its report, GAO reviewed medical records at seven Army early-deploying reserve units to determine the number of required examinations that have been conducted and obtained expert opinion on the value of periodic examinations.
What GAO Found
The Army has not consistently carried out the statutory requirements for monitoring the health and dental status of its early-deploying reservists. As a result, the Army does not have sufficient information to know how many reservists can perform their assigned duties and are ready for deployment. At reserve units GAO visited, approximately 66 percent of the medical records were available for review. At those locations, GAO found that about 13 percent of the 5-year physical examinations had not been performed, about 49 percent of early-deploying reservists lacked current dental examinations, and none of the annual medical certificates required of reservists were completed by them and reviewed by the units. Medical experts recommend periodic physical and dental examinations as an effective means of assessing health. Army early-deploying reservists need to be healthy to meet the specific demands of their occupations; examinations and other health screenings can be used to identify those who cannot perform their assigned duties. Without adequate examinations, the Army may train, support, and mobilize reservists who are unfit for duty. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations to comply with statutory requirements to conduct medical and dental examinations and provide dental treatment. VA's ability to perform its missions to provide medical care to veterans and compensate them for their service-connected disabilities could be hampered if the Army's medical surveillance system contains inadequate or incomplete information. |
gao_GAO-05-567T | gao_GAO-05-567T_0 | FISMA Authorized and Strengthened Information Security Requirements
Enacted into law on December 17, 2002, as Title III of the E- Government Act of 2002, FISMA authorized and strengthened information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements. Specifically, this program is to include: ● periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; ● risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; ● subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; ● security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; ● periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; ● a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; ● procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security ● plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. DHS uses a variety of major applications and general support systems in support of operational and administrative requirements. Department of Homeland Security’s FISMA Reports Highlight Increases in Performance Measures, but Challenges Remain
In its FISMA-mandated report for fiscal year 2004, DHS generally reported increases in compliance with information security requirements as compared with 2003. However, DHS continues to face significant challenges. DHS has yet to develop a complete and accurate inventory, or an effective plan of action and milestones. DHS reported a significant increase for this performance measure in its fiscal year 2004 report. DHS reported a substantial increase in the percentage of employees and contractors who received security awareness training in fiscal year 2004. The Department reported that it had trained 85 percent of its staff compared to 14 percent in 2003. The total number of agency systems is a key element in OMB’s performance measures, in that agency progress is indicated by the percentage of total systems that meet specific information security requirements. In summary, DHS generally showed increases in the OMB performance measures for FISMA implementation in fiscal year 2004. However, it still faces challenges in implementing the statutory requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, GAO has reported that poor information security is a widespread problem that has potentially devastating consequences. Accordingly, since 1997, GAO has identified information security as a governmentwide high-risk issue in reports to Congress--most recently in January 2005. Concerned with accounts of attacks on commercial systems via the Internet and reports of significant weaknesses in federal computer systems that made them vulnerable to attack, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which permanently authorized and strengthened the federal information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements established for federal agencies. FISMA requires that agencies report annually to OMB who issues guidance for that reporting process. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the third largest agency in the federal government, uses a variety of major applications and general systems in support of operational and administrative requirements. This testimony discusses DHS's progress and challenges in implementing FISMA as reported by the agency and its Inspector General (IG).
What GAO Found
DHS has made progress in implementing key federal information security requirements, yet it continues to face challenges in fulfilling the requirements mandated by FISMA. In its fiscal year 2004 report on FISMA implementation, DHS highlights increases in the majority of the key performance measures (developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to track agency performance in implementing information security requirements), such as the percentage of agency systems reviewed and percentage of employee and contractor personnel who received security awareness training. For example, DHS reported a substantial increase in the percentage of personnel that received security awareness training, rising from 14 percent in fiscal year 2003 to 85 percent in fiscal year 2004. However, DHS continues to face significant challenges in meeting most statutory information security requirements. For example, DHS has yet to develop a complete and accurate inventory or an effective remediation process. |
gao_GAO-16-190 | gao_GAO-16-190_0 | Various Options Exist for Targeting Assistance, but Each Involves Challenges That FEMA Would Have to Overcome
Although any pre-FIRM property located in an SFHA in a participating community is currently generally eligible for a subsidy, according to some stakeholders we interviewed and our analysis of literature we reviewed, options for targeting assistance to subsidized NFIP policyholders who may experience difficulty paying full-risk rates include means testing based on the income level of policyholders or geographic areas, setting premium caps, and basing assistance on the cost of mitigating the risk of damage to a home. However, they all involve trade-offs, and implementing any of them would likely be challenging. In contrast, a means- tested program would decouple the subsidy from the property and instead attach it to the policyholder or a group of policyholders on the basis of need, as determined by specified financial requirements and eligibility criteria. Because the current NFIP structure attaches the assistance to the property rather than the policyholder, FEMA does not collect income information for policyholders who receive subsidies. Further, FEMA continues to work on implementing required changes under the Biggert-Waters Act, as amended by HFIAA. However, estimating the cost of providing assistance under various targeting options with precision is difficult because FEMA lacks the elevation data needed to calculate full-risk rates for currently subsidized properties. Estimation of Eligible Policyholders Based on Individuals’ Financial Need
Our analysis of ACS data showed that, depending on the income threshold used, 47 percent to 74 percent of subsidized policyholders (approximately 285,000 to 451,000) would likely be eligible to receive assistance under a means-tested approach that considers individuals’ financial need. For example, if the eligibility threshold were increased to 140 percent of AMI, we estimated that the percentage of policyholders who would likely be eligible to receive assistance would increase to about 87 percent. FEMA Lacks Information Needed to Estimate the Cost of Assistance
As previously discussed, FEMA does not collect certain flood risk information that would be needed to calculate the full-risk rate for most subsidized policies; as a result, estimating the cost of providing subsidy assistance under various targeting options is difficult. As a result, we recommended that FEMA develop and implement a plan to obtain information needed to determine full-risk rates for subsidized properties. FEMA generally agreed with the recommendation and has taken limited action to implement it. Information about flood risk is needed to correctly charge full-risk rates for an increasing number of policies as FEMA phases out subsidies. Each mechanism involves trade-offs among affordability and four policy goals for federal involvement in natural catastrophe insurance. We identified these four policy goals, which have not changed, in our 2007 report on the federal role in natural catastrophe insurance: (1) charging premium rates that fully reflect actual risks; (2) encouraging private markets to provide natural catastrophe insurance; (3) encouraging broad participation in natural catastrophe insurance programs; and (4) limiting costs to taxpayers before and after a disaster. The other delivery mechanisms we identified— vouchers, tax expenditures, and grants and loans for mitigation—would likely help support these goals. With tax expenditures, policyholders would be charged a full-risk rate premium before having their tax liability reduced when they file their taxes. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to describe (1) options to target assistance to National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) subsidized policyholders who may experience difficulty paying full-risk rates, (2) the number of currently subsidized policyholders who might be eligible for assistance under certain options and the cost of implementing these options, and (3) potential delivery mechanisms for providing assistance to eligible policyholders. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Federal Insurance Office (FIO), Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, Louisiana Department of Insurance, and New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance and representatives from 18 organizations with flood insurance knowledge to obtain input on (1) options that could be used to target assistance for NFIP; (2) different mechanisms that other federal programs have used to deliver assistance and the extent to which they could be used to deliver assistance in NFIP; and (3) to the extent possible, any benefits and challenges of using these options and delivery mechanisms. We interviewed officials at the following 18 organizations:
Allstate Insurance Company
American Academy of Actuaries
Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc.
Center for Economic Justice
Consumer Federation of America
National Academy of Sciences
National Association of Insurance Commissioners
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
National Association of Realtors
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
RAND Corporation
SmartSafer.org
USAA General Indemnity Company
Risk Management and Decision Processes Center at the Wharton Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America Insurance Information Institute Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University School of the University of Pennsylvania
Wright National Flood Insurance Company On the basis of our literature review and interviews, we identified three general options that could potentially be used to target assistance to NFIP policyholders who may experience difficulty paying full-risk rates: means testing based on the income level of policyholders or local geographic areas, setting premium caps based on a percentage of total insurance coverage, and basing assistance on the cost of mitigating the risk of damage to a home. Because FEMA does not collect income information for its NFIP policyholders, we attempted to obtain income data from IRS for subsidized policyholders as of September 30, 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of May 30, 2015, FEMA, which administers NFIP, subsidized about 996,000 flood insurance policies. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 authorized these highly discounted premiums. To help strengthen NFIP's financial solvency, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 required FEMA to eliminate or phase out almost all subsidized premiums. However, affected policyholders raised concerns about the resulting rate increases. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 sought to address affordability concerns by repealing or altering some Biggert-Waters Act requirements.
GAO was asked to identify options for policyholders who may face affordability issues if charged full-risk rate premiums. This report describes options to target assistance to policyholders, estimates of eligible policyholders and associated costs of these options, and mechanisms for delivering assistance. GAO reviewed literature on approaches for targeting and delivering assistance, interviewed 18 organizations familiar with flood insurance and officials from FEMA and other agencies, and analyzed NFIP premium data and Census income data for 2009-2013 (most recent).
What GAO Found
Options for targeting assistance to subsidized policyholders of primary residences who may experience difficulty paying full-risk rates for their National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policies include means testing assistance based on the income level of policyholders or geographic areas, setting premium caps, and basing assistance on the cost of mitigating the risk of damage to their homes. Currently, NFIP subsidies are tied to the property. Implementing a means-tested approach would decouple the subsidy from the property and instead attach it to the policyholder or a group of policyholders on the basis of financial need. All of these options involve trade-offs, and implementing any of them would present challenges because the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would have to collect data that it does not currently collect, such as policyholders' income and flood-risk information needed to calculate full-risk rates.
Although data are limited, they suggest that many policyholders who currently receive a subsidy would likely be eligible for assistance under certain targeting options GAO identified. For example, using Census data, under the means-tested approach based on individual policyholders' income and using an eligibility threshold of 80 percent of area median income, about 47 percent of subsidized policyholders, as of September 2013, would likely be eligible to receive assistance. If the eligibility threshold were increased to 140 percent of area median income, 74 percent would likely be eligible to receive assistance. Under this and other targeting options, however, it is not possible to estimate the cost of providing assistance with precision because FEMA lacks the information needed to calculate full-risk rates for currently subsidized properties. GAO recommended in July 2013 that FEMA collect information from all policyholders necessary to determine flood risk. FEMA agreed with the recommendation but has taken limited action to implement it, citing the considerable time and cost involved in obtaining the information. FEMA officials stated that they plan to continue to rely on subsidized policyholders to voluntarily obtain this information. Without proper flood-risk information, the cost of the existing subsidy or other assistance—which would be important for Congress in considering options to address affordability—cannot be determined accurately.
Several mechanisms are available for delivering assistance to eligible policyholders, but each involves trade-offs among four public policy goals. For NFIP, these goals are (1) charging premium rates that fully reflect risk, (2) encouraging private markets to provide flood insurance, (3) encouraging broad program participation, and (4) limiting administrative costs. NFIP currently uses discounted rates to deliver subsidies to certain policyholders but could choose from a variety of delivery mechanisms, including vouchers, tax expenditures, and grants and loans, depending on policy priorities. For example, while tax expenditures do not have the stigma that some individuals may associate with government spending programs, policyholders could face cash flow challenges because they would generally need to pay the full premium before they receive the tax benefit. Finally, alternative mechanisms could increase administrative costs because FEMA would incur additional costs associated with setting up and administering a new assistance program or tax benefit, among other reasons.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO recommended in GAO-13-607 that FEMA obtain information needed to determine full-risk rates for subsidized properties and maintains the importance of implementing the recommendation. FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-14-326 | gao_GAO-14-326_0 | DOD and the Services Have Taken Steps to Implement PSMs for Major Weapon Systems, but Certain Aspects of the Implementation Process Remain Incomplete
DOD and the services have taken steps to implement PSMs for major weapon systems and have described them as a valuable resource in managing product support, but certain aspects of the implementation process remain incomplete. Almost All Systems Have PSMs Assigned, but DOD and the Services Do Not Have a Plan to Institutionalize a Comprehensive Career Path for PSMs
DOD has assigned PSMs to almost all of its major weapon systems and has developed PSM training courses, but DOD, in coordination with the military services, has not developed a plan—to include objectives, milestones, and resources—to implement and institutionalize a comprehensive PSM career path. As of the most-current data available from the military services, 325 of 332 PSM position requirements across DOD for major weapon systems—approximately 98 percent—were filled. A similar provision was subsequently codified at section 1706 of Title 10, U.S. Code. ASA(ALT) officials stated that major weapon systems program offices have raised the issue of the lack of clear roles and responsibilities of these personnel and, according to a senior AMC official, AMC discussed this issue with their personnel in an attempt to address this issue. Without clear guidance detailing responsibilities and reporting relationships for AMC support personnel involved in the sustainment of weapon systems, PSMs may be hindered in their ability to effectively manage and conduct their daily product support responsibilities. DOD Does Not Have Sufficient Information to Determine the Effects of PSMs
DOD does not fully know how or to what extent PSMs are affecting life- cycle sustainment decisions because it is not systematically collecting or evaluating information on the implementation or effect of PSMs. Program evaluation guidance states that evaluations can play a key role in program planning, management, and oversight by providing feedback—on both program design and execution—to Program Managers, Congress, executive-branch policy officials, and the public. Although DOD Has Not Systematically Collected Data on the Effects PSMs Are Having on Life-Cycle Sustainment Decisions, Program Offices Identified PSM-Related Good Practices and Challenges
In the absence of department- or service-wide information systematically documenting the effects PSMs are having on life-cycle sustainment decisions, we conducted interviews with product support personnel assigned to 12 major weapon systems, and program offices identified several good practices being employed as well as several challenges that PSMs face. While DOD and all of the services have taken some steps to develop a comprehensive career path and associated guidance to develop, train, and support future PSMs, DOD, in coordination with the military services, has not developed a plan—to include objectives, milestones, and resources—to implement and institutionalize a comprehensive PSM career path. Until DOD develops such a plan, the department may not be able to ensure that the services can fill PSM positions with properly qualified personnel in the future. Without clear, comprehensive, and centralized implementation guidance, DOD may be hindered in its ability to implement future PSMs for its major weapon systems. Likewise, until the Army clarifies roles and responsibilities in its guidance for the sustainment portion of the life cycle for major weapon systems, PSMs may be hindered in their ability to effectively manage and conduct their daily product support responsibilities. With PSMs now in place for almost all major weapon systems, information on the effects PSMs are having on life-cycle management and sustainment decisions could help inform DOD, the services, and Congress on the extent to which the PSM position is helping to improve product support efforts or whether changes are needed to guidance or to roles and responsibilities to enhance the contributions of PSMs. To help inform departmental and congressional oversight of the status of Product Support Manager (PSM) implementation and the influence, if any, that PSMs have in life-cycle sustainment decisions for major weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD)—in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—to systematically collect and evaluate information on the effects, if any, that PSMs are having on life-cycle sustainment decisions for their assigned major weapon systems. To better enable Army Product Support Managers (PSM) to fulfill their daily product support responsibilities, including planning and proactively managing sustainment efforts for their assigned weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army—in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA) and the Commander of Army Materiel Command (AMC)—to review the current process for requesting and distributing sustainment funding for major weapon systems and to take necessary actions to ensure that PSMs have greater visibility of the amount of sustainment funds their weapon systems will receive including prior to the year of execution of funds, to the extent possible. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain weapon systems. With the prospect of tighter defense budgets, DOD has placed more attention on controlling total life-cycle costs with initiatives aimed at ensuring that weapon systems are more affordable over the long term. Section 2337 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires that each major weapon system be supported by a PSM and lays out the responsibilities of the PSM, including developing and implementing a comprehensive product support strategy for the system. GAO was asked to review DOD's progress in implementing PSMs for major weapon systems.
This report examines (1) the steps, if any, that DOD and the military services have taken to implement PSMs for major weapon systems and (2) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the effects, if any, that PSMs are having on life-cycle sustainment decisions for their assigned systems. To conduct this review, GAO obtained information and interviewed product support personnel assigned to 12 of 332 major weapon systems that reflected varying characteristics—such as military service and system costs—and analyzed documentation from DOD and the military services.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have taken steps to implement Product Support Managers (PSM) for major weapon systems, but certain aspects of the implementation process remain incomplete. The services have assigned PSMs to almost all of their major weapon systems. For example, as of February 2014, 325 of 332 PSM position requirements across DOD for major weapon systems—approximately 98 percent—were filled. While DOD and all of the services have taken some steps to develop a comprehensive career path and associated guidance to develop, train, and support future PSMs, DOD, in coordination with the military services, has not developed a plan—to include objectives, milestones, and resources—to implement and institutionalize a comprehensive PSM career path. Until DOD develops such a plan, it may not be able to ensure that the services can fill PSM positions with qualified personnel in the future. Moreover, DOD's PSM implementation guidance is not centralized and future product support personnel may be hindered in their ability to easily access and implement such guidance. Also, because the latest DOD guidance lacks detail and contains a potentially unclear provision, personnel may confuse the responsibilities of Program Managers and PSMs. Without clear, comprehensive, and centralized implementation guidance, DOD may be hindered in its ability to institutionalize the implementation of PSMs for its major weapon systems going forward. Additionally, the Army has been working for a year to clarify the roles and responsibilities of certain product support personnel, who support PSMs, for the sustainment portion of the life cycle for major weapon systems. According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, major weapon systems program offices have raised the issue of the lack of clear roles and responsibilities of these personnel, which has prompted senior-level Army meetings to attempt to resolve the issue. However, the Army has not yet finalized guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities, which may hinder PSMs in their ability to effectively manage and conduct their daily product support responsibilities.
DOD does not fully know how or to what extent PSMs are affecting life-cycle sustainment decisions because it has not systematically collected and evaluated information on the effects PSMs are having on their assigned weapon systems. Program evaluation guidance states that evaluations can play a key role in program planning, management, and oversight by providing feedback to managers on programs. Evaluations can show whether PSMs are conducting good practices that could be shared across the department as well as whether changes are needed to guidance or other areas to enhance the contributions of PSMs. In the absence of DOD information on the effects PSMs are having on life-cycle sustainment decisions, weapon system program offices identified several good practices and challenges associated with PSMs. For example, several PSMs told us that they had initiated analyses focused on reducing life-cycle sustainment costs for their assigned weapon systems. One challenge that Army headquarters officials noted was that PSMs do not have knowledge of how much sustainment funding their systems will receive prior to the year of execution of funds. Without greater visibility over the allocation of sustainment funding for their assigned weapon systems, these PSMs may be hindered in their ability to proactively manage and influence their system's life-cycle sustainment decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and the services develop a plan to institutionalize a career path for PSMs; issue clear, comprehensive, and centralized PSM implementation guidance; evaluate the effects PSMs have on sustainment decisions; and improve Army PSMs' visibility over sustainment funding. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-556T | gao_GAO-10-556T_0 | 1). Roughly $36.9 billion in TARP funds have been allocated to these servicers for modification of non-GSE loans. Of the trial modifications begun, about 0.8 million were in active trial modifications, fewer than 0.2 million were in active permanent modifications, and the remaining had been canceled. To date, Treasury has reported limited information on the number of borrowers who have been denied trial modifications under HAMP. Further Actions Needed by Treasury to Improve HAMP’s Transparency and Accountability
In our July 2009 report on HAMP, we noted that Treasury’s projection that 3 to 4 million borrowers could be offered loan modifications was based on several uncertain assumptions and might be overly optimistic. We also reported that while HAMP is the cornerstone effort under TARP to meet the act’s goals of preserving homeownership and protecting home values, a number of HAMP programs remained largely undefined. According to Treasury, as of March 1—over a year after the first announcement of HAMP—details of the second-lien program had not yet been finalized, and only two servicers had signed an agreement to participate in the program. Finally, we reported in July that Treasury had not finalized a comprehensive system of internal control for HAMP. In addition, Treasury has not yet finalized remedies, or penalites, for servicers who are not in compliance with HAMP guidelines. According to Treasury, these remedies will be complete in April 2010 and a HAMP compliance committee has been established to review issues related to servicers’ compliance with program guidelines and to enforce appropriate remedies. Servicers Reported Facing Challenges in Implementing HAMP, and Program Implementation Was Sometimes Inconsistent
The servicers we interviewed told us that a major challenge they faced in implementing the HAMP first-lien modification program was the number of changes to the program. Each major program change often required servicers to adjust their business practices, update their systems, and retrain their servicing staff. In addition, although one of HAMP’s goals is to create clear, consistent, and uniform guidance for loan modifications across the industry, we found inconsistencies and wide variations among the HAMP servicers that we contacted with respect to communication with borrowers about HAMP, the criteria used to evaluate borrowers for imminent default, and the tracking of HAMP complaints. Treasury has not developed standards to evaluate servicers’ performance in communicating with borrowers or penalties for servicers that do not meet Treasury’s requirements. Among the 10 servicers we contacted, there were 7 different sets of criteria for determining imminent default. Tracking of HAMP complaints – While Treasury has directed HAMP servicers to have procedures and systems in place to respond to HAMP inquiries and complaints and to ensure fair and timely resolutions, some servicers are not systematically tracking HAMP complaints or their resolutions. Similarly, several of the servicers we interviewed indicated that they tracked resolutions only to certain types of complaints. We have shared our preliminary observations about inconsistencies in servicers’ implementation of HAMP with Treasury so that these inconsistencies can be addressed in a timely manner. HAMP Faces Additional Challenges Going Forward
While HAMP has offered some relief to over a million borrowers struggling to make their mortgage payments, the program may face several additional challenges going forward. Conversions – Treasury has taken some steps to address the challenge of converting trial modifications to permanent modifications, but conversions may continue to be an issue. As a result, it remains difficult to determine whether this program feature is likely to meet its purpose of reducing redefaults among high debt-burdened borrowers. Appendix I: Examples of Other Foreclosure Prevention Programs
Borrowers with loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac can refinance into a fixed rate loan at the current market rate Eligible borrowers are current on their loans, the owner occupant of a one- to four-unit property, and have a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of less than 125 percent Between February 2009 and February 2010, over 190,000 borrowers were refinanced through HARP Borrowers can refinance into an affordable loan insured by FHA Eligible borrowers are those who, among other factors, have a monthly mortgage debt-to-income ratio above 31 percent Servicers provided incentive payments; lenders required to write down the existing mortgage amount depending on the borrower’s monthly mortgage debt-to-income ratio and total household debt. According to Treasury, it will work with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to build and refine the internal controls within these financial agents’ operations as new program components are implemented. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mortgage loan defaults and foreclosures are key factors behind the current economic downturn. In response, Congress passed and the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which authorized the Department of the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under TARP, Treasury created the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) as its cornerstone effort to meet the act's goal of protecting home values and preserving homeownership. This statement focuses on (1) HAMP's program activities to date, (2) status of GAO's July 2009 recommendations to strengthen HAMP's transparency and accountability, (3) preliminary findings from GAO's current work evaluating servicers' implementation of HAMP, and (4) additional challenges HAMP faces going forward. GAO obtained information from 10 HAMP servicers of various sizes that accounted for 71 percent of the TARP funds allocated to participating servicers. GAO reviewed their policies and procedures, interviewed management and quality assurance staff, and observed a sample of phone calls between borrowers and servicers. GAO is also reviewing samples of loan files for borrowers offered and denied HAMP trial modifications. Finally, GAO spoke with officials at Treasury and its financial agents--Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac--and is analyzing program information and data from these sources.
What GAO Found
When Treasury announced the program in March 2009, it estimated that HAMP could help 3 to 4 million borrowers. Through February 2010, including both the portion funded by TARP and the portion funded by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: (1) about 1.1 million borrowers had begun trial modifications; of which (2) about 800,000 were in active trial modifications, and (3) fewer than 200,000 permanent modifications had been made. As of early March 2010, the TARP-funded portion of the program had 113 participating servicers, and about $36.9 billion of the $50 billion in TARP funds for HAMP had been allocated to these servicers. A typical TARP-funded modification could result in a monthly mortgage payment reduction of about $520. Treasury has taken some steps, but has not fully addressed concerns that GAO raised in its July 2009 report on HAMP's transparency and accountability. For example, Treasury has yet to finalize some key components of its internal controls over the first-lien program, including establishing metrics and benchmarks for servicers' performance. In addition, Treasury has not finalized remedial actions, or penalties, for servicers not in compliance with HAMP guidelines. According to Treasury, these remedies will be completed in April 2010. Lastly, GAO reported that Treasury's projection that 3 to 4 million borrowers could be helped by HAMP was based on several uncertain assumptions and might be overly optimistic, and GAO recommended that Treasury update this estimate, but the Department has not yet done so. Preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work show inconsistencies in some aspects of program implementation. Although one of HAMP's goals was to ensure that mortgage modifications were standardized, Treasury has not issued specific guidelines for all program areas, allowing inconsistencies in how servicers treat borrowers. For example, the 10 servicers GAO contacted had 7 different sets of criteria for determining whether borrowers who were not yet 60 days delinquent qualified for HAMP. Also, some servicers were not systematically tracking all HAMP complaints and, in some cases, tracked only resolutions to certain types of complaints, such as written complaints addressed to the company president. GAO also found that servicers faced challenges implementing HAMP because of the number of changes to the program, some of which have required servicers to readjust their business practices, update their systems, and retrain staff. HAMP is likely to face additional challenges going forward, including successfully converting trial modifications, addressing the needs of borrowers who have substantial negative equity, limiting redefaults for those who receive modifications, and achieving program stability. While GAO's study is not yet completed, GAO shared preliminary findings with Treasury to allow it to address these issues in a timely manner. |
gao_GAO-09-447 | gao_GAO-09-447_0 | Passports Using Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents
Our investigator was easily able to obtain four genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. In the most egregious case, our investigator obtained a U.S. passport using counterfeit documents and the SSN of a man who died in 1965. In another case, our undercover investigator obtained a U.S. passport using counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child—even though his counterfeit documents and application indicated he was 53 years old. State and USPS employees did not identify our documents as counterfeit in any of our four tests. All four passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. Our tests show a variety of ways that malicious individuals with even minimal counterfeiting capabilities and access to another person’s identity could obtain genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. Our investigator used a genuine U.S. passport obtained by using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents to pass through airport security. In January 2009, our investigator purchased an airline ticket for a domestic flight using the fictitious name from one of our test scenarios. He then used the fraudulently obtained passport from that test as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major metropolitan-area airport. On these documents, we used a fictitious identity and a SSN that we had previously obtained from SSA for the purpose of conducting undercover tests. Test Two: Investigator Obtained Passport Using a Genuine but Fraudulently Obtained State Identification Card
Our second test found that State did not detect a counterfeit New York birth certificate our undercover investigator presented to prove his U.S. citizenship in support of a passport application. Four days after our investigator submitted his application, State issued a genuine U.S. passport in the fictitious name presented on the counterfeit documents. Corrective Action Briefing
We briefed State officials on the results of our investigation. They agreed that our findings expose a major vulnerability in State’s passport issuance process. According to State officials, the department’s ability to verify the information submitted as part of a passport application is hampered by limitations to its information sharing and data access with other agencies at the federal and state levels. Subsequent to our briefing, State officials informed us that they identified and revoked our four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and that they would study the matter further to determine what steps would be appropriate to improve passport issuance procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
A genuine U.S. passport is a vital document, permitting its owner to travel freely in and out of the United States, prove U.S. citizenship, obtain further identification documents, and set up bank accounts, among other things. Unfortunately, a terrorist or other criminal could take advantage of these benefits by fraudulently obtaining a genuine U.S. passport from the Department of State (State). There are many ways that malicious individuals could fraudulently obtain a genuine U.S. passport, including stealing an American citizen's identity and counterfeiting or fraudulently obtaining identification or citizenship documents to meet State requirements. GAO was asked to proactively test the effectiveness of State's passport issuance process to determine whether the process is vulnerable to fraud. To do so, GAO designed four test scenarios that simulated the actions of a malicious individual who had access to an American citizen's personal identity information. GAO created counterfeit documents for four fictitious or deceased individuals using off-the-shelf, commercially available hardware, software, and materials. An undercover GAO investigator then applied for passports at three United States Postal Service (USPS) locations and a State-run passport office.
What GAO Found
GAO's investigation shows that terrorists or criminals could steal an American citizen's identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create fraudulent documentation for that identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. passport from State. GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach and was successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case. In the most egregious case, an undercover GAO investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the Social Security Number (SSN) of a man who died in 1965. In another case, the investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child GAO created for a previous investigation--even though the investigator's counterfeit documents and application indicated he was 53 years old. All four passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. In all four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained documents. State and USPS employees did not identify GAO's documents as counterfeit. GAO's investigator later purchased an airline ticket under the name used on one of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and then used that passport as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major metropolitan-area airport. At a briefing on the results of GAO's investigation, State officials agreed with GAO that the investigation exposes a major vulnerability in State's passport issuance process. According to State officials, State's fraud detection efforts are hampered by limitations to its information sharing and data access with other federal and state agencies. After GAO's briefing, State officials notified GAO that they identified and revoked GAO's four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and were studying the matter to determine the appropriate steps for improving State's passport issuance process. |
gao_GAO-05-458 | gao_GAO-05-458_0 | Chemical companies can claim certain information, such as data disclosing chemical processes, as confidential business information. EPA Lacks Sufficient Data to Ensure That Potential Health and Environmental Risks of New Chemicals Are Identified
While TSCA authorizes EPA to promulgate rules requiring chemical companies to conduct tests on chemicals and submit the resulting data to EPA, TSCA does not require chemical companies to test new chemicals for their toxicity and exposures before they are submitted for EPA’s review and, according to EPA officials, chemical companies typically do not voluntarily perform such testing. However, use of the models can present weaknesses in an assessment because models do not always accurately determine the chemicals’ properties and the full extent of their adverse effects, especially with regard to their general health effects. Nevertheless, EPA believes that the models are useful as basic screening tools where actual test data on health and environmental effects information is not available from chemical companies. This method, also referred to as the nearest analogue approach, involves using models to compare new chemicals with chemicals with similar molecular structures for which test data on health and environmental effects are available. EPA Does Not Routinely Assess Existing Chemicals, Has Limited Information on Their Health and Environmental Risks, and Has Issued Few Regulations Controlling Such Chemicals
TSCA authorizes but does not specifically require EPA to review the risks of existing chemicals. While chemical industry organizations have said that they will voluntarily provide a basic set of test data on certain high-production-volume chemicals that are not part of the HPV Challenge Program, it is unclear that their efforts will produce information sufficient for EPA to make determinations of a chemical’s risk to human health or the environment or provide the information in a timely manner. For example, on the basis of a study performed by the state of Illinois with the cooperation of chemical companies and EPA, Illinois regulators found that toxicity information submitted under TSCA was useful in identifying chemical substances that should be included in contingency plans in order to alert emergency response and planning personnel to the presence of highly toxic substances at facilities. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To improve EPA’s ability to assess the health and environmental risks of chemicals, the Congress should consider amending TSCA to provide explicit authority for EPA to enter into enforceable consent agreements under which chemical companies are required to conduct testing; give EPA, in addition to its current authorities under section 4 of TSCA, the authority to require chemical substance manufacturers and processors to develop test data based on substantial production volume and the necessity for testing; and authorize EPA to share with the states and foreign governments the confidential business information that chemical companies provide to EPA, subject to regulations to be established by EPA in consultation with the chemical industry and other interested parties, that would set forth the procedures to be followed by all recipients of the information in order to protect the information from unauthorized disclosures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve EPA’s management of its chemical review program, we recommend the EPA Administrator develop and implement a methodology for using information collected through the HPV Challenge Program to prioritize chemicals for further review and to identify and obtain additional information needed to assess their risks; promulgate a rule under section 8 of TSCA requiring chemical companies to submit to EPA copies of any health and safety studies, as well as other information concerning the environmental and health effects of chemicals, that they submit to foreign governments on chemicals that the companies manufacture or process in, or import to, the United States; develop a strategy for improving and validating, for regulatory purposes, the models that EPA uses to assess and predict the risks of chemicals and to inform regulatory decisions on the production, use, and disposal of the chemicals; and revise its regulations to require that companies reassert claims of confidentiality submitted to EPA under TSCA within a certain time period after the information is initially claimed as confidential. Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to review the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) efforts to (1) control the risks of new chemicals not yet in commerce, (2) assess existing chemicals used in commerce, and (3) publicly disclose information provided by chemical companies under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). PCBs are toxic and very persistent in the environment. The agency determined these chemicals would pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Chemicals play an important role in everyday life, but some may be harmful to human health and the environment. Chemicals are used to produce items widely used throughout society, including consumer products such as cleansers, paints, plastics, and fuels, as well as industrial solvents and additives. However, some chemicals, such as lead and mercury, are highly toxic at certain doses and need to be regulated because of health and safety concerns. In 1976, the Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to control chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. GAO reviewed EPA's efforts to (1) control the risks of new chemicals not yet in commerce, (2) assess the risks of existing chemicals used in commerce, and (3) publicly disclose information provided by chemical companies under TSCA.
What GAO Found
EPA's reviews of new chemicals provide limited assurance that health and environmental risks are identified before the chemicals enter commerce. Chemical companies are not required by TSCA, absent a test rule, to test new chemicals before they are submitted for EPA's review, and companies generally do not voluntarily perform such testing. Given limited test data, EPA predicts new chemicals' toxicity by using models that compare the new chemicals with chemicals of similar molecular structures that have previously been tested. However, the use of the models does not ensure that chemicals' risks are fully assessed before they enter commerce because the models are not always accurate in predicting chemical properties and toxicity, especially in connection with general health effects. Nevertheless, given the lack of test data and health and safety information available to the agency, EPA believes the models are generally useful as screening tools for identifying potentially harmful chemicals and, in conjunction with other information, such as the anticipated potential uses and exposures of the new chemicals, provide a reasonable basis for reviewing new chemicals. The agency recognizes, however, that obtaining additional information would improve the predictive capabilities of its models. EPA does not routinely assess the risks of all existing chemicals and EPA faces challenges in obtaining the information necessary to do so. TSCA's authorities for collecting data on existing chemicals do not facilitate EPA's review process because they generally place the costly and time-consuming burden of obtaining data on EPA. Partly because of a lack of information on existing chemicals, EPA, in partnership with industry and environmental groups, initiated the High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program in 1998, under which chemical companies began voluntarily providing information on the basic properties of chemicals produced in large amounts. It is unclear whether the program will produce sufficient information for EPA to determine chemicals' risks to human health and the environment. EPA has limited ability to publicly share the information it receives from chemical companies under TSCA. TSCA prohibits the disclosure of confidential business information, and chemical companies claim much of the data submitted as confidential. While EPA has the authority to evaluate the appropriateness of these confidentiality claims, EPA states that it does not have the resources to challenge large numbers of claims. State environmental agencies and others are interested in obtaining confidential business information for use in various activities, such as developing contingency plans to alert emergency response personnel of the presence of highly toxic substances at manufacturing facilities. Chemical companies recently have expressed interest in working with EPA to identify ways to enable other organizations to use the information given the adoption of appropriate safeguards. |
gao_GAO-13-601 | gao_GAO-13-601_0 | Specifically, the data hub will provide one electronic connection and near real-time access to the common federal data, as well as provide access to state and third party data sources needed to verify consumer application information. Federal and State Roles in Exchanges
The role of the federal government with respect to an exchange for a state is dependent on whether that state seeks to operate a state-based exchange. CMS Expects to Operate FFEs, including Partnership Exchanges, in 34 States in 2014
For 2014, CMS will operate the exchange in 34 states, although it expects that states will assist in carrying out certain activities in almost half of those exchanges. CMS is required to operate an FFE in the remaining 34 states. 1 for a map of exchange arrangements for 2014.) Planned CMS and State Activities to Establish Exchanges Have Evolved Recently and May Continue to Change
The activities that CMS and the states each plan to carry out to establish the exchanges have evolved recently. CMS was required to certify or conditionally approve any 2014 state-based exchanges by January 1, 2013. For example, issuers began submitting applications to exchanges for QHP certification on April 1, 2013. If any state conditionally approved to operate a state-based exchange or to participate in a partnership exchange does not adequately progress towards implementation of all required activities, CMS has indicated that it would carry out more exchange functions in that state. CMS Issued Numerous Regulations and Guidance Necessary to Establish FFEs, and Made Progress in Each of the Core Exchange Functions and in Developing the Data Hub
CMS issued numerous regulations and guidance that it has said are necessary to set a framework within which the federal government, states, issuers of health coverage, and others can participate in the exchanges. CMS has many key activities remaining to be completed across the core exchange functions—eligibility and enrollment, including development and implementation of the data hub; program management; and consumer assistance. While CMS stated that the agency has thus far met project schedules and milestones for establishing agreements and developing the data hub, several critical tasks remain to be completed before the October 1, 2013, implementation milestone. According to CMS officials and the testing timeline:
Service Level Agreements (SLA) between CMS and the states, which define characteristics of the system once it is operational, such as transaction response time and days and hours of availability, are planned to be completed in July 2013;
SLAs between CMS and its federal partner agencies that provide verification data are expected to be completed in July 2013; and
Completion of external testing with all federal partner agencies and all states is to be completed by the beginning of September 2013. The activities that remain for CMS to implement the plan management function primarily relate to the review and certification of the QHPs that will be offered in the FFEs. For those 15 FFEs for which states will assist with the plan management function, CMS will rely on the states to ensure the exchanges are ready by October 2013. CMS has yet to complete many activities related to consumer assistance and outreach, and some initial steps were behind schedule. Specifically, several steps necessary for the implementation of the Navigator program in FFEs have been delayed by about 2 months. Nevertheless, much remains to be accomplished within a relatively short amount of time. However, certain factors, such as the still-unknown and evolving scope of the exchange activities CMS will be required to perform in each state, and the large numbers of activities remaining to be performed—some close to the start of enrollment—suggest a potential for implementation challenges going forward. And while the missed interim deadlines may not affect implementation, additional missed deadlines closer to the start of enrollment could do so. CMS recently completed risk assessments and plans for mitigating identified risks associated with the data hub, and is also working on strategies to address state preparedness contingencies. Whether CMS’s contingency planning will assure the timely and smooth implementation of the exchanges by October 2013 cannot yet be determined. Agency Comments
We received comments from HHS on a draft of this report (see app. HHS emphasized the progress it has made in establishing exchanges since PPACA became law, and expressed its confidence that on October 1, 2013, exchanges will be open and functioning in every state. Appendix I: Contractors Supporting the Federally Facilitated Exchanges and Data Hub and Amounts Obligated
Table 5 provides information on the amounts the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) obligated for contract activities to support the establishment of the federally facilitated exchanges (FFE) and the data hub and carry out certain other exchange-related activities by individual contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required the establishment in all states of exchangesmarketplaces where eligible individuals can compare and select health insurance plans. CMS must oversee the establishment of exchanges, including approving states to operate one or establishing and operating one itself in states that will not do so. CMS will approve states to assist it in carrying out certain FFE functions. CMS will also operate an electronic data hub to provide eligibility information to the exchanges and state agencies. Enrollment begins on October 1, 2013, with coverage effective January 1, 2014. GAO was asked to examine CMSs role and preparedness to establish FFEs and the data hub. In this report, GAO describes (1) the federal governments role in establishing FFEs for operation in 2014 and state participation in that effort; and (2) the status of federal and state actions taken and planned for FFEs and the data hub.
GAO reviewed regulations and guidance issued by CMS and documents indicating the activities that the federal government and states are expected to carry out for these exchanges. GAO also reviewed planning documents CMS used to track the implementation of federal and state activities, including documents describing the development and implementation of the data hub. GAO also interviewed CMS officials responsible for establishment of the exchanges. GAO relied largely on documentation provided by CMSincluding information CMS developed based on its contacts with the statesregarding the status of the exchanges and did not interview or collect information directly from states.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) will operate a health insurance exchange in the 34 states that will not operate a state-based exchange for 2014. Of these 34 federally facilitated exchanges (FFE), 15 are in states expected to assist CMS in carrying out certain FFE functions. However, the activities that CMS plans to carry out in these 15 exchanges, as well as in the state-based exchanges, have evolved and may continue to change. For example, CMS approved states' exchange arrangements on the condition that they ultimately complete activities necessary for exchange implementation. CMS indicated that it would carry out more exchange functions if any state did not adequately progress towards implementation of all required activities.
CMS completed many activities necessary to establish FFEs by October 1, 2013, although many remain to be completed and some were behind schedule. CMS issued numerous regulations and guidance and took steps to establish processes and data systems necessary to operate the exchanges. The activities remaining cross the core exchange functional areas of eligibility and enrollment, plan management, and consumer assistance. To support consumer-eligibility determinations, for example, CMS is developing a data hub that will provide electronic, near real-time access to federal data, as well as provide access to state and third party data sources needed to verify consumer-eligibility information. While CMS has met project schedules, several critical tasks, such as final testing with federal and state partners, remain to be completed. For plan management, CMS must review and certify the qualified health plans (QHP) that will be offered in the FFEs. Though the system used to submit applications for QHP certification was operational during the anticipated time frame, several key tasks regarding plan management, including certification of QHPs and inclusion of QHP information on the exchange websites, remain to be completed. In the case of consumer assistance, for example, funding awards for Navigators--a key consumer assistance program--have been delayed by about 2 months, which has delayed training and other activities. CMS is also depending on the states to implement specific FFE exchange functions, and CMS data show that many state activities remained to be completed and some were behind schedule.
Much progress has been made, but much remains to be accomplished within a relatively short amount of time. CMS's timelines provide a roadmap to completion; however, factors such as the still-evolving scope of CMS's required activities in each state and the many activities yet to be performed--some close to the start of enrollment--suggest a potential for challenges going forward. And while the missed interim deadlines may not affect implementation, additional missed deadlines closer to the start of enrollment could do so. CMS recently completed risk assessments and plans for mitigating risks associated with the data hub, and is also working on strategies to address state preparedness contingencies. Whether these efforts will assure the timely and smooth implementation of the exchanges by October 2013 cannot yet be determined.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services emphasized the progress it has made in establishing exchanges, and expressed its confidence that exchanges will be open and functioning in every state by October 1, 2013. |
gao_GAO-05-543 | gao_GAO-05-543_0 | While the agencies use a variety of assets, in some cases the air and marine assets are similar or have similar mission capabilities. DHS Has Undertaken Efforts to Address Efficient Use of Air and Marine Assets
DHS Aviation and Boat Councils Identified Opportunities to Achieve Cost Efficiencies and Savings Involving the Department’s Air and Marine Assets
DHS has taken steps over the last 2 years to review the practices used by USCG, CBP, and ICE to acquire, operate, and maintain their air and marine assets and train the personnel that operate them. Specifically, the contractor study examined DHS’s aviation capabilities in relation to the collective assets of these three agencies and identified overlaps in aviation capability, assets, training, maintenance and logistics, facilities, and acquisition that could be minimized to achieve efficiencies and reduce operating expenses. To address one of the contractor study’s recommendations, the council issued a broad-based departmentwide “concept of operations” plan to DHS senior management in April 2005 that establishes a framework for how the agencies can work collaboratively in a joint environment to accomplish mission priorities. For example, rather than initiating a separate procurement, CBP acquired six boats through an existing Coast Guard contract and saved $300,000 by taking advantage of USCG’s large-volume discounts. According to DHS, the purpose of the transfer was to consolidate air and marine operations within the BTS directorate, to realign and streamline agency resources, and allow DHS to maximize the use of its aircraft and pilots, as well as gain potential efficiencies in support areas, such as maintenance, acquisition, and training. Coordination among Agencies Initiated by Local Unit Leadership
The types of air and marine asset coordination efforts practiced by USCG, CBP, and ICE units at the locations we visited varied and were primarily informal and based on the willingness of local unit commanders to cooperate with each other, according to the local unit officials with whom we spoke. This combined area represents over 1,600 miles of coastline and over 30,000 square miles of open water that the agencies have responsibility for patrolling and keeping secure. For example, USCG, ICE, and CBP local unit officials told us that the agencies developed weekly air and marine schedules that helped increase law enforcement coverage in the area. The agencies employed fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and boats to cover this area. USCG also provides docking space for CBP boats. Local officials also cited differences in asset capabilities as limiting opportunities for asset coordination. Headquarters officials cited potential legal issues that could limit efforts to coordinate the use of assets among agencies. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established DHS, prohibited the diversion of USCG assets to any other organization or entity of DHS, except for details or assignments that do not reduce the USCG’s capability to perform its missions. One of the ongoing challenges facing the department is balancing the need for a department-level coordinated, integrated approach to implementing border security while supporting the efforts of agencies with border security responsibilities, including the United States Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as they fulfill their missions in the field. As part of these initiatives, DHS needs to ensure that guidance provided by the department will address the coordination of air and marine assets within CBP, as well as ensure that the role and use of USCG air and marine assets in homeland security missions is coordinated with CBP. | Why GAO Did This Study
Three agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have primary responsibility for securing the nation's borders--the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Together, they enforce security across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico and Canada, and protect more than 361 seaports and 95,000 miles of coastline. To fulfill their missions, these agencies deploy a variety of valuable air and marine assets. In this report, GAO analyzed (1) what efforts DHS has undertaken to facilitate coordination of the air and marine assets of the three agencies and (2) how the agencies' local air and marine units have, in selected areas, coordinated the use of assets and what challenges they faced.
What GAO Found
DHS established departmental councils that have identified opportunities to achieve cost savings or cost efficiencies involving the department's air and marine assets--airplanes, helicopters, and boats. Specifically, the aviation council issued a plan that provides a framework for increasing coordination and collaboration across agencies in the operation and support of aviation assets and resources. For example, the plan identifies opportunities to improve the tracking of aviation assets, develop standardized training programs across agencies, and consolidate maintenance programs and facilities. An additional plan outlines a broad-based approach for effectively employing the department's aviation assets. The boats council helped CBP take advantage of large-volume discounts to purchase six boats through an existing USCG contract, saving an estimated $300,000. DHS officials said they are also developing a plan for merging the assets and personnel of the Air and Marine Operations division of ICE with CBP. This effort is intended to enable DHS to maximize the use of its aircraft and pilots and gain potential efficiencies in maintenance, acquisition, and training. DHS expects to finish planning how this effort will be accomplished by September 30, 2005. The agencies at the four locations GAO visited had undertaken efforts to coordinate assets and related training on an ad hoc basis because of the willingness of local commanders to cooperate with each other. For example, in South Florida, the three agencies jointly developed weekly air and marine schedules for the aircraft and boats they deploy to increase coverage in the area and reduce duplication of patrols. In Bellingham, Washington, USCG provided training to CBP staff, enabling CBP boat operators to supplement USCG crew. Officials at all locations noted that challenges affect the extent to which such coordination can reasonably occur. For example, some assets are not shared because agencies' needs differ. Headquarter officials also cited potential legal issues that could limit efforts to coordinate the use of assets among agencies, such as prohibition of the diversion of USCG assets to any other organization or entity of DHS. Local unit officials stated that DHS needed to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in conducting their homeland security missions to ensure that DHS's air and marine assets are used in an efficient and coordinated manner that optimizes use of DHS's resources. |
gao_GAO-12-92 | gao_GAO-12-92_0 | The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In addition, HSPD-7 identified lead federal agencies, referred to as sector-specific agencies, which are responsible for coordinating critical infrastructure protection efforts with the public and private stakeholders in their respective sectors. Public and private organizations may decide to voluntarily adopt this guidance to help them manage cyber-based risks. Many organizations exist that develop standards and guidance that, among other things, promote the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer systems and information. Much of this guidance is tailored to the unique characteristics of each sector. While SCC representatives confirmed lists of cybersecurity guidance that they stated was used within their respective sectors, the representatives emphasized that the lists were not comprehensive and that additional standards and guidance are likely used within the sectors. Implementation of Cybersecurity Can Be Enforced through a Variety of Mechanisms, but More Could Be Done to Disseminate and Promote Guidance
Implementation of cybersecurity guidance can occur through a variety of mechanisms, including enforcement of regulations and voluntarily in response to business incentives; however, responsible federal entities could take additional steps to promote the most applicable and effective guidance throughout the sectors. Regulated Entities Are Required to Comply with Federal Cybersecurity Regulations or Face Enforcement Actions
Critical infrastructure entities covered under regulation, such as depository institutions in the banking and finance sector; the bulk power system in the electricity subsector of the energy sector; health care and public health sector; and the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector, are regulated by the federal government and thus are required to meet mandatory cybersecurity standards established by regulation under federal law. DHS and Sector-Specific Agencies Have Taken Steps to Disseminate and Promote Guidance, but More Could Be Done
As recognized in federal policy, the dissemination and promotion of cybersecurity standards and guidance is a goal in enhancing the security of our nation’s cyber-reliant critical infrastructure. In this regard, DHS and the other sector-specific agencies for the sectors selected for review have disseminated and promoted cybersecurity guidance among and within sectors. While these are significant steps, DHS and the other sector-specific agencies have not identified the key cybersecurity guidance applicable to or widely used in each of their respective critical infrastructure sectors. However, given the plethora of guidance available, individual entities within the sectors may be challenged in identifying the guidance that is most applicable and effective in improving their security posture. Improved knowledge of the guidance that is available could help both federal and private sector decision makers better coordinate their efforts to protect critical cyber-reliant assets. Cybersecurity Guidance For Three Subsectors Is Substantially Similar to Federal Guidance
Sector cybersecurity guidance related to three subsectors (electricity, depository institutions, and nuclear reactors) is substantially similar to guidance applicable to federal agencies. Specifically, sector cybersecurity guidance and supplementary documents that we analyzed addressed most of NIST’s risk management framework steps and most of the 198 recommended security controls in NIST SP 800-53 (listed in table 3) that are specified for federal information systems. Both required and voluntary guidance has been developed and issued by industry regulators, associations, and other groups that is tailored to the business needs of entities or provides methods to address unique risks or operations. While entities operating in a federal regulatory environment face enforcement mechanisms for not adhering to standards in regulatory requirements, entities not subject to regulation do not face such enforcement mechanisms, but implement such guidance to, among other things, mitigate risks, maintain profits, and meet customer expectations. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the sector-specific agencies, sector coordinating councils, and the owners and operators of cyber-reliant critical infrastructure for the associated seven critical infrastructure sectors, determine whether it is appropriate to have key cybersecurity guidance listed in sector plans or annual plans and adjust planning guidance accordingly to suggest the inclusion of such guidance in future plans. In particular, DHS stated that it will work with its public and private sector partners to determine whether it is appropriate to have cybersecurity guidance drafted for each sector. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) cybersecurity guidance for entities within selected critical infrastructure sectors, (2) the extent to which implementation of cybersecurity guidance is enforced and promoted within selected sectors, and (3) areas of commonalities and differences that exist between sectors’ cybersecurity guidance and guidance applicable to federal agencies. Appendix II: Cybersecurity Guidance Applicable within Critical Infrastructure Sectors
This appendix contains tables listing cybersecurity guidance identified as applicable to entities within the seven critical infrastructure sectors: banking and finance; communications; energy (electricity and oil and natural gas); health care and public health; information technology; nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; and water. | Why GAO Did This Study
Critical infrastructures are systems and assets critical to the nation's security, economy, and public health and safety, most of which are owned by the private sector. These assets rely on networked computers and systems, thus making them susceptible to cyber-based risks. Managing such risk involves the use of cybersecurity guidance that promotes or requires actions to enhance the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer systems. For seven critical infrastructure sectors, GAO was asked to identify (1) cybersecurity guidance for entities within the sectors, (2) the extent to which implementation of this guidance is enforced and promoted, and (3) areas of commonalities and differences between sector cybersecurity guidance and guidance applicable to federal agencies. To do this, GAO collected and analyzed information from responsible private sector coordinating councils; federal agencies, including sector-specific agencies that are responsible for coordinating critical infrastructure protection efforts; and standards-making bodies. In addition, GAO compared a set of guidance in each of three subsectors with guidance applicable to federal agencies.
What GAO Found
A wide variety of cybersecurity guidance is available from national and international organizations for entities within the seven critical infrastructure sectors GAO reviewed--banking and finance; communications; energy; health care and public health; information technology; nuclear reactors, material, and waste; and water. Much of this guidance is tailored to business needs of entities or provides methods to address unique risks or operations. In addition, entities operating in regulated environments are subject to mandatory standards to meet their regulatory requirements; entities operating outside of a regulatory environment may voluntarily adopt standards and guidance. While private sector coordinating council representatives confirmed lists of cybersecurity guidance that they stated were used within their respective sectors, the representatives emphasized that the lists were not comprehensive and that additional standards and guidance are likely used.
Implementation of cybersecurity guidance can occur through a variety of mechanisms, including enforcement of regulations and voluntarily in response to business incentives; however, sector-specific agencies could take additional steps to promote the most applicable and effective guidance throughout the sectors. A number of subsectors within the sectors included in GAO's review, such as electricity in the energy sector, are required to meet mandatory cybersecurity standards established by regulation under federal law or face enforcement mechanisms, such as civil monetary penalties. By contrast, entities not subject to regulation may voluntarily implement cybersecurity guidance to, among other things, reduce risk, protect intellectual property, and meet customer expectations. Federal policy establishes the dissemination and promotion of cybersecurity-related standards and guidance as a goal to enhancing the security of our nation's cyber-reliant critical infrastructure. DHS and the other lead agencies for the sectors selected for review have disseminated and promoted cybersecurity guidance among and within sectors. However, DHS and the other sector-specific agencies have not identified the key cybersecurity guidance applicable to or widely used in each of their respective critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, most of the sector-specific critical infrastructure protection plans for the sectors reviewed do not identify key guidance and standards for cybersecurity because doing so was not specifically suggested by DHS guidance. Given the plethora of guidance available, individual entities within the sectors may be challenged in identifying the guidance that is most applicable and effective in improving their security posture. Improved knowledge of the guidance that is available could help both federal and private sector decision makers better coordinate their efforts to protect critical cyber-reliant assets.
Sector cybersecurity guidance that GAO compared in three subsectors within the banking and finance, energy, and nuclear sectors is substantially similar to guidance applicable to federal agencies. Specifically, one set of guidance for each subsector, along with supplementary documents, addressed most risk management steps and most recommended security controls that are specified for federal information systems in guidance from the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. GAO is recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with public and private sector partners, determine whether it is appropriate to have cybersecurity guidance listed in sector plans. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with public and private sector partners, determine whether it is appropriate to have cybersecurity guidance listed in sector plans. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-347T | gao_GAO-13-347T_0 | USPS’s Financial Condition
USPS faces a dire financial situation and does not have sufficient revenues to cover its expenses, putting its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and efficient universal services to the public at risk. USPS continues to incur operating deficits that are unsustainable, has not made required payments of $11.1 billion to prefund retiree health benefit liabilities, and has reached its $15 billion borrowing limit. As presented in table 1, since fiscal year 2006, USPS has achieved about $15 billion in savings and reduced its workforce by about 168,000, while also experiencing a 25 percent decline in total mail volume and net losses totaling $40 billion. USPS continues to face significant decreases in mail volume and revenues as online communication and e-commerce expand. First-Class Mail—which is highly profitable and generates the majority of the revenues used to cover overhead costs—declined 33 percent since it peaked in fiscal year 2001, and USPS projects a continued decline through fiscal year 2020. Thus, USPS can no longer borrow to maintain its financial solvency or finance needed capital investment. In this regard, the USPS Board of Governors recently directed postal management to accelerate restructuring efforts to achieve greater savings. At the end of fiscal year 2012, USPS had $48 billion in unfunded retiree health benefit liabilities. USPS has also reported that in the short term, should circumstances leave it with insufficient liquidity, it may need to prioritize payments to its employees and suppliers ahead of those to the federal government. USPS Initiatives to Reduce Costs and Increase Revenues
USPS has several initiatives to reduce costs and increase its revenues to curtail future net losses. In February 2012, USPS announced a 5-year business plan with the goal of achieving $22.5 billion in annual cost savings by the end of fiscal year 2016. To increase revenue, USPS is working to increase use of shipping and package services. We recently reported that USPS is pursuing 55 initiatives to generate revenue. We found that USPS’s mail processing network exceeds what is needed for declining mail volume. Employee associations were concerned that reducing service could result in a greater loss of mail volume and revenue that could worsen USPS’s financial condition. Concluding Observations
In summary, to improve its financial situation, USPS needs to reduce its expenses to close the gap between revenue and expenses, repay its outstanding debt, continue funding its retirement obligations, and increase capital for investment, such as replacing its aging vehicle fleet. In addition, as noted in prior reports, congressional action is needed to (1) modify USPS’s retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner; (2) facilitate USPS’s ability to align costs with revenues based on changing workload and mail use; and (3) require that any binding arbitration resulting from collective bargaining takes USPS’s financial condition into account. As we have continued to underscore, Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS’s financial viability. In previous reports, we have provided strategies and options, to both reduce costs and enhance revenues, that Congress could consider to better align USPS costs with revenues and address constraints and legal restrictions that limit USPS’s ability to reduce costs and improve efficiency; we have also reported on implications for addressing USPS’s benefit liabilities. If Congress does not act soon, USPS could be forced to take more drastic actions that could have disruptive, negative effects on its employees, customers, and the availability of reliable and affordable postal services. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS is in a serious financial crisis as its declining mail volume has not generated sufficient revenue to cover its expenses and financial obligations. First-Class Mail--which is highly profitable and generates the majority of the revenues used to cover overhead costs--declined 33 percent since it peaked in fiscal year 2001, and USPS projects a continued decline through fiscal year 2020. Declining mail volume is putting USPS's mission of providing prompt, reliable, and efficient universal services to the public at risk.
This testimony discusses (1) USPS's financial condition, (2) initiatives to reduce costs and increase revenues, and (3) actions needed to improve USPS's financial situation. The testimony is based primarily on our past and ongoing work and our analysis of USPS's recent financial results.
In previous reports, GAO has provided strategies and options that USPS and Congress could consider to better align USPS costs with revenues and address constraints and legal restrictions that limit USPS's ability to reduce costs and improve efficiency. GAO has also stated that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS's financial viability.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) continues to incur unsustainable operating deficits, has not made required payments of $11.1 billion to prefund retiree health benefits, and has reached its $15 billion borrowing limit. Thus far, USPS has been able to operate within these constraints, but now faces a critical shortage of liquidity that threatens its financial solvency and ability to finance needed capital investment. USPS had an almost 25 percent decline in total mail volume and net losses totaling $40 billion since fiscal year 2006. While USPS achieved about $15 billion in savings and reduced its workforce by about 168,000 over this period, its debt and unfunded benefit liabilities grew to $96 billion by the end of fiscal year 2012. USPS expects mail volume and revenue to continue decreasing as online bill communication and e-commerce expand.
USPS has reported on several initiatives to reduce costs and increase its revenues to curtail future net losses. To reduce costs, USPS announced a 5-year business plan in February 2012 with the goal of achieving $22.5 billion in annual cost savings by the end of fiscal year 2016. USPS has begun implementing this plan, which includes making changes to its mail processing, retail, and delivery networks and redesigning its workforce in line with changing mail volume. To achieve greater savings, USPS's Board of Governors recently directed postal management to accelerate these efforts. To increase revenue, USPS is pursuing 55 initiatives. While USPS expects shipping and package services to continue to grow, such growth is not expected to fully offset declining mail volume.
USPS needs to reduce its expenses to avoid even greater financial losses, repay its outstanding debt, continue funding its retirement obligations, and increase capital for investment, including replacing its aging vehicle fleet. Also, Congress needs to act to (1) modify USPS's retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner; (2) facilitate USPS's ability to align costs with revenues based on changing workload and mail use; and (3) require that any binding arbitration resulting from collective bargaining takes USPS's financial condition into account. No one action in itself will address USPS's financial condition; we have previously recommended a comprehensive package of actions. If Congress does not act soon, USPS could be forced to take more drastic actions that could have disruptive, negative effects on its employees, customers, and the availability of postal services. USPS also reported that it would prioritize payments to employees and suppliers ahead of those to the federal government. |
gao_GAO-17-543 | gao_GAO-17-543_0 | To conduct this analysis, PRC assesses the value of the monopolies based on the volume of mail—and the associated net revenues—that USPS would be expected to lose if its monopolies were eliminated and new entrants were allowed to provide mail delivery. PRC’s annual estimate of the value of USPS’s monopolies has increased substantially in recent years—from $3.28 billion in fiscal year 2012 to $5.45 billion in fiscal year 2015. Stakeholders, experts, and the experiences of selected foreign posts all suggest that USPS’s monopolies and other postal policies are interdependent—particularly the specifics around universal service—and therefore should be considered in tandem. Postal Stakeholders, Experts, and USPS Believe Relaxing Postal Monopolies Could Reduce USPS’s Revenues and Threaten Its Ability to Provide Universal Service
Stakeholders, experts, and USPS told us that narrowing or eliminating the existing letter delivery and mailbox monopolies could likely reduce USPS’s revenues and threaten its ability to provide the current level of universal service. While PRC has not taken a position on whether USPS’s letter delivery monopoly should be narrowed or eliminated, it reported in 2008 that “…under the current system, the (letter delivery) monopoly is maintained to offset the costs placed on by the USO.”
Most Postal Stakeholders and Experts Agree That Relaxing USPS’s Mailbox Monopoly Could Affect Mail Safety, Security, and Efficiency
Stakeholders: Nine of the 16 stakeholders believe that narrowing or eliminating USPS’s mailbox monopoly could decrease mail security, and they also oppose changes to this monopoly. Third, USPS advised that allowing third-party mailbox deliveries could allow competing providers to skim relatively profitable mail volume away from USPS, leaving it with less revenue to finance the costs of its universal service obligation. Additionally, seven of these experts also said relaxing the monopolies could induce USPS to become more efficient and increase innovation across the postal market. Some Countries Reported Revenue Losses for Postal Operators, Increases in Competition and Efficiency after Elimination of Monopolies
A number of countries have narrowed or eliminated their postal monopolies over the past two decades as part of overall postal reform that expanded the commercial freedom of their postal services. Specifically: Increased Competition: The post and/or regulator from all six of the countries that we contacted—Sweden, Italy, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—said the liberalization of their postal markets resulted in increased competition. For example, one stakeholder who opposes modifying USPS’s monopolies said that, if they were to be changed, policies to ensure universal delivery service would need to be adopted. On the other hand, USPS has reported that it is subject to statutory requirements to which its private competitors are not. Scope Decisions Would Involve Multiple Considerations
Defining the scope of any study is critical because, according to the government auditing standards, the scope defines aspects of the subject matter to be studied and other key data collection considerations—such as the period of time reviewed and the type of data to be collected, among other things. For example, significant time and resources would be required for a study to estimate the financial effects for all laws that apply differently to USPS and its competitors—as well as the net effect of these legal differences. The decisions made about how to address these challenges would help determine the usefulness of the estimates to policymakers. A study estimating the financial effects of all laws that apply differently to USPS and its private competitors would require significant time and resources; if estimates were desired in a shorter time frame—or if financial resources were limited—tradeoffs would be required. USPS and PRC separately provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In response to USPS’s suggested clarification of PRC’s estimates presented in table 1, we added a note to make it clear that, while PRC’s estimates presented in the table represent the effect on USPS’s net income if its mailbox monopoly or both monopolies were to be eliminated, it is not the case that subtracting the estimated value of the mailbox monopoly from the estimated value of the combined letter delivery and mailbox monopolies provides the value of the letter delivery monopoly alone. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess: (1) what is known about the value of the U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) letter delivery and mailbox monopolies, (2) views on the potential effects of narrowing or eliminating these monopolies; and (3) considerations that would need to be addressed to estimate the value of USPS’s financial advantages and burdens resulting from laws that apply differently to USPS and its private competitors. In particular:
PRC makes assumptions about the extent to which a potential entrant would be able to deliver contestable mail with a lower cost structure than USPS. As such, PRC staff said that both the value of the combined postal monopolies—and the value of the mailbox monopoly on its own—are likely to continue to increase in the next few years. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS's mission is to provide universal delivery service while operating as a self-financing entity. Congress has provided USPS with monopolies to deliver letter mail and access mailboxes to protect its revenues, which enables it to fulfill its universal service mission, among other reasons. Despite its monopolies, USPS's poor financial condition has placed its universal service mission at risk. USPS's net losses were $5.6 billion in fiscal year 2016 and were greater than $62 billion over the past decade.
GAO was asked to review the postal monopolies. This report examines (1) what is known about the value of USPS's letter delivery and mailbox monopolies, (2) views on the potential effects of narrowing or eliminating these monopolies; and (3) considerations that would need to be addressed to estimate the effects of laws that apply differently to USPS and its private competitors. To address these questions, GAO reviewed reports issued by PRC and others; obtained views from USPS and PRC, as well as postal stakeholders and experts who have submitted public comments to PRC proceedings; and collected information from six countries—France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—that have eliminated their postal monopolies, selected based on criteria including their share of global mail volume.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. USPS disagreed with some stakeholder perspectives, among other things. GAO believes that the information is portrayed in a balanced way and added USPS responses, where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The value of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) letter delivery and mailbox monopolies was $5.45 billion in fiscal year 2015, according to the most recent estimate prepared by the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), the regulator of USPS. This figure suggests that USPS's net income would decline by this amount if its monopolies were eliminated. To develop these estimates, PRC identifies the mail covered under USPS's monopolies for which a potential entrant might compete to provide service if the monopolies were to be eliminated; such mail is referred to as “contestable.” PRC's estimated value of these monopolies has increased substantially in recent years—it was $3.28 billion in fiscal year 2012—and PRC staff expects that the value will continue to increase in the next few years due to increased volumes of contestable mail.
Narrowing or eliminating USPS's letter delivery and mailbox monopolies would likely have varied effects, according to views provided by postal stakeholders, experts, USPS, and PRC. For example, all parties agreed that allowing other entities to deliver letters could decrease USPS's revenues, and that additional strain would be placed on USPS's ability to continue providing the current level of universal service. Additionally, some stakeholders said that allowing other entities to deliver items to the mailbox could adversely affect the security of mail and increase clutter that would impair USPS's delivery efficiency. On the other hand, most of the postal experts we interviewed said that allowing entry to this market by private competitors could result in increased competition that would spur USPS to become more efficient. Officials from foreign posts or regulators in all six of the countries GAO contacted reported increases in competition after ending their postal delivery monopolies, and some of these countries also reported losses of revenue and market share for the carriers providing universal service. Stakeholders, experts, foreign officials, and USPS agreed that postal policies are interdependent and therefore need to be considered in tandem with one another; officials from all six countries we contacted told us that concurrent postal policy changes, such as increasing a post's degree of commercial freedom or decreasing the scope of its universal service obligation, assisted their transitions away from postal monopolies.
Estimating the effects of laws that apply differently to USPS and its private competitors would require steps including defining appropriate study objectives and assessing scope and methodological tradeoffs. For example, objectives would need to clarify the extent of financial effects to be estimated—whether for USPS as a whole, for only specific products, or for USPS relative to competitors. Scoping decisions would need to define the specific areas to be studied, the period of time to be reviewed, and the type of data to be collected. This would involve multiple considerations, including determining which laws to include and how to address differing stakeholder views. Additional judgment would be needed to address any lack of consensus on methodologies and to determine the appropriate degree of time and resources. For example, a comprehensive study estimating the effects of every law would require significant time and resources; if estimates were desired in a shorter time frame—or if financial resources were limited—tradeoffs would be required. |
gao_HEHS-98-62 | gao_HEHS-98-62_0 | SSI—a federal income assistance program that provides monthly cash payments to needy aged, blind, or disabled persons—is administered by the Social Security Administration.The welfare reform law eliminated SSI eligibility for most aliens and tightened the eligibility criteria for children to qualify for disability assistance, with projected savings of more than $21 billion over a 6-year period, according to Congressional Budget Office estimates. States Generally Opted to Administer Medicaid as They Did Prior to Welfare Reform
Although the new welfare reform law provided states with certain choices regarding Medicaid eligibility and administration, the states that we visited chose welfare reform options that sustained Medicaid coverage for their previously eligible populations. Medicaid-related options involve income and resource criteria for determining eligibility, aspects of program administration, sanctions for noncompliance with TANF work requirements, and continued Medicaid coverage for certain aliens residing in the United States at the time of the law’s enactment. In the first year of welfare reform implementation, states generally chose to maintain the linkages formerly in place between their Medicaid and cash assistance programs. Four of the nine states we visited reported having separate income or resource standards for Medicaid and TANF. Welfare reform gave states the option to continue using a single agency to determine eligibility for Medicaid and TANF or to assign those duties to separate agencies. All nine states use a common application for the programs, and only Wisconsin has separate agencies for determining applicant eligibility. None of the nine states we visited denied Medicaid as a program sanction for noncompliance with state work rules. According to state estimates, about 350 aliens qualify for state-funded medical assistance. Medicaid Education and Enrollment Become Increasingly Important in Post-Welfare-Reform Era
Welfare reform poses additional Medicaid education and enrollment challenges for states. Although the welfare reform law preserved Medicaid eligibility for families who would have previously qualified for Medicaid, data show that eligible children in low-income families who do not receive cash assistance are much less likely to enroll in the Medicaid program than those who receive cash assistance. The other states did not have estimates of the number of Medicaid-eligible children who are—or are not—enrolled in their Medicaid programs. However, the states we visited made few structural changes to their Medicaid programs during the first full year of welfare reform, thereby demonstrating their desire to maintain Medicaid benefits already in place. To collect consistent information on (1) states’ Medicaid-related choices, (2) implications of those choices on Medicaid eligibles and state administrative procedures, and (3) steps states have taken or plan to take to educate and enroll Medicaid eligibles, we developed a standardized protocol. Nine States’ Income and Resource Standards
Income and resource standards were among the financial criteria that welfare officials used to determine applicant eligibility for AFDC and for Medicaid coverage that accompanied cash assistance. Two states—California and New Jersey—have more generous income standards for Medicaid than for their cash assistance programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Medicaid-related actions states have taken in the first year of welfare reform, focusing on: (1) the Medicaid related options the welfare reform law gave states and the approaches states have taken; (2) the implications of these states choices for Medicaid eligibles and for the states' administrative processes; and (3) steps states have taken or plan to take to educate and enroll Medicaid eligibles, in view of their changing eligibility for cash assistance programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the first full year of welfare reform, the nine states GAO reviewed chose welfare reform options that generally sustained Medicaid coverage for their previously eligible populations; (2) the options provided to states included establishing different income and resource (asset) standards for their Medicaid and cash assistance programs, administering the two programs separately, imposing Medicaid-related penalties for welfare recipients not complying with state work rules, and discontinuing Medicaid coverage for aliens; (3) four of the nine states GAO visited had separate income or resource standards for their Medicaid and cash assistance programs; (4) according to officials in these states, eligibility standards had been separated as part of state welfare reform; (5) consistent with the options offered states by the welfare reform law, these separate standards often provided more generous income or resource limits for Medicaid than for welfare recipients, thus protecting eligibility for medical assistance; (6) to foster administrative efficiencies for states and public assistance applicants, all nine states chose to continue using a common application for their welfare and Medicaid programs and eight chose to continue using a single agency at the local level to determine applicant eligibility; (7) while the welfare reform law offered states the option of witholding Medicaid as a sanction for noncompliance with state work rules, as well as discontinuing Medicaid coverage for most aliens, none of the nine states chose to do so; (8) the intial choices that these states made resulted in little structural change in their Medicaid programs; (9) there were initially some concerns that new Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility restrictions for certain aliens and disabled children would affect their Medicaid eligibility; (10) however, subsequent legislation modified and reversed, to some extent, the provisions that restricted SSI eligibility for these populations; (11) welfare reform also poses new challenges for states' Medicaid beneficiary education and enrollment activities; (12) even prior to welfare reform, significant numbers of children were eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled; and (13) welfare reform increases the number of Medicaid eligibles who do not receive cash assistance--individuals who are often difficult to identify and enroll in Medicaid. |
gao_GAO-08-928T | gao_GAO-08-928T_0 | Importantly, the weights were designed to be descriptive not prescriptive—that is, the weights were designed to develop a measure of the national average amount of time that judges actually spent on specific cases, not to develop a measure of how much time judges should spend on various types of cases. 1993 Case Weights Reasonably Accurate, But Accuracy of 2004 Case Weights Cannot Be Statistically Determined
In our 2003 report, we found the district court case weights approved in 1993 to be a reasonably accurate measure of the average time demands a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that court. At the time of our 2003 report, the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Judicial Conference’s Judicial Resources Committee had approved the research design for revising the 1993 case weights, with a goal of having new weights submitted to the Resources Committee for review in the summer of 2004. First, the design assumed that judicial time spent on a given case could be accurately estimated by viewing the case as a set of individual tasks or events in the case. Information about event frequencies and, where available, time spent on the events would be extracted from existing administrative data bases and report and used to develop estimates of the judge-time spent on different types of cases. For event data, the research design proposed using data from two data bases (one of which was new and had not been implemented in all district courts) that would have to be integrated to obtain and analyze the event data. Second, the research design did not require judges to record time spent on individual cases. However, a majority of district judges’ time is spent on case-related work outside the courtroom. The time required for noncourtroom events would be derived from structured, guided discussion of groups of 8 to 13 experienced district court judges in each of the 12 geographic circuits (about 100 judges in all). Thus, the planned methodology did not make it possible to objectively, statistically assess how accurate the new case weights are—weights whose accuracy the Judicial Conference relies upon in assessing judgeship needs. Accuracy of Courts of Appeals Case-Related Workload Measure Cannot Be Assessed
The principal quantitative measure the Judicial Conference uses to assess the need for additional courts of appeals judgeships is adjusted case filings. The adjusted filings workload measure is not based on any empirical data regarding the time that different types of cases required of appellate judges. It is not based on empirical data regarding the judge time that different types of cases may require. Various Proposals Have Been Considered for Changing the Court of Appeals Workload Measure
In the past decade the Judicial Conference has considered a number of proposals for developing a revised case-related workload measure for the courts of appeals judges, but has been unable to reach a consensus on any approach. Our 2003 Recommendations and the Judiciary’s Response
In our 2003 report we recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States update the district court case weights using a methodology that supports an objective, statistically reliable means of calculating the accuracy of the resulting weights; and develop a methodology for measuring the case-related workload of courts of appeals judges that supports an objective, statistically reliable means of calculating the accuracy of the resulting workload measures and that addressed the special case characteristics of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. With regard to our 2003 recommendation for updating the district court case weights, the FJC agreed that the method used to develop the new case weights would not permit the calculation of standard errors, but that other methods could be used to assess the integrity of the resulting case weight system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Biennially, the Judicial Conference, the federal judiciary's principal policymaking body, assesses the need for additional judges. The assessment is based on a variety of factors, but begins with quantitative case-related workload measures. This testimony focuses on (1) whether the judiciary's quantitative case-related workload measures from 1993 were reasonably accurate; and (2) the reasonableness of any proposed methodologies to update the 1993 workload measures. The comments in this testimony are based on a report GAO issued in May 2003.
What GAO Found
In 2003, GAO reported that the 1993 district court case weights were reasonably accurate measures of the average time demands that a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that district. At the time of GAO's 2003 report, the Judicial Conference was using case weights approved in 1993 to assess the need for additional district court judgeships. The weights were based on data judges recorded about the actual in-court and out-of-court time spent on specific cases from filing to disposition. This methodology permitted the calculation of objective, statistical measures of the accuracy of the final case weights. In 2003, GAO reviewed the research design the Judicial Conference's Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics had approved for updating the 1993 district court case weights, and had two concerns about the design. First, the design assumed that the judicial time spent on a case could be accurately estimated by viewing the case as a set of individual tasks or events in the case. Information about event frequencies and, where available, time spent on the events would be extracted from existing databases and used to develop estimates of the judge-time spent on different types of cases. However, for event data, the research design proposed using data from two data bases that had yet to be integrated to obtain and analyze the data. Second, unlike the methodology used to develop the 1993 case weights, the design for updating the case weights included limited data on the time judges actually spent on specific types of cases. Specifically, the proposed design included data from judicial databases on the in-court time judges spent on different types of cases, but did not include collecting actual data on the noncourtroom time that judges spend on different types of cases. Instead, estimates of judges' noncourtroom time were derived from the structured, guided discussions of about 100 experienced judges meeting in 12 separate groups (one for each geographic circuit). Noncourtroom time was likely to represent the majority of judge time used to develop the revised case weights. The accuracy of case weights developed on such consensus data cannot be assessed using standard statistical methods, such as the calculation of standard errors. Thus, it would not be possible to objectively, statistically assess how accurate the new case weights are--weights on whose reasonable accuracy the Judicial Conference relies in assessing judgeship needs. The case-related workload measure for courts of appeals judges is adjusted case filings in which all cases are considered to take an equal amount of judge time except for pro se cases--those in which one or more of the parties is not represented by an attorney--which are discounted. In our 2003 review, we found no empirical basis on which to assess the accuracy of this workload measure. Although a number of alternatives to the adjusted filings measure have been considered, the Judicial Conference has been unable to agree on a different approach that could be applied to all courts of appeal. |
gao_GAO-16-164 | gao_GAO-16-164_0 | Use of renewable energy. Energy-remote installations in Alaska and Hawaii face some unique differences from the installations located in the 48 contiguous states. DOD Met Some Reporting Requirements and Correctly Reflected the Military Services’ and Defense Agencies’ Data and Other Inputs in Its Fiscal Year 2013 Energy Report, but the Data Are Unreliable
DOD’s Fiscal Year 2013 Energy Report Met Some but Not All Reporting Requirements
Of the 12 reporting requirements for DOD’s Energy Report, our analysis showed that the department fully addressed 6, partially addressed 4, and did not address 2. The requirements fully addressed included describing actions taken to implement the energy performance master plan and energy savings realized from such actions, among other requirements. DOD Reported Data in Its Energy Report That Was Captured and Reported Using Different Methods, Rendering It Unreliable
We found that the military services and defense agencies captured and reported data using different methods in three areas of the Energy Report: energy consumption of tenants and hosts, energy projects, and end-of-fiscal-year data. Military Services Are Helping to Ensure Energy Security at U.S. Energy-Remote Installations, but Areas of Risk Remain
Military Services Are Helping to Ensure Energy Security
The military services are helping to ensure energy security at all installations in Alaska and Hawaii by installing multiple power sources, which can be utilized in the event of an outage, at their remote facilities. However, across the military services, officials told us that energy security projects do not compete well for funding because there is no clarity regarding the role that energy security plays in military service processes when evaluating a project for funding. Officials at six of the nine locations we visited or contacted cited difficulty obtaining funding for energy security or would like to see dedicated funding for energy security projects. For example, officials overseeing the Air Force’s Alaska Radar System stated that they have sought military construction funding since 2002 to build a networked system of multiple fuel tanks, referred to as a tank farm, at three off-grid locations that each has only one large fuel tank. However, the officials said they are having difficulties obtaining funding because energy security projects do not compete well against other military construction projects, such as those for new facilities or mission-critical activities. For example, they said that energy security projects—which have significant infrastructure costs—do not compete well for funding against energy conservation efforts based on return on investment. As a result, military service officials told us that they had difficulty incorporating energy security into funding decisions. Without clarification of the processes the military services use to compare and prioritize projects for funding to include consideration of energy security, it will be difficult for decision makers to have sufficient information to adequately prioritize energy security projects for funding when appropriate and thus address energy security issues. Fort Greely officials stated that the Army hired a contractor to conduct a study to identify alternative energy solutions to lower costs and still provide energy security. Without reexamining the process for producing the Energy Report to help ensure it fully complies with statutory requirements, providing more consistent guidance to the installations, and identifying in the Energy Report instances in which data may not be comparable among the military services and defense agencies and the reasons why, it will be difficult for decision makers in DOD to plan effectively for steps to reach energy goals, and Congress will have limited oversight of the department’s energy consumption and difficulty in comparing energy projects among those reporting. In order to improve the consistency of certain data submitted by the military services and defense agencies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and reported in the Energy Report, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the heads of the defense agencies, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment to work together to provide more consistent guidance to the installations, including clearly stating the energy reporting requirements for tenant and host facilities, energy projects, and end-of-fiscal-year data, and identify in the Energy Report instances in which data may not be comparable among the military services and defense agencies and the reasons why. In written comments, DOD concurred with all recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed the 12 required reporting elements and reliably reported data in its fiscal year 2013 Annual Energy Management Report (Energy Report) and (2) the military services helped ensure energy security at energy-remote military installations in the United States. Moreover, the electrical systems in Alaska and Hawaii are not connected to each other. However, the report did not describe the types and amounts of financial incentives received, if any, as indicated in the required reporting element. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is the largest energy consumer in the federal government, spending about $4.1 billion on facilities' energy at more than 500 permanent military installations throughout the world in fiscal year 2013. To help ensure oversight of DOD's fulfillment of energy performance goals, Congress requires that DOD track energy savings, investments, and projects in its annual Energy Report. The Energy Report also details DOD's activities to enhance energy security.
Congress included a provision for GAO to review DOD's fiscal year 2013 Energy Report and energy security at energy-remote military installations—that is, those installations located in areas with limited connectivity and without significant infrastructure of power plants, transmission lines, or distribution lines.
GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD addressed the 12 required reporting elements and reliably reported data in its fiscal year 2013 Energy Report and (2) the military services help ensure energy security at energy-remote military installations in the United States. GAO analyzed DOD's Energy Report and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military services, defense agencies, and all installations in Alaska and Hawaii because they were identified as energy remote.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2013 Annual Energy Management Report (Energy Report) addressed some of the required reporting elements and correctly incorporated data from the military services and defense agencies. However, the report is not fully reliable because the data were captured and reported using different methods, hindering comparability across the department. Specifically, the Energy Report addressed six, partially addressed four, and did not address two reporting requirements. For example, the Energy Report addressed the requirement to describe actions taken to implement DOD's energy performance master plan, partially addressed the requirement to describe progress to meet various energy goals (it described progress for three of five required goals), and did not address the requirement to describe the types and amount of financial incentives received. The Energy Report correctly reflected data provided by the military services and defense agencies. However, the military services and defense agencies used different methods for capturing and reporting on data in the Energy Report such as on energy consumption and projects. These inconsistencies resulted from guidance that was either unclear or lacking. For example, DOD did not provide guidance on reporting end-of-fiscal-year energy data; thus, the military services and defense agencies used different reporting methods. Without clear guidance for reporting data consistently, it will be difficult for DOD to have reliable data to plan effectively to reach energy goals, and Congress will have limited oversight of DOD's energy consumption and difficulty in comparing energy projects.
The military services generally help ensure energy security (the ability to continue missions in the event of a power outage) at their energy-remote military installations in Alaska and Hawaii by providing access to multiple power sources. However, GAO identified areas of risk to energy security regarding installation electricity systems, high energy costs, and funding. GAO found that the military services addressed some risks by conducting studies on integrating renewable energy into electricity systems and identifying alternative energy solutions to lower costs. However, military service efforts to incorporate energy security into funding decisions have been limited. The processes to evaluate projects for funding generally do not consider energy security in prioritizing those to receive funding, and officials from all four military services stated that there is no military service or DOD guidance related to evaluating projects for funding that focuses on energy security. As a result, six of the nine locations GAO visited in Alaska and Hawaii cited difficulty obtaining funding for energy security projects. For example, officials at the Air Force's Alaska Radar System said they have sought funding since 2002 to build a networked system of multiple fuel tanks at three off-grid locations that each have only one fuel tank, but they said energy security projects do not compete well against other projects, such as those for new facilities. Navy officials similarly stated that energy security projects—which have significant infrastructure costs—do not compete well for funding against energy conservation efforts based on return on investment. Without clarification of the processes used to compare and prioritize projects for funding to include consideration of energy security, it will be difficult for decision makers to have sufficient information to adequately prioritize energy security projects for funding when appropriate and thus address energy security issues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD revise its guidance for producing the Energy Report and clarify funding processes to include consideration of energy security. DOD concurred with all recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-47 | gao_GAO-10-47_0 | Mercury can harm fetuses and cause neurological disorders in children, resulting in, among other things, impaired cognitive abilities. Substantial Mercury Reductions Have Been Achieved Using Sorbent Injection Technology at 14 Plants and in Many DOE Tests
Power plants using sorbent injection systems—either commercially deployed or tested by DOE and industry—have achieved substantial mercury reductions with the three main types of coal and on boiler configurations that exist at nearly three-fourths of U.S. coal-fired power plants. Nonetheless, some plants already achieve substantial mercury emissions reductions with existing control devices for other pollutants. Data from power plants show that these boilers have achieved, on average, reductions in mercury emissions of about 90 percent. Further, when the results of 50 tests of sorbent injection systems at power plants conducted primarily as part of DOE’s or EPRI’s mercury control research and development programs are factored in, mercury reductions of at least 90 percent have been achieved at boiler configurations used at nearly three- fourths of coal-fired power boilers nationally. Plant officials told us, for example, that they chose to install fabric filters to assist with mercury control for 10 of the sorbent injection systems currently deployed—but that some of the devices were installed primarily to comply with other air pollution control requirements. The successful deployments of sorbent injection technologies at power plants occurred around the time DOE concluded, on the basis of its tests, that these technologies were ready for commercial deployment. Some Plants May Require Alternative Strategies to Achieve Significant Mercury Reductions
While sorbent injection technology has been shown to be effective with all coal types and on boiler configurations that currently exist at more than three-fourths of U.S. coal-fired power plants, DOE tests show that some plants may not be able to achieve mercury reductions of 90 percent or more with sorbent injection systems alone. Mercury Control Technologies Are Often Relatively Inexpensive, but Costs Depend Largely on How Plants Comply with Requirements for Reducing Other Pollutants
The cost to meet current regulatory requirements for mercury reductions has varied depending in large part on decisions regarding compliance with other pollution reduction requirements. The costs of purchasing and installing sorbent injection systems and monitoring equipment have averaged about $3.6 million for the 14 coal- fired boilers that use sorbent injection systems alone to reduce mercury emissions. Information on detailed average costs to purchase and install sorbent injection systems and monitoring equipment, with and without fabric filters, is provided in appendix V.
Regarding operating costs, plant managers said that annual operating costs associated with sorbent injection systems consist almost entirely of the cost of the sorbent itself. Most sorbents increase the carbon content of fly ash, which may render it unsuitable for some commercial uses. Advances in sorbent technologies that have reduced costs at some plants also offer the potential to preserve the market value of fly ash. Decisions EPA Faces on Key Regulatory Issues Will Have Implications for the Effectiveness of Its Mercury Emission Standard for Coal- Fired Power Plants and the Availability of Monitoring Data
EPA’s decisions on key regulatory issues will impact the overall stringency of its MACT standard regulating mercury emissions. Specifically, the data EPA decides to use will affect (1) the mercury emission reductions calculated for “best performers,” from which a proposed emission limit is derived; (2) whether EPA will establish varying standards for the three coal types; and (3) how EPA’s standard will take into account varying operating conditions. Each of these issues will affect the stringency of the MACT standard the agency proposes. Current Data from Commercial Deployments and DOE Tests Could Be Used in Determining Whether to Support a More Stringent Standard for Mercury Emissions from Power Plants Than Was Last Proposed by EPA
Obtaining data on mercury emissions and identifying the “best performers”—defined as the 12 percent of coal-fired power plant boilers with the lowest mercury emissions—is a critical initial step in the development of a MACT standard regulating mercury emissions. Before a federal agency can collect data from 10 or more nongovernmental parties, such as power plants, it must obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the information collection request. EPA and DOE provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to examine (1) the mercury reductions that have been achieved by existing mercury control technologies and the extent to which they are being used at coal-fired power plants, (2) the costs associated with mercury control technologies currently in use, and (3) key issues the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces in developing a new regulation for mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 491 U.S. coal-fired power plants are the largest unregulated industrial source of mercury emissions nationwide, annually emitting about 48 tons of mercury--a toxic element that poses health threats, including neurological disorders in children. In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that mercury emissions from these sources should be regulated, but the agency has not set a maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standard, as the Clean Air Act requires. Some power plants, however, must reduce mercury emissions to comply with state regulations or consent decrees. After managing a long-term mercury control research and development program, the Department of Energy (DOE) reported in 2008 that systems that inject sorbents--powdery substances to which mercury binds--into the exhaust from boilers of coal-fired power plants were ready for commercial deployment. Tests of sorbent injection systems, the most mature mercury control technology, were conducted on a variety of coal types and boiler configurations--that is, on boilers using different air pollution control devices. In this context, GAO was asked to examine (1) reductions achieved by mercury control technologies and the extent of their use at power plants, (2) the cost of mercury control technologies, and (3) key issues EPA faces in regulating mercury emissions from power plants. GAO obtained data from power plants operating sorbent injection systems. EPA and DOE provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Commercial deployments and 50 DOE and industry tests of sorbent injection systems have achieved, on average, 90 percent reductions in mercury emissions. These systems are being used on 25 boilers at 14 coal-fired plants, enabling them to meet state or other mercury emission requirements--generally 80 percent to 90 percent reductions. The effectiveness of sorbent injection is largely affected by coal type and boiler configuration. Importantly, the substantial mercury reductions using these systems commercially and in tests were achieved with all three main types of coal and on boiler configurations that exist at nearly three-fourths of U.S. coal-fired power plants. While sorbent injection has been shown to be widely effective, DOE tests suggest that other strategies, such as blending coals or using other technologies, may be needed to achieve substantial reductions at some plants. Finally, some plants already achieve substantial mercury reductions with existing controls designed for other pollutants. The cost of the mercury control technologies in use at power plants has varied, depending in large part on decisions regarding compliance with other pollution reduction requirements. The costs of purchasing and installing sorbent injection systems and monitoring equipment have averaged about $3.6 million for the 14 coal-fired boilers operating sorbent systems alone to meet state requirements. This cost is a fraction of the cost of other pollution control devices. When plants also installed a fabric filter device primarily to assist the sorbent injection system in mercury reduction, the average cost of $16 million is still relatively low compared with that of other air pollution control devices. Annual operating costs of sorbent injection systems, which often consist almost entirely of the cost of the sorbent itself, have been, on average, about $675,000. In addition, some plants have incurred other costs, primarily due to lost sales of a coal combustion byproduct--fly ash--that plants have sold for commercial use. The carbon in sorbents can render fly ash unusable for certain purposes. Advances in sorbent technologies that have reduced sorbent costs at some plants offer the potential to preserve the market value of fly ash. EPA's decisions on key regulatory issues will have implications for the effectiveness of its mercury emissions standard. In particular, the data EPA decides to use will impact (1) the emissions reductions it starts with in developing its regulation, (2) whether it will establish varying standards for the three main coal types, and (3) how the standard will take into account a full range of operating conditions at the plants. These issues can affect the stringency of the MACT standard EPA proposes. For example, if EPA uses data from its 1999 power plant survey as the basis for its mercury standard, the standard could be less stringent than what has been broadly demonstrated in recent commercial deployments and DOE tests of sorbent injection systems at power plants. On July 2, 2009, EPA announced that it would seek approval from the Office of Management and Budget to conduct an information collection request to update existing emissions data, among other things, from power plants. |
gao_GAO-06-877T | gao_GAO-06-877T_0 | Background
The UN headquarters buildings are in need of renovation. Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of the UN Internal Auditors
The UN is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement due to a range of weaknesses in existing oversight practices. International auditing standards also state that financial regulations and the rules of an international institution should not restrict an audit organization from fulfilling its mandate. Funding Arrangements Hinder OIOS’s Ability to Respond to Changing Circumstances and to Reallocate Resources to Address High-Risk Areas
UN funding arrangements severely limit OIOS’s ability to respond to changing circumstances and reallocate its resources among its multiple funding sources, OIOS locations worldwide, or its operating divisions— Internal Audit Divisions I and II; the Investigations Division; and the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Consulting Division—to address changing priorities. Reliance on Other Entities for Funding Could Infringe on OIOS’s Independence
OIOS is dependent on UN funds and programs and other UN entities for resources, access, and reimbursement for the services it provides. By denying OIOS funding, UN entities could avoid OIOS audits or investigations, and high-risk areas could potentially be excluded from timely examination. Since then, OIOS has begun to develop and implement the key components of effective oversight. OIOS Has Developed Annual Work Plans, but Has Not Fully Implemented a Risk Management Framework
OIOS has adopted a risk management framework to link the office’s annual work plans to risk-based priorities, but it has not fully implemented this framework. OIOS Lacks a Mechanism to Determine Appropriate Resource Levels
While OIOS officials have stated that the office does not have adequate resources, they do not have a mechanism in place to determine appropriate staffing levels to help justify budget requests, except for peacekeeping oversight services. The Current UN Procurement Process Contains Numerous Weaknesses
While the UN has yet to finalize its CMP procurement strategy, to the extent that it relies on current UN processes, implementation of the planned renovation is vulnerable to the procurement weaknesses that we have identified. If handled through an independent process, vendor complaints could alert senior UN officials and UN auditors to the failure of UN procurement staff to comply with stated procedures. The committee’s chairman and members told us that the committee does not have the resources to keep up with its expanding workload. Earlier this year, OIOS reiterated its 2001 recommendation that the UN reduce the committee’s caseload and restructure the committee “to allow competent review of the cases.”
UN Does Not Consistently Implement Its Process for Helping to Ensure That It Conducts Business with Qualified Vendors
The UN does not consistently implement its process for helping to ensure that it is conducting business with qualified vendors. The UN Has Not Fully Established Ethics Guidance for Procurement Personnel
The UN has been considering the development of specific ethics guidance for procurement officers for almost a decade, in response to General Assembly directives dating back to 1998. GAO’s Recommendation to Address Weaknesses in UN Procurement
In our April 2006 report on UN procurement, we recommended that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN work with member states to encourage the UN to establish an independent bid protest mechanism, address problems facing its principle contract-review committee, implement a process to help ensure that it conducts business with qualified vendors, and to take other steps to improve UN procurement. Effective internal oversight and management of the procurement process will be necessary for the successful completion of the project. In addition, OIOS’s shortcomings in meeting key components of international auditing standards could undermine the office’s effectiveness in carrying out its functions as the UN’s main internal oversight body. While the UN has yet to finalize its CMP procurement strategy, to the extent that it relies on the current process, we have identified numerous weaknesses with the existing procurement process that could impact implementation of the CMP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The UN headquarters buildings are in need of renovation. The Capital Master Plan is an opportunity for the organization to renovate its headquarters buildings and ensure conformity with current safety, fire, and security requirements. Estimated by the UN to cost about $1.6 billion, the renovation will require a substantial management effort by the UN--including the use of effective internal oversight and procurement practices. Based on recently issued work, GAO (1) examined the extent to which UN funding arrangements for its Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) ensure independent oversight and the consistency of OIOS's practices with key international auditing standards and (2) assessed the UN's procurement processes according to key standards for internal controls.
What GAO Found
The effective implementation of the planned UN renovation is vulnerable due to a range of weaknesses in existing internal oversight and procurement practices. In particular, UN funding arrangements adversely affect OIOS's budgetary independence and compromise OIOS's ability to investigate high-risk areas. In addition, while the UN has yet to finalize a specific procurement process for the UN Capital Master Plan, to the extent that it relies on UN procurement processes, it remains vulnerable to the numerous procurement weaknesses that GAO have previously identified. First, UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS's ability to operate independently as mandated by the General Assembly and required by international auditing standards. While OIOS is funded by a regular budget and 12 other revenue streams, UN financial regulations and rules severely limit OIOS's ability to respond to changing circumstances and reallocate resources among revenue streams, locations, and operating divisions. Thus, OIOS cannot always direct resources to high-risk areas that may emerge after its budget is approved. Second, OIOS depends on the resources of the funds, programs, and other entities it audits. The managers of these programs can deny OIOS permission to perform work or not pay OIOS for services. UN entities could thus avoid OIOS audits or investigations, and high-risk areas can be and have been excluded from timely examination. OIOS has begun to implement key measures for effective oversight, but some of its practices fall short of the applicable international auditing standards it has adopted. OIOS develops an annual work plan, but the risk management framework on which the work plans are based is not fully implemented. OIOS officials report the office does not have adequate resources, but they also lack a mechanism to determine appropriate staffing levels. Furthermore, OIOS has no mandatory training curriculum for staff. While the UN has yet to finalize its Capital Master Plan procurement strategy, to the extent that it relies on the current process, implementation of the Capital Master Plan remains vulnerable to numerous procurement weaknesses. For example, the UN has not established an independent process to consider vendor protests that could alert senior UN officials of failures by procurement staff to comply with stated procedures. Also, the chairman of the UN procurement contract review committee has stated that his committee does not have the resources to keep up with its expanding workload. In addition, the UN does not consistently implement its process for helping to ensure that it is conducting business with qualified vendors. GAO also found that the UN has not demonstrated a commitment to improving its professional procurement staff despite long-standing shortcomings and has yet to complete action on specific ethics guidance for procurement officers. |
gao_GAO-05-721 | gao_GAO-05-721_0 | EPA’s Process for Budgeting and Allocating Resources Does Not Fully Consider the Current Workload in Terms of Strategic Goals or Specific Laws
EPA budgets and allocates resources incrementally, largely based on historical precedents, and thus its process does not reflect a bottom-up review of the nature or distribution of the current workload—either for specific environmental laws or the broader goals and objectives in the agency’s strategic plan. These historical precedents are drawn from workload models EPA had developed in the 1980s, but the distribution of EPA’s workload has changed over time as EPA has taken on new responsibilities under the Clean Water Act and other laws and the states gradually assumed a greater role in the day-to-day implementation of key aspects of this workload. Other factors, such as the introduction of new technologies and shifts in regional population, have also affected the amount, type, and distribution of EPA’s resource needs. Within the existing system, EPA and state officials have some flexibility to realign resources based on actual workload but have not taken full advantage of such opportunities. EPA has developed several initiatives that could improve the agency’s ability to plan its resources more strategically, including some efforts that focus on workforce planning and others that could provide key information needed to support a data-driven approach to budgeting and allocating resources. Beyond these initiatives, however, EPA faces larger challenges in adopting a more systematic process for budgeting and resource allocation: obtaining reliable data on key workload indicators and overcoming internal resistance to adopting such a process. Although EPA’s workforce planning initiatives address, to varying degrees, some of the recommended practices for managing human capital, its efforts could be more effective. The primary focus of the project was identifying the gap between states’ needs and available resources. One of the challenges to improving data quality will be determining which of the workload indicators represent the most significant drivers of resource needs. Conclusions
Because EPA does not have a system in place to conduct periodic bottom- up assessments of the work that needs to be done, the distribution of the workload, or staff and other resource needs, the agency may be unable to respond effectively to changing needs and constrained resources. EPA is obligated to meet its reporting responsibilities under section 516(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act. Officials from these entities and the four EPA regional offices selected for review also provided information on the challenges EPA faces in taking actions to improve resource planning. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal and state fiscal constraints may jeopardize past and future accomplishments resulting from the Clean Water Act (the act). In this environment, it is important to manage available resources as efficiently as possible and to identify future human capital needs, including the size of the workforce and its deployment across the organization. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) process for budgeting and allocating resources considers the nature and distribution of its Clean Water Act workload and (2) the actions EPA is taking to improve resource planning and the challenges the agency faces in doing so.
What GAO Found
EPA's process for budgeting and allocating resources is largely based on historical precedent and does not fully consider the changing nature or distribution of the workload either for specific environmental laws or the broader goals and objectives in the agency's strategic plan. With prior year's allocations as the baseline, year-to-year changes are marginal. EPA's program offices and regions also have some flexibility to realign resources based on actual workload. Overall, the impact of these changes is minor, according to EPA. Because the nature and distribution of the act's workload has changed as the scope of regulated activities has grown, with EPA gaining new responsibilities and shifting others to the states, more than marginal changes may be appropriate. EPA does not conduct the periodic "bottom-up" assessments of the work that needs to be done, the distribution of the workload, or the resources needed to respond more effectively to changing needs and constrained resources. EPA has developed initiatives that could improve its ability to plan its resources more strategically, including efforts that focus on workforce planning. These efforts are promising but could be more effective if two agencywide initiatives were better coordinated and employee skill surveys were designed to identify gaps in needed skills. Beyond these initiatives, EPA faces larger challenges in adopting a more systematic process for budgeting and resource allocation, particularly in obtaining reliable data on key workload indicators. According to EPA officials, data on many of the factors that affect workload--and thus, drive resource needs--are not comprehensive or reliable. One of the biggest challenges will be assessing which of the workload indicators represent the most significant factors in determining resource needs. While this assessment presents a challenge, it would help EPA set priorities for improving data quality. |
gao_GAO-02-8 | gao_GAO-02-8_0 | In 1998, whereas 96 percent of employers with 50 or more employees offered health insurance, 71 percent of employers with 10 to 49 employees provided coverage and only about 36 percent of employers with fewer than 10 workers offered health benefits to their employees.The primary reason small employers cited for not offering coverage was cost. Similar Premiums for Small And Large Employers May Mask Coverage Differences And Potentially Higher Costs to Small Employers for Those Not Insured
Average annual health insurance premiums—the total amount paid by both employers and employees—were nearly the same for small and large employers in 1998. Small employers generally purchased coverage with higher cost-sharing requirements for their employees compared to larger employers. In addition, workers covered through small employers are less likely to receive certain benefits. As a result, insurers spend a smaller share of small employers’ premium dollars on benefits and more on administrative and other expenses than they do for large employers’. Estimates of a group’s future expenses that are based on prior health care use tend to be more accurate the larger the group is. Nearly all states have restricted insurers’ ability to vary small employers’ premiums to some degree. Other State Efforts Have Had A Limited Effect on Affordability
States have undertaken other efforts to help small employers purchase health insurance, but have had limited success in addressing affordability issues. Attempts to reduce premiums by allowing insurers to offer less generous, scaled-back benefit packages have not been widely embraced by small employers. For example, see the following. These efforts are directed toward helping to make health insurance more affordable for small employers by subsidizing costs for the employers or their employees or by helping small employers gain some of the advantages large employers have in purchasing health insurance. | What GAO Found
Many small employers--those with 50 or fewer workers--do not offer health benefits to their employees. This is particularly true for employers with fewer than 10 workers. The families of workers employed by small employers are about twice as likely to be uninsured as households with a worker at a large employer. Despite efforts by Congress and the states to help small employers buy coverage, many small employers continue to cite cost as a major obstacle to providing coverage. Small and large employers purchasing health insurance generally had comparable premiums in 1998, but this comparison does not fully reflect the challenges facing small employers in providing health insurance for their employees. Although the premiums were similar, the health plans offered by small employers were slightly less generous on average--they had slightly higher average cost-sharing requirements for their employees and were somewhat less likely to offer some benefits, excluding, for example, mental health services and chiropractic care. Also, insurers' costs to administer employer-based health insurance and protect against potentially large health care costs result in a larger share of small employers' premium dollars being spent on these nonbenefit expenses. Nearly all states have passed laws that limit the ability of insurers to vary premiums charged to small employers on the basis of the group's risk factors, including health. Other state efforts to make insurance more affordable for small employers have had limited results. Few small employers appear interested in lower-cost benefit packages that require significantly higher cost sharing by individuals or that scale back benefits that are covered. |
gao_GAO-08-858T | gao_GAO-08-858T_0 | U.S. Assistance to Palau Is Projected to Exceed $852 Million in 1995-2009
The United States’ cost of providing assistance to Palau in 1995-2009 is projected to exceed $852 million. The three categories of assistance mandated by the compact—compact direct assistance, compact federal services, and compact road construction—represent approximately 48 percent, 3 percent, and 17 percent, respectively, of total projected U.S. assistance for 1995-2009. U.S. agencies provide the remaining 31 percent of total assistance through discretionary federal programs. This assistance flows as a direct transfer payment to the government of Palau. The compact provides for federal postal, weather, and aviation services in Palau at a level equivalent to the services provided the year before the compact was implemented. Palau has since made efforts to maintain the road; however, both U.S. and Palau officials expressed concerns regarding Palau’s ability to maintain the road in a condition that will allow for the desired economic development. Five agencies—Education, HHS, Interior, DOD, and DOT—contributed the majority of this assistance (see attachment V). Palau Made Progress in Accountability but Has Limited Capacity to Address Internal Control Weaknesses, and Interior’s Oversight Has Been Limited
Although Palau’s more recent single audit reports show improvement in its financial accountability, the reports show persistent weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting, its compliance with some federal award requirements, and its internal control over compliance with these requirements. However, Palau has limited capacity to address these weaknesses in a timely way, putting Palau at risk of being unable to sustain its improvements in financial accountability and to operate a major federal program according to applicable requirements. Palau met the majority of the compact’s and related agreements’ reporting requirements for accountability over compact funds, but Palau and the U.S. government did not meet all of the consultation requirements. In addition, the recent single audits show that the reliability of Palau’s financial statements has improved. However, despite the improved reliability of its financial statements, Palau has long-standing and significant weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting and has limited capacity to address these weaknesses. As a result, Palau is at risk of being unable to sustain its improvements in financial accountability. Regarding compliance with the compact and its related agreements, Palau met the majority of the reporting requirements, submitting the required economic development plans and annual reports. However, according to Palau and U.S. officials, the required trust fund consultations did not take place. Interior provided limited oversight of Palau’s accountability for compact and other U.S. assistance. Interior’s OIA and Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported efforts to assist or oversee Palau’s accountability for federal funds. For example, according to Interior officials, Interior has monitored Palau’s progress in completing and issuing its single audit reports; used Palau’s single audit and compact annual reports to monitor Palau’s use of compact funds; and worked with Palau to track single audit findings and resolve issues. Also, according to Interior officials, OIA has provided general technical assistance funds to train Palau employees as well as funds to enhance Palau’s financial management systems and processes. However, an OIA official said that its oversight of compact funding has not been extensive and that the compact gives Palau broad discretion in compact spending. Although the expiration of compact direct assistance at the end of 2009 will reduce the national government’s revenues by about $13.3 million, Palau will gain access to an additional $10 million in annual financing when its yearly trust fund withdrawals increase in 2010 from $5 million to $15 million. Moreover, unless the federal programs and services agreement is renewed or extended past 2009, Palau will lose postal, weather, and aviation services that are estimated to cost U.S. agencies almost $1.6 million in 2009. Availability and Value of Trust Fund Withdrawals
Palau’s prospects for economic self-sufficiency also depend in part on the availability of the planned $15 million annual trust fund withdrawals and the value of those withdrawals over time. Conclusions and Recommendations
In 2009, the U.S. and Palau governments will formally review the terms of the compact and its related agreements. Interior’s OIA will remain the cognizant agency for Palau for compact direct assistance through 2009 and will continue to review Palau’s single audits as long as U.S. federal program funds are expended in Palau. To strengthen Palau’s ability to provide accountability and meet applicable requirements for federal assistance, our recent report recommends that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Office of Insular Affairs to formally consult with the government of Palau regarding Palau’s financial management challenges and to target future technical assistance toward building Palau’s financial management capacity. Interior agreed with our recommendation and identified steps it will take to implement it. The compact federal programs and services agreement—establishing the legal status of programs and related services, federal agencies, U.S. contractors, and personnel of U.S. agencies implementing both compact federal services and discretionary federal programs in Palau—expires in 2009. Requires Palau to report annually on its use of compact funds. Establishes that the United States has full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to Palau. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1995, when the Compact of Free Association between Palau and the United States entered into force, U.S. aid to Palau has included assistance provided for in the compact and related subsidiary agreements--direct assistance to the Palau national government, including investment in a trust fund intended to provide $15 million annually from 2010 through 2044; federal postal, weather, and aviation services; and construction of a major road--with the U.S. interest of promoting Palau's self-sufficiency and economic advancement. U.S. assistance to Palau has also included discretionary federal programs, such as health, education, and infrastructure services, that are not provided for in the compact. Compact direct assistance is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2009. In addition, the related subsidiary agreement providing for federal services to Palau will expire on that date unless renewed or extended. At that time, Palau's annual withdrawals from its trust fund can increase from $5 million to $15 million. The compact mandates that the U.S. and Palau governments review the terms of the compact and its related agreements in 2009 and concur on any modifications to those terms. The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) has primary responsibility for monitoring and coordinating all U.S. assistance to Palau, and the Department of State (State) is responsible for government-to-government relations. To provide accountability for compact funds, the compact's related agreements require an annual audit of Palau's use of compact funds and require Palau to submit economic development plans, identifying planned expenditures of compact assistance, and annual reports on, among other topics, its implementation of these plans. The U.S. and Palau governments are also required to hold annual economic consultations to review Palau's progress toward self-sufficiency and to consult regarding Palau's trust fund every 5 years. My statement is based on our report, which was released this week. In this report, we examined (1) the provision of compact and other U.S. assistance to Palau in 1995-2009, (2) Palau's and U.S. agencies' efforts to provide accountability over Palau's use of federal funds, and (3) Palau's prospects for achieving economic self-sufficiency. We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
What GAO Found
U.S. aid to Palau in 1995-2009 is expected to exceed $852 million. Compact direct assistance, providing general budgetary support for Palau's government operations, is projected at $411 million, or 48 percent of the assistance provided. The provision of compact federal services--postal, weather, and aviation--is projected at about $25 million, or 3 percent of the assistance, and the compact road construction accounted for $149 million, or 17 percent of the assistance. Palau's receipt of discretionary federal program assistance is projected at $267 million, or 31 percent of the total assistance provided. In 1995-2006, five U.S. agencies--the Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), Interior, Defense (DOD), and Transportation (DOT)--contributed the majority of discretionary federal program assistance to Palau. Palau has made progress in establishing financial accountability, despite limited capacity to address persistent internal control weaknesses, and has met most compact accountability requirements; however, Interior's monitoring of Palau's accountability has been limited. Palau's single audit reports for 1995-2006 show that it improved its timeliness in submitting the reports and improved the reliability of its financial statements. However, the reports show persistent weaknesses in Palau's internal controls over financial reporting; the reports also indicate that Palau has not complied with all federal award requirements and show persistent weaknesses in Palau's internal controls over compliance with these requirements. Although Palau has developed plans to correct these weaknesses, limited capacity in financial accounting resources and expertise puts at risk Palau's ability to sustain its improvements in financial accountability and to operate a major federal program within applicable requirements. Palau met the majority of the compact's and related agreements' accountability requirements, such as submitting annual reports and economic development plans. OIA and State officials, as well as officials from the government of Palau, reported that they participated in the required economic consultations but that the meetings were not held annually. Moreover, U.S. and Palau officials acknowledged that the required trust fund consultations were not held at all. According to OIA officials, OIA has used Palau's single audit results and compact annual reports to monitor Palau's use of compact funds and has provided technical assistance funds to train Palau employees as well as funds to enhance Palau's financial management systems and processes. However, OIA officials said that Interior views its oversight role as limited. To improve Palau's ability to sustain its improvements in financial reporting and address its internal control weaknesses, our report recommends that the Secretary of the Interior direct OIA to formally consult with the government of Palau regarding Palau's financial management challenges and target future technical assistance toward building Palau's financial management capacity. Responding to a draft of our report, Interior agreed with our recommendation and identified steps it will take to implement it. |
gao_GAO-10-695 | gao_GAO-10-695_0 | DOD Has Actions Underway to Address Financial Management Weaknesses Related to Military Equipment, but Additional Actions Are Needed
Our review of prior reports, studies, and analyses to identify weaknesses in DOD’s operations identified the following seven categories of weaknesses that impaired the department’s ability to account for the cost of military equipment: (1) support for the existence, completeness, and cost of recorded assets is needed; (2) more detail is needed in DOD contracts to allocate costs to contract deliverables; (3) additional guidance is needed to help ensure consistency for asset accounting; (4) monitoring is needed to help ensure compliance with department policies; (5) departmentwide cost accounting requirements need to be defined; (6) departmentwide cost accounting capabilities need to be developed; and (7) systems integration is needed. DOD has begun actions to address these previously reported weaknesses; however, it acknowledges that additional actions are needed before these weaknesses are fully addressed. They acknowledged that the department is currently focused on verifying the reliability of information, other than cost, recorded in its property accountability systems. These officials told us that until the department fully addresses the weaknesses that prevent it from accurately and completely accounting for the cost of its military equipment, it will continue to rely on a methodology to estimate the cost of its military equipment assets for financial reporting purposes. DOD had not structured contracts at the level of detail needed to identify and assign costs to individual military equipment assets. Specifically, the contracts were not structured in a manner that facilitated application of the appropriate accounting treatment for costs, including the identification of those costs that should be captured as part of the full cost of a deliverable. In addition, DOD policy requires contract deliverables, including military equipment, that meet predefined criteria, be assigned a unique item identifier. Departmentwide cost accounting requirements need to be defined. Since DOD has stated that it intends to support the identification, aggregation, accounting, and reporting of cost information through the implementation of the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERPs), it is important that DOD define its cost accounting requirements to ensure that these systems provide these capabilities. DOD has not yet determined how the SFIS data elements will be used to identify and aggregate cost information, nor has it established time frames for developing the cost accounting requirements and completing SFIS. DOD acknowledged that it does not yet have the capability to identify, aggregate, and capture the full costs of its military equipment and has stated that the ERPs are intended to provide this capability. Conclusions
While DOD is relying on a methodology to estimate the cost of its military equipment, the department has various actions underway to begin laying a foundation for addressing weaknesses that currently impair its ability to identify, aggregate, and account for the full cost of its military equipment assets. For example, DOD has taken important steps such as requiring greater detail in contract-related documentation, such as invoices, and the assignment of unique identifiers to individual items to aid its ability to identify, aggregate, and account for the cost of acquired assets. Recommendations
In order to enhance corrective actions underway within DOD to address previously reported weaknesses and improve DOD’s ability to provide reliable information on the full cost of military equipment acquired through MDAPs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD Chief Management Officer to work jointly with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the military department Chief Management Officers, as appropriate, to take the following nine actions: Enforce compliance with the department’s records management policy by periodically evaluating the extent to which the components are maintaining documentation in support of the full cost of military equipment. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to identify previously reported weaknesses that impair the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ability to provide reliable cost information for military equipment acquired through major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and determine what actions DOD has taken to address them. We searched databases of audit reports issued during calendar years 2005 through 2009 using key terms (e.g., military equipment; general property, plant, and equipment; financial management; tained an understanding of MDAPs, weapons systems acquisition; and major defense acquisition programs). Using applicable criteria, we assessed whether the actions taken adequately addressed the identified weaknesses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) are used to acquire, modernize, or extend the service life of the Department of Defense's (DOD) most expensive assets, primarily military equipment. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23), section 304(b), directed us to perform a review of weaknesses in DOD's operations that affect the reliability of financial information for assets acquired through MDAP. To do so, GAO identified and reviewed previously reported weaknesses that impair DOD's ability to provide reliable cost information for military equipment acquired through MDAPs, and determined what actions DOD has taken to address them. GAO searched databases of audit reports issued during calendar years 2005 through 2009 to identify previously reported weaknesses. Using applicable criteria, GAO assessed whether the actions taken by DOD adequately addressed these weaknesses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that weaknesses that impaired the department's ability to identify, aggregate, and account for the full cost of military equipment it acquires comprised seven major categories. Specifically, DOD had not (1) maintained support for the existence, completeness, and cost of recorded assets; (2) structured its contracts at the level of detail needed to allocate costs to contract deliverables; (3) provided guidance to help ensure consistency for asset accounting; (4) implemented monitoring controls to help ensure compliance with department policies; (5) defined departmentwide cost accounting requirements; (6) developed departmentwide cost accounting capabilities; and (7) integrated its systems. Although the department has acknowledged that it is primarily focused on verifying the reliability of information, other than cost, recorded in its property accountability systems, DOD has begun actions to address these weaknesses and improve its capability to identify, aggregate, and account for the full cost of its military equipment. For example, DOD is requiring that acquisition contracts be structured in a manner that facilitates application of the appropriate accounting treatment for contract costs, including the identification of costs that should be captured as part of the full cost of a deliverable. In addition, it has also begun to require that all contract deliverables that meet defined criteria be assigned a unique item identifier to facilitate asset tracking and aggregation of costs, and that electronic contract-related documentation, such as the invoice and receipt/acceptance documents, be maintained in a central data repository to ensure the availability of supporting documentation. Moreover, the department has begun to identify cost accounting data elements within its Standard Financial Information Structure (SFIS) and requires that its business-related Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems support this structure. These efforts are intended to improve data sharing and integration between business areas. DOD acknowledged that the actions taken to date do not yet provide the department with the capabilities it needs to identify, aggregate, and account for the full cost of its military equipment. For example, DOD has begun to develop ERPs but has not yet defined the cost accounting requirements to be used to evaluate if these ERPs will provide the functionality needed to support cost accounting and management. DOD stated that additional actions, sustained management focus, and the involvement of many functional groups across DOD are needed before weaknesses that impair its ability to account for the full cost of the military equipment it acquires are addressed. Until DOD defines its cost accounting requirements and completes the other actions it has taken (e.g., defining data elements in SFIS) to support cost accounting and management, DOD is at risk of not meeting its financial management objective to report the full cost of its military equipment. DOD has stated that until these actions are completed it will continue to rely on its military equipment valuation (MEV) methodology to estimate the cost of its military equipment for financial reporting purposes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 11 recommendations intended to strengthen actions DOD has taken to begin improving its ability to identify, aggregate, and account for the cost of military equipment acquired through MDAPs. Specifically, our recommendations focused on the need to define departmentwide cost accounting requirements and develop the process and system capabilities needed to support cost accounting and management. DOD concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-850 | gao_GAO-06-850_0 | The training primarily benefits U.S. forces. U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed Collectively with Other Activities
The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and counterterrorism. The security assistance programs in each of these countries may support one or more of these goals. State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million through their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. State assesses these goals in its annual mission planning process. Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts’ Compliance with State Policy
In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights abuses occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These lapses resulted from unclear vetting procedures, undefined roles for vetting, and the lack of a monitoring mechanism to ensure posts’ compliance with vetting procedures. However, we found that responsible officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia did not monitor whether offices within each post were following vetting procedures, and State headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the posts to vet trainees. To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Security Forces Receiving U.S. Assistance
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Based on our review of 273 out of 468 files, we estimate that 27 percent (127 trainees) lacked evidence of vetting. The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. Morocco and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this systematic monitoring, and Algeria does not participate in any programs involving government transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as foreign military sales or EDA. Additionally, according to State and based on our work, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco, and the Western Sahara that would trigger greater scrutiny of end use. To assess U.S. agencies’ implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State’s policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, we reviewed relevant statutes and implementing guidelines. We interviewed DOD officials responsible for end-use monitoring at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in Rabat and Tunis to determine what monitoring activities took place in these countries, whether these countries have any sensitive defense articles requiring systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and whether there have been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin equipment. Algeria does not receive U.S.-origin defense articles from the U.S. government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to these countries and examines U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance, (2) assesses U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, and (3) examines agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia and analyzed trainee files to determine compliance with human rights vetting policy.
What GAO Found
The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train and equip security forces in these countries. DOD and State assess these programs together with other related activities through evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other country goals. State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco and Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for whom no vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though posts maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 percent of these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and has required posts to assign an official responsible for vetting, it does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin defense articles subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, such as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to DOD officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would call for greater scrutiny of end use by these countries. |
gao_GAO-13-438 | gao_GAO-13-438_0 | This work has involved the efforts of various agencies, industry, and subject-matter experts to develop, acquire, and store medical countermeasures. HHS has used these material threat determinations to assess the potential public health and medical consequences of the CBRN agents, and to establish specific medical requirements for developing countermeasures. More than Half of CBRN Medical Countermeasures Have Been Approved for at Least Some Children
About 60 percent of CBRN medical countermeasures in the SNS have been approved for children, but in many instances approval is limited to specific age groups. PHEMCE officials stated that the remaining 40 percent of the CBRN countermeasures have not been approved for any pediatric use. Furthermore, some of the CBRN medical countermeasures in the SNS have not been approved to treat individuals of any age for the specific indications for which they have been stockpiled. For example, ciprofloxacin is stockpiled in the SNS for the treatment of anthrax, plague, and tularemia, but is not approved for these indications. Even products that are not approved for a CBRN indication may be used in a public health emergency under an EUA— after an emergency has been declared—or under an IND protocol. HHS Faces Challenges in Developing and Acquiring Pediatric Medical Countermeasures but Is Taking Steps to Address the Needs of the Pediatric Population
HHS faces economic, regulatory, scientific, and ethical challenges in its efforts to develop and acquire CBRN medical countermeasures for children in an emergency. For example, extrapolating data from animal studies presents other scientific challenges in understanding the response to the medical countermeasures used to prevent or treat the disease or condition. HHS Is Taking Steps to Focus on the Pediatric Population and Develop Pediatric Formulations of Existing Medical Countermeasures
Although challenges persist in developing and acquiring pediatric medical countermeasures, HHS is beginning to address gaps in the SNS for pediatric medical countermeasures by focusing agency efforts on children, developing pediatric formulations of medical countermeasures in the SNS, and preparing and reviewing EUA and IND application materials in advance of emergencies. HHS and State and Local Governments Address Dispensing of Pediatric Medical Countermeasures in Their Response Plans
More than half of HHS’s emergency response plans that we examined included information about pediatric medical countermeasures. CDC and FDA developed guidance on pediatric dispensing for state and local government use. Although more than half of HHS’s response plans included information about dispensing specific countermeasures to children, HHS officials told us that the purpose of these plans is to provide guidance for emergency responses at the federal level, and not instructions for use at the state and local level, which is where dispensing to children would The response plans for nuclear or radiological incidents also occur. CDC and FDA Guidance for State and Local Governments Includes Information on Pediatric Dispensing
Both CDC and FDA developed guidance for the dispensing of CBRN medical countermeasures from the SNS to the public, including children. For example, CDC developed guidance about receiving, distributing, and dispensing contents from the SNS to help state and local emergency management and public health personnel plan for the use of countermeasures from the SNS. State and Local Government Plans Provide Details about Pediatric Dispensing
State and local governments have provided details about pediatric dispensing in their emergency response plans. All seven of the state response plans we reviewed addressed the dispensing of countermeasures to the pediatric population during a CBRN incident. Additionally, all seven states adopted some version of a “family member pick-up” policy—sometimes referred to as a “head of household” policy—which would allow adults to pick up medicines for other family members, including children, during an event. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix II, HHS concurred with our findings. In addition, HHS emphasized that the needs of the pediatric population have been a priority for HHS since the origins of Project Bioshield, and that the department is continuously progressing in this area. Appendix I: Pediatric CBRN Medical Countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile
Table 1 presents additional information about certain types of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) medical countermeasures available in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) by CBRN threat, as well as their regulatory status, for the pediatric population. GAO-12-121. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation remains vulnerable to terrorist and other threats posed by CBRN agents. Medical countermeasures--drugs, vaccines, and medical devices--can prevent or treat the effects of exposure to CBRN agents, and countermeasures are available in the SNS for some of these agents. Children, who make up 25 percent of the population in the United States, are especially vulnerable because many of the countermeasures in the SNS have only been approved for use in adults. HHS leads the federal efforts to develop and acquire countermeasures.
GAO was asked about efforts to address the needs of children in the event of a CBRN incident. This report examines (1) the percentage of CBRN medical countermeasures in the SNS that are approved for pediatric use; (2) the challenges HHS faces in developing and acquiring CBRN medical countermeasures for the pediatric population, and the steps it is taking to address them; and (3) the ways that HHS has addressed the dispensing of pediatric medical countermeasures in its emergency response plans and guidance, and ways that state and local governments have addressed this issue. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant laws, agency documents, and reports, and interviewed HHS officials, industry representatives, and subject-matter experts. GAO also reviewed a stratified sample of emergency response plans from seven state and seven local governments, based on geographic location and population size, to assess how these governments address pediatric dispensing.
What GAO Found
According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), about 60 percent of the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) medical countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) have been approved for children, but in many instances approval is limited to specific age groups. In addition, about 40 percent of the CBRN countermeasures have not been approved for any pediatric use. Furthermore, some of the countermeasures have not been approved to treat individuals for the specific indications for which they have been stockpiled. For example, ciprofloxacin is stockpiled in the SNS for the treatment of anthrax, plague, and tularemia, but is not approved for these indications. Countermeasures may be used to treat unapproved age groups or indications under an emergency use authorization (EUA) or an Investigational New Drug (IND) application submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
HHS faces a variety of economic, regulatory, scientific, and ethical challenges in developing and acquiring pediatric CBRN medical countermeasures. High costs and the high risk of failure associated with testing and research of pharmaceutical products on children, difficulties in meeting regulatory requirements for approving CBRN countermeasures, and scientific and ethical obstacles to safely evaluating countermeasures for children all pose challenges to developing pediatric countermeasures. Despite these challenges, HHS has taken steps to focus agency efforts on the pediatric population, adapt pediatric formulations from existing medical countermeasures, and prepare and review materials for EUAs and INDs in advance of public health emergencies.
HHS addresses dispensing of pediatric medical countermeasures in more than half of its 12 response plans and in its guidance, and seven state and seven local government plans that GAO reviewed included details about pediatric dispensing. Seven of the 12 HHS plans include information about pediatric medical countermeasures; however, HHS officials stated that these plans are intended to provide guidance for emergency response at the federal level, and not at the state or local levels, which is where dispensing would occur. CDC and FDA also provide guidance on pediatric dispensing that state and local governments can use in their planning. For example, CDC developed guidance about receiving, distributing, and dispensing contents from the SNS to help state and local emergency management and public health personnel plan for the use of countermeasures from the SNS. Response plans for all 14 of the state and local governments that GAO reviewed also included details about dispensing to the pediatric population during an emergency. For example, these seven states and seven local governments all adopted some version of a "family member pick-up" policy--sometimes referred to as a "head of household" policy--which would allow adults to pick up medicines for other family members, including children, during an event.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with our findings. HHS emphasized that the needs of the pediatric population have been a priority for HHS and that the department is continuously progressing in this area. |
gao_GAO-16-439 | gao_GAO-16-439_0 | 1). 2. 3. The F-35 program’s original requirements state that it must include a fully functional and effective logistics system to ensure operational readiness and availability. DOD Is Aware of Risks to ALIS Functionality That Users Have Identified, but Does Not Have a Plan to Prioritize and Address Them as Key Program Milestones Approach
DOD is aware of risks that could affect ALIS but does not have a plan to prioritize and address them in a holistic manner to ensure that ALIS is fully functional as the F-35 program approaches key milestones— including Air Force and Navy initial operational capability declarations in 2016 and 2018, respectively, and the start of the program’s full-rate production in 2019. In addition, pilots and maintainers at three sites expressed confidence in ALIS’s future capabilities as the system continues to improve. However, during our focus-group sessions, ALIS users also identified several issues, which, if not addressed, could result in operational and schedule risks. DOD is aware of these risks and, as discussed later, is addressing risks on a case-by-case basis. The Marine Corps, which often deploys to austere locations, did not conduct deployability tests prior to declaring initial operational capability in July 2015. Although the more deployable version of ALIS was fielded in summer of 2015, DOD has yet to complete comprehensive deployability testing. Currently, ALIS information, including data from all U.S. F-35 sites, flows from the Standard Operating Units (SOU) to a single national Central Point of Entry, and then to the lone Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit (ALOU). The F-35 program office has taken some actions in an attempt to address smaller ALIS functionality issues between major software upgrades, and is considering the procurement of additional ALIS servers to add redundancy to the system. Although key milestones—such as Air Force and Navy initial operational capability declarations and the start of full-rate production—are quickly approaching, DOD does not have a plan that prioritizes ALIS risks to ensure that the most important are expediently addressed and that ALIS is fully functional by these milestones. By continuing to respond to issues on a case-by-case basis rather than in a holistic manner, there is no guarantee that DOD will address the highest risks, and as a result, DOD may encounter further schedule and development delays, including system upgrades, which could affect operations and potentially lead to cost increases. DOD Has Estimated the Costs of ALIS, but Including Additional Analyses and Information Would Increase the Credibility and Accuracy of Its Estimate
DOD has estimated total ALIS costs to be approximately $16.7 billion over its 56-year life cycle. In addition, credible cost estimates should include sensitivity analyses to examine how changes to individual assumptions and inputs affect the estimate as a whole. In lieu of the analyses, program officials stated that they assume that if ALIS does not perform as planned, aircraft could not be flown as frequently as intended, and this lower-than-expected utilization rate would therefore decrease sustainment costs. DOD stated that the department considers the sensitivity analyses that the F-35 program office performs to be a form of uncertainty analysis, as described in DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Operating & Support Cost Estimating Guide; however, the DOD cost estimating guidance does not require DOD to conduct a sensitivity or uncertainty analysis on ALIS since DOD does not consider ALIS a major cost driver of the F-35 program. As our report states, according to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, cost estimates should include uncertainty analyses to determine the level of uncertainty associated with the estimate in order to be credible. For example, a 2013 DOD-commissioned plan found that any functionality problems or schedule slippage with ALIS will have a significant impact on costs—with downstream additional costs due to performance and schedule delays potentially reaching up to $20-100 billion. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer to ensure that future estimates of ALIS costs use historical data as available and reflect significant program changes consistent with cost-estimating best practices identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has a plan to ensure the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) is fully functional as the key F-35 program milestones approach, we reviewed documentation of program plans with relevant sustainment elements including the F-35 Global Sustainment Plan, the Weapon System Planning Document, the F-35 Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment Concept of Operations, and the F-35 Operational Requirements Document. To determine the extent to which DOD has credibly and accurately estimated ALIS costs, we evaluated the reliability of DOD’s estimate of ALIS costs contained in the F-35 program office’s 2014 estimate of F-35 operating and support (O&S) costs, the most up-to-date estimate completed at the time of our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 is the most ambitious and expensive weapon system in DOD's history, with sustainment costs comprising the vast majority of DOD's $1.3 trillion cost estimate. Central to F-35 sustainment is ALIS—a complex system supporting operations, mission planning, supply-chain management, maintenance, and other processes. The F-35 program is approaching several key milestones: the Air Force and Navy are to declare the ability to operate and deploy the F-35 in 2016 and 2018 respectively, and full-rate production of the aircraft is to begin in 2019. However, ALIS has experienced developmental issues and schedule delays that have put aircraft availability and flying missions at risk. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review the F-35's ALIS. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which DOD has (1) a plan to ensure that ALIS is fully functional as key program milestones approach and (2) credibly and accurately estimated ALIS costs. GAO reviewed F-35 program documentation, interviewed officials, and conducted focus groups with ALIS users.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) is aware of risks that could affect the F-35's Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), but does not have a plan to ensure that ALIS is fully functional as key program milestones approach. ALIS users, including pilots and maintainers, in GAO's focus groups identified benefits of the system, such as the incorporation of multiple functions into a single system. However, users also identified several issues that could result in operational and schedule risks. These include the following:
ALIS may not be deployable : ALIS requires server connectivity and the necessary infrastructure to provide power to the system. The Marine Corps, which often deploys to austere locations, declared in July 2015 its ability to operate and deploy the F-35 without conducting deployability tests of ALIS. A newer version of ALIS was put into operation in the summer of 2015, but DOD has not yet completed comprehensive deployability tests.
ALIS does not have redundant infrastructure : ALIS's current design results in all F-35 data produced across the U.S. fleet to be routed to a Central Point of Entry and then to ALIS's main operating unit with no backup system or redundancy. If either of these fail, it could take the entire F-35 fleet offline.
DOD is taking some steps to address these and other risks such as resolving smaller ALIS functionality issues between major software upgrades and considering the procurement of additional ALIS infrastructure but the department is attending to issues on a case-by-case basis. DOD does not have a plan that prioritizes ALIS risks to ensure that the most important are expediently addressed and that DOD has a fully functional ALIS as program milestones draw close. By continuing to respond to issues on a case-by-case basis rather than in a holistic manner, there is no guarantee that DOD will address the highest risks by the start of full-rate production in 2019, and as a result, DOD may encounter further schedule and development delays, which could affect operations and potentially lead to cost increases.
DOD has estimated total ALIS costs to be about $16.7 billion over the F-35's 56-year life cycle, but performing additional analyses and including historical cost data would increase the credibility and accuracy of DOD's estimate. GAO's cost estimating best practices state that cost estimates should include uncertainty analyses to determine the level of uncertainty associated with the estimate in order to be credible. In addition, credible cost estimates should include sensitivity analyses to examine how changes to individual assumptions and inputs affect the estimate as a whole. DOD's guidance does not require the department to perform these analyses for ALIS, and DOD officials stated that they have not done so in part because ALIS constitutes less than 2 percent of the F-35's estimated total sustainment costs. Program officials said that if ALIS is not fully functional, the F-35 could not be operated as frequently as intended, but a DOD-commissioned plan found that schedule slippage and functionality problems with ALIS could lead to $20-100 billion in additional costs. Without uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, it is unclear how ALIS can affect costs. GAO also found that using historical cost data would make DOD's cost estimate more accurate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations including that DOD develop a plan to address ALIS risks, and conduct certain analyses and include historical data to improve its ALIS cost estimate. DOD concurred with developing a plan and partially concurred with the cost estimating recommendations, stating that it follows its own guidance. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_RCED-99-111 | gao_RCED-99-111_0 | Introduction
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the federal program for ensuring the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites that pose significant risks to public health and the environment. In 1997, we reported that (1) several agencies had begun to implement systems that consider the relative risks of sites when allocating cleanup funds, while other agencies had not; (2) EPA had not resolved the cost recovery problems we had identified; and (3) EPA still had to improve its use of independent estimates to set the best contract prices for cleanups, its ability to control contractors’ high program management costs, and its efforts to reduce a significant backlog of Superfund contract audits. Specifically, we wanted to assess (1) the efforts that EPA and other federal agencies with major cleanup responsibilities have made to set priorities for spending limited cleanup funds at the sites posing the highest risks; (2) EPA’s actions to recover its expenditures for cleanups from the parties that caused the contamination, and (3) EPA’s efforts to better control contractors’ cleanup costs. However, EPA may not know about all high-risk sites because states now increasingly decide which ones they will address under their own cleanup programs and which ones they want EPA to address through the Superfund program. States are now assuming more responsibility for high-risk sites—those that are risky enough to be eligible for the National Priorities List. The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Energy Have Set Risk-Based Cleanup Priorities, but Interior Has Not Yet Identified All Sites Needing Cleanup
Three of the four federal agencies with the largest cleanup workloads—the departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Energy—have implemented systems to set cleanup funding priorities on the basis of the relative risk sites pose. To date, the agency has not adopted this recommendation. To more effectively use its limited cleanup funds and better leverage funds from responsible parties to clean up its hazardous waste sites so as to protect the public and the environment, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget; the Assistant Secretary for Lands and Minerals Management; and the Solicitor of the Interior to work together to ensure that the Bureau of Land Management (l) develops a national database for all of its known hazardous waste sites and abandoned mine sites; (2) develops and implements a strategy for updating its national database, which includes collecting new information on potential hazardous waste sites and abandoned mines in a consistent manner across all of its state offices; (3) develops and applies a mechanism for setting cleanup priorities among sites on a nationwide basis using risk and other factors, as appropriate; (4) develops a comprehensive cleanup strategy, including specific goals and time lines for cleaning up the sites, on the basis of their risk-based priorities; and (5) develops nationwide procedures for conducting searches of potentially responsible parties and for using CERCLA authorities, where appropriate, to get more responsible parties to perform or pay for cleaning up contamination; and all of Interior’s bureaus and regional offices understand the purpose and size of the Department’s Central Hazardous Materials Fund and the criteria the Department uses to allocate dollars to cleanups, including both remedial and removal actions. However, EPA has had less success changing cost recovery policies that exclude a significant portion of its indirect cleanup costs from its cost recovery efforts. 3.1)
Although EPA has obtained settlements to recover $2.4 billion, it has lost the opportunity to recover up to another $1.9 billion of indirect costs because it did not revise its indirect cost rate to include all appropriate costs. However, its actions have been slow and some have not gone far enough to protect the government from exposure to unnecessary costs. EPA has reduced its backlog of required contract audits and is more frequently using its own estimates of what cleanup actions should cost to negotiate contract prices. Since the mid-1990s, EPA has used 11 percent as its target for program support costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the efforts that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the other federal agencies with major cleanup responsibilities have made to set priorities for spending limited cleanup funds at the hazardous waste sites posing the highest risks to human health and the environment; (2) EPA's actions to recover its expenditures for cleanups from the parties that are legally liable for the contamination; and (3) EPA's efforts to better control contractors' cleanup costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for several years, GAO has included the Superfund program on its list of federal programs that pose significant financial risk to the government and potential for waste and abuse; (2) agencies have corrected some of these problems, but those that remain are important enough to prevent GAO from removing Superfund from the high-risk list; (3) 4 of the 5 agencies GAO reviewed--EPA, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy (DOE)--are setting cleanup priorities on the basis of the relative risk that sites pose to human health and the environment; (4) EPA, Agriculture, and Defense set nationwide priorities for most of their sites; (5) however, EPA may not know about all high-risk sites because states are taking on more cleanups and deciding, often on the basis of factors other than risk, which sites to refer to EPA for possible listing; (6) each DOE facility considers risk and other factors when setting priorities among its competing environmental management projects; (7) however, cleanups at one facility do not compete with those at another facility on a nationwide basis; (8) the Bureau of Land Management has not set nationwide cleanup priorities because it has not yet developed an overall cleanup strategy or an inventory of its hazardous waste sites, estimated to cost billions of dollars to address; (9) although EPA has succeeded in getting responsible parties to conduct 70 percent of long-term Superfund cleanups, it has been less successful in recovering its costs from responsible parties when it conducts a cleanup; (10) EPA has lost the opportunity to collect almost $2 billion it spent on cleaning up sites since the program began because it excluded large portions of its indirect costs when it calculated what costs to assess parties; (11) while EPA has developed a new method of calculating these costs that could increase their recovery, the agency has not implemented it; (12) EPA has eliminated almost all of its backlog of 500 required Superfund contract audits, and is trying to complete the new audits on time; (13) however, some of EPA's actions have been slow and have not gone far enough to address GAO's concerns that the agency was not using its own estimates of what contract work should cost to negotiate the best contract price for the government or to control contractors' program support costs; and (14) less money is going toward the actual cleanup of high-risk sites, and excessive amounts are still being spent on administrative support costs. |
gao_GAO-17-62 | gao_GAO-17-62_0 | For federal compensation to be paid, aggregate industry insured losses from certified acts must exceed a certain amount (program trigger). Insurers’ practices for managing their exposure and pricing terrorism risk coverage are intended to cover their share of losses under TRIA (their deductibles and coshares). Insurers do not consider in their pricing the potential federal share of losses, which may be recouped after an event. Officials from two insurers we interviewed for this report discussed how they manage their terrorism exposure using aggregation limits. The federal government may not be required to recoup any of its losses. Second, the option of insurer set-asides—through which insurers would more explicitly address their terrorism exposure through their capital, assets, or liabilities—could be used to help cover insurers’ share of potential terrorism losses or both insurers’ and the federal government’s share of potential losses. Insurer set-asides could be structured in at least three ways: (1) loss reserves for events that have not yet occurred, (2) separate capital requirements for terrorism risk exposures, or (3) segregated assets that only can be used for a specific purpose such as potential terrorism losses. Implementing a set-aside for TRIA could be complex. State laws. Both TRIA’s Current Funding Structure and Alternative Funding Options Could Adversely Affect the Market, but Some Factors Could Help Mitigate the Effects
TRIA’s current recoupment mechanism and alternative funding options could affect affordability and participation for policyholders, the flexibility of the use of insurers’ assets, and the exposure and role of the federal government. Following a certified terrorism event, Treasury recoups federal losses through premium surcharges on all policyholders with TRIA-eligible insurance line coverage. A federal charge on insurers or policyholders structured as either (1) a premium-like charge intended to help pay for the federal share of potential losses and replace the current recoupment provision, or (2) a backstop charge paid to the Treasury for the promise of payment of the federal share of losses with recoupment still in place to cover the federal share of losses. The magnitude of potential effects for the alternative funding options varies by the design and the implementation. In particular, the approach in the legislative proposals may result in price increases for two reasons: (1) a portion of insurers’ terrorism risk premiums would be shifted to a segregated asset account that could only be used for potential terrorism losses, and insurers might increase prices if, as a result, they needed to raise additional capital to cover other insured losses; or (2) depending on the size and timing of a terrorism event, some of the segregated assets might be used to pay for some of or all the federal share of losses, so that not all the premiums collected would necessarily be available to cover the insurer’s own share of losses. Our analysis also indicated that designing a federal charge for terrorism risk insurance to apply to a broad group of policyholders could mitigate potential price increases. Requiring an Insurer Set- Aside for Terrorism Risk Could Hamper Risk Management, but Broadening the Use for Additional Purposes Could Help Mitigate These Effects Restrictions on Flexibility of Assets
Because restricting the use of assets could hamper risk management, insurers likely would be more affected by the government requiring the type of set-aside involving segregated assets for potential terrorism losses than the other set-aside approaches. This could increase federal fiscal exposure. Treasury and NAIC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We incorporated technical comments we received from these entities, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine (1) how insurers manage their terrorism risk exposure and price terrorism risk insurance; (2) the federal government’s recoupment requirements and how the federal share of terrorism losses would be affected in different scenarios; (3) how alternative funding approaches could be designed and implemented; and (4) the potential effects of the approaches. Potential Effects
To assess the potential effects of recoupment of the federal share of losses, a federal charge for terrorism risk insurance, and terrorism set- asides on policyholders, insurers, the federal government, state regulators, and reinsurers, we interviewed market participants. These programs illustrate a variety of approaches for pricing and managing federal charges that could provide insight on how a charge for terrorism risk insurance could be designed. Risk-based capital requirements. For example, a charge could be designed as voluntary or mandatory. To the Extent That Losses Are Not Expected to Be Recouped, the Federal Government Provides an Economic Subsidy under TRIA
Under TRIA, the federal government initially shares responsibility for some of the insured losses with private insurers in the event of a certified terrorism event and may recoup all or some of its losses through policyholder surcharges. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurers generally stopped covering terrorism risk because losses could be too high relative to the premiums they could charge. Congress enacted TRIA to share losses from a certified act of terrorism between insurers and the government, address market disruptions, and help ensure widespread availability and affordability of terrorism coverage. TRIA does not include an up-front federal charge for the government's share of potential losses. The act mandates that, when private industry's losses are below a certain amount, the federal government recoups some or all of the federal share of losses through policyholder surcharges.
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to review alternative funding approaches for TRIA. Among other things, this report examines (1) how insurers manage their terrorism exposure and federal recoupment of losses, (2) how alternative funding approaches could be designed and implemented, and (3) the potential effects of these approaches as well as the current structure. To assess these funding approaches, GAO reviewed related studies, analyzed several terrorism loss scenarios for each funding approach to estimate potential effects on market participants, and interviewed industry participants.
Treasury and NAIC provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO also incorporated technical comments received from selected third parties, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act's (TRIA) current structure, insurers manage their terrorism exposure to cover their share of losses and not the federal share of losses, which may be recouped from policyholders after an event. Specifically, insurers do not assume the risk of the federal share of potential losses and, thus, do not consider the potential federal share of losses in how they manage their terrorism risk exposure and price coverage. Many insurers include a nominal charge for terrorism risk coverage, if they charge for it at all. Most insurers manage their exposure by limiting the amount of coverage they provide in certain geographic areas. Under the current structure, in some scenarios federal losses must be recouped through premium surcharges on policyholders with TRIA-eligible insurance coverage after a certified terrorism event. However, depending on the size of the terrorism event and the aggregate premiums of affected insurers, the federal government may not be required to recoup all of its losses. To date, no terrorism events have been certified under TRIA.
Designing and implementing alternatives to TRIA's current funding structure, such as a federal terrorism risk insurance charge or set-aside of insurer funds, would require trade-offs among various policy goals and involve complexities. For example,
Federal charge. A charge on insurers or policyholders could either (1) be a risk-based charge intended to help pay for the federal share of potential losses, replacing the current recoupment structure, or (2) be a charge, or fee, paid to the Treasury for the promise of payment of the federal share of loses with recoupment in place to cover the actual losses. A federal charge could help cover potential losses, but determining a price based on risk would be difficult.
Terrorism set-asides. An insurer set-aside to explicitly address terrorism exposure through liabilities, capital, or assets could be designed as (1) loss reserves for future terrorism losses, (2) separate or additional capital requirements for terrorism risk, or (3) separate assets that only could be used for terrorism losses. A set-aside of insurer funds could help cover insurers' potential losses but some approaches would be complex to implement due to implications related to current accounting practices and state laws.
TRIA's current recoupment structure and some alternative approaches could increase prices for policyholders and have various effects on market participants and the federal government. GAO's analysis indicated that the current structure and some alternative approaches could affect the price of coverage and policyholder decisions to purchase terrorism coverage. In addition, one set-aside approach could restrict the flexibility with which insurers can use assets (generally, for a variety of risks) and thus hamper risk management. Under each option, federal fiscal exposure exists. For example, a charge to cover the federal share of losses may be insufficient to cover losses in the near term. However, the design of an alternative approach can, in part, mitigate the magnitude of these effects. For example, lengthening recoupment time frames, charging a broad group of policyholders, or allowing flexibility in applying a set-aside could help mitigate the effects. |
gao_NSIAD-95-140 | gao_NSIAD-95-140_0 | Unclear Jurisdiction May Lead to Inappropriate Exports of Militarily Sensitive Stealth-Related Commodities
Unclear jurisdiction over stealth-related commodities increases the likelihood that militarily sensitive stealth technology will be exported under the less restrictive Commerce export control system. Export applications that Commerce refers based on missile technology concerns are sent to the Missile Technology Export Control group (MTEC). Recommendations
In light of the more stringent controls under the AECA and the sensitivity of stealth technology, we recommend that the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, clarify the licensing jurisdiction between the USML and the CCL for all stealth-related commodities and technologies with a view toward ensuring adequate controls under the AECA for all sensitive stealth-related items and the Secretary of Commerce revise current licensing referral procedures on all stealth-related items that remain on the CCL to ensure that Commerce refers all export applications for stealth-related commodities and technology to DOD and State for review, unless the Secretaries of Defense and State determine their review of these items is not necessary. To assess whether current referral procedures allow DOD to review all stealth-related exports, we examined the referral histories for the stealth-related exports we identified. GAO Comments
1. Munitions List (USML). 3. Comments From the Department of Commerce
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Commerce’s letter dated May 2, 1995. GAO Comments
1. 2. In addition, as noted in our report, the Department of Defense (DOD) and State officials agree that jurisdiction over stealth-related technology and commodities is ill defined and should be clarified. 3. 4. 5. 6. Commerce states that it has sufficient authority to deny validated license applications for products the U.S. government does not want to export. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed export controls over stealth-related commodities and technology, focusing on: (1) how control over stealth technology and related commodities is split between the Department of State's U.S. Munitions List (USML) and the Department of Commerce's Commodity Control List (CCL); (2) the impact of shared jurisdiction over stealth-related items; and (3) whether current referral procedures allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to review all stealth-related exports.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) stealth technology materials fall under the jurisdiction of both USML and CCL; (2) Commerce believes that stealth-related commodities should be placed on USML to avoid confusion and possible seizure by the Customs Service; (3) the unclear jurisdiction over stealth technology may lead to the inappropriate export of militarily-sensitive stealth materials and technology; (4) the less restrictive export controls governing CCL commodities give exporters an incentive to apply for CCL export licenses for USML-covered material; (5) Commerce can deny CCL export licenses only under limited circumstances or for certain destinations, while State has broader authority to deny applications that are against national interests; and (6) the United States cannot ensure that export licenses for stealth-related technology are properly reviewed and controlled because Commerce does not refer all stealth technology export applications to DOD or State for review. |
gao_GAO-14-570 | gao_GAO-14-570_0 | Consumers typically learn about medical credit cards, or related products such as installment loans, from participating providers, who give information about the product and the available financing options. One Company Appears to Issue the Majority of Medical Credit Cards
Market Participants
One company, CareCredit LLC (CareCredit), issues the majority of medical credit cards, according to available information, although no comprehensive data source on the industry exists. Market participants with whom we spoke cited three other banks—Citibank, N.A. CareCredit, Citibank, and Wells Fargo issue medical credit cards under their own names, while Comenity works with third-party companies (sometimes called aggregators) or retail networks that offer and market the product under their own names. Apart from participants in the medical credit card market, some companies play other roles related to financing procedures not covered by health insurance. Relationship between Card Companies and Participating Providers
Card companies contract with participating providers to offer financing products to consumers. Settlements with GE Capital Retail Bank and CareCredit
In December 2013, CFPB announced a consent order with GE Capital Retail Bank and its affiliate CareCredit. The company also agreed to make several changes in its practices, including enhancements to consumer disclosures provided during the application process and on billing statements immediately prior to the expiration of the promotional period, enhanced training to providers on making the terms of the credit arrangement transparent to patients, and enhanced warnings to consumers about the expiration of the promotional period. In June 2013, GE Capital Retail Bank and CareCredit entered into a settlement agreement with the New York Attorney General, who had alleged deceptive enrollment practices and inadequate disclosure of product terms and conditions. Medical Credit Cards Commonly Offer Revolving Credit with Deferred Interest
The medical credit cards we reviewed in depth resembled conventional credit cards (offered a revolving line of credit with an established credit limit) and offered some form of promotional financing (special terms and conditions valid for a specified period). But if the balance is not paid in full within the specified promotional period, the accrued interest is assessed to the account. As seen in table 2, the APR for consumers who did not pay off the purchase amount before the promotional period expired varied depending on the product, but our analysis found that most cardholders had deferred interest products with an APR of 26.99 percent or more. Although less common, major card companies we reviewed also offered a promotional monthly fixed-payment option, which charged a set interest rate (an APR from 0 to 17.99 percent) during a specified period (from 12 to 60 months). Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the (1) participants and (2) products in the marketplace for medical credit cards. For the purposes of this report, we used “medical credit cards” to refer collectively to financial products— including revolving credit lines and installment loans—that are designed specifically to finance health care services not covered by health insurance. To address these objectives, we conducted a literature review of articles using the Proquest, PubMed, and ABI/Inform databases using search terms such as “medical credit card,” “health care credit card,” “healthcare financing,” and “medical financing” for the purpose of obtaining background and context surrounding the products. We also interviewed representatives of two federal agencies, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (known as CFPB) and the Federal Trade Commission. We also reviewed the settlement agreements and related materials resulting from two enforcement actions against CareCredit, one by CFPB and one by the New York State Office of the Attorney General. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medical credit cards and related products (such as installment loans) are offered by financial institutions through participating providers to pay for services not covered by health insurance, such as dental and cosmetic procedures, or for veterinary care. Medical credit cards received increased attention after enforcement actions in 2013 against GE Capital Retail Bank in relation to its CareCredit product.
GAO was asked to review the marketplace for medical credit cards and related products. This report describes the participants and products in this marketplace. To address these objectives, GAO conducted a literature review and reviewed websites, product terms and conditions, and other publicly available information. GAO also interviewed staff of, and collected documents from, CFPB, 14 card companies representing a mix of size and type, and organizations that represented participating providers, financial institutions, and consumer interests and were familiar with the medical credit card marketplace. GAO also reviewed settlement agreements between CareCredit and CFPB and the New York Attorney General.
What GAO Found
Multiple entities offer medical credit cards, but according to market participants with whom GAO spoke, CareCredit LLC issues the majority of medical credit cards. In 2013, the company reported 4.4 million cardholders and 177,000 participating providers in its network, the majority of which were dental offices. Several other financial institutions also issue medical credit cards, usually offering their own branded product, but sometimes providing financing for retail networks or third-party companies that offer and market cards under their own names (see table). The marketplace for financing services not covered by health insurance also includes companies that assist providers in offering their own payment plans and websites that largely serve a marketing function by directing consumers to others' products. In 2013, GE Capital Retail Bank and its affiliate CareCredit entered into separate agreements with the New York Attorney General and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (known as CFPB), which had alleged deceptive card enrollment processes, including failure to provide disclosures and inaccurate information given by participating providers to consumers. Both settlements required CareCredit to make several changes to its practices, such as enhancing consumer disclosures.
Medical credit cards from large banks offer a revolving line of credit with an established credit limit—akin to a conventional credit card—with some form of promotional financing (special terms and conditions, which are valid for a specified period of time). The most commonly used financing option is deferred interest, with no interest charged for a promotional period but interest charged retroactively if the balance is not paid in full before the end of the promotional period, usually 6 to 24 months. Among large banks GAO reviewed, as of May 2014, the most commonly used products had an annual percentage rate (APR) of 26.99 percent or more. Alternatively, these banks also offered revolving credit with fixed monthly payments, with an APR of 0 to 17.99 percent. Installment loans or products targeted at consumers with poor credit histories were offered by certain other market participants.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-13-771 | gao_GAO-13-771_0 | Agencies Have Allocated Over $1.2 Billion in CARSI and Non-CARSI Funds to Support Various Security Activities in Central America
Since fiscal year 2008, U.S. agencies have allocated more than $1.2 billion in funding for CARSI activities and non-CARSI funding that supports CARSI goals. As of June 1, 2013, State and USAID had allocated close to $495 million and disbursed at least $189 million in funding for CARSI activities to provide partner countries with equipment, technical assistance, and training to improve interdiction and disrupt criminal networks. U.S. agencies, including State, DOD, and DOJ, have used non- CARSI funding to provide additional security-related equipment, technical assistance, and training, as well as infrastructure and investigation assistance to the region. As of March 31, 2013, U.S. agencies estimated that they had allocated approximately $708 million in non-CARSI funding that supported CARSI goals from fiscal year 2008 through the first half of fiscal year 2013, with State, USAID, and DOD allocating the largest amount of non-CARSI funds to support CARSI goals. For example, State conducted reviews of the forensic capabilities in six partner countries over the course of 2011 to evaluate the crime scene investigation, prosecution, and forensic science programs and capacities in each country. For example, USAID officials reported that they used assessment reports to help identify and consider partner country juvenile justice and community policing needs and absorptive capacities; these assessment reports included specific recommendations for designing and selecting juvenile justice and community policing projects in partner countries. For example, in one partner country, embassy officials reported that they held numerous meetings with other donor governments. Through these outreach meetings, embassy officials were able to identify one donor government’s investments in police intelligence in the partner country and consequently reduced funding for CARSI activities in that area. Interagency Meetings Used to Coordinate U.S. Efforts and Help Identify and Consider Partner Country Needs, Absorptive Capacities, and Non-U.S. Investments
When selecting activities to fund under CARSI, State and USAID officials also used interagency meetings at embassies in all seven partner countries to coordinate U.S. efforts, as well as to help identify and consider partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and related non- U.S. investments in those partner countries. Agencies Reported on Some CARSI Results, but Not on Progress toward Interagency Objectives, and Efforts Are Under Way to Evaluate CARSI Activities
Using various mechanisms, State and USAID have reported on some CARSI results at the initiative, country, and project levels. However, U.S. agencies have not assessed or reported their performance using the metrics outlined in a 2012 interagency strategy for Central America that are designed to measure the results of CARSI and complementary non-CARSI programming. USAID is currently implementing an evaluation of selected CARSI activities and State is planning an evaluation of some of its CARSI activities. A different embassy reported in April 2013 that a CARSI-supported anti-gang education and training program had been successfully expanded nationwide and had taught over 3,000 children over 3 years of the program. Agencies Have Not Assessed and Reported Progress toward Objectives Outlined in the U.S. Interagency Strategy for Central America
While State and USAID have reported on some CARSI results, U.S. agencies have not assessed and reported on their results using the performance metrics identified in the February 2012 interagency citizen security strategy for Central America. Nevertheless, INL officials stated that they intend to conduct an evaluation of their CARSI activities beginning in fiscal year 2014, as CARSI approaches its 5-year point. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that U.S. agencies have relevant information on the progress of CARSI and related U.S. government activities, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator direct their representatives on the Central America Interagency Working Group to work with the other members to assess the progress of CARSI and related U.S. government activities in achieving the objectives outlined in the U.S. government’s interagency citizen security strategy for Central America. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report (1) provides an updated assessment of U.S. agencies’ funding and activities that support Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) goals; (2) examines whether U.S. agencies took steps to consider partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and related U.S. and non-U.S. investments when selecting activities to fund under CARSI; and (3) examines information on the extent to which U.S. agencies reported CARSI results and evaluated CARSI activities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) shares responsibility with State to administer the ESF account. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug trafficking organizations and gangs have expanded in Central America, threatening the security of these countries and the United States. Since 2008, the U.S. government has helped Central America and Mexico respond to these threats and in 2010 established CARSI solely to assist Central America. CARSI's goals are to create safe streets, disrupt criminals and contraband, support capable governments, and increase state presence and cooperation among CARSI partners. GAO reported on CARSI funding in January 2013 and was asked to further review CARSI and related activities in Central America.
This report (1) provides an updated assessment of U.S. agencies' funding and activities that support CARSI goals; (2) examines whether U.S. agencies took steps to consider partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and U.S. and non-U.S. investments when selecting CARSI activities; and (3) examines information on the extent to which U.S. agencies reported CARSI results and evaluated CARSI activities. GAO analyzed CARSI and complementary non-CARSI funding; reviewed documents on CARSI activities, partner country needs, and CARSI results; interviewed U.S. agency officials about CARSI and related activities; and observed CARSI activities in three countries.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2008, U.S. agencies allocated over $1.2 billion in funding for Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) activities and non-CARSI funding that supports CARSI goals. As of June 1, 2013, the Department of State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) obligated at least $463 million of the close to $495 million in allocated funding for CARSI activities, and disbursed at least $189 million to provide partner countries with equipment, technical assistance, and training to improve interdiction and disrupt criminal networks. Moreover, as of March 31, 2013, U.S. agencies estimated that they had allocated approximately $708 million in non-CARSI funding that supports CARSI goals, but data on disbursements were not readily available. U.S. agencies, including State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Justice, use this funding to provide equipment, technical assistance, and training, as well as infrastructure and investigation assistance to partner countries. For example, DOD allocated $25 million in funding to help Guatemala establish an interagency border unit to combat drug trafficking.
State and USAID took a variety of steps--using assessment reports, outreach meetings with host governments and other donors, and interagency meetings--to help identify and consider partner countries' needs, absorptive capacities, and related U.S. and non-U.S. investments when selecting CARSI activities. For example, State used an assessment report on crime scene investigation and forensic programs and capacities of six partner countries to inform decisions on selecting CARSI activities. In addition, USAID officials used assessment reports to help identify and consider partner country juvenile justice and community policing needs and absorptive capacities; these assessment reports included specific recommendations for designing and selecting juvenile justice and community policing projects in partner countries. Also, in one partner country, embassy officials used donor outreach meetings to identify another donor's significant investment in police intelligence in the partner country; the embassy consequently reduced funding for CARSI activities in that area.
While U.S. agencies have reported on some CARSI results, they have not assessed progress in meeting interagency objectives for Central America. State and USAID have reported some CARSI results through various mechanisms at the initiative, country, and project levels. For example, one embassy reported that its CARSI-supported anti-gang education project had expanded nationwide and taught over 3,000 children over 3 years of the program. However, U.S. agencies have not assessed their performance using the metrics outlined in a 2012 interagency strategy for Central America that were designed to measure the results of CARSI and related non-CARSI activities. GAO recognizes that collecting performance data may be challenging and that the metrics could require some adjustments. Nevertheless, assessing progress toward achieving the strategy's objectives could help guide U.S. agencies' decisions about their activities and identify areas for improvement. In addition to ongoing assessments of progress, GAO has concluded in prior work that evaluations are important to obtain more in-depth information on programs' performance and context. USAID is conducting an evaluation of its CARSI crime prevention programming to be completed in 2014. State officials said that they are planning to conduct an evaluation of some of their CARSI activities beginning in fiscal year 2014.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State and USAID work with other agencies to assess progress in achieving the objectives of the interagency strategy for Central America. State and USAID concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-344 | gao_GAO-04-344_0 | DOD Unable to Estimate the Size of Its Clearance Backlog
DOD did not know the size of its personnel security clearance backlog and has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD was unable to estimate the size of its backlog for overdue reinvestigations that have not yet been submitted, but our estimates for overdue submitted investigation requests and overdue adjudications were roughly 270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively, at the end of September 2003. These estimates are not based on a consistent set of DOD-wide definitions and measures; instead, the time limits for defining and measuring the backlog varied from agency to agency. 2). The existence of varying sets of time limits for completing investigations makes it difficult to develop accurate estimates of the size of DOD’s investigative backlog. Multiple Impediments Slow DOD’s Progress in Eliminating Its Backlog and Generating Accurate Backlog Estimates
We have identified four major impediments that have slowed DOD’s progress in eliminating its clearance backlog and two impediments that have hindered its ability to produce accurate backlog estimates. Large Number of Clearance Requests, Limited Staffing, Existing Backlog, and No Strategic Plan for Information- Access Problems Slow DOD’s Efforts to Eliminate the Backlog
In our review of documents and discussions with officials from DOD, OPM, industry associations, and investigator contractors, we identified four major impediments that have hampered DOD’s ability to eliminate its current security clearance backlog. Also, backlog-related delays in issuing initial security clearances may raise the cost of doing classified work for the U.S. government. In addition, DOD’s inability to accurately determine the actual size of its clearance backlog and project the number of clearances needed results in inaccurate budget requests and staffing plans. Status Update on the Authorized Transfer of DSS Investigative Functions and Personnel to OPM
In December 2003, advisors to the Director of OPM recommended that the congressionally authorized transfer of DSS investigative functions and personnel to OPM not occur—at least for the rest of fiscal year 2004—due primarily to concerns about the financial risks associated with the transfer. The advisors recommended an alternative plan that is currently being discussed by DOD and OPM officials. As of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress with the certifications required before the transfer can take place. This situation may increase risks to national security and monetary costs associated with delays in granting clearances. Key to generating those reports is the implementation of the overdue JPAS with its ability to track when reinvestigations are due. Recommendations for Executive Action
Because of continuing concerns about the size of the backlog and its accurate measurement and the personnel security clearance program’s importance to national security, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence take the following four actions: Identify and implement steps to match the sizes of the investigative and adjudicative workforces to the clearance request workload; Develop a strategic plan for overcoming problems accessing data locally, at the state level, and overseas; Develop DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures, and monitor the backlog at each of the three clearance-process stages using the DOD-wide measures; and Complete the implementation of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to develop a corrective action plan as required under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act that incorporates corrective actions and milestones for addressing material weaknesses in the Defense Security Service personnel security investigative program and performance measures for monitoring the progress of corrective actions; establish a strategic plan that includes agency goals, performance measures, and procedures for tracking progress in meeting goals in accordance with sound management practices and the Government Performance and Results Act; conduct analyses needed to (1) determine an appropriate workload that investigators and case analysts can manage while meeting federal standards and (2) develop an overall strategy and resource plan to improve the quality and timeliness of investigations and reduce the number of overdue reinvestigations; review and clarify all investigative policy guidance to ensure that investigations comply with federal standards; establish a process for identifying and forwarding to the Security Policy Board suggested changes to policy guidance concerning the implementation of the federal standards and other investigative policy issues; establish formal quality control mechanisms to ensure that Defense Security Service or contracted investigators perform high-quality investigations, including periodic reviews of samples of completed investigations and feedback on problems to senior managers, investigators, and trainers; establish a training infrastructure for basic and continuing investigator and case analyst training that includes formal feedback mechanisms to assess training needs and measure effectiveness, and as a high priority, provide training on complying with federal investigative standards for investigators and case analysts; and take steps to correct the case management automation problems to gain short-term capability and develop long-term, cost-effective automation alternatives. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To estimate the size and accuracy of the Department of Defense-wide (DOD) personnel security clearance backlog, we obtained separate estimates of the investigative and adjudicative backlogs from the Defense Security Service (DSS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and DOD’s central adjudication facilities. To identify the potential adverse effects of the impediments to eliminating the backlog and accurately estimating its size, we reviewed prior GAO and Joint Security Commission reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist attacks and espionage cases have heightened national security concerns and highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that the Department of Defense (DOD) had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to address: (1) What is the size of DOD's security clearance backlog, and how accurately is DOD able to estimate its size? (2) What factors impede DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and accurately determine its size? (3) What are the potential adverse effects of those impediments to eliminating DOD's backlog and accurately estimating the backlog's size? GAO was also asked to determine the status of the congressionally authorized transfer of Defense Security Service (DSS) investigative functions and personnel to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
What GAO Found
DOD did not know the size of its security clearance backlog at the end of September 2003 and has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD cannot estimate the size of its backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted for renewal, but prior estimates of this portion of the backlog suggest it was sizeable. Using September 2003 data from DSS, OPM, and nine adjudication facilities, GAO calculated the size of investigative and adjudicative portions of the backlog at roughly 270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively. Because these estimates were made using time-based goals that varied from agency to agency, the actual backlog size is uncertain. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate--and accurately estimate the size of--its clearance backlog. Four major impediments slowing the elimination of the backlog are (1) the large numbers of new clearance requests; (2) the insufficient investigator and adjudicator workforces; (3) the size of the existing backlog; and (4) the lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining access to state, local, and overseas information needed to complete investigations. Two other factors have hampered DOD's ability to develop accurate estimates of the backlog size. DOD has failed to provide adequate oversight of its clearance program, including developing DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures and using the measures to assess the backlog regularly. In addition, delays in implementing its Joint Personnel Adjudication System have limited DOD's ability to monitor backlog size and track when periodic reinvestigations are due. DOD's failure to eliminate and accurately assess the size of the backlog may have adverse effects. Delays in updating overdue clearances for command, agency, and industry personnel who are doing classified work may increase risks to national security. Slowness in issuing new clearances can increase the costs of doing classified government work. Finally, DOD's inability to accurately define and measure the backlog and project future clearance requests that it expects to receive can adversely affect its ability to develop accurate budgetary and staffing plans. In December 2003, advisors to OPM's Director recommended that the authorized transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to OPM should not occur for at least the rest of fiscal year 2004. That recommendation was based on uncertainties over financial risks that OPM might incur. An alternative plan being discussed by DOD and OPM calls for leaving investigative staff in DSS and giving them training for, and access to, OPM's case management system. A DOD official estimated that using the OPM system, instead of DOD's current system, would avoid about $100 million in update and maintenance costs during the next 5 years. Also, as of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress with certifications required prior to any transfer. |
gao_GAO-09-112 | gao_GAO-09-112_0 | To analyze the NAOMS air carrier pilot survey’s planning, design, and implementation (including pretest, interview, and data collection methods); interviewer training; development of survey questions, including which safety events to include in the survey; and sampling, we interviewed officials from NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and NAOMS project staff. We asked three external experts to review and assess the NAOMS air carrier pilot survey’s design and implementation as well as considerations for analysis of collected data. NAOMS Was Intended to Identify Accident Precursors and Potential Safety Issues
The NAOMS project was conceived and designed in 1997 to provide broad, long-term measures on trends and to measure the effect of new technologies and policies on aviation safety. A Web-based version of the air carrier pilot survey and related information were handed off to ALPA in January 2007. Although ALPA never had access to existing NAOMS data, this official also expressed uncertainty about what should be done with the existing data. “demonstrated a survey methodology to quantitatively measure aviation safety, tracked trends in event rates over time, identified effects of new procedures introduced into the operating environment, and generated interest and acceptance of NAOMS by some of the aviation community as described in the Project Plans.”
The OIG report identified several shortcomings of the project, including that (1) the “contracting officers did not adequately specify project requirements” or “hold Battelle responsible for completing the NAOMS Project as designed or proposed”; (2) the “contractor underestimated the level of effort required to design and implement the NAOMS survey”; (3) “NASA had no formal agreement in place for the transfer and permanent service of NAOMS”; and (4) “NAOMS working groups failed to achieve their objectives of validating the survey data and gaining consensus among aviation safety stakeholders about what NAOMS survey data should be released.” An additional deficiency, according to the OIG, was that, as of February 2008, “NASA had not published an analysis of the NAOMS data nor adequately publicized the details of the NAOMS Project and its primary purpose as a contributor to the ASMM Project.”
NAOMS’s Planning and Design Were Robust, but Implementation Decisions Complicate Data Analysis
We found that, overall, the NAOMS project followed generally accepted survey design and implementation principles, but decisions made in developing and executing the air carrier pilot survey complicate data analysis. The Survey’s Planning and Design
Early documentation of the NAOMS project shows that the project was planned and developed in accordance with generally accepted principles of survey planning and design. They devised mechanisms to protect respondent confidentiality. The NAOMS survey methodologist ran experiments from 1998 through 1999 to generate and test hypotheses that could be incorporated into the design of the air carrier pilot survey. A Large-Scale Field Trial Resolved Many Issues, but Not Others
In 1999, following more than 1 year of research, experiments, and questionnaire development, NAOMS researchers conducted a large-scale field trial. Potential Problems Related to the Sampling Strategy Require Additional Assessment
While NAOMS researchers designed and selected a sample in accordance with generally accepted survey research principles, sampling decisions they made to address complications influenced the nature of the data collected. To develop NAOMS’s sampling strategy, the team first needed to identify a target population. NASA envisioned a wide range of participants in the working groups, including pilots; flight attendants; people familiar with alternative data systems; and other aviation stakeholders, such as academic researchers and industry. A New Survey Would Require Detailed Planning and Revisiting Sampling Strategies
A new survey similar to NAOMS would require more coherent planning and sampling methods linked to specific analytic goals. As a research and development project, NAOMS was a successful proof of concept. Alternatively, a newly constituted research team might lead operational, survey, and statistical experts in extensively analyzing existing data to validate a new survey’s utility for various purposes or to illuminate future projects of the same type. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and to the Department of Transportation for their review. We agree with NASA’s concern about pilot identification and have revised the report to highlight NASA’s concern; however, we also note that other government agencies have developed mechanisms for releasing, in a controlled manner, extremely sensitive raw data with high risk for the identification of individuals to appropriate researchers. Statement on the National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service (NAOMS), begun by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1997, aimed to develop a methodology that could be used to survey a wide range of aviation personnel to monitor aviation safety. NASA expected NAOMS surveys to be permanently implemented and to complement existing federal and industry air safety databases by generating ongoing data to track event rates into the future. The project never met these goals and was curtailed in January 2007. GAO was asked to answer these questions: (1) What were the nature and history of NASA's NAOMS project? (2) Was the survey planned, designed, and implemented in accordance with generally accepted survey principles? (3) What steps would make a new survey similar to NAOMS better and more useful? To complete this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed material related to the NAOMS project and interviewed officials from NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the National Transportation Safety Board. GAO also compared the development of the NAOMS survey with guidelines issued from the Office of Management and Budget, and asked external experts to review and assess the survey's design and implementation.
What GAO Found
NAOMS was intended to demonstrate the feasibility of using surveys to identify accident precursors and potential safety issues. The project was conceived and designed to provide broad, long-term measures on trends and to measure the effects of new technologies and aviation safety policies. Researchers planned to interview a range of aviation personnel to collect data in order to generate statistically reliable estimates of risks and trends. After planning and development, a field trial, and eventual implementation of the air carrier pilot survey and the development of a smaller survey of general aviation pilots, the project effectively ended when NASA transmitted a Web-based version of the air carrier pilot survey to the Air Line Pilots Association. NAOMS's air carrier pilot survey was planned and designed in accordance with generally accepted survey principles, including its research and development, consultation with stakeholders, memory experiments to enhance the questionnaire, and a large-scale field trial. The survey's sample design and selection also met generally accepted research principles, but there were some limitations, and the survey data may not adequately represent the target population. Sample frame and design decisions to maintain program independence and pilot privacy complicate analysis of NAOMS data. Certain implementation decisions, including extended methodological experiments and data entry issues, also complicate analytical strategies. Also, working groups of aviation stakeholders were convened as part of NAOMS to assess the validity and utility of the data, but these groups never had access to the raw data and were disbanded before achieving consensus. To date, NAOMS data have not been fully analyzed or benchmarked against other data sources. While NAOMS's limitations are not insurmountable, a new survey would require more coherent planning and sampling methods, a cost-benefit analysis, closer collaboration with potential customers, a detailed analysis plan, a reexamination of the sampling strategy, and a detailed project management plan to accommodate concerns inherent in any survey endeavor. As a research and development project, NAOMS was a successful proof of concept with many strong methodological features, but the air carrier pilot survey could not be reinstated without revisions to address some of its methodological limitations. The designers of a new survey would want to supplement NAOMS where it was self-limiting. Alternatively, a newly constituted research team might lead operational, survey, and statistical experts in extensively analyzing existing data to illuminate future projects. In reviewing a draft of this report, NASA reiterated that NAOMS was a research and development project and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. NASA also expressed concern about protecting NAOMS respondents' confidentiality, a concern GAO shares. However, GAO noted that other agencies have developed mechanisms for releasing sensitive data to appropriate researchers. The Department of Transportation had no comments. |
gao_GAO-04-983T | gao_GAO-04-983T_0 | In fiscal year 2003, EPA awarded $656 million in discretionary grants. In August 2003, we further addressed the question of environmental results. We reported that EPA (1) had awarded some grants before considering how the results of the grantees’ work would contribute to achieving environment results; (2) had not developed environmental measures and outcomes for its grants programs; and (3) often did not require grantees to submit workplans that explain how a project will achieve measurable environmental results. Problems Persist in Addressing Grants’ Environmental Results
For its grants programs, EPA is still not effectively linking grants to environmental results. EPA reported that, overall, less than one-third of the 93 grant workplans reviewed identified environmental outcomes. Not surprisingly, given the lack of outcomes in the workplans, OMB found that EPA grant programs are not demonstrating results. In February 2004, OMB found that 8 of the 10 EPA grant programs it reviewed were “not demonstrating results.” These programs total about $2.8 billion. Furthermore, not every EPA program office has yet developed environmental measures for their grant programs. EPA plans to issue its environmental outcomes policy—a key objective originally scheduled for 2003—in fall 2004, but the policy will not become effective until January 2005. Furthermore, as a result of this delay, EPA has delayed meeting the objectives of developing a tutorial for grantees, requiring outcomes in solicitations, and incorporating success on achieving outcomes into the criteria for awarding grants—objectives that are contingent on the issuance of the policy. In the absence of a final outcomes policy, EPA issued an interim policy in January 2004. Finally, EPA will not meet the grant management’s plan first-year (2004) target for the performance measure of the environmental outcomes goal— the percentage of grant workplans, decision memoranda, and terms of conditions that discuss how grantees plan to measure and report on environmental outcomes. As drafted, this policy appears to have EPA moving in the right direction for addressing environmental outcomes. Emphasizes environmental results throughout the grant life cycle— awards, monitoring, and reporting. Specifically, the draft policy requires that EPA program offices (1) ensure that each grant funding package includes a description of the EPA strategic goals and objectives the grant is intended to address and (2) provide assurance that the grant workplan contains well-defined outputs, and to the “maximum extent practicable,” well-defined outcome measures. In conclusion, we believe that if fully implemented, EPA’s forthcoming outcome policy should help the agency and the Congress ensure that grant funding is linked to EPA’s strategic plan and to anticipated environmental and public health outcomes. We believe that the major challenge to meeting EPA’s goal of identifying and achieving outcomes continues to be in implementation throughout the agency. Given EPA’s uneven performance in addressing its grants management problems to this point, congressional oversight is important to ensuring that EPA’s Administrator, managers, and staff implement its grants management plan, including the critical goal of identifying and achieving environmental results from the agency’s $4 billion annual investment in grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has faced persistent challenges in managing its grants, which constitute over one-half of the agency's budget, or about $4 billion annually. These challenges include achieving and measuring environmental results from grant funding. It is easier to measure grant activities (outputs) than the environmental results of those activities (outcomes), which may occur years after the grant was completed. In 2003, EPA issued a 5-year strategic plan for managing grants that set out goals, including identifying and achieving environmental outcomes. This testimony describes persistent problems EPA has faced in addressing grants' environmental results and the extent to which EPA has made progress in addressing problems in achieving environmental results from its grants. It summarizes and updates two reports GAO issued on EPA's grant management in August 2003 and March 2004.
What GAO Found
EPA's problems in identifying and achieving environmental results from its grants persist. The agency is still not consistently ensuring that grants awarded are clearly linked to environmental outcomes in grant workplans, according to GAO's analysis and EPA's internal reviews. For example, EPA's 2003 internal reviews found that less than one-third of grant workplans reviewed--the document that lays out how the grantee will use the funding--identified anticipated environmental outcomes. Not surprisingly, given the lack of outcomes in grant workplans, the Office of Management and Budget's recent review of 10 EPA grant programs found that 8 of the grant programs reviewed were not demonstrating results. Furthermore, not every EPA program office has yet developed environmental measures for their grant programs. EPA's progress in addressing problems in achieving environmental results from grants to this point has been slower and more limited than planned. While EPA had planned to issue an outcome policy--a critical ingredient to progress on this front--in 2003, the policy's issuance has been delayed to the fall of 2004, and will not become effective until January 2005. In the meantime, EPA has issued a limited, interim policy that requires program offices to link grants to EPA's strategic goals, but does not link grants to environmental outcomes. Furthermore, as a result of the delay in issuing an outcome policy, EPA officials do not expect to meet the 5-year plan's first-year target for the goal's performance measure. The forthcoming draft policy we reviewed appears to be moving EPA in the right direction for addressing environmental outcomes from its grants. For example, the draft policy emphasizes environmental results throughout the grant life cycle--awards, monitoring, and reporting. Consistent and effective implementation of the policy will, however, be a major challenge. Successful implementation will require extensive training of agency personnel and broad based education of literally thousands of grantees. |
gao_GAO-06-514 | gao_GAO-06-514_0 | Consumer-Directed Health Plans
Although insurance carriers and employers offer several variants of CDHPs in the private health insurance market, these plans generally include three basic components—a health plan with a high deductible; an associated tax-advantaged account to pay for medical expenses under the deductible; and decision-support tools to help enrollees evaluate health care treatment options, providers, and costs. Decision-support tools, including information on the price and quality of health care services and providers, can help CDHP enrollees become more actively involved in making health care purchasing decisions. Available Surveys Suggest That a Small but Growing Share of Privately Insured Enrollees and Dependents Were Covered by a CDHP
Although no national database of CDHP enrollment exists, we estimate that the number of enrollees and dependents covered by these plans increased from about 3 million in January 2005 to between about 5 and 6 million in January 2006, based on publicly available survey data. Small employers are more likely to purchase rather than self- fund their health insurance plans and are less likely to offer an HRA-based than an HSA-eligible plan. Most Employers Contributed to Health Accounts, and the Share of Account Funds Spent by Enrollees Varied Widely
Most employers made a contribution to their employees’ health accounts, and there was wide variation in the share of account funds spent by enrollees. Early experience with HSAs suggests that some individuals are using their account funds to pay for medical care, whereas others are choosing to pay for care with other, out-of-pocket sources, rather than withdrawing the funds from their HSAs. Based on HRA account data provided by three multistate insurance carriers, the most common annual employer HRA contribution in 2004 ranged from about $500 to $750 for single coverage and from about $1,500 to $2,000 for family coverage. In 2004, most enrollees in HRA-based plans spent a portion of their account funds. Not All HSA-Eligible Plan Enrollees Opened and Contributed to an Account
According to industry officials, not all HSA-eligible plan enrollees opened and contributed to the associated HSA. CDHP experts and industry officials stated that some account holders are primarily using HSAs as a tax-advantaged savings vehicle. Desire to Restrain Rising Cost of Health Care Coverage Is Primary Factor Driving Growth of CDHPs
The primary factor responsible for the growth of CDHPs is the rising cost of health care coverage. CDHP experts also reported that individuals were more likely to enroll in a CDHP offered by an employer when the employer offered a generous contribution to the CDHP premium and associated savings account, offered more comprehensive benefits, and effectively educated its employees about the plans. In addition, according to these officials, employers would be more likely to offer a CDHP in the future if health care premiums continue rising significantly or if CDHPs demonstrate the ability to reduce the rising cost of health care coverage. Federal and State Requirements, Inadequate Consumer Tools, and Other Factors Could Limit the Appeal of CDHPs
Industry officials and CDHP experts we interviewed cited several factors that could limit the appeal of CDHPs, including a lack of flexibility in the federal statutory provisions and guidance establishing HSAs and HSA- eligible plans and insurance or income tax requirements in eight states that do not reflect federal statutory provisions for HSAs. Officials of provider associations and experts suggested additional factors, including the inability of the patient or provider to know at the time service is delivered the amount to be deducted from the patient’s CDHP account, and the inadequacy of decision-support tools provided by insurance carriers to help enrollees assess the cost and quality of providers and treatment options. The likelihood that employers will increasingly offer CDHPs may be influenced by how, or if, the plans demonstrate cost savings. We received technical comments from IRS and AHIP, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Insurance carriers, employers, and individuals are showing increasing interest in consumer-directed health plans (CDHP). CDHPs typically combine a high-deductible health plan with a health reimbursement arrangement (HRA) or health savings account (HSA). HRAs and HSAs are tax-advantaged accounts used to pay enrollees' health care expenses, and unused balances may accrue for future use, potentially giving enrollees an incentive to purchase health care more prudently. The plans also provide decision-support tools to help enrollees become more actively involved in making health care purchasing decisions. Because CDHPs are relatively new, there is interest in the extent of enrollment and in other aspects of the plans. GAO was asked to review the prevalence of CDHPs, how the associated accounts are funded and used, and the factors that may contribute to the growth or limit the appeal of these plans. GAO examined survey data on CDHP enrollment and interviewed or obtained data from employers, insurance carriers, individuals, financial institutions, and other CDHP experts.
What GAO Found
Enrollment in CDHPs accounts for a small but growing share of the 177 million Americans with private health insurance coverage. From January 2005 to January 2006, the number of enrollees and dependents covered by a CDHP--either an HRA-based plan or an HSA-eligible plan--increased from about 3 million to between about 5 and 6 million. An increasing number of health insurance carriers and employers began offering CDHPs during 2005. Most employers made a contribution to their employees' health accounts, and the share of account funds spent by enrollees varied. Employers commonly contributed to their employees' HRAs from $500 to $750 for individual coverage and $1,500 to $2,000 for family coverage in 2004. Most HRA-based plan enrollees spent some or all of these HRA funds in that year. For HSAs, industry representatives noted that not all HSA-eligible plan enrollees opened and contributed to an HSA, and survey data indicate that two-thirds of employers offering these plans contributed to their employees' HSAs. Industry representatives indicated that while most HSA account holders withdrew a portion of their account funds in 2005, some account holders used other, out-of-pocket funds, rather than their HSAs, to pay for medical care. According to industry officials and experts, the primary factor responsible for the growth of CDHPs is the rising cost of health care coverage. Prompting the growth of enrollment among individuals is the desire to lower premiums and accumulate tax-advantaged savings, according to the officials. Experts noted that employers would be more likely to offer a CDHP if the plans demonstrate the ability to restrain rising costs, and employees would be more likely to enroll in a CDHP if employers offered more comprehensive CDHP benefits coupled with education about the plans. Experts and industry officials cited several factors that may limit the appeal of CDHPs. Certain federal requirements for HSAs and HSA-eligible plans may preclude changes desired by some, such as higher annual contribution limits for HSAs. Certain state insurance requirements or income tax laws in eight states do not reflect federal statutory provisions for HSAs and HSA-eligible plans. Insurers are generally unable to determine the amount to be deducted from the patient's CDHP account at the time of service or offer decision-support tools that provide enrollees with sufficiently detailed data on the cost and quality of health care. GAO received technical comments from organizations that provided data for this report, and incorporated the comments as appropriate. |
gao_RCED-96-70FS | gao_RCED-96-70FS_0 | As a result, a standard may be either more or less stringent than one based solely on human health risks. Differences Between the States’ Groundwater Standards and the Federal MCLs
Because the federal MCLs are typically used as cleanup standards for groundwater used as drinking water at Superfund sites and many of the states based some of their own groundwater standards on the federal MCLs, we compared the states’ standards for contaminants to the corresponding MCLs. These standards tended to be more stringent than the MCLs. Overall, the states provided more flexibility in applying their soil standards than their groundwater standards. Flexibility to Adjust Cleanup Levels Based on Soil Standards to Account for Site-Specific Conditions
Eight of the 13 states that had soil standards indicated that they allow the extent of the cleanup deemed necessary under their standards to be adjusted for site-specific factors. Thus, cleanup levels can be tailored to local conditions. The degree of flexibility largely depended on whether the groundwater was considered a potential source of drinking water. The questions in our survey included (1) whether a state’s standards were derived from a risk-based formula and/or other factors, such as the naturally occurring levels of contamination in the soil and groundwater; (2) whether the formulas were based on EPA’s guidance or on the state’s own methodologies for estimating human health risks from contamination; (3) what risk levels, such as a 1-in-1-million increased probability of contracting cancer, were used in setting the standards; (4) whether the standards were set for different uses of the land or groundwater; and (5) whether the standards were considered fixed limits or the state provided flexibility to adjust the cleanup levels based on these standards to take into account specific conditions at a site. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how states establish and apply environmental standards when cleaning up Superfund sites, focusing on whether states: (1) base their standards on human health risks; and (2) provide flexibility so that the level of cleanup can be adjusted according to the extent of contamination.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 20 of the 21 states reviewed base their hazardous waste site standards on the danger posed to human health, and the cost and technical feasibility of achieving them; (2) states base their groundwater standards on existing federal drinking water standards; (3) when states set their environmental standards at levels other than the federal limit, they tend to be more stringent; (4) states provide more flexibility in adjusting the cleanup level when the cleanup involves soil pollution rather than groundwater pollution, in order to reflect a particular site's condition and health risk; (5) more than half of the states with soil standards regularly allow their cleanup levels to be adjusted for site-specific conditions; (6) less than one-fourth of the states with groundwater standards allow their cleanup levels to be adjusted; and (7) those states not allowing cleanup level adjustments view their groundwater as a potential source of drinking water and implement different standards, depending on the projected use of land or groundwater. |
gao_GAO-03-534 | gao_GAO-03-534_0 | For fiscal year 2003, FHWA expects to fund about $20 billion for highway infrastructure improvements and projects designed to relieve congestion. For projects that state departments of transportation demonstrate are likely to have minimal environmental impacts or in situations in which the existence of significant environmental impacts is initially unclear, FHWA provides for a simplified and less structured review of environmental impacts. More extensive and structured environmental review is required from FHWA for projects in which significant environmental impacts are anticipated. Instead, for these types of projects, FHWA advises state departments of transportation to conduct environmental review activities commensurate with the level of impact, including (1) identifying environmental features that will be affected by the project (if any); (2) assessing the environmental impacts caused by the project to the extent that it is clearly established that impacts are minor; (3) addressing public, federal, and state resource agency concerns where adverse impacts are likely to occur; (4) gaining FHWA’s approval for classification as a categorical exclusion; and (5) obtaining permits, if needed, to clearly establish that there is little potential for significant impacts and that the project’s classification as a categorical exclusion is appropriate. For an environmental assessment, the state department of transportation must (1) identify environmental features that will be affected by the proposed project; (2) evaluate one or more alternatives (but need not evaluate all reasonable alternatives); (3) assess impacts to the environment caused by the project or any of its alternatives and determine measures to mitigate unavoidable environmental impacts; and (4) invite comments and obtain feedback from the public and interested federal, state, and local agencies. Identifying alternatives and assessing environmental impacts. Stakeholders’ Views Differed on Which Aspects Frequently Add Undue Time to Environmental Reviews
Stakeholders of highway construction projects we contacted identified 43 aspects that they said added undue time (more time than what stakeholders viewed as necessary to complete the review) to environmental reviews of federally funded highway projects. A majority of stakeholders with primary responsibilities for environmental and historical preservation issues, and those with primary responsibilities for transportation improvement, identified five aspects as occurring frequently; but there was no agreement across groups about which aspects add undue time. For the most part, environmental stakeholders, such as resource agencies, state historic preservation agencies, and environmental advocacy organizations, told us that state departments of transportation waited too long to consider environmental impacts and involve important stakeholders. State departments and federal resource agencies lack sufficient staff. Sixty-nine percent of transportation improvement stakeholders (11 of 16) who provided a rating for this aspect told us that undue time is frequently added to environmental reviews because state departments of transportation and federal resource agencies lack sufficient staff to handle their responsibilities in a timely manner. Obtaining wetlands permits considered time consuming. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided the Departments of Transportation and Interior with a draft of this report for their review and comment. The Department of Transportation responded that it had no comments, and the Department of Interior did not provide a response to our request for comments. To determine stakeholders’ views on the aspects that frequently add undue time to environmental reviews of federally funded highway projects, we contacted 51 organizations with a role or interest in highway project environmental reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has a long-term commitment to helping states construct, improve, and repair roads and bridges to meet the nation's mobility needs. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) expects to provide states about $20 billion for highway construction projects in fiscal year 2003. State departments of transportation are primarily responsible for initiating and completing projects. Many federal and state agencies with environmental responsibilities (called resource agencies) help ensure that environmental issues are considered. The environmental review of a federally funded highway project can take from several days to several years. GAO is reporting on the (1) activities involved in the environmental reviews of federally funded highway projects and (2) stakeholders' views on the aspects of environmental review, if any, that unduly add time to gaining environmental approval. GAO obtained stakeholder views from 16 transportation improvement and 12 environmental officials from a variety of federal, state, and private organizations with responsibilities for or interests in constructing federally funded highways. The Department of Transportation had no comments on a draft of this report. Other agencies provided either technical comments or did not respond to our request for comments.
What GAO Found
Environmental review activities typically consist of identifying and assessing environmental impacts, evaluating alternatives, and gaining input and/or approvals from FHWA, resource agencies, and the public; and become more complex if significant environmental impacts are anticipated. For the 91 percent of projects that are expected to have minimal environmental impacts, state departments of transportation need only to identify environmental features, assess possible impacts, address any resource agency and public concerns, and obtain permits, if needed. For the 6 percent of projects where it is initially unclear whether significant environmental impacts may exist, additional activities occur, including evaluating alternatives to the proposed project and obtaining FHWA approval. For the 3 percent of highway projects with expected significant environmental impacts, states conduct extensive environmental review, including evaluating all reasonable alternatives and their environmental impacts and consult with resource agencies. Stakeholders we contacted identified 43 aspects that they said frequently (more than half the time) add more time than viewed as necessary to environmental reviews of federally funded highway projects. A majority of stakeholders with primary responsibilities for environmental and historical preservation issues and those with primary responsibilities for transportation improvement identified five aspects as occurring frequently. However, there was no overall agreement about which aspects frequently add undue time to environmental reviews. A majority of environmental stakeholders told us that state departments of transportation waited too long to consider environmental impacts and involve important stakeholders. In contrast, a majority of transportation improvement stakeholders told us that state departments of transportation and federal resource agencies lack sufficient staff to handle their workloads and that meeting statutory criteria for historic preservation projects on public lands and obtaining wetlands permits are too time consuming. However, the stakeholders generally could not tell us how much time these aspects add to the reviews. |
gao_GAO-13-421 | gao_GAO-13-421_0 | In calculating their spending requirements, some participating agencies made improper exclusions and used differing methodologies. Specifically, 8 of the 11 agencies did not consistently meet annual spending requirements for SBIR. Without such guidance, agencies will likely continue to calculate spending requirements in differing ways. Agencies and SBA Have Not Consistently Complied with Certain Reporting Requirements
Agencies participating in the SBIR and STTR programs have not consistently complied with Small Business Act requirements for annually reporting a description of their methodologies for calculating their extramural R&D budgets to SBA. Specifically, the SBA policy directives state that the methodology report must include an itemization of each R&D program excluded from the calculation of the agency’s extramural budget and a brief explanation of why it is excluded. In our review, we found that two of the participating agencies—EPA and HHS—complied fully with the requirements because they included in their methodology reports an itemization of the programs excluded from the calculation of their extramural R&D budget and an explanation of why the programs were excluded for all 6 fiscal years in our review; and six agencies—DHS, DOD, DOE, DOT, NASA and NSF—did not fully meet these requirements for the 6 fiscal years in our review because their methodology reports either identified some excluded programs but not others that we identified or the reports omitted explanations for exclusions. As a result, agencies submitted different information, including different levels of detail on their methodologies. SBA Annual Reports to Congressional Committees Are Often Late and Incomplete
SBA has not consistently complied with the requirement for reporting its analysis of the agencies’ methodologies in its annual report to Congress, as required by the Small Business Act. For example, SBA’s analysis was limited to a table attached to the annual report to Congress that often did not include information on particular agencies; SBA provided no other documentation showing the results of its analysis of the agency methodology reports. Without more comprehensive analysis and accurate information on participating agencies in SBA’s annual report, Congress does not have information on the extent to which agencies are reporting what is required by law or if they are under spending by, for example, taking improper exclusions. The agency plans to submit the reports to Congress in 2013, making the data available to Congress on the programs 2 to 4 years after the end of the fiscal year. Basing Spending Requirements on Agencies’ Total R&D Budgets Could Increase Spending and Program Participation
Changing the methodology to calculate the SBIR and STTR spending requirements based on each agency’s total R&D budget instead of each agency’s extramural R&D budget would increase the amount of each agency’s spending requirement for the programs, some much more than others, depending on the assumptions about how the funding base change is implemented. Changing the Calculation Methodology Would Increase the Number of Agencies Required to Participate
Changing the calculation methodology to the total R&D budget would also increase the number of agencies that would be required to participate in the SBIR and STTR programs, assuming the same dollar thresholds for participating in the programs were applied to the total R&D budget rather than only the extramural R&D budget. With the implementation in 2013 of a pilot program allowing agencies under certain conditions to use up to 3 percent of SBIR program funds for certain administrative costs, SBA expects to require agencies in the pilot program to track and report the spending of that 3 percent but not all of their administrative costs. Neither the authorizing legislation for the programs nor SBA guidance directs agencies to track and estimate administrative costs, and neither the law nor SBA guidance defines these administrative costs. In turn, SBA is to review this information and report on it annually to Congress. Agencies also submitted differing information in these reports because SBA’s policy directives do not specify the format for the reports. Without more rigorous oversight by SBA and more timely and detailed reporting on the part of both SBA and participating agencies, it will be difficult for SBA to ensure that intended benefits of these programs are being attained and that Congress receives critical information to oversee these programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that participating agencies and SBA comply with spending and reporting requirements for the SBIR and STTR programs, we recommend the SBA Administrator take the following four actions:
Provide additional guidance on how agencies should calculate spending requirements when agency appropriations are received late in the fiscal year and the format agencies are to include in their methodology reports. Direct participating agencies to include in their annual reports the calculation of the final extramural R&D budget used as the basis for their SBIR and STTR spending requirements and, if they did not meet the spending requirements, the reasons why not and how they plan to meet the spending requirements in the future. Appendix I: Comparison of Participating Agencies’ Reported Requirements and Spending for the SBIR and STTR Programs, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011
Figures 2 through 12 compare reported spending requirements of the 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program with their reported spending over fiscal years 2006 to 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Act established the SBIR and STTR programs to use small businesses to meet federal R&D needs. The law mandates that agencies, with extramural R&D budgets that meet the thresholds for participation, must spend a percentage of these annual budgets on the SBIR and STTR programs. The agencies are to report on their activities to SBA and, in turn, SBA is to report to Congress. Eleven agencies participate in SBIR, and five of them also participate in STTR. The act's 2011 reauthorization mandates that GAO review SBA's and the agencies' compliance with spending and reporting requirements, and other program aspects, for fiscal years 2006 to 2011. GAO determined (1) the extent to which participating agencies complied with spending requirements and how the agencies calculated these requirements, (2) the extent to which participating agencies and SBA complied with certain reporting requirements, (3) the potential effects of basing the spending requirements on an agency's total R&D budget, and (4) the cost to participating agencies of SBIR and STTR program administration. GAO reviewed agency calculations of spending requirements and the required reports and interviewed SBA and participating agency program and financial officials.
What GAO Found
Using data agencies had reported to the Small Business Administration (SBA), GAO found that 8 of the 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and 4 of the 5 agencies participating in the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program did not consistently comply with spending requirements for fiscal years 2006 to 2011. In calculating their annual spending requirements for these programs, some agencies made improper exclusions from their extramural research and development (R&D) budgets and used differing methodologies. SBA, which oversees the programs, provided guidance in policy directives for agencies on calculating these requirements, but the directives do not provide guidance on calculating the requirements when appropriations are late and spending is delayed, resulting in agencies using differing methodologies. This made it difficult to determine whether agencies' calculations were correct. Without further SBA guidance, agencies will likely continue calculating spending requirements in differing ways.
The participating agencies and SBA have not consistently complied with certain program reporting requirements. For example, in their methodology reports to SBA, the agencies submitted different levels of detail on their methodologies, such as the programs excluded from the extramural budget and the reasons for the exclusions. SBA's guidance states that the methodology reports are to itemize each R&D program excluded from the calculation of the agency's extramural budget and explain why a program is excluded but does not specify the format of the methodology reports to ensure consistency. Also, SBA's annual reports to Congress contained limited analysis of the agencies' methodologies, often not including information on particular agencies. Without more guidance to agencies on the formats of their methodology reports and more analysis of the contents of those reports, SBA cannot provide Congress with information on the extent to which agencies are reporting what is required. Further, SBA has not submitted an annual report on these programs for fiscal years 2009 to 2011 but plans to submit the reports to Congress later in 2013--making the data available to Congress on the programs 2 to 4 years late.
Potential effects of basing each participating agency's spending requirement on its total R&D budget instead of its extramural R&D budget include an increase in the amount of the spending requirement--for some agencies more than others--depending on how much of the agency's R&D budget is composed of extramural spending. Also, if the thresholds of the spending requirements for participation in the programs did not change, changing the base to an agency's total R&D budget would increase the number of agencies required to participate.
The agencies' cost of administering the programs could not be determined because the agencies have not consistently tracked that cost as they are not required to by the authorizing legislation of the programs. Nine of the 11 agencies in SBIR provided GAO with estimates of some of these costs for fiscal year 2011--most of which were for salaries and expenses. With the start of a pilot program allowing agencies to use up to 3 percent of SBIR program funds for administrative costs in 2013, SBA plans to require agencies to track and report administrative costs paid from program funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that SBA provide additional guidance to agencies for spending and reporting requirements and provide Congress with a more timely annual report with more analysis of the agencies' methodologies. SBA stated that it agrees with the recom-mendations and will implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-25 | gao_GAO-06-25_0 | 1.) The state plan must establish each district’s and school’s annual measurable objectives for increasing the number of teachers meeting qualification requirements and receiving high- quality professional development with the goal of ensuring that all teachers meet the requirements by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. Selected state and district officials told us that certain groups of teachers would likely face challenges meeting the requirements by the 2005-2006 deadline. Most States Reported That the Majority of Teachers Are Qualified, but Some Data Issues Remain
The data reported by 47 states suggest that the majority of core academic classes were taught by teachers who met NCLBA requirements during the 2003-2004 school year. States have improved in their ability to track and report the percentage of core academic classes taught by teachers who met NCLBA qualifications. Despite this progress, several issues limit the quality and precision of state-reported data and make it difficult to determine the exact percentage of core academic classes taught by teachers meeting NCLBA qualification requirements. Selected States and Districts Faced Implementation Challenges
Although numerous ways exist for veteran teachers to demonstrate subject matter competency, officials in site visit states and districts and national association representatives told us that some teachers providing instruction in multiple core academic subjects, such as special education teachers and teachers in rural areas and specialized school settings, may not meet the requirements by the deadline. Seven of the 11 districts that we visited also continued to use the funds for class size reduction efforts. All Visited Districts Used Title II Funds for Professional Development, and Many of Them Used These Funds for Class Size Reduction
All districts that we visited used Title II funds to provide professional development to teachers and focused their efforts on improving the quality of instruction in core academic subjects such as reading and math. Officials in the majority of the districts that we visited told us that NCLBA’s emphasis on student achievement and on strategies supported by research had led to improvements in the kinds of professional development they funded with Title II funds. Officials in 7 of the 11 districts that we visited told us that they also used Title II funds to hire additional teachers to reduce class size. District officials indicated that they were now redirecting funds to support initiatives designed to improve teachers’ subject matter knowledge and instructional skills, such as professional development. Visited Districts Considered Student Achievement Needs in Identifying Uses of Title II Funds
Officials in the districts that we visited said that in deciding what specific initiatives should be funded with Title II funds, such as the types of professional development programs for teachers, they considered student achievement needs and targeted the funds to programs designed to help teachers address those needs. The districts then targeted their Title II funds to programs for teachers to improve instruction in those subjects in which students were lagging behind. While most districts that we visited targeted Title II funds to subject areas that presented academic challenges to students, only a few of the Title II funded initiatives were directed to specific groups of teachers, such as teachers in high-poverty schools or teachers who had not yet met the requirements of NCLBA. Education Monitored States’ Implementation of Teacher Qualification Requirements
Education provided written feedback to states on their implementation of NCLBA’s teacher qualification requirements through the Title II monitoring process. Education provided technical assistance to state officials from all 50 states through site visits by the Teacher Assistance Corps (TAC). Some Information on Education’s Web Site Was Not Readily Accessible
According to Education officials, Education’s Web site has been an important part of their outreach efforts regarding NCLBA’s teacher qualification requirements. However, officials from most states and districts that we visited who use Education’s Web site to access information on teacher programs or requirements told us that they were unaware of some of Education’s teacher resources or had difficulty accessing those resources. No Child Left Behind Act: Education Needs to Provide Additional Technical Assistance and Conduct Implementation Studies for School Choice Provision. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001 established qualification requirements that teachers of core academic subjects must meet by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. Congress has appropriated approximately $3 billion a year through the Title II, Part A (Title II), of NCLBA for teacher improvement programs since the law was passed. With the deadline approaching for all teachers to meet the requirements, GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of state efforts to meet NCLBA's teacher qualification requirements, (2) the use of Title II funds in selected districts, and (3) how the U.S. Department of Education (Education) monitors states and assists them with implementation of the requirements. To obtain this information, GAO reviewed teacher qualifications data submitted to Education by 47 states, conducted site visits to 6 states selected for variance in factors such as teacher requirements and geographic location, visited 11 school districts across these states identified as high-need, and interviewed national experts and Education officials.
What GAO Found
Data reported to Education by 47 states suggest that the majority of core academic classes were taught by teachers who met NCLBA requirements during the 2003-2004 school year. States have improved in their ability to track and report the percentage of core academic classes taught by teachers who met NCLBA qualification requirements, but several limitations on the quality and precision of state-reported data make it difficult to determine the exact percentage of core academic classes taught by teachers meeting the requirements. Five of the 6 states that we visited allowed veteran teachers to demonstrate subject matter competency through a state-developed procedure called High Objective Uniform State Standard of Evaluation (HOUSSE). Officials in states and districts that we visited said that teachers of multiple subjects, such as teachers in rural schools with a small teaching staff, would likely face challenges meeting the requirements by the 2005-2006 deadline. The 11 school districts that we visited all used Title II funds to provide professional development, and most used Title II funds to reduce class size. Officials in the majority of these districts indicated that NCLBA had led to improvements in the kinds of professional development they funded with Title II funds. Although officials in over half of the districts indicated that they continued to use Title II funds to reduce class size, an activity that was supported under a federal program that predated NCLBA, some district officials told us that they had shifted funds away from class size reduction to initiatives designed to improve teachers' subject matter knowledge and instructional skills, such as professional development. All districts that we visited reported considering student achievement data and targeting Title II funds to improve instruction in the academic subjects in which students were lagging behind. In the 11 districts, few efforts funded with Title II targeted specific groups of teachers, such as teachers in high-poverty schools. Title II funds constituted a small proportion of total funds that districts could use for teacher improvement initiatives, and all districts that we visited used several other funding sources to support their teacher programs. Education monitored state efforts to meet the teacher qualification requirements and offered multiple types of assistance to help teachers meet the requirements. In monitoring states, Education has found several areas of concern, such as states not ensuring that certain newly hired teachers met NCLBA's requirements. Education's assistance has included professional development for teachers and site visits to provide technical assistance to state officials. Education officials said that their Web site has been an important tool for disseminating resources about the requirements, but officials from most states and districts that we visited told us that they were unaware of some of these resources or had difficulty locating them, despite frequently using the Web site. |
gao_GGD-99-102 | gao_GGD-99-102_0 | As a result, the Service has no assurance that the seeding process provided an effective oversight mechanism. Nevertheless, even when these additional audits are taken into consideration, we determined that the Service did not perform all audits required. Even after counting these additional audits reported by the Service, we determined that it did not perform the minimum number of annual audits or on-site audits required during the periods included in our review. Specifically, the Service had not stated in the NCOA Processing Acknowledgment Form that NCOA data are not to be used to create or maintain new-movers lists. The Service disagreed with our recommendation in 1996 and stated that it believed that (1) a restriction on the creation and maintenance of new- movers lists from NCOA-linked data was not required by privacy law, (2) enforcement of such a restriction on customers of licensees would be impracticable, and (3) we had misinterpreted the purpose of the acknowledgment form when we said that it was “to limit the use of NCOA- linked data by the customers of licensees.”
Our recent review showed that the Service has not implemented our recommendation that it amend or revise the acknowledgment form to explicitly convey this restriction to the customers of licensees. Further, we continue to believe that more specific language in the acknowledgment form that licensees’ customers sign could help ensure that use of NCOA-linked data is limited to the purposes for which it was collected. The Service has been partially responsive to our previous recommendations to strengthen oversight of the NCOA program in that it developed and implemented written procedures for (1) seeding NCOA file updates released to licensees and (2) reviewing, responding to, and documenting customers’ NCOA-related inquiries and complaints and licensees’ NCOA-related advertising. In addition, the Service reported that it had performed more licensee on-site audits than were documented in licensee audit files at the NCOA program office. The Postmaster General should also ensure that NCOA program officials and other appropriate Service officials coordinate actions to identify and correct weaknesses in the process of alerting program officials when mail is sent to seed record addresses so that the process works as intended and ensure that licensees that fail successive audits are promptly suspended or terminated, as appropriate, from the program or that the licensing agreement is revised to reflect Service policy regarding when licensees will be suspended or terminated. Comments From the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated its previous report on the U.S. Postal Service's National Change of Address (NCOA) program, focusing on: (1) the actions the Service has taken in response to GAO's 1996 report; and (2) whether any additional actions are needed to strengthen the Service's oversight of the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as recommended, the Service has developed and implemented written procedures that addressed its NCOA program oversight and control responsibilities for: (a) using seed records to help detect the unauthorized disclosure of NCOA data by licensees, should it occur; and (b) reviewing, responding to, and documenting NCOA-related complaints and inquiries from postal customers and NCOA-related proposed advertisements by licensees; (2) however, procedures designed by the Service to ensure that it is alerted when mail is sent to seed record addresses were not working as intended; thus, the Service lacked assurance that the seeding process provided an effective program oversight mechanism; (3) further, even though required to do so by the licensing agreement or by prescribed program procedures, during the 1996 through 1998 period GAO examined, the Service did not always: (a) conduct the minimum number of licensee audits, including on-site audits; (b) promptly reaudit licensees that failed initial audits; or (c) promptly or always suspend or terminate licensees that failed successive audits; (4) also, the Service reported that it had performed more licensee audits than were documented in its audit files; however, even when GAO included these additional audits in its data, GAO determined that the Service did not perform all audits required; (5) the Service has taken no action on GAO's recommendations that it explicitly state, in the acknowledgement form signed by customers of licensees, that NCOA program-linked data are not to be used to create or maintain new-movers lists; and (6) GAO continues to believe that more specific language in the acknowledgement form could help ensure that use of NCOA program-linked data is limited to the purposes for which they were collected. |
gao_GAO-14-223 | gao_GAO-14-223_0 | The second step is to award ship recycling contracts for specific ships to qualified contractors. These criteria include considering how a contractor plans to dismantle ships and the extent that the site is capable to support that effort. MARAD’s Best Value Process for Source Selection of Its Ship Recycling Contracts is Consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation
After becoming qualified, a contractor’s facility is eligible to compete for ship recycling contracts, and does so by providing offers in response to MARAD’s announcements on specific ships. This process allows the government to accept an offer other than the best priced offer, considering both price and non-price factors. MARAD uses the following three evaluation criteria to determine which offers provide the best value for the government: price, past performance. Figure 3 describes in more detail the steps MARAD uses in its best value source selection for ship recycling contracts. MARAD Has Taken Steps to Clarify Its Source Selection Process, but Could Strengthen Its Communication Strategy
MARAD has made some efforts over the last year to clarify certain parts of its source selection process; however, during our review, contractors told us that they do not fully understand how it works. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Improving its communication strategy with its contractors could help MARAD maximize the transparency of its source selection process. As a result, we recommended that it develop a comprehensive approach to manage its ship disposal program.comprehensive management plan, or strategic plan, which outlined short and long-term strategies for the disposal of the agency’s obsolete ships; however, several key elements are outdated or no longer applicable. Since then, however, it has not updated its plan, because, according to program officials, the principles of the plan remain relevant. MARAD was required, however, to provide regular reports to Congress for several years, the last of which was in March 2011. The reports provided information on the progress made to address the backlog, and other activities accomplished since the In 2006, MARAD issued a last report, but did not provide the strategic short- and long-term direction for the program. The 2006 strategy does not take into account current market conditions, goals, and external risks. (See appendix II)
Further, MARAD officials expressed concern about maintaining the supplier base to help ensure adequate competition among contractors as the number of ships available for disposal decreases, a concern that is not addressed in the 2006 plan. Competition is a cornerstone of federal contracting and a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government’s investment. An updated strategic plan that reflects the current external environment and risks could better position MARAD to identify challenges and opportunities confronting the future management of the ship disposal program, including maintaining long- term participation in and competition within the industrial base for ship disposal. Ship recycling contractors have been concerned whether changes in their facility and processes are being approved by MARAD. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance MARAD’s transparency in its source selection processes or other aspects of ship disposal and strategic direction for its efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the MARAD Administrator to take the following two actions: Improve MARAD’s communication strategy, such as by holding an annual industry day or annual meetings with qualified contractors, to transparently communicate information to qualified contractors and to respond to their questions; and
Update MARAD’s 2006 comprehensive management plan, i.e. DOT did not take a position on our recommendations, but generally agreed with the facts presented. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 mandated that GAO conduct an assessment of the source selection procedures and practices used to award the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) ship recycling contracts, including the process, procedures and practices used for qualification of ship disposal facilities, whether MARAD’s contract source selection procedures and practices are consistent with the law, and best practices associated with making source selection decisions, as well as any other aspect we deem appropriate to review. This report assesses MARAD’s (1) source selection process; (2) communication strategy with ship disposal facility contractors; and (3) long-term ship disposal strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Timely and proper disposal of obsolete ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet-older ships designated for use in national emergencies-is critical to protecting the environment. Because these ships often contain hazardous materials, members of Congress and others have raised issues about the environmental concerns. As part of the Department of Transportation, MARAD's Ship Disposal Program serves as the federal government's agent for competing and awarding contracts for recycling the ships' materials. Congress has required MARAD's ship disposal program to award ship recycling contracts to qualified ship recycling facilities on the basis of best value. The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 mandated that GAO review MARAD's source selection procedures and practices used to award ship recycling contracts.
In this report, GAO assessed MARAD's (1) source selection process; (2) communication strategy with ship recycling contractors; and (3) long-term ship disposal strategy. To complete this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed documentation on MARAD's qualification process, source selection procedures, and strategies; and interviewed MARAD and all of its qualified ship recycling contractors.
What GAO Found
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) uses a two-step source selection process, first by qualifying contractors and then awarding contracts for ship recycling services based on best value, consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). In the first step, MARAD qualifies contractors' ship recycling facilities. The qualification process involves evaluating ship recycling facilities' proposals based on multiple criteria, including how a facility plans to dismantle ships and the extent to which the contractor-including its ability to meet local, state, and federal regulations-supports that effort. For the second step, MARAD awards ship recycling contracts for specific ships using a best value source selection process. The best value source selection process allows the government to accept an offer other than the best-priced offer, considering both price and non-price factors, that provides the greatest overall benefit to the government. MARAD considers three evaluation criteria-price, schedule and capacity, and past performance.
MARAD has made some efforts over the last year to clarify certain elements of its source selection process; however, MARAD could strengthen its communication strategy with its contractors. All of the qualified contractors GAO spoke with were confused about MARAD's source selection process-including how MARAD uses past performance to evaluate contractors' offers. MARAD has made an effort to clarify its past performance criterion by further explaining what is considered in its most recent solicitation. However other concerns remain. For example, some contractors expressed concern as to whether changes to their facility were approved by MARAD. GAO's standards for internal controls state that management should ensure adequate means of communicating with external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Improving its communication strategy with its contractors could help MARAD maximize the transparency of its source selection process.
In 2006, MARAD issued a comprehensive management plan, or strategic plan, that outlined short- and long-term strategies for the disposal of MARAD's obsolete ships; however several key elements are now outdated or no longer applicable. According to program officials, MARAD was required to provide regular reports to Congress for several years, the last of which was in March 2011, on the progress made to address the backlog of obsolete ships. However, these reports did not provide the strategic short- and long-term direction for the program. Further, they indicated that the principles of the plan remain relevant; but the 2006 strategy does not take into account current market conditions, goals, and external risks. For example, concerns about maintaining the supplier base are not addressed in the plan. MARAD wants to maintain a supplier base to ensure competition for future ship recycling contracts, but has not fully considered risks and options to address this pending issue. Competition is a cornerstone in federal contracting and a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government's investment. An updated strategic plan that reflects the current external environment and risks could better position MARAD to identify future challenges and opportunities to help ensure the long-term participation and competition of the industrial base for ship disposal.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Department of Transportation improve its communication strategy and update its strategic plan. The Department agreed with the facts but did not take a position on our recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-170 | gao_T-AIMD-96-170_0 | Until resolved, they will continue to prevent us from expressing an opinion on IRS’ financial statements in the future. These improvements have made IRS’ accounting for its administrative operations much better today than it was 4 years ago. In this case, the banker is the Treasury and the differences are great. In addition, IRS will be challenged to fully meet the federal accounting standards for accounting for accounts receivable, which become effective for fiscal year 1998. Many of these actions are still incomplete and do not yet respond fully to any of our recommendations. As a result, until IRS makes more progress in correcting its management and technical weaknesses, its ability to develop systems and make changes to correct financial management problems will be hampered. IRS’ financial information will provide significant input to the preparation and audit of both Treasury’s agencywide and the governmentwide financial statements. IRS Follow-Through Will Be Critical
In summary, it will be essential for IRS to follow-through and ensure that its planned short-term, interim actions are completed on schedule to improve the reliability of IRS’ financial statements, and we will continue to work with IRS in doing so. Recent GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to IRS’ Financial Management and TSM Problems
Financial Audit Reports
Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1992 Financial Statements (GAO/AIMD-93-2, June 30, 1993)
Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1993 Financial Statements (GAO/AIMD-94-120, June 15, 1994)
Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1994 Financial Statements (GAO/AIMD-95-141, August 4, 1995)
Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1995 Financial Statements (GAO/AIMD-96-101, July 11, 1996)
Reports and Testimonies Related to IRS Financial Audits and TSM
IRS Operations: Significant Challenges in Financial Management and Systems Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-96-56, March 6, 1996)
Tax Systems Modernization: Management and Technical Weaknesses Must Be Overcome To Achieve Success (GAO/T-AIMD-96-75, March 26, 1996)
Tax Systems Modernization: Progress in Achieving IRS’ Business Vision (GAO/T-GGD-96-123, May 9, 1996)
Letter to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, on security weaknesses at IRS’ Cyberfile Data Center (AIMD-96-85R, May 9, 1996)
Financial Audit: Actions Needed to Improve IRS Financial Management (GAO/T-AIMD-96-96, June 6, 1996)
Tax Systems Modernization: Actions Underway But IRS Has Not Yet Corrected Management and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-96-106, June 7, 1996)
Tax Systems Modernization: Cyberfile Project Was Poorly Planned and Managed (GAO/AIMD-96-140, August 26, 1996)
Internal Revenue Service: Business Operations Need Continued Improvement (GAO/AIMD/GGD-96-152, September 9, 1996)
Internal Revenue Service: Critical Need to Continue Improving Core Business Practices (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-96-188, September 10, 1996)
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to prepare reliable financial statements and improve its financial management, focusing on: (1) IRS implementation of GAO recommendations to correct financial management weaknesses; (2) IRS progress in addressing major problems that have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on its financial statements; (3) IRS problems in developing Tax Systems Modernization (TSM); and (4) how IRS financial management weaknesses affect Department of the Treasury and governmentwide financial statements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS is implementing some short-term interim strategies to resolve financial management problems in time for its fiscal year 1996 financial statement audit; (2) IRS will need to make more sweeping changes and devise long-term solutions to fully address problems in its accounting for administrative operations, reporting accounts receivable, and accounting for revenue; (3) many IRS actions for correcting management and technical problems in developing TSM are incomplete and do not fully respond to the recommendations; (4) IRS financial information provides significant input to and greatly affects the preparation and audit of Treasury and governmentwide financial statements; and (5) it will be essential for IRS to follow through on its short-term and long-term efforts to improve its financial statements and financial management systems. |
gao_GAO-06-105 | gao_GAO-06-105_0 | Compliance with these routine requirements is the first step toward determining who is fit for duty. Although the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OSD/P&R) has the responsibility for overseeing medical and physical fitness policy and processes, this office has not established a management control framework and executed a plan to oversee compliance with routine examinations. According to Army regulation, all soldiers within the Army National Guard are required to have a dental examination on an annual basis. OSD Has Not Enforced Its Directive Requiring the Services to Report on Compliance with Physical Fitness Exams
OSD has not enforced its own directive requiring the reserve and active components to report on their members’ compliance with physical fitness examinations by March 2005. Each reserve component employs a tracking system capable of monitoring compliance with medical examinations, but only one reserve component—the Navy Reserve—has data that are reliable for determining compliance with routine medical examinations. Units that input data into this system are responsible for reviewing the data and certifying that they are correct. However, quality assurance procedures are not followed. DOD Lacks Visibility over the Health Status of Reserve Components after Being Called to Active Duty and the Extent to which Members with Preexisting Conditions Required Care during Deployment
DOD does not have complete visibility over the health status of reserve component members after they are called to duty and is unable to determine the extent of care provided to those members deployed with preexisting medical conditions. Despite the existence of various sources of medical information, DOD has incomplete visibility over members’ health status when called to active duty, primarily because the reserve components vary in their ability to systematically identify, track, and report members’ medical deployability and the DOD-wide centralized database cannot provide complete information—both of which hinder DOD’s ability to accurately determine what forces remain for future deployments. In addition, although medical information is captured on predeployment forms for all reserve component members and entered into a DOD-wide centralized database during mobilization, some data are still missing and information regarding the reasons why members were found nondeployable is not captured in a way that can be easily searched through the database. During this review, we found that DOD has continued to make progress toward collecting the pre- and postdeployment forms. Because DOD has not determined what preexisting conditions may be allowed into a specific theater of operations, it has not known what preexisting conditions to track. To have visibility over reserve components’ compliance with routine medical and physical fitness examinations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and the Principal Deputy to the Under Secretary, to establish a management control framework and execute a plan for issuing guidance, establishing quality assurance for data reliability, and tracking compliance with routine medical and physical fitness examinations; and direct the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the Principle Deputy who oversees the Office of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation, to take steps to enforce the service reporting requirement on the status of members’ physical fitness in conjunction with the actions taken in the first recommendation. To help prevent the deployment of reserve component members with preexisting medical conditions that could adversely affect the mission and strain resources in theater, and to provide visibility over those members deployed with preexisting conditions for which treatment can be provided in theater, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense: direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to determine what preexisting medical conditions should not be allowed into specific theaters of operations, especially during the initial stages of the operation, and to take steps to ensure that each service component consistently utilizes these as criteria for determining the medical deployability of its reserve component members during mobilization; and direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, in concert with the service secretaries, to explore using existing tracking systems to track those who have treatable preexisting medical conditions in theater. We have not seen enough evidence to agree that DOD has put in place a management control framework that will enforce holding all responsible levels accountable, ensuring that all routine medical requirements are being met, and that complete and reliable data are being entered into the appropriate tracking systems. We chose units that had deployed for Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom. To assess DOD’s visibility over reserve components’ health status after they are called to duty and the care, if any, provided to those deployed with preexisting conditions, we collected and analyzed information from a variety of sources throughout DOD. Reserve Forces: DOD Policies Do Not Ensure That Personnel Meet Medical and Physical Fitness Standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) operations in time of war or national emergency depend on sizeable reserve force involvement and DOD expects future use of the reserve force to remain high. Operational readiness depends on healthy and fit personnel. Long-standing problems have been identified with reserve members not being in proper medical or physical condition. Drilling members in the reserve force by law are required to have a medical exam every 5 years and an annual certificate of their medical status. Also, DOD policies require an annual dental exam and an annual evaluation of physical fitness. Compliance with these routine requirements is the first step in determining who is fit for duty. Public Law 108-375 required GAO to study DOD's management of the health status of reserve members activated for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. GAO assessed DOD's (1) ability to determine reserve force compliance with routine exams, and (2) visibility over reserve members' health status after they are called to duty and the care, if any, provided to those deployed with preexisting conditions.
What GAO Found
DOD is unable to determine the extent to which the reserve force complied with routine examinations due to lack of complete or reliable data. Although each reserve component employs a tracking system capable of monitoring compliance with medical exams, only one component has taken the necessary quality assurance steps to ensure the reliability of its data. While the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has the responsibility for overseeing medical and physical fitness policy and processes, it has not established a management control framework and executed a plan to oversee compliance with routine examinations. Specifically, this office has not enforced holding all responsible levels accountable, ensuring that all requirements are being met, and that complete and reliable data are being entered into the appropriate tracking system. For example, this office has not enforced its own requirement for the services to report on the components' physical fitness status. Without complete and reliable data, DOD is not in a sound position to provide the Secretary of Defense or Congress assurances that the reserve force is medically and physically fit when called to active duty. DOD has only limited visibility over the health status of reserve members after they are called to duty and is unable to determine the extent of care provided to those members deployed with preexisting medical conditions despite the existence of various sources of medical information. The components collect various types of medical data, but vary in their ability to systematically identify, track, and report information on those with temporary and permanent conditions that may limit deployability. In addition, medical information is captured on predeployment forms for all members and entered into a DOD-wide centralized database. GAO has previously reported that the database has missing and incomplete health data, and DOD is working to correct this through its quality assurance program. GAO found during this review that DOD has continued to make progress entering the data from the forms into the database, but the data are still incomplete and the reasons why members are determined medically nondeployable are not captured in a way that is easily discernable. While the Under Secretary of Defense continues to have responsibility for overseeing the medical and physical fitness of reserve members after they are called to duty, the combatant commanders, under the Joint Chief of Staff, have this responsibility for the theater. DOD is unable to determine the care provided to those deployed with preexisting medical conditions because DOD has not determined what preexisting conditions may be allowed into a specific theater and, thus, does not know what conditions to track. Evidence GAO developed suggests that members are deployed into theater with preexisting conditions, such as diabetes, heart problems, and cancer. The impact of those who are not medically and physically fit for duty could be significant for future deployments as the pool of reserve members from which to fill requirements is dwindling and those who have deployed are not in as good health as they were before deployment. |
gao_GAO-08-852 | gao_GAO-08-852_0 | As a result, it is inevitable that assumptions and policy judgments must be used in risk analysis and management. DHS has used an evolving risk-based methodology to identify the urban areas eligible for HSGP grants and the amount of funds states and urban areas receive (see Fig 2). DHS made this change in response to the 9/11Act requirement to perform a risk assessment for the 100 largest MSAs by population. The change to the use of MSA data in fiscal year 2008 also resulted in changes in the relative risk rankings of some urban areas. As a result, DHS officials expanded the eligible urban areas in fiscal year 2008 to a total of 60 UASI grantees, in part, to address the effects of this change to MSA data, as well as to ensure that all urban areas that received fiscal year 2007 funding also received funding for fiscal year 2008, according to DHS officials. One benefit of the change to MSAs was that the UASI boundaries align more closely with the boundaries used to collect some of the economic and population data used in the model. Consequently, the fiscal year 2008 model may have resulted in more accurate data. Vulnerability Element of the Risk Analysis Model Has Limitations that Reduce Its Value
Although the methodology DHS uses is reasonable, the vulnerability element of the risk analysis model—as currently calculated by DHS—has limitations that reduce its value for providing an accurate assessment of risk. DHS considered most areas of the country equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack in the risk analysis model used for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and assigned a constant value to vulnerability, which ignores geographic differences in the social, built, and natural environments across states and urban areas. As a result, DHS did not measure vulnerability, but assigned it a constant value of 1.0 across all states and urban areas. DHS’s risk-based allocation methodology and risk analysis model are generally reasonable tools for measuring relative risk within a given fiscal year, considering its use of a generally-accepted risk calculation formula; key model results’ decreased sensitivity to incremental changes in the assumptions related to Tier 1 UASI grantees or the eligibility for Tier 2 UASI funding, the reliability of the consequence variable component indices, and its adoption of MSAs to calculate urban area footprints. Homeland Security Grant Program
Introduction
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in fiscal
DHS provided approximately $1.7 billion to states and urban areas through its Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events. DHS plans to distribute about $1.6 billion for these grants in fiscal year 2008. What methodology did DHS use to allocate HSGP funds for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, including any changes DHS made to the eligibility and allocation processes for fiscal year 2008 and the placement of states and urban areas within threat tiers, and why? Scope and Methodology
We analyzed DHS documents including the FY2007 and FY2008 risk analysis models,
grant guidance, presentations, and interviewed DHS officials about: The HSGP grant determination process in FY07—and any changes to the The process by which DHS’s risk analysis model is used to estimate relative risk: Risk = Threat*(Vulnerability & Consequences); How the effectiveness assessment process is conducted; How final allocation decisions are made. Effectiveness Assessment
For fiscal year 2007 DHS assessed the applications submitted by states and eligible urban areas. FY 2007 Effectiveness Assessment
Final Allocation Process – FY 2007 Grants Based on Both Risk and Effectiveness Scores
DHS allocated funds based on the risk scores of states and urban areas, as adjusted by their effectiveness scores. minimum = 0.375% of all funds appropriated for SHSP and UASI. In fiscal year 2005, the footprint was limited to city boundaries (and did not include the 10-mile buffer zone). In fiscal year 2008, DHS used Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from the Census Bureau, as required under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has distributed almost $20 billion in funding to enhance the nation's capabilities to respond to acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events. In fiscal year 2007, DHS provided approximately $1.7 billion to states and urban areas through its Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events. As part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2007, GAO was mandated to review the methodology used by DHS to allocate HSGP grants. This report addresses (1) the changes DHS has made to its risk-based methodology used to allocate grant funding from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008 and (2) whether the fiscal year 2008 methodology is reasonable. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed DHS documents related to its methodology and grant guidance, interviewed DHS officials about the grant process used in fiscal year 2007 and changes made to the process for fiscal year 2008, and used GAO's risk management framework based on best practices.
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2008 HSGP grants, DHS is primarily following the same methodology it used in fiscal year 2007, but incorporated metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) within the model used to calculate risk. The methodology consists of a three-step process--a risk analysis of urban areas and states based on measures of threat, vulnerability and consequences, an effectiveness assessment of applicants' investment justifications, and a final allocation decision. The principal change in the risk analysis model for 2008 is in the definition of the geographic boundaries of eligible urban areas. In 2007, the footprint was defined using several criteria, which included a 10-mile buffer zone around the center city. Reflecting the requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS assessed risk for the Census Bureau's 100 largest MSAs by population in determining its 2008 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant allocations. This change altered the geographic footprint of the urban areas assessed, aligning them more closely with the boundaries used by government agencies to collect some of the economic and population data used in the model. This may have resulted in DHS using data in its model that more accurately estimated the population and economy of those areas. The change to the use of MSA data in fiscal year 2008 also resulted in changes in the relative risk rankings of some urban areas. As a result, DHS officials expanded the eligible urban areas in fiscal year 2008 to a total of 60 UASI grantees, in part, to address the effects of this change to MSA data, as well as to ensure that all urban areas receiving fiscal year 2007 funding continued to receive funding in fiscal year 2008, according to DHS officials. Generally, DHS has constructed a reasonable methodology to assess risk and allocate funds within a given fiscal year. The risk analysis model DHS uses as part of its methodology includes empirical risk analysis and policy judgments to select the urban areas eligible for grants (all states are guaranteed a specified minimum percentage of grant funds available) and to allocate State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and UASI funds. However, our review found that the vulnerability element of the risk analysis model has limitations that reduce its value. Measuring vulnerability is considered a generally-accepted practice in assessing risk; however, DHS's current risk analysis model does not measure vulnerability for each state and urban area. Rather, DHS considered all states and urban areas equally vulnerable to a successful attack and assigned every state and urban area a vulnerability score of 1.0 in the risk analysis model, which does not take into account any geographic differences. Thus, as a practical matter, the final risk scores are determined by the threat and consequences scores. |
gao_GAO-09-569 | gao_GAO-09-569_0 | An individual applying for a new business license or a renewal of his/her business license to operate a farm labor contracting, garment manufacturing, or car washing and polishing business must first prove full compliance with federal employment taxes by filing all required federal employment tax returns and resolving all outstanding federal employment taxes through full payment or appeal. According to the IRS Ogden database on business applicants, 7,194 businesses applied for a business license in the three industries one or more times from calendar years 2006 through 2008 and requested that IRS provide California with information on their compliance with federal employment taxes. California businesses filed 441 employment tax returns to come into compliance to qualify for California business licenses and IRS collected nearly $7.4 million in employment taxes, according to IRS Ogden spreadsheets. We estimated that IRS incurred about $331,348 to operate the data-sharing arrangement in calendar years 2006 and 2007. Using our estimate, the ROI for this data-sharing arrangement is 22:1. IRS has not tracked the cost data needed to do a study comparing the ROI of the IRS Ogden/DLSE enforcement activity with those of other current enforcement activities to determine how the IRS Ogden/DLSE data-sharing arrangement ROI compares with those of IRS’s other enforcement activities. However, IRS has developed ROI estimates for five new direct revenue-producing enforcement initiatives it proposed in its fiscal year 2009 budget submission. Tax Compliance among Businesses Showed Improvement after They Applied for State Business Licenses
We identified the 2,017 businesses that applied for business licenses in calendar year 2006 only, and found that 315 of these businesses had unpaid assessments at the time of applying and that tax compliance improved for these 315 businesses. All but 1 of the 350 businesses that had unpaid assessments when they applied for business licenses in calendar year 2006 were small businesses. Many Opportunities Exist to Require Federal Tax Compliance to Qualify for State Business Licenses, but Challenges Exist
We contacted revenue officials in every state and the District of Columbia to ask whether their states have business licensing requirements and, if so, whether they require demonstration of state tax compliance before business licenses are granted. Some states and some business types may represent more of an immediate opportunity for establishing arrangements that require federal tax compliance to qualify for state business licenses. States that currently require compliance with state taxes for selected business license applicants may be more amenable to requiring federal tax compliance than states that do not even require state tax compliance since they already recognize tax compliance as important for the businesses. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to analyze (1) the extent to which requiring a demonstration of federal tax compliance to qualify for a state business license has the potential to improve federal tax compliance and (2) what opportunities exist for increasing arrangements that require federal tax compliance to qualify for state business licensing. To provide background on data-sharing arrangements that require compliance with tax obligations to qualify for state business licensing, we reviewed relevant Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) documents and interviewed IRS and California officials. For our analysis, we matched records of the California businesses that we selected from the Access database because they applied in calendar year 2006 only with IRS’s Unpaid Assessments file as of the weeks of September 18, 2006, and August 18, 2008; identified the number of businesses with unpaid assessments and the amounts of their tax debt as of the week of September 18, 2006; and identified the applicants for business licenses in 2006 only that had resolved their unpaid assessments as of August 18, 2008, and the amounts of their tax debt they resolved. To determine what opportunities exist for increasing data sharing for arrangements that require federal tax compliance to qualify for state business licensing, we (1) analyzed and summarized which states and the District of Columbia have data-sharing arrangements that require state tax compliance to qualify for state business licensing, which states do not have such arrangements, and which states do not require businesses to obtain business licenses on the state level; (2) contacted revenue officials in 50 states and the District of Columbia via e-mail with structured questions about the extent to which their states engage in data-sharing arrangements that require demonstration of tax compliance before business licenses are granted; and (3) sent a follow-up e-mail to 21 state revenue officials who confirmed that their states require applicants to be compliant with state taxes to qualify for business licenses, by requesting information on the amount of taxes collected, the costs associated with operating the data-sharing arrangements, and benefits of these data- sharing relationships to the states. | Why GAO Did This Study
The California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), requires applicants for California business licenses in three industries--farm labor contracting, garment manufacturing, and car washing and polishing--to be in compliance with federal employment tax obligations to qualify. Based on questions about whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is fully using data from state and local governments to reduce the tax gap, GAO was asked to analyze (1) the extent to which requiring a demonstration of federal tax compliance to qualify for a state business license has the potential to improve federal tax compliance and (2) what opportunities exist for increasing arrangements that require federal tax compliance to qualify for state business licensing. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed IRS administrative and tax data. GAO identified California as a case study. GAO interviewed IRS and state officials and contacted revenue officials in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
What GAO Found
The California requirement that three types of businesses be in compliance with federal employment taxes to obtain a state business license shows promise as a valuable tool for improving federal tax compliance. According to data from IRS, of 7,194 businesses that applied for a California business license one or more times from calendar years 2006 through 2008 about 24 percent had to file employment tax returns or pay overdue taxes to come into compliance with federal employment taxes. California businesses filed 441 employment tax returns and IRS collected nearly $7.4 million in current dollars in employment taxes in calendar year 2006 and in 8 months of calendar year 2007. GAO estimated that IRS incurred about $331,348 to operate the data-sharing arrangement for this period. Using this cost estimate, the ROI for this arrangement is 22:1. IRS has not tracked the cost data needed to compare the ROI of the IRS-DLSE enforcement activity with other current enforcement activities. However, IRS's highest estimated ROI among five new direct revenue-producing enforcement initiatives proposed in its fiscal year 2009 budget was 11.4:1. Tax compliance among businesses after they applied for state business licenses showed continued improvement. GAO identified 2,017 businesses that applied for business licenses in calendar year 2006 only and found that 315 of these businesses had unpaid assessments as of September 18, 2006. By August 18, 2008, 165 of these businesses had resolved or lowered their unpaid assessment debt by $1,925,162. All but 1 of the 350 businesses that had unpaid assessments when they applied for business licenses in calendar year 2006 were small businesses. GAO's analysis, although showing a promising ROI, did not take into account certain factors, such as whether other tax collection activities were in process for the businesses that applied for licenses. Many opportunities exist to require federal tax compliance to qualify for state business licenses. GAO contacted revenue officials in every state and the District of Columbia to ask whether their states require tax compliance for business licenses. For the 48 respondents, 20 revenue officials said that their states require compliance with state taxes to obtain a state business license, and that these requirements exist for one or more industries. Twenty said that their states do not have such a requirement; 8 said that their states have no business license requirement at the state level. According to IRS, arrangements exist with 13 states that require compliance with one or more federal taxes to qualify for a state business license. Varying licensing requirements from state to state and lack of uniformity among states in categorizing a license as a "business license" make pinpointing the exact number of opportunities difficult. States that currently require compliance with state taxes for selected business license applicants may represent more of an immediate opportunity for establishing arrangements that require federal tax compliance to qualify for a state business license since they already see tax compliance as important for the businesses. Some challenges, such as a lack of current legal authority in some states to link businesses to tax compliance, would need to be addressed if requiring federal tax compliance for state business licenses is to be expanded. |
gao_GAO-15-100 | gao_GAO-15-100_0 | Cost reserves are used to mitigate issues during the development of a project. We recommended that NASA conduct an updated joint cost and schedule risk analysis to address the issues we identified and use more detailed cost information to adjust its cost estimates. Specifically, in the past 14 months, the overall project schedule reserve declined from 14 months to 11 months.With less than 4 years until the planned launch in October 2018, the project’s overall schedule reserve is above the Goddard standard and JWST plan—which was set above the Goddard standard and included more reserve than required—for schedule reserve at this point in the project. The JWST project has used over 20 percent of the schedule reserve it held in the past 14 months with almost 4 years remaining for its integration and test effort, where GAO’s prior work has shown and NASA has concurred problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip. All individual element and major subsystem schedules have lost schedule reserve since last year. This is particularly the case with JWST given its complexity. With schedule losses having already occurred on most elements and major subsystems across the project prior to most of the project’s integration and testing efforts, the fiscal year 2016 funding may arrive too late to prevent further schedule delays and the risk of such delays impacting the launch date is heightened. The project continues to address other technical risks and challenges as it continues development and testing of the various JWST elements and major subsystems. GAO best practices call for programs to regularly update cost risk analyses to account for new risks. The project did subsequently agree to conduct its own cost risk analysis of the prime contractor’s remaining work. If properly conducted, its analysis will provide the project with the reliable information necessary to gauge whether the contractor’s budget is on target or at risk of future cost overruns. Project and Prime Contractor Have Not Updated Risk Analyses to Account for New Risks
Neither NASA’s joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) analysis nor Northrop Grumman’s cost risk analysis to support the prime contract has been updated since 2011. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following two actions: In order to provide additional information and analyses to effectively manage the program and account for new risks identified after the 2011 replan, direct JWST project officials to follow best practices while conducting a cost risk analysis on the prime contract for the work remaining and ensure the analysis is updated as significant risks emerge. These comments are reprinted in appendix V. In responding to a draft of this report, NASA partially concurred with one recommendation and concurred with another. Furthermore, NASA noted the JWST project initiated a cost risk analysis of the prime contract that is incorporating best practices and will update it when required by NASA policy. As the telescope is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, both JWST and NASA officials have a tremendous stake in the success of the JWST project. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which (1) technical challenges are impacting the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project’s ability to stay on schedule and budget, (2) budget and cost estimates reflect current information about project risks, and (3) the project uses award fee contracts to motivate and assess contractor performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
JWST is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. With significant integration and testing planned until the launch date, the JWST project will need to address many challenges before NASA can conduct the science the telescope is intended to produce. GAO has made a number of prior recommendations to NASA, including in December 2012 that the project perform an updated joint cost and schedule risk analysis to improve cost estimates. NASA initially concurred with this recommendation, but it later indicated that the tracking of information it already had in place was sufficient and ultimately decided not to conduct another joint cost and schedule risk analysis.
GAO was mandated to assess the program annually and report on its progress. This is the third such report. This report assesses, among other issues, the extent to which (1) technical challenges are impacting the JWST project's ability to stay on schedule and budget, and (2) budget and cost estimates reflect current information about project risks. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed monthly and quarterly JWST reports, interviewed NASA and contractor officials, reviewed relevant policies, and conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data.
What GAO Found
With just under 4 years until its planned launch in October 2018, the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reports it remains on schedule and budget. Technical challenges with JWST elements and major subsystems, however, have diminished the project's overall schedule reserve and increased risk. During the past year, delays have occurred on every element and major subsystem schedule—especially with the cryocooler—leaving all at risk of negatively impacting the overall project schedule reserve if further delays occur.
The project reports its overall schedule reserve is above its plan and standards. However, JWST is one of the most complex projects in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) history and has begun integrating and testing only two of the five elements and major subsystems. As such, maintaining as much schedule reserve as possible to navigate through almost 4 more years of integration and testing that remains, where prior work has shown problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip, is critical. While the project has been able to reorganize work when necessary to mitigate schedule slips, this flexibility will diminish going forward. JWST is also facing limited short-term cost reserves to mitigate additional project schedule threats.
The JWST project and prime contractor's cost risk analyses used to validate the JWST budget are outdated and do not account for many new risks identified since 2011. GAO best practices for cost estimating call for regularly updating cost risk analyses to validate that reserves are sufficient to account for new risks. NASA officials said they conduct sufficient analysis to monitor the health of the budget. These efforts, however, do not incorporate potential impacts of risks identified since 2011 into estimates. While the project has subsequently agreed to conduct a cost risk analysis of the contract, it is important that they follow best practices, for example, by regularly updating that analysis. Doing so would provide the project with reliable information to gauge whether the contractor is at risk of future cost overruns.
What GAO Recommends
Among other actions, NASA should follow best practices when updating its cost risk analysis to ensure reliability. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA partially concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-383 | gao_GAO-08-383_0 | Numbers of Media Outlets and Owners Generally Increase with Market Size, Although Operating Agreements May Reduce the Effective Number of Independent Outlets
Markets with large populations have more television, radio, and newspaper outlets than less populated markets. In more diverse markets, we also observed more radio and television stations and newspapers operating in languages other than English, which contributed to a greater number of outlets. For example, some media companies participate in agreements to share content among several outlets. This example suggests that the number of independently owned outlets in a given market might not always be a good indicator of how many independently produced local news or other programs are available in a market. The Internet Is Expanding Access to Media Content
The Internet delivers content from a virtually limitless supply of sources. These weaknesses include (1) exemptions from filing for certain types of broadcast stations, such as noncommercial stations; (2) inadequate data quality procedures; and (3) problematic data storage and retrieval. We identified three primary barriers contributing to the limited levels of ownership by minorities and women. These barriers include (1) the large scale of ownership in the media industry, (2) a lack of easy access to sufficient capital for financing the purchases of stations, and (3) the repeal of the tax certificate program, which provided financial incentives for incumbents to sell stations to minorities. A Variety of Economic, Legal and Regulatory, and Technical Factors Influence Media Ownership
Economic factors—including high fixed costs and the size of the market— influence the number of media outlets available in markets, the presence of operating agreements between outlets, and incentives for firms to consolidate their operations. Legal and regulatory factors appear to influence ownership of media outlets as well, by constraining the number and types of media outlets that a single entity can own. High Fixed Costs and Local Market Size Are Important Economic Factors that Influence the Number and Ownership of Media Outlets
We found that fixed costs are prevalent in the media industry and are an important economic factor influencing the number and ownership of media outlets. Stakeholders’ Opinions Varied on Modifications to Media Ownership Rules, but Business Stakeholders Were More Likely to Favor Deregulation
The stakeholders we interviewed seldom agreed on proposed modifications to media ownership rules. However, most business stakeholders expressing opinions on these rules were more likely to report that they should be relaxed or repealed. In contrast, nonbusiness stakeholders who expressed opinions on the rules were more likely to report that the rules should be left in place or strengthened. Both business and nonbusiness stakeholders who expressed an opinion on the previously repealed tax certificate program supported either reinstating or expanding the program to encourage the sale of broadcast outlets to minorities. Though media options vary by local market, the overall growth in the communications industry and the emergence of the Internet have provided unprecedented levels of media choices to the American public. In undertaking this effort, FCC noted that it was appropriate to develop “precise information on minority and female ownership of mass media facilities” and “annual information on the state and progress of minority and female ownership,” thereby positioning “both Congress and the Commission to assess the need for, and success of, programs to foster opportunities for minorities and females to own broadcast facilities.” Yet, data weaknesses stemming from how the data are collected, verified, and stored limit the benefits of this effort. Recommendation for Executive Action
To more effectively monitor and report on the ownership of broadcast outlets by minorities and women, we recommend that the Chairman, FCC, identify processes and procedures to improve the reliability of FCC’s data on gender, race, and ethnicity so that these data can be readily used to accurately depict the level, nature, and trends in minority and women ownership, thereby enabling FCC and the Congress to determine how well FCC is meeting its policy goal of diversity in media ownership. To select the case study DMAs, we used a stratified random sample. | Why GAO Did This Study
The media industry plays an important role in educating and entertaining the public. While the media industry provides the public with many national choices, media outlets located in a local market are more likely to provide local programs that meet the needs of residents in the market compared to national outlets. This report reviews (1) the number and ownership of various media outlets; (2) the level of minority- and women-owned broadcast outlets; (3) the influence of economic, legal and regulatory, and technological factors on the number and ownership of media outlets; and (4) stakeholders' opinions on modifying certain media ownership laws and regulations. GAO conducted case studies of 16 randomly sampled markets, stratified by population. GAO also interviewed officials from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Department of Commerce, trade associations, and the industry. Finally, GAO reviewed FCC's forms, processes, and reports.
What GAO Found
The numbers of media outlets and owners of media outlets generally increase with the size of the market; markets with large populations have more television and radio stations and newspapers than less populated markets. Additionally, diverse markets have more outlets operating in languages other than English, contributing to a greater number of outlets. Some companies participate in operating agreements wherein two or more media outlets might, for example, share content. As such, these agreements may suggest that the number of independently owned media outlets might not always be a good indicator of how many independently produced local news and other programs are available in a market. Finally, the Internet is expanding access to media content and competition. On a biennial basis, FCC collects data on the gender, race, and ethnicity of broadcast owners to, according to FCC, position itself and the Congress to assess the need for, and success of, programs to foster minority and women ownership. However, these data suffer from three weaknesses: (1) exemptions from filing for certain types of broadcast stations, (2) inadequate data quality procedures, and (3) problems with data storage and retrieval. These weaknesses limit the benefits of this data collection effort. While reliable government data are lacking, available evidence suggests that ownership of broadcast outlets by minorities and women is limited. Several barriers contribute to the limited levels of ownership by these groups, including a lack of easy access to sufficient capital. A variety of economic, legal and regulatory, and technological factors influence media ownership. Two economic factors--high fixed costs and the size of the market--appear to influence the number of media outlets in a market, the incentive to consolidate, and the prevalence of operating agreements. By limiting the number and types of media outlets that a company can own, various laws and regulations affect the ownership of media outlets. Technological factors, such as the emergence of the Internet, have facilitated entry for new companies, thereby increasing the amount of content and competition. Stakeholders expressed varied opinions on modifications to media ownership rules. Most business stakeholders expressing an opinion on various media ownership rules were more likely to report that the rules should be relaxed or repealed. In contrast, nonbusiness stakeholders who expressed an opinion on the rules were more likely to report that the rules should be left in place or strengthened. Both business and nonbusiness stakeholders who expressed an opinion on a previously repealed tax certificate program supported either reinstating or expanding the program to encourage the sale of broadcast outlets to minorities. |
gao_GAO-03-228 | gao_GAO-03-228_0 | For the 2000 Census, Hispanics could identify themselves as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or “other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.” Respondents who checked off this last category could write in a specific subgroup such as “Salvadoran.” Although this approach was similar to that used for the 1990 Census, as shown in figure 1, the “other” category in the 1990 Census included examples of other Hispanic subgroups. The Bureau removed the subgroup examples as part of a broader effort to simplify the questionnaire and thus help reverse the downward trend in mail response rates that had been occurring since 1970. In redesigning the questionnaire, the Bureau added as much white space as possible, and removed unnecessary words to make the questionnaire shorter and more readable. Moreover, evaluations conducted since the 2000 Census by the Bureau indicate that the Bureau obtained a more complete count of Hispanics in the 2000 Census than it did in 1990. No Bureau Tests Were Designed Specifically to Measure the Impact of Questionnaire Changes on Hispanic Subgroup Data
Bureau guidance requires that any changes to the census form must first be thoroughly tested. Nevertheless, while the Bureau conducted a number of tests of the sequencing and wording of the race and ethnicity questions, according to Bureau officials, it did not specifically design any tests to determine the impact of the changes on the quality of Hispanic subgroup data. Because OMB standards do not require data on Hispanic subgroups, Bureau officials said that the Bureau targeted its resources on testing and research aimed at improving the overall count of Hispanics. The Bureau Plans to Conduct Targeted Research on Hispanic Subgroups in the Future
Because of concerns relating to the 2000 Census counts of Hispanic subgroups, Bureau officials said that they plan to focus testing and research on these questions in preparation for the 2010 Census. Bureau officials told us that they expect that the ACS will continue to use the 2000 Census Hispanic question until research and testing on a new version is complete. Although the specific questions about the Hispanic subgroup data differed from those identified in our review of the Bureau’s efforts to collect and report data on the homeless and others without conventional housing, a common cause of both sets of problems was the Bureau’s lack of agencywide guidelines for its decisions on the level of quality needed to release data to the public. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help boost response rates of both the general and Hispanic populations, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) redesigned the 2000 questionnaire, in part by deleting a list of examples of Hispanic subgroups from the question on Hispanic origin. While more Hispanics were counted in 2000 compared to 1990, the counts for Dominicans and other Hispanic subgroups were lower than expected. Concerned that this was caused by the deletion of Hispanic subgroup examples, congressional requesters asked us to investigate the research and management activities behind the changes.
What GAO Found
In both the 1990 and 2000 census, Hispanics could identify themselves as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Hispanic. Respondents checking off this latter category could write in a specific subgroup such as "Salvadoran." The "other" category in the 1990 Census included examples of subgroups to clarify the question. For the 2000 Census, the Bureau removed the subgroup examples as part of a broader effort to simplify the questionnaire and help improve response rates. The Bureau removed unnecessary words and added blank space to shorten the questionnaire and make it more readable. Although the Bureau conducted a number of tests on the sequencing and wording of the race and ethnicity questions, and sought input from several expert panels, no Bureau tests were designed specifically to measure the impact of the questionnaire changes on the quality of Hispanic subgroup data. According to Bureau officials, because federal laws and guidelines require data on Hispanics but not Hispanic subgroups, the Bureau targeted its resources on research aimed at improving the overall count of Hispanics. Bureau evaluations conducted after the census indicated that deleting the subgroup examples might have confused some respondents and produced less-than-accurate subgroup data. A key factor behind the Bureau's release of the questionable subgroup data was its lack of adequate guidelines governing the quality needed before making data publicly available. As part of its planning for the 2010 Census, the Bureau intends to conduct further research on the Hispanic origin question, including a field test in parts of New York City. However, until research on a new version of the question is finalized, Bureau officials said that other census surveys will continue to use the 2000 Census format of the Hispanic origin question. |
gao_GAO-14-454T | gao_GAO-14-454T_0 | For example, any airport with at least 10,000 passengers is assured at least $1 million in annual grant funding. The program now provides subsidies to airlines to serve small airports that are (1) at least 70 driving miles from the nearest medium- or large-hub airport, or (2) requires a per-passenger EAS subsidy less than $200 unless such point is greater than 210 miles from the nearest medium- or large-hub airport. Congress also established SCASDP as a pilot program in 2000 in the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21), to help small communities enhance their air service. The Airline Industry Is Adapting to Economic Pressures that Creates Challenges to Maintaining Air Service to Small Communities
Service to Small Communities Has Declined since 2007
Air service to small airports as measured by the number of flights and seats available has mostly declined since 2007, but so has service to airports of all sizes. Federal Programs and Policies Support Service to Small Communities but Face Challenges
Two federal programs continue to support air service to small communities but also face some challenges. In addition, the appropriations Congress made available to EAS increased from about $102 million in fiscal year 2003 to about $232 million in fiscal year 2013 (see table 1 below). This was due, in part, to EAS subsidized service not having the destinations, frequency, or low fares that passengers prefer. The number of EAS communities being served by airlines with aircraft smaller than 15-seats doubled from 2009 through 2013. Small Community Grants Have Had Limited Effectiveness in Retaining Air Service
Small-hub and smaller airports are eligible for SCASDP grants provided the airport is not receiving sufficient air service or had unreasonably high airfares. We found in 2005 and 2007 that SCASDP grantees pursued a variety of goals and strategies for supporting air service, and some of the grants resulted in successfully meeting their intended purposes.variety of project goals and strategies to improve air service to their community, including (1) adding flights, airlines, and destinations; (2) lowering fares; (3) upgrading the aircraft serving the community; (4) obtaining better data for planning and marketing air service; (5) increasing enplanements; and (6) curbing the loss of passengers to other airports. Legislation, Regulations, and Airport Policies Affect Service to Small Communities
In addition to the federal programs previously discussed, other legislative and regulatory policies could affect the provision of air service to small communities. Multimodal and Nongovernmental Transportation Options Could Help Small Communities
A Multimodal Approach Could Be Used to Connect Communities
In July 2009, we concluded that a multimodal approach—one that relies on for example, bus service to larger airports or air taxi service to connect communities—is an alternative to providing scheduled air-service connectivity to small communities. For some communities that receive EAS subsidies—for example, those that have limited demand for the service due to proximity to other airports or limited population—other transportation modes might be more cost effective and practical than these subsidies. When potentially cost-effective alternatives, such as bus service to other airports, are not used, the costs of subsidies may be higher than necessary to link these communities to the nation’s passenger aviation system. Considering options to the current EAS program, such as multimodal transportation, may help Congress identify opportunities to limit the financial strain on the EAS program. Local Community Approaches to Attracting Air Service Have Had Some Success
GAO-06-21. In its 2008 review of SCASDP, the DOT OIG reported that airlines operating in small communities typically have limited resources to invest in marketing designed to stimulate demand, and using funds for marketing programs in support of other incentive programs— such as revenue guarantees or cost subsidies—can stimulate demand by increasing awareness of airport services and mitigate “leakage” of passengers to surrounding airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Establishing and retaining reliable air service to small communities has been a challenge for decades. Communities seek access to air transportation services as a driver for attracting investment and generating employment. To incentivize service, Congress established two programs to help support air service to small communities—EAS and SCASDP. Airports are categorized by DOT's Federal Aviation Administration and described in terms of “hub” size based on the number of passengers served annually. Airports range from large hubs with at least 7.3 million passengers in 2012 to nonprimary airports with fewer than 10,000 passengers. Airports receiving subsidized EAS service are either nonhub or nonprimary, and SCASDP airports are small hub or smaller.
This testimony discusses (1) the airline industry factors affecting air service to small communities, (2) the federal programs and policies that support air service to small communities, and (3) other options for improving access to air service for these communities. The testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from 2003 through 2014; analysis of industry data for years 2007 through 2013; and selected updates on EAS and SCASDP programs. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program documentation and interviewed DOT officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
Air service to small communities has declined since 2007 due, in part, to higher fuel costs and declining population, and for some communities, compounded by more attractive service (i.e., larger airports in larger cities) within driving distance. In fact, airports of all sizes have lost capacity in the number of available seats, and largely for flights as well. However, medium-hub and small-hub airports have proportionally lost more service than large-hub or nonhub airports (see figure).
The two primary programs, designed to help small communities retain air service, administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT), face challenges.
The Essential Air Service (EAS) program, which received about $232 million in 2013, provided subsidies to airlines that served 117 eligible non-Alaskan communities in 2013. For the most part, only airports in eligible communities that received EAS-subsidized service have experienced an increased number of flights since 2007. However, the service may not always be the most cost-effective option for connecting people to the national transportation network, and the total and per-community EAS subsidies have grown since 2008. Legislation to control costs was recently enacted which limited access to EAS, for example by changing eligibility requirements.
The Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP) is a grant program to help small communities enhance air service at small-hub or smaller airports. DOT can award no more than 40 grants a year, thus SCASDP assists fewer communities than does EAS. Further, unlike EAS, funding for SCASDP—$6 million in 2013—has decreased since the program was created in 2002. Past reviews of SCASDP's effectiveness have found mixed success, with about half or less of the grants achieving their goals.
Multimodal and community-based approaches can be used to help small communities connect to the nation's transportation network. Multimodal solutions, such as bus access to larger airports or air taxi service, could be more cost-effective than current programs. In addition, some communities have had success with attracting air service through methods such as financial incentives and marketing support. |
gao_GAO-13-260 | gao_GAO-13-260_0 | Jones Act Results in a Discrete Shipping Market between the United States and Puerto Rico
Jones Act requirements have resulted in a discrete shipping market between Puerto Rico and the United States. Most of the cargo shipped between the United States and Puerto Rico is carried by four Jones Act carriers that provide dedicated, scheduled, weekly service using containerships and container barges—some of which have exceeded their expected useful life. Dry and liquid bulk cargo vessels also operate in the market under the Jones Act, although some shippers report that qualified bulk cargo vessels may not always be available to meet their needs. Cargo moving between Puerto Rico and foreign destinations is carried by numerous foreign-flag vessels, typically as part of longer global trade routes. Freight rates in this market are determined by a number of factors, including the supply of vessels and consumer demand in the market, as well as costs that carriers face to operate, some of which are affected by Jones Act requirements. The average freight rates of the four major Jones Act carriers in this market were lower in 2010 than they were in 2006, as the recent recession has contributed to decreases in demand. In contrast, foreign-flag carriers operate under different rules, regulations, and supply and demand conditions and generally have lower costs to operate than Jones Act carriers. Shippers doing business in Puerto Rico reported that freight rates for foreign carriers going to and from foreign ports are often—although not always—lower than rates they pay to ship similar cargo from the United States, despite longer distances. However, data were not available to allow us to validate the examples given or verify the extent to which this occurred. According to these shippers, lower rates, as well as limited availability of qualified vessels in some cases can lead companies to source products from foreign countries rather than the United States. 1). 2). According to shippers and carriers, several other factors not directly related to Jones Act requirements in the Puerto Rico market contribute to how freight rates are set, including the following:
For approximately 85 percent of the cargo moving between the United States and Puerto Rico, freight rates are set on a negotiated basis Although volume discounts are not unique to this under contract.market or the global maritime shipping industry, large volume shippers have more leverage to negotiate contracts with lower rates while small volume shippers or those that require infrequent service will likely pay higher rates. Many Factors Influence Prices of Goods in Puerto Rico and the Impact of Transportation Costs Likely Varies by Type of Good
The prices of goods sold in Puerto Rico are determined by a host of supply and demand factors, similar to freight rates, and therefore, the impact of any costs to ship between the United States and Puerto Rico on the average prices of goods in Puerto Rico is difficult, if not impossible, to On the demand side, key factors include the determine with precision.state of the economy and associated level of income of consumers, the tastes of potential consumers for various goods, and the extent to which consumers have ready substitutes (of other goods or the same good from elsewhere) available to meet their needs. According to MARAD officials, unrestricted competition with foreign-flag operators in the Puerto Rico trade would almost certainly lead to the disappearance of most U.S.-flag vessels in this trade. The nature of the service provided between Puerto Rico and the United States could also be affected by a full exemption from the Jones Act. Potential Effects and Trade-offs of an Exemption to the U.S.- Build Requirement
Rather than allowing foreign carriers to provide service between the United States and Puerto Rico, a different modification advocated by some stakeholders would be to allow vessels engaged in trade between the United States and Puerto Rico to be eligible for an exemption from the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act. According to proponents of this change, the availability of lower cost vessels could encourage existing carriers to recapitalize their aging fleets. Because of these price differentials, eliminating the U.S.-build requirement and allowing Jones Act carriers to deploy foreign-built vessels to serve Puerto Rico could reduce or eliminate U.S. shipyards’ expectations for future orders from this market and could have serious implications for the recent order for two U.S.-built ships for this market from one of the Jones Act carriers. Concluding Observations
The Jones Act was enacted nearly a century ago to help promote a viable maritime and shipbuilding industry that would, among other things, provide transportation for the nation’s maritime commerce and be available to serve the nation in times of war and national emergency. However, it is not possible to measure the extent to which rates in this trade are higher than they otherwise would be because the extent to which rules and regulations that would apply to international carriers’ vessels that may serve this trade are not known, and so many factors influence freight rates and product prices that the independent effect and associated economic costs of the Jones Act cannot be determined. Homeland Security and DOT provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated, as appropriate. DOT also generally agreed with the information presented in the report, but noted that many of the issues related to the Jones Act are both complex and multifaceted. We collected and analyzed data relevant to these markets and gathered the perspectives and experiences of numerous public and private sector stakeholders through interviews and written responses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Puerto Rico is subject to Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, known as the "Jones Act" (Act), which requires that maritime transport of cargo between points in the United States be carried by vessels that are (1) owned by U.S. citizens and registered in the United States, (2) built in the United States, and (3) operated with predominantly U.S.-citizen crews. The general purposes of the Jones Act include providing the nation with a strong merchant marine that can provide transportation for the nation's maritime commerce, serve in time of war or national emergency, and support an adequate shipyard industrial base. Companies (shippers) that use Jones Act carriers for shipping in the Puerto Rico trade have expressed concerns that, as a result of the Jones Act, freight rates between the United States and Puerto Rico are higher than they otherwise would be, and given the reliance on waterborne transportation have an adverse economic impact on Puerto Rico.
This report examines (1) maritime transportation to and from Puerto Rico and how the Jones Act affects that trade and (2) possible effects of modifying the application of the Jones Act in Puerto Rico. GAO collected and analyzed information and literature relevant to the market and gathered the views of numerous public and private sector stakeholders through interviews and written responses. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Transportation (DOT) generally agreed with the report, but emphasized that many of the issues related to the Jones Act are complex and multifaceted. DOT and others also provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Jones Act requirements have resulted in a discrete shipping market between Puerto Rico and the United States. Most of the cargo shipped between the United States and Puerto Rico is carried by four Jones Act carriers that provide dedicated, scheduled weekly service using containerships and container barges. Although some vessels are operating beyond their expected useful service life, many have been reconstructed or refurbished. Jones Act dry and liquid bulkcargo vessels also operate in the market, although some shippers report that qualified bulk-cargo vessels may not always be available to meet their needs. Cargo moving between Puerto Rico and foreign destinations is carried by numerous foreign-flag vessels, often with greater capacity, and typically as part of longer global trade routes. Freight rates are determined by a number of factors, including the supply of vessels and consumer demand in the market, as well as costs that carriers face to operate, some of which (e.g., crew costs) are affected by Jones Act requirements. The average freight rates of the four major Jones Act carriers in this market were lower in 2010 than they were in 2006, which was the onset of the recent recession in Puerto Rico that has contributed to decreases in demand. Foreign-flag carriers serving Puerto Rico from foreign ports operate under different rules, regulations, and supply and demand conditions and generally have lower costs to operate than Jones Act carriers have. Shippers doing business in Puerto Rico that GAO contacted reported that the freight rates are often--although not always--lower for foreign carriers going to and from Puerto Rico and foreign locations than the rates shippers pay to ship similar cargo to and from the United States, despite longer distances. However, data were not available to allow us to validate the examples given or verify the extent to which this difference occurred. According to these shippers, lower rates, as well as the limited availability of qualified vessels in some cases, can lead companies to source products from foreign countries rather than the United States.
The effects of modifying the application of the Jones Act for Puerto Rico are highly uncertain, and various trade-offs could materialize depending on how the Act is modified. Under a full exemption from the Act, the rules and requirements that would apply to all carriers would need to be determined. While proponents of this change expect increased competition and greater availability of vessels to suit shippers' needs, it is also possible that the reliability and other beneficial aspects of the current service could be affected. Furthermore, because of cost advantages, unrestricted competition from foreign-flag vessels could result in the disappearance of most U.S.-flag vessels in this trade, having a negative impact on the U.S. merchant marine and the shipyard industrial base that the Act was meant to protect. Instead of a full exemption, some stakeholders advocate an exemption from the U.S.-build requirement for vessels. According to proponents of this change, the availability of lower-cost, foreign-built vessels could encourage existing carriers to recapitalize their aging fleets (although one existing carrier has recently ordered two new U.S.-built vessels for this trade), and could encourage new carriers to enter the market. However, as with a full exemption, this partial exemption could also reduce or eliminate existing and future shipbuilding orders for vessels to be used in the Puerto Rico trade, having a negative impact on the shipyard industrial base the Act was meant to support. |
gao_GGD-98-199 | gao_GGD-98-199_0 | Introduction
According to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Guide to the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF), the CPDF is the federal government’s central personnel automated database that contains statistically accurate demographic information on about 1.9 million federal civilian employees. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this review, we had three objectives: (1) determine the extent to which selected CPDF data elements are accurate, including the data elements used by OPM’s Office of the Actuaries for estimating the government’s liability for future payments of federal retirement programs; (2) determine whether selected users of CPDF data believed CPDF products met their needs, including whether the products were current, accurate, and complete and whether the cautions OPM provided to them on the limitations associated with using the data were sufficient for them to present the CPDF data correctly; and (3) determine whether OPM has documented changes to the System and verified the System’s acceptance of those changes, as recommended in applicable federal guidance, and whether the System would implement CPDF edits as intended. We mailed the questionnaires to 247 individuals identified by OPM’s OWI as representing all the requesters of CPDF products in fiscal year 1996 who obtained data directly from OPM. On a periodic basis, however, OPM draws a governmentwide sample of CPDF records and measures CPDF data accuracy by comparing selected data in former federal employees’ official personnel folders to data in the CPDF for the same period. OPM generally makes the results of its measurements of CPDF data accuracy available to CPDF data users within OPM but not to non-OPM users. However, OPM did not make that statement for its December 1990 measurement of 1988 CPDF data. OPM officials said that OPM does not routinely inform non-OPM users of the results of its measurements of historical accuracy. OPM has not promulgated a standard for the accuracy of CPDF data. Conclusion
Most of the 28 data elements we reviewed were 99 percent or more accurate in the aggregate. USERs Generally Reported CPDF Products Met Their Needs, but Further Awareness of Cautions on CPDF Data Could Affect Use of the Data
We used a questionnaire to determine the extent to which selected CPDF users believed (1) the CPDF data they used met their needs, including whether the products were current, accurate, and complete; and (2) they received sufficient cautions about the limitations of CPDF data to use or present the CPDF data correctly. The guidance suggested that agencies document the life cycle of an automated information system from its initiation through installation and operation. OIT officials said that to their knowledge the System has not had problems processing data reliably and that the System’s owner, OPM’s OWI, concurred. Our review of 718 of the 763 computer instructions used by the CPDF showed that the System uses instructions that should implement CPDF edits as intended. OIT officials said that for OPM to accomplish its future information technology (IT) goals it will have to follow a structured approach for computer application development. In addition, the testing that was done was not done by an independent reviewer. Although OIT did not follow an SDLC approach and did not have documentation to show that the 1986 software upgrade passed acceptance tests or that subsequent modifications to the System’s software applications worked as intended, its managers said that they believe the System is reliable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) database of federal civilian employees, the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF), focusing on: (1) the extent to which selected CPDF data elements are accurate, including the data elements used by OPM's Office of the Actuaries for estimating the government's liability for future payments of federal retirement programs; (2) whether selected users of CPDF data believed that CPDF products met their needs, including whether the products were current, accurate, and complete and whether the cautions OPM provided to them on the limitations associated with using the data were sufficient for them to present the CPDF data correctly; and (3) whether OPM has documented changes to the Central Personnel Data System and verified the System's acceptance of those changes, as recommended in applicable federal guidance, and whether the System would implement CPDF edits as intended.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OPM does not have an official standard for the desired accuracy of CPDF data elements; (2) on a periodic basis, however, OPM measures CPDF data accuracy by comparing certain data found in a sample of former federal employees' official personnel folders to data in the CPDF for the same period; (3) OPM generally makes the results of its measurements of CPDF data accuracy available to users of CPDF data within OPM but not to non-OPM users; (4) although the accuracy of the CPDF data GAO reviewed varied by data element, about two-thirds of the selected CPDF data elements GAO reviewed were 99-percent or more accurate; (5) GAO surveyed all the requesters of CPDF products that OPM identified as obtaining data directly from OPM for fiscal year (FY) 1996; (6) most of these CPDF users reported that CPDF products met their needs, including the data being current, accurate, and complete; (7) the majority of surveyed users reported that they believed that the caution statements OPM provided were sufficient for them to use CPDF data correctly; (8) however, OPM did not provide these users of CPDF data with all 28 cautions that explain how CPDF limitations could affect how they present or use CPDF data; (9) although applicable federal guidance recommended that agencies document the life cycle of an automated information system from its initiation through installation and operation, OPM did not document changes that it made to the System in 1986 when it did a major redesign of the System's software; (10) OPM also did not have documentation to show that acceptance testing of those changes was done and, according to OPM, the testing was not done by an independent reviewer; (11) however, OPM officials said that to their knowledge the System has not had problems processing data reliably; (12) GAO's review of the computer instructions for most CPDF edits used by the System showed that the System uses instructions that should implement the CPDF edits reviewed as intended; (13) OPM officials acknowledged that for OPM to accomplish its future information technology goals it will have to follow an approach that includes documenting the development, modification, and management of its automated information systems and their software applications; and (14) OPM has committed to adopting this approach by no later than FY 2002. |
gao_GAO-15-207 | gao_GAO-15-207_0 | For the Medicaid program, this system is the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS). Provider enrollment and pre- and post-payment claims data review activities, and the MMIS subsystems that support them, were designed primarily to address program integrity goals of states’ delivery of fee-for- service health care to Medicaid beneficiaries. Ten Selected States Rely on a Variety of Systems to Support Program Integrity
All 10 of the states in our study had implemented MMIS subsystems to support their program integrity efforts. Three states reported that they were operating MMISs that were implemented more than 20 years ago, while 7 states had upgraded their subsystems in the past 13 years, and 2 of those reported having done so in the past 2 years. Further, 7 states had, in the past 10 years, implemented other new and more advanced systems, in addition to their MMISs, to meet specific needs related to enrolling providers and processing claims data. CMS Provides Data, Technical Guidance, and Funds to Help States Enhance Medicaid Program Integrity, but Most of the Selected States Do Not Measure Systems’ Effectiveness
In accordance with federal laws and agency program integrity plans, CMS takes steps to support states’ efforts to implement information systems that help prevent and detect improper payments in the Medicaid program. According to CMS officials with Medicaid Integrity Institute, the agency determines state Medicaid administrators’ needs for continuing education based on information collected by surveys administered during training sessions. States can request and receive funds to cover up to 90 percent of these costs, depending upon the extent to which their plans for implementing the systems meet certain technical specifications and requirements defined by CMS, including those defined for the implementation of system functionality to support efforts to prevent and detect improper payments. that support Medicaid administration.federal matching funds these states received. For its part, CMS has not required the states to identify and report on the outcomes and effectiveness of systems used for program integrity purposes. Without identifying and measuring the financial benefits (i.e., money saved or recovered) that result from using their MMISs and other systems, CMS and state Medicaid administrators cannot be assured of the systems’ effectiveness in helping to prevent and detect improper payments. Moreover, without having required states to institute consistent and repeatable approaches for measuring and reporting such outcomes, CMS Medicaid officials lack an essential mechanism for ensuring that the federal financial assistance that states receive to help fund the operations and maintenance of these systems is an effective use of resources to support Medicaid program integrity efforts. Selected States and CMS Have Taken Steps to Overcome Challenges with Using Systems to Analyze Managed Care Data
Even as the selected states rely on their systems to help prevent and detect improper Medicaid payments, five of the seven states in our study that administered Medicaid as both fee-for-service and managed care— North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, California, and Maryland—faced challenges that were specific to the use of their systems for ensuring the These challenges introduced integrity of their managed care programs.limitations in the states’ ability to use their systems to analyze managed care encounter data because of the (1) content of the data reported, (2) quality of the data submitted, or (3) inconsistencies between the ways managed care and fee-for-service data values are defined. However, the effectiveness of the systems for program integrity purposes is unknown. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the federal government’s and states’ investments in information systems result in outcomes that are effective in supporting efforts to save funds through the prevention and detection of improper payments in the Medicaid program, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the Administrator of CMS to require states to measure quantifiable benefits, such as cost reductions or avoidance, achieved as a result of operating information systems to help prevent and detect improper payments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the types and implementation status of the information systems used by states and territories to support Medicaid administrators’ efforts to prevent and detect improper payments to providers; (2) the extent to which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is making available funds, data sources, and other technical resources to support Medicaid programs’ efforts to implement systems that help prevent and detect improper payments to providers, and the effectiveness of the states’ systems; and (3) key challenges, if any, that Medicaid programs have faced in using IT to enhance program integrity initiatives, and CMS’s actions to support efforts to overcome these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides health care coverage to certain low-income individuals. The program is overseen by CMS, while the states that administer Medicaid are tasked with taking actions to ensure its integrity. Such actions include implementing IT systems that provide program integrity analysts with capabilities to assess claims, provider, beneficiary, and other data relevant to Medicaid; and supporting efforts to prevent and detect improper payments to providers.
GAO was asked to review states' implementation of IT systems that support Medicaid. GAO determined (1) the types and implementation status of the systems used by states to support program integrity initiatives; (2) the extent to which CMS is making available data, technical resources, and funds to support Medicaid programs' efforts to implement systems, and the effectiveness of the states' systems; and (3) key challenges that Medicaid programs have faced in using IT to enhance program integrity initiatives, and CMS's actions to support efforts to overcome them. To do this, GAO analyzed information from 10 selected states covering a range of expenditures on such systems, reviewed program management documentation, and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
In the 10 selected states reviewed, GAO found the use of varying types of information technology (IT) systems to support efforts to prevent and detect improper payments. All 10 states had implemented a Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) to process claims and support their program integrity efforts, and 7 had implemented additional types of systems to meet specific needs. Three states were operating MMISs that were implemented more than 20 years ago, but 7 states had upgraded their MMISs, and 2 of those had done so in the past 2 years. In addition, 7 states had implemented other systems, such as data analytics and decision support systems that enabled complex reviews of multiple claims and identification of providers' billing patterns that could be fraudulent. While the MMISs and other systems implemented by the 10 states were designed primarily for administering Medicaid as a fee-for-service program, in which providers file claims for reimbursement for each service delivered to patients, officials with 7 of the 10 states also administered managed care plans–plans for which provider organizations are reimbursed based on a fixed amount each month–and 1 state administered Medicaid exclusively as managed care. Officials with the 9 states who administered fee-for-service plans said they used their systems to help conduct pre- and post-payment reviews of claims.
All 10 states received technical and financial support from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for implementing the systems. For example, they accessed the agency's databases to collect information that helped determine providers' eligibility to enroll in Medicaid. In addition, all 10 states had participated in training, technical workgroups, and collaborative sessions facilitated by CMS. With the agency's approval, the 10 states received up to 90 percent in federal matching funds to help implement systems. All 10 states reported that agency support, particularly training, helped them to implement systems needed to prevent and detect improper payments.
However, the effectiveness of the states' use of the systems for program integrity purposes is not known. CMS does not require states to measure or report quantifiable benefits achieved as a result of using the systems; accordingly, only 3 of the 10 selected states measured benefits. Without identifying and measuring such benefits (i.e., money saved or recovered) that result from using MMISs and other systems, CMS and the states cannot be assured of the systems' effectiveness in helping to prevent and detect improper payments. Moreover, without requiring states to institute approaches for measuring and reporting such outcomes, CMS officials lack an essential mechanism for ensuring that the federal financial assistance that states receive to help fund these systems effectively supports Medicaid program integrity efforts.
Five of the 10 states faced challenges with using systems for managed care program integrity–introduced by the content, quality, and definitions of data on services provided. However, 1 state had taken steps to overcome such challenges and had integrated data and implemented functionality needed to review managed care data both prior to and after payment. For its part, CMS had conducted training related specifically to collecting and analyzing these data to help prevent and detect improper payments in the Medicaid program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS require states to measure and report quantifiable benefits of program integrity systems when requesting federal funds, and to reflect their approach for doing so. The agency agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-51 | gao_T-HEHS-99-51_0 | SSA’s organizational culture has been most evident in the low priority it has often placed on verifying recipients’ initial and continuing eligibility for benefits, recovering SSI overpayments, and addressing program fraud and abuse. 1). The SSI program continues to be vulnerable to fraud and abuse. However, SSA has begun to take more decisive action to address SSI fraud and abuse since the program was designated high risk. Recent Changes in Management Approach May Improve Program Direction
In addition to long-standing problems attributable to SSA’s organizational culture, our work suggests that SSA’s management of the SSI program has often led to untimely and flawed program policies and inadequate program direction. In prior reports, we have noted that program direction and problem resolution at SSA have been hindered by SSA’s continued reluctance to take a leadership role in SSI policy development before major program crises occur. SSI Strategic Planning
Our earlier work has also shown that SSI program direction has suffered as a result of SSA’s failure to develop program-specific goals, priorities, and plans for addressing program weaknesses. The persistence of the long-standing problems discussed today demonstrates SSA’s inability to focus on its most critical program challenges. Conclusions
Because the SSI program is essential to the financial health and well being of millions of low-income aged, blind, and disabled recipients, it is essential that the program is adequately protected from fraud, waste, and abuse. To a large extent, the problems we have discussed today are attributable to an ingrained organizational culture that has historically placed a greater value on quickly processing and paying claims than on controlling program costs, and a management approach characterized by a reluctance to address SSI problems requiring long-term solutions and/or legislative changes. SSA has acknowledged the important role of management in defining organizational priorities and the need to strike a better balance between serving the public and fiscal accountability for its programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, focusing on: (1) the problem areas that currently pose the greatest risk to the SSI program; (2) the Social Security Administration's (SSA) recent efforts to improve the SSI program; and (3) additional actions that should be taken.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the SSI program suffers from program abuses and mismanagement, increases in overpayments, and SSA's inability to recover outstanding debt; (2) in February 1997, GAO designated SSI a high-risk program because of its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse, and because of insufficient management oversight of the program; (3) to a great extent, SSA's inability to address long-standing SSI program problems is attributable to two underlying causes: (a) an organizational culture that places a greater priority on processing and paying claims than on controlling program expenditures; and (b) a management approach characterized by SSA's reluctance to fulfill its SSI policy development and planning role in advance of major program crises; (4) as a result, SSA has continued to experience significant difficulties with regard to verifying recipients' initial and continuing eligibility for benefits, recovering SSI overpayments, combating program fraud and abuse and providing adequate program direction; (5) since SSI was designated high risk, SSA has taken a number of actions to improve the financial integrity of the program and revise its traditional approach to program management; (6) however, several of SSA's initiatives are now in the early planning or implementation stages, or require the passage of new legislation before they can move forward; (7) in other areas, SSA's actions have been insufficient; and (8) thus, it is important that SSA sustain and expand its efforts to address problem areas and strike a balance between meeting the needs of SSI recipients and fiscal accountability for its programs. |
gao_GAO-17-482 | gao_GAO-17-482_0 | The January 2016 instruction calls for the strategic management of the acquisitions of contracted services. This limited DOD’s leadership insight into future spending on contracted services. Limited Implementation of Key Leadership Positions Impedes Effective Strategic Management of Service Acquisitions
DOD has not fully implemented the three key leadership positions— FDEs, CLLs, and SSMs—that were identified in DOD’s January 2016 instruction and which were to enable DOD to more strategically manage service acquisitions. DPAP-SA officials noted that the officials appointed to be FDEs had multiple responsibilities, and considered their FDE roles as secondary. Additionally, CLLs largely existed in name only. Consequently, FDEs and CLLs have had a minimal effect on how DOD manages services. In particular, SSM officials cited cultural barriers to implementing the hierarchical approach to service acquisition envisioned in DOD’s January 2016 instruction, in part because each military department has traditionally taken a decentralized approach to managing services. DPAP-SA officials responsible for services were aware of the implementation challenges and have efforts underway to revise the January 2016 instruction, in part to further clarify position authorities and responsibilities. The three SSMs we interviewed were unsure about the value of FDEs and CLLs and how these positions were to influence decisions made by the commands. In that regard, our analysis of DOD fiscal year 2016 service contract obligations found that depending on the organization’s structure and mission, specific commands within the military departments award the majority of contract obligations for particular portfolios of services (see table 4). Federal internal control standards state that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibilities, and delegate authorities to achieve its objectives. SRRB Implementation at the Military Departments Has Had a Minimal Effect on Strategic Management of Service Requirements
DOD’s January 2016 instruction formalized the requirement to hold SRRBs to validate, prioritize, and approve service requirements from a holistic viewpoint—an approach that comprehensively considers service requirements within and across portfolios. We found, however, that the three military commands we reviewed did not implement SRRBs that approved service requirements from a holistic perspective, but instead leveraged their existing contract review boards, which focus their efforts on assuring proposed contract solicitations and awards are in compliance with federal acquisition regulations and DOD guidance. As a result, SRRBs at the three commands we reviewed had a minimal effect on supporting trade-off decisions in the service portfolios or assessing opportunities for efficiencies and eliminating duplicative requirements that could inform the command’s program objective memorandum (POM) submissions. Federal internal control standards call for agency management to identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving defined objectives. Until DOD clarifies the purpose and timing of the SRRB process, DOD components may not be achieving the expected benefits of DOD’s SRRB process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help foster strategic decision making and improvements in the acquisition of services, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics take the following two actions as part of its effort to update the January 2016 instruction:
Reassess the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and organizational placement of key leadership positions, including functional domain experts, senior services managers, and component level leads; and
Clarify the purpose and timing of the SRRB process to better align it with DOD’s programming and budgeting processes. Regarding our first recommendation, DOD concurred with the need to reassess key leadership positions roles and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2016, DOD obligated about $150 billion, or just over half of its total contract spending, on contracted services. In January 2016, DOD issued an instruction on services that identified three key leadership positions, and clarified their roles and responsibilities, and called for Services Requirements Review Boards to holistically approve service requirements above $10 million.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to report on DOD's acquisition of contracted services. This report assesses implementation of (1) key services acquisitions leadership positions and (2) Services Requirements Review Boards.
GAO reviewed the roles and responsibilities of the three key leadership positions identified in DOD's January 2016 instruction. GAO also selected three military commands with large fiscal year 2015 contracted services obligations based on analysis of federal procurement spending; reviewed Review Board implementation for the selected commands; and interviewed responsible DOD, military department, and command officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not fully implemented the three key leadership positions—functional domain experts (FDE), component level leads (CLL), and senior services managers (SSM)—that were identified in DOD's January 2016 instruction and which were to enable DOD to more strategically manage service acquisitions (see table).
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy officials noted that the officials appointed to be FDEs had multiple responsibilities, and considered their FDE roles as secondary. Additionally, CLLs largely existed in name only. Consequently, FDEs and CLLs had a minimal effect on how DOD manages services. GAO also found that SSMs—who are responsible for implementing the January 2016 instruction within their military departments—were unsure about the value of FDEs and CLLs and how these positions should influence decisions made by the commands. Moreover, the SSMs GAO interviewed cited cultural barriers to implementing the hierarchical, portfolio-management approach to service acquisition envisioned in DOD's January 2016 instruction, in part because each military department has traditionally taken a decentralized approach to managing services. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy officials responsible for services were aware of these challenges and have begun efforts to revise the January 2016 instruction, in part to further clarify position authorities and responsibilities. Federal internal control standards state that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibilities, and delegate authorities to achieve its objectives.
Services Requirements Review Boards were intended to prioritize and approve services in a comprehensive portfolio-based manner in order to achieve efficiencies, but the military commands GAO reviewed did not do so. Instead, commands largely leveraged existing contract review boards that occurred throughout the year and focused on approving individual contracts. As a result, the Services Requirements Review Boards at these commands had minimal effect on supporting trade-off decisions within and across service portfolios or capturing efficiencies that could inform the command's programming and budgeting decisions. Federal internal control standards call for management to identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving defined objectives. Until DOD clarifies the purpose and timing of the Services Requirements Review Boards process, DOD components will not achieve the expected benefits as anticipated in the January 2016 instruction.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD reassess the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and organizational placement of the three key leadership positions; and clarify policies concerning the purpose and timing of the Review Board process. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-11 | gao_GAO-03-11_0 | Historically, school districts have contracted with private companies for noninstructional services, such as transportation and food service, and have also relied on contractors in some cases to provide limited instructional services to specified populations. In recent years, the options available to public schools considering contracting with private companies have steadily grown. In these public schools, companies generally provide the same kinds of educational and management services that school districts do for traditional public schools. Three companies currently operate in the District of Columbia: Edison Schools, Mosaica Education, and Chancellor Beacon Academies. Education Management Companies Have Multifaceted Programs; District Schools Varied in Their Implementation
The companies that operate public schools in the District of Columbia offer management and educational services as part of their programs; the extent to which District schools managed by these companies implemented all of the components of the companies’ programs varied. Additionally, all have activities designed to involve and support parents and students. Six District schools adopted selected elements of their companies’ educational programs or chose other educational programs. Limited Research Exists of the Effectiveness of These Companies’ Programs
Little rigorous research exists on the effectiveness of the three educational management companies—Edison, Mosaica, and Chancellor Beacon—in the schools they manage across the country; as a result, we cannot draw conclusions about the effect that these companies’ programs have on student achievement, parental satisfaction, parental involvement, or school climate. | What GAO Found
In recent years, local school districts and traditional public schools have taken various initiatives to improve failing schools. School districts and charter schools are increasingly contracting with private, for-profit companies to provide a range of education and management services to schools. In the District of Columbia, some public schools contract with three such companies: Edison Schools, Mosaica Education, and Chancellor Beacon Academies. These three companies have programs that consist of both management services, such as personnel, and educational services, which they offer to schools across the nation; in the District, most of the schools managed by these companies have either adopted selected elements of their companies' programs or chosen other educational programs. Each company provides services such as curriculum, assessments, parental involvement opportunities, and student and family support. Little is known about the effectiveness of these companies' programs on student achievement, parental satisfaction, parental involvement, or school climate because few rigorous studies have been conducted. Although the companies publish year-to-year comparisons of standardized test scores to indicate that students in schools they manage are making academic gains, they do not present data on comparable students who are not in their programs, a necessary component of a program effectiveness study. |
gao_GAO-09-85 | gao_GAO-09-85_0 | Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities
DHS and DOT share responsibility for securing the commercial vehicle sector. TSA Has Begun Conducting Risk Assessments of the Commercial Vehicle Sector, but Has Not Completed These Efforts or Fully Used the Results to Support Its Security Strategy
TSA has taken actions to assess the security risks associated with the commercial vehicle sector, including assessing threats, initiating vulnerability assessments, and developing best security practices, but more work remains to fully assess the security risks of commercial trucks and buses, and to ensure that this information is used to inform TSA’s security strategy. As a result, TSA cannot be assured that its approach for securing the commercial vehicle sector is aligned with the highest priority security needs. Moreover, TSA has not completed a report as required by the 9/11 Commission Act on various aspects of commercial vehicle security. However, TSA officials could not identify when the NTSRA will be finalized. However, TSA has not developed a plan or a time frame for completing a risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector, including the level of resources required to complete the assessment and the appropriate scope of the assessment including determining the combination of threat scenarios and field-level vulnerability assessments it intends to use. Government and Industry Have Taken Actions to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Vehicles, but TSA Has Not Completely Assessed the Effectiveness of Its Actions
Key government and industry stakeholders have taken actions to strengthen the security of the commercial vehicles sector, but TSA has not assessed the effectiveness of its actions. States, individually and collectively, through their state transportation and law enforcement associations, have also worked to strengthen the security of commercial vehicles. Several of these programs have been implemented by TSA and other DHS components, others by DOT, and several jointly by DHS and DOT. TSA Uses Performance Measures to Monitor Its Efforts in Securing Commercial Vehicles, but Lacks Effectiveness Measures for Key Security Programs
TSA has begun developing measures that gauge the completion of its program activities, but could improve its efforts by collecting data that would measure the effectiveness of its programs in strengthening commercial vehicle security. TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Coordinate with Federal, State, and Industry Stakeholders Regarding the Security of the Commercial Vehicle Sector, but Further Actions Can Enhance Coordination
While TSA has taken actions to improve coordination with federal, state, and industry stakeholders to strengthen commercial vehicle security, more can be done to ensure that these coordination efforts enhance security for the sector. Without enhanced coordination, TSA will have difficulty expanding its vulnerability assessments to other states. TSA and FMCSA also do not have a process in place to share information important to monitoring the results of security programs, consistent with leading practices for collaborating agencies. In addition, as TSA expands its CSRs of hazardous materials transporters, DOT may benefit from knowing which firms TSA has reviewed to avoid duplication of effort. TSA also has not developed a plan to conduct consequence assessments, or leveraged the consequence assessments of other sectors. Establish a plan and a time frame for completing risk assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, and use this information to support future updates to the Transportation Sector Strategic Plan, to include conducting: to the extent feasible, assessments that include information about the likelihood of a terrorist attack method on a particular asset, system, or network as required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; a vulnerability assessment of the commercial vehicle sector, including: assessing the scope and method of assessments required to gauge the sector’s vulnerabilities; considering the findings and recommendations of the Missouri pilot evaluation report to strengthen future Corporate Security Reviews; and enhancing direct coordination with state governments to expand the Transportation Security Administration’s field inspection Corporate Security Review capacities; consequence assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, or developing alternative strategies to assess potential consequences of attacks, such as coordinating with other Sector-Specific Agencies to leverage their consequence assessment efforts. 2. (3) To what extent has TSA coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing commercial vehicles with other federal entities, states and private sector stakeholders? We also met with TSA HMC officials and interviewed officials from truck and bus companies that had undergone CSRs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Numerous incidents around the world have highlighted the vulnerability of commercial vehicles to terrorist acts. Commercial vehicles include over 1 million highly diverse truck and intercity bus firms. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primary federal responsibility for ensuring the security of the commercial vehicle sector, while vehicle operators are responsible for implementing security measures for their firms. GAO was asked to examine: (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed security risks for commercial vehicles; (2) actions taken by key stakeholders to mitigate identified risks; and (3) TSA efforts to coordinate its security strategy with other federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. GAO reviewed TSA plans, assessments, and other documents; visited a nonrandom sample of 26 commercial truck and bus companies of varying sizes, locations, and types of operations; and interviewed TSA and other federal and state officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
TSA has taken actions to evaluate the security risks associated with the commercial vehicle sector, including assessing threats and initiating vulnerability assessments, but more work remains to fully gauge security risks. Risk assessment uses a combined analysis of threat, vulnerability, and consequence to estimate the likelihood of terrorist attacks and the severity of their impact. TSA conducted threat assessments of the commercial vehicle sector and has also cosponsored a vulnerability assessment pilot program in Missouri. However, TSA's threat assessments generally have not identified the likelihood of specific threats, as required by DHS policy. TSA has also not determined the scope, method, and time frame for completing vulnerability assessments of the commercial vehicle sector. In addition, TSA has not conducted consequence assessments, or leveraged the consequence assessments of other sectors. As a result of limitations with its threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, TSA cannot be sure that its approach for securing the commercial vehicle sector addresses the highest priority security needs. Moreover, TSA has not developed a plan or time frame to complete a risk assessment of the sector. Nor has TSA completed a report on commercial trucking security as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act). Key government and industry stakeholders have taken actions to strengthen the security of commercial vehicles, but TSA has not assessed the effectiveness of federal programs. TSA and the Department of Transportation (DOT) have implemented programs to strengthen security, particularly those emphasizing the protection of hazardous materials. States have also worked collaboratively to strengthen commercial vehicle security through their transportation and law enforcement officials' associations, and the establishment of fusion centers. TSA also has begun developing and using performance measures to monitor the progress of its program activities to secure the commercial vehicle sector, but has not developed measures to assess the effectiveness of these actions in mitigating security risks. Without such information, TSA will be limited in its ability to measure its success in enhancing commercial vehicle security. While TSA has also taken actions to improve coordination with federal, state, and industry stakeholders, more can be done to ensure that these coordination efforts enhance security for the sector. TSA signed joint agreements with DOT and supported the establishment of intergovernmental and industry councils to strengthen collaboration. TSA and DOT completed an agreement to avoid duplication of effort as required by the 9/11 Commission Act. However, some state and industry officials GAO interviewed reported that TSA had not clearly defined stakeholder roles and responsibilities consistent with leading practices for collaborating agencies. TSA has not developed a means to monitor and assess the effectiveness of its coordination efforts. Without enhanced coordination with the states, TSA will have difficulty expanding its vulnerability assessments. |
gao_GAO-16-827 | gao_GAO-16-827_0 | NMFS and the Councils Have Limited Information on the Magnitude and Timing of Climate Change Effects on Fish Stocks
We found that NMFS and the Councils have general information about the types of effects climate change is likely to have on federally managed fish stocks, but information about the magnitude and timing of effects for specific fish stocks is limited, based on the responses NMFS and the Councils provided to our questionnaire, our analysis of NMFS and Council documentation, and our interviews with NMFS and Council officials. In general, NMFS and Council officials from the Alaska region said that they do not anticipate the effects of climate change on the abundance of northern rock sole to be significant, but acknowledged that it is unknown how warming ocean conditions may affect the timing or location of the fish’s life cycle events, such as spawning. Atlantic cod. NMFS and the Councils Identified Several Challenges to Better Understand the Effects of Climate Change on Fish Stocks
Through the questionnaire responses and our interviews, NMFS and Council officials identified several challenges to better understand the existing and anticipated effects of climate change on fish stocks as well as efforts they are taking to address some of these challenges, including:
Understanding how climate change may affect fish stocks. It can be challenging to determine whether a change in a fish stock’s abundance or distribution is caused by climate change; natural variation in the oceans; or other human or environmental factors, such as overfishing or pollution, according to NMFS and some Council officials. The Strategy recognizes the importance of incorporating climate information into the fisheries management process but does not provide specific guidance on how this is to be done. By developing guidance on how the NMFS regions and Councils are to incorporate climate information into different parts of the fisheries management process, NMFS may help ensure consistency in how its regions and the Councils factor climate-related risks into fisheries management decision making. In addition, the Strategy lays out overall objectives to help identify the agency’s climate information needs and help better ensure effective management in a changing climate, but does not contain agency-wide performance measures to track progress in achieving the Strategy’s objectives. However, most of the measures did not contain other key attributes. By incorporating key attributes associated with successful performance measures in the final performance measures developed for the plans and assessing whether agency-wide performance measures may also be needed, NMFS may be in a better position to determine the extent to which the objectives of the Strategy overall are being achieved. Developing such guidance would align with federal standards for internal control and may help NMFS ensure consistency in how its regions and the Councils factor climate-related risks into fisheries management decision making. Moreover, NMFS has not developed agency-wide performance measures to assess progress in meeting the Strategy’s overall objectives, instead choosing to wait to complete the regional action plans before determining whether such measures may be necessary. In finalizing the regional action plans for implementing the NOAA Fisheries Climate Science Strategy, (1) incorporate the key attributes associated with successful performance measures in the final performance measures developed for the plans and (2) assess whether agency-wide performance measures may be needed to determine the extent to which the objectives of the Strategy overall are being achieved, and develop such measures, as appropriate, that incorporate the key attributes of successful performance measures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) information the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Regional Fishery Management Councils (Council) have about the existing and anticipated effects of climate change on federally managed fish stocks and challenges they face to better understand these effects and (2) efforts NMFS has taken to help it and the Councils incorporate climate information into the fisheries management process. | Why GAO Did This Study
NMFS and the Councils manage commercial and recreational marine fisheries that are critical to the nation's economy. The effects of climate change may pose risks to these fisheries that could have economic consequences for the fishing industry and coastal communities, according to the 2014 Third National Climate Assessment.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to address the effects of climate change on federal fisheries. This report examines (1) information NMFS and the Councils have about the existing and anticipated effects of climate change on federally managed fish stocks and challenges to better understand these effects and (2) efforts NMFS has taken to help it and the Councils incorporate climate information into fisheries management. GAO analyzed responses to its questionnaire from all NMFS regions and the Councils, analyzed seven nongeneralizable fish species selected to reflect variation in the potential effects of climate change, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed NMFS and Council officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and eight Regional Fishery Management Councils (Council) have general information on the types of effects climate change is likely to have on federally managed fish stocks but limited information on the magnitude and timing of effects for specific stocks. They also face several challenges to better understand these effects, based on GAO's analysis of NMFS and Council questionnaire responses, NMFS and Council documentation, and interviews with NMFS and Council officials. For example, NMFS officials said that northern rock sole may adapt to warming ocean temperatures more easily than other fish species, but it is unknown how such temperatures may affect the timing of the fish's life cycle events, such as spawning. NMFS and Council officials identified several challenges to better understand potential climate change effects on fish stocks, including determining whether a change in a stock's abundance or distribution is the result of climate change or other factors, such as overfishing in the case of Atlantic cod.
NMFS developed a climate science strategy in 2015 to help increase the use of climate information in fisheries management. The strategy lays out a national framework to be implemented by NMFS' regions but does not provide specific guidance on how climate information should be incorporated into the fisheries management process. An NMFS official said that developing such guidance has not been an agency priority, but as knowledge on climate change progresses there is a more pressing need to incorporate climate information into fisheries management decision making. Developing such guidance would align with federal standards for internal control and may help NMFS ensure consistency in how its regions and the Councils factor climate-related risks into fisheries management. In addition, NMFS has not developed agency-wide performance measures to track progress toward the strategy's overall objectives, a leading practice. NMFS officials said they are waiting to finalize regional action plans for implementing the strategy before determining whether such measures may be necessary. GAO reviewed the proposed measures in NMFS' draft regional action plans and found that they aligned with some key attributes of successful performance measures. But, most of the measures did not contain other key attributes, such as measurable targets. By incorporating key attributes when developing performance measures and assessing whether agency-wide measures may also be needed, NMFS may be in a better position to determine the extent to which the objectives of its strategy overall are being achieved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NMFS (1) develop guidance on incorporating climate information into the fisheries management process and (2) incorporate key attributes of successful performance measures in the regional action plans and assess whether agency-wide measures for the climate science strategy may be needed. The agency agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-318T | gao_GAO-10-318T_0 | Departmental Plans and Documents Address Aspects of Management Integration, but DHS Has Not Yet Developed a Comprehensive Strategy
The 9/11 Commission Act requires DHS to develop a strategy for management integration as part of the department’s integration and transformation to create a more efficient and orderly consolidation of functions and personnel in the department. Although DHS stated at that time that it was developing an integration strategy, it has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy for management integration that is consistent with statute and that contains all of the characteristics we identified in 2005. According to DHS’s USM, the department has not yet done so because, in part, the Management Directorate has focused on building the management operations capacity within the functional areas, such as financial management and information technology. According to DHS’s USM, Chief of Staff, and department and component management chiefs, in the absence of a comprehensive management integration strategy, various departmental documents collectively contribute to the department’s strategy for implementing and achieving management integration. In addition, although DHS has developed some performance goals and measures to measure management activities, it has not yet established measures for assessing management integration across the department. For example, DHS has increased the number of departmentwide performance measures for the Management Directorate in support of Goal 5 of DHS’s Strategic Plan. Without such a set of measures, DHS cannot assess its progress in implementing and achieving management integration both within and across its functional areas. DHS’s Management Directorate Has Taken Actions to Communicate and Consolidate Management Policies, Processes, and Systems
While DHS does not have a comprehensive management strategy, its Management Directorate is working to consolidate management policies, processes, and systems and it has instituted a system of management councils and governance boards. For example, the Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) initiative is the department’s current effort to consolidate its financial management, acquisition, and asset management systems. Performance Management Practices Could Be More Consistently Applied Departmentwide to Strengthen Reporting Relationships between Department and Component Management Chiefs
The USM and department and component management chiefs are held accountable for implementing management integration through reporting relationships at three levels—between the Secretary and the USM, the USM and department management chiefs, and the department and component management chiefs—in which, among other things, the Secretary of Homeland Security, USM, and department chiefs are required to provide input into performance plans and evaluations. In our review, we found that performance management practices for management integration between DHS’s department and component management chiefs are not consistently in place. Department chiefs are not consistently providing the guidance and input required by department management directives and in accordance with performance management leading practices. Without ensuring that the management chiefs provide input into component chiefs’ performance plans and evaluations as required, the Management Directorate cannot be sure that component chiefs are fully implementing management integration. In addition, the agreements consistently include objectives related to management integration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Significant management challenges exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as it continues to integrate its varied management processes, policies, and systems in areas such as financial management and information technology. These activities are primarily led by the Under Secretary for Management (USM), department management chiefs, and management chiefs in DHS's seven components. This testimony summarizes a new GAO report (GAO-10-131) that examined (1) the extent to which DHS has developed a comprehensive strategy for management integration that includes the characteristics recommended in GAO's earlier 2005 report, (2) how DHS is implementing management integration, and (3) the extent to which the USM is holding the department and component management chiefs accountable for implementing management integration through reporting relationships. GAO reviewed DHS plans and interviewed DHS management officials.
What GAO Found
DHS has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy for management integration as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 and with the characteristics GAO recommended in a 2005 report. Although DHS stated at that time that it was developing an integration strategy it has not yet done so, in part because it has focused on building operations capacity within functional management areas. In the absence of a comprehensive management integration strategy, DHS officials stated that documents such as strategic plans and management directives address aspects of a management integration strategy and can help the department to manage its integration efforts. However, they do not generally include all of the strategy characteristics GAO identified, such as identifying the critical links that must occur among management initiatives. In addition, DHS has increased the number of performance measures for the Management Directorate, but has not yet established measures for assessing management integration across the department. Without these measures, DHS cannot assess its progress in implementing and achieving management integration. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy, DHS's Management Directorate has implemented management integration through certain initiatives and mechanisms to communicate and consolidate management policies, processes, and systems. For example, DHS is in the process of consolidating its financial management, acquisition, and asset management systems. The directorate has also instituted a system of management councils and governance boards to communicate information and manage specific activities related to management initiatives. The USM and department and component management chiefs are held accountable for implementing management integration through reporting relationships at three levels--between the Secretary and the USM, the USM and department chiefs, and the department and component chiefs--in which, among other things, the Secretary of Homeland Security, USM, and department chiefs are required to provide input into performance plans and evaluations. Performance management practices for management integration between DHS's department and component management chiefs are not consistently in place. Department chiefs are not consistently providing the guidance and input required by department management directives and in accordance with performance management leading practices. Without ensuring that the management chiefs provide input into component chiefs' performance plans and evaluations as required, the directorate cannot be sure that component chiefs are fully implementing management integration. |
gao_GAO-13-702 | gao_GAO-13-702_0 | Background
Drug Compounding by Pharmacies
Traditionally, a drug is compounded, through the process of mixing, combining, or altering ingredients, to create a customized drug tailored to the medical needs of an individual patient upon receipt of a prescription. See appendix II for details about these developments and how they have affected FDA’s authority to oversee drug compounding. States and National Organizations Have Taken Various Actions to Strengthen Oversight of Drug Compounding
The four states we reviewed—California, Connecticut, Florida, and Iowa—have each recently taken actions, such as working with national pharmacy organizations, to improve their oversight of drug compounding. In addition, national pharmacy organizations have undertaken efforts to help states oversee drug compounding. For example, national pharmacy organizations have developed standards for compounded drugs that could be adopted by states. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure appropriate oversight of the safety of products from the entities that prepare and distribute compounded drugs that have a high potential to adversely affect public health, Congress should consider clarifying FDA’s authority to regulate entities that compound drugs. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of the FDA to take steps to consistently collect reliable and timely information in FDA’s existing databases on inspections and enforcement actions associated with compounded drugs, and clearly differentiate in FDA’s database, those manufacturers of FDA- approved drugs that FDA inspects for compliance with good manufacturing practices from those entities compounding drugs that are not FDA-approved and that FDA does not routinely inspect. HHS’s comments also support the Matter for Congressional Consideration that Congress should consider clarifying FDA’s authority to oversee entities that compound drugs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug compounding is the process by which a pharmacist combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a drug tailored to the medical needs of an individual. An outbreak of fungal meningitis in 2012 linked to contaminated compounded drugs has raised concerns about state and federal oversight of drug compounding. GAO was asked to update its 2003 testimony on drug compounding. Specifically, this report addresses (1) the status of FDA's authority to oversee drug compounding, and the gaps, if any, between state and federal authority; (2) how FDA has used its data and authority to oversee drug compounding; and (3) the actions taken or planned by states or national pharmacy organizations to improve oversight of drug compounding. GAO reviewed relevant statutes and guidance; reviewed FDA data; and interviewed officials from FDA, national pharmacy organizations, and four states with varied geography, population, and pharmacy regulations.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that the entities that compound drugs have appropriate oversight, Congress should consider clarifying FDAs authority to oversee drug compounding. In addition, FDA should ensure its databases collect reliable and timely data on inspections associated with compounded drugs, and differentiate drug compounders from manufacturers. HHS's comments support the need to clarify FDA's authority, and stated that the information in its inspection database could be improved and that it would consider whether it can differentiate compounding pharmacies from manufacturers. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-112 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-112_0 | Navy Has Been More Successful Than the Other Services in Reducing Costly Excess Capacity
Even after four BRAC rounds, the four services have costly excess capacity within their depot maintenance systems. Depot Workload Allocation Policies Still Evolving
For several years, the Congress has asked DOD to better define core capability requirements and specifically identify the workloads and weapon systems that must be maintained in DOD depots to satisfy core requirements. However, some policy changes have been made in response to concerns about the policy proposal. Key Policy Proposals Are Still in Draft
Additionally, although two draft depot maintenance policy letters were distributed in December 1996 and January 1997, it is uncertain when, or if, these policy statements will be issued. While we are continuing work in this area, we are concerned that, due to a lack of clear policy and direction, some maintenance strategies are being delayed and others are being selected that may not be the most cost-effective. A recent risk assessment subsequently determined that the entire workload could be outsourced and would no longer be classified as core. As indicated, for many programs, including the largest systems in terms of acquisition costs, the final support decisions have not yet been made. DOD’s projected savings level is based on estimates made through studies by the CORM and the DSB. While we believe some savings may be achieved from outsourcing some depot maintenance workloads, our work shows that savings estimates of this magnitude are questionable for several key reasons. It also houses the management of the Air Force’s metrology and calibration program. Abstracts From Related GAO Products
High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997)
This report addresses the difficult process of reducing DOD’s infrastructure. Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996)
If not effectively managed, the privatization of depot maintenance activities, could exacerbate existing capacity problems and the inefficiencies inherent in underuse of depot maintenance capacity. We noted that (1) DOD’s evolving depot maintenance policy includes a public-private mix and shifts work to the private sector where feasible; (2) depot privatization could worsen excess maintenance capacity and inefficiencies if not carefully managed; (3) the DOD policy report provides an overall framework for managing depot maintenance activities and substantial implementation flexibility, but the policy is not consistent with congressional guidance on public-private competition for noncore workloads; (4) privatizing depot maintenance is not likely to achieve the 20-percent savings DOD projects, since most savings have come from competition rather than privatization; (5) about half of depot maintenance private-public competitions have been won by the public sector; and (6) DOD plans to privatize-in-place and delay downsizing and closure of two Air Logistics Centers will probably cost more than closing them and relocating their workloads to underutilized defense or private facilities. Concerns have also been raised about other aspects of the depot closures. Depot Maintenance: Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support a Downsized Military (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993)
We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the current DOD depot maintenance system has excess capacity, (2) the basis for current DOD allocations of depot work between the public and private sectors, (3) whether the private sector’s role in the performance of depot maintenance activities is changing, (4) the status of the public-private competition initiative, and (5) the action needed to ensure that future defense maintenance requirements can be managed more cost-effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD): (1) plans for eliminating costly depot maintenance excess capacity; (2) progress in finalizing a new depot workload allocation policy; (3) current approach for allocating maintenance workloads for new and existing systems; and (4) estimates that billions can be saved by outsourcing depot maintenance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is important to note that the waste and inefficiency in DOD's logistics system, including the management of its $13 billion depot maintenance program, is one of the key reasons GAO identified DOD's infrastructure activities as 1 of 24 high-risk areas within the federal government; (2) costly excess capacity totalling about 50 percent remains in the DOD depot system, which actually comprises four systems; (3) as the services seek to privatize a greater share of their depot maintenance, the cost of maintaining excess capacity will increase unless additional capacity reductions are made; (4) the Navy has made the greatest progress in dealing with this through consolidation and expedited closures of facilities affected by the base realignment and closure process; (5) the Army and, even more so, the Air Force have been less successful; (6) all three military departments to some extent are implementing actions that will privatize-in-place costly excess capacity; (7) GAO's work shows that DOD's plans and policies for outsourcing depot maintenance are still evolving; (8) last year, the Congress received and ultimately rejected DOD's proposed policy regarding depot-level maintenance and repair; (9) provisions in the policy were predicated on relief from the existing statutes that influence depot workload allocations between the public and private sectors; (10) some changes have been made based on congressional concerns about certain aspects of the policy report, but DOD has not finalized its new policy to address all of these concerns; (11) however, core capability requirements have not yet been quantified and no time frame has been established for finalizing key draft depot maintenance policy letters issued in December 1996 and January 1997; (12) GAO's ongoing work shows that for both existing and new systems, assessments are being made to determine what portion of the current workload could be outsourced with acceptable risk; (13) the absence of clear policy on how to proceed in this area has caused some delays in choosing maintenance sources and raised some concerns about whether the most cost-effective strategies are being selected; (14) DOD's projected savings are based on estimates cited by the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) and the Defense Science Board (DSB); (15) GAO believes that in some cases outsourcing can reduce maintenance costs, but not to the extent being estimated by the CORM and DSB; and (16) if not effectively managed, privatizing depot maintenance activities could exacerbate existing capacity problems and the inefficiencies inherent in underutilization of depot maintenance capacity. |
gao_GGD-95-170 | gao_GGD-95-170_0 | According to our analysis of NCJJ data, the rate at which juvenile court judges sent formal delinquency cases to criminal court has remained less than 2 percent from 1988 to 1992. Our analysis of statutory exclusion laws indicated that the laws generally established specific criteria that focused on juveniles (1) charged with serious violent offenses and/or (2) with previous court records. In addition, our analysis showed that legislation passed in the last 16 years included two primary types of changes: (1) in 24 states and the District of Columbia legislative changes tended to increase the population of juveniles who may be sent to criminal court and (2) in 17 other states, recent legislation changed the method in which certain juveniles may be sent to criminal court (e.g., from the judicial waiver to the prosecutor direct filing). In 1992, about 47 percent of juveniles whose cases were waived were white, 50 percent were black, and 3 percent were of other races. For example, in Virginia, any juvenile previously convicted as an adult is excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction regardless of the offense. Most Juveniles Sentenced in Criminal Court for Serious Offenses Were Incarcerated
In four of seven states we analyzed, over half of the juveniles sentenced in criminal court for serious violent, serious property, or drug offenses were incarcerated in each state. In fact, in five of the states, some juveniles convicted of serious violent offenses received probation sentences. In 1992, in about 43 percent of approximately 744,000 formal delinquency cases, juveniles were placed on probation. Of the remaining 53 percent of the cases, about 30 percent of the juveniles were placed on probation, 23 percent received some other disposition, and 0.4 percent were placed in a residential treatment program. Specifically, we agreed with your Committees to provide the frequency to which juveniles have been sent to criminal court by judicial waiver, prosecutor direct filing, and statutory exclusion; analyze juvenile conviction rates and sentences of juveniles prosecuted in criminal court using the most current data; analyze the dispositions of juveniles in juvenile court; and analyze the conditions of confinement in adult correctional facilities for juveniles convicted in criminal court. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the frequency with which juveniles have been sent to criminal court, focusing on: (1) juvenile conviction rates and sentences in criminal court; (2) dispositions of juvenile cases in juvenile court; and (3) conditions of confinement for juveniles incarcerated in adult correctional facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) less than 2 percent of the juvenile delinquency cases filed in juvenile court from 1988 through 1992 were transferred to criminal court; (2) in states that permitted prosecutor direct filing, between 1 and 13 percent of the juvenile cases were referred directly to criminal court; (3) state laws that excluded certain juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction mainly focused on violent offenses or juveniles with previous court records; (4) new state laws have generally increased the frequency in which juveniles are sent to criminal court by either decreasing the age or increasing the types of offenses for which juveniles may be sent to criminal court; (5) juveniles in six of the seven states studied tended to be convicted when prosecuted in criminal court, most often for property offenses; (6) between 3 to 50 percent of the juveniles convicted of serious violent offenses received probation; (7) in four of the seven states, juvenile incarceration rates for violent, property, and drug offenses were between 62 and 100 percent; (8) in the 744,000 formal delinquency cases filed in 1992, 43 percent of the juveniles received probation, 27 percent of the cases were dismissed, 17 percent of the juveniles were placed in residential treatment, 12 percent received other disposition, and 1 percent were transferred to criminal court; and (9) in three of the states studied, the juveniles sentenced to adult prisons were housed in separate prisons, but health, recreation, and educational services were equivalent in all seven states' facilities. |
gao_GAO-07-425 | gao_GAO-07-425_0 | IT Is Critical to Achieving DHS’s Mission
To accomplish its mission, DHS relies extensively on IT. Specifically, of 27 key practices in OPM’s framework, the department’s plan and related documentation fully address 15 practices and partially address the other 12, meaning that these 12 are missing elements that are essential to having a well-defined and executable plan. DHS officials responsible for developing the plan attributed the missing elements to, among other things, the department’s decision to focus its resources on other IT priorities. These officials also stated that until the missing elements are fully addressed, it is unlikely that the plan will be effectively and efficiently implemented, which in turn will continue to put DHS at risk of not having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to manage and deliver its mission-critical IT systems. In addition, the plan calls for involving key stakeholders—such as the CIO, the CHCO, and their component agency counterparts—in carrying out a range of workforce planning activities, such as conducting a workforce analysis, developing an inventory of current staff skills, and identifying the future skills that are needed for mission-critical positions. For example, they do not include specific milestones for when most defined activities and steps are to be completed. DHS’s plan and supporting documentation provide for a number of leadership and knowledge management practices. However, the plan does not fully address other accountability-related practices. According to these officials, the agency is in the process of developing a strategy to implement the plan. Specifically, the department and its components are required to report quarterly to OMB on progress in meeting certain human capital goals, such as filling mission-critical positions and delivering training to strengthen key IT knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this regard, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary and the component agency heads to ensure that (1) IT human capital planning efforts fully satisfy relevant federal guidance and related best practices, (2) roles and responsibilities for implementing the resulting IT human capital plan and all supporting plans are clearly defined and understood, (3) resources needed to effectively and efficiently implement the plans are made available, and (4) progress in implementing the plans is regularly measured and periodically reported to DHS leadership and Congress. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) whether the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) information technology (IT) human capital plan is consistent with federal guidance and associated best practices and (2) the status of the plan’s implementation. We evaluated this plan and supporting documentation against selected practices in the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework. We also interviewed (1) officials from DHS’s Offices of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO); (2) the CIO Council executive sponsor for Human Capital issues; and (3) officials from the department’s IT Human Capital Resource Center, which helped develop the IT human capital plan and supporting documentation. For our second objective, we reviewed plan implementation activities within the DHS Offices of the CIO and the CHCO and three DHS component agencies: the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Federal Emergency Management Administration. In addition, although the supporting documents and the plan provide for involving key stakeholders, they do not assign stakeholders responsibility and accountability for specific activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In performing its missions, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) relies extensively on information technology (IT). Recognizing this, DHS's fiscal year 2006 appropriations act required its Chief Information Officer (CIO) to submit a report to congressional appropriations committees that includes, among other things, an IT human capital plan, and the act directs GAO to review the report. GAO's review addressed (1) whether the IT human capital plan is consistent with federal guidance and associated best practices and (2) the status of the plan's implementation. In performing its review, GAO compared DHS's plan and supporting documentation with 27 practices in the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework of the Office of Personnel Management, and examined plan implementation activities at three DHS component agencies.
What GAO Found
DHS's IT human capital plan is largely consistent with federal guidance and associated best practices; however, it does not fully address a number of important practices that GAO examined. Specifically, the plan and supporting documentation fully address 15 practices; for example, they provide for developing a complete inventory of existing staff skills, identifying IT skills that will be needed to achieve agency goals, determining skill gaps, and developing plans to address such gaps. They also provides for involving key stakeholders--such as the CIO, the Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO), and component agency CIOs and human capital directors--in carrying out the skill gap analyses and other workforce planning activities. Nevertheless, elements of 12 of the 27 practices are not included in the plan or related documentation. For example, although the plan and supporting documents describe the department's IT human capital goals and steps necessary to implement them, most steps do not include associated milestones. In addition, although the plan and supporting documents provide for involving key stakeholders, they do not specifically assign these stakeholders responsibility and accountability for carrying out planned activities. These and other missing elements of the practices are important because they help ensure that the plan is implemented efficiently and effectively. DHS officials provided various reasons why the missing practices were omitted, including uncertainty surrounding the source of resources for implementing the plan and the demands of other IT priorities, such as consolidating component agency data centers. To date, DHS has made limited progress in implementing the plan, according to officials from the offices of the department's CIO and CHCO and three DHS agencies (the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency). These officials said that they are nonetheless following several of the practices because they are required to report quarterly to the Office of Management and Budget on progress in meeting such human capital goals as filling mission-critical positions and delivering key IT training. DHS officials stated that the department's limited progress in implementing the plan was due to its focus on other priorities, and ambiguity surrounding plan implementation roles and responsibilities. Until DHS has a complete plan that fully addresses all practices and the department and components implement the plan, DHS will continue to be at risk of not having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to manage and deliver the IT systems that are essential to executing the department's mission and achieving its transformation goals. |
gao_GAO-06-973 | gao_GAO-06-973_0 | The Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance, which was about $1.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2005, depends on the revenues flowing into the fund and the appropriations made available from the fund for various spending accounts. From fiscal year 1997, the year when existing Trust Fund excise taxes were authorized, through fiscal year 2006, the General Fund contribution has averaged 20 percent of FAA’s total budget. Some Stakeholders Favor the Current Funding System, but Others Raise Revenue Adequacy, Equity, and Efficiency Concerns
Some stakeholders support the current excise tax system, stating that it has been successful in funding FAA, has low administrative costs, and distributes the tax burden in a reasonable manner. Other stakeholders, including FAA, state that under the current system, the disconnect between the revenues contributed by users and the costs they impose on the NAS raises revenue adequacy, equity, and efficiency concerns. Trends in, and FAA’s projections of, both inflation-adjusted fares and average plane size suggest that the revenue collected under the current funding system has fallen and will continue to fall relative to FAA’s workload and costs, supporting revenue adequacy concerns. Comparisons of revenue contributed and costs imposed by different flights provide support for equity and efficiency concerns. However, the extent to which revenue and costs are linked depends critically on how the costs of FAA’s services are assigned to NAS users. Alternative Funding Options Present Both Advantages and Disadvantages
Alternative funding options for collecting revenues from NAS users present both advantages and disadvantages. The degree to which alternative funding options could address concerns about the current excise system ultimately depends on the extent to which the contributions required from users actually reflect the costs they impose on the system. Given the diverse nature of FAA’s activities, a combination of alternative options may offer the most promise for linking revenues and costs. Switching to any alternative funding option would raise administrative and transition issues. Some stakeholders who support the adoption of direct user charges also support a change in FAA’s governance structure—for example, commercializing air navigation services—but we found no evidence that the adoption of direct charges would require a governance change. The six funding options considered here include two that would modify the current excise tax structure and four that would adopt more direct charges to users. Alternative Capital Financing Methods Have Advantages and Disadvantages
Allowing FAA to use debt financing for capital projects have advantages and disadvantages. Some stakeholders believe debt financing is attractive because it could provide FAA with a stable source of revenue to fund capital development and, at the same time, spread the costs out over the life of a capital project as its benefits are realized. Debt-financing raises significant concerns, however, because it encumbers future resources and because expenditures from debt proceeds may not be subject to the congressional oversight that appropriations receive. Debt Financing Raises Budgetary Concerns
Debt financing is subject to federal budget scoring rules and raises issues regarding borrowing costs that are particularly important in light of the federal government’s long term structural fiscal imbalance. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT and Treasury for review and comment. Therefore, in our view, our report does not mischaracterize the status of FAA’s cost accounting system by stating that an analysis of the extent to which the current funding approach, or alternative funding approaches, aligns costs with revenues would require the completion of a cost accounting system or the use of cost finding techniques. We also interviewed officials from government agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury); representatives of aviation industry groups, including the Air Transport Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), and the National Business Aviation Association; and academic and financial experts. To assess the advantages and concerns that have been raised about the current approach to collecting revenues from national airspace system (NAS) users to fund FAA and the extent to which the available evidence supports the concerns, we examined FAA budget data, Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund) revenue data, FAA forecasts, data reported to the Department of Transportation (DOT) on aircraft size and airfares (DOT Form 41 data), and FAA aviation activity data. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund), and the excise taxes that support the Trust Fund are scheduled for reauthorization at the end of fiscal year 2007. FAA is primarily supported by the Trust Fund, which receives revenues from a series of excise taxes paid by users of the national airspace system (NAS). The Trust Fund's uncommitted balance decreased by more than 70 percent from the end of fiscal year 2001 through the end of fiscal year 2005. The remaining funding is derived from the General Fund. This report focuses on the portion of revenues generated from users of the NAS and addresses the following key questions: (1) What advantages and concerns have been raised about the current approach to collecting revenues from NAS users to fund FAA, and to what extent does available evidence support the concerns? (2) What are the implications of adopting alternative funding options to collect the revenues contributed by users that fund FAA's budget? (3) What are the advantages and disadvantages of authorizing FAA to use debt financing for capital projects? This report is based on interviews with relevant federal agencies, including FAA, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congressional Budget Office. GAO also obtained relevant documents from these agencies, other key stakeholders, and academic and financial experts.
What GAO Found
Some stakeholders support the current excise tax system, stating that it has been successful in funding FAA, has low administrative costs, and distributes the tax burden in a reasonable manner. Other stakeholders, including FAA, state that under the current system there is a disconnect between revenues contributed by users and the costs they impose on the NAS that raises revenue adequacy, equity, and efficiency concerns. Trends and FAA projections in both inflation-adjusted fares and average plane size suggest that the revenue collected under the current funding system has fallen and will continue to fall relative to FAA's workload and costs, supporting revenue adequacy concerns. Comparisons of revenue contributed and costs imposed by different flights provide support for equity and efficiency concerns. The extent to which revenues and costs are linked, however, depends critically on how costs are allocated. Thus, to assess the extent to which the current approach or other approaches aligns costs with revenues would require completing an analysis of costs, using either a cost accounting system or cost finding techniques to assign costs to NAS users. The implications of adopting alternative funding options to collect revenue from NAS users and address concerns about the current excise tax system vary depending on the extent to which users' revenue contributions reflect the costs those users impose on FAA. This report considers six selected funding options, including two that modify the current excise tax structure and four that adopt more direct charges to users. Given the diverse nature of FAA's activities, a combination of alternative options may offer the most promise for linking revenues and costs. Switching to any alternative funding option would raise administrative and transition issues. Some stakeholders who support the adoption of direct user charges also support a change in FAA's governance structure, but GAO found no evidence adoption of direct charges requires this. Authorizing FAA to use debt financing for capital projects would have advantages and disadvantages. Some stakeholders identify debt financing as attractive because it could provide FAA with a stable source of revenue to fund capital developments, while at the same time spreading the costs out over the life of a capital project as its benefits are realized. Debt financing raises significant concerns, however, because it encumbers future resources, and expenditures from debt proceeds may not be subject to the congressional oversight that appropriations receive. Concerns regarding borrowing costs, oversight, and encumbering future resources are particularly important in light of the federal government's long-term structural fiscal imbalance. The Departments of Transportation and Treasury provided comments and technical clarifications on a draft of this report which we have incorporated or responded to as appropriate. DOT's comments focused on governance reforms required to adopt a user fee approach, and whether we accurately described the status of FAA's accounting system. Treasury's raised concerns about the level of analytical development for the options and associated issues. Data was not available to conduct the analysis Treasury suggested, and we agree necessary. However, we believe the report provides useful information to facilitate debate on the options. |
gao_NSIAD-97-94 | gao_NSIAD-97-94_0 | The ALE-50 towed decoy system is in production, while the future RFCM system is in development. The ALE-50 decoy system is to be used by the Air Force on 437 F-16 and 95 B-1 aircraft. In particular, because F/A-18E/Fs will not be replacing all of the C/D models in the Navy/Marine Corps inventory in the foreseeable future, adding a towed decoy system to the F/A-18C/D potentially offers the opportunity to save additional aircraft and aircrew’s lives in the event of hostilities. This will be true even if F/A-18E/Fs are procured at the Navy’s desired rates of as high as 60 per year. DOD and the Navy have done studies to determine whether towed decoys could improve the survivability of the F/A-18C/D. Matters for Congressional Consideration
In light of the demonstrated improvement in survivability that analyses and test results indicate towed decoy systems can provide, and recognizing that in the year 2010 almost 50 percent of the Navy’s tactical fighter inventory will still be current generation fighter aircraft such as the F/A-18C/D, Congress may wish to direct the Navy to find, as it has done for its F/A-18E/F and the Air Force has done for the F-16, cost-effective ways to improve the survivability of its current aircraft. 1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition plans for the ALE-50 towed decoy system and the Radio Frequency Countermeasures System (RFCM), which includes a more advanced towed decoy, focusing on whether towed decoys could improve the survivability of certain Navy and Air Force aircraft.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's effort to improve the survivability of its aircraft through the use of towed decoys has demonstrated positive results; (2) according to test reports and test officials, the ALE-50 has done very well in effectiveness testing and the future RFCM decoy system is expected to be even more capable; (3) the Air Force is actively engaged in efforts to field towed decoy systems on a number of its current aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, and B-1, while the Navy is planning towed decoys only for its future F/A-18E/F; (4) in the year 2010, almost 50 percent of the Navy's tactical fighter inventory will still be current generation fighter aircraft such as the F/A-18C/D, even if new F/A-18E/Fs are procured at the rates desired by the Navy between now and then; and (5) improving the survivability of the F/A-18C/D, as well as other current Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, potentially offers the opportunity to save additional aircraft and aircrew's lives in the event of future hostilities and also addresses congressional concerns expressed for F/A-18C/D survivability. |
gao_GAO-02-31 | gao_GAO-02-31_0 | Both occupied and vacant housing units are included in the housing unit inventory. In constant fiscal year 2000 dollars, the estimated full-cycle cost of the 2000 decennial census of about $6.5 billion is nearly double the $3.3 billion cost of the 1990 decennial census. When full-cycle cost is divided by the number of American households of 117.3 million in 2000 and 104.0 million in 1990, the cost per housing unit of the 2000 census of $56 increased 75- percent compared to the 1990 census cost of $32 per housing unit. For the 1990 census, the bureau marketing effort was limited and it was considerably expanded for the 2000 census. Our objectives were to (1) update full-cycle costs to reflect the most current information and (2) analyze bureau data to determine the causes of the significant increase in cost per housing unit for the 2000 census when compared to the cost for the 1990 census. 5. | What GAO Found
The estimated $6.5 billion full-cycle cost of the 2000 decennial census is nearly double that of the 1990 census. When the full-cycle cost is divided by the number of American households, the cost per housing unit of the 2000 census was $56 compared to $32 per housing unit for the 1990 census. The primary reasons for the cost increases include the following: (1) in the 1990 census, field data collection cost was $16 per housing unit, while in the 2000 census it was $32 per housing unit; (2) in the 1990 census, technology costs were $5 per housing unit compared to $8 per housing unit for the 2000 census; and (3) the data content and products activity cost $3 per housing unit in 1990 and $5 per housing unit in 2000. |
gao_GAO-08-511 | gao_GAO-08-511_0 | FAA approves, on a case-by-case basis, applications from government agencies and private-sector entities for authority to operate UASs in the national airspace system. These agencies are interested in expanded use of UASs and state and local governments would also like to begin using UASs for law enforcement or firefighting. Small UASs could also help companies survey pipeline or transportation infrastructure. A lack of regulations for UASs limits their operations and leads to a lack of airspace for UAS testing and evaluation and a lack of data that would aid in setting standards. These requirements call for a person operating an aircraft to maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. FAA and DOD are addressing some technological challenges, but TSA has not addressed the security implications of routine UAS operations. FAA is taking steps to develop data to use in developing standards, but has been slow to analyze the data that it has already collected. UAPO is developing a program plan to inform the aviation community of FAA’s perspective on all that needs to be accomplished and the time frames required to create a regulatory framework that will ensure UAS safety and allow UASs to have routine access to the national airspace system. FAA Is Mitigating Anticipated Workload Increase by Automating Some COA Processing Steps, and GSA Is Working to Develop an Inventory of Federal UASs
FAA has taken some actions to mitigate the workload challenge stemming from an anticipated increase in requests for COAs to operate UASs in the national airspace system. Experts and Stakeholders Believe an Overarching Entity Could Facilitate Efforts to Achieve Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace System
In addition to FAA, DOD, TSA, and GSA, other federal agencies, academia, and the private sector also have UAS expertise or a stake in obtaining routine UAS access to the national airspace system. Congress addressed a similar coordination challenge in 2003 when it passed legislation to create JPDO to plan for and coordinate a transformation of the nation’s current air traffic control system to the next generation air transportation system (NextGen) by 2025. The experts predicted that UASs could assume some missions currently performed by manned aircraft, but could perform these missions using engines that burn less fuel or produce less air pollution. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To coordinate and focus the efforts of federal agencies and harness the capabilities of the private sector so that the nation may obtain further benefits from UASs as soon as possible, Congress should consider creating an overarching body within FAA, as it did when it established JPDO, to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector efforts in meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the national airspace system. To meet this objective, we developed the following research questions: (1) What are the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the federal government’s response to these challenges? To address these questions, we surveyed the literature and also obtained and reviewed documents and interviewed officials of government, academic, and private-sector entities involved with UAS issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAO's research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is the federal government's response to these challenges? To address these questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.
What GAO Found
UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security, science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer emissions. UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack security protection--a potential challenge if UASs proliferate as expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address these challenges is yet another challenge. FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal, academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the private sector. |
gao_NSIAD-98-153 | gao_NSIAD-98-153_0 | In April 1996, DOD changed the purpose of the NMD program from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program and designated NMD as a major defense acquisition program. Under the technology readiness program, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) developed and matured technologies for possible use in an NMD system. 1). NMD Program Not Sufficiently Defined for Reliable Cost Estimate at the Time 3+3 Program Was Established
The NMD cost estimate has evolved as the system requirements and program plans have become better defined. DOD officials acknowledged in testimony that additional funds were needed to reduce program risks. Congressional Funding Increases
Because of concerns about the adequacy of funding to support the deployment readiness program and based on testimony by senior defense officials, Congress appropriated significantly more funds for the NMD program in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 than were requested in the President’s budgets for those years. According to NMD officials, these funding increases have been or are being used for risk reduction activities and to execute the 3+3 program. Future Funding Requirements Depend on Variables Yet to Be Chosen
Future NMD funding requirements depend in large part on how the system is designed and when and where it will be deployed. To provide a basis for estimating near-term funding requirements and to help determine how these differences will impact future funding needs, the program office prepared four different life-cycle cost estimates, based on two locations—one at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and the other in Alaska—and two capability levels—one available in fiscal year 2003 and the other in fiscal year 2006. Schedule and Technical Risk Remain High
In December 1997, we reported that DOD faces significant challenges in the NMD program because of high schedule and technical risk. Since our December report, DOD has revised program plans to mitigate schedule and technical risk to some extent. DOD officials told us, however, that overall schedule and technical risk associated with a 2003 deployment will remain high, despite these actions. In February 1998, a panel of former senior military, civilian, and industry leaders confirmed our assessment that the 3+3 program contained high schedule risk. In the judgment of the study panel, successful execution of the 3+3 program on the planned schedule is highly unlikely. As a result of added funding, BMDO has also increased the number of tests planned. The limitations cited in the report include (1) the limited amount of testing planned prior to the deployment readiness review; (2) the fact that the booster to be used in the ground-based interceptor will not be tested prior to the readiness review; (3) the interface between the system’s battle management, command, communications, and control element and the national command authority will not be tested before the decision review; (4) the system’s performance against multiple targets will not be tested; and (5) models and simulations used to support the review will have minimal validation by real flight data. Conclusions
The May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended significant increases in NMD funding. Increased funds provided by Congress in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 have enabled BMDO to conduct risk reduction activities, such as purchasing back-up hardware and preserving competition for the development of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Missile Defense (NMD) program funding requirements and schedule and technical risks, focusing on: (1) why the Department of Defense (DOD) significantly increased the program's near-term funding in its May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review; (2) how funding increases authorized and appropriated by Congress for the program in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 have been used or are planned to be used; and (3) DOD's planned level of future funding for the NMD program and planned uses for those funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD significantly increased its NMD funding requirements in May 1997 because more rigorous cost estimates, based on more detailed program requirements and plans, showed that the program could not be accomplished within previously projected funding levels; (2) the 3+3 NMD program was not sufficiently defined for detailed cost estimating when it initially changed from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program, and was designated a major defense acquisition program in April 1996; (3) the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review included the first program estimate based on detailed system descriptions, requirements, and plans; (4) funding increases provided by Congress in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 were used for risk reduction activities, such as: (a) retaining competition in the development of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle, considered one of the most technically challenging components of the system; (b) increasing the number of planned tests; and (c) purchasing additional spare hardware; (5) Congress increased funding for NMD because of concerns about the adequacy of funding to support the program; (6) the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) Director acknowledged in an April 1996 testimony that an additional $350 million a year could be used to reduce program risks; (7) future NMD funding requirements will depend in large part on the system design and architecture, and when and where it is deployed; (8) details on the specific system and location are not expected for some time; (9) program life-cycle costs ranged from $18.4 billion by fiscal year 2003 to $28.3 billion by fiscal year 2006; (10) since GAO's December 1997 report, DOD has increased funding and revised NMD program plans to mitigate schedule and technical risks; (11) however, program officials told GAO that even with the mitigation actions resulting from the increased funding, schedule and technical risks associated with a 2003 deployment remain high; (12) according to a February 1998 report of a panel of former senior military, government, and industry officials, successful execution of the 3+3 program on the planned schedule is highly unlikely; and (13) this panel concluded that the program would benefit from the earliest possible restructuring to contain the risk. |
gao_GAO-11-835T | gao_GAO-11-835T_0 | In fact, all of the DOD programs on GAO’s High-Risk List relate to business operations, including systems and processes related to management of contracts, finances, supply chain, and support infrastructure, as well as weapon systems acquisition. Long-standing and pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s financial management and related business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable information needed to make sound decisions and report on the financial status and cost of DOD activities to Congress and DOD decision makers; (2) adversely impacted its operational efficiency and mission performance in areas of major weapons system support and logistics; and (3) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to impair management’s ability to assess the resources needed for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. DOD also requests billions of dollars each year to maintain its weapon systems, but it has limited ability to identify, aggregate, and use financial management information for managing and controlling operating and support costs. DOD’s Past Strategies for Improving Financial Management Were Ineffective but Recent Initiatives Are Encouraging
Over the years, DOD has initiated several broad-based reform efforts to address its long-standing financial management weaknesses. The DOD Comptroller directed the DOD components participating in the FIAR Plan—the departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency—to use a standard process and aggressively modify their activities to support and emphasize achievement of the priorities. In May 2010, DOD introduced a new phased approach that divides progress toward achieving financial statement auditability into five waves (or phases) of concerted improvement activities (see appendix I). Numerous Challenges Must Be Addressed in Order for DOD to Successfully Reform Financial Management
Improving the department’s financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and the Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. It is critical that the current initiatives being led by the DOD Deputy Chief Management Officer and the DOD Comptroller be continued and provided with sufficient resources and ongoing monitoring in the future. Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, the current initiatives may falter, similar to previous efforts. Below are some of the key challenges that the department must address in order for the financial management operations of the department to improve to the point where DOD may be able to produce auditable financial statements. Committed and sustained leadership. Effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses. Competent financial management workforce. In developing the plan, the department identified financial management as one of its enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. Accountability and effective oversight. Well-defined enterprise architecture. For decades, DOD has been challenged in modernizing its timeworn business systems. DOD officials have said that successful implementation of ERPs is key to transforming the department’s business operations, including financial management, and in improving the department’s capability to provide DOD management and Congress with accurate and reliable information on the results of DOD’s operations. In addition, the DCMO and the DOD Comptroller have shown commitment and leadership in moving DOD’s financial management improvement efforts forward. GAO will continue to monitor the progress of and provide feedback on the status of DOD’s financial management improvement efforts. Appendix I: FIAR Plan Waves
The first three waves focus on achieving the DOD Comptroller’s interim budgetary and asset accountability priorities, while the remaining two waves are intended to complete actions needed to achieve full financial statement auditability. | Why GAO Did This Study
As one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces many challenges in resolving serious problems in its financial management and related business operations and systems. DOD is required by various statutes to (1) improve its financial management processes, controls, and systems to ensure that complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information is prepared and responsive to the financial information needs of agency management and oversight bodies, and (2) produce audited financial statements. Over the years, DOD has initiated numerous efforts to improve the department's financial management operations and achieve an unqualified (clean) opinion on the reliability of its reported financial information. These efforts have fallen short of sustained improvement in financial management or financial statement auditability. The Subcommittee has asked GAO to provide its perspective on the status of DOD's financial management weaknesses and its efforts to resolve them; the challenges DOD continues to face in improving its financial management and operations; and the status of its efforts to implement automated business systems as a critical element of DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness strategy.
What GAO Found
DOD financial management has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1995 and, despite several reform initiatives, remains on the list today. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to impair management's ability to assess the resources needed for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. DOD spends billions of dollars each year to maintain key business operations intended to support the warfighter, including systems and processes related to the management of contracts, finances, supply chain, support infrastructure, and weapon systems acquisition. These operations are directly impacted by the problems in financial management. In addition, the long-standing financial management weaknesses have precluded DOD from being able to undergo the scrutiny of a financial statement audit. DOD's past strategies for improving financial management were ineffective, but recent initiatives are encouraging. In 2005, DOD issued its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan for improving financial management and reporting. In 2009, the DOD Comptroller directed that FIAR efforts focus on financial information in two priority areas: budget and mission-critical assets. The FIAR Plan also has a new phased approach that comprises five waves of concerted improvement activities. The first three waves focus on the two priority areas, and the last two on working toward full auditability. The plan is being implemented largely through the Army, Navy, and Air Force military departments and the Defense Logistics Agency, lending increased importance to the committed leadership in these components. Improving the department's financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. It is critical that current initiatives related to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial management that have the support of the DOD's Deputy Chief Management Officer and Comptroller continue with sustained leadership and monitoring. Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, current initiatives may falter. Below are some of the key challenges that DOD must address for its financial management to improve to the point where DOD is able to produce auditable financial statements: (1) committed and sustained leadership, (2) effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses, (3) competent financial management workforce, (4) accountability and effective oversight, (5) well-defined enterprise architecture, and (6) successful implementation of the enterprise resource planning systems. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-303 | gao_T-AIMD-98-303_0 | It has six major program agencies to carry out these responsibilities: the Employment and Training Administration, the Employment Standards Administration, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, and the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a government corporation that administers the guaranteed retirement pension system. For example, according to Labor officials, billions of dollars in benefits payments to Americans, such as unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, would be at significant risk of disruption, and accurate labor statistics on the economy used by both public and private organizations may not be produced. By late 1996, Labor’s Year 2000 activities had increased, and it reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that it completed the Year 2000 awareness phase in December 1996. Several of the systems are at risk of failure, including some state systems that could fail as early as January 1999 because they involve calculations a year into the future. Therefore, it is critical that Labor initiate the development of realistic contingency plans to ensure continuity of core business processes in the event of Year 2000-induced failures. Plans for other business areas and supporting systems are expected later this year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the significant information technology challenges that the upcoming century change poses to the Department of Labor, and to several of its agencies, focusing on: (1) specific year 2000 issues facing two elements of Labor's Employment and Training Administration; (2) the year 2000 efforts of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs and of the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and (3) observations on the year 2000 readiness of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Labor and its agencies have made progress, but are still at risk in several areas; (2) these areas include making benefits payments to laid-off workers, collecting labor statistics, and ensuring accurate accounting for pension benefits; (3) several of the systems supporting these business areas are at risk; some could fail as early as January 1999 because they involve calculations a year into the future; and (4) accordingly, it is critical that appropriate contingency plans be developed to ensure business continuity in the event of systems failures. |
gao_GAO-08-278T | gao_GAO-08-278T_0 | RUS administers electric, telecommunications, and water programs that help finance the infrastructure necessary to improve the quality of life and promote economic development in rural areas. SBA and USDA Rural Development Have Used a Variety of Mechanisms to Collaborate with Other Federal Agencies and with Each Other
Generally speaking, collaboration involves any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the agencies act alone. Agencies use a number of different mechanisms to collaborate with each other, including MOUs, procurement and other contractual agreements, and various legal authorities. Both SBA and USDA have used the authority provided by the Economy Act to facilitate collaboration. The Economy Act is a general statutory provision that permits federal agencies to enter into mutual agreements with other federal agencies to purchase goods or services and take advantage of specialized experience or expertise. For example, SBA has an agreement with the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) to examine SBA’s Small Business Lending Companies (SBLC). Additionally, using the disaster provisions under its traditional multifamily and single- family rural housing programs, Rural Development collaborated with FEMA in providing assistance to hurricane victims. While SBA and Rural Development are not currently involved in a collaborative working relationship, both agencies have some experience collaborating with each other on issues involving rural development. The MOU outlined each agency’s responsibilities to (1) coordinate program delivery services and (2) cooperate with other private sector and federal, state, and local agencies to ensure that all available resources worked together to promote rural development. Finally, in creating the RBIP in 2002, Congress authorized Rural Development and SBA to enter into an interagency agreement to create rural business investment companies. Rural Development and SBA conditionally elected to fund three rural business investment companies. Section 1403 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 rescinded funding for the program at the end of fiscal year 2006. SBA and Rural Development Both Have a Field Office Network, but Rural Development Appears to Have a More Recognized Presence in Rural Areas
Both SBA and Rural Development have field offices in locations across the United States. However, Rural Development has more state and local field offices and is a more recognized presence in rural areas than SBA. SBA currently has 68 district offices, many of which are not located in rural communities or are not readily accessible to rural small businesses. It appears that Rural Development has an extensive physical infrastructure in rural areas and expertise in working with rural lenders and small businesses. Our Ongoing Work Will Study the Potential for Increased Collaboration between SBA and Rural Development
You requested that we conduct a review of the potential for increased collaboration between SBA and Rural Development, and we have recently begun this work. In general, the major objectives of our review are to determine: 1. The kind of cooperation that is already taking place between SBA and Rural Development offices, and 3. Any opportunities or barriers that may exist to cooperation and collaboration between SBA and Rural Development. To assess the differences and similarities between SBA loan programs and Rural Development business programs, we will review relevant SBA and Rural Development documents describing their loan and business programs. To determine what cooperation has taken place between SBA and Rural Development, we will examine previous collaboration efforts and cooperation between the agencies in providing programs and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) and Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development offices share a mission of attending to underserved markets, promoting economic development, and improving the quality of life in America through the promotion of entrepreneurship and community development. In the past, these agencies have had cooperative working relationships to help manage their respective rural loan and economic development programs. At this subcommittee's request, GAO has undertaken a review of potential opportunities for SBA to seek increased collaboration and cooperation with USDA Rural Development (Rural Development), particularly given Rural Development's large and recognizable presence in rural communities. In this testimony, GAO provides preliminary views on (1) mechanisms that SBA and USDA have used to facilitate collaboration with other federal agencies and with each other; (2) the organization of SBA and USDA Rural Development field offices; and (3) the planned approach for GAO's recently initiated evaluation on collaboration between SBA and Rural Development. GAO discussed the contents of this testimony with SBA and USDA officials.
What GAO Found
While SBA and Rural Development are not currently involved in a collaborative working relationship, SBA and Rural Development have used a number of different mechanisms, both formal and informal, to collaborate with other agencies and each other. For example, both agencies have used the Economy Act--a general statutory provision that permits federal agencies, under certain circumstances, to enter into mutual agreements with other federal agencies to purchase goods or services and take advantage of specialized experience or expertise. SBA and USDA used the act to enter into an interagency agreement to create rural business investment companies to provide equity investments to rural small businesses. For this initiative, Congress also authorized USDA and SBA to administer the Rural Business Investment Program to create these investment companies. However, funding for this program was rescinded at the end of fiscal year 2006. SBA and Rural Development have also used other mechanisms to collaborate, including memorandums of understanding (MOU), contractual agreements, and other legal authorities. For instance, Rural Development has collaborated with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in providing assistance to the victims of Hurricane Katrina using the disaster provisions under its multifamily and single-family rural housing programs. To collaborate with each other, in the past SBA and Rural Development have established MOUs to ensure coordination of programs and activities between the two agencies and improve effectiveness in promoting rural development. Both SBA and Rural Development have undergone restructuring that has resulted in downsizing and greater centralization of each agency's field operations. Currently, SBA's 68 field offices--many of them in urban centers--are still undergoing the transformation to a more centralized structure. Rural Development has largely completed the transformation and continues to have a large presence in rural areas through a network of hundreds of field offices. The program's recognized presence in rural areas and expertise in the issues and challenges facing rural lenders and small businesses may make these offices appropriate partners to help deliver SBA services. GAO has recently begun a review of the potential for increased collaboration between SBA and Rural Development. In general, the major objectives are to examine the differences and similarities between SBA loan programs and Rural Development business programs, any cooperation that is already taking place between SBA and Rural Development, and any opportunities for or barriers to collaboration. |
gao_GAO-09-906T | gao_GAO-09-906T_0 | The Forest Service and four Interior agencies—the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service—are responsible for wildland fire management. Agencies’ Efforts to Implement a New Approach to Managing Wildland Fire Have Better Positioned Them to Respond to Fire Effectively
The Forest Service and the Interior agencies have improved their understanding of wildland fire’s role on the landscape and have taken important steps toward improving their ability to cost-effectively protect communities and resources. Under this policy, the agencies abandoned their attempt to put out every wildland fire, seeking instead to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fires so as to protect communities and important resources at risk but also to consider both the cost and long-term effects of that response. These steps include reducing hazardous fuels, in an effort to keep wildland fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect important resources by lessening a fire’s intensity. The agencies have also taken steps to foster fire-resistant communities. In addition, the agencies have made improvements laying important groundwork for enhancing their response to wildland fire, including: Implementing the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. Acquiring and using firefighting assets effectively. Agencies Have Yet to Take Certain Key Actions That Would Substantially Improve Their Management of Wildland Fire
Despite the important steps the agencies have taken, much work remains. We have previously recommended several key actions that, if completed, would improve the agencies’ management of wildland fire. Completing an investment strategy that lays out various approaches for reducing fuels and responding to wildland fires and the estimated costs associated with each approach and the trade- offs involved—what we have termed a cohesive strategy—is essential for Congress and the agencies to make informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches for addressing the nation’s wildland fire problems. Establish a cost-containment strategy. Although these documents do provide overarching goals and objectives, they lack the clarity and specificity needed by land management and firefighting officials in the field to help manage and contain wildland fire costs. As a result, despite the improvements the agencies are making to policy, decision support tools, and oversight, we believe that managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies’ leadership places on containing costs and—as we concluded in our 2007 report—are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. Clearly define financial responsibilities for fires that cross jurisdictions. Without such clarification, the concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface from fire—and that the federal government, therefore, would continue to bear more than its share of that cost—are unlikely to be addressed. Mitigate effects of rising fire costs on other agency programs. The sharply rising costs of managing wildland fires have led the Forest Service and the Interior agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire suppression, disrupting or delaying activities in these other programs. Better methods of estimating the suppression funds the agencies request, as we recommended in 2004, could reduce the likelihood that the agencies would need to transfer funds from other accounts, yet the agencies continue to use an estimation method with known problems. Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened dramatically over the past decade, with more than a doubling of both the average annual acreage burned and federal appropriations for wildland fire management. The deteriorating fire situation has led the agencies responsible for managing wildland fires on federal lands--the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior--to reassess how they respond to wildland fire and to take steps to improve their fire management programs. This testimony discusses (1) progress the agencies have made in managing wildland fire and (2) key actions GAO believes are still necessary to improve their wildland fire management. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and reviews of agency documents and interviews with agency officials on actions the agencies have taken in response to previous GAO findings and recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have improved their understanding of wildland fire's ecological role on the landscape and have taken important steps toward enhancing their ability to cost-effectively protect communities and resources by seeking to (1) make communities and resources less susceptible to being damaged by wildland fire and (2) respond to fire so as to protect communities and important resources at risk while also considering both the cost and long-term effects of that response. To help them do so, the agencies have reduced potentially flammable vegetation in an effort to keep wildland fires from spreading into the wildland-urban interface and to help protect important resources by lessening a fire's intensity; sponsored efforts to educate homeowners about steps they can take to protect their homes from wildland fire; and provided grants to help homeowners carry out these steps. The agencies have also made improvements that lay important groundwork for enhancing their response to wildland fire, including adopting new guidance on how managers in the field are to select firefighting strategies, improving the analytical tools that assist managers in selecting a strategy, and improving how the agencies acquire and use expensive firefighting assets. Despite the agencies' efforts, much work remains. GAO has previously recommended several key actions that, if completed, would substantially improve the agencies' management of wildland fire. Specifically, the agencies should: (1) Develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential approaches for addressing the growing wildland fire threat, including estimating costs associated with each approach and the trade-offs involved. Such information would help the agencies and Congress make fundamental decisions about an effective and affordable approach to responding to fires. (2) Establish a cost-containment strategy that clarifies the importance of containing costs relative to other, often-competing objectives. Without such clarification, GAO believes managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs and are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. (3) Clarify financial responsibilities for fires that cross federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Unless the financial responsibilities for multijurisdictional fires are clarified, concerns that the existing framework insulates nonfederal entities from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban interface from fire--and that the federal government would thus continue to bear more than its share of the cost--are unlikely to be addressed. (4) Take action to mitigate the effects of rising fire costs on other agency programs. The sharply rising costs of managing wildland fires have led the agencies to transfer funds from other programs to help pay for fire suppression, disrupting or delaying activities in these other programs. Better methods of predicting needed suppression funding could reduce the need to transfer funds from other programs. |
gao_NSIAD-96-178 | gao_NSIAD-96-178_0 | It is within this changing political, military, and economic environment that the School of the Americas has been operating. Today, virtually all Latin American countries have representative governments, although the democratic institutions in many of these countries are in their embryonic stage.Reflecting the fragile nature of democracy in some countries, the 1991 Santiago Resolution of the Organization of American States called for the preservation and strengthening of democratic systems and was reinforced at the 1995 Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Williamsburg, Virginia. Further, human rights violations continue to be a concern in the region. Students at the School come primarily from their countries’ military or police forces, with a significant proportion from military or police academies. School of the Americas Is Predominant Choice of Latin Americans
Of the 5,895 foreign students that came to the United States to attend U.S. Army training courses in fiscal year 1995, 842 (14 percent) were from Spanish-speaking Latin American and Caribbean countries. Table 1 provides a brief description of the courses offered in 1996 and the number of students that attended these courses in 1995. Officials at the School pointed out that because all international training courses are based on U.S. doctrine, foreign students from other regions receive training in similar subjects as the students at the School. Instructors at the School
Courses at the School are taught by U.S. and Latin American military members as well as some civilian instructors. Recent Army Study of the School
In 1995, TRADOC contracted for a study to analyze and develop recommendations concerning the future need for the School of the Americas and what purposes the School should serve. The curriculum would include courses on the development of threat assessments, strategic plans, budgets and acquisition plans, civil-military relations, and methods of legislative oversight. Chronology of Key Events in the History of the U.S. Army School of the Americas
The U.S. Army established the Latin America Center-Ground Division in the Panama Canal Zone to provide instruction to U.S. Army personnel in garrison technical skills such as food preparation, maintenance, and other support functions, with limited training for Latin Americans. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the U.S. Army School of the Americas and a Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to strengthen civilian institutions involved in defense and security activities in Latin American countries.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Latin American environment in which the School operates is undergoing radical political and economic change; (2) in addition, the role of the military in many of these societies is beginning to evolve from one of political dominance to a more professional model subordinate to the civilian authority; (3) although the School trains the majority of Latin American students that come to the United States for Army training, primarily because the curriculum is taught in Spanish, it provides a small percent of the training that the Army provides to foreign students from around the world; (4) virtually all of the 745 students attending the School in 1995 represented their countries' military or police forces, with few civilians attending the School; (5) many of the courses at the School provide instruction in military and combat skills; however, since 1990, the curriculum has been broadened to include courses addressing post-Cold War needs of the region; (6) the courses offered at the School are based on U.S. military doctrine, and foreign students from other regions receive basically the same courses at other Army training locations, with the exception of the School's emphasis on human rights; (7) courses are taught by U.S. and Latin American military personnel and some civilian instructors; (8) a recent study contracted for by the Army to determine whether the School should be retained and why concluded that the School should continue but recommended a number of changes; and (9) in response to the emerging post-Cold War need to strengthen civilian institutions in Latin America, DOD is considering establishing a separate institution to focus on civilian-military relations and the development of greater civilian expertise in the region's defense establishments. |
gao_GAO-04-150T | gao_GAO-04-150T_0 | In fiscal year 1996, the program had its first accumulated surplus, and by fiscal year 2000, the accumulated surplus had increased to almost $10 billion, in 2002 dollars. However, the program’s finances reversed direction in 2001, and at the end of fiscal year 2002, its accumulated deficit was about $3.6 billion. PBGC estimates that this deficit grew to $5.7 billion by July 31, 2003. Termination of Severely Underfunded Plans Was Primary Factor in Financial Decline of Single- Employer Program
The financial condition of the single-employer pension insurance program returned to an accumulated deficit in 2002 largely due to the termination, or expected termination, of several severely underfunded pension plans. PBGC estimates that in 2002, underfunded steel company pension plans accounted for 80 percent of the $9.3 billion in program losses for the year. Plan Unfunded Liabilities Were Increased by Stock Market and Interest Rate Declines
The termination of underfunded plans in 2002 occurred after a sharp decline in the stock market had reduced plan asset values and a general decline in interest rates had increased plan liability values, and the sponsors did not make the contributions necessary to adequately fund the plans before they were terminated. PBGC Faces Long- Term Financial Risks from a Potential Imbalance of Assets and Liabilities
Two primary risks threaten the long-term financial viability of the single- employer program. On the asset side, PBGC also faces the risk that it may not receive sufficient revenue from premium payments and investments to offset the losses experienced by the single-employer program in 2002 or that this program may experience in the future. Nevertheless, because of serious risks to the program’s viability, we have placed the PBGC single-employer insurance program on our high-risk list. In our view, several types of reforms might be considered to reduce the risks to the single-employer program’s long-term financial viability. These reforms could be made to strengthen funding rules applicable to poorly funded plans; modify program guarantees; improve the availability of information about plan investments, termination funding, and program guarantees. In any event, any changes adopted to address the challenge facing PBGC should provide a means to hold sponsors accountable for adequately funding their plans, provide plan sponsors with incentives to increase plan funding, and improve the transparency of the plan’s financial information. Disclose benefit guarantees to additional participants. In 1974, ERISA placed three important charges on PBGC: first, protect the pension benefits so essential to the retirement security of hard working Americans; second, minimize the pension insurance premiums and other costs of carrying out the agency’s obligations; and finally, foster the health of the private defined- benefit pension plan system. Ultimately, however, for any insurance program, including the single-employer pension insurance program, to be self-financing, there must be a balance between premiums and the program’s exposure to losses. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 34 million workers and retirees in 30,000 single-employer defined benefit pension plans rely on a federal insurance program managed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to protect their pension benefits, and the program's long-term financial viability is in doubt. Over the last decade, the program swung from a $3.6 billion accumulated deficit (liabilities exceeded assets), to a $10.1 billion accumulated surplus, and back to a $3.6 billion accumulated deficit, in 2002 dollars. Furthermore, despite a record $9 billion in estimated losses to the program in 2002, additional severe losses may be on the horizon. PBGC estimates that financially weak companies sponsor plans with $35 billion in unfunded benefits, which ultimately might become losses to the program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on the factors that contributed to recent changes in the single-employer pension insurance program's financial condition, risks to the program's long-term financial viability, and changes to the program that might be considered to reduce those risks.
What GAO Found
The single-employer pension insurance program returned to an accumulated deficit in 2002 largely due to the termination, or expected termination, of several severely underfunded pension plans. Factors that contributed to the severity of plans' underfunded condition included a sharp stock market decline, which reduced plan assets, and an interest rate decline, which increased plan termination costs. For example, PBGC estimates losses to the program from terminating the Bethlehem Steel pension plan, which was nearly fully funded in 1999 based on reports to IRS, at $3.7 billion when it was terminated in 2002. The plan's assets had decreased by over $2.5 billion, while its liabilities had increased by about $1.4 billion since 1999. The single-employer program faces two primary risks to its long-term financial viability. First, the losses experienced in 2002 could continue or accelerate if, for example, structural problems in particular industries result in additional bankruptcies. Second, revenue from premiums and investments might be inadequate to offset program losses experienced to date or those that occur in the future. Revenue from premiums might fall, for example, if the number of program participants decreases. Because of these risks, we recently placed the single-employer insurance program on our high-risk list of agencies with significant vulnerabilities to the federal government. While there is not an immediate crisis, there is a serious problem threatening the retirement security of millions of American workers and retirees. Several reforms might reduce the risks to the program's longterm financial viability. Such changes include: strengthening funding rules applicable to poorly funded plans, modifying program guarantees, restructuring premiums, and improving the availability of information about plan investments, termination funding, and program guarantees. Any changes adopted to address the challenge facing PBGC should provide a means to hold plan sponsors accountable for adequately funding their plans, provide plan sponsors with incentives to increase plan funding, and improve the transparency of plan information. |
gao_GAO-12-886 | gao_GAO-12-886_0 | FSOC’s three primary purposes under the Dodd-Frank Act are to 1. identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies, as well as risks that could arise outside the financial services marketplace; 2. promote market discipline by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of these large companies that the U.S. government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and 3. respond to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system. To achieve these purposes, the Dodd-Frank Act gave FSOC a number of important authorities that allow it to collect information across the financial system so that regulators will be better prepared to address emerging threats; designate for supervision by the Federal Reserve those nonbank financial companies that pose risks to the financial system as defined by the act; designate as systemically important certain financial market utilities (FMU) and payment, clearing, or settlement activities, requiring them to meet prescribed risk management standards, and subjecting them to enhanced regulatory oversight; recommend stricter standards for the large, interconnected bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies designated for enhanced supervision; vote on determination by the Federal Reserve that action should be taken to break up institutions that pose a “grave threat” to U.S. financial stability; and facilitate information sharing and coordination among the member agencies to eliminate gaps in the regulatory structure. FSOC and OFR Face Challenges Achieving Their Missions
Key FSOC missions—to identify risks to U.S. financial stability and respond to emerging threats to stability—are inherently challenging. Further, such threats do not develop in precisely the same way in successive crises, making them harder to identify. OFR also faces the challenge of trying to build a world-class research organization from the ground up while meeting shorter term goals and responsibilities. FSOC’s and OFR’s Management Structures and Mechanisms Could Be Enhanced to Provide Greater Accountability and Transparency
FSOC and OFR have taken steps toward meeting the challenges they face, including setting up their management structures, communicating their mission and goals, and hiring staff. Additionally, while FSOC and OFR have developed web pages on Treasury’s website and taken other steps to provide information to the public, these efforts have limitations and do not always fully inform Congress or the public about their activities and progress. Without taking additional steps to improve accountability and transparency, FSOC and OFR are missing the opportunity to demonstrate their progress in carrying out their missions. FSOC has established seven standing committees generally composed of staff of its members and member agencies to carry out the business of the council including developing the information the members need to make decisions effectively. OFR has also adopted policies and procedures for its operations. In addition, FSOC has some planning under way and OFR has taken some actions and planned others that are consistent with legal requirements or leading practices for new organizations relative to strategic planning and performance management. OFR issued a strategic framework in March 2012 to cover fiscal years 2012-2014. In the 2012 Annual Report, FSOC also more clearly identifies recommendations starting each one with “the council recommends,” but it still does not consistently designate an FSOC member or members to monitor or implement the recommendations nor does it establish time frames for certain actions such as reporting to the council on the status of the recommendation. FSOC and OFR Have Taken Steps to Build Mechanisms to Identify Potential Threats to Financial Stability, but More Work Is Needed to Realize This Goal
FSOC has taken steps to meet its statutory responsibilities related to identifying risks and potential emerging threats to U.S. financial stability, but has not yet developed comprehensive and systematic mechanisms to realize these goals. Although FSOC and OFR have adopted communication methods to provide information to the public and Congress on their activities, some of their methods could be strengthened. Through the committee structure, FSOC members’ staffs also noted that agencies had leveraged their joint expertise and resources to carry out FSOC’s statutory responsibilities, including rulemakings. OFR officials also noted that they play a key role on FSOC’s Data Committee, which supports coordination of and consultation on issues related to FSOC data collection and sharing. Leveraging resources. Such persons could be those from the industry and academics. Both the 2011 and 2012 Annual Reports identify a number of threats, but they do not use a systematic forward-looking process for doing so. Individual benefits. However, FSOC has not set up processes to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the overall impact of designations. Doing a comprehensive analysis to assess whether designations are having their intended impact of providing greater financial stability and the extent of any other impacts will be challenging. FSOC Has Issued Mandated Reports, but Does Not Have Sufficient Processes for Identifying or Prioritizing Emerging Threats
As table 2 shows, the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that FSOC issue a number of reports, including five one-time studies and ongoing annual reports. However, FSOC has not developed a structure that supports having a systematic or comprehensive process for identifying potential emerging threats. The 2011 report includes over 30 threats without explicitly specifying which are most important. Successfully implementing their mandates will require FSOC members to actively work together and with external stakeholders. Potential threats to financial stability are discussed at FSOC meetings and FSOC has established a Systemic Risk Committee to facilitate coordination among members’ staffs, including member agencies that often have their own groups devoted to risk analysis. However, more needs to be done to promote collaboration—both among FSOC members and between FSOC and external stakeholders. Thus, some threats may not be identified consistently or at all. Moreover, addressing these issues can help FSOC and OFR to further promote collaboration among FSOC’s members and with external stakeholders, which is critical to their ability to achieve their missions. We recommend that FSOC and OFR clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including FSOC members and member agencies, to better ensure that the monitoring and analysis of the financial system are comprehensive and not unnecessarily duplicative. As FSOC continues to develop approaches for monitoring threats to financial stability, we recommend that FSOC develop an approach that includes systematic sharing of key financial risk indicators across FSOC members and member agencies to assist in identifying potential threats for further monitoring or analysis. To improve the transparency of FSOC and OFR operations, we recommend that FSOC and OFR each develop a communication strategy to improve communications with the public. Establish formal collaboration and coordination policies that clarify issues such as when collaboration or coordination should occur and what role FSOC should play in facilitating that coordination. More fully incorporate key practices for successful collaboration that we have previously identified. Develop more systematic forward-looking approaches for reporting on potential emerging threats to financial stability in annual reports. Make recommendations in the annual report more specific by identifying which FSOC member agency or agencies, as appropriate, are recommended to monitor or implement such actions within specified time frames. Second, Treasury states that it expects FSOC will consider the effects on the financial system resulting from designation in its periodic assessments in response to our recommendation that FSOC develop a framework for assessing the impact of its decisions for designating FMUs and nonbank financial companies on the wider economy and those entities. We acknowledge OFR’s efforts in continuing to develop the elements required for a strategic plan and performance management system and will review this information when it is publicly released. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to examine the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) and Office of Financial Research’s (OFR) (1) challenges in fulfilling their missions; (2) efforts in establishing management structures and mechanisms to carry out their missions and attain their goals; and (3) activities for supporting collaboration among members and external stakeholders, including international bodies and regulators; as well as (4) FSOC’s processes used to issue rules and reports. To examine FSOC’s and OFR’s efforts in establishing management structures and mechanisms to carry out their missions, we reviewed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act), FSOC’s bylaws and organizational structure (including its committee structure), and OFR’s strategic framework. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created FSOC to identify and address threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system and OFR to support FSOC and Congress by providing financial research and data. GAO was asked to examine (1) any challenges FSOC and OFR face in fulfilling their missions (2) FSOC and OFR's efforts to establish management structures and mechanisms to carry out their missions, (3) FSOC and OFR's activities for supporting collaboration among their members and external stakeholders, and (4) the processes FSOC used to issue rules and reports. GAO reviewed FSOC documents related to the annual reports, rulemakings, and committee procedures, as well as documents on OFR's budget, staffing, and strategic planning. GAO also interviewed FSOC and OFR staff, FSOC member and member agency staff, and external stakeholders, including foreign officials, industry trade groups, and academics.
What GAO Found
These new organizations--the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR)--face challenges in achieving their missions. Key FSOC missions--to identify risks and respond to emerging threats to financial stability--are inherently challenging, in part, because risks to financial stability do not develop in precisely the same way in successive crises. Collaboration among FSOC members can also be challenging at times, as almost all of them represent independent agencies that retained existing authorities. OFR faces the challenge of trying to establish and build a world-class research organization while meeting shorter-term goals and responsibilities.
FSOC's and OFR's management mechanisms to carry out their missions could be enhanced to provide greater accountability and transparency. FSOC and OFR have taken steps toward establishing such mechanisms. FSOC has established seven standing committees generally composed of staff of its members and member agencies to support the council in carrying out its business and provide information to the council for decision making and adopted a memorandum of understanding on information sharing to help govern its activities. FSOC and OFR have also issued annual reports on their activities and created web pages that provide some information to the public. However, certain mechanisms could be strengthened. For instance:
FSOC's Systemic Risk Committee, which is responsible for identifying risks to financial stability, has procedures to facilitate analysis of risks raised by staff. However, without a more systematic approach and comprehensive information, FSOC member agencies, on their own, may not be well positioned to judge which potential threats will benefit from interagency discussions. GAO recommends that FSOC collect and share key financial risk indicators as part of a systematic approach to help identify potential threats to financial stability.
Public information on FSOC's and OFR's decision making and activities is limited, which makes assessing their progress in carrying out their missions difficult. GAO recommends that (1) FSOC keep detailed records of closeddoor sessions and (2) both entities develop a communication strategy to improve communications with the public.
FSOC's annual reports--which serve as its key accountability documents--do not consistently identify which entities should monitor or implement the identified recommendations or give time frames for specific actions. To hold FSOC accountable for its recommendations, GAO recommends that FSOC recommend a lead agency or agencies to monitor or implement each recommendation within specified time frames.
OFR issued a strategic framework in March 2012 as an important first step in adopting a strategic planning and performance management system. However, that document lacked some leading practices such as linking activities to strategic goals and performance measurement systems. GAO recommends that OFR further develop a strategic planning and performance management system that includes these elements and will allow it to be held accountable.
Although FSOC and OFR have taken steps to promote collaboration among FSOC members and external stakeholders, FSOC could further adopt key practices. FSOC member agency staff noted that agencies have leveraged their joint expertise and resources to produce FSOCs mandated reports and rules. OFR has also taken steps to collaborate with external stakeholders by initiating a working paper series, moving to form an advisory committee, and coordinating U.S. efforts at the international level to help create a legal entity identifier for financial entities that could enable regulators to identify parties to financial transactions. However, FSOC could do more to promote collaboration. For instance, FSOC, and OFR are required to monitor risks to financial stability, but they have not yet clarified agency responsibilities for implementationcreating the potential for regulatory gaps or duplication of effort. In addition, FSOC could take better advantage of statutory mechanisms to leverage external resources, including developing advisory committees. To improve collaboration and coordination among its member agencies and with external stakeholders, GAO recommends that FSOC (1) develop policies to clarify when formal collaboration or coordination should occur and FSOCs role in such efforts, (2) more fully incorporate key practices for successful collaboration that GAO has previously identified, and (3) clarify roles and responsibilities for implementing requirements to monitor risks to the financial system.
FSOC has issued rules that improve the transparency of its processes, and statutorily mandated reports but has not established processes to help ensure that these will have their intended results. While FSOC has issued rules on processes for designating nonbank financial entities for additional oversight and intends to review certain aspects of those rules, it has not developed plans for comprehensively evaluating whether designations are having their intended impactreducing threats to financial stability. The impact of the designations on the economy and the financial entities will depend, in part, on a number of rules being issued by independent FSOC member agencies that will be applied to those being designated. Without a comprehensive assessment of the impact of these rules that will require the cooperation of individual FSOC members, understanding whether the designations are having their intended impact will be difficult. GAO recommends that FSOC develop a comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of its designation decisions. In addition, FSOC has not developed a systematic forward-looking process for identifying potential emerging threats in its mandated annual reporting process. In particular, FSOC does not have processes for consistently identifying such threats, separating them from more current threats, or prioritizing them. Identifying a large number of threatsthe 2011 report identified over 30without prioritizing them makes focusing on those that are most important difficult for decisionmakers. The 2012 report also included many threats, and neither report separates current threats from those that are potentially emerging. To improve FSOCs annual reporting on potential emerging threats, GAO recommends that FSOC develop more systematic approaches that are forward looking and help to prioritize the threats.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 10 recommendations to strengthen the accountability and transparency of FSOC and OFR's decisions and activities as well as to enhance collaboration among FSOC members and with external stakeholders. Treasury said, as Chairperson, that the council and OFR would consider the recommendations, but questioned the need for FSOC and OFR to clarify responsibilities for monitoring threats to financial stability and stated that OFR expects to share some risk indicators. However, stronger and more systematic actions are still needed in these areas. |
gao_GAO-05-379 | gao_GAO-05-379_0 | In fiscal year 2003, for the energy program activities we identified, the federal government provided at least $9.8 billion in estimated budget authority. On the revenue side, in fiscal year 2003, the federal government collected about $10.1 billion through various energy-related programs that include fees and royalties on development of federal energy resources and about $34.6 billion in excise taxes on gasoline and other fuels. On the basis of our analysis of fiscal year 2003 estimated budget authority for energy-related programs and outlay equivalent estimates for energy-related income tax preferences, resources to address energy supply activities accounted for almost one-half of the $14.2 billion in federal energy-related resources. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, as amended, requires federal agencies to achieve reductions in energy use. Most of the collections are royalties, rents, and bonuses from oil and gas on federal lands or offshore areas; while taxes on gasoline and other fuels account for most of the excise tax revenue. It Is Difficult to Assess Progress of Federal Efforts to Implement the National Energy Policy Report Recommendations
It is difficult to fully assess the status of progress made in implementation of the NEP recommendations because the information DOE has reported has been limited. For example, the NEP report recommended the development of energy educational programs, including possible legislation to create education programs funded by the energy industry. However, the January 2005 status report provided only an overview of federal energy education efforts, and it made no mention of creating education programs through legislation. Specifically, some of the recommendations are open-ended and lack measurable goals. However, this recommendation is open-ended and does not contain a specific, measurable goal, thereby making it difficult to understand how or to what extent the activities described have helped to implement the recommendation. Federal Resources Devoted to Energy-Related Activities Have Grown since 2000
Federal energy-related program resources have grown since the release of the NEP report as programs continue to address the major energy activity areas. For example, compared with fiscal year 2000 estimated budget authority, fiscal year 2003 estimated budget authority funding grew by about 30 percent, from $7.3 billion to $9.6 billion for those programs where we could identify estimated budget authority for both years. In addition, over the same time period, outlay equivalent estimates for energy-related income tax preferences grew by over 60 percent, from $2.7 billion to about $4.4 billion. Energy supply continues to be a major emphasis of the federal efforts, accounting for a majority of the growth. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) identify the federal government’s major energy- related efforts, (2) review the status of efforts to implement the May 2001 National Energy Policy (NEP) report recommendations, and (3) determine the extent to which resources associated with federal energy-related efforts has changed since the release of the NEP report. In addition, we also attempted to identify collections from energy-related excise taxes. Based on our review of the NEP report and the program and tax preference descriptions and our discussions with applicable program officials, we identified eight categories of energy- related activities and grouped the programs and tax preferences by these eight areas: (1) energy supply, (2) energy’s impact on the environment and health, (3) low-income energy consumer assistance, (4) basic energy science research, (5) energy delivery infrastructure, (6) energy conservation, (7) energy assurance and physical security, and (8) energy market competition and education. To review the status of federal efforts to implement the recommendations contained in the May 2001 NEP report, we reviewed publicly reported status information on the implementation of the NEP recommendations, focusing on DOE’s most recent January 2005 report on the status of the 106 NEP recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The lives of most Americans are affected by energy. Increased energy demand and higher energy prices has led to concerns about dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound energy. The federal government has adopted energy policies and implemented programs over the years that have focused on the appropriate role of the federal government in energy, attempting to achieve balance between supply and conservation. The May 2001 National Energy Policy (NEP) report contained over 100 recommendations that it stated, taken together, provide a national energy plan that addresses the energy challenges facing the nation. As Congress considers existing federal energy programs and proposed energy legislation in support of the May 2001 report, GAO was asked to (1) identify major federal energy-related efforts, (2) review the status of efforts to implement the recommendations in the May 2001 NEP report, and (3) determine the extent to which resources associated with federal energy-related efforts have changed since the release of the NEP report.
What GAO Found
Over 150 energy-related program activities and 11 tax preferences address eight major energy activity areas: (1) energy supply, (2) energy's impact on the environment and health, (3) low-income energy consumer assistance, (4) basic energy science research, (5) energy delivery infrastructure, (6) energy conservation, (7) energy assurance and physical security, and (8) energy market competition and education. At least 18 federal agencies, from the Department of Energy (DOE) to the Department of Health and Human Services, have energy-related activities. Based on fiscal year 2003 data (the most complete data available), the federal government provided a minimum of $9.8 billion in estimated budget authority for the energy-related programs we identified. In addition, various federal energy-related income tax preferences provided another estimated $4.4 billion in outlay equivalent value, primarily for energy supply objectives. On the revenue side, the federal government collected about $10.1 billion in fiscal year 2003 through various energy-related programs and about $34.6 billion in energy-related excise taxes. Significant collections involve royalties from the sale of oil and gas resources on federal lands, while taxes on gasoline and other fuels account for most of the excise taxes. While DOE reports that most of the 2001 NEP report recommendations are implemented, it is difficult to independently assess the status of efforts made to implement these recommendations because of limited information and the open-ended nature of some of the recommendations themselves. For example, the NEP report recommended the development of energy educational programs, including possible legislation to create education programs funded by the energy industry. However, DOE's January 2005 status report on NEP implementation provided only an overview of federal energy education efforts and made no mention of possible legislation to create such programs. In addition, some of the recommendations are open-ended and lack a specific, measurable goal, which makes it difficult to assess progress. Without a specific, measurable goal, it can be difficult to understand how and to what extent activities are helping to fulfill a recommendation. While this report does not make recommendations, it provides observations on the lack of information on the status of the NEP recommendations, which may hinder policy makers in assessing progress and determining future energy policies. Resources devoted to energy-related programs have grown since the release of the NEP report. For example, compared with fiscal year 2000, just prior to the 2001 NEP report, fiscal year 2003 estimated budget authority for energy-related programs grew by about 30 percent, from $7.3 billion to $9.6 billion. In addition, over the same period, estimated outlay equivalents for energy-related income tax preferences grew by over 60 percent, from $2.7 billion to $4.4 billion. Federal efforts have continued to address the eight major energy activities. Energy supply continues to be a major emphasis of the federal efforts, accounting for a majority of the growth. |
gao_GAO-07-208T | gao_GAO-07-208T_0 | Our analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that two key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable information. Two primary areas—personnel savings and reduced CTO fees—represented the majority of the over $56 million of estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel with the full implementation of DTS, but rather the shifting of staff to other functions. Also, as part of the Navy’s overall evaluation of the economic analysis, program officials stated that “the Navy has not identified, and conceivably will not recommend, any personnel billets for reduction.” Finally, the Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) October 2003 report on the economic analysis noted that it could not validate approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s total costs, including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost estimates because credible supporting documentation was lacking. DOD strongly objected to our finding that the personnel savings are unrealistic. However, based on our review and analysis of documentation and discussion with department personnel, we found that the underlying assumptions in support of the $54.1 million were not valid, particularly in regard to the amounts estimated for the Navy and Air Force. Savings Associated with Reduction of CTO Fees Are Unknown
According to the September 2003 economic analysis, DOD expected to realize annual net savings of $31 million through reduced fees paid to the CTOs because the successful implementation of DTS would enable the majority of airline tickets to be acquired with either no or minimal intervention by the CTOs. Rather, the sole support provided by the PMO-DTS was an article in a travel industry trade publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private sector company. This contract applies to the Defense Travel Region 6 travel area. Specific examples of failures to effectively implement the DOD policy on conducting economic analyses include the (1) DTS life-cycle cost estimates portion of the economic analysis was not independently validated as specified in DOD’s guidance and (2) September 2003 DTS economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs, as required by DOD and OMB guidance. Because an economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that a sensitivity analysis be performed to understand the effects of the imprecision in both underlying data and modeling assumptions. Presently, the reported DTS utilization is based on a DTS Voucher Analysis Model that was developed in calendar year 2003 using estimated data, but over the years has not been completely updated with actual data. This lack of accurate and pertinent utilization data hinders management’s ability to monitor its progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system, as well as to provide consistent and accurate data to Congress. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve DTS Utilization, but Further Action Is Needed
Although the military services have issued various memorandums aimed at increasing the utilization of DTS, the military service DTS program officials all pointed to ineffective training as a primary cause of DTS not being utilized to a far greater extent. While these actions are a positive step forward, they do not address the fundamental problem that DTS’s requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting—a primary cause of the previous problems. Our February 2006 analysis of selected flight information disclosed that DOD still did not have reasonable assurance that DTS displayed flights in accordance with its stated requirements. For example, DOD has retained a requirement to display 25 flights for each inquiry. Until DOD improves DTS requirement management practices, it will not have this assurance. Equally important, however, will be the department’s ability to resolve the long-standing difficulties that DTS has encountered with its requirements management and system testing. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system. The Defense Travel System (DTS) is envisioned as DOD's standard end-to-end travel system. This testimony is based on GAO's September 2006 related report. Today's testimony highlights GAO's key findings with regard to the following objectives: (1) Were the two key assumptions made in the September 2003 economic analysis reasonable? (2) Was DOD taking action to ensure full utilization of DTS and gathering the data needed to monitor DTS utilization? and (3) Has DOD resolved several functional problems associated with weak system requirements and testing? To address these objectives, GAO (1) reviewed the September 2003 DTS economic analysis, (2) analyzed DTS utilization data, and (3) analyzed DTS flight information.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on reliable information. Two cost components represent the majority of the over $56 million in estimated net savings--personnel savings and reduced commercial travel office (CTO) fees. In regard to the personnel savings, GAO's analysis found that the $24.2 million of personnel savings related to the Air Force and the Navy were not supported. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting of staff from the travel function to other functions. The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings from the implementation of DTS. In regard to the CTO fees, the economic analysis assumed that 70 percent of all DTS airline tickets would either require no intervention or minimal intervention from the CTOs, resulting in an estimated annual net savings of $31 million. However, the sole support provided by the DTS program office was an article in a trade industry publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private sector company. Furthermore, the economic analysis was not prepared in accordance with guidance prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget and DOD. DOD guidance stated that the life-cycle cost estimates should be verified by an independent party, but this did not occur. The economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs. Because an economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that the imprecision in both the underlying data and assumptions be understood. Such an assessment is referred to as a sensitivity analysis. DOD acknowledged that DTS is not being used to the fullest extent possible, but lacks comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. DOD's utilization data are based on a model that was developed in calendar year 2003. However, the model has not been completely updated to reflect actual DTS usage. The lack of accurate utilization data hinders management's ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system. GAO also found that the military services have initiated actions that are aimed at increasing the utilization of DTS. Finally, GAO found that DTS still has not addressed the underlying problems associated with weak requirements management and system testing. While DOD has acted to address concerns GAO previously raised, GAO found that DTS's requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting. For example, DTS displaying up to 25 flights for each inquiry is questionable because it is unclear whether this is a valid requirement. Until DOD improves DTS's requirements management practices, the department will not have reasonable assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality. |
gao_GAO-06-530 | gao_GAO-06-530_0 | The Military Services Did Not Follow DOD Policy in Calculating Carryover
The military services have not consistently implemented DOD’s 2002 revised policy in calculating carryover. Instead, the military services used different methodologies for calculating the reported actual and the allowable amount of carryover since DOD changed its carryover policy in December 2002. Specifically, (1) the military services did not consistently calculate the allowable amount of carryover that was reported in their fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006 budgets because they used different tables (both provided by DOD) that contained different outlay rates for the same appropriation; (2) the Air Force did not follow DOD’s regulation on calculating carryover, which affected the amount of allowable carryover and actual carryover by tens of millions of dollars and whether the actual amount of carryover exceeded the allowable amount as reported in the fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006 budgets; and (3) the Army depot maintenance and ordnance activity groups’ actual carryover was understated in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 because carryover associated with prior year orders was not included in the carryover calculation as required. As a result, year-end carryover data provided to decision makers who review and use these data for budgeting—Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and congressional decision makers—are erroneous and not comparable across the three military services. Navy Generally Followed DOD’s Carryover Policy but Better Disclosure Is Needed for Reporting on Research and Development Activity Group’s Carryover
In analyzing the Navy’s actual carryover figures for the naval shipyards, aviation depots, and research and development activity groups shown in the fiscal year 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 budgets to Congress, we found that the Navy generally followed DOD’s policy on calculating the actual amount of carryover as well as the allowable amount of carryover. While the budgets show that the Navy research and development activity group did not exceed the ceiling for any of the 4 years, the budgets no longer provide information that shows if any of the five subactivity groups individually exceeded the carryover ceiling, as the Navy budgets did prior to the change in the carryover policy in December 2002. Carryover Increased Due to Military Services Placing Orders Late in the Fiscal Year
Carryover is greatly affected by orders accepted late in the fiscal year that generally cannot be completed, and in some cases cannot even be started, prior to the end of the fiscal year. These reasons included (1) funds provided to customers late in the fiscal year to finance existing requirements, (2) new work requirements identified at year end, (3) problems encountered in processing orders, and (4) work scheduled at year end. Further, our analysis showed that 39 of the 68 orders—over half of the orders reviewed—were not complete at the end of the next fiscal year, generating a second year of carryover. In addition to increasing carryover amounts, orders accepted by working capital fund activities late in the fiscal year, in which these activities do not perform the work until well into the next fiscal year or even subsequent years, may not (1) be the most effective use of DOD resources at that time and (2) have complied with all of the order acceptance provisions cited in the DOD Financial Management Regulation. Reasons Customer Orders Are Placed Late in the Fiscal Year
As shown in figure 1, our review of 68 fiscal year-end orders for 2003 and 2004 identified four key factors contributing to orders generally being issued by customers late in the fiscal year and being accepted by the working capital fund activities during the last month of the fiscal year. Therefore, $277,898 carried over into fiscal year 2006. To determine if customers were submitting orders to working capital fund activities late in the fiscal year and, if so, the effect that this practice has had on carryover, we obtained data on orders accepted by working capital fund activities in September 2003 and September 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2006 budget estimates, working capital fund activity groups (depot maintenance, ordnance, and research and development) will have about $6.3 billion of funded work that will be carried over from fiscal year 2006 into fiscal year 2007. The congressional defense committees recognize that these activity groups need some carryover to ensure smooth work flow from one fiscal year to the next. However, the committees have previously raised concern that the amount of carryover may be more than is needed. GAO was asked to determine (1) if the military services' carryover calculations were in compliance with DOD's new carryover policy and (2) if customers were submitting orders to working capital fund activities late in the fiscal year and, if so, the effect this practice has had on carryover.
What GAO Found
The military services have not consistently implemented DOD's revised policy in calculating carryover. Instead, the military services used different methodologies for calculating the reported actual amount of carryover and the allowable amount of carryover since DOD changed its carryover policy in December 2002. The military services did not consistently calculate the allowable amount of carryover that was reported in their fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006 budgets because they used different outlay rates for the same appropriation. The Air Force did not follow DOD's regulation on calculating carryover for its depot maintenance activity group, which affected the amount of allowable carryover and actual carryover by tens of millions of dollars and whether the actual carryover exceeded the allowable amount as reported in the fiscal year 2004, 2005, and 2006 budgets. The Army depot maintenance and ordnance activity groups' actual carryover was understated in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 because carryover associated with prior year orders was not included. While the Navy generally followed DOD's policy for calculating carryover, the Navy consolidated the reporting of carryover information for research and development activities. The Navy budgets no longer provide information to show if any of the five research and development subactivity groups individually exceeded the carryover ceiling as the Navy budgets did prior to the change in the carryover policy. As a result, carryover data provided to decision makers who review and use the data for budgeting are erroneous and not comparable across the three military services. For example, the Air Force reported to Congress that the actual fiscal year 2002 carryover for depot maintenance was $87 million less than the ceiling. If the Air Force followed DOD's policy, GAO's calculations show its carryover would have exceeded the ceiling by $216 million. Carryover is greatly affected by orders accepted by working capital fund activities late in the fiscal year that generally cannot be completed by fiscal year end, and in some cases cannot even be started prior to the end of the fiscal year. GAO's analysis of 68 fiscal year-end orders identified four key factors contributing to orders generally being issued by customers late in the fiscal year and being accepted by the working capital fund activities during the last month of the fiscal year. These reasons included (1) funds provided to the customer late in the fiscal year to finance existing requirements, (2) new work requirements identified at year end, (3) problems encountered in processing orders, and (4) work scheduled at year end. GAO's analysis showed that over half of the orders reviewed were not completed at the end of the next fiscal year, generating a second year of carryover on the same order. As a result, some orders may not have been the most effective use of DOD resources at that time and may not have complied with all of the order acceptance provisions cited in the DOD Financial Management Regulation. |
gao_GAO-13-286 | gao_GAO-13-286_0 | DOD Has a Variety of Technology Transition Programs That Support Military Users
We identified 20 technology transition programs, managed by OSD and the military departments, that provide structured mechanisms and funding to facilitate technology transition. However, all are consistent in providing opportunities to transition technologies from the S&T community to a military user, such as an acquisition program or the warfighter in the field. In addition, most programs target fairly mature technologies, which are suitable for final stages of development and demonstration. Collectively, the programs we reviewed use a mix of S&T and other research, development, test, and evaluation funding—about $7.9 billion obligated from fiscal years 2010 through 2012—to facilitate technology transition. Technology Transition Programs Provide Technologies to Military Users, But Tracking of Project Outcomes and Benefits after Transition Is Limited
Most programs that we assessed track whether their projects were completed and successfully transitioned to intended users. On average, programs reported a historical transition rate of over 70 percent for their technology transition projects. However, about one-quarter of the projects transitioned to other organizations, such as test and evaluation centers and industry, for further development. For the most part, the programs do not track their projects beyond transition, which limits their ability to know and report final outcomes for transitioned technologies and any associated benefits DOD achieved from those technologies. Figure 4 shows the distribution of transitions reported by the transition programs we assessed for fiscal years 2010-2012 that fall into one of three categories—transition to an acquisition program, transition directly to the field for use by the warfighter, and transitions to “other” users such as S&T organizations, test and evaluation centers, or industry. The vast majority of the projects resulted in technologies transitioning to acquisition programs or directly to the warfighter in the field. Few Programs Track Project Outcomes and Benefits after Transition
As GAO has reported in the past, tracking technology transitions and the impact of those transitions, such as cost savings or deployment of the technology in a product, provides key feedback that can inform the management of programs. Programs Facilitate Transition Through Sound Project Selection and Management Practices
As GAO has reported in the past, technology transition programs need to establish disciplined selection and management processes as well as tools to ensure that new technologies can be effectively transitioned to a military user. Programs must have processes in place that support the selection of projects that have realistic schedule and cost expectations, as well as sufficiently mature technologies. Once selected, projects require effective management to ensure technology risks are minimized, costs and schedules are maintained, and transition commitments are confirmed. Formal agreements and other project assessment measures also are important to ensure projects stay on track and stakeholders sustain their commitments to transition. In conducting this review, we found that OSD and military department technology transition programs make use of these practices to varying degrees. There may be opportunities for more widespread use of these tools among the programs we reviewed, which could help strengthen technology transition success. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve visibility and management of the department’s efforts to transition technologies to support the needs of the warfighter, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
Require that all technology transition programs track and measure project outcomes, to include not only whether technologies transitioned to an intended user but also the longer-term impact of whether the technologies benefitted acquisition programs or military users in the field. Assess transition programs to identify opportunities for more widespread use of existing transition management tools, such as technology transition agreements and technology commitment level evaluation mechanisms. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify what Department of Defense (DOD) programs exist that are dedicated to facilitating technology transition from the science and technology (S&T) community to a user, we reviewed DOD reports and documents. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD and Congress recognize that technology innovation sometimes moves too slowly from the lab to the field. Programs have been created in DOD to help facilitate the transition of new technologies. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to undertake a body of work that will provide a holistic assessment of DOD's S&T enterprise. This report reflects the results from GAO's first review, which focuses on technology transition. Generally, when technologies have been sufficiently matured in the S&T environment, the technologies are available to transition to a military user. GAO's specific objectives were to (1) determine what DOD programs are dedicated to facilitating technology transition, (2) assess the outcomes of these transition programs, and (3) identify practices among the programs that may facilitate technology transition. GAO conducted interviews with and collected information from each technology transition program to identify their selection, management, and assessment practices, as well as project outcomes.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 20 technology transition programs--managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military departments--that provide structured mechanisms and funding to facilitate technology transition. All of the programs GAO reviewed are consistent in providing opportunities to transition technologies from the science and technology (S&T) environment to a user, such as a weapon system acquisition program or the warfighter in the field. To help speed the delivery of technologies to users, most transition programs target fairly mature technologies, which are suitable for final stages of development and demonstration. Collectively, the programs GAO reviewed obligated about $7.9 billion in Department of Defense (DOD) research, development, test, and evaluation funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to support technology transition.
Most programs that GAO assessed track whether their projects were completed and successfully transitioned to intended users. On average, programs reported a historical transition rate of over 70 percent for projects. The vast majority of these projects resulted in technologies transitioning to acquisition programs or directly to the warfighter. However, about one-quarter of the projects transitioned to other organizations, such as test and evaluation centers, for further development. Prior GAO work found that tracking technology transitions and the impact of those transitions, such as cost savings or deployment of the technology in a product, provides key feedback that can inform the management of programs. For the most part, transition programs that GAO reviewed do not track projects beyond transition, which limits their ability to know and report final outcomes for transitioned technologies and the associated benefits realized from those technologies.
As GAO has reported in the past, effective selection and management processes as well as tools are needed to ensure that new technologies can be successfully transitioned to military users. GAO found that OSD's and the Military Departments' technology transition programs make use of these practices to varying degrees. Most programs have formal review processes to determine whether candidate projects have sufficiently mature technologies, are in demand by users, and have schedules and costs that fit within the programs' criteria. Once selected, projects require effective management to ensure risks are minimized and transition commitments are confirmed. Many program officials indicated that regular stakeholder communication during project execution is important to ensure projects stay on track and transition commitments are sustained. Moreover, many program officials identified the use of formal management tools, such as technology transition agreements, as key mechanisms to help hold stakeholders accountable and facilitate technology transition.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD require programs to track and measure project outcomes to document transition results and benefits from transition, as well as assess programs to identify opportunities for more widespread use of existing transition management tools. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations and stated that it will initiate actions to address potential opportunities for improvement identified in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-820 | gao_GAO-09-820_0 | As provided in the BioShield Act, the process requires: 1. the DHS Secretary, in consultation with the HHS Secretary and the heads of other agencies as appropriate, to determine that a material threat exists and issue a “material threat determination;” 2. the HHS Secretary to determine countermeasures that are necessary to protect the public health; 3. the HHS Secretary to determine that a particular countermeasure is appropriate for procurement for the Strategic National Stockpile using the Special Reserve Fund and the quantities to be procured; 4. the DHS and HHS Secretaries to jointly recommend to the Director of OMB that the Special Reserve Fund should be used for the designated countermeasure acquisitions; 5. the director of OMB to approve the use of the Special Reserve Fund; 6. both Secretaries to notify designated congressional committees of the procurement. HHS Has Used New Authorities to Procure Countermeasures
HHS has used its Special Reserve Fund (purchasing) authority and one of its contracting authorities to procure countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile. To date, the remaining eight contracts are valued at almost $2 billion. HHS Has Established Internal Controls for Its New Authorities, but Lacks Adequate Documentation of the Risks of Using the Contracting Authorities
In response to BioShield requirements, HHS has established internal controls on its Special Reserve Fund (purchasing) and contracting authorities, but lacks adequate documentation of the risks of using the new contracting authorities. Language in the BioShield Act sets up a broad framework of controls over the procurement of countermeasures, including those with Special Reserve Funds, by requiring HHS to coordinate with DHS and obtain approval by OMB before the Fund may be used. In addition to the language in the Act, HHS officials told us that the internal controls for procuring countermeasures using the Fund are documented in a variety of internal policy and procedure documents and interagency agreements, which provide guidance on roles and responsibilities for how the controls are to be implemented. On October 18, 2005, HHS issued a memorandum that provided guidance on the use of the following contracting authorities: the increased simplified acquisition threshold and its use with the Special Reserve Fund, the increased micropurchase threshold, and the use of personal services contracts. Federal internal control standards state that management needs to comprehensively identify risks, analyze them for possible effect, and determine how risks should be managed. Some of the risk statements identify some risks and one mentions possible negative consequences that could occur without proper controls in place, but the statements lack an analysis of those risks. It simply states that “control procedures are necessary to prevent noncompliance with specific requirements of the Act.” In particular, the risk statement on simplified acquisition procedures in the memo does not discuss a key risk associated with using simplified acquisition procedures—namely, that an agency is prohibited from obtaining cost or pricing data for acquisitions at or below the simplified acquisition threshold. Not having adequately documented and appropriately communicated risk assessments, which institutionalize agency policies, may potentially result in future employees not knowing or understanding the risks or tradeoffs involved in using the various contracting authorities. Although HHS has established internal controls for its new purchasing and contracting authorities, the risk assessment statements related to the agency’s internal controls for the contracting authorities are not sufficiently specific. In particular, the failure to mention and lack of analysis of specific risks in the risk statements associated with using the increased micropurchase threshold and increased simplified acquisition procedures is not consistent with requirements under federal internal control standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Project BioShield Act of 2004 (BioShield Act) increased the federal government's ability to procure needed countermeasures to address threats from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. Under the BioShield Act, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was provided with new contracting authorities (increased simplified acquisition and micropurchase thresholds, and expanded abilities to use procedures other than full and open competition and personal services contracts) and was authorized to use about $5.6 billion in a Special Reserve Fund to procure countermeasures. Based on the BioShield Act's mandate, GAO reviewed (1) how HHS has used its purchasing and contracting authorities, and (2) the extent to which HHS has internal controls in place to manage and help ensure the appropriate use of its new authorities. To do this work, GAO reviewed contract files and other HHS documents, including internal control guidance, which GAO compared with federal statutes and federal internal control standards.
What GAO Found
Since 2004, HHS has awarded nine contracts using its Special Reserve Fund (Fund) purchasing authority under the BioShield Act to procure countermeasures that address anthrax, botulism, smallpox, and radiation poisoning. HHS may procure countermeasures that are approved by the Food and Drug Administration and ones that are unapproved, but are within 8 years of approval. Of the nine contracts, one was terminated for convenience and the remaining eight are valued at almost $2 billion. HHS officials told GAO that additional contracts are likely to be awarded in the near future as the Fund provides funding through fiscal year 2013. In addition, HHS has used one of its new contracting authorities, simplified acquisition procedures, although it has not used this authority since 2005. HHS has established internal controls on its new purchasing and contracting authorities. In addition to the language in the BioShield Act, which sets up a broad framework of controls over the use of the Special Reserve Fund, the internal controls for this purchasing authority are documented in a variety of internal policy and procedure documents and interagency agreements, which provide guidance on roles and responsibilities for how the controls are to be implemented. In response to BioShield Act requirements, HHS also established internal controls for three of the contracting authorities: the increased simplified acquisition threshold and its use with Special Reserve Funds, the increased micropurchase threshold, and the use of personal services contracts. Federal internal control standards state that, among other things, management needs to comprehensively identify risks, analyze them for possible effect, and determine how risks should be managed. Although some of the risk statements in a memo HHS issued identify some risks and one mentions possible negative consequences that could occur without proper controls in place, the risk statements for using the increased micropurchase threshold and increased simplified acquisition procedures lack analysis of specific risks. In particular, the memo does not discuss a key risk associated with using simplified acquisition procedures--namely, that an agency is prohibited from obtaining cost or pricing data for acquisitions at or below the simplified acquisition threshold. Without this data, the agency may not be able to determine if the price of a contract is fair and reasonable. Moreover, not having adequately documented and appropriately communicated risk assessments potentially results in future employees not knowing or understanding the risks or trade-offs involved in using the authorities. With employee turnover, HHS' reliance on the knowledge of current personnel to appropriately implement key controls will not enable future employees to make sound, informed, and consistent decisions. |
gao_GAO-04-547 | gao_GAO-04-547_0 | Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons Central to Increased Combat Power
DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use of precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating concepts, particularly in surveillance and command and control systems, have created unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for commanders and their forces, yet the full extent to which operations have been affected is unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of precision- guided weapons have also provided military commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations. Shared Situation Awareness Speeds Command and Control
DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in bombing operations, increasing lethality significantly. An official from DOD’s Office of Force Transformation told us that the office is conducting a series of case studies of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and exercises at the National Training Center and elsewhere to better understand these effects. Precision Weapons Provide Increased Flexibility
Precision weapons reduce limitations created by poor weather and visibility, enable bombing operations from higher and safer altitudes, and allow aircraft to be used in new ways. This analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed targets increased by 12 percentage points from Kosovo to Afghanistan. However, four interrelated areas stood out as key barriers to continued progress: (1) the lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment; (2) DOD’s continuing difficulty in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the effects of bombing operations; (3) the absence of a unified battlefield data collection system to provide standardized measures and baseline data on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing operations; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels understand and adapt to changes in the operating environment brought about by the move to a highly networked force using advanced technologies. Notwithstanding these advances, the full impact of these changes is still emerging and is not fully understood. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure continuing evolution of the capabilities demonstrated in recent conflicts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified commands, and the military departments to take the following four actions: identify the primary information required for bombing operations, such as targeting and battle damage assessments, ensure that planned interoperability enhancements provide the standardized definitions, mission reporting formats, and other necessary instructions for this information to be used by all unified commands during joint combat operations, and determine whether this standardized information can replace that used by the individual services; formulate a plan to provide sufficient numbers of personnel trained in battle damage assessment procedures when they are needed for combat operations and include in the plan the following: incentives for personnel to take the existing joint training on damage assessment, development of a system to be used by the Joint Forces Command to track and mobilize personnel who have received damage assessment training for use during surge situations, and development of guidance on the appropriate use of effects-based, probabilistic, and other nontraditional concepts in assessing battle damages; develop a unified battlefield information system that provides for the identification and collection of data on key, standardized measures of bombing operations needed to assess the basic efficiency and effectiveness of such operations, for use by all unified commands; and develop a joint operations training capability that provides commanders and staffs with a realistic simulation of the increased pace of operations and other emerging changes to the combat operating environment. We conducted these discussions to gain a detailed understanding of the results of our analyses and officials’ perspectives on the impact of the changing strategy on operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and technologies, such as improvements in force networks and increased use of precision weapons, designed to address changes in the security environment resulting from the continuing terrorist threat and the advent of the information age. Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress.
What GAO Found
Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked operations, such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and more integrated command and control centers, have improved DOD's ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force--reducing the time required for analysis and decision making in combat operations. However, recognizing that the full impact of these changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a series of case studies to better understand the effects of networked operations. Improvements in force networks have also been enhanced by the use of precision-guided weapons and associated technologies. These improvements not only provide commanders with greatly increased flexibility, such as the ability to conduct bombing operations in poor weather and from higher and safer altitudes, but also increase the accuracy of bombing operations. GAO's analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and those in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas stand out as key: (1) a lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to needed capabilities among military services; (2) continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses of bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other improvements in the speed of operations; (3) the absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness, which creates confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies, about assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs, and about procurement decisions; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information, more centralized management, and other changes in the operating environment brought about by the strategic changes. |
gao_GAO-13-303 | gao_GAO-13-303_0 | Ex-Im faces multiple risks when it extends export credit financing. Operational risk. Representatives from industry trade associations noted that Ex- Im’s ability to offer direct loans helped Ex-Im to fill the gap in private- sector lending following the financial crisis and implementation of more stringent banking regulations. Ex-Im Uses Modeling to Estimate Subsidy Costs and Reserves, and Accounts for Multiple Risks in These Processes and in Setting Fees
Ex-Im uses a loss estimation model to estimate credit subsidy costs and loss reserves and allowances. Consistent with audit recommendations and industry best practices, Ex- Im also incorporated five qualitative factors into the loss model in 2012 to adjust for circumstances that may cause estimated losses to differ from historical experience. However, a 1-year forecast may not capture the uncertainty associated with Ex-Im’s longer-term transactions, and the use of subsequent short- term forecasts does not address this limitation. Ex-Im’s Fees Are Guided by International Agreements and Internal Analyses
Ex-Im’s fees for medium- and long-term products account for the credit and political risk associated with each transaction and are guided in large part by the OECD Arrangement, which establishes guidelines for determining “minimum premiums”—fees to cover the risk of not being repaid—and minimum interest rates that participant ECAs charge. Ex-Im’s pricing structure for medium- and long-term products (about 85 percent of Ex-Im’s exposure) includes the following:
Exposure fees. Ex-Im Reported a Default Rate under 1 Percent and Generated Receipts, but the Long-Term Budgetary Impact Is Uncertain
Ex-Im calculates and reports default rates for its portfolio, but it has not maintained data useful for assessing the performance of newer books of business. Ex-Im has been self-sustaining since 2008. Ex-Im Has Started Developing a More Comprehensive Risk- Management Framework
In September 2012, the Ex-Im IG issued a report on Ex-Im’s management of risk at the overall portfolio level. Stress testing is consistent with our internal control standards and industry practices. Ex-Im officials also indicated that they intend to share their stress testing and loss modeling methodologies with other federal credit agencies so that others may benefit from Ex-Im’s efforts. Ex-Im has not yet made plans to report its stress scenarios and stress test results to Congress. In addition to the three recommendations discussed previously, the IG recommended that Ex-Im: (1) develop a systematic approach for modeling portfolio risk, including identifying appropriate qualitative risk factors; (2) with the assistance of external experts, implement a formal framework for the use of financial models, including procedures for model validation; (3) review risk metrics and reporting procedures to enhance transparency and to better inform key stakeholders; and (4) amend its by- laws to provide for oversight of an agencywide risk-management function by Ex-Im’s Board of Directors. Ex-Im has taken some steps to manage its increased workload. However, without benchmarks to determine when workload levels have created too much risk, Ex-Im’s ability to monitor and manage operational risks associated with its already increased business volume may be limited. For several years, Ex-Im has been self- sustaining for budgetary purposes, although the long-term cost of Ex-Im’s new business is not yet known. Providing this information to Congress—potentially as part of Ex-Im’s annual report— would be consistent with federal internal control standards for effective external communication and would aid congressional oversight of the agency. This is contrary to federal internal control standards, which indicate that agencies should develop a risk-management approach based on how much risk can be prudently accepted. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States take the following four actions:
To help improve the reliability of its loss estimation model, Ex-Im should assess whether it is using the best available data for adjusting loss estimates for longer-term transactions to account for global economic risk. Concerning our recommendation that Ex-Im retain point-in-time data on credit performance, Ex-Im said it had already begun doing so and would use these data to compare the performance of newer and older books of business and to enhance its loss estimation model. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) how the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s (Ex-Im) business changed in recent years and possible reasons for these changes; (2) how Ex-Im determines credit subsidy costs, loss reserves and allowances, and product fees, and how these processes account for different risks; (3) how Ex-Im’s financial portfolio has performed and the budgetary impact of its programs; and (4) the extent to which Ex-Im has a comprehensive risk-management framework. We also analyzed International Monetary Fund data on the volume of U.S. exports over fiscal years 1990 through 2012 in order to compare changes in export volume with changes in Ex-Im authorizations. This included the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990; the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ex-Im helps U.S. firms export goods and services by providing a range of financial products. The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 increased the statutory ceiling on the agency's total exposure to $140 billion in 2014. The act also requires GAO to evaluate Ex-Im's growth and the effectiveness of its risk management. This report discusses (1) how Ex-Im's business changed in recent years and possible reasons for these changes; (2) how Ex-Im determines credit subsidy costs, loss reserves and allowances, and product fees, and how these processes account for different risks; (3) how Ex-Im's financial portfolio has performed and the budgetary impact of its programs; and (4) the extent to which Ex-Im has a comprehensive risk-management framework. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Ex-Im's financial data, policies and procedures, and processes for calculating program costs and loss reserves. GAO also interviewed Ex-Im officials and other entities involved in export financing.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Export-Import Bank's (Ex-Im) outstanding financial commitments (exposure) grew from about $59 billion to about $107 billion, largely in long-term loans and guarantees. Factors associated with this growth include reduced private-sector financing following the financial crisis and Ex-Im's authorization of direct loans--a product not offered by export credit agencies in some other countries--to fill the gap in private-sector lending.
Ex-Im's processes for determining credit subsidy costs, loss reserves and allowances, and fees account for multiple risks. To implement the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and other requirements, Ex-Im calculates subsidy costs and loss reserves and allowances with a loss model that uses historical data and takes credit, political, and other risks into account. Consistent with industry practices, Ex-Im added factors to the model in 2012 to adjust for circumstances that may cause estimated credit losses to differ from historical experience. Opportunities exist to further improve the model. For example, Ex-Im uses a 1-year forecast of certain bond defaults to predict possible changes in loss estimates from changed economic conditions. However, a short-term forecast may not be appropriate for adjusting estimated defaults for longer-term products. Ex-Im's fees are generally risk-based and, for medium- and long-term products (about 85 percent of Ex-Im's exposure), guided by international agreements that set minimum fees that account for credit and political risk.
As of December 2012, Ex-Im reported an overall default rate of less than 1 percent. However, Ex-Im has not maintained data needed to compare the performance of newer books of business with more seasoned books at comparable points in time, a type of analysis recommended by federal banking regulators. Also, without point-in-time data showing when defaults occur, the precision of Ex-Im's loss model may be limited. Ex-Im has been self-sustaining since 2008 and has generated receipts for the government. But, because Ex-Im's portfolio contains a large volume of recent transactions, the long-term impact of this business on default rates and the federal budget is not yet known.
Ex-Im has been developing a more comprehensive risk-management framework but faces operational risks. Ex-Im manages credit and other risks through transaction underwriting, monitoring, and restructuring. Ex-Im also started addressing recommendations by its Inspector General (IG) about portfolio stress testing, thresholds for managing portfolio concentrations, and risk governance. GAO’s review of internal control standards and industry practices indicates that the IG’s recommendations represent promising techniques that merit continued attention. Ex-Im has not yet made plans to report its stress test scenarios and results to Congress, although doing so would aid congressional oversight and be consistent with internal control standards for effective external communication. Ex-Im faces potential operational risks because the growth in its business volume has strained the capacity of its workforce. Ex-Im has determined that it needs more staff, but it has not formally determined the level of business it can properly manage. GAO internal control standards state that agencies should develop a risk-management approach based on how much risk can be prudently accepted. Without benchmarks to determine when workload levels have created too much risk, Ex-Im’s ability to manage its increased business volume may be limited.
What GAO Recommends
Ex-Im should (1) assess whether it is using the best available data for adjusting the loss estimates for longer-term transactions to account for global economic risk, (2) retain point-in-time performance data to compare the performance of newer and older business and to enhance loss modeling, (3) report stress testing scenarios and results to Congress, and (4) develop benchmarks to monitor and manage workload levels. Ex-Im agreed with each of these recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-97-147 | gao_T-RCED-97-147_0 | Background
Amtrak was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to operate and revitalize intercity passenger rail service. In response to continually growing losses and a widening gap between operating deficits and federal operating subsidies, Amtrak developed its Strategic Business Plan. This plan (which has been revised several times) was designed to increase revenues and control cost growth and, at the same time, eliminate Amtrak’s need for federal operating subsidies by 2002. However, the relative gap between total revenues and expenses has not significantly closed, and passenger revenues (adjusted for inflation)—which Amtrak has been relying on to help close the gap—have generally declined over the past several years (see apps. At the end of fiscal year 1994, the gap between Amtrak’s operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $75 million. It is important to note that Amtrak’s increased debt levels could limit the use of federal operating support to cover future operating deficits. We reported in June 1996 that Amtrak will need billions of dollars to address its capital needs, such as bringing the Northeast Corridor up to a state of good repair. A significant capital investment will be required for other projects as well. For example, additional capital assistance will be required to introduce high-speed rail service between New York and Boston. Progress Has Been Slow in Addressing Previously Reported Capital Needs
We reported in July 1996 and February 1995 on Amtrak’s need for capital investments and some of the problems being experienced as a result. It is likely that as Amtrak assumes increased debt (including capital lease obligations) to acquire equipment and as the number of cars in Amtrak’s fleet that exceed their useful life increases, even less of Amtrak’s future capital grants will be available to meet capital investment needs. Achieving Operating Self-Sufficiency by 2002 Will Be Difficult
Amtrak’s ability to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2002 will be difficult, given the environment within which it operates. Amtrak is relying heavily on capital investment to support its goal of eliminating federal operating subsidies. Amtrak would like increased federal capital assistance to be provided from a dedicated funding source, such as would be provided by the bill you introduced Mr. Chairman, S. 436 (the “Intercity Passenger Rail Trust Fund Act of 1997”). Amtrak is also subject to the competitive and economic environment within which it operates. Such trade-offs in the future could limit further increases in Amtrak’s yield and, ultimately, revenue growth. Finally, Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions necessary to further reduce costs. These include making the route and service adjustments necessary to save money and to collectively bargain cost-saving productivity improvements with its employees. Although the business plans have helped reduce net losses, Amtrak continues to face significant challenges in accomplishing this goal, and it is likely Amtrak will continue to require federal financial support—both operating and capital—well into the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed Amtrak and the future of intercity passenger rail in the United States, focusing on: (1) Amtrak's financial condition and progress toward operating self-sufficiency; (2) Amtrak's need for, and use of, capital funds; and (3) factors that will play a role in Amtrak's future viability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak's financial condition is still very precarious and heavily dependent on federal operating and capital funds; (2) GAO previously reported that Amtrak's financial condition had deteriorated steadily since 1990 and that Amtrak was unlikely to overcome its financial problems without significant increases in passenger revenues and/or subsidies from federal, state, and local governments; (3) in response to its deteriorating financial condition, Amtrak in 1995 and 1996 developed strategic business plans designed to increase revenues and reduce cost growth; (4) however, GAO has found that in the past 2 years, passenger revenues, adjusted for inflation, have generally declined, and in fiscal year (FY) 1996, the gap between operating deficits and federal operating subsidies began to grow again to levels exceeding those of FY 1994, when the continuation of Amtrak's nationwide passenger rail service was severely threatened; (5) at the end of FY 1996, the gap between the operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $82 million; (6) capital investment continues to play a critical role in supporting Amtrak's business plans and ultimately in maintaining Amtrak's viability; (7) such investment will not only help Amtrak retain revenues by improving the quality of its service, but will be important in facilitating the revenue growth predicted in the business plans; (8) in both 1995 and 1996, GAO reported that Amtrak faced significant capital investment needs to, among other things, bring its equipment and facilities systemwide and its tracks in the Northeast Corridor into a state of good repair and to introduce high-speed rail service (at speeds of up to 150 miles per hour) between Washington and Boston; (9) Amtrak will need billions of dollars in capital investment for these and other projects; (10) it will be difficult for Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency by 2002 given the environment within which it operates; (11) Amtrak is relying heavily on capital investment to support its business plans, which envision a significant increase in capital funding support, possibly from a dedicated funding source such as the Intercity Passenger Rail Trust fund that would be established by S. 436; (12) Amtrak is also relying greatly on revenue growth and cost containment to achieve its goal of eliminating federal operating support; and (13) the economic and competitive environment within which Amtrak operates may limit revenue growth, and Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions, such as route and service adjustments, necessary to reduce costs. |
gao_GAO-13-252 | gao_GAO-13-252_0 | EPA may also defer oversight of the long-term cleanup of a site eligible for the NPL through the Other Cleanup Activity (OCA) approach. EPA Defers Oversight of a Majority of Sites Eligible for the NPL to Approaches Outside of the Superfund Program
EPA most commonly addresses the cleanup of sites eligible for the NPL by “deferring” oversight to approaches outside of the Superfund program. EPA Defers Oversight of More Than Half the Sites Eligible for the NPL to Approaches Outside of the Superfund Program
Among the 3,402 sites reported to the Superfund program in CERCLIS that EPA has identified as having contamination making them eligible for EPA deferred 1,984 sites to cleanup approaches outside of the the NPL,Superfund program (see fig. While the manual defines OCA deferrals generally, it does not define each type of OCA deferral. EPA officials noted they were working on additional guidance for OCA deferrals. The SA and NPL Processes Are Similar in Many Ways and EPA Has Accounted for Some Differences Between Them
The processes for implementing the SA and NPL approaches have many similarities. Through specific provisions in its SA agreements with PRPs, EPA has sought to make the two approaches comparable by accounting for the following four key differences:
First, EPA has the authority to pay for remedial actions only at sites listed on the NPL.include a provision to help ensure cleanups are not delayed by a loss of funding if the PRP ceases work during the remedial action phase of cleanup. Even with EPA’s efforts to achieve equivalence of SA agreement and NPL sites through these provisions, some sites may not benefit from these efforts because EPA regions have entered into agreements with PRPs at sites that they said were likely eligible for the SA approach without following the SA guidance. According to EPA headquarters officials, if regions are going to conduct a long-term cleanup under the Superfund program at a site, but not list it on the NPL, the agency prefers regions to use the SA approach. EPA’s Tracking and Reporting of Certain Aspects of the Process under the SA Approach Differ Significantly from That under the NPL Approach
Some differences remain between the way EPA tracks sites under the SA and NPL approaches. In addition, a lower proportion of SA agreement sites have reached construction completion compared with similar NPL sites. SA agreement sites tend to be in earlier phases of the cleanup process because the SA approach began more recently than the NPL approach. Moreover, EPA’s guidance does not specify in detail the documentation regions should have to support their decisions on OCA deferrals or completion of cleanup at these sites. Without clearer guidance on OCA deferrals, EPA does not have reasonable assurance that it can consistently track its OCA deferral sites in CERCLIS or that its regions’ documentation will be appropriate or sufficient to verify that these sites have been deferred or have completed cleanup. Update EPA’s written policies on SA agreement sites, including taking steps such as clarifying whether the SA approach is EPA’s preferred approach for long-term cleanup of sites under the Superfund program and outside of the NPL, specifying what documentation is sufficient to support the Hazard Ranking System score at SA agreement sites, and defining when the database code that identifies sites with SA agreements should remain in place. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of the work and the methodology used to examine (1) how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) addresses the cleanup of sites it has identified as eligible for the National Priorities List (NPL), (2) how the processes for implementing the Superfund Alternative (SA) and NPL approaches compare, and (3) how SA agreement sites compare with similar NPL sites in completing the cleanup process. To compare how SA agreement sites and similar NPL sites complete the cleanup process, we identified SA agreement sites and constructed a comparison group of 74 NPL sites with agreements between EPA and potentially responsible parties (PRP) similar to those at SA agreement sites as follows:
We identified 67 SA agreement sites using the SA code and added to that 3 SA agreement sites with their SA code removed after the site was listed on the NPL for a total of 70 SA agreement sites; we identified these three sites through our interviews with EPA officials. Median Length of Negotiations at SA Agreement Sites and Similar NPL Sites
As shown in table 3, for agreements with PRPs finalized from June 2002 through December 2012, SA agreement sites and similar NPL sites in our analysis showed mixed results in the length of time to complete negotiations, with SA agreement sites taking about as long as similar NPL sites for remedial investigation and feasibility study negotiations and less time for remedial design and remedial action negotiations. However, given the relatively small number of cleanup activities for both NPL and SA agreement sites in our analysis and differences at the site level, the differences in the median length of cleanup activities cannot be attributed entirely to the type of approach used at each site. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Superfund program, EPA may address the long-term cleanup of certain hazardous waste sites by placing them on the NPL and overseeing the cleanup. To be eligible for the NPL, a site must be sufficiently contaminated, among other things. EPA regions have discretion to choose among several other approaches to address sites eligible for the NPL. For example, under the Superfund program, EPA regions may enter into agreements with PRPs using the SA approach. EPA may also defer the oversight of cleanup at eligible sites to approaches outside of the Superfund program. GAO was asked to review EPA's implementation of the SA approach and how it compares with the NPL approach. This report examines (1) how EPA addresses the cleanup of sites it has identified as eligible for the NPL, (2) how the processes for implementing the SA and NPL approaches compare, and (3) how SA agreement sites compare with similar NPL sites in completing the cleanup process. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed program data as of December 2012; interviewed EPA officials; and compared SA agreement sites with 74 NPL sites selected based on their similarity to SA agreement sites.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) most commonly addresses the cleanup of sites it has identified as eligible for the National Priorities List (NPL) by deferring oversight of the cleanup to approaches outside of the Superfund program. As of December 2012, of the 3,402 sites EPA identified as potentially eligible, EPA has deferred oversight of 1,984 sites to approaches outside the Superfund program, including 1,766 Other Cleanup Activity (OCA) deferrals to states and other entities. However, EPA has not issued guidance for OCA deferrals as it has for the other cleanup approaches. Moreover, EPA's program guidance does not clearly define each type of OCA deferral or specify in detail the documentation EPA regions should have to support their decisions on OCA deferrals. Without clearer guidance on OCA deferrals, EPA cannot be reasonably assured that its regions are consistently tracking these sites or that their documentation will be appropriate or sufficient to verify that these sites have been deferred or have completed cleanup. Under the Superfund program, EPA oversees the cleanup of 1,313 sites on the NPL, 67 sites under the Superfund Alternative (SA) approach, and at least 38 sites under another undefined approach.
The processes for implementing the SA and NPL approaches, while similar in many ways, have several differences. EPA has accounted for some of these differences in its SA guidance by listing specific provisions for SA agreements with potentially responsible parties (PRP), such as owners and operators of a site. One such provision helps ensure cleanups are not delayed by a loss of funding if the PRP stops cleaning up the site. However, some EPA regions have entered into agreements with PRPs at sites that officials said were likely eligible for the SA approach without following the SA guidance. Such agreements may not benefit from EPA's provisions for SA agreements. EPA headquarters officials said the agency prefers regions to use the SA approach at such sites, but EPA has not stated this preference explicitly in its guidance. In addition, EPA's tracking and reporting of certain aspects of the process under the SA approach differs from that under the NPL approach. As a result, EPA's tracking of SA agreement sites in its Superfund database is incomplete; the standards for documenting the NPL eligibility of SA agreement sites are less clear than those for NPL sites; and EPA is not publicly reporting a full picture of SA agreement sites. Unless EPA makes improvements in these areas, its management of the process at SA agreement sites may be hampered.
The SA agreement sites showed mixed results in completing the cleanup process when compared with 74 similar NPL sites GAO analyzed. Specifically, SA agreement and NPL sites in GAO's analysis showed mixed results in the average time to complete negotiations with PRPs and for specific cleanup activities, such as remedial investigation and feasibility studies, remedial designs, and remedial actions. In addition, a lower proportion of SA agreement sites have completed cleanup compared with similar NPL sites. SA agreement sites tend to be in earlier phases of the cleanup process because the SA approach began more recently than the NPL approach. Given the limited number of activities for both NPL and SA agreement sites in GAO's analysis, these differences cannot be attributed entirely to the type of approach used at each site.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA issue guidance to define and clarify documentation requirements for OCA deferrals and clarify its policies on SA agreement sites. EPA agreed with the report's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-956T | gao_GAO-10-956T_0 | States Have Made Significant Progress in Reducing Payment Errors
The SNAP Payment Error Rate Has Declined to a Record Low
The national payment error rate — the percentage of SNAP benefit dollars overpaid or underpaid to program participants—has declined by about 56 percent over the last 11 years, from 9.86 percent in 1999 to 4.36 percent in 2009, in a time of increasing participation (see figure 1). FNS and States Have Taken Steps to Increase Payment Accuracy
We found that FNS and the states we reviewed have taken many approaches to increasing SNAP payment accuracy, most of which are consistent with internal control practices known to reduce improper payments. Despite this progress, the amount of SNAP benefits paid in error is substantial, totaling about $2.2 billion in 2009. This necessitates continued top-level attention from USDA management and continued federal and state commitment to determining the causes of improper payments and taking corrective actions to reduce them. Estimates Suggest Trafficking Has Declined, but FNS Could Further Enhance Program Integrity
FNS Estimates Suggest That the Rate of SNAP Trafficking Has Declined
The national rate of SNAP trafficking declined from about 3.8 cents per dollar of benefits redeemed in 1993 to about 1.0 cent per dollar during the years 2002 to 2005, as shown in table 1. FNS Has Taken Action to Improve Retailer Monitoring and Increase Trafficking Penalties
In response to our prior recommendation that FNS improves analysis and monitoring, FNS has implemented new technology to improve its ability to detect trafficking and disqualify retailers who traffic, which has contributed to more sophisticated analyses of SNAP transactions and categorization of stores based on risk. Consistent with our recommendation that FNS develop a strategy to increase penalties for trafficking, FNS received new authority to impose increased financial penalties for trafficking. However, FNS officials told us they have taken few recent steps to increase state efforts to pursue recipients suspected of trafficking, in part because of state resource constraints, but will continue to examine the impact of financial incentives in preparation for the expected upcoming program reauthorization. These categorically eligible households do not need to meet SNAP eligibility requirements such as the SNAP asset or gross income test because their general need has been established by the TANF program. For example, in 35 of the states that confer categorical eligibility for all TANF services, there is no limit on the amount of assets a household may have to be determined eligible, according to a FNS report. Even though households may be deemed categorically eligible for SNAP, the amount of assistance households are eligible for is determined based on each household’s income and other circumstances using the same process used for other SNAP recipients. Households can be categorically eligible for SNAP even if they receive no TANF funded service other than a toll-free telephone number or informational brochure. According to FNS officials, increased use of categorical eligibility by states has reduced administrative burdens and increased access to SNAP benefits to households who would not otherwise be eligible for the program due to SNAP income or asset limits. While FNS and the states believe categorical eligibility has improved program access and payment accuracy, the extent of its impact on access and program integrity is unclear. However, little is known about the extent to which increased use of categorical eligibility has affected the integrity of the program. As current fiscal stress and looming deficits continue to limit the amount of assistance available to needy families, it is more important than ever that scarce federal resources are targeted to those who are most in need and that the federal government ensure that every federal dollar is spent as intended. GAO-07-465. GAO-07-53. GAO-05-245. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is intended to help low-income individuals and families obtain a better diet by supplementing their income with benefits to purchase food. USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and the states jointly implement SNAP. Participation in the program has risen steadily over the last decade to an all time high of more than 33 million in fiscal year 2009, providing critical assistance to families in need. This testimony discusses GAO's past work on three issues related to ensuring integrity of the program: (1) improper payments to SNAP participants, (2) trafficking of SNAP benefits, and (3) categorical eligibility for certain individuals or households. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports on categorical eligibility (GAO-07-465), payment errors (GAO-05-245), and food stamp trafficking (GAO-07-53), developed through data analyses, case file reviews, site visits, interviews with officials, and a 50- state survey. GAO also updated data where available and collected information on recent USDA actions and policy changes.
What GAO Found
The national payment error rate reported for SNAP, which combines states' overpayments and underpayments to program participants, has declined by 56 percent from 1999 to 2009, from 9.86 percent to a record low of 4.36 percent. This reduction is due, in part, to options made available to states that simplified certain program rules. In addition, FNS and the states GAO reviewed have taken several steps to improve SNAP payment accuracy that are consistent with internal control practices known to reduce improper payments such as providing financial incentives and penalties based on performance. Despite this progress, the amount of SNAP benefits paid in error is substantial, totaling about $2.2 billion in 2009 and necessitating continued top-level attention and commitment to determining the causes of improper payments and taking corrective actions to reduce them. FNS estimates indicate that the national rate of food stamp trafficking declined from about 3.8 cents per dollar of benefits redeemed in 1993 to about 1.0 cent per dollar during the years 2002 to 2005 but that trafficking occurs more frequently in smaller stores. FNS has taken advantage of electronic benefit transfer to reduce fraud, and in response to prior GAO recommendations, has implemented new technology and categorized stores based on risk to improve its ability to detect trafficking and disqualify retailers who traffic. FNS also received authority to impose increased financial penalties for trafficking as recommended; however, it has not yet assessed higher penalties because implementing regulations are not yet finalized. FNS is considering additional steps to encourage states to pursue recipients suspected of trafficking but limited state resources are a constraint. Categorically eligible households do not need to meet SNAP eligibility requirements because their need has been established under the states' Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. As of June 2010, 36 states have opted to provide categorical eligibility for SNAP to any household found eligible for a service funded through TANF and, in 35 states, there is no limit on the amount of assets certain households may have to be determined eligible, according to FNS. Households can be categorically eligible for SNAP even if they receive no TANF funded service other than a toll-free telephone number or informational brochure. However, the amount of assistance eligible households receive is determined using the same process used for other SNAP recipients. According to FNS officials, increased use of categorical eligibility by states has reduced administrative burdens and increased access to SNAP benefits to households who would not otherwise be eligible due to asset or income limits. However, little is known about the extent of its impact on increased access or program integrity. SNAP has played a key role in assisting families facing hardship during the economic crisis, but given fiscal constraints and program growth, it is more important than ever to understand the impact of policy changes, and balance improvements in access with efforts to ensure accountability. FNS generally agreed with GAO's prior recommendations to address SNAP trafficking and categorical eligibility issues and has taken action in response to most of them. |
gao_GAO-07-921 | gao_GAO-07-921_0 | NHTSA has not raised the CAFE standard for cars above 27.5 mpg since 1990 because, among other reasons, NHTSA officials wish to first restructure the program to mitigate potential negative effects on safety of raising the standards. EPA reports the yearly CAFE results for each manufacturer to NHTSA for CAFE enforcement. 2 for a display of how the standard applies to trucks of different sizes). For example, the Senate passed a bill that calls for cars and light trucks to achieve a combined CAFE average of 35 mpg by 2020. Most of these experts said CAFE was somewhat effective in reducing fuel consumption, and a study by NAS estimated that in 2002 CAFE, along with other factors, contributed to saving about 2.8 million barrels of fuel per day, or about 14 percent of consumption in that year. As noted, NHTSA has made this change to the light truck program; and as of model year 2011, light trucks will be required to meet size-based CAFE standards, and the agency would like to institute a similar change for cars. Some Market-Based Policy Options Could Complement the CAFE Program
Through reviews of our past reports and other studies, interviews with experts, reviews of recently proposed legislation, and analysis of existing programs in the United States and other countries, we identified several market-based policies involving cars and light trucks that could complement and strengthen CAFE’s fuel-saving effects or that could be broader reaching and potentially more cost-effective alternatives to the CAFE program. However, some of these incentives may work at cross purposes to programs intended to reduce fuel consumption. Market-based incentives have also been used to increase the availability and use of biofuels, but our recent report on these efforts identified several limitations, and the cost- effectiveness of these programs is unclear. Several options, including a tax on fuel or a carbon cap-and-trade program, affect a broader range of fuel-saving behaviors among consumers and could be more cost-effective. Such options could help the nation reach larger, long-term fuel-saving goals at a lower cost than CAFE, but time would be needed to design and garner support for each before it could be implemented. Several issues may limit the effectiveness of the Gas Guzzler Tax. Expanding the use of alternative fuels can work in parallel with CAFE standards to reduce oil consumption. In addition, evaluating and updating existing consumer incentives, such as tax credits for buying fuel- saving vehicles or taxes on purchases of vehicles with low fuel economy ratings, could strengthen the CAFE program’s fuel-saving effects. Thus, Congress should consider giving NHTSA (1) the authority to reform the car CAFE program much as it restructured the light truck CAFE program and evaluate additional refinements to the program such as credit trading; (2) the resources to update information on the capabilities of new technologies to enhance passenger vehicle fuel economy—as was done in the 2002 NAS study; and (3) the flexibility to adjust the program in the future in response to changes in the passenger vehicle market, such as improved automotive technology and changes in the mix of passenger vehicle types. To help ensure the nation’s fuel-saving goals are achieved in the most efficient fashion, we further recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with all relevant agency officials, including the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Secretary of the Treasury evaluate the impacts existing and potential policy options are having or might have on fuel consumption by cars and light trucks beyond what may be achieved through CAFE standards alone and report on the result of this evaluation. Specifically, such an analysis should evaluate (1) existing consumer incentives that complement CAFE to determine whether changes to the incentives could improve their effectiveness and reduce their costs; (2) existing incentives that may affect fuel consumption by cars and light trucks—whether these policies were designed to do so or not—to ensure that policies meant to reduce fuel consumption are not being counteracted inadvertently by policies that increase fuel consumption; and (3) broader reaching strategies such as a carbon tax, cap-and-trade program, and others, as possible long-term alternatives to the CAFE program. To assess NHTSA’s capabilities to further revise CAFE standards, we reviewed budgets for the CAFE program and NHTSA’s fiscal year 2007 budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns over national security, environmental stresses, and high fuel prices have raised interest in reducing oil consumption. Through the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requires cars and light trucks to meet certain fuel economy standards. As requested, GAO discusses (1) how CAFE standards are designed to reduce fuel consumption, (2) strengths and weaknesses of the CAFE program and NHTSA's capabilities, and (3) market-based policies that could complement or replace CAFE. To do this work, GAO reviewed recent studies and interviewed leading experts and agency officials.
What GAO Found
NHTSA, an administration within the Department of Transportation(DOT), is primarily responsible for setting and enforcing CAFE standards for cars and light trucks, although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) are also involved. NHTSA raised the light truck CAFE standards from 20.7 miles per gallon (mpg) in 2004 to 22.2 mpg in 2007. Subsequently, NHTSA, which has authority to restructure the light truck program, set different standards for light trucks of different sizes. The new approach takes full effect in 2011. However, NHTSA has not raised the CAFE standard for cars above 27.5 mpg since 1990 due, in part, to provisions in DOT's annual appropriations acts for fiscal years 1996 through 2001 and, more recently, to NHTSA's desire to restructure the car CAFE program before raising the standard to avoid potential negative safety impacts. Many experts believe CAFE has helped save oil--for example, a study by the National Academy of Sciences estimated that in 2002 CAFE contributed to saving 2.8 million barrels of fuel a day in passenger vehicles, or 14 percent of consumption in that year. CAFE would help the nation work toward fuel-saving goals if standards are increased, and GAO's evaluation of NHTSA's capabilities suggests the agency could act quickly to implement new standards and restructure the program. However, GAO identified several characteristics that limit CAFE's potential to save fuel. Several refinements to the CAFE program could improve its effectiveness and reduce costs, such as setting different standards for cars of different sizes as the restructured light truck program does and instituting a broader CAFE credit trading program. The Senate recently passed a bill modifying the CAFE program that includes these refinements. Meeting the nation's goals to reduce oil consumption over time will require more than CAFE alone, and GAO identified several market-based incentives involving passenger vehicles that could complement and strengthen CAFE's fuel-saving effects or that potentially could serve as alternatives to CAFE. Some market incentives, such as a tax credit for hybrid vehicles and the Gas Guzzler Tax on fuel-inefficient cars, currently exist to encourage consumers to buy fuel-efficient vehicles. However, GAO identified other vehicle purchasing incentives that may work at cross purposes to those intended to reduce fuel consumption. For example, market incentives have been used to increase the availability and use of alternative fuels; however, GAO's recent report on one of these efforts identified several limitations. Several additional policy options, including a tax on fuel or a carbon cap-and-trade program, would affect a broader range of fuel-saving behaviors among consumers and would likely be more cost-effective than CAFE. Such options could help the nation reach larger, long-term fuel-saving goals at a lower cost than CAFE, but time would be needed to design and garner support for each before it was implemented. However, increasing the CAFE standards and considering options to improve the program would contribute to fuel-saving goals in the immediate future. |
gao_GAO-17-639 | gao_GAO-17-639_0 | Background
More than 2.7-million miles of pipeline transport roughly two-thirds of our nation’s domestic energy supply. (See fig. Gathering pipelines: Gas gathering pipelines collect natural gas and other gases from production areas, while hazardous liquid gathering pipelines collect oil and other petroleum products from oil well heads. However, external coatings can be damaged by construction or degrade over time. Cathodic protection involves applying an electrical current onto the pipeline to control external corrosion. Pipeline Operators Use Steel, Plastics, and Various Corrosion Prevention Technologies, Which Have a Range of Benefits and Limitations
Nearly All Federally Regulated Pipelines Are Constructed of Steel or Plastic, Which Involve Various Benefits, Limitations and Costs
The vast majority (over 95 percent) of U.S. gas and hazardous liquid pipeline miles that PHMSA regulates are constructed of either steel or plastic, with relatively minor use (less than 5 percent) of other materials, including composites and iron, according to our analysis of PHMSA data from 2015. In practice, steel’s strength to withstand high operating pressures and other design characteristics generally facilitate its use across all portions of the pipeline network. According to operators and expert stakeholders, coatings and cathodic protection are generally a cost-effective way to protect steel pipelines against external corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, and operators and expert stakeholders said that coatings and cathodic protection are a relatively small portion of total pipeline cost. PHMSA Uses Data on Pipelines and Corrosion Prevention to Prioritize Inspections, but Lacks a Process to Assess and Validate the Effectiveness of Its Approach
PHMSA uses data on pipelines and corrosion collected from operators in its Risk Ranking Index Model (referred to as RRIM) to determine the frequency of PHMSA’s inspections of operators based on threats to pipeline integrity, such as ineffective coatings. Moreover, PHMSA has not used data to assess the model’s overall effectiveness and lacks a process to do such an evaluation. Without documentation and a data-driven evaluation process, both of which are consistent with federal management principles, PHMSA cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of RRIM in allocating PHMSA’s limited inspection resources according to pipeline threats or targeting its limited resources to the greatest threats. PHMSA officials said they used professional judgment to select threat factors, to determine their associated weights, and to establish the risk tiers and inspection frequency, but they did not document the rationale or justification for their decisions, including how, if at all, they used data as part of developing this approach. The officials said they conducted sensitivity analyses to calibrate the threat factor weights when they designed RRIM in 2012, but did not document these analyses. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assess and validate the effectiveness of PHMSA’s RRIM in prioritizing pipelines for inspection, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of PHMSA to take the following two actions: document the decisions and underlying assumptions for the design of RRIM, including what data and information were analyzed as part of determining each component of the model, such as the threat factors, weights, risk tiers, and inspection frequency. The Department of Transportation and NTSB also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. This appendix provides perspectives obtained from interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of eight pipeline operators and eight additional stakeholders with expertise on pipeline materials and corrosion (expert stakeholders) on (1) the use of pipeline materials and corrosion prevention technologies internationally, and (2) the potential improvements in pipeline materials and corrosion prevention technologies. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the pipeline materials and corrosion prevention technologies that are used in the gas and hazardous liquid pipeline network and their respective benefits and limitations; (2) how selected pipeline operators train personnel to manage corrosion and the challenges that exist in ensuring personnel are qualified, and (3) how the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) uses data on pipelines and corrosion prevention to inform its inspection priorities. We assessed the data’s reliability by reviewing PHMSA reports, analyzing the data to identify any outlier values, and interviewing PHMSA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. energy pipeline network is composed of over 2.7-million miles of pipelines transporting gas and hazardous liquids. While pipelines are a relatively safe mode of transportation, incidents caused by material failures and corrosion may result in fatalities and environmental damage. PHMSA, an agency within the Department of Transportation, inspects pipeline operators and oversees safety regulations.
2016 pipeline safety legislation included a provision for GAO to examine a variety of topics related to pipeline materials and corrosion. This report addresses: (1) the materials and corrosion-prevention technologies used in the pipeline network and their benefits and limitations and (2) how PHMSA uses data on pipelines and corrosion to inform inspection priorities, among other topics. GAO analyzed PHMSA's 2010–2016 data; reviewed PHMSA regulations; and interviewed PHMSA officials and representatives of nine states selected based on pipeline inspection roles, eight pipeline operators—providing a range of sizes, geographic locations, and other factors—and eight stakeholders selected for expertise on pipeline and corrosion issues.
What GAO Found
The U.S. gas and hazardous liquid pipeline network is constructed primarily of steel and plastic pipes, both of which offer benefits and limitations that present trade-offs to pipeline operators, as do corrosion prevention technology options. According to data from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), over 98 percent of federally regulated pipelines that gather natural gas and other gases and hazardous liquid products, such as oil, and transmit those products across long distances are made of steel. An increasing majority of pipelines that distribute natural gas to homes and businesses are made of plastics. Steel pipelines are manufactured in various grades to accommodate higher operating pressures, but require corrosion protection and cost more than plastics, according to operators and experts. In contrast, plastics and emerging composite materials generally are corrosion-resistant, but lack the strength to accommodate high-operating pressures. Operators use a range of technologies to protect steel pipes from corrosion, including applying coatings and cathodic protection, which applies an electrical current to the pipe. (See fig.) While such technologies are generally considered effective, operators and experts stated that coatings degrade over time and that cathodic protection requires ongoing maintenance and costs to deliver the current over long pipeline distances, among other considerations.
PHMSA uses materials and corrosion data collected from operators in its Risk Ranking Index Model to determine the frequency of PHMSA's inspections of operators based on threats, such as ineffective coatings, to pipeline integrity. PHMSA officials said they used professional judgment to develop their model, but did not document key decisions for: (1) the threat factors selected, (2) their associated weights, or (3) the thresholds for high, medium, and low risk tiers for pipeline segments inspected by PHMSA. Moreover, PHMSA has not used data to assess its model's overall effectiveness, as would be consistent with federal management principles. PHMSA officials said they have not established an evaluation process because they consider the model to be effective in prioritizing inspections. Although PHMSA officials said they analyzed the model when they developed it in 2012, they have not done so since that time and did not document the results of this initial analysis. Without documentation and a data-driven evaluation process, PHMSA cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of the model it uses to allocate PHMSA's limited inspection resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that PHMSA document the design of its Risk Ranking Index Model and implement a process that uses data to periodically assess the model's effectiveness. The Department of Transportation agreed with our recommendation and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-153 | gao_GAO-08-153_0 | The February 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, emphasizes a transition of responsibility for reconstruction to the Iraqi government. 1). U.S. and Iraqi Reports Show Differing Spending Rates
Citing unofficial Ministry of Finance data, the administration’s September 2007 Benchmark Assessment Report stated that the Iraqi ministries had spent 24 percent of their capital projects budgets, as of July 15, 2007. According to official reporting by the Ministry of Finance, as of August 31, 2007, Iraqi ministries spent only 4.4 percent of their 2007 investment budget (most of which is for capital projects). The Government of Iraq Faces Many Challenges in Attempting to Spend Its Capital Projects Budget
U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified a number of factors that challenge the Iraqi government’s efforts to fully spend its budget for capital projects. First, Treasury officials noted that violence and sectarian strife can delay capital budget execution by increasing the time and cost needed to award and monitor contracts, and by reducing the number of contractors willing to bid on projects. Second, these officials stated that recent refugee outflows and the de- Ba’athification process have reduced the number of skilled workers available and contributed to the exodus of Iraq’s professional class from the country. Third, U.S. and foreign officials also noted that weaknesses in Iraqi procurement, budgeting, and accounting procedures impede completion of capital projects. In addition, Iraqi procurement regulations require about a dozen signatures to approve oil and electricity contracts exceeding $10 million, which also slows the process, according to U.S. officials. Several U.S. Assistance Efforts Are Under Way to Improve Iraqi Budget Execution
In early 2007, U.S. agencies increased the focus of their assistance efforts on improving the Iraqi government’s ability to effectively execute its budget for capital projects, although it is not clear what impact this increased focus has had, given the inconsistent expenditure data presented earlier in this report. In addition, improving Iraqi government budget execution is part of a broader U.S. assistance effort aimed at improving the capacity of the Iraqi government through automation of the financial management system, training, and advisors embedded with ministries. State established this position in the U.S. Embassy in February 2007 to work with senior Iraqi government officials and to coordinate with U.S. agencies that provide assistance related to improving Iraq’s budget execution. Procurement Assistance Program. USAID suspended assistance to the Ministry of Finance to implement IFMIS in June 2007, following the kidnapping of five BearingPoint employees. According to USAID officials, this program includes several activities to assist with provincial budget execution. The discrepancies between the unofficial and official data highlight the ambiguities about the extent to which the government of Iraq is spending its resources on capital projects. Recommendation
To help ensure more accurate reporting of the government of Iraq’s spending of its capital projects budget, we recommend that the Secretary of Treasury work with the government of Iraq and relevant U.S. agencies to enhance the Treasury department’s ability to report accurate and reliable expenditure data from the ministries and provinces. Specifically, we (1) examine the data the U.S. embassy uses to determine the extent to which the Iraqi government has spent its 2007 capital projects budget, (2) identify factors affecting the Iraqi government’s ability to spend these funds, and (3) describe U.S. government efforts to assist the Iraqi government in spending its capital projects funds. In addition, we reviewed previous GAO reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's inability to spend its resources to rebuild infrastructure and deliver essential services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Further, Iraq's ability to spend its $10.1 billion capital projects budget in 2007 was one of the 18 benchmarks used to assess U.S. progress in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. This report (1) examines data the U.S. embassy used to determine the extent to which the government of Iraq spent its 2007 capital projects budget, (2) identifies factors affecting the Iraqi government's ability to spend these funds, and (3) describes U.S. government efforts to assist the Iraqi government in spending its capital projects funds. For this effort, GAO reviewed Iraqi government budget data and information on provincial spending collected by the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams. GAO also interviewed officials from the departments of the Treasury, Defense, State, and other agencies and organizations.
What GAO Found
U.S. and Iraq reports show widely disparate rates for Iraqi government spending on capital projects. Accordingly, GAO cannot determine the extent to which the Iraqi government is spending its 2007 capital projects budget. In its September 2007 Iraqi benchmark assessment, the administration reported that Iraq's central government ministries had spent 24 percent of their 2007 capital projects budget, as of July 15, 2007. However, this report is not consistent with Iraq's official expenditure reports, which show that the central ministries had spent only 4.4 percent of their investment budget as of August 2007. The discrepancies between the official and unofficial data highlight uncertainties about the sources and use of Iraq's expenditure data. The government of Iraq faces many challenges that limit its ability to spend its capital project budget. Violence and sectarian strife delay capital budget execution by increasing the time and cost needed to implement contracts. Recent refugee flows and the de-Ba'athification process have contributed to the exodus of skilled labor from Iraq. In addition, U.S. and foreign officials also noted that weaknesses in Iraqi procurement, budgeting, and accounting procedures impede completion of capital projects. For example, according to the State Department, Iraq's Contracting Committee requires about a dozen signatures to approve projects exceeding $10 million, which slows the process. U.S. agencies have undertaken a variety of programs to help Iraq execute its capital projects budget, although it is not clear what impact these efforts have had to date. U.S. agencies supported new efforts in 2007 targeting Iraq's ability to spend capital budget funds, including an office to provide procurement assistance to ministries and provinces and a new position in the U.S. Embassy to coordinate with senior Iraqi government officials on budget execution and oversee related U.S. assistance efforts. In addition, improving Iraqi government budget execution is part of a broader U.S. assistance effort to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has trained 500 ministry officials in procurement or budget execution. USAID also led an effort to implement an automated financial management information system for the Iraqi government, although this program was suspended in June 2007 following the kidnapping of five contractors involved in the project. In addition, U.S. advisors work directly with key Iraqi ministries to assist with budget execution and procurement, among other responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-11-539 | gao_GAO-11-539_0 | Carryover and Its Use
Carryover is the reported dollar value of work that has been ordered and funded (obligated) by customers but not completed by working capital fund activities at the end of the fiscal year. Under the policy, the allowable amount of carryover is based on the amount of new orders received in a given year and the outlay rate of the customers’ appropriations financing the work. Changes to the AFWCF That Affected the Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 Calculation of Carryover and the Allowable Amount of Carryover
The Air Force made changes to the calculation of carryover that reduced both the carryover and the allowable amount of carryover. Air Force Underestimated Carryover in Its Budgets
In its budget information, the Air Force consistently underestimated the amount of carryover that would exceed the allowable amount from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. In 3 of the 5 years, the actual amount of carryover exceeded the budgeted amount by over $250 million. In fiscal year 2010, Air Force headquarters and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) began implementing actions to improve the accuracy of budgeting for AFWCF carryover such as incorporating overseas contingency operations (OCO) funded orders in the fiscal year 2012 AFWCF budget. These actions have the potential to improve the accuracy of budgeting for AFWCF carryover, but their success can be determined only when budgeted carryover information is compared to actual results. Reliable budget information on carryover is critical since decision makers use this information when reviewing the AFWCF budgets. AFWCF Actual Carryover Consistently Exceeded the Allowable Carryover
Our analysis of AFWCF reports showed that in each year from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 actual carryover exceeded the allowable carryover amounts. Therefore, the Air Force decision to increase the allowable amount of carryover for orders funded with multiyear appropriations was not in accordance with the DOD Financial Management Regulation. This provision in the regulation does not pertain to the Air Force. Carryover Increased at ALCs from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 on Orders Received from External Customers
Carryover related to external depot maintenance work increased from $1 billion at the end of fiscal year 2006 to $1.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2010. Our analysis of ALC depot maintenance reports and discussions with Air Force officials identified four primary reasons for this increase. First, Air Force underestimated its forecasted workload requirements on the number of hours of depot maintenance work to be performed on repairing assets, such as aircraft. Second, because the Air Force believed its depot maintenance workload would decrease, the Air Force directed AFMC to reduce its workforce in November 2007. While the ALCs reduced their workforce by about 2,000 civilian personnel, the actual workload and related funding increased instead of decreased—thus resulting in personnel shortages. Third, during the 5-year period, the Air Force budget underestimated the amount of funds on new orders that would be received from customers and the work performed by the ALCs did not keep pace with the increase in funds received on new orders from year to year. Fourth, the ALCs could not obtain parts when needed to perform repair work that contributed to the growth of carryover. From fiscal years 2008 to 2010, average backorders at the ALCs grew by 44 percent. While the carryover metric is a management tool for controlling the amount of work that can carry over from one fiscal year to the next, the metric can also be used as a tool to identify problems in other areas such as (1) developing workload requirements on the number of hours of depot maintenance work to be performed, (2) establishing personnel levels to perform the depot maintenance work, (3) developing budgets on the amount of new orders for depot maintenance work, and (4) obtaining spare parts to perform depot maintenance work. In its comments, DOD concurred with the five recommendations and cited actions planned or under way to address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which (1) budget information on Air Force depot maintenance carryover for fiscal years 2006 through 2010 approximated actual results and, if not, any needed actions the Air Force is taking to improve budgeting for carryover, and (2) the Air Force depot maintenance actual carryover exceeded the allowable amount of carryover from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 and any adjustments were made to the allowable amount, we obtained and analyzed Air Force depot maintenance reports that contained information on budgeted and actual carryover and the allowable amount of carryover for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
Three Air Force depots support combat readiness by providing repair services to keep Air Force units operating worldwide. To the extent that the depots do not complete work at year end, the work and related funding will be carried into the next fiscal year. Carryover is the reported dollar value of work that has been ordered and funded by customers but not completed at the end of the fiscal year. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which: (1) budget information on depot maintenance carryover approximated actual results from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 and, if not, any needed actions to improve budgeting for carryover; (2) depot maintenance carryover exceeded the allowable amount and any adjustments were made to the allowable amount; and (3) there was growth in carryover at the depots and the reasons for the growth. To address these objectives, GAO (1) reviewed relevant carryover guidance, (2) obtained and analyzed reported carryover and related data at the Air Logistics Centers (ALC), and (3) interviewed DOD and Air Force officials.
What GAO Found
The Air Force consistently underestimated the dollar amount of carryover that would exceed the allowable amount in the Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF) budgets from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. In 3 of the 5 years, the budgeted carryover amount underestimated the actual amount by over $250 million. The budget information on carryover is critical since decision makers use this information when reviewing the AFWCF budgets. The Air Force began implementing actions to improve budgeting for AFWCF such as including overseas contingency operations funded orders in the AFWCF fiscal year 2012 budget. These actions have the potential to improve the accuracy of budgeting for AFWCF, but their success will only be known when budgeted carryover information is compared to actual results. GAO analysis of AFWCF reports showed that in each year actual carryover exceeded the allowable amount from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. The allowable amount of carryover is based on the amount of new orders received and the outlay rate of customers' appropriations financing the work. The amount of carryover that exceeded the allowable ranged from $4 million to $568 million. Further, the Air Force increased the allowable amount for orders funded with multiyear appropriations by $115 million and $125 million in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, respectively. Without this adjustment, the AFWCF would have exceeded the allowable carryover by corresponding amounts. The DOD regulation on orders funded with multiyear appropriations only pertains to Army ordnance activities that perform a manufacturing function. Therefore, the provision on increasing the allowable amount of carryover for orders funded with multiyear appropriations does not apply to the Air Force. GAO analysis of ALC reports and discussions with Air Force officials identified four reasons for the increase in carryover from $1 billion at the end of fiscal year 2006 to $1.9 billion--nearly 7 months of work--at the end of fiscal year 2010 on depot maintenance work. First, Air Force underestimated its forecasted workload requirements on the number of hours of work to be performed. Second, because the Air Force believed its depot maintenance workload would decrease, it reduced its workforce in November 2007. While the ALCs reduced their workforce by about 2,000 civilian personnel, the actual workload increased instead of decreased--thus resulting in personnel shortages. Third, the Air Force budget underestimated the amount of funds on new orders received from customers, and the work performed by the ALCs did not keep pace with the increase in funding on new orders from year to year. Fourth, the ALCs could not obtain parts when needed to perform repair work that contributed to the growth of carryover. Air Force data showed that the average monthly outstanding backorders for spare parts at the ALCs grew by about 44 percent from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010. The Air Force is taking action to address these problems but still needs to compare budgeted to actual information, such as the number of hours of work to be performed, and identify the reasons for the differences.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes five recommendations to DOD to improve the budgeting and management of carryover, such as comparing budgeted to actual information on carryover and clarifying DOD guidance on allowable carryover funded with multiyear appropriations. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and has actions planned or under way to implement them. |
gao_GAO-16-212T | gao_GAO-16-212T_0 | Further, federal internal control standards state that organizations must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications, and adequate means of communicating with external parties who may have an impact on the organization achieving its goals. Additionally, scholarships to students were awarded several months after many schools had completed their admissions and enrollment processes, limiting the amount of time and choice in selecting schools. Effective Controls to Safeguard Federal Funds
Effective policies and procedures: During our 2013 review, we found that OSP’s policies and procedures lacked detail in several areas related to school compliance and financial accounting, which may weaken overall accountability for program funds. The absence of detailed policies and procedures reflect weak internal control in the areas of risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and control environment. Without a mechanism or procedures to verify the accuracy of the information provided, OSP cannot provide reasonable assurance that participating schools meet the criteria established for participation in the program. As a result, there is a risk that federal dollars will be provided for students to attend schools that do not meet the education and health and safety standards required by the District. For example, in OSP—and other eligibility-based choice programs—it is important to have accurate, up-to-date student application information in order to meet program objectives, such as determining eligibility and awarding program scholarships in an efficient and timely manner. In addition, because a key variable in the OSP database used in the student selection process was unreliably populated, OSP’s ability to accurately select students based on established priorities for the program may have been compromised. To address these issues we recommended Education explore ways to improve monitoring and oversight of the program administrator. Proper Execution of Roles and Responsibilities
Internal control activities help ensure that actions are taken to address risks, and include a wide range of activities such as approvals, authorizations, and verifications. For our 2013 report, OSP told us they did not receive any information from the District as a result of any inspections, nor did the administrator follow up with District agencies to inquire about them. To address these issues, we recommended Education work with the Mayor of the District of Columbia to revise the MOU that governs OSP implementation to include processes that ensure the results of OSP school inspections are communicated to the program administrator. In conclusion, OSP has provided low-income families in the District additional choices for educating their children and has likely made private school accessible to some of these children who would not otherwise have had access. However, to help ensure that OSP efficiently and effectively uses federal funds for their intended purpose—that is, to provide increased opportunities to low-income parents to send their children, particularly those attending low-performing schools, to private schools—any entity responsible for operating a school choice program such as OSP needs a strong accountability infrastructure that incorporates the elements of internal control discussed above. Education stated that they had addressed some of the issues that we identified, but we were unable to assess the extent to which they had implemented our recommendations in time for this statement. We continue to believe that by fully addressing our nine remaining recommendations for the OSP program, Education would promote more efficient and effective program implementation and accountability over federal funds, regardless of which entity is administering the program. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
School vouchers are one of many school choice programs. Vouchers provide students with public funds to attend private schools and are often featured in discussions on education reform. The District of Columbia’s (District) Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) has garnered national attention as the first federally-funded private school voucher program in the United States. Since the program’s inception, Congress has provided more than $180 million for OSP, which has, in turn, provided expanded school choice to low-income students by awarding more than 6,100 scholarships to low-income students in the District. GAO’s 2013 report was in response to a request from the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate that GAO review the extent to which OSP was meeting its stated goals and properly managing federal funds.
This statement is based on GAO’s 2013 report, and discusses the importance of ensuring effective implementation of OSP and any future similar federal school choice programs and providing sufficient accountability for public funds.
What GAO Found
Students in the District of Columbia (District) have many choices for K-12 schooling including charter, magnet, and traditional public schools, as well as private schools through the federally funded Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP). Strong fiscal monitoring and oversight of the various schools that participate in choice programs is critical to ensuring that these programs have effective internal controls that help them meet the goal of providing a quality education to students. Internal control is broadly defined as a process designed to provide reasonable assurance that an organization can achieve its objectives. Five internal control standards—control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring—should be an integral part of a system that managers use to regulate and guide an agency’s operations.
During GAO’s 2013 review of OSP, most families GAO spoke with were generally happy with their children’s participation in the program, citing increased safety and security at their children’s OSP schools and improved quality of education. However, GAO found weaknesses in three areas—access to timely and complete program and award information, effective controls to safeguard federal funds, and clearly defined and properly executed roles and responsibilities—that are the result of internal control deficiencies that may limit the effectiveness of OSP and its ability to meet its goal of providing a quality education experience for students in the District. Strong internal controls in these areas would strengthen the OSP and are critical to the success of any similar federally funded school voucher program.
What GAO Recommends
In 2013, GAO made 10 recommendations to Education to improve OSP. To date, one recommendation has been closed as implemented. In October 2015, Education told GAO that it had addressed some of the issues that GAO identified in the 2013 report, but GAO was unable to assess the extent to which they had implemented our recommendations in time for this statement. GAO continues to believe that the 2013 recommendations would address weaknesses previously identified in OSP, and would improve the implementation and effectiveness of OSP—and any future federally funded choice programs. |
gao_GAO-07-451 | gao_GAO-07-451_0 | DOD’s business systems modernization is one of the high-risk areas, and it is an essential enabler to addressing many of the department’s other high-risk areas. DOD Is in the Early Stages of Federating Its BEA and Much Remains to Be Decided and Accomplished
DOD’s BMA federation strategy provides a foundation on which to build and align DOD’s parent business architecture (the BEA) with its subordinate architectures (i.e., component- and program-level architectures). According to BTA program officials, including the chief technical officer, the department is in the early stages of defining and implementing its strategy and intends to develop more detailed plans. In particular, the strategy defines the department’s federated architecture goals; describes federation concepts that are to be applied; and explains high-level activities, capabilities, products, and services intended to facilitate implementation of the concepts. However, it does not adequately define the tasks needed to achieve the strategy’s goals, including those associated with executing high-level activities and providing related capabilities, products, and services. Specifically, the strategy does not adequately address how strategy execution will be governed, including assignment of roles and responsibilities, measurement of progress and results, and provision of resources. Also, the strategy does not address, among other things, how the architectures of the military departments will align with the latest version of the BEA and how DOD will identify and provide for sharing of common applications and systems across the department. As a result, the military departments and defense agencies may pursue duplicative efforts. To the department’s credit, it recognizes the need for greater detail surrounding how it will extend (federate) its BEA. Recommendation for Executive Action
To further assist the department in evolving its BEA, we are reiterating our prior recommendation for a BEA development management plan, and augmenting it by recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the chair of the DBSMC, to task the appropriate DOD organizations, to ensure that this plan describes, at a minimum, how the BMA architecture federation will be governed; how the BMA federation strategy alignment with the DOD EA federation strategy will be achieved; how component business architectures’ alignment with incremental versions of the BEA will be achieved; how shared services will be identified, exposed, and subscribed to; and what milestones will be used to measure progress and results. To accomplish our objective, we reviewed DOD’s Business Mission Area Federation Strategy and Road Map released in September 2006, comparing the strategy and any associated implementation plans with prior findings and recommendations relative to the content of the strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, we first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high risk," and we continue to designate it as such today. To assist in addressing this high-risk area, Congress passed legislation consistent with prior GAO recommendations for Defense to develop a business enterprise architecture (BEA). In September 2006, DOD released version 4.0 of its BEA, which despite improvements over prior versions, was not aligned with component architectures. Subsequently, Defense issued a strategy for extending its BEA to the component military services and defense agencies. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's BEA, GAO assessed DOD's progress in defining this strategy by comparing it with prior findings and recommendations relevant to the strategy's content.
What GAO Found
DOD's Business Mission Area federation strategy for extending its BEA to the military departments and defense agencies provides a foundation on which to build and align the department's parent business architecture (the BEA) with its subordinate architectures (i.e., component- and program-level architectures). In particular, the strategy, which was released in September 2006, states the department's federated architecture goals; describes federation concepts that are to be applied; and explains high-level activities, capabilities, products, and services that are intended to facilitate implementation of the concepts. However, the strategy does not adequately define the tasks needed to achieve the strategy's goals, including those associated with executing high-level activities and providing related capabilities, products, and services. Specifically, it does not adequately address how strategy execution will be governed, including assignment of roles and responsibilities, measurement of progress and results, and provision of resources. Also, the strategy does not address, among other things, how the component architectures will be aligned with the latest version of the BEA and how it will identify and provide for reuse of common applications and systems across the department. According to program officials, the department intends to develop more detailed plans to execute the strategy. This means that much remains to be decided and accomplished before DOD will have the means in place to create a federated BEA that satisfies GAO's prior recommendations and legislative requirements. Without one, the department will remain challenged in its ability to minimize duplication and maximize interoperability among its thousands of business systems. |
gao_GGD-97-170 | gao_GGD-97-170_0 | Most of the physicians paid under title 5 were with the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Defense (DOD). Physicians paid under title 38 were with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As we agreed with you, our principal objectives were to (1) compare amounts paid to federal physicians under title 5 with amounts paid to physicians under other sections of the U.S. Code and with physicians in the private sector; (2) determine what other types of pay and benefits federally employed physicians receive; and (3) identify ongoing efforts by federal agencies that affect or have the potential to affect physicians’ pay. Therefore, we did not attempt to make conclusions or recommendations on the sufficiency, size, or continued need for PCAs under title 5. Federal Physicians’ Pay Comparisons
When measured by the average, physicians’ pay for HHS physicians who did not receive title 38 special pay was less than physicians’ pay of HHS and VA physicians who received special payments under title 38. Average basic pay for physicians paid under title 37 was $43,110 for physicians in the military and $54,510 for Commissioned Corps physicians. Large differences in average special pay to physicians—over $20,000—existed between HHS physicians who received PCAs ($15,760) and VA physicians and HHS physicians who received special pay under title 38 ($39,585 and $38,950, respectively). The average PCA of HHS physicians ($15,760) was also lower than the average special pay received by military and Commissioned Corps physicians, $35,190 and $43,260, respectively. In selected medical specialties in which large numbers of federal and private physicians practiced (general surgery, internal medicine, psychiatry, and family practice), our comparison of pay information from studies of private sector physicians’ pay and the pay of federal physicians who were paid under titles 37 and 38 showed that private sector physicians were generally paid more. As of May 1997, HHS was the only agency to have used this expanded authority to provide special pay to its physicians. The average pay for military and Commissioned Corps physicians was 39 and 24 percent less than the average for VA physicians. The average pay for HHS physicians was about the same as the average for Commissioned Corps physicians and about 20 percent more than the average for physicians in the military. Title 5 Physicians Receiving Title 38 Pay
HHS, DOD, and the Department of Justice, which pay physicians under title 5, were authorized, under a delegation of title 38 pay authority from OPM, to use the same categories of special payments to physicians described in the previous section in paying their physicians. On the basis of our preliminary work, we agreed to obtain physicians’ pay and benefit information for full-time federal physicians paid under title 5, most of whom were with HHS or DOD; physicians with the Public Health Service’s Commissioned Corps or on military duty and paid under title 37; physicians with VA and paid under title 38; and title 5 physicians with HHS who received special payments under title 38. The military service pay centers for the Army and Air Force provided us with total amounts of basic pay, special pay for physicians, incentive pay, and allowances. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on pay and benefits of physicians employed by the federal government and in the private sector, to be used in considering reauthorization of the Federal Physicians Comparability Allowance Act (5 U.S.C. 5948). GAO did not attempt to make conclusions or recommendations on the sufficiency, size, or continued need for physician comparability allowances (PCA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the average annual pay for Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) physicians paid under title 5 was: (a) 17 percent less than the average for HHS physicians who received special pay under title 38; (b) 21 percent less than the average for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) physicians paid under title 38; (c) 4 percent greater than the average for Commissioned Corps physicians; and (d) 23 percent greater than the average for physicians in the military; (2) the average pay for title 5 HHS physicians was $101,660; (3) for HHS physicians who received PCAs, average pay was $104,730 compared with $79,485 for those who did not receive a PCA or special pay under title 38; (4) the average pay for Department of Defense (DOD) physicians paid under title 5 was $86,760; (5) for DOD physicians receiving a PCA, average pay was 89,710; (6) for VA and HHS physicians who received special pay under title 38, average pay was $128,540 and $122,555, respectively; (7) average pay for physicians in the military (Army and Air Force) and the Commissioned Corps, both of whom were paid under title 37, was $78,250 and $97,770, respectively; (8) in general, physicians paid under titles 37 and 38 were eligible for and received more types and higher amounts of special pay than HHS and DOD physicians receiving PCAs under title 5; (9) the average PCA for HHS physicians was $15,760 and the average PCA for DOD physicians paid under title 5 was $12,505; (10) average special pay amounts for VA and HHS physicians receiving title 38 special pay were $39,585 and $38,950, respectively; (11) average special pay amounts for physicians in the military and the Commissioned Corps were $35,190 and $43,260, respectively; (12) for selected medical specialties, GAO comparisons of pay information from studies of private sector physicians' pay with the pay of federal physicians who were paid under titles 37 and 38 showed that private sector physicians were generally paid more; (13) in addition to basic pay and physicians' special pay, federal and private sector physicians were eligible for employer-provided nonwage compensation; (14) regarding ongoing efforts that affect or have the potential to affect physicians' pay, GAO identified two recent initiatives; (15) since November 1993, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has delegated authority to HHS, DOD, and the Department of Justice allowing them to provide title 38 special pay to their physicians; (16) as of May 1997, HHS was the only agency to have used this authority; and (17) VA is currently exploring the feasibility and appropriateness of linking physicians' pay with performance. |
gao_GAO-01-665 | gao_GAO-01-665_0 | Overview
MDBs are autonomous international financial entities that finance economic and social development projects and programs in developing countries. The MDBs primarily fund these projects and programs using money borrowed from world capital markets or money provided by governments of member countries. Thus, MDBs enable developing countries to access foreign currency resources on more advantageous terms than would be available to them solely on the basis of their own international credit standing. The MDBs provide assistance in the form of loans, equity investments, loan and equity guarantees, and technical assistance. The primary vehicle of development assistance is direct lending. The United States is the largest member in most of the MDBs discussed in this report, contributing significant amounts to support the missions of the MDBs and subscribing a significant amount of the MDBs’ callable capital.The Congress appropriates funds for the United States’ contributions to the MDBs. Multilateral Development Banks: Their Missions, Functions, and Organization
Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) are autonomous international financial entities that finance economic and social development projects and programs and provide technical assistance in developing countries primarily using money borrowed from world capital markets or contributed by governments of developed countries. Table 8 summarizes the U.S. voting percentages at each MDB. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses Multilateral Development Banks (MDB), which provide financial support for projects and programs that promote social and economic progress in developing countries. GAO provides (1) summaries of each bank's mission, function, and operations; (2) key bank financial data covering the last three fiscal years; and (3) information on the U.S. investment in capital and voting percentages in each MDB.
What GAO Found
GAO found that MDBs are autonomous international financial entities that finance economic and social development projects and programs in developing countries. The MDBs primarily fund these projects and programs using money borrowed from world capital markets or money provided by the governments of member countries. MDBs enable developing countries to access foreign currency resources on more advantageous terms than would be available to them on the basis of their own international credit standing. The MDBs provide assistance in the form of loans, equity investments, loan and equity guarantees, and technical assistance. Direct lending is the primary vehicle of development assistance. The United States is the largest member in most of the MDBs discussed in this report, contributing significant amounts to support the missions of the MDBs and subscribing a significant amount to MDBs' callable capital. |
gao_GAO-13-200 | gao_GAO-13-200_0 | Marshals, USNCB, and ICE—use information from state, local, territorial, and tribal jurisdictions, as well as passenger data from CBP, to determine whether registered sex offenders are traveling outside of the United States. Marshals, Consular Affairs, and CBP—may be notified of registered sex offenders traveling to the United States through several means, including tips from foreign officials or when CBP queries the registered sex offender’s biographic information at a port of entry and finds that the offender has a criminal history. However, none of these sources provides complete or comprehensive information on registered sex offenders leaving or returning to the United States. In addition, foreign officials do not always monitor when a registered sex offender is returning to the United States. However, because ICE has not requested to receive the automated notifications, ICE will not be notified of registered sex offenders who leave the country via a land port of entry. First, CBP collects and analyzes information on individuals leaving the United States via private or commercial airline, commercial vessel, and voluntary reporting from rail, but does not routinely query individuals who leave the United States by commercial bus line, private vessel, private vehicle, or by foot . Specifically, FBI officials stated that, in collaboration with other IWG member agencies, they are developing a process that will send an automated notification to the U.S. Marshals’ NSOTC and registry and law enforcement officials in the jurisdictions where the sex offender is registered: (1) when a registered sex offender has purchased an airline or cruise ticket for international travel, (2) 1 week before the registered sex offender is scheduled to travel by commercial air or sea transport, and (3) when a CBP officer queries that person’s biographic information at a U.S. port of entry, such as any U.S. airport. Further, jurisdictions that collect offenders’ self reported data may also be able to provide more details. However, by not requesting to receive the automated notification, ICE will not have information on registered sex offenders who committed offenses against children, left the country via a land port of entry, and had their biographical information queried at the port. Federal Agencies Do Not Share All Available Information They Have on Traveling Registered Sex Offenders with One Another, thus Limiting the Number and Content of Notifications Sent to Foreign Officials
USNCB provides more comprehensive information on sex offenders’ travel plans to its INTERPOL counterparts than ICE provides to its foreign law enforcement counterparts, and the additional information that USNCB has could help support ICE’s mission. Specifically, as shown in figure 2, from August 1 through September 30, 2012, USNCB notified its counterparts of 105 offenders that ICE did not provide to its counterparts. Similarly, ICE notified its counterparts of 100 offenders that USNCB did not provide to its counterparts. This is in part because the U.S. Taking steps to ensure that USNCB and ICE have information on the same registered sex offenders traveling internationally—which could entail, for example, the two agencies copying one another on notifications to their foreign counterparts, or USNCB receiving information directly from NTC—could help ensure that USNCB and ICE are providing more comprehensive information on traveling registered sex offenders to their foreign counterparts to help inform public safety decisions. Conclusions
Cases in which individuals who had previously been convicted of a sex offense in the United States subsequently traveled overseas to commit an offense against a child underscore the importance of sex offender registration and notification standards to help ensure public safety in the United States and abroad. Some of the limitations federal agencies have faced with regard to identifying registered sex offenders leaving and returning to the United States are expected to be addressed by the automated notification the FBI is currently developing. To ensure that USNCB and ICE are providing more comprehensive information to their respective foreign counterparts regarding registered sex offenders traveling internationally, we recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security take steps to help ensure that USNCB and ICE have information on the same number of registered sex offenders as well as the same level of detail on registered sex offenders traveling internationally. To determine the extent to which these officials have procedures in place to implement these requirements, we addressed the following questions: (1) How and to what extent does the federal government determine whether registered sex offenders are leaving or returning to the United States? (2) How and to what extent have federal agencies notified foreign officials about registered sex offenders traveling internationally? Marshals)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Washington – U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB)
Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
We excluded DOD from our review because under SORNA, the departments responsible for dealing with registered sex offenders traveling abroad were identified as DOJ, DHS, and State. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, certain individuals who had been convicted of a sex offense in the United States have traveled overseas and committed offenses against children. GAO was asked to review what relevant federal agenciesincluding DOJ, DHS, and the Department of Stateare doing with regard to registered sex offenders traveling or living abroad. This report addresses the following questions: (1) How and to what extent does the federal government determine whether registered sex offenders are leaving or returning to the United States? (2) How and to what extent have federal agencies notified foreign officials about registered sex offenders traveling internationally? GAO analyzed August and September 2012 data from the U.S. Marshals, USNCB, and ICE on registered sex offenders who traveled internationally. GAO also interviewed relevant agency officials and surveyed officials from all 50 states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia to determine the extent to which they identify and use information on traveling sex offenders.
What GAO Found
Three federal agencies--U.S. Marshals, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Washington - U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--use information from state, local, territorial, and tribal jurisdictions, as well as passenger data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to identify registered sex offenders traveling outside of the United States. Similarly, these agencies may be notified of registered sex offenders traveling to the United States through several means, including tips from foreign officials or when CBP queries the registered sex offender's biographic information at a port of entry and finds that the offender has a criminal history. However, none of these sources provides complete or comprehensive information on registered sex offenders leaving or returning to the United States. For example, CBP does not routinely query individuals who leave the United States by commercial bus, private vessel, private vehicle, or by foot, in which case CBP may not be able to determine if any of these individuals are registered sex offenders. In addition, foreign officials do not always monitor when a registered sex offender is returning to the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), working with other agencies, is developing a process that will address some of these limitations. Specifically, the FBI will send an automated notice to the U.S. Marshals and law enforcement officials in the jurisdictions where the sex offender is registered that the offender is traveling, to the extent that the offender's biographical information is queried at the port of entry. However, because ICE has not requested to receive the automated notifications, ICE will not be notified of registered sex offenders who leave the country via a land port of entry whose biographical information is queried.
USNCB and ICE have notified foreign officials of some registered sex offenders leaving and returning to the country, but could increase the number and content of these notifications. USNCB notifies its foreign INTERPOL counterparts about registered sex offenders traveling internationally, and ICE notifies its foreign law enforcement counterparts about traveling sex offenders who had committed an offense against a child. USNCB provides more detailed information than ICE because USNCB uses offenders' self-reported travel information that some jurisdictions collect, which may include details such as hotel information. Since ICE uses passenger data, it does not have these details. Also, data from August 1 to September 30, 2012, showed that the two agencies had significant differences in the number of offenders they identified in notifications. USNCB sent notifications on 105 traveling sex offenders that ICE did not, and, conversely, ICE sent notifications on 100 traveling sex offenders that USNCB did not. In part this is because the two agencies rely on different information sources and do not share information with one another. Taking steps to ensure that these agencies have all available information on the same registered sex offenders traveling internationally could help ensure that the agencies are providing more comprehensive information to their foreign counterparts to help inform public safety decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ICE consider receiving the automated notifications and DOJ and DHS take steps to ensure that USNCB and ICE (1) have information on the same number of traveling registered sex offenders and (2) have access to the same level of detail about each traveling registered sex offender. USNCB within DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-389 | gao_GAO-13-389_0 | For example, the Act makes clear that executive branch employees, Members of Congress, and employees of Congress are not exempt from insider trading prohibitions under securities laws. The Prevalence of the Sale of Political Intelligence Is Unknown, but Some Investors Use It to Inform Investment Decisions
The prevalence of the sale of political intelligence is not known and is therefore difficult to quantify, as political intelligence information gathering and dissemination is often bundled with other information sources, financial compensation is usually not tied to specific sources of information or investment decisions, and consensus among political intelligence firms does not exist regarding some terms used in the STOCK Act definition of political intelligence. Even when a connection can be established between discrete pieces of government information and investment decisions, it is not always clear whether such information could be definitively categorized as material or nonmaterial and whether such information stemmed from public or nonpublic sources at the time of the information exchange. The phrase “who is known to intend to use information to inform investment decisions” is also unclear and difficult to interpret, because investor’s intentions are not always known. Interviewees from six of eight political intelligence firms and one of four law firms who provide political intelligence said that they have policies in place to ensure they do not knowingly sell material nonpublic information, which would be a violation of insider trading laws. These laws were the LDA, the Federal Election Campaign Act, and the Investment Advisers Act. Analysis of Three Federal Laws Relevant to Potential Political Intelligence Disclosure Requirements Purpose of Disclosure Requirement (establish a clear definition)
What forms to file
Where to file Allows or requires electronic registration or reporting Termination of registration (e.g., if filer no longer fits requirements, a request may be made to no longer file reports)
Who must file
Who is exempt from filing Threshold requirements (only if a threshold is met)
Records maintained (e.g., a record of contributions to a government official is kept and the location is reported)
Filing deadline Frequency of filing reports Information about the filer’s communications or contacts made on behalf of the client Information about the client A list of individuals who acted on behalf of the client during the reporting period (applicable if the lobbyist was engaged in political intelligence) Expenditures or income
Campaign contributions (contributions paid by filer to a government official’s election)
Gifts (from filer to a government official )
Training or ethics course (e.g., education on new requirements and procedures for those required to report)
Restriction provisions on what filers can and cannot do Enforcement, fines, and penalties Audits (to monitor compliance with requirements and procedures of disclosure reports) Public access to filer’s data (e.g., timing and format for providing information)
Additional practical issues and concerns that would need to be considered include:
A robust enforcement effort may be necessary to ensure compliance: Specifically, interviewees from four of eight political intelligence firms said firms could be less willing to register and report political intelligence activities because of concerns that public disclosure could result in a loss of their competitive advantage. Concluding Observations
Government information helps companies and individuals understand and anticipate the potential effects of executive and legislative branch actions on business, finance, and other decisions. What is most difficult to measure is the extent to which investment decisions are based on a single piece of government information or political intelligence. This is in part because government information is often bundled with other information which collectively influences an investment decision and in part because the flow of information does not lend itself to quantification or ongoing documentation for the purpose of measuring industry activity. While no laws or ethics rules specifically govern the political intelligence industry, executive and legislative branch ethics guidance and securities laws provide parameters for government officials to protect material nonpublic information. Specifically, SEC’s Rule 10b-5, which applies to both the executive and legislative branches of government, prohibits the use of material nonpublic information. If Congress chose to supplement existing guidance and laws with required disclosure of political intelligence information, the benefits and costs of disclosure would have to be balanced along with consideration of related practical and legal issues. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 (P.L. The objectives for conducting our work were to describe the legal and ethical issues, if any, that may apply to the sale of political intelligence; what is known about the sale of public and nonpublic political intelligence, the extent to which investors rely on such information, and the effect the sale of political intelligence may have on the financial markets; and any potential benefits and any practical or legal issues that may be raised from imposing disclosure requirements on those who engage in these activities. To determine the laws and ethics rules that govern the sale of political intelligence and to determine the extent to which information being sold would be considered nonpublic information we examined legislative and executive branch ethics guidance and the interpretation and application of SEC Rule 10b-5 (related to insider trading) to identify and summarize the distinctions between public and nonpublic information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Companies and individuals use political intelligence to understand the potential effects of legislative and executive branch actions on business, finance, and other decisions. The STOCK Act of 2012 directed GAO to report to Congress on the role of political intelligence in the financial markets. GAO reviewed (1) the legal and ethical issues, if any, that may apply to the sale of political intelligence; (2) what is known about the sale of public and nonpublic political intelligence, the extent to which investors rely on such information, and the effect the sale of political intelligence may have on the financial markets; and (3) any potential benefits and any practical or legal issues that may be raised from imposing disclosure requirements on those who engage in these activities.
To answer these objectives GAO examined federal guidance including Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 (related to insider trading), federal disclosure models including the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and the Federal Election Campaign Act; and the extent to which data existed to measure the size of the political intelligence industry. GAO also interviewed individuals at political intelligence, media, financial services, and law firms; trade associations; advocacy organizations; and executive and legislative branch officials. Interviewees were selected based on research on the political intelligence industry, their experience with these activities and referrals.
What GAO Found
The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 specifically defines political intelligence as information that is "derived by a person from direct communications with an executive branch employee, a Member of Congress, or an employee of Congress; and provided in exchange for financial compensation to a client who intends, and who is known to intend, to use the information to inform investment decisions." While no other laws or ethics rules specifically govern political intelligence activities, securities laws and executive and legislative branch ethics rules and guidance do provide guidelines for government officials to protect material nonpublic information (e.g., information that has not been disseminated to the general public or is not authorized to be made public). For example, insider trading laws apply to both the executive and legislative branches and prohibit the disclosure of material nonpublic information derived from employees' official positions for personal benefit.
The prevalence of the sale of political intelligence is not known and therefore difficult to quantify. The extent to which investment decisions are based on a single piece of political intelligence would be extremely difficult to measure. This is in part because a firm's information is often bundled with other information such as industry research and policy analysis, and because the flow of information does not readily lend itself to quantification or ongoing documentation for the purpose of measuring industry activity. Investors typically use multiple sources of information to influence their investment and business decisions.
Even when a connection can be established between discrete pieces of government information and investment decisions, it is not always clear whether such information could be definitively categorized as material (would a reasonable investor find the information important in making an investment decision) and whether such information stemmed from public or nonpublic sources at the time of the information exchange (information has a higher value at a time when it is not widely known and thus has the potential to inform a profitable transaction). It is also difficult to determine the extent to which nonpublic government information is being sold as political intelligence. Specifically, it is not always possible to determine the timing of when nonpublic information becomes public. Representatives of most political intelligence firms interviewed said they have policies in place to ensure they do not knowingly sell material nonpublic information and potentially violate insider trading laws.
Finally, if Congress chose to supplement existing guidance and laws with required disclosure of political intelligence information, the benefits (such as greater transparency) and costs (such as resources to administer) of disclosure would have to be balanced along with consideration of related practical and legal issues. For example, Congress would need to address the lack of consensus on the meaning of the terms "direct communication" and "investment decision" to provide clarity regarding the definition of political intelligence as well as guidance to specify the purpose of disclosure, who would be required to file, how often disclosures would be required, and who would manage the disclosure process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-04-992T | gao_GAO-04-992T_0 | Scheduled Mortgage Maturities Through 2013 Vary by Year and Program
Of the 11,267 subsidized properties (containing 914,441 units) with HUD mortgages, 21 percent (2,328 properties containing 236,650 units) have mortgages that are scheduled to mature from 2003 through 2013. Additionally, the bulk of these mortgages (about 75 percent) are scheduled to mature in the latter three years of the 10-year period (see fig. 1). 2). The states also vary considerably in terms of the percentage of their respective HUD mortgages on subsidized properties that are scheduled to mature through 2013, ranging from 7 percent in Alabama to 53 percent in South Dakota. Tenant Impacts Depend on Protections and Property Owners’ Decisions
Over the next 10 years, low-income tenants in over 101,000 units may have to pay higher rents or move when HUD-subsidized mortgages reach maturity. This is because no statutory requirement exists to protect tenants from increases in rent when HUD mortgages mature and rent restrictions are lifted. Property owners are not required to notify tenants when they pay off their mortgage at mortgage maturity. HUD data show that nonprofit organizations own about 38 percent of the properties with mortgages scheduled to mature in the next 10 years. Most Properties with HUD Mortgages That Reached Maturity Offer Rents Affordable to Low-Income Tenants
Our review of HUD’s data showed that HUD-insured mortgages at 32 properties matured between January 1, 1993, and December 31, 2002. Sixteen of the 32 properties are still serving low-income tenants through project-based Section 8 rental assistance contracts. Tools and Incentives Are Available to Help Keep Properties Affordable, but Are Not Specifically Designed to Deal with HUD Mortgage Maturity
HUD does not offer any tools or incentives to keep properties affordable after HUD mortgages mature, although it does offer incentives to maintain affordability for properties that also have expiring rental assistance contracts. However, about three- quarters of the state and local agencies that responded to our survey reported that they do not track the maturity dates on HUD mortgages, and none provided examples of tools or incentives used to keep units affordable after mortgage maturity. These state and local agencies identified several incentives that they believe are the most effective in preserving the affordability of housing for low-income tenants. 3). This Web site contains detailed property-level data on active HUD-insured mortgages and expiring rental assistance contracts. However, according to our survey, some state and local agencies perceive that the information is not readily available. Using HUD’s data that we obtained to respond to your request, we also developed a prototype searchable database, available in CD-ROM format, showing property-level data for each of HUD’s subsidized rental properties scheduled to mature in the next 10 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has subsidized the development of about 1.7 million rental units in over 23,000 privately owned properties by offering owners favorable long-term mortgage financing, rental assistance payments, or both in exchange for owners' commitment to house low-income tenants. When owners pay off mortgages--the mortgages "mature"--the subsidized financing ends, raising the possibility of rent increases. Based on a report issued in January 2004, this testimony discusses (1) the number and selected characteristics of HUD-subsidized rental properties with mortgages scheduled to mature in the next 10 years, (2) the potential impact on tenants upon mortgage maturity, and (3) the tools and incentives that HUD, the states, and localities offer owners to keep HUD properties affordable upon mortgage maturity.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, the HUD mortgages on 2,328 properties--21 percent of the 11,267 subsidized properties with HUD mortgages--are scheduled to mature in the next 10 years, but among states this percentage varies significantly: from 7 percent in Alabama, to 53 percent in South Dakota. About three-quarters of these mortgages are scheduled to mature in the last 3 years of the 10-year period. As part of our analysis, we developed a searchable database available on a CD-ROM, showing property-level data for each of HUD's subsidized rental properties scheduled to mature in the next 10 years. Impacts on tenants depend on tenant protections available under program statutes and regulations, as well as on property owners' decisions about their properties. No statutory requirement exists to protect tenants from increases in rent when HUD mortgages mature, absent the existence of rental assistance contracts or other subsidies. Without tenant protection requirements, tenants in over 101,000 units that do not receive rental assistance may have to pay higher rents or move when the HUD mortgages on these properties mature and rent restrictions are lifted. During the past 10 years, HUD-insured mortgages at 32 properties reached mortgage maturity, and the majority of these properties are still serving low-income tenants. HUD does not offer incentives to owners to keep properties affordable upon mortgage maturity. While many state and local agencies GAO surveyed offered incentives to preserve affordable housing, they have not directed them specifically at properties where HUD mortgages mature. Most of the agencies do not track HUD mortgage maturity dates for subsidized properties. In addition, although HUD's Web site contains detailed property-level data, some state and local agencies perceive that the information is not readily available. |
gao_HEHS-96-184 | gao_HEHS-96-184_0 | Many states have attempted to maximize the benefits of managed care by requiring beneficiaries to enroll. Direct Marketing Increases Enrollment in Managed Care But Has Resulted in Some Abuses
In some managed care programs—primarily those that are voluntary—states rely on participating MCOs to inform beneficiaries about managed care and to encourage them to enroll. Many of these abuses have resulted in access problems for beneficiaries—which are sometimes compounded by MCOs’ delays in processing beneficiaries’ requests to disenroll from their plan. In addition to these actions, four states—California, Florida, New York, and Tennessee—have since banned or restricted door-to-door marketing by MCOs. Each state also has elected to assume—either directly or through its counties or enrollment broker—the enrollment function and, as part of this process, to concentrate its resources on educating beneficiaries about managed care and helping them select a health plan rather than be assigned to one by default. These states prefer that, when multiple plans are available, beneficiaries choose their own plan—as opposed to being assigned to one by the state. Generally, various community groups and programs—such as churches, Head Start, maternal and child health programs, programs for homeless people, and legal aid services—promote beneficiary understanding of a state’s managed care program and provide assistance to beneficiaries in choosing an MCO. Measures of the Effectiveness of Education and Enrollment Efforts Are Limited
Collectively, the states we visited point to a number of data sources that can indicate beneficiary understanding of and satisfaction with the Medicaid managed care program. However, these sources—as currently designed and analyzed—do not directly measure the effectiveness of their enrollment and education programs. However, these surveys generally have focused on beneficiary views on the overall quality of care received and have suffered from very low response rates. To better measure the effectiveness of their education and enrollment programs, states might include in their satisfaction surveys specific questions related to these programs. This process also can be difficult for new beneficiaries who are unfamiliar with fee-for-service or managed care. While the rate at which beneficiaries select an MCO is one available indicator, it alone does not reflect the degree to which Medicaid beneficiaries understand and appropriately use the managed care system. Specifically, these states have restricted the types of direct-marketing activities MCOs can use. Scope and Methodology
To describe the role of marketing in expanding participation in managed care and the types of marketing and enrollment abuses that have occurred in Medicaid managed care to date, we obtained and reviewed documentation from state Medicaid agencies and state attorneys general offices. To identify states’ efforts to measure the effectiveness of their education and enrollment approaches, we discussed the use of various performance indicators with program officials in the four states. Prosecuted and convicted MCO representatives and state employees Recouped $25,000 in payments to plans for fraudulent enrollments Established fines of up to $5,000 for each violation of marketing and enrollment contract requirements Established fines of up to $10,000 per Medicaid beneficiary enrolled as a result of marketing fraud (continued)
Enrollment Broker Contracts in Missouri and Ohio
Of the four states we visited, Missouri and Ohio elected to use enrollment brokers to conduct their Medicaid managed care education and enrollment functions. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on state efforts to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care, focusing on: (1) the role of managed care organizations (MCO) in marketing and expanding managed care participation; (2) the types of marketing and enrollment abuses that have occurred and states' efforts to curb these abuses and ensure that beneficiaries are informed about their health plan options; and (3) state efforts to measure the effectiveness of their education and enrollment approaches.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) to boost enrollment in their Medicaid managed care programs, especially where participation is voluntary, some states have allowed MCOs to use various direct-marketing strategies, including door-to-door marketing, to encourage beneficiaries to sign up with their plan; (2) however, some MCOs and their agents have engaged in unscrupulous practices to maximize beneficiary enrollment, and thereby maximize plan revenues and commissions; (3) these practices include bribing public officials to obtain confidential information on beneficiaries, paying beneficiaries cash and other incentives to sign up, deliberately misinforming beneficiaries about access to care, and enrolling ineligible beneficiaries; (4) to address or avoid these marketing problems, many states have banned or restricted direct-marketing activities by MCOs and have retained responsibility for enrolling or disenrolling Medicaid beneficiaries; (5) as part of their enrollment programs, these states devote considerable efforts to facilitating beneficiaries' difficult transition from fee-for-service to managed care; (6) to do this, they have developed strategies to help beneficiaries understand the principles of managed care and make the often complex decisions involved with selecting an MCO; (7) despite their common emphasis on using the enrollment process as an opportunity to promote beneficiary understanding of the program and selection of an MCO, the four states GAO visited varied in their specific approaches, in part, due to their goals and circumstances; (8) these four states' education and enrollment efforts are also often augmented by community groups, such as maternal and child health advocates, and by MCOs, who are contractually required to inform enrollees on a continuing basis of plan services and operations; (9) although community groups in the four states generally believe that their states' education and enrollment efforts have facilitated beneficiaries' transition or introduction to managed care, methods used to measure the effectiveness of these approaches have been limited; (10) state officials and experts GAO contacted consider the best current measure to be the rate at which beneficiaries select their own health plan, rather than being assigned to one by the state; (11) while these states attempt to reach voluntary selection rates of 80 percent or higher, their actual experience has ranged from 59 to 88 percent; and (12) as general measures of the overall operation of their Medicaid managed care programs, these states also track other indicators, but none of these was designed or analyzed to specifically measure the effectiveness of the education and enrollment process. |
gao_GAO-04-588T | gao_GAO-04-588T_0 | Background
The safety and quality of the U.S. food supply is governed by a highly complex system that is based on more than 30 laws and administered by 12 agencies. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), have most of the regulatory responsibilities for ensuring the safety of the nation’s food supply and account for most federal food safety spending. Existing statutes give the agencies different regulatory and enforcement authorities. Fragmented System Hampers the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Food Safety Efforts
As we have stated in numerous reports and testimonies, the fragmented federal food safety system is not the product of strategic design. Rather, it emerged piecemeal, over many decades, typically in response to particular health threats or economic crises. In short, what authorities agencies have to enforce food safety regulations, which agency has jurisdiction to regulate what food products, and how frequently they inspect food facilities is determined by the legislation that governs each agency, or by administrative agreement between the two agencies, without strategic design as to how to best protect public health. As a result there is fragmentation, inconsistency, and overlap in the federal food safety system. Federal agencies’ different authorities result in inconsistent inspection and enforcement. Frequency of inspections is not based on risk. Federal expenditures are not based on the volume of foods regulated, consumed, or their risk of foodborne illness. As a result, expenditures for food safety activities are disproportionate to the amount of food products each agency regulates and to the level of public consumption of those food products. Emerging Terrorist Threats Highlight the Need to Reorganize the Federal Food Safety System
The fragmented legal and organizational structures of the federal food safety system are now further challenged by the realization that American farms and food are vulnerable to potential attack and deliberate contamination. Fundamental Changes Needed to Improve Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Federal Food Safety System
To address the problems I have just outlined, a fundamental transformation of the current food safety system is necessary. In our view, integrating the overlapping and duplicative responsibilities for food safety into a single agency or department can create synergy and economies of scale that would provide for more focused and efficient efforts to protect the nation’s food supply. It is time to ask whether a system that developed in a piecemeal fashion in response to specific problems as they arose over the course of several decades can efficiently and effectively respond to today’s challenges. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To provide more efficient, consistent, and effective federal oversight of the nation’s food supply, we suggest that the Congress consider enacting comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food safety legislation establishing a single, independent food safety agency at the Cabinet level. | Why GAO Did This Study
The safety of the U.S. food supply is governed by a highly complex system of more than 30 laws administered by 12 agencies. In light of the recent focus on government reorganization, it is time to ask whether the current system can effectively and efficiently respond to today's challenges. At the request of the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, we reviewed and summarized our work on the safety and security of the food supply regarding (1) the fragmented legal and organizational structure of the federal food safety system, (2) the consequences of overlapping and inconsistent inspection and enforcement, and (3) options for consolidating food safety functions.
What GAO Found
As we have stated in numerous reports and testimonies, the federal food safety system is not the product of strategic design. Rather, it emerged piecemeal, over many decades, typically in response to particular health threats or economic crises. The result is a fragmented legal and organizational structure that gives responsibility for specific food commodities to different agencies and provides them with significantly different authorities and responsibilities. The existing food safety statutes create fragmented jurisdictions between the two principal food safety agencies, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). As a result, there are inconsistencies in the frequency of the agencies' inspections of food facilities and the enforcement authorities available to these agencies. In short, which agency has jurisdiction to regulate various food products, the regulatory authorities they have available to them, and how frequently they inspect food facilities is determined by disparate statutes or by administrative agreement between the two agencies, without strategic design as to how to best protect public health. In many instances, food processing facilities are inspected by both FDA and USDA. Furthermore, federal food safety efforts are based on statutory requirements, not risk. For example, funding for USDA and FDA is not proportionate to the amount of food products each agency regulates, to the level of public consumption of those foods, or to the frequency of foodborne illnesses associated with food products. A federal food safety system with diffused and overlapping lines of authority and responsibility cannot effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission and meet new food safety challenges. These challenges are more pressing today as we face emerging threats such as mad cow disease and the potential for deliberate contamination of our food supply through bioterrorism. Therefore, fundamental changes are needed. First, there is a need to overhaul existing food safety legislation to make it uniform, consistent, and risk based. Second, consolidation of food safety agencies under a single independent agency or a single department is needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the current federal food safety system. Integrating the overlapping responsibilities for food safety into a single agency or department can create synergy and economies of scale, as well as provide more focused and efficient efforts to protect the nation's food supply. |
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