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gao_GAO-06-568 | gao_GAO-06-568_0 | At the federal level, HUD is responsible for enforcing RESPA, which regulates real estate settlement practices. Certain Aspects of the Title Insurance Market Merit Further Study
Some aspects of the title insurance market that set it apart from other lines of insurance merit further study, including: the importance of title search costs, rather than losses, in setting premium rates; the fact that title insurance agents play a more important role than agents for other lines of insurance; the fact that title insurance is generally marketed not to consumers but to professionals such as real estate agents or mortgage brokers; the proliferation of affiliated business arrangements between title agents and these professionals; and the involvement and coordination among the regulators of multiple types of entities involved in the marketing and sale of title insurance. Extent to Which Premium Rates Reflect Underlying Costs Not Always Clear
The extent to which title insurance premium rates reflect insurers’ underlying costs is not always clear. However, most state regulators do not appear to consider title search expenses to be part of the premium. Extent of Competition in the Industry That Could Benefit Consumers Is Not Clear
For several reasons, the competitiveness of the title insurance market merits further study. First, because the purchase of title insurance is an infrequent and unfamiliar transaction for most people, consumers often rely on the advice of a real estate or mortgage professional in choosing a title insurer. As a result, title insurers and agents normally market their product to such professionals rather than to consumers. Thus, while consumers are the ones paying for title insurance, they generally do not know how to “shop around” for the best deal, and may not even know that they can. For example, a real estate broker that is part owner of a title agency might be seen as unable to provide objective advice on which title insurer a consumer should use. In addition, among the state regulators with whom we spoke for this review, one did not normally examine such arrangements, but the others were beginning to conduct more extensive reviews. Extent of Involvement and Coordination among Regulators of the Multiple Entities Involved in the Sale of Title Insurance Is Worthy of Further Study
Several types of entities (besides the insurers and their agents) are involved in the sale of title insurance, and the degree of involvement and the extent of coordination among the regulators of these entities appears to vary, making this an area meriting further review. Further Study of the Implications of Recent State and Federal Investigations Could Be Beneficial
Federal and state investigators have identified two primary types of potentially illegal activities associated with the sale of title insurance. Investigations Have Alleged Existence of Kickback Schemes and Fraudulent Activities in the Title Insurance Industry
In several states, state insurance regulators identified captive reinsurance arrangements that they alleged were being used by title insurers and agents to inappropriately compensate others—such as builders or lenders—for referrals. State and federal investigators have also alleged the existence of inappropriate or fraudulent business arrangements among title agencies, title insurers, mortgage brokers, attorneys, and real estate brokers that were allegedly being used to convey kickbacks and referral fees. A typical fraudulent business arrangement involves a shell title agency that is set up by a title agent but that generally has no physical location, employees, or assets, and does not actually perform title and settlement business. State and federal investigators have also looked at other types of alleged kickbacks that title agents have given real estate agents and brokers, and attorneys involved in real estate transactions. Investigators alleged that these inducements also violated federal and state anti-kickback and anti- rebating laws. Potential Regulatory Changes Raise a Number of Issues
Over the past several years, regulators, industry groups, and others have suggested changes to regulations that would affect the way title insurance is sold. HUD announced in June of 2005 that it was again considering revisions to the regulations, and has subsequently held a number of industry roundtables to get input from industry and others. The model law for title agents includes, among other things, agent licensing requirements and prohibitions on referral fees. Finally, at least one consumer advocate has suggested that requiring lenders to pay for the title policies from which they benefit might increase competition and ultimately lower costs for consumers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title insurance is a required element of almost all real estate purchases and is not an insignificant cost for consumers. However, consumers generally do not have the knowledge needed to "shop around" for title insurance and usually rely on professionals involved in real estate--such as lenders, real estate agents, and attorneys--for advice in selecting a title insurer. Recent state and federal investigations into title insurance sales have identified practices that may have benefited these professionals and title insurance providers at the expense of consumers. At your request, GAO currently has work under way studying the title insurance industry, including pricing, competition, the size of the market, the roles of the various participants in the market, and how they are regulated. You asked GAO to identify and report on preliminary issues for further study. In so doing, this report focuses on: (1) the reasonableness of cost structures and agent practices common to the title insurance market that are not typical of other insurance markets; (2) the implications of activities identified in recent state and federal investigations that may have benefited real estate professionals rather than consumers; and (3) the potential need for regulatory changes that would affect the way that title insurance is sold.
What GAO Found
Some cost structures and agent practices that are common to the title insurance market are not typical of other lines of insurance and merit further study. First, the extent to which premium rates reflect underlying costs is not always clear. For example, most states do not consider title search and examination costs--insurers' largest expense--to be part of the premium, and do not review them. Second, while title agents play a key role in the underwriting process, the extent to which state insurance regulators review them is not clear. Few states regularly collect information on agents, and three states do not license them. Third, the extent to which a competitive environment exists within the title insurance market that benefits consumers is also not clear. Consumers generally lack the knowledge necessary to "shop around" for a title insurer and therefore often rely on the advice of real estate and mortgage professionals. As a result, title agents normally market their business to these professionals, creating a form of competition from which the benefit to consumers is not always clear. Fourth, real estate brokers and lenders are increasingly becoming full or part owners of title agencies, which may benefit consumers by allowing one-stop shopping, but may also create conflicts of interest. Finally, multiple regulators oversee the different entities involved in the title insurance industry, but the extent of involvement and coordination among these entities is not clear. Recent state and federal investigations have identified potentially illegal activities--mainly involving alleged kickbacks--that also merit further study. The investigations alleged instances of real estate agents, mortgage brokers, and lenders receiving referral fees or other inducements in return for steering business to title insurers or agents, activities that may have violated federal or state anti-kickback laws. Participants allegedly used several methods to convey the inducements, including captive reinsurance agreements, fraudulent business arrangements, and discounted business services. For example, investigators identified several "shell" title agencies created by a title agent and a real estate or mortgage broker that had no physical location or employees and did not perform any title business, allegedly serving only to obscure referral payments. Insurers and industry associations with whom we spoke said that they had begun to address such alleged activities but also said that current regulations needed clarification. In the past several years, regulators, industry groups, and others have suggested changes to the way title insurance is sold, and further study of these suggestions could be beneficial. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development announced in June 2005 that it was considering revisions to the regulations implementing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. In addition, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners is considering changes to model laws for title insurers and title agents. Finally, at least one consumer advocate has suggested that requiring lenders to pay for the title policies from which they benefit might increase competition and ultimately lower consumers' costs. |
gao_GAO-15-75 | gao_GAO-15-75_0 | The departments are also required to notify Congress of their intent to transfer funds and initiate activities for GSCF projects before starting project execution, and DOD is required to seek approval to retransfer funds. State and DOD Guidance Describes Process for GSCF Project Development
State and DOD officials developed a guidance document that was issued in March 2014 as a State cable titled Utilizing the Global Security Contingency Fund, which describes how State and DOD are to identify, develop, and execute GSCF projects. 1. State Guidance Describes the GSCF Congressional Notification and Funding Transfer Process
State issued a separate document in March 2014, titled Global Security Contingency Fund Program Execution Guidance, which describes a process for congressional notification and internal State procedures for transferring and managing funds in the joint GSCF account.guidance states that State and DOD should complete all congressional notification requirements to secure approval to transfer funds. 2. As of September 2014, State and DOD have not met the execution target dates contained in the congressional notifications for the five fiscal year 2012 GSCF projects by an average of about 8 months, assuming the projects meet the currently planned execution dates. In July 2014, State and DOD sent congressional notifications for two additional projects. State and DOD’s Five Fiscal Year 2012 GSCF Projects Did Not Meet Originally Planned Execution Target Dates
The five State and DOD fiscal year 2012 GSCF projects have not met the execution target dates contained in the congressional notifications due to a variety of factors, including partner nation security concerns and the time it took to obtain congressional approval. Figure 7 describes each project, total funds transferred, and the original and currently planned dates of execution for initiation of training activities and equipment delivery, as of September 2014. State and DOD officials stated that the target dates were not met due to partner nation security concerns as well as additional details and supporting documentation needed by Congress to obtain congressional approval. State and DOD Have Not Defined Time Frames to Guide and Track GSCF Projects
State’s March 2014 GSCF cable states that the GSCF program is to address near- to mid-term security concerns driven by emergent challenges or opportunities, but it does not clearly define what time frames constitute near- or mid-term. Moreover, State and DOD do not routinely track GSCF projects against established time frames. Key management practices call for developing control activities to ensure management’s directives are being met, such as clearly defining the time frame associated with projects and tracking whether the projects are meeting their goals. State officials said that GSCF is intended to address emergent challenges that fall outside of the normal budgeting and planning process; however, while this approach allows for flexibility, it does not clarify how long near- to mid-term GSCF projects should take. Without clearly defining a range of time for near- to mid-term GSCF projects, stakeholders, including those proposing and approving GSCF projects, will not know the criteria for how long a project should take. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the definition of the GSCF program and assist stakeholders in assessing whether GSCF is meeting its goals, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
Provide a range of time to clarify the time frames associated with near- to mid-term GSCF projects, and track GSCF projects against established time frames. In the written comments, State did not agree and DOD partially agreed with the first recommendation, and both departments agreed with the second recommendation. This report (1) describes the processes State and DOD have developed to manage the program, (2) describes the status of GSCF projects, and (3) assesses the extent to which State and DOD have clearly defined time frames for GSCF projects. To assess the extent to which State and DOD have clearly defined time frames for GSCF projects, we obtained and analyzed State and DOD’s congressional notification packages for GSCF projects, GSCF project updates to Congress, and State’s GSCF guidance documents. We compared this information to criteria in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
As instability abroad threatens U.S. and foreign partners' interests, the United States has emphasized the importance of building partner capacity to address emerging threats. Congress established GSCF in fiscal year 2012, and this pilot authority allows State and DOD to pool funds and expertise to address near- to mid-term needs for training, equipping, and enhancing foreign security forces. State and DOD jointly administer GSCF and are required to notify Congress of their intent to transfer funds and initiate GSCF activities before starting project execution. GAO was mandated to review State and DOD's procedures for managing GSCF.
This report (1) describes processes State and DOD have developed to manage the program, (2) describes the status of GSCF projects, and (3) assesses the extent to which State and DOD have clearly defined time frames for GSCF projects. GAO analyzed State and DOD guidance and GSCF documents, and compared GSCF guidance to internal control standards. GAO also interviewed State and DOD officials about GSCF.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have developed processes to manage the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) program. In March 2014, State and DOD officials used lessons learned from developing the initial GSCF projects to document a 14-step process to identify, develop, and execute GSCF projects. Additionally, State issued a separate document describing the process for congressional notification and internal State procedures for how to transfer and manage funds in the joint GSCF account.
State and DOD have submitted congressional notification packages for seven GSCF projects since fiscal year 2012. As of September 2014, State and DOD had not met the original dates contained in the congressional notifications for the initial five GSCF projects for beginning training and equipment delivery by an average of about 8 months. State and DOD officials stated that the dates were not met due to security concerns as well as additional details and supporting documentation required by Congress to obtain congressional approval. In July 2014, State and DOD also sent congressional notifications for two additional projects that have not begun execution. The figure below shows GAO's analysis of the identification, and original and currently planned or actual execution dates, of the initiation of training activities for the five initial GSCF projects.
State's March 2014 cable states that GSCF projects are to address near- to mid-term security concerns, but the cable does not clearly define what time frame constitutes near- or mid-term, and State and DOD do not track GSCF projects against established time frames. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for developing control activities to ensure management's directives are being met, such as defining a range of time for projects and tracking whether projects are meeting their goals. State officials said that GSCF is intended to address challenges outside of the normal budgeting and planning process; however, this approach does not define how long near- to mid-term GSCF projects should take. Without a range of time for GSCF projects, it is not clear how long projects should take, and State and DOD do not have time frames to track whether GSCF projects are addressing near- to mid-term needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State and DOD (1) provide an overall range of time for near- to mid-term GSCF projects and (2) track projects against this time frame. State disagreed and DOD partially agreed with the first recommendation, citing the need for flexibility. GAO agreed and modified the recommendation to clarify its intent, as discussed in the report. Both departments agreed with the second recommendation to track GSCF projects. |
gao_GAO-17-627T | gao_GAO-17-627T_0 | This type of system is a critical component of a larger effort to improve organizational performance. Lessons Learned in Creating a Market-Driven, Results-Oriented Pay System
Our 2005 work showed that implementing a more market-based and more performance-oriented pay system is both doable and desirable. Moreover, representatives of public, private, and nonprofit organizations, in discussing the successes and challenges they have experienced in designing and implementing their own results-oriented pay systems, told us at the time they had to shift from a culture where compensation is based on position and longevity to one that is performance-oriented, affordable and sustainable. Focus on a set of values and objectives to guide the pay system. 2. Examine the value of employees’ total compensation to remain competitive in the labor market. 3. Build in safeguards to enhance the transparency and ensure the fairness of pay decisions. 4. Devolve decision-making on pay to appropriate levels. 5. 6. Build consensus to gain ownership and acceptance for pay reforms. 7. Monitor and refine the implementation of the pay system. Additional Steps Agencies Can Take to Be Competitive in the Labor Market and Address Skills Gaps
Agency Actions Can Help Transform Personnel Management
Our prior work has found that across a range of human capital functions, while in some cases statutory changes may be needed to advance reforms, in many instances improvements are within the control of federal agencies. Indeed, Congress has already provided agencies with a number of tools and flexibilities to help them build and maintain a high- performing workforce. As we noted in our 2017 high-risk update, agencies can drive improvements to their high risk areas—including strategic human capital management—through such steps as:
Sustained leadership commitment, including developing long-term priorities and goals, and providing continuing oversight and accountability;
Ensuring agencies have adequate capacity to address their personnel issues, including collaborating with other agencies and stakeholders as appropriate; Identifying root causes of problems and developing action plans to address them, including establishing goals and performance measures;
Monitoring actions by, for example, tracking performance measures and progress against goals; and
Demonstrating progress by showing issues are being effectively managed and root causes are being addressed. This framework is to be used in 2017 by agencies to plan, implement, evaluate, and improve human capital policies and programs. By analyzing hiring authorities, OPM and agencies could identify opportunities to refine authorities, expand access to specific authorities found to be highly efficient and effective, and eliminate those found to be less effective. The GS System Could Better Balance Attributes of a Modern, Effective Classification System
The GS classification system is a mechanism for organizing federal white- collar work—notably for the purpose of determining pay—based on a position’s duties, responsibilities, and difficulty, among other things. We and others have found that the work of the federal government has become more highly skilled and specialized than the GS classification system was designed to address when it was created in 1949 when most of the federal workforce was engaged in clerical work. Among other things, we found effective performance management helps agencies establish a clear “line of sight” between individual performance and organizational success and using core competencies helps to reinforce organizational objectives. Opportunities Exist to Address Human Resources Capacity Challenges
In 2014, we found that many agency CHCO said their offices did not have the capacity to lead strategic human capital management activities such as talent management, workforce planning, and promoting high performance and a results-oriented culture. Instead, these offices remained focused on transactional human resource activities like benefits and processing personnel actions. The human resources specialist occupation continues to be one of six government-wide, mission-critical skills gap areas identified by OPM. The federal compensation system should allow the government to cost-effectively attract, motivate, and retain a high- performing, agile workforce necessary to meet those missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
A careful consideration of federal pay is an essential part of fiscal stewardship and is necessary to support the recruitment and retention of a talented, agile, and high-performing federal workforce. High-performing organizations have found that the life-cycle of human capital management activities—including workforce planning, recruitment, on-boarding, compensation, engagement, succession planning, and retirement programs—need to be aligned for the cost-effective achievement of an organization's mission. However, despite some improvements, strategic human capital management—and more specifically, skills gaps in mission critical occupations—continues to be a GAO high-risk area.
This testimony is based on a body of GAO work primarily issued between June 2012 and March 2017. It focuses on (1) lessons learned in creating a more market driven, results-oriented approach to federal pay, and (2) opportunities, in addition to pay and benefits, that OPM and agencies could use to be more competitive in the labor market and address skills gaps.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has shown that implementing a market-based and more performance-oriented federal pay system is both doable and desirable, and should be part of a broader strategy of change management and performance improvement initiatives. In 2005, GAO identified the following key themes that highlight the leadership and management strategies high-performing organizations collectively considered in designing and managing a pay system that is performance oriented, affordable, and sustainable. Specifically, they:
1. Focus on a set of values and objectives to guide the pay system.
2. Examine the value of employees' total compensation to remain competitive in the labor market.
3. Build in safeguards to enhance the transparency and ensure the fairness of pay decisions.
4. Devolve decision-making on pay to appropriate levels.
5. Provide clear and consistent communication so that employees at all levels can understand how compensation reforms are implemented.
6. Build consensus to gain ownership and acceptance for pay reforms.
7. Monitor and refine the implementation of the pay system.
While the federal compensation system may need to be re-examined, Congress has already provided agencies with tools and flexibilities to build and maintain a high-performing workforce. They include, for example:
Hiring process
GAO reported in 2016 that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and selected agencies had not evaluated the effectiveness of hiring authorities. By evaluating them, of which over 100 were used in 2014, OPM and agencies could identify ways to expand access to those found to be more effective, and eliminate those found to be less effective.
General Schedule (GS) classification system
The federal government has become more highly skilled and specialized than the GS classification system was designed to address at its inception in 1949. OPM and stakeholders should examine ways to make the classification system consistent with attributes GAO identified of a modern, effective classification system, such as internal and external equity.
Performance management
Credible and effective performance management systems are a strategic tool to achieve organizational results. These systems should emphasize “a line a sight” between individual performance and organizational success, and use core competencies to reinforce organizational objectives, among other things.
Human resources capacity
The human resources specialist occupation is a mission critical skills gap area. Chief Human Capital Officers have reported that human resources specialists do not have the skills to lead strategic human capital management activities. Strengthening this capacity could help agencies better meet their missions.
What GAO Recommends
Over the years, GAO has made recommendations to agencies and OPM to improve their strategic human capital management efforts. OPM and agencies generally concurred. This testimony discusses actions taken to implement key recommendations to improve federal hiring and classification. |
gao_GAO-10-498 | gao_GAO-10-498_0 | The Composition of Treasury’s Debt Portfolio Changed Substantially following the 2008 Financial Market Crisis but Has Begun to Transition Back to Pre–Market Crisis Structure
The Size and Composition of Treasury’s Debt Portfolio Changed Substantially Due in Part to Borrowing for TARP, the SFP, and the Recovery Act
The borrowing associated with the actions that the federal government took in response to the financial-market crisis and recession including TARP, the SFP, and the Recovery Act, substantially altered the size and composition of Treasury’s outstanding debt portfolio. Treasury Paid a Premium for the Sustained Use of CMBs in 2008 and 2009
While CMBs provided Treasury with needed borrowing flexibility immediately following the start of the financial market crisis in 2008, Treasury paid a premium for its sustained use of CMBs in 2008 and 2009. The Medium- and Long- Term Fiscal Outlook Will Continue to Present Debt Management Challenges
The actions that Treasury has taken to increase borrowing in response to the recession and financial-market crisis take place within the context of the already-serious longer-term fiscal condition of the federal government. Treasury receives market information through multiple formal and informal channels. Market Participants and Experts Suggested Ways for Treasury to Improve Its Collection of Information from End-Investors
Respondents to our survey of the largest domestic holders of Treasury securities suggested ideas for improving Treasury’s collection of information from end-investors. Investors Reported Increased Demand for TIPS and Suggested Actions for Treasury to Take That Could the TIPS Market
Investors and Market Experts Reported an Increased Demand for TIPS
As previously noted, one challenge for Treasury will be to gauge inve demand for Treasury securities in order to finance historically large deficits expected in the medium and long term. These changes, which are meant to improve TIPS liquidity, are based on Treasury’s own analysis and on input that Treasury received from market participants and GAO. One of the Most Important Groups through Which Treasury Receives Market Information Has Expressed Concerns about the Increase in Direct Bidding in Treasury Auctions
One of Treasury’s important channels of communication is with primary dealers. Primary dealers that we interviewed told us that they are satisfied with their communication with Treasury. Raising significant amounts of cash at the lowest cost of borrowing over time requires sufficien competitive participation at auctions. Information from market participants on their demand for Treasury securities, including the typ information that we received from our survey of the largest domestic holders of Treasury securities, is critical to this effort. a. The liquidity of TIPS has been found to be less than nominal Treasury securities. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report is part of GAO's requirement, under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, to monitor the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and submit special reports as warranted from oversight findings. It evaluates Treasury's borrowing actions since the start of the crisis, and how Treasury communicates with market participants in the context of the growing debt portfolio and the medium- and long-term fiscal outlook. GAO analyzed market data; interviewed Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and market experts; and surveyed major domestic holders of Treasury securities.
What GAO Found
The economic recession and financial-market crisis, and the federal government's response to both, have significantly increased the amount of federal debt. While the composition of Treasury's debt portfolio changed in response to this increase, Treasury has taken a number of steps in the past year to return the composition of the debt portfolio to pre-market crisis structure. One action Treasury has undertaken has been to reduce its reliance on cash management bills (CMB). While CMBs provided Treasury with needed borrowing flexibility immediately following the financial market crisis in 2008, Treasury paid a premium for its sustained use of CMBs in 2008 and 2009. In recent months, Treasury also has begun to stabilize shorter-term bill issuance and increase issuance of longer-term coupons. Given the medium- and long-term fiscal outlook, Treasury will continue to be presented with the challenge of raising significant amounts of cash at the lowest costs over time. This makes evaluating the demand for Treasury securities increasingly important. Sufficient information from market participants on their demand for Treasury securities, including the type of information that GAO received from its survey of the largest domestic holders of Treasury securities, will be critical as Treasury moves forward to meet these challenges. In GAO's survey, investors reported increased demand for Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and suggested ways for Treasury to further improve TIPS liquidity and thereby lower borrowing costs. Treasury receives input from market participants through a variety of formal and informal channels, but overall satisfaction with these communication channels varies by type of market participant. Market participants suggested to GAO a number of changes including increasing investor diversification on the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC) and regular collection of information from end-investors. Primary dealers, who are satisfied with their communication, raised concerns about the recent increase in direct bidding and its effect on Treasury auctions. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-94 | gao_T-HEHS-97-94_0 | My remarks today focus on two broad issues: (1) key factors that explain the 3.3-percent growth rate in fiscal year 1996 and their implications for future Medicaid spending and (2) the administration’s proposal to contain Medicaid cost growth through decreases in disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments and per capita caps, and to increase state flexibility. in the 1996 growth rate, so a variety of factors—such as a downturn in the economy—could result in increased growth rates in subsequent years. Finally, the administration’s proposal for Medicaid reform would further control spending by reducing DSH expenditures and imposing a per capita cap, while providing the states greater flexibility in program policy and administration for their managed care and long-term care programs. These initiatives should produce cost savings. However, in controlling program spending, attention should be given to targeting federal funds appropriately and ensuring that added program flexibility is accompanied by effective federal monitoring and oversight. Recent slowdowns in state-initiated eligibility expansions also helped to effect substantial decreases in the growth rates in selected states. State Managed Care Programs and Long-Term Care Policies
uncertain because of state variations in program scope and objectives. Potential for Higher Expenditure Growth in Future Years
Many of the factors that resulted in the 3.3-percent growth rate in 1996—such as DSH payments, unemployment rates, and program policy changes—will continue to influence the Medicaid growth rate in future years. However, there are indications that some of these components may contribute to higher—not lower—growth rates, while the effect of others is more uncertain. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed recent Medicaid spending trends and their potential implications for future outlays, focusing on: (1) key factors that explain the Medicaid 3.3-percent growth rate in fiscal year 1996; and (2) the administration's proposal to contain Medicaid cost growth through decreases in disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments and per capita caps, and to increase state flexibility.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO found no single pattern across all states that accounts for the recent dramatic decrease in the growth of Medicaid spending; (2) rather, a combination of factors, some affecting only certain states and others common to many states, explains the low 1996 growth rate; (3) leading factors include continued reductions in DSH payments in some states as a result of earlier federal restrictions on the amount of such payments and the leveling off of Medicaid enrollment in other states following planned expansions in prior years; (4) a number of states GAO contacted attributed the lower growth rate to a generally improved economy and state initiatives to limit expenditure growth through programmatic changes, such as managed care programs and long-term care alternatives; (5) while the magnitude of the effect of these programmatic changes is less clear, there is evidence that they helped to restrain program costs; (6) it is likely that the 3.3-percent growth rate is not indicative of the growth rate in the years ahead; (7) just as a number of factors converged to bring about the drop in the 1996 growth rate, so a variety of factors, such as a downturn in the economy, could result in increased growth rates in subsequent years; (8) the administration's proposal for Medicaid reform would further control spending by reducing DSH expenditures and imposing a per capita cap, while providing the states greater flexibility in program policy and administration for their managed care and long-term care programs; (9) these initiatives should produce cost savings; and (10) however, in controlling program spending, attention should be given to targeting federal funds appropriately and ensuring that added program flexibility is accompanied by effective federal monitoring and oversight. |
gao_GGD-95-137 | gao_GGD-95-137_0 | IRS’ routine collection process can involve three stages, and taxpayers may enter into an installment agreement during any stage. IRS made these changes to the installment agreement program to (1) improve voluntary compliance by emphasizing to taxpayers that installment payments are an option available to them to pay their tax debts if full payments cannot be made on time; (2) expedite the IRS collection process by bringing more delinquent accounts into a current status sooner, thereby increasing collections on such accounts in the form of installment payments; and (3) enhance its “one-stop service” concept by allowing staff in all functions with taxpayer contact to approve agreements. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the increase in installment agreements following changes IRS made in April 1992; (2) the effects these changes had on IRS’ collection activity; (3) concerns raised by IRS’ internal auditors regarding these changes; and (4) administrative aspects of the program, such as the information IRS provides taxpayers regarding installment agreements, and opportunities for improvement. In doing so, IRS contacted 87 taxpayers who were granted pre-assessed installment agreements and found that 39 percent had not adjusted their withholding or estimated payments to avoid owing money on successive tax returns. According to IRS data, pre-assessed installment agreements accounted for almost 31 percent of the 2.6 million new agreements in fiscal year 1994. Conclusions
Since 1991, taxpayer use of installment agreements has grown considerably, and installment agreements have accounted for a growing portion of IRS’ collection activity. The auditors also raised concerns about the ease with which taxpayers could accumulate additional tax debt by adding new income tax liabilities to existing agreements. IRS has acted to address the internal auditors’ concerns. Recommendations
To improve the information provided to taxpayers and the administration of the installment agreement program, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue notify taxpayers about projected total costs and payoff periods when setting up agreements with taxpayers and when mailing monthly reminder notices, experiment with Form 9465 to test whether having space for taxpayers to authorize direct debit installment payments increases the frequency with which this option is used, and send agreement default notices to taxpayers by regular mail instead of certified mail unless an account is being referred for levy action. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Installment Agreement Program, focusing on the: (1) increase in installment agreements since IRS streamlined the processing and approval of taxpayers' requests for installment agreements; (2) effects these changes had on IRS collection activities; (3) internal auditors' concerns regarding these changes; (4) information that IRS provides taxpayers on their liabilities under installment agreements; and (5) administrative practices that could improve the installment agreement program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 2.6 million new installment agreements approved in fiscal year (FY) 1994 represented a 136-percent increase over the number of FY 1991 installment agreements; (2) the amount of taxes paid through new installment agreements increased 135 percent between FY 1991 and 1994 and accounted for 33 percent of the delinquent taxes paid in FY 1994; (3) installment agreement program changes have affected IRS collection activities by reducing Automated Collection System collections and the routine collection process workload; (4) IRS internal auditors have raised concerns about the ease of entering into installment agreements and IRS failure to instruct taxpayers to amend their withholding or estimated taxes to prevent future delinquencies; (5) IRS may be permitting financially capable taxpayers to avoid paying their tax debts in one on-time payment and to accumulate tax debts by adding new tax balances to existing agreements; (6) IRS is taking steps to reduce the problems the auditors identified; and (7) administrative changes to improve the installment agreement program and reduce costs include informing taxpayers of the applicable penalties and interest that will be added to their installment agreements, allowing taxpayers to make electronic direct debit payments, and sending some default notices by regular mail instead of certified mail. |
gao_HEHS-95-61 | gao_HEHS-95-61_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the amount of funding needed to improve inadequate facilities and the overall physical condition and prevalence of schools that need major repairs, we surveyed a national sample of schools and augmented the survey with visits to selected school districts. We asked about (1) the physical condition of buildings and major building features, such as roofs; framing, floors, and foundations; exterior walls and interior finishes; plumbing; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC); and electric power; (2) the status of environmental conditions, such as lighting, heating, and ventilation; (3) the amount districts and schools had spent in the last 3 years or plan to spend in the next 3 years due to federal mandates that require managing or correcting hazardous materials problems and providing access to all programs for all students; and (4) an estimate of the total cost of needed repairs, renovations, and modernizations to put all buildings in good overall condition. Our analyses are based on responses from 78 percent of the schools sampled. Principal Findings
Schools Report Needing Billions to Improve Facilities
On the basis of our survey results, we estimate that the nation’s schools need $112 billion to complete all repairs, renovations, and modernizations required to restore facilities to good overall condition and to comply with federal mandates. Almost two-thirds of the schools reported needing $11 billion—an average of $.2 million per school—to comply with federal mandates over the next 3 years. Two-Thirds of Schools Adequate but Millions of Students Must Attend Other One-Third
School officials reported that two-thirds of the nation’s schools are in adequate (or better) condition, at most needing only some preventive maintenance or corrective repair. However, about 14 million students must attend the remaining one-third (25,000 schools), in which at least one building is in need of extensive repair or replacement. 6.) this district? 1. 5. 7. Circle one. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the condition of the nation's school buildings, focusing on the: (1) amount of funding public elementary and secondary schools need to improve inadequate facilities; and (2) overall condition and prevalence of schools that need major repairs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) based on a national sample, the nation's schools need an estimated $112 billion to repair or upgrade their facilities to good condition; (2) two-thirds of the schools need $11 billion over the next 3 years to comply with federal mandates to make all programs accessible to all students, to remove hazardous substances, and to meet other requirements; (3) schools also need to comply with state and local health and sanitation codes, safety standards, and building codes; (4) two-thirds of the schools are in adequate or better condition and need only preventive maintenance or corrective repair; (5) about 14 million students nationwide attend the remaining one-third of schools that need extensive repair; (6) almost 60 percent of the nation's schools reported problems with at least one major building feature and about one-half of the schools have at least one unsatisfactory environmental condition such as poor ventilation or poor physical security; and (7) the major factors that contribute to inadequate school facilities include school districts' decisions to defer vital maintenance and repair expenditures because of funding constraints, unfunded federal and state mandates, and shifting population patterns. |
gao_GAO-05-420 | gao_GAO-05-420_0 | Most of the initiatives do not have direct appropriations but rely instead on a variety of alternative funding strategies. Table 1 summarizes the funding strategies employed by the 25 OMB-sponsored e-gov initiatives in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Although Agencies Generally Contributed Amounts as Planned, Shortfalls Nevertheless Occurred
For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, agencies generally made funding contributions in the amounts originally planned by the managing partners of the 10 initiatives that relied on funding contributions. Although most contributions were made in the amounts planned, 6 of the 10 initiatives experienced funding shortfalls from their planned budgets in fiscal year 2003, and 9 experienced shortfalls in fiscal year 2004. The rationale provided by agencies for contributions that were less than planned included (1) substitution of in-kind resources in lieu of funds, (2) lack of budget guidance from OMB reflecting the original planned amounts, (3) inability to obtain congressional approval to reprogram funds from other accounts, and (4) organizational realignments associated with creation of DHS in fiscal year 2003. The e-Rulemaking initiative, managed by EPA, received only $5,850,208 (51 percent) of its planned fiscal year 2004 budget of $11,505,000 in partner agency contributions. In providing a rationale for contributions made late in the fiscal year, officials from both managing and funding partner agencies reported that the administrative burden associated with drafting, negotiating, and signing interagency agreements, as well as the timing of appropriations bill enactment, contributed to these delays. Officials from 5 of the 10 initiatives that relied on funding contributions from partner agencies specifically cited the administrative burden as a factor in interagency agreements being reached in the third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were, for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, to (1) determine whether federal agencies made contributions in the amounts planned to the 10 e-gov initiatives that relied on such contributions, and (2) determine the timing of these contributions and reasons for any contributions made late in each fiscal year. E-Rulemaking officials reported that the resulting shortfall in funds, compounded with delays in receiving funds from other agencies, required them to scale back agency migration to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), the centerpiece of the initiative. According to OMB officials, the planned allocation for GovBenefits was erroneously not included in its annual budget guidance to DHS. | Why GAO Did This Study
In accordance with the President's Management Agenda, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has sponsored initiatives to promote electronic government--the use of information technology, such as Web-based Internet applications, to enhance government services. Generally, these "e-gov" initiatives do not have direct appropriations but depend on a variety of funding sources, including monetary contributions from participating agencies. GAO was asked to review the funding of e-gov initiatives that relied on such contributions: specifically, to determine, for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, whether agencies made contributions in the amounts planned and to determine the timing of these contributions.
What GAO Found
Most federal agencies contributed funds as originally planned by the managing partners of the 10 initiatives that relied on such contributions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Nevertheless, 6 of the 10 initiatives experienced shortfalls from their funding plans in fiscal year 2003 and 9 in 2004. The rationale provided by agencies for contributions that were less than planned included: (1) substitution of in-kind resources in lieu of funds, (2) lack of budget guidance from OMB reflecting planned funding amounts, (3) inability to obtain permission to reprogram funds from other accounts, and (4) organizational realignments associated with creation of the Department of Homeland Security in fiscal year 2003. For example, the e-Rulemaking initiative (managed by the Environmental Protection Agency) received only 51 percent of its planned fiscal year 2004 contributions. Although the initiative's funding plan called for adding new funding partners in that year, OMB did not reflect this expansion when it issued its annual budget guidance to agencies. As a result, the newly added agencies generally did not contribute. According to E-Rulemaking officials, the resulting shortfall in funds, along with delays in receiving funds from other agencies, required them to significantly scale back their plans. In most cases, fiscal year 2003 and 2004 contributions from partner agencies were made in the third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. Agency officials identified the administrative burden associated with drafting, negotiating, and signing interagency agreements, as well as the delayed enactment of the fiscal year 2003-2004 appropriations bills, as contributing to this timing of contributions. However, according to officials from several agencies, although the administrative burden is still high, agencies have become more accustomed to funding strategies based on partner agency contributions. |
gao_GAO-15-277T | gao_GAO-15-277T_0 | OPM Has a Long History of Unsuccessful Efforts to Modernize Retirement Processing
Recognizing the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its retirement claims processing, OPM has undertaken a number of initiatives since 1987 that were aimed at modernizing its paper-intensive processes and antiquated systems. In mid-1996, OPM terminated the program. OPM’s Efforts to Modernize Retirement Processing Have Been Plagued by IT Management Weaknesses
Our prior reports noted that OPM’s efforts to modernize its retirement system were hindered by weaknesses in key IT management disciplines. For example, in reporting on RSM in February 2005, we noted weaknesses in project management, risk management, and organizational change management. We reported again on OPM’s retirement modernization in January 2008, as the agency was about to deploy a new automated retirement processing system.management capabilities, including system testing, cost estimating, and progress reporting. In April 2009, we again reported on OPM’s retirement modernization, noting that the agency still remained far from achieving the modernized Specifically, we retirement processing capabilities that it had planned.noted that significant weaknesses continued to exist in the areas of cost estimating, progress reporting, and testing, while also noting two additional weaknesses related to planning and oversight. However, meeting minutes indicated that no discussion or action was taken to address these problems. OPM Plans to Acquire New Technology to Improve Retirement Processing
OPM’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2014-2018 includes a strategic goal to “Ensure that Federal retirees receive timely, appropriate, transparent, seamless, and accurate retirement benefits.” To achieve this goal, the agency has set forth a strategy to improve the retirement claims processing system by, among other things, investing in information technology solutions, such as the acquisition of a case management system. In addition, the agency’s February 2014 Strategic Information Technology Plan articulated OPM’s vision of “transitioning the retirement program to a paperless system that will truly honor a Federal employee’s service by authorizing accurate retirement benefits on the day they are due, answering customers’ questions in a timely manner, and promoting self-service account maintenance.” The plan also reiterated the agency’s intention to acquire a new case management system. Beyond acquisition of the case management system, the strategic IT plan also describes other initiatives that are intended to incrementally improve retirement claims processing. Our experience has shown that challenges, such as those that have plagued the agency’s past efforts, can successfully be overcome through using a more disciplined approach to IT acquisition management. To help federal agencies, such as OPM, address the acquisition challenges that they face, in 2011, we reported on nine common factors critical to the success of IT acquisitions. The factors most commonly identified include active engagement of stakeholders, program staff with the necessary knowledge and skills, and senior department and agency executive support for the program. These nine critical success factors are consistent with leading industry practices for IT acquisitions. Finally, officials for five of the seven selected investments identified having the end users test and validate the system components prior to formal end user acceptance testing for deployment as critical to the success of their program. Testing of functionality by end users Use of the critical success factors described above can serve as a model of best practices for all agencies as they plan and conduct their own IT acquisitions. For over two decades, the agency’s retirement modernization efforts were plagued by weaknesses in management capabilities that are critical to the success of such endeavors. Applying the information technology best practices we have identified to OPM’s acquisition of a new case management system could help the agency overcome its long history of unsuccessful retirement modernization efforts. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The use of IT is integral to OPM's ability to carry out its responsibilities in modernizing federal employee retirement claims processing. Since 1987, the agency has undertaken a number of initiatives that were aimed at modernizing its paper-intensive processes and antiquated systems, but that were unsuccessful.
GAO was asked to summarize findings from its previous reports on the challenges that OPM has faced in modernizing its retirement claims processing systems. The testimony also summarizes the agency's current plans to acquire new technology to improve the retirement process and key IT acquisition best practices that could serve as critical factors in the agency's successful accomplishment of its latest modernization efforts.
The information in this testimony is primarily based on GAO's previous work at OPM. GAO also reviewed the agency's plans and related information discussing current efforts to improve retirement processing systems. Additionally, the testimony highlights findings from GAO's previous report on critical success factors for major IT acquisitions. Work in support of this testimony was performed during November and December 2014.
What GAO Found
In a series of reviews, GAO found that the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) efforts over two decades to modernize its processing of federal employee retirement applications were fraught with information technology (IT) management weaknesses. Specifically, in 2005, GAO made recommendations to address weaknesses in project, risk, and organizational change management. In 2008, as OPM was on the verge of deploying an automated retirement processing system, GAO reported deficiencies in, and made recommendations to address, additional weaknesses in system testing, cost estimating, and progress reporting. In 2009, GAO reported that OPM continued to have deficiencies in its cost estimating, progress reporting, and testing practices and made recommendations to address these and other weaknesses in the planning and oversight of the agency's modernization effort. OPM began to address these recommendations; however, in February 2011, it terminated the modernization effort.
OPM's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2014-2018 includes a goal to deliver retirement benefits to employees accurately, seamlessly, and on time. To achieve this goal, the agency has plans to acquire a new case management system and, ultimately, to transition to a paperless system that will authorize accurate retirement benefits on the day they are due. In addition, the agency plans other initiatives that are intended to incrementally improve retirement claims processing.
GAO has previously reported that its experience at other agencies has demonstrated that successfully overcoming challenges, such as those that have plagued OPM's past efforts, can best be achieved when critical success factors are applied. Nine common factors critical to the success of IT acquisitions are
Active engagement of senior officials with stakeholders.
Qualified and experienced program staff.
Support of senior department and agency executives.
Involvement of end users and stakeholders in the development of requirements.
Participation of end users in testing system functionality prior to formal end user acceptance testing.
Consistency and stability of government and contractor staff.
Prioritization of requirements by program staff.
Regular communication maintained between program officials and the prime contractor.
Sufficient funding.
These critical success factors can serve as a model of best practices that OPM could apply to enhance the likelihood that the incremental IT investments the agency now plans, including the acquisition of a new case management system, will be successfully achieved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations at this time. GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to address IT management challenges that OPM has faced in carrying out its retirement modernization efforts. Fully addressing these challenges remains key to the success of OPM's efforts. |
gao_GAO-17-349 | gao_GAO-17-349_0 | There are 168 VA medical centers. In fiscal year 2015, VA obligated about $10.1 billion to purchase care from non-VA providers. 3. Facility Alignment Is Affected by Shifts in Veteran Population and Care Delivery, and an Aging Infrastructure
Long-standing factors, such as shifts in the veteran population and the delivery of care, as well as an aging infrastructure affect VA’s efforts to fully align its real property portfolio with the veteran population. This shift in the utilization of inpatient to outpatient services will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatients, as a majority of VA medical facilities were originally designed for the delivery of inpatient care. Planning officials at five of the seven medical facilities in our review told us it is often difficult and costly to modernize, renovate, and retrofit older facilities—including converting inpatient facilities into outpatient facilities. Limitations in the Capital-Planning Processes Impede VA’s Alignment of Facilities with Veterans’ Needs
VA’s SCIP Has Limitations
SCIP has several limitations in the scoring and approval process, time frames, and access to information that can limit its utility to effectively facilitate the alignment of facilities with veterans’ needs. According to federal standards for internal control, agencies should identify quality information and ensure that it is accessible. Specifically, in 2015, the Independent Assessment found that SCIP’s scoring and approval processes and time frames, among other things, undermined VA’s capital-planning and prioritization process. Not addressing important, known limitations runs counter to federal standards for internal control, which note that agencies should evaluate and determine appropriate corrective action for identified limitations and deficiencies on a timely basis. VAIP Facility Master Plans Have Limited Usefulness Because They Do Not Adequately Consider Care in the Community, among Other Weaknesses
VA’s ongoing VAIP Process (estimated by VA officials to cost $108 million upon completion) was designed to provide a more strategic vision for aligning VA’s medical facilities and services with veterans’ needs. However, the facility master-planning process has several limitations, including that it assumes that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, including the status quo and purchasing care from the community. Long- term costs for capital assets are particularly relevant for VA as its data project that the number of enrolled veterans will begin to fall after 2024. Officials who oversee the VAIP Process told us that the facility master plans’ lack of analyses regarding care in the community was because they were awaiting further guidance from VA on the proportion of care and types of services to obtain from the community versus in VA facilities. The limitations of the VAIP Process’s facility master plans reduce its utility for the VA’s planning officials to the point where some local officials said that they do not use VAIP results and planning officials from five of the seven medical facilities in our review told us that they already contract for their own facility master plans, separate from VAIP. Local Approaches to Stakeholder Involvement Vary due to a Lack of VA Guidance
VA Has Not Consistently Integrated Stakeholders into Facility Alignment Decisions
VA does not always include stakeholders in facility alignment decisions that affect veterans’ health care. We also found that when stakeholders were not always engaged consistently with best practices, VA’s facility alignment efforts were challenged by external stakeholders. VA Lacks Guidance That Incorporates the Best Practice of Fully Engaging Stakeholders and Does Not Evaluate Communication Efforts
VA does not provide officials at VISNs and medical facilities with guidance that incorporates best practices on fully engaging both internal and external stakeholders about facility alignment decisions, or evaluate the effectiveness of local stakeholder engagement efforts. In addition, VA officials stated that they do not monitor and evaluate their communication methods for best practices or for the methods’ effectiveness in reaching their intended audiences. Also, VA does not have a process for monitoring and evaluating its communication methods, which runs counter to federal standards for internal control. Recommendations for Executive Action and Our Evaluation
To improve VA’s ability to plan for and facilitate the alignment of its facilities with veteran needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the appropriate offices and administrations to take the following four actions: 1. 2. Develop and implement a mechanism to evaluate VISN and facility communication efforts with stakeholders to ensure that these communication efforts are working as intended and align with guidance and best practices. VA partially concurred with our first recommendation. VA fully concurred with the other three recommendations and outlined a plan to implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the largest health care systems in the United States, with 168 VA medical centers and more than 1,000 outpatient facilities. Many of these facilities are underutilized and outdated. A previous effort aimed at modernizing and better aligning facilities was not fully implemented.
GAO was asked to review the current alignment of VA medical facilities with veterans' needs. This report examines: (1) the factors that affect VA facility alignment with veterans' needs, (2) the extent to which VA's capital-planning process facilitates the alignment of facilities with the veteran population, and (3) the extent to which VA has followed best practices by integrating stakeholders in facility alignment decisions. GAO reviewed VA's facility- planning documents and data, and interviewed VA officials in headquarters and at seven medical facilities selected for their geographic location, population, and past alignment efforts. GAO also evaluated VA's actions against federal standards for internal control and best practices for capital planning.
What GAO Found
Geographic shifts in the veteran population, changes in health care delivery, and an aging infrastructure affect the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. For example, a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care. In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit existing facilities given the challenges associated with these older facilities.
VA relies on the Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) process to plan and prioritize capital projects, but SCIP's limitations—including subjective narratives, long time frames, and restricted access to information—undermine VA's ability to achieve its goals. Although VA acknowledges many of these limitations, it has taken little action in response. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should evaluate and determine appropriate corrective action for identified limitations on a timely basis. Without doing so, VA lacks reasonable assurance that its facility-alignment reflects veterans' needs.
A separate planning process—VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)—was designed to supplement SCIP and to provide planners with a more strategic vision for their medical facilities through the creation of facility master plans. However, GAO found limitations with this ongoing effort, which VA estimated to cost $108 million. Specifically, the facility master plans assume that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, such as purchasing care from the community. However, VA's use of care in the community has increased to an obligated $10.1 billion in fiscal year 2015. Federal capital-acquisition guidance identifies inefficient spending as a risk of not considering other options for delivering services. This consideration is particularly relevant as VA's data project that the number of enrolled veterans will begin to fall after 2024. Officials who oversee the VAIP process said that they were awaiting further analyses required by recently released VA guidance on the proportion of care and types of services to obtain from the community. As a result of this and other limitations, some local VA officials said that they make little use of the VAIP facility master plans and contract for their own facility master plans outside the VAIP process.
Although VA instructs local VA officials to communicate with stakeholders, its guidance is not detailed enough to conform to best practices. VA has not consistently followed best practices for effectively engaging stakeholders in facility consolidation efforts—such as in utilizing two-way communication early in the process and using data to demonstrate the rationale for facility alignment decisions. GAO found that when stakeholders were not always engaged consistently with best practices, VA's efforts to align facilities with veterans' needs were challenged. Also, VA officials said that they do not monitor or evaluate these communications efforts and, therefore, have little assurance that the methods used effectively disseminate information to stakeholders. This approach runs counter to federal standards for internal control, which instruct agencies to monitor and evaluate activities, such as communications methods.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made four recommendations, including that: VA improve SCIP's scoring and approval process among other limitations and discontinue or improve the utility of the VAIP facility master plans, and improve guidance to effectively communicate facility alignment decisions with stakeholders and to evaluate these efforts. VA partially concurred with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the other recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations are sound, as described in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-658 | gao_GAO-09-658_0 | We also met with Federal Reserve officials to discuss the stress test methodology and results for the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies and reviewed related documents relevant to the Capital Assistance Program (CAP). 1). According to a Treasury official, as of June 12, 2009, Treasury has not yet liquidated any CPP warrants in the financial markets. This survey will continue on a monthly basis going forward. These decisions raise a number of potential concerns. The items published are similar to those already in use to evaluate repurchase requests that had been received from smaller bank holding companies, and include the following considerations the bank holding company’s ability to continue to act as an intermediary and spur lending to creditworthy households and businesses, whether the bank holding company’s post-repurchase capital position is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s supervisory expectations, whether the bank holding company will maintain its financial and management support for its subsidiary banks subsequent to repurchase, and whether the bank holding company and subsidiaries are in a position to meet all of their funding and counterparty obligations without government capital or utilization of the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. A public announcement of the selections will be made in June 2009. Treasury also noted that its Financial Stability Plan provided the basis for its improved communication strategy. 3). Treasury has made progress in developing a more routine process for hiring OFS staff. The extent to which the institutions will disclose additional information is unclear. Moreover, the Federal Reserve did not provide OFS staff with information about SCAP prior to its public release and has no plans to share ongoing information about any of the SCAP institutions that continue to be CPP or CAP participants. Treasury has recognized the importance of reaching out to congressional stakeholders on a regular and proactive basis and planned to do more to ensure that all committees of jurisdiction receive regular communication about TARP. However, until this strategy is fully implemented, congressional stakeholders may not receive information in a consistent or timely manner. In addition, although Treasury has said that the new www.financialstability.gov Web site is a key component of its efforts to improve communication on TARP, it has not yet taken steps to determine whether the site is user-friendly or whether visitors to the site are finding the information they seek. However, continued attention to hiring remains important because some offices within OFS, such as the offices of Homeownership and Risk and Compliance, continue to have a number of vacancies that need to be filled as TARP programs become fully implemented. Treasury has continued to build a network of contractors and financial agents to support TARP administration and operations and has an opportunity to enhance transparency through its existing reporting mechanisms. Useful details are still lacking, however, on the costs of procurement contracts and financial agency agreements, such as a breakdown obligated and expenses for each entity. These contracts and agreements are key tools OFS has used to help develop and administer its TARP programs. By not providing this information, Treasury is missing an opportunity to provide additional transparency about the cost of TARP operations. Finally, to help improve the transparency of CAP—in particular the stress tests results—we recommend that the Director of Supervision and Regulation of the Federal Reserve consider periodically disclosing to the public the aggregate performance of the 19 bank holding companies against the more adverse scenario forecast numbers for the duration of the 2-year forecast period and whether or not the scenario needs to be revised. Appendix V: Synopsis of Citigroup’s Financial Condition
Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup) is one of the few institutions that has participated in multiple Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's fifth report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) follows up on prior recommendations. It also reviews (1) activities that had been initiated or completed under TARP as of June 12, 2009; (2) the Department of the Treasury's Office of Financial Stability's (OFS) hiring efforts and use of contractors; and (3) TARP performance indicators. To do this, GAO reviewed signed agreements and other relevant documentation and met with officials from OFS, contractors, and financial regulators.
What GAO Found
Treasury continued to operationalize its more recent programs, including the Capital Assistance Program (CAP). As part of this program, the Federal Reserve led the stress tests of the largest 19 U.S. bank holding companies, which revealed that about half needed to raise additional capital to keep them strongly capitalized and lending even if economic conditions worsen. Whether any of the institutions will have to participate in CAP has yet to be determined. While the Federal Reserve disclosed the stress test results, it has no plans to disclose information about the 19 institutions going forward. What information, if any, is disclosed will be left to the discretion of the affected institutions raising a number of concerns including potentially inconsistent or only selected information being disclosed. Moreover, the Federal Reserve had not developed a mechanism to share information with OFS about the ongoing condition of the 19 bank holding companies that continue to participate in TARP programs. According to Treasury, its Financial Stability Plan has provided a basis for its communication strategy. Treasury plans to more regularly communicate with congressional committees of jurisdiction about TARP. However, until this strategy is fully implemented, all congressional stakeholders will not be receiving information in a consistent or timely manner. A key component of the communication strategy is the new www.financialstability.gov Web site. While a goal of the new site is to provide the public with a more user friendly format, Treasury has not yet measured the public's satisfaction with the site. OFS has made progress in establishing its management infrastructure. Continued attention to hiring remains important because some offices within OFS, including the Office of the Chief Risk and Compliance Officer, continue to have a number of vacancies that will need to be filled as TARP programs are fully implemented. Treasury has also continued to build a network of contractors and financial agents to support TARP administration and operations. These contracts and agreements are key tools OFS has used to help develop and administer its TARP programs. Treasury has provided information to the public on procurement contracts and financial agency agreements, but has not included a breakdown of cost data by each entity. As a result, Treasury is missing an opportunity to provide additional transparency about TARP operations. |
gao_GAO-14-31 | gao_GAO-14-31_0 | Yet, characteristics of federal programs in Puerto Rico may differ from the states for other reasons. Persistent deficits have resulted in an increase in Puerto Rico’s public debt, which represents a much larger share of personal income than in any of the states. For 3 other programs, while the programs themselves would likely not change under statehood, eligibility determinations for these programs could be affected indirectly by changes that could occur to benefits in other programs. Statehood would not likely affect the 15 remaining programs. The extent to which federal spending would change for some of the programs that would be affected by Puerto Rico statehood depends on various assumptions, such as which program eligibility options Puerto Rico might select, and the rates at which eligible residents might participate in the programs. For example, for the four largest programs for which federal spending would be likely to change under statehood— Medicare, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI—and for the ninth largest program for which federal spending would be likely to change—CHIP—GAO used various assumptions to estimate a range of federal spending. Potential Changes to Selected Federal Revenue Sources under Puerto Rico Statehood
All the federal revenue sources we reviewed could be affected if Puerto Rico became a state. As with our review of programs, we assumed that if Puerto Rico becomes a state, it would be treated as such for purposes of revenue collection. For example, under statehood, Puerto Rico residents would be subject to federal tax on all their income: currently they are subject to federal tax only on income from sources outside of Puerto Rico. For example, for the two largest revenue sources that would be affected substantially by statehood—individual and corporate income taxes—we used various assumptions to estimate a range of federal revenue. The estimate ranges are based on Puerto Rico being treated the same as the states in either 2009 or 2010, based on the year for which the most recent data were available. For example, the low end of the estimate range shown in figure 6 below is based on lower-bound assumptions for applicable corporate income tax rates, upper-bound assumptions for the extent of U.S. ownership of Puerto Rico businesses, and the assumption that U.S. corporations would have used prior-year losses of affiliated Puerto Rico corporations to offset their federal taxable income to the maximum extent. The estimates for corporate income tax in figure 6 do not take into account any changes in behavior of businesses with activities in Puerto Rico. For example, according to tax policy experts at the Department of the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation, changes in federal income tax requirements under Puerto Rico statehood are likely to motivate some corporations with substantial amounts of income derived from intangible (and therefore mobile) assets to relocate from Puerto Rico to a lower tax foreign location. The extent to which such corporations might relocate from Puerto Rico is unknown. Consequently, we produced an alternative set of corporate income tax revenue estimates to account for some businesses with activities in Puerto Rico potentially relocating under statehood. Accounting for this assumption, in conjunction with the other assumptions described previously, resulted in an estimated range of corporate income tax revenue of -$0.1 billion to $3.4 billion. Factors under Statehood that Could Influence Changes in Federal Spending and Revenue
Statehood could result in dynamic economic and fiscal changes for Puerto Rico, changes that could ultimately impact the level of federal spending in Puerto Rico, and the revenue collected from residents of, and corporations in, Puerto Rico. However, the precise nature of how such changes would affect federal spending and revenue is uncertain. Because statehood would cause numerous adjustments important to Puerto Rico’s future, it would require careful consideration by Congress and the residents of Puerto Rico. Consequently, statehood’s aggregate fiscal impact would be influenced greatly by the terms of admission, strategies to promote economic development, and decisions regarding Puerto Rico’s revenue structure. Likewise, Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate has been relatively high, and its labor force participation rate has been relatively low, compared to those of the states. Recently, Puerto Rico has taken steps to improve its fiscal position, including reducing the size of its government workforce and reforming its primary public employee retirement system. However, in February 2014, Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds were downgraded to speculative—noninvestment— grade by three ratings agencies, in part because of concerns about Puerto Rico’s fiscal position. Effect of a Statehood Transition Period
Under statehood, certain federal programs in Puerto Rico could change substantially if Puerto Rico were treated the same as the states. In response to our estimate for corporate income tax revenue, the Governor noted that to counter the effect of increased taxes on Puerto Rico businesses upon the imposition of federal taxes, our draft report suggested that Puerto Rico would reduce its corporate tax rate to 3.8 percent to be on par with the average corporate tax rate in the states (state taxes are deductable against corporate income for federal tax purposes). Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to evaluate (1) potential changes to selected federal programs and related changes in federal spending, and (2) potential changes in selected sources of federal revenue, should Puerto Rico become a state. The 29 programs we selected to review accounted for about 86 percent of spending in fiscal year 2010 on federal programs that generally provide funds directly to states and territories, or to residents and institutions in the states and territories. We developed estimate ranges of the potential changes in federal spending for the four largest programs that would be likely to change under statehood: Medicare, Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). We developed estimate ranges for a single year in the past, as if Puerto Rico had been treated the same as the states in that year. Actual spending in Puerto Rico, to which we compare the estimates, is in fiscal-year terms because the spending data were reported in fiscal-year terms. This office updates and publishes the annual federal poverty guidelines.participation in federal programs, such as SSI, for which Puerto Rico residents would become eligible under statehood. Potential Changes to Selected Sources of Federal Revenue
To evaluate potential changes to selected sources of federal revenue under Puerto Rico statehood, we reviewed federal laws and regulations related to the main sources of federal revenue in 2012—individual income tax (which accounted for 46.2 percent of federal revenue in 2012), employment tax (34.5 percent), corporate income tax (9.9 percent), excise tax (3.2 percent), customs duties (1.2 percent), and estate and gift taxes (0.6 percent). We used the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM program—which models U.S. federal and state income tax systems—to estimate the aggregate federal income tax liability for 2010, as if each Puerto Rico individual income tax filer had filed a U.S. individual tax return per U.S. tax law as of January 2, 2013.payments in excess of tax liability for the three largest refundable tax credits: the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC), child tax credit We also estimated (CTC), and earned income tax credit (EITC).accounted for 94 percent of obligations from refundable credits in fiscal year 2012. Puerto Rico allows a credit for taxes paid to the United States, its possessions, and foreign countries. According to officials from Puerto Rico’s Department of Internal Revenue, most of these taxes would have been paid to the United States. In addition, we did not have data for the amount of state and local income taxes that the filing entities would have paid in Puerto Rico if it had been a state. In the first year of statehood, when Puerto Rico subsidiaries of U.S. corporations first become subject to federal tax and are consolidated into their parent corporations’ tax returns, large portions of their losses could be used to offset the taxable income reported on those returns, leaving only smaller amounts (or newly generated losses) available to offset income in subsequent years. Factors That Could Affect Federal Spending and Revenue
To identify factors under statehood that could influence changes in federal spending and revenues, we reviewed economic data from the Puerto Rico government and reports on the Puerto Rico economy, such as those from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Congressional Budget Office. We also interviewed officials from the current and past Puerto Rico government administrations and Puerto Rico business associations representing large economic sectors in Puerto Rico to obtain their views on the potential impacts of statehood on Puerto Rico’s economy and public finances. This provision is estimated to provide an additional $10.7 billion in Medicare funding from fiscal years 2010 to 2019. Puerto Rico is not eligible for this enhanced federal match. Since Puerto Rico does not qualify for a DSH allotment as a territory, there is no direct effect from this provision on actual federal spending in Puerto Rico. | Why GAO Did This Study
Puerto Rico has access to many federal programs, and is subject to certain federal tax laws; however, for some programs and for some aspects of tax law, Puerto Rico is treated differently than the states. Options for Puerto Rico's political status include statehood.
GAO was asked to review potential fiscal implications for federal programs if Puerto Rico were to become a state. This report examines potential changes to selected federal programs and related spending changes, and changes to selected federal revenue sources that would be expected should Puerto Rico become a state. This report also discusses economic and fiscal factors under statehood that could influence changes in spending and revenues.
To evaluate potential changes to selected federal programs and revenue sources, GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations and interviewed federal and Puerto Rico agency officials. To discuss factors that could influence changes in spending and revenue, GAO reviewed economic data from Puerto Rico's government and interviewed officials from the current and past Puerto Rico government administrations.
What GAO Found
Of the 29 federal programs GAO reviewed (which accounted for about 86 percent of federal program spending for states or their residents in fiscal year 2010), statehood would likely affect 11 programs. For 3 other programs, while the programs themselves would likely not change under statehood, eligibility determinations for these programs could be affected indirectly by changes that could occur to benefits in other programs. Statehood would not likely affect the 15 remaining programs. See figure below.
The extent to which federal spending would change for some of the programs affected by Puerto Rico statehood depends on various assumptions: these assumptions include the program eligibility options Puerto Rico might select or the rates at which eligible residents might participate in the programs. For example, for the four largest programs for which federal spending likely would change under statehood—Medicare, Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—GAO used various assumptions to estimate the range of potential effects on federal program spending. The estimated ranges for the four programs, as described below, are based on Puerto Rico being treated the same as the states in either 2010 or 2011, based on the year for which GAO had the most recent data.
Medicare: In fiscal year 2010, actual federal Medicare spending in Puerto Rico was $4.5 billion; if Puerto Rico had been a state in calendar year 2010, estimated federal spending would have ranged from $4.5 billion to $6.0 billion. The Medicare estimates take into account certain changes under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act occurring after 2010 that would reduce spending. Also, the Medicare estimates depend on the estimates for Medicaid, as some individuals are eligible for both programs.
Medicaid: In fiscal year 2011, actual federal Medicaid spending in Puerto Rico was $685 million; if Puerto Rico had been a state in calendar year 2011, estimated federal spending would have ranged from $1.1 billion to $2.1 billion. The Medicaid estimates do not take into account the cost of nursing home and home health services in Puerto Rico due to the lack of available cost data, and because Puerto Rico lacks an infrastructure of nursing home facilities, according to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services officials. If these services became available, Medicaid spending would likely increase.
SNAP: In fiscal year 2011, actual federal spending for a similar program in Puerto Rico was $1.9 billion; if Puerto Rico had been a state in calendar year 2011, residents would have been eligible for SNAP, and estimated federal spending would have ranged from $1.7 billion to $2.6 billion. One reason why the low end of the estimate range is less than actual spending is because participants' benefits would be reduced because of benefits received from SSI, for which Puerto Rico residents would newly qualify.
SSI: In fiscal year 2011, actual federal spending for a similar program in Puerto Rico was $24 million; if Puerto Rico had been a state in calendar year 2011, residents would have been eligible for SSI, and estimated federal spending would have ranged from $1.5 billion to $1.8 billion.
All the federal revenue sources GAO reviewed—individual and corporate income taxes, employment tax, excise tax, estate and gift taxes, and customs duties—could be affected if Puerto Rico became a state. For example, under statehood, Puerto Rico residents would be subject to federal tax on all their income: currently, they are subject to federal tax only on income from sources outside of Puerto Rico. Also, some sources of income, such as pension income, are taxed differently in Puerto Rico than in the states. As a result, for 2010, Puerto Rico filers' adjusted gross income for federal tax purposes would have been higher than that for Puerto Rico tax purposes. For some revenue sources, the extent to which federal revenue would change depends on various assumptions. For example, for the two largest revenue sources that would be affected substantially by statehood—individual and corporate income taxes—GAO used various assumptions to estimate a range of federal revenue. The estimate ranges, as described below, are based on Puerto Rico being treated the same as the states in either 2009 or 2010, based on the year for which GAO had the most recent data.
Individual income tax: In 2010, Puerto Rico taxpayers reported paying $20 million to the United States, its possessions, or foreign countries. According to officials from Puerto Rico's Department of Internal Revenue, most of these payments would have been to the United States. If Puerto Rico had been a state in 2010, estimated individual income tax revenue from Puerto Rico taxpayers would have ranged from $2.2 billion to $2.3 billion (after accounting for estimated payments in excess of tax liability from refundable tax credits, such as the earned income tax credit).
Corporate income tax: In 2009, U.S. corporations paid about an estimated $4.3 billion in tax on income from their affiliates in Puerto Rico. Most of this amount was from an unusually large amount of dividends repatriated from Puerto Rico (compared to amounts repatriated in earlier years or in 2010). Absent that spike in dividends, the federal taxes these corporations would have paid for 2009 would have been about $1.4 billion. If Puerto Rico had been a state in 2009, estimated corporate income tax revenue from businesses that filed a Puerto Rico tax return for that year (or their parent corporations in the United States) would have ranged from $5.0 to $9.3 billion. The low end of this range assumes that U.S. corporations would have used prior-year losses of affiliated Puerto Rico corporations to offset their federal taxable income to the maximum extent (leaving only smaller or newly generated losses available to offset income in subsequent years), among other assumptions. However, this range does not take into account any behavioral changes of businesses with activities in Puerto Rico. For example, according to tax policy experts at the Department of the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation, changes in federal income tax requirements under statehood would likely motivate some corporations with substantial amounts of income derived from intangible (and therefore mobile) assets to relocate from Puerto Rico to lower tax foreign locations. The extent to which such corporations might relocate from Puerto Rico is unknown. Consequently, GAO produced an alternative set of revenue estimates to account for some businesses with activities in Puerto Rico potentially relocating under statehood: this range was -$0.1 billion to $3.4 billion. The low end of this range is negative because U.S. corporations would have used their Puerto Rico affiliates' prior-year losses to reduce their taxes to such an extent that they would have more than offset the positive tax amounts that other corporations continuing to operate in Puerto Rico under statehood would have paid.
Puerto Rico faces various economic and fiscal challenges that could potentially impact changes in federal spending and revenue under statehood. For example, its economy largely has been in recession since 2006, and its levels of employment and labor force participation are relatively low, compared to those of the states. Persistent deficits have resulted in an increase in Puerto Rico's public debt, which represents a much larger share of personal income than in any state (and in February 2014, Puerto Rico's general obligation bonds were downgraded to speculative—noninvestment—grade by three ratings agencies). Puerto Rico has taken recent steps to improve its fiscal position, such as reducing its government workforce and reforming its largest public employee retirement system. Changes in federal program spending and to federal tax law under statehood could lead to economic and fiscal changes of their own in Puerto Rico. That may have a cascading effect on federal spending and revenue levels. However, the precise nature of such changes is uncertain. Because statehood would cause numerous adjustments important to Puerto Rico's future, it would require careful consideration by Congress and the residents of Puerto Rico. Consequently, statehood's aggregate fiscal impact would be influenced greatly by the terms of admission, strategies to promote economic development, and decisions regarding Puerto Rico's government revenue structure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. Federal agency and Puerto Rico government officials reviewed GAO's draft report; their comments were incorporated as appropriate.
To view the Spanish translation of this highlights page, please see GAO-14-301 . |
gao_GAO-11-203 | gao_GAO-11-203_0 | For example, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that Congress include the levels of debt implied by the spending and revenue levels in the budget resolution for the next 5 years and allows for specific estimates of the increase in debt subject to the limit. Since 1995, the debt limit has been increased 12 times. The amount potentially provided by the extraordinary actions for a 1-month DISP in fiscal year 2010 was less than the monthly increase in debt subject to the limit for most months of the year. G-Fund growth results from an increase in federal employee retirement funds being invested in Treasury securities. Approaching the Debt Limit Can Add Uncertainty in the Treasury Market
Postponed Auctions and Other Disruptions May Lead to Increased Borrowing Costs
Some of the actions Treasury takes to manage the amount of debt as it approaches the debt limit disrupt the regular and predictable auction schedule that Treasury relies on to promote liquid markets and finance the government’s borrowing needs at the lowest cost over time. Conclusions
The debt limit does not control or limit the ability of the federal government to run deficits or incur obligations. Rather, it is a limit on the ability to pay bills incurred. Debates surrounding the debt limit may raise awareness about the federal government’s current debt trajectory and also provide Congress with an opportunity to debate the fiscal policy decisions driving that trajectory. Failure to raise the debt limit could lead to serious negative consequences in the Treasury market and for the ability of the United States to finance federal debt at the lowest cost over time. So too some of the actions Treasury takes to manage the amount of debt near the debt limit, such as reducing the size of auctions, can compromise the certainty of supply that Treasury relies on to achieve the lowest borrowing cost over time. In addition, managing debt near the debt limit diverts Treasury’s limited resources away from other cash and debt management issues at a time when Treasury already faces significant challenges in lengthening the average maturity of its debt portfolio, which reduces rollover risk and uncertainty about future interest payments. As a result, once debt is at the debt limit, Congress will likely have less time to debate raising the debt limit before there are disruptions to government programs and services and to the Treasury market. Better alignment could be possible if decisions about the debt level occur in conjunction with spending and revenue decisions as opposed to the after-the-fact approach now used. It might also facilitate efforts to change the fiscal path by highlighting the implications of these spending and revenue decisions on debt. To avoid these potential disruptions to the Treasury market and to help inform the fiscal policy debate in a timely way, Congress should consider ways to better link decisions about the debt limit with decisions about spending and revenue. They also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the actions that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has taken to manage debt near the debt limit and challenges that arise, (2) analyze the effects that approaching the debt limit had on the market for Treasury securities, including Treasury’s borrowing costs, and (3) in light of the disconnect between the debt limit and the policy decisions that have an effect on the size of federal debt, describe alternative triggers or mechanisms that would permit consideration of the link between policy decisions and the effect on debt when or before decisions are made. We conducted semistructured interviews with budget and legislative experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has prepared this report to assist Congress in identifying and addressing debt management challenges. Since 1995, the statutory debt limit has been increased 12 times to its current level of $14.294 trillion. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) recently notified Congress that the current debt limit could be reached as early as April 5, 2011, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that under current law debt subject to the limit will exceed $25 trillion in 2021. This report (1) describes the actions that Treasury traditionally takes to manage debt near the limit, (2) analyzes the effects that approaching the debt limit has had on the market for Treasury securities, and (3) describes alternative mechanisms that would permit consideration of the link between policy decisions and the effect on debt when or before decisions are made. GAO analyzed Treasury and market data; interviewed Treasury officials, budget and legislative experts, and market participants; and reviewed practices in selected countries.
What GAO Found
The debt limit does not control or limit the ability of the federal government to run deficits or incur obligations. Rather, it is a limit on the ability to pay obligations already incurred. While debates surrounding the debt limit may raise awareness about the federal government's current debt trajectory and may also provide Congress with an opportunity to debate the fiscal policy decisions driving that trajectory, the ability to have an immediate effect on debt levels is limited. This is because the debt reflects previously enacted tax and spending policies. Delays in raising the debt limit create debt and cash management challenges for the Treasury, and these challenges have been exacerbated in recent years by a large growth in debt. In the past, Treasury has often used extraordinary actions, such as suspending investments or temporarily disinvesting securities held in federal employee retirement funds, to remain under the statutory limit. However, the extraordinary actions available to the Treasury have not kept pace with the growth in borrowing needs. For example, unlike the past, the amount potentially provided by the extraordinary actions for 1 month in fiscal year 2010 was less than the monthly increase in debt subject to the limit for most months of the year. As a result, once debt reaches the limit, Congress will likely have less time than in prior years to debate raising the debt limit before there are disruptions to government programs and services. This trend is likely to continue given the long-term fiscal outlook. Failure to raise the debt limit in a timely manner could have serious negative consequences for the Treasury market and increase borrowing costs. Also, some of the actions that Treasury has taken to manage the amount of debt near the limit add uncertainty to the Treasury market. In the past, Treasury has postponed auctions and dramatically reduced the amount of bills outstanding, which compromised the regularity of auctions and the certainty of supply on which Treasury relies to achieve the lowest borrowing cost over time. GAO's analysis suggests that borrowing costs modestly increased during debt limit debates in 2002, 2003, and most recently in 2010. In addition, managing debt near the debt limit diverts Treasury's limited resources away from other cash and debt management issues at a time when Treasury already faces challenges in lengthening the average maturity of its debt portfolio. Observers and participants suggested improving the link between the spending and revenue decisions that drive debt and changes in the debt limit. Better alignment could be possible if decisions about the debt level occur in conjunction with spending and revenue decisions as opposed to the after-the-fact approach now used. This practice, which is similar to practices used in some other countries, might facilitate efforts to change the fiscal path by highlighting the implications of tax and spending decisions on changes in debt. To avoid potential disruptions to Treasury markets and help inform fiscal policy decisions in a timely way, Congress should consider ways to better link decisions about the debt limit with decisions about spending and revenue. Treasury provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-789T | gao_GAO-04-789T_0 | According to our own analysis of SSA’s data, residency overpayments appear to vary by geographic region, with the majority of overpayments having been detected in several large metropolitan areas. Finally, we determined that most of the overpayments detected during this period were attributable to recipients who were born outside the U.S.
Residency Violations May be More Prevalent than SSA Has Detected
SSA detected an average of about 46,000 recipient residency violations annually between 1997 and 2001, resulting in $118 million in overpayments. Overall, we found that just 15 counties in 5 states—California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York—accounted for 54 percent of all residency overpayments detected by SSA during this period. Reliance on Self- Reported Information and Other Vulnerabilities Have Impeded SSA’s Ability to Detect and Deter Violations
SSA’s ability to detect and deter residency violations has been impeded by three kinds of weaknesses. First, the agency has relied heavily on self- reported information from recipients to determine domestic residency, often without independently verifying such information. Second, SSA has made insufficient use of its existing tools for identifying potential violations, such as its risk analysis system to screen for high-risk cases. Finally, the agency historically has not made adequate use of independent data sources from other federal agencies or private organizations to detect nonresidency of SSI recipients. Our prior work has shown that about 77 percent of all payment errors in the SSI program were attributable to recipients who do not comply with reporting requirements. However, program guidelines do not require field staff to perform any additional verification steps to establish recipients’ residency. Because Medicaid eligibility is often directly tied to SSI eligibility, identifying residency violations may save funds from both programs. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security Administration. Supplemental Security Income: Additional Actions Needed to Reduce Program Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program paid about $36 billion in benefits to about 6.9 million recipients in 2003. In recent years, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has identified a general increase in the amount of annual overpayments made to recipients who are not present in the U.S. as required by SSI program guidelines--a problem we refer as "residency violations." This problem has caused concern among both program administrators and policy makers. As such, GAO was asked to determine what is known about the extent to which SSI benefits are improperly paid to individuals who are not present in the United States and to identify any weaknesses in SSA's processes and policies that impede the agency's ability to detect and deter residency violations.
What GAO Found
Overpayments resulting from residency violations totaled about $118 million between 1997 and 2001. Additionally, the extent of violations appears to vary by geographic region, with overpayments being more prevalent in several large metropolitan areas. GAO found that 54 percent of all overpayments detected by SSA during this period occurred in just 15 counties. In addition, we found that recipients born outside the United States accounted for at least 87 percent of all residency overpayments. SSA's ability to detect and deter residency violations is impeded by three kinds of weaknesses. First, the agency relies heavily on self-reported information from recipients to determine domestic residency, often without independently verifying such information. Second, SSA makes insufficient use of existing tools to detect violations, such as its "risk analysis" system, redeterminations, and home visits. Finally, the agency has not adequately pursued independent sources of information from other federal agencies or private organizations to detect nonresidency of SSI recipients. GAO recognizes that the SSI program is complex to administer, and residency requirements are particularly difficult to enforce because they can necessitate time-consuming, labor-intensive verification checks, such as home visits. However, SSA has not employed a systematic, comprehensive approach to this problem that would allow the agency to use its available systems and procedures more efficiently and reduce the program's exposure to additional violations. |
gao_GAO-02-279 | gao_GAO-02-279_0 | MDS Used to Assess Nursing Home Residents
Since 1991, nursing homes have been required to develop a plan of care for each resident based on the periodic collection of MDS data. In Medicare, these case-mix groups are known as resource utilization groups. As of January 2001, 18 states had introduced such payment systems for their Medicaid programs. Ten of these states’ reviews were in operation as of January 2001. States with Separate MDS Review Programs Emphasize On-Site Oversight, but Also Conduct Off-Site Monitoring
Nine of the 10 states with separate, longer standing MDS accuracy review programs use on-site reviews to test the accuracy of MDS data, generally visiting all or a significant portion of facilities in the state at least annually, if not more frequently. Requiring nursing homes to prepare corrective action plans and imposing financial penalties signal the importance of MDS accuracy to facilities and are tools to improve the accuracy of the MDS data. Recommendations for Executive Action
With the goal of complementing and leveraging the considerable federal and state resources already devoted to nursing home surveys and to separate MDS accuracy review programs, we recommend that the administrator of CMS review the adequacy of current state efforts to ensure the accuracy of MDS data, and provide, where necessary, additional guidance, training, and technical assistance; monitor the adequacy of state MDS accuracy activities on an ongoing basis, such as through the use of the established federal comparative survey process; and provide guidance to state agencies and nursing homes that sufficient evidentiary documentation to support the full MDS assessment be included in residents’ medical records. Without adequate documentation, it is unclear whether the nursing home staff sufficiently observed the resident to determine his or her care needs or merely checked off a box on the assessment form. | What GAO Found
Nursing homes that participate in Medicare and Medicaid must periodically assess the needs of residents in order to develop an appropriate plan of care. Such resident assessments are known as the minimum data set (MDS). According to officials in the 10 states with MDS accuracy review programs in operation as of January 2001, these programs were established to set Medicaid payments and identify quality of care problems. Nine of the 10 states conduct periodic on-site reviews in all or a significant portion of their nursing homes to assess the accuracy of the MDS data. These reviews sample a home's MDS assessments to determine whether the basis for the assessments is adequately documented in residents' medical records. These reviews often include interviews of nursing home personnel familiar with residents and observations of the residents themselves. States with separate MDS review programs identified various approaches to improve MDS accuracy. State officials highlighted the on-site review process itself and provider education activities as their primary approaches. State officials also reported such remedies as requiring nursing homes to prepare a corrective action plan or imposing financial penalties on nursing homes when serious or extensive errors in MDS data are found. Following the 1998 implementation of Medicare's MDS-based payment system, the Health Care Financing Administration began its own review program to ensure the accuracy of MDS data. |
gao_GAO-08-633 | gao_GAO-08-633_0 | Incumbents. Competitors. The High-Cost Program’s Structure Has Contributed to Inconsistent Distribution of Support and Availability of Services across Rural America
The high-cost program provides support to eligible carriers in all states, with higher levels of support going to more rural states. In general, rural carriers receive more support than nonrural carriers. But the high-cost program also indirectly supports broadband service in some rural areas, particularly those areas served by rural carriers. Basic Telephone Service
Currently, the high-cost program provides support for the provision of basic telephone service. While There Is a Clearly Established Purpose for the High- Cost Program, FCC Has Not Established Performance Goals and Measures
In the 1996 Act, the Congress established the principles underlying universal service, which provide a clear purpose for the high-cost program. Additionally, FCC has not developed outcome-based performance measures for the program. While FCC has begun preliminary efforts to address these shortcomings, its efforts do not align with practices GAO and OMB have identified as useful in developing successful performance goals and measures. In the absence of program goals and data pertaining to the program’s performance, the Congress and FCC may be limited in their ability to make informed decisions about the future of the program. In particular, the Congress said that “quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.” Additionally, the Congress said that consumers in all regions of the country, including “those in rural, insular, and high-cost areas” should have access to telecommunications and information services that are “reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas.” These guiding principles provide a clear purpose for the high-cost program. We were unable to identify any performance goals or measures for the high-cost program. Internal Control Mechanisms for the High-Cost Program Are Limited and Hinder FCC’s Ability to Assess the Risk of Noncompliance with Program Rules and Ensure Cost-Effective Use of Program Funds
Internal controls mechanisms for the high-cost program focus on three areas. Yet, each area has weaknesses. The carrier certification process exhibits inconsistency across states and carriers, the carrier audits have been limited in number and types of reported findings, and carrier data validation focuses primarily on completeness and not accuracy. Further, these weaknesses could contribute to excessive program expenditures. Internal Control Mechanisms for the High- Cost Program Exhibit Weaknesses
Internal control mechanisms for the high-cost program focus on three areas: (1) carrier certification, (2) carrier audits, and (3) carrier data validation processes. To respond to this task, FCC modified and expanded the high-cost program. Yet, FCC has not established performance goals or measures for the program. In particular, the report provides information on (1) the effect that the structure of the program has on the levels of support and types of services available in high-cost areas; (2) the extent that the program has performance goals and measures; and (3) the extent that the program has mechanisms in place to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. For the third objective, we conducted a survey of state regulatory commissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), the Congress said that consumers in "rural, insular, and high-cost areas" should have access to services and rates that are "reasonably comparable" to those in urban areas. To implement the 1996 Act, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) modified and expanded the high-cost program. The program provides funding to some telecommunications carriers, facilitating lower telephone rates in rural areas. GAO was asked to review (1) the effect that the program structure has on the level of support and types of services in rural areas, (2) the extent to which FCC has developed performance goals and measures for the program, and (3) the extent to which FCC has implemented internal control mechanisms. GAO reviewed relevant documents; interviewed federal and state officials, industry participants, and experts; conducted 11 state site visits; and conducted a survey of state regulators, available online at GAO-08-662SP .
What GAO Found
The high-cost program's structure has resulted in the inconsistent distribution of support and availability of services across rural America. The program provides support to carriers in all states. However, small carriers receive more support than large carriers. As a result, carriers serving similar rural areas can receive different levels of support. Currently, the high-cost program provides support for the provision of basic telephone service, which is widely available and subscribed to in the nation. But, the program also indirectly supports broadband service, including high-speed Internet, in some rural areas, particularly those areas served by small carriers. The program provides support to both incumbents and competitors; as a result, it creates an incentive for competition to exist where it might not otherwise occur. There is a clearly established purpose for the high-cost program, but FCC has not established performance goals or measures. GAO was unable to identify performance goals or measures for the program. While FCC has begun preliminary efforts to address these shortcomings, the efforts do not align with practices that GAO has identified as useful for developing successful performance goals and measures. For example, FCC has not created performance goals and measures for intermediate and multiyear periods. In the absence of performance goals and measures, the Congress and FCC are limited in their ability to make informed decisions about the future of the high-cost program. While some internal control mechanisms exist for the high-cost program, these mechanisms are limited and exhibit weaknesses that hinder FCC's ability to assess the risk of noncompliance with program rules and ensure cost-effective use of program funds. Internal control mechanisms for the program consist of (1) carrier certification that funds will be used consistent with program rules, (2) carrier audits, and (3) carrier data validation. Yet, each mechanism has weaknesses. The carrier certification process exhibits inconsistency across the states that certify carriers, carrier audits have been limited in number and reported findings, and carrier data validation focuses primarily on completeness and not accuracy. These weaknesses could contribute to excessive program expenditures. |
gao_GAO-06-1011 | gao_GAO-06-1011_0 | DOD’s Management of Its Imminent Danger Pay Program Could Benefit from Additional Oversight
DOD’s processes for reviewing existing imminent danger pay areas and combat zones can be improved. While combatant commanders have taken the initiative periodically to make recommendations to designate or terminate imminent danger pay areas, DOD has not conducted annual reviews of existing imminent danger pay areas in accordance with its guidance to ensure that conditions in these areas continue to warrant such designations. Also, DOD has not updated its guidance to reflect that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) has assumed responsibility for initiating and managing annual reviews. In addition, DOD also has not incorporated factors contained in questionnaires completed by combatant commanders that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) uses to evaluate when conditions in foreign areas pose the threat of physical harm or imminent danger to servicemembers performing duty in designated locations. By conducting annual reviews of existing designations in accordance with its guidance, DOD could strengthen its oversight of imminent danger pay designations to ensure that conditions in designated areas continue to pose the threat of physical harm or imminent danger to servicemembers and that these areas should continue to be designated. DOD Does Not Have a Departmentwide Policy to Monitor Cross-Month Travel to Areas Designated for Imminent Danger Pay or Combat Zone Tax Relief Benefits
Internal controls over servicemembers’ temporary duty travel to areas designated for imminent danger pay or combat zone tax relief benefits need to be strengthened. While two DOD components have instituted policies to regulate and monitor cross-month travel to these areas, there is no similar departmentwide policy to ensure that travel to areas designated for imminent danger pay or combat zone tax relief benefits needs to cross calendar months. However, the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army, Europe—which collectively account for 62 percent of imminent danger pay areas and 86 percent of areas designated for combat zone tax relief benefits—have developed policies and controls to monitor and regulate cross-month travel to areas designated for imminent danger pay and combat zone tax relief benefits to preclude, in their view, the appearance of abuse of these benefits. By establishing internal controls such as a departmentwide policy and periodic audits to monitor cross-month travel, DOD could ensure that all areas are covered and further strengthen its management of imminent danger pay and combat zone tax relief benefits. While DOD tracks and reports the cost of imminent danger pay to Congress as part of its budget request, the department does not report the amount of servicemembers’ compensation that qualifies for combat zone tax relief benefits. Combat zone tax relief benefits could allow servicemembers to exclude a significant portion of their compensation from federal taxes. The reporting of combat zone tax relief benefit data to Congress could provide information on the extent of this benefit and aid Congress in its oversight role. As stated in our scope and methodology and the report, data limitations prevented us from determining the full extent of temporary duty travel to areas designated for imminent danger pay and combat zone tax relief benefits, as well as how much of this travel crossed calendar months. Further, we reviewed only temporary duty travel vouchers processed using DOD’s Defense Travel System. The scope of this review excluded servicemembers deployed or assigned to foreign areas. For purposes of our analysis, we defined cross-month travel as any temporary duty travel of 30 days or fewer that begins during one month and concludes during the following month. | Why GAO Did This Study
Servicemembers who are assigned, deployed, or travel on temporary duty to certain foreign areas are eligible for special pays and benefits including (1) imminent danger pay (IDP) when the Department of Defense (DOD) determines that members are subject to the threat of physical harm or imminent danger and (2) combat zone tax relief (CZTR) benefits, which allow members to exclude earned income from federal taxes. If travel to IDP- or CZTR-designated areas begins during one month and concludes during another (known as cross-month travel), members could receive 2 full months of benefits. GAO conducted this review under the Comptroller General's authority to initiate such reviews. GAO evaluated DOD's (1) process for reviewing IDP areas and (2) internal controls over servicemembers' temporary duty travel to areas designated for IDP and CZTR benefits. GAO is also providing information on the reporting of IDP and CZTR data. GAO analyzed legislation, guidance, travel vouchers, and internal control standards and interviewed appropriate officials.
What GAO Found
DOD's processes for reviewing existing IDP areas could be improved. While combatant commanders have taken the initiative periodically to make recommendations to designate or terminate IDP areas, DOD has not conducted annual reviews of existing IDP designations in accordance with its guidance to ensure that conditions in these areas continue to warrant such designation. Also, DOD has not updated its guidance to reflect current responsibilities for initiating annual reviews or to include factors used to determine when conditions in foreign areas pose the threat of physical harm or imminent danger to servicemembers on duty in these locations. DOD conducted 6 annual reviews between 1992 and 2006. When conducting reviews, DOD has queried combatant commanders using a set of factors to determine the nature of threats to servicemembers. However, DOD has not incorporated these factors into its guidance. By conducting annual reviews in accordance with its guidance, DOD could strengthen its oversight of IDP designations to ensure that conditions in designated areas continue to pose the threat of physical harm or imminent danger to servicemembers and that these areas should continue to be designated. Internal controls over servicemembers' temporary duty travel to areas designated for IDP or CZTR benefits need to be strengthened. While two DOD components have instituted policies to regulate and monitor cross-month travel to these areas, there is no similar departmentwide policy to ensure that travel to areas designated for IDP or CZTR benefits needs to cross calendar months. Data limitations prevented GAO from determining the full extent of temporary duty travel to areas designated for IDP and CZTR benefits, as well as how much of this travel crosses calendar months. The U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army, Europe--which collectively account for 62 percent of IDP areas and 86 percent of CZTR benefit areas--have developed policies and controls to monitor and regulate cross-month travel to areas designated for IDP and CZTR benefits to preclude, in their view, the appearance of abuse of these benefits. By establishing internal controls such as a departmentwide policy and periodic audits to monitor cross-month travel, DOD could ensure all areas are covered and further strengthen its management of IDP and CZTR benefits. DOD tracks IDP costs and servicemembers' compensation that qualifies for CZTR benefits. While DOD reports the cost of IDP to Congress as part of its budget request, the department does not report servicemembers' compensation that qualifies for CZTR benefits. Combat zone tax relief benefits could allow servicemembers to exclude a significant portion of their income from federal taxes. Reporting data on CZTR benefits to Congress could provide information on the extent of this benefit and aid Congress in its oversight role. |
gao_GAO-07-147 | gao_GAO-07-147_0 | Commission Recommends Increased Assistance and Identifies U.S. In 2004–2005, USAID and State used a competitive process to select grantees. As the table shows, USINT plays an important role in implementing State and USAID democracy assistance focused on Cuba. Table 4 summarizes State and USAID awards from 1996–2005. Grantee Selection Was Based on Unsolicited Proposals until 2004
Our analysis showed that about 95 percent ($61.9 million) of USAID’s total awards were made in response to unsolicited proposals. Recipients of U.S. humanitarian and material assistance, training, and information included human rights activists, political dissidents, independent librarians, journalists, and political prisoners and their families. Dissidents we interviewed in Cuba said that they appreciated the range and types of U.S. democracy assistance, that this assistance was useful in their work, and that this aid demonstrated the U.S. government’s commitment to democracy in Cuba. Grantees Provided Four Types of Assistance in 2005
In 2005, the 10 grantees we reviewed reported activities in four categories: (1) providing humanitarian and material assistance and training to independent civil society groups and individuals; (2) disseminating uncensored information to, within, and from Cuba; (3) increasing international criticism of the Cuban regime by highlighting its human and workers’ rights violations; and (4) planning for a future transition to democracy by sponsoring conferences and publishing studies. Some grantees have taken steps to reduce the risk of loss—due to theft or confiscation by the Cuban government—of assistance shipped to Cuba. Monitoring and Oversight of Cuba Program Grants Did Not Provide Adequate Assurance That Funds Were Used Properly
USAID’s internal controls over both the awarding of Cuba program grants and the oversight of grantees do not provide adequate assurance that the grant funds are being used properly or that grantees are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The agency’s preaward reviews of grantees often were not completed prior to grant awards, and USAID auditors did not adequately follow up to correct deficiencies after grant awards. Grant Agreements Did Not Support Program Accountability
We performed a detailed review of four cooperative agreements and one grant agreement that USAID signed between 1997 and 2005 for democracy assistance for Cuba. We identified several weaknesses in the USAID Cuba program office’s oversight and monitoring of grantees’ implementation of grants and cooperative agreements, including the lack of policies and procedures for identifying at-risk grantees, formal oversight of grant implementation, and a framework for monitoring cost sharing. In addition, USAID does not have a formal process for reviewing this reporting. USAID and Grantees Have Focused on Measuring and Reporting Program Activities
USAID and its grantees have not routinely collected and reported data and other information about the results or impact of the democracy assistance they have provided. The quarterly reports submitted by 10 grantees in 2005 consistently provided data about program activities. These include: Increasing staff expertise and meeting more regularly with grantees. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the roles and objectives of the agencies implementing U.S. democracy assistance targeted at Cuba and the characteristics and selection of the grantees receiving Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awards; (2) the types, amounts, beneficiaries, and methods used to deliver assistance for selected grantees in 2005; (3) USAID’s monitoring and oversight of these grantees; and (4) the availability of data to evaluate whether U.S. assistance has achieved its goals. For 10 grantees, we reviewed the internal controls and related residual fiscal accountability risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. law authorizes aid for nonviolent democratic change in Cuba. From 1996-2005, the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded grants totaling $74 million to support such change. A presidential commission recently recommended increasing funding for these efforts. This report examines (1) agency roles in implementing this aid and selection of grantees; (2) types of aid, recipients, and methods of delivery reported in 2005; (3) oversight of grantees; and (4) data about the impact of this aid. To address these objectives, we analyzed the activities and internal controls, and USAID's oversight and management of, 10 grantees with about 76 percent (in dollars) of total active awards for Cuba democracy aid. Our review focused on USAID because State's first awards were not made until mid-2005.
What GAO Found
The Department of State State and USAID implement U.S. democracy assistance for Cuba through an interagency process. However, communication between these agencies was sometimes ineffective, most critically about grantees' on-island activities. About 95 percent ($62 million) of USAID's total awards were made in response to unsolicited proposals; however, after 2004, both USAID and State used formal competition to select grantees. Dissidents in Havana said that U.S. assistance provided moral support and enhanced their ability to work for democracy. In 2005, the 10 grantees we reviewed delivered humanitarian and other aid, training, and information to human rights and political activists, independent librarians and journalists, and political prisoners and their families. Assistance shipped to Cuba included food, medicine, clothing, office equipment and supplies, shortwave radios, books, and newsletters. Grantees also conducted international advocacy for human and workers' rights in Cuba and planned for a future democratic transition. Given the Cuban government's repressive policies and opposition to U.S. democracy assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods that varied in terms of security, flexibility, and cost. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba, a State post, has played an important role in distributing the aid provided by some grantees. Internal controls--both over the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees--do not provide adequate assurance that the grant funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Preaward reviews of grantees were not always completed before awards, and USAID did not follow up adequately after awards to correct weaknesses in grantee policies, procedures, and accounting systems identified by these reviews. In addition, standardized grant agreements did not provide sufficient details to support program accountability or the correction of the weaknesses identified by preaward reviews. The Cuba program office also did not adequately manage at-risk grantees and lacked formal review or oversight procedures for monitoring grantee activities. We performed limited testing for 10 grantees and identified questionable expenditures and significant internal control weaknesses with 3 grantees that USAID had not detected. The Cuban government's active opposition to U.S. democracy assistance presents a challenging operating environment for State and USAID. Although USAID and its grantees have some evaluation and anecdotal information about program results, they have focused on measuring and reporting program activities, such as the volume of food, medicine, or books sent to Cuba. USAID recently took several steps to collect better information about program results, such as increasing staff expertise and meeting more regularly with grantees. |
gao_GAO-16-656 | gao_GAO-16-656_0 | New Core Partially Delivered Financial Management Systems Capabilities; Other Initiatives Are Under Way for Remaining Capabilities
By October 2015, HUD had completed transitioning 4 of the 14 planned financial management systems capabilities to shared service solutions provided by ARC. Travel and relocation. As a result, the department continues to execute programmatic transactions using costly and inefficient legacy systems. After spending at least $58 million over a period of 3 years, in April 2016 the department officially completed development close-out activities for the New Core program. According to a June 20, 2016, memorandum, HUD’s Deputy CFO reported that the migration also resulted in improved internal controls, such as real-time checks with the documents in the procurement system for recording commitments and obligations; increased discipline in financial activities, including the use of delegated authority for purchases; improved compliance with laws and regulations; better data quality due to ARC’s core accounting system ensuring that budget funds control balances are the same as balances in the general ledger; strengthened funds-control process because of, among other things, improvements in the accuracy of payroll costs and improved procedures for accounts receivable; and increased confidence in controls and configurations employed on systems used for purchase cards, processing invoice payments, procurement management, and employee time and attendance. HUD officials, including the Deputy Secretary, also stated that other new initiatives were under way to deliver financial management systems capabilities and replace legacy systems that were not addressed under New Core. Implementation of New Core Demonstrated Weaknesses in HUD’s IT Management and Governance
Our experience with IT-related programs has shown that disciplined management practices can help agencies plan, manage, and oversee modernization efforts. For instance, the roadmap did not account for when or how the department would replace other systems identified to be replaced with the program and fell short of clearly outlining what needed to occur to achieve expected benefits such as reducing the costs of legacy systems. Individual schedules were also established and managed for the 4 capabilities delivered through October 2015. Nevertheless, limitations existed in HUD’s implementation of these requirements management practices. For example, the department did not document its “as-is” processes to aid in defining and managing requirements. HUD’s IT Governance and Executive-Level Oversight for New Core Were Not Fully Effective
GAO’s guide to effective IT investment management emphasizes the importance of applying effective disciplined, repeatable governance processes for selecting and re-selecting, controlling, and evaluating investments to ensure mission needs are met. Specifically, although the governing entities reviewed the same New Core program artifacts we assessed, HUD’s reviews did not raise concerns regarding the management weaknesses we identified during the course of our review and did not require improvement plans for known deficiencies. Until HUD addresses weaknesses in IT governance practices and strengthens executive-level oversight for financial management systems modernization efforts, the department’s capacity to manage and control successor efforts may be limited. With New Core, the department transitioned 4 of 14 planned capabilities to shared service solutions. In doing so, the department added efficiencies and integrated systems that support the processing of financial management functions. HUD’s efforts to modernize its financial management systems have been hindered by weaknesses in implementing key IT management practices. Further, HUD faced challenges with sustaining leadership, coordinating among stakeholders, and aligning New Core with other IT modernization efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address weaknesses in the department’s financial management systems modernization efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the Chief Financial Officer to work with the Chief Information Officer to take the following three actions with regard to managing subsequent initiatives: define a high-level depiction of the IT systems anticipated in the future state, a description of the operations that must be performed and who must perform them, and an explanation of where and how the operations are to be carried out; develop comprehensive plans for scope, schedule and cost; and ensure requirements are fully documented and traceable. In its comments, HUD neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but noted that it plans to improve management practices and IT governance for future modernization efforts. Our specific objectives for this review were to (1) determine the planned financial management systems capabilities implemented through New Core and (2) evaluate HUD’s implementation of key IT management practices applied to the program. In the area of program definition, we reviewed documentation including the New Core Implementation Plan and the New Core Program Charters, and New Core Program Management Plans for each release, and briefings to determine whether these artifacts were developed in adherence with key practices and elements for fully defining a program as called for in PMI program management standards, concept of operations guidance published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and our previous reports on IT modernization efforts. Specifically, HUD gained access to 7 systems operated by ARC. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUD is responsible for managing and reporting on the nearly $45 billion it spends annually for housing programs. The department has reported its reliance on outdated and costly-to-maintain systems used for financial management functions. In 2013, HUD initiated a modernization program called New Core, which involved migrating financial management capabilities to a federal shared service provider, with expected benefits to include reducing legacy systems costs, improving the data, and resolving weaknesses in its financial management systems. After spending about $58 million over 3 years, HUD decided to end New Core development in April 2016.
Congress included a provision for GAO to review the New Core program. This review (1) determined the financial management systems capabilities implemented through New Core and (2) evaluated HUD's implementation of key IT management practices applied to the program. GAO reviewed New Core plans and documentation to assess the capabilities delivered, compared HUD's implementation to recognized IT practices, and interviewed relevant agency officials.
What GAO Found
In October 2015, as part of its planned New Core financial management systems modernization efforts, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) completed transitioning 4 of 14 capabilities to shared service solutions. The implemented capabilities were for managing employee travel and relocation; recording time and attendance; performing core accounting functions such as general ledger accounting, producing financial reports, and processing salaries and expenses transactions; and managing procurements. As a result, the department reported that it fully replaced 4 systems, gained access to 7 shared service solutions, streamlined administrative services, and added efficiencies to the processing of financial management functions. For example, the systems used for core accounting and procurement were integrated to support the timely recording of commitments and obligations. However, while the 4 capabilities were transitioned as scheduled, none fully met the department's requirements or expectations. For instance, the department continues to execute programmatic transactions using costly and inefficient legacy systems that were expected to be replaced with New Core. HUD has begun other initiatives to deliver financial management systems capabilities and replace legacy systems that were not addressed under New Core. Detailed plans for these efforts are in development.
HUD's efforts to implement planned capabilities for New Core demonstrated weaknesses in the department's information technology (IT) management and governance practices. Key management practices include fully defining what a program is intended to accomplish; developing the program scope, schedule, and costs; and managing requirements. However, HUD's management of New Core had weaknesses in these areas. For example, the department did not:
outline operations for all planned capabilities or create a roadmap for transitioning to the desired modernized environment;
create comprehensive scope, schedule, and cost documentation; and
manage requirements to ensure they were fully documented and traceable from business needs to system implementation.
Effective governance and executive-level oversight also help ensure programs achieve expected results. Specifically, establishing governance control reviews and providing oversight through, among other things, sustained leadership and coordination among stakeholders can strengthen modernization efforts. However, during the effort to implement New Core, HUD's IT governance and oversight were not fully effective. For example, governance reviews did not raise concerns or require improvement plans for management weaknesses identified, such as the lack of a schedule with a valid critical path. Moreover, executive-level oversight did not ensure effective coordination among stakeholders.
With any further pursuit of new initiatives to modernize its financial management systems, it is critical that the department consistently apply key IT management practices and effective governance to ensure it does not jeopardize the success of these efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that HUD address weaknesses in key IT management practices for future financial systems modernization efforts and take action to improve its governance and strengthen investment oversight. HUD neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, but stated it would improve management practices and governance for future efforts. |
gao_GAO-04-58 | gao_GAO-04-58_0 | EPA proposed several alternative cost thresholds for routine maintenance and repair below which modifications could be considered exempt and solicited comments on the thresholds. In addition, during a September 3, 2002, hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Health, Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor, and Pensions, former EPA Administrator Carol Browner testified that, among other things, she was concerned that the revisions would “eliminate the very features of the current law that provide transparency to the public—monitoring, record keeping, and reporting.”
Because EPA’s Assessments Showed That Some NSR Revisions Could Affect the Enforcement Cases, the Agency Made Changes before Issuing the Final and Proposed Rules
EPA enforcement officials assessed the potential impact of the NSR revisions (before issuing them as final and proposed rules in December 2002) on the enforcement cases against coal-fired utilities and determined that some of the revisions could have an impact. In part as a result of the assessments, for the revisions that were included in the final rule, EPA adjusted the content and wording of the language before issuing the rule so that they were not expected to affect the cases. Furthermore, some EPA enforcement officials and key stakeholders believe that the announcement of the August 2003 final rule, in which EPA set a specific cost threshold for routine replacement activities, could also delay settlement of some of the cases and could affect judges’ decisions in the cases about what remedies to apply to companies that are found to be in violation of the old NSR rule. Therefore, since this provision in the rule was not a significant change for the utility industry, the EPA staff did not expect this provision to affect the cases. In general, EPA enforcement officials were concerned that if the agency specifically proposed a definition of routine maintenance that was different from the way the agency had applied the exclusion in the past, defendants could delay the cases by arguing that some of the facility changes under dispute in the lawsuits might be able to qualify for an exemption from NSR. EPA Enforcement Staff and Key Stakeholders Believe the Possibility of Revising the Routine Maintenance Exclusion Delayed Settlement of Some Cases, and the August 2003 Rule May Have Additional Negative Effects
According to former and current EPA senior enforcement officials, despite the agency’s efforts to minimize the impact of the final and proposed rules on the enforcement cases, they believe the possibility that EPA could revise the routine maintenance exclusion in ways that could improve the companies’ legal positions in the cases had a detrimental effect on the willingness of some companies to settle. For example, a company can now determine on its own if there is a “reasonable possibility” that a change could trigger NSR, but the rule is unclear about how companies will make this determination and how the public can access information about it. On the other hand, according to some state and local air quality agencies and environmental groups, because a company can pursue a facility change without an NSR permit under a PAL, as long as total facility emissions do not increase, the public may have fewer opportunities to provide input on a company’s decision to modify a facility, assess the emissions created (including hazardous air pollutants that may not be identified for monitoring under the PAL), and consider ways to control them. These changes may still trigger state or local requirements to obtain a permit and its associated public participation rules, depending on the state or locality, but, as we have stated, the scope of these requirements varies widely. The rule may also affect judges’ decisions regarding whether the companies have to install pollution controls, jeopardizing the expected emissions reductions. Recommendations for To better ensure the ability of federal, state, local, and public entities to Executive Action monitor facility emissions and NSR compliance, we recommend that the EPA Administrator better define what constitutes a “reasonable possibility” that emissions after a facility change will trigger NSR requirements, require that companies maintain documentation on all “reasonable possibility” determinations, and determine, with state and local air quality agencies, how to ensure public access to company’s on-site information on facility changes and emissions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether EPA and DOJ assessed the potential impact that issuing the final and proposed rules in December 2002 would have on enforcement cases pending against coal-fired utilities and what the assessments indicated, and (2) what effect, if any, the final rule might have on public access to information on facility changes and the resulting emissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revisions to the New Source Review (NSR) program--a key component of the federal government's plan to limit harmful industrial emissions--have been under scrutiny by the Congress, environmental groups, state and local air quality agencies, the courts, and several industry groups. The revisions more explicitly define when companies can modify their facilities without needing to obtain an NSR permit or install costly pollution controls, as NSR requires. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) assessed the potential impact of the revisions on the ongoing enforcement cases against coal-fired utilities and, if so, what the assessments indicated; and (2) what effect, if any, the revisions might have on public access to information about facility changes and their resulting emissions.
What GAO Found
EPA staff assessed the potential impact of the NSR revisions on the utility enforcement cases and, according to current and former EPA enforcement officials, determined that some of the revisions could affect the cases. EPA staff discussed the potential effects of the revisions with DOJ. In part as a result of the assessments, EPA changed some of the revisions before issuing them as final and proposed rules in December 2002. Specifically, EPA changed the content and wording of some of the provisions included in the final rule and determined that the rule would not affect the cases. However, EPA enforcement officials were very concerned that the proposed rule--addressing when a company could consider a facility change "routine maintenance, repair, or replacement" and exempt from NSR--could have a negative impact on the cases. The concern was that proposing one specific definition for this exclusion that differed from the way the agency had applied it in the past could affect the cases' outcome. Consequently, EPA instead proposed several alternative definitions--different cost thresholds below which a company could make a change that is exempt--for public comment. Nevertheless, some of the enforcement officials and stakeholders believe that industry's knowledge that EPA could be defining the exclusion in terms more favorable to industry delayed some settlements while the rule was being developed, jeopardizing expected emissions reductions. Subsequently, in August 2003, despite seven ongoing cases, EPA announced a final rule specifying a 20 percent cost threshold below which a company could make certain changes and consider them routine replacement and exempt from NSR. EPA and DOJ maintain that the rule will not affect the cases because it applies only to future changes. But some EPA enforcement officials and stakeholders are concerned that even if judges find companies to be in violation of the old rule, judges could be persuaded, when setting remedies, to not require the installation of pollution controls--limiting emissions benefits--because under the 20 percent threshold, most of the facility changes in dispute would now be exempt. Certain provisions in the December 2002 final rule could limit assurance of the public's access to data about--and input on--decisions to modify facilities in ways that affect emissions. This would make it more difficult for the public to monitor local emissions, health risks, and NSR compliance. Under the rule, fewer facility changes may trigger NSR and thus the need for permits and related requirements to notify the public about changes and to solicit comments--unless state and local air quality agencies have their own permit and public outreach rules. However, the scope of these state and local rules varies widely. Also under the rule, companies will now determine whether there is a "reasonable possibility" a facility change will increase emissions enough to trigger NSR--in effect policing themselves. But EPA has not defined "reasonable possibility," required that companies keep data on all of their reasonable possibility determinations, or specified how the public can access the data companies do keep on site. |
gao_GAO-16-27 | gao_GAO-16-27_0 | All of the reviews found that the program resulted in administrative costs savings and enhanced subcontracting opportunities for small businesses. Test Program Allows Participants and DOD to Avoid Millions in Administrative Costs and May Provide Additional Benefits
Prior DOD reviews estimated that use of the Test Program resulted in the avoidance of millions of dollars in administrative costs for both participants and DOD and may offer other benefits. Significant one-time administrative costs could result if the Test Program were canceled or allowed to expire and comprehensive subcontracting plans could no longer be used. However, DOD has not taken action to address the program’s status. According to these reviews, cost avoidance is enabled primarily by the use of a single comprehensive subcontracting plan for multiple contracts rather than an individual subcontracting plan for each contract. For example, for fiscal year 2005, the review estimated that the administrative cost avoided by DOD under the Test Program was at least $45 million. All of the participants we interviewed noted that the issue of small business subcontracting has greater visibility and awareness with corporate leadership as a result of the Test Program and that their entities might be less inclined to award subcontracts to small businesses in its absence. Our analysis found that 87 percent of DCMA’s reviews indicated that participants made acceptable progress on their initiatives to enhance small business opportunities, but that participants’ performance in meeting their negotiated subcontracting goals varied. Our analysis also found that while participants did not always meet individual goals, their aggregate performance resulted in subcontract awards to small business that exceeded aggregate goals by approximately $5.4 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2013. Finally, DCMA’s annual performance reviews, which assess achievements against both negotiated initiatives and goals, have been largely positive. In our review period of fiscal years 2006 through 2013, we found
16 initiatives resulted in the redirect of approximately $93 million in subcontracts from large business to small businesses; a 72-percent success rate in participants meeting milestones for increasing small business subcontracts in targeted industries;
24 mentor-protégé initiatives resulted in 61 new mentor-protégé relationships between participants and small businesses; and
11 SBIR projects that identified 83 new small business suppliers. The 2013 DOD review estimated that initiatives completed by Test Program participants could amount to as much as $1.8 billion per year in increased small business opportunities, and that participants spent as much as $5.5 million annually on small business subcontracting enhancements and initiatives. Test Program participants can only count certain small business subcontracting activities toward their goals. DOD officials said they have never terminated a participant from the program, but that some have voluntarily exited the program. Working with Congress to address the program’s status, for example by providing information on the effectiveness of the Test Program as identified in the three DOD-commissioned reviews and our analysis, could help eliminate the uncertainty associated with the program. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure continued reductions in administrative costs to DOD and program participants and enhance subcontracting opportunities for small businesses, Congress should consider making the Test Program permanent. Given these findings, and that DOD had not acted on the 2007 review recommendation to work with Congress to make the program permanent, we included a recommendation in the draft report for DOD to draft a legislative proposal to make the program permanent or otherwise work with Congress to determine the status of the Test Program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 821(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for us to report on the results of the Department of Defense’s Test Program for Negotiation of Comprehensive Small Business Subcontracting Plans (Test Program). This report addresses the extent to which the Test Program (1) reduces administrative costs, and (2) enhances subcontracting opportunities for small businesses. To address whether the Test Program enhances subcontracting opportunities for small businesses by successfully achieving its annual goals, we reviewed Test Program participants’ comprehensive subcontracting plans and negotiation support memorandums and analyzed performance data from fiscal years 2006 through 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, DOD has been conducting a congressionally directed test program related to how contractors report their subcontracting activities. The purpose of the program is to test whether using comprehensive subcontracting plans that cover multiple contracts across contractor plants, divisions, or entire companies can yield administrative cost savings and enhance small business subcontracting opportunities. Despite the 25-year existence of the program, little is publicly known about its effectiveness.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to report on the results of the program. This report addresses the extent to which the program (1) reduces administrative costs, and (2) enhances subcontracting opportunities for small businesses. GAO analyzed prior DOD reviews and data on estimates of administrative costs savings; reviewed program participants' performance for enhancing small business subcontracting opportunities for fiscal years 2006 through 2013; and interviewed officials from DOD, program participants, and small business advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
Reviews commissioned by the Department of Defense (DOD) concluded that the Test Program for Negotiation of Comprehensive Small Business Subcontracting Plans (Test Program) has resulted in the avoidance of millions of dollars in administrative costs for both program participants and DOD. According to the review conducted in 2013, the 12 firms then participating in the program avoided about $18.5 million in costs through the use of single comprehensive subcontracting plans rather than multiple individual subcontracting plans. Also, a 2007 review estimated that DOD avoided administrative costs of at least $45 million in fiscal year 2005. GAO reviewed the methodologies used for these reviews and took other steps to validate their findings. According to DOD officials, if the Test Program were terminated or allowed to expire, a significant one-time administrative cost of about $22 million could result to participants. GAO's analysis confirms this conclusion. Test Program participants and DOD officials GAO interviewed stated that the program also has resulted in non-financial benefits, including greater company-wide awareness of small business subcontracting opportunities. The participants GAO interviewed said that without the program their companies might be less inclined to award subcontracts to small businesses. They emphasized, however, that the program's continuing test status creates uncertainty and inhibits further expansion. The 2007 review recommended that DOD work with Congress to make the Test Program permanent; however, DOD has not acted on this recommendation. Doing so could help eliminate uncertainty with the program.
GAO found that the Test Program enhanced small business subcontracting opportunities, although participants' performance in meeting individual goals has varied. Participants are evaluated on their achievement of negotiated initiatives and goals in their comprehensive subcontracting plans. GAO's analysis of performance reports found that participants made acceptable progress on their initiatives 87 percent of the time, thus providing tangible subcontracting opportunities for small businesses. For example, during fiscal years 2006 through 2013, program participants redirected nearly $93 million in subcontracts from large businesses to small businesses. Participants also achieved a 72-percent success rate in increasing small business subcontracts in areas such as integrated circuits and information technology, thus addressing a concern among some small businesses that high-end technical work was not being subcontracted under the program. The 2013 DOD review estimated that participant initiatives could amount to as much as $1.8 billion per year in increased small business opportunities. GAO's analysis found that participants did not always meet individual goals, in part due to the challenging nature of these goals. However, GAO also found that their combined performance from fiscal years 2006 through 2013 resulted in subcontract awards to small businesses that exceeded aggregate goals by about $5.4 billion. The annual performance reviews of the participants, which take into account performance on both initiatives and goals, have been largely positive.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider making the program permanent. GAO also recommends that DOD work with Congress on the program's status. DOD agreed. DOD disagreed with a recommendation to draft a legislative proposal to make the program permanent. GAO subsequently modified the recommendation and added the matter for Congress. |
gao_GAO-17-527 | gao_GAO-17-527_0 | Figure 3 summarizes the most common recruiting, screening, and training process for new enlistees. DOD’s Yearly Medical Early and Overall Attrition Rates Were Generally Stable for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2015
Medical Early Attrition Rates during Enlistees’ Initial Terms of Commitment Were Generally Stable for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2015
Based on our analysis of DOD accession and attrition data, early attrition rates due to medical reasons during an enlistee’s initial term of commitment were generally stable for fiscal years 2005 through 2015. For example, the medical early attrition rate at the 48-month point of enlistees’ initial term of commitment was an estimated 14.9 percent in fiscal year 2005 and an estimated 13.7 percent in fiscal year 2011—the most recent year for which 48 months of data were available—with fluctuations between these years. According to this analysis, the leading category of early attrition due to medical reasons is “Unqualified for active duty, other” which DOD defines as a nondisability medical condition, such as obesity, motion sickness or allergies, that interferes with the performance of duties and contributes to the failure to meet physical readiness standards. This is because DOD does not have a process for the military services’ training bases to provide USMEPCOM all of the medical records of enlistees who separate early due to medical reasons. Specifically, the draft instruction does not identify a clear process with defined roles and responsibilities. USMEPCOM officials stated that they are currently in the process of repairing the database, but they could not provide a schedule for its completion. Without a schedule for these database repairs, USMEPCOM has limited assurance that this tool will be available to it expeditiously. However, until USMEPCOM uses EPTS separation information to provide regular and specific feedback to MEPS chief medical officers, USMEPCOM may not be assured that it is adequately identifying medically disqualifying conditions among applicants for military service before the military services invest substantial resources in the applicants’ initial training. DOD Has Not Implemented Its New Electronic Health Record at MEPS Locations
DOD has not implemented its new electronic health record system at the MEPS and its schedule to do so is uncertain. This new system is intended to give DOD the capability to electronically share more complete medical data with and between both federal and private sector medical facilities that are similarly equipped. Without a clear and complete schedule for implementation of its new system, DOD has limited assurance that the system will be support the MEPS as planned. This means that the phased implementation of MHS GENESIS at the MEPS is likely to be several years away at a minimum. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a schedule for deploying the new electronic health record system, MHS GENESIS, within USMEPCOM. To determine the extent to which USMEPCOM obtains, analyzes, and uses information about enlistee early attrition due to medical reasons, we reviewed DOD memorandums and USMEPCOM regulations related to obtaining, analyzing, and using information about enlistee early attrition due to medical reasons. To determine the extent to which DOD has implemented its new electronic health record system at the MEPS to obtain and document applicants’ medical information, we reviewed selected DOD, USMEPCOM, and military regulations related to applicant medical screening processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
For fiscal years 2005 through 2015, the military services enlisted over 1.7 million servicemembers at an estimated cost of approximately $75,000 each. Incomplete medical information or inadequate screening of enlistees at MEPS may result in them not fulfilling their initial terms of commitment and the military services losing their investment in them.
The House Report accompanying a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review applicant medical screening issues at the MEPS. This report assesses the extent to which (1) enlistees have not completed their initial terms of commitment due to medical reasons; (2) USMEPCOM obtains, analyzes, and uses information about enlistee medical early attrition; and (3) DOD has implemented its new electronic health record system at the MEPS. GAO analyzed accession and attrition data for fiscal years 2005 through 2015 (the most recent available), visited selected MEPS near services' training bases, and reviewed selected DOD, USMEPCOM, and service policies.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) accession and attrition data found that early attrition rates due to medical reasons during an enlistee's initial term of commitment were generally stable for fiscal years 2005 through 2015. As shown in the figure, the medical early attrition rate at the 48-month point was an estimated 14.9 percent in fiscal year 2005 and an estimated 13.7 percent in fiscal year 2011—the most recent year for which 48 months of data were available. The leading category for early attrition was “unqualified for active duty, other,” which DOD defines as a nondisability condition such as obesity.
U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), DOD's organization responsible for medically qualifying applicants for military service, does not fully obtain, analyze and use information about enlistees who separate early due to medical reasons. This is because DOD does not have a clearly defined process for the military services to provide USMEPCOM with all relevant medical records. Further, the database that USMEPCOM relies on to analyze these records is inoperable and no schedule has been developed to repair it. As a result, USMEPCOM has provided limited feedback to chief medical officers—responsible for the medical qualification decisions—that they could use to improve screening outcomes. Without addressing these issues, DOD has limited assurance that medically disqualifying conditions among new enlistees will be identified before the services invest substantial resources in their initial training.
DOD has not implemented its new electronic health record system at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) and its schedule to do so is uncertain. Known as MHS GENESIS, this new system is intended to give DOD the capability to electronically share more complete medical data with and between both federal and private sector medical facilities that are similarly equipped. Without a clear and complete schedule for implementation of MHS GENESIS, DOD has limited assurance that the system will support the MEPS as planned.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a clear process for USMEPCOM to obtain medical early separation records, a schedule to repair the database used to analyze the records, and a schedule to deploy MHS GENESIS at the MEPS. DOD concurred with the first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third, stating it is already developing such a schedule. GAO continues to believe action is needed as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-363 | gao_GAO-04-363_0 | Under these programs, state Medicaid programs pay enrolled beneficiaries’ Medicare premiums. SSA Is Conducting an Annual Outreach Effort Targeted to Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries
In response to BIPA, SSA is conducting an annual outreach effort to help increase enrollment in Medicare savings programs. This outreach consists of a nationwide mailing campaign and data sharing with the states. Letters were targeted to beneficiaries whose incomes from Social Security and certain other federal sources were less than 135 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). In addition to sending letters to potentially eligible low-income Medicare beneficiaries, in 2002 SSA provided all but six states with an electronic data file containing the names of all beneficiaries to whom it had sent letters in that state. For the June through October 2003 mailing, SSA sent a second round of letters to about 4.3 million potentially eligible low-income Medicare beneficiaries nationwide whom its records indicated might have met the QMB, SLMB, and QI income eligibility criteria and were not currently enrolled in Medicare savings programs. For example, beneficiaries less than 65 years old, persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, and residents in southern states experienced larger additional increases in enrollment. More than 74,000 Additional Beneficiaries Enrolled in Medicare Savings Programs Following SSA’s 2002 Mailing
On the basis of our analysis of SSA’s Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), we estimate that, of the 16.4 million SSA letter recipients in 2002, an additional 74,000 beneficiaries (0.5 percent of letter recipients) enrolled in Medicare savings programs than would have likely enrolled without the mailing. Certain States and Demographic Groups Had Higher Enrollment Rates Following SSA’s Outreach
Across the United States, letter recipients residing in the southern states had a 0.6 percent additional increase in enrollment following SSA’s mailing. Enrollment Increases Varied among Selected States We Reviewed, with Several Reporting Increased Calls and Applications Concurrent with SSA Mailing
The percentage of additional letter recipients newly enrolling in Medicare savings programs following SSA’s mailings varied significantly among the six states we reviewed. Among these six states, enrollment increases ranged from 0.3 to 2.9 percent. The varying effects on enrollment by state can be attributed to several factors, including, the share of eligible beneficiaries already enrolled in Medicare savings programs prior to the outreach, a state’s ability to handle increased phone calls and applications, and a state’s income and asset limits. Concurrent with SSA’s mailing, each of the states we reviewed reported that the state or other stakeholders conducted additional outreach. SSA also noted that improvements in state enrollment processes could further increase enrollment. Appendix I: Methodology
To determine what outreach the Social Security Administration (SSA) conducted in response to the statutory requirement, we obtained and reviewed copies of SSA documents, including sample 2002 and 2003 outreach letters and data on the number of letters sent to eligible Medicare beneficiaries in each state, as well as reports prepared by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) related to the Medicare savings program. To determine how enrollment changed following SSA’s outreach, we analyzed records from SSA’s Master Beneficiary Record (MBR)—a database that contains the administrative records of Social Security beneficiaries, including payments for Medicare premiums—and CMS’s national enrollment data for the Medicare savings programs. To determine how additional enrollment in the programs changed in selected states following SSA’s outreach and what outreach efforts these states undertook, we interviewed Medicaid officials in six states— Alabama, California, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. In addition, we obtained information from each state to the extent available on its involvement with the SSA mailing, the state’s specific eligibility criteria for its Medicare savings program, outreach efforts conducted by the state to low-income Medicare beneficiaries, and state data on call and application volume before, during, and after the SSA outreach. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist low-income beneficiaries with their share of premiums and other out-of-pocket costs associated with Medicare, Congress has created four Medicare savings programs. Historic low enrollment in these programs has been attributed to several factors, including lack of awareness about the programs, and cumbersome eligibility determination and enrollment processes through state Medicaid programs. Concerned about this low enrollment, Congress passed legislation as part of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) requiring the Social Security Administration (SSA) to notify low-income Medicare beneficiaries of their potential eligibility for Medicare savings programs. The statute also required GAO to study the impact of SSA's outreach effort. GAO examined what outreach SSA undertook to increase enrollment, how enrollment changed following SSA's 2002 outreach, and how enrollment changed in selected states following SSA's outreach and what additional outreach efforts these states undertook. GAO reviewed information obtained from SSA and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), analyzed enrollment data provided by SSA and CMS, and interviewed officials in and obtained data from six selected states (Alabama, California, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
What GAO Found
In response to a statutory requirement, SSA is carrying out an annual outreach effort to help increase enrollment in Medicare savings programs. This outreach effort consists of mailing letters to potentially eligible lowincome beneficiaries nationwide as well as sharing data with states to assist with their supplemental outreach efforts. In 2002, SSA sent 16.4 million letters to low-income Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes from Social Security and certain other federal sources met the income eligibility criteria for Medicare savings programs. The 2002 letters provided eligibility criteria for programs in the beneficiary's home state and urged beneficiaries interested in enrolling to call a state telephone number provided. In addition to sending these letters, SSA provided states with a data file containing information on the beneficiaries to whom it sent letters. In 2003, SSA sent another 4.3 million letters to potentially eligible beneficiaries, and indicated that it intends to repeat the outreach mailing annually to newly eligible beneficiaries and a portion of prior letter recipients. Following SSA's outreach efforts in 2002, GAO estimated that more than 74,000 additional eligible beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare savings programs, 0.5 percent of all 2002 letter recipients, than would have likely enrolled without the letter. CMS enrollment data also showed that growth in Medicare savings programs enrollment for the year following SSA's mailing was nearly double that for each of the 3 prior years. Of the 74,000 additional enrollees, certain states and demographic groups had somewhat larger increases in enrollment than other groups. The highest additional enrollment increase was in Alabama, where 2.9 percent of letter recipients enrolled, followed by Delaware at 2.0 percent. Beneficiaries less than 65 years old, persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, and residents in southern states also had higher enrollment rates than other groups. The percentage of letter recipients newly enrolling in Medicare savings programs following SSA's 2002 mailing ranged from 0.3 to 2.9 percent among the six states GAO reviewed. The varying effects on enrollment by state could be attributable to several factors, including the share of eligible beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare savings programs prior to the outreach, each state's ability to handle increased call and application volume, and a state's income and asset limits. Four states GAO reviewed reported increases in the numbers of calls received or applications mailed or received following the SSA mailing and then decreases after the mailing period ended. Each of the states GAO reviewed reported that the state or other stakeholders conducted additional outreach during SSA's 2002 outreach. SSA generally agreed with GAO's findings. CMS stated that it did not have specific comments on the report. |
gao_GAO-09-273 | gao_GAO-09-273_0 | The Federal Air Marshal Service’s Operational Approach to Achieving Its Core Mission Is Based on Risk-Related Factors
FAMS’s operational approach (concept of operations) is based on risk- related factors, such as assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. FAMS is guided by the provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act that specify the deployment of federal air marshals on flights presenting high-security risks, such as nonstop, long- distance flights targeted on September 11, 2001. FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of high-risk flights by establishing coverage goals for 10 targeted critical flight categories. An Independent Assessment Concluded That the Federal Air Marshal Service’s Approach for Achieving Its Core Mission Was Reasonable; Recommendations for Enhancing the Approach Are Being Implemented
In its 2003 PART review of FAMS, OMB concluded that an independent evaluation should be conducted to assess FAMS’s performance related to aspects of the agency’s concept of operations—particularly aspects involving flight coverage risk categories, the distribution of covered flights, and target levels of coverage. The Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded research and development center, performed this evaluation and issued a final report in July 2006. The Homeland Security Institute recommended, for example, that FAMS increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the coverage of flights within various risk categories. Also, the institute examined FAMS’s scheduling processes and analyzed outputs in the form of “coverage” data reflecting when and where air marshals were deployed on flights. We reviewed the Homeland Security Institute’s evaluation methodology and generally found it to be reasonable. As presented in table 1, FAMS had implemented or had ongoing efforts to implement all of the recommended enhancements, as of October 2008. The Federal Air Marshal Service Modified Its Dress Code and Hotel Policies to Further Protect Air Marshals’ Anonymity
To further protect the anonymity of air marshals while on missions, and in response to air marshals’ feedback and the working groups’ recommendations, FAMS management revised the dress code policy and the hotel policy for air marshals in August 2006 and February 2007, respectively. The Federal Air Marshal Service Conducted a Workforce Satisfaction Survey in 2007; the Potential Usefulness of Future Surveys Could Be Enhanced by Improving the Response Rate and Redesigning Certain Questions
In late fiscal year 2007, FAMS conducted a workforce satisfaction survey of all staff—not just air marshals—to help determine issues affecting the ability of agency personnel to perform their jobs—and to obtain feedback on the effectiveness of measures already taken by management to address relevant issues. For example, although the 2007 workforce satisfaction survey had an overall response rate (46 percent) that constituted less than half of the FAMS workforce, 79 percent of the respondents indicated that there had been positive changes from the prior year. Regarding future plans, FAMS expects to administer a workforce satisfaction survey every 2 years. However, the 46 percent response rate was substantially less than the 80 percent rate OMB encourages for federal surveys that require its approval. Several key improvements in FAMS policies and procedures have resulted from these efforts. Among other improvements, for example, FAMS amended its policy for flight check-in and boarding procedures to better ensure the anonymity of air marshals in mission status. The current FAMS Director, after being designated in June 2008 to head the agency, issued a broadcast message to all employees, expressing a commitment to continue applicable processes and initiatives, including the working group process, listening sessions, field office visits, and the internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management on any topic. FAMS, to its credit, has established a number of processes and initiatives—including a workforce satisfaction survey—to address various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals and other FAMS personnel to perform their aviation-security mission. To what extent has the Federal Air Marshal Service’s operational approach for achieving its core mission been independently assessed? This report is the public version of a restricted report that we provided to congressional requesters in December 2008. U.S. commercial passenger carriers make roughly 28,000 domestic and international flights each day. | Why GAO Did This Study
By deploying armed air marshals onboard selected flights, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), a component of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), plays a key role in helping to protect approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily by U.S. air carriers. GAO was asked to examine (1) FAMS's operational approach or "concept of operations" for covering flights, (2) to what extent this operational approach has been independently evaluated, and (3) the processes and initiatives FAMS established to address workforce-related issues. GAO analyzed documented policies and procedures regarding FAMS's operational approach and a July 2006 classified report based on an independent evaluation of that approach. Also, GAO analyzed employee working group reports and other documentation of FAMS's processes and initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues, and interviewed the FAMS Director, other senior officials, and 67 air marshals (selected to reflect a range in levels of experience). This report is the public version of a restricted report (GAO-09-53SU) issued in December 2008.
What GAO Found
Because the number of air marshals is less than the number of daily flights, FAMS's operational approach is to assign air marshals to selected flights it deems high risk--such as the nonstop, long-distance flights targeted on September 11, 2001. In assigning air marshals, FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of flights in 10 targeted high-risk categories, which are based on consideration of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. In July 2006, the Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded research and development center, independently assessed FAMS's operational approach and found it to be reasonable. However, the institute noted that certain types of flights were covered less often than others. The institute recommended that FAMS increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the coverage of flights within the various risk categories. As of October 2008, FAMS had taken actions (or had ongoing efforts) to implement the Homeland Security Institute's recommendations. GAO found the institute's evaluation methodology to be reasonable. To address workforce-related issues, FAMS's previous director, who served until June 2008, established a number of processes and initiatives--such as working groups, listening sessions, and an internal Web site--for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management on any topic. These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, FAMS revised its policy for airport check-in and aircraft boarding procedures to help protect the anonymity of air marshals in mission status, and FAMS adjusted its flight scheduling process for air marshals to support a better work-life balance. The air marshals GAO interviewed expressed satisfaction with FAMS efforts to address workforce-related issues. Further, the current FAMS Director, after being designated in June 2008 to head the agency, issued a broadcast message to all employees, expressing a commitment to continue applicable processes and initiatives. Also, FAMS has plans to conduct a workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007. Although the 2007 survey indicated positive changes since the prior year, it was answered by 46 percent of the workforce, well short of the 80-percent response rate that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) encourages for ensuring that results reflect the views of the target population. OMB guidance gives steps, such as extending the cut-off date for responding, that could improve the response rate of future surveys. Also, several of the 2007 survey questions were ambiguous, and response options were limited. Addressing these design considerations could enhance future survey results. |
gao_GAO-06-109 | gao_GAO-06-109_0 | Generally, prescription drugs are drugs that are safe for use only under the supervision of a health care practitioner. FDA considers the advisory committees’ recommendations in its deliberations. Four aspects of FDA’s review process were unusual: officials who would normally have been responsible for signing an action letter disagreed with the decision and did not sign the not-approvable letter for Plan B; high-level management was more involved than for other OTC switch applications; conflicting accounts exist of whether the decision to not approve the application was made before the reviews were completed; and the rationale for the not-approvable decision was novel and did not follow FDA’s traditional practices. The Acting Director of CDER Rejected the Recommendations of a Joint Advisory Committee and FDA’s Review Officials
On May 6, 2004, the Acting Director of CDER rejected the recommendations of a joint advisory committee and FDA review officials by signing the not-approvable letter for the Plan B OTC switch application. First, the FDA officials who would normally sign an action letter for an OTC switch application disagreed with the decision and did not sign the Plan B not- approvable letter; as a result, the Acting Director of CDER did so. High-Level FDA Management Was More Involved Than Usual in the Review Process for the Plan B Prescription-to-OTC Switch Application
High-level FDA management became more involved than usual in the review process for the Plan B OTC switch application. FDA Officials Gave Conflicting Accounts of When the Decision to Not Approve Plan B Was Made
FDA officials gave conflicting accounts of when the not-approvable decision for the Plan B OTC switch application was made. The Acting Director further concluded that because these differences in cognitive development made it inappropriate to extrapolate data from older to younger adolescents in this case, there was insufficient data on the use of Plan B among younger adolescents. FDA review officials disagreed with the Acting Director’s rationale and noted that the agency had not considered behavioral implications resulting from differences in cognitive development in prior OTC switch decisions. FDA Review Officials Disagreed with the Acting Director’s Rationale for the Not-Approvable Decision FDA review staff, the Directors of the Offices of Drug Evaluation III and V, and the Director of the Office of New Drugs disagreed with the Acting Director of CDER’s rationale for not approving the Plan B OTC switch application. Plan B Decision Was Not Typical of Other Proposed Prescription-to-OTC Switch Decisions
The decision to not approve the Plan B OTC switch application was not typical of the other 67 proposed prescription-to-OTC switch decisions made from 1994 through 2004. Plan B Was the Only Prescription-to-OTC Switch Decision from 1994 through 2004 in Which the Action Letter Was Signed by the Director of CDER
From 1994 through 2004, 94 action letters were issued during the review processes for the 68 prescription-to-OTC switch applications, and only 1 action letter—the not-approvable letter for Plan B—was signed by the Director, in this case the Acting Director, of CDER. Plan B was the only contraceptive or emergency contraceptive proposed for an OTC switch during this period. There Are No Age- Related Restrictions for Safety Reasons for Any FDA-Approved Contraceptives
According to the Deputy Director of the Office of New Drugs, there are no age-related marketing restrictions for any FDA-approved contraceptives, and FDA has not required any pediatric studies. Also, it was unusual for the Acting Director of CDER to inform FDA’s review staff that it had been determined that the Plan B decision would be made by high-level management. Third, FDA disagreed with our finding that the Acting Director’s rationale for denying the application was novel and did not follow FDA’s traditional practices. In his May 6, 2004, memorandum, the Acting Director stated that “Because of these large developmental differences, I believe that it is very difficult to extrapolate data on behavior from older to younger ages.” The Acting Director acknowledged that considering adolescents’ cognitive development as a rationale for a not-approvable decision was unprecedented for an OTC switch application. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine how the decision was made to not approve the switch of Plan B from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC), we reviewed documents, such as the Plan B OTC switch action package related to the May 6, 2004, decision from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2003, Women's Capital Corporation submitted an application to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requesting the marketing status of its emergency contraceptive pill(ECP), Plan B, be switched from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC). ECPs can be used to prevent an unintended pregnancy when contraception fails or after unprotected intercourse, including cases of sexual assault. In May 2004, the Acting Director for the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) issued a "not-approvable" letter for the switch application, citing safety concerns about the use of Plan B in women under 16 years of age without the supervision of a health care practitioner. Because the not-approvable decision for the Plan B OTC switch application was contrary to the recommendations of FDA's joint advisory committee and FDA review staff, questions were raised about FDA's process for arriving at this decision. GAO was asked to examine (1) how the decision was made to not approve the switch of Plan B from prescription to OTC, (2) how the Plan B decision compares to the decisions for other proposed prescription-to-OTC switches from 1994 through 2004, and (3) whether there are age-related marketing restrictions for prescription Plan B and other prescription and OTC contraceptives. To conduct this review, GAO examined FDA's actions prior to the May 6, 2004, not-approvable letter for the initial application.
What GAO Found
On May 6, 2004, the Acting Director of CDER rejected the recommendations of FDA's joint advisory committee and FDA review officials by signing the not-approvable letter for the Plan B switch application. While FDA followed its general procedures for considering the application, four aspects of FDA's review process were unusual. First, the directors of the offices that reviewed the application, who would normally have been responsible for signing the Plan B action letter, disagreed with the decision and did not sign the not-approvable letter for Plan B. The Director of the Office of New Drugs also disagreed and did not sign the letter. Second, FDA's high-level management was more involved in the review of Plan B than in those of other OTC switch applications. Third, there are conflicting accounts of whether the decision to not approve the application was made before the reviews were completed. Fourth, the rationale for the Acting Director's decision was novel and did not follow FDA's traditional practices. The Acting Director stated that he was concerned about the potential behavioral implications for younger adolescents of marketing Plan B OTC because of their level of cognitive development and that it was invalid to extrapolate data from older to younger adolescents. FDA review officials noted that the agency has not considered behavioral implications due to differences in cognitive development in prior OTC switch decisions and that the agency previously has considered it scientifically appropriate to extrapolate data from older to younger adolescents. The Plan B decision was not typical of the other 67 proposed prescription-to-OTC switch decisions made by FDA from 1994 through 2004. The Plan B OTC switch application was the only one during this period that was not approved after the advisory committees recommended approval. The Plan B action letter was the only one signed by someone other than the officials who would normally sign the letter. Further, there are no age-related marketing restrictions for any prescription or OTC contraceptives that FDA has approved, and FDA has not required pediatric studies for them. FDA identified no issues that would require age-related restrictions in the review of the original prescription Plan B new drug application. In its comments on a draft of this report, FDA disagreed with GAO's finding that high-level management was more involved with the Plan B OTC switch application than usual, with GAO's discussion about when the not-approvable decision was made, and with GAO's finding that the Acting Director of CDER's rationale for denying the application was novel. However, GAO found that high-level management's involvement for the Plan B decision was unusual for an OTC switch application and FDA officials gave GAO conflicting accounts about when they believed the decision was made. The Acting Director acknowledged to GAO that considering adolescents' cognitive development as a rationale for a not-approvable decision was unprecedented for an OTC application, and other FDA officials told GAO that the rationale differed from FDA's traditional practices. |
gao_GAO-15-647 | gao_GAO-15-647_0 | Overall, the total tax debt inventory has been trending upward. Process for Categorizing and Routing Collection Cases Is Largely Automated, but Management Monitors Priority Cases to Achieve Program Goals
Automated Inventory Delivery System Categorizes and Routes Cases to Potentially Be Worked Based on Numerous Factors
IRS uses an automated process to categorize and route most collection cases for potential selection. Management Identifies and Monitors Cases in Priority Areas
IRS’s executives set priorities for closing cases in certain priority areas. However, according to IRS officials, if periodic monitoring indicates that goals may not be met, collection headquarters and program staff collaborate to determine if they should take action to select and work priority cases in sufficient numbers to achieve case closure goals. However, IRS officials also said that they periodically search available collections inventory for large business or high-wealth individuals with unpaid balances when goals are at risk of not being met. IRS Exceeded Case Closure Goals for Priority Areas
During fiscal years 2013 and 2014, IRS exceeded nearly all of its goals for collections in its priority areas. However, when we compared IRS’s processes to standards in the Green Book, we found that they were deficient in some areas, thereby increasing the risk that the collections program may not meet its stated mission. IRS Has Not Clearly Defined Objectives or Key Terms, Such as Fairness, for the Collection Program and Case Selection Process
Internal control standard: define objectives Program objectives are to be clearly defined in measurable terms to enable the design of internal control for related risks. IRS also has not clearly defined important terms such as fairness. Although fairness is in the collection mission statement and IDS processes may affect how collection cases are selected, collection officials had not defined fairness or established it as a program or case selection objective. Without clear objectives for the program and case selection processes codified in official IRS guidance—including definitions for key terms like fairness and risk—IRS is hindered in its efforts to ensure the program is achieving its mission, including ensuring that taxpayers are treated fairly—should fairness become a program objective. According to IRS collection officials, documents identifying and describing IDS procedures and the case selection process are not available because they are the result of incremental decisions and system changes implemented over several years. Without adequate documentation, it is difficult to determine whether the collection’s case selection procedures are effective in supporting program objectives. A lack of documented procedures also increases the risk that they will be consistently applied. Although evaluations have been conducted from time to time, IRS does not have procedures to periodically monitor IDS categorization and routing rules, such as reevaluating dollar thresholds used for categorizing some cases as high priority and routing cases to one collections function instead of another (e.g., ACS versus the Field). IRS has evaluated business rules on an ad-hoc basis. Another risk is that without systematic monitoring, collection procedures could result in unnecessary costs or missed collections. Not adjusting dollar amounts used to make collections case routing decisions could lead to inconsistent treatment of taxpayers over time as the real values of the dollar amounts declined due to inflation. Conclusions
IRS’s collection program is the federal government’s primary enforcement tool for compelling noncompliant taxpayers to file their tax returns and pay taxes, encouraging voluntary compliance and thereby helping address the tax gap. Lastly, IRS noted that our report did not identify any instances where the selection of a case was considered inappropriate or unfair. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) processes for categorizing and routing collection cases, trends in priority areas, and key process changes for fiscal years 2012 through 2014; and (2) assesses how well the processes for case selection support collection’s mission, including applying tax laws with integrity and fairness to all. In regard to internal control standards on establishing program objectives, we interviewed various collection officials, including the Director of Collection and other IRS headquarters managers in the offices of Enterprise Collection Strategy, Campus Compliance Services, and Field Collection, concerning their understanding of the mission, objectives, and internal controls of the collection program and IDS processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS's collection program pursues individuals and businesses that failed to fully pay their taxes or file returns. Since 2009, the total tax debt inventory has increased 23 percent to $380 billion, while collection staff declined 23 percent. Given its large workload and declining resources, it is important that IRS make informed decisions about the collection cases it pursues to enhance compliance and confidence in the tax system.
GAO was asked to review IRS's processes for categorizing and routing collection cases for potential selection. This report (1) describes collection processes and trends in priority areas; and (2) assesses how well controls support the mission, including applying tax laws with integrity and fairness to all.
GAO reviewed IRS guidance, processes, and controls for categorizing and routing collection cases, reviewed data on results in priority areas, assessed whether IRS's controls followed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) collection program largely uses automated processes to categorize and route unpaid tax or unfiled tax return cases for potential selection. The automated Inventory Delivery System (IDS) categorizes and routes cases based on many factors, such as type of tax and amount owed. Outside of IDS, collection managers set goals for closing cases in priority areas, such as delinquent employer payroll taxes and cases involving certain high-wealth taxpayers. If goals are at risk of not being met, officials may take action to select additional priority cases. In recent fiscal years, the collection program has exceeded nearly all case closure goals for priority cases. However, because IRS has not identified objectives for the collection program, such as fairness, it is difficult to assess the program's overall effectiveness.
GAO identified several areas where the lack of documented objectives and internal control deficiencies for categorizing and routing cases increase the risk that the collection program's mission, including fair case selection, will not be achieved. Examples of key internal control steps and deficiencies follow.
Program objectives and key terms are not clearly defined: Although fairness is specified in the collection mission statement and IDS processes can affect how collection cases are selected, management has not defined fairness or any other program or case selection objectives. IRS collection's management referred to various documents as examples of program objectives. However, the documents were not specific enough nor codified in official IRS guidance to ensure proper control over the program. Without clearly defined objectives that can enhance program effectiveness, it is difficult for IRS to ensure it selected collection cases in a fair and unbiased manner.
Case categorization and routing procedures are not documented: According to management, case categorization and routing procedures were developed over several years as the result of incremental decisions and system changes. However, GAO found that the system and decisions were not documented, such as the selection of priority areas. Without documentation, it is difficult to determine whether processes are effective or consistently applied.
Effectiveness of processes is not routinely monitored : Despite some ad-hoc studies, IRS does not have procedures to periodically monitor IDS, including the dollar thresholds used to identify some cases for collection. Management could not provide GAO with justification for the thresholds because according to officials, they were set so long ago. Without periodic evaluations, out-of-date collection procedures could result in unnecessary costs or missed collections. Unadjusted dollar amounts could lead to inconsistent treatment of taxpayers over time as the real value of dollar thresholds decline over time due to inflation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS take five actions to improve collection controls, such as clearly defining and documenting program objectives and control procedures, and periodically evaluating the effectiveness of controls. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS said it generally agreed with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-327 | gao_GAO-10-327_0 | Companies also consider payroll taxes in managing offshore operations. Our analysis of SEC filings found that in 2008, 29 of the top defense contractors—accounting for 41 percent of DOD contracting dollars in fiscal year 2008—had at least 1,194 offshore subsidiaries. According to 13 of the top defense contractors we interviewed, 718 of the 738 offshore subsidiaries—or 97 percent—that they reported to the SEC in fiscal year 2008 were generally used to support global commercial clients, and foreign government contracts rather than DOD contracts. Our review of 2008 SEC filings for the 29 publicly traded defense companies found that approximately one-third reported decreasing their 2008 effective U.S. tax rates through the use of foreign affiliates, lower foreign tax rates, and indefinite reinvestment of foreign income outside of the United States. Offshore Subsidiaries Supporting DOD Service Contracts Overseas Were Principally Used to Avoid Payroll Taxes
The primary use of the offshore subsidiaries registered outside the contract place of performance—many of those reviewed in our six case studies—was to hire U.S. workers to perform services overseas and thereby avoid Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes for those employees. HEART Act Resulted in Contractors Paying FICA Taxes and Impacted Use of Offshore Subsidiaries
After the HEART Act took effect, defense contractors that were not paying FICA taxes on U.S. personnel working on DOD contracts outside of the United States began to submit requests for equitable adjustments to recover their newly increased tax costs. As a result, in fiscal year 2009, four of the five contractors using offshore subsidiaries to support DOD work requested reimbursement of at least $140 million from DOD for new FICA payments on the contracts we reviewed as well as some others. Several contractors stated that they initially used offshore subsidiaries to hire U.S. workers to perform services overseas in order to offer competitive prices when bidding for DOD contracts, and as this practice grew, it became a competitive necessity. Defense Contractors’ Offshore Subsidiaries Continue to Avoid Unemployment Taxes for Their U.S. Workers
While five of the six contractors in our case studies said that reducing FICA tax payments was the primary reason for using offshore subsidiaries, this practice also allowed the contractors to reduce costs by avoiding state and federal unemployment insurance taxes for U.S. personnel working overseas. In one state where four of the six case study contractors have a corporate presence, we reviewed documentation for about 140 former employees of several contractors who were denied unemployment benefits in 2009. State workforce officials indicated that these benefits were denied because the employees worked for a foreign subsidiary and not an American employer. Contractors’ Use of Offshore Subsidiaries Did Not Impede DOD’s Contract Oversight
In the contracts we reviewed, DOD oversight officials were aware of the roles that offshore subsidiaries played in supporting the contracts. DOD officials said that oversight mechanisms, such as DCAA’s annual reviews of incurred costs, provide knowledge of the activities of offshore subsidiaries in cost-reimbursement contracts. Contracting officials said that the use of offshore subsidiaries did not negatively affect contract schedule or performance. Contract file and oversight documents we reviewed, such as contractor price proposals and cost accounting disclosure statements, disclosed the use of offshore subsidiaries. Conclusion
While defense contractors have increased their offshore subsidiaries used for commercial purposes, the practice of using offshore subsidiaries to avoid certain payroll taxes on U.S. government contracts has been addressed by the HEART Act. As a result, contractors have begun to pay FICA taxes for U.S. workers hired through offshore subsidiaries to support DOD contracts, thus contributing to the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds. We selected these contractors based on a range of the amount of government work in fiscal year 2008, location of identified subsidiaries, and industry type. In addition, we reviewed relevant Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit reports and documentation. In addition, we reviewed guidance and interviewed Department of Labor officials about federal and state unemployment insurance eligibility requirements. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many federal contractors establish offshore subsidiaries to take advantage of labor and market conditions. GAO has found that they also use offshore subsidiaries to reduce their U.S. tax burdens. In 2008, Congress passed the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax (HEART) Act which resulted in contractor offshore subsidiaries paying certain payroll taxes for U.S. personnel working abroad. Fiscal year 2009's National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to report on the rationales, implications, and costs and benefits of defense contractors' use of offshore subsidiaries. We (1) assessed trends and purposes for contractors' offshore subsidiaries; (2) identified how contractors use subsidiaries to support defense contracts; (3) assessed DOD's oversight of contractors' use of offshore subsidiaries. To conduct our work, we reviewed data for the 29 U.S. publicly traded contractors with at least $1 billion in DOD spending in fiscal year 2008, reviewed several illustrative contracts selected based on categories of DOD services most often performed overseas, reviewed audit documents, and interviewed DOD officials about oversight.
What GAO Found
Many of the top 29 U.S. publicly traded defense contractors--those with $1 billion or more in DOD contracts in fiscal year 2008--have created offshore subsidiaries to facilitate global operations. Between fiscal years 2003 and 2008, they increased their use of these subsidiaries by 26 percent, maintaining at least 1,194 in 2008. We interviewed 13 of the 29 contractors based on a range of the amount of government work, locations of subsidiaries, and industry types; they reported that 97 percent of the subsidiaries generally supported global commercial and foreign government clients, while the remaining 3 percent supported DOD contracts performed overseas. These subsidiaries also helped the 29 contractors reduce taxes, with about one-third decreasing their effective U.S. corporate tax rates in 2008 in part through the use of foreign affiliates, lower foreign tax rates, and indefinite reinvestment of foreign income outside of the United States. For five of the DOD contracts we reviewed, companies principally used offshore subsidiaries to hire U.S. workers providing services overseas on U.S. government contracts in order to avoid Social Security, Medicare--known as Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)--and other payroll taxes. This practice allowed contractors to offer lower bids when competing for certain services and thereby reduce costs for DOD. Our analysis of two contracts showed that the use of offshore subsidiaries saved DOD at least $110 million annually prior to the HEART Act, through payroll tax avoidance. While this practice provided contract cost savings for DOD, it resulted in these companies avoiding payroll taxes that would have contributed to the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds. The 2008 HEART Act resulted in offshore subsidiaries of U.S. companies paying FICA taxes for U.S. workers performing services overseas on U.S. government contracts. As a result, in fiscal year 2009, four of the case study contractors using offshore subsidiaries to support DOD work requested reimbursement from DOD of at least $140 million for new FICA payments. Federal and state unemployment payroll taxes, however, were not covered by the HEART Act, and several contractors that used offshore subsidiaries have continued to avoid these taxes. In one state, we reviewed documentation for about 140 former employees of several contractors who were denied unemployment benefits in 2009. State workforce officials indicated these benefits were denied because the employees worked for a foreign subsidiary and not an American employer. DOD officials were aware of the roles offshore subsidiaries played in the DOD contracts we reviewed and stated that oversight mechanisms, such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency's reviews of incurred costs and oversight documents, inform them of the activities of offshore subsidiaries. In contracts we reviewed, evidence of offshore subsidiaries was present in contractor labor rates, cost accounting disclosures, and contractor price proposals. Contracting officials stated that the use of offshore subsidiaries did not negatively impact contract schedule or performance. |
gao_GAO-02-472T | gao_GAO-02-472T_0 | Reinsurers and insurers have begun shedding their exposure to terrorism risk as insurance contracts come up for renewal, leaving policyholders increasingly exposed to losses from a terrorist attack. Reinsurers Are Withdrawing from the Market for Terrorism Insurance
Reinsurers—companies that routinely take on some of the risk that direct primary insurers face in return for a share of the premiums—are now unwilling to participate in terrorism coverage because of the enormous losses they suffered after September 11th and the newly recognized difficulties of pricing terrorism insurance. As Business Exposure to Uninsured Risks Rises, so Do the Potential Economic Consequences
While the extent of the negative economic impacts of a lack of terrorism coverage is not yet clear, the potential for more severe economic impacts is increasing as the level of uninsured risk climbs. If another terrorist event of similar magnitude were to take place, all those losses would still be incurred. These reasons can be attributed to uncertainty and an unwillingness among lenders and investors to accept risks that cannot yet be reasonably estimated and that insurance companies are unable to price. The broker could not find more terrorism coverage for these properties. The firm reported it has not been able to find an insurer that will sell it terrorism coverage at any price. Without this loan and others like it, the firm’s future growth potential is severely limited. NAIC agreed with insurers that without reinsurance, insurers’ solvency could be at risk if they were required to provide insurance for terrorism. | What GAO Found
In the closing months of last year, insurers claimed that they could not afford to continue providing coverage for potential terrorism losses. Considerable debate has taken place on what the federal government can do to keep commercial insurance companies involved in providing terrorism insurance, even without the protection that they normally receive from reinsurance. Insurance companies are withdrawing from the market because they believe that neither the frequency nor the magnitude of future terrorist losses can be estimated. Insurance coverage for terroris is disappearing, particularly for large businesses and those perceived to be at some risk. This withdrawal is happening fastest among reinsurers. Because the insurers' withdrawal has been gradual, the extent of the potential economic consequences is still unclear. What is clear is that without terrorism insurance, terrorist attacks would dramatically increase direct losses to businesses, employees, and lenders. Furthermore, the government's ability to intervene after a future terrorist attack may be hampered by its lack of claims-processing and payments systems. Even without actual terrorist attacks, some properties and businesses have been unable to find terrorism coverage at any price. These problems are likely to increase as more insurance contracts come up for renewal during the coming year. The resulting economic drag could slow economic recovery and growth. |
gao_GAO-07-714 | gao_GAO-07-714_0 | These businesses numbered over 300,000 in 2004 and accounted for almost 45 percent of all U.S. manufacturing jobs. In addition, multiple agencies may be tasked by the President to focus their efforts on a specific topic of relevance to the business community. These agencies may create interagency groups consisting of representatives from multiple federal agencies to better coordinate their individual programs and crosscutting activities. Few Federal Programs Target Small Businesses Engaged in Manufacturing, but Services Are Available through over 200 Federal Programs That Broadly Support the U.S. Business Sector
Of the 254 federal programs we identified that provide financial or nonfinancial services or both to support the U.S. business sector, 5 programs provide services specifically to small businesses engaged in manufacturing, while an additional 15 programs target manufacturers, regardless of their size. Only 1 of the 5 programs offered financial assistance in addition to its nonfinancial services. In addition, MTAPP provides hands on assistance with quality assurance, improving the efficiency of manufacturing operations, sales and marketing, information technology, and business planning. As shown in table 1, these 3 programs provided $3.8 million and served 95 small manufacturers on average each year from fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Small Manufacturers May Obtain Services from 15 Federal Programs That Target Manufacturers, Regardless of Size
Agencies within Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Labor administered 15 programs that provided services specifically to manufacturers, regardless of their size. Because not all of these programs gather data on the size of the manufacturing businesses they serve, we could not determine the extent to which small manufacturers avail themselves of the services that each of these programs offer. Small Manufacturers May Also Benefit from Many Federal Programs That Target Businesses, Regardless of Size or Type
We identified an additional 107 programs administered by 15 agencies included in our review that offer financial or nonfinancial services or both to businesses, regardless of the size or type of business. Six Interagency Efforts Support Manufacturing, and 14 Support All Businesses, Including Manufacturers
Of the 20 federal interagency efforts we identified that address the concerns of the business sector, 4 specifically focus on the challenges faced by small manufacturers, 2 focus on issues faced by manufacturers in general, and the remaining 14 focus on issues of concern to small businesses or businesses in general. Of the remaining 14 interagency efforts that we identified, 5 focus on the concerns of small businesses and 9 focus on the concerns of all businesses in general, both of which may address some issues that are also relevant to small businesses engaged in manufacturing. All of the agencies except for the Appalachian Regional Commission provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We identified (1) those programs that provide services to support manufacturing by U.S. small businesses and, for fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the services and funds these programs provided and their levels of participation and (2) current federal interagency efforts that support manufacturing by U.S. small businesses. In addition, we compiled a list of studies that focuses on federal programs that support small businesses engaged in manufacturing. Target businesses
Small Business Transportation Resource Centers: 1) disseminate information to small and disadvantaged businesses on business opportunities in Transportation- direct and Transportation-funded activities; 2) carry out market research, and business analyses, to identify the training and technical assistance needs of small businesses to help them become better prepared to compete for and receive transportation-related contracts; 3) design and carry out training and technical assistance programs to encourage, promote, and help minority entrepreneurs and businesses in obtain contracts, subcontracts, and projects related to business opportunities in Transportation-direct and Transportation-funded activities; 4) develop support mechanisms to help minority entrepreneurs and businesses take advantage of those business opportunities; 5) assist minority entrepreneurs and businesses by identifying opportunities for obtaining investment capital and debt financing, including Transportation’s Short Term Lending Program; 6) participate in and cooperate with federal and other programs designed to provide financial management and other forms of support and assistance to minority entrepreneurs and businesses; and 7) conduct outreach and disseminate information to small and disadvantaged business across the nation at local, regional and national transportation and business related conferences, seminars and workshops. Appendix XVII: National Science Foundation – Programs that Offer Services to Small Manufacturers and Types of Services
Target businesses Agency description of program purpose
Appendix XVIII: Small Business Administration – Programs that Offer Services to Small Manufacturers and Types of Services
Appendix XVIII: Small Business Administration – Programs that Offer Services to Small Manufacturers and Types of Services The Pollution Control Loans program is designed to provide financing to eligible small businesses for the planning, design, or installation of a pollution control facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Small businesses engaged in manufacturing, typically those with 500 or fewer employees, comprise about 90 percent of all U.S. manufacturers and employ 6 million workers. Recent studies have shown that small manufacturing businesses face a number of challenges in their efforts to remain competitive, including the inability to obtain operating and investment capital, a lack of familiarity with new business practices, and difficulty in finding independent advice and skilled employees. To help these businesses overcome such challenges, many federal agencies provide financial and nonfinancial technical services through targeted or general programs or create interagency work groups to better coordinate their efforts and more effectively support these businesses. In this context, GAO identified (1) federal programs that provide services to support small businesses engaged in manufacturing and (2) federal interagency efforts that focus on issues of concern to small manufacturing businesses. To identify these programs and efforts, GAO obtained documentation from 19 federal agencies. In commenting on a draft of this report, 18 of the 19 agencies made technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 254 federal programs that provide services to support the business sector, of which 5 provide services specifically to small businesses engaged in manufacturing and an additional 15 target manufacturers, regardless of their size. Seven of the 20 programs had data on the level of services provided to small manufacturing businesses, and between fiscal years 2004 through 2006 these programs provided over $35 million and served from about 8,000 small manufacturing businesses in 2004 to over 9,000 in 2006. The 5 programs that target small businesses engaged in manufacturing provide primarily nonfinancial technical assistance to help firms improve the efficiency of their manufacturing operations and their quality control processes as well as to solve specific manufacturing problems. These 5 programs also offer small manufacturing businesses general assistance with their strategic and business planning, accounting and financing, and sales and marketing. In addition, 1 of the 5 programs offers financial assistance. Of the 15 programs that provide services to manufacturers, regardless of their size, 9 offer only nonfinancial services similar to the 5 that target small manufacturing firms, and 6 also provide financial services. Small businesses engaged in manufacturing also can obtain services from 127 other federal programs that are available to all small businesses, regardless of their business type. Many of these programs provide general business and management services, and about 35 percent also offer financial services, such as loans or grants. Finally, small manufacturing businesses can obtain general business, export, and financial services from an additional 107 federal programs designed to help the business sector in general, regardless of the size or type of the business involved. Because not all of these programs gather data on the size of the businesses they serve, it is unclear how many small manufacturing firms received services from these general programs. GAO identified 20 federal interagency efforts that focus on supporting the business sector. Of these 20 efforts, 4 were created specifically to focus on the challenges that small businesses engaged in manufacturing face, and 2 were created to focus on issues relevant to manufacturers in general, regardless of their size. The agencies involved in 3 of the 4 interagency efforts that focus on the concerns of small manufacturing businesses collaborate to expand and coordinate their services through national networks of technical assistance centers. The 4th effort involves efforts to help small manufacturing businesses improve the efficiency of their operations. The 2 interagency efforts that focus on issues relevant to manufacturers in general focus on developing strategies to improve the competitiveness of manufacturers and resolving issues associated with manufacturing-related research and development policies, programs, and budgets. The remaining 14 interagency efforts that GAO identified focus on the concerns of small businesses or of all businesses in general, which may include some issues that also are of concern to small manufacturing businesses. |
gao_GAO-03-1026 | gao_GAO-03-1026_0 | The Navy and Air Force SOF components are responsible for managing their own language-training programs. The foreign language program provides training for more than 12,000 SOF military personnel (about 28 percent of all 43,671 SOF personnel) who are required to acquire some level of proficiency in one or more foreign languages. These actions include consolidating all language training under a single contractor, completing a long overdue assessment of language requirements, improving communication and coordination with all program stakeholders, developing a database to monitor language proficiencies and training, and looking for ways to make use of other foreign-language-training assets. Without such a cohesive management framework, the program may lose its current momentum, and it may be unable to meet the new language-training needs that SOF personnel are likely to have as they take on expanded roles and responsibilities in counterterrorism and other military operations. Approach Needed to Improve Access to Language-Training Resources
The SOF foreign-language-training program continues to face ongoing challenges that limit the access that special operations forces have to take advantage of language-training opportunities. In addition, Army Reserve and National Guard members face further hurdles in getting access to training because of their geographic dispersion and part-time status. These members also receive lower monetary incentives for achieving required proficiencies and fewer training opportunities than active-duty members. Greater reliance on SOF personnel in combating terrorism may increase these challenges. But program officials are still at an early stage in their evaluations. As a result, SOF personnel need to have a wide range of options to gain access to language-training resources at anytime and anywhere they are stationed or deployed. Conclusions
While the U.S. Special Operations Command has taken several recent actions to begin improving the delivery of language training and the management of its foreign language program, these actions have been taken without the benefit of a cohesive management framework combined with strategic planning tools. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the management and delivery of foreign language training for special operations forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command to adopt a strategy for meeting special operations forces’ foreign language requirements and develop the necessary strategic-planning tools (a strategic plan with associated performance plan and reports) to use in managing and assessing the progress of its foreign language program and to better address future human capital challenges and incorporate distance/distributive-learning approaches into the program to improve the special operations forces’ access to language training, and if additional resources are required, to request them. In identifying ways for the command to deal with challenges that limit accessibility to its foreign language training resources, we interviewed officials at SOFLO and the service component commands to understand the training requirements and resources and determine the challenges faced by SOF personnel in gaining accessing language training. 1.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Of the 44,000 special operations forces (SOF) that perform difficult, complex, and sensitive military missions on short notice anytime and anywhere in the world, more than 12,000 (28 percent) have a foreign language requirement to operate in places where English is not spoken. In the Senate Report on the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that GAO review SOF foreign language requirements and training. In this report, we (1) assess the U.S. Special Operations Command's recent actions to improve the management of the SOF foreign language program and the delivery of training, and (2) identify ways for the command to deal with ongoing challenges that limit SOF personnel's access to language-training opportunities.
What GAO Found
Recent actions taken by the U.S. Special Operations Command are starting to address some long-standing problems with the management of the SOF foreign language program and the delivery of language training. In September 2002, the command consolidated all training under a single contractor to provide a universal, standardized curriculum and a range of delivery mechanisms for Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF components. Initial assessments suggest that the contractor's offerings are meeting contract expectations. In other actions, the program is completing an overdue assessment of SOF language requirements, developing a database of language proficiencies and training, and finding ways to take advantage of other national language-training assets. While promising, these ongoing actions are taking place without the benefit of a cohesive management framework incorporating a strategy and strategic planning to guide, integrate, and monitor its activities. Without such a framework, the program risks losing its current momentum and failing to meet new language-training needs that SOF personnel are likely to acquire as they take on expanded roles in combating terrorism and other military operations. The SOF foreign language program continues to face challenges, such as more frequent and longer deployments, that limit personnel's access to language training. Army Reserve and National Guard SOF members face additional difficulties in gaining access to centrally located training because of geographical dispersion and part-time status; they also have lower monetary incentives to acquire language proficiencies and fewer training opportunities. As a result, most SOF personnel have been unable to take needed training or required tests to qualify in their respective language(s). To address these challenges, program officials are looking into distance/distributive-learning approaches, which offer "anytime, anywhere" training that would be highly adaptable to SOF personnel needs, but they are still at an early stage in their evaluations. |
gao_GAO-13-662 | gao_GAO-13-662_0 | Before IRS created CAP, large corporations waited about 50 months on average from the time a tax return was filed to IRS closing of the traditional audit under CIC. As already noted, taxpayers had to reflect uncertainty about their tax liability on their financial statements. IRS’s vision is reflected in the following seven CAP goals: ensure taxpayer compliance; reduce overall examination time; increase currency for taxpayers (e.g., working on the unfiled return for the most recent tax year during the CAP pre-filing stage); enhance the accurate, efficient, and timely resolution of complex tax issues; increase audit coverage by providing more efficient use of resources; reduce taxpayer administrative burden; and increase certainty for taxpayers. IRS Has Not Evaluated Whether CAP Is Meeting Its Intended Goals, Has Not Established a Full Suite of Performance Measures and Targets, and Has Not Developed Consistent and Complete Data
Although CAP started 8 years ago and IRS is looking to further expand CAP, IRS has not evaluated CAP’s effectiveness, whether its goals are being accomplished, or whether it should be expanded and if so, to what extent. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) in February 2013 recommended that IRS develop an evaluation plan for CAP and IRS agreed to do so in responding to TIGTA’s report. IRS officials stated in May 2013 that they will start to develop a plan for evaluating CAP during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013 but they did not state when the plan would be completed or the evaluation would be done. As shown in table 2 and discussed below, IRS cannot show the extent to which CAP goals are being met because some goals do not have measures and none have specific targets. It is useful to know how taxpayers feel about issue resolution; however, IRS does not have a system to track issues that are being audited and resolved to provide data to help assess the goal. Specifically, tracking staff time charges on pre-filing activities for CAP could not be done because the code used by IRS to track some charges also included non-CAP activities; doing an analysis of CAP time charges would help determine whether CAP saves resources compared to traditional audits. Even if IRS compiled and tracked data on all audited issues, whether or not resolved, IRS does not have a way to identify and track emerging tax issues. Without this tracking, IRS cannot readily determine how quickly new issues are identified or resolved in CAP. IRS’s Readiness to Further Expand Compliance Maintenance Is Unclear
IRS has been moving taxpayers into the Compliance Maintenance phase. In this phase, IRS intends to save resources by streamlining its reviews of corporate tax returns. Such a plan also could discuss how IRS will assimilate these taxpayers and ensure that IRS has the capacity to manage the increased workload within the expedited time frames envisioned for corporate taxpayers placed into Compliance Maintenance. CAP may not achieve its intended goals if IRS does not have a clear plan or criteria for how it would expand Compliance Maintenance and monitor and ensure that the right taxpayers are in this phase. CAP’s Expedited Time Frames Pose Coordination Difficulties for Some Tax Issues Which IRS Is Addressing
According to IRS account coordinators for CAP cases, other IRS officials, corporate tax experts, and large corporation tax officials that we interviewed or that participated in our focus groups, the expedited nature of a CAP audit has led to difficulties in coordinating IRS reviews of APAs and research credits—both take longer to complete than the pre-filing time frame of CAP allows. However, it is too early to tell whether IRS’s efforts will work. Similarly, IRS does not track whether CAP is identifying emerging tax issues. Absent a clear plan for expanding Compliance Maintenance and ensuring that account coordinators clearly understand guidance on monitoring and removing taxpayers, it will be difficult for IRS to provide reasonable assurance that Compliance Maintenance accepts the most compliant and cooperative corporate taxpayers, which is necessary for this phase to work as intended and to contribute to CAP goals, such as generating resource savings to increase audit coverage. Develop measures for each CAP goal and set related targets. Consistently and completely capture data needed to track progress against the CAP goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the goals and potential benefits of the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP), (2) assess the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) efforts to determine whether CAP is meeting its goals, (3) assess IRS’s readiness to expand Compliance Maintenance, and (4) describe IRS’s efforts to coordinate CAP with existing processes for large corporate compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS audits of the tax returns filed by large corporations take four years, on average, to complete. Additional years can be spent in appeals. This is costly to IRS and creates years of uncertainty about a large corporation's actual tax liability. In response, IRS developed CAP in 2005. Under this process, IRS and taxpayers agree on how to report tax issues before the return is filed: compliant and cooperative taxpayers can get a streamlined IRS review of their tax return in a phase called Compliance Maintenance. GAO was asked to assess this process. In this report, GAO (1) describes the goals and potential benefits of the process, (2) assesses IRS's efforts to determine whether these goals are met, (3) assesses IRS's readiness to move more taxpayers into Compliance Maintenance, and (4) describes IRS's efforts to coordinate the process with its existing compliance processes. GAO reviewed IRS documentation and data, interviewed IRS officials and corporate tax experts, and held focus groups with tax executives of large corporations and with IRS audit staff.
What GAO Found
Officials GAO interviewed inside and outside of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally agreed on the potential major benefits of the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) to taxpayers and IRS as reflected in its goals. These goals include saving IRS time and resources to use for other audits while ensuring compliance, and reducing taxpayer burden while increasing certainty on tax amounts now owed.
Contrary to its guidelines, IRS has not evaluated whether the goals are being achieved or the process should be expanded. IRS officials told GAO that IRS will start developing an evaluation plan in 2013, but did not provide dates for when an evaluation would be completed. IRS cannot show the extent to which the goals are being met for two reasons.
Some goals do not have measures and none have targets. Although developing measures and setting targets for goals (such as ensuring taxpayer compliance) can be difficult, not doing so limits IRS's ability to determine whether the process is working as intended.
IRS does not have consistent and complete data for CAP. Inconsistent data make some analyses difficult to do. For instance, the average annual staff hours spent auditing a return could not be analyzed because the code to track staff time charges sometimes included non-CAP time charges. Incomplete data did not allow IRS to track progress for some goals. While IRS audit teams document tax issues in case files, IRS does not compile the data to track issue resolution. As a result, IRS cannot readily determine whether audit teams are resolving issues uniformly or identifying emerging tax compliance issues. Similarly, IRS does not have a system to track resource savings. Without a system, IRS cannot know the amount of saved resources or plan for their reallocation.
IRS has been moving taxpayers into Compliance Maintenance without documenting a plan to ensure, among other things, that IRS has the capacity to assimilate these taxpayers in an expedited fashion, as intended. In addition, IRS audit staff had concerns about guidance on moving taxpayers in and out of this phase. IRS clarified the guidance in May 2013, but has not verified whether the audit staff understand it. Without verification, IRS does not have reasonable assurance that the audit staff understand which taxpayers are right for Compliance Maintenance and when it would be appropriate to remove them.
IRS is addressing difficulties in coordinating CAP with other compliance processes. Difficulties include resolving some complex tax issues within the expedited time frames, and ensuring that all IRS specialists who assist audit teams understand the process. It is too early to tell whether IRS's efforts will work.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS evaluate the process, develop measures and targets for the goals, consistently capture data to track goal progress, track resolution of tax issues and resource savings, develop a plan to expand Compliance Maintenance, and verify that audit staff understand attempts to clarify related guidance. In written comments, IRS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-662 | gao_GAO-04-662_0 | DOE Has Overall Program Plan in Place, but the Large Number of Organizations Involved in the Program Could Delay Progress
Since the program was transferred from DOD to DOE in December 2002, DOE (1) has developed an overall program plan to manage the construction of the fossil fuel plants, (2) has selected two U.S. contractors to oversee work on the replacement fossil fuel plants, and (3) is working with its U.S. contractors to review design and construction plans for the plants. However, U.S. and Russian officials expressed concern that the large number of U.S. and Russian organizations, 17, involved in the overall management of the program makes coordination difficult and has led to delays. DOE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Shut Down the Reactors, Including Obtaining Russia’s Support to Implement Key Nonproliferation and Safety Initiatives
Final shutdown of Russia’s three plutonium production reactors is uncertain because DOE faces challenges in implementing its program. Russia’s recent rejection of DOE’s initiatives to reduce the amount of plutonium being produced by the reactors and to improve the safety of the reactors prior to their shutdown raises serious questions about Russia’s commitment to the fundamental nonproliferation and safety goals of the program. Furthermore, the agreement contains shutdown dates that are not realistic. Finally, thousands of Russian nuclear workers who are currently employed at the reactors and related facilities will be displaced when the reactors are closed. Although DOE officials told us that a failure to find jobs for these workers could threaten the success of the program, DOE has not developed a plan to coordinate the shutdown of the reactors with other DOE and Department of State efforts designed to find employment for Russian nuclear workers. DOE Has Spent Only a Small Portion of Available Program Funds, and Total Program Costs Are Likely to Be Significantly Higher Than DOE’s Original Estimates
As of December 31, 2003, DOE had spent $7.8 million, about 4 percent of the funds available, to begin work on planning and developing the program. To increase the chances for program success by clarifying the existing reactor shutdown agreement, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration and Secretary of State, do the following: reach agreement with Russia on the steps that must be taken to permanently shut down the reactors and the specific requirements that must be met to complete the replacement fossil fuel plants; identify any additional costs that may surface as a result of refining the scope of work associated with shutting down the reactors and completing the replacement fossil fuel plants and revise cost and schedule estimates for the program accordingly; and amend the March 2003 reactor shutdown agreement as soon as practicable to accurately reflect DOE’s more realistic shutdown dates for Russia’s three plutonium production reactors. We interviewed officials from DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management and from the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Russia's continued operation of three plutonium production reactors poses a serious proliferation threat. The Department of Energy's (DOE) Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program seeks to facilitate the reactors' closure by building or refurbishing replacement fossil fuel plants. This report (1) describes DOE's efforts to manage and implement the program, (2) assesses the challenges DOE faces in achieving its goal of shutting down the reactors, and (3) identifies DOE's current expenditures and projected program costs.
What GAO Found
DOE is financing and managing the construction of two fossil fuel plants in Russia that will replace the heat and electricity that will be lost with the shutdown of Russia's three plutonium production reactors. DOE (1) has developed an overall plan to manage its program, (2) has selected two U.S. contractors to oversee the construction of replacement fossil fuel plants, and (3) is working with its U.S. contractors to review specific design and construction plans for the plants. DOE officials expressed concern that the number of organizations, 17, involved in the program makes coordination difficult and has led to delays. Additionally, DOE and U.S. contractor officials said that the primary Russian contractor may not have adequate experience and currently lacks enough staff to implement its part of the program. Final shutdown of the reactors is uncertain because DOE faces a number of challenges in implementing its program, including (1) ensuring Russia's commitment to the nonproliferation and safety goals of the program, (2) clarifying the existing reactor shutdown agreement, and (3) working with Russia to find employment for thousands of Russian nuclear workers who will lose their jobs when the reactors are closed. Russia's rejection of DOE's proposals to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors and to improve the safety of the reactors before they are shut down raises serious questions about Russia's commitment to key program goals. Furthermore, the existing reactor shutdown agreement contains shutdown dates that do not reflect DOE's planned program schedule. Finally, the challenge of finding employment for Russian nuclear workers could undermine the program by creating the potential for Russia to continue operating the reactors longer than necessary to ensure jobs for the workers. DOE has not developed a plan to address this issue. As of December 31, 2003, DOE had spent $7.8 million--about 4 percent of available funds on planning and developing the program, including travel, overhead, project administration, and document translation costs. Regarding future program costs, DOE officials told us that they expect the projected costs to build the replacement fossil fuel plants to be significantly higher than their original estimate of $466 million, possibly as much as $1 billion. |
gao_GAO-12-599T | gao_GAO-12-599T_0 | Further Steps Are Needed to Mitigate Risks in the Visa Waiver Program
In May 2011, we reported that DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement.However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA approval. DHS requires applicants for Visa Waiver Program travel to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS took several steps to minimize the burden associated with ESTA use. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of the Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent—about 364,000 travelers—traveled under the Visa Waiver Program without verified ESTA approval. As we reported in May 2011, DHS had not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has established procedures to review quarterly a sample of noncompliant passengers to evaluate potential security risks associated with the ESTA program. Further, in May 2011, we reported that to meet certain statutory requirements, DHS requires that Visa Waiver Program countries enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, only about half of the countries had fully complied with this requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. The 9/11 Act specifies that each Visa Waiver Program country must enter into agreements with the United States to share information regarding whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the United States represent a threat to the security or welfare of the United States and to report lost or stolen passports. In March 2012, DHS reported that 24 of the 36 Visa Waiver Program countries have signed HSPD-6 agreements. DHS, with the support of interagency partners, established a compliance schedule requiring the last of the Visa Waiver Program countries to finalize these agreements by June 2012. DHS, in coordination with the Department of State and the Department of Justice, developed measures short of termination that could be applied to countries not meeting their compliance date. According to officials, DHS plans to decide which measures to apply on a case-by-case basis. Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population
ICE Investigates Few In- Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could Benefit from Improved Planning
As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to, among other things, ICE’s competing priorities; however, these efforts could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE indicated it may allocate more resources to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward, and that it planned to focus primarily on suspected overstays who ICE has identified as high risk or who recently overstayed their authorized periods of admission. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United States. We recommended that ICE establish a target time frame for assessing the funding and resources ERO would require in order to assume responsibility for civil overstay enforcement and use the results of that assessment. DHS officials agreed with our recommendation and stated that ICE planned to identify resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of its fiscal year 2013 resource planning process. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts to identify and report on visa overstays were hindered by unreliable data. GAO-11-335. GAO-11-411. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS manages the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals from 36 countries to apply for admission to the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without a visa. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, over 98 million visitors were admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. During that time period, the Department of State issued more than 36 million nonimmigrant visas for temporary travel to the country. DHS is also responsible for investigating overstaysunauthorized immigrants who entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required DHS, in consultation with the Department of State, to take steps to enhance the security of the program. This testimony is based on GAO products issued in September 2008; April, May, and December 2011; and selected updates from DHS as of March 2012 on the status of DHSs efforts to implement the 9/11 Act requirements and to address prior GAO recommendations. As requested, it addresses the following issues: (1) challenges in the Visa Waiver Program, and (2) overstay enforcement efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported on actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken to improve the security of the Visa Waiver Program; but, additional risks remain. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), and took steps to minimize the burden associated with this requirement. DHS requires Visa Waiver Program travelers to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. DHS made efforts to minimize the burden imposed by this requirement. For example, although travelers formerly filled out a Visa Waiver Program application form for each journey to the United States, ESTA approval is generally valid for 2 years. However, GAO reported that DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of travelers without verified ESTA approval. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percentabout 364,000 travelerstraveled under the program without verified ESTA approval. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS had not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program and recommended that it establish timeframes for regular review. DHS concurred and has since established procedures to review a sample of noncompliant passengers on a quarterly basis. Further, per the 9/11 Act, DHS requires Visa Waiver Program countries to enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, DHS reported that only about half of the 36 countries have fully complied with this requirement as of March 2012, and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. DHS, with its interagency partners, established a compliance schedule to finalize these agreements by June 2012. Also, DHS and its interagency partners have developed measures short of termination that could be applied on a case-by-case basis to countries not meeting their compliance date.
In April 2011, GAO reported that federal agencies take actions against a small portion of overstays, but improving planning could strengthen overstay enforcement. Immigration and Customs Enforcements (ICE) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is responsible for overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated 4 to 5.5 million overstays in the United States because of, among other things, competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United States. In April 2011, GAO recommended that developing a time frame for assessing needed resources ICE could strengthen ICEs planning efforts. DHS concurred and stated that ICE planned to identify resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of its fiscal year 2013 resource planning process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, strengthen plans to address certain risks of the Visa Waiver Program and for overstay enforcement efforts. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-04-806T | gao_GAO-04-806T_0 | Treasury and Insurers Have Made Progress in Implementing TRIA, although Important Work Remains
More than a year after TRIA’s enactment, Treasury and insurance industry participants have made progress in implementing and complying with its provisions, although Treasury has yet to fully implement the 3-year program. Treasury Has Issued Regulations, Staffed the TRIP Office, and Begun Studies and Data Collection Efforts
To implement TRIA and make TRIP functional, Treasury has taken numerous regulatory and administrative actions that include rulemaking, staffing a program office, and collecting and analyzing data. As of April 2004, Treasury had not yet decided whether to extend the “make available” requirement to policies issued or renewed in 2005. Insurers are concerned that Treasury has not already made a decision about extending the “make available” requirement through 2005. Although Available, Few Are Buying Terrorism Insurance and the Industry Has Made Little Progress Toward Post-TRIA Coverage
While TRIA has improved the availability of terrorism insurance, particularly for high-risk properties in major metropolitan areas, most commercial policyholders are not buying the coverage. Limited industry data suggest that 10–30 percent of commercial policyholders are purchasing terrorism insurance, perhaps because most policyholders perceive themselves at relatively low risk for a terrorist event. Some industry experts are concerned that those most at risk from terrorism are generally the ones buying terrorism insurance. In combination with low purchase rates, these conditions could result in uninsured losses for those businesses without terrorism coverage or cause financial problems for insurers, should a terrorist event occur. Moreover, even policyholders who have purchased terrorism insurance may remain uninsured for significant risks arising from certified terrorist events—that is, those meeting statutory criteria for reimbursement under TRIA—such as those involving NBC agents or radioactive contamination. Finally, although insurers and some reinsurers have cautiously reentered the terrorism risk market, insurance industry participants have made little progress toward developing a mechanism that could permit the commercial insurance market to resume providing terrorism coverage without a government backstop. TRIA requires that insurers “make available” coverage for terrorism on terms not differing materially from other coverage. Largely because of this requirement, terrorism insurance has been widely available, even for development projects in high-risk areas of the country. In spite of the reentry of reinsurers into the terrorism market, insurance experts said that without TRIA caps on potential losses, both insurers and reinsurers likely still would be unwilling to sell terrorism coverage because they have not found a reliable way to price their exposure to terrorist losses. The first was to ensure that business activity did not suffer from the lack of insurance by requiring insurers to continue to provide protection from the financial consequences of another terrorist attack. As a result, the first objective of TRIA appears largely to have been achieved. Such an assessment could be a part of Treasury’s TRIA-mandated study to “assess…the likely capacity of the property and casualty insurance industry to offer insurance for terrorism risk after termination of the Program.”
Recommendation for Executive Action
As part of the response to the TRIA-mandated study that requires Treasury to assess the effectiveness of TRIA and evaluate the capacity of the industry to offer terrorism insurance after TRIA expires, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, after consulting with the insurance industry and other interested parties, identify for Congress an array of alternatives that may exist for expanding the availability and affordability of terrorism insurance after TRIA expires. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance coverage for terrorism largely disappeared. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in 2002 to help commercial property-casualty policyholders obtain terrorism insurance and give the insurance industry time to develop mechanisms to provide such insurance after the act expires on December 31, 2005. Under TRIA, the Department of Treasury (Treasury) caps insurer liability and would process claims and reimburse insurers for a large share of losses from terrorist acts that Treasury certified as meeting certain criteria. As Treasury and industry participants have operated under TRIA for more than a year, GAO was asked to assess Treasury's progress in implementing TRIA and describe how TRIA affected the terrorism insurance market.
What GAO Found
Treasury and industry participants have made significant progress in implementing TRIA to date, although Treasury has important actions to complete in order to comply with its responsibilities under TRIA. Treasury has issued regulations on TRIA, created and staffed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program office, and begun mandated studies and data collection efforts. However, Treasury has not yet made a decision on whether to extend the mandate that insurers "make available" terrorism coverage, using terms not differing materially from other coverage, for policies issued or renewed in 2005. Treasury's ongoing studies and data collection efforts will provide further insight into TRIA's effectiveness. TRIA has enhanced the availability of terrorism insurance for commercial policyholders, largely fulfilling a principal objective of the legislation. In particular, TRIA has benefited commercial policyholders in major metropolitan areas perceived to be at greater risk for a terrorist attack, largely because of the requirement in TRIA that insurers offer coverage for terrorism. Prior to TRIA, GAO reported concern that some development projects had already been delayed or cancelled because of the unavailability of insurance and continued fears that other projects also would be adversely impacted. GAO also conveyed the widespread concern that general economic growth and development could be slowed by a lack of available terrorism insurance. Largely because of TRIA, these problems no longer appear to be major concerns. Despite increased availability of coverage, limited industry data suggest that most commercial policyholders are not buying terrorism insurance, perhaps because they perceive their risk of losses from a terrorist act as being relatively low. The potential negative effects of low purchase rates, in combination with the probability that those most likely to be the targets of terrorist attacks may also be the ones most likely to have purchased coverage, would become evident only in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Such negative effects could include more difficult economic recovery for businesses without terrorism coverage or potentially significant financial problems for insurers. Moreover, those that have purchased terrorism insurance may still be exposed to significant risks that have been excluded by insurance companies, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical events. Finally, although insurers and some reinsurers have cautiously reentered the terrorism risk market to cover insurers' remaining exposures, industry sources indicated no progress to date toward finding a reliable method for pricing terrorism insurance and little movement toward any mechanism that would enable insurers to provide terrorism insurance to businesses without government involvement. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-166 | gao_T-AIMD-98-166_0 | From contract award on September 30, 1996, through its conclusion 15 months later at the end of December 1997, both HCFA and contractor staff made significant progress in integrating the test commercial system and evaluating its potential for Medicare use nationwide. HCFA used both a policy evaluation team and a technical team to concentrate separately on these aspects of the test. A detailed comparison of the commercial system’s payment policies with those of Medicare identified conflicting edits—inconsistencies that in some cases would increase and in others decrease the amount of the Medicare payments. First, it developed the design specifications and related computer code necessary for integrating the commercial system into the Medicare claims-processing software. Second, it integrated the claims-auditing system into the system that processes Medicare part B claims. Finally, the team conducted numerous tests of the integrated system to determine its effect both on processing speed and accuracy. HCFA management was kept apprised of the status of the test through regular progress reports and frequent contact with the project management team. Limited Test Contract Precluded Speedy Nationwide Implementation
HCFA’s contract limited the use of the test system to its Iowa site and did not include a provision for implementation throughout the Medicare program if the test proved successful. As a result, additional time will now be needed to award another contract to implement the test system’s claims-auditing software or any other approach nationwide. Initial HCFA Plan to Develop Own Edits Expensive and Ineffective
In reporting the test results, HCFA representatives recommended that the HCFA Administrator award a contract to develop HCFA-owned claims-auditing edits to supplement the correct coding initiative, rather than acquire these edits commercially. We found serious flaws in this approach—in terms of cost, overall effectiveness, and underlying assumptions. HCFA’s plan to develop its own edits was also inconsistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy in acquiring information resources. HCFA has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of its plan to develop edits internally. She said that HCFA plans to begin immediately to acquire and implement commercial claims-auditing software in as expedited a manner as possible. We are encouraged that after a slow start, HCFA now plans to move quickly to take advantage of the comprehensive claims-auditing capability that is available, and we are looking forward to seeing HCFA’s milestones for expeditiously implementing this capability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) progress in testing and acquiring a commercial system for identifying inappropriate Medicare bills; (2) how HCFA tested this commercial system; (3) HCFA's initial management decisions and their consequences; and (4) HCFA's plans for immediate implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from contract award on September 30, 1996, through its conclusion at the end of December 1997, both HCFA and contractor staff made significant progress in integrating the test commercial system and evaluating its potential for Medicare use nationwide; (2) HCFA used both a policy evaluation team and a technical team to concentrate separately on aspects of the test; (3) a detailed comparison of the commercial system's payment policies with those of Medicare identified conflicting edits--inconsistencies that in some cases would increase and in others decrease the amount of the Medicare payments; (4) the technical team: (a) developed the design specifications and related computer code necessary for integrating the commercial system into Medicare claims-processing software; (b) integrated the claims-auditing system into the system that processes Medicare part B claims; and (c) conducted numerous tests of the integrated system to determine its effect both on processing speed and accuracy; (5) HCFA management was kept apprised of the status of the test through regular reports and frequent contact with the project management team; (6) HCFA's contract limited the use of the test system to its Iowa site and did not include a provision for implementation throughout the Medicare program if the test proved successful; (7) additional time will be needed to award another contract to implement the test system's claims-auditing software; (8) HCFA representatives recommended that the HCFA Administrator award a contract to develop HCFA-owned claims-auditing edits to supplement the correct coding initiative, rather than acquire these edits commercially; (9) GAO found serious flaws in terms of cost, overall effectiveness, and underlying assumptions; (10) HCFA's plan to develop its own edits was also inconsistent with Office of Management and Budget policy in acquiring information resources; (11) HCFA has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of its plan to develop edits internally; (12) HCFA plans to begin immediately to acquire and implement commercial claims-auditing software in as expedient a manner as possible; and (13) HCFA now plans to move quickly to take advantage of the comprehensive claims-auditing capability that is available. |
gao_GAO-14-834 | gao_GAO-14-834_0 | We identified 12 broad elements in the act that should be included in the strategy, such as descriptions of the presence, activities, and operations of Iran and its proxy actors in the Western Hemisphere; a description of the federal law enforcement capability and military forces in the Western Hemisphere that may organize to counter the threat posed by Iran and its proxy actors; and a plan to address any efforts by foreign persons, entities, and governments in the region to assist Iran in evading United States and international sanctions. State Uses a Variety of Mechanisms to Collaborate with Other Stakeholders to Address Iranian Activities in the Western Hemisphere
In accordance with the act, officials in State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs developed the strategy based on consultations with officials representing DOD, DHS, DOJ, Treasury, ODNI, and USTR in headquarters and also conducted some outreach to overseas posts and partner governments. According to State officials, the strategy represents a consensus view of key agencies, including DOD, DHS, DOJ, and the Intelligence Community. Of note, while DOD as a whole joined in this consensus, one part of DOD—the Southern Command—disagreed with the strategy’s characterization of the Iranian threat in the hemisphere at the time the strategy was prepared. For the 12 strategy elements shown in table 1: of the 6 that the act states should include a description of Iranian activities or Latin American government capabilities to address Iranian activities, the strategy fully addresses 2 and partially addresses 4; of the 6 that the act states should include plans to address potential threats to U.S. interests, the strategy partially addresses 2 and does not address 4. Second, ODNI officials reported several reasons why the Intelligence Community Assessment only partially addressed some of the elements. The strategy fully addresses problem definition and risk assessment. The strategy partially addresses three other desirable characteristics of national strategies: purpose, scope, and methodology; goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. The strategy does not address two desirable characteristics of national strategies: resources, investments, and risk management; and integration and implementation. Recommendation for Executive Action
For elements identified in the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 that were not fully addressed in the strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of State provide the relevant congressional committees with information that would fully address these elements. In the absence of such information, State should explain to the congressional committees why it was not included in the strategy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In December 2012, Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, which, among other things, required the Department of State (State) to assess the threats posed to the United States by Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the relevant congressional committees the results of the assessment and a strategy to address these threats. In this report, we examine (1) State’s collaboration with other key U.S. agencies and foreign partners to address Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, (2) the extent to which the strategy on addressing Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere included elements identified in the act, and (3) the extent to which the strategy on addressing Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere included desirable characteristics of national strategies. We chose these countries based on a number of factors including whether they had experienced instances of Iran-linked terrorist attacks, their bilateral relationship with the United States, and our ability to meet with host governments. Similar to our analysis of the extent to which the strategy addressed elements identified in the act, we analyzed all three documents that make up the strategy and assessed how, if at all, the strategy addressed the elements in the act. As we discuss in our report, State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) did not address elements for which State and ODNI sought but did not find relevant information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The activities of Iranian government elements, such as a 2011 attempt to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in the United States, could pose a threat to U.S. national security. Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, requiring State to assess the threats posed to the United States by Iran's presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere and to develop a strategy to address those threats. This report examines (1) State's collaboration with other key U.S. agencies and foreign partners to address Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, (2) the extent to which the strategy addresses elements identified in the act, and (3) the extent to which the strategy includes desirable characteristics of national strategies.
GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C.; Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; and Mexico. GAO chose these countries based on factors such as past instances of Iran-linked terrorist attacks and their bilateral relationships with the United States.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) uses a variety of mechanisms to collaborate with interagency partners and host governments to address activities of Iran in the Western Hemisphere. In developing the strategy, which includes an Intelligence Community Assessment developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), State's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs worked with other U.S. agencies at the headquarters level and relied on cable reporting from posts. According to State officials, the strategy represents a consensus view of key agencies. While the Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole joined in this consensus, one part of DOD—the Southern Command—disagreed with the strategy's characterization of the Iranian threat at the time the strategy was prepared. State also uses venues such as country team meetings and law enforcement working groups to address Iranian activities.
While the strategy contains information on Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, it does not contain all the information that the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 stated it should include. GAO identified 12 distinct elements that the act stated should be included in the strategy. As shown in the figure, the strategy fully addresses 2, partially addresses 6, and does not address 4 of 12 elements. For example, the strategy contains information describing the operations of Iran, but does not include a plan to address U.S. interests to ensure energy supplies from the Western Hemisphere are free from foreign manipulation. State and ODNI officials reported several reasons why the strategy may not fully address the information identified in the law. For example, State said it only included information in the strategy if it deemed the activity identified in the law to be a threat to the United States.
Note: ODNI officials did not provide documentation for three of the elements that were fully or partially addressed in the Intelligence Community Assessment.
State is not legally required to address the six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies GAO has identified, but the strategy does include some of them. The strategy fully addresses problem definition and risk assessment. It partially addresses purpose, scope, and methodology; goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. The strategy does not, however, address resources, investments, and risk management; and integration into other strategies and implementation by other levels of government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State provide the relevant congressional committees with additional information that would fully address the elements in the act. In the absence of such information, State should explain why it was not included in the strategy. State generally disagreed with our assessment of the extent to which the strategy addressed the elements in the act but agreed to continue to provide Congress with information regarding Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere. |
gao_GAO-06-181T | gao_GAO-06-181T_0 | Further, TSA completed a threat assessment for mass transit and rail and has begun to identify critical rail assets, but it has not yet completed an overall risk assessment for the passenger rail industry. However, until all three assessments of rail systems—threat, criticality, and vulnerability—have been completed in sequence, and until TSA determines how to use the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize risk (e.g., whether high, medium, or low), it may not be possible to prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about protecting them. Because neither this element nor the framework as a whole has been finalized or provided to TSA or other sector-specific agencies, it is not clear what impact, if any, DHS’s framework may have on ongoing risk assessments conducted by, and the methodologies used by, TSA, ODP, and others, and whether or how DHS will be able to use these results to compare risks and prioritize homeland security investments among sectors. Rail industry stakeholders and federal agency officials raised questions about how effectively DHS had collaborated with them on rail security issues. These agencies undertook a number of initiatives to enhance the security of passenger rail systems after September 11. TSA Has Begun Testing Rail Security Technologies
In addition to issuing security directives, TSA also sought to enhance passenger rail security by conducting research on technologies related to screening passengers and checked baggage in the passenger rail environment. U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist
U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure their rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, in the United States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. For example, some assessments evaluated vulnerabilities of physical assets, such as tunnels and bridges, throughout the passenger rail system. For example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a customer awareness program. Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S. rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security personnel they utilized since September 11, to provide security throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility of their security personnel. Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the United States
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we encountered three practices in other countries that were not currently in use among the domestic passenger rail operators we contacted as of June 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. Implementing these three practices—covert testing, random screening, and a government-sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices—in the United States could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the differences between the United States and these foreign nations. The framework that DHS is developing to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed and compared in a consistent way needs to be completed and shared with TSA and other sector-specific agencies. In our recently issued report on passenger rail security, we recommended, among other things, that to help ensure that the federal government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk, and in order to evaluate, select, and implement commensurate measures to help the nation’s passenger rail operators protect their systems against acts of terrorism, TSA should establish a plan with timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best practices and can be measured and enforced, by using the federal rule-making process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks, and the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony provides information on how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), have assessed risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system using risk management principles; actions federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators and differences among these practices.
What GAO Found
Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments as well as establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been identified. Until TSA completes these efforts, however, the agency will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration, such as providing security training to passenger rail operators, TSA issued emergency security directives in 2004 to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for example, had implemented customer awareness programs to encourage passengers to report suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of their security personnel, upgraded security technology, and improved rail system design to enhance security. We also observed security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may nevertheless warrant further examination. |
gao_GAO-15-514 | gao_GAO-15-514_0 | If the information in the application meets the requirements for tax exempt status, IRS will issue a determination letter approving tax exempt status. EO uses a variety of sources to identify exempt organizations for possible examination, and conducts review steps that filter out some organizations. Referrals Identify Particular Organizations that May Be Noncompliant
Referrals are complaints of exempt organization noncompliance made by third parties, including the public and other parts of EO and IRS. Examiners and Managers Make the Final Decision on Whether to Conduct an Examination
Dismissals. EO receives referrals from many sources. Design and Implementation of Some Controls Was Adequate; Other Controls Should Be Strengthened to Reduce the Risk of Unfair Examination Selection
We found that the design of certain examination selection controls aligned with the IRM or with standards for effective internal control (see sidebar and figure 4). These control deficiencies increase the risk that EO could fall short of TE/GE’s mission and select organizations for examination in an unfair manner—for example, based on an organization’s religious, educational, political, or other views. Design of Internal Controls. In alignment with IRM requirements, EO maintains well-documented procedures for several examination selection processes. In focus groups, we found that staff who use these (and other IRM sections) to conduct their work generally view them as valuable tools that help them administer the tax law (see text box). If it’s a 501(c)(4), if one organization is allowed to do something, then they all are—they are treated fairly and equally.”
Other Controls Needed Improvement or Standards Were Not Followed
We found that while EO had established various procedures over its examination selection processes, there were several areas where EO’s controls were not well designed or implemented (see table 6). EO’s primary sources of guidance for compliance checks, compliance reviews, and EOCA classification are not included in the IRM, as required by the IRM. Reliance on procedures that are outside of the IRM creates the risk that EO staff could deviate from procedures without executive management approval, which could result in unfair selection of organizations’ returns for examination. Also, an estimated 22 percent of examination returns that were dismissed in fiscal year 2014 did not have the required management signature. As such, the current level of ongoing monitoring of examination and database files to ensure that selection decisions are documented and approved, to help ensure fairness, is inadequate. Recommendations
To better ensure the Exempt Organization (EO) unit’s adherence to the Tax Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE) division’s mission of “applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all” in selecting exempt organizations to review or examine, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct EO to take the following nine actions: 1. Develop, document, and implement additional monitoring procedures in order to ensure case selection controls, including ensuring that procedures for obtaining required signatures and documenting explanations for selection decisions, are being followed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the processes for selecting tax-exempt organizations for examination, and (2) assesses the adequacy of the controls (including procedures) for selecting examination cases that the Exempt Organizations (EO) unit uses to achieve the Tax Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE) division’s stated mission of “applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.”
For the first objective, we reviewed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) documents that describe the processes and criteria for selecting exempt organization returns for examination. We asked questions on internal control related topics, such as the clarity of EO procedures and the adequacy of training to apply these procedures. We also selected random probability samples of the database files to review required text, such as justifications for selecting or not selecting a return for Within the examination or review. Finally, we selected random probability samples of dismissed examination files, and closed examination files from processes described earlier in this report.samples we reviewed. Appendix II: Effectiveness of Procedural Control Implementation for Selection Decisions and Approvals
The Exempt Organizations (EO) unit has procedures in place to document multiple types of examination selection decisions and approvals. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS examines tax-exempt organizations to enforce their compliance with the tax code. Examinations can result in assessment of taxes or revocation of tax-exempt status, among other things.
GAO was asked to review IRS's criteria and processes for selecting exempt organizations for examination. This report (1) describes these processes and (2) assesses the adequacy of examination selection controls.
GAO reviewed IRS criteria, processes, and controls for selecting organizations for examination and spoke with IRS officials; assessed whether IRS controls followed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government ; reviewed random probability samples from two populations of examination files; and conducted tests on populations and random probability samples from three databases used in EO examination selection to determine the adequacy of EO's control implementation (for files closed in fiscal year 2014). GAO also conducted eight focus groups on internal controls topics with EO staff who conduct research or make examination selection decisions.
What GAO Found
The Exempt Organizations (EO) unit within the Tax Exempt and Government Entities (TE/GE) division at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reviews organizations' applications for tax-exempt status to determine whether to grant status and oversees existing exempt organizations' compliance with the tax code. To identify exempt organizations for possible examination, EO uses a variety of information sources: for example, EO receives referrals of exempt organization noncompliance from third parties, such as the public, and other parts of IRS.
EO uses various controls intended to help it select exempt organizations for examination, in an effort to adhere to TE/GE's mission of “applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.” For example, EO maintains well-documented procedures for several examination selection processes in the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), IRS's primary, official source of instructions to staff; staff can deviate from procedures that are included in the IRM only with executive management approval. In focus groups, EO staff generally told GAO that these procedures were valuable tools to help them administer the tax law.
However, there are several areas where EO's controls were not well designed or implemented. The control deficiencies GAO found increase the risk that EO could select organizations for examination in an unfair manner—for example, based on an organization's religious, educational, political, or other views. Examples of internal control deficiencies GAO found include the following:
Staff could deviate from procedures for some selection processes without executive management approval. GAO found that procedures for some processes—such as applying selection criteria to organizations under consideration for review—are not included in the IRM, as required by IRS policy. As a result, staff are not required to obtain executive management approval to deviate from these procedures. This increases the risk of unfair selection of organizations' returns for examination.
EO management does not consistently monitor selection decisions. GAO found that IRS does not consistently monitor examinations and database files to ensure that selection decisions are documented and approved, to help ensure fairness. GAO's review of examination files found that approval of some selection decisions was not documented, as required by EO procedures. For example, GAO's analysis of a sample of files suggests that an estimated 12 to 34 percent of cases where staff initially selected an organization for examination, but ultimately decided not to perform the examination, were missing the indication of management approval of the final decision, as required in the IRM. Continuous monitoring is an element of internal control; EO management has not been conducting sufficient monitoring to ensure that required approvals were taking place.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that IRS take 10 actions to improve selection control design and implementation, such as ensuring that all selection procedures are included in the IRM and thus subject to executive management approval, and developing additional examination selection monitoring procedures. IRS generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-623 | gao_GAO-11-623_0 | Specifically, Title IV of the Dodd- Frank Act, among other things, amends the Investment Advisers Act by eliminating the exemption from SEC registration upon which advisers to private funds have generally relied—thereby generally requiring advisers only to private funds with assets of $150 million or more to register with SEC; providing SEC with the authority to require certain advisers to private funds to maintain records and file reports with SEC; providing exemptions from registration to advisers solely to venture capital funds, advisers to certain private funds with less than $150 million of assets under management, and certain foreign private advisers; authorizing SEC to collect certain systemic-risk data and share this information with the Financial Stability Oversight Council; and generally requiring that advisers with assets under management of less than $100 million register with the state in which they have their principal office, if required by the laws of that state. SEC oversees registered investment advisers primarily through its Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Division of Investment Management, and Division of Enforcement. Although Forming an SRO to Oversee Private Fund Advisers Appears Feasible, It Would Require Legislative Action and Present Challenges
Regulators, industry representatives, investment advisers, and others we interviewed told us that it was difficult to opine definitively on the feasibility of forming and operating a private fund adviser SRO because of the many unknown factors, such as its specific form, functions, and membership. Nonetheless, the general consensus was that forming a private fund adviser SRO similar to FINRA could be done but not without challenges. Regulators and industry representatives pointed to the creation and existence of other securities SROs as evidence that forming an SRO to oversee private fund advisers is feasible. Legislation Would Be Needed to Allow a Private Fund Adviser SRO to Operate under the Federal Securities Laws
According to SEC staff and two securities law experts, legislation would be needed to allow for the formation of a private fund adviser SRO under the federal securities laws. Moreover, they said that an existing SRO would also face challenges reaching agreement on, among other things, the SRO’s governance structures. While a Private Fund Adviser SRO Could Help Address SEC’s Examination Capacity Challenges, It Would Involve Trade-offs
According to securities regulators and industry representatives, a private fund adviser SRO could offer a number of advantages and disadvantages. However, SEC still would have oversight responsibility for over 10,600 registered investment advisers that do not solely advise private funds. A private fund adviser SRO could also create regulatory gaps in the oversight of registered investment advisers. However, in its section 914 study, SEC staff concluded that the agency likely will not have sufficient capacity to effectively examine registered investment advisers, including private fund advisers, with adequate frequency. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to SEC. SEC staff provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the feasibility of forming and operating a private fund adviser self-regulatory organization (SRO), including the actions that would need to be taken and challenges that would need to be addressed, and (2) the potential advantages and disadvantages of a private fund adviser SRO. Although the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) directs us to assess the feasibility of forming an SRO for private funds, our study focuses on an SRO for private fund advisers. In addition, we reviewed past regulatory and legislative proposals for creating an SRO to oversee investment advisers or funds, relevant academic studies, SEC staff’s Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations (as mandated under section 914 of the Dodd-Frank Act) (section 914 study), and related material to gain insights on the potential form and functions of a private fund adviser SRO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, hedge funds, private equity funds, and other private funds proliferated but were largely unregulated, causing members of Congress and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff to raise questions about investor protection and systemic risk. To address this potential regulatory gap, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) brought certain advisers to private funds under the federal securities laws, requiring them to register with SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires GAO to examine the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory organization (SRO) to provide primary oversight of private fund advisers. This report discusses (1) the feasibility of forming such an SRO, and (2) the potential advantages and disadvantages of a private fund adviser SRO. To address the mandate, GAO reviewed federal securities laws, SEC staff's recently completed study on its investment adviser examination program that was mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, past regulatory and legislative proposals to create an SRO for investment advisers, and associated comment letters. GAO also interviewed SEC and SRO staffs, other regulators, and various market participants and observers. We provided a draft of this report to SEC for review and comment. SEC staff provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Regulators, industry representatives, investment advisers, and others told GAO that it was difficult to opine definitively on the feasibility of a private fund adviser SRO, given its unknown form, functions, and membership. Nonetheless, the general consensus was that forming a private fund adviser SRO could be done, as evidenced by the creation and existence of other SROs. At the same time, they said that the formation of a private fund adviser SRO would require legislation and would not be without challenges. SEC staff and securities law experts said that the federal securities laws currently do not allow for the registration of a private fund adviser SRO with SEC. In addition, regulators, industry representatives, and others told GAO that forming such an SRO could face challenges, including raising the necessary start-up capital and reaching agreements on its fee and governance structures. Some of the identified challenges are similar to those that existing securities SROs had to confront during their creation. Creating a private fund adviser SRO would involve advantages and disadvantages. SEC will assume responsibility for overseeing additional investment advisers to certain private funds on July 21, 2011. It plans to oversee these advisers primarily through its investment adviser examination program. However, SEC likely will not have sufficient capacity to effectively examine registered investment advisers with adequate frequency without additional resources, according to a recent SEC staff report. A private fund adviser SRO could supplement SEC's oversight of investment advisers and help address SEC's capacity challenges. However, such an SRO would oversee only a fraction of all registered investment advisers. Specifically, SEC would need to maintain the staff and resources necessary to examine the majority of investment advisers that do not advise private funds and to oversee the private fund adviser SRO, among other things. Furthermore, by fragmenting regulation between advisers that advise private funds and those that do not, a private fund adviser SRO could lead to regulatory gaps, duplication, and inconsistencies. |
gao_GAO-11-496T | gao_GAO-11-496T_0 | As shown in figure 1, the cost of enumerating each housing unit has escalated from around $16 in 1970, to around $98 in 2010, in constant 2010 dollars (an increase of over 500 percent). Indeed, the 2010 Census required an unprecedented commitment of resources, including recruiting more than 3.8 million total applicants— roughly equivalent to the entire population of Oklahoma—for its temporary workforce; and rose in cost from an initial estimate of $11.3 billion in 2001 to around $13 billion. Since 1970, the Bureau has used a similar approach to count the vast majority of the population. A fundamental reexamination of the nation’s approach to the census will require the Bureau to rethink its approach to planning, testing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the census, and addressing such questions as: Why was a certain program initiated? To determine if these and other census-taking activities were effective, the Bureau plans to complete over 70 studies covering such topics as marketing and publicity, field operations, privacy and confidentiality, and language barriers. Moreover, in several of the programs we reviewed, assessments were not always focused on the value-added of a particular operation, such as the extent to which it reduced costs and/or enhanced data quality. Lesson #3: Institutionalize Efforts to Address High-Risk Areas
A key priority for the Bureau will be to fully address those areas that led us to designate the 2010 Census a high-risk program. The problems the Bureau encountered in managing its IT systems, developing reliable life- cycle cost estimates, and testing key operations under census-like conditions were cross-cutting in that they affected a number of different activities, and thus threatened the Bureau’s readiness for the census. Incorporate Best Practices for IT Acquisition Management
IT is critical to a successful census because it helps support the Bureau’s data collection, analysis, and dissemination activities. Both we and the Department of Commerce Inspector General made a series of recommendations to address these issues, and the Bureau took steps to implement them. However, the Bureau was still limited in its ability to effectively monitor productivity or implement quality-assurance procedures as documented in its operational plans. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to ensure the reliability of the 2020 cost estimate, and the Bureau has already taken several actions in that regard. Moving forward, as the Bureau refines and implements its testing plans, our past work on census testing has shown that it will be important for its strategy to include, but not be limited to, these key components of a sound study: clearly stated objectives with accompanying performance measures; research questions linked to test objectives and, as appropriate, a clear rationale for why sites were selected for field tests; a thoroughly documented data collection strategy; input from stakeholders and lessons learned considered in developing test objectives; and a data analysis plan including, as appropriate, methods for determining the extent to which specific activities contribute to controlling costs and enhancing quality. Lesson Learned #4: Ensure That the Bureau’s Management, Culture, and Business Practices Are Aligned with a Cost-Effective Enumeration
On the basis of our earlier work on high-performing organizations, fundamental reforms will mean ensuring that the Bureau’s organizational culture and structure, as well as its approach to strategic planning, human- capital management, internal collaboration, knowledge sharing, capital decision making, risk and change management, and other internal functions are aligned toward delivering more cost-effective outcomes. On the basis of our work on planning for the 2010 Census, a road map for 2020 could include, but not be limited to, the following elements that could be updated on a regular basis: specific, measurable performance goals, how the Bureau’s efforts, procedures, and projects would contribute to those goals, and what performance measures would be used; descriptions of how the Bureau’s approaches to human-capital management, organizational structure, IT acquisitions, and other internal functions are aligned with the performance goals; an assessment of the risks associated with each significant decennial operation, including the interrelationships between the operations and a description of relevant mitigation plans; detailed milestone estimates for each significant decennial operation, including estimated testing dates, and justification for any changes to milestone estimates; detailed life-cycle cost estimates of the decennial census that are credible, comprehensive, accurate, and well-documented as stipulated by OMB and GAO guidance; and a detailed description of all significant contracts the Bureau plans to enter into and a risk management plan for those contracts. 2010 Census: Data Collection Operations Were Generally Completed as Planned, but Long-standing Challenges Suggest Need for Fundamental Reforms. Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk Management of Decennial Systems. 2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010 Census. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO added the 2010 Census to its list of high-risk programs in 2008 in part because of (1) long-standing weaknesses in the Census Bureau's (Bureau) information technology (IT) acquisition and contract management function, (2) difficulties in developing reliable life-cycle cost estimates, and (3) key operations that were not tested under operational conditions. These issues jeopardized the Bureau's readiness for the count. Moreover, societal trends, such as concerns over privacy, have made a cost-effective census an increasingly difficult challenge. At about $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest U.S. Census in history. As requested, this testimony focuses on lessons learned from the 2010 Census, and initiatives that show promise for producing a more cost-effective population count in 2020. This testimony is based on completed and ongoing work, including an analysis of Bureau documents, interviews with Bureau officials, and field observations of census operations in urban and rural locations across the country.
What GAO Found
In February 2011, GAO removed the 2010 Census from its High-Risk List because the Bureau generally completed its peak enumeration activities and released congressional apportionment and redistricting data consistent with its operational plans. The Bureau improved its readiness for the census by strengthening its risk management activities, enhancing systems testing, and meeting regularly with executives from its parent agency, the Department of Commerce. Strong congressional oversight was also critical. Still, the 2010 Census required an unprecedented commitment of resources, and the cost of enumerating each housing unit has escalated from around $16 in 1970, to around $98 in 2010, in constant 2010 dollars. Based on the results of the 2010 and prior censuses, the following four early lessons learned could help secure a more cost-effective enumeration in 2020: 1. Reexamine the Nation's Approach to Taking the Census: The Bureau has used a similar approach to count most of the population since 1970. However, the approach has not kept pace with changes to society. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to rethink its approach to planning, testing, implementing, and monitoring the census to address long-standing challenges. 2. Assess and Refine Existing Operations Focusing on Tailoring Them to Specific Locations and Population Groups: The Bureau plans to complete over 70 studies of the 2010 Census covering such topics as the Bureau's publicity efforts and field operations. As this research is completed, it will be important for it to assess the value-added of a particular operation in order for it to determine how best to allocate its resources for 2020. 3. Institutionalize Efforts to Address High-Risk Areas: Focus areas include incorporating best practices for IT acquisition management; developing reliable cost estimates; and ensuring key operations are fully tested, in part by developing clearly stated research objectives, a thoroughly documented data collection strategy, and methods for determining the extent to which specific activities contributed to controlling costs and enhancing quality. 4. Ensure that the Bureau's Management, Culture, and Business Practices Align with a Cost-Effective Enumeration: The Bureau will need to ensure that its organizational culture and structure, as well as its approach to strategic planning, human capital management, collaboration, and other internal functions are focused on delivering more cost-effective outcomes. The Bureau has launched an ambitious planning program for 2020. As these actions gain momentum, it will be important that they enhance the Bureau's capacity to control costs, ensure quality, and adapt to future technological and societal changes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony, but past reports recommended that the Bureau strengthen its testing of key IT systems, better document and update its cost estimates, and develop an operational plan that integrates performance, budget, and other information. The Bureau generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-14-19 | gao_GAO-14-19_0 | The Adult and Dislocated Worker programs provide participants with a variety of employment services. Local Areas Used Various Sources to Identify Demand Occupations and Required Participants to Complete Certain Activities before Entering Training
Most Local Areas Used a Variety of Sources to Identify Demand Occupations
We estimate that a majority of local areas used various sources of information to identify demand occupations (see fig. Specifically, we estimate that nearly 90 percent of local areas used state job banks to identify available jobs, and nearly 90 percent of local areas used industry and occupational projections to identify occupations that are projected to grow. Local areas found all of the sources of information they used to identify demand occupations at least moderately useful. As compared to other sources of information, about 90 percent of areas used local initiatives for at least one of the following reasons:
They more accurately reflected the current and expected needs of local employers. They provided more detailed information. 4).case managers to discuss labor market information and training options; 2) complete a skills or interest assessment; or 3) obtain information about the occupation for which they wanted training. Most Local Areas Overcame Challenges in Guiding Participants Toward Training
Most local areas faced challenges in guiding participants toward training, but were still able to guide them toward training. We estimate that two- thirds of local areas faced major or moderate challenges related to (1) participants’ lack of financial or work supports, such as child care or transportation, and (2) participants’ lack of basic skills necessary to participate in training, such as reading and math skills (see fig. In 57 percent of local areas, however, the challenges they experienced did not negatively affect their ability to guide participants toward training. Local Areas Had Difficulty Helping Employers Fill Certain Jobs for a Variety of Reasons, Including the Low Skills of Some Participants
Challenges in Helping Fill Jobs Included Participants’ Lack of Qualifications and Basic Skills
Local areas cited a variety of reasons why they had difficulty helping employers fill certain jobs in 2012, including participants’ lack of relevant qualifications and basic skills, according to GAO estimates. According to workforce experts, some of these jobs, such as welders and machinists, can be considered “middle-skilled” jobs because they require more than a high-school diploma but less than a 4- year college degree. According to these agencies, these approaches aim to enable individuals to secure industry relevant certification and obtain employment within an occupational area and to advance to higher levels of future education and employment in that area. However, little is known about the extent to which local areas are using career pathways approaches—or how they are using these approaches— specifically to prepare participants for middle-skilled jobs that employers have difficulty filling. the extent to which these programs are positioned to help supply workers for hard-to-fill jobs, our work suggests that the programs have difficulty supplying workers for certain types of middle-skilled jobs due to the low skill level of some program participants, among other reasons. Without additional information— beyond what it already plans to collect—on whether and how local areas are using career pathways approaches to prepare participants for the types of middle-skilled jobs that employers are having difficulty filling, DOL may not be well-positioned to help local areas use these approaches to better meet employers’ needs. Recommendation
To help local areas better meet employers’ needs for skilled workers, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor: collect information on the use of career pathways approaches by local areas specifically to prepare workers for the types of middle-skilled jobs that employers have difficulty filling; and to the extent such approaches are being used, disseminate information about them, such as implementation challenges, strategies, and results. DOL agreed with our recommendation and did not provide any comments on the e-supplement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on: 1) how local workforce areas have identified occupations that are in demand and how they have guided participants toward training for them; and 2) what challenges local workforce areas have faced in helping employers fill certain jobs. All estimates based on the survey results are subject to sampling error. We used the results of the survey to create estimates about the population of all WIBs nationwide. Appendix II: Occupations That Employers Had Difficulty Filling in Calendar Year 2012
Our web-based survey of 200 workforce investment boards (WIB) included a question asking if employers in their local area had difficulty filling jobs in certain occupations in calendar year 2012 (see appendix I for more information on the survey’s methodology). | Why GAO Did This Study
The economy is recovering from the recession, but employers still have difficulty filling certain jobs. DOL's Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Adult and Dislocated Worker programs are designed in part to help employers find the skilled workers they need. The programs provide participants with services including job training, which must be for occupations that are in demand. However, questions have been raised about the extent to which these programs are positioned to help supply workers for jobs that employers have difficulty filling. The conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 mandated that GAO assess the Adult and Dislocated Worker programs. This report addresses (1) how local workforce areas have identified occupations that are in demand and how they have guided participants toward training for them; and (2) what challenges local workforce areas have faced in helping employers fill certain jobs. GAO conducted a web-based survey of a nationally representative sample of 200 local workforce investment boards (WIB), which oversee local workforce areas, and used the results to create estimates about the population of all WIBs nationwide. GAO also interviewed DOL officials and workforce organizations.
What GAO Found
Based on survey results for calendar year 2012, GAO estimates that most local areas used various sources of information to identify occupations that are in demand (i.e., available jobs and occupations that are projected to grow). Local areas found all of the sources of information they used to be at least moderately useful. To identify occupations that are in demand, GAO estimates that nearly 90 percent of local areas used state job banks and occupational projections, both of which are funded by the Department of Labor (DOL). All percentages presented on this highlights page are estimates from the survey and have a sampling error of no larger than plus or minus 7 percentage points. In addition, 93 percent of areas used at least one local initiative, such as a partnership with the local economic development agency, to identify such jobs. As compared to other sources, areas reported using local initiatives because they provided more detailed information and better reflected local employers' needs. To guide participants toward training, most local areas required them to complete certain activities, such as meeting with a case manager to discuss training options (80 percent) or completing a skills assessment (78 percent). Most local areas faced challenges in guiding participants toward training. Specifically, local areas faced challenges related to participants' lack of financial or work supports, such as child care or transportation (67 percent); participants' lack of the basic skills necessary even to participate in training (66 percent); difficulty finding training providers who could quickly adapt curricula to employers' changing needs (62 percent); and high training costs (54 percent). However, in 57 percent of local areas, these challenges did not affect their ability to guide participants toward training.
Local areas had difficulty helping employers fill certain jobs for a variety of reasons, including the low skills of some participants, according to GAO estimates. Eighty percent of local areas reported that employers had difficulty filling certain jobs, some of which can be considered "middle-skilled" jobs, such as welders and machinists, because they require more than a high-school diploma but less than a 4-year college degree. These local areas had difficulty supplying such workers because participants lacked relevant qualifications or the basic skills needed to participate in related training, among other reasons. To help participants improve their skills, DOL and other agencies have encouraged the use of career pathways approaches that combine job training with basic skills education and support services. According to these agencies, such approaches aim to enable participants to secure industry relevant certification and obtain employment within an occupational area and advance to higher levels of future education and employment in the area. However, little is known about the extent to which local areas are using career pathways approaches--or how they are using these approaches--specifically to prepare participants for middle-skilled jobs that employers have had difficulty filling. Without information on whether and how local areas are using these approaches to prepare participants for such jobs, DOL may not be well-positioned to help local areas use these approaches to better meet employers' needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL collect and disseminate information on how local areas have used career pathways approaches to prepare workers for middle-skilled jobs that employers have difficulty filling. DOL agreed with our recommendation.. |
gao_AIMD-99-41 | gao_AIMD-99-41_0 | Our objective was to determine whether Customs is effectively managing ACE, including whether Customs has adequately justified ACE cost-effectiveness. Customs Is Developing, but Has Not Yet Completed, Its Target Systems Architecture
Customs does not currently have a complete enterprise systems architecture. Because these characteristics were not based on a complete understanding of its enterprisewide functional and information needs, as specified in both best practice and Treasury guidance, we concluded that Customs did not have adequate assurance that its information systems will optimally support its needs across all business areas. Conclusions
Until Customs completes and enforces its enterprise systems architecture, it will not have adequate assurance that ACE and other systems it plans to build and operationally deploy (1) will effectively meet the agency’s business needs and (2) are compatible, efficient, and cost-effective to develop, integrate, and maintain. Customs has not effectively implemented any of these investment management practices on ACE. Specifically, (1) Customs’ investment analysis did not address alternatives to its chosen ACE system solution, (2) Customs’ did not use rigorous cost estimating techniques in preparing its ACE cost estimate and its cost-benefit analysis for ACE omitted substantial costs and inflated benefits, and (3) Customs is not justifying and validating the costs and benefits for each ACE increment. Customs is developing and acquiring ACE in a series of 21 increments. Furthermore, because it is not justifying the return on its investment in each ACE increment, Customs will not be able to demonstrate whether ACE is cost-effective until it has already spent hundreds of millions of dollars to develop/acquire the entire system. Our evaluations found that Customs lacks the capability to either develop or acquire ACE software effectively, and that it lacks a software process improvement program. As a result, Customs’ ACE software development capability is immature. To accomplish this, GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Customs, with the support of Customs’ CIO, ensure that Customs (1) rigorously analyze alternative approaches to building ACE, including ITDS as an alternative to developing ACE entirely within Customs and; (2) make investment decisions incrementally, i.e., for each increment: use disciplined processes to prepare a rigorous life-cycle cost estimate, including an explicit discussion of its inherent uncertainty; prepare realistic and supportable benefit expectations; require a favorable return-on-investment and compliance with Customs’ architecture before making any investment; and validate actual costs and benefits once an increment is piloted, compare these with estimates, use the results in making further decisions on subsequent increments, and report the results to Customs’ House and Senate appropriations and authorizing committees; and (3) strengthen ACE software acquisition management by: establishing an effective process improvement program and correcting the weaknesses in ACE software acquisition processes identified in this report, thereby bringing ACE processes to at least SEI level 2 and requiring at least SEI level 2 processes of all ACE software contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Customs Service's management of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), focusing on whether Customs has adequately justified ACE cost-effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Customs is not managing ACE effectively, and it does not have a firm basis for concluding that ACE is a cost-effective solution to modernizing its commercial environment; (2) GAO found serious weaknesses relating to architectural definition, investment management, and software development and acquisition that must be corrected before further investment in ACE is justified; (3) Customs is not building ACE within the context of a complete and enforced systems architecture; (4) in May 1998, GAO reported that Customs' architecture was incomplete because it was not based on a complete understanding of its enterprisewide functional and information needs; (5) GAO also reported that Customs had not yet instituted effective procedures for ensuring compliance with the architecture once it is completed; (6) until its architecture is completed and effectively enforced, Customs will not have adequate assurance that information systems like ACE will optimally support its needs across all business areas; (7) further, Customs lacks a reliable estimate of what ACE will cost to build, deploy, and maintain; and Customs has neither adequately justified, nor is it effectively monitoring, ACE's cost-effectiveness; (8) specifically, Customs did not use rigorous cost estimating techniques in preparing its cost estimate, and did not disclose the inherent imprecision of the estimate; (9) additionally, Customs omitted costs and inflated benefits in preparing its cost-benefit analysis; (10) moreover, Customs is not using effective incremental investment management practices; (11) while Customs plans to develop/acquire ACE in 21 increments, these increments are not individually cost-benefit justified, and Customs is not determining what benefits each increment, once operational, actually provides; (12) as a result, Customs will not know if ACE's expected return-on-investment is actually being realized until it has already spent hundreds of millions of dollars developing/acquiring the entire system; and (13) GAO found that Customs has neither the capability to effectively develop nor acquire ACE and that its processes for doing both, according to widely accepted and proven software capability maturity models, are ad hoc, immature, and ineffective. |
gao_GAO-03-1108T | gao_GAO-03-1108T_0 | Since the 1990s, the federal government has considered the use of smart card technology as one option for electronically improving security over buildings and computer systems. For example, the process of verifying the identity of people accessing federal buildings and computer systems, especially when used in combination with other technologies, such as biometrics, is significantly enhanced with the use of smart cards. Other potential benefits and uses include creating electronic passenger lists for deploying military personnel and tracking immunization and other medical records. Challenges to the Successful Adoption of Smart Cards
The benefits of smart card adoption can be achieved only if key management and technical challenges are understood and met. While these challenges have slowed the adoption of smart card technology in past years, they may be less difficult in the future because of increased management concerns about securing federal facilities and information systems, and because technical advances have improved the capabilities and reduced the cost of smart card systems. As a result, agency officials have found that obtaining adequate resources is critical to implementing a major government smart card system. Maintaining the Security of Smart Card Systems and Privacy of Personal Information
Although concerns about security are a key driver for the adoption of smart card technology in the federal government, the security of smart card systems is not foolproof and must be addressed when agencies plan the implementation of a smart card system. Actions Have Been Taken to Promote Consistent Smart Card Adoption across Government
Given the significant management and technical challenges associated with successful adoption of smart cards, an ongoing series of initiatives have been undertaken in the federal government to facilitate the adoption of the technology. As I mentioned earlier, GSA was originally tasked in 1996 with coordinating an effort to adopt multiapplication smart cards across the federal government, and it has taken important steps to promote federal smart card use. OMB has begun to take action to develop a framework of policy guidance for governmentwide smart card adoption. The memo sketched out a three-part initiative: First, OMB plans to develop common policy for authentication and identity management, including technical guidance to be developed by GSA and NIST, that will result in a comprehensive policy for credentialing federal employees. Second, OMB intends to execute a governmentwide acquisition of authentication technology, including smart cards, to achieve cost savings in the near term. However, agencies continue to face a number of challenges in implementing smart-card–based systems, including sustaining executive level commitment, recognizing resource requirements, integrating physical and logical security practices, achieving interoperability, and maintaining system security and privacy of personal information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is increasingly interested in the use of smart cards--credit-card-like devices that use integrated circuit chips to store and process data--for improving the security of its many physical and information assets. Besides better authentication of the identities of people accessing buildings and computer systems, smart cards offer a number of potential benefits and uses, such as creating electronic passenger lists for deploying military personnel, and tracking immunization and other medical records. Earlier this year, GAO reported on the use of smart cards across the federal government (GAO-03-144). GAO was asked to testify on the results of this work, including the challenges to successful adoption of smart cards throughout the federal government, as well as the government's progress in promoting this smart card adoption.
What GAO Found
To successfully implement smart card systems, agency managers have faced a number of substantial challenges: sustaining executive-level commitment in the face of organizational resistance and cost concerns; obtaining adequate resources for projects that can require extensive modifications to technical infrastructures and software; integrating security practices across agencies, a task requiring collaboration among separate and dissimilar internal organizations; achieving smart card interoperability across the government; and maintaining the security of smart card systems and the privacy of personal information. These difficulties may be less formidable as management concerns about facility and information system security increase and as technical advances improve smart card capabilities and reduce costs. However, such challenges, which have slowed the adoption of this technology in the past, continue to be factors in smart card projects. Given the significant management and technical challenges associated with successful adoption of smart cards, a series of initiatives has been undertaken to facilitate the adoption of the technology. As the federal government's designated promoter of smart card technology, GSA assists agencies in assessing the potential of smart cards and in implementation. GSA has set up a governmentwide, standards-based contracting vehicle and has established interagency groups to work on procedures, standards, and guidelines. As the government's policymaker, OMB is beginning to develop a framework of policy guidance for governmentwide smart card adoption. In a July 2003 memorandum, OMB described a three-part initiative on authentication and identity management in the government, consisting of (1) developing common policy and technical guidance; (2) executing a governmentwide acquisition of authentication technology, including smart cards; and (3) selecting shared service providers for smart card technology. These efforts address the need for consistent, up-to-date standards and policy on smart cards, but both GSA and OMB still have much work to do before common credentialing systems can be successfully implemented across government agencies. |
gao_HEHS-96-19 | gao_HEHS-96-19_0 | The seven renovation projects are intended to improve delivery of veterans’ health care at existing medical centers by correcting fire and safety deficiencies, improving patient environment, and increasing efficiency. Projects Would Not Correct All Deficiencies
Our analysis of VA documents shows that VA has identified major construction needs in addition to the proposed projects. Delaying the projects longer would extend the construction award dates. VA officials are concerned that delaying project funding could significantly affect construction award dates. Our observation that delaying project funding until fiscal year 1997 should have a negligible effect on construction award dates for projects if design schedules are met is based on the premise that design funds will be available for the projects in fiscal year 1996. It also provides the expected veterans’ health care benefits and VA costs, the relationship between the proposed project and VA’s planned reorganization, and the potential effects of delayed project funding on veterans’ health care and VA costs. VA did not consider all available options when developing the Brevard proposal. In December 1992, we reported that in selecting the replacement site for the closed Martinez medical center, VA should consider the construction cost, the time needed to complete construction, effects on veterans’ access to care, potential for affiliation with medical schools, environmental impact, capabilities of the replacement facility, and consistency with the long-range needs of VA and the Department of Defense beneficiaries in the target area. Cost estimates for funding delay have not been computed. Marion’s 5-year facility plan includes no additional major construction projects but includes $4.2 million for two minor projects. Expected Benefits and Costs
Veterans’ health care: The Lebanon medical center would not serve any new types of patients or provide any new services. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional staff request, GAO provided information on nine proposed Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) construction projects, focusing on: (1) the projects' benefits to veterans; (2) VA efforts to realign all of its facilities into new service networks; and (3) the potential effects of funding delays an VA contract award dates and costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the nine proposed construction projects would primarily enhance VA inpatient care capacity within designated target areas; (2) the two new medical centers would improve veterans' access to quality care and attract new users; (3) the seven renovation projects at existing medical centers would benefit users by correcting fire and safety deficiencies and improving patient environment; (4) the medical centers undergoing renovation need an additional $308 million to correct all of their deficiencies; (5) VA has not considered all available alternatives to the construction projects, partially because planned realignment criteria have not been finalized; (6) the construction of new and renovated facilities will likely limit future VA realignment decisions, since the facilities have an expected useful life of 25 years or more; and (7) delaying funding until fiscal year (FY) 1997 is likely to have a minimal affect on VA contract award dates and costs, but longer delays could significantly increase costs and award date slippage. |
gao_GAO-05-947 | gao_GAO-05-947_0 | Agents involved in the transaction may be required to split their shares of the commission with their brokers. Participating brokers use an MLS to “list” the homes they have for sale, providing other brokers with detailed information on the properties, including how much of the commission will be shared with the buyer’s agent. Various Factors Can Influence the Extent of Price Competition in Real Estate Brokerage
A number of factors can influence the degree of price competition in the real estate brokerage industry. Some economists have observed that brokers typically compete more on nonprice factors, such as service quality, than on price. Evidence from academic literature and industry participants with whom we spoke highlighted several potential causes of this apparent lack of price competition. Thus, with the increase in housing prices, the brokerage fee for selling a median-priced home increased even as the commission rate fell. Traditional Brokers’ Resistance to Nontraditional Brokerage Models
Traditional brokers may discourage price competition by resisting cooperation with brokers and firms whose business models depart from charging conventional commission rates, according to several industry analysts and participants we spoke with. Some State Laws and Regulations Can Affect Price Competition
Although state laws and regulations related to real estate licensing can protect consumers, DOJ and FTC have expressed concerns that some of these laws and regulations may also unnecessarily hinder competition among brokers and limit consumer choice. Antirebate Provisions
At least 14 states appear to prohibit, by law or regulation, real estate brokers from giving consumers rebates on commissions or to place restrictions on this practice. The Internet also has fostered the creation or expansion of a number of Internet-oriented firms that provide real estate brokerage or related services, including discount brokers and broker referral services. The Internet Facilitates Alternative Service and Pricing Options
Although Internet-oriented brokerages and related firms represent only a small portion of the real estate brokerage market at present, the Internet has made different service and pricing options more widely available to consumers. Alternative listing Web sites offer alternatives to the MLS, allowing sellers who want to sell their homes themselves to advertise their properties to buyers and giving buyers another source of information on homes for sale. Wider Use of the Internet in Real Estate Brokerage Will Depend on the Availability of Listing Information and Other Factors
Several factors could limit the extent to which the Internet is used in real estate transactions. Few State-Chartered Banks Appear to Engage in Real Estate Brokerage
Our review of certain state statutes and regulations showed that approximately 30 states may potentially authorize state-chartered banks or their operating subsidiaries to engage in some real estate brokerage activities. However, we also found that because only a small number of banks in these states appeared to have taken advantage of this authority, the effect on competition and consumers was likely minimal. They noted that real estate brokerage is not typically part of a bank’s business model, and that banks in small communities may be reluctant to compete with local real estate brokers that may be clients of the banks. “Competition and Efficiency in Transacting: The Case of Residential Real Estate Brokerage.” AREUEA Journal, vol. “International Residential Real Estate Brokerage Fees and Implications for the US Brokerage Industry.” International Real Estate Review, vol. Federal Trade Commission. The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry, vol. | Why GAO Did This Study
Consumers paid an estimated $61 billion in residential real estate brokerage fees in 2004. Because commission rates have remained relatively uniform--regardless of market conditions, home prices, or the effort required to sell a home--some economists have questioned the extent of price competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry. Further, while the Internet offers time and cost savings to the process of searching for homes, Internet-oriented brokerage firms account for only a small share of the brokerage market. Finally, there has been ongoing debate about the potential competitive effects of bank involvement in real estate brokerage. GAO was asked to discuss (1) factors affecting price competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry, (2) the status of the use of the Internet in residential real estate brokerage and potential barriers to its increased use, and (3) the effect on competition and consumers of residential real estate brokerage by state-chartered banks in states that permit this practice.
What GAO Found
The residential real estate brokerage industry has competitive attributes, but its competition appears to be based more on nonprice variables--such as quality, reputation, or level of service--than on brokerage fees, according to a review of the academic literature and interviews with industry analysts and participants. One potential cause of the industry's apparent lack of price variation is the use of multiple listing services (MLS), which facilitates cooperation among brokers in a way that can benefit consumers but may also discourage participating brokers from deviating from conventional commission rates. For instance, an MLS listing gives brokers information on the commission that will be paid to the broker who brings the buyer to that property. This practice potentially creates a disincentive for home sellers or their brokers to offer less than the prevailing rate, since buyers' brokers may show high-commission properties first. Some state laws and regulations may also affect price competition, such as those prohibiting brokers from giving clients rebates on commissions. Although such laws and regulations can protect consumers, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have argued that they may also unnecessarily limit competition and reduce consumers' choices. The Internet has changed the way consumers look for real estate and has facilitated the creation and expansion of alternatives to traditional brokers. A variety of Web sites allows consumers to access property information that once was available only by contacting brokers directly. The Internet also has fostered the growth of nontraditional residential real estate brokerage models, including discount brokers and broker referral services. However, industry participants and analysts cited several obstacles to more widespread use of the Internet in real estate transactions, including restrictions on listing information on Web sites, some traditional brokers' resistance to cooperating with nontraditional firms, and certain state laws and regulations. Although about 30 states potentially authorize state-chartered banks or their operating subsidiaries to engage in some form of residential real estate brokerage, few banks in these states appear to have done so. GAO's contacts with seven banks engaged in brokerage in two states found that they were located in small communities with few other brokerage options, and that their brokerage services did not differ significantly from those of other local real estate brokers. In general, because residential real estate brokerage by state-chartered banks appears to be so limited, its effect on competition and consumers has likely been minimal. |
gao_GAO-07-572 | gao_GAO-07-572_0 | The MMA Prescription Drug Benefit
MMA created a prescription drug benefit for beneficiaries, called Medicare Part D, which became effective January 1, 2006. Sponsors with plans ending in 2007 that offer prescription drug coverage that is actuarially equivalent to that under Part D can receive a federal tax-free subsidy equal to 28 percent of the allowable gross retiree prescription drug costs over $265 (up from $250 for plans ending in 2006) through $5,350 (up from $5,000 for plans ending in 2006), with a maximum subsidy of $1,423 per beneficiary for each individual eligible for Part D who is enrolled in the employment-based plan instead of Part D. Actuarial equivalence, which is attested to by a qualified actuary, is intended to certify that a retiree health benefit sponsor’s coverage is at least as generous as the standard Part D coverage. Majority of Sponsors Reported Continuing to Offer Prescription Drug Coverage and Accepting the RDS
According to survey data we reviewed, the majority of surveyed retiree health benefit sponsors reported that they continued to offer prescription drug coverage and accepted the RDS for 2006. However, the size of the reported majority differed across the surveys. Data from CMS show that more than 3,900 sponsors, representing approximately 7 million retirees, were approved for the RDS for 2006. CMS preliminary data for 2007 showed that the number of sponsors approved for the RDS decreased somewhat from 2006, to about 3,600 sponsors. Sponsors Considered a Variety of Factors When Selecting MMA Prescription Drug Coverage Options
Public and private sponsors we interviewed reported considering a variety of factors when selecting MMA prescription drug coverage options. Sponsors cited factors such as whether they could offer the same retiree health benefits they offered prior to the MMA, their ability to save on costs, the ease of explaining the option to retirees, the administrative requirements associated with each option, and the extent of information available on the options. When making decisions about which, if any, MMA option to pursue, public sponsors we interviewed were affected by some factors that private sponsors did not face. For example, sponsors that offer their own PDP or MA-PD plan must generally meet all CMS requirements for Part D plans, such as including specific categories of prescription drugs on their formularies. In contrast, sponsors that select the RDS option are able to offer the same retiree health benefits they offered prior to the MMA, as long as a sponsor’s coverage remains at least as generous as the standard Part D benefit, thus meeting the actuarial equivalence standard to qualify for the RDS. In the Short Term, Sponsors’ Decisions Regarding MMA Options Resulted in Benefits Remaining Relatively Unchanged, but over the Longer Term the Effect Is Unclear
Sponsors’ decisions regarding the various MMA options appear to have resulted in the provision of retiree health benefits remaining relatively unchanged in the short term, although the effect over the longer term on the provision of health benefits to retirees is unclear. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent sponsors will continue to select the same MMA option in the future. To the extent that sponsors that have accepted the RDS select other MMA options in subsequent years, sponsors’ provision of retiree health benefits may change. CMS agreed with the finding that the majority of sponsors reported continuing to offer prescription drug coverage and accepting the RDS for 2006, with smaller percentages of sponsors reporting selecting other MMA options. However, both the 2006 Kaiser/Hewitt survey—which reported that 82 percent of surveyed employers accepted the RDS for 2006—and the 2006 Mercer survey— which reported that 51 percent of surveyed employers accepted the RDS for 2006—were reporting decisions surveyed employers said they had already made, not what they planned to do. The draft report stated that, in general, in order to implement most MMA options other than the RDS, sponsors would likely have to change the prescription drug benefits they offer. The report describes both the opinions of experts who said the MMA may extend the amount of time that sponsors offer benefits without reducing coverage and those who said the Medicare Part D benefit may make it more likely that sponsors will stop offering prescription drug benefits for retirees, and there was not a preponderance of opinion for either perspective. Specifically, this appendix briefly describes the methodologies by objective and then discusses (1) surveys of employment-based health benefits, (2) federal surveys, (3) data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and (4) interviews with sponsors and other experts. Interviews with Sponsors and Experts
To learn more about retiree health benefit trends, the factors that sponsors considered in selecting the MMA options, the effect that sponsors’ decisions about the MMA options may have on the provision of health benefits for retirees, and alternative approaches for the provision of employment-based retiree health coverage, we interviewed 13 of the 15 private and public sector sponsors of employment-based retiree health benefits that we interviewed for the initial mandated study published in 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) created a prescription drug benefit for beneficiaries, called Medicare Part D, beginning in January 2006. The MMA resulted in options for sponsors of employment-based prescription drug benefits, such as a federal subsidy payment--the retiree drug subsidy (RDS)--when sponsors provide benefits meeting certain MMA requirements to Medicare-eligible retirees. The MMA required GAO to conduct two studies on trends in employment-based retiree health coverage and the MMA options available to sponsors. The first study, Retiree Health Benefits: Options for Employment-Based Prescription Drug Benefits under the Medicare Modernization Act (GAO-05-205), was published February 14, 2005. In this second study, GAO determined which MMA prescription drug coverage options sponsors selected, the factors they considered in selecting these options, and the effect these decisions may have on the provision of employment-based health benefits for retirees. GAO identified options that sponsors selected using data from employer benefit surveys and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that administers Medicare. To obtain sponsors' views about the factors they considered and the effects of their decisions, GAO also interviewed private and public sector sponsors and experts.
What GAO Found
According to survey data GAO reviewed, a majority of retiree health benefit sponsors reported that for 2006 they continued to offer prescription drug coverage and accepted the RDS. However, the size of the reported majority differed across the surveys. For example, one survey of private sector sponsors with 1,000 or more employees found that 82 percent of these sponsors accepted the RDS for 2006. Another survey of private and public sponsors found that 51 percent of surveyed sponsors with 500 or more employees accepted the RDS for 2006. Data from CMS showed that more than 3,900 sponsors, representing about 7 million retirees, were approved for the RDS for 2006. According to the surveys GAO reviewed, much smaller percentages of sponsors reported selecting other MMA options for 2006. For 2007, according to one survey, 78 percent of surveyed employers reported that they planned to apply for the RDS for that year. CMS data showed that about 3,600 sponsors were approved for the RDS for 2007. Public and private sponsors GAO interviewed reported considering a variety of factors when selecting MMA prescription drug coverage options, including whether they could offer the same retiree health benefits they offered prior to the MMA and their ability to save on costs. In general, in order to implement most MMA options, sponsors would likely have to change the prescription drug benefits they offer. For example, sponsors that offer their own Medicare Part D plan must generally meet all CMS requirements for Part D plans, such as providing coverage for specific categories of prescription drugs. In contrast, sponsors that select the RDS option can offer the same retiree health benefits they offered prior to the MMA, as long as a sponsor's coverage remains at least actuarially equivalent to the standard Part D benefit. When deciding which, if any, options to pursue, public sponsors were affected by some factors that did not affect private sponsors. In the short term, sponsors' decisions regarding the MMA options appear to have resulted in benefits remaining relatively unchanged, in part because a majority of surveyed sponsors reported that they continued to offer prescription drug benefits and accepted the RDS the first 2 years the RDS was offered. Over the longer term, the effect of sponsors' decisions about the MMA options is unclear. For example, some experts GAO interviewed indicated that the MMA may extend the amount of time that sponsors offer benefits without reducing coverage, while other experts said the availability of the Medicare Part D benefit may make it more likely that sponsors will stop offering prescription drug benefits for retirees. In addition, it is unclear to what extent sponsors will continue to select the same MMA option in the future. To the extent that sponsors that have accepted the RDS select other MMA options, sponsors' provision of retiree health benefits may change. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS and four experts agreed with the report's findings. |
gao_GAO-12-934T | gao_GAO-12-934T_0 | Legacy Vessel Fleet’s Condition Is Poor and Generally Declining Despite Coast Guard Maintenance Efforts
From fiscal years 2005 through 2011, the physical condition of the Coast Guard’s legacy vessels was generally poor. A primary Coast Guard measure of a vessel’s condition—the operational percent of time free of major casualties—shows that the high endurance cutters, medium endurance cutters, and patrol boats generally remained well below target levels from fiscal years 2005 through 2011. Other evidence, such as our review of vessel condition assessments and inspections the Coast Guard conducts of the legacy vessels, also shows that the condition of the legacy vessel fleet is generally declining. The Coast Guard has taken two key actions to improve the condition of its legacy vessels. First, in 2009, the Coast Guard reorganized its maintenance command structure to focus on standardization of practices. Under this reorganization, the Coast Guard eliminated its two Maintenance and Logistics Commands and replaced them with a centralized command structure—the Surface Forces Logistics Center— whereby a single product line manager oversees the maintenance of similar classes of vessels. Coast Guard officials reported that this change was made to enable better oversight of the condition of entire classes of the vessel fleet, reduce the workload on vessel crews by providing centralized support for procurement of replacement parts, and implement centralized maintenance plans to address commonly occurring Second, Coast Guard officials also reported that the Coast casualties.Guard was on schedule to complete a 10-year, almost half-billion dollar set of sustainment projects to refurbish selected patrol boats and upgrade medium endurance cutters, known as Mission Effectiveness Projects, which are intended to improve legacy vessel operating and cost performance. Maintenance Expenditures Have Recently Increased, and the Process for Estimating Costs Does Not Fully Meet Best Practices
Expenditures for the two key types of legacy vessel annual depot-level maintenance—scheduled and unscheduled maintenance—declined from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007, and then rose from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011. Our July 2012 report provides further information regarding the Coast Guard’s annual depot-level maintenance expenditures. Our review found that the Coast Guard’s process for estimating legacy vessel annual depot-level maintenance costs does not fully reflect relevant best practices. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a high-quality and reliable cost estimate includes certain best practice characteristics. We determined that the three characteristics relevant to the Coast Guard’s cost estimation process are that the process should be (1) well-documented, (2) comprehensive, and (3) accurate. To address these issues, in our July 2012 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to ensure that the Coast Guard’s annual depot-level maintenance cost estimates conform to cost estimating best practices. Declining Condition of the Legacy Vessel Fleet Makes Operational Capacity Targets Increasingly Unachievable
The operational capacity of the Coast Guard’s legacy vessel fleet declined from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. In particular, while performance varied across the legacy vessel classes, two key Coast Guard metrics—operational hours and lost cutter days—show that the legacy vessels did not meet their operational capacity targets and lost considerable planned operational time. For example, the high endurance cutters and 210-foot medium endurance cutters did not meet any of their operational hour targets from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, and the 270-foot medium endurance cutters met their targets only in fiscal year 2008. Coast Guard efforts to sustain its legacy vessel fleet and meet mission requirements until the replacement vessels are delivered are also challenged by uncertainties regarding the future mix of vessels, as well as the implementation of a rotational crew concept for the replacement vessel for the high endurance cutters, known as the national security cutter. The Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2013 to 2017 5-year Capital Investment Plan does not allocate funds for the acquisition of the last two replacement national security cutters, as called for by the program of record, and it is unclear how this could affect the decommissioning schedule of the high endurance cutters, the last of which the Coast Guard currently plans to decommission in fiscal year 2023. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the condition of the Coast Guard's legacy vessel fleet, and challenges the Coast Guard faces in sustaining these vessels and meeting mission requirements. The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security, is the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship. The legacy vessel fleet is critical for executing Coast Guard missions, which include defense operations; search and rescue; and securing ports, waterways, and coastal areas. The comments will focus on the legacy 378-foot high endurance cutters, 270-foot and 210-foot medium endurance cutters, and 110-foot patrol boats, and are based on findings from the report we released in July 2012.
This testimony summarizes the findings of our July 2012 report and addresses (1) how the physical condition of the Coast Guard's legacy vessel fleet changed from fiscal years 2005 through 2011, and key actions the Coast Guard has taken related to the physical condition of its legacy fleet; (2) key annual maintenance expenditure trends for the legacy vessel fleet, and the extent to which the Coast Guard's cost estimating process has followed established best practices; and (3) the operational capacity of the legacy vessel fleet and the extent to which the Coast Guard faces challenges in sustaining the legacy vessel fleet and meeting mission requirements.
For information, contact contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or [email protected] .
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2005 through 2011, the physical condition of the Coast Guard's legacy vessels was generally poor. A primary Coast Guard measure of a vessel's condition--the operational percent of time free of major casualties--shows that the high endurance cutters, medium endurance cutters, and patrol boats generally remained well below target levels from fiscal years 2005 through 2011.
The Coast Guard has taken two key actions to improve the condition of its legacy vessels. First, in 2009, the Coast Guard reorganized its maintenance command structure to focus on standardization of practices. Under this reorganization, the Coast Guard eliminated its two Maintenance and Logistics Commands and replaced them with a centralized command structure--the Surface Forces Logistics Center--whereby a single product line manager oversees the maintenance of similar classes of vessels. Coast Guard officials reported that this change was made to enable better oversight of the condition of entire classes of the vessel fleet, reduce the workload on vessel crews by providing centralized support for procurement of replacement parts, and implement centralized maintenance plans to address commonly occurring casualties. Second, Coast Guard officials also reported that the Coast Guard was on schedule to complete a 10-year, almost half-billion dollar set of sustainment projects to refurbish selected patrol boats and upgrade medium endurance cutters, known as Mission Effectiveness Projects, which are intended to improve legacy vessel operating and cost performance.
Expenditures for the two key types of legacy vessel annual depot-level maintenance--scheduled and unscheduled maintenance--declined from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007, and then rose from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011.
Further, annual depot-level maintenance expenditures often exceeded the Coast Guard's budgeted funds for depot-level maintenance for the legacy vessels--known as Standard Support Levels--from fiscal years 2005 through 2011. Our review found that the Coast Guard's process for estimating legacy vessel annual depot-level maintenance costs does not fully reflect relevant best practices. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a high-quality and reliable cost estimate includes certain best practice characteristics. We determined that the three characteristics relevant to the Coast Guard's cost estimation process are that the process should be (1) well-documented, (2) comprehensive, and (3) accurate.
The operational capacity of the Coast Guard's legacy vessel fleet declined from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. In particular, while performance varied across the legacy vessel classes, two key Coast Guard metrics--operational hours and lost cutter days--show that the legacy vessels did not meet their operational capacity targets and lost considerable planned operational time.
Coast Guard efforts to sustain its legacy vessel fleet and meet mission requirements until the replacement vessels are delivered are also challenged by uncertainties regarding the future mix of vessels, as well as the implementation of a rotational crew concept for the replacement vessel for the high endurance cutters, known as the national security cutter. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2013 to 2017 5-year Capital Investment Plan does not allocate funds for the acquisition of the last two replacement national security cutters, as called for by the program of record, and it is unclear how this could affect the decommissioning schedule of the high endurance cutters, the last of which the Coast Guard currently plans to decommission in fiscal year 2023. |
gao_GAO-09-286 | gao_GAO-09-286_0 | The percentage of teachers that reported that instruction time had stayed the same was similarly high across a range of school characteristics, irrespective of the schools’ percentage of low- income or minority students or of students with limited English proficiency, or the schools’ improvement under NCLBA. However, 7 percent of the teachers reported a reduction in the time spent on arts education. Teachers at Schools Identified as Needing Improvement and Those with a Higher Percentage of Minority Students Were More Likely to Report a Decrease in the Amount of Time Spent on Arts Education
According to Education’s data, the vast majority of elementary school teachers surveyed reported that the amount of weekly instruction time spent across all subjects, including arts education, stayed the same in the 2006-2007 school year compared with the 2004-2005 school year. However, there were some significant differences across characteristics in the percentages of teachers reporting that the time spent on arts education had decreased, as shown in table 3. While Basic State Requirements for Arts Education in Schools Have Remained Constant in Most States, State Funding Levels for Arts Education Changed
According to our survey of state arts officials, since passage of NCLBA, basic state requirements for arts education in schools, such as the number of hours a week that the arts must be taught, have remained virtually unchanged and more states have established funding for some type of arts education, such as providing grants to schools to promote arts education. Arts officials attributed changes in funding to state budget changes to a greater extent than to NCLBA or other factors. Since NCLBA, District Officials and School Principals Have Used Several Strategies to Provide Arts Education; However, Some Struggled with Decreased Budgets and Competing Demands on Instruction Time
District officials and school principals have used several strategies to provide arts education, including varying when the arts are offered, seeking funding and collaborative arrangements in the arts community, and integrating the arts into other subjects; however, some struggled with decreased budgets and competing demands on instruction time, according to officials we interviewed. Overall Research on the Association between Arts Education and Student Outcomes Is Inconclusive
While some studies that have examined the association between arts education and students’ academic achievement have found a small positive association with student outcomes, others have found none. Education said that it will carefully consider our recommendation that the department’s planned study of NCLBA implementation include questions in its surveys asking respondents to describe the reasons for any changes in instruction time they report. The study was framed around four questions: (1) has the amount of instruction time for arts education changed and, if so, have certain groups been more affected than others, (2) to what extent have state education agencies’ requirements and funding for arts education changed since NCLBA, (3) what are school officials in selected districts doing to provide arts education since NCLBA and what challenges do they face in doing so, and (4) what is known about the effect of arts education in improving student outcomes? We ultimately decided to recruit school districts and schools in other states. Review of Existing Studies on the Effect of Arts Education on Student Outcomes
To determine what existing research says about the effects of arts education on student outcomes, we used several search strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), districts and schools must demonstrate adequate yearly progress (AYP) for all students. Because schools may spend more time improving students' academic skills to meet NCLBA's requirements, some are concerned that arts education might be cut back. To determine how, if at all, student access to arts education has changed since NCLBA, the Congress asked: (1) has the amount of instruction time for arts education changed and, if so, have certain groups been more affected than others, (2) to what extent have state education agencies' requirements and funding for arts education changed since NCLBA, (3) what are school officials in selected districts doing to provide arts education since NCLBA and what challenges do they face in doing so, and (4) what is known about the effect of arts education in improving student outcomes? GAO analyzed data from the U.S. Department of Education (Education), surveyed 50 state arts officials, interviewed officials in 8 school districts and 19 schools, and reviewed existing research.
What GAO Found
According to data from Education's national survey, most elementary school teachers--about 90 percent--reported that instruction time for arts education stayed the same between school years 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. The percentage of teachers that reported that instruction time had stayed the same was similarly high across a range of school characteristics, irrespective of the schools' percentage of low-income or minority students or of students with limited English proficiency, or the schools' improvement under NCLBA. Moreover, about 4 percent of teachers reported an increase. However, about 7 percent reported a decrease, and GAO identified statistically significant differences across school characteristics in the percentage of teachers reporting that the time spent on arts education had decreased. Teachers at schools identified as needing improvement and those with higher percentages of minority students were more likely to report a reduction in time spent on the arts. Because Education's survey did not include questions about why instruction time changed, GAO was not able to determine the reasons for the disparities its analysis identified. A new study of NCLBA implementation that Education plans to undertake may collect information on the uses of instruction time, among other topics. However, Education has not yet determined if it will collect information on the reasons instruction time changed for certain groups. While basic state requirements for arts education in schools have remained unchanged in most states, state funding levels for arts education increased in some states and decreased in others, according to GAO's survey of state arts officials. Arts education officials attributed the funding changes to state budget changes to a greater extent than they did to NCLBA or other factors. School principals have used several strategies to provide arts education; however, some struggled with decreased budgets and competing demands on instruction time, according to those GAO interviewed. Strategies for maintaining arts education include seeking funding and collaborative arrangements in the arts community. Competing demands on instruction time were due to state education agency or school district actions taken to meet NCLBA proficiency standards. Overall, research on the effect of arts education on student outcomes is inconclusive. Some studies that examined the effect of arts education on students' reading and math achievement found a small positive effect, but others found none. |
gao_GAO-07-397T | gao_GAO-07-397T_0 | Determination of Force Structure and Military Personnel Requirements Is A Complex Process Involving Both OSD And The Services
Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated process and analyses-–rather than on one clearly documented process. OSD is responsible for the QDR–-the official strategic plan of DOD–-and provides policy and budget guidance to the services on the number of active personnel. Also, the number of combat brigades is specified by OSD in the QDR and is essentially a “given” in the Army’s requirements process. New Demands on Services Have Not Been Fully Reflected In Recent Requirements Analyses
Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in the QDR or their own service requirements analyses, which have been based on OSD guidance. This has caused the Marine Corps to initiate a new post-QDR analysis of its force structure requirements. The service analyses I am about to discuss all preceded the Secretary of Defense’s announcement of his intention to increase Army and Marine Corps end strength by 92,000. Army’s Most Recent Biennial Analysis Did Not Fully Consider Requirements for Modular Units and Force Rotation Demands
The Army’s most recent requirements analysis, which examined force structure and military personnel needs for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, considered some of the Army’s new transformation concepts, such as the Army’s conversion to a modular force. However, the reports the Army cited in its response were internal to the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Army’s analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time (including 14 active and 4 to 5 National Guard brigades) to support worldwide operations. However, the Army’s global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future. DOD Has Not Clearly Demonstrated the Basis For Military Personnel Requests
Our past work has also shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for its military personnel requests to Congress, requests that demonstrate a clear link to military strategy. Ensuring that the department provides a sound basis for military personnel requests and can demonstrate how they are linked to the military strategy will become increasingly important as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation. Moreover, the Marine Corps’ decision to initiate a new study to assess active military personnel requirements shortly after the 2006 QDR was completed is an indication that the QDR did not achieve consensus in required end strength levels. In evaluating DOD’s proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? To what extent are the proposed military personnel increases based on supporting operations in Iraq versus an assessment of longer-term requirements? How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does the department plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment? | Why GAO Did This Study
The war in Iraq along with other overseas operations have led to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and raised questions about whether those forces are appropriately sized and structured. In 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with GAO's recommendation that it review military personnel requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concluded in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the number of active personnel in the Army and Marine Corps should not change. However, the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans to increase these services' active end strength by 92,000 troops. Given the long-term costs associated with this increase, it is important that Congress understand how DOD determines military personnel requirements and the extent of its analysis. GAO has issued a number of reports on DOD's force structure and the impact of ongoing operations on military personnel, equipment, training, and related funding. This statement, which draws on that prior work, focuses on (1) the processes and analyses OSD and the services use to assess force structure and military personnel levels; (2) the extent to which the services' requirements analyses reflect new demands as a result of the changed security environment; and (3) the extent of information DOD has provided to Congress to support requests for military personnel.
What GAO Found
Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated analyses. Decisions reached by OSD during the QDR and the budget process about planning scenarios, required combat forces, and military personnel levels set the parameters within which the services can determine their own requirements for units and allocate military positions. Using OSD guidance and scenarios, the Army's most recent biennial analysis, completed in 2006, indicated that the Army's total requirements and available end strength were about equal. The Marine Corps' most recent assessment led to an adjustment in the composition and mix of its units. Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in OSD guidance, the QDR, or in recent service analyses. First, the Army's analysis did not fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based force to modular units, partly because modular units are a new concept and partly because the Army made some optimistic assumptions about its ability to achieve efficiencies and staff modular units within the QDR-directed active military personnel level of 482,400. Second, the Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future. The Marine Corps' analyses reflected some new missions resulting from the new security environment. However, the Commandant initiated a new study following the 2006 QDR partly to assess the impact of requirements for a Special Operation Command. Prior GAO work has shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for military personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the defense strategy. GAO believes it will become increasingly important to demonstrate a clear linkage as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation and DOD attempts to balance competing priorities for resources. In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment? |
gao_GAO-05-835T | gao_GAO-05-835T_0 | Legacy Airlines Must Reduce Costs to Restore Profitability
Since 2000, legacy airlines have faced unprecedented internal and external challenges. Legacy airlines, as a group, have been unsuccessful in reducing their costs to become more competitive with low cost airlines. Meanwhile, low cost airlines have been able to maintain low unit costs, primarily by continuing to grow. At the same time, low cost airlines have been able to continue producing modest profits as a result of lower unit costs (see figure 4). Legacy airlines have lost a cumulative $28 billion since 2001 and are predicted to lose another $5 billion in 2005, according to industry analysts. Bankruptcy is Common in the Airline Industry, but There is No Evidence that it is Harmful to the Industry or Competitors
Airlines seek bankruptcy protection for such reasons as severe liquidity pressures, an inability to obtain relief from employees and creditors, and an inability to obtain new financing, according to airline officials and bankruptcy experts. As a result of the structural problems and external shocks previously discussed, there have been 160 total airline bankruptcy filings since deregulation in 1978, including 20 since 2000, according to the Air Transport Association. With very few exceptions, airlines that enter bankruptcy do not emerge from it. Contrary to some assertions that bankruptcy protection has led to overcapacity and under pricing that have harmed healthy airlines, we found no evidence that this has occurred either in individual markets or to the industry overall. Both studies found that airlines under bankruptcy protection did not lower their fares or hurt competitor airlines, as some have contended. Legacy Airlines Face Significant Near-term Liquidity Pressures, including $10.4 Billion in Pensions Contributions over the Next 4 Years
Under current law, legacy airlines’ pension funding requirements are estimated to be a minimum of $10.4 billion from 2005 through 2008. The growth of pension underfunding is attributable to 3 factors. Airline management has funded their pension plans far less than they could have. For example, PBGC examined 101 cases of airline pension contributions from 1997 through 2002; these cases covered 18 pension plans sponsored by 5 airlines.During this time, $28.2 billion dollars could have been contributed to these pension plans on a tax-deductible basis; actual contributions amounted to $2.4 billion, or about 8.5 percent of what they could have contributed, despite earning profits in 1997-2000 (see figure 9) The maximum deductible contribution was made in only 1 of the 101 pension contribution cases examined by PBGC. The cost to PBGC and participants of defined benefit pension terminations has grown in recent years as the level of pension underfunding has deepened. The effect of various proposals to reform pension requirements on airlines, PBGC, and plan participants will vary. Dramatic changes in the level and nature of demand for air travel combined with an equally dramatic evolution in how airlines meet that demand have forced a drastic restructuring in the competitive structure of the industry. However, this should not be confused with causing the industry’s instability. However, the termination of pension obligations by United Airlines and US Airways has had substantial and wide-spread effects on the PBGC and thousands of airline employees, retirees, and other beneficiaries. If their plans are frozen so that future liabilities do not continue to grow, allowing an extended payback period may reduce the likelihood that these airlines will file for bankruptcy and terminate their pensions in the coming year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the U.S. airline industry has confronted unprecedented financial losses. Two of the nation's largest airlines--United Airlines and US Airways--went into bankruptcy, terminating their pension plans and passing the unfunded liability to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). PBGC's unfunded liability was $9.6 billion; plan participants lost $5.2 billion in benefits. Considerable debate has ensued over airlines' use of bankruptcy protection as a means to continue operations, often for years. Many in the industry and elsewhere have maintained that airlines' use of this approach is harmful to the industry, in that it allows inefficient carriers to reduce ticket prices below those of their competitors. This debate has received even sharper focus with pension defaults. Critics argue that by not having to meet their pension obligations, airlines in bankruptcy have an advantage that may encourage other companies to take the same approach. GAO's testimony presents preliminary observations in three areas: (1) the continued financial difficulties faced by legacy airlines, (2) the effect of bankruptcy on the industry and competitors, and (3) the effect of airline pension underfunding on employees, retirees, airlines, and the PBGC.
What GAO Found
U.S. legacy airlines have not been able to reduce their costs sufficiently to profitably compete with low cost airlines that continue to capture market share. Internal and external challenges to the industry have fundamentally changed the nature of the industry and forced legacy airlines to restructure themselves financially. The changing demand for air travel and the growth of low cost airlines has kept fares low, forcing these airlines to reduce their costs. They have struggled to do so, however, especially as the cost of jet fuel has jumped. So far, they have been unable to reduce costs to the level of their low-cost rivals. As a result, legacy airlines have continued to lose money--$28 billion since 2001. Although some industry observers have asserted that airlines undergoing bankruptcy reorganization contribute to the industry's financial problems, GAO found no clear evidence that historically airlines in bankruptcy have financially harmed competing airlines. Bankruptcy is endemic to the industry; 160 airlines filed for bankruptcy since deregulation in 1978, including 20 since 2000. Most airlines that entered bankruptcy have not survived. While bankruptcy may not be detrimental to the health of the airline industry, it is detrimental for pension plan participants and the PBGC. The remaining legacy airlines with defined benefit pension plans face over $60 billion in fixed obligations over the next 4 years, including $10.4 billion in pension contributions--more than some of these airlines may be able to afford given continued losses. Various pension reform proposals may provide some immediate liquidity relief to those airlines, but at the cost shifting additional risk to PBGC. Moreover, legacy airlines still face considerable restructuring before they become competitive with low cost airlines. |
gao_GAO-11-111 | gao_GAO-11-111_0 | Background
Each year during the filing season IRS accepts individual income tax returns electronically and on paper, processes the returns, and validates key pieces of information. IRS Exceeded Some 2010 Telephone Service Goals, but Timeliness Is Not Included in Paper Correspondence Goals and IRS Could Do More to Improve Service
The percentage of callers seeking live assistance who actually received it—referred to as IRS’s Customer Service Representative Level of Service (LOS)—improved to 76 percent in 2010 as compared to the previous 2 years, as shown in table 2. IRS Does Not Have a Customer Service Telephone Standard
The decline in IRS’s live telephone assistance goal from 82 percent in 2005 through 2008 to 71 percent in 2010 raises questions about what constitutes good customer service. Once set, however, IRS officials identified several challenges to meeting such a standard, including: the potential need for additional resources; the need to balance resources between telephone services, other taxpayer services, and enforcement activities; unexpected changes in agency priorities which require the flexibility to shift resources to respond; and potentially significant fluctuations in call volume, including those resulting from tax law changes. By not consistently using existing processes to solicit input from IRS’s frontline employees to identify issues for further research, including contributing ideas for Contact Analytics, IRS may miss areas of importance to taxpayers which could improve taxpayer service. IRS Does Not Have Performance Measures to Assess the Timeliness of Its Taxpayer Correspondence Services
IRS’s frontline assistor staff is trained to respond to both telephone inquiries and taxpayer correspondence. In all, IRS has five balanced performance measures that address the productivity of its telephone service. Visits to IRS’s Web Site Increased and IRS Is Taking Steps to Improve Taxpayer Satisfaction
Visits to IRS’s Web site continue to increase, and in particular, the use of automated services like “Where’s My Refund?” is substantially higher than in 2007, as table 6 shows. application, which determines whether the taxpayer received the $250 stimulus payment in 2009; the Electronic Filing Personal Identification Number (PIN) application, which enables taxpayers to request their PIN to sign and file their return electronically; Seven Interactive Tax Assistant topics, which use interactive question-and- response processes, similar to what is used by phone assistors, to answer taxpayer questions about common tax law issues such as filing status, standard deduction, and eligibility for the Child Tax Credit; and a state-by-state partial list of volunteer tax preparation sites with contact and availability information. Accuracy at IRS’s Walk-In Sites Improved, but IRS’s Evaluation of the Debit Card Program at Volunteer Sites Is Missing Stakeholder Input
Through April 30, 2010, IRS received 2.8 million taxpayer contacts at its 401 IRS walk-in sites, about the same as last year. Further, IRS introduced a new return preparation assistance accuracy measure, which assesses the extent to which IRS staff prepares accurate returns. Return preparation accuracy by volunteers increased compared to 2009. IRS included its partner bank institutions in its evaluation of the program’s 2010 performance, but the evaluation did not include other key stakeholders, such as taxpayers or partners from volunteer sites where the program was implemented. Although IRS dealt with a number of challenges this filing season, its performance improved in some areas and IRS met some goals. For example, assessing the costs and benefits of storing recorded calls for longer than the current 45-day period could help IRS use Contact Analytics to better determine why taxpayers call. He disagreed with two recommendations. He also agreed with the recommendation to develop a performance measure for taxpayer correspondence that includes providing timely service to taxpayers. However, a customer service telephone standard would serve as a means of communicating to Congress and others what IRS believes would constitute good customer service. Having such a standard would make the gap between the standard and annual performance goals more transparent. Finally, the Deputy Commissioner disagreed with the recommendation that IRS assess its business units’ needs for holding Contact Analytics calls beyond 45 days and store calls for this period or document that the costs of doing so exceed the benefits. Contact Analytics should allow IRS to better understand the reasons taxpayers call. Because further analysis could demonstrate whether the benefits of storing calls for a longer period currently exceed the costs, we believe this recommendation remains valid. As noted earlier in the report, IRS officials attribute the combined effect of correcting millions of taxpayer errors and conducting targeted pre-refund compliance checks to missing goals for refund timeliness and refund interest paid. However, IRS also narrowly missed its goals for deposit timeliness and efficiency. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) filing season is an enormous undertaking that includes processing individual income tax returns, issuing refunds, and responding to taxpayers. GAO was asked to assess IRS's 2010 filing season performance in relation to its goals and prior years' performance processing individual tax returns, answering telephones, and delivering Web and face-to-face services. To conduct the analysis, GAO analyzed data and documents from IRS, interviewed IRS officials, observed IRS operations, and interviewed tax industry experts.
What GAO Found
IRS dealt with a number of challenges this filing season, including significant tax law changes, such as the Making Work Pay credit, and corresponding changes in taxpayer behavior. IRS balanced its resources across its filing season activities with improvements in some areas but fluctuations in others. Return processing: Electronic filing, which reduces costs to IRS, increased about 3 percent, to 71 percent of all individual returns. However, IRS experienced delays in issuing millions of refunds, which IRS officials attributed primarily to correcting taxpayer errors associated with the Making Work Pay credit and conducting additional automated checks. Telephone service: Compared to 2009, the percentage of callers seeking live assistance who received it improved in 2010 and the accuracy of answers remained high, at over 90 percent. However, the average wait time increased. Further, IRS's annual goal for providing caller assistance was lower than any of the preceding 5 years. However, IRS lacks a standard for what constitutes good customer telephone service that could be compared to its annual goals. Such a standard would make the gap between the annual goals and the standard more transparent. IRS is using a tool called Contact Analytics to better understand the reasons why taxpayers call. However, IRS has not assessed the costs and benefits of storing recorded calls for longer than the current 45 day period for use in Contact Analytics, and GAO identified gaps in the process IRS uses to solicit input on call topics from frontline IRS staff. Such input could be used to identify issues for further research using Contact Analytics. IRS's customer service staff also responds to taxpayer correspondence. IRS received about 20 million pieces of correspondence in 2010, but it does not have a performance measure that addresses the timeliness of taxpayer correspondence, a key agency objective. By not having such a performance measure, IRS managers may have a less informed basis for balancing resources across telephone and correspondence services. Web site: Visits to IRS's Web site increased and IRS is taking steps to improve content management before introducing a new Web site in 2012. Face-to-face: In 2010, taxpayer visits to IRS's walk-in sites and sites operated by volunteers remained about the same as in 2009. IRS's program to provide refunds on debit cards at certain volunteer sites, targeting taxpayers without bank accounts, received little use in 2010. IRS's evaluation of the program did not include taxpayers or volunteers. By not including these stakeholders, IRS risks not learning the real reasons for low participation. GAO's five recommendations to IRS are to establish a customer service telephone standard, assess the costs and benefits of storing recorded calls beyond 45 days, solicit information on call trends from employees, develop a performance measure for the timeliness of taxpayer correspondence, and involve key stakeholders in its evaluation of its debit card program. IRS disagreed with developing a customer service standard, not wanting to revise its measurement of phone service. However, a standard would allow IRS to communicate to Congress what it believes constitutes good service. IRS also disagreed with assessing the costs and benefits of storing calls beyond 45 days. GAO's report suggests that further analysis could show whether the benefits of doing so currently exceed the costs. IRS generally agreed with the other three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-840T | gao_GAO-06-840T_0 | Regional Enforcement Activities Vary Substantially
EPA’s enforcement program depends heavily upon inspections by regional or state enforcement staff as the primary means of detecting violations and evaluating overall facility compliance. However, as we reported in 2000, EPA’s regional offices varied substantially on the actions they take to enforce the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act. Consistent with earlier observations of EPA’s Office of Inspector General and internal agency studies, we found these variations in regional actions reflected in the (1) number of inspections EPA and state enforcement personnel conducted at facilities discharging pollutants within a region, (2) number and type of enforcement actions taken, and (3) the size of the penalties assessed and the criteria used in determining the penalties assessed. In this regard, contrary to EPA policy, some regions did not (1) conduct an adequate number of oversight inspections of state programs, (2) sufficiently encourage states to consider economic benefit in calculating penalties, (3) take more direct federal actions where states were slow to act, and (4) require states to report all significant violators. Several Factors Contribute to Variations in Regional Enforcement Programs
While EPA’s data show variations in key measures associated with the agency’s enforcement program, they do little to explain the causes of the variations. Our work identified the following causes: (1) differences in philosophical approaches to enforcement, (2) incomplete and inaccurate national enforcement data, and (3) an antiquated workforce planning and allocation system. Some regions step more readily into cases when they consider a state’s action to be inadequate, while other regions are more concerned about infringing on the discretion of states that have been delegated enforcement responsibilities. The region or the state responsible for carrying out the enforcement program is responsible for entering data into EPA’s national databases. “managers in the regions and in OECA headquarters have become increasingly frustrated that they are not receiving from the reports and data analyses they need to manage their programs… has been less attention to the data in the national systems, a commensurate decline in data quality, and insufficient use of data by enforcement/compliance managers.”
Consistent with our findings and recommendations, EPA’s Office of Inspector General recently reported that, “OECA’s 2005 publicly-reported GPRA performance measures do not effectively characterize changes in compliance or other outcomes because OECA lacks reliable compliance rates and other reliable outcome data. While EPA has initiated several projects over the past decade to improve its workload and workforce assessment systems, it continues to face major challenges in this area If EPA is to substantially improve its resource planning, we reported, it must adopt a more rigorous and systematic process for (1) obtaining reliable data on key workload indicators, such as the quality of water in particular areas, which can be used to budget and allocate resources, and (2) designing budget and cost accounting systems that are able to isolate the resources needed and allocated to key enforcement activities. Consequently, should EPA either downsize or increase its enforcement and compliance staff, it would not have the information needed to determine how many employees are appropriate, what technical skills they must have, and how best to allocate employees among strategic goals and geographic locations in order to ensure that reductions or increases could be absorbed with minimal adverse impacts in carrying out the agency’s mission. EPA Has Initiated or Planned Actions to Achieve Greater Consistency in Enforcement Activities
Over the past several years, EPA has initiated or planned several actions to improve its enforcement program. These actions include (1) the creation of a State Review Framework, (2) improvements in the quality of enforcement data, and (3) enhancements to the agency’s workforce planning and allocation system. These reviews are intended to provide a mechanism by which EPA can ensure a consistent level of environmental and public health protection across the country. Issues that still need to be addressed include how EPA will assess states’ implementation of alternative enforcement and compliance strategies, such as strategies to assist businesses in their efforts to comply with environmental regulations; encourage businesses to take steps to reduce pollution; offer incentives (e.g., public recognition) for businesses that demonstrate good records of compliance; and encourage businesses to participate in programs to audit their environmental performance and make the results of these audits and corrective actions available to EPA, other environmental regulators, and the public. For example, initiatives to improve EPA’s ability to manage for environmental results are essentially long-term. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces the nation's environmental laws and regulations through its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA). While OECA provides overall direction on enforcement policies and occasionally takes direct enforcement action, many enforcement responsibilities are carried out by EPA's 10 regional offices. In addition, these offices oversee the enforcement programs of state agencies that have been delegated the authority to enforce federal environmental protection regulations. This testimony is based on GAO's reports on EPA's enforcement activities issued over the past several years and on observations from ongoing work that is being performed at the request of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, and the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations. GAO's previous reports examined the (1) consistency among EPA regions in carrying out enforcement activities, (2) factors that contribute to any inconsistency, and (3) EPA's actions to address these factors. Our current work examines how EPA, in consultation with regions and states, sets priorities for compliance and enforcement and how the agency and states determine respective compliance and enforcement roles and responsibilities and allocate resources for these purposes.
What GAO Found
EPA regions vary substantially in the actions they take to enforce environmental requirements, according to GAO's analysis of key management indicators that EPA headquarters uses to monitor regional performance. These indicators include the number of inspections performed at regulated facilities and the amount of penalties assessed for noncompliance with environmental regulations. In addition, the regions differ substantially in their overall strategies to oversee states within their jurisdictions. For example, contrary to EPA policy, some regions did not require states to report all significant violators, while other regions adhered to EPA's policy in this regard. GAO identified several factors that contribute to regional variations in enforcement. These factors include (1) differences in philosophy among regional enforcement staff about how best to secure compliance with environmental requirements; (2) incomplete and unreliable enforcement data that impede EPA's ability to accurately determine the extent to which variations occur; and (3) an antiquated workforce planning and allocation system that is not adequate for deploying staff in a manner to ensure consistency and effectiveness in enforcing environmental requirements. EPA recognizes that while some variation in environmental enforcement is necessary to reflect local conditions, core enforcement requirements must be consistently implemented to ensure fairness and equitable treatment. Consequently, similar violations should be met with similar enforcement responses regardless of geographic location. In response to GAO findings and recommendations, EPA has initiated or planned several long-term actions that are intended to achieve greater consistency in state and regional enforcement actions. These include (1) a new State Review Framework process for measuring states' performance of core enforcement activities, (2) a number of initiatives to improve the agency's compliance and enforcement data, and (3) enhancements to the agency's workforce planning and allocation system to improve the agency's ability to match its staff and technical capabilities with the needs of individual regions. However, these actions have yet to achieve significant results and will likely require a number of years and a steady top-level commitment of staff and financial resources to substantially improve EPA's ability to target enforcement actions in a consistent and equitable manner. |
gao_GAO-10-838T | gao_GAO-10-838T_0 | Background
The federal government collects, generates, and uses large amounts of information in electronic form, from enormous geographic databases to individual e-mails. Federal Agencies and NARA Have Responsibilities for Federal Records Management
Under the Federal Records Act, each federal agency is required to make and preserve records that (1) document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency and (2) provide the information necessary to protect the legal and financial rights of the government and of persons directly affected by the agency’s activities. If these records are not effectively managed, individuals might lose access to benefits for which they are entitled, the government could be exposed to legal liabilities, and historical records of vital interest could be lost forever. For records management, NARA is responsible for issuing guidance; working with agencies to implement effective controls over the creation, maintenance, and use of records in the conduct of agency business; providing oversight of agencies’ records management programs; approving the disposition (destruction or preservation) of records; and providing storage facilities for agency records. Federal Records Management Has Been Given Low Priority and Has Had Persistent Weaknesses
Historically, despite the requirements of the Federal Records Act, records management has received low priority within the federal government. In 2008, we reported on weaknesses in federal e-mail management at four agencies. According to NARA, the survey results showed that almost 80 percent of agencies were at moderate to high risk of improper disposition of records. ● Huge volumes of electronic information are being created. Electronic information is increasingly being created in volumes that pose a significant technical challenge to our ability to organize it and make it accessible. ● Electronic records are complex. ● Identification and classification of electronic records are difficult in a decentralized computing environment. Documents can be created on individuals’ desktop computers and stored on local hard drives. As we reported in 2008, e-mail is especially problematic. Agency Commitment Is a Prerequisite for Addressing the Electronic Records Challenge
As NARA has pointed out, the decision to move to electronic recordkeeping is inevitable, but as we and NARA have previously reported, implementing such systems requires that agencies commit the necessary resources for planning and implementation, including establishing a sound records management program as a basis. Nor will automation solve the problem of lack of priority, which, as our previous work has shown, is of long standing. However, several developments could lead to increased senior-level attention to records management: NARA’s use of public ratings as a spur to agency management, growing recognition of risks entailed in poor information and records management, the requirements and emphasis of the recent Open Government Directive, and the influence of congressional oversight. Senior management commitment, if followed through with effective implementation, could improve the governmentwide management of electronic and other records. Electronic Recordkeeping Systems Are Challenging to Implement and Will Not Yet Solve the End User Problem
Moving to electronic recordkeeping is not a simple or easy process. Raising visibility, as NARA is doing by publishing the results of its self-assessment survey, can raise the perception among senior agency officials of the importance of records management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies are increasingly using electronic means to create, exchange, and store information, and in doing so, they frequently create federal records: that is, information, in whatever form, that documents government functions, activities, decisions, and other important transactions. As the volume of electronic information grows, so does the challenge of managing electronic records. Both federal agency heads and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) have responsibilities for managing federal records. As requested, after providing some context about records management in the federal government and the roles of federal agencies and NARA, this testimony describes the challenges of electronic records management and potential means of addressing these challenges. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied primarily on its previous work, supplemented by analysis of publicly available documents.
What GAO Found
Under the Federal Records Act, agencies are to manage the creation, maintenance, use, and disposition of records in order to achieve adequate and proper documentation of the policies and transactions of the federal government and effective and economical management of agency operations. If records are poorly managed, individuals might lose access to benefits for which they are entitled, the government could be exposed to legal liabilities, and records of historical interest could be lost forever. NARA is responsible, among other things, for providing records management guidance, assistance, and oversight. However, as GAO has previously reported, records management has received low priority within the federal government. Prior reports have identified persistent weaknesses in federal records management, including a lack of policies and training. GAO's most recent report, in 2008, found weaknesses in e-mail management at the four agencies reviewed due in part to insufficient oversight and training. This year, NARA published the results of its first annual agency records management self-assessment survey, indicating that almost 80 percent of agencies were at moderate to high risk of improper disposition of records. Electronic records are challenging to manage, especially as electronic information is being created in volumes that pose a significant technical challenge to the ability to organize and make it accessible. Further, electronic records range in complexity from simple text files to highly complex formats with embedded computational formulas and dynamic content, and new formats continue to be created. Finally, in a decentralized environment, it is difficult to ensure that records are properly identified and managed by end users on individual desktops (the "user challenge"). E-mail is particularly problematic, because it combines all these challenges and is ubiquitous. Technology alone cannot solve the problem without commitment from agencies. Electronic recordkeeping systems can be challenging to implement and can require considerable resources for planning and implementation, including establishing a sound records management program as a basis. In addition, the "user problem" is not yet solved, particularly for e-mail messages. Further, automation will not solve the problem of lack of priority, which is of long standing. However, several developments may lead to increased senior-level attention to records management: NARA's use of public ratings as a spur to agency management, growing recognition of risks entailed in poor information and records management, the requirements and emphasis of the recent Open Government Directive, and the influence of congressional oversight. Senior management commitment, if followed through with effective implementation, could improve the governmentwide management of electronic and other records. |
gao_GGD-97-6 | gao_GGD-97-6_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in describing the potential benefits and impediments of a voluntary tax agency reconciliation type filing system were to (1) estimate how many taxpayers would not have to prepare returns under this kind of system, (2) identify the operational characteristics such a system might have, (3) identify the pros and cons of such a system to taxpayers and IRS, and (4) identify any major impediments to or costs in establishing such a system under the current federal tax laws. IRS does not receive information returns on taxpayers’ costs to produce income. Taxpayers who agreed with the return information could notify IRS of their acceptance, possibly by telephone using, their personal identification number as their electronic signature. However, even if IRS could produce tax returns prior to April 15, some taxpayers may be reluctant to participate in this voluntary program because they distrust IRS to accurately prepare their returns or because they would not be able to get access to refunds early in the tax filing system. About 7 percent of the information returns are paper. Since its 1987 study, IRS has not reexamined the operational characteristics of a tax agency reconciliation filing system as a potential alternative for filing tax returns, even though technological improvements, such as electronic filing, may make it possible to speed up information returns processing. Conclusions
As many as 51 million taxpayers, primarily wage earners, would not have to prepare tax returns under a tax agency reconciliation type system. Instead, IRS could prepare their returns for them on the basis of taxpayer supplied information, such as filing status and dependents, which along with information returns would be used to produce tax returns. A major impediment to establishing a tax agency reconciliation system is the length of time it takes IRS to process information returns. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Comments
In its written comments, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants stated that it did not believe that IRS has the ability to implement a tax agency reconciliation system in the foreseeable future because of (1) the current uncertainty of IRS budget and staffing levels, (2) the inability of IRS to process and payers to file complete and accurate information returns on a timely basis, (3) the unknown effect on voluntary compliance that could occur if taxpayers fail to report income to IRS from sources not covered by information returns, and (4) the potential for IRS to make more errors processing taxpayers’ changes to IRS prepared returns under an alternative system than it currently makes processing tax returns. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the possible benefits, impediments, and costs of establishing a tax agency reconciliation filing system, focusing on: (1) the estimated number of taxpayers that would not have to prepare returns in such a system; (2) the system's operational characteristics; (3) potential advantages and disadvantages to taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and (4) major impediments to and costs in establishing this type of system under existing federal tax laws.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as many as 51 million taxpayers, or 45 percent of all taxpayers who filed 1992 tax returns, would not have to prepare returns if IRS established a voluntary tax agency reconciliation system; (2) the general operational concept for such a system would be for IRS to produce and mail tax returns based on taxpayer-supplied information about income, filing status, and dependents, and then have taxpayers review the returns and notify IRS if they agreed with the information; (3) the reconciliation system could reduce taxpayers' time and cost to prepare returns and reduce IRS processing and compliance costs, but could adversely affect such parties as tax preparers; (4) a major operational impediment to a reconciliation system is that IRS does not currently process information returns in sufficient time to send taxpayers their tax returns before the return filing due date; (5) IRS has two initiatives under way to speed up information returns processing; (6) a 1987 IRS study found that a tax agency reconciliation system was not then feasible, but indicated that such technological advances as electronic filing of tax data may make such a system feasible in the future; and (7) taxpayers may be reluctant to rely on IRS to prepare their tax returns, may not trust IRS to accurately calculate their taxes, and may not get their refunds as early in the tax filing system as they currently do. |
gao_GAO-02-498T | gao_GAO-02-498T_0 | The handbook also provides an administrative appeals process. OMB has not yet released DOD’s inventory for 2001. In 1999, DOD began to augment its A-76 program with what it terms strategic sourcing. DOD’s Ambitious Goals for Using A-76 Have Varied Over Time
After several years of limited use of Circular A-76, the deputy secretary of defense gave renewed emphasis to the A-76 program in August 1995 when he directed the services to make outsourcing of support activities a priority in an effort to reduce operating costs and free up funds to meet other priority needs. The number of positions planned for study and the timeframes for accomplishing those studies have changed over time in response to difficulties in identifying activities to be studied. It also planned to study about 120,000 positions under strategic sourcing during that timeframe. To what extent the A-76 study goals are likely to change in the future could be a function of changes in inventories of commercial activities and continuing management emphasis on competitive sourcing. They include (1) the time required to complete the studies, (2) cost and resources to conduct and implement the studies, (3) selecting and grouping positions to compete, and (4) developing and maintaining reliable estimates of projected savings expected from the competitions. Studies Took Longer to Complete Than Initially Expected
Individual A-76 studies in DOD have taken longer than initially projected. Selecting and Grouping Functions to Compete Can Be Difficult
Selecting and grouping functions and positions to compete can be difficult. Commercial Activities Panel Is Studying Sourcing Policies and Procedures
Although comprising a relatively small portion of the government’s overall service contracting activity, competitive sourcing under Circular A-76 has been the subject of much controversy because of concerns about the process raised both by the public and private sectors. The Commercial Activities Panel, as it is known, is required to report its findings and recommendations to the Congress by May 1, 2002. Subsequently, the panel held three public hearings. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been at the forefront of federal agencies in using the OMB Circular A-76 process. In 1995, DOD made it a priority to reduce operating costs and free funds for other needs. DOD has also augmented the A-76 program with what it terms strategic sourcing--a broader array of reinvention and reengineering options that may not necessarily involve A-76 competitions. The number of positions--at one point 229,000--that DOD planned to study and the time frames for the studies have varied. Current plans are to study about 183,000 positions between fiscal years 1997 and 2007. Changes in the inventory of commercial activities and the current administration's sourcing initiatives could change the number of positions studied in the future. However, GAO has not evaluated the extent to which these changes might occur. DOD's A-76 program has faced several challenges that may provide valuable lessons learned for other federal agencies. These lessons include the following: (1) studies took longer than initially projected, (2) costs and resources required for the studies were underestimated, (3) selecting and grouping functions to compete can be difficult, and (4) determining and maintaining reliable estimates of savings were difficult. The Commercial Activities Panel is studying and has held public hearings about the policies and procedures, including the A-76 process, and the transfer of commercial activities from government personnel to contractors. The panel, comprised of federal and private sector experts, is required to report its findings and recommendations to Congress by May 2002. |
gao_GAO-11-648T | gao_GAO-11-648T_0 | Internal Control Weaknesses in DHS’s Biometric Transportation ID Program Hinder Efforts to Ensure Security Objectives Are Fully Achieved
DHS has established a system of TWIC-related processes and controls. However, internal control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and use of TWIC potentially limit the program’s ability to meet the program’s stated mission needs or provide reasonable assurance that access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities is restricted to qualified individuals. Specifically, internal controls in the enrollment and background checking processes are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that (1) only qualified individuals can acquire TWICs; (2) adjudicators follow a process with clear criteria for applying discretionary authority when applicants are found to have extensive criminal convictions; or (3) once issued a TWIC, TWIC holders have maintained their eligibility. To meet the stated program purpose, TSA’s focus in designing the TWIC program was on facilitating the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess the internal controls in place to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance that the program could meet defined mission needs for limiting access to only qualified individuals. For example, controls that the TWIC program has in place to identify the use of potentially counterfeit identity documents are not used to routinely inform background checking processes. Additionally, controls are not in place to determine whether an applicant has a need for a TWIC. Further, TWIC program controls are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that TWIC holders have maintained their eligibility once issued TWICs. Internal control weaknesses in TWIC enrollment, background checking, and use could have contributed to the breach of selected MTSA-regulated facilities during covert tests conducted by our investigators. During these tests at several selected ports, our investigators were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and false business cases (i.e., reasons for requesting access). TWIC’s Effectiveness at Enhancing Security Has Not Been Assessed, and the Coast Guard Lacks the Ability to Assess Trends in TWIC Compliance
DHS asserted in its 2009 and 2010 budget submissions that the absence of the TWIC program would leave America’s critical maritime port facilities vulnerable to terrorist activities. However, to date, DHS has not assessed the effectiveness of TWIC at enhancing security or reducing risk for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. Further, DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned with card readers, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility-specific identity credentials with business cases. According to TSA and Coast Guard officials, because the program was mandated by Congress as part of MTSA, DHS did not conduct a risk assessment to identify and mitigate program risks prior to implementation. Further, according to these officials, neither the Coast Guard nor TSA analyzed the potential effectiveness of TWIC in reducing or mitigating security risk—either before or after implementation—because they were not required to do so by Congress. However, internal control weaknesses raise questions about the effectiveness of the TWIC program. Moreover, as we have previously reported, Congress also needs information on whether and in what respects a program is working well or poorly to support its oversight of agencies and their budgets, and agencies’ stakeholders need performance information to accurately judge program effectiveness. Therefore, we recommended in our May 2011 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security conduct an effectiveness assessment that includes addressing internal control weaknesses and, at a minimum, evaluates whether use of TWIC in its present form and planned use with readers would enhance the posture of security beyond efforts already in place given costs and program risks. DHS concurred with our recommendation. Therefore, in our May 2011 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security use the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and corrective actions needed to implement the TWIC program. The report we are releasing today aims to help inform stakeholder views on these issues. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses credentialing issues associated with the security of U.S. transportation systems and facilities. Securing these systems requires balancing security to address potential threats while facilitating the flow of people and goods that are critical to the U.S. economy and international commerce. As we have previously reported, these systems and facilities are vulnerable and difficult to secure given their size, easy accessibility, large number of potential targets, and proximity to urban areas. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) required regulations preventing individuals from having unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels unless they possess a biometric transportation security card and are authorized to be in such an area. MTSA further required that biometric transportation security cards be issued to eligible individuals unless determined that an applicant poses a security risk warranting denial of the card. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program is designed to implement these biometric maritime security card requirements. The TWIC program, once implemented, aims to meet the following stated mission needs: (1) Positively identify authorized individuals who require unescorted access to secure areas of the nation's transportation system. (2) Determine the eligibility of individuals to be authorized unescorted access to secure areas of the transportation system by conducting a security threat assessment. (3) Ensure that unauthorized individuals are not able to defeat or otherwise compromise the access system in order to be granted permissions that have been assigned to an authorized individual. (4) Identify individuals who fail to maintain their eligibility requirements subsequent to being permitted unescorted access to secure areas of the nation's transportation system and immediately revoke the individual's permissions. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard are responsible for implementing and enforcing the TWIC program. In addition, DHS's Screening Coordination Office facilitates coordination among the various DHS components involved in TWIC. This testimony is based on a report we are releasing publicly today on the TWIC program. Like the report, this testimony discusses the extent to which: (1) TWIC processes for enrollment, background checking, and use are designed to provide reasonable assurance that unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels is limited to qualified individuals, and (2) DHS has assessed the effectiveness of TWIC, and whether the Coast Guard has effective systems in place to measure compliance.
What GAO Found
DHS has established a system of TWIC-related processes and controls. However, internal control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and use of TWIC potentially limit the program's ability to meet the program's stated mission needs or provide reasonable assurance that access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities is restricted to qualified individuals. Specifically, internal controls in the enrollment and background checking processes are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that (1) only qualified individuals can acquire TWICs; (2) adjudicators follow a process with clear criteria for applying discretionary authority when applicants are found to have extensive criminal convictions; or (3) once issued a TWIC, TWIC holders have maintained their eligibility. To meet the stated program purpose, TSA's focus in designing the TWIC program was on facilitating the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess the internal controls in place to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance that the program could meet defined mission needs for limiting access to only qualified individuals. For example, controls that the TWIC program has in place to identify the use of potentially counterfeit identity documents are not used to routinely inform background checking processes. Internal control weaknesses in TWIC enrollment, background checking, and use could have contributed to the breach of selected MTSA-regulated facilities during covert tests conducted by our investigators. During these tests at several selected ports, our investigators were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and false business cases (i.e., reasons for requesting access). DHS asserted in its 2009 and 2010 budget submissions that the absence of the TWIC program would leave America's critical maritime port facilities vulnerable to terrorist activities. However, to date, DHS has not assessed the effectiveness of TWIC at enhancing security or reducing risk for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. Further, DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned with card readers, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility-specific identity credentials with business cases. According to TSA and Coast Guard officials, because the program was mandated by Congress as part of MTSA, DHS did not conduct a risk assessment to identify and mitigate program risks prior to implementation. Further, according to these officials, neither the Coast Guard nor TSA analyzed the potential effectiveness of TWIC in reducing or mitigating security risk--either before or after implementation--because they were not required to do so by Congress. However, internal control weaknesses raise questions about the effectiveness of the TWIC program. Moreover, as we have previously reported, Congress also needs information on whether and in what respects a program is working well or poorly to support its oversight of agencies and their budgets, and agencies' stakeholders need performance information to accurately judge program effectiveness. Therefore, we recommended in our May 2011 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security conduct an effectiveness assessment that includes addressing internal control weaknesses and, at a minimum, evaluates whether use of TWIC in its present form and planned use with readers would enhance the posture of security beyond efforts already in place given costs and program risks. DHS concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-549 | gao_GAO-07-549_0 | DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and Measures of Effectiveness
DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in identifying capability gaps and developing measures of effectiveness, which are critical to successfully executing this approach. Specifically, the department has: (1) formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a core mission and gave them priority comparable to combat operations, and assigned numerous responsibilities to DOD organizations, (2) expanded DOD’s planning construct to more fully address stability operations, and (3) defined a new joint operating concept that will serve as a basis for how the military will support stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in the next 15 to 20 years. However, DOD has made limited progress in identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities, and in developing measures of effectiveness, which are critical steps required by DOD’s new directive and important tenets of performance-based management. This directive reflects a fundamental shift in DOD’s policy because it designates stability operations as a core mission that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and emphasizes that integrated military and civilian efforts are key to successful stability operations efforts. DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning for Stability Operations
DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Limited Guidance, Information Sharing and Training Hinder Interagency Participation in the Development of Military Plans
Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation in the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non- DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non- DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning processes and capabilities, and non-DOD organizations have limited capacity to fully engage in DOD’s planning efforts. Without clear guidance to the combatant commanders on how to establish adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning, a process to share planning information as plans are being developed, and methods to orient and include professional planners from key organizations in DOD’s planning process, the contributions and capabilities of these organizations may not be fully integrated into DOD’s plans, and a unified government approach may not be achieved. Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning
DOD planners are not consistently using lessons learned from past operations as they develop future contingency plans. Lessons learned from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our analysis indicates that DOD planners are not using this information on a consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1) DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons- learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. We interviewed officials at the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, and the United States Agency for International Development to obtain other agencies’ perspectives regarding DOD’s planning process and the inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in contingency plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State to integrate stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO was asked to address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities, and challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2) DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three combatant commands, and evaluated DOD's use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a related study of the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate stability operations.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD's ability to develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15-20 years. These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD's policy because they elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD's guidance. DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD's planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range of planning activities. Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this information because (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. |
gao_GAO-05-731 | gao_GAO-05-731_0 | To determine the funding that Egypt should receive for completing each reform activity, USAID considers the activity’s significance, the cost to the Egyptian government associated with completing it, the Egyptian government’s willingness to implement it, the U.S. government’s interest in seeing it implemented, and the contribution of the completed activity to Egypt’s economic growth. USAID Provided Almost $2 Billion in Cash Transfer Program Funding and Technical Assistance
USAID disbursed about $1.8 billion in Cash Transfer Program funds to the government of Egypt as it completed agreed-on economic reform activities, primarily in the areas of finance and trade. In commenting on a draft of this report, USAID officials agreed that these disbursements had occurred. Various Factors Have Limited the Program’s Ability to Influence Egypt’s Reforms
Although the Cash Transfer Program provided financial and technical assistance to support Egypt’s completion of reform-related activities, several factors have limited the program’s ability to influence Egypt to undertake certain reforms. These factors include the following: Financial costs versus benefits of reform-related activities. Since fiscal year 1992, the government of Egypt requested, and USAID granted, 19 extensions to the deadlines originally agreed to in MOUs. The need to tighten conditions tied to the program’s funding disbursements was highlighted in the 2002 review by State and USAID. USAID Made Efforts to Evaluate Cash Transfer Program’s Impact on Egypt’s Reforms, but The Assessments Had Limitations
Demonstrating the impact of policy reforms is challenging, according to USAID officials and academics studying such reforms; however, USAID conducted two evaluations related to the Cash Transfer Program activities, as well as a series of opinion surveys that attempted to assess the impact of economic reform activities supported by the program. In addition, collecting reliable data is problematic in Egypt. Beginning in 2005, USAID will obligate Cash Transfer funds only after it is certain that the Egyptian government will complete agreed-on activities. He stated that the draft was fair and clear, but that the Egyptian government’s completion of 70 percent of the 196 agreed-on activities related substantially to the Cash Transfer Program’s structure rather than to shortcomings in Egypt’s policy reforms. Additionally, USAID stated that granting deadline extensions to permit Egypt to complete activities increased the U.S. government’s influence in accomplishing reforms. USAID also provided technical comments as did the Department of State, which we incorporated where appropriate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review for the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, focused on (1) the Cash Transfer Program’s disbursement of funds and Egypt’s completion of agreed-on activities since in fiscal year 1992, (2) factors affecting the program’s influence on Egypt’s economic reform activities, (3) U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) efforts to evaluate the program’s impact on Egypt’s economic reform, and (4) USAID’s changes to the program in response to the 2002 Department of State and USAID review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has focused the Cash Transfer Program in Egypt on supporting economic reform activities to move Egypt toward a more liberal and market-oriented economy. USAID has provided funds to Egypt's government as it completed agreed-on economic reform activities. In fiscal year 2002, the Department of State and USAID conducted a review of U.S. economic assistance in Egypt that led USAID to renegotiate the program's terms. USAID and Egypt signed a new agreement in March 2005. GAO's review of the Cash Transfer Program focused on the program's disbursement of funds and Egypt's completion of agreed-on activities, factors affecting the program's influence on Egypt's economic reform, USAID's efforts to evaluate the program's impact, and USAID's changes to the program in response to the 2002 review by the Department of State and USAID. GAO received comments on a draft of this report from USAID. USAID stated that the draft was fair and clear but that Egypt's completion of about 70 percent of the activities resulted from the program's structure rather than shortcomings in Egypt's policy reforms. USAID also stated that extending the target dates for completing reforms increased U.S. influence in accomplishing reforms.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 1992, USAID's Cash Transfer Program has provided about $1.8 billion in economic assistance to the Egyptian government for completing reform-related activities, such as privatizing state-owned companies. USAID and Egypt have identified 196 reform-related activities, and Egypt has completed 136 of them (about 70 percent), primarily in the areas of finance and trade. Although the Cash Transfer Program supported Egypt's completion of reform activities, several factors have limited its ability to influence the Egyptian government to undertake certain reforms. First, the financial costs of certain reforms affected the Egyptian government's willingness to undertake them despite their potential benefits; although the Cash Transfer Program offsets some of those costs, its contribution to Egypt's overall budget is small. In addition, Egypt is cautious about undertaking reforms that may lead to domestic instability. Finally, USAID granted numerous extensions that allowed Egypt additional time to complete agreed-on activities, thus weakening the conditions tied to funding disbursement. Despite the difficulty of determining the impact of policy reform, USAID conducted two evaluations of Cash Transfer activities as well as a series of opinion surveys on the impact of certain activities supported by the program. Although these studies reported some positive results, GAO found limitations with some of the measures used to evaluate the activities' impact on Egypt's economy. In response to recommendations in the 2002 Department of State and USAID review, USAID (1) narrowed the Cash Transfer Program's focus to reforms in the financial sector, (2) will obligate funds when it is certain that the Egyptian government will complete activities rather than when the government agrees to undertake them, and (3) is improving its monitoring and evaluation system. |
gao_GAO-07-576T | gao_GAO-07-576T_0 | Our reports were among the resources that the Congress drew on in enacting the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which provided guidance for fundamental election administration reform and created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to oversee the election administration reform process. Actions EAC has taken since 2004 to improve voting systems include publishing the Best Practices Toolkit and specialized management guides to assist states and local jurisdictions with managing election-related activities and equipment; issuing voting system standards in 2005, referred to as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines; establishing procedures for certifying voting systems; establishing a program for accreditation of independent testing laboratories, with support from NIST’s National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program; disbursing to states approximately $2.3 billion in appropriations for the replacement of older voting equipment and election administration improvements under Title III of HAVA; and conducting national surveys of the 2004 general election, uniformed and overseas voters, and other studies. The Contextual Role and Performance Characteristics of Electronic Voting Systems Are Important to Understanding Their Use
Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, continuous elections process that involves the interplay of people, processes, and technology. All levels of government—federal, state, and local— share responsibilities for aspects of elections and voting systems. Such performance can be viewed in terms of several characteristics, such as security, reliability, ease of use, and cost effectiveness. Development. Among other things, this phase includes activities associated with the physical environments in which the system operates. Reliability. Ease of use depends on how well jurisdictions design ballots and educate voters on the use of the equipment. Widespread Concerns about Electronic Voting Systems Have Been Reported
Election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy groups, and others have raised significant security and reliability concerns with electronic voting systems, citing, for example, inadequacies in standards, system design and development, operation and management activities, and testing. In 2005, we examined the range of concerns raised by these groups and aligned them with their relevant life cycle phases. We also examined EAC’s efforts related to these concerns. Weak system security controls. Inadequate System Operation and Management Activities
Several reports raised concerns about the operational practices of local jurisdictions and the actual performance of their respective electronic voting systems during elections. These include incorrect system configurations, inadequate security management programs, and poor implementation of security procedures. Poor version control of system software. Regarding voting systems, states and jurisdictions’ responses to our surveys showed that differing versions of the national voting system standards were used (not always the most current version); voting system life cycle management practices were not consistently implemented; and certain types of system testing were not widely performed. Roles and responsibilities. The remaining 22 states said that they did not conduct or require system security testing. Addressing Voting System Challenges Requires the Combined Efforts of All Levels of Government
The challenges in ensuring that voting systems perform securely and reliably are not unlike those faced by any technology user— application of well-defined standards for system capabilities and performance; effective integration of the people, processes, and technology throughout the voting system life cycle; rigorous and disciplined performance of security and testing activities; objective measurement to determine whether the systems are performing as intended; and analytical and economically justified basis for making informed decisions about voting system investment options. These challenges are complicated by other conditions common to both the national elections community and other information technology environments: the distribution of responsibilities among various organizations, technology changes, funding opportunities and constraints, changing requirements and standards, and public attention. Therefore, all levels of government need to work together to address these challenges, under the leadership of the EAC. To assist the EAC in executing its leadership role, we previously made recommendations to the commission aimed at better planning its ongoing and future activities relative to, for example, system standards and information sharing. While the EAC agreed with the recommendations, it told us that its ability to effectively execute its role is resource constrained. The challenge facing all voting jurisdictions will be to ensure that these activities are fully and properly performed, particularly in light of the security and reliability concerns that have been reported with electronic voting systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 2000 national elections, concerns have been raised by various groups regarding the election process, including voting technologies. Beginning in 2001, GAO published a series of reports examining virtually every aspect of the elections process. GAO's complement of reports were used by Congress in framing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which, among other things, provided for replacement of older voting equipment with more modern electronic voting systems and established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to lead the nation's election reform efforts. GAO's later reports have raised concerns about the security and reliability of these electronic voting systems, examined the EAC's efforts to address these concerns, and surveyed state and local officials about practices used during the 2004 election, as well as plans for their systems for the 2006 election. Using its published work on electronic voting systems, GAO was asked to testify on (1) the contextual role and characteristics of electronic voting systems, (2) the range of security and reliability concerns that have been reported about these systems, (3) the experiences and management practices of states and local jurisdictions regarding these systems, and (4) the longstanding and emerging challenges facing all levels of government in using these systems.
What GAO Found
Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, year-round elections process that involves the interplay of people, processes, and technology, and includes all levels of government. How well these systems play their role in an election depends in large part on how well they are managed throughout their life cycle, which begins with defining system standards; includes system design, development, and testing; and concludes with system operations. Important attributes of the systems' performance are security, reliability, ease of use, and cost effectiveness. A range of parties knowledgable about elections or voting systems have expressed concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems; these concerns can be associated with stages in the system life cycle. Examples of concerns include vague or incomplete voting system standards, system design flaws, poorly developed security controls, incorrect system configurations, inadequate testing, and poor overall security management. For the 2004 national elections, states' and local governments' responses to our surveys showed that they did not always ensure that important life cycle and security management practices were employed for their respective electronic voting systems. In particular, responses indicated that the most current standards were not always adopted and applied, security management practices and controls were employed to varying degrees, and certain types of system testing were not commonly performed. Moreover, jurisdictions' responses showed that they did not consistently monitor the performance of their systems. In GAO's view, the challenges faced in acquiring and operating electronic voting systems are not unlike those faced by any technology user--adoption and application of well-defined system standards; effective integration of the technology with the people who operate it and the processes that govern this operation; rigorous and disciplined performance of system security and testing activities; reliable measurement of system performance; and the analytical basis for making informed, economically justified decisions about voting system investment options. These challenges are complicated by other conditions such as the distribution of responsibilities among various organizations and funding opportunities and constraints. Given the diffused and decentralized allocation of voting system roles and responsibilities across all levels of government, addressing these challenges will require the combined efforts of all levels of government, under the leadership of the EAC. To assist the EAC in executing its leadership role, GAO has previously made recommendations to the commission aimed at better planning its ongoing and future activities relative to, for example, system standards and information sharing. While the EAC agreed with the recommendations, it stated that its ability to effectively execute its role is resource constrained. |
gao_GAO-10-835 | gao_GAO-10-835_0 | DOD Has Not Developed a System to Effectively Track the Progress of Its Counternarcotics Activities, but Continues to Work to Improve Its Efforts
DOD does not have an effective system for tracking the progress of its counternarcotics activities; however, it continues efforts to improve the system. We have found that measuring performance provides managers a basis for making fact-based decisions. However, these measures lack a number of attributes which we consider key to successful performance measures and, therefore, do not provide a clear indication of DOD’s progress toward its counternarcotics goals. Recognizing the need to update and improve its measures, in May 2010, DOD issued new guidance for its counternarcotics performance measurement system. However, DOD officials noted the department will faces challenges implementing the guidance. DOD Has Developed Performance Measures and a Database for Its Counternarcotics Activities
We have previously reported that effective performance measurement systems include steps to measure performance, such as establishing performance measures and collecting data. Objectivity. Measurable target. Creating performance measures that assess program outcomes. DOD officials noted that ensuring adequate resources—such as expertise and training in performance management—are available to develop performance measures at both DASD-CN> and the combatant commands will be a challenge. DOD Rarely Uses the Performance Information Contained in Its Performance Measurement System to Manage Its Counternarcotics Activities and Has Applied Few Practices to Facilitate Its Use
DOD makes limited use of its performance measurement system to manage its counternarcotics activities and has applied few practices to facilitate its use. We have found that the full benefit of collecting performance information is realized only when managers use the information to inform key decisions. While DOD has applied some practices to facilitate the use of the performance information in its system, it does not utilize certain key practices, such as frequently and effectively communicating performance information. Absent an effective performance management system, DOD lacks critical information to use to improve the management and oversight of its counternarcotics activities. DOD Submits Performance Reports to ONDCP, But Makes Limited Use of the Information in Its Performance Measurement System to Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotics Activities
DOD officials representing DASD-CN>, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTCOM, JIATF-S, and JIATF-W told us they rarely use information from DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system to manage counternarcotics activities. To address weaknesses identified in DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics and Global Threats to review the department’s performance measures for counternarcotics activities and revise the measures, as appropriate, to include the key attributes of successful performance measures previously identified by GAO. 2. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. In response to this mandate, we examined the extent to which (1) DOD’s counternarcotics performance measurement system enables DOD to track progress and (2) DOD uses performance information from its counternarcotics performance measurement system to manage its activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) leads detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States in support of law enforcement agencies. DOD reported resources of more than $1.5 billion for fiscal year 2010 to support its counternarcotics activities. Congress mandated GAO report on DOD's counternarcotics performance measurement system. Specifically, this report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's counternarcotics performance measurement system enables DOD to track progress and (2) DOD uses performance information from its counternarcotics performance measurement system to manage its activities. GAO analyzed relevant DOD performance and budget documents, and discussed these efforts with officials from DOD and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).
What GAO Found
DOD does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities; however, it continues efforts to improve the system. GAO has previously reported that measuring performance provides managers a basis for making fact-based decisions. DOD has established performance measures for its counternarcotics activities and a database to collect performance information, including measures, targets, and results. However, these measures lack a number of attributes, such as being clearly stated and objective, which GAO considers key to successful performance measures. In May 2010, DOD issued new guidance for its counternarcotics performance measurement system. However, DOD officials noted the department will face challenges implementing the guidance. These challenges include creating performance measures that assess program outcomes and ensuring adequate resources, such as expertise in performance management, are available to develop measures. DOD rarely uses the information in its performance measurement system to manage its counternarcotics activities and has applied few practices to facilitate its use. GAO has found that the full benefit of collecting performance information is realized only when managers use it to inform key decisions. However, DOD officials responsible for counternarcotics activities throughout the department told us they rarely use data submitted to the system to manage activities. Rather, they tend to manage programs using data not submitted to the system, such as information obtained in weekly program meetings regarding the cost and timeliness of projects. Moreover, officials responsible for oversight of DOD's activities stated they use the system to develop reports for ONDCP, but not to allocate resources. While DOD has applied some practices to facilitate the use of the performance information in its system, it does not utilize certain key practices identified by GAO, such as frequently and effectively communicating performance information. Absent an effective performance management system, DOD lacks critical information to use to improve the management and oversight of its counternarcotics activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to improve DOD's counternarcotics performance measurement system by (1) revising its performance measures and (2) applying practices to better facilitate the use of performance data to manage its counternarcotics activities. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-822 | gao_GAO-08-822_0 | The GCSS-MC is one such system investment. However, the program now expects to reach FOC in fiscal year 2010 at a cost of about $442 million over a 12-year life cycle. Effective implementation of this framework can minimize program risks and better ensure that system investments are defined in a way to optimally support mission operations and performance, as well as deliver promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Thus far, GCSS-MC has not been managed in accordance with key aspects of this framework, which has already contributed to more than 3 years in program schedule delays and about $193 million in cost increases. These IT acquisition management control weaknesses include compliance with DOD’s federated BEA not being sufficiently expected costs not being reliably estimated; earned value management not being adequately implemented; system requirements not always being effectively managed, although this has recently improved; key program risks not being effectively managed; and key system quality measures not being used. The reasons that these key practices have not been sufficiently executed include limitations in the applicable DOD guidance and tools, and not collecting relevant data, each of which is described in the applicable sections of this report. As a result, the Marine Corps does not have a sufficient basis for deciding whether GCSS-MC, as defined, is the most cost-effective solution to meeting its mission needs, and it does not have a reliable basis against which to measure cost performance. The original benefit estimate for the first increment was based on questionable assumptions and insufficient data from comparable programs. However, this schedule-focused approach has not been effectively implemented because it is based on a baseline schedule that was not derived using key schedule estimating practices. However, it has not effectively implemented the process for all identified risks. Conclusions
DOD’s success in delivering large-scale business systems, such as GCSS- MC, is in large part determined by the extent to which it employs the kind of rigorous and disciplined IT management controls that are reflected in DOD policies and related guidance. The department has not effectively implemented a number of essential IT management controls on GCSS-MC, which has already contributed to significant cost overruns and schedule delays, and has increased the program’s risk going forward of not delivering a cost-effective system solution and not meeting future cost, schedule, capability, and benefit commitments. Another related indicator of progress, trends in system problems and change requests, also cannot be gauged because the data needed to do so are not being collected. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that each GCSS-MC system increment is economically justified on the basis of a full and reliable understanding of costs, benefits, and risks, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that investment in the next acquisition phase of the program’s first increment is conditional upon fully disclosing to program oversight and approval entities the steps under way or planned to address each of the risks discussed in this report, including the risk of not being architecturally compliant and being duplicative of related programs, not producing expected mission benefits commensurate with reliably estimated costs, not effectively implementing EVM, not mitigating known program risks, and not knowing whether the system is becoming more or less mature and stable. To enhance GCSS-MC’s use of EVM, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, through the appropriate chain of command, to ensure that the program office (1) monitors the actual start and completion dates of work activities performed so that the impact of deviations on downstream scheduled work can be proactively addressed; (2) allocates resources, such as labor hours and material, to all key activities on the schedule; (3) integrates key activities and supporting tasks and subtasks; (4) identifies and allocates the amount of float time needed for key activities to account for potential problems that might occur along or near the schedule’s critical path; (5) performs a schedule risk analysis to determine the level of confidence in meeting the program’s activities and completion date; (6) allocates schedule reserve for high-risk activities on the critical path; and (7) discloses the inherent risks and limitations associated with any future use of the program’s EVM reports until the schedule has been risk-adjusted. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Department of the Navy is effectively implementing information technology management controls on the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC). To accomplish this, we focused on the first increment of GCSS-MC relative to the following management areas: architectural alignment, economic justification, earned value management, requirements management, risk management, and system quality measurement. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization as a high-risk program because, among other things, it has been challenged in implementing key information technology (IT) management controls on its thousands of business systems. The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps program is one such system. Initiated in 2003, the program is to modernize the Marine Corps logistics systems. The first increment is to cost about $442 million and be deployed in fiscal year 2010. GAO was asked to determine whether the Department of the Navy is effectively implementing IT management controls on this program. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed the program's implementation of several key IT management disciplines, including economic justification, earned value management, risk management, and system quality measurement.
What GAO Found
DOD has not effectively implemented key IT management controls provided for in DOD and related acquisition guidance on this program. If implemented effectively, these and other IT management disciplines increase the likelihood that a given system investment will produce the right solution to fill a mission need and that this system solution will be acquired and deployed in a manner that maximizes the chances of delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Neither of these outcomes is being fully realized on this program, as evidenced by the fact that its first increment has already slipped more than 3 years and is expected to cost about $193 million more than envisioned. These slippages and cost overruns can be attributed in part to the management control weaknesses discussed in this report and summarized below. Moreover, additional slippages and overruns are likely if these and other IT management weaknesses are not addressed. Investment in the system has not been economically justified on the basis of reliable estimates of both benefits and costs. Specifically, while projected benefits were risk-adjusted to compensate for limited data and questionable assumptions, the cost side of the benefit/cost equation is not sufficiently reliable because it was not derived in accordance with key cost estimating practices. In particular, it was not based on historical data from similar programs and it did not account for schedule risks, both of which are needed for the estimate to be considered accurate and credible. Earned value management that the program uses to measure progress has not been adequately implemented. Specifically, the schedule baseline against which the program gauges progress is not based on key estimating practices provided for in federal guidance, such as assessing schedule risks and allocating schedule reserves to address these risks. As a result, program progress cannot be adequately measured, and likely program completion dates cannot be projected based on actual work performed. Some significant program risks have not been adequately managed. While a well-defined risk management plan and supporting process have been put in place, the process has not always been followed. Specifically, mitigation steps for significant risks either have not been implemented or proved ineffective, allowing the risks to become actual problems. The data needed to produce key indicators of system quality, such as trends in the volume of significant and unresolved problems and change requests, are not being collected. Without such data, it is unclear whether the system is becoming more or less mature and stable. The reasons for these weaknesses range from limitations of DOD guidance and tools, to not collecting relevant data. Until they are addressed, DOD is at risk of delivering a solution that does not cost-effectively support mission operations and falls short of cost, schedule, and capability expectations. |
gao_GAO-07-15 | gao_GAO-07-15_0 | 1). Moreover, the current structure does not appear to effectively target federal funds where they may achieve the greatest level of public benefits. In contrast, corridor routes account for most of Amtrak’s ridership and appear to offer greater potential to provide passenger transportation benefits and public benefits. 2). 3). Over 80 percent of the nation’s population now lives in a metropolitan area. Canada did not have debt at the time of their restructurings. United States Will Need to Address Three Key Elements to Improve the Benefits of Intercity Passenger Rail
We found that other countries we visited addressed key reform elements in the process of reforming or restructuring their intercity passenger rail systems. However, Amtrak has a history of poor financial and operating performance. Amtrak is taking actions within its existing authority to implement these initiatives, although most of the actions currently being taken are operating in nature. Instead, Amtrak’s financial condition deteriorated. Amtrak Is Not Positioned to Address the Three Key Reform Elements
Amtrak, as an operator, is not in a position to adopt and ultimately implement key elements to begin reforming intercity passenger rail in the United States. Most of all, Amtrak cannot address the three key elements of reform we observed in other countries: 1) clearly defining national policy goals, 2) clearly defining the various roles and responsibilities of public and private sector entities involved, and 3) establishing a level of funding to devote to these goals. However, federal-state cost sharing is common in highway and transit programs where investment is encouraged through matching grants. However, states are challenged to leverage their expenditures on intercity passenger rail. Freight railroads have other concerns as well. Options for the Future of Intercity Passenger Rail Will Determine the Level of Federal Involvement
As the federal government is the primary provider of funds, oversight, and direction for intercity passenger rail service, federal policy makers should take the lead in deciding what the federal government’s role in intercity passenger rail service should be and what changes, if any, need to be made to its goals, structure, and funding. This section discusses each option separately, although some combination of these options could also be implemented. Leading private and public organizations we have studied in the past, such as General Electric and the state of Washington, have stressed the importance of developing performance measures and then linking investment decisions and their expected outcomes to overall strategic goals and objectives.While federal funding is currently a major source of financial support for intercity passenger rail service in the United States, currently there are no requirements for a periodic, regular evaluation of the use of federal funds (outside of annual appropriations legislation and yearly FRA grant reviews). For example, furthering this goal could include using federal subsidies for intercity passenger rail to: reduce highway congestion, increase intermodal connectivity, provide environmental benefits, or increase redundancy in regional or urban transportation. The status quo and incremental change options do not allow for a reexamination by all stakeholders of the goals, roles and funding mechanisms of the system and would not significantly increase the potential benefits of the system relative to the expenditures required. Conclusions
If the role of intercity passenger rail is to be effectively integrated into the national transportation system and federal support is to be targeted to assure its performance, results and accountability, we believe that there is a clear need to change the current structure of and the federal role in intercity passenger rail in the United States. In particular, we focused on: (1) the characteristics of the U.S. intercity passenger rail system and the value and benefits provided by this system, (2) foreign experiences with passenger rail reform and lessons learned for the United States, (3) how well the United States is positioned to reform intercity passenger rail, (4) challenges that must be addressed in any reform efforts, and (5) potential options for the federal role in intercity passenger rail. We reviewed data for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (U.K.). Each region has its own rail company. GAO Comments
1. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Intercity passenger rail service is at a critical juncture in the United States. Amtrak, the current service provider, requires $1 billion a year in federal subsidies to stay financially viable but cannot keep pace with its deteriorating infrastructure. At the same time, the federal government faces growing fiscal challenges. To assist the Congress, GAO reviewed (1) the existing U.S. system and its potential benefits, (2) how foreign countries have handled passenger rail reform and how well the United States is positioned to consider reform, (3) challenges inherent in attempting reform efforts, and (4) potential options for the federal role in intercity passenger rail. GAO analyzed data on intercity passenger rail performance and studied reform efforts in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
What GAO Found
The existing intercity passenger rail system is in poor financial condition and the current structure does not effectively target federal funds to where they provide the greatest public benefits, such as transportation congestion relief. Routes of 750 miles or more, while providing service for some rural areas and connections between regions, show limited public benefits for dollars expended. These routes account for 15 percent of riders but 80 percent of financial losses. "Corridor" routes (generally less than 500 miles in length) have higher ridership, perform better financially, and appear to offer greater potential for public benefits. The countries GAO studied varied in their reform approach, but their experience shows the United States needs to consider three key elements in attempting any reform: (1) define national policy goals, (2) define the roles of government and other participants, and (3) establish stable funding. Countries found these elements important in setting the role of passenger rail in the national transportation system and increasing the benefit from investing in passenger rail. Currently, however, the United States is not well positioned to address these key elements. The goals or expected outcomes of intercity passenger rail policies are ambiguous, participants' roles are unclear, and there is widespread disagreement about the level of funding to devote to this effort. Amtrak is taking actions within its authority to reduce costs and increase efficiency, but Amtrak is not in a position to address all key elements. To undertake reform, federal leadership is needed. Addressing key elements of reform poses many challenges, because those who have a stake in the process have divergent goals or points of view. Amtrak workers, freight railroads that own much of the rail system over which passenger trains operate, and federal and state governments would be among those affected. The diversity of viewpoints poses challenges for determining both the overall goal for passenger rail in the United States and the federal role in achieving this goal. Funding-related challenges include identifying how to pay for achieving these goals and how to overcome disadvantages intercity passenger rail faces relative to leveraging of federal funds. Although federal-state cost sharing is common in highway and transit programs, states face difficulty leveraging their expenditures on rail service. There are four main options for the federal role in intercity passenger rail service: (1) keep the existing structure and funding, (2) make incremental changes to improve financial or operational performance, (3) discontinue federal involvement, or (4) fundamentally restructure the system. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and each faces its own challenges. Each requires some level of federal funding, a clear articulation of expected goals, and, except for the status quo option, substantial time to implement. Of these options, the fourth--fundamental restructuring--would allow for effectively integrating rail into the national transportation system and substantially improving overall performance and accountability. |
gao_GAO-09-910T | gao_GAO-09-910T_0 | In addition to receiving disability benefits from VA, veterans may receive disability benefits from the Department of Defense (DOD). VA’s Disability Claims and Appeals Processing Has Improved in Some Areas and Worsened in Others
Over the past 10 fiscal years, the total number of compensation claims decisions completed annually by VA and the average days compensation claims were pending improved, while the total number of claims pending at year end and the average days to complete a claim worsened. From fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2008, VA increased the number of initial compensation claims processed annually by nearly 60 percent from about 458,000 to about 729,000 (see fig. 1). 2). From the end of fiscal year 1999 to the end of fiscal year 2008, pending claims increased by more than 65 percent from about 207,000 to about 343,000 (see fig. Several factors have contributed to the trends in VA’s disability workloads. Another factor impacting VA’s claims workloads—particularly the average time to complete a claim—is the complexity of claims received. In addition, according to VA officials, veterans cited more disabilities in their claims in recent years than in the past, and these claims can take longer to complete because each disability must be evaluated separately. For example, over the past 6 fiscal years, the number of appeals resolved increased about 22 percent from over 72,000 in fiscal year 2003 to almost 88,000 in fiscal year 2008 (see fig. VA Continues to Take Steps to Improve Claims Processing
VA has taken several steps to improve claims processing, including increasing claims processing staff, redistributing certain workloads, implementing a joint pilot with DOD to perform disability evaluations, and developing a number of other initiatives to expedite benefits to veterans. VA expects these efforts to yield improvements, but their effects are not yet known and we have identified challenges with some of these efforts. VA expects its productivity to decline further before it improves, in part because of the challenge of training and integrating new staff. Since 2001, VA has created 15 resource centers that are staffed exclusively to process claims or appeals from backlogged regional offices at distinct phases in the claims process. Although such efforts could improve the timeliness as well as the consistency of its decisions, VA has not collected data to evaluate the effect of its workload redistribution efforts. In the pilot, VA completes disability ratings for servicemembers found unfit for duty. VA has also begun other initiatives such as testing other ways to process claims and leveraging technology. We are in the process of reviewing these initiatives as part of our ongoing study. In conclusion, workload data indicate that VA has made progress in some areas of its disability claims and appeals process, but it continues to experience challenges in reducing the time it takes to process claims and appeals and in reducing the number of claims awaiting decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee asked GAO to present its preliminary findings on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability claims process. This statement discusses (1) the trends in VA compensation claims and appeals, and (2) the steps VA is taking to improve disability claims processing. This testimony is based on ongoing work. GAO's findings are based largely on VA performance data and information obtained from VA documents and through interviews with VA officials. This testimony is also based on past GAO work on this subject, updated as appropriate to reflect VA's current workload and initiatives.
What GAO Found
Over the past several years, VA disability claims workloads at both the initial and appellate levels have improved in some areas and worsened in others. For example, the number of disability claims VA completes annually at the initial level increased about 60 percent--from about 458,000 in fiscal year 1999 to about 729,000 in fiscal year 2008. However, during this same period, the number of claims pending at year-end increased 65 percent to about 343,000. Several factors affect these and other disability claims workloads, including increases in disability claims received, growing complexity of claims, court decisions and changes in regulation. Disability claims workloads at the appellate level have also improved in some areas and worsened in others. For example, over the past several years, the number of appeals resolved increased 22 percent, from more than 72,000 cases in fiscal year 2003 to almost 88,000 cases in fiscal year 2008. However, it took on average 96 days longer in fiscal year 2008 to resolve appeals than in fiscal year 2003. One factor that affects workloads at the appellate level is the submission of new evidence or claims that must be evaluated. VA has taken several steps to improve claims processing, but the effect of some of these actions is not yet known. For example, VA increased claims processing staff about 58 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 2009, which has helped to increase the total number of decisions VA issues annually. However, VA expects individual staff productivity to decline in the short-term in part because of the challenge of training and integrating new staff. In addition, VA has established 15 resource centers to which it redistributes claims and appeals for processing from backlogged regional offices. Although VA has not collected data to evaluate the effect of its workload redistribution efforts, these efforts may ultimately increase the timeliness and consistency of VA's decisions. VA is also implementing a pilot with the Department of Defense (DOD) to perform joint disability evaluations that has the potential to streamline the disability process for prospective veterans. Finally, VA has begun other initiatives, which we are in the process of reviewing, such as targeting certain claims for fast-track processing and leveraging technology. |
gao_GAO-01-1043 | gao_GAO-01-1043_0 | The Attorney General is also responsible for reviewing applications to determine whether applicants qualify for compensation and establishing procedures for paying claims. The regulation established RECP within Justice’s Civil Division and charged it with administering claims adjudication and compensation under the act. Through the end of fiscal year 2000, RECP received 7,819 applications for compensation. During this period, RECP approved and denied roughly equal numbers of applications, awarding compensation to about 46 percent of the claimants, and denying compensation to about 46 percent. RECA claims are most frequently denied because the disease contracted by the victim is not specifically designated as eligible for compensation under the RECA program. On July 24, 2001, the President signed into law a supplemental appropriations act, which provided the Trust Fund with “. DOJ’s Administrative Costs Fluctuated
As shown in table 6, RECP’s FTE staff levels and administrative costs have fluctuated from the first full year of the program in fiscal year 1993 through the end of fiscal year 2000. Administrative costs were $2.1 million in fiscal year 1993, $1.1 million in fiscal year 1999, and $1.3 million for fiscal year 2000. Certification of the Trust Fund Payments Appears Adequate
Justice has procedures in place to certify that funds are appropriately disbursed from the Trust Fund. Our review of the payment documentation for 30 randomly selected RECA cases, where compensation was awarded, indicated that all payments were made as authorized. Trust Fund Appears to be Used Appropriately
On the basis of our review of a random sample of 30 of the approximately 1,592 RECA payments made from fiscal years 1996 through 2000 where compensation was awarded by RECP (from the Trust Fund) to eligible individuals, we found that the payments were made as authorized to these individuals. Views on RECP’s Outreach Activities Are Mixed
To identify and inform people of their potential eligibility for compensation under the program and to help them apply for compensation, RECP engages in three primary outreach activities. RECP Engages in Outreach Activities
RECP has established an Internet website, conducts onsite visits, and operates a toll-free telephone number for program queries. | What GAO Found
From 1945 through 1962, the United States conducted a series of aboveground atomic weapons tests. Many people exposed to radiation from this nuclear weapons testing program later developed serious diseases, including cancer. To begin the process of making partial restitution to these victims, the President signed into law the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) in 1990. RECA established the Radiation Exposure Compensation Trust Fund (Trust Fund), criteria for determining claimant eligibility for compensation, and a program (administered by the Attorney General) to process and adjudicate claims under the act. The Department of Justice (DOJ) established the Radiation Exposure Compensation Program (RECP) within its Civil Division to administer its responsibilities under the act. Through the end of fiscal year 2000, RECP received 7,819 applications for compensation. Roughly equal numbers of applications have been approved and denied, awarding compensation to about 46 percent of the claimants and denying compensation to about 46 percent. RECA claims are most often denied because the victim's disease is not eligible for compensation under the RECA program. The costs for administering RECP have fluctuated from the first full year of program implementation, fiscal year 1993, through fiscal year 2000. For example, administrative costs were $2.1 million in fiscal year 1993 and $1.3 million in fiscal year 2000. DOJ has procedures in place to certify that funds are appropriately disbursed from the Trust Fund. A review of the payment documentation for 30 randomly selected RECA cases in which compensation was awarded indicated that all payments were made as authorized. To identify and inform candidates of their potential eligibility for compensation under the program and to help them apply for funds, RECP engages in three primary outreach programs. The program has established an Internet website, conducts onsite visits to groups and organizations to promote the program, and operates a toll-free telephone line for program queries. |
gao_GAO-08-15 | gao_GAO-08-15_0 | 1). The most recent results from this survey showed that in 2006, 2.7 percent of 12th graders said they had used anabolic steroids without a prescription at least once. Some Federally Funded Efforts Are Designed to Focus on Preventing Teenage Steroid Abuse, While Other Efforts Designed to Address Substance Abuse in General May Include Teenagers
There are two categories of federally funded efforts that address teenage abuse of anabolic steroids. Efforts are either designed to focus on preventing the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers or are broader and designed to prevent substance abuse in general—which can include abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers. Two programs that received federal research funding for their development and testing, ATLAS and ATHENA, are designed to focus on preventing or reducing teen abuse of anabolic steroids. In addition, there are various research efforts and education and outreach activities that focus on this issue. Two federal grant programs—ONDCP’s Drug-Free Communities Support program and Education’s School-Based Student Drug Testing program—are designed to support state and local efforts to prevent substance abuse in general and may include anabolic steroid abuse among teenagers as part of the programs’ substance abuse prevention efforts. In 2007, about one-quarter of more than 700 grantees reported that they were addressing steroid abuse as one of their program’s objectives. Research Shows Teenage Anabolic Steroid Abuse Is Linked to Certain Risk Factors and That Prevention Programs May Have Some Short-term Effectiveness
Of the 16 studies we reviewed, nearly half focused on linking certain risk factors and behaviors to teenagers’ abuse of anabolic steroids, including the use of other drugs, risky sexual behaviors, and aggressive behaviors. Most of the other studies we reviewed were assessments of the ATLAS and ATHENA prevention programs and in general suggested that the programs may reduce abuse of anabolic steroids and other drugs among high school athletes immediately following participation in the programs. Almost half of the studies we reviewed identified certain risk factors and behaviors linked to the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers. Several studies found that the use of alcohol and other drugs—such as tobacco, marijuana, and cocaine—is associated with the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers, including teenage athletes and non-athletes. Experts Find There Are Gaps in Research on the Sustained Effectiveness of Prevention Programs and on the Long-term Health Effects for Teenagers
Experts identified gaps in the research that addresses anabolic steroid abuse among teenagers. Experts also identified gaps in the research on the long-term health effects of initiating the abuse of anabolic steroids as teenagers. Experts also report that the extent of the psychological effects of anabolic steroid abuse and, in particular, of withdrawal from steroid abuse, is unclear due to limited research. Appendix I: Selected Federally Funded Efforts That Address or Can Address Anabolic Steroid Abuse among Teenagers
Table 1 lists selected federally funded efforts—including programs, research, and educational and outreach activities—that are designed to focus on preventing or reducing the abuse of anabolic steroids by teenagers (focused efforts), as well as other broader efforts that may address teenage abuse of anabolic steroids as part of the programs’ general substance abuse prevention efforts. The list includes programs funded by two departments and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in the Executive Office of the President. “Effects of a multidimensional anabolic steroid prevention intervention: the Adolescents Training and Learning to Avoid Steroids (ATLAS) program.” JAMA, vol. | Why GAO Did This Study
The abuse of anabolic steroids by teenagers--that is, their use without a prescription--is a health concern. Anabolic steroids are synthetic forms of the hormone testosterone that can be taken orally, injected, or rubbed on the skin. Although a 2006 survey funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) found that less than 3 percent of 12th graders had abused anabolic steroids, it also found that about 40 percent of 12th graders described anabolic steroids as "fairly easy" or "very easy" to get. The abuse of anabolic steroids can cause serious health effects and behavioral changes in teenagers. GAO was asked to examine federally funded efforts to address the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers and to review available research on this issue. This report describes (1) federally funded efforts that address teenage abuse of anabolic steroids, (2) available research on teenage abuse of anabolic steroids, and (3) gaps or areas in need of improvement that federal officials and other experts identify in research that addresses teenage anabolic steroid abuse. To do this work, GAO reviewed federal agency materials and published studies identified through a literature review and interviewed federal officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
There are two categories of federally funded efforts that address teenage abuse of anabolic steroids. Efforts are either designed to focus on preventing the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers or are broader and designed to prevent substance abuse in general--which can include abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers. Two programs that received federal funding during their development and testing, Athletes Training and Learning to Avoid Steroids (ATLAS) and Athletes Targeting Healthy Exercise & Nutrition Alternatives (ATHENA), are designed to focus on preventing or reducing teen abuse of anabolic steroids through use of gender-specific student-led curricula. In addition, there are various research efforts and education and outreach activities that focus on this issue. Two federal grant programs--the Office of National Drug Control Policy's Drug-Free Communities Support program and the Department of Education's School-Based Student Drug Testing program--are designed to support state and local efforts to prevent substance abuse in general and may include anabolic steroid abuse among teenagers as part of the programs' substance abuse prevention efforts. In 2007, about one-quarter of more than 700 Drug-Free Communities Support program grantees reported that they were addressing steroid abuse as one of their program's objectives. Almost half of the 16 studies GAO reviewed identified certain risk factors and behaviors linked to the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers. Several of these studies found connections between anabolic steroid abuse and risk factors such as use of other drugs, risky sexual behaviors, and aggressive behaviors. Most of the other studies were assessments of the ATLAS and ATHENA prevention programs and in general suggested that the programs may reduce abuse of anabolic steroids and other drugs among high school athletes immediately following participation in the programs. Experts identified gaps in the research addressing teenage abuse of anabolic steroids. Experts identified a lack of conclusive evidence of the sustained effectiveness over time of available prevention programs, for example at 1 year following participants' completion of the programs. Experts also identified gaps in the research on the long-term health effects of initiating anabolic steroid abuse as a teenager--including research on effects that may be particularly harmful in teens--and in research on psychological effects of anabolic steroid abuse. |
gao_GAO-03-185 | gao_GAO-03-185_0 | Contractor Physicians Billed Similarly to Their Counterparts for Emergency Department Services
Our comparison of the billings by contractor physicians retained by staffing companies to other affiliated physicians—such as those practicing in partnerships, medical groups, and employee-based staffing companies— showed that contractor physicians and those with other affiliations both billed for higher-level E&M services at comparable rates in four of the five states we reviewed and at a lower rate in the fifth state we reviewed. To determine the comparability of patients treated by both types of physicians, we examined the rates at which patients had been transported by ambulance to the emergency department, received diagnostic tests, or were admitted to the hospital within 24 hours of the emergency department visit. Despite Representing a Significant Share of Billings, Staffing Companies That Retain Contractor Physicians Are Practically Invisible to Oversight
In four of the five states we examined, a substantial percentage of the physicians providing emergency department care were contractor physicians associated with staffing companies. However, because the staffing companies are not subject to the enrollment procedures that the carriers routinely conduct for physicians and medical groups before they are allowed to bill Medicare, CMS does not collect critical information that would enable it to identify claims that are submitted by staffing companies on behalf of their contractor physicians. In four of the five states studied, from 27 to 58 percent of the physicians with substantial emergency department practices were contractor physicians associated with staffing companies. Because staffing companies that retain contractor physicians may not be reassigned benefits and are not enrolled in Medicare, CMS has no information on these companies and cannot associate the billings of individual contractor physicians with specific staffing companies. CMS’s carriers cannot identify claims submitted by these staffing companies and, therefore, cannot subject them to same systematic scrutiny as those of other groups. To determine how the use of staffing companies that retain contractor physicians has affected CMS’s ability to monitor emergency department billings, we reviewed documentation related to the provider enrollment process. Methods for Comparing Billing Patterns
To determine whether contractor physicians retained by staffing companies bill Medicare for the higher-level services at rates comparable to other emergency department physicians, we did the following. | Why GAO Did This Study
Staffing companies that contract with physicians to staff hospital departments--including emergency departments--are not permitted to bill Medicare. In the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Congress directed GAO to assess the program integrity implications of enrolling these companies and allowing them to bill Medicare. GAO reviewed about 2.8 million emergency department claims for 2000 from five states and assessed whether contractor physicians retained by staffing companies billed Medicare comparably to other emergency department physicians. GAO also evaluated how the lack of information on staffing companies affects efforts to assure Medicare program integrity.
What GAO Found
Contractor physicians associated with staffing companies billed Medicare for complex and costly, higher-level emergency department services at rates similar to emergency department physicians with other affiliations, such as those practicing in partnerships, medical groups, or employee-based staffing companies. In addition, the patients treated by contractor physicians received diagnostic tests, were admitted to the hospital, and used ambulance transport at rates similar to patients treated by other emergency department physicians. Staffing companies that retain contractor physicians remain largely invisible to the oversight efforts of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) because these companies are not enrolled in Medicare. Although CMS has information on the individual physicians, it has no information on the companies themselves. This may hinder oversight because contractor physicians provided a significant share of emergency care to Medicare beneficiaries. For example, in four of the five states studied, 27 to 58 percent of the physicians with substantial emergency department practices were contractor physicians retained by staffing companies. CMS does not permit the enrollment of staffing companies that retain contractor physicians because, under current law, these companies may not be reassigned Medicare benefits. This limits CMS's ability to monitor claims. CMS cannot identify claims submitted by these companies on behalf of their contractor physicians nor can it subject the claims to the same systematic scrutiny given to enrolled groups. Consequently, it cannot evaluate the billing patterns of specific companies nor assess the aggregate impact of these companies on Medicare program integrity. |
gao_GAO-07-915 | gao_GAO-07-915_0 | Background
Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to combat trafficking in persons. Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Key Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons Crimes
Subsequent to the enactment of the TVPA, federal agencies reported 139 prosecutions and hundreds of investigations of trafficking for commercial sex or labor as of June 2007. To support federal efforts to identify victims and investigate and prosecute these crimes, agencies (1) provided training to agency personnel to raise awareness and increase the skills needed to identify victims and pursue trafficking investigations and prosecutions, (2) carried out outreach and training to raise public awareness of and skills in identifying trafficking victims, and (3) engaged state and local knowledge and resources by funding state and local trafficking in persons task forces and developing and disseminating a model state law. In addition, to address their responsibilities related to trafficking in persons crimes, some agencies have established special units, agency-level goals, or plans or strategies. Our prior work has shown that a strategic framework that would include, at a minimum, a common outcome and mutually reinforcing strategies; agreed-on roles and responsibilities; and compatible polices, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries can help agencies enhance and expand collaboration on issues that are national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions. Federal agencies have also developed tools to facilitate interagency coordination and even coordination with state and local law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations in trafficking cases, usually on a case- by-case basis. Currently, coordination among agencies on training and outreach is largely episodic. BJA Has Helped Support Federally Funded State and Local Human Trafficking Law Enforcement Task Forces, but Lacks a Plan to Identify and Focus Technical Assistance Needs
To help coordinate U.S. efforts to identify trafficking victims, get needed services to victims of trafficking, and investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons crimes in communities across the country, BJA established a program to fund state and local law enforcement human trafficking task forces. Since 2004, BJA has awarded grants of up to $450,000 for a 3-year period to each of 42 task forces. BJA reported using its general funds to support some technical assistance to the task forces (e.g., sponsoring the development of a train-the-trainer curriculum on human trafficking and funding a national conference) and taking further steps to help respond to task force technical assistance needs. However, task force members we contacted and DOJ officials pointed to continued and additional technical assistance needs. BJA does not have a technical assistance plan for its human trafficking grant program. BJA officials told us that they recognized the need for a technical assistance plan for its human trafficking initiative and had begun to prepare a plan to provide additional and proactive technical assistance to the task forces. Our previous work on federal agencies’ administration of grants or funding to state and local entities has shown the need for agencies that administer grants or funding to state and local entities to implement a plan that focuses technical assistance efforts on areas of greatest need. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To ascertain the status of U.S. efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, this report discusses (1) key activities federal agencies have undertaken to combat trafficking in persons crimes, (2) federal efforts to coordinate on investigations and prosecutions of trafficking in persons crimes and whether these efforts might be enhanced, and (3) how the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) supported federally funded state and local human trafficking task forces and whether these efforts might be improved. Information is also not consistent across agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human trafficking is a transnational crime whose victims include men, women, and children and may involve violations of labor, immigration, antislavery, and other criminal laws. To ensure punishment of traffickers and protection of victims, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), which is subject to reauthorization in 2007. The Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) lead federal investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes. As requested, this report discusses (1) key activities federal agencies have undertaken to combat human trafficking crimes, (2) federal efforts to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of these crimes, and (3) how the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) supported federally funded state and local human trafficking task forces. GAO reviewed strategies, reports, and other agency documents; analyzed trafficking data; and interviewed agency officials and task force members.
What GAO Found
Since the enactment of the TVPA in 2000, federal agencies have (1) investigated allegations of trafficking crimes, leading to 139 prosecutions;(2) provided training and implemented state and local initiatives to support investigations and prosecutions; and (3) established organizational structures, agency-level goals, plans, or strategies. For example, agencies have trained new and current personnel on investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons crimes through their agency training academies and centers, provided Web-based training, and developed and disseminated guidance on case pursuance. Agencies have also sponsored outreach and training to state and local law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and the general public through a toll-free complaint line, newsletters, national conferences, and model legislation. Finally, some agencies have established special units or plans for carrying out their antitrafficking duties. Federal agencies have coordinated across agencies on investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes on a case-by-case basis, determined by individual case needs, and established relationships among law enforcement officials across agencies. For example, several federal agencies worked together to resolve a landmark trafficking case involving over 250 victims. However, DOJ and DHS officials have identified the need to advance and expand U.S. efforts to combat trafficking through more collaborative and proactive strategies to identify trafficking victims. Prior GAO work on interagency collaboration has shown that a strategic framework that includes, among other things, a common outcome, mutually reinforcing strategies, and compatible polices and procedures to operate across agency boundaries can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies dealing with issues that are national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions. To support U.S. efforts to investigate trafficking in persons, BJA has awarded grants of up to $450,000 to establish 42 state and local human trafficking law enforcement task forces. BJA has funded the development of a train-the-trainer curriculum and a national conference on human trafficking and taken further steps to respond to task force technical assistance needs. Nevertheless, task force members from the seven task forces we contacted and DOJ officials identified continued and additional assistance needs. BJA does not have a technical assistance plan for its human trafficking task force grant program. Prior GAO work has shown the need for agencies that administer grants or funding to state and local entities to implement a plan to focus technical assistance on areas of greatest need. BJA officials said they were preparing a plan to provide additional and proactive technical assistance to the task forces, but as of June 2007 had not received the necessary approvals. |
gao_HEHS-95-122 | gao_HEHS-95-122_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The House Budget Committee asked us to examine (1) the nature of federal and state Medicaid spending in recent years, (2) some states’ efforts to contain Medicaid costs and expand coverage through waivers of certain federal requirements, and (3) the potential impact of the waivers on federal spending and on Medicaid’s program structure overall. Collecting Information on Medicaid Spending and Waivers
To address the issue of federal and state Medicaid spending, we analyzed data contained in HCFA statistical reports and also reviewed and synthesized information from research articles and major studies that focused on Medicaid costs. Between 1985 and 1993, federal Medicaid expenditures grew each year, on average, by 16 percent. During this time, state Medicaid expenditures grew at a slightly slower rate of 15 percent. Medicaid spending has also increased sharply when compared with spending for other federal social programs. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that program spending will grow by 10.7 percent annually over the next 5 years. Most states’ demonstrations expand coverage to low-income individuals and families who were previously ineligible for Medicaid (although income and categorical requirements for these new eligibles vary considerably from state to state). Some Section 1115 Demonstrations Could Increase Federal Expenditures
Some states with approved section 1115 waivers could be eligible for more federal Medicaid funds than they might have received without the waivers. Under these terms, spending for Tennessee’s Medicaid program may increase from $2.7 billion in 1993 to $4.1 billion in 1998. It currently consumes about 6 percent of all federal outlays (3 times the share devoted to Food Stamps and 5 times the share devoted to AFDC). The administration’s method for determining budget neutrality may allow states access to more federal funding than they would have received without the waiver. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal and state Medicaid spending trends, focusing on: (1) states' efforts to contain Medicaid costs and expand coverage through waivers of certain federal requirements; and (2) the potential impact of these waivers on federal spending and on Medicaid's overall program structure.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Medicaid accounts for about 6 percent of all federal outlays; (2) federal Medicaid costs will increase from $131 billion to $260 billion by the year 2000, which will be more than the rate of increase for the total federal budget; (3) between 1985 and 1993, federal Medicaid spending increased 16 percent per year, while state spending increased 15 percent per year; (4) federal spending increased more than 25 percent per year in 1992 and 1993, mostly due to states collecting donations and taxes from certain hospitals and then returning them as Medicaid payments; (5) some states have sought waivers from certain program requirements to expand coverage to formerly ineligible clients; (6) it could not determine how managed care will impact patient access to services and the quality of care, since only two states have completed waiver implementation under their new systems; (7) some states will receive more Medicaid funds than others under their approved waivers than they would have under their previous programs; (8) despite negotiated spending caps, the waivers could increase federal Medicaid spending, since more low-income people will receive coverage under state programs; and (9) concerns over the future of Medicaid include who will benefit from savings generated by the shift to managed care, the potential for increased federal Medicaid spending, and limiting programs if they become too costly. |
gao_HEHS-97-21 | gao_HEHS-97-21_0 | SMDA 90 and Related Regulations
To improve the flow of information about medical device problems to FDA’s adverse event reporting system, the Congress passed SMDA requires the establishment of a network of communication about device-related events among user facilities, distributors, manufacturers, and FDA. To speed processing and analysis of reports, FDA has initiated several changes to its adverse event reporting system. Manufacturer Reports Have Increased Significantly
Manufacturer reports of medical device problems increased dramatically after SMDA directly accounted for the increased volume of reports because, until recently, FDA did not systematically collect information on the source of complaints. A comparison of two 4-year periods, fiscal years 1987 through 1990 and 1991 through 1994, illustrates the rapid growth of FDA officials believe the upward trend in reporting is due to (1) the unanticipated, large volume of problems associated with silicone gel-filled breast implants, which accounted for nearly one-third of all of the manufacturer event reports submitted to FDA during fiscal years 1992 through 1994, and (2) increased compliance by manufacturers with the 1984 medical device reporting regulation and SMDA . Although FDA assigns malfunction reports a lower priority than reports of death and serious injury, processing malfunction reports quickly is critical because of their potential to alert FDA to device problems that could cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if the malfunction were to recur. Further, user facilities’ reports are often late, inaccurate, or incomplete. User Facilities May Be Underreporting Deaths to FDA
Before SMDA ’s reporting requirements became effective in late 1991, user facilities were not required to submit device-related adverse event reports to manufacturers and FDA. 4). Untimely and poor quality reports limit FDA’s ability to identify device problems and assess the risk to the public health. However, of the 5,199 serious injury and illness reports FDA had received from user facilities as of June 1995, 3,588 (69 percent) did not need to have been sent to FDA because the user facility knew the manufacturer and identified it in the report. Finally, FDA cannot assess its performance as an early warning system for device problems because it does not keep track of the length of time that it takes to review and resolve serious device problems. FDA Does Not Record How Long It Takes to Respond to Reported Device Problems
Maintaining reliable productivity indicators on the length of time FDA takes to process, review, and initiate action on device problems and on the time that passes before manufacturers correct the problems would better ensure that serious device problems are receiving prompt attention. Conclusions
The quantity of information reported to FDA about medical device problems has increased dramatically since SMDA ’s reporting requirements became effective in 1991. Because FDA has not ensured that reported device problems receive prompt attention and appropriate resolution, however, its adverse event reporting system is not providing an early warning about device problems. Furthermore, although FDA’s initiatives may improve its reporting system, they do not address its difficulty in ensuring prompt resolution of device problems, compliance with SMDA document corrective actions on adverse event reports that result from analysis and investigations of device problems; and collect and disseminate adverse event trend analysis and corrective actions taken by manufacturers and FDA to the medical device community. Specifically, FDA believes that (1) medical device reports are supplemental in nature and that its entire postmarket surveillance system, its GMP regulations, and other related activities combined constitute the most comprehensive source of information regarding marketed medical devices; (2) the deficiencies in the adverse event reporting system cited in our report are being corrected; and (3) adverse event reports from all sources are promptly and thoroughly reviewed, and appropriate actions are taken to protect the public health. Scope and Methodology
We conducted our review of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) implementation of the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (SMDA and to publish the final medical device reporting regulation required by the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed user facilities' compliance with the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990's (SMDA 90) reporting requirements, focusing on whether: (1) the enactment of SMDA 90 has led to an increase in reporting of device-related adverse events to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); (2) the amount and quality of information from user facilities have enhanced FDA's ability to quickly identify and take action on device problems; (3) manufacturers and FDA have responded to device problems identified in user facility reports; (4) FDA routinely communicates device problem trends and corrective actions taken to user facilities and the public; and (5) changes need to be made to the user facility reporting requirements and FDA's adverse event reporting system to improve medical device problem reporting.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the amount of information reported to FDA about medical device problems has increased dramatically since SMDA 90 was enacted, FDA does not systematically act to ensure that the reported problems receive prompt attention and appropriate resolution; (2) as a result, FDA's adverse event reporting system is not providing an early warning about problem medical devices as SMDA 90 intended; (3) during fiscal years (FY) 1991 through 1994, FDA received almost four times as many adverse event reports from device manufacturers as it did during FY 1987 through 1990; (4) however, the extent to which user facility reporting under SMDA 90 directly accounted for the increased volume of reports is unclear because, until recently, FDA did not require manufacturers to disclose whether serious injury reports originated from user facilities or from some other source; (5) this increased volume made it difficult for FDA to process and review reports in a timely manner; (6) to address this problem, FDA chose to give priority to death and serious injury reports, which resulted in its delaying for nearly 2 years processing and reviewing almost 50,000 malfunction reports, which are essential in alerting FDA to potentially serious device problems before they result in death or serious injury; (7) to better manage the reporting workload in the future, FDA has initiated several changes to the adverse event reporting system; (8) FDA has received significantly fewer adverse event reports from user facilities than it expected; (9) much of the information that user facilities did provide was of poor quality and incomplete, in part because FDA did not issue the final medical device reporting regulation in a timely manner or periodically educate user facilities about their responsibilities under SMDA 90; (10) although FDA contends that it notifies manufacturers and user facilities about imminent hazards and industrywide safety concerns, it does not routinely document the corrective actions it takes or those taken by manufacturers to address reported medical device problems; (11) FDA does not keep track of the length of time it takes to process, review, and initiate action on serious device-related problems or the time that elapses before manufacturers resolve the problems; (12) manufacturer and user facility representatives told GAO they do not know how FDA uses adverse event reports to protect the public health; and (13) FDA and representatives of both medical devise users and manufacturers believe that the reporting system is overburdened with reports and data that may not be necessary to detect and resolve device problems. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-149 | gao_T-AIMD-98-149_0 | The federal government is extremely vulnerable to the Year 2000 issue due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations. Our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress, and our reports contain numerous recommendations, which the agencies have almost universally agreed to implement. One of the largest, and largely unknown, risks relates to the global nature of the problem. However, with this electronic dependence and massive exchanging of data comes increasing risk that uncorrected Year 2000 problems in other countries will adversely affect the United States. Consequently, setting priorities is essential, with the focus being on systems most critical to our health and safety, financial well being, national security, or the economy. Agencies must start business continuity and contingency planning now to safeguard their ability to deliver a minimum acceptable level of services in the event of Year 2000-induced failures. No nationwide assessment—including the private and public sectors—has been undertaken to gauge this. Interior estimates that correcting these 95 systems will cost $17.3 million, as shown in the following table. In addition to these systems, the department is also assessing its communications systems and embedded computer chip technologies to determine whether they will be affected by the coming century change. As the only staff member in Interior’s Year 2000 Project Office, the department’s coordinator does not have the ability to verify the accuracy of reported information on the bureaus’ and offices’ mission-critical systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed where the federal government stands in its efforts to lessen Year 2000 risks and GAO's preliminary observations on Year 2000 activities at the Department of the Interior.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the federal government is extremely vulnerable to the Year 2000 issue due to its widespread dependence on computer systems; (2) its reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress, and its reports contain numerous recommendations, which the agencies have almost universally agreed to implement; (3) one of the largest, and largely unknown, risks relates to the global nature of the Year 2000 problem; (4) with electronic dependence and massive exchange of data comes increasing risk that uncorrected Year 2000 problems in other countries will adversely affect the United States; (5) setting priorities for Year 2000 conversion is essential, with the focus being on systems most critical to health and safety, financial well being, national security, or the economy; (6) agencies must start business continuity and contingency planning now to safeguard their ability to deliver a minimum acceptable level of services in the event of Year 2000-induced failures; (7) agencies must have strategies for independently verifying the status of their Year 2000 efforts; (8) no nationwide assessment, including the private and public sectors, has been undertaken of Year 2000 risks and readiness; (9) Interior estimates that correcting its 95 mission-critical systems will cost $17.3 million; (10) Interior is also assessing its communications systems and embedded chip technologies to determine whether they will be affected by the century change; and (11) Interior's Year 2000 coordinator does not have the ability to verify the accuracy of reported information on the bureaus' and offices' mission-critical systems. |
gao_GAO-04-753 | gao_GAO-04-753_0 | 2): 1. Specifically, none of the plans included analyses of gaps between the critical skills and competencies currently needed by the workforce and those that will be needed in the future. Furthermore, none of the plans contained results-oriented performance measures. As a result, DOD and the components do not have comprehensive strategic workforce plans to guide their human capital efforts. Need for Information on Current and Future Workforce Competencies Is the Major Challenge to Effective Strategic Workforce Planning
The major challenge that DOD and most of the components face in their efforts to develop and implement strategic workforce plans is their need for information on current workforce competencies and the competencies they anticipate needing in the future. This problem results from DOD’s and the components’ not having developed tools to collect and/or store, and manage data on workforce competencies that are critical to successful work accomplishment. As a result, it is not clear whether they are designing and funding workforce strategies that will effectively shape the civilian workforce with the appropriate competencies needed to accomplish future DOD missions. Senior department and component officials all acknowledged this shortfall, and told us that they are taking steps to address this challenge. Though these are steps in the right direction, the lack of information on current competencies and future needs is a continuing problem that several organizations, including GAO, have previously identified. Although DOD and the components have taken steps to develop and implement civilian strategic workforce plans to address future civilian workforce needs, they generally lack some key elements essential to successful workforce planning. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the comprehensiveness of strategic workforce planning for the DOD civilian workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military service headquarters, and the Defense Logistics Agency to build upon their strategic workforce planning efforts through the following three actions: Analyze and document the gaps between current critical skills and competencies and those needed for the future workforce. Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of Defense and State. | Why GAO Did This Study
During its downsizing in the early 1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) did not focus on strategically reshaping its civilian workforce. GAO was asked to address DOD's efforts to strategically plan for its future civilian workforce at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the military services' headquarters, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Specifically, GAO determined: (1) the extent to which civilian strategic workforce plans have been developed and implemented to address future civilian workforce requirements, and (2) the major challenges affecting the development and implementation of these plans.
What GAO Found
OSD, the service headquarters, and DLA have recently taken steps to develop and implement civilian strategic workforce plans to address future civilian workforce needs, but these plans generally lack some key elements essential to successful workforce planning. As a result, OSD, the military services' headquarters, and DLA--herein referred to as DOD and the components--do not have comprehensive strategic workforce plans to guide their human capital efforts. None of the plans included analyses of the gaps between critical skills and competencies (a set of behaviors that are critical to work accomplishment) currently needed by the workforce and those that will be needed in the future. Without including gap analyses, DOD and the components may not be able to effectively design strategies to hire, develop, and retain the best possible workforce. Furthermore, none of the plans contained results-oriented performance measures that could provide the data necessary to assess the outcomes of civilian human capital initiatives. The major challenge that DOD and most of the components face in their efforts to develop and implement strategic workforce plans is their need for information on current competencies and those that will likely be needed in the future. This problem results from DOD's and the components' not having developed tools to collect and/or store, and manage data on workforce competencies. Without this information, it not clear whether they are designing and funding workforce strategies that will effectively shape their civilian workforces with the appropriate competencies needed to accomplish future DOD missions. Senior department and component officials all acknowledged this shortfall and told us that they are taking steps to address this challenge. Though these are steps in the right direction, the lack of information on current competencies and future needs is a continuing problem that several organizations, including GAO, have previously identified. |
gao_GAO-14-243T | gao_GAO-14-243T_0 | Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) has responsibility for the administration and oversight of the FSM and RMI compact sector and supplemental education grants. FSM and RMI Prioritized Education and Health Sectors in Spending Compact Funds
In fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the FSM spent about two-thirds and the RMI spent about half of their total compact sector funds in the education and health sectors—$158 million for the FSM and $89 million for the RMI. Concerned about the sustainability of sector budgets as compact funding declines through fiscal year 2023 due to the annual decrements, JEMCO and JEMFAC passed resolutions in 2011, capping budgetary levels for personnel in the education and health sectors of both countries at fiscal year 2011 levels. Without such plans, the countries may not be able to sustain essential services in the education and health sectors. Data Inconsistencies Hindered Our Assessment of FSM and RMI Progress in the Education and Health Sectors
Data reliability issues hindered our assessment of progress by the FSM and RMI in both the education and health sectors for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Although both countries tracked annual indicators in these sectors to measure progress during this period, we encountered data reliability issues in the subsets of indicators we examined. For example, we found that the four FSM states did not use common definitions for some indicators; consequently, the education indicator reports we reviewed did not contain consistent data for these indicators and comparisons could not be made across states. In the RMI, we determined that data for three of the subset of five education indicators we reviewed could not be used to assess education sector progress for the compact as a whole because of issues such as lack of data from the country’s outer islands, inconsistencies in reported data for some years, and revisions to data with no explanation. In the RMI, of the subset of five health indicators we reviewed, we determined one was sufficiently reliable and two were not sufficiently reliable to assess progress because of various issues with data collection and reporting. For the remaining two FSM health indicators we examined, we had no basis to judge the reliability of the data. JEMCO and JEMFAC have also raised concerns about the reliability of the FSM’s education and health data and the RMI’s health data and required that each country obtain an independent assessment and verification of these data; neither country has met that requirement. Without reliable data, the countries cannot assess progress toward their goals in the education and health sectors and cannot effectively use results data for setting priorities and allocating resources aimed at improving performance. FSM and RMI Face Financial Accountability Challenges; Oversight Bodies Are Hindered by Limitations
The single audit reports we reviewed indicated challenges to ensuring accountability of compact and noncompact U.S. funds in the FSM and RMI. For example, the FSM National Government’s 2011 single audit report contained several repeat findings—problems noted in previous audits that had not been corrected for several years—and identified problems with the extent of noncompliance with program requirements, such as preparing required quarterly reports. To improve financial accountability, OIA led actions that resulted in the creation of the Chuuk Financial Control Commission, but OIA has not coordinated with other U.S. agencies regarding the risk status of the FSM and the RMI for noncompact funds. Moreover, other federal agencies whose grants may be at risk have not routinely considered designating either country as a high-risk grantee. We also found that the offices responsible for compact administration in the FSM, RMI, and United States faced limitations hindering their ability to conduct compact oversight. Finally, we found that OIA experienced a staffing shortage that disproportionately affected compact grant oversight compared to other OIA activities, with 6 of 11 planned positions unfilled in 2012 and 5 of 11 unfilled in 2013 (for details, see pages 51-53 of the report, GAO-13-675). We recommended that Interior take all necessary steps to improve the ability of JEMCO and JEMFAC to ensure that the FSM and RMI (1) complete satisfactory plans to address annual decrements in compact funds, (2) produce reliable indicator data used to track progress in education and health, and (3) address all single audit findings in a timely manner. In order to improve financial accountability of noncompact U.S. grant assistance provided to the FSM and the RMI, we recommended that Interior consult with other grantor agencies to determine whether the FSM National Government, any FSM state government, or the RMI government meets the criteria to be designated as a high-risk grant recipient for noncompact funds, or whether other steps should be taken to improve accountability. To ensure that Interior is providing appropriate resources for oversight and monitoring of the FSM and RMI compacts, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior take actions to correct the disproportionate staffing shortage related to compact grant implementation and oversight. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the U.S. government approved amended Compacts of Free Association with the FSM and the RMI, providing for a total of $3.6 billion in assistance over 20 years. This testimony draws from GAO's September 2013 report on the use and accountability of these funds to review (1) the FSM's and RMI's use of compact funds in the education and health sectors; (2) the extent to which the FSM and RMI have made progress toward stated goals in education and health; and (3) the extent to which oversight activities by the FSM, RMI, and U.S. governments ensure accountability for compact funding. Like the report, this testimony also provides information on infrastructure spending in the education and health sectors. GAO reviewed relevant documents and data, including single audit reports; interviewed officials from Interior, other U.S. agencies, and the FSM and RMI; assessed data reliability for subsets of both countries' education and health indicators; and visited compact-funded education and health facilities in both countries.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) spent at least half their compact sector funds in the education and health sectors. Because both countries spent significant amounts of compact funds on personnel in those sectors, the U.S.-FSM and U.S.-RMI joint management and accountability committees capped budgets for personnel in those sectors at fiscal year 2011 levels due to concerns about the sustainability of sector budgets as compact funding continues to decline through fiscal year 2023. As required by the committees, the FSM states completed plans to address annual decreases in compact funding; however, as of August 2013, the FSM National Government and the RMI had not submitted plans to address the annual decreases. Without such plans, the countries may not be able to sustain essential services in the education and health sectors.
Data reliability issues hindered GAO's assessment of each country's progress in the education and health sectors for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Although both countries tracked annual indicators in these sectors during this period, GAO determined that many of these data were not sufficiently reliable for the purpose of measuring progress for the compacts as a whole over the time frame. In education, GAO found 3 of 14 indicators in the subsets of indicators it reviewed for both countries to be sufficiently reliable. GAO found a variety of education data reliability problems; for example, the four FSM states did not use common definitions for some indicators, resulting in inconsistent data for those indicators, and in the RMI some indicators lacked data from the outer islands. In the health sector, GAO determined that data for all 5 of the subset of indicators it reviewed in the FSM were not sufficiently reliable, and in the RMI, 1 health indicator was sufficiently reliable, 2 were not sufficiently reliable, and for 2 others, GAO had no basis to judge due to insufficient information. The joint management and accountability committees have raised concerns about the reliability of FSM's education and health data and RMI's health data and required each country to obtain an independent assessment and verification of these data; both countries have yet to meet that requirement. Without reliable data, the countries cannot assess progress toward their goals in the education and health sectors.
The single audit reports GAO reviewed indicated challenges to ensuring accountability of U.S. funds in the FSM and RMI. For example, the governments' single audits showed repeat findings and persistent problems in noncompliance with U.S. program requirements, such as accounting for equipment. The Department of the Interior (Interior) has taken steps regarding accountability of compact funds, such as establishing a financial control commission in one FSM state, but Interior has not coordinated with other U.S. agencies about the risk status of the FSM and RMI and whether to designate either country as a high-risk grantee. Furthermore, the FSM, RMI, and U.S. offices responsible for compact administration faced limitations hindering their ability to conduct compact oversight. For example, Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) experienced a staffing shortage that disproportionately affected compact grant oversight compared to other OIA activities, leaving 6 of 11 planned positions for compact oversight unfilled as of 2012 and 5 of 11 still unfilled as of 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations. In its September 2013 report, GAO recommended that, among other actions, Interior should (1) take all necessary steps to ensure the reliability of FSM and RMI indicators in education and health, (2) assess whether to designate each country as high risk, and (3) take actions to correct its disproportionate staffing shortage related to compact grant implementation and oversight. Interior generally agreed with the recommendations and identified actions taken, ongoing, and planned. |
gao_GAO-02-22 | gao_GAO-02-22_0 | How Brain Fingerprinting Is Intended to Work
According to its developer, Brain Fingerprinting is designed to determine whether an individual recognizes specific information related to an event or activity by measuring electrical brain wave responses to words, phrases, or pictures presented on a computer screen. Its developer has indicated that Brain Fingerprinting, therefore, is not designed for screening functions, which involves questioning individuals about events unknown to the investigator. Rather, the developer has indicated that an investigator would be able to use this information as evidence for or against a suspect. For example, he has indicated that the technique could be used to determine whether a suspect has knowledge of details connecting him or her to a crime. Probes are unique details of the event or activity that are supposed to be known only to the examiner or investigator and the subject. DOD officials indicated that most DOD criminal investigations do not lend themselves to a Guilty Knowledge Test-based technique, such as Brain Fingerprinting, because these kinds of investigations typically lack the specific information that is needed for administering such a test and because knowledge of the discrete elements of an event or activity may not be limited to only the investigator and the perpetrator. The research expenses, equipment, and training costs exceeded any perceived benefit. Appendix II: Comments From the U.S. Secret Service
Appendix III: Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation | What GAO Found
Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies are seeking to add new techniques to their arsenal of investigative tools. "Brain fingerprinting" measures brain wave responses to determine whether an individual recognizes certain details of an event or activity. Because the technique requires specific information about the event that would be known only to the perpetrator and the investigator, Brain Fingerprinting is not designed as a screening tool--a function that involves questioning a subject about events unknown to the investigator. Instead, an investigator would be able to use certain information as evidence for or against a subject. For example, the technique could be used to determine whether a subject has knowledge of details about a crime. Officials representing the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation do not forsee using the brain fingerprinting technique because of its limited use. Furthermore, given the technique's limitations, the research expenses, equipment, and training costs are perceived to exceed benefits. |
gao_GAO-10-292T | gao_GAO-10-292T_0 | Evaluating the appropriateness of confidentiality claims is time- and resource-intensive, and EPA does not challenge most claims. EPA uses risk assessments developed with IRIS toxicity data to determine whether the identified health risks warrant regulatory or other actions. EPA Lacks Adequate Information on Potential Health and Environmental Risks of Chemicals
EPA lacks adequate scientific information on the toxicity of many chemicals that are or may be found in the environment. For existing chemicals, TSCA generally places the burden of obtaining data on EPA, rather than on the companies that produce the chemicals. This approach requires that EPA demonstrate certain health or environmental risks before it can require companies to further test their chemicals. As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the risks of the more than 83,000 commercial chemicals in use. for new chemicals that, for various reasons, never In addition to TSCA, EPA assesses chemicals under its IRIS program reported in March 2008 that this key program was at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency has not been able to keep its existing assessments current; decrease its backlog of 70 assessments complete assessments of key chemicals of concern, such as dioxin, formaldehyde, and trichloroethylene (TCE). As a result, we recommended that EPA adopt a streamlined, more transparent assessment process. As a result, we included the IRIS program along with TSCA in our high-risk designation on assessing and controlling toxic chemicals. We reviewed EPA’s reforms and testified that overall, if implemented effectively, these reforms will address our recommendations and provide a sound framework for conducting IRIS assessments and significantly improve the IRIS process. Overall, the viability of the IRIS program will depend on effective and sustained management, given the number of factors that can impede the progress of IRIS assessments—even one delay can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated to incorporate changing science. As we have previously stated, we believe th contribute to EPA’s failure to complete timely IRIS assessments. TSCA’s Regulatory Framework Impedes EPA’s Efforts to Control Risks Posed by Chemicals
While TSCA authorizes EPA to issue regulations that may ban, limit, or otherwise regulate the production or use of existing toxic chemicals, EPA must meet a high legal threshold, which has proven to be difficult. In addition, before regulating a chemical under section 6, the EPA Administrator must consider and publish a statement regarding the following: the effects of the chemical on human health and the magnitude of human exposure to the chemical; the effects of the chemical on the environment and the magnitude of the environment’s exposure to the chemical; the benefits of the chemical for various uses and the availability of substitutes for those uses; and the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health. EPA has had difficulty demonstrating that harmful chemicals pose an unreasonable risk and consequently should be regulated. In fact, since Congress passed TSCA in 1976—over 33 years ago—EPA has issued TSCA regulations on only five existing chemicals or chemical classes. In 1991, one of these regulations—the 1989 regulation banning most uses of asbestos—was largely vacated by a federal appeals court decision that cited EPA’s failure to meet statutory requirements. In contrast to the United States, the European Union and a number of other countries have banned all, or almost all, asbestos and asbestos-containing products. Asbestos is a known human carcinogen that can cause lung cancer and other diseases if inhaled. TSCA Limits EPA’s Ability to Share Information
TSCA’ s confidential business information provisions limit EPA’s ability to make the information that it collects under the act available to outside entities if chemical companies designate such information as confidential business information. According to EPA officials, about 95 percent of premanufacture notices contain some information that chemical companies claim as confidential. In our June 2005 report, we suggested that Congress consider amending TSCA to authorize EPA to share the confidential business information that chemical companies provide to EPA with states and foreign governments. In our previous reports on TSC have recommended both statutory and regulatory changes to (1) strengthen EPA’s authority to obtain additional information from the chemical industry, (2) shift more of the burden to chemical companies for demonstrating the safety of their chemicals, and (3) enhance the public’s understanding of the risks of chemicals to which they may be exposed, among other things. Chemical Regulation: Options for Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Toxic Substances Control Act. Chemical Assessments: EPA’s New Assessment Process Will Further Limit the Productivity and Credibility of Its Integrated Risk Information System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to obtain information on the risks of chemicals and to control those that it determines to pose an unreasonable risk. EPA also conducts assessments of chemicals under its Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) program. Nonetheless, EPA does not have sufficient information to determine whether it should establish controls to limit public exposure to many chemicals that may pose substantial health risks. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended statutory changes to TSCA to, among other things, provide EPA with additional authorities to obtain health and safety information from the chemical industry and to shift more of the burden to chemical companies for demonstrating the safety of their chemicals. GAO has also recommended that EPA adopt a streamlined, more transparent IRIS assessment process to address significant productivity and credibility issues. Problems with TSCA and IRIS led GAO to add transforming EPA's processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals to its list of high-risk areas warranting attention by Congress and the executive branch This testimony, based on prior GAO work, addresses EPA's implementation of TSCA and IRIS and options for (1) obtaining more information on chemical risks, (2) controlling these risks, and (3) sharing more of the information collected under TSCA.
What GAO Found
EPA lacks adequate scientific information on the toxicity of many chemicals. One major reason is that TSCA generally places the burden of obtaining data about existing chemicals on EPA rather than on chemical companies. For example, the act requires EPA to demonstrate certain health or environmental risks before it can require companies to further test their chemicals. As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the risks of the over 83,000 chemicals already in use. Moreover, TSCA does not require chemical companies to test the approximately 700 new chemicals introduced into commerce each year for toxicity, and companies generally do not voluntarily perform such testing. Furthermore, the procedures EPA must follow to obtain test data from companies can take years. Regarding IRIS, in 2008, GAO reported that this significant chemical assessment program--which provides EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals--is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency has not been able to complete timely, credible assessments. In May 2009, EPA announced reforms to its IRIS assessment process, citing GAO's conclusions and its high-risk designation. Overall, GAO believes that, if the reforms are effectively implemented, they will address GAO's recommendations and provide a sound framework for conducting IRIS assessments. However, given the number of obstacles that can impede the progress of IRIS assessments, the viability of this program will depend on effective and sustained management. While TSCA authorizes EPA to ban, limit, or otherwise regulate existing toxic chemicals, EPA must meet a high legal threshold, which has proven difficult. For example, EPA must demonstrate "unreasonable risk" to ban or limit chemical production, which EPA believes requires it to conduct extensive cost-benefit analyses that can take many years to complete. Since 1976, EPA has issued regulations to control only five existing chemicals. Furthermore, its 1989 regulation phasing out most uses of asbestos was largely vacated by a federal appeals court in 1991 because it was not based on "substantial evidence." In contrast, the European Union and a number of other countries have largely banned asbestos, a known human carcinogen that can cause lung cancer and other diseases. GAO previously suggested that Congress amend TSCA to reduce the evidentiary burden EPA must meet to control toxic substances and continues to believe such change warrants consideration. Because of TSCA's prohibitions on the disclosure of confidential business information, EPA has limited ability to share information on chemical production and risk. According to EPA officials, about 95 percent of the notices companies have provided to EPA on new chemicals contain some information claimed as confidential. Evaluating the appropriateness of confidentiality claims is time- and resource-intensive, and EPA does not challenge most claims. GAO previously suggested that Congress, among other things, consider amending TSCA to authorize EPA to share the confidential business information that chemical companies provide to EPA with states. |
gao_GAO-07-336 | gao_GAO-07-336_0 | Most Major Projects Have Exceeded Original Costs and Are Years Late, Principally Because of Ineffective DOE Project Oversight and Contractor Management
The estimated costs of many of the DOE major construction projects we reviewed have significantly exceeded original estimates and schedules have slipped. In addition, as shown in table 2, 9 of the 12 projects experienced schedule delays ranging from 9 months to more than 11 years. The DOE project oversight issues mentioned in table 3 include the following: inadequate systems for measuring contractor performance; approval of construction activities before final designs were sufficiently insufficient DOE staffing and experience; inadequate use of project management controls; lack of headquarters assistance and oversight support of field project directors; failure to detect contractor performance problems, including inadequate federal inspection activities; and poor government cost estimates, including inadequate funding for contingencies. Cost increases and schedule delays for 6 of the 9 projects were due in part to contractors’ poor management of the development and integration of technologies used in project designs by, among other things, not accurately anticipating the cost and time that would be required to carry out the highly complex tasks involved. DOE Does Not Consistently Measure Technology Readiness to Ensure That Critical Technologies Will Work as Intended before Construction Begins
Although DOE requires its final designs to be sufficiently complete before beginning construction, it has not systematically ensured that the critical technologies reflected in project designs are technologically ready. DOE Does Not Consistently Assess Technology Readiness
Only 1 of the 5 projects we reviewed to determine how DOE ensures that project designs are sufficiently complete before construction—projects that were approaching or had recently begun construction—had a systematic assessment of technology readiness to determine whether the project components would work individually or collectively as expected in the intended design. DOE’s experience with the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant is a case in point. The DOE project directors of the 5 DOE projects that are nearing, or have recently begun construction, told us they have completed, or expect to complete prior to construction, 85 to 100 percent of their projects’ final design. Both NASA and DOD use a nine-point scale to measure technology readiness, from a low of TRL 1 (basic principles observed) to a high of TRL 9 (total system used successfully in project operations). According to several DOE project directors we spoke with, a consistent, systematic method for assessing technology readiness would help achieve a number of objectives: that is, standardize terminology, make technology assessments more transparent, and improve communication among project stakeholders before they make critical project decisions. Other federal agencies have recognized the need to consistently measure and communicate technology readiness to help avoid cost increases and delays that result from relying on immature technologies. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy’s (DOE) major construction projects have experienced cost increases and schedule delays and the factors that have contributed to these problems, we identified (1) active DOE major line-item construction projects that have current total project cost estimates above the $750 million threshold— DOE’s criteria for “major construction projects,” and (2) the projects with estimates above $400 million—the DOE threshold for major projects until July 2006. Nuclear Weapons: Design Reviews of DOE’s Tritium Extraction Facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) spends billions of dollars on major construction projects that help maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile, conduct research and development, and process nuclear waste so that it can be disposed of. Because of DOE's long-standing project management problems, GAO determined the extent to which (1) DOE's major construction projects are having cost increases and schedule delays and the major factors contributing to these problems and (2) DOE ensures that project designs are sufficiently complete before construction begins to help avoid cost increases and delays. We examined 12 DOE major projects with total costs of about $27 billion, spoke with federal and contractor officials, and reviewed project management documents.
What GAO Found
Of the 12 DOE major projects GAO reviewed, 9 exceeded their original cost or schedule estimates, principally because of ineffective DOE project oversight and poor contractor management. Specifically, 8 of the 12 projects experienced cost increases ranging from $79.0 million to $7.9 billion, and 9 of the 12 projects were behind schedule by 9 months to more than 11 years. Project oversight problems included, among other things, inadequate systems for measuring contractor performance, approval of construction activities before final designs were sufficiently complete, ineffective project reviews, and insufficient DOE staffing. Furthermore, contractors poorly managed the development and integration of the technology used in the projects by, among other things, not accurately anticipating the cost and time that would be required to carry out the highly complex tasks involved. Even though DOE requires final project designs to be sufficiently complete before beginning construction, it has not systematically ensured that the critical technologies reflected in these designs have been demonstrated to work as intended (technology readiness) before committing to construction expenses. Specifically, only one of the five DOE project directors with projects that have recently begun or are nearing construction had systematically assessed technology readiness. The other four directors also told us that they have or will have completed prior to construction, 85 to 100 percent of their projects' final design, but they had not systematically assessed technology readiness. Proceeding into construction without also demonstrating a technology's readiness can lead to cost increases and delays. For example, one technology to be used in DOE's Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant was not sufficiently demonstrated--that is, shown to be technologically ready for its intended application--before construction began. Consequently, the technology did not perform as expected, which resulted in about $225 million in redesign costs and schedule delays of more than 1 year. To help avoid these problems, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) pioneered and the Department of Defense (DOD) has adopted for its projects a method for measuring and communicating technology readiness levels (TRL). Using a scale from one (basic principles observed) through nine (total system used successfully in project operations), TRLs show the extent to which technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended in the project. DOE project directors agreed that such an approach would help make technology assessments more transparent and improve stakeholder communication prior to making critical project decisions, such as authorizing construction. |
gao_GAO-04-435T | gao_GAO-04-435T_0 | More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim- Majority Countries
Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war on terrorism. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries— that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East
Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim countries. In contrast to State, the BBG has a strategic plan that focuses on a market-based approach to increasing audience size in priority markets. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to guide State’s and all federal agencies’ communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition, State and the BBG lacked adequate measures of progress toward reaching its public diplomacy goals. Since our report, State and the Board have focused on improving their performance measures. State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide its Operations but BBG Does
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the development stage. State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals
Mr. Chairman, in addition to deficiencies in public diplomacy strategies, we found that State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. BBG Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance
In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities
Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with measurable indicators of progress. The Board’s key challenge in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11 within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies did not focus exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.
What GAO Found
Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. Also since September 11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism. However, State does not have a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives. In addition, we found that while the BBG did have a strategic plan, the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and all federal agencies' communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. |
gao_T-GGD-96-103 | gao_T-GGD-96-103_0 | Juvenile Justice: Selected Issues Relating to OJJDP’s Reauthorization
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). We will also discuss how the OJJDP process for outside peer review of discretionary grant applications compares to the processes of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). The Assistant Attorney General and the OJJDP Administrator said that they believed communication and coordination between OJP and its component offices had improved. OJJDP Awarded 162 New Discretionary Grants for Fiscal Years 1993 Through 1995
For fiscal years 1993 through 1995, OJJDP data showed that it awarded 162 new discretionary grants. Funded projects covered a variety of program areas. OJJDP’s Process for Implementing Its Discretionary Grant Program
OJJDP manages its discretionary grants by setting goals and priorities for the programs and publicizing available grant programs. It is to consider review comments from peer reviewers and other program offices. The official noted that funding grants in this manner results in additional paperwork. These panels generally met about three times a year. In our review to determine how research results were communicated, we reviewed the following five grants, which were completed in fiscal year 1995: (1) Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Juvenile Delinquency—a longitudinal research study conducted in three states; (2) Funding Support for Specific Program Development for a State Clearinghouse for Missing Children—a training and technical assistance grant; (3) County-wide Youth Gang Prevention Project—Malheur County—a demonstration project; (4) National Juvenile Hate Crime Study—a research grant; and (5) American Bar Association Symposium on International Child Abduction—a training and technical assistance grant. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its review of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), focusing on issues related to its management and grant administration.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) communication and coordination between the Office of Justice Programs and its components has improved, but components' independent statutory authority may impede future coordination efforts; (2) OJJDP onsite monitoring of formula grants was generally timely, but it may change its procedures to increase the frequency of site visits; (3) in fiscal years (FY) 1993 through 1995, OJJDP awarded 162 new discretionary grants that covered a variety of program areas; (4) these discretionary grants ranged from $3.1 million for a 3-year project to $31,448 for an 18-month project; (5) to implement its discretionary grant program, OJJDP sets program goals and priorities, publicizes available grant programs and solicits grant applications, evaluates applications through initial and peer reviews, and awards and monitors grants; (6) OJJDP awarded most grants in FY 1993 through 1995 competitively; (7) the OJJDP peer review process generally resembles the National Institutes of Health's and the National Science Foundation's processes except in panel size and structure and in how reviewers are appointed; (8) OJJDP had monitoring plans for most grants, but little monitoring actually occurred; and (9) OJJDP makes the results of its grants available through a contractor database and other electronic forms. |
gao_HEHS-00-183 | gao_HEHS-00-183_0 | Medicare Managed Care Before the BBA
Before the BBA, numerous studies by us, the Physician Payment Review Commission—which has been incorporated into the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission—HCFA, and others demonstrated that the Medicare program spent hundreds of millions more on beneficiaries enrolled in health plans than it would have spent if the same individuals had remained in traditional FFS Medicare.This occurred because Medicare payments were based on the estimated cost of FFS beneficiaries with average health and were not adequately adjusted to reflect the fact that plans tended to enroll beneficiaries in better-than-average health who had lower health care costs—a phenomenon known as favorable selection. Plans more frequently withdrew from counties they had entered more recently, where they had attracted fewer enrollees, or where they faced larger competitors. All affected enrollees have to choose a new plan (if a plan accepting new enrollees is available in their county) or switch to FFS. Plan withdrawals in both years disproportionately affect beneficiaries living in small urban, fringe, and rural counties.In 2000, approximately 65 percent of the 328,000 beneficiaries affected by the withdrawals lived in one of these types of counties even though these areas accounted for less than 33 percent of Medicare's managed care enrollees. A small number of plans accounted for a substantial portion of the affected enrollees in both years—the 10 largest withdrawing plans accounting for 45 percent in 2000 and 37 percent in 2001. (See tables 2 and 3.) 2.) However, Sterling Option I does not offer prescription drug coverage. The withdrawals in 2000 followed a pattern that is similar to the pattern of withdrawals in FEHBP, as well as the pattern we found in our prior analysis of the 1999 Medicare plan withdrawals.Nearly all of the plans that terminated their Medicare contracts for 2000 or reduced their service areas were relatively new entrants in their respective markets, had attracted few beneficiaries, or had only a small share of the local Medicare managed care market. The plan withdrawals for 2001 deviate somewhat from this pattern in that some older, more established plans are terminating. 3.) In 2001, for example, FEHBP plan withdrawals are expected to affect about 1 percent of enrollees, compared to Medicare+Choice withdrawals affecting 15 percent of enrollees. In 2000, Most Terminating Plans Were Recent Entrants With Relatively Low Enrollments; Pattern Less Evident in 2001
The vast majority of Medicare+Choice plans that terminated their Medicare contracts in 2000, as opposed to reducing the number of counties they served, were recent entrants into urban areas that already had substantial plan participation. 4.) 5.) However, since the BBA was enacted the increase in Medicare+Choice payment rates has exceeded the growth in per capita FFS spending. Moreover, although industry representatives have called for higher payment rates, the extent to which rate increases would affect plans' decisions to participate in Medicare is unclear. Relationship Between Payment Rates and Plan Withdrawals Difficult to Interpret
The effect of payment rates on Medicare+Choice plan participation is ambiguous. Because of contract terminations and service area reductions, by January 2001 more than 1.6 million beneficiaries will have had to switch to a different plan or the traditional fee-for-service program since 1999. In July 1999, HCFA provided us with a list of plans that had announced they were withdrawing from the program or reducing their service areas as of January 1, 2000, and the counties and number of enrollees affected. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed health care plans' withdrawal from the Medicare Choice program, focusing on the: (1) geographic distribution and the distribution among plans of enrollees affected by the recent plan withdrawals; (2) factors associated with plans that terminated or reduced their participation in the program; and (3) likely role of payment rates in affecting plans' decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) of 309 plans serving Medicare beneficiaries at the end of 1999, 99 plans terminated their contracts or reduced the number of counties they served for the 2000 contract year, and 118 have announced they will terminate their contracts or reduce service areas for the 2001 contract year; (2) these withdrawals affected about 328,000 enrollees in 2000 and will affect almost 1 million enrollees in 2001; (3) the number of enrollees affected accounts for about 5 percent of Medicare Choice enrollees in 2000 and about 15 percent in 2001; (4) a disproportionate number of affected enrollees live outside of major urban areas; (5) a portion of these enrollees, approximately 79,000 in 2000 and 159,000 in 2001, will have no other Medicare managed care option available in their area and must either switch to a non-managed care option, if one is available in their area, or return to traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare; (6) while a new private FFS plan has begun to offer services in many of the affected areas as an alternative to the traditional public FFS Health Care Financing Administration does not offer a prescription drug benefit; (7) in January 2000, Medicare Choice plans tended to withdraw from more difficult to serve rural counties or large urban areas that they had entered more recently or where they failed to attract sufficient enrollment; (8) in 2001, the trend is essentially the same for the service area reductions but somewhat different for the contract terminations, which involve some older, more established plans; (9) the pattern of Medicare Choice withdrawals shares common elements with plan participation in the similarly choice-based health insurance program for federal employees; (10) industry representatives contend that the Balanced Budget Act's (BBA) payment rate changes were too severe and that low Medicare payment rates are largely responsible for the plan withdrawals; (11) however, since the BBA was enacted, Medicare Choice payment rates have risen faster than per capita FFS spending; (12) in addition, many plans have attracted beneficiaries who have lower-than-average expected health care costs, while Medicare Choice payments are largely based on the expected cost of beneficiaries with average health care needs; and (13) it is unclear whether Medicare Choice payment rate increases would affect plans' participation decisions. |
gao_AIMD-97-2 | gao_AIMD-97-2_0 | Our analysis of FAA major outage data from September 1994 through May 1996 at the Chicago, Dallas-Ft. Worth, New York, Washington, and Cleveland en route centers showed that DCC accounted for 10 of the 21 outages, or about 48 percent. FAA has specified a DCC system availability requirement of 99.9 percent. FAA attributes increasing MTTR to depleted inventories of out-of production DCC spare parts and a shortage of experienced DCC repair technicians. Decreases in DCC availability will result in costly delays for airlines and passengers. FAA Has Made Good Progress on DCCR but Can Reduce Risk Further
Thus far, FAA has made good progress on its DCCR acquisition, but much remains to be accomplished. To FAA’s credit, the fourth and final software build has completed integration testing, and some formal system-level test and demonstration activities have occurred. However, the number of software defects being found is slightly higher than projections, and despite the fact that FAA’s defect fix rate has kept pace with the higher numbers and its DCCR defect trend lines are favorable when considering defect severity, unresolved defects delayed the start of concurrent system-level testing at the Technical Center and the first site by several weeks. Also to FAA’s credit, it has prudently made formal risk management and quality assurance integral components of the acquisition. However, two risks associated with concurrent test plans are not being formally addressed—managing contention for limited test staff among three concurrent test activities, and controlling and synchronizing changes to three DCCR system test configurations. DCCR Is Ahead of Schedule and Contractor Reports Show the Contract Is Under Budget
According to the publicly announced DCCR schedule, the first site is to be operationally ready on October 1997. As such, each increment of tests is designed to sequentially test for and disclose different information about the system’s ability to perform as intended. By not formally managing these risks, FAA is increasing the chances that they will be overlooked and adversely affect DCCR. FAA has thus far made good progress in its efforts to replace DCC with DCCR. Recommendations
To maximize the likelihood of delivering promised DCCR capabilities on time and within contract budgets, we recommend that you direct the FAA Administrator to ensure that (1) contention for human test resources during DCCR concurrent test activities and (2) change control over system test configuration baselines during concurrent test activities are managed as formal program risks. Our objectives were to determine (1) the portion of the recent major outages experienced at the five DCC-equipped en route centers that were attributable to DCC, (2) whether DCC was meeting its system availability requirement, (3) FAA’s projections of future DCC outages and availability, and (4) whether FAA was effectively managing the DCCR acquisition to ensure delivery of specified capabilities on schedule and within estimated cost. To assess future DCC outages and availability, we obtained FAA projections of the number of DCC outages and the associated MTTR for these outages for calendar years 1996 through 2000, reviewed FAA’s Supportability Review of Display Channel Complex (DCC) and Computer Display Channel (CDC) (Initial Report), dated May 1995, and Supportability Review Update of Display Channel Complex (DCC) Hardware, dated March 1996, and interviewed Air Traffic Services officials responsible for these reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Display Channel Complex Rehost (DCCR) project, intended as an interim replacementof the Display Channel Complex (DCC), focusing on: (1) recent outages caused by DCC; (2) whether DCC was meeting its system availability requirement; (3) FAA's projections of future DCC outages and availability; and (4) whether FAA was effectively managing the DCCR acquisition to ensure delivery of specified capabilities on schedule and within estimated cost.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DCC, built and deployed over 30 years ago, is critical to FAA's ability to display aircraft situational data in five of FAA's 20 air route traffic control centers; (2) DCC is also responsible for most of the major outages at the five centers from September 1994 through May 1996, accounting for about 48 percent of the total number of major outages and nearly 87 percent of unscheduled system downtime associated with these outages; (3) according to FAA, DCC was able to exceed its availability requirement from fiscal year (FY) 1990 to 1993, on average at the five centers, because of heroic maintenance efforts using "chewing gum and chicken wire"; (4) however, it fell slightly short of the requirement in FY 1994 and 1995, and FAA expects availability to decrease further because of shortages of spare parts and experienced DCC technicians; (5) decreases in DCC availability will result in costly delays for airlines and passengers; (6) FAA has made good progress in acquiring DCCR, but much remains to be accomplished; (7) thus far, the fourth and final DCCR software build is complete, and the number of reported software defects, while cumulatively slightly higher than projections, is showing a favorable trend when adjusted for defect severity; (8) also, FAA is ahead of schedule in completing informal system-level tests, formal testing is generally on schedule, and the first site is ready to begin the system acceptance process; (9) DCCR's development has benefitted from formal risk management and quality assurance programs, and FAA has plans in place to accelerate completion of formal system-level tests; (10) contractor financial reports show that DCCR is under spending estimates; (11) in light of its progress to date, FAA has an opportunity to deliver promised DCCR capabilities on time and within contract budgets; (12) the likelihood of doing so can be increased, however, by acting to mitigate two known risks associated with remaining development activities; (13) specifically, FAA's test plans call for conducting three system-level tests concurrently rather than sequentially, as is normally done; (14) by doing so, FAA expects to implement DCCR early; (15) however, FAA is not formally managing two risks associated with DCCR concurrent testing, which are: (a) staffing three test activities at the same time and thus potentially spreading test personnel too thin; and (b) not defining how it will control and synchronize changes to three system test configurations so as to prevent configuration differences among the three during testing; and (16) by formally managing these risks, FAA will greatly reduce the chances of them impeding future DCCR progress. |
gao_GAO-14-657 | gao_GAO-14-657_0 | In states electing not to establish and operate either type of exchange, PPACA required the federal government to establish and operate the exchange. 1.) For example, for federally facilitated exchanges, CMS requires that issuers with more than 20 percent market share in the small-group market participate in the small-business exchange as a condition of participation in the individual In adopting this requirement, CMS indicated that the purpose exchange. Most of the Largest Issuers in the 2012 Individual and Small- group Markets Participated in the 2014 Exchanges, with Exceptions in Some States
In most states, issuers with the largest share of the 2012 individual and small-group markets participated in the 2014 individual and small- business exchanges. In 2012, a large number of issuers participated in state individual and small-group markets, although coverage was generally concentrated among a small number of these participating issuers. 2.) Most issuers with less than 5 percent of their 2012 market did not participate in the 2014 exchanges, although in many states more than one of these smaller issuers did participate. In addition, some issuers that participated in the 2014 individual or small- business exchanges had not participated in that respective 2012 market. Some of the other issuers, however, had previously provided coverage in other markets. In most states, for 2014 the issuers participating in the exchanges represented a mix of larger issuers, smaller issuers, and issuers new to that market. An average of 4 larger issuers in the individual market and 3 issuers in the small-group market accounted for the majority of these market-share totals in each state and, on average, more smaller issuers—those that had less than 5 percent of the 2012 market—than larger issuers participated in the individual exchanges in 2014. Nearly All 2014 Exchanges Had Multiple Participating Issuers, Which Generally Offered More Plans than the Minimum Required by PPACA
In nearly all states, multiple issuers participated in the individual and small-business exchanges in 2014; an average of 6 issuers and 4 issuers, respectively. Overall, the number of participating issuers varied widely between states; from 1 to 17 issuers through the individual exchange and from 1 to 13 issuers through the small-business exchanges. However, almost all exchanges had more than 1 issuer participating—49 individual exchanges and 45 small-business exchanges. More than half of participating issuers offered coverage through both the individual and small-business exchanges, although more issuers participated in the individual exchanges than in the small-business exchanges. Of the 323 issuers that participated in the exchanges, 175 participated in both the individual and small-business exchanges in their state. Of the 291 issuers, 257 offered more than the minimum number of plans required by PPACA—one gold and one silver plan—in all the rating areas in which they offered coverage. Of the 207 issuers in the small-business exchanges, each issuer offered an average of 12 plans in each rating area and 183 offered more than the minimum number of plans required in all the rating areas they offered coverage in. Agency Comments
We received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Health and Human Services and incorporated them as appropriate. Appendix II: Number of Issuers Participating in the 2014 Individual and Small-business Exchanges, by State
Table 5 presents information from interactive figure 4 on the number of issuers participating in the individual and small business exchanges in 2014, by state. Appendix III: Number of Plans Offered by Issuers Participating in the 2014 Exchanges across Rating Areas
Table 6 presents information on the number of plans issuers offered in each state in the individual and small-business exchanges across rating areas in 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA required by January 1, 2014, the establishment in each state of health insurance exchanges—marketplaces where eligible individuals and small businesses can compare and select among insurance plans. Issuer participation, including the number of plans these issuers offer, is a key factor in the extent of consumer choice offered by the exchanges.
GAO was asked to examine the number and types of issuers participating in both the individual and small-business exchanges beginning in 2014, as well as how this compared with issuer participation in the individual and small-group markets prior to the exchanges. In this report, GAO describes (1) the extent to which issuers that previously offered health plans in the individual and small-group markets participated in the exchanges in 2014, and (2) the issuers that participated in 2014 exchanges and the health plans they offered.
GAO analyzed data obtained from CMS and states on the health plans offered by issuers that participated in states' exchanges in 2014. GAO also analyzed CMS data on issuers' participation and market share in the 2012 individual and small-group markets, the most recently available national market-wide data. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and interviewed CMS officials to identify federal requirements related to exchange participation. GAO obtained information on state participation requirements from applicable states.
What GAO Found
Most of the largest issuers of health coverage from 2012 participated in the exchanges that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) required be established in all states in 2014. Previously, in 2012, while a large number of issuers participated in state individual and small-group markets, a small number of these participating issuers held a majority of the market share in terms of enrollment. In 2014, for both those exchanges serving the individual market and those serving the small-group market, in more than two-thirds of states the issuer with the largest share of the 2012 market participated in the 2014 exchange. In addition, in most states, other larger issuers with a 5 percent or more share of the 2012 market participated in the 2014 exchanges. Most smaller issuers with less than 5 percent of the 2012 market did not participate in the 2014 exchanges, although in many states more than one of these smaller issuers did participate. In addition, some issuers that participated in a 2014 individual or small-business exchange had not offered coverage in the respective 2012 market, although they may have offered coverage in other markets within the same state. In most states, for 2014, the issuers participating in the exchanges represented a mix of larger issuers, smaller issuers, and issuers new to that market.
Multiple issuers participated in nearly all 2014 exchanges and generally offered more health plans than the minimum of two required by PPACA. Overall, the number of participating issuers varied widely between states, from 1 to 17 issuers in the individual exchanges and from 1 to 13 issuers in the small-business exchanges. However, almost all exchanges—49 individual and 45 small-business—had more than one issuer participating. More than half of participating issuers offered coverage through both the individual and small-business exchange in that state, although more issuers participated in the individual exchanges than in the small-business exchanges. Issuers varied substantially in the number of plans they offered; 257 of the 291 issuers in the individual exchanges, and 183 of the 207 issuers in the small-business exchanges, offered more than the minimum number of plans required by PPACA in all the rating areas in which they offered coverage. For both the individual and small-business exchanges, collectively, issuers in the 25 most populous states tended to offer a higher than average number of plans, while those in less populous states were less likely to do so.
GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Health and Human Services and incorporated them as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-647 | gao_GAO-01-647_0 | U.S. and EU Nonreciprocal Preference Programs
Both the United States and the European Union established GSP programs in the early 1970s, each offering trade preferences to more than 100 developing countries around the world. However, a smaller percentage of imports from these beneficiary countries actually received preferential treatment—2 percent ($18 billion) of total U.S. imports and 6 percent ($45 billion) of total EU imports in 1999. U.S. and EU Approaches to Nonreciprocal Trade Have Evolved in Similar Ways
The United States and the European Union have offered greater tariff preferences over time, both in terms of product coverage and reduced restrictions. II for further details on the U.S. and EU programs.) U.S. and EU Programs Offer Relatively Similar Tariff Rates on Average and Exclude Some Sensitive Products
Despite some differences in how they structure their tariff preferences, U.S. and EU nonreciprocal trade preference programs offer beneficiary countries similar overall simple average tariff reductions. Although the United States covers a smaller share of its dutiable imports with its preference programs, U.S. beneficiaries use more of their available preferences than do EU beneficiaries. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our analysis, we compared (1) the volume of U.S. and EU nonreciprocal preferential trade, (2) the evolution of U.S. and EU approaches to nonreciprocal trade preferences, (3) the tariff preferences offered by the U.S. and EU nonreciprocal trade programs, and (4) the extent to which U.S. and EU program beneficiaries take advantage of the tariff preferences offered under the programs. EU preferential trade data have some limitations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Both the United States and the European Union (EU) began providing trade preferences to eligible developing countries in the early 1970s. These trade preferences, which reduced tariffs and product quotas, are "nonreciprocal," meaning that beneficiaries need not reciprocate with lower tariffs for donor export countries. This report discusses (1) the volume of U.S. and EU nonreciprocal preferential trade, (2) the U.S. and EU approaches to nonreciprocal trade preferences, (3) the tariff preferences offered by the U.S. and EU nonreciprocal trade programs, and (4) the extent to which U.S. and EU program beneficiaries take advantage of the tariff preferences offered under the programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the volume of imports receiving preferential tariff rates under U.S. and EU nonreciprocal trade preference programs in 1999 represented a relatively small share of total U.S. and EU imports, at two percent ($18 billion) and six percent ($45 billion), respectively. The U.S. and EU approaches to nonreciprocal preferential trade have evolved in similar ways since their inception in the early 1970s. U.S. and EU programs have included increasingly more products, particularly to the poorest countries, and have, over time, relaxed customs requirements that specify where and how products can be made. Despite some program differences, the U.S. and EU nonreciprocal preference arrangements offer relatively similar tariff preferences on average. On the whole, EU programs cover more products than do U.S. programs, but U.S. beneficiary countries use more of their available tariff preferences than do EU beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-04-443T | gao_GAO-04-443T_0 | Security Check Is Major Contributing Factor to Length of Time It Takes to Adjudicate Visas
State cannot readily identify the total length of time it takes for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa. To obtain visa data on science students and scholars, and to determine how long the visa process takes, we reviewed all Visas Mantis cables received from posts between April and June 2003, which totaled approximately 5,000. We drew a random sample of 71 cases from the 2,888 science student and scholar visa applications to measure the length of time taken at various points in the visa process. We found that visas for science students and scholars took on average 67 days from the date the Visas Mantis cable was submitted from post to the date State sent a response to the post. In addition, the data for both samples show that lengthy waits remain in some cases. Several Factors Contribute to the Length of Time It Takes to Resolve Visas Mantis Cases
We found that several factors, including interoperability problems among the systems that State and FBI use, contribute to the time it takes to process a Visas Mantis case. In addition, it takes time for data to be entered in State’s systems once State receives the information. Post Officials Seek Clearer Guidance and More Feedback
During our visits to posts in September 2003, officials told us they were unsure whether they were adding to the wait time because they did not have clear guidance on when to apply the Visas Mantis process and were not receiving feedback on the amount of information they provided in their Visas Mantis requests. Factors such as the time of year an applicant applies for a visa, the appointment requirements, and the staffing situation at posts generally affect how long an applicant will have to wait for an interview. Agency Officials Cite Improvements
State and FBI officials acknowledged that visa waits have been a problem but said they are implementing improvements to the process and working to decrease the number of pending Visas Mantis cases. For example, State and FBI officials told us that the validity of Visas Mantis checks for students and scholars has been extended to 12 months for applicants who are returning to a program or activity and will perform the same functions at the same facility or organization that was the basis for the original Visas Mantis check. Consular Affairs officials told us that State has invested about $1 million on a new information management system that it said would reduce the time it takes to process Visas Mantis cases. To help improve the process and reduce the length of time it takes for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa, we are recommending that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, develop and implement a plan to improve the Visas Mantis process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year thousands of international science students and scholars apply for visas to enter the United States to participate in education and exchange programs. They offer our country diversity and intellectual knowledge and are an economic resource. At the same time, the United States has important national security interests in screening these individuals when they apply for a visa. At a House Committee on Science hearing in March 2003, witnesses raised concern about the length of time it takes for science students and scholars to obtain a visa and about losing top international students to other countries due to visa delays. GAO reviewed 1) how long it takes a science student or scholar from another country to obtain a visa and the factors contributing to the length of time, and 2) what measures are under way to improve the process and decrease the number of pending cases.
What GAO Found
State Department (State) cannot readily identify the time it takes for a science student or scholar to obtain a visa. State has not set specific criteria or time frames for how long the visa process should take, but its goal is to adjudicate visas as quickly as possible, consistent with immigration laws and homeland security objectives. GAO found that the time it takes to adjudicate a visa depends largely on whether an applicant must undergo an interagency security check known as Visas Mantis, which is designed to protect against sensitive technology transfers. Based on a random sample of Visas Mantis cases for science students and scholars sent from posts between April and June 2003, GAO found it took an average of 67 days for the security check to be processed and for State to notify the post. In addition, GAO's visits to posts in China, India, and Russia in September 2003 showed that many Visas Mantis cases had been pending 60 days or more. GAO also found that the way in which Visas Mantis information was disseminated at headquarters level made it difficult to resolve some of these cases expeditiously. Furthermore, consular staff at posts GAO visited said they were unsure whether they were contributing to lengthy waits because they lacked clear guidance on when to apply Visas Mantis checks and did not receive feedback on whether they were providing enough information in their Visas Mantis requests. Another factor that may affect the time taken to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars is the wait for an interview. While State and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials acknowledged there have been lengthy waits for visas, they report having measures under way that they believe will improve the process and that they are collaborating to identify and resolve outstanding Visas Mantis cases. In addition, State officials told GAO they have invested about $1 million to upgrade the technology for sending Visas Mantis requests. According to State officials, the new system will help to reduce the time it takes to process Visas Mantis cases. |
gao_GAO-16-485 | gao_GAO-16-485_0 | Background
Definition and Types of FGM/C
FGM/C comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. Prevalence of FGM/C
Available data from nationally representative surveys show that FGM/C is concentrated in 30 countries and at least 200 million girls and women alive today have undergone some form of FGM/C, according to UNICEF (see fig. UNICEF also estimates that more than 3 million girls annually are at risk for FGM/C in Africa. In September 2015, the UN General Assembly formally adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, along with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 associated targets. In addition, State and USAID jointly developed the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally, released in August 2012. U.S. and UN Studies Have Identified Factors Contributing to the Persistence of FGM/C and Approaches to Address It
Factors Contributing to the Persistence of FGM/C
FGM/C has persisted into the 21st century despite UN resolutions condemning this practice and the passage of laws banning it in many countries where it is prevalent, as UNICEF has reported. Recent U.S. and UN studies of efforts to address FGM/C have identified several factors contributing to its prevalence, including its power as a social norm, the belief that FGM/C is a religious obligation, the medicalization of the practice, and challenges enforcing existing laws. In addition, the practice is exacerbated by poverty and poor education. Medicalization refers to the performance of FGM/C by health care providers rather than traditional practitioners. Including FGM/C in Broader Gender Equality and Human Rights Efforts
FGM/C should be addressed as part of broader efforts to promote gender equality and female empowerment, according to PRB. State’s and USAID’s Efforts to Address FGM/C Abroad Are Limited
State and USAID currently have limited international assistance efforts to address FGM/C. In 2014, State and USAID each had one active standalone project to address FGM/C. U.S. Contributions to UNFPA and UNICEF Have Not Supported Their Joint Program on FGM/C
State provides annual funding to UNFPA and UNICEF but, to date, none of this funding supports the Joint Program on FGM/C, the largest international effort to address FGM/C. However, if the general restrictions for UNFPA funding are met, there are currently no specific legal restrictions that would prohibit U.S. funding provided to UNFPA from being available for the Joint Program on FGM/C. USAID’s Assistance Efforts to Combat FGM/C Are Limited
Competing Priorities Limit USAID Funding for FGM/C
USAID has competing development priorities, which leave little funding available for FGM/C-related efforts, according to USAID officials. This report (1) summarizes findings from recent U.S. and United Nations (UN) studies about the factors contributing to FGM/C and approaches to addressing this practice internationally and (2) examines the Department of State’s (State) and the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) current efforts to address FGM/C abroad. We also collected information on projects with FGM/C components from USAID’s overseas missions in countries where FGM/C is prevalent. Appendix III: List of Countries Where Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting Is Concentrated with Decrees or Legislation Related to the Practice, According to the United Nations Children’s Fund
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported in 2013 that 24 countries where Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) is prevalent have enacted legislation related to FGM/C. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 200 million girls and women alive today have undergone FGM/C in the 30 countries where available data show this harmful practice is concentrated. More than 3 million girls are estimated to be at risk for FGM/C annually in Africa. FGM/C comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs. It is rooted in the cultural traditions of many communities but has several adverse health consequences and the UN identifies it as a violation of human rights. In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 that included the elimination of FGM/C among its targets. UNFPA and UNICEF implement the Joint Program on FGM/C in 17 countries—the largest current international assistance effort to address FGM/C. State and USAID include FGM/C as part of their global strategy to respond to gender-based violence.
GAO was asked to review State's and USAID's efforts to address FGM/C abroad. This report (1) summarizes findings from recent U.S. and UN studies about factors contributing to FGM/C and approaches to addressing this practice and (2) examines State's and USAID's current efforts to address FGM/C abroad. GAO reviewed recent UN and USAID studies on assistance efforts to address FGM/C, analyzed related strategies and policies, and interviewed State and USAID officials. GAO also analyzed information on FGM/C-related projects and activities from USAID's overseas missions, and State and USAID bureaus.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
U.S. and United Nations (UN) studies since 2010 have identified a variety of factors contributing to the persistence of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). In many communities where FGM/C is prevalent, FGM/C is an influential social norm that ensures social acceptance and is commonly perceived as a religious obligation. In addition, medicalization of the practice— when it is performed by health care providers rather than traditional practitioners—increases the perception of legitimacy in some countries. Although the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that many countries where FGM/C is prevalent have passed laws banning the practice, enforcement is a challenge. The studies also have identified key approaches to addressing FGM/C, including efforts to implement community education programs, outreach and training for medical professionals, and the inclusion of FGM/C in broader gender equality and human rights programs.
U.S. assistance efforts to address FGM/C are limited. The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) each had one active standalone project in 2014, and the agencies also undertook some FGM/C-related efforts as components of projects with broader assistance goals. In addition, the U.S. government provides funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF but, to date, has not contributed funds to the UN agencies' Joint Program on FGM/C. If congressional restrictions for UNFPA funding (such as the requirement for UNFPA to maintain U.S. funds in a separate account) are met, there are currently no specific legal restrictions that would prohibit U.S. funding provided to UNFPA from being available for the Joint Program on FGM/C. Competing development priorities, such as HIV/AIDS, leave little funding specifically for FGM/C, according to USAID officials. |
gao_GAO-11-645T | gao_GAO-11-645T_0 | Greater Colocation of Services at One-Stop Centers May Increase Efficiencies
Congress passed WIA partly in response to concerns about fragmentation and inefficiencies in federal employment and training programs. These 13 program categories represent about 40 percent of the federal appropriations for employment and training programs in fiscal year 2010. One-stop centers serve as the key access point for a range of services that help unemployed workers re-enter the workforce—including job search assistance, skill assessment and case management, occupational skills and on-the-job training, basic education and literacy training, as well as access to Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits and other supportive services— and they also assist employers in finding workers. We have previously reported that colocating services can result in improved communication among programs, improved delivery of services for clients, and elimination of duplication. Although the potential benefits of colocation are recognized, implementation may pose challenges. Three of the largest employment and training programs, the TANF, ES, and WIA Adult programs, provide some of the same employment and training services to low-income individuals, despite differences between the programs (see fig. Susidized employment. At the state level, the TANF program is typically administered by the state human services or welfare agency, and the ES and WIA Adult programs are typically administered by the state workforce agency. We previously recommended that Labor collaborate with Education, HHS, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to develop a research agenda that examines the impacts of various approaches to program integration on job seeker and employer satisfaction and outcomes. While states and localities have undertaken some potentially promising initiatives to achieve greater administrative efficiencies, little information is available about the strategies and results of these initiatives; therefore, it is unclear the extent to which practices in these states could serve as models for others. We recently recommended that the Secretaries of Labor and HHS work together to develop and disseminate information that could inform such efforts, including information on state initiatives to consolidate program administrative structures and state and local efforts to colocate additional programs at one-stop centers. These are difficult issues to address because they may require agencies and Congress to re-examine within and across various mission areas the fundamental structure, operation, funding, and performance of a number of long-standing federal programs and activities. Appendix I: Federally Funded Employment and Training Programs by Agency, Fiscal Year 2009
Employment and Training Programs: Opportunities Exist for Improving Efficiency. Multiple Employment and Training Programs: Providing Information on Colocating Services and Consolidating Administrative Structures Could Promote Efficiencies. Workforce Investment Act: Substantial Funds Are Used for Training, but Little Is Known Nationally about Training Outcomes. Multiple Employment Training Programs: Overlap Among Programs Raises Questions About Efficiency. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the findings from our recent work on federal employment and training programs and our prior work on the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA). GAO has recently identified 47 federally-funded employment and training programs for fiscal year 2009, defining them as programs that are specifically designed to enhance the job skills of individuals in order to increase their employability, identify job opportunities, and/or help job seekers obtain employment. These programs, which are administered by nine separate federal agencies--including the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS)--spent about $18 billion dollars in fiscal year 2009 to provide services such as job search assistance and job counseling to program participants. Seven programs accounted for about three-fourths of this spending, and two--Wagner- Peyser funded Employment Service (ES) and WIA Adult--together reported serving over 18 million individuals, or about 77 percent of the total number of participants served across all programs. Forty-four of the 47 programs we identified, including those with broader missions such as multipurpose block grants, overlap with at least one other program in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. However, differences may exist in eligibility, objectives, and service delivery. Almost all of the 47 programs tracked multiple outcome measures related to employment and training, and the most frequently tracked outcome measure was "entered employment." However, little is known about the effectiveness of employment and training programs because, since 2004, only 5 reported conducting an impact study, and about half of all the remaining programs have not had a performance review of any kind. The multiplicity of employment and training programs combined with the limited information regarding impact raise concerns about the extent to which the federally-funded employment and training system is performing as efficiently and effectively as it should. As early as the 1990s we issued a series of reports that raised questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of the federally-funded employment and training system, and we concluded that a structural overhaul and consolidation of these programs was needed. Partly in response to such concerns, 13 years ago Congress passed WIA. This testimony focuses on two areas where we have identified opportunities to promote greater efficiencies: colocating services and consolidating administrative structures
What GAO Found
Increasing colocation of services at a single site, as well as consolidating state workforce and welfare administrative agencies, could increase efficiencies, and several states and localities have undertaken such initiatives. However, implementation may pose challenges and little information is available about the strategies and results of these initiatives. To facilitate further progress in increasing administrative efficiencies, we have previously recommended that the Secretaries of Labor and HHS work together to develop and disseminate information about such efforts. Sustained congressional oversight is pivotal in promoting further efficiencies. Specifically, Congress could explore opportunities to foster state and local innovation in integrating services and consolidating administrative structures. |
gao_GAO-13-255 | gao_GAO-13-255_0 | NIFA is USDA’s primary extramural research agency, and, unlike staff of ARS, who conduct their own research, NIFA staff do not conduct research. ARS and NIFA Use Agency and Scientific Safeguards to Prevent Duplication of Research Projects in Similar Topic Areas, but Some Shortcomings Exist
ARS and NIFA generally focus on many of the same broad topics, and the agencies rely on agency-developed safeguards, as well as on the scientific community’s professional norms, to prevent duplication of research projects within and between the agencies. Indeed, agency officials and stakeholders could provide no recent examples of duplication within or between the two agencies, and our review of 20 randomly selected agency research projects did not identify duplicative projects. The key safeguards ARS developed to help prevent duplicative research projects include the following:
National program leaders set research project objectives. National program leaders review project plans. The peer review process used by scientific journals limits the publication of unnecessarily duplicative research. Some Shortcomings May Limit the Utility of Certain Agency Safeguards
Our review also identified some shortcomings with certain agency safeguards, which may somewhat limit their usefulness and increase the potential risk of duplication between or within the two agencies. Three of these shortcomings limit CRIS’s utility to guard against duplication of research projects, specifically, (1) ARS data in CRIS are not current; (2) NIFA directs staff to conduct a CRIS duplication check for what amounts to two-thirds, but not all, of its competitive grants; and (3) CRIS searches are not user friendly. ARS project information that is typically at least 6 months out-of-date when uploaded limits CRIS’s utility as a safeguard to prevent duplication of research projects and increases the risk of inadvertent project duplication at the two agencies. After discussing this topic with us, agency officials said that ARS now expects its staff to send ARS project information on a quarterly basis to NIFA for uploading. NIFA directs its staff to conduct a CRIS duplication search for certain projects accounting for about two-thirds of the funding it awarded for competitive grants over the last decade. The agency recently convened a task force to study, among other issues, whether this directive should be extended to other competitive grants. High-Level Collaborative Planning Has Increased, but Agency-Level Collaborative Planning between ARS and NIFA Has Not Been Systematic
Over the past few years, USDA’s Chief Scientist has facilitated increased collaborative planning within the REE mission area, particularly between ARS and NIFA, but agency-level collaborative planning between these two agencies has not been systematic. Specifically, the Chief Scientist and her staff have led several REE-level planning efforts that, over the past several years, have brought together staff from the two agencies and generated key products. Nevertheless, six USDA officials with planning responsibilities said that collaborative planning between ARS and NIFA national program leaders has not been systematic for topic areas the agencies have in common, and 20 officials and stakeholders said that ARS and NIFA should systematically hold joint planning and stakeholder input meetings to make the best use of limited agricultural research resources. USDA, however, has not implemented these recommendations. By enhancing collaborative planning for topic areas that ARS and NIFA have in common, as the animal sciences area has done, the agencies can take full advantage of their collective knowledge and expertise in setting their research priorities and determining their roles and responsibilities for carrying out these priorities. In addition, some collaborative planning initiated jointly by ARS and NIFA has occurred across national program areas, such as in the animal sciences area. For our recommendation that USDA require, as it identifies promising systems for searching and disseminating research project information, the appropriate entity to (1) determine whether VIVO or other systems are more effective or efficient than CRIS in identifying potentially duplicative research and (2) revise guidance to reflect the best system and methods for identifying potentially duplicative research projects: In the written comments, the Chief Scientist stated that, as the initiatives “mature and provide validated improvements over existing systems, guidance for use of the best available tools for safeguarding against duplication” could “enhance this benefit.”
For our recommendation that USDA enhance ARS’s and NIFA’s collaborative approach across all topic areas they have in common— including holding jointly sponsored meetings with stakeholders—to help set their research priorities and help them determine their roles and responsibilities for carrying out these priorities: While USDA did not expressly agree or disagree with this recommendation, it stated in its comments that it expects ARS and NIFA to “continue to increase the number of jointly sponsored planning activities” and that ARS- NIFA joint stakeholder meetings in Plant Sciences and Aquaculture are already planned for 2013. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the topics the Agricultural Research Agency (ARS) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) focus on and the safeguards they use to prevent duplication of research projects, along with any shortcomings in those safeguards, and (2) collaborative planning ARS and NIFA engaged in and how, if at all, such planning could be enhanced. | Why GAO Did This Study
The USDA's principal research agencies, ARS and NIFA, play a key role in supporting agricultural science, and questions have been raised about the extent to which the two agencies may be performing duplicative research and whether the agencies collaborate in planning research. Research duplication is the inadvertent repetition of research that does not confirm or verify conclusions from prior studies. Collaborative planning involves bringing together research agencies and stakeholders to discuss priorities and roles and responsibilities. In this context, GAO was asked to assess how these agencies ensure the efficient use of their resources for research. This report examines (1) the topics ARS and NIFA focus on and the safeguards the agencies use to prevent duplication of research projects, along with any shortcomings in those safeguards, and (2) collaborative planning ARS and NIFA engaged in and how, if at all, such planning could be enhanced. GAO reviewed USDA safeguards against duplication within and between ARS and NIFA; reviewed 20 randomly selected projects; analyzed information on collaborative planning; and interviewed officials from USDA, universities, and industry.
What GAO Found
The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) generally focus on many of the same broad topics and rely on agency safeguards, as well as on the scientific community's professional norms, to prevent inadvertent duplication of research projects within and between the agencies. Shortcomings with certain agency safeguards, however, may increase the potential risk of project duplication within or between the two agencies. ARS and NIFA built in their own safeguards to help prevent project duplication, such as (1) panels of independent external scientists who review proposed projects and (2) agency requirements for staff to ensure that proposed work is relevant, including checking the Current Research Information System (CRIS)--USDA's primary system containing project-level information on its ongoing and completed research projects--for potentially duplicative research projects in both agencies. The agencies also rely on professional norms to safeguard against duplication, such as the peer review process used by scientific journals to limit the publication of unnecessarily duplicative research. Indeed, agency officials and stakeholders could not provide recent examples of duplication within or between the two agencies, and GAO's review of 20 randomly selected research projects did not identify duplicative projects. Nevertheless, GAO identified a few shortcomings that somewhat limit the utility of certain agency safeguards. First, information in CRIS about ARS projects was typically at least 6 months out-of-date when uploaded, which undermines CRIS's utility as a safeguard. ARS officials said that the agency now expects staff to provide ARS project information on a quarterly basis, but ARS has not issued guidance about this expectation. Second, NIFA directs staff to conduct a CRIS duplication check for projects that accounted for about two-thirds of the funding it awarded for competitive grants; as a result, about one-third of its competitive grants are not subject to this safeguard against duplication. NIFA recently convened a task force to study, among other issues, whether the directive to check CRIS should be extended to all competitive grants.
USDA's Chief Scientist facilitated high-level collaborative planning, particularly between ARS and NIFA, in recent years, but 20 USDA officials and stakeholders said that agency-level collaborative planning between ARS's and NIFA's national program leaders working in common topic areas could be more systematic to make the best use of limited agricultural research resources. Specifically, the Chief Scientist and her staff led several high-level planning efforts that brought together staff from the two agencies and generated key products, such as a plan that identified USDA's seven goals for implementing its science priorities and the agencies responsible for implementing these goals. Nevertheless, national program leaders at the two agencies generally do not, and are not required to, systematically hold joint meetings for seeking stakeholder input and for setting research priorities. Some systematic collaborative planning, however, has been jointly initiated by ARS and NIFA national program leaders, such as in the animal sciences area. By enhancing collaborative planning across national program areas, as the animal sciences area has, ARS and NIFA can take fuller advantage of their collective knowledge and expertise to help set their research priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that ARS issue guidance that project information be provided to CRIS on a quarterly basis and that ARS and NIFA enhance collaborative planning. USDA generally agreed with GAO's findings, and cited benefits for three of the four recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-867T | gao_GAO-12-867T_0 | DOE and NNSA Struggled to Determine How NNSA Should Operate as a Separately Organized Agency
NNSA focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations; however, it and DOE have struggled with establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. Several factors contributed to this situation. First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to follow for establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board’s June 1999 report suggested several federal agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce, which could be used as a model for NNSA. However, as we reported in January 2007, none of the agency officials we interviewed considered their agency to be separately organized or believed that their agency’s operational methods were transferable to NNSA. Second, DOE’s January 2000 implementation plan, which was required by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. Instead, reflecting the opposition of the then DOE senior leadership to the creation of NNSA, the implementation plan “dual-hatted” virtually every significant statutory position in NNSA with DOE officials (i.e., having DOE officials contemporaneously serve in NNSA and DOE positions), including the Director of NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence and General Counsel. As we testified in April 2001, this practice caused considerable concern about NNSA’s ability to function with the independence envisioned in the NNSA Act. A lack of formal agreement between DOE and NNSA in a number of key areas—budgeting, procurement, information technology, management and administration, and safeguards and security—resulted in organizational conflicts that inhibited effective operations. Even where formal procedures were developed, interpersonal disagreements hindered effective cooperation. For example, our January 2007 report described the conflict between NNSA and DOE counterintelligence offices. Subsequently, Congress amended the NNSA Act to consolidate the counterintelligence programs of DOE and NNSA under the Department of Energy. NNSA Has Made Considerable Improvements, but Deficiencies Persist, Especially in Management of Major Projects and Contracts
Since its creation, NNSA has made considerable progress resolving some of its long-standing management deficiencies. For example, we reported in June 2004 that NNSA had better delineated lines of authority and improved communication between NNSA headquarters and its site offices. NNSA’s establishment of an effective headquarters security organization has made significant progress implementing these recommendations by performing security reviews, developing security performance measures, and instituting a security lessons-learned center. Nevertheless, NNSA continues to experience significant deficiencies, particularly in its management of major projects and contracts. However, for more than a decade, NNSA has continued to experience significant cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, principally because of ineffective oversight and poor contractor management. In some areas, NNSA can be viewed as a success. In particular, NNSA has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing, accomplishing this complicated task by using state-of-the-art facilities, as well as the skills of top scientists. Careful federal oversight over the tens of billions of dollars NNSA proposes to spend to modernize nuclear facilities will be necessary to ensure these funds are spent in as an effective and efficient manner as possible, especially given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major projects. DOE and NNSA have acted on many of these recommendations and have made considerable progress. Nevertheless, enough significant management problems remain that prompt some to call for removing NNSA from DOE and either moving it to another department or establishing it as a separate agency. As we concluded in January 2007, however, we do not believe that such drastic changes are necessary, and we continue to hold this view today. Importantly, we are uncertain whether such significant organizational changes to increase NNSA’s independence would produce the desired effect of creating a modern, responsive, effective, and efficient nuclear security enterprise. In light of the substantial leadership commitment to reform made by senior DOE and NNSA officials, and the significant improvements that have already been made, we believe that NNSA remains capable of delivering the management improvements necessary to be an effective organization, and we will continue to monitor NNSA’s progress making these improvements. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the late 1990s, DOE had difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nations nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response, Congress created NNSA as a separately organized agency within DOE under the NNSA Act. NNSA is responsible for managing nuclear weapon- and nonproliferation-related national security activities in laboratories and other facilities, collectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. GAO continues to identify problems across the nuclear security enterprise, from projects cost and schedule overruns to inadequate oversight of safety and security at NNSAs sites. With NNSA proposing to spend tens of billions of dollars to modernize its facilities, it is important to ensure scarce resources are spent in an effective and efficient manner.
This testimony addresses (1) NNSAs early experiences organizing and operating as a separately organized agency within DOE and (2) NNSAs efforts to correct long-standing management deficiencies. It is based on prior GAO reports issued from January 1995 to March 2012.
DOE and NNSA continue to act on the numerous recommendations GAO has made to improve NNSAs management. GAO will continue to monitor DOEs and NNSAs implementation of these recommendations.
What GAO Found
After the enactment of Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NNSA Act), the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) struggled to determine how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. A number of factors contributed to this. First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to follow for establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. Several federal agencies were suggested as models, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce. However, GAO reported in January 2007 that agency officials GAO interviewed did not consider their agency to be separately organized or believed that their agencys operational methods were transferable to NNSA. Second, DOEs January 2000 plan to implement the NNSA Act did not define how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. Internal DOE opposition to the creation of NNSA led the department to fill virtually every significant statutory position in NNSA with DOE officials (i.e., having DOE officials contemporaneously serve in NNSA and DOE positions). As GAO testified in April 2001, this practice of dual-hatting caused considerable concern about NNSAs ability to independently function. Also, lack of formal agreement between DOE and NNSA in a number of key areas such as, among others, budgeting and procurement, led to organizational conflicts that inhibited effective operations. Even where formal procedures were developed, interpersonal disagreements hindered effective cooperation. For example, a January 2007 GAO report described the conflict between NNSA and DOE counterintelligence offices, which led to Congress subsequently amending the NNSA Act to consolidate the counterintelligence programs of DOE and NNSA under DOE.
NNSA has made considerable progress resolving some of its long-standing management deficiencies, but significant improvement is still needed especially in NNSAs management of its major projects and contracts. GAO reported in June 2004 that NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and has improved communication between its headquarters and site offices. In addition, NNSAs establishment of an effective headquarters security organization has made significant progress resolving many of the security weaknesses GAO has identified. Nevertheless, NNSA continues to experience major cost and schedule overruns on its projects, such as research and production facilities and nuclear weapons refurbishments, principally because of ineffective oversight and poor contractor management. In some areas, NNSA can be viewed as a success. Importantly, NNSA has continued to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing. At the same time, NNSAs struggles in defining itself as a separately organized agency within DOE, and the considerable management problems that remain have led to calls in Congress and other organizations to increase NNSAs independence from DOE. However, senior DOE and NNSA officials have committed to continuing reform, and DOEs and NNSAs efforts have led to some management improvements. As a result, GAO continues to believe, as it concluded in its January 2007 report, that drastic organizational change to increase independence is unnecessary and questions whether such change would solve the agencys remaining management problems. |
gao_GAO-02-478T | gao_GAO-02-478T_0 | In addition to VA’s better known missions—to provide health care and benefits to veterans and medical research and education— VA has a fourth mission: to provide medical backup to DOD in times of war and civilian health care backup in the event of disasters producing mass casualties. Medical Recordkeeping and Surveillance During the Gulf War Was Lacking
Investigations into the unexplained illnesses of service members and veterans who had been deployed to the Persian Gulf uncovered the need for DOD to implement an effective medical surveillance system to obtain comprehensive medical data on deployed service members, including Reservists and National Guardsmen. The council concluded that the Gulf War exposed many deficiencies in the ability to collect, maintain, and transfer accurate data describing the movement of troops, potential exposures to health risks, and medical incidents in theater. Medical Surveillance Under Operation Joint Endeavor Improved but Was Not Comprehensive
In response to these reports, DOD strengthened its medical surveillance system under Operation Joint Endeavor when service members were deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Hungary. Despite the Department’s progress, we and others have reported on DOD’s implementation difficulties during Operation Joint Endeavor and the shortcomings in DOD’s ability to maintain reliable health information on service members. DOD also recently established guidelines and additional policy initiatives for improving military medical surveillance. DOD has several other initiatives for improving its information technology capabilities, which are in various stages of development. In addition to its ongoing information technology initiatives, DOD recently issued two major policies for advancing its military medical surveillance system. Concluding Observations
Clearly, the need for comprehensive health information on service members and veterans is compelling, and much more needs to be done. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) recently established a medical surveillance system to respond to the health care needs of both military personnel and veterans. A medical surveillance system involves the ongoing collection and analysis of uniform information on deployments, environmental health threats, disease monitoring, medical assessments, and medical encounters and its timely dissemination to military commanders, medical personnel, and others. GAO and others have reported extensively on weaknesses in DOD's medical surveillance capability and performance during the Gulf War and Operation Joint Endeavor. Investigations into the unexplained illnesses of Gulf War veterans revealed DOD's inability to collect, maintain, and transfer accurate data on the movement of troops, potential exposures to health risks, and medical incidents during deployment. DOD improved its medical surveillance system under Operation Joint Endeavor, which provided useful information to military commanders and medical personnel. However, several problems persist. DOD has several efforts under way to improve the reliability of deployment information and enhance its information technology capabilities. Although its recent policies and reorganization reflect a commitment to establish a comprehensive medical surveillance system, much needs to be done to implement the system. To the extent DOD's medical surveillance capability is realized, VA will be better able to serve veterans and provide backup to DOD in times of war. |
gao_GAO-06-833T | gao_GAO-06-833T_0 | The E-Government Act of 2002 strives to enhance protection for personal information in government information systems by requiring that agencies conduct privacy impact assessments (PIA). A PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. PIAs are important because they serve as a tool for agencies to fully consider privacy implications of planned systems and data collections before those systems and collections have been fully implemented, when it may be relatively easy to make critical adjustments. Key elements of this program include ● periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; ● risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce risks to an acceptable level and ensure that security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; ● security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; ● periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices; ● a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies through plans of action and milestones; and ● procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. As discussed, this should be minimized. Applicable laws such as the Privacy Act currently do not require agencies to notify individuals of security breaches involving their personal information; however, doing so allows those affected the opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the dangers of identity theft. Breach notification is also important in that it can help an organization address key privacy rights of individuals. Public disclosure of data breaches is a key step in ensuring that organizations are held accountable for the protection of personal information. Designing useful, easy-to-understand notices has been cited as a challenge in other areas where privacy notices are required by law, such as in the financial industry—where businesses are required by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to send notices to consumers about their privacy practices—and in the federal government, which is required by the Privacy Act to issue public notices in the Federal Register about its systems of records containing personal information. Given that people may be adversely affected by a compromise of their personal information, it is critical that they fully understand the nature of the threat and the options they have to address it. In summary, agencies can take a number of actions to help guard against the possibility that databases of personally identifiable information are inadvertently compromised, among which developing PIAs and ensuring that a robust information security program is in place are key. More specific practical measures aimed at preventing inadvertent data breaches include limiting the collection of personal information, limiting data retention, limiting access to personal information and training personnel accordingly, and considering using technological controls such as encryption when data need to be stored on mobile devices. Nevertheless, data breaches can still occur at any time, and when they do, notification to the individuals affected and/or the public has clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the dangers of identity theft. Care is needed in defining appropriate criteria if agencies are to be required to report security breaches to the public. Further, care is also needed to ensure that notices are useful and easy-to-understand so that they are effective in alerting individuals to actions they may want to take to minimize the risk of identity theft. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent security breach at the Department of Veterans Affairs, in which personal data on millions of veterans were compromised, has highlighted the importance of the federal government's processes for protecting personal information. As the federal government obtains and processes information about individuals in increasingly diverse ways, it remains critically important that it properly protect this information and respect the privacy rights of individuals. GAO was asked to testify on preventing and responding to improper disclosures of personal information in the federal government, including how agencies should notify individuals and the public when breaches occur. In preparing this testimony, GAO drew on its previous reports and testimonies, as well as on expert opinion provided in congressional testimony and other sources.
What GAO Found
Agencies can take a number of actions to help guard against the possibility that databases of personally identifiable information are inadvertently compromised. The first key step is to develop a privacy impact assessment--an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed--whenever information technology is used to process personal information. These assessments, required by the E-Government Act of 2002, are a tool for agencies to fully consider the privacy implications of planned systems and data collections before implementation, when it may be easier to make critical adjustments. The second key step is to ensure that a robust information security program is in place, as required by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). Such a program includes periodic risk assessments; security awareness training; security policies, procedures, and practices, as well as tests of their effectiveness; and procedures for addressing deficiencies and for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. More specific practical measures aimed at preventing inadvertent data breaches include limiting the collection of personal information, limiting the time that such data are retained, limiting access to personal information and training personnel accordingly, and considering the use of technological controls such as encryption when data need to be stored on mobile devices. When data breaches do occur, notification to the individuals affected and/or the public has clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the dangers of identity theft. Although existing laws do not require agencies to notify the public when data breaches occur, such notification is consistent with agencies' responsibility to inform individuals about how their information is being accessed and used, and it promotes accountability for privacy protection. That said, care is needed in defining appropriate criteria for incidents that merit notification. Notifying individuals of security incidents that do not pose serious risks could be counterproductive and costly, while giving too much discretion to agencies could result in their avoiding the disclosure of potentially harmful breaches. Care is also needed to ensure that notices are useful and easy to understand, so that they are effective in alerting recipients to actions they may want to take to minimize the risk of identity theft. Among other things, it is important to provide context in the notice--explaining to recipients why they are receiving a notice and what to do about it. It is also important the notices be coordinated with law enforcement to avoid impeding ongoing investigations. Given that individuals may be adversely impacted by a compromise of their personal information, it is critical that they fully understand the nature of the threat and the options they have to address it. |
gao_RCED-98-151 | gao_RCED-98-151_0 | Enacted in December 1997, the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 authorized federal funding for Amtrak’s capital and operating expenses through fiscal year 2002 and repealed several provisions of federal law that limited Amtrak’s ability to manage costs and maximize revenues. In addition, 14 routes lost more than $100 per passenger carried. In making its decisions on route closures and service reductions, Amtrak examined such factors as the financial performance of each route; the effect of a route’s closure on connecting routes and the overall network; the efficient use of equipment; marketing concerns; states’ willingness to subsidize service; Amtrak’s mandate to provide national passenger rail service; and a route’s potential for improved profitability through, for example, the growth of mail and express merchandise services. In addition, the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act directed the newly created Amtrak Reform Council to assess Amtrak’s financial performance. Amtrak’s Operating and Capital Subsidies
Since 1971, Amtrak has received about $21 billion in federal operating and capital funding to help cover the costs of providing intercity passenger rail service. Furthermore, in March 1998, Amtrak’s Board of Directors approved a revised strategic business plan for fiscal years 1998 through 2003 that projects a net loss of $845 million for fiscal year 1998—$83 million more than the $762 million net loss that occurred in fiscal year 1997. The revised plan reflects a serious cash-flow problem and Amtrak’s need to borrow substantially more money than originally planned to pay operating expenses. As discussed previously, Amtrak planned to reduce its net loss and eliminate its need for federal operating subsidies primarily by increasing revenues while controlling costs. Amtrak also is upgrading its track between Washington, D.C., and New York City to further reduce travel time by 15 minutes to 2-3/4 hours by enabling trains to travel at speeds up to 135 miles per hour. Table 2 compares how Amtrak would spend federal funds under its glidepath with how Amtrak proposes to spend its federal capital appropriation under FTA’s approach to maintenance expenses. Amtrak and FRA officials stated that these reforms will provide few, if any, immediate financial benefits and their longer-term benefits are unclear. Amtrak and FRA officials told us that the repeal of the statutory ban on contracting out work that would result in layoffs will have little, if any, immediate effect on Amtrak’s financial performance. Financial Performance of Amtrak’s Routes
This appendix presents information on (1) the effect of excluding depreciation in calculating profit and loss per passenger for each Amtrak route, fiscal year 1997; (2) the operating ratio of each Amtrak route, fiscal years 1994 through 1997; (3) the profit or loss of each Amtrak route, fiscal years 1994 through 1997; (4) revenues, expenses, and profit or loss of each Amtrak route, fiscal year 1997; (5) the ridership on each Amtrak route, fiscal years 1994 through 1997; (6) the profit or loss per passenger for each Amtrak route, fiscal years 1994 through 1997; (7) the improved financial performance of certain Amtrak routes as a result of state payments, fiscal year 1997; (8) the load factor for each Amtrak route, fiscal year 1997; (9) Amtrak routes discontinued since fiscal year 1994; and (10) the segments of Amtrak routes discontinued since fiscal year 1994. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the financial: (1) performance of Amtrak's current routes; (2) implications for Amtrak of multiyear capital requirements and declining federal operating subsidies; and (3) effect on Amtrak of reforms contained in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak spends almost $2 for every dollar of revenue it earns in providing intercity passenger service; (2) only the Metroliner's high-speed service between Washington, D.C., and New York City is profitable; all of Amtrak's other 39 routes operate at a loss; (3) financial performance measures highlight the problems that Amtrak routes generally are experiencing; (4) for example, 3 Amtrak routes spent more than $3 for every dollar of revenue, and 14 routes lost more than $100 per passenger in fiscal year (FY) 1997; (5) at the same time, Amtrak has improved the financial performance of several routes by negotiating support payments with affected states; (6) for example, California supplemented the revenues of two routes by about $16.5 million each in FY 1997 because these routes particularly benefited its residents; (7) any decisions about restructuring Amtrak's route system need to consider whether and how Amtrak will continue to provide national passenger service; (8) an analysis also needs to assess each route's customer demand and financial performance, the willingness of state and local governments to subsidize service, and the route's broader benefits; (9) these benefits could include providing connecting service to other routes, providing public transportation that links smaller communities with major cities, and helping to alleviate highway congestion and pollution; (10) Amtrak is in a very precarious financial position and remains heavily dependent on federal funding to pay its operating and capital expenses; (11) while Amtrak's goal is to eliminate the need for federal operating subsidies by 2002, its Board of Directors approved a revised strategic business plan in March 1998 that projected substantially higher net losses in FY 1998 and FY 1999 than were included in the previous plan; (12) to reduce these net losses, Amtrak's revised plan would use federal capital appropriations to pay for maintenance expenses that traditionally have been treated as operating expenses; (13) as a result, Amtrak would spend $800 million, or 15 percent, less for capital improvements over the next 5 years than previously planned; (14) as currently structured, Amtrak will continue to require federal capital and operating support in 2002 and well into the future; (15) the reforms included in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 will have little, if any, immediate effect on Amtrak's financial performance, according to Amtrak and Federal Railroad Administration officials; and (16) the officials added that the longer-term benefits of these reforms are unclear. |
gao_GAO-03-937T | gao_GAO-03-937T_0 | District Court Weighted Case Filings, as Approved, Are a Reasonably Accurate Measure of Case-Related Judge Workload
The demands upon judges’ time are largely a function of both the number and complexity of the cases on their dockets. Some types of cases may demand relatively little time, and others may require many hours of work. Importantly, the weights were designed to be descriptive not prescriptive—that is, the weights were designed to develop a measure of the national average amount of time that judges actually spent on specific types of cases, not to develop a measure of how much time judges should spend on specific types of cases. Overall, the weighted case filings, as approved in 1993, are a reasonably accurate method of measuring the average judge time that a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court would require. The methodology used to develop the case weights was reasonable. It used a valid sampling procedure, developed weights based on actual case-related time recorded by judges from case filing to disposition, and included a measure (standard errors) of the statistical confidence in the final weight for each weighted case type. Current Case Weights about 10 Years Old
The case weights are almost 10 years old, and the time data on which they were based are as much as 15 years old. Changes since the case weights were finalized in 1993, such as changes in the characteristics of cases filed in federal district courts and in case management practices, may affect how accurately the weights continue to reflect the time burden on district court judges today. Concerns about the Research Design for Updating the District Court Case Weights
The Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Judicial Resources has approved the research design for revising the current case weights, with the goal of having new weights submitted to the Resources Committee for review in the summer of 2004. Actual time data would be limited to that available from existing reports on the time associated with courtroom events and proceedings for different types of cases. The time required for noncourtroom events would be derived from structured, guided discussions of groups of 8 to 13 experienced district court judges in each of the 12 geographic circuits (about 100 judges in all). Thus, it will not be possible to objectively, statistically assess how accurate the new case weights are—weights on whose accuracy the Judicial Conference will rely in assessing judgeship needs in the future. Adjusted Case Filings: Accuracy of Courts of Appeals Case-Related Workload Measure Cannot Be Assessed
The principal workload measure that the Judicial Conference uses to assess the need for additional courts of appeals judges is adjusted case filings. We found that adjusted case filings are based on data available from standard statistical reports for the courts of appeals. The measure is not based on any empirical data about the judge time required by different types of cases in the courts of appeals. On the basis of the documentation we reviewed, we determined that there is no empirical basis for assessing the potential accuracy of adjusted filings a measure of case-related judge workload. Recommendations
In our report, we recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States update the district court case weights using a methodology that supports an objective, statistically reliable means of calculating the accuracy of the resulting weights; and develop a methodology for measuring the case-related workload of courts of appeals judges that supports an objective, statistically reliable means of calculating the accuracy of the resulting workload measure(s) and that addresses the special case characteristics of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Appendix I: Quality Assurance Steps the Judiciary Takes to Ensure the Accuracy of Case Filing Data for Weighted Filings
Whether the district court case weights are a reasonably accurate measure of district judge case-related workload is dependent upon two variables: (1) the accuracy of the case weights themselves and (2) the accuracy of classifying cases filed in district courts by the case type used for the case weights. If case filings are inaccurately identified by case type, then the weights are inaccurately calculated. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO appeared before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, House Committee on the Judiciary to discuss the results of our review and assessment of case-related workload measures for district court and courts of appeals judges. Biennially, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal judiciary's principal policymaking body, assesses the judiciary's needs for additional judgeships. If the Conference determines that additional judgeships are needed, it transmits a request to Congress identifying the number, type (courts of appeals, district, or bankruptcy), and location of the judgeships it is requesting. In assessing the need for additional district and appellate court judgeships, the Judicial Conference considers a variety of information, including responses to its biennial survey of individual courts, temporary increases or decreases in case filings, and other factors specific to an individual court. However, the Conference's analysis begins with the quantitative case-related workload measures it has adopted for the district courts and courts of appeals--weighted case filings and adjusted case filings, respectively. These two measures recognize, to different degrees, that the time demands on judges are largely a function of both the number and complexity of the cases on their dockets. Some types of cases may demand relatively little time and others may require many hours of work.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the district court weighted case filings, as approved in 1993, appear to be a reasonably accurate measure of the average time demands that a specific number and mix of cases filed in a district court could be expected to place on the district judges in that district. The methodology used to develop the case weights was based on a valid sampling procedure, developed weights based on actual case-related time recorded by judges from case filing to disposition, and included a measure (standard errors) of the statistical confidence in the final weight for each weighted case type. The case weights, however, are about 10 years old, and the data on which the weights are based are as much as 15 years old. Changes since 1993, such as the characteristics of cases filed in federal district courts and changes in case management practices, may have affected whether the 1993 case weights continue to be a reasonably accurate measure of the average time burden on district court judges resulting from a specific volume and mix of cases. The Judicial Conference's Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics has approved a research design for updating the current case weights, and we have some concerns about that design. The design would include limited data on the time judges actually spend on specific types of cases. The proposed design would not include collecting actual data on the non-courtroom time that judges spend on different types of cases. Estimates of the non-courtroom time required for specific types of cases would be based on estimates derived from the structured, guided discussions of about 100 experienced judges meeting in 12 separate groups (one for each geographic circuit). The accuracy of case weights developed on such consensus data cannot be assessed using standard statistical methods, such as the calculation of standard errors. Thus, it would not be possible to objectively, statistically assess how accurate the new case weights are. Adjusted case filings, the principal quantitative measure used to assess the case-related workload of courts of appeals judges, are based on available data from standard statistical reports from the courts of appeals. The measure is not based on any empirical data about the judge time required by different types of cases in the courts of appeals. The measure essentially assumes that all cases filed in the courts of appeals, with the exception of pro se cases--those in which one or both parties are not represented by an attorney--require the same amount of judge time. On the basis of the documentation we reviewed, there is no empirical basis on which to assess the accuracy of adjusted filings as a measure of case-related workload for courts of appeals judges. Whether the district court case weights are a reasonably accurate measure of district judge case-related workload is dependent upon two variables: (1) the accuracy of the case weights themselves and (2) the accuracy of classifying cases filed in district courts by the case type used for the case weights. If case filings are inaccurately identified by case type, then the weights are inaccurately calculated. |
gao_GAO-05-341 | gao_GAO-05-341_0 | Finally, the DOD regulation requires periodic evaluations of local activities, which implement DOD’s ethics program, to ensure they meet standards. To implement its ethics program, DOD relies on local ethics counselors within DOD’s military services and agencies to train and counsel employees on conflict-of- interest and procurement integrity rules. Training and Counseling Results Are Not Measured
DOD has delegated responsibility for training and counseling to more than 2,000 ethics counselors assigned to commands and organizations worldwide. At the 12 DOD locations we visited we found training and counseling efforts varied in the content of ethics information provided, who is required to attend training and counseling, and how often the training and counseling is provided. DOD currently evaluates its ethics program’s performance in terms of process indicators—such as the number of financial disclosure forms completed, the number of ethics counselors, and the amount of time spent by ethics counselors on training and counseling services. Additionally, DOD does not know whether the training and counseling includes all relevant conflict-of-interest and procurement integrity rules. For information on reported allegations of potential misconduct the ethics officials referred us to the inspectors general offices. As a result, DOD has not determined if reports of potential misconduct are increasing or decreasing and why such a change may be occurring. Specifically, defense regulations provide that contractors should have (1) a written code of ethical conduct; (2) ethics training for all employees; (3) periodic reviews of its compliance with its code of ethical conduct; (4) systems to detect improper conduct in connection with government contracts; and (5) processes to ensure corrective actions are taken. While DOD evaluates components of contractors’ financial and management controls, neither the Defense Contract Management Agency nor the Defense Contract Audit Agency—the agencies responsible for oversight of defense contractors’ operations—had assessed the adequacy of contractors’ practices for hiring current and former government employees. This review found that the company relied excessively on employees to self-monitor their compliance with post-government employment restrictions. The review concluded that by relying on employees to monitor their own behavior, the company increased the risk of noncompliance, due to either employees’ willful misconduct or failure to understand complex ethics rules. Recommendations
We are making three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to take actions to improve DOD’s knowledge and oversight of its ethics program and contractors’ ethics programs to raise the level of confidence that DOD’s business is conducted with impartiality and integrity: Regularly assess training and counseling efforts for quality and content, to ensure that individuals covered by conflict-of-interest and procurement integrity rules receive training and counseling that meet standards promulgated by DOD Standards of Conduct Office. Ensure ethics officials, as required by the joint ethics regulation, track and report on the status of alleged misconduct to the military services and defense agencies head ethics officials. Our report identifies opportunities to improve (1) DOD’s efforts to train and counsel its workforce to raise awareness of ethics rules and standards as well as DOD measures of the effectiveness of these efforts and (2) DOD’s knowledge of defense contractors’ programs to promote ethical standards of conduct. To assess DOD’s knowledge of defense contractors’ programs to promote ethical standards of conduct, we interviewed seven defense contractors about their ethics programs and hiring practices of former government employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) spent more than $200 billion to purchase goods and services. To help ensure defense contracts are awarded fairly and current and former employees do not use their knowledge of DOD acquisition activities to gain financial or other benefits, DOD personnel are required to conduct themselves in a manner that meets federal ethics rules and standards. Regulations require DOD to implement an ethics program and provide that contractors meet certain ethics standards. For this report, GAO assessed (1) DOD's efforts to train and counsel its workforce to raise awareness of ethics rules and standards as well as DOD measures of the effectiveness of these efforts and (2) DOD's knowledge of defense contractors' programs to promote ethical standards of conduct.
What GAO Found
To implement its ethics program, DOD has delegated responsibility for training and counseling employees on conflict-of-interest and procurement integrity rules to more than 2,000 ethics counselors in DOD's military services and agencies. These efforts vary in who is required to attend training and counseling, the content of ethics information provided, and how often the training and counseling is provided. While some variation may be warranted, DOD lacks the knowledge needed to determine whether local efforts are meeting the objectives of its ethics program--in large part because DOD does not systematically capture information on the quality and content of the training and counseling or employee activity as they relate to ethics rules and restrictions. Specifically, ethics counselors were unable to tell us if people subject to procurement integrity rules were trained. Instead, DOD evaluates its ethics program in terms of process indicators--such as the number of people filing financial disclosure forms, the number of ethics officials providing training and counseling services, and the amount of time ethics officials spend on such activities--which do not provide metrics to assess the effectiveness of local training and counseling efforts. DOD also lacks adequate information on the number and status of allegations of potential misconduct related to conflict-of-interest and procurement integrity rules. Ethics officials did not know of 53 reported allegations of potential misconduct referred to inspectors general offices. DOD has taken several actions since October 2004 aimed at enhancing its ethics program. However, without knowledge of training, counseling, and reported allegations of misconduct, DOD is not positioned to assess the effectiveness of its efforts. DOD's knowledge of defense contractor efforts to promote ethical standards is also limited. Defense regulations provide that contractors should have ethics programs, provide ethics training for all employees and implement systems to detect improper conduct in connection with government contracts. Despite these regulations, DOD had not evaluated the hiring practices of the contractors GAO contacted. Neither the Defense Contract Management Agency nor the Defense Contract Audit Agency--the agencies responsible for oversight of defense contractors' operations--had assessed the adequacy of contractors' practices for hiring current and former government employees. An independent review of one of DOD's largest contractors found that the company lacked the management controls needed to ensure an effective ethics program. Instead, the review found that the company relied excessively on employees to self-monitor their compliance with post-government employment restrictions. The review concluded that by relying on self-monitoring, the company increased the risk of noncompliance, due to either employees' willful misconduct or failure to understand complex ethics rules. |
gao_GAO-17-15 | gao_GAO-17-15_0 | The DNP Working System Offers Either Partial or No Access to Three of the Six Databases Required by Law
The DNP working system offers full access to three of the databases required by IPERIA: the System for Award Management exclusion records, the Debt Check database, and the List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE). However, it offers either partial or no access to the remaining three: the Credit Alert Interactive Voice Response System, SSA’s prisoner data, and SSA’s death records. SSA shares two sets of death data: its full death file and DMF. These officials stated that the Social Security Act would need to be amended to allow the agency to share its full death file with Treasury for the DNP working system. While there is a continued need for SSA to address the risk of errors in its death data, sharing the full death file through the DNP working system would provide agencies with additional information and enhance efforts to identify and prevent improper payments to deceased individuals. Selected Agencies Have Used the DNP Working System in Limited Ways in Part Because of a Lack of Clear Strategy and Guidance
Nine of the 10 agencies we reviewed used the DNP working system’s payment integration functionality, despite limitations in its effectiveness and the lack of OMB and Treasury guidance for key aspects of the payment integration process. Aside from the payment integration process, 6 of the 10 agencies we reviewed used the DNP working system in limited ways, and 9 of the 10 agencies accessed the databases through means other than the DNP working system. Moreover, certain limitations are not fully communicated through existing guidance. While matching is conducted at the time of payment, agencies generally receive the results after payments have been made. The payment integration process matches against only two databases, DMF and SAM exclusion records. Payments reviewed. Examples of these types of payments include Department of Defense payments disbursed through the Defense Finance and Accounting Service ($477 billion in fiscal year 2015) and Medicare Fee-for-Service payments ($351 billion in calendar year 2014). OMB has not developed or documented a strategy for how it expects agencies to use the DNP working system. OMB has not established specific goals or performance measures by which to evaluate agency use of the DNP working system, in part because it has not developed a strategy for how agencies should use the system. In its first annual report to Congress on the overall DNP Initiative, OMB reported that the DNP Initiative prevented $2 billion in improper payments in fiscal year 2014. While the report highlighted the DNP working system and four other agency-specific efforts, all of the reported $2 billion in prevented improper payments resulted from use of the agency-specific efforts, not the DNP working system. The 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies collectively reported in their AFRs about $680,000 in improper payments prevented through use of the DNP working system in fiscal year 2015. Without monitoring mechanisms, OMB may not effectively evaluate the DNP working system or identify performance issues. Conclusions
Improper payments are a significant problem in the federal government, and the DNP working system is one tool that agencies can use to help reduce them. While the most common use of the DNP working system is its payment integration process, OMB guidance is unclear as to whether use of the process is required, and Treasury’s Do Not Pay Agency Implementation Guide does not clearly describe the limitations of the process, including the data sources used and the timing of matching. To reasonably assure that agencies use the DNP working system effectively, the Director of OMB should develop a strategy—and communicate its strategy through guidance—for how agencies should use the DNP working system to complement existing data matching processes and whether and how agencies should consider using the DNP working system to streamline existing data matching. OMB stated that it agreed or generally agreed with the concepts behind the remaining five recommendations, as discussed below, but did not state whether it agreed with the recommendations themselves or planned to implement them. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review examines the extent to which (1) the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) developed the Do Not Pay (DNP) working system and obtained access to relevant databases, (2) selected agencies used the DNP working system to help review eligibility, and (3) OMB monitored the use of the DNP working system. We used this information to identify large components and those with high reported improper payment estimates. To address our third objective, we analyzed agency reporting on the use of the DNP working system in the 10 selected agencies’ fiscal year 2015 agency financial reports and OMB’s first annual report on the DNP Initiative; obtained relevant documentation regarding OMB’s monitoring of the DNP working system; and compared this information to relevant laws, guidance, and federal internal control standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments are a long-standing, significant problem in the federal government, estimated at nearly $137 billion in fiscal year 2015. GAO previously reported that one strategy to help prevent improper payments is up-front verification of eligibility through data sharing and matching. Established by OMB in 2011 and hosted by Treasury, the DNP working system is a web-based, centralized data matching service.
GAO was asked to review the DNP working system. This report examines the extent to which (1) OMB and Treasury developed the DNP working system and obtained access to relevant databases, (2) selected agencies used the DNP working system to help review eligibility, and (3) OMB monitored the use of the system. GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance; interviewed officials at OMB, Treasury, and 10 user agencies selected in part based on size and reported improper payment estimates, including those with the largest reported estimates; and analyzed DNP working system documentation.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in coordination with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), developed the Do Not Pay (DNP) working system as a data matching service for agencies to use in preventing improper payments, but GAO found that the DNP working system offers either partial or no access to three of the six databases required by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012, as amended. Specifically, the DNP working system offers no access to the Social Security Administration's (SSA) prisoner records and partial access to the Credit Alert Interactive Voice Response System and SSA's death records. The death records offered through the DNP working system do not include state-reported death data. SSA officials stated that sharing its full death file—which includes state-reported death data—would require an amendment to the Social Security Act. Sharing the full death file through the DNP working system would enhance efforts to identify and prevent improper payments.
The 10 agencies GAO reviewed have used the DNP working system in limited ways, in part because of a lack of clear OMB strategy and guidance. The most common way these agencies used the DNP working system is through its payment integration process, whereby Treasury compares disbursements it makes with DNP databases. However, Treasury matches against only two databases, and because the matching is performed simultaneously with disbursement, agencies generally do not receive the results in time to prevent improper payments. Further, because the payment integration process is built into Treasury's payment process, it does not compare payments disbursed through other means, such as payments made by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service ($477 billion in fiscal year 2015). OMB and Treasury guidance do not fully address the limitations of the payment integration process or whether its use is required. Aside from payment integration, 6 of the 10 agencies GAO reviewed used the DNP working system in limited ways, and 9 of the 10 agencies used some of the databases outside the DNP working system. OMB has not developed a strategy or communicated through guidance how it expects agencies to use the DNP working system. As a result, agencies may not effectively and efficiently use the system to help reduce improper payments.
Although OMB collects certain information about the use of the DNP working system, it has not developed monitoring mechanisms, such as goals or performance measures. Reported savings from use of the DNP working system have been minimal. OMB reported that the overall DNP Initiative (which encompasses the DNP working system and other agency-specific efforts) prevented over $2 billion in improper payments in fiscal year 2014, but none of these savings resulted from use of the DNP working system. Further, while OMB has not reported on fiscal year 2015 results, the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies reported about $680,000 in improper payments prevented through use of the system in fiscal year 2015. However, GAO identified instances in which such agency-reported information was not consistent with reports generated by the system. Without monitoring mechanisms and reliable data, OMB cannot effectively evaluate the DNP working system or identify and address performance issues.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider amending the Social Security Act to allow SSA to share its full death file through the DNP working system. GAO is making two recommendations to Treasury and seven to OMB, including for OMB to develop and communicate a strategy and guidance and develop monitoring mechanisms. Treasury agreed. OMB agreed with two and agreed or generally agreed with the concepts behind the remaining five. GAO believes that it is important to fully implement all of the recommendations. |
gao_GGD-95-43 | gao_GGD-95-43_0 | In December 1993, RTC issued its business plan. Our objectives were to determine whether RTC had (1) developed and implemented a strategy for disposing of its land assets and (2) assessed the results of its land sales initiatives to identify the most cost-effective disposition methods and best practices. Recognizing the challenge posed by land assets, RTC formed a land task force in the summer of 1991 to analyze its land inventory and develop a strategy for disposing of these assets. Finally, the directive required the land task force to (1) review field office initiative plans for consistency and compliance with recommended land policies and sales methods and (2) evaluate the results of land sales initiatives at the completion of each initiative and identify which sales methods are most effective. By the end of February 1995, RTC indicated that it had reduced its inventory of these types of assets to about $850 million. The actual sales expense data, along with other relevant information, should enable RTC to evaluate the effectiveness of different sales initiatives and monitor sales-related expenses to identify the most effective marketing and sales techniques. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Resolution Trust Corporation's (RTC) land disposition activities, focusing on whether RTC: (1) developed and implemented a strategy to dispose of its land assets; and (2) assessed the results of its land sales initiatives to identify the most cost-effective disposition methods and best practices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that RTC: (1) adopted a land disposition strategy in May 1992 and formed a land task force to analyze its land inventory; (2) disposed of about $16 billion in land and loans between January 1993 and June 1994, although it had about $850 million in these assets remaining unsold as of February 1995; (3) was unable to identify the most effective land disposition methods because it failed to develop a formal procedure to collect all the actual expense data related to each land sales initiative or establish a methodology for evaluating the results of each initiative; and (4) issued a directive requiring that the expenses for each multiasset sales initiative be documented, which should allow it to identify the most effective marketing and sales techniques and best practices. |
gao_GAO-10-744T | gao_GAO-10-744T_0 | This increased reliance on contractors to perform agency missions increases the risk that government decisions can be influenced by contractor employees, which can result in a loss of control and accountability. Civilian Agencies’ Efforts to Develop Insourcing Requirements
In response to the mandate in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, we reviewed the status of civilian agencies’ efforts to develop and implement insourcing guidance. We reported in October 2009 that none of the nine civilian agencies we met with between July and October 2009 had met the statutory deadline to produce insourcing guidance. Waiting for additional OMB guidance and clarification regarding outsourcing and inherently governmental functions. Intending to use the results, best practices, and lessons learned from the multisector workforce planning pilots to better inform their insourcing guidelines and procedures. Although OMB and agencies have yet to issue insourcing guidance, OMB reported in December 2009 that 24 agencies had launched planning pilots to address the use of contractors in one or more of their organizations. Agencies were due to report the results of their pilots to OMB by May 1, 2010. Proposed OMB Policy on Work Reserved for Federal Employees
Following the initiative of the March 2009 Presidential memo on government contracting and in response to a congressional mandate, OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued a public notice on March 31, 2010 that provides proposed policy for determining when work must be performed by, or reserved for, federal employees. The proposal provides the following guidance to executive branch agencies: Adopts the statutory definition in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998 as a single, governmentwide definition of inherently governmental functions. This definition classifies an activity as inherently governmental when it is so intimately related to the public interest that it must be performed by federal employees. Introduces the category of “critical functions,” as functions whose importance to the agency’s mission and operation requires that at least a portion of the function must be reserved for federal employees to ensure the agency has sufficient internal capability to effectively perform and maintain control. Comments from agencies and the public on the proposed policy are due to OMB by June 1, 2010. Effective Implementation of Insourcing Policies Will Depend on Agencies’ Ability to Address Workforce Planning and Other Challenges
Agency efforts to effectively insource certain functions now performed by contractors will in large part depend on their ability to assess their human- capital and mission requirements and develop and execute plans to fulfill those requirements so they have a workforce that possesses the necessary education, knowledge, skills, and competencies to accomplish their mission. Our prior work has identified workforce planning challenges that can affect an agency’s ability to obtain the right mix of federal employees and contractor personnel. Furthermore agencies face other operational and administrative challenges as our 2009 review of civilian agency insourcing efforts identified with respect to implementing guidance to facilitate the conversion of contractor personnel to government positions, including the following: Infrastructure. Agencies face difficulties in gathering and analyzing certain types of service contracting data needed for making insourcing decisions. Tools Available for Agencies’ Insourcing Efforts
Agency implementation of insourcing efforts could be facilitated by tools that we identified in prior work. Inventories. Business Case Analysis. A balanced analytical approach, used by some agencies when deciding to outsource functions, could facilitate agency decisions in determining whether insourcing a particular function has the potential to achieve mission requirements. Human Capital Flexibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies face a complicated set of decisions in finding the right mix of government and contractor personnel to conduct their missions. While contractors, when properly used, can play an important role in helping agencies accomplish their missions, GAO has found that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core agency missions. Congress and the Executive branch also have expressed concern as to whether federal agencies have become over-reliant on contractors and have appropriately outsourced services. A March 2009 Presidential memorandum tasked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to take several actions in response to this concern. Based on GAO's prior work, this statement discusses (1) civilian agencies' development and implementation of guidelines to consider whether contracted functions should be brought in-house --a process known as insourcing; (2) OMB's proposed policy on work reserved for federal employees; (3) challenges agencies face in managing the federal workforce; and (4) key tools available for insourcing and related efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO reviewed the status of civilian agencies efforts to develop and implementinsourcing guidance and reported in October 2009 that none of the nine civilian agencies with whom we met had met the statutory deadline to produce insourcing guidance. Primarily, they were waiting to ensure their guidance was consistent with or receive additional OMB guidance, and to use the results, best practices, and lessons learned from their multisector workforce pilots to better inform their insourcing guidelines. Since the time of our review, OMB reported in December 2009 that 24 agencies had launched pilots to address overuse of contractors in one or more of their organizations. Agencies were due to report the results of their pilots to OMB by May 1, 2010. In response to a congressional mandate, OMB recently issued a public notice that provides proposed policy for determining when work must be performed by federal employees. Comments on the policy are due from federal agencies and the public by June 1, 2010. The proposed policy provides the following guidance to executive branch agencies: it adopts a single, governmentwide definition of inherently governmental functions in accordance with the definition in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, which classifies an activity as inherently governmental when it is so intimately related to the public interest that it must be performed by federal employees; it provides guidance for determining functions "closely associated with inherently governmental;" and it introduces the category of "critical functions," as work that must be reserved for federal employees in order to ensure the agency has the internal capability to maintain control of its missions and operations. Agency efforts to effectively insource functions performed by contractors will in large part depend on the ability to assess mission and human capital requirements and develop and execute plans to fulfill those requirements so agencies have a workforce that possesses the necessary knowledge, skills, and competencies to accomplish their mission. Furthermore, GAO's 2009 review of civilian agency insourcing efforts identified operational and administrative challenges agencies face with respect to implementing the conversion of contractor personnel to government positions. For example, agencies face difficulties in gathering and analyzing certain types of service contracting data needed for making insourcing decisions. Agency implementation of insourcing efforts could be facilitated by tools that GAO has previously identified, including: (1) Inventories to identify inherently governmental functions; (2) Business case analysis to facilitate agency decisions in determining whether insourcing a particular function has potential to achieve mission requirements; and (3) Human-capital flexibilities to efficiently fill positions that should be brought in-house. |
gao_GAO-17-400 | gao_GAO-17-400_0 | Background
The 21st Century program is authorized to provide a wide range of activities for K-12 students and their families to: 1. provide opportunities for academic enrichment, including providing tutorial services to help students—particularly students who attend low-performing schools—meet state and local academic standards in core subjects such as reading and mathematics; 2. offer students a broad array of additional services, such as drug and violence prevention, counseling, art, music, recreation, and technology programs that are designed to reinforce and complement instruction in the regular school day; and 3. offer literacy and related educational development opportunities to families of students served. States, in turn, competitively award funds to sub-grantees, which may be school districts or community-based organizations, such as those that focus on youth development. States Use a Variety of Criteria to Award Sub-grants for 21st Century Program Centers, Which Use Funds to Provide a Broad Array of Services
States Use Varied Criteria, Funding Periods, and Amounts for Sub-grants to 21st Century Program Providers
Together states received more than 4,000 21st Century sub-grant applications and funded nearly 60 percent of them (about 2,400) in their most recent sub-grant competitions, according to our survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia. These state evaluations—from New Jersey, Texas, and Washington—examined behavioral outcomes such as school-day attendance and discipline. Alignment of Performance Measures with Program Objectives
Education’s current performance measures were established in 1998. In particular, Education officials told us they have not substantially revised performance measures since 1998 in part because the program’s authorization lapsed from 2008 through 2016, with ESSA providing funding authorization starting in fiscal year 2017. Specifically, without measures for student behavioral and socio-emotional outcomes, Education lacks useful data on the extent to which the program is achieving its stated objectives, especially in areas where the program is likely to have positive effects on student outcomes. Further, leading practices in performance management call for agencies to use performance information as the basis for decision making. Education’s Technical Assistance Does Not Yet Adequately Address Many States’ Challenges in Evaluating and Sustaining Programs States Reported Mixed Reviews on Education’s Technical Assistance for Evaluating their 21st Century Programs
States in our survey gave mixed reviews on the usefulness of Education’s technical assistance for developing and conducting state-level evaluations. Further, 40 states commented in our survey that they face challenges in evaluating sub-grantee performance that may limit their capacity to conduct high-quality evaluations. According to Education officials, it has not provided written guidance to states on 21st Century program evaluations since 1999, when it provided states non-regulatory guidance in the form of a guide to help them evaluate their programs and use the results to make program improvements. Specifically, the program was reauthorized twice, resulting in changes to requirements for measuring and evaluating program performance. Federal standards for internal control state that when significant changes occur in how an agency achieves its objectives it should periodically review policies and procedures for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving its objectives or addressing related risks. Absent new written, non-regulatory guidance to states that addresses the areas in which they struggle most, Education may miss opportunities to help states improve their capacity to conduct high-quality evaluations and ultimately improve their programs. Further, as we stated, research has shown that 21st Century programs more often have positive effects on student attendance and reducing disciplinary incidents than on improving students’ academic outcomes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our study of the 21st Century program was framed around four objectives: (1) how 21st Century funds are awarded and used, (2) what is known about the effectiveness of 21st Century programs, (3) the extent to which Education has effectively managed and used program data to inform decisions about the 21st Century program, and (4) the extent to which Education’s technical assistance has helped states assess and sustain high-quality programs once 21st Century funding ends. We received responses from all 50 states and the District of Columbia for a 100 percent response rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Education's 21st Century program—funded about $1 billion annually since 2002—supports a broad array of activities outside the school day to improve student outcomes in high-poverty or low-performing K-12 schools. A statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 included a provision for GAO to review Education programs outside the regular school day.
GAO examined (1) how 21st Century funds are awarded and used, (2) what is known about the effectiveness of these programs, (3) how Education manages and uses program data to inform decision making, and (4) Education's technical assistance for evaluating and sustaining programs. GAO conducted a 50-state survey of program officials, obtaining a 100 percent response rate. GAO also reviewed selected state program evaluations and academic studies on student outcomes, and observed program activities and interviewed officials in four states representing a range of grant size and location.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education (Education) awards 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st Century) grants to states, who in turn, competitively award funds to local organizations, which use them to offer academic enrichment and other activities to improve students' academic and behavioral outcomes. In their most recent grant competitions, states awarded 21st Century funds to nearly 2,400 organizations—including school districts and community-based organizations—based on a variety of criteria, such as the quality of their proposed program designs. Relevant research we reviewed that compared program participants to those of non-participants suggests that the 21st Century program is effective in improving students' behavioral outcomes, such as school-day attendance and reduced disciplinary incidents, more often than their academic outcomes. However, because Education's current 21st Century performance measures primarily focus on students' reading and math scores on state tests, Education lacks useful data about whether the program is achieving its objectives to improve students' behavioral outcomes such as attendance and discipline—the areas where the program most frequently has a positive effect. Education officials have not substantially revised the program's performance measures since 1998, in part because its authorization lapsed from fiscal years 2008 through 2016. Leading practices in performance measurement call for federal agencies to align performance measures with program objectives.
Education's technical assistance to states does not adequately address challenges states face in evaluating their 21st Century programs and sustaining them when program funding ends. About a third of states reported in GAO's 50-state survey that they face challenges in evaluating program performance, such as difficulty designing evaluations that shed light on program effects. Further, the 21st Century program was reauthorized twice, which resulted in significant changes to state requirements for evaluating programs. However, Education has not provided states written guidance on developing and conducting high-quality evaluations since 1999. Federal standards for internal control state that when significant changes occur agencies should periodically review policies for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving their objectives. Absent written guidance to states on conducting high-quality evaluations, Education may miss opportunities to help states improve their capacity to conduct such evaluations to assure the program is meeting its goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that Education expand its performance measures for behavioral outcomes and provide written guidance to states on conducting high-quality program evaluations. Education neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations, and outlined steps it is taking to address them. |
gao_GAO-14-215 | gao_GAO-14-215_0 | The Federal Civilian Workforce Grew by 14 percent from 2004 through 2012, and 14 percent of On Board Employees were Eligible to Retire in 2012
From 2004 to 2012, the non-postal civilian workforce grew from 1.88 million to 2.13 million, an increase of 14 percent, or 258,882 individuals. The number of permanent career executive branch employees grew by 256,718, from about 1.7 million in 2004 to 1.96 million in 2012 (an increase of 15 percent). Of the 24 CFO Act agencies, 13 had more permanent career employees in 2012 than they did in 2004, 10 had fewer, and one agency was unchanged. Three agencies (DOD, DHS, and VA) accounted for 94 percent of the growth between 2004 and 2012. A number of factors contributed to the overall growth of the civilian workforce: For example, at DOD, according to agency officials, converting certain positions from military to civilian, as well as the growth of the agency’s acquisition and cybersecurity workforce contributed to this overall increase. At VA, according to agency officials, approximately 80 percent of employees hired from 2004 through 2012 were hired by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), primarily to meet increased demand for medical and health-related services for military veterans. At DHS, the increase in civilian permanent career employment was due to increased staffing to secure the nation’s borders. Employees in professional or administrative positions account for most of the overall increase in federal civilian employment. During the recession, the total attrition rate dropped to a low of 2.5 percent in 2009 before rebounding to pre-recession levels in 2011 and 2012. With respect to retirement eligibility, of the 1.96 million permanent career employees on board as of September 2012, nearly 270,000 (14 percent) were eligible to retire. By September 2017, nearly 600,000 (31 percent) of on board staff will be eligible to retire. From 2004 through 2012, Federal Civilian Compensation Remained Relatively Constant as a Proportion of Total Discretionary Spending
With respect to pay and benefits as measured by each full-time equivalent (FTE) position, total government-wide compensation grew by an average of 1.2 percent per year from 2004 to 2012 ($106,097 to $116,828—about a 10 percent overall increase). Much of this growth was driven by increased cost of personnel benefits, which rose at a rate of 1.9 percent per year (a 16.3 percent increase overall). One study showed that employer contributions for premiums for family insurance coverage nationwide grew by about 58 percent from 2004 through 2012, for an average annual increase of around 5 percent.spending rose at an average annual rate of 1 percent per year (a 7.9 percent increase overall). In terms of employee pay per FTE, Spending on pay and benefits as a proportion of the federal discretionary budget remained relatively constant (at about 14 percent) from 2004 to 2010, with slight increases in 2011 and 2012. With respect to occupational categories,increase in spending on pay from 2004 to 2012 was due to more employees working in professional or administrative positions, which often require specialized knowledge and advanced skills and degrees, and thus, higher pay. Concluding Observations
While the size of the civilian federal workforce grew moderately during the period of our study, most of this growth was concentrated in a few large agencies and reflects some of our nation’s pressing priorities. Although employment levels have grown, large numbers of retirement-eligible employees may be cause for concern among agencies, decision-makers, and other stakeholders, because they could produce mission critical skills gaps if turnover is not strategically managed and monitored. At the same time, retirement-eligible employees present an opportunity for agencies to align their workforces with current and future mission needs. In addition, we provided sections of this report to DOD, DHS, and VA. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from OMB, OPM, DOD, DHS, and VA, which we incorporated as appropriate. To assess the extent to which federal civilian employee compensation has changed as a percentage of total discretionary spending from fiscal year 2004 through 2012, we analyzed discretionary outlays from OMB’s MAX Information System , which captures compensation costs as gross obligations, hereafter referred to as “spending.” We analyzed spending on employee compensation as a ratio of federal discretionary spending (as opposed to other baseline measures, such as total federal spending or gross domestic product) because discretionary spending—that is, spending that is decided upon by Congress each fiscal year through annual appropriations acts—includes personnel costs as well as other operational and program expenses (such as equipment and contracts) that agencies incur to carry out their mission. In addition, we interviewed OMB officials to understand any discrepancies in the data. To determine the factors contributing to workforce, turnover, and compensation trends in the civilian workforce from 2004 to 2012, we interviewed officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Defense (DOD), Veterans Administration (VA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
Skilled federal workers are critical to the successful operation of government. At the same time, personnel costs for current and former federal civilian employees represented about 26 percent of total discretionary spending in 2012; these personnel costs are outlays from budget authority authorized by appropriations acts. Given the need to control agencies' personnel costs while also maintaining agencies' high performance, a thorough understanding of employment and compensation trends is a critical component of strategic workforce planning.
GAO was asked to provide data on federal employment and compensation trends. This report examines (1) employment trends of federal civilian personnel from 2004 to 2012 and some factors that affect these trends, and (2) the extent to which federal civilian employee compensation has changed (as a percentage of total discretionary spending) and some reasons for this change.
For this report, GAO analyzed government-wide executive branch civilian personnel data from 2004 to 2012. GAO also interviewed Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other selected agency officials. GAO also reviewed relevant literature, such as studies on attrition.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from OMB, OPM, and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs; comments were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
From 2004 to 2012, the federal non-postal civilian workforce grew by 258,882 employees, from 1.88 million to 2.13 million (14 percent). Permanent career employees accounted for most of the growth, increasing by 256,718 employees, from 1.7 million in 2004 to 1.96 million in 2012 (15 percent). Three agencies--the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA)--accounted for about 94 percent of this increase. At DOD, officials said that converting certain positions from military to civilian, as well as the growth of the agency's acquisition and cybersecurity workforce, contributed to this overall increase. At VA, officials said the increased demand for medical and health-related services for military veterans drove most of the growth in personnel levels. DHS officials said the increase in employment was due in large part to the nation's border security requirements. (In contrast, ten agencies had fewer career permanent employees in 2012 than they did in 2004). Government-wide, most of the increase in employment from 2004 to 2012 occurred within occupational categories that require higher skill and educational levels. These categories include professional occupations (e.g., doctors and scientists), and administrative occupations (e.g., financial and program managers), as opposed to clerical, technical, and blue collar occupations (which remained stable). In terms of turnover, retirement rates remained relatively flat (at around 3.5 percent) from 2004 until the start of the recession in December 2007. Retirement rates fell to a low of around 2.5 percent during the recession in 2009, and then increased to pre-recession rates in 2011 and 2012. With respect to retirement eligibility, of the 1.96 million permanent career employees on board as of September 2012, nearly 270,000 (14 percent) were eligible to retire. By September 2017, nearly 600,000 (around 31 percent) will be eligible to retire, government-wide.
Spending on total government-wide compensation for each full-time equivalent (FTE) position grew by an average of 1.2 percent per year, from $106,097 in 2004 to $116,828 in 2012. Much of this growth was driven by increased personnel benefits costs, which rose at a rate of 1.9 percent per year. Other factors included locality pay adjustments, as well as a change in the composition of the federal workforce (with a larger share of employees working in professional or administrative positions, requiring advanced skills and degrees). In terms of employee pay per FTE, spending rose at an average annual rate of 1 percent per year (a 7.9 percent increase overall). However, as a proportion of governmentwide federal discretionary spending, spending on compensation remained constant from 2004 to 2010 (at 14 percent), with slight increases in 2011 and 2012.
While the federal civilian workforce grew in size from 2004 to 2012, most of the growth was concentrated in three federal agencies and was driven by the need to address some of the nation's pressing priorities. At the same time--as GAO reported in February 2013--large numbers of retirement-eligible employees in the years ahead may be cause for concern: Their retirement could produce mission critical skills gaps if left unaddressed. As GAO reported in its February 2013 High Risk update, strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader organizational strategic planning will be essential for ensuring that-- going forward--agenices have the talent, skill, and experience mix they need to cost-effectively execute their mission and program goals. |
gao_GAO-13-734 | gao_GAO-13-734_0 | Component Efforts to Integrate Field Operations through Collaborative Mechanisms
In the absence of a unified field structure, DHS’s operational components have established and utilized collaborative mechanisms, including virtual approaches, to better integrate their field operations. Specifically, DHS field components have employed collaborative mechanisms to coordinate their missions and share information among multiple stakeholders in order to increase their mission effectiveness and efficiencies. These mechanisms focus on a range of missions and are located throughout the United States. Opportunities Exist for DHS to Enhance Its Visibility over Collaborative Field Mechanisms of Its Key Operational Components
DHS, at the departmental level, has limited awareness of the universe of component field collaborative mechanisms and of the types and quality of collaborative practices they employ to better coordinate and integrate mission operations. Specifically, when we asked for a list of formalized mechanisms that DHS headquarters considered to be successful examples of field collaboration, this information was not readily available at the departmental level, according to senior DHS officials. Participants Identified Practices That Enhanced or Served as Challenges to Collaboration; DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and Disseminating Promising Practices
Participants Identified Common Practices That Enhanced Collaboration, Which DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and Disseminating on a Broader Scale
Common Practices That Enhanced Collaboration
During the course of our review, participants from the four selected DHS collaborative mechanism types provided information on successful practices that enhanced their collaboration that could be useful for DHS to collect and disseminate on a broader scale. For example, participants from all 10 mechanisms stated that forming positive working relationships was tied to better information sharing among them. As noted earlier in this report, DHS does not collect this type of information at the departmental level primarily because the mechanisms operate under the components. However, collecting promising practices information from the collaborative mechanisms at the departmental level and disseminating it to components throughout DHS would inform components about specific practices from which they could also benefit. Also, given that our fieldwork indicated similar collaboration issues are relevant to multiple components, a more centralized DHS clearinghouse of collaborative promising practices information could be more easily accessed by a wide range of DHS component stakeholders than under the current structure, where such information is now stovepiped and may not be readily shared outside of individual components or mechanisms. Also, there was a majority opinion among mechanism participants we visited that rotation of key personnel and lack of leadership buy-in hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms. Not only is the department ultimately accountable for the resources that support these mechanisms, it is also responsible for making important decisions about the overall field structure of its components, and for moving the department closer to its goal of greater component integration. By collecting information about the universe of collaborative mechanisms and developing a fuller understanding of them and the promising practices they employ, DHS could be in a better position to utilize these practices across components to help move the department toward its strategic goal of increased operational integration. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that any future efforts to analyze or implement changes to DHS’s regional field office structure, including the establishment of collaborative field mechanisms, are informed by current collaborative practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the appropriate department official to take the following two actions: (1) collect information on the existing collaborative mechanisms to have better visibility of them, and (2) collect information on promising practices, including such things as potential ways to address any identified challenges or barriers to collaboration as well as any identified performance metrics, from the collaborative mechanisms and disseminate them to components. This report (1) assesses the extent to which DHS has identified the collaborative field mechanisms—that is, multiagency groups such as task forces, committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration across the participating agencies in order to more effectively and efficiently achieve their mission—of its key operational components, and (2) describes factors that participants of selected mechanisms identified that enhance or are challenges to their collaboration, and assesses the extent to which DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative practices. We also interviewed DHS officials and analyzed documentation (i.e., components daily activity reports) obtained from responsible senior DHS headquarters officials to identify the extent to which the department has visibility over the collaborative field mechanisms activities—including any plans to increase visibility over the mechanisms in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is the third-largest department in the federal government, with an annual budget of about $60 billion, 200,000 staff, and a broad range of missions. In 2002, DHS was created from 22 legacy agencies. The geographic overlap of these agencies' legacy field office structures was extensive, underscoring the importance of collaboration among them when conducting missions that crossed across boundaries. As a follow-on to GAO's September 2012 report on DHS's efforts to integrate field operations, GAO was asked to review DHS and key operational components' use of collaborative mechanisms. This report (1) assesses DHS's visibility over collaborative field mechanisms established by component agencies, and (2) describes factors that enhance or impede collaboration within these mechanisms, and the extent to which DHS has collected and disseminated successful collaborative practices.
GAO analyzed selected mechanisms' guidance; conducted 10 mechanism site visits based on their geographic diversity, among other factors; and compared their practices with collaboration practices identified in previous GAO work. GAO also interviewed DHS and component officials.
What GAO Found
Opportunities exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance its visibility over collaborative field mechanisms (i.e., multiagency groups such as task forces, committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration to more effectively and efficiently achieve their missions) established by component agencies. DHS, at the departmental level, has limited visibility over the universe and operation of these mechanisms and does not identify information from them that could further enhance collaboration across DHS and inform future DHS decisions. In the absence of a single DHS regional/field structure, DHS components have created collaborative mechanisms to better integrate field operations by better coordinating their missions and sharing information. However, when GAO sought to identify these mechanisms, in conjunction with DHS, senior DHS officials stated that while they maintain regular visibility over component activities--which may involve these collaborative mechanisms--DHS does not collect information on the types of mechanisms and collaborative practices these mechanisms employ because the mechanisms operate under the components, and thus this information was not readily available at the departmental level. DHS officials stated that primary oversight over the mechanisms is the responsibility of the operational components or mechanism participants. However, DHS's own strategic goals emphasize the importance of cross-departmental integration and coordination to enhance DHS's mission, and DHS could benefit--on a strategic level--from greater awareness of these mechanisms and the collaborative practices they employ. DHS is ultimately accountable for the resources that support these mechanisms, and is responsible for decision making about its overall field structure and for moving the department closer to its goal of greater component unification and integration. By collecting additional information on collaborative mechanisms, DHS could achieve better visibility over the universe of existing mechanisms, and thus be better positioned to analyze or implement any future changes to DHS's regional/field structure.
Participants from each of the collaborative mechanisms GAO reviewed identified several common factors that enhanced their collaboration, which DHS could benefit from collecting and disseminating on a broader scale. For example, participants identified the value of sharing resources, information, and recognition of successful missions as examples of successful collaboration practices they employed. Officials also cited collaboration challenges, including resource constraints, rotation of key personnel, and lack of leadership commitment. As GAO's fieldwork indicated, similar collaboration issues are relevant to multiple components, thus, DHS leadership could benefit from undertaking a review of collaborative mechanisms to solicit and identify promising practices, and then sharing this information among all components. In addition, given DHS's more strategic perspective, a more centralized DHS clearinghouse of collaborative practices information could be more efficient to collect and more easily accessed by a wider range of DHS components than under the current structure, where such information may not be readily shared outside of individual components or mechanisms. Collecting and disseminating information on collaborative practices would allow DHS to inform components about promising practices and lessons learned from which they could benefit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS (1) collect information on existing collaborative mechanisms for better visibility over them, and (2) collect promising practices from the mechanisms and distribute them to components. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-12-920 | gao_GAO-12-920_0 | 1). OECD states that PFM includes all components of a country’s budget cycle. The ministry of finance centrally consolidates these accounts. Assessment Tools Highlight Both Improvements and Weaknesses in Developing Countries’ PFM Systems
Broad PFM assessments conducted by international organizations report improvements in countries’ PFM systems, as well as continued weaknesses. USAID provides PFM capacity-building activities through its development programs and is seeking to provide more of its assistance through recipient countries’ financial systems. Capacity-building activities to strengthen PFM systems are typically part of broader democracy and governance (DG) or economic growth (EG) programs. Treasury’s OTA provides technical assistance through advisors who work in-country within the finance ministry, the central bank, or other government entities. USAID’s and Treasury’s Processes for Developing PFM Programs Involve Consultation with Stakeholders and Rely on Assessments of Host-Country Systems
USAID’s Processes
USAID is implementing new processes for developing programs that reflect new agency reform priorities to increase the use of country systems to deliver U.S. assistance. According to USAID, most country offices are required to develop a Country Development Cooperation Strategy, a 5-year strategy document, by the end of fiscal year 2013. 2. USAID and Treasury Use Certain Processes to Monitor and Evaluate PFM-Related Programs, but Implementation Has Some Weaknesses
USAID’s Processes
USAID Uses Multiple Tools to Monitor Its PFM Assistance but Lacks a Process for Tracking Use of Country Systems
To monitor PFM-related programs, USAID develops performance management plans, reviews periodic progress reports, and conducts site visits, among other activities, but reviews of USAID programs have identified agency-wide weaknesses in implementation, including using unreliable baseline data and inaccurate reporting of results. Prior reviews of USAID programs have identified challenges in the agency’s implementation of its monitoring processes across many types of programs, including DG and EG programs. USAID adopted a new evaluation policy in January 2011 and updated its guidance in February 2012 to reflect it. The new evaluation policy requires that all large projects have at least one evaluation and that evaluations use methods that generate the highest-quality and most credible evidence, including experimental The policy also states that 3 percent of program budgets methods.should be devoted to external evaluation and classifies two types of evaluations: performance evaluations, which focus on descriptive and normative questions and other questions pertinent to program design, management, and operational decision making; and impact evaluations, which define a counterfactual (what would have happened had the program not been implemented) to control for external factors and measure the change in a development outcome that is attributable to a defined intervention. USAID adopted the new policy to address a number of weaknesses it had identified in its evaluation practices. Treasury’s Processes
Treasury’s OTA Uses Various Processes to Monitor PFM- Related Programs
Treasury’s OTA uses various processes to monitor PFM-related programs, including narrative monthly and trip reports, annual quantitative performance measures, and customer feedback surveys, but weaknesses exist in some of its evaluation processes. OTA’s quantitative performance measures have been a useful project- level indicator of performance but have not been a useful indicator of OTA-wide performance because of conceptual problems and errors introduced by OTA when aggregating the performance data. OTA has not yet fully implemented its requirement to conduct independent evaluations—that is, evaluations conducted by someone other than the resident advisor—of its completed technical assistance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To monitor progress toward USAID’s target to obligate 30 percent of its annual assistance through local systems by 2015, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the appropriate offices to develop a process to reliably identify and track the agency’s use of local systems in all countries receiving assistance. To improve the effectiveness of OTA’s technical assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct OTA to take the following two actions to improve monitoring and evaluation: implement additional controls to improve the process for computing OTA-wide annual performance measures, and fully implement OTA’s existing requirement for end-of-project evaluations and, consistent with its existing guidance, have an independent party conduct the evaluations. In concurring with our two recommendations, USAID reported that it is in the process of refining definitions that will identify and help measure the assistance that qualifies to meet the agency’s target of obligating 30 percent of its annual assistance through local systems by 2015. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the process the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) uses to develop programs to strengthen public financial management (PFM) systems, we reviewed USAID’s official policy and procedures, as contained in the Automated Directives System, as well as USAID’s new guidance documents for developing country strategies and designing projects, including the Country Development Cooperation Strategy and Project Design Guidance. To examine the process the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) uses to develop programs to strengthen PFM systems, we interviewed senior OTA officials regarding OTA’s policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective management of public resources can play an important role in a countrys development. In recent years, developing countries committed to strengthen their PFM systems and donors committed to use those systems as much as possible. The United States provides assistance to strengthen PFM systems primarily through USAID and Treasury. USAID conducts capacity building activities to strengthen PFM systems as part of its development programs and has also set a target to obligate 30 percent of its annual assistance through local systems by 2015. Treasury provides technical assistance through advisors who work in country, typically with the finance ministry.
GAO was asked to examine the processes U.S. agencies use to (1) develop programs to strengthen PFM systems and (2) monitor and evaluate those programs. GAO reviewed agency guidance and program documents, interviewed U.S. agency officials, and selected case studies to serve as illustrative examples of PFM-related programs.
What GAO Found
To develop programs to strengthen developing countries Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) rely on assessments of the host country governments systems. In 2011, USAID implemented new processes that place a greater emphasis on PFM in its development efforts as the agency aims to increase its use of country systems to deliver assistance. The agency traditionally included PFM capacity-building efforts only as components of broader programs, as it identified relevant weaknesses during the country assessment or program design process. USAIDs new strategy and program development processes include a mandatory assessment of a countrys institutional capacity, including its financial systems, and a requirement to consider the use of country systems to deliver assistance. Most USAID country offices are required to develop a strategy using the new guidance by the end of fiscal year 2013. Treasurys process for developing programs begins with an initial assessment of the host countrys capabilities. Treasury staff then draft objectives for the program. For example, a Treasury program in Honduras set four objectives, including improving operational efficiency and enhancing accountability by strengthening the organization of the ministry of finance. Once in country, the advisor develops an annual workplan, outlining more specific goals aimed at meeting the overall objectives.
USAID and Treasury use several processes to monitor and evaluate their PFM assistance, but weaknesses exist. USAID uses its regular procedures, which may include performance management plans, periodic progress reporting, site visits, and evaluations, to monitor and evaluate its PFM-related programs. Prior reports by USAIDs Inspector General and GAO have found weaknesses in USAIDs implementation of its monitoring procedures in other programs, including programs from the USAID offices that provide PFM assistance. In addition, USAID is currently unable to monitor overall progress toward its target to obligate 30 percent of its program funds through local systems by 2015. USAID, and GAO in prior reports, have identified a number of weaknesses in evaluation practice. To address weaknesses the agency had identified, USAID adopted a new evaluation policy in January 2011 that states that all large projects are required to have an external evaluation, 3 percent of program budgets should be devoted to external evaluation, and evaluations must use methods that generate the highest quality evidence. Treasurys processes for monitoring and evaluating its programs include monthly reports, annual quantitative performance measures, voluntary customer feedback surveys, and on-site management reviews, but Treasury does not fully evaluate the performance of its completed technical assistance programs. In addition, Treasurys quantitative performance measures have been a useful project-level indicator of performance but have not been a useful indicator of overall performance due in part to inherent challenges associated with summarizing program performance and errors introduced when aggregating the performance data. Furthermore, a senior Treasury official reported that Treasury had not yet fully implemented a requirement to conduct independent postproject evaluations of its technical assistance programs.
What GAO Recommends
USAID should improve its capacity to measure its use of local systems and ensure adequate monitoring of its PFM programs. Treasury should implement additional controls to improve the process for computing program-wide annual performance measures and fully implement its requirement to evaluate the impact of its completed assistance. USAID and Treasury both concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_RCED-95-22 | gao_RCED-95-22_0 | Universe of Properties to Be Acquired by the Forest Service Under the Santini-Burton Act
After the Santini-Burton Act was enacted, the Forest Service planned to acquire about 20,000 acres of land under the land buyout program authorized under the act. Through July 1994, a total of about $86.5 million (including about $7 million in grants from California) had been spent by the Forest Service for land acquisitions and related administrative expenses. For the 135 acquisitions reviewed, the Forest Service required independent appraisals and paid the resulting estimated fair market value for each of the properties. Nonetheless, many owners of property in the basin continue to assert that TRPA’s land-use controls result in takings of their private property. Thus, since at least 1969, the property owners should have had some expectation of the future implementation of restrictions on growth in the basin. Information on 135 Forest Service Land Acquisitions in the Lake Tahoe Basin Sampled by GAO
Table III.1 provides information on the 135 cases GAO sampled of land purchases by the Forest Service within the Lake Tahoe Basin. Specifically, he asked that we determine (1) the extent to which the Forest Service had acquired properties in the basin under the act, (2) whether the classification of lands within the basin as environmentally sensitive may have adversely affected their values, and (3) the extent to which the circumstances surrounding the buyout program might involve issues related to a taking by the federal government of private property under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Forest Service is treating land owners in the Lake Tahoe Basin fairly in acquiring their environmentally sensitive lands under the Santini-Burton Act, focusing on the extent to which the: (1) Forest Service acquires lands within the basin under the authorized buyout program; (2) land values have been affected by environmentally sensitive classifications; and (3) Forest Service's acquisition of environmentally sensitive lands constitutes a government taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) under the act, the Forest Service has acquired almost 11,000 acres in the Lake Tahoe Basin and plans to acquire an additional 9,000 acres; (2) the Forest Service has spent about $86.5 million for land acquisitions and administrative expenses; (3) although the effect of environmentally sensitive classifications on land values cannot be quantified, land use restrictions have resulted in the reduction of fair-market values of some lands; (4) none of the Forest Service's acquisitions constitute a taking of private property by the federal government without just compensation; (5) the Forest Service has paid most property owners more than their original purchase price for the lands; and (6) property owners should expect further restrictions on the growth in the basin to protect the lake and its environs. |
gao_GAO-17-582 | gao_GAO-17-582_0 | Background
Overview of OSA Aircraft
According to DOD, there were 287 aircraft in the OSA fleet as of May 2017. Table 1 lists the number of OSA aircraft by DOD owner/operator and type of usage. Required and Authorized Users
DOD guidance sets clear priorities for the use of its aircraft to support officials in certain positions within the department. DOD’s tier three and four travelers are not required to use government aircraft, but are authorized to use the aircraft for official travel when the demands of their travel prevent the use of commercial aircraft. DOD’s aircraft are also used to support employees and members of Congress and White House support missions—a user pool which could total over 550 users. White House support missions are trips provided by DOD and directed by the President such as travel for cabinet-level officials, the Vice-President, and First Lady. Executive Aircraft Supported Thousands of Annual Flights for a Variety of Users and for Select Flights DOD Generally Followed Its Guidance for Approving Use
During calendar years 2014 through 2015, government and military officials took more than 19,000 flights on OSA executive aircraft, and our review of a nongeneralizable, random sample of flight packages from calendar years 2014 and 2015 found that DOD generally followed its guidance for approving use of these aircraft for these selected flights. Executive Aircraft Use
We analyzed the data for executive flights conducted during calendars years 2014 and 2015, and found that there were a total of 19,752 flights. During calendar years 2014 and 2015, the executive flights went to over 1,000 locations, and the ten most visited destinations accounted for about 40 percent of those flights. Our analysis showed that service secretary controlled aircraft accounted for 13 percent of the executive flights in 2014, and 15 percent of the executive flights in 2015. DOD Generally Followed Its Approval Guidance for a Select Set of Executive Flights Reviewed We analyzed flight request packages from a nongeneralizable, random sample of 53 executive flights taken during calendar years 2014 through 2015 and, consistent with a report we issued in 2014, we found that for these select flights DOD generally followed its guidance for approving executive aircraft use. Although some packages were missing items, we did not find evidence to suggest the requested flight should have been disapproved. We discussed any items that were missing with DOD officials and did not find evidence to suggest the requested flights should have been disapproved. DOD Recently Implemented an Annual OSA Validation Process
In recent years, DOD has implemented a consistent process to validate the size of its OSA fleet. The services do not generally use the validation process determinations as a basis for their OSA aircraft procurement and divestment decisions. The Chairman’s 2016 OSA fleet validation memorandum indicated that with a fleet of 45 executive aircraft the risk to mission accomplishment was moderate; and the mission risk for the nonexecutive fleet of 256 aircraft was low. Service officials told us their decisions to divest or replace OSA aircraft are generally made based on internal service assessments concerning the age and maintenance condition of the aircraft, and the need to balance OSA aircraft requirements against other service priorities. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also analyzed a nongeneralizable, random sample of 53 executive OSA flights and compared the documentation in the flight request packages to the flight package documentation requirements listed in DOD’s OSA guidance. To examine the process DOD uses to validate its OSA fleet size and the extent to which the process results have influenced force structure decisions, we gathered documentation on DOD’s annual OSA validation process. | Why GAO Did This Study
OSA missions support the movement of a limited number of high-priority passengers and cargo with time, place, or mission-sensitive requirements. DOD's OSA aircraft are variants of commercial aircraft. OSA aircraft are categorized as either executive (used to transport DOD, congressional, and cabinet officials) or non-executive (used to fulfill wartime or contingency needs). As of May 2017, DOD had 287 OSA aircraft—44 executive and 243 non-executive—about 6 percent of DOD's airlift/cargo/utility aircraft.
House Report 114-537 and Senate Report 114-255 included provisions for GAO to review the use and size of the OSA fleet. This report examines the extent to which DOD (1) used OSA executive aircraft in 2014 and 2015, and if this usage complied with guidance; and (2) has a process to validate its OSA fleet size. GAO reviewed DOD guidance for approving the use of OSA aircraft, analyzed the most current executive aircraft flight data available—calendar years 2014 and 2015—and compared the approval documentation from a sample of those flights to DOD's guidance. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials to assess DOD's OSA validation process and results.
What GAO Found
In calendar years 2014 and 2015, government officials took thousands of flights on Operational Support Airlift (OSA) executive aircraft, and our review of a nongeneralizable sample of 53 flight packages found that those trips generally followed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance for requesting the use of government aircraft. DOD requires its officials in certain positions to fly on military aircraft, including OSA executive aircraft. It also authorizes, but does not require, officials in other government positions to fly on OSA executive aircraft. We analyzed the use of OSA executive aircraft during 2014 and 2015—the latest years for which data were available—and found that of the 19,752 executive flights conducted, 31 percent supported required users and 69 percent supported other authorized users. The Vice President, the First Lady, and other cabinet-level officials on White House support mission trips accounted for about 12 percent of the flights, and members of congress and congressional employees accounted for about 5 percent of the flights. DOD guidance requires documentation for each flight request including the rank or position of the traveler, itinerary, and in some cases, cost data. While not generalizable beyond these flights, our review of 53 flight request packages found that the packages generally contained most required documentation. Although some packages were missing items, we discussed those items with DOD officials, and we did not find evidence to suggest the requested flight should have been disapproved.
In recent years, DOD has implemented a consistent process to validate the size of its OSA fleet and to have a risk assessment of the fleet's ability to meet requirements all 365 days per year. In 2016, for example, the executive fleet's risk-to-mission accomplishment was assessed as moderate, and the non-executive fleet's risk-to-mission was assessed as low. The services do not generally use the validation process determinations as a basis for OSA aircraft procurement and divestment decisions. According to service officials, those decisions are based on separate, independent evaluations of their force structure needs, which evaluate the age and maintenance conditions of their aircraft, and the need to balance OSA aircraft requirements against other service priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
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