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gao_GAO-07-1125T | gao_GAO-07-1125T_0 | Amended Compacts of Free Association: 2004- 2023
In 2003, the United States approved separate amended compacts with the FSM and RMI that (1) continue the defense relationship, including a new agreement providing U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI through 2086; (2) strengthen immigration provisions; and (3) provide an estimated $3.6 billion in financial assistance to both nations from 2004 through 2023, including about $1.5 billion to the RMI (see app. Financial assistance is provided in the form of annual sector grants and contributions to each nation’s trust fund. In addition, the RMI has not enacted economic policy reforms needed to improve its growth prospects. The RMI development plan identifies fishing and tourism as key potential private sector growth industries. Although the RMI has undertaken efforts aimed at economic policy reform, it has made limited progress in implementing key tax, land, foreign investment, and public sector reforms that are needed to improve its growth prospects. The RMI Faces Challenges to Effectively Implementing Compact Assistance for Its Long-Term Development Goals
The RMI has allocated funds to priority sectors, although several factors have hindered its use of the funds to meet long-term development needs. For example: Management and land use issues. Lack of planning for declining U.S. assistance. The usefulness of the RMI’s quarterly performance reports has also been limited by incomplete and inaccurate information. Staff and skill limitations have constrained the RMI’s ability to provide day-to-day monitoring of sector grant operations. RMI Trust Fund May Not Provide Sustainable Income After Compact Grants End
Market volatility and choice of investment strategy could lead to a wide range of RMI trust fund balances in 2023 (see app. Although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund balance with additional contributions, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risks. Our analysis indicates that, under various scenarios, the RMI’s trust fund could fall short of the maximum allowed disbursement level—an amount equal to the inflation- adjusted compact grants in 2023—after compact grants end, with the probability of shortfalls increasing over time (see fig. As of June 2007, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. However, the RMI faces significant challenges in working toward the compact goals of economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance as the compact grants decrease. Largely dependent on government spending of foreign aid, the RMI has limited potential for private sector growth, and its government has made little progress in implementing reforms needed to increase investment opportunities and tax income. Because the trust fund’s earnings are intended as a main source of U.S. assistance to the RMI after compact grants end, the fund’s potential inadequacy to provide sustainable income in some years could impact the RMI’s ability to provide government services. Prior Recommendations
Our prior reports on the amended compacts include recommendations that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs, as chair of the RMI management and trust fund committees, to, among other things, ensure that JEMFAC address the lack of RMI progress in implementing reforms to increase investment and tax income; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the the RMI to establish plans to minimize the impact of declining assistance; coordinate with other U.S. agencies on JEMFAC to work with the RMI to fully develop a reliable mechanism for measuring progress toward compact goals; and ensure the RMI trust fund committee’s assessment and timely reporting of the fund’s likely status as a source of revenue after 2023. For example, in August 2006, JEMFAC discussed the RMI’s slow progress in implementing economic reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the U.S. government extended its economic assistance to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) through an Amended Compact of Free Association. From 2004 to 2023, the United States will provide an estimated $1.5 billion to the RMI, with annually decreasing grants as well as increasing contributions to a trust fund. The assistance, targeting six sectors, is aimed at assisting the country's efforts to promote economic advancement and budgetary self-reliance. The trust fund is to be invested and provide income for the RMI after compact grants end. The Department of the Interior (Interior) administers and oversees this assistance. Drawing on prior GAO reports ( GAO-05-633 , GAO-06-590 , GAO-07-163 , GAO-07-513 , GAO-07-514R), this testimony discusses (1) the RMI's economic prospects, (2) implementation of the amended compact to meet long-term goals, and (3) potential trust fund earnings. In conducting its prior work, GAO visited the RMI, reviewed reports, interviewed officials and experts, and used a simulation model to project the trust fund's income. Prior GAO reports recommended, among other things, that Interior work with the RMI to address lack of progress in implementing reforms; plan for declining grants; reliably measure progress; and ensure timely reporting on the fund's likely status as a source of revenue after 2023. Interior agreed with GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
The RMI has limited prospects for achieving its long-term development goals and has not enacted policy reforms needed to achieve economic growth. The RMI economy depends on public sector spending of foreign assistance rather than on private sector or remittance income. At the same time, the two private sector industries identified as having growth potential--fisheries and tourism--face significant barriers to expansion because of a costly business environment. RMI emigrants also lack marketable skills needed to increase revenue from remittances. Despite declining grants under the compact, RMI progress in implementing key policy reforms to improve the private sector environment, such as tax or land reform, has been slow. In August 2006, the RMI's compact management committee began to address the country's slow progress in implementing reforms. Although the RMI has made progress in implementing compact assistance, it faces several challenges in allocating and using this assistance to support its long-term development goals. RMI grant allocations have reflected compact priorities by targeting health, education, and infrastructure. However, political disagreement over land use and management of public entities has negatively affected infrastructure projects. The RMI also has not planned for long-term sustainability of services that takes into account declining compact assistance. Inadequate baseline data and incomplete performance reports have further limited the RMI's ability to adequately measure progress. Although single-audit reporting has been timely, insufficient staff and skills have limited the RMI's ability to monitor day-to-day sector grant operations. Interior's Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) has conducted administrative oversight of the sector grants but has been constrained by competing oversight priorities. The RMI trust fund may not provide sustainable income for the country after compact grants end. Market volatility and the choice of investment strategy could cause the RMI trust fund balance to vary widely, and there is increasing probability that in some years the trust fund will not reach the maximum disbursement level allowed--an amount equal to the inflation-adjusted compact grants in 2023--or be able to disburse any income. In addition, although the RMI has supplemented its trust fund income with a contribution from Taiwan, other sources of income are uncertain or entail risk. Trust fund management processes have also been problematic; as of June 2007, the RMI trust fund committee had not appointed an independent auditor or a money manager to invest the fund according to the proposed investment strategy. |
gao_GAO-11-316 | gao_GAO-11-316_0 | DOD Has Not Fully Estimated the Cost of Posture Initiatives in South Korea or Provided an Analysis of Alternatives to Tour Normalization
DOD is currently transforming its military posture in South Korea through a series of four interrelated posture initiatives, but has not estimated the total costs involved, or provided an analysis of alternatives for one initiative—tour normalization—that was initiated by the Commander, USFK that potentially could affect tens of thousands of DOD personnel and dependents and increase costs by billions of dollars. The largest of these four initiatives and the primary long-term cost driver is tour normalization—extending the tour length of military service members and moving thousands of their dependents from the United States to South Korea. DOD Has Not Estimated the Cost of Posture Initiatives in Japan and Guam
DOD has embarked on a major realignment of U.S. military posture in mainland Japan, Okinawa, and Guam, but has not developed comprehensive cost estimates for these initiatives; as a result, DOD is unable to ensure that all costs are fully accounted for or determine if resources are adequate to support the program. However, USFJ officials were able to provide us with details from an October 2006 Government of Japan budget estimate study for realignment costs covering Japan’s fiscal years 2007 through 2014. In 2006, Japan estimated it would spend approximately $3.6 billion for this initiative, but DOD has not estimated what its costs will be. Seeking more visibility into DOD posture initiative costs and funding requirements, the Senate Appropriations Committee recently directed DOD to provide comprehensive and routine updates on the status of posture-restructuring initiatives in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands (see app. If fully responsive to the committee’s reporting direction, DOD status updates should provide needed transparency and visibility into the near- and long-term costs and funding requirements associated with the transformation initiatives. DOD Lacks Comprehensive Cost Information Needed for Affordability Analysis
As discussed in our recent report on military posture in Europe, DOD guidance does not require combatant commanders to include comprehensive information on posture costs in their theater posture plan, and as a result, DOD lacks critical information that could be used by decision makers and congressional committees as they deliberate new posture requirements and the associated allocation of resources. According to USFJ officials, in Okinawa alone, Japan would build approximately 321 new buildings and 573 housing units, all of which will need to be furnished and equipped by DOD. In total, from 2006 through 2010, the military services obligated about $24.6 billion to build, operate, and maintain installations in Asia, of which about $5.9 billion (24 percent) was for military construction and family housing, and $18.7 billion (76 percent) was for operation and maintenance of these installations (for a more detailed breakdown of costs at installations in Asia see app. Ongoing Transformation Initiatives May Significantly Increase the Cost of DOD’s Posture in Asia
Data provided by the military services projects that they will require approximately $5.2 billion per year through 2015, of which $2.3 billion (45 percent) will be for military construction and family housing and $2.9 billion per year (55 percent) will be for installation operations and maintenance costs. Without a comprehensive estimate of the total cost of posture—including existing facilities and infrastructure that will not be affected by any new posture initiatives—and routine reporting of those costs, DOD decision makers and congressional committees will not have the full fiscal context they need to develop and consider DOD’s funding requests for future posture initiatives. Identify and limit investments and other financial risks associated with construction programs at Camp Humphreys—funded either by direct appropriations or through alternative financing methods such as the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program—that are affected by decisions related to tour normalization until a business case analysis for the strategic objectives that have to this point driven the decision to implement tour normalization in South Korea, is reviewed and the most cost-effective approach is approved by the Secretary of Defense. In its response, DOD acknowledged that while USFK has completed numerous analyses concerning tour normalization, DOD agrees that there is value in conducting a business case analysis that assesses alternatives to strategic objectives. DOD also agreed with our recommendations to develop annual cost estimates for DOD posture in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility; provide these cost estimates to the Combatant Commander in a time frame to support development of the annual theater posture plan; and to provide these cost estimates to the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to support DOD-wide posture deliberations, affordability analyses and reporting to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently conducting the largest transformation of military posture in the Pacific region since the end of World War II. Transforming posture in Korea, Japan, and Guam will affect tens of thousands of military personnel and their families and require the construction of hundreds of new facilities and more than 3,500 housing units. GAO was asked to examine: (1) initiatives in Korea, their cost implications, and the basis for "tour normalization;" (2) initiatives in Japan and Guam and their cost implications; and (3) the extent to which DOD estimates the total cost of posture and addresses affordability issues. GAO assessed DOD policies and procedures, interviewed relevant DOD and State Department officials, and analyzed cost data from the military services
What GAO Found
DOD is transforming the facilities and infrastructure that support its posture in Asia without the benefit of comprehensive cost information or an analysis of alternatives that are essential to conducting affordability analysis. In South Korea, DOD is transforming its military posture through a series of four interrelated posture initiatives. GAO obtained DOD cost estimates that total $17.6 billion through 2020 for initiatives in South Korea, but DOD cost estimates are incomplete. One initiative, to extend the tour length of military service members and move thousands of dependents to South Korea--called "tour normalization"--could cost DOD $5 billion by 2020 and $22 billion or more through 2050, but this initiative was not supported by a business case analysis that would have considered alternative courses of action and their associated costs and benefits. As a result, DOD is unable to demonstrate that tour normalization is the most cost-effective approach to meeting its strategic objectives. This omission raises concerns about the investments being made in a $13 billion construction program at Camp Humphreys, where tour normalization is largely being implemented. DOD is also transforming its military posture in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam but has not estimated the total costs associated with these initiatives. Based on an October 2006 Government of Japan budget estimate study for realignment costs and limited cost information developed by DOD, GAO identified approximately $29.1 billion--primarily just construction costs--that is anticipated to be shared by the United States and Japan to implement these initiatives. DOD officials stated total cost estimates for its initiatives were not available because of the significant uncertainty surrounding initiativeimplementation schedules. The Senate Appropriations Committee recently directed DOD to provide annual status updates on posture initiatives in Korea, Japan, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. If DOD is fully responsive to the Committee's reporting direction, these updates should provide needed visibility into initiative cost and funding requirements. DOD's posture planning guidance does not require the U.S. Pacific Command to include comprehensive cost data in its theater posture plan, and as a result, DOD lacks critical information that could be used by decision makers as they deliberate on posture requirements and affordability. GAO analysis shows that of the approximately $24.6 billion obligated by the military services to support installations in Asia from 2006 through 2010, approximately $18.7 billion (76 percent) was for operation and maintenance of these facilities. The services estimate that operation and maintenance costs would be about $2.9 billion per year through 2015. However, this estimate appears to be understated, and DOD's initiatives may significantly increase those costs. For example, DOD has yet to estimate costs associated with furnishing and equipping approximately 321 new buildings and 578 housing units in Okinawa. Without comprehensive and routine reporting of posture costs, DOD decision makers will not have the full fiscal context in which to develop posture plans and requirements, and congressional committees will lack a full understanding of the potential funding requirements associated with DOD budget requests.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a business case analysis for its strategic objectives related to tour normalization in Korea, limit investments at Camp Humphreys until the business case is completed, and develop comprehensive cost estimates of posture in the Pacific. DOD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, but it did not specify what corrective actions it would take or time frames for completion. |
gao_GAO-13-483 | gao_GAO-13-483_0 | Both USAID and CDC provide technical assistance to partner countries to support supply chain management. First, PEPFAR and USAID have consolidated supply chains for PEPFAR’s ARV drug procurement, enhancing efficiency and reducing operational costs. Second, PEPFAR has improved donor coordination by creating a network to facilitate information sharing and by developing an emergency procurement mechanism. Third, PEPFAR has provided partner countries with technical assistance, such as assessment tools and training, to help strengthen their supply chains and manage them more effectively. PEPFAR Has Consolidated Supply Chains for ARV Drug Procurement
PEPFAR has consolidated supply chains for ARV drugs across partner countries to increase the efficiency of ARV drug procurement and shipping. PEPFAR Has Improved Coordination of ARV Procurement with Other Donors
PEPFAR has also coordinated with other donors to improve those elements of the supply chain that operate within the control of partner countries. In particular, it has developed an information-sharing network and established an emergency procurement mechanism. PEPFAR determines the level and type of supply chain assistance primarily on the basis of each country’s treatment program and supply chain capacity and the state of its HIV epidemic. However, 11 of the 16 evaluations of partner-country supply chains that we reviewed identified weaknesses in inventory controls; 7 of these 11 evaluations also cited weaknesses in record keeping, including missing or inaccurate drug consumption data. Human resource constraints contribute to these weaknesses, and PEPFAR is making efforts to address them over the long term. In addition, because OGAC does not require country teams to monitor partner countries’ progress in measuring ARV drug consumption, waste, and loss, OGAC may not be able to reliably ascertain the extent to which supply chains in partner countries are affected by shortages, waste, and loss and take appropriate action to mitigate these risks. Inadequate Inventory Controls and Record Keeping in Some Partner- Country Supply Chains May Increase the Risks of Shortages, Waste, and Loss
From our review of 16 supply chain evaluations conducted in seven PEPFAR partner countries since 2011, we identified inadequate inventory controls for monitoring drug supply, as well as missing or inaccurate record keeping, as key weaknesses in ARV drug supply chains controlled by partner countries. These weaknesses can increase the risks of drug shortages, waste, and loss. However, OGAC does not specifically require country teams that support partner-country supply chains to develop and implement plans to strengthen partner countries’ inventory controls and record keeping to reduce the risks of shortages, waste, and loss in ARV drug supply chains. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that drug supply chains in PEPFAR partner countries function efficiently and mitigate the risks of shortages and wasted and lost drugs, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. State agreed with the intent of our first recommendation to improve partner countries’ inventory controls and record keeping for drug supply chain management. We believe that requiring country teams to track the progress partner countries are making in measuring ARV drug consumption, waste, and loss in whatever way is most appropriate in those countries would be beneficial in two ways: (1) it would provide a measure of accountability for partner countries as they transition to assuming greater responsibility for managing their supply chains, and (2) it would provide OGAC with flexibility in the differing contexts of PEPFAR involvement in each country. Global AIDS Coordinator and interested congressional committees. This report examines (1) actions PEPFAR has taken regarding antiretroviral (ARV) drug supply chains and (2) partner-country ARV drug supply chain operations. The expert review we also analyzed was a best-practices supply chain study for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To examine actions PEPFAR has taken regarding ARV drug supply chains, as well as to describe partner-country ARV drug supply chain operations, we reviewed reports and guidance issued by PEPFAR and its implementing partners, including all 35 PEPFAR country and regional operational plans and all 22 PEPFAR country partnership frameworks for fiscal year 2012. Global Health: Spending Requirement Presents Challenges for Allocating Prevention Funding under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic: Selection of Antiretroviral Medications Provided under U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
PEPFAR, first authorized in 2003, has supported significant advances in HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care in over 30 countries, including directly supporting treatment for about 5.1 million people; however, millions more people still need treatment. PEPFAR has allocated more than half of its funding to care and treatment and has spent over $1.2 billion to purchase ARV drugs. In addition to supplying ARV drugs directly in some countries, PEPFAR also helps partner countries manage their drug supply chains. GAO was asked to review PEPFARsupported ARV drug supply chains. GAO examined (1) actions PEPFAR has taken regarding ARV drug supply chains and (2) partner-country ARV drug supply chain operations. GAO reviewed PEPFAR and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) guidance and supply chain studies; analyzed 16 supply chain evaluations conducted in seven countries and published in 2011 and 2012; interviewed officials from OGAC, USAID, and other agencies; and conducted fieldwork in three countries selected on the basis of program size and other factors.
What GAO Found
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has worked with U.S. implementing agencies, international donors, and partner countries to increase the efficiency and reliability of antiretroviral (ARV) drug supply chains. It has done so by improving drug supply planning and procurement as well as incountry distribution of drugs. First, PEPFAR has consolidated supply chains for ARV drug procurement for more than 20 partner countries to enhance efficiency and reduce costs and has begun further consolidation with other U.S. global health programs. Second, PEPFAR has improved coordination among donors by creating an information-sharing network to help detect and resolve supply gaps and other supply chain weaknesses and by developing an emergency drug procurement mechanism. Third, PEPFAR has provided partner countries with technical assistance, such as assessment tools and training, to help them better manage drug supply planning, procurement, and distribution.
Evaluations of partner-country supply chains reflect weaknesses in inventory controls and record keeping, which may increase the risk of drug shortages, waste, and loss. The Department of State's Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) has issued guidance for PEPFAR emphasizing the importance of effective information management for efficient ARV drug supply chain operations. However, 11 of the 16 supply chain evaluations GAO reviewed cited weaknesses in partner countries' inventory controls; 7 of these 11 evaluations also cited weaknesses in record keeping, including incomplete or inaccurate data on the consumption of ARV drugs. These weaknesses can increase the risks of drug shortages, waste, and loss of inventory. In one country, an evaluation team identified losses valued at about $265,000. Human resource constraints contribute to these weaknesses, and PEPFAR is addressing them through technical assistance and training. However, OGAC does not require PEPFAR interagency teams in each country to develop plans to strengthen inventory controls and record keeping. Nor does OGAC require country teams to track the progress partner countries are making in measuring ARV drug consumption, waste, and loss. Thus, OGAC cannot ascertain the extent of partner-country supply chain weaknesses and take appropriate action to mitigate risks. For PEPFAR and partner countries to continue expanding treatment programs to serve up to 23 million eligible people, further improving drug supply chains is critical, particularly the efficiency of elements managed by partner countries. These improvements will become increasingly important as partner countries assume more responsibility for managing supply chains.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of State should direct OGAC to require country teams to (1) develop and implement plans to help partner countries improve inventory controls and record keeping; and (2) track the progress partner countries are making in measuring ARV drug consumption, waste, and loss. State generally agreed with the intent of both recommendations; GAO revised the second to make it broader and more feasible to implement in differing partner-country contexts. |
gao_HEHS-97-155 | gao_HEHS-97-155_0 | 2). 3). Delinquencies and Defaults Under ICR Are Higher Than Under Other Repayment Plans
Across all four types of repayment plans, 14.4 percent of FDLP borrowers were delinquent and 1.7 percent were in default, according to the Department data in our analysis. Compared with the three other payment plans, the overall percentage of loans that were delinquent or in default under ICR were higher (see fig. There appear to be two possible explanations for why borrowers using ICR, as a group, have overall higher delinquencies and defaults than borrowers using the other repayment plans. 5). Given that the majority (53.3 percent) of borrowers with DCS consolidation loans are ICR users, the overall higher delinquency rate for ICR compared with the other repayment plans could be partly the result of considerably greater involvement of DCS consolidation loan borrowers (borrowers who previously defaulted on FFELP loans) in the ICR plan compared with the other repayment plans. 6). ICR users who had DCS consolidation loans defaulted at a rate of 8.8 percent, compared with rates of 0.9 percent and 2.5 percent for ICR users with nonconsolidated and direct consolidation loans, respectively. Total Borrower Payments Under ICR Are Higher in Some Circumstances, Lower in Others
There is no single answer to whether a borrower will pay more or less under ICR compared with standard, extended, or graduated plans. In contrast, a borrower with $40,000 or more in loans would repay far less under ICR than under the extended and graduated alternatives because under these two plans the borrower pays off the total loan; the borrower using ICR would not. Measures Taken to Obtain and Verify Borrower Income Information
Information on borrower income for computing monthly payment amounts for the ICR plan is obtained from either documentation provided by the borrower or information from IRS on the borrower’s AGI as reported on his or her federal income tax return. This documentation, referred to as “alternative documentation of income,” can be recent pay stubs, dividend statements, canceled checks, or a statement signed by the borrowers explaining their source of income. According to a Department official, the Department uses alternative documentation for borrowers in their first year of repayment because, in most cases, AGI information from IRS is zero or close to zero. However, when borrowers submit this documentation, they also certify that they are providing accurate and complete income information. After ICR users have been out of school for at least 1 year, their monthly payment amount is based on their AGI as reported on their federal income tax returns. According to Department officials, the Department does not verify the accuracy of the information the borrowers provide IRS on their tax returns. The officials also said that borrowers who do not cooperate in providing accurate income information are automatically removed from the ICR plan and placed into the standard repayment plan. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which borrowers are using the income contingent repayment (ICR) plan compared with other repayment plans, we obtained and analyzed data from the Department of Education on Federal Direct Loan Programs (FDLP) loans being repaid as of March 31, 1997. To determine the extent to which the Department or its FDLP service center verifies the accuracy of borrowers’ income information, we reviewed Department regulations and guidelines. Data on FDLP Loans in Repayment
Table II.1: Repayment Plans Selected by Borrowers of All Kinds of FDLP Loans, as of March 31, 1997 Amount (in millions)
Table II.2: Repayment Plans Selected by Borrowers With Nonconsolidated Loans, as of March 31, 1997 Amount (in millions)
Table II.3: Repayment Plans Selected by Borrowers With Direct Consolidation Loans, as of March 31, 1997 Amount (in millions)
Table II.4: Repayment Plans Selected by Borrowers With DCS Consolidation Loans, as of March 31, 1997 Amount (in millions)
Kinds of Schools Attended by Nonconsolidated Loan Borrowers
Delinquency Rates of FDLP Borrowers
Table IV.4: Delinquency Rates of DCS Consolidation Loan Borrowers by Kind of Repayment Plan, as of March 31, 1997
Defaults of FDLP Borrowers
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed borrowers' use of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program's (FDLP) income contingent repayment (ICR) plan, focusing on: (1) the extent to which borrowers are using ICR compared with other repayment plans available under FDLP; (2) how loan delinquencies and defaults under ICR compare with delinquencies and defaults under other FDLP repayment plans; (3) how loan payments under ICR compare with payments under other FDLP repayment plans; and (4) how the Department of Education, which administers the program, verifies the accuracy of income reported by borrowers using ICR.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of March 31, 1997, about 663,000 borrowers owing about $5.3 billion in FDLP loans were repaying loans; (2) about 9 percent of these borrowers were using ICR; (3) GAO found that 80 percent of borrowers using ICR either were current in their monthly payments or had their payments suspended because they were in school or for other reasons; (4) borrowers using ICR tended to be delinquent or in default at higher percentages than borrowers using other repayment plans; (5) borrowers who have been placed into the ICR plan because they have defaulted on an Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loan are a major factor in the higher percentage of defaults for ICR users; (6) of the 2,832 borrowers using ICR and in default, 2,083, or 73.6 percent, had defaulted on an FFELP loan; (7) comparing estimated total loan payments for ICR users and borrowers who use the three other repayment plans is complicated; (8) compared with borrowers who use the standard repayment plan, ICR users and those using extended and graduated plans generally face higher total payments; (9) compared with borrowers who use the extended or graduated repayment plans, ICR users face comparatively higher total payments if their incomes are low but comparatively lower total payments if their incomes are high; (10) the Department of Education checks the reported income of borrowers using ICR in one of two ways; (11) for borrowers who are in their first year of repayment or who may have recently lost their jobs, the Department relies primarily on documentation submited by the borrower, such as pay stubs, dividend statements, or cancelled checks; (12) the Department does not verify the accuracy of this documentation when it is submitted; rather it relies on a signed certification from the borrower that the information is complete and accurate; (13) for borrowers who have been out of school for a year or more, the Department obtains income information directly from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); (14) the Department does not verify the accuracy of information borrowers provide IRS but relies on IRS' verification process; (15) however, during the transition from using borrower documentation to using IRS information, the Department compares the income amounts from the two sources for discrepancies; and (16) if there are significant discrepancies or if borrowers do not cooperate in providing correct income information, they are removed from the ICR plan and placed into another repayment plan. |
gao_GAO-14-651T | gao_GAO-14-651T_0 | Children in Foster Care Receive Psychotropic Medications at Higher Rates than Other Children in Medicaid
In December 2012, we reported information on national levels of psychotropic drug use among foster care children based on the results of the NSCAW II. According to the results from NSCAW II, 18 percent of foster-care children were taking a psychotropic medication at the time they were surveyed. Additionally, foster children who lived in group homes or residential treatment centers had much higher rates of psychotropic medication use than foster children living in nonrelative foster homes or formal kin care—48 percent versus 14 percent and 12 percent, respectively. The higher utilization rate among children living in group homes or residential treatment centers may be related to these children having higher rates of potential mental-health need—about 69 percent had a potential mental-health need compared to about 44 percent of children living in nonrelative foster homes. Among foster children who took psychotropic medication, 13 percent took three or more psychotropic medications concurrently. NSCAW II survey findings also showed that 6.4 percent of foster children took an antipsychotic medication and that the majority were ages 6 through 11. In December 2011, we reported findings from our analysis of five states’ Medicaid prescription drug data that found children in foster care in Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Texas were prescribed psychotropic medications at higher rates than nonfoster children in Medicaid during 2008. The following describes the extent to which the selected states’ monitoring programs in our review covered these areas. HHS concurred with the recommendation and, in April 2012, issued guidance regarding the oversight of psychotropic medications among children in foster care. In our April 2014 follow-up report, we also found that, to varying degrees, each of the five selected states we reviewed has policies and procedures designed to address the monitoring and oversight of psychotropic medications prescribed to children in foster care. For example:
All five selected states’ foster-care programs use some type of functional assessment or screening tool, such as the Child and Adolescent Needs and Strengths (CANS), for screening and treatment planning, which may prompt a referral for a psychiatric evaluation as deemed appropriate. Many states have, or are transitioning to, MCOs to administer prescription-drug benefits, and, as our work demonstrates, selected states have taken limited steps to plan for the oversight of drug prescribing for foster children receiving health care through MCOs—which creates a risk that controls instituted in recent years under fee-for-service may not remain once states move to managed care. We recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services issue guidance to state Medicaid, child-welfare, and mental-health officials regarding prescription- drug monitoring and oversight for children in foster care receiving psychotropic medications through MCOs. Case Studies Varied in Quality of Documentation Supporting the Use of Psychotropic Medications
Expert Reviews of Select Foster Children’s Foster and Medical Files Found Variation in the Quality of Documentation
As part of our April 2014 report, we also contracted with two child psychiatrists to provide clinical evaluations of 24 cases that we selected from the population of foster children prescribed psychotropic drugs in 2008. With regard to evidence-based therapies, experts found that 3 of 15 children who may have benefitted from such therapies were mostly provided such services. In 11 of 15 applicable cases, the experts found that evidence-based therapies were partially provided, such as for instances when some psychosocial or evidence-based therapies were documented, but other evidence-based therapies that may have been more applicable or beneficial were not provided. In 1 of 15 cases there was no documentation that evidence-based therapies were provided. Our experts found in 4 of 9 infant cases reviewed that the prescription of psychotropic medication was for non- mental-health purposes, such as to treat skin conditions, based on documentation reviewed. However, our experts found that in 2 of 9 cases the infants were prescribed psychotropic medications for psychiatric reasons, and the rationale and oversight for such medications were partially supported by documentation. Children in foster care are especially vulnerable because they more frequently have been subjected to traumatic experiences involving abuse or neglect and they may suffer from multiple, serious mental-health conditions. The federal government and state governments in our review recently have taken action to improve the oversight of psychotropic medication prescribing to foster care children, however, continued assessment and guidance is needed to protect this vulnerable population. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foster children have often been removed from abusive or neglectful homes and tend to have more mental- health conditions than other children. Treatment of these conditions may include psychotropic drugs, but the risks these drugs pose specifically to children are not well understood. This testimony discusses GAO's recent work on (1) the extent to which children in foster care are prescribed psychotropic medications, (2) federal and state actions to oversee psychotropic prescribing to children in foster care, and (3) the extent to which the use of psychotropic medications was supported by foster and medical records for selected case studies of children in foster care who were prescribed these medications. This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from 2011 through 2014 that used various methodologies, including reviewing federal studies, analyzing Medicaid prescription claims data from five states, and contracting with two experts to review 24 case files (selected, in part, based on potential health risk indicators). The findings related to the expert reviews of 24 case files are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
In December 2012, GAO reported on the results of the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) surveys of children in contact with the child-welfare system conducted during 2008-2011. 18 percent of foster-care children were taking a psychotropic medication at the time they were surveyed. Foster children who lived in group homes or residential treatment centers had much higher rates of psychotropic medication use than those living in nonrelative foster homes or formal kin care—48 percent versus 14 percent and 12 percent, respectively, according to the surveys. The higher utilization rate among children living in group homes or residential treatment centers may be related to these children having higher rates of potential mental-health need. Among foster children who took psychotropic medication, about 13 percent took three or more psychotropic medications concurrently. About 6.4 percent of foster children took an antipsychotic medication—psychotropic medications with potentially serious side effects that are intended to treat serious mental-health conditions such as schizophrenia—and the majority were ages 6 -11. In examining prescribing at the state level, GAO found similar results in its December 2011 review. Specifically, children in foster care in Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Texas were prescribed psychotropic medications at higher rates than nonfoster children in Medicaid during 2008, although prescribing rates varied by state.
In April 2014, GAO found the federal government and states have taken a multitude of steps to better oversee psychotropic drug prescribing for children in foster care, although more can be done as states increasingly deliver their medication benefits through Medicaid managed care. In addition, GAO found that, to varying degrees, each of the five selected states it reviewed had policies and procedures designed to address the monitoring and oversight of psychotropic medications prescribed to children in foster care. For example, all five selected states' foster-care programs use a screening tool that may prompt a referral of the foster child for a psychiatric evaluation. GAO also found that ACF had provided webinars and technical guidance to states. However, many states have, or are transitioning to, managed care organizations (MCO) to deliver Medicaid prescription-drug benefits, and GAO found variation in the extent that the five selected states were taking steps to plan for the oversight of drug prescribing for foster children receiving these benefits through MCOs.
For an April 2014 report, GAO contracted with two child psychiatrists to review foster and medical records for 24 cases in five selected states and found varying quality in the documentation supporting the use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care. These experts found that for many of the cases the prescriptions were mostly supported by documentation. However, in some areas, such as evidence-based therapies—interventions shown to produce measureable improvements—the experts found documentation was lacking. For example, the experts found that 3 of 15 children who may have benefited from such therapies were mostly provided such services, while in 11 of the 15 cases, the experts found that evidence-based therapies were partially provided but also found that other evidence-based therapies that may have been more applicable or beneficial were not provided, based on the documents reviewed. In 1 of the 15 cases there was no documentation that evidence-based therapies were provided.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work, including that the Secretary of Health and Human Services issue guidance to state Medicaid, child-welfare, and mental-health officials regarding prescription-drug monitoring and oversight for children in foster care receiving psychotropic medications through MCOs. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) concurred with the recommendation and described planned actions. |
gao_GAO-08-144T | gao_GAO-08-144T_0 | NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006, but the implementing guidance for the plan was still under development. National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist Foreign Nations to Combat Terrorism
A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. The strategies state that this approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing Guidance Is Still under Development
In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic operational plans to combat terrorism using every element of national power, including those of U.S. LEAs. According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance for the plan was still under development as of May 2007, and they would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance. Several Factors Limit LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists
Although some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, most LEAs have not been given clear guidance for helping foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We found that LEA efforts to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists have been hindered because the LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly articulated roles and responsibilities from NCTC to assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess LEA progress; (4) formal structures to coordinate LEA operational and technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to specific foreign nation needs. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. Although embassies generally use law enforcement working groups to share information, we found they were not focused on joint investigative or operational efforts to identify and disrupt terrorist acts. As a result, we found that State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may not be targeting their full range of training and assistance to help foreign countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This testimony addresses (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.
What GAO Found
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism or how they should do so. In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with developing a plan to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006. According to NCTC, Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, implementing guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the contents of the plan or the guidance. LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance program. However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries. |
gao_GAO-01-198 | gao_GAO-01-198_0 | To determine whether the Army’s planned force structure for two major theater wars would be sufficient to support these seven concurrent contingency operations, we compared the results of Total Army Analysis 2007 with the contingency operations requirements shown in table 1. Conclusions
The Army’s force structure, which is based on a two-war scenario, generally provides the number and types of units required to simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies lasting more than 6 months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for extended periods of time, as has been the case in recent years, it would seem prudent to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs. Forces Most Heavily Used for Contingency Operations
The Army’s force structure requirements for the seven illustrative contingency operations include units from nearly all the Army’s 26 branches. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Military Strategy calls for U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Accordingly, the Army calculates its force structure requirements on the basis of this scenario. The strategy also calls for the Army to support operations in a series of concurrent contingencies and assumes that forces thus engaged will be withdrawn and redeployed if war occurs. The Army's difficulty in supporting contingency operations without repeatedly calling on some types of units has raised questions about whether forces structured to meet the two-war scenario can also support multiple peacetime contingency operations. GAO reviewed the Army's force planning process, known as Total Army Analysis 2007, to determine whether the Army's planned force structure will meet its contingency requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Army's force structure generally provides the number and types of units required to simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies lasting for more than six months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for long periods of time, it would seem prudent to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs. |
gao_GAO-04-367 | gao_GAO-04-367_0 | By including competitive sourcing as one of five governmentwide initiatives announced in August 2001, the administration directed agencies to implement competitive sourcing programs to achieve increased savings and to improve performance. Agencies Have Established a Foundation for Their Competitive Sourcing Programs
When the President announced competitive sourcing as one of five governmentwide management agenda items in August 2001, few agencies other than DOD had an established competitive sourcing infrastructure—a key component of OMB’s strategy for institutionalizing competitive sourcing. Since that time, all six civilian agencies we reviewed have established a basic competitive sourcing program infrastructure. Interagency forums for sharing information also have been established. OMB Guidance Has Focused More on Meeting Targets and Milestones Than on Improving Outcomes
The ultimate goal of the competitive sourcing initiative is to improve government performance and efficiency. VIII for further discussion on the criteria these agencies have used to select positions for competition.) To address this challenge, the Federal Acquisition Council is currently studying agency staffing and skill requirements. Despite these additional personnel requirements, many department-level offices in the civilian agencies we reviewed have only one or two full-time staff to complete FAIR Act inventories, interpret new laws and regulations, and oversee agency selection of positions to compete and the competitions. Funding Challenges
Funding their competitive sourcing programs also has been cited as a challenge for agencies. However, some officials told us that OMB recently instructed their agencies to include a line item in their fiscal year 2005 budget request for their competitive sourcing programs. Some Agencies Used Strategic Approach to Identify and Prioritize Activities for Competition
Several agencies have developed strategic and transparent competitive sourcing approaches by integrating their strategic and human capital plans with their competitive sourcing plans—an approach encouraged by the Commercial Activities Panel. OMB, in its leadership role, has a difficult task in guiding this initiative and must balance the need for transparency and consistency with the flexibility agencies need in implementing significant changes to operations. While OMB is addressing the funding and human capital challenges that agencies face, it needs to ensure that the FAIR Act inventory and goal-setting process is more strategic and helpful to agencies in carrying out their competitive sourcing responsibilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To complement efforts already underway that address funding and human capital challenges and to help agencies realize the potential benefits of competitive sourcing and ensure greater transparency and accountability, we recommend that the Director of OMB take the following three actions: ensure greater consistency in the classification of positions as commercial or inherently governmental when positions contain a mix of commercial and inherently governmental tasks by reviewing current guidance and developing additional guidelines, as necessary, for agencies and OMB examiners; work with agencies to ensure they are more strategic in their sourcing decisions and are identifying broader functional areas and/or enterprisewide activities, as appropriate, for possible public-private competition; and require agencies to develop competition plans that focus on achieving measurable efficiency and performance improvement outcomes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the progress DOD and the civilian agencies have made in establishing the competitive sourcing program in response to the President’s Management Agenda, we interviewed officials at the Department of Agriculture; DOD; and the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, the Interior, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs. (Contained in revised Circular A-76)
Appendix VII: OMB Scorecard Criteria for the Competitive Sourcing Initiative
Appendix VII: OMB Scorecard Criteria for the Competitive Sourcing Initiative an OMB approved “yellow” competition plan to compete an OMB approved “green” competition plan to compete commercial activities available for competition; commercial activities available for competition; completed one standard competition or publicly announced standard competitions that exceed the number of positions identified for competition in the agency’s yellow competition plan; publicly announced standard competitions in accordance with the schedule outlined in the agency “green” competition plan; since January 2001, completed at least 10 competitions (no minimum number of positions required per competition); in the past two quarters, completed 75% of streamlined competitions in a 90-day timeframe; and in the past year, completed 90% of all standard competitions in a 12-month time frame; in the past two quarters, canceled less than 20% of publicly announced standard and streamlined competitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2001, the administration announced competitive sourcing as one of five initiatives in the President's Management Agenda. Under competitive sourcing, federal agencies open their commercial activities to competition among public and private sector sources. While competitive sourcing is expected to encourage innovation and improve efficiency and performance, it represents a major management change for most agencies. This report describes the progress selected agencies have made in establishing a competitive sourcing program, identifies major challenges these agencies are facing, and discusses strategies they are using to select activities for competition.
What GAO Found
Since the President announced competitive sourcing as a governmentwide initiative, the six civilian agencies GAO reviewed created a basic infrastructure for their competitive sourcing programs, including establishing offices, appointing officials, hiring staff and consultants, issuing guidance, and conducting training. With infrastructures in place and leadership involvement, each agency has developed competitive sourcing plans and conducted some competitions. The Department of Defense (DOD) has had an extensive competitive sourcing program since the mid-1990s. Interagency forums for sharing competitive sourcing information also have been established. While such activities are underway, each agency GAO reviewed, including DOD, cited several significant challenges in achieving its competitive sourcing goals. Key among these is maintaining workforce inventories that distinguish inherently governmental positions from commercial positions--a prerequisite to identifying potential positions to compete. Agencies also have been challenged to develop competitive sourcing approaches that would improve efficiency, in part because agencies have focused more on following OMB guidance on the number of positions to compete--not on achieving savings and improving performance. Ensuring adequate personnel with the skills needed to run a competitive sourcing program also challenged agencies. Many civilian department-level offices have only one or two full-time staff to interpret new laws, implement new OMB guidance, maintain inventories of competable positions and activities, and oversee agency competitions. The Federal Acquisition Council is currently identifying agency staffing needs to address this challenge. Finally, some of the civilian agencies we reviewed reported funding challenges in implementing their competitive sourcing programs. OMB told agencies to include a line item for competitive sourcing activities in their fiscal year 2005 budget requests. Several agencies integrated their strategic, human capital, and competitive sourcing plans--an approach encouraged by the Commercial Activities Panel, which was convened to conduct a congressionally mandated study of the competitive sourcing process. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used business case analyses to assess the economic benefits of various sourcing alternatives. An IRS official said this approach required minimal investment to determine an activity's suitability for competitive sourcing. The National Institutes of Health, the Army, and the Department of Education also took a strategic approach to competitive sourcing. OMB's task in balancing the need for transparency and consistency with the flexibility agencies need is not an easy one. While OMB is addressing funding and human capital challenges, it needs to do more to assure that the agencies' inventories of commercial positions and goal-setting processes are more strategic and helpful to agencies in achieving savings and improving performance. |
gao_GAO-14-850 | gao_GAO-14-850_0 | Most Jurisdictions Did Not Collect Data for Calculating Wait Times, Primarily because Wait Times Have Not Been an Issue, but Some Have Made Estimates Using Various Practices
On the basis of our survey, we estimate that 78 percent (from 74 to 83 percent) of local jurisdictions nationwide did not collect, receive, or have available information that would allow them to calculate voter wait times that occurred at individual polling places on Election Day 2012. Some jurisdictions did collect some types of wait-time-related information that election administration researchers and state and local officials have said could be helpful in measuring wait times. Because there is no comprehensive set of data on voter wait times across jurisdictions nationwide and we estimate that most jurisdictions did not collect data on wait times based on our survey of election jurisdictions, we relied on election officials in the jurisdictions we surveyed to estimate wait times for these measures based on their perspectives, data, or other information on wait times. A Number of Factors Affected Voter Wait Times on Election Day 2012, and Their Impacts Varied across Jurisdictions
On the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, interviews with election officials and researchers, and review of relevant literature, we found that various factors, such as voting before Election Day and ballot characteristics, affected voter wait times at different stages in the voting process on Election Day 2012. For example, we estimate that 22 percent (from 17 to 27 percent) of all jurisdictions nationwide had wait times that officials considered too long at a few or more polling places on Election Day, and we asked officials in these jurisdictions to select which factors they believed contributed to long voter wait times at polling places in their jurisdiction. Impact of Factors Varied across Jurisdictions
Multiple factors affected wait times on Election Day 2012 in the 5 local jurisdictions we selected for interviews. While the nine factors we identified apply generally across all jurisdictions, their specific impact on Election Day 2012 wait times depended on the unique circumstances in each of our selected jurisdictions, leading to targeted approaches for reducing wait times where needed and where resources allowed. According to jurisdiction officials, lengthy ballots—an average of eight 17- inch pages—were the primary cause of long voter wait times. To what extent did local election jurisdictions collect data to measure voter wait times and have long voter wait times on Election Day 2012? 2. For both objectives, we (1) conducted a web-based survey of election officials from a nationally representative stratified random sample of 423 local election jurisdictions, excluding jurisdictions with populations of 10,000 or fewer and jurisdictions in Oregon and Washington; (2) analyzed responses from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a survey of U.S. citizens aged 18 and over; (3) interviewed state election officials from 47 states and the District of Columbia, as well as local election administration officials, on-site or by phone, from 5 selected local jurisdictions—Detroit, Michigan; Hartford, Connecticut; Lee County, Florida; Los Angeles County, California; and Prince William County, Virginia; and (4) interviewed officials from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and 14 researchers and representatives from research organizations in the field of election administration. Overall, there are about 10,500 local government jurisdictions responsible for conducting elections nationwide. We analyzed survey responses to provide nationwide estimates for Election Day 2012 of any data collected on wait times, voter wait times, views on the factors that affected long wait times, policies and practices used, and any revisions to policies to address the possible causes of long wait times, among other things.sampling error—that is, the extent to which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained if the whole population had been observed. While these 5 jurisdictions are not representative of all election jurisdictions nationwide and their responses cannot be generalized to other local election jurisdictions, officials in these locations provided a range of perspectives on voter wait times and information on how factors affected wait times in practice and allowed us to compare Election Day 2012 experiences across jurisdictions. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions turn out to vote in U.S. general elections, and there were reports of long wait times at some polling places on Election Day in 2012. The authority to regulate elections is shared by federal, state, and local officials; however, responsibility for conducting federal elections primarily resides with about 10,500 local election jurisdictions. GAO was asked to examine voter wait times for the November 2012 election.
This report addresses (1) the extent to which local election jurisdictions collected data to measure voter wait times and had long wait times on Election Day 2012, and (2) the factors that affected wait times and their impacts across jurisdictions. GAO surveyed officials from a nationwide generalizable sample of 423 local election jurisdictions, excluding jurisdictions with populations of 10,000 or fewer and in the vote-by-mail states of Oregon and Washington, to obtain information on voter wait times (80 percent responded). Estimates from the survey are subject to sampling error and are reported with 95 percent confidence intervals. GAO also interviewed election officials from 47 of 50 states and the District of Columbia to obtain their views on wait time issues. GAO also selected 5 local jurisdictions based on, among other things, demographic characteristics and estimated wait times to examine in more detail their Election Day 2012 experiences. The results from these 5 jurisdictions are not generalizable, but provide insights into jurisdictions' experiences. GAO also reviewed literature on wait times and interviewed 14 election researchers selected based on their work on election wait times.
What GAO Found
On the basis of GAO's nationwide generalizable survey of local election jurisdictions, GAO estimates that 78 percent (from 74 to 83 percent) of jurisdictions did not collect data that would allow them to calculate wait times, primarily because wait times have not been an issue, and most jurisdictions did not have long wait times on Election Day 2012. Specifically, GAO estimates that 78 percent (from 73 to 83 percent) of local jurisdictions nationwide had no polling places with wait times officials considered to be too long and 22 percent (from 17 to 27 percent) had wait times that officials considered too long at a few or more polling places on Election Day 2012. Jurisdiction officials had varying views on the length of time that would be considered too long—for example, some officials considered 10 minutes too long, while others considered 30 minutes too long. Because there is no comprehensive set of data on wait times across jurisdictions nationwide, GAO relied on election officials in the jurisdictions it surveyed to estimate wait times based on their perspectives and any data or information they collected on voter wait times.
Multiple factors affected voter wait times on Election Day 2012, and their impacts varied across jurisdictions. Specifically, GAO's survey of local election jurisdictions, review of wait time literature, and interviews with election officials and researchers identified nine common factors that affected wait times.
The specific impact of these nine factors depended on the unique circumstances in each of the 5 local jurisdictions GAO selected for interviews, leading to targeted approaches for reducing wait times where needed. For example, according to election officials in 2 jurisdictions, lengthy ballots were the primary cause of long wait times. In 1 of these jurisdictions, state constitutional amendments accounted for five of its eight ballot pages on average, and since the 2012 election, a state law was enacted that established additional word limits to such amendments, which officials said could help reduce wait times. Another jurisdiction that had ballots of similar length did not report long wait times.
In comments on draft report excerpts, 1 jurisdiction stated that our description of its experiences was accurate. The Election Assistance Commission and 4 other jurisdictions did not have comments. |
gao_GAO-11-131 | gao_GAO-11-131_0 | DOD Guidance Does Not Require EUCOM to Estimate or Report the Total Cost of Posture
DOD guidance does not require EUCOM to include comprehensive information on posture costs in its theater posture plan and, as a result, DOD lacks critical information that could be used by decision makers and congressional committees as they deliberate posture requirements and the associated allocation of resources. Of the approximately $17.2 billion obligated by the services to support DOD’s posture in Europe from 2006 through 2009, approximately $13 billion (78 percent) was for operation and maintenance costs. These proposed revisions, however, will not require commanders to report operation and maintenance costs unrelated to posture initiatives at existing installations in the theater posture plan. To obtain a more comprehensive estimate of the cost of DOD’s posture in Europe we gathered obligations data from the Army, Navy, and Air Force related to military construction, family housing, and operation and maintenance appropriations for installations in the EUCOM area of responsibility and found that military construction and family housing obligations accounted for about one-fifth of the services’ total obligations against those appropriations from fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Keeping Army Brigades in Europe: In September 2010, we reported that delays in decisions associated with the number and composition of U.S. Army forces in Europe will impact posture costs. Until DOD requires the combatant commands to compile and report on comprehensive costs for established locations, DOD and Congress will be limited in their ability to weigh the costs and benefits of existing posture and posture initiatives and to make fully informed decisions on funding DOD’s posture in Europe. EUCOM Lacks a Systematic Process to Evaluate Posture Alternatives and Routinely Incorporate Interagency Views in Posture Planning
EUCOM has developed an approach to compile posture requirements and prepare annual theater posture plans, but does not have clearly defined methods for evaluating posture alternatives or routinely incorporating the views of interagency stakeholders. Although the approach EUCOM has taken to determine posture requirements has fostered greater communication between key stakeholders and improved its ability to resolve conflicting views on posture issues, it has not been clearly defined and codified in command guidance, and it does not specifically provide for the comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits, because the combatant commander has not been required to include such analysis in developing the theater posture plan. In addition, the Interagency Partnering Directorate, which was established by the EUCOM commander to improve interagency coordination for the command, did not fully participate in developing the 2010 posture plan, because its role in posture planning has not been defined. As a result of these weaknesses in EUCOM’s posture planning approach, the command is limited in its ability to consider and evaluate the cost of posture in conjunction with the strategic benefits it provides and may not be fully leveraging interagency perspectives as it defines future posture requirements. In addition, since EUCOM is taking steps to address posture matters and is developing guidance for identifying and resolving posture issues within the command, it has an opportunity to use this guidance to clearly define and codify a process for how the theater posture plan is to be drafted, to establish approaches to collect and analyze comprehensive cost information and address affordability issues, and to regularly obtain the perspectives of relevant agencies throughout the posture planning process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide for more comprehensive information on the cost of posture and analysis of posture alternatives as future theater posture plans are developed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to revise the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to require the theater posture plan to include the cost of operating and maintaining existing installations and estimate the costs associated with initiatives that would alter future posture and provide guidance on how the combatant commands should analyze the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action when considering proposed changes to posture. To determine the extent to which EUCOM has clearly defined methods for evaluating posture alternatives and including the views of interagency stakeholders, we reviewed departmental guidance and directives on command functions, campaign planning, overseas force structure changes, and global defense posture management. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced sweeping changes to restructure U.S. military presence overseas and reduce military posture in Europe. In August, 2010, the Secretary of Defense called for a review of DOD operations and activities to identify opportunities to decrease costs in order to free funds to support other DOD priorities. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs asked GAO to determine the extent to which the European Command (EUCOM) (1) estimates and reports the total cost of DOD's installations in Europe and (2) has defined methods for evaluating posture alternatives and including the views of interagency stakeholders in its posture planning process. To address these objectives, GAO assessed DOD plans and guidance, reviewed planning efforts in EUCOM, and collected obligations data from the military services for the military construction, family housing, and operation and maintenance appropriations.
What GAO Found
DOD posture planning guidance does not require EUCOM to include comprehensive cost data in its theater posture plan and, as a result, DOD lacks critical information that could be used by decision makers as they deliberate posture requirements. DOD guidance requires that theater posture plans provide specific information on, and estimate the military construction costs for, installations in a combatant commander's area of responsibility. However, this guidance does not require EUCOM to report the total cost to operate and maintain installations in Europe. GAO analysis shows that of the approximately $17.2 billion obligated by the services to support installations in Europe from 2006 through 2009, approximately $13 billion (78 percent) was for operation and maintenance costs. Several factors--such as the possibility of keeping four Army brigades in Europe instead of two--could impact future costs. DOD is drafting guidance to require more comprehensive cost estimates for posture initiatives; however, these revisions will not require commanders to report costs, unrelated to posture initiatives, for DOD installations. GAO's prior work has demonstrated that comprehensive cost information is critical to support decisions on funding and affordability. Until DOD requires the combatant commands to compile and report comprehensive cost data in their posture plans, DOD and Congress will be limited in their abilities to make fully informed decisions regarding DOD's posture in Europe. EUCOM has developed an approach to compile posture requirements, but it does not have clearly defined methods for evaluating posture alternatives or routinely incorporating the views of interagency stakeholders. EUCOM has taken several steps to assign responsibilities for developing its posture plan and established an Executive Council to deliberate posture issues and work with the service component commands, but the process of developing a theater posture plan is relatively new and is not yet clearly defined and codified in command guidance. While EUCOM's steps to date have improved its ability to communicate with stakeholders and resolve conflicting views on posture issues, it has not been clearly defined and codified in command guidance. Furthermore, it does not provide for the analysis of costs and benefits, because the combatant commander has not been required to include such analysis in developing the theater posture plan. In addition, the Interagency Partnering Directorate--which was established by the EUCOM commander to improve interagency coordination within the command--has been included in the Executive Council, but EUCOM has not defined how interagency representatives can regularly participate in ongoing posture planning activities. As a result of these weaknesses in EUCOM's posture planning approach, the command is limited in its ability to consider and evaluate the cost of posture in conjunction with the strategic benefits it provides, and it may not be fully leveraging interagency perspectives as it defines future posture requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD revise posture planning guidance to require comprehensive estimates of posture costs and provide for consistent analysis of posture alternatives, and that EUCOM clarify its posture planning process and methods to regularly obtain interagency perspectives. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified corrective actions, but additional steps are needed to fully address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-48 | gao_GAO-11-48_0 | NSP 1 Grantees Overcame Challenges and Used a Variety of Strategies to Meet Obligation and Income-Targeting Requirements
Most Grantees Met the Deadline for Obligating Funds
HERA required NSP 1 grantees to obligate all of their funds within 18 months, creating a September 2010 deadline for most grantees. HUD data also show that 298 NSP 1 grantees obligated at least 25 percent of their grant funds for activities benefiting low-income households. For example, several grantees mentioned they had encountered competition from private investors in their efforts to acquire NSP-eligible properties. Several grantees also worked with banks’ “first look” programs, which gave them the opportunity to bid on bank-owned foreclosed properties before other potential buyers. HUD Has Taken Actions to Mitigate NSP 1 Program Risks through Training, Technical Assistance, and the Establishment of Internal Controls
As previously noted, HERA established specific program requirements for NSP 1 beyond those for CDBG, including an accelerated timeline for obligating funds and the requirement that grantees must use 25 percent of their NSP 1 funds to benefit households at or below 50 percent AMI. HUD officials said that some of the assistance grantees found useful was delivered using funds that HUD received well after the start of NSP 1. Additionally, CPD field office staff conducted on-site monitoring of 176 grantees (57 percent of NSP 1 grantees). HUD field offices conducted the majority of on-site monitoring from April through September 2010. We found no instances of significant noncompliance with the key NSP 1 requirements we reviewed for the 32 properties in our nonstatistical sample. HUD Adapted an Information System for NSP 1, but Data on Program Outputs Have Limitations
HUD Modified DRGR and Provided Training and Guidance
HUD made several modifications to DRGR—a system that was designed to assist in managing Disaster Recovery grants—in order to collect information for NSP 1 and subsequent rounds of the program. HUD also provided training and technical assistance to HUD field staff and NSP grantees that were unfamiliar with DRGR. Reporting Flexibilities and Shortcomings in HUD Guidance Have Limited the Usefulness of Output Data in DRGR
Although DRGR has been a useful tool for monitoring grantees’ obligations, variation in the way grantees were allowed to classify certain activities and select output measures in DRGR complicates the analysis of program outputs. Additionally, HUD officials said they were more focused on reporting outputs for “end uses” of NSP 1 funds, such as the number of housing units rehabilitated and demolished and the number of benefiting households. The assessment will focus primarily on the impacts of NSP 2—which funds the same types of activities as NSP 1—but will also incorporate the results of NSP 1 where the two rounds of the program overlap. While HUD has developed a method to resolve the overcounting issue, limitations in HUD’s written guidance to grantees and field staff may be contributing to variation in data entry and impairing HUD’s ability to accurately summarize program outputs. Similarly, HUD has not provided grantees with written guidance specifying the output measures they should select for different activity types. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Congress created the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), which is administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to help reduce the number of foreclosed and abandoned properties and restore depressed local housing markets. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) authorized the first phase of this program (NSP 1), providing $3.92 billion in grant funds to states and local governments. HERA mandated that GAO report on whether NSP 1 funds were being used in a manner consistent with criteria set forth in the act. To respond to this mandate we examined (1) grantees’ progress and challenges in meeting NSP 1 obligation time frames and income-targeting criteria, (2) HUD’s actions to mitigate program risks and ensure grantees’ compliance with key NSP 1 requirements, and (3) HUD’s efforts to collect program data and assess program performance. We reviewed HUD’s internal controls for NSP 1, including HUD’s guidance and procedures for monitoring grantee compliance with key program requirements. Additionally, we visited 8 grantees to conduct limited tests of compliance with key program requirements. We interviewed OIG staff about these audits and reviewed documentation on HUD’s actions to address the OIG’s recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) to help reduce the number of foreclosed and abandoned properties and restore depressed local housing markets. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) authorized the program's first round (NSP 1), providing $3.92 billion in grant funds to states and local governments. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administers the program. HERA mandated that GAO report on whether grantees were using NSP 1 funds in accordance with the act's criteria. For this mandate, GAO examined (1) grantees' progress and challenges in meeting NSP 1 obligation and income-targeting requirements, (2) HUD's actions to mitigate program risks and ensure grantees' compliance with key NSP 1 requirements, and (3) HUD's efforts to collect program data and assess program performance. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed HUD data and the information system used for NSP 1; interviewed HUD officials and representatives of NSP 1 grantees; analyzed HUD's internal control processes; and conducted limited tests of 8 grantees' compliance with key NSP 1 requirements.
What GAO Found
According to HUD data, the vast majority of the 309 NSP 1 grantees obligated their funds within the required 18-month time frame. As a result, over 99 percent of NSP 1 funds were obligated as of early October 2010. Also, consistent with HERA criteria, most grantees obligated at least 25 percent of their funds for housing for low-income households. Some grantees with whom GAO spoke modified their NSP 1 strategies to meet obligation deadlines and overcome other challenges such as competition from private investors in acquiring foreclosed and abandoned homes. For instance, with HUD approval, some grantees expanded the geographic areas they were targeting. Grantees also participated in banks' "first look" programs, which give grantees the chance to bid on bank-owned properties before other potential buyers. HUD provided training, guidance, and technical assistance to grantees to address new requirements and risks posed by NSP 1. Although the grantees GAO spoke with were generally satisfied with HUD's guidance and program support, some said these efforts would have been more useful if provided earlier. HUD officials said that some of the assistance grantees found useful was delivered using funds that HUD received well after the start of NSP 1. HUD also established various internal control processes for NSP 1 and hired additional staff to help oversee the program. HUD field office staff conducted remote monitoring of all grantees and on-site monitoring for 176 grantees that HUD considered to be higher risk. Although HUD is still aggregating the results of its on-site monitoring, available results from the four field offices GAO contacted generally showed compliance with key NSP 1 requirements but also found some financial management deficiencies. HUD is requiring grantees to take corrective actions, where appropriate. GAO's review of records for 32 properties at 8 grantees found no instances of significant noncompliance with key NSP 1 requirements. To collect information on NSP 1, HUD adapted an existing financial and information system--the Disaster Recovery Grant Reporting (DRGR) system--and provided training and guidance on its use. HUD has used the system to monitor NSP 1 grantees' obligations and summarize program outputs for specific types of activities (rehabilitation and construction, demolition, and homeownership assistance). However, variation in the way grantees entered information into DRGR makes it difficult to summarize outputs for each activity (e.g., housing units acquired) without undercounting, and overall outputs (e.g., total benefiting households) without overcounting. HUD has developed a method for addressing the overcounting problem, but insufficient guidance to grantees and HUD field staff may be contributing to variation in data entry that limits the usefulness of DRGR output information. For example, HUD has not provided grantees with specific written guidance on selecting output measures, which can lead to inconsistency among grantees. HUD is planning an assessment of NSP outcomes that will focus primarily on the program's second round (NSP 2) but will also include NSP 1 in geographic areas where the two phases of the program overlap.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HUD provide additional guidance to NSP grantees and HUD field staff to help ensure that information on output measures is collected in HUD's data system in a more consistent manner. HUD agreed with the report's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-67 | gao_GAO-11-67_0 | NNSA Has Not Fully Implemented Contingency and Disaster Recovery Planning and Testing for Its Classified Supercomputing Assets
Contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing for NNSA’s classified supercomputing systems have not been fully implemented at each of the three weapons laboratories—Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore. Until the agency fully implements a contingency and disaster recovery planning program for its classified supercomputing assets at the weapons laboratories, it has limited assurance that vital information can be recovered and made available to meet national security priorities and requirements. For example, the laboratory identified critical information technology resources for each of its classified supercomputing systems, but did not specifically identify the critical data. The supercomputers provide a necessary means to determine the effects of changes to current weapons systems and to determine a level of confidence in the performance of future untested systems. The classified supercomputing capabilities serve as the computational surrogate to nuclear weapons testing and are central to national security. All of the laboratories had backup processes in place. Not All Laboratories Had Developed and Tested Contingency and Disaster Recovery Plans
NIST guidelines and CNSS policies call for the development and testing of contingency plans and the development of disaster recovery plans for each information system to ensure that, in the event of a service disruption, the work and supporting functions of the agency can continue to be performed. The laboratories addressed disaster recovery planning to a limited extent; none specifically addressed the supercomputing environment. One of the laboratories—Los Alamos—had created testing guides but had not yet conducted formal testing. NNSA Component Organizations Were Unclear of Their Roles and Responsibilities for Providing Oversight
The aforementioned shortcomings existed, at least in part, because NNSA’s component organizations were unclear of their roles and responsibilities for providing oversight in the laboratories’ implementation of contingency and disaster recovery planning. Although the weapons laboratories have the ability to share supercomputing capacity, barriers exist. NNSA Does Not Track the Costs for Ensu ring Contingency and Disaster Recove Planning for Its Superco Assets
Although NNSA reported obligating approximately $1.7 billion from fisc 2007 through 2009 to implement its ASC program activities at the three weapons laboratories, the costs for ensuring the recovery of its classifie supercomputing operations are unknown. Conclusions
All three NNSA weapons laboratories have implemented some components of a contingency planning and disaster recovery program. NNSA, however, has not provided effective oversight to ensure that the laboratories have comprehensive and effective contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing. Although one laboratory’s analysis is not comprehensive and the other two laboratories have not completed a BIA, NNSA and the laboratories consider the consequence of loss of availability of the classified supercomputers as a low-risk impact, and do not consider them to be mission critical. In addit the laboratories have not tested offsite recovery capabilities and the agency has not tested the laboratories’ ability to share “on-demand” capacity if needed or determined the minimum capacity needed to meet Stockpile Stewardship Program requirements, particularly in the event that it may need to establish emergency processing priorities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess the extent to which (1) the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has implemented contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing for its classified supercomputing assets, (2) the three laboratories are able to share classified supercomputing capacity for recovery operations, should service disruptions occur, and (3) NNSA tracks the costs for ensuring contingency and disaster recovery planning for its classified supercomputing assets. We reviewed the weapons laboratories’ efforts to determine the minimal supercomputing capacity needed to meet NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program requirements along with the ability of the weapons laboratories to share supercomputing capacity on an “on- demand” basis, including the use of advanced architecture systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the absence of underground nuclear weapons testing, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) relies on its supercomputing operations at its three weapons laboratories to simulate the effects of changes to current weapons systems, calculate the confidence of future untested systems, and ensure military requirements are met. GAO was requested to assess the extent to which (1) NNSA has implemented contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing for its classified supercomputing systems, (2) the laboratories are able to share supercomputing capacity for recovery operations, and (3) NNSA tracks the costs for contingency and disaster recovery planning for supercomputing assets. To do this work, GAO examined contingency and disaster recovery planning policies and activities, and analyzed classified supercomputing capabilities at the weapons laboratories, and NNSA budgetary data.
What GAO Found
All three NNSA weapons laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore--have implemented some components of a contingency planning and disaster recovery program. NNSA, however, has not provided effective oversight to ensure that the laboratories have comprehensive and effective contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing. Further, due to lack of planning and analysis by NNSA and the laboratories, the impact of a system outage is unclear. Only one of the three laboratories--Los Alamos--had conducted a business impact analysis to assess the criticality of resources and acceptable outage time frames; yet, NNSA and all three laboratories consider the consequence associated with the loss of system availability to be low impact and do not consider the classified supercomputers to be mission critical. Nonetheless, NNSA classified supercomputing capabilities serve as a computational surrogate to nuclear weapons testing and are used to address other areas of national security. Despite the absence of business impact analyses, all laboratories had key components of a contingency planning program in place. However, shortcomings existed. For example, all laboratories had backup processes in place and had developed contingency plans, but the plans were not comprehensive. Specifically, one plan did not address the supercomputing operations, and none of the plans had been tested at the time of GAO's review. In addition, the laboratories addressed disaster recovery to a limited extent, but not specifically for the supercomputers. These shortcomings existed, at least in part, because NNSA's component organizations, including the Office of the Chief Information Officer, were unclear about their roles and responsibilities for providing oversight in the laboratories' implementation of contingency and disaster recovery planning. Until the agency fully implements a contingency and disaster recovery planning program for its weapons laboratories, it has limited assurance that vital information can be recovered and made available to meet national security priorities and requirements. Although the laboratories have the technological capability to share supercomputing capacity across all three weapons laboratories, barriers exist that could impede recovery operations. For example, the laboratories do not know the minimum supercomputing capacity needed to meet program requirements, such as simulating the effects of changes to weapons systems, should a disruption occur. In addition, the laboratories have not tested the technological capability to share the capacity on an on-demand basis for recovery operations. Without having an understanding of capacity needs and subsequent testing, the laboratories have little assurance that they could effectively share capacity if needed. Although NNSA obligated approximately $1.7 billion to help implement its classified supercomputing program from fiscal years 2007 through 2009, the agency has not tracked costs for contingency and disaster recovery planning and is uncertain of actual funds that were spent toward these efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that NNSA clearly define roles and responsibilities for its component organizations in providing oversight for contingency and disaster recovery planning for the classified supercomputing environment. NNSA agreed with most of GAO's recommendations, but did not concur with recommendations relating to capacity planning and cost tracking. |
gao_GAO-02-312 | gao_GAO-02-312_0 | In addition to periodic surveys, state survey agencies investigate complaints of inadequate care, including allegations of physical or sexual abuse. Although one of their primary missions is to investigate financial fraud and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, MFCUs also have authority to investigate the physical and sexual abuse of nursing home residents. Delays in Reporting Abuse Preclude Immediate Response by Law Enforcement or Survey Authorities
Most of the local police departments in the three states we visited told us that they were seldom summoned to a nursing home following an alleged instance of abuse. Abuse Allegations Not Immediately Reported to State Survey Agencies
Our review of 158 case files—mostly from 1999 and 2000—indicated state survey agencies were often not promptly notified of abuse allegations.While individuals filing complaints are not compelled to report allegations within a prescribed time frame, nursing homes in the states we visited are required to notify the state survey agency of abuse allegations the day they learn of the allegation or the following day. Only six of these entities represented organizations—such as long-term care ombudsmen—that are capable of pursuing abuse allegations. MFCU and local law enforcement officials indicated that nursing home residents are often unwilling or unable to provide testimony. CMS Employment Requirements and Background Checks Do Not Ensure Resident Protection
While CMS requires nursing homes to establish policies that prevent the hiring of individuals who have been convicted of abusing nursing home residents, this requirement does not include offenses committed against individuals outside the nursing home setting, nor does it specify that states conduct background checks on all prospective employees. By the time state survey agencies have determined that some aides are abusive, these aides may have already found employment in other homes. In addition, law enforcement authorities need to ensure that abusive individuals are prosecuted when appropriate, and survey agencies should recommend to CMS that available administrative sanctions be imposed against known abusers. We interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS ) regarding these requirements and also discussed their oversight of the state survey agencies responsible for surveying nursing homes and certifying their compliance with federal laws and regulations. To evaluate whether sufficient safeguards exist to protect residents from abusive individuals, we reviewed federal and state laws regarding criminal background check requirements for nursing home employees and state nurse aide registries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Often suffering from multiple physical and mental impairments, the 1.5 million elderly and disabled Americans living in nursing homes are a highly vulnerable population. These individuals typically require extensive help with daily living, such as such as dressing, feeding, and bathing. Many require skilled nursing or rehabilitative care. In recent years, reports of inadequate care, including malnutrition, dehydration, and other forms of neglect, have led to mounting scrutiny from state and federal authorities, which share responsibility for overseeing the nation's 17,000 nursing homes. Concerns have also been growing that some residents are abused--pushed, slapped, or beaten--by the very individuals to whom their care has been entrusted.
What GAO Found
GAO found that allegations of physical and sexual abuse of nursing home residents are not reported promptly. Local law enforcement officials said that they are seldom summoned to nursing homes to immediately investigate allegations of abuse and that few allegations are ever prosecuted. Some agencies use different policies when deciding whether to refer allegations of abuse to law enforcement. As a result, law enforcement agencies were never told of some incidents or were notified only after lengthy delays. GAO found that federal and state safeguards intended to protect nursing home residents from abuse are inadequate. No federal statute requires criminal background checks for nursing home employees. Background checks are also not required by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which sets the standards that nursing homes must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. State agencies rarely recommend that sanctions be imposed on nursing homes. Although state agencies compile lists of aids who have previously abused residents, which can prevent an aide from being hired at another nursing home, GAO found that delays in making these identifications can limit the usefulness of these registries. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see GAO-02-448T . |
gao_GAO-06-871T | gao_GAO-06-871T_0 | Together, according to USDA, these forest pests have the potential to cause the loss of trees valued at trillions of dollars. APHIS is the lead federal agency responsible for responding to insects and diseases that have entered the country and that might harm U.S. agriculture. Eradicating the Asian Longhorned Beetle Appears Likely, While Success on the Emerald Ash Borer and P. ramorum Is Less Promising
Evidence suggests that the Asian longhorned beetle will be eradicated, while the emerald ash borer and P. ramorum are likely to continue to infest and damage forest ecosystems indefinitely, despite efforts to control them. Many Factors Affect the Success of Eradication Efforts
The success of efforts to eradicate the Asian longhorned beetle, the emerald ash borer, and P. ramorum has been affected by factors relating to species biology, quarantines, detection and control technologies, and funding. Species Biology
Specific biological characteristics of each of the three pests greatly influence the potential success of eradication efforts. This approach has been used to eradicate infestations of the Asian longhorned beetle. Related to funding concerns, we found that timely updates to pest management plans for the three species have not always been available to provide decision makers and the public with current information about how recent developments—including funding reductions—will affect the prospects for success of the containment and eradication of these pests. The plans and their updates should incorporate and describe changes in the extent of the infestations, progress to date in control and eradication efforts, and long-term funding needs. Other Areas of Continued Vulnerability in Regard to Preventing the Arrival and Spread of Pests
In our work on the three forest pests and, more broadly, the coordination between USDA and DHS on invasive species prevention activities, we found vulnerabilities that we believe should be addressed to reduce the risk that new forest pests will arrive and spread. These vulnerabilities involve USDA’s overall forest health monitoring program and USDA’s and DHS’s management of port inspections. Urban areas are at high risk because they are common destinations for cargo and travelers that might be transporting pests. With the three pests we examined, as well as others, we have seen that delays in detection and identification allowed them to become established and spread before control efforts could begin. The first seeks to extend the agency’s normal forest sampling program, which traditionally has not sufficiently sampled urban forests. For example, we found that DHS has not developed or used a risk-based staffing model to ensure that adequate numbers of agricultural inspectors are staffed to ports and other areas of greatest vulnerability. In addition, despite an interagency agreement intended to facilitate coordination and communication between DHS and USDA, agricultural specialists are not consistently receiving notifications of changes to inspection policies and urgent inspection alerts. We also found that DHS has allowed its canine detection program (dogs trained to sniff out items that may harbor pests) to deteriorate. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Invasive forest pests have seriously harmed our environment and imposed significant costs on our economy. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the lead agency for responding to forest pests and coordinates with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prevent pests from entering the country. GAO issued two reports in 2006 on these programs. This testimony describes (1) the status of USDA's efforts to eradicate the Asian longhorned beetle, emerald ash borer, and Phytophthora ramorum; (2) the factors affecting the success of those eradication efforts; and (3) areas of continued vulnerability in regard to preventing the arrival and spread of forest pests.
What GAO Found
On the basis of the available evidence, it appears that the Asian longhorned beetle will be eradicated in the three states that have infestations, although funding reductions have extended the likely completion date. In contrast, the emerald ash borer and P. ramorum--the pathogen that causes Sudden Oak Death--are likely to continue to infest and damage forest ecosystems in the Midwest and on the West Coast, despite efforts to control them. The success of the federal responses to these infestations has been affected by several factors. First, the unique biological characteristics of each species greatly influences the ability to effectively control them. Second, quarantines have helped contain the spread of the pests, but implementing and enforcing quarantines has been difficult. Third, the only available method for eradicating these pests is to destroy infested trees and plants--a costly and sometimes impractical approach. Fourth, despite budgeting over $420 million to control these three pests, USDA program managers told GAO that funding has not been sufficient to fully implement their programs. We also found that USDA had not adequately prepared up-to-date management plans to provide decision makers and the public with current information on the extent of the infestation, eradication goals, and long-term funding needs. We identified areas of vulnerability that we believe increase the risk of future forest pest infestations. Specifically, we found that despite efforts to expand USDA's forest health monitoring programs, they do not adequately provide for comprehensive monitoring in urban forests or other locations considered at high risk from pest invasions. Monitoring in such areas is important because they are common destination points for internationally traded cargo, which is a frequent pathway for pests. Improvements could help prevent situations such as those experienced with the Asian longhorned beetle, the emerald ash borer, and P. ramorum, in which years of delay in detection allowed them to become established before control programs began. In our report on port inspections, we found that DHS has not used a risk-based staffing model to assign newly hired agricultural specialists to ports of entry. As a result, DHS does not have assurance that staff are assigned to areas of greatest vulnerability. In addition, despite an interagency agreement intended to facilitate coordination between DHS and USDA, agricultural specialists are not consistently receiving notifications of changes to policies and urgent inspection alerts in a timely manner. We also reported that DHS has allowed the canine inspection program--dogs trained to locate items that might harbor pests--to deteriorate. Dozens of canine units are vacant, and the proficiency scores of the remaining canine units have declined. |
gao_GAO-08-659T | gao_GAO-08-659T_0 | Redesign Implications for Decennial Census Operations
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. Prior to the redesigning effort, the Bureau had already changed its plans for the dress rehearsal, in part, to focus greater attention on the testing of technology. The redesign approach selected by the Secretary will require that the Bureau quickly develop and test a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation. Any paper-based option has its own set of unique issues, such as setting up operations to support paper field data collection centers and seeking printing solutions for enumerator forms. Dropping the use of the HHCs for nonresponse follow-up and reverting to paper for that operation this late in the decade also precludes nonresponse follow-up from being fully tested in the dress rehearsal. The Bureau has recently made efforts to further define requirements for the FDCA program, and it has estimated that the revised requirements will result in significant cost increases. Given the redesigning effort, implementing our recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing adequate risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. Redesign Implications for Decennial Census Life Cycle Costs
Even without considering the recent expected cost increases announced by the Bureau to accommodate the redesign of the FDCA program, the Bureau’s cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating trend from the 1970 Census. The Bureau estimated that the 2000 Census would cost around $5 billion. We have repeatedly reported that the Bureau would be challenged to control the cost of the 2010 Census. To manage the 2010 Census and contain costs, we recommended that the Bureau develop a comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census that should include the itemized estimated costs of each component, including a sensitivity analysis and an explanation of significant changes in the assumptions on which these costs were based. In response, the Bureau provided us with the 2010 Census Operations and Systems Plan, dated August 2007. The assumptions in the fiscal year 2009 President’s Budget life cycle cost estimate of $11.5 billion may not have included recent productivity data from last year’s address canvassing dress rehearsal. As the Bureau updates its estimate of the life cycle cost annually and as part of the redesigning effort, it will be important that it reflect changing assumptions for productivity and hours worked. The Bureau must solidify the FDCA program requirements, strengthen risk management activities, and plan and conduct critical testing of the Decennial Census systems. The challenges we highlighted today call for effective risk mitigation by the U.S. Census Bureau, and careful monitoring and oversight by the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, the Congress, GAO, and other key stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology (IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO's observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs.
What GAO Found
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. Last week Commerce announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to accommodate the Bureau's design. For example, Commerce has selected an option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers (HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators. Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO's recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA program is expected to result in significant increases to the life cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census. Even without considering the recent expected cost increases announced by the Bureau to accompany the redesign of the FDCA program, the Bureau's cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating trend from previous censuses. Previously, GAO recommended that the Bureau develop an integrated and comprehensive plan to manage operations. Specifically, to understand and manage the assumptions that drive the cost of the decennial census, GAO recommended, among other actions, that the Bureau annually update the cost of the 2010 Census and conduct sensitivity analysis on the $11.5 billion estimate. However, while the Bureau understands the utility of sensitivity analysis, it has not conducted such an analysis. |
gao_GAO-09-575 | gao_GAO-09-575_0 | According to ACS data from the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2007, about two-thirds of the adults who reported limited English speaking ability were Spanish speaking. Reported national enrollment was between 1.0 million and 1.2 million English language learners each reporting year from 2000 to 2007. Federal Support for Adult English Instruction Is Dispersed across Many Programs That Collect Little Data and Have Limited Coordination
English Language Instruction Is Authorized under Multiple Federal Programs with Varied Purposes, and Few Have Data on the Extent of Support
Federal support for adult English language learning is dispersed across a diverse array of programs within Education, HHS, and Labor, but most of the programs that allow it do so in support of other program goals, such as self-sufficiency, workforce attachment, or family literacy, and do not collect data that would indicate participation in or spending on adult English language learning. Yet, while Education, HHS, and Labor all serve populations in need of language assistance, there is no ongoing mechanism to share information or expand and capitalize on the agencies’ individual efforts. While most states did not distinguish the funding they provided for English language learning from the funding provided for other components of adult education, their financial contributions for adult education varied considerably. Some States and Local Providers Coordinated with Other Federally Funded Programs
Some state agencies that manage the Adult Education State Grant Program and the local providers they support have taken steps to coordinate with other federal- and state-funded programs that serve populations likely to need this help—particularly refugees, those seeking assistance through one-stops, and those receiving public financial support. Federal Agencies Have Undertaken Some Research, but Have Not Coordinated Research Planning across Agencies on Adult English Language Learning
At the time of our review, Education had one research study under way to test the effectiveness of a particular approach to adult English language learning, and Education and Labor had some ongoing work related to adult English language learners. Education officials said that there had been little research on what approaches are effective for adult English language learning, and that there are limited federal funds for rigorous research. However, while agencies cited a few efforts to collaborate on specific projects, they had not coordinated research planning across agencies to systematically leverage research resources for increasing the knowledge base regarding adult English language learning. To ensure the most efficient use of available research resources and to inform practitioners and other stakeholders in the area of adult English language instruction, we recommend that the Secretary of Education work with the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the National Institute for Literacy to implement a coordinated strategy for planning and conducting research on effective approaches to providing adult English language instruction and disseminating the research results. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) trends in the need for and enrollment in federally funded adult English language programs, (2) the nature of federal support for adult English language learning, (3) ways in which states and local public providers have supported English language programs for adults, and (4) federal agencies’ plans for research to identify effective approaches to adult English language learning. To determine ways in which states and local providers support English language learning for adults, we conducted semistructured telephone interviews with officials responsible for administering the Adult Education State Grants in the 12 states that we have previously mentioned. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of adults in the U.S. report that they speak limited English, and English language ability appears linked to multiple dimensions of adult life, such as civic participation and workforce participation and mobility. GAO examined (1) the trends in the need for and enrollment in federally funded adult English language programs, (2) the nature of federal support for adult English language learning, (3) ways in which states and local public providers have supported English language programs for adults, and (4) federal agencies' plans for research to identify effective approaches to adult English language learning. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Census and enrollment data and conducted interviews with federal officials within the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor and the National Institute for Literacy (NIFL); semistructured telephone interviews with state adult education officials in 12 states; site visits to 4 states; and reviews of relevant laws and literature.
What GAO Found
The number of adults who speak English less than very well grew by 21.8 percent between 2000 and 2007, to roughly 22 million. The Adult Education State Grant Program, the key federal program for adult English language instruction, reported enrollment of about 1.1 million English language learners in 2007--which had remained relatively stable since 2000. However, most state adult education grantees we contacted reported increased demand. Also, there are many federal programs that allow for adult English language instruction for which national enrollment data are not collected. Federal support is dispersed across diverse programs in Education, HHS, and Labor that allow for English language learning in pursuit of other goals and do not collect data on participation in English language learning or the amount of federal funding that supports it. The agencies have undertaken initiatives and provided technical assistance. However, while there has been some collaboration among federal offices on behalf of English language learning, there is no ongoing mechanism to share information on resources or strategies to expand and capitalize on the agencies' individual efforts. States GAO contacted generally did not distinguish funding for English language learning from the other components of adult education, but they did vary greatly in the state matching funds contributed to their programs. GAO found states and local providers collaborating with other federal- and state-funded programs that serve populations likely to need this help. Yet such ef-forts to coordinate were not universal, and some local providers said they did not know how to access additional instructional or financial resources. States and local providers also supported English language learning in various ways. Education had one research study under way to test the effectiveness of an approach to adult English language learning, and Education and Labor had some ongoing work related to adult English language learners. Education officials said that there had been little research on what approaches are effective for adult English language learning, and noted that federal funds for rigorous research are limited. However, while agencies cited efforts to collaborate, they had not coordinated research planning across agencies to leverage research resources for adult English language learning. |
gao_GAO-09-384 | gao_GAO-09-384_0 | Cervical cancer screening consists of pelvic exams and the Pap test. The guidance also allows states to use a broader definition of “screened under the program,” which includes extending Medicaid eligibility to (1) women screened by a CDC-funded provider within the scope of the state’s Early Detection Program, even if CDC funds did not pay for the particular service, or (2) women screened by a non– CDC-funded provider whom the state has elected to include as part of its Early Detection Program. CDC’s Early Detection Program Screens More Than Half a Million Women Annually, but Many Eligible Women Are Not Screened
The CDC’s Early Detection Program screened about half a million or more women for breast and cervical cancer annually from 2002 through 2006. Most States Extend Medicaid Eligibility to More Women Than the Minimum Required, but Some Women Are Still Excluded Based on Screening Source
Most states extend Medicaid eligibility under the Treatment Act to more women than is minimally required—those whose screening or diagnostic services were paid for with CDC funds. As of October 2008, 17 states reported applying only this minimum definition in determining Medicaid eligibility under the Treatment Act. The remaining 19 states further extend eligibility to women who were screened and diagnosed by non-CDC-funded providers. Seventeen states offer Medicaid eligibility only to women screened or diagnosed with CDC funds. In most of the states that limit Medicaid eligibility to women served with CDC funds or that extend eligibility to women served by a CDC-funded provider, once a woman who received her screening and diagnostic services outside the Early Detection Program is diagnosed with cancer, she cannot access Medicaid coverage under the Treatment Act. Medicaid Enrollment and Spending under the Treatment Act Vary across States
Medicaid enrollment under the Treatment Act varied widely in 2006, ranging from fewer than 100 women in each of South Dakota, Delaware, and Hawaii to more than 9,300 women in California. From 2004 to 2006, the median rate of enrollment growth was 40 percent among the 35 states reporting data for both years. Among the 39 states reporting Medicaid enrollment and spending data for 2006, total monthly spending per Treatment Act enrollee averaged $1,067, ranging from $584 in Oklahoma to $2,304 in Colorado. State eligibility policies and practices can also affect average spending. Few Statewide Alternatives to Medicaid Coverage for Treatment Are Available to Low- Income, Uninsured Women; Local Resources Offer Assistance in Some Areas
Among states that limit Medicaid eligibility under the Treatment Act to women screened with CDC funds or that extend Medicaid eligibility to women screened by a CDC-funded provider, few statewide alternatives to Medicaid coverage for treatment are available to low-income, uninsured women who are screened and diagnosed outside of the Early Detection Program. These programs pay specifically for breast or cervical cancer treatment or more broadly provide health insurance coverage or free or reduced-fee health care. The Maryland Breast and Cervical Cancer Diagnosis and Treatment Program pays specifically for breast and cervical cancer diagnosis and treatment services, according to our survey. These include donated care, funding from local charity organizations, and county assistance. For example, an Early Detection Program official in Indiana told us that densely populated areas of the state, such as North Central Indiana and South Bend, had multiple treatment resources, but women living in rural areas had limited access to them. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how many eligible women have been screened by the Early Detection Program, we compared the number of women screened by the Early Detection Program with the number of low-income, uninsured women eligible to be screened, including those who were screened by another provider or were not screened by any provider. We analyzed data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Minimum Data Elements (MDE) to determine the number of women screened by the Early Detection Program. To identify alternatives available to low-income, uninsured women who need treatment for breast or cervical cancer, but who are not covered under the Treatment Act, we obtained general information from our Web- based survey of Early Detection Program directors (described above). | Why GAO Did This Study
Tens of thousands of women die each year from breast or cervical cancer. While screening and early detection through mammograms and Pap tests--followed by treatment--can improve survival, low-income, uninsured women are often not screened. In 1990, Congress authorized the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to fund screening and diagnostic services for such women, which led CDC to establish the National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program. The Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000 was also enacted to allow states to extend Medicaid eligibility to women screened under the Early Detection Program and who need breast or cervical cancer treatment. Screened under the program is defined, at a minimum, as screening paid for with CDC funds. GAO examined the Early Detection Program's screening of eligible women, states' implementation of the Treatment Act, Medicaid enrollment and spending under the Treatment Act, and alternatives available to women ineligible for Medicaid under the Treatment Act. To do this, GAO compared CDC data on women screened by the Early Detection Program from 2002 to 2006 with federal estimates of the eligible population, surveyed program directors on the 51 states' (including the District of Columbia) implementation of the Treatment Act, analyzed Medicaid enrollment and spending data, and conducted case studies in selected states.
What GAO Found
The CDC's Early Detection Program providers screen more than half a million low-income, uninsured women a year for breast and cervical cancer, but many eligible women are screened by other providers or not screened at all. Comparing CDC screening data with federal estimates of low-income, uninsured women, GAO estimated that from 2005 through 2006, 15 percent of eligible women received a mammogram from the Early Detection Program, while 26 percent were screened by other providers and 60 percent were not screened. For Pap tests, GAO estimated that from 2004 through 2006, 9 percent were screened by the program, 59 percent by other providers, and 33 percent were not screened. Most states extend Medicaid eligibility under the Treatment Act to more women than is minimally required. As of October 2008, 17 states met the minimum requirement to offer Medicaid eligibility to women whose screening or diagnostic services were paid for with CDC funds; 15 extended eligibility to women screened or diagnosed by a CDC-funded provider, whether CDC funds paid specifically for these services or not; and 19 states further extended eligibility to women who were screened or diagnosed by a non-CDC-funded provider. In most of the states that offer Medicaid eligibility only to women served with CDC funds or by a CDC-funded provider, if a woman is screened and diagnosed with cancer outside the Early Detection Program, she cannot access Medicaid coverage under the Treatment Act. Medicaid enrollment and average spending under the Treatment Act vary across states. In 2006, state enrollment ranged from fewer than 100 women to more than 9,300. Median enrollment was 395 among the 39 states reporting data, with most experiencing enrollment growth from 2004 to 2006. Among the 39 states, average monthly spending per enrollee was $1,067, ranging from $584 to $2,304. Spending may vary due to several factors, including differences in state eligibility policies and practices and Medicaid benefit plan design. Few statewide alternatives to Medicaid coverage are available to low-income, uninsured women who need breast or cervical cancer treatment but are ineligible for Medicaid under the Treatment Act. Early Detection Program directors in only four of the states with more limited eligibility standards reported having a statewide program that pays for cancer treatment or provides broader health insurance or free or reduced-fee care. And while several sources identified possible local resources as alternatives--donated care, funding from local charity organizations, and county assistance--the availability and applicability of these resources varies by area. For example, an Early Detection Program official in Indiana told us that densely populated areas of the state had multiple treatment resources, but women living in rural areas had limited access to them. |
gao_GAO-01-280 | gao_GAO-01-280_0 | Conclusions
Congress provided agencies with substantial discretion in developing their section 223 civil penalty relief policies. Not surprisingly, the agencies used that discretion and developed policies that vary substantially. The agencies also varied in how key terms were defined and in their policies’ conditions and exclusions. This variability notwithstanding, all of the agencies’ policies and programs that we reviewed were within the discretion afforded to them by SBREFA. Agencies were allowed to limit the scope of their programs to only a portion of their enforcement actions against small entities, and they could decide not to give small entities any additional civil penalty relief. Agencies were also allowed to establish whatever conditions or exclusions they wanted for participation in their programs, subject to the requirements and limitations in other statutes. | What GAO Found
One of the ways that federal regulatory agencies enforce applicable statutes and regulations is through the imposition of civil monetary penalties for violations of those statutes and regulations. The amounts of the penalties imposed can vary substantially, depending on the limits specified in the applicable statutes or regulations and the degree to which the agencies impose the maximum fines permitted. Congress provided agencies with substantial discretion in developing their Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) policies. Not surprisingly, the agencies used that discretion and developed policies that vary substantially. The agencies also varied in how key terms were defined and in their policies' conditions and exclusions. This variability notwithstanding, all of the agencies' policies and programs that GAO reviewed were within the discretion afforded to them by the SBREFA Agencies were allowed to limit the scope of their programs to only a portion of their enforcement actions against small entities, and they could decide not to give small entities any additional penalty relief. Agencies were also allowed to establish whatever conditions or exclusions they wanted for participation in their programs, subject to the requirements and limitations in other statutes. |
gao_GAO-14-409 | gao_GAO-14-409_0 | Unserved and Underserved Areas Used Alternative Approaches and Considered Various Factors to Deploy Broadband
Alternative Ownership and Financing Approaches
Project sponsors we spoke with pursued various approaches for financing and deploying broadband in unserved and underserved areas that differed from more traditional commercial project models, such as those often built by incumbent providers in more urban areas. In particular, types of project sponsors included (1) municipalities, (2) non-traditional private providers, (3) a consortiums of sponsors in a region, and (4) cooperatives. Non-Traditional Private Providers
Private networks are eligible to receive federal funding but not all private networks discussed in this report received federal funding. Factors Considered
In making broadband deployment decisions, project sponsors told us they considered various factors related to their ability to fund successful projects, including the (1) likelihood of near-term service upgrades by incumbent broadband service providers; (2) potential demand for new service; (3) potential broadband technologies; and (4) existing infrastructure and potential local assistance for providers. Stakeholders Cited Economic, Legal, and Policy Issues in Deploying Broadband in Unserved and Underserved Areas
Economic
Stakeholders we contacted, including project sponsors, broadband providers, and industry experts, told us that broadband deployment projects in unserved and underserved areas face challenging economic issues. As noted above, remote areas generally have high costs to deploy broadband due to the expense of deploying technologies over long distances and potentially difficult terrain to often relatively few potential subscribers. Legal
Project sponsors and industry experts we contacted told us that some states have laws that limit or ban companies that are not telecommunications companies from deploying broadband, on the basis that it creates unfair competition. For example, in Vidalia, Louisiana, an official told us that state laws bar any municipality from deploying broadband directly to consumers, so the city is planning to build and own a new fiber-optic network, but will not offer retail service in order to comply with the law and avoid competing with incumbent cable and telephone companies. FCC Has Undertaken Various Efforts to Foster Broadband Deployment in Unserved Areas
As one of its primary goals, FCC has several efforts under way to increase broadband deployment, efforts that help to address the economic and policy issues raised by stakeholders. In particular, FCC established the Connect America Fund in the November 2011 USF Transformation Order to provide funds for voice and broadband capable networks in areas where there is no private business case to provide broadband—one of the key challenges to deploying broadband. 30, 2014 Technology Transition Order, FCC adopted an experiment in which it intends to solicit proposals from non-traditional providers, including utilities and municipalities, to deploy wireline or wireless technologies in rural, high-cost areas.receive Connect America Funds for projects in high-cost areas and must meet requirements similar to those of ETCs including providing service to all those in a designated service area, reduced rates for voice service plans for low-income populations, and the ability to operate during emergency situations. In addition, FCC has stated that it will collect information on viable business models that could support the deployment of fiber- optic or other next-generation wired technology in rural areas, despite the challenges in doing so. FCC plans to also gather information on the conditions under which consumers would prefer next-generation wireless services instead of wireline services. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FCC for its review and comment. FCC provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report provides information on (1) what is known about the alternative approaches unserved and underserved areas have used, or attempted to use, and some factors considered in broadband deployment decisions; (2) stakeholders’ views on broadband deployment issues in unserved and underserved areas; and (3) efforts FCC has undertaken to foster broadband deployment in unserved areas. While there may be valuable lessons in the examples profiled in our case studies, their limited number does not allow us to generalize findings to the broader universe of all entities seeking to deploy broadband networks. We also interviewed industry experts, incumbent providers, project sponsors, and stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Broadband service provides users with many opportunities to improve communications and broadband deployment is particularly critical in rural areas to provide advanced communications to remote users and communities. In 2010, FCC estimated that 7 million U.S. housing units—about 5 percent of the nation's housing units—did not have access to wireline broadband service, mostly in rural areas. Some municipalities, cooperatives, and non-traditional private providers are exploring ways to sponsor and fund broadband projects in unserved and underserved areas.
GAO was asked to provide information on options for broadband deployment in unserved and underserved areas. This report examines (1) what is known about the alternative approaches unserved and underserved areas have used to deploy broadband and some factors considered in deployment decisions; (2) stakeholders' views on broadband deployment in unserved and underserved areas; and (3) efforts FCC has undertaken to foster broadband deployment in unserved areas. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed FCC officials, representatives from industry, and incumbent providers. GAO also conducted an in-depth review of 21 geographically dispersed broadband projects selected to include various sponsor types, such as municipalities, non-traditional private providers, and cooperatives, and various ownership and financing approaches. GAO provided FCC with a draft of this report for comment. In response, FCC provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The unserved and underserved areas that GAO reviewed used alternative approaches and considered various factors to deploy broadband. Broadband project sponsors in those areas included municipalities, non-traditional private providers, consortiums of sponsors in a region, and cooperatives. In making broadband deployment decisions, project sponsors said they considered diverse factors related to their ability to fund successful projects, such as the (1) likelihood of near-term service upgrades by incumbent providers, (2) potential demand for new services, (3) potential broadband technologies, and (4) existing infrastructure and potential local assistance available to providers. For financing approaches, some project sponsors used local private and public funds while others leveraged federal funds. In addition, project sponsors used a variety of ownership structures that ranged from public ownership to local private investors.
Stakeholders and project sponsors GAO contacted cited economic, legal, and policy concerns in deploying broadband in unserved and underserved areas. For example, regarding funding, stakeholders said that remote areas generally face high broadband deployment costs due to the expense of deploying technologies over long distances or difficult terrain and that often the return on investment is low since there are relatively few potential subscribers in those areas. Project sponsors and industry experts noted legal concerns, including concerns with laws in some states that limit or ban companies that are not telecommunications companies from deploying broadband due to concerns about unfair competition. For example, in Louisiana, a city official GAO contacted said state laws bar any municipality from deploying broadband directly to consumers, so the city is planning to build and own a fiber-optic network, but to comply with the state law, will not offer retail service. Stakeholders also noted several policy concerns, including concerns over the accuracy of federal broadband-mapping efforts and whether the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) broadband-speed benchmark is set high enough. While there may be valuable lessons in the examples profiled in our case studies, their limited number does not allow us to generalize findings to the broader universe of all entities seeking to deploy broadband networks.
FCC has several efforts under way to increase broadband deployment in unserved areas, efforts that help address the economic and policy concerns raised by stakeholders. FCC established the Connect America Fund in November 2011 to support voice and broadband access in areas where no private business case exists to provide broadband—one of the key challenges these areas face in deploying broadband. Additionally, in January 2014, FCC adopted an order in which it stated that it will solicit proposals from non-traditional providers, including utilities and municipalities, to deploy broadband technologies in rural, high-cost areas. Through this effort, FCC plans to explore broadband policy issues and gather information on viable business models for deploying fiber-optic or next-generation wired technology in rural areas. FCC plans to also gather information on the conditions under which rural consumers would prefer next-generation wireless services over wireline. |
gao_GAO-03-183 | gao_GAO-03-183_0 | In 2000, Medicare SNF expenditures were $13 billion for services provided to 1.4 million Medicare patients. SNFs' Medicare margins were sufficiently high that, while Medicare's share of most SNFs' total patient days was relatively small, SNFs with higher Medicare margins generally had higher total margins, which reflect all SNF revenues and costs. Medicare Margins Generally High, Particularly in 2000 and for SNFs in Large For-Profit Chains and Those with High Occupancy
For their first 2 years under PPS, most freestanding SNFs reported positive Medicare margins, meaning that their payments more than covered their costs. In 1999, the median facility had a Medicare margin exceeding 8 percent, and over one-tenth had margins of 30 percent or more. By 2000, the median Medicare margin for freestanding SNFs had risen to nearly 19 percent, and almost one-quarter of SNFs had Medicare margins of 30 percent or more. At the same time, payments increased, as the temporary increases authorized by the Congress began to be implemented. Despite the expiration of two temporary Medicare payment increases and the completed transition from payments based on a facility's own costs to PPS rates, SNFs' positive Medicare margins are likely to continue. By contrast, the care for about two-thirds of patients was paid for by Medicaid with the remainder generally paid for by the patients themselves. With Medicare, the actual median total margin was 1.8 percent. The larger Medicaid's share of a SNF's patient days, the smaller its total margin. Reported Medicare Costs of Hospital- Based SNFs Substantially Exceeded Medicare Payments
In contrast to freestanding SNFs, hospital-based SNFs reported very negative Medicare margins after the introduction of the PPS. Unlike Freestanding SNFs, Most Hospital-Based SNFs Had Very Negative Medicare Margins
In 1999, about 90 percent of all hospital-based SNFs reported Medicare costs exceeding Medicare payments, and the median hospital-based SNF posted Medicare margins of –53 percent. Prior to the PPS, Medicare's payments to SNFs were based on each facility's own costs. In the first year of the PPS, hospital-based SNFs, unlike their freestanding counterparts, did not respond to the incentives in the PPS by reducing costs: compared to 1997, hospital-based SNFs' costs in 1999 were higher by $29 per day. Differences in Services and Accounting Practices May Contribute to Cost Differences between Hospital-Based and Freestanding SNFs
Some differences in costs between hospital-based and freestanding SNFs may also reflect differences in services in the two settings. In light of these accounting issues, reported costs of hospital-based SNFs, as well as margins calculated from these costs, should be treated cautiously. Freestanding SNFs, which treat most Medicare SNF patients, generally received Medicare payments that exceeded their costs, often by considerable amounts. The AHA representatives objected to our statement that the higher per diem costs of hospital-based SNFs could be partly due to the historical patterns of allocating overhead and other costs to the SNF. A Medicare margin for a SNF is based on the difference between its Medicare payments and its reported costs of serving Medicare patients. Skilled Nursing Facilities: Providers Have Responded to Medicare Payment System by Changing Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report addresses (1) the relationship between Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) payments and the costs of treating Medicare patients in freestanding SNFs, as well as the effect of Medicare SNF payments on the financial condition of these facilities, and (2) the relationship between Medicare SNF payments and the costs of treating patients in hospital-based SNFs, as well as the factors that may account for cost differences between hospital-based and freestanding SNFs.
What GAO Found
Under the prospective payment system (PPS), most freestanding SNFs Medicare payments substantially exceeded the costs of caring for Medicare patients, contributing to facilities' overall positive financial condition. In 1999, the first full year under the PPS, the median freestanding SNF Medicare margin--a measure that compares Medicare payments with Medicare costs--was slightly over 8 percent. By 2000, when the temporary payment increases authorized by the Congress started to take effect, the median Medicare margin had risen to almost 19 percent. However, nearly one-quarter of SNFs in 2000 had Medicare margins exceeding 30 percent, while about one-fifth had negative Medicare margins; that is, the payments they received from Medicare did not cover their costs of providing care. Medicare margins were higher for freestanding SNFs affiliated with large, for-profit nursing home chains and for those with high occupancy. The median SNF total margin--which reflects total revenues and costs across all patients--was 1.3 percent in 1999 and 1.8 percent in 2000. A SNF's total margin tended to be higher when its Medicare margin was higher despite the fact that, in most SNFs, Medicare's share of patient days was small. The total margins for freestanding SNFs tended to be lower when a higher proportion of a SNF's patients had their care paid for by Medicaid. Unlike freestanding SNFs, about 90 percent of hospital-based SNFs reported significantly negative Medicare margins after Medicare's new SNF payment system was launched. The median hospital-based SNF Medicare margin was --53 percent in 1999. Under the PPS, per diem payments to hospital-based SNFs dropped considerably, reflecting the change from payments based on a facility's own costs to fixed payments based on average costs for all facilities. At the same time, hospital-based SNFs reported per diem costs rose from 1997 through 1999. This is in contrast to the experience of freestanding SNFs, which had lower per diem Medicare costs than hospital-based SNFs prior to the PPS and reduced their costs further after the shift to the PPS. The higher Medicare costs reported by hospital-based SNFs may stem in part from differences in services provided to patients. The higher costs may also reflect the historical allocation of overhead costs to the SNF from the hospital, an accounting practice that, while consistent with the payment incentives under the prior cost-based reimbursement system, means that hospital-based SNFs reported costs should be treated cautiously. |
gao_GAO-04-582T | gao_GAO-04-582T_0 | In peacetime—when a reservist is training or performing military duty not related to a contingency operation—certain thresholds are imposed at particular points in service before a reservist is eligible to receive the same compensation as a member of the active component. Basic military compensation, in constant dollars, remained fairly steady during the 1990s but has increased in recent years. For example, an enlisted member in pay grade E-4 who is married with no other dependents (family size 2) earned $3,156 per month in basic military compensation in fiscal year 2003, compared with $2,656 per month in fiscal year 1999, or a 19 percent increase. In addition to increases in basic military compensation, other pay policies and protections may help to mitigate reservists’ financial hardship during deployment. We found that DOD lacked sufficient information on the magnitude, the causes, and the effects of income change to determine the need for compensation programs targeting reservists who meet three criteria: (1) fill critical wartime specialties, (2) experience high degrees of income loss when on extended periods of active duty, and (3) demonstrate that income loss is a significant factor in their retention decisions. This survey was conducted before the mobilizations occurring after September 11, 2001. DOD has tabulated the survey results and expects to issue a report with its analysis of the results by July 2004. Notable improvements have been made to the health care benefits for reservists and their families. As we have previously reported, given the federal government’s growing deficits, it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the longer term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further enhance military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For example, proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this context. Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program
While we have not specifically reviewed the use of reenlistment bonuses for reservists, our work has shown that DOD could improve the management and oversight of the SRB program with more methodologically rigorous evaluations. The SRB program is intended to help the services retain enlisted personnel in critical occupational specialties, such as linguists and information technology specialists. Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more active duty enlisted personnel. As a result of the services’ expanded use of SRBs for active duty personnel, the cost of the program more than doubled—from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to $791 million in fiscal year 2002. Despite increased use of the SRB program, DOD has cited continued retention problems in specialized occupations such as air traffic controller, linguist, and information technology specialist. On the basis of our work, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to (1) retain the requirement for an annual review of the SRB program and (2) develop a consistent set of methodologically sound procedures and metrics for reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of all aspects of each service’s SRB program administration. DOD concurred with the recommendations but has not yet taken actions to address them. Mail Delivery
Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their families at home. In the report, we will assess (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail delivery issues and problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom compare to those during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts to identify actions to resolve problems for future contingencies. Timeliness
The timeliness of the mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Even though the data shows otherwise, military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. Comparison With Operations Desert Shield/Storm
Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems were encountered. Efforts to Resolve Postal Problems
No single entity has been officially tasked to resolve the long-standing postal problems seen again during Operation Iraqi Freedom. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has deployed high numbers of active duty and reserve troops to fight the global war on terrorism and for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ensuring that U.S. military forces are adequately compensated and that the morale of deployed troops remains high have been priorities for the Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD). In response to congressional mandates, GAO has reviewed a number of issues concerning military personnel. For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the results of its work on military compensation for National Guard and Reserve personnel and on the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, a tool DOD can use to enhance retention of military personnel in critical occupational specialties. In addition, GAO was asked to provide its preliminary views, based on ongoing work, concerning mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East.
What GAO Found
Reservists who are called to active duty to support a contingency operation are eligible to receive the same pay and benefits as members of the active component. Moreover, in constant dollars, basic military compensation has increased in recent years. For instance, an enlisted reservist in pay grade E-4 who is married with no other dependents and who is called to active duty experienced a 19 percent increase in basic military compensation between fiscal years 1999 and 2003. Despite these increases, income loss is a concern to many reservists, although DOD has lacked timely, sufficient information to assess the full scope and nature of this problem. Benefits for reserve personnel have also improved, notably in the area of health care. As GAO has previously reported, given the federal government's growing deficits, it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the longer term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further enhance military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For example, proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this context. Although GAO has not specifically reviewed the use of SRBs to enhance reserve retention, GAO has noted shortcomings in DOD's management and oversight of the SRB program for active duty personnel. GAO's observations of this program may be helpful in making decisions for the use of SRBs for reservists. Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more active duty enlisted personnel in a broader range of military specialties, even though the program was intended to help the services meet retention problems in selected critical specialties. As a result, the cost of the program more than doubled in just 5 years--from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to $791 million in fiscal year 2002. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of SRBs in targeting bonuses to improve retention in selected critical occupations is unknown. DOD has not conducted a rigorous review of the SRB program. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations to institute more effective controls to assess the progress of the SRB program, but has not taken action as yet. Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their families at home. GAO has been reviewing mail delivery to deployed troops and expects to issue a report soon. GAO's preliminary findings show that mail delivery continues to be hampered by many of the same problems encountered during the first Gulf War. First, DOD does not have a reliable accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Second, despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate lessons learned into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the same problems, such as inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and transportation. Third, DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency operations. GAO plans to make several recommendations to improve DOD's mail delivery to deployed troops. |
gao_GAO-17-737 | gao_GAO-17-737_0 | According to UNHCR, registration is a key tool for providing protection to refugees. UNHCR uses ProGres to log and maintain biographic information such as names and family information, and uses the Biometric Identity Management System (BIMS) and IrisGuard to collect and store biometric information such as iris scans and fingerprints. The United States Refugee Admissions Process
State manages the USRAP admissions process in conjunction with DHS, and both agencies work with other government agencies, UNHCR, IOM, and various NGOs to process applications for refugees seeking resettlement to the United States. From fiscal year 2011 through June 2016, 61 percent of all refugee cases referred to the United States for resettlement consideration were referred by UNHCR, or roughly 405,000 referrals out of the 655,000 total. The resettlement application process continues at one of the nine RSCs. State Has Worked with UNHCR on Various Measures Designed to Ensure the Integrity of the Resettlement Referral Process
State and UNHCR have worked together on several measures designed to ensure integrity in the resettlement referral process. The organizations have developed a Framework for Cooperation to guide their partnership, emphasizing measures such as oversight activities and risk management. According to UNHCR officials, these visits have resulted in strengthening refugee protection and resettlement operations. UNHCR Has Various Procedures and Systems Designed to Help Ensure Program Integrity in the Resettlement Referral Process and Works with State to Implement Them
UNHCR has developed guidance documents, baseline SOPs, and identity management programs that it notes are meant to help ensure the integrity of their operations, including the refugee resettlement referral process. To Address Staff Fraud Risks, State and RSCs Have Taken Steps to Follow Many Leading Antifraud Practices but Could Improve Implementation of Controls and Assessment of Risk
State and RSCs report instituting a number of activities to combat the risk of fraud committed by RSC staff. State and RSCs Have Taken Steps to Combat Staff Fraud but Have Not Followed Some Leading Practices
To address instances of fraud committed by staff at RSCs, State and RSCs report instituting a number of antifraud activities, many of which correspond with leading practices identified in GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. All nine RSCs stated that they had assigned staff fraud risk management responsibilities to specific staff members. State and RSCs Report that RSCs Have Shared Information on and Designed Control Activities to Address Staff Fraud Risk, but Implementation Gaps Remain
To help prevent or mitigate fraud committed by staff at RSCs, State and RSC officials said that they had established collaborative relationships with both internal and external partners to share information, which is consistent with another leading practice identified in the Fraud Risk Framework. State works with RSCs to implement the control activities identified in the Program Integrity Guidelines to mitigate staff fraud risks. State required RSCs to comply with the original Program Integrity Guidelines by October 2014. Without requiring RSCs to conduct regular staff fraud risk assessments that are tailored to their specific operating environments and reviewing these assessments to examine the suitability of existing fraud controls, State may lack necessary information about staff fraud risks and therefore not have reasonable assurance that existing controls effectively reduce these risks. To reduce these risks, State and RSCs have instituted several antifraud activities, many of which correspond with leading antifraud practices. Pursuing efforts to ensure RSC compliance with these controls is essential to reducing the risks of staff fraud. To better identify risks from RSC staff fraud, the Secretary of State should direct the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration to update guidance, such as the Program Integrity Guidelines, to require each RSC to conduct regular staff fraud risk assessments that are tailored to each RSC’s specific operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to UNHCR, as of the end of 2015, more than 21 million people had become refugees. In fiscal year 2016, the United States admitted nearly 85,000 refugees. State manages the U.S. refugee admissions program (USRAP). UNHCR referred 61 percent of the refugees considered by the United States for resettlement from October 2011 to June 2016, and State worked with staff hired by nine RSCs to process their applications. Deterring and detecting fraud is essential to ensuring the integrity of USRAP.
GAO examined (1) how State works with UNHCR to ensure program integrity in the UNHCR resettlement referral process and (2) the extent to which State and RSCs follow leading practices to reduce the risk of fraud committed by RSC staff. GAO analyzed State and UNHCR data and documents; interviewed relevant officials; conducted fieldwork at UNHCR offices in Denmark, El Salvador, Jordan, Kenya, and Switzerland; interviewed senior officials from all nine RSCs; and visited RSCs in Austria, Jordan, Kenya, and a suboffice in El Salvador. This report is based on GAO-17-446SU , with certain sensitive information removed.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have worked together on several measures designed to ensure integrity in the resettlement referral process. State and UNHCR have established a Framework for Cooperation to guide their partnership, emphasizing measures such as effective oversight structures, close coordination, and risk management. Working with State, UNHCR has implemented standard operating procedures and other guidance that, according to UNHCR officials, provide baseline requirements throughout the referral process. UNHCR also uses databases to help verify the identities of and manage information about refugees. These systems store biographic information such as names, personal histories, and the types of persecution refugees experienced in their home countries. They also maintain biometric information, such as iris scans and fingerprints.
To reduce the risk of fraud committed by staff at the nine Resettlement Support Centers (RSC) worldwide, State and RSCs have instituted several antifraud activities, many of which correspond with leading antifraud practices, but key gaps remain. Overseen by State, the organizations that operate RSCs hire staff to process and prescreen applicants who have been referred for resettlement consideration. According to State and RSC officials, RSCs have experienced staff fraud. Officials said that instances of staff fraud are uncommon, but they illustrate risks to the integrity of RSC operations. To manage these risks, State and RSCs have established a number of activities consistent with leading antifraud practices. For example, officials from all nine RSCs stated that they assign staff fraud risk management responsibilities to designated individuals. State has also worked with RSCs to develop and implement controls to ensure program integrity. However, RSCs face challenges implementing some of these controls. Additionally, State has not required RSCs to conduct regular staff fraud risk assessments tailored to each RSC or examined the suitability of related control activities. Without taking additional steps to address these issues, State and RSCs may face challenges in identifying new staff fraud risks or gaps in the program's internal control system as well as designing and implementing new control activities to mitigate them.
What GAO Recommends
To better assess and manage risks of fraud committed by staff at RSCs, State should actively pursue efforts to ensure RSCs comply with program integrity measures; require each RSC to conduct regular risk assessments tailored to its operations; and use these assessments to design, implement, and revise control activities to mitigate risks of staff fraud. State agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-716 | gao_GAO-09-716_0 | 1). However, complex plans and plans with missing data have required more time to process—up to 9 years, in some instances (the full time span we examined). PBGC Makes Most Benefit Determinations in Less than 3 Years
PBGC becomes the trustee of most plans within 10 months of termination and, once it has assumed trusteeship of a plan, the agency takes slightly less than 3 years to process most benefit determinations and notify participants of their final benefit amount. Nevertheless, nearly three-quarters of the benefit determinations that took 4 or more years to process were for participants in just 10 of the 1,089 plans terminated and trusteed during fiscal years 2000 through 2008, as shown in figure 6. Although nearly two-thirds of the plans we examined did not have any participants with qualified domestic relations orders, several of the ten plans associated with the lengthiest processing times had numerous participants with such orders. New Initiatives to Shorten the Benefit Determination Process Do Not Address Longest Delays
PBGC officials have taken steps to shorten the benefit determination process, although these initiatives do not specifically address complex cases. As summarized in table 2, of the 10 plans with the greatest number of overpayments, 9 also had large numbers of participants, including many who were subject to the guarantee limits and who were retired and receiving estimated benefits. Ultimately, this retiree’s payment was reduced by almost two-thirds, mostly due to guarantee limits. Although these cases accounted for fewer than 10 percent of those with overpayments, the amounts they owed accounted for more than 40 percent of total recoupments. It has reduced the average amount of time to decide an appeal by almost a year and has cut the average amount of time needed to resolve all appeals- related inquiries in half. PBGC Does Not Readily Provide Key Information that Could Help Avoid Unnecessary Appeals
Although some appellants have successfully used the appeals process to increase their benefits, PBGC is not readily providing key information that would be helpful to participants in deciding whether or not to pursue an appeal. Plan provisions and guarantee limitations are often complicated, and it may be difficult for the average individual to interpret PBGC’s benefit calculations, especially for complex plans. Recommendations
To improve PBGC’s benefit determination process, a more strategic approach is needed to prepare for and manage the calculation of benefit amounts and communications with participants in cases involving large, complex plans. We analyzed the individual level data on benefits, by case, to determine the length of time it takes PBGC to make benefit determinations and the extent to which overpayments affect retirees’ benefits. Most private sector defined benefit plans do not require or allow participant contributions. In addition, both Bethlehem Steel and RTI (but not US Airways) were among the 10 plans most affected by processing delays and by overpayments. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the insurer of over 29,000 private sector defined benefit plans, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) may be required to assume responsibility for the plans of a growing number of companies filing bankruptcy due to the recession. Concerns about PBGC's benefit determination process, reductions in benefits due to guarantee limits, and workers' retirement security overall led the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, among others, to ask GAO to study: (1) how long it takes PBGC to make benefit determinations; (2) the extent of overpayments on retirees' benefits; (3) how well PBGC communicates with participants; and (4) the timeliness and accessibility of the appeals process. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed PBGC policies and procedures, analyzed automated data and case files, and interviewed PBGC officials and certain associations, participants, and their representatives from among those most affected by the process.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of plans terminated with insufficient funds and trusteed by PBGC during fiscal years 2000 through 2008 revealed that a small number of complex plans--especially those with large numbers of participants affected by limits on guaranteed benefit amounts--accounted for most cases with lengthy delays and overpayments. Processing times. PBGC completed most participants' benefit determinations in less than 3 years, but required more time--up to 9 years--to process determinations for complex plans and plans with missing data. Nearly three-quarters of the lengthiest processing times were associated with individuals in just 10 of the 1,089 plans reviewed. Although PBGC has taken steps to shorten this process, its initiatives do not address the longest delays. Overpayments. Although many participants are affected by sizable benefit reductions, the vast majority are not affected by overpayments. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of overpayments involved participants in just 10 plans. In cases with overpayments, PBGC's policy generally requires participants' benefits to be reduced by no more than 10 percent until the amount owed is repaid, but due to participants' ages, the full amount often is never recouped. Communication. PBGC has made efforts to improve communication, but key correspondence often did not meet the needs of those in complex plans. For example, when the process was lengthy, PBGC did not communicate with some participants for several years. When the benefit calculation was complicated, PBGC did not provide explanations that could be understood without further information or assistance. Appeals. Since restructuring the appeals process in 2003, PBGC has reduced the average amount of time needed to decide an appeal by almost a year. However, the agency does not readily provide key information that would be helpful to participants in deciding whether to pursue an appeal. |
gao_HEHS-98-229 | gao_HEHS-98-229_0 | States are also expected to develop estimates of treatment need on a statewide and local basis and report them to CSAT in their block grant applications and through STNAP. Under the 1992 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act (P.L. Through STNAP, CSAT provides states with funding and technical assistance to conduct studies to determine the need and demand for substance abuse treatment in relation to the states’ resource availability. NHSDA Limitations Affect the Accuracy of National Estimates of Drug Abuse Treatment Need
Although OAS relies primarily on NHSDA to make national estimates of drug abuse treatment need for the general population and certain subpopulations, the survey has limitations that can lead to underestimates of treatment need. OAS’ Adjusted NHSDA Data Provide a Higher Estimate of Treatment Need by Compensating for Some Undercounting
To partially account for NHSDA’s undercoverage of hard-to-reach populations and underreporting of drug use by survey respondents, OAS developed a methodology that substitutes data from sources presumed to be more reliable. Using this methodology, OAS estimated that in 1995, about 8.9 million people in the United States needed drug abuse treatment compared with the 6.9 million estimate—including 2.6 million women—derived solely from NHSDA. While this adjustment results in a treatment need estimate that is about 29 percent higher than the estimate based on only NHSDA data, it still results in conservative estimates of treatment need. A regression model OAS developed in 1996 uses NHSDA sample data and local area indicators to estimate state-level drug prevalence and treatment need. SAMHSA expects the expanded NHSDA to improve its prevalence estimates of drug abuse in the 50 states and the District of Columbia—one of the goals included in its 1999 performance plan. However, SAMHSA officials and other experts believe that more validation is needed overall in the methods used to estimate drug abuse treatment need. Our review of needs assessment information in states’ fiscal year 1997 block grant applications found the data to be incomplete and of questionable quality. According to SAMHSA, this is due, in part, to states’ lack of sufficient data and resources to complete the extensive amount of data required in block grant applications. Although one of SAMHSA’s performance goals is to increase to 80 percent the proportion of state applications that include STNAP needs assessment data, SAMHSA did not provide any information in the performance plan on how it will increase state reporting or verify the data reported by states in block grant applications. While SAMHSA has efforts under way to improve its national estimates through the expansion of NHSDA, the survey is still likely to result in an underestimate of treatment need. Even though states are required to provide estimates of treatment need as part of their block grant applications, not all states report this information and some of the data reported are inaccurate. (See tables 1 and 2.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the need for drug abuse treatment, focusing on: (1) the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's (SAMHSA) efforts to estimate drug abuse treatment need on a national basis, including estimates of subpopulations, and possible limitations of these efforts; and (2) state estimates of drug abuse treatment need.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SAMHSA's national estimates of drug abuse treatment need are primarily derived from the agency's National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA); (2) while NHSDA is the principal measure of the prevalence of illicit drug use in the United States, SAMHSA and others have recognized that certain survey limitations affect the accuracy of need estimates, which may result in an underestimate of treatment need; (3) NHSDA's reliance on self-reported data likely results in underreported drug use; (4) to compensate for these limitations, in 1996, SAMHSA developed a method for assessing treatment need that adjusts NHSDA prevalence data with other data sources, including crime reports and treatment facility data; (5) SAMHSA estimated that in 1995, about 8.9 million people in the United States needed treatment for an illicit drug, compared to its estimate of 6.9 million derived solely from NHSDA data; (6) beginning in 1999, SAMHSA will expand NHSDA to provide better national drug use estimates of subpopulations and to provide state estimates of prevalence and treatment need; (7) in any case, these adjustments will only partially correct NHSDA's limitations and are likely to still result in an underestimate of treatment need; (8) states use various methods to develop estimates of treatment need, which are used to help make planning and resource allocation decisions; (9) states are required to report these estimates in applications for federal block grant funds for substance abuse prevention and treatment; (10) GAO's review of fiscal year (FY) 1997 block grant applications show that not all states submitted such data, and of those that did, some submitted incomplete or inaccurate data; (11) according to SAMHSA, the incomplete and inaccurate data are due, in part, to states' lack of sufficient data and resources to complete block grant applications; (12) in response to prior concerns about the lack of state and substate estimates of treatment need, the State Treatment Needs Assessment Program (STNAP), administered by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), was initiated in 1992; (13) under 3-year contracts with CSAT, states are provided financial and technical assistance for conducting needs assessments and developing estimates of treatment need to include in their block grant applications; and (14) SAMHSA has established the improvement of state STNAP needs assessment reporting as a goal in its FY 1999 performance plan. |
gao_GAO-07-459T | gao_GAO-07-459T_0 | DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Has Not Issued a Strategy for Securing the Transportation Sector
DHS has made progress in assessing the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system, but has not issued a plan based on those risk assessments for securing the entire transportation sector and supporting plans for each mode of transportation, including passenger rail. We reported that, until all three assessments of passenger rail systems—threat, criticality, and vulnerability—have been completed, and until TSA determined how to use the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize the level of risk (high, medium, or low), it will be difficult to prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about protecting them. We also reported in September 2005 that DHS was developing, but had not yet completed, a framework intended to help TSA, OGT, and other federal agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. Until TSA issues the TSSP and modal plans, the agency lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including passenger rail. Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security, Improve Federal Coordination, and Develop Industry Partnerships
In addition to ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March 2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. For example, TSA tested rail security technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. In addition, TSA established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each mode of transportation to develop security policies and partnerships with industry stakeholders, including passenger rail and other surface modes. Further, in September 2006, FRA’s and TSA’s roles and responsibilities for compliance inspections were outlined in an annex to the existing memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT. TSA Has Reported Taking Additional Actions to Strengthen Passenger Rail Security, Improve Coordination with DOT, and Develop Industry Partnerships In January 2007, TSA identified additional actions they had taken to strengthen passenger rail security. Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Were Not Used in the United States
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we identified three foreign practices that were not currently in use among the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted as of September 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a government- sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S. could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. Conclusions
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the 2005 London rail bombings and the 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlight the inherent vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack. Moreover, securing rail and other surface transportation systems is a daunting task, requiring that the federal government develop clear strategies that are based on an assessment of the risks to the security of the systems, including goals and objectives, for strengthening the security of these systems. TSA has also taken steps improve coordination with federal, state, and local governments, and has reported taking steps to strengthen partnerships with passenger rail industry stakeholders to enhance the security of the passenger rail system. Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 London subway bombings and 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected program updates obtained in January 2007. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessments for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail; (2) the actions that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, improve federal coordination, and develop industry partnerships; and (3) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to enhance security.
What GAO Found
The DHS Office of Grants and Training and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the passenger rail system. However, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail. We found that, until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. We also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, TSA has not yet issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans for passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on risk assessments. Until TSA does so, the agency lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. TSA has also taken steps to strengthen coordination with DOT and develop partnerships with industry stakeholders. DHS and DOT have updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. TSA also established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each transportation mode to develop security policies and work to strengthen industry partnerships for passenger rail and other surface modes. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has also reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security and working to develop a clearinghouse of security technologies. |
gao_GAO-15-546T | gao_GAO-15-546T_0 | Accordingly, in preparation for the 2020 Census, the Bureau has been researching and testing new methods and technologies to more cost- effectively count the population while maintaining high-quality results. The Bureau is also conducting tests in 2015 that are expected to inform the design decision, including the Address Validation Test, which was completed in early 2015 and was used to examine new methods for updating the Bureau’s address list; the 2015 Census Test, which is currently being conducted in Arizona to test, among other things, reengineered non-response follow-up field operations, as well as enabling enumerators to use their personally owned mobile devices to collect census data; and the Optimizing Self Response Test, which is currently being conducted in Savannah, Georgia, and the surrounding area and is intended to further explore methods of encouraging households to respond using the Internet, such as using advertizing and outreach to motivate respondents, and enabling households to respond without a Bureau-issued identification number. Key Challenges Need to Be Addressed before Potential Cost Savings Can Be Realized
The Bureau has been making important progress in researching and testing various design options associated with four interrelated cost- savings initiatives: using data previously provided to the government to help enumerate the population, updating the Bureau’s address list and maps of the nation, only where needed, reengineering management of field work, and maximizing self-response. In November 2013, we also reported on weaknesses in the Bureau’s scheduling practices related to its address list development activity. Reengineering the Management of Field Operations
The Bureau is researching and testing ways to more efficiently and effectively manage its multiple field operations for the 2020 Census. In our February 2015 report, we recommended that the Bureau update estimated costs for the Internet response option and ensure future cost estimates are reliable, develop methodologies for answering key research questions, and establish high-level time frames for cloud computing decisions. For example, the Bureau stated that it planned to revise the 2020 Census cost estimate once the September 2015 design decision is made. Major 2020 Census Cost- Saving Initiatives Rely on, among Other Things, Effective Implementation of a Large and Complex IT Development Effort
In October 2014, the Bureau initiated an enterprise-wide IT initiative called the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP) program, which is intended to deliver a “system of systems” to serve all of the Bureau’s survey data collection and processing functions—rather than continuing to build and maintain unique, survey-specific systems with redundant capabilities. Most importantly for the 2020 Census, CEDCAP is expected to deliver the systems and IT infrastructure needed to implement the Bureau’s cost-savings initiatives. The Bureau has made progress in practices related to IT governance and requirements management, but more work is needed to address critical workforce gaps and information security. The Bureau has made progress in strengthening these areas in response to recommendations we made in September 2012. The Bureau’s efforts to monitor the status of its efforts to close these competency gaps will be critical to ensuring the Bureau has the skills it needs to effectively deliver IT solutions for the 2020 Census. However, with only 3-and-a-half years remaining until the Bureau plans to have all systems and processes for the 2020 Census developed and ready for end-to-end system testing, the magnitude of the planned changes, the Bureau’s prior track record, and existing challenges, the 2020 Census program faces significant risk. Moreover, the Bureau needs to take action to address the specific challenges we have highlighted in prior reports. If these actions are not taken, cost overruns, schedules delays, and performance shortfalls may diminish the potentially significant cost savings that the Bureau estimates will result from redesigning the census for 2020. | Why GAO Did This Study
The cost of the decennial census has steadily increased each decade, with the 2010 Census being the most costly in history, totaling approximately $13 billion. If the growth rate continues, the 2020 Census could cost approximately $25 billion (in constant 2010 dollars). In an effort to contain costs while continuing to ensure an accurate enumeration, the Bureau is researching and testing new methods and technologies.
This September, the Bureau plans to announce its preliminary design for the 2020 Census, and in October 2018 the Bureau plans to have all systems and processes for the 2020 Census developed and ready for operational testing. As Census Day 2020 gets closer, the margin for schedule slippages is becoming increasingly narrow.
GAO was asked to testify on the Bureau's progress in implementing cost-savings initiatives and associated challenges for the 2020 Census. To prepare this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area over the last several years.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau (Bureau) has research and testing efforts well under way to support reforming aspects of the 2020 Census in order to contain costs. The table below briefly describes the four main cost-saving initiatives and the Bureau's associated savings estimates.
However, the Bureau faces significant challenges and unanswered questions related to these initiatives and their associated cost savings. For example, the Bureau needs to finalize decisions on: the use of data records from other government agencies; more cost-effectively maintaining complete and accurate map and address data; and the use of technology to more efficiently manage field operations. The Bureau also needs to take action on GAO's recommendations to develop reliable cost estimates and time frames for key decisions related to deploying the Internet self-response option.
The successful execution of the 2020 Census also depends on the effective implementation of a large and complex information technology (IT) development effort. This effort—the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing program—is intended to result in an interconnected set of systems to serve all the Bureau's data collection and processing functions, including the systems and infrastructure needed to support the 2020 Census cost-savings initiatives. But as GAO has reported, the Bureau has not always prioritized key testing and research activities needed to inform IT system development. GAO has also previously found weaknesses in the Bureau's management of IT , and made recommendations to address them. In response, the Bureau has made important improvements in the areas of governance, system development methodologies, requirements management, and workforce planning. However, more work remains to ensure that it has the critical skills needed to effectively deliver IT solutions and that its systems and information are protected from unauthorized access or tampering.
The Bureau needs to take action to address the recommendations GAO has made in prior reports. If these actions are not taken, cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls will likely diminish the potential cost savings that the Bureau estimates will result from redesigning the census for 2020.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior work, GAO made 121 recommendations to, among other things, assist the Bureau in planning for its Internet response option, completing key research and testing activities, and improving its IT management and security. The Bureau generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-602 | gao_GAO-02-602_0 | These copayments, which are the same for men and women, vary depending on the plan option and providers selected. DOD Health Care Services for Women
In addition to the range of health care services offered to all DOD beneficiaries, TRICARE provides health care services targeted specifically to women. Most Women Beneficiaries Are Satisfied With DOD’s Health Care Benefit, but Some Concerns Exist
Overall, women beneficiaries report being satisfied with the TRICARE health care benefit, but some have concerns about the type of care they receive. For active duty women, concerns also stem from the attitudes and the climate established by the command personnel who may not understand women’s health care needs. For example, some women beneficiaries do not understand the importance of physical exams and preventive screenings such as Pap smears and mammograms. In addition, the TRICARE benefit requires some beneficiaries to share in the cost of their health care—a characteristic also found in the FEHBP plans we reviewed. We reviewed selected health care plans under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) to compare the covered benefits with those provided by TRICARE. | What GAO Found
Half of all beneficiaries in the Department of Defense's (DOD) Tricare health care program are women. With a health care system historically oriented towards men, DOD has had to work to ensure that its women beneficiaries receive the full range of medical services they are entitled to, including obstetrical and gynecological care and diagnostic services such as Pap smears and mammograms. TRICARE-covered benefits are in line with American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists guidelines and are comparable to women's health benefits offered by two of the largest health plans under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). DOD also requires some beneficiaries to share in the cost of their health care. Both DOD's and FEHBP's copayments, which are the same for men and women, vary depending on the plan option and the providers selected. Women beneficiaries report being satisfied with the health care benefits they receive under TRICARE. Some women beneficiaries, however, have expressed concerns about obtaining services when they are stationed overseas or in remote areas. Some active duty women are also concerned that command personnel may not understand women's health care needs. |
gao_GAO-09-310T | gao_GAO-09-310T_0 | Today’s Financial Regulatory System Was Built over the Course of More Than a Century, Largely in Response to Crises or Market Developments
As a result of 150 years of changes in financial regulation in the United States, the regulatory system has become complex and fragmented. Today, responsibilities for overseeing the financial services industry are shared among almost a dozen federal banking, securities, futures, and other regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies. Changes in Financial Institutions and Their Products Have Significantly Challenged the U.S. Financial Regulatory System
Several key developments in financial markets and products in the past few decades have significantly challenged the existing financial regulatory structure. Regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by these conglomerates, and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. A second dramatic development in U.S. financial markets in recent decades has been the increasingly critical roles played by less-regulated entities. In particular, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Finally, with the increasingly global aspects of financial markets, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Alternatives for Reforming the U.S. Financial Regulatory System
As a result of significant market developments in recent decades that have outpaced a fragmented and outdated regulatory structure, significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are critically and urgently needed. The current system has important weaknesses that, if not addressed, will continue to expose the nation’s financial system to serious risks. Our report offers a framework for crafting and evaluating regulatory reform proposals; it consists of the following nine characteristics that should be reflected in any new regulatory system. By applying the elements of this framework, the relative strengths and weaknesses of any reform proposal should be better revealed, and policymakers should be able to focus on identifying trade-offs and balancing competing goals. Similarly, the framework could be used to craft proposals, or to identify aspects to be added to existing proposals to make them more effective and appropriate for addressing the limitations of the current system. 1. 2. As we noted in our report, gaps in the current level of federal oversight of mortgage lenders, credit rating agencies, and certain complex financial products such as CDOs and credit default swaps likely have contributed to the current crisis. 3. Efficient and effective. Key issues to be addressed: Consider the appropriate role of the states in a financial regulatory system and how federal and state roles can be better harmonized. Such efforts are under way in other jurisdictions. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's January 8, 2009, report that provides a framework for modernizing the outdated U.S. financial regulatory system. GAO prepared this work under the authority of the Comptroller General to help policymakers weigh various regulatory reform proposals and consider ways in which the current regulatory system could be made more effective and efficient. This testimony (1) describes how regulation has evolved in banking, securities, thrifts, credit unions, futures, insurance, secondary mortgage markets and other important areas; (2) describes several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades that have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework that can be used by Congress and others to shape potential regulatory reform efforts.
What GAO Found
The current U.S. financial regulatory system has relied on a fragmented and complex arrangement of federal and state regulators--put into place over the past 150 years--that has not kept pace with major developments in financial markets and products in recent decades. Today, almost a dozen federal regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies share responsibility for overseeing the financial services industry. As the nation finds itself in the midst of one of the worst financial crises ever, it has become apparent that the regulatory system is ill-suited to meet the nation's needs in the 21st century. Several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system. First, regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by large and interconnected financial conglomerates and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. Second, regulators have had to address problems in financial markets resulting from the activities of large and sometimes less-regulated market participants--such as nonbank mortgage lenders, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies--some of which play significant roles in today's financial markets. Third, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Finally, as financial markets have become increasingly global, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. These significant developments have outpaced a fragmented and outdated regulatory structure, and, as a result, significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are critically and urgently needed. The current system has significant weaknesses that, if not addressed, will continue to expose the nation's financial system to serious risks. Our report offers a framework for crafting and evaluating regulatory reform proposals consisting of nine characteristics that should be reflected in any new regulatory system. By applying the elements of the framework, the relative strengths and weaknesses of any reform proposal should be better revealed, and policymakers should be able to focus on identifying trade-offs and balancing competing goals. Similarly, the framework could be used to craft proposals, or to identify aspects to be added to existing proposals to make them more effective and appropriate for addressing the limitations of the current system. |
gao_GAO-13-661 | gao_GAO-13-661_0 | However, DOD did not agree with our recommendation. DOD Has Collected a Majority of Required Reports on the Results of Equipment- Related Corrosion Projects and Is Taking Steps to Obtain Those Outstanding
DOD’s Corrosion Office has collected a majority of required final and follow-on reports from project managers on the results of equipment- related corrosion projects and is taking steps to obtain outstanding reports. Project managers had submitted the required final reports for 55 of the 88 projects (about 63 percent) funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. We found that 55 of the 88 required final reports (63 percent) for projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 had been submitted. DOD Collects Information on the Benefits of Corrosion Projects, but Is Not Always Reporting Details of the Benefits or Determining Whether Projects Achieve Their Estimated ROI
DOD requires the military departments to collect and report key information from corrosion projects about new technologies and methods to prevent and mitigate corrosion in military equipment to the Corrosion Office; however, DOD does not have complete information about the benefits of all of its projects and is sometimes unable to determine whether projects achieve their estimated ROI. On the basis of the identified challenges, Corrosion Office officials stated that they plan to revise the strategic plan to eliminate the guidance on validating the ROI and to provide revised guidance on how the project managers should be reassessing the ROI. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight, but Does Not Have a Comprehensive Overview of the Status of All Equipment-Related Corrosion Projects
DOD has taken steps to improve oversight of its equipment-related corrosion projects, such as revising its DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan to provide additional guidance on reporting requirements. While the reports provide the status for each project, GAO found that the Corrosion Office does not consolidate information to monitor the status of all these projects, such as if a project has not transitioned to service use or has been discontinued. Further, we found that project managers vary in how they reported the ROI for discontinued projects. DOD Has Incorporated Lessons from Equipment- Related Corrosion Projects, but Does Not Have a Comprehensive Database to Share Lessons of All Projects
The military departments have identified lessons learned from their equipment-related corrosion projects and shared some lessons with corrosion-related personnel; however, DOD has no centralized and secure database or other source to share lessons from all project final and follow-on reports, including those with sensitive information. Without specific guidance to require that follow-on reports include details of measures of achievements other than ROI, including benefits, the Corrosion Office will be missing the opportunity to know whether equipment-related corrosion projects have achieved outcomes to prevent or mitigate corrosion. Without a mechanism or tool to assist in monitoring and consolidating status information about whether the technology or method demonstrated by each equipment-related corrosion project has transitioned to the military departments’ use, the Corrosion Office and the Corrosion Executives may not have timely information about whether the corrosion projects produced proven methods and products to prevent the corrosion of military equipment. Until a comprehensive, centralized, and secure database is developed that includes lessons learned from all completed corrosion projects, officials from DOD’s corrosion community will not have full and complete information on lessons learned, including proven methods or products to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military equipment. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making four recommendations to improve DOD’s corrosion- prevention and control program: To enhance DOD in its oversight of the status and potential benefits of its equipment-related corrosion projects, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics require the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to
Revise the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan or other guidance to require that the military departments include in all follow-on reports the details of measures of achievement other than ROI, such as the features, results, and potential benefits of the project. Finally, DOD did not concur with one recommendation. DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation in the draft report that the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, revise guidance to specify how the military departments’ Corrosion Executives and project managers should report the ROI for discontinued projects to ensure consistent reporting for all equipment-related corrosion projects. To determine the extent to which DOD has identified, shared, and incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects into future planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion, we reviewed key documents, including relevant law to understand legislative requirements, and DOD policy and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of equipment maintenance and expected service life of equipment. Corrosion affects military readiness by taking critical systems out of action and creating safety hazards. GAO was asked to review DOD's military-equipment corrosion-prevention and mitigation projects. In this report, GAO addressed the extent to which DOD has (1) ensured the submission of required reports for equipment-related corrosion projects; (2) collected the information needed to determine whether benefits and other measures have been achieved from equipment-related corrosion projects; (3) tracked the status of equipment-related corrosion projects; and (4) identified, shared, and incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects into future planning to prevent or mitigate corrosion. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD policies and plans and met with DOD corrosion officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $63 million in 88 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new technology or methods addressing equipment-related corrosion. DOD's Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) has collected a majority of required final and follow-on reports on the results of equipment-related corrosion projects and is taking steps to obtain outstanding reports. As of May 2013, GAO found project managers had submitted final reports for 55 of the 88 projects (about 63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 and submitted follow-on reports for 27 of the 41 projects (about 66 percent) funded from 2005 through 2007.
DOD requires the military departments to collect and report to the Corrosion Office key information from equipment-related corrosion projects about new technologies or methods; however, DOD does not have complete information about the benefits of all projects. GAO found that the military departments inconsistently reported measures of achievement other than the return on investment (ROI), such as when outcomes prompted changes to military equipment specifications. Further, the military departments did not always collect required information needed to recompute the estimated ROI and were unable to determine whether projects had achieved their estimated ROI. Corrosion Office officials plan to revise guidance on how project managers should be reassessing the ROI. Without specific guidance to require that follow-on reports include details of measures of achievement other than ROI, the Corrosion Office will be missing the opportunity to know whether equipment-related corrosion projects have achieved outcomes to prevent corrosion.
DOD has taken steps to improve oversight of its equipment-related corrosion projects, such as revising its DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan to provide additional guidance on reporting requirements. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive overview of the status of all equipment-related corrosion projects. While the reports provide the status for each project, GAO found that the Corrosion Office does not consolidate information to monitor the status of all these projects, such as if a project has not transitioned to service use or has been discontinued. Further, GAO found that project managers vary in how they reported the ROI for discontinued projects. Without a mechanism to consolidate projects' status to facilitate monitoring and guidance for reporting ROIs for discontinued projects, the Corrosion Office and the military departments may not have timely information of whether the corrosion projects produced proven methods and products to prevent the corrosion of military equipment.
DOD has identified and incorporated lessons learned from equipment-related corrosion projects and shared some lessons with the corrosion community; however, DOD has no centralized and secure database or other source to share lessons from all project reports, including those with sensitive information. While DOD has begun to develop a database that would contain lessons learned on all projects, development is in the early stages, and DOD is unsure when it will be completed. Until a comprehensive, centralized, and secure database is developed that includes lessons learned from all completed projects, officials from DOD's corrosion community will not have full and complete information on lessons learned, including proven methods or products to prevent or mitigate corrosion of military equipment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends four actions to improve the oversight of DODs corrosion-prevention and control program. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with one, and did not concur with one. DOD plans to develop a database to collect data and lessons learned on corrosion projects and to revise guidance on how to report the ROI for discontinued projects. DOD did not agree that guidance should be revised to ensure military departments consistently report projects benefits. GAO maintains that this recommendation is warranted for project oversight. |
gao_GAO-14-246 | gao_GAO-14-246_0 | Extramural research accounted for more than 80 percent of NIH’s budget in fiscal year 2012. Twenty-four of the 27 ICs fund extramural research projects, and these ICs make final decisions on which extramural research projects to fund following a standard peer review process.what NIH considers “unsolicited” research and research training projects for which applications are submitted in response to broad funding opportunity announcements that span the breadth of the NIH mission. Individual Institutes and Centers Set Their Own Research Priorities Using a Variety of Approaches, Including Strategic Planning, Annual Planning, and Review of Research Portfolios
Individual ICs at NIH set their own research priorities, and we found that the five selected ICs we reviewed did so considering similar factors and using various priority-setting approaches. Officials at all five of the ICs stated that their mission and available appropriations inform priority setting approaches. Some IC officials noted that because the costs of potential research projects generally exceed the available appropriation, the ICs generally must prioritize among research projects. In priority setting, IC officials also reported taking into consideration scientific needs and opportunities, gaps in funded research, the burden of disease in a population, and public health need, such as an emerging public health threat that needs to be addressed, like influenza. Review and evaluation of research portfolio: Officials from the five selected ICs we interviewed stated they conduct reviews of their research portfolio to help ensure existing priorities reflect and align with current scientific opportunities, research gaps, and emerging science. While the individual ICs set their own priorities, according to NIH officials, the OD provides leadership to the ICs and helps coordinate priority setting activities, especially for efforts that involve multiple ICs. NIH Funding Levels Varied Widely For Selected Categories of Research, Conditions, and Diseases Corresponding to the Leading Causes of Death and Chronic Conditions
In fiscal year 2012, NIH reported funding levels that ranged widely—from $13 million for projects in one RCDC category to more than $5.6 billion for another—for the 40 different RCDC categories we examined. NIH officials said that RCDC is the agency’s official system for reporting research funding across the agency’s ICs and it provides a method for reporting consistent information about NIH funding. Agency officials said that the system was not designed to be able to estimate a total, non-duplicated amount of funding specific to a given disease or condition because RCDC categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Specifically:
Projects may be reported in multiple categories. For example, the category of cancer includes other cancer categories, such as breast cancer, lung cancer, or prostate cancer, and the research funding reported in each of these categories will also be reported in the cancer research total. RCDC also does not capture the funding for all diseases that NIH studies. Not all projects that NIH funds are included. Some ICs have their own systems that track and report funding within their research portfolios. Of the five selected ICs we reviewed, two had their own systems for tracking their funding. NCI maintains a publicly available website that communicates funding decisions across the research supported by NCI. The system was developed in 1998 and categorizes research into more than 40 specific cancer types, as well as almost 50 research topics that are not disease-specific. Funding for individual projects may be separated and reported in the NCI system by the specific types of cancers being studied. NCI officials told us that they use the system to report data to stakeholders, including Congress, and that the analyses they conduct based on these data enhance NCI’s ability to plan and monitor its scientific investment. The Department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and other interested parties. See table 4 for a list of the most prevalent chronic diseases and conditions for adults identified by CDC. To determine the corresponding categories from the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Research, Condition, and Disease Categorization system (RCDC) for the diseases and conditions that are the leading causes of death in the United States, the leading causes of death globally, and the most prevalent chronic diseases and conditions in the United States, we identified the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) codes associated with each of these diseases and conditions and, using their related descriptions, compared them with the RCDC category descriptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
NIH is the nation's leader in sponsoring and conducting biomedical research. In fiscal year 2012, NIH had a budget of almost $31 billion, over 80 percent of which was used to fund extramural research that supports scientists and research personnel working at universities, medical schools, and other research institutions. Twenty-four of NIH's 27 ICs that support extramural research are focused on particular diseases, conditions, or research areas, and these ICs have their own appropriations. Decisions about which projects are funded are made by these individual ICs. NIH reports funding for 235 research, condition, and disease categories in RCDC.
GAO was asked to review NIH funding related to leading diseases and health conditions. GAO examined (1) how research priorities are set at NIH, and (2) NIH allocations of research funding across selected diseases and conditions. For five ICs—National Cancer Institute; National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases; and National Institute of General Medical Sciences—GAO reviewed documents and interviewed IC officials about priority setting. GAO reviewed NIH fiscal year 2012 funding reported by RCDC for 40 research, condition, and disease categories related to the leading causes of death in the United States and globally, and the most prevalent chronic diseases and conditions in the United States.
What GAO Found
Individual institutes and centers (ICs) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) set their own research priorities, and GAO found that the five selected ICs—awarding the largest amount of research funding—that it reviewed did so considering similar factors and using various priority-setting approaches. Agency officials stated that the ICs' mission and appropriations inform priority-setting approaches. Some IC officials noted that because the costs of potential research projects generally exceed the available appropriation, the ICs must prioritize among research projects. In priority setting, IC officials reported taking into consideration scientific needs and opportunities, gaps in funded research, the burden of disease in a population, and public health need, such as an emerging public health threat like influenza that needs to be addressed. While each IC GAO examined had its own approach for setting priorities, they all considered the input of stakeholders, including the scientific community, and used some similar strategies. All five ICs developed strategic plans, though the process varied by IC. Some ICs also used annual planning activities in various forms, which then guided funding opportunity announcements. All five ICs also conducted reviews and evaluations of their research portfolios to ensure that their priorities align with scientific opportunities, research gaps, and emerging science. In addition to these efforts at the IC level, agency officials told GAO that the NIH Office of the Director provides leadership and coordinates priority setting activities, especially for those activities that involve multiple ICs.
NIH reported funding levels that varied widely for the 40 different Research, Condition, and Disease Categorization system (RCDC) categories GAO examined that correspond to the leading causes of death and the most prevalent chronic conditions. For example, NIH reported actual fiscal year 2012 funding levels ranging from $13 million for projects in the fibromyalgia category to more than $5.6 billion for projects in the cancer category. Although these categories are part of NIH's RCDC, which is used to categorize the research activities across the agency, agency officials said that the system cannot estimate a total, non-duplicated amount of funding that is specific to a given disease or condition. This is because RCDC categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. For example, projects may be included in multiple RCDC categories, some categories are related to each other and therefore some categories may also be included within another, and funding for all diseases is not captured in the system. While RCDC is NIH's official system for reporting research funding across the ICs, two of the five ICs that GAO reviewed—the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—had their own systems for tracking their funding, which allowed them to provide more detailed information than that available from RCDC. For example, NCI has a publicly available website that specifies funding for more than 40 specific cancer types as well as almost 50 research topics that are not disease-specific. Funding for individual projects may be separated for specific studies into those cancer types. According to officials, the system enhances NCI's ability to plan and monitor its scientific investment.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-98-118 | gao_GGD-98-118_0 | It also showed a wide variation in FPI performance by customer agency and some variation by product category. However, it is important to recognize that they likely overstate timeliness because they did not account for shipping time for orders with due dates specified as the day the order should arrive at its destination and not the day by which the order should be shipped. Furthermore, although the results for these 109 orders were not projectable to the universe of FPI orders, they raised questions about which due dates should be used to measure timeliness, especially from the customer’s perspective. In fact, our analysis showed that 8 of the 12 months in fiscal year 1997 had better on-time delivery performance than the same months in fiscal year 1996. In the absence of data or a workable approach for incorporating shipping time, our analysis, as well as FPI’s timeliness evaluation, considered all shipments to be on time if FPI’s data showed that they left the factory on or before the due date. Selected Customer Agency Views on FPI Delivery Issues
Just as our analysis by customer agency showed wide variations in FPI delivery performance by customer agency, officials within DLA, FSS, SSA, and VA who were involved in buying FPI products had mixed views on FPI’s performance in meeting delivery due dates, as well as on related FPI delivery practices. However, despite FPI’s goal to promote total customer satisfaction, our work showed that certain key agency customers were clearly dissatisfied with FPI’s delivery performance and practices. Accounting for shipping time where appropriate would improve the accuracy of future evaluations of timeliness and provide a better picture of performance. Furthermore, over one-half of 109 randomly selected orders showed that the due dates in FPI’s system were later than what customers had originally requested; and FPI had limited documentation explaining the differences and whether customers were notified of the reasons for the changes and approved of the revised due dates. Recommendations
In order for FPI to have a more accurate and reliable measure of timeliness for use in evaluating its delivery performance, we recommend that the Director of BOP direct FPI’s Chief Operating Officer to identify orders with destination due dates and account for shipping time for these orders when evaluating delivery performance; develop and implement an approach for documenting the reasons for due date revisions, whether customers were notified of the reasons for changes, and whether customers approved of revised due dates; and appropriately consider due date revisions and whether customers approved of them in evaluating timeliness. Department of Defense (miscellaneous nonservice components)
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) develop and assess statistics on FPI delivery performance and (2) obtain the views of selected customer agencies’ procurement officials on FPI delivery practices. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) developed and assessed statistics on Federal Prison Industries' (FPI) delivery performance; and (2) obtained the views of selected customer agencies' procurement officials on FPI delivery practices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FPI delivery performance is improving; (2) 8 of the 12 months in fiscal year (FY) 1997 had better on-time delivery performance than the same months in FY 1996; (3) however, FPI fell short of meeting its on-time delivery goal of 90 percent in FY 1997; (4) there was a wide variation in FPI performance by customer agency and some variation by product category; (5) the results of GAO's analysis and FPI's own timeliness evaluations should be viewed with two caveats in mind; (6) they both likely overstate timeliness because they did not account for shipping time for orders with due dates specified as the day the order should arrive at its destination; (7) GAO and FPI's timeliness evaluations considered all shipments to be on-time if FPI data showed that they left the factory on or before the due date; (8) accounting for shipping time for orders with destination due dates would have improved the accuracy of the timeliness evaluations and provided a better picture of performance; (9) its review of 109 randomly selected orders showed that over one-half of them had due dates in FPI's system that were later than what customers had originally requested; (10) because of limited documentation, GAO could not always determine the reasons due dates were different, including whether FPI had not accepted them, or whether customers were notified of the reasons for changes and approved of the revised due dates; (11) although the results of these 109 orders were not projectable to the universe of FPI orders, they raised questions about which due dates should be used to measure timeliness, especially from the customer's perspective; (12) just as GAO's analysis by customer agency showed wide variation in FPI delivery performance, customer agency officials within the Defense Logistics Agency, the Federal Supply Service, Social Security Administration, and Department of Veterans Affairs had mixed views on FPI's delivery performance, despite FPI's goal to promote total customer satisfaction; (13) although GAO sought the views of only selected customers, several key procurement officials within these agencies were clearly dissatisfied with FPI's delivery performance and practices; (14) FPI does not develop delivery performance data by customer agency; and (15) without these data, FPI was not in a good position to easily detect individual agencies' problems with its performance and to improve overall customer relations. |
gao_NSIAD-99-56 | gao_NSIAD-99-56_0 | To achieve modernization goals, DOD plans to reduce the cost of its infrastructure, which includes central training. The services consider a number of factors in formulating their central training requirements. Training workload measures the output of the services’ central training programs. The total decrease in funding between the two FYDPs was $8.4 billion. Training of New Personnel
Funding for the training of new personnel in the 1999 FYDP was projected to be about $4.1 billion less in total than projected in the 1998 FYDP. Most of the decrease ($4 billion) was to correct an error in the Army’s allocation of military salaries. An Army official stated that the error had no impact on the Army’s budget requests for military personnel salaries and benefits. According to Army training officials, the Army did not fully fund several training initiatives in the 1999 FYDP such as improvements in the Army’s human relations training. Because these are high priorities for the Army, the Army officials expect that these initiatives will be fully funded in the 2000 FYDP, probably at the expense of other major commands. In addition, as part of the implementation of the Total Army School System program, the Army Reserve reviewed its professional development training programs and cut its budget for students, instructors, and overhead. Army training officials stated that the Army knowingly underfunded some training installation support programs, adding to the existing maintenance backlog. These changes were primarily due to personnel reductions, planned savings from training initiatives, deferred real property maintenance, planned savings from changes in the procurement profile for trainer aircraft, higher flying-hour costs, and planned savings from competitive sourcing and regionalization initiatives. Installation Support for Training
Total funding levels for installation support for training were projected to be lower by $154 million in the 1999 FYDP than in the 1998 FYDP primarily due to projected savings from Navy-wide competition sourcing and regionalization initiatives, the shifting of some funds for installation support activities from the training mission to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and the use of some installation support funds for skill training programs, a higher Navy priority. Air Force Funding Changes Primarily Due to Projected Lower Attrition, Increases in Pilot Production, and Increases in Real Property Maintenance and Cost of Studies
Although both the 1998 and 1999 FYDPs projected an overall increase in Air Force central training funding over the 1999-2003 period and both projected about the same annual funding levels, there were significant funding shifts among three categories—professional and skill training, aviation and flight training, and installation support for training. The increases were for additional pilot production to alleviate the pilot shortage resulting from lower than expected retention rates. If the savings do not materialize, and the Air Force wants to maintain installations at the level they programmed, the Air Force will need to look elsewhere for this funding. To identify trends in workload data, we used data contained in the Army’s, the Navy’s, and the Marine Corps’ annual Operation and Maintenance Justification of Estimates budget books submitted to Congress for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. To determine the causes for the changes in annual funding and workload trends for central training categories between the two FYDPs and the impact of the changes on future central training funding levels, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force headquarters training divisions. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the significant differences in two Department of Defense training programs, focusing on the: (1) training categories and military services with the most significant funding changes from the 1998 to the 1999 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP); (2) bases for the changes; and (3) potential impact of the changes on the services' future training budgets.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the total funding for central training was projected to be $8.4 billion less in the 1999 FYDP than the 1998 FYDP; (2) the categories with the most significant changes in each of the services were the Army's training of new personnel; and the Army's, the Navy's, and the Air Force's professional and skill training, aviation and flight training; (3) the majority of the $8.4 billion decrease was due to changes in the Army's central training program; (4) $4 billion of the decrease in Army funding was to correct for an error in the 1998 FYDP that overstated the cost of enlistees' student salaries; (5) another $1.1 billion of the decrease related to the realignment of Army aviation procurement out of central training; (6) the remaining $3.3 billion primarily came from projected savings from: (a) the Army, the Navy and the Air Force reducing the number of personnel projected to be trained; (b) all of the military services contracting some installation support functions with lower cost providers; and (c) the Army and the Navy implementing training initiatives that utilize technology and other cost savings measures; (7) additionally, some of the $3.3 billion came from cuts by the Army and the Navy in funding levels for installation support and underfunding by the Army of some of its training programs; (8) the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may not be able to accomplish their central training programs at the funding levels in the 1999 FYDP; (9) the services are experiencing lower-than-expected retention rates for enlisted personnel, which will require increased accessions and additional funds for new personnel and skill training; (10) the services projected savings in installation support and funded real property maintenance at minimum maintenance levels; (11) if the programmed savings do not materialize, the services will need additional funds to maintain the current levels of maintenance or add to the existing backlog of real property maintenance; (12) the Army did not fully fund training initiatives, but it plans to fully fund these initiatives in the future; (13) the Army already had to request supplemental funding for fiscal year 1999 for the Army reserve professional development training programs because it found that programmed reductions adversely affected the programs; (14) the Army's actual aviation training workloads are higher than those used to develop FYDP 1999; and (15) the Army and the Navy programmed savings from training initiatives that use technology to reduce training. |
gao_GAO-13-612 | gao_GAO-13-612_0 | For example, COMPETES 2007 authorized creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy in DOE to overcome long-term and high-risk technological barriers in developing energy technologies, and it authorized programs in Education and NSF to train teachers in STEM fields. Appropriations Generally Increased but Fell Short of Authorizations, and Most Newly Authorized Programs Were Not Funded
Of the $62.2 billion authorized under the COMPETES Acts in fiscal years 2008 through 2012, $52.4 billion was appropriated, including $51.9 billion for the entire budgets of NSF, Science, and NIST. 1.) The COMPETES Acts also specifically authorized funding for 40 individual programs, including some programs within and some outside of NSF, Science, and NIST. Among the 40 programs for which the COMPETES Acts specifically authorized funding, the 12 programs that existed before the acts all received appropriations and continue to operate. Agencies did include funding requests in their budget submissions for 4 of the 22 newly authorized programs that did not receive funding. For the other 18 programs, officials most often told us they did not request appropriations because their agencies already had similar programs under way or could work within current programs to carry out similar activities. For example, Science officials told us the office did not request appropriations for the Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes because the program’s implementation would have duplicated existing activities. Recent Evaluations Generally Suggest Positive Results and Some Recommend Improvements for Implemented Programs
Recent evaluations that we identified have generally suggested positive results for the fully implemented programs for which the COMPETES Acts specifically authorized funding; some of the evaluations have also recommended ways to improve the programs. We also reviewed relevant laws, including COMPETES 2007 and the COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (COMPETES 2010), and we interviewed agency officials from the National Science Foundation (NSF); the Department of Energy (DOE), including the Office of Science (Science) and the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E); the Department of Commerce (Commerce), including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Economic Development Administration; and the Department of Education (Education). We interviewed agency officials to learn about the status of programs that received funding. We reported findings on a select number of programs and evaluations based on the following criteria: (1) we included programs that received federal funding in fiscal year 2012 and are continuing operations as of May 2013 and (2) for each focus area, we chose programs with the most recent evaluations and included up to two of the most recent studies for those programs. Appendix II: Programs for Which the COMPETES Acts Specifically Authorized Funding
Figure 4 below shows the 40 programs for which the America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act of 2007 or the COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 specifically authorized funding. The scope of our review is based on a mandate in the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (COMPETES 2010) that calls for GAO to evaluate the extent to which programs authorized under the law have been funded, implemented, and are contributing to achieving the goals of the act. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Scientific and technological innovation and a workforce educated in STEM fields are critical to long-term U.S. economic competitiveness. Leaders in government, business, and education have expressed concern about the nation's ability to compete with other technologically advanced countries in these fields. In this context, Congress passed COMPETES 2007 and reauthorized the act with COMPETES 2010, each with the overall goal of investing in research and development to improve U.S. competitiveness. Among other things, the acts specifically authorized funding for certain programs.
COMPETES 2010 mandated GAO to evaluate the status of authorized programs. GAO examined (1) the extent to which funding was appropriated under the authorization of COMPETES 2007 and COMPETES 2010 and (2) what recent evaluations suggest about how programs for which the acts specifically authorized funding are working. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, interviewed agency officials, and reviewed program evaluations for quality and content.
This report contains no recommendations.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2008-2012, $52.4 billion was appropriated out of the $62.2 billion authorized under the America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007 (COMPETES 2007) and the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (COMPETES 2010). Almost all of these funds went to the entire budgets of three existing research entities--the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science (Science)--including all of the programs and activities the entities carry out. Appropriations for NSF, NIST, and Science generally increased under the acts but did not reach levels authorized by the acts. In addition to authorizing the budgets of these entities, COMPETES 2007 and COMPETES 2010 specifically authorized funding for 40 individual programs, including some programs within and some outside of these entities. Among those 40 programs, the 12 programs that existed before COMPETES 2007 received appropriations and continue to operate. Six of 28 newly authorized programs were also funded. Of these 6 programs, 1--DOE's Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, set up to develop new energy technologies--is continuing operations, 3 were not funded in fiscal year 2012, and 2 were not fully implemented as of May 2013. For the 22 programs that were not funded, agency officials generally said that they did not request funding in their budget submissions; most often this was because agencies had similar programs under way or could pursue similar objectives within current programs. For example, Science said it did not request funding for the Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes because it would have duplicated other Science programs.
For the fully implemented programs for which the COMPETES Acts specifically authorized funding, recent evaluations generally reported positive results, and some evaluations provided suggestions for improvements. Recent evaluations have been conducted for almost all of the programs that were implemented, or for aspects of those programs. For example, studies of the Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship Program found that the program has increased the number of qualified science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) teachers, but also suggested that retention of teachers in high-need schools could be improved. |
gao_GAO-17-715 | gao_GAO-17-715_0 | Figure 4 shows State’s worldwide spending for hardship pay in fiscal years 2011 through 2016. State Mostly Followed Its Process for Determining Hardship Pay Rates at Overseas Posts but in a Few Cases Awarded Director Points without Adequately Explaining How Posts Met Relevant Criteria
State Mostly Followed Its Process for Determining Hardship Pay Rates at Overseas Posts
ALS determines hardship pay rates through a process of analyzing factors affecting living conditions at overseas posts such as physical and social isolation, crime, air pollution, and medical care. State policies note that Director Points may be awarded for extreme conditions not adequately captured in State’s written standards. Twelve of the 15 memos did not clearly document how the posts met State’s criteria for awarding Director Points. To determine danger pay rates at overseas posts, State uses a two-part process that bases danger pay eligibility on threat ratings for political violence and terrorism at posts and danger pay rates on whether eligible family members are allowed at posts (see fig. State’s Procedures to Implement Its Policies for Stopping and Starting Hardship Pay Are Resource Intensive, but State Has Not Assessed Their Cost- Effectiveness; State’s Procedures for Danger Pay Are Mostly Automated
State’s policies for stopping and starting hardship pay when employees temporarily leave their assigned overseas posts depend on a variety of factors such as the travel destination, purpose of travel, and assigned post. State Has Not Assessed the Cost-Effectiveness of Its Policies and Procedures for Stopping and Starting Hardship Pay
State has not assessed the cost-effectiveness of its policies and procedures for stopping and starting hardship pay, which were established decades ago. State Identified $2.9 Million in Improper Payments Related to Hardship and Danger Pay but Has Not Analyzed Data That Could Identify More
CGFS identified a total of about $2.9 million in improper payments for hardship and danger pay in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including about $2.8 million for hardship pay and nearly $67 thousand for danger pay (see table 2). We found that CGFS had not analyzed available data that could help to identify hardship posts at risk of overpayments and thereby aid in recapture audit and improper payment prevention efforts. Guidance from the Office of Management and Budget notes that such techniques could be part of an internal control program to prevent, detect, and recover overpayments. Hardship and danger pay are important incentives for State employees to work at these challenging locations. State officials noted that these policies and procedures are resource intensive to implement and contribute to improper payments, which are costly to recover. In its comments, reproduced in appendix II, State concurred with all three recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine (1) the Department of State’s (State) spending at overseas posts for hardship and danger pay in fiscal years 2011-2016, (2) the extent to which State has followed its process for determining hardship and danger pay rates at overseas posts, (3) the procedures State uses to implement its policies for stopping and starting hardship and danger pay when employees temporarily leave their assigned overseas posts, and (4) the extent to which State has identified improper payments related to hardship and danger pay. | Why GAO Did This Study
State provides hardship and danger pay, among other allowances, as incentives for State personnel to work at challenging overseas locations. Hardship pay compensates employees for service at overseas posts where conditions differ substantially from those in the United States. Danger pay compensates employees for service at posts where civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions threaten the health or well-being of an employee.
This report examines hardship and danger pay, specifically, (1) State’s spending at overseas posts in fiscal years 2011-2016, (2) the extent to which State has followed its process for determining rates, (3) the procedures State uses to implement its policies for starting and stopping hardship and danger pay, and (4) the extent to which State has identified improper payments. GAO analyzed State data and documents; interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork at four posts that receive hardship or danger pay: Islamabad, Pakistan; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; and Tunis, Tunisia.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) spent about $732 million for hardship pay and $266 million for danger pay at overseas posts in fiscal years 2011 through 2016.
State has mostly followed its process for determining hardship and danger pay rates at overseas posts. To determine hardship rates, State calculates scores for overseas posts based on information from post surveys and data on factors such as air pollution and crime. GAO reviewed scores for 192 posts and found that State mostly followed its process. However, in 12 of 15 cases where State added points for extreme conditions not captured in its written standards—Director Points—it did not clearly document how posts met these criteria. Without adequate documentation, the department cannot ensure that it is awarding these points consistently. For danger pay, State followed a process that bases rates on threat levels for political violence and terrorism and whether family members are allowed at post.
State’s procedures for stopping and starting hardship pay when employees temporarily leave posts—based on several factors—are resource intensive, but State has not assessed their cost-effectiveness. State uses diplomatic cables to adjust hardship pay, but these procedures are resource intensive—requiring 10,000 pay actions each year—and contribute to improper payments, which are costly to recover. State’s procedures for adjusting danger pay through time and attendance, based on whether or not employees are present at posts, are mostly automated. State has not assessed the cost-effectiveness of its hardship pay policies and procedures in accordance with its Foreign Affairs Manual .
State identified $2.9 million in improper payments related mostly to hardship pay in fiscal years 2015-2016. State conducts required improper payments audits but has not analyzed available data that could help further identify and recover overpayments related to hardship pay. Guidance from the Office of Management and Budget notes that such data analysis could be part of an internal control program to prevent, detect, and recover overpayments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State clearly document the use of Director Points for extreme conditions at posts; assess the cost-effectiveness of its policies and procedures for stopping and starting hardship pay for overseas employees; and analyze available data to identify, recover, and prevent improper payments related to hardship pay. State concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-97-154 | gao_AIMD-97-154_0 | We interviewed VBA officials and contractor personnel involved with the software process improvement effort to determine what actions VBA has taken to improve its software capability. Conclusions
Recognizing the importance of a mature software development capability, VBA has initiated actions to address the weaknesses identified in our June 1996 report. Recognizing that these deficiencies need to be addressed, VBA has efforts underway to do so. If these deficiencies are not sufficiently addressed, VBA’s software development capability will remain ad hoc and chaotic, subjecting the agency to continuing risk of cost overruns, poor quality software, and schedule delays. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits, in conjunction with VBA’s chief information officer, to define the milestones, costs, tasks, and risks of the software process improvement initiative in order to provide a clear strategy for how VBA plans to improve its software development capability to a repeatable level; develop and use a baseline showing VBA’s current software development capability from which to measure VBA’s software improvement effort; ensure that a training plan is developed and implemented that will provide key software development staff training in the software process improvement methodology, its principles, and key process areas; and establish a source selection process to ensure that VBA’s software development contractors have the mature processes necessary for timely, high-quality software development, including evaluating and validating documentation provided by potential contractors establishing that they are at the repeatable level or higher. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO conducted a follow-up review to determine the actions taken by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) to address management and technical weaknesses identified in the June 19, 1996, hearing on the agency's modernization effort, focusing on the agency's actions to improve its software development capability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VBA has taken action to improve its software development capability; (2) among other things, it has launched a software process improvement initiative, chartered a software engineering process group, and obtained the services of an experienced contractor to assist in developing and implementing a software process improvement effort; (3) although it has made progress, VBA has not yet fully addressed needed software development improvements; (4) these include a need for: (a) a defined strategy to reach the repeatable level and a baseline to measure improvements; (b) a process improvement training program for its software developers; and (c) a process to ensure that VBA's software development contractors are at the repeatable level; (5) VBA generally agrees that these issues need to be addressed and has efforts under way to do so; and (6) until these deficiencies are sufficiently addressed, VBA's software development capability remains ad hoc and chaotic, subjecting the agency to continuing risk of cost overruns, poor quality software, and schedule delays in software development. |
gao_HEHS-99-28 | gao_HEHS-99-28_0 | Background
In 1935, title II of the Social Security Act created the Social Security retirement program to pay benefits to retired workers. These laws and regulations generally limit the use of the SSN to the required purpose by explicitly prohibiting other uses or disclosures. Federal Laws and Regulations Require SSN Use in Some Public Programs
A number of federal laws and regulations require the use of the SSN as an individual’s identifier to facilitate automated exchanges that help administrators enforce compliance with federal laws, determine eligibility for benefits, or both. Businesses and Governments Use SSNs Extensively
The advent of computerized record keeping has led private businesses and government agencies to routinely use SSNs for activities other than those required by federal laws and regulations. Because there are so many users of the SSN, we focused on describing SSN use by organizations that routinely use these numbers for activities that affect a large number of people: organizations that sell personal information, provide financial services, and offer health care services and state government agencies that are responsible for collecting personal income tax and licensing drivers. Federal law does not prohibit such disclosure of SSNs. Credit bureau officials told us that customers are not required to provide SSNs when requesting reports, but requests without SSNs need to include enough information to sufficiently identify the individual. Officials in the health care industry expect their use of SSNs to increase. The Social Security Act authorizes states to use SSNs to administer any tax, general public assistance, driver’s license, or motor vehicle registration law in order to identify individuals affected by such laws. State income tax administrators routinely use the SSN as a primary identifier in their programs. For example, tax administration officials said they use SSNs to cross-reference owners’ or officers’ business income tax returns with their personal income tax returns so that an audit of one triggers an audit of the other. Business and State Officials Believe Federal Laws Restricting Uses of SSNs Would Have a Negative Impact
Officials of the programs and activities we reviewed believed their entities would be negatively affected if federal laws were enacted restricting use of SSNs. State tax administrators and credit bureau officials said that federal restrictions could hamper their ability to conduct routine internal activities. Officials of businesses that sell personal information and driver licensing agencies also believed that federal restrictions on SSN use could make it difficult for others to obtain specific records from them. Organizations and Agencies We Contacted Concerning Their Use of Social Security Numbers
Scope and Methodology
We identified federal requirements and restrictions governing Social Security numbers (SSN) by using a list prepared by the Social Security Administration (SSA) that identified federal laws addressing SSNs. We developed information on programs’ required uses of SSNs by interviewing officials at the following: SSA’s Retirement, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs; the Internal Revenue Service’s federal personal income tax program; the Department of Health and Human Services’ Medicare, Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Child Support Enforcement programs; and the Department of Agriculture’s Food Stamp program. We did not verify the accuracy of the information provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the social security number (SSN) is used, focusing on: (1) federal laws and regulations requiring or restricting SSN use; (2) how extensively the private and public sectors use SSNs for purposes not required by federal law; and (3) what businesses and governments believe the impact would be if federal laws limiting the use of SSNs were passed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) no single law regulates the overall use of SSNs; (2) the Social Security Act, which created the social security programs for which the SSN was developed, did not require the Social Security Administration (SSA) to devise SSNs; (3) however, once SSA created and began using SSNs to help administer its programs, Congress recognized the universal nature of the SSN and subsequently enacted laws requiring SSN uses for some purposes not related to social security; (4) federal laws now require that SSNs be used in the administration of some programs, including the federal personal income tax program; the Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, Food Stamp, and Child Support Enforcement programs; and state commercial driver licensing programs; (5) some of these laws impose restrictions on SSN use relating to the programs or activities involved; (6) no federal law, however, imposes broad restrictions on businesses' and state and local governments' use of SSNs when that use is unrelated to a specific federal requirement; (7) the report additionally addresses businesses' and governments' uses of SSNs for purposes not required by federal law; (8) officials of all of the organizations GAO reviewed--businesses that sell personal information, those that offer financial and health care services, and state personal income tax and driver licensing agencies--routinely choose to use SSNs as a management tool to conduct their business or program activities; (9) credit bureau and state personal income tax officials, for example, said they use the SSN as a primary record identifier for internal activities, such as maintaining individual consumer credit histories and identifying income tax filers; (10) all the organizations said they used SSNs to facilitate data exchanges necessary to their business; (11) they use SSNs to obtain information to assess credit risk, locate assets, or to ensure compliance with their program rules and regulations; (12) GAO reports officials of the organizations as saying their ability to conduct routine internal activities and data exchanges could be adversely affected if the federal government passed laws that limited their use of SSNs; and (13) however, given the public's concern about the disclosure of SSNs, officials of businesses that sell personal information and driver licensing agencies said that some members of their industry have taken steps to limit disclosure. |
gao_HEHS-96-26 | gao_HEHS-96-26_0 | States where most cases live in EMAs receive the largest amounts per case, since larger proportions of their caseloads are double counted. 1). 2). This results in a higher level of per-case funding for states with EMAs because the EMA cases are double counted. 3). Specifically, funding equity could be improved by modifying the existing caseload and fiscal capacity measures, and by including a cost measure. An important purpose of the Ryan White CARE Act was to target emergency funding to areas of greatest need. Recommendations to the Congress
To achieve greater equity in the distribution of funds, we recommend that the Congress modify the funding formulas to reduce the double counting of EMA cases so that comparable medical services funding is available for people with AIDS, regardless of where they live, adopt a caseload indicator that better reflects the number of people living with AIDS who are in need of services, and include an indicator that reflects the relative differences across states and EMAs in the cost of serving people with AIDS. Existing Formulas
Title I funds are distributed on the basis of the cumulative number of AIDS cases EMAs report and their cumulative AIDS incidence rate. III.3). Consolidated Grants
The simplest way to improve funding equity is to consolidate titles I and II into a single grant and distribute funds to the state governments through an equity-based formula. IV.1). A number of mechanisms could be employed, however, to avoid EMA and state funding losses when funding equity is improved. Older Americans Act: Funding Formula Could Better Reflect State Needs (GAO/HEHS-04-41, May 12, 1994). 2, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the funding formulas established under the Ryan White Care Act, focusing on: (1) whether the existing formulas distribute funds equitably to states and eligible metropolitan areas (EMA); (2) the factors that inhibit greater funding equity; and (3) formula changes that are needed to improve funding equity.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although Ryan White Care Act funding formulas include factors used in equity-based formulas, they result in per-case funding discrepancies because EMA cases are double counted; (2) states without EMA do not benefit from double counting and receive significantly less funding; (3) the indicators used to target funds to needy states and EMA fail to take geographic cost differences into consideration; (4) EMA funding levels are based on the cumulative number of reported acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) cases, resulting in the oldest EMA receiving the most funding; (5) better cost indicators could be used to target more funds to states and EMA where resources are the most needed; and (6) funding equity could be improved by eliminating the inappropriate double counting of AIDS cases and by using more appropriate measures of EMA and state funding needs. |
gao_GAO-07-153 | gao_GAO-07-153_0 | GSA Fleet Would Face Reduced Revenues and Need Legislative Authority to Donate Cars
If GSA were required to donate 1 to 5 percent of its compact sedans to YouthBuild USA (112 to 559 cars), its annual sales revenue would be reduced by an estimated $600,000 to $3 million. However, GSA would need additional new statutory authority to allow it to increase its leasing rates for the purpose of recovering costs associated with donating cars. Currently, to support its Fleet operations, GSA relies on the proceeds of its auction of used vehicles and the income it receives from the rates it charges agencies that lease vehicles from it. GSA Would Need Statutory Authority to Donate Vehicles Directly to YouthBuild USA
In order for GSA to donate cars from its Fleet program directly to YouthBuild USA, it would need new statutory authority to deviate from the existing process for disposing of surplus federal property. Available Research Suggests That Car Access Leads to Jobs and Other Benefits
Taken as a whole, the seven studies we reviewed consistently indicated that owning a car or having access to one increases the likelihood that low- income individuals (such as rural Youthbuild participants) get a job (see app. Differences between the populations in these studies and rural Youthbuild participants did not allow us to use the studies’ results to identify the degree to which participants in YouthBuild USA’s LICO program would benefit from having a car. For example, a car likely allows a person to search for a job over a wider geographic area, expanding the number of employment opportunities and the chances he or she will find a job. However, determining the extent that Youthbuild participants would benefit from such a program is not possible because of limitations in the methodologies of these studies, differences between individuals served by these programs compared with YouthBuild USA, and differences in the designs of the existing programs and the YouthBuild USA proposal. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) assess the effect of donating 1 to 5 percent of selected General Services Administration (GSA) used cars on GSA’s fleet vehicle sales operations, (2) describe what studies have shown with respect to the benefits that car ownership or access may hold for low- income individuals, and (3) describe what studies of selected Low Income Car Ownership (LICO) programs and experiences of these programs have shown with respect to the benefits of participant car ownership. To assess the role of car ownership in facilitating employment. The study did not control for urban and rural areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist youth who live in high poverty rural areas obtain and retain jobs, YouthBuild USA, a national nonprofit organization, has proposed providing donated used cars to selected low-income youth in rural communities. YouthBuild USA's proposed program hinges on receiving donations of used cars from the federal government's General Services Administration (GSA). This report discusses (1) the effect of donating 1 to 5 percent of selected GSA used cars on GSA's fleet vehicle sales operations, (2) what studies have shown with respect to the benefits that car ownership or access may hold for low-income individuals, and (3) what studies of selected low income car ownership programs and experiences of these programs have shown with respect to the benefits of participant car ownership. In conducting this study, GAO examined auction data from GSA, reviewed academic studies on the benefits of car access in gaining employment, and interviewed officials of six existing low income car ownership programs.
What GAO Found
If GSA annually donated 1 to 5 percent of the compact sedans available for auction from its Fleet program (112 to 559 cars), its annual sales revenue would be reduced by $600,000 to $3 million. To donate cars directly to YouthBuild USA, GSA would need new statutory authority to deviate from the existing process for disposing of surplus federal property. If it were given this authority, GSA would likely first seek appropriations to recover the loss in sales revenue from the donations but would also consider increasing its leasing rates for compact sedans. However, GSA would also require new legislative authority to increase its rates for this purpose because the current statute governing its Fleet program does not allow it to pass on these costs to the agencies that lease vehicles from it. The seven studies GAO reviewed consistently found that owning a car or having access to one increases the likelihood that low-income individuals (such as rural Youthbuild participants) find a job. One reason for this is that a car allows a person to search for a job over a wider geographic area. Differences between the populations in these studies and rural Youthbuild participants did not allow GAO to use this research to identify the degree to which participants in YouthBuild USA's proposed program would benefit from having a car. Six studies of low income car ownership programs and the experiences of those operating the programs indicated that participants got and retained jobs, earned higher wages, and spent more time with their families as a result of owning a car. However, it is difficult to project the results of these studies to rural Youthbuild participants because of limitations in the methodologies of the studies, differences between individuals served by the programs and YouthBuild USA, and differences in the designs of the existing programs and the YouthBuild USA proposal. |
gao_GAO-07-844 | gao_GAO-07-844_0 | VA Realignment Plans Include Critical Success Factors
VA’s plans for realigning the management of its IT program include elements of several of the six factors that we identified as critical to the department’s implementation of a centralized management structure (see table 1). Additional departmental actions could increase assurance that the realignment will be completed successfully. For example, department officials indicate that VA is currently assessing the roles and responsibilities of the approximately 6,000 staff that have been permanently assigned to the Office of Information and Technology, but the department has not yet established a knowledge and skills inventory to determine what skills are available in order to decide the proper roles for all employees within the new organization. In particular, VA has taken actions to improve communication for the realignment by addressing staff concerns. According to the department, it has concentrated its efforts to date on transferring staff to the CIO’s office and on creating a new organizational structure. The department has not addressed this critical success factor because it has not dedicated an implementation team to manage the realignment effort and track its progress. Centralized Control of IT Budget Has Not Yet Been Clearly Established
Within VA’s new centralized management structure, the CIO is expected to be responsible for ensuring that there are fiscal controls over the department’s IT appropriation and for overseeing capital planning and execution. According to the department, it plans to establish the CIO’s control over the IT budget by (1) designating organizations with specific roles and responsibilities for controlling the budget to report directly to the CIO, (2) implementing an IT governance structure that assigns budget oversight responsibilities to specific governance boards, and (3) developing and implementing IT portfolio management and financial management processes in the new organization. While these measures show the potential for establishing the CIO’s control of the budget, the department has not yet fully implemented them; thus, their effectiveness in ensuring accountability for the budget has not yet been established. Expedite the development of performance metrics to track the progress of the realignment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) realignment plan includes critical factors for successful implementation of a centralized management approach, we obtained and analyzed realignment documents from VA, its realignment contractor, and the independent verification and validation (IV&V) contractor. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spends nearly $1 billion yearly to support its information technology (IT) needs; yet it has encountered persistent challenges in managing IT projects. In October 2005, VA initiated a realignment to centralize its IT management program that it plans to complete by July 2008. GAO was requested to determine (1) whether the department's realignment plan includes critical factors for successful implementation and (2) how the centralized management approach is to ensure that the chief information officer (CIO) is accountable for the department's entire IT budget. To do so, GAO identified critical success factors, analyzed realignment and budget documents, and held discussions with VA officials.
What GAO Found
VA's plans for realigning the management of its IT program include elements of several factors that GAO identified as critical to the department's implementation of a centralized structure; additional departmental actions could increase assurance that the realignment will be completed successfully. Since undertaking the realignment, VA has concentrated its efforts on transferring approximately 6,000 staff to the CIO's authority and on creating a new organizational structure. It has also taken certain actions to establish an IT governance plan, identify workforce management responsibilities, and increase communication about the realignment with staff. However, it has not yet created a knowledge and skills inventory to help determine proper roles for all employees in the new organization, established governance boards to manage resources, or dedicated an implementation team to manage change and track the progress of the realignment with performance metrics. As a result, the department risks jeopardizing the success of its efforts and may not realize the long-term benefits of the realignment. Within the new structure, the CIO is to have responsibility for ensuring that there are fiscal controls over the IT appropriation and for overseeing capital planning processes, budget execution, and financial management programs. According to the department, it plans to establish the CIO's control by (1) designating organizations with specific roles and responsibilities for controlling the budget to report directly to the CIO; (2) implementing a governance structure that assigns budget oversight responsibilities to specific governance boards; and (3) developing and implementing IT portfolio management and financial management processes. While these measures show the potential for establishing control of the budget, VA has not yet fully implemented them or committed to a time frame for doing so. Thus, their effectiveness in ensuring the CIO's accountability for the budget has not yet been established. |
gao_NSIAD-98-42 | gao_NSIAD-98-42_0 | NASA and DOD rely on the U.S. Space Command’s Space Surveillance Network, which is operated and maintained by the Air Force, Naval, and Army Space Commands, to provide information on space objects. Instead, it relies on DOD’s capabilities to perform this function. Despite this dependency relationship, the policy makes no provision for an interagency mechanism—either organizational or funding—to ensure that DOD’s space surveillance capabilities meet NASA’s requirements. We evaluated (1) how well DOD’s existing space surveillance capabilities support DOD’s and NASA’s current and future surveillance requirements and (2) the extent to which potential space surveillance capabilities and technologies are coordinated to provide opportunities for improvements. DOD’s space surveillance requirements are under review and are likely to become more stringent. Because DOD’s existing space surveillance network cannot satisfy its and NASA’s emerging requirements, changes in the network may be needed. Thus, there is no authoritative direction, formal agreement, or clear plan on how the two agencies could consolidate their requirements for a common capability. Unless DOD and NASA can establish a consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance requirements, an opportunity may be missed to (1) better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space station and (2) help satisfy national security needs, including U.S. forces’ future needs for space asset information. Potential Surveillance Capabilities Are Not Sufficiently Coordinated
DOD’s plans to modernize the existing Naval Space Surveillance System (known as the Fence) and develop three new ballistic missile warning systems do not adequately consider NASA’s or DOD’s emerging space surveillance requirements. A coordinated plan between DOD and NASA that considers all existing and planned capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a consolidated set of emerging national security and civil space surveillance requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space surveillance requirements and DOD's space surveillance capabilities, focusing on: (1) how well DOD's existing surveillance capabilities support DOD's and NASA's current and future surveillance requirements; and (2) the extent to which potential surveillance capabilities and technologies are coordinated to provide opportunities for improvements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's existing space surveillance network is not capable of providing the information NASA needs to adequately predict collisions between space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion dollar space programs like the space station; (2) the existing network cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements, which are currently under review; (3) DOD's plans--to modernize an existing surveillance network radar system and develop three new ballistic missile warning systems that could contribute to performing the surveillance function--do not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's surveillance requirements; (4) these four systems are separately managed by the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army; (5) an opportunity exists to consider these systems' potential capabilities to enhance the surveillance network to better satisfy requirements and achieve greater benefits from planned investment in space sensor technology; (6) despite NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information, the 1996 National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency mechanism--either organizational or funding--to ensure that DOD's surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements; (7) overall, there is no authoritative direction, formal agreement, or clear plan on how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance requirements for a common capability; (8) a coordinated interagency plan that considers all existing and planned space surveillance capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance requirements; (9) unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a plan, an opportunity may be missed to simultaneously: (a) achieve efficiencies; (b) better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space station; and (c) help satisfy national security needs, including the U.S. forces' future needs for space asset information. |
gao_GAO-08-271T | gao_GAO-08-271T_0 | Physicians who work at VA medical facilities are required to hold at least one current and unrestricted state medical license. VA’s Credentialing and Privileging Processes
Credentialing Process
When physicians apply for initial appointment, they initiate the credentialing process by completing VA’s application, which includes entering into VetPro—a Web-based credentialing system VA implemented in March 2001—information used by VA medical facility officials in the credentialing process. VA does not require this query at reappointment because VA headquarters regularly receives reports from FSMB on any VA physician whose name appears on FSMB’s list, indicating that disciplinary action has been taken against the physician’s state medical license. Figure 1 illustrates VA’s credentialing process. Privileging Process
Physicians, in addition to entering credentialing information into VetPro, must complete a written request for clinical privileges. The facility medical staff specialist provides a physician’s clinical service chief with the physician’s requested clinical privileges and information needed to complete the privileging process, including information that indicates that the credentialing information entered by the physician into VetPro has been verified with the appropriate sources. When deciding to recommend clinical privileges, a clinical service chief considers whether the physician has the appropriate professional credentials, training, and work experience to perform the privileges requested. For reappointment only, a clinical service chief is to consider observations of the physician’s delivery of health care to veterans, and VA’s policy requires that information on a physician’s performance, such as a physician’s surgical complication rate, be used when deciding whether to renew a physician’s clinical privileges. Figure 2 illustrates VA’s privileging process. VA has another requirement that is related to the renewal of physicians’ clinical privileges. VA Has Addressed All GAO Physician Privileging Recommendations, but Extent of Medical Facility Compliance Is Unknown
In our 2006 report, we found that the physician files at the seven facilities we visited demonstrated compliance with four VA credentialing and four privileging requirements we reviewed. However, we found that there were problems complying with a fifth privileging requirement—to use information on a physician’s performance in making privileging decisions. To better ensure that VA physicians are qualified to deliver care safely to veterans, we recommended that VA provide guidance to medical facilities on how to collect individual physician performance information in accordance with VA’s credentialing and privileging policy to use in medical facilities’ privileging process, enforce the requirement that medical facilities submit information on paid VA medical malpractice claims to VA’s Office of Medical-Legal Affairs within 60 days after being notified that the claim is paid, and instruct medical facilities to establish internal controls to ensure the accuracy of their privileging information. VA states that it has implemented all three recommendations we made in our May 2006 report to address compliance with VA’s physician privileging requirements by establishing policy and guidance for its medical facilities. However, we do not know the extent of compliance with these requirements at VA medical facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In a report issued in May 2006, GAO examined compliance with the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) physician credentialing and privileging requirements at seven VA medical facilities GAO visited. VA's credentialing process is used to determine whether a physician's professional credentials, such as licensure, are valid and meet VA's requirements for employment. VA's privileging process is used to determine which health care services or clinical privileges, such as surgical procedures, a VA physician is qualified to provide to veterans without supervision. Although GAO cannot generalize from its findings, GAO found that the seven facilities were complying with credentialing requirements. However, the facilities were not complying with aspects of certain privileging requirements. To better ensure that VA physicians are qualified to deliver care safely to veterans, GAO made three recommendations to improve VA's privileging of physicians. GAO was asked to testify on (1) how VA credentials and privileges physicians working in its medical facilities and (2) the extent to which VA has implemented the three recommendations made in GAO's May 2006 report that address VA's privileging requirements. To update its issued work, GAO reviewed VA's policies, procedures, and correspondence related to physician privileging and interviewed VA central office officials to determine if the recommendations made in GAO's May 2006 report were implemented.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) has specific requirements that medical facility officials must follow to credential and privilege physicians. VA requires its medical facility officials to credential and privilege facility physicians periodically so that they can continue to work at VA. Facility officials verify the information used in the credentialing process and query certain databases that contain information on disciplinary actions that have been taken against a physician's state medical license and have information about a physician's professional competence. Each physician also must complete a written request for clinical privileges that is reviewed by the physician's supervisor who considers whether the physician has the appropriate professional credentials, training, and work experience. In addition, every 2 years, the supervisor is to consider information on a physician's performance, such as a physician's surgical complication rate, when deciding whether to renew a physician's clinical privileges. In a May 2006, GAO examined compliance with VA's physician credentialing and privileging requirements at seven VA medical facilities it visited and made three recommendations designed to improve aspects of privileging and oversight of the process. The three recommendations were (1) to provide guidance to medical facilities on how to collect individual physician performance information in accordance with VA's credentialing and privileging policy to use in medical facilities' privileging process, (2) to enforce the requirement that medical facilities submit information on paid VA medical malpractice claims to VA within 60 days after being notified that the claim is paid, and (3) to instruct medical facilities to establish internal controls to ensure the accuracy of their privileging information. VA reports that it has implemented all three recommendations by establishing policy and guidance for its medical facilities. However, GAO does not know the extent of compliance with these requirements at VA medical facilities. |
gao_GAO-04-401T | gao_GAO-04-401T_0 | Background
Floods continue to be the most destructive natural hazard in terms of damage and economic loss to the nation. Not only do floods cause damage and loss, they can be deadly—flooding caused the deaths of about 900 people from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001. FEMA Has Sought to Minimize Flood- Related Losses Through the National Flood Insurance Program and Various Mitigation Grant Programs
Through the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA has sought to minimize flood-related property losses by making flood insurance available on reasonable terms and encouraging its purchase by people who need flood insurance protection—particularly those living in flood prone areas. Flood maps provide the basis for establishing floodplain building standards that participating communities must adopt and enforce as part of the program. The program has paid about $12 billion in insurance claims, primarily from policyholder premiums that otherwise would have been paid through taxpayer-funded disaster relief or borne by home and business owners themselves. FEMA also has a variety of grant programs designed to mitigate the effects of natural hazards, including flooding, on people and property. In addition, FEMA provides funding for mitigation planning activities and projects before and after floods occur, respectively through the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. About 49,000—approximately 1 percent of the 4.4 million buildings currently insured under the program—have been flooded on more than one occasion during a 10-year period and have received flood insurance payments of $1,000 or more for each claim. According to FEMA, repetitive loss properties have accounted for about 38 percent of all program claim costs historically and are projected by FEMA to cost about $200 million annually. Since 1978, the total cost of these repetitive loss properties to the program has been about $4.6 billion. For example, in Texas, since 1978 there have been approximately 45,000 flood claims totaling over $1 billion for repetitive damage. FEMA has Developed a Strategy and Members of Congress Have Proposed Changes to Address Repetitive Losses
FEMA has developed a strategy to reduce the number of properties repeatedly flooded that, like congressional proposals, seeks to target repetitive loss properties with the greatest losses. 253, as passed by the House, included a pilot program to allow FEMA to use flood insurance program funds to target “severe” repetitive loss properties for mitigation. 253, based on a preliminary assessment, they appear to have the potential to reduce the number and/or vulnerability of repetitive loss properties and, thereby, the potential to help improve the program’s financial condition. (For state by state details on the total number of repetitive loss properties, the number of currently insured repetitive loss properties, the number of currently insured repetitive loss properties that meet the criteria proposed in the H.R. Such outcome-based measures could allow FEMA to assess the impact of savings to the National Flood Insurance Program resulting from its mitigation of repetitive loss properties. 253 on these properties. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency Management Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Floods have been, and continue to be, the most destructive natural hazard in terms of damage and economic loss to the nation. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2002, about 900 lives were lost due to flooding and flood damages totaled about $55 billion. Some properties have been repeatedly flooded and the subject of federal flood insurance claims. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for assisting state and local governments, private entities, and individuals to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, including floods. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the primary vehicle for FEMA's efforts to mitigate the impact of floods. The Senate Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, asked GAO to discuss (1) FEMA's approach to flood mitigation, (2) the effect of repetitive loss properties on the NFIP, and (3) recent actions taken or proposed to address the impact of repetitive loss properties on the NFIP.
What GAO Found
FEMA has taken a multifaceted approach to mitigating, or minimizing the life and property losses and disaster assistance costs that result from flooding. Through the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA develops and updates flood maps that identify flood prone areas and makes insurance available for communities that agree to adopt and enforce building standards based upon these maps. Since its inception in 1968, the National Flood Insurance Program has paid $12 billion in insurance claims to owners of flood-damage properties that have been funded primarily by policyholders' premiums that otherwise would have been paid through taxpayer-funded disaster relief or borne by home and business owners themselves. Through a variety of grant programs, FEMA also provides funding for mitigation planning activities and projects before and after floods occur. Repetitive loss properties represent a significant portion of annual flood insurance program claims. About 1 percent of the 4.4 million properties currently insured by the program are considered to be repetitive loss properties--properties for which policyholders have made two or more $1,000 flood claims. However, about 38 percent of all program claim costs have been the result of repetitive loss properties, at a cost of about $4.6 billion since 1978. Recent federal actions to reduce program losses related to repetitive loss properties include FEMA's strategy to target severe repetitive loss properties for mitigation and congressional proposals to phase out coverage or begin charging full and actuarially based rates for repetitive loss property owners who refuse to accept FEMA's offer to purchase or mitigate the effect of floods on these buildings. FEMA's strategy and the congressional proposals appear to have the potential to reduce the number and vulnerability of repetitive loss properties and, thereby, the potential to help reduce the number of flood insurance claims. |
gao_GAO-12-604 | gao_GAO-12-604_0 | When the primary NPOESS contract was awarded in August 2002, the program was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2018. Overview of Initial NOAA and DOD Plans for Replacement Satellite Programs
After the decision was made to disband the NPOESS program in 2010, NOAA and DOD began planning for their respective satellite programs. Both agencies made progress on these activities, but recent events have resulted in major program changes. However, the agency now plans to remove key requirements, including selected sensors and ground systems, to keep the program within budget. DOD established its DWSS program office and modified its contracts accordingly before deciding in early 2012 to terminate the program and reassess its requirements (as directed by Congress). NOAA Established the JPSS Program and Contracts for Most Components, but Plans to Modify Requirements to Limit Costs
After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA transferred management responsibilities to its new satellite program, defined its requirements, and transferred contracts to the new program. While final decisions on what will be removed are expected by the end of June 2012, NOAA may discontinue: support for OMPS operations on JPSS-1; development of two of the three planned Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensors, the spacecraft for all three of these sensors, and the launch vehicle for the three sensors; development of the OMPS and CERES sensors on JPSS-2; plans for a network of ground-based receptor stations; planned improvements in the time it takes to obtain satellite data from JPSS-2 (the requirement was to provide data in 30 minutes; instead, the requirement will remain at the JPSS-1 level of 80 minutes); plans to install an Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS) at two plans to support ground operations for DOD’s future polar satellite program. NPP Is in Orbit; Sensor Data Are Being Calibrated for Use
NPP was successfully launched on October 28, 2011. Development of JPSS Is Under Way; Critical Decisions and Milestones Are Pending
The major components of the JPSS program are at different stages of development, and important decisions and program milestones lie ahead. Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing technical issues and the impact of these issues had not yet been determined. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP, and NOAA is planning to upgrade selected parts of the ground systems to increase security and reliability. The free-flyer project is still in a planning stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the instruments or when these satellites will launch. JPSS Risk Management Process in Place; Key Risks Remain
The JPSS program has a structured risk management process in place and is working to mitigate key program risks; however, NOAA faces key risks involving the potential for satellite gaps and does not yet have mitigation plans. The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an The JPSS program is working to mitigate the risks of a lack of a cost and schedule baseline and program office staffing shortfalls, but NOAA has not established mitigation plans to address the risk of a gap in the afternoon orbit or potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and European polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary information to NOAA forecasts. Moreover, until NOAA establishes mitigation plans for a satellite data gap, it runs the risk of not being able to fulfill its mission of providing weather forecasts to protect lives, property, and commerce. JPSS program officials are currently working to calibrate NPP data so that they are useable by civilian and military meteorologists and to manage the development of sensors for the first JPSS satellite. In its comments, NOAA agreed with the report’s recommendation and noted that the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service— a NOAA component agency—has performed analyses on how to mitigate potential gaps in satellite data, but has not yet compiled this information into a report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate efforts to transfer management and contract responsibilities from the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program to the separate satellite programs being established at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Department of Defense (DOD), (2) assess NOAA’s progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite and the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), and (3) evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks. We interviewed agency and contractor officials to evaluate actions to address each transition risk. Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users. | Why GAO Did This Study
Environmental satellites provide critical data used in forecasting weather and measuring variations in climate over time. NPOESSa program managed by NOAA, DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administrationwas planned to replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. However, 8 years after a development contract for the NPOESS program was awarded in 2002, the cost estimate had more than doubledto about $15 billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality had been removed from the program, and the programs tri-agency management structure had proven to be ineffective. In February 2010, a presidential task force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions.
GAO was asked to evaluate (1) efforts to transfer responsibilities from the NPOESS program to the separate NOAA and DOD programs, (2) NOAAs progress in developing its satellite system, and (3) NOAAs efforts to mitigate key project risks. To do so, GAO analyzed program management, contract, cost, and risk data, attended executive program reviews, and interviewed agency and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
Following the decision to disband the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program in 2010, both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) made initial progress in transferring key management responsibilities to their separate program offices. Specifically, NOAA established a Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program office, documented its requirements, and transferred existing contracts for earth-observing sensors to the new program. DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite System program office and modified contracts accordingly. However, recent events have resulted in major program changes at both agencies. NOAA plans to revise its program requirements to remove key elements, including sensors and ground-based data processing systems, to keep the program within budget. Further, in early 2012, DOD decided to terminate its program and reassess its requirements.
Over the past year, NOAA has made progress in developing its satellite system, but critical decisions and milestones lie ahead. In October 2011, the JPSS program office successfully launched a satellite originally called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). Data from the satellite are currently being calibrated and validated, and NOAA meteorologists started using selected satellite data products in their weather forecasts in May 2012. Further, the three major components of the JPSS program (the flight, ground, and free-flyer projects) are at different stages of development. Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing technical issues. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP and NOAA is planning to upgrade parts of the ground system infrastructure to increase its security and reliability. The free-flyer project, intended to integrate and launch key instruments that could not be accommodated on the JPSS satellites, is still in a planning stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the instruments or when these satellites will launch.
The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an effective risk management process; however, the program still faces significant risks. It does not yet have a cost and schedule baseline in place, the program office is not yet fully staffed, and there will likely be a gap in satellite data lasting 17 to 53 months from the time NPP is projected to cease operations and the first JPSS satellite begins to operate. There are also potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and European polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary information to NOAA forecasts. The JPSS program office is managing the first two risks, but NOAA has not established plans to mitigate potential satellite gaps. Until these risks are mitigated and resolved, civilian and military satellite data users may not have the information they need for timely weather forecasting, thereby risking lives, property, and commerce.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making a recommendation to NOAA to establish mitigation plans to address the risk of satellite data gaps. NOAA agreed with GAOs recommendation and noted that the agency is developing a report to address the risk of data gaps. |
gao_GAO-11-483T | gao_GAO-11-483T_0 | Background
The Recovery Act provided DOE with more than $41.7 billion, including $35.2 billion for projects and activities and $6.5 billion in borrowing authority. This amount included about $5 billion for the Weatherization Assistance Program, about $3.2 billion for the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program, and about $3.1 billion for the State Energy Program. The Recovery Act also provided about $6 billion to the Office of Environmental Management for environmental cleanup projects and about $2.5 billion to the Loan Guarantee Program Office to support loan guarantees for renewable energy and electric power transmission projects. As of March 10, 2011, DOE reported that it had obligated $33.1 billion (94 percent) and spent $12.5 billion (36 percent) of the $35.2 billion it received under the Recovery Act for projects and activities (see table 1). By comparison, as of December 31, 2009, the department had obligated $23.2 billion (54 percent) and spent $1.8 billion (4 percent). DOE Recovery Act Spending and Jobs Funded Vary by Program
DOE programs vary in the amount of Recovery Act funds they have obligated and spent and in the number of jobs funded through such spending, according to DOE and recipient reported data. Table 2 shows Recovery Act funding, obligations, and spending for the selected DOE programs. As of March 10, 2011, the percentage of Recovery Act funding spent on these selected programs ranged from a high of 67 percent for the Office of Environmental Management’s cleanup activities to a low of 5 percent for the Loan Guarantee Program Office. Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program
The Recovery Act provided about $3.2 billion for DOE’s Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program (EECBG), funding the program for the first time since it was authorized, in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. As of March 10, 2011, recipients reported spending about $860 million. We expect to issue a report in April 2011 with greater detail about the implementation of the EECBG program, including information on the challenges that EECBG recipients have reported encountering in using grant funds and the quality of jobs data reported by recipients. As of March 2011, DOE had obligated virtually all of the $6 billion in Recovery Act funding for cleanup activities and had spent nearly $4 billion, or about two-thirds of the funds. Recovery Act-funded employment for DOE’s cleanup activities peaked in the last quarter of fiscal year 2010. DOE reported for the last quarter of fiscal year 2010 an estimated total of 10,977 FTEs funded by the Recovery Act. According to our analysis of DOE data, as of March 10, 2011, DOE’s LGP had obligated only about 17 percent of the remaining $2.5 billion in Recovery Act funds. As of January 31, 2011, recipients reported obligating over $2.7 billion and spending over $900 million of their available funds. As of February 2011, DOE reported that it had released the remaining half of funds to the 44 recipients that had met these requirements. All of the recipients submitted their quarterly data to FederalReporting.gov and, for the fourth quarter of 2010, reported approximately 15,391 FTEs had been funded by the Recovery Act under this program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) aims to promote economic recovery, make investments, and minimize or avoid reductions in state and local government services. As of February 2011, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the act will cost $821 billion in spending and tax provisions through 2019. The Recovery Act provided the Department of Energy (DOE) more than $41.7 billion--$35.2 billion for projects and activities and $6.5 billion in borrowing authority--in areas such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, and environmental cleanup. This included about $3.2 billion for the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program, about $3.1 billion for the State Energy Program, and about $5 billion for the Weatherization Assistance Program. The act also provided about $6 billion to DOE's Office of Environmental Management for environmental cleanup activities and about $2.5 billion to its Loan Guarantee Program Office to support such guarantees for, among other things, renewable energy projects. This testimony focuses on DOE's obligations and spending of Recovery Act funds for these programs and information reported on jobs funded as a result of this spending. This testimony is based on prior GAO work updated with data from DOE and on preliminary results from ongoing GAO work on the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program.
What GAO Found
As of March 10, 2011, DOE reported that it had obligated $33.1 billion (94 percent) and spent $12.5 billion (36 percent) of the $35.2 billion it received under the Recovery Act for projects and activities. This is an increase from December 31, 2009, when DOE reported that it had obligated $23.2 billion and spent $1.8 billion. DOE programs vary in the amount of Recovery Act funds they have obligated and spent and in the number of jobs funded through such spending, according to DOE and recipient reported data. Specifically: (1) Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program. DOE has obligated the full $3.2 billion of Recovery Act funding provided for the program and, as of March 2011, some grant recipients reported spending about $860 million. GAO expects to issue a report in April 2011 with information on the quality of jobs data reported by recipients. (2) Office of Environmental Management Cleanup Activities. DOE has obligated virtually all of the $6 billion in Recovery Act funding for cleanup activities and, as of March 2011, had spent about two-thirds of the funds. Recovery Act-funded employment for DOE's cleanup activities peaked in the last quarter of 2010, when DOE reported that 10,977 full-time equivalents had been funded by the act. (3) Loan Guarantee Program. As of March 2011, DOE has obligated about 17 percent of the $2.5 billion provided for Loan Guarantee Program. For the last quarter of 2010, recipients reported 784 full-time equivalents had been funded from Loan Guarantee Program projects. (4) State Energy Program. As of January 2011, grant recipients reported obligating over $2.7 billion of Recovery Act funding and spending over $900 million of the $3.1 billion appropriated to the State Energy Program. (5) Weatherization Assistance Program. As of March 2011, DOE reported that half of the $5 billion of Recovery Act funding provided for the Weatherization Assistance Program had been spent. Recipients reported that about 15,391 full-time equivalents had been funded by the Recovery Act for the fourth quarter of 2010. |
gao_GAO-05-293 | gao_GAO-05-293_0 | DOD’s Equipment Reconstitution Estimating Process Contained Weaknesses That Produced Errors
The two-phased process DOD used to develop its fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget equipment reconstitution requirements contained weaknesses that produced errors that may result in misstatements of future-year budget estimates if not corrected. We observed two problems with the COST model associated with the first phase of DOD’s process that have generated unreliable estimates. First, the COST model can overstate reconstitution costs related to aircraft and ship costs because these costs are covered in both the operations and reconstitution sections of the model. Second, there is uncertainty in DOD over the maintenance requirements covered by the model. We also noted problems with the second phase of DOD’s process. In one instance, the Army did not consider funding in its baseline peacetime operation and maintenance budget that would be available for equipment reconstitution. In another instance, the services included requirements in their reconstitution estimates that appear to be inconsistent with equipment reconstitution activities established by OSD’s supplemental budget preparation guidance. Duplication of Cost Requirements Overstates Reconstitution Estimate
The model that OSD and the services used in the first phase of the process to calculate reconstitution requirements for fiscal year 2004 resulted in an overstatement of about $1.2 billion. Consequently, the department cannot have confidence in its equipment reconstitution budget estimate. DOD Not Accurately Reporting Equipment Reconstitution Costs
DOD has not accurately tracked and reported its equipment reconstitution costs because the services are unable to segregate equipment reconstitution from other maintenance requirements, as required. Our analysis of the DFAS report showed that 1) the Air Force is not separately reporting equipment reconstitution obligations because it does not have a mechanism within its current accounting system to track them, 2) the Army is including unit reconstitution obligations that are above and beyond equipment reconstitution and other maintenance costs, and 3) the Navy is unable to segregate regular maintenance from reconstitution maintenance for ship overhauls. As a result, the equipment reconstitution obligations are being inconsistently reported by the services and the report data are not reliable for accurately determining how much the services are actually obligating for the reconstitution of equipment returning from deployments in support of the global war on terrorism. Specifically, the Air Force does not have a mechanism nor has it established codes that can track the dollar amounts obligated on equipment reconstitution in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, which the guidance does not require. For example, units reconstituting after returning from Iraq may be including maintenance obligations generated during training exercises. As a result, the Army’s equipment reconstitution amounts are likely overstated. Recommendations for Executive Action
To correct the weaknesses we identified in the equipment reconstitution cost estimating process the department used when developing its fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget request, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: Direct the OSD comptroller to revise its COST model to ensure that costs covered by the model’s operating tempo cost elements are not duplicated by costs in the model’s reconstitution cost elements; Direct the OSD comptroller to clearly establish what equipment maintenance requirements should be covered by the COST model and communicate this information to IDA to ensure that the model calculations reflect only these maintenance costs; Direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a step in its supplemental estimating process to offset the estimate with the baseline budget to improve future contingency funding estimates; Direct the OSD comptroller to clarify its supplemental budget guidance to the services on what types of maintenance requirements should and should not be included as equipment reconstitution when developing the supplemental budget; and Direct the OSD comptroller to ensure that all potential equipment reconstitution requirements are considered when developing supplemental budget requests by allowing the services to include anticipated equipment losses—both operational losses and maintenance washouts—in their supplemental budgeting process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The high pace of military operations in Iraq and elsewhere has generated a multibillion dollar equipment maintenance requirement that must be addressed after units return home. Upon returning from deployments, active, reserve, and National Guard units reconstitute, or restore, their equipment to a condition that enables them to conduct training and prepare for future deployments. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses a two-phased process to develop equipment reconstitution supplemental budget estimates. GAO reviewed this process for the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget to determine (1) the extent to which the process produced reliable estimates of reconstitution requirements in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget, and (2) whether DOD is accurately tracking and reporting reconstitution costs.
What GAO Found
DOD's two-phased process to develop its fiscal year 2004 equipment reconstitution cost estimates contained weaknesses that produced errors, which may result in misstatements of future-year reconstitution cost requirements. The model DOD used to estimate costs in the first phase of the process generated unreliable estimates due to two main reasons. First, the model can overstate aircraft and ship reconstitution costs because these costs are covered in two different sections of the model. As a result, the model's estimate for Air Force aircraft reconstitution was overstated by over $1 billion. Second, there is uncertainty over what maintenance requirements the model covered. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services developed their requirements with the understanding that the model did not calculate all maintenance requirements. GAO learned that the model may duplicate some requirements that the services manually calculated and included in their cost estimates. Consequently, DOD cannot have confidence that its equipment reconstitution budget estimate is reliable. There are also reconstitution estimating and guidance problems associated with the second phase of the process, where the services may develop alternative estimates outside of the model. For instance, the Army failed to consider funding in its baseline budget that would be available for equipment reconstitution. In another instance, the services included requirements in their reconstitution estimates that appear to go beyond equipment reconstitution as established by OSD's guidance. Nonetheless, GAO found an accumulation of unfulfilled equipment reconstitution requirements, because OSD guidance excluded the services from requesting funds for projected battle and other expected losses. The effect of losses not recognized in OSD's supplemental budget requirements have not yet been quantified and may be significant. GAO believes these problems are creating a backlog of equipment reconstitution requirements that will eventually need to be addressed in future budgets. DOD has not accurately tracked and reported its equipment reconstitution cost because the services are unable to segregate equipment reconstitution from other maintenance requirements as required. As a result, DOD cannot accurately report the cost of equipment reconstitution and, consequently, the total cost of the global war on terror. The Air Force does not break out its equipment reconstitution obligations from other global war-on-terrorism obligations in a DOD monthly cost report because it does not have a mechanism that can track the amounts obligated on equipment reconstitution and delineate such obligations from routine maintenance. Further, Army- and Navy-reported equipment reconstitution obligations are likely overstated in the monthly report because they include other maintenance costs--such as those related to equipment used in training exercises--that do not fall within DOD's description of equipment reconstitution. |
gao_GAO-15-574 | gao_GAO-15-574_0 | As of April 1, 2015, FCC had received 48 RDAs and no informal or formal complaints. FCC Has Conducted Public Outreach Efforts but Has Not Evaluated Their Effectiveness
FCC has undertaken numerous efforts to conduct its CVAA-mandated informational and educational program to inform the public about the act’s protections and remedies. the key practices we identified and found FCC’s efforts did not always align with the key practices, as shown in table 1. FCC Has Taken Limited Actions to Ensure and Determine Compliance with Recordkeeping Provisions and with Accessibility Requirements
FCC Established a Database to Facilitate Industry Self-Certifications
The primary action FCC has taken to ensure industry’s compliance with CVAA’s recordkeeping requirements was to establish the Recordkeeping Compliance Certification and Contact Information (RCCCI) Registry, which is maintained on FCC’s website. Companies subject to any of CVAA’s accessibility requirements must submit an annual certification to FCC that they are maintaining records of their efforts to make their products accessible through the RCCCI Registry. Furthermore, FCC cannot say whether industry is fully complying with the requirements to make products and services accessible. However, FCC lacks an objective measure for making this determination. In the 2014 biennial report to Congress, FCC based its determination of industry compliance primarily on the public comments it received and industry association reports to prepare the final report. For example, based on comments it received, FCC determined that Section 255 companies increased the availability of accessible telecommunications equipment and that Section 716 and 718 companies “made efforts to comply.” Although such commentary does not enable FCC to objectively determine industry compliance, developing an objective measure might not be cost-effective because to date, FCC has received no informal or formal complaints asserting non-compliance with CVAA accessibility requirements. Stakeholders Indicate CVAA’s Recordkeeping Obligations Have Had Minimal Effects Thus Far on the Development and Deployment of New Communications Technologies
Stakeholders we surveyed and interviewed generally reported that CVAA’s recordkeeping obligations have not affected the development and deployment of new communications technologies. As shown in figure 6, we estimate that 72 percent of companies view those requirements as having had no effect on their development and deployment of new communications technologies. In our interviews, industry associations and advocates for people with disabilities generally indicated that product accessibility had improved since the passage of CVAA. Representatives from industry associations highlighted a number of association-led efforts to bring industry and consumers together to ensure that the needs of consumers with disabilities are being addressed. Advocates for people with disabilities indicated that there were still many ways in which the accessibility of communications technology could be further improved, but some believed that CVAA resulted in more widely available accessible technology. In the written comments, FCC stated that it agreed with our recommendation and noted that evaluating its public outreach efforts could enable FCC to determine whether current resources allocated to these efforts are appropriate and help to ensure the quality, quantity, and timeliness of such efforts. This report presents information on (1) the extent to which FCC established complaint and enforcement procedures within the time frames required by CVAA and conducted public outreach, (2) the actions FCC has taken to ensure industry compliance with CVAA’s recordkeeping provisions and to determine the level of industry compliance with accessibility requirements, and (3) stakeholders’ views on the effect of CVAA’s recordkeeping obligations on the development and deployment of new communications technologies.We did not assess the effectiveness of CVAA’s enforcement provisions and FCC’s enforcement procedures to ensure compliance with CVAA because FCC had not taken any enforcement actions at the time of our review. Appendix III: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Actions Implementing the Accessibility Complaint and Enforcement Procedures Required by the 21st Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA)
Appendix III: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Actions Implementing the Accessibility Complaint and Enforcement Procedures Required by the 21st Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA)
Section 717 provisions related to FCC’s establishment of complaint and enforcement procedures FCC shall establish regulations within one year after CVAA’s enactment on October 8, 2010, that facilitate the filing of formal and informal complaints that allege a violation of Section 255, 716, or 718. FCC does not charge a fee for filing an informal complaint. | Why GAO Did This Study
CVAA was enacted to help ensure that people with disabilities have full access to the benefits of technological advances in communications. The act required FCC to establish regulations and conduct public outreach and included a provision that GAO review FCC's efforts. GAO examined (1) the extent to which FCC established complaint and enforcement procedures within CVAA-required time frames and conducted public outreach, (2) the actions FCC has taken to ensure industry compliance with CVAA's recordkeeping provisions and to determine the level of industry compliance with accessibility requirements, and (3) stakeholders' views on the effect of CVAA's recordkeeping obligations on the development and deployment of new communications technologies.
GAO reviewed FCC's regulations, orders, and biennial reports to Congress; surveyed a random sample of companies certifying compliance with CVAA requirements; assessed FCC's efforts to conduct public outreach against key practices GAO previously identified through an expert panel; and interviewed FCC officials and representatives from industry associations, consumer advocate groups, and disability research organizations selected based on CVAA-related comments they submitted to FCC.
What GAO Found
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established accessibility complaint and enforcement procedures within the time frames mandated by the 21st Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA) to ensure that people with disabilities would have access to advanced communications. FCC's complaint and enforcement procedures enable consumers to file (1) a pre-complaint Request for Dispute Assistance (RDA), (2) an informal complaint, or (3) a formal complaint if consumers believe a communications product or service is not accessible to people with disabilities. From October 8, 2013, to April 1, 2015, FCC received 48 RDAs and no informal or formal complaints. FCC has undertaken numerous efforts to inform the public about CVAA's protections and remedies by, for example, hosting seminars and webinars and publishing consumer guides on accessibility issues. However, GAO found FCC's efforts do not always align with key practices for conducting public outreach. In particular, FCC has not evaluated the effectiveness of its public outreach efforts. Without such an evaluation, FCC does not know the program's effectiveness in informing the public of the protections and remedies available under CVAA and thus cannot reasonably assure the quality, quantity, and timeliness of the outreach program. Evaluating the outreach efforts would also enable FCC to determine whether current resources allocated to the outreach program are appropriate or need adjustment.
FCC has taken limited actions to ensure industry compliance with CVAA's recordkeeping provisions and does not know the extent to which industry is fully complying with the requirements to make products and services accessible. FCC established the Recordkeeping Compliance Certification and Contact Information Registry to help ensure industry compliance with recordkeeping requirements. Companies subject to any CVAA accessibility requirement must submit an annual certification to FCC that they are maintaining records of their efforts to make their products accessible through the Registry. FCC could not say whether industry is complying with CVAA accessibility requirements because FCC lacks an objective measure for making this determination. However, developing a measure might not be cost effective given that FCC has received no informal or formal complaints asserting non-compliance with these requirements. In FCC's 2014 biennial report to Congress, FCC based its determination of industry compliance on public comments and industry association reports.
Stakeholders GAO surveyed and interviewed generally reported that CVAA's recordkeeping obligations have not affected the development and deployment of new communications technologies. Specifically, GAO estimated that between 59 and 70 percent of companies view CVAA's recordkeeping requirements as having had no effect on their development and deployment of new communications technologies. Overall, industry associations and disability advocates GAO interviewed generally agreed that accessibility improved since the passage of CVAA. Industry associations highlighted a number of association-led efforts to bring industry and consumers together to ensure that the needs of disabled consumers are being addressed. Advocates for people with disabilities indicated that there were still many ways in which the accessibility of communications technology could be further improved, but some believed that CVAA resulted in more widely available accessible technology.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should evaluate its public outreach efforts and ensure those efforts incorporate key practices. FCC concurred with the recommendation and intends to take action to address it. |
gao_GAO-04-625T | gao_GAO-04-625T_0 | VA Facilities Demonstrated Mixed Compliance with Key VA Screening Requirements
We identified key VA screening requirements and found mixed compliance with these requirements in the four facilities we visited. All four facilities generally complied with VA’s existing policies for verifying the professional credentials of practitioners currently employed in VA facilities, either by contacting the state licensing boards for practitioners such as physicians or physically inspecting the licenses or national certificates for practitioners such as nurses and respiratory therapists. VA has not conducted oversight of its facilities’ compliance with the key screening requirements. These reviews did not include determining whether the facilities were verifying professional credentials. Gaps in Key VA Screening Requirements Create Vulnerabilities
Gaps in VA’s requirements for screening the professional credentials and personal backgrounds of practitioners create vulnerabilities in its screening processes that could place patients at risk by allowing health care practitioners who might harm patients to work in VA facilities. Another available national database, the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (HIPDB), contains information on professional disciplinary actions and criminal convictions involving all licensed health care practitioners, not just physicians and dentists. As with physical inspection of state licenses, physical inspection of national certificates alone can be misleading; not all certificates are marked if restricted, and they can be forged. Implementing fingerprint-only checks for practitioners who are currently exempt from background investigations would detect practitioners with criminal histories. However, compliance with the existing key screening requirements was mixed at the four facilities we visited. In addition, VA does not require all practitioners with direct patient care access, such as medical residents, to have their fingerprints checked against a criminal history database. In our report, we recommend that VA take the following four actions: expand the verification requirement that facility officials contact state licensing boards and national certifying organizations to include all state licenses and national certificates held by practitioners VA intends to hire and currently employed practitioners, expand the query of the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank to include all licensed practitioners that VA intends to hire and periodically query this database for practitioners currently employed in VA, require fingerprint checks for all health care practitioners who were previously exempted from background investigations and who have direct patient care access, and conduct oversight to help ensure that facilities comply with all key screening requirements for practitioners VA intends to hire and practitioners currently employed by VA.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employs about 190,000 individuals including physicians, nurses, and therapists at its facilities. It supplements these practitioners with contract staff and medical residents. Cases of practitioners causing intentional harm to patients have raised concerns about VA's screening of practitioners' professional credentials and personal backgrounds. This testimony is based on GAO's report VA Health Care: Improved Screening of Practitioners Would Reduce Risk to Veterans, GAO-04-566 (Mar. 31, 2004). GAO was asked to (1) identify and assess the extent to which selected VA facilities comply with existing key VA screening requirements and (2) determine the adequacy of these requirements for its practitioners.
What GAO Found
GAO identified key VA screening requirements that include verifying state licenses and national certificates; completing background investigations, including fingerprinting to check for criminal histories; and checking national databases for reports of practitioners who have been professionally disciplined or excluded from federal health care programs. GAO reviewed 100 practitioners' personnel files at each of four facilities it visited and found mixed compliance with the existing key VA screening requirements. GAO also found that VA has not conducted oversight of its facilities' compliance with the key screening requirements. GAO found adequate screening requirements for certain practitioners, such as physicians and dentists, for whom all licenses are verified by contacting state licensing boards. However, existing screening requirements for others, such as nurses and respiratory therapists currently employed in VA, are less stringent because they do not require verifying all state licenses and national certificates. Moreover, they require only physical inspection of these credentials rather than contacting licensing boards or certifying organizations. Physical inspection alone can be misleading; not all credentials indicate whether they are restricted, and credentials can be forged. VA also does not require facility officials to query, for other than physicians and dentists, a national database that includes reports of disciplinary actions and criminal convictions involving all licensed practitioners. In addition, many practitioners with direct patient care access, such as medical residents, are not required to undergo background investigations, including fingerprinting to check for criminal histories. This pattern of gaps and mixed compliance with key VA key screening requirements create vulnerabilities to the extent that VA remains unaware of practitioners who could place patients at risk. |
gao_T-GGD-96-185 | gao_T-GGD-96-185_0 | The order also allocates responsibilities to both federal agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a centralized regulatory review process, and recognizes OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as the repository of expertise on regulatory issues. As the Chairman and Ranking Member of this Subcommittee requested, we focused our review on three issues: (1) the extent to which agencies are adhering to and OIRA is applying the executive order’s cost-benefit analysis requirements; (2) whether OIRA is significantly changing agencies’ proposed regulations during its review process; and (3) whether agencies are eliminating regulations and, if so, whether the elimination and revision of regulations are reducing regulatory burden. Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements
Agencies’ responsibilities in the executive order to assess the costs and benefits of their proposed regulations vary depending on whether the regulatory action involved is “significant” or “economically significant.” A significant regulatory action is defined in the order as any action “that is likely to result in a rule that may (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.”
Any regulatory action that meets the first of these criteria is considered “economically significant.” If the action does not meet the first criterion but meets any of the other three criteria, it is considered “significant for noneconomic reasons.”
OIRA’s Interpretation of the Order’s Cost-Benefit Requirements
said that agencies should, at a minimum, include a statement in the preamble to proposed significant regulations indicating that they considered the potential costs and benefits of the regulations during their development. For 28 of the 29 economically significant rules, a cost-benefit analysis document was either in OIRA’s files or was provided by OIRA staff. benefits of the regulatory action. Although we found evidence of some OIRA involvement in all of the regulations we investigated, the data available did not provide sufficient evidence to conclusively determine whether OIRA-recommended changes were made to all of the regulations. Most OIRA Changes Appeared Substantive
In 21 of the 32 rules for which evidence existed of OIRA-suggested changes, the changes made to the rules appeared to be substantive in nature. Therefore, for these entries there did not appear to be any reduction in substantive regulatory burden. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implementation of Executive Order 12866, which is intended to improve regulatory planning and review.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the extent of federal agencies' cost-benefit analyses of proposed regulations depends on whether the regulatory action is economically significant or significant for noneconomic reasons; (2) agencies are required to provide the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) with their cost-benefit analyses of the regulatory action, but agencies often do not perform these analyses because they believe the analyses are not worth the time and effort; (3) OIRA provided cost-benefit analyses for 28 of 29 economically significant regulatory actions reviewed, but 2 of these analysis did not contain all required elements; (4) 14 significant noneconomic regulatory actions did not have cost-benefit analyses for various reasons; (5) although there was evidence of OIRA involvement in all regulations reviewed, the data was insufficient to determine whether OIRA-recommended changes were made; (6) at present, OIRA reviews are limited to only significant regulatory actions; (7) OIRA works informally with agencies during regulations' development and its influence may often be indirect and subtle; (8) for 21 of 32 rules, OIRA-suggested changes appear to have been substantive; and (9) periodic agency reviews of regulations have resulted in the elimination or revision of some regulations, but the overall regulatory burden appears not to have been significantly reduced because of regulatory obsolescence and duplication and the addition of new regulations. |
gao_HEHS-98-25 | gao_HEHS-98-25_0 | There are about 150 assisted reproductive technology programs in the United States. It is less prescriptive than traditional FDA regulation and it has generally been well received by industry. The Proposed Approach Addresses Certain Omissions in Current Regulation
We have three concerns about omissions in the current regulation that FDA has identified and plans to address under its proposed approach: (1) lack of registration of tissue facilities, (2) some types of tissue facilities not covered under the current regulation, and (3) misleading and false advertising in cord blood banking. Proposed Approach Does Not Adequately Address Certain Issues
Four issues not addressed in the current regulation are addressed in the proposed approach but in a manner that does not adequately eliminate potential safety problems: (1) the lack of error and accident reporting to FDA, (2) inadequate tracking systems, (3) the lack of safety and efficacy data on specific stem cell therapies, and (4) inadequate tissue-processing techniques. FDA officials stated that the proposed approach addresses this problem, but tissue tracking is mentioned in the proposed approach only as an example of good tissue practices and its role in the transmission of communicable diseases. Stem cells that were obtained for autologous use or from a close blood relative (related allogeneic) would not require FDA approval. More than minimally manipulated cells or tissues would be subject to processing controls and to premarket requirements to determine safety and effectiveness. For these tissues, FDA would require that the validation of the procedures be documented and available when FDA inspects a facility but would not require the submission of any information on processing. Conclusions
In its proposed approach, FDA addresses three problems we identified as not covered in the current regulation: registration of tissue banks, oversight of reproductive and stem cell facilities, and false product claims. In four instances, we found that the proposed approach addresses issues that are not covered in the current regulation but does so in a manner that is inadequate to eliminate potential safety problems. FDA should also add to its oversight plans provisions that would require tissue facilities to obtain informed consent before procuring any tissues intended for transplantation from living donors; disclosure of genetic tests that have been performed on donated reproductive tissues; tissue facilities to report serious error and accidents to FDA (“serious” to be defined in consultation with industry representatives); facilities that collect, store, process, distribute, or transplant human tissues to establish validated systems to track tissues to consignees and recipients; tissue facilities that collect, store, process, or distribute allogeneic peripheral stem cells or any cord blood stem cells to make premarket submissions if FDA determines that adequate safety and efficacy data are not available to license such products; and tissue facilities to inform FDA of the types of processing techniques used on tissues and to supply information on the safety and efficacy of these techniques. Comments From the Food and Drug Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on FDA’s October 23, 1997, letter. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) oversight of transplanted human tissue as well as potential safety problems, focusing on: (1) gaps in the current regulation; and (2) whether and how FDA plans to address them in the approach it has proposed for regulating tissue banking.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FDA is just now expanding its oversight to improve tissue-banking safeguards in the growing field of tissue-based therapies; (2) FDA has proposed a regulatory approach that is much broader in scope than the current regulation; (3) still in its formative stages, the regulatory approach describes a risk-based approach that industry has generally received well; (4) FDA's proposed approach would alleviate three safety problems not covered by the current regulation: (a) FDA has no universal registry of tissue facilities currently operating in the United States; (b) the current regulation does not cover reproductive tissue or stem cell facilities; and (c) there are numerous instances of misleading and false advertising in private cord blood banking; (5) two problems that FDA does not address in the current regulation or in the proposed approach are: (a) some facilities obtain informed consent after infant delivery, raising safety and ethical concerns about cord blood; and (b) FDA has no current or proposed requirements for disclosing to recipients whether genetic tests have been performed on reproductive tissues and stem cells; and (6) four instances in which FDA's proposed approach inadequately addresses potential safety problems not covered in the current regulation are: (a) facilities would be required to record and investigate errors and accidents but not to report them to FDA; (b) the proposed approach only minimally mentions tracking tissues as good tissue practices and then only in respect to controlling disease transmission; (c) FDA will not require premarket submissions when cells or tissues are to be used in the person from whom they are obtained or in a close blood relative; and (d) FDA has proposed that certain tissue products be subject to premarket approval and that it evaluate processing techniques used on those products, but, for minimally manipulated tissue products, would require only that the validation of the procedure be documented and available when FDA inspects facilities. |
gao_GAO-12-476 | gao_GAO-12-476_0 | Therefore, NCTC did not send the nomination to TSC. 2010 Guidance Addresses Weaknesses in Nominations Process, but Agencies Face Challenges in Managing Increased Volumes of Information
Changes to Watchlisting Guidance and Impacts on Agencies
The July 2010 Watchlisting Guidance includes changes that were intended to address weaknesses in the nominations process that were exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack and to clarify how agencies are to nominate individuals to the watchlist. Since the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, agencies involved in the watchlist nominations process have pursued staffing, technology, working groups, and other solutions to strengthen the process and manage increasing volumes of information. The Number of Individuals on the Watchlist and Aviation-Related Subsets Increased after the Attempted Attack
Immediately after the December 2009 attempted attack, federal agencies took steps that resulted in an increase in the number of individuals in the TSDB and its aviation-related subsets—the No Fly and Selectee lists— based on new intelligence and threat information. Also, upon completion of this initiative, the number of U.S. persons on the No Fly List more than doubled and the number of U.S. persons on the Selectee List increased by about 10 percent. For example, TSA actions have resulted in more individuals being denied boarding aircraft or subjected to enhanced screening before boarding. State took actions to revoke hundreds of U.S. visas immediately after the attempted attack because it determined that the individuals could present an immediate threat. TSA Has Encountered More Individuals on the No Fly and Selectee Lists and Is Screening against More Watchlist Records
No Fly and Selectee List Encounters
After the attempted attack, TSA continued implementation of the Secure Flight program, which enabled TSA to assume direct responsibility for determining if individuals are matches to the No Fly or Selectee lists from air carriers. Appendix III contains additional information on how Secure Flight has reduced the likelihood of passengers being misidentified as being on the watchlist and related inconveniences. Upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry, CBP would inspect the passengers and determine their admissibility. Routinely assessing these outcomes and impacts governmentwide could help decision makers determine if the watchlist is achieving its intended results without having unintended consequences or needs further revisions. Since the guidance was approved, agencies have expressed concerns about the increasing volumes of information and related challenges in processing this information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help inform future efforts to strengthen watchlisting and screening processes, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism establish mechanisms or use existing interagency bodies to routinely assess how the watchlisting guidance has impacted the watchlisting community—including its capacity to submit and process nominations in accordance with provisions in the guidance—and whether any adjustments to agency programs or the guidance are needed, and whether use of the watchlist during agency screening processes is achieving intended results, including whether the overall outcomes and impacts of screening on agency resources and the traveling public are acceptable and manageable or if adjustments to agency programs or the watchlisting guidance are needed. The CIA did not provide any comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
Our reporting objectives were to determine (1) the actions the federal government has taken since the December 25, 2009, attempted attack to strengthen the watchlist nominations process, the extent to which departments and agencies are experiencing challenges in implementing revised watchlisting guidance, and the extent to which agencies are assessing impacts of the actions they have taken; (2) how the composition of the watchlist has changed as a result of actions taken by departments and agencies after the attempted attack; and (3) how screening and law enforcement agencies are addressing vulnerabilities exposed by the attempted attack as well as the outcomes of related screening, and to what extent federal agencies are assessing the impacts of this screening. Screening and Law Enforcement Agency Actions
To identify how screening and law enforcement agencies have addressed vulnerabilities exposed by the attempted attack and how they are assessing the outcomes and impacts of screening or vetting, we focused on the departments and agencies that use the watchlist to screen individuals traveling to the United States—the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which screens passengers before they board aircraft; U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which inspects travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States; and State, which screens individuals who apply for U.S. visas. We obtained data—generally for 2009 and 2010 but in some cases through May 2011—on how often these agencies have encountered individuals on the watchlist and the outcomes of these encounters to help determine what impact changes in agency screening or vetting procedures has had on operations and the traveling public, among other things. We issued a classified report on this work in December 2011. Figure 2 provides an overview of the process used to nominate individuals for inclusion in the TSDB. | Why GAO Did This Study
The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 exposed weaknesses in how the federal government nominated individuals to the terrorist watchlist and gaps in how agencies used the list to screen individuals to determine if they posed a security threat. In response, the President tasked agencies to take corrective actions. GAO was asked to assess (1) government actions since the incident to strengthen the nominations process, (2) how the composition of the watchlist has changed based on these actions, and (3) how agencies are addressing gaps in screening processes. GAO analyzed government reports, the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist, data on the volumes of nominations from January 2009 through May 2011, the composition of the list, and the outcomes of screening agency programs. GAO also interviewed officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and screening agencies to discuss changes to policies, guidance, and processes and related impacts on agency operations and the traveling public, among other things. This report is a public version of the classified report that GAO issued in December 2011 and omits certain information, such as details on the nominations guidance and the specific outcomes of screening processes.
What GAO Found
In July 2010, the federal government finalized guidance to address weaknesses in the watchlist nominations process that were exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack and to clarify how agencies are to nominate individuals to the watchlist. The nominating agencies GAO contacted expressed concerns about the increasing volumes of information and related challenges in processing this information. Nevertheless, nominating agencies are sending more information for inclusion in the terrorist watchlist after the attempted attack than before the attempted attack. Agencies are also pursuing staffing, technology, and other solutions to address challenges in processing the volumes of information. In 2011, an interagency policy committee began an initiative to assess the initial impacts the guidance has had on nominating agencies, but did not provide details on whether such assessments would be routinely conducted in the future. Routine assessments could help the government determine the extent to which impacts are acceptable and manageable from a policy perspective and inform future efforts to strengthen the nominations process.
After the attempted attack, federal agencies took steps to reassess the threat posed by certain individuals already identified in government databases and either add them to the watchlist or change their watchlist status, which included adding individuals to the watchlist’s aviation-related subset lists. For example, the number of U.S. persons (U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents) on the subset No Fly List the government uses to deny individuals the boarding of aircraft more than doubled after the attempted attack.
Screening agencies are addressing gaps in processes that were exposed by the attempted attack. For example, based on the growth of lists used to screen aviation passengers and continued implementation of Secure Flight—which enabled the Transportation Security Administration to assume direct responsibility for conducting watchlist screening from air carriers—more individuals have been denied boarding aircraft or subjected to additional physical screening before boarding. Secure Flight has also reduced the likelihood of passengers being misidentified as being on the watchlist and has allowed agencies to use a broader set of watchlist records during screening. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has built upon its practice of evaluating individuals before they board flights to the United States, resulting in hundreds more non-U.S. persons on the watchlist being kept off flights because the agency determined they would likely be deemed inadmissible upon arrival at a U.S. airport. The Department of State revoked hundreds of visas shortly after the attempted attack because it determined that the individuals could present an immediate threat to the United States. These actions are intended to enhance homeland security, but have also impacted agency resources and the traveling public. An interagency policy committee is also assessing the outcomes and impacts of these actions, but it did not provide details on this effort. Routine assessments could help decision makers and Congress determine if the watchlist is achieving its intended outcomes and help information future efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the outcomes and impacts of agencies’ actions to strengthen nominations and screening processes are routinely assessed. Technical comments were provided and incorporated. |
gao_GAO-07-1248T | gao_GAO-07-1248T_0 | The act directs FCC to require full-power television stations to cease analog broadcasting and to broadcast solely digital transmissions after February 17, 2009. The act also directed NTIA to establish a $1.5 billion subsidy program through which households can obtain coupons toward the purchase of digital-to-analog converter boxes. The Coalition’s mission is to ensure that no consumer is left without broadcast television due to a lack of information about the transition. Federal Government and Private Stakeholder Consumer Education Efforts Are Underway
Federal and private stakeholders are making progress in educating consumers about the DTV transition, with both independent and coordinated efforts underway. FCC has taken several steps toward educating consumers about the transition. In addition, FCC has met with some industry groups, consumer groups, and other government agencies and participated in public events intended to educate audiences about the transition. NTIA said it has provided informational brochures in English and Spanish to the public and provided a copy to every member of Congress and federal agencies that serve some of the populations noted above. On a voluntary basis, some private stakeholders have begun implementing measures to inform consumers about the DTV transition. As previously mentioned, one such private-sector led effort is the DTV Transition Coalition, which has developed and consumer tested various messages about the transition, using surveys and focus groups of the affected consumers—the general population, senior citizens, minority groups, and over-the-air analog television households—to understand what messages are most effective in informing them about the transition. Many Consumer Education Efforts Are Still in the Planning Stages and Have Not Been Widely Implemented
Widespread and comprehensive consumer education efforts have yet to be implemented, but additional efforts are currently being planned. FCC, NTIA, and private sector stakeholders have plans to further educate consumers as the digital transition nears. The converter box subsidy program, to be administered by NTIA, will also have a consumer education component implemented by its contractor, IBM. Because many education efforts are in the planning or initial stages of implementation, it is too early to tell how effective these efforts will be. These proposals include requiring television broadcasters to conduct on-air consumer education efforts and regularly report on the status of these efforts, requiring cable and satellite providers to insert periodic notices in customers’ bills about the transition and their future viewing options, and requiring manufacturers to include information on the transition with any television set or related device they import or distribute in the United States. Difficulties Remain in the Implementation of Consumer Education Programs
Despite efforts currently underway and those being planned, difficulties remain in the implementation of consumer education programs. Private sector organizations are participating in outreach efforts, but these actions are voluntary and therefore the government cannot be assured of the extent of private sector efforts. Further, we heard from strategic communication experts from industry, government, and academia that potential challenges might obstruct consumer education efforts. In particular, the experts and others highlighted several challenges: Prioritizing limited resources. Reaching underserved populations. Aligning stakeholders. Our Future Work Will Focus on Consumer Awareness of the DTV Transition
In our ongoing work for the House Energy and Commerce committee and this committee, we plan to assess the progress of consumer education and awareness about the DTV transition. We will continue to monitor consumer education programs and plan to conduct a series of consumer surveys throughout the year prior to the transition date. We will seek to determine the level of public awareness of those who will be affected by the transition and awareness of the converter box subsidy program and other options for viewing digital signals after the transition. We will review the government’s responsibility for consumer education, monitor the outcome of FCC’s notices of proposed rulemaking regarding the transition, and collect details on IBM’s consumer education plan as they become available. | Why GAO Did This Study
On February 17, 2009, federal law requires all full-power television stations in the United States to cease analog broadcasting and broadcast digital-only transmissions, often referred to as the digital television (DTV) transition. Federal law also requires the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to create a program that subsidizes consumers' purchases of digital-to-analog converter boxes. After the transition, households with analog sets that rely on over-the-air broadcast signals must take action or they will lose television service, but some households might not be aware of this potential disruption. This testimony provides preliminary information on (1) the consumer education efforts currently underway, (2) education efforts being planned, (3) difficulties with the implementation of consumer education programs, and (4) ongoing GAO work on consumer education and awareness regarding the transition. GAO interviewed officials with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NTIA. Further, GAO met with a wide variety of industry and other stakeholders involved with the transition, including members of the DTV Transition Coalition--a group of public and private stakeholders, and experts on strategic communications. GAO discussed this testimony with FCC and NTIA officials and incorporated their comments.
What GAO Found
A number of federal and private stakeholders have begun consumer education campaigns, with both independent and coordinated efforts underway. FCC has taken several steps to promote consumer awareness, such as launching a Web site, participating in events intended to educate the public, and requiring sellers of televisions to include consumer alerts on non-digital televisions. NTIA has created brochures in English and Spanish to provide the public information about its converter box subsidy program and is partnering with organizations to perform outreach to disadvantaged groups. Earlier this year, the DTV Transition Coalition was launched to help ensure that no consumer is left without broadcast television due to a lack of information. Over 160 private, public, and non-profit groups have joined the Coalition to coordinate consumer education efforts. While widespread and comprehensive consumer education efforts have yet to be implemented, various efforts are currently being planned. FCC, NTIA, and private sector stakeholders have plans to further educate consumers as the DTV transition nears. For example, voluntary public service announcements to raise awareness of the transition are planned by industry groups and FCC is considering requiring broadcasters, manufacturers and cable and satellite providers to insert various messages and alerts in their products and programming. In addition, the converter box subsidy program will have a consumer education component. Because many education efforts are in the planning or early stages of implementation, it is too early to tell how effective these efforts will be. Various factors make consumer education difficult. While private sector stakeholders are participating in outreach efforts, these actions are voluntary and therefore the government cannot be assured of the extent of private sector efforts. Strategic communications experts from industry, government, and academia identified potential challenges to a consumer education campaign, including (1) prioritizing limited resources to target the right audience, (2) educating consumers to help protect them from making unnecessary purchases, (3) reaching underserved populations, and (4) aligning stakeholders to form a consistent, coordinated effort. GAO has work planned to assess the progress of consumer awareness. In particular, GAO plans to conduct a series of surveys to determine the population affected by the DTV transition, levels of awareness about the transition, and demographic information about the affected population. Throughout the transition, GAO will continue to monitor government and industry education efforts and analyze these efforts relative to best practices for consumer education campaigns. GAO plans to review the government's responsibility for consumer education, monitor the outcome of FCC's rulemaking related to consumer education, and collect details of the consumer education component of the converter box subsidy program. |
gao_GAO-09-704 | gao_GAO-09-704_0 | Federal Oversight and Enforcement of Fair Lending Laws Are Shared among Multiple Agencies and Depository Institution Regulators
Responsibility for federal oversight and enforcement of the fair lending laws is principally shared among three enforcement agencies and five depository institution regulators (see app. HMDA Data Provide Information on the Race, Sex, and Other Personal Characteristics of Mortgage Loan Borrowers and Applicants
HMDA, as amended, requires certain lenders to collect, disclose, and report data on the personal characteristics of mortgage borrowers and loan applicants (for example, their ethnicity, race, and sex), the type of loan or application (for example, if the loan is insured or guaranteed by a federal agency such as the Federal Housing Administration), and certain financial data such as the loan amount and borrowers’ incomes. Data Available to Detect Potentially Heightened Risk for Fair Lending Violations Have Limitations, and Options to Enhance the Data Involve Trade-offs
Federal enforcement agencies and depository institution regulators use analysis of HMDA data and other information to identify lenders that potentially are at heightened risk of having violated the fair lending laws and target their investigations and examinations accordingly. Requiring lenders to collect and publicly report additional data could benefit federal oversight efforts as well as independent research into potential discrimination in lending, but also would impose additional costs, particularly on smaller institutions with limited recordkeeping systems. Furthermore, using such surrogates may require examiners to cull through individual nonmortgage loan files. In contrast, enforcement agencies, which have jurisdiction over independent lenders have conducted relatively few investigations of such lenders that have been identified as outliers over the past several years (for example, HUD and FTC have initiated 22 such investigations since 2005). HUD and FTC also generally do not conduct fair lending investigations of independent lenders that are not viewed as outliers. OCC selects a sample of all lenders—including those that are not required to file HMDA data—for targeted fair lending examinations. At the depository institution regulators, fair lending oversight generally is housed in offices that are responsible for oversight of a variety of consumer compliance laws and regulations, and the CRA, in addition to the fair lending laws. These differing approaches raise questions about the consistency and effectiveness of the depository institution regulators’ collective fair lending oversight efforts, which are likely to persist so long as the fragmented regulatory structure remains in place. In contrast, OCC made one referral during this period and NCUA none. Because federal enforcement efforts to manage ECOA’s 2- year statute of limitations may not always be successful, the agencies’ capacity to thoroughly investigate potential fair lending violations and take appropriate corrective action in certain cases may be compromised. Without similar authority for nonbank subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve’s capacity to identify potential risks for fair lending violations is limited. For example, the evidence suggests that lenders regulated by FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and OTS are more likely than lenders regulated by OCC and NCUA to be the subject of referrals to DOJ for being at potentially heightened risk of fair lending violations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) assess the strengths and limitations of data sources that enforcement agencies and depository institution regulators use to screen for lenders that have potentially heightened risk for fair lending law violations and discusses options for enhancing the data; (2) assess federal oversight of lenders that may represent relatively high risks of fair lending violations as evidenced by analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and other information; (3) examine differences in depository institution regulators’ fair lending oversight programs; and (4) discuss enforcement agencies’ recent litigation involving potential fair lending law violations and challenges that federal officials have identified in fulfilling their enforcement responsibilities. We gathered information on how enforcement agencies—the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—and depository institution regulators—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)—use data sources such as HMDA data to screen for high-risk lenders. HMDA requires many mortgage lenders to collect and report data on mortgage applicants and borrowers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)--the "fair lending laws"--prohibit discrimination in lending. Responsibility for their oversight is shared among three enforcement agencies--the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Department of Justice (DOJ)--and five depository institution regulators--the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). This report examines (1) data used by agencies and the public to detect potential violations and options to enhance the data, (2) federal oversight of lenders that are identified as at heightened risk of violating the fair lending laws, and (3) recent cases involving fair lending laws and associated enforcement challenges. GAO analyzed fair lending laws, relevant research, and interviewed agency officials, lenders, and consumer groups. GAO also reviewed 152 depository institution fair lending examination files. Depending upon file availability by regulator, GAO reviewed all relevant files or a random sample as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires certain lenders to collect and publicly report data on the race, national origin, and sex of mortgage loan borrowers. Enforcement agencies and depository institution regulators use HMDA data to identify outliers--lenders that may have violated fair lending laws--and focus their investigations and examinations accordingly. But, HMDA data also have limitations; they do not include information on the credit risks of mortgage borrowers, which may limit regulators' and the public's capacity to identify lenders most likely to be engaged in discriminatory practices without first conducting labor-intensive reviews. Another data limitation is that lenders are not required to report data on the race, ethnicity, and sex of nonmortgage loan borrowers--such as small businesses, which limits oversight of such lending. While requiring lenders to report additional data would impose costs on them, particularly smaller institutions, options exist to mitigate such costs to some degree, such as limiting the reporting requirements to larger institutions. Without additional data, agencies' and regulators' capacity to identify potential lending discrimination is limited. GAO identified the following limitations in the consistency and effectiveness of fair lending oversight that are largely attributable to the fragmented U.S. financial regulatory system: (1) Federal oversight of lenders that may represent heightened risks of fair lending law violations is limited. For example, the enforcement agencies are responsible for monitoring independent mortgage lenders' compliance with the fair lending laws. Such lenders have been large originators of subprime mortgage loans in recent years and have more frequently been identified through analysis of HMDA data as outliers than depository institutions, such as banks. Depository institution regulators are more likely to assess the activities of outliers and, unlike enforcement agencies, they routinely assess the compliance of lenders that are not outliers. As a result, many fair lending violations at independent lenders may go undetected, and efforts to deter potential violations may be ineffective. (2) Although depository institution regulators' fair lending oversight efforts may be more comprehensive, the division of responsibility among multiple agencies raises questions about the consistency and effectiveness of their efforts. For example, each regulator uses a different approach to analyze HMDA data to identify outliers and examination documentation varies. Moreover, since 2005, OTS, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC have referred more than 100 lenders to DOJ for further investigations of potential fair lending violations, as required by ECOA, while OCC made one referral and NCUA none. Enforcement agencies have settled relatively few (eight) fair lending cases since 2005. Agencies identified several enforcement challenges, including the complexity of fair lending cases, difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff, and the constraints of ECOA's 2-year statute of limitations. |
gao_GAO-07-639T | gao_GAO-07-639T_0 | U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting
According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. The costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have been high, as looted explosives and ammunition from these sites have been used to construct IEDs that have killed and maimed people. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting
U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly with the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security Because of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions
DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S. forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security for conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage sites, including the following: The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide security.”
The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual surrender or desertion. According to a study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk to U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions storage sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to verify whether they pose any residual risk. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies also have assessed that looted munitions are being used in the construction of IEDs. DOD’s Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations
While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration during planning for future operations. A critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces, as illustrated by intelligence assessments that show one potential adversary, for example, also has considerable munitions stockpiles that would require a sizable occupying force to secure or destroy. Because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, the department’s actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists during posthostility operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require significant manpower or other resources during and after major combat operations to secure. Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to have DOD assess the risks associated with unsecured conventional munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective risk mitigation strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations planning. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and execution. |
gao_GAO-05-803 | gao_GAO-05-803_0 | Independent media development efforts are not clearly defined, but are commonly understood to include activities such as training or educating local or indigenous reporters and editors on subjects such as media ethics, professionalism, accountability, investigative journalism, media business management and marketing, strategies for transforming state broadcasters into public service networks, and legal defense or legal regulatory issues; developing media or press centers; developing journalism schools and curriculum; ensuring the financial sustainability and independence of media outlets, through loan programs, advertising development, grants for commodities, and other means; supplying equipment or helping to build infrastructure needed to ensure media independence, including technical capacity; developing professional journalist, publisher, or broadcast associations; developing networks of independent media, such as sharing arrangements, which link production, distribution, and management of material; supporting the establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks and advocacy groups that protect freedom of the press; promoting an understanding of professional media practices and the role of free and independent media in society; and engaging diplomatically to advance the development of press freedoms or media-related institutions, laws, and regulatory frameworks. In addition, donors frequently use different approaches for developing independent media. U.S.-Sponsored Media Development Funding Levels Difficult to Determine
Our analysis of available documents revealed that together, State and USAID obligated at least $40 million in fiscal year 2004 to support a number of independent media development efforts. We found that the largest portion of the State and USAID fiscal year 2004 obligations for independent media development—about 60 percent of all the agency obligations we could identify—funded efforts in Europe and Eurasia. Finally, complex donor funding arrangements, including in some cases multiple project implementers and subgrantees, can obscure funding relationships and make it difficult to accurately determine the overall level of U.S. financial support, as well as the number of specific efforts provided in individual countries. See table 3 for a list of the objectives and performance indicators for USAID missions in the countries we reviewed. State and USAID Missions Use Broad Indexes of Country Press Freedom That Cannot Measure Performance of U.S. Efforts
In the cases we reviewed, State and USAID often selected media indexes, such as the Media Sustainability Index (MSI) and Freedom House’s Press Freedom survey, to measure the results of their independent media development efforts. The MSI and the Press Freedom survey assess the freedom of media in a country; however, when used alone as performance indicators, media indexes are of limited utility in measuring the specific contributions of specific activities or combined U.S. efforts toward developing independent media in particular countries. Programmatic Factors Can Affect Media Development Efforts
The sustainability of local organizations can impact the overall results of media development efforts or the success of specific projects and activities in a country. Sustainability challenges were primarily due to a poor economic environment or lack of sufficient business management training. State generally concurred with our report, and USAID offered technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. In addition, State indicated that it plans to develop additional performance indicators and promote best practices in the future. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Independent media development led by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports the national security goal of developing sustainable democracies around the world. Independent media institutions play a role in supporting commerce, improving public health efforts, reducing corruption, and providing civic education. According to the Freedom House's Freedom of the Press 2005 survey, despite important gains in some countries, the overall level of press freedom worldwide continued to worsen in 2004. GAO was asked to examine (1) U.S. government funding for independent media development overseas; (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies measure performance toward achieving results; and (3) the challenges the United States faces in achieving results. The Department of State generally concurred with our report and USAID offered technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. In addition, State indicated that it plans to develop additional performance indicators and promote best practices in the future.
What GAO Found
The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development obligated at least $40 million in fiscal year 2004 for the development of independent media, including activities such as journalism and business management training and support for legal and regulatory frameworks. About 60 percent of the fiscal year 2004 USAID and State obligations we identified supported independent media development projects in Europe and Eurasia. However, precise funding levels are difficult to identify due to a lack of agencywide budget codes to track media development obligations, differing definitions of independent media development, and complex funding patterns. State and USAID face challenges in designing performance indicators and accurately measuring and reporting results directly tied to the performance of U.S. independent media efforts. The tools most frequently used by State and USAID as performance indicators--Freedom House's Freedom of the Press survey and the IREX Media Sustainability Index--are useful for determining the status of the media in selected countries but are of limited utility in measuring the specific contributions of U.S.-sponsored programs and activities toward developing independent media in countries when used alone. Several country-specific and programmatic challenges can impede the implementation of media development efforts, including a changing political condition, sustainability of local media outlets, and coordination between donors and providers. Specifically, a country's changing political condition or lack of adequate civic and legal institutions can create challenges for a mission to plan, implement, and measure the results of its efforts. The sustainability of program recipients can also impede the overall success of efforts or specific activities at the country level. In addition, when coordination of activities is unstructured or informal, redundancies and confusion of responsibilities can impact project implementation. |
gao_GAO-14-525 | gao_GAO-14-525_0 | Background
Under legislation that established Advocacy in its current form in 1976, Advocacy’ duties are to serve as a focal point for small businesses’ concerns about the federal government’s policies and activities; advise small businesses on how to interact with the federal develop proposals for federal agencies on behalf of small businesses; represent the views and interests of small businesses before federal agencies; enlist the cooperation and assistance of public and private agencies, businesses, and other organizations in disseminating information about the federal government’s programs and services that benefit small businesses. Advocacy’s Internal Controls Do Not Ensure the Quality of Its Research and That Required Information Quality Practices Are Followed
Producing research products, both internally and externally, on issues of importance to small businesses is one of Advocacy’s primary responsibilities. Without adequate documentation—a key internal control—of its peer reviews, Advocacy does not have an institutional record of its activities and cannot demonstrate that it is following its own peer review process. Advocacy Has Not Followed Some Required Elements of Information Quality Guidelines
While Advocacy has quality review policies for its peer review process, it does not have policies and procedures that reflect the federal information quality guidelines on retaining data for influential studies or taking other steps to substantiate the quality of information in such studies when they have not retained the data. We also found that Advocacy staff had not taken additional steps, in the absence of retaining the underlying data, to substantiate the quality of the regulatory cost estimates in two of the studies that it sponsored and disseminated. Documentation of Key Regulatory Activities is Inconsistent and Roundtables Are Not Publicized According to Advocacy’s Policies
Advocacy has practices and procedures (“policies”) for its regulatory activities—comment letters and roundtables—however, documentation of these key regulatory activities is inconsistent. For example, the guide stated that when regulatory attorneys decide to intervene in the rulemaking process, they must follow up, as appropriate, with the interested associations to ensure that Advocacy has sufficient information and data to make its case for intervening. But there is no policy to document these interactions. But the guide contains no policy that this step be documented. According to federal internal control standards, effective management of a workforce is essential to achieving program results. Yet Advocacy has not incorporated succession planning into its workforce planning efforts, such as its training and mentoring initiatives. However, Advocacy’s research, regulatory, and workforce planning functions could be improved by strengthening its internal controls as follows:
Research activities. Regulatory activities. Advocacy’s lack of documentation and transparency of the regulatory activities we reviewed made it difficult to validate Advocacy’s efforts to represent small businesses. While Advocacy’s workforce planning efforts help in managing its current staff, these efforts do not include any strategies to plan for succession, even though several staff have been with the office for many years and will eventually need to be replaced. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve Advocacy’s system of internal control, and help to provide reasonable assurance that the office is meeting its mission, we recommend that the Chief Counsel of Advocacy take the following five actions:
Strengthen the accountability of its research activities by taking the following two actions:
Enhance its peer review policies and procedures by including written guidance on selecting peer reviewers and documenting all steps of the peer review process—whether a peer review occurred and how and to what extent peer reviewer comments were addressed. II), Advocacy agreed with our recommendations. Finally, Advocacy agreed that workforce planning is important for ensuring that the office maintains the skills and resources needed to fulfill its mission and noted that the office is developing a Leadership Succession Plan in response to our recommendation. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines Advocacy’s (1) research activities; (2) regulatory activities, including the applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to Advocacy’s roundtables; and (3) workforce planning efforts. We analyzed Advocacy’s research products produced in the 5 most recent fiscal years—2008 through 2012—and interviewed relevant Advocacy officials on the processes by which they assess the quality of its research products. Appendix II: Comments from the Office of Advocacy, Small Business Administration
Appendix III: Legal Analysis of the Applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the Office of Advocacy’s Roundtables
Conclusions
Advocacy is an “agency” under FACA first because it meets the statutory definition of this term in FACA and the Administrative Procedure Act incorporated by reference: it is an “authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency” and not subject to statutory exemption. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created Advocacy within SBA in 1976 as an independent voice for small businesses. Questions have recently been raised about Advocacy's efforts to represent small businesses in regulatory activities and some of its research on small business issues. In light of these questions, GAO was asked to review Advocacy's activities.
This report examines Advocacy's (1) research, (2) regulatory activities, and (3) workforce planning efforts. GAO analyzed Advocacy's research, comment letters, and other regulatory information for fiscal years 2008-2013; assessed Advocacy's policies and procedures against federal standards for internal control and information quality; and interviewed agency officials, and small business and industry representatives. GAO also analyzed the applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to Advocacy roundtables.
What GAO Found
The Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) within the Small Business Administration (SBA) fulfills its mission by researching small business issues and providing input into federal rulemaking and related regulatory activities. However, GAO identified key areas in Advocacy's system of internal control that could be improved.
Research. GAO found that Advocacy did not ensure that its staff monitored the quality of the information the office disseminated, as required. GAO reviewed 20 selected research products and found that in 16 cases a required quality review had not been documented. Advocacy recently established a review policy for its research, but it does not include procedures for selecting the reviewers or documenting that a review occurred and how reviewer comments are addressed. GAO also found that Advocacy staff had not followed federal information quality guidelines to retain data and could not substantiate the quality of information in two cost-estimation reports—a research product it has contracted for every 5 years. Without better controls over its quality review process and efforts to substantiate the information it disseminates, Advocacy cannot ensure the validity of one of its core activities—research in support of small businesses.
Regulatory activities. Advocacy recently updated procedures for its regulatory activities, but these could be strengthened. GAO found the extent to which individual staff maintained records varied, in part, because the procedures lacked policies for documentation. For instance, the procedures state that when staff decide to intervene in the rulemaking process, they must follow up as appropriate with the interested groups to ensure that Advocacy has sufficient information and data to support its case. However, there is no policy that these interactions be documented. Federal internal control standards state that documentation and records should be maintained. If key procedures are not being documented, managers do not have an institutional record that agency goals and objectives in this area are being met. GAO also found that the Federal Advisory Committee Act's transparency and other requirements do not apply to Advocacy's meetings with stakeholders to get input on regulations (roundtables).
Workforce planning. Advocacy's workforce efforts include training and mentoring for new staff, but do not include succession planning, which is recommended by the Office of Personnel Management. According to federal internal control standards, effective management of a workforce is essential to achieving program results. Officials told GAO that Advocacy was a small office and that additional staff were hired on an as-needed basis. However, some key staff have been with Advocacy for many years and their experience will be difficult to replace. If Advocacy does not incorporate succession planning strategies into its workforce planning efforts, it is at risk of not having the skills and expertise to meet its mission when key staff leave or retire.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes several recommendations to improve the Office of Advocacy's controls over the quality of its research, the documentation of its regulatory activities, and workforce planning. In commenting on a draft of this report, Advocacy agreed with our recommendations and noted some steps it will take to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-49 | gao_GAO-16-49_0 | Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and NOAA. Task Force Member Agencies Estimated Expending an Average of About $260 Million Annually to Address Aquatic Invasive Species in Fiscal Years 2012 through 2014
Task Force member agencies estimated expending an average of about $260 million annually for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 to address aquatic invasive species. As a result, the information reported by Task Force member agencies on annual expenditures through our questionnaire generally reflects the agencies’ best estimates, rather than actual expenditures. Task Force Member Agencies Conducted a Wide Range of Activities and Identified Several Challenges in Addressing Aquatic Invasive Species
Through our questionnaire and interviews with officials from the Task Force and its member agencies, we found that member agencies conducted a wide range of activities and faced several challenges in addressing aquatic invasive species. Most member agencies reported conducting activities across the seven general activity categories developed by the National Invasive Species Council, including taking actions to prevent introductions of new aquatic invasive species and control the spread of existing ones (see app. Regarding overarching challenges, several Task Force member agencies—including officials from the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, the Corps, and NOAA—expressed concern that their activities, though numerous, may not be adequate relative to the growing magnitude and impacts of aquatic invasive species amid decreasing or constrained agency resources. For example, U.S. The Corps operates a series of electric barriers in the Chicago Area Waterway System located approximately 25 miles from Lake Michigan to prevent the entry of Asian Carp and other aquatic invasive species from the Mississippi River Basin into the Great Lakes. The Task Force Has Not Taken Key Steps to Measure Progress in Achieving Its Strategic Goals
The Task Force has not taken key steps to measure progress in achieving the goals laid out in its 2013-2017 strategic plan. Task Force representatives said they plan to further discuss the idea of reviving or modifying the reporting matrix at their next semiannual Task Force meeting in November 2015. The Task Force and its member agencies have taken significant steps— including conducting a wide array of activities and developing a strategic plan to guide their efforts—to address the threats and impacts of aquatic invasive species. However, the Task Force has not met several of the 1990 Act’s requirements, including reporting annually to Congress on the program’s progress, or developed a mechanism to ensure its strategic goals are measurable and accountable, such as through an operational plan, as called for in its strategic plan, because of constrained funding and limited resources. Developing and regularly using a tracking mechanism could help the Task Force measure progress in achieving its strategic goals, as well as help the Task Force meet the 1990 Act’s requirements to describe its members’ roles and specific activities and to report annually to Congress on the program’s progress. Recommendation for Executive Action
As the Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force considers how to measure progress toward accomplishing its strategic goals, we recommend that the Task Force develop and regularly use a tracking mechanism, to include elements envisioned for an operational plan and to largely meet requirements in the 1990 Act, including: specifying the roles of member agencies related to its strategic plan, tracking activities to be conducted by collecting information on those activities and associated funding, measuring progress member agencies have made in achieving its reporting to Congress annually on the progress of its program. NOAA also stated that our report did not mention federal mandates intended to address aquatic invasive species other than the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, the National Invasive Species Act of 1996, and Executive Order 13112. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how much the Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force (Task Force) member agencies expended addressing aquatic invasive species from fiscal year 2012 through 2014; (2) activities conducted by Task Force member agencies and challenges in addressing aquatic invasive species; and (3) the extent to which the Task Force has measured progress in achieving the goals of its 2013-2017 strategic plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aquatic invasive species—harmful, nonnative plants, animals, and microorganisms living in aquatic habitats—damage ecosystems or threaten commercial, agricultural, and recreational activities. The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 created the Task Force and required it to develop an aquatic nuisance (which GAO refers to as invasive) species program. The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 includes a provision that GAO assess federal costs of, and spending on, aquatic invasive species.
This report examines (1) how much Task Force member agencies expended addressing aquatic invasive species for fiscal years 2012-2014; (2) activities conducted by Task Force member agencies and challenges in addressing aquatic invasive species; and (3) the extent to which the Task Force has measured progress in achieving the goals of its 2013-2017 strategic plan. GAO sent a questionnaire to member agencies to obtain expenditures for fiscal years 2012-2014; interviewed member agency officials; and analyzed laws and strategic planning documents.
What GAO Found
The 13 federal member agencies of the Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force (Task Force) estimated expending an average of about $260 million annually for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 to address aquatic invasive species. However, several member agencies identified in their questionnaire responses challenges in developing their estimates. For example, some member agencies reported that their activities to address aquatic invasive species were often integrated into larger projects, making it difficult to isolate the portion of expenditures specific to aquatic invasive species out of total expenditures for the projects. As a result, expenditure information reported by GAO generally reflects member agencies' best estimates of total expenditures, rather than actual expenditures.
Task Force member agencies conducted a wide range of activities and identified several challenges in addressing aquatic invasive species. Member agencies reported conducting activities across several activity categories, including taking actions to prevent introductions, control the spread of existing invaders, and research ecological impacts of aquatic invasive species. For instance, most conducted prevention activities—such as constructing a series of electric barriers to prevent the entry of Asian Carp from the Mississippi River Basin into the Great Lakes—recognizing that prevention activities may be the most cost-effective method of addressing aquatic invasive species. Additionally, officials from several member agencies expressed concern that their activities, though numerous, may not be adequate relative to the growing magnitude and impacts of aquatic invasive species amid decreasing or constrained agency resources.
The Task Force—which is co-chaired by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—developed a 2013-2017 strategic plan to guide its member agencies but has not taken key steps to measure progress in achieving the goals laid out in its strategic plan. As called for in its strategic plan, the Task Force in 2012 planned to develop an operational plan to track and measure aquatic invasive species activities and progress. However, the Task Force did not develop an operational plan because of constrained funding and limited resources, according to Task Force representatives. The Task Force also did not meet several of the 1990 Act's requirements including describing its members' roles and activities and reporting annually to Congress on the program's progress. The representatives agreed that a mechanism to track activities and measure progress is important and said they plan to discuss the possibility of doing so at their November 2015 meeting. Task Force representatives, however, had not established a time frame or specifics for their approach. Developing and regularly using a tracking mechanism could help the Task Force measure progress in achieving its strategic goals, as well as help the Task Force meet the 1990 Act's requirements to describe its members' roles and specific activities and to report annually to Congress on the program's progress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Task Force develop a mechanism to measure progress toward its strategic goals and help meet certain statutory requirements. Most member agencies generally concurred or had no comments, but NOAA disagreed. GAO believes its recommendation is valid as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-06-961T | gao_GAO-06-961T_0 | Since then, the ILC industry has experienced significant asset growth and evolved from small, limited-purpose institutions to a diverse group of insured financial institutions with a variety of business models. Most notably, as shown in figure 1, from 1987 to March 31, 2006, ILC assets have grown over 3,900 percent, from $3.8 billion to over $155 billion, while the number of ILCs declined about 42 percent from 106 to 61. Federal banking law permits FDIC-insured ILCs to engage in the same activities as other insured depository institutions. In addition, ILCs generally are subject to the same federal regulatory safeguards that apply to commercial banks and thrifts. This authority is limited with respect to certain types of subsidiaries, such as those regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or state insurance regulators, but even those subsidiaries may be examined by the Board under appropriate circumstances where the Board “has reasonable cause to believe that such subsidiary is engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated depository institution” or the Board has determined that examination of the subsidiary is necessary to inform the Board of the systems the company has to monitor and control the financial and operational risks within the holding company system that may threaten the safety and soundness of an affiliated depository institution. However, FDIC’s general examination authority is less extensive than a consolidated supervisor’s. While FDIC has provided some examples where its supervisory approach effectively protected the insured institution and mitigated losses to the bank insurance fund, questions remain about whether FDIC’s supervisory approach and authority over BHC Act-exempt holding companies and affiliates addresses all risks to the ILC from these entities. ILCs May Offer Commercial Holding Companies a Greater Ability to Mix Banking and Commerce than Other Insured Depository Institutions, but Views on Competitive Implications Are Mixed
ILC holding companies and their affiliates may be able to mix banking and commerce more than other insured depository institutions because the holding companies and affiliates of ILCs are not subject to business activity limitations that generally apply to insured depository institution holding companies. In addition, there are a number of pending applications for deposit insurance with FDIC involving commercial firms, including one of the largest retail firms. We have previously reported that the potential risks that may result from greater mixing of banking and commerce include the (1) expansion of the federal safety net provided for banks to their commercial entities, (2) increased conflicts of interest within a mixed banking and commercial conglomerate, and (3) increased economic power exercised by large conglomerate enterprises. Because of the significant recent growth and complexity of some ILCs, the industry has changed since being granted an exemption from consolidated supervision in 1987, and some have expressed concerns that ILCs may have expanded beyond the original scope and purpose intended by Congress. While FDIC has supervisory authority over an insured ILC, it does not have the same authority to supervise ILC holding companies and affiliates as a consolidated supervisor. However, FDIC’s supervisory approach over ILC holding companies and affiliates has not been tested by a large ILC parent during periods of economic stress. Moreover, we are concerned that insured institutions posing similar risks to the Deposit Insurance Fund are not being overseen by bank supervisors that possess similar powers. Because of these differences in supervision, we found that, from a regulatory standpoint, ILCs in a holding company structure may pose more risk of loss to the Fund than other types of insured depository institutions in a holding company structure. In addition, we find it unusual that this limited exemption for ILCs would be the primary means for expanding the mixing of banking and commerce than afforded to the holding companies of other financial institutions. Because it has been a long time since Congress has focused on the potential advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and commerce and given the rapid growth of ILC assets and a potential for increased attractiveness of the ILC charter, we concluded in our 2005 report that Congress should more broadly consider the advantages and disadvantages of mixing banking and commerce to determine whether continuing to allow ILC holding companies to engage in this activity more than the holding companies of other types of financial institutions is warranted or whether other financial or bank holding companies should be permitted to engage in this level of activity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since their origin in the early 1900s, industrial loan corporations (ILCs) have grown significantly in size, and some have expressed concern that ILCs may have expanded beyond the original scope and purpose intended by Congress. Others have questioned whether the current regulatory structure for overseeing ILCs is adequate. This testimony is based on our September 2005 report that, among other things, (1) described the growth and permissible activities of the ILC industry, (2) compared the supervisory authority of the FDI--the current federal regulator for ILCs--with consolidated supervisors, and (3) described the extent to which ILC parents could mix banking and commerce. In this testimony GAO is reiterating that Congress should (1) consider options for strengthening the regulatory oversight of ILCs and (2) more broadly consider whether allowing ILCs a greater degree of mixing banking and commerce is warranted or whether other entities should be permitted to engage in this level of activity.
What GAO Found
The ILC industry has experienced significant asset growth and has evolved from once small, limited-purpose institutions to a diverse industry that includes some of the nation's largest and more complex financial institutions. Between 1987 and 2006, ILC assets grew over 3,900 percent from $3.8 billion to over $155 billion. In most respects, ILCs may engage in the same activities as other depository institutions insured by the FDIC and are subject to the same federal safety and soundness safeguards and consumer protection laws. Therefore, from an operations standpoint, ILCs pose similar risks to the bank insurance fund as other types of insured depository institutions. Parents of insured depository institutions that present similar risks to the bank insurance fund are not, however, being overseen by bank supervisors that possess similar powers. ILCs typically are owned or controlled by a holding company that may also own or control other entities. Although FDIC has supervisory authority over an insured ILC, this authority does not explicitly extend to ILC holding companies and, therefore, is less extensive than the authority consolidated supervisors have over bank and thrift holding companies. Therefore, from a regulatory standpoint, these ILCs may pose more risk of loss to the bank insurance fund than other insured depository institutions operating in a holding company. For example, FDIC's authority to examine ILC affiliates is more limited than a consolidated supervisor. While FDIC asserted that its authority may achieve many of the same results as consolidated supervision, and that its supervisory model has mitigated losses to the bank insurance fund in some instances, FDIC's authority is limited to a particular set of circumstances and may not be used at all times. Further, FDIC's authority has not been tested by a large ILC parent during times of economic stress. Because of an exception in federal banking law, ILC holding companies can mix banking and commerce more than the holding companies of most other depository institutions. In addition, there are a number of pending applications for deposit insurance with FDIC involving commercial firms, including one of the largest retail firms. While some industry participants assert that mixing banking and commerce may offer benefits from operational efficiencies, empirical evidence documenting these benefits is mixed. Federal policy separating banking and commerce focuses on the potential risks from integrating these functions, such as the potential expansion of the federal safety net provided for banks to their commercial entities. GAO finds it unusual that a limited ILC exemption would be the primary means for mixing banking and commerce on a broader scale and sees merits in Congress taking a look at whether ILCs or other entities should be allowed to engage in this level of activity. |
gao_GAO-05-417 | gao_GAO-05-417_0 | Agencies were to first include this improper payment information in their initial fiscal year 2003 budget submissions. Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Assessing Programs for Risk of Significant Improper Payments
In response to the new requirements of the IPIA, agencies overall made progress in identifying programs susceptible to the risk of improper payments. At the same time, our reviews of the fiscal year 2004 PARs for 29 of 35 federal agencies that are significant to the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements suggest that even with the enhanced emphasis on improper payment reporting fueled by the new legislation, certain agencies have not yet performed risk assessments of all their programs. Of the 15 agencies with prior reporting requirements under OMB Circular No. A-11, 12 reported that they had performed comprehensive inventories and assessed the risk of improper payments for all their programs and activities. Magnitude of Improper Payments Is Still Unknown
Once agencies have identified programs that may be susceptible to significant improper payments, developing statistically valid estimates of the amounts of improper payments for their programs and activities has been a further challenge. In the 29 agency PARs included in our review, 17 agencies reported over $45 billion of improper payments in 41 programs. This represented almost a $10 billion, or 27 percent, increase in the dollar amount of improper payments reported by agencies in fiscal year 2003. However, we determined that this increase was primarily attributable to changes in the method for estimating and reporting improper payment amounts in the Department of Health and Human Services’ Medicare Program. The 24 agency programs with no prior reporting requirements reported improper payment estimates that did not significantly increase the governmentwide total. We found that for 34 of the programs, agencies reported estimates in their fiscal year 2004 PARs or stated that improper payment amounts were insignificant. As shown in table 1, the governmentwide estimate did not include the remaining 12 programs with total outlays of $248.7 billion in 2004. This included some of the largest risk-susceptible federal programs, such as the Department of Health and Human Services’ Medicaid Program, with outlays exceeding $175 billion annually, or the Department of Education’s Title I Program, with outlays of over $10 billion annually. Scope and Methodology
This report is based on our review of agency fiscal year 2004 Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR). | Why GAO Did This Study
Fiscal year 2004 marked the first year that federal agencies governmentwide were required to report improper payment information under the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). The increasing scope of reporting over the past several years has demonstrated that improper payments are a significant and widespread problem in federal agencies, and in the past a limited number of agencies reported in their Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) annual payment accuracy rates and estimated improper payment amounts. Because of your continued interest in addressing the governmentwide improper payments issue, you asked GAO to report on (1) the extent to which agencies have performed the required assessments to identify programs and activities that are susceptible to significant improper payments and (2) the annual amount estimated for improper payments by the agencies.
What GAO Found
The federal government made progress in identifying programs susceptible to the risk of improper payments in response to the new IPIA requirements. The fiscal year 2004 PARs for 29 of 35 federal agencies that are significant to the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements show that even with the enhanced emphasis on improper payment reporting fueled by the new legislation, 6 agencies reported that they did not perform risk assessments of all their programs. The magnitude of the governmentwide improper payment problem is still unknown, because agencies have not yet prepared estimates of improper payments for all of their programs. In the 29 agency PARs included in GAO's fiscal year 2004 review, 17 agencies reported over $45 billion of improper payments in 41 programs governmentwide. This represented almost a $10 billion, or 27 percent, increase in the amount of improper payments reported by agencies in fiscal year 2003. This increase was primarily attributable to changes in the method for estimating and reporting improper payment amounts in one major program. Looking forward, future estimates are likely to trend higher because the governmentwide estimate did not include 12 programs with outlays of $248.7 billion in fiscal year 2004 that were required to annually report improper payments under OMB Circular No. A-11 during the past 3 years. This included some of the largest risksusceptible federal programs, such as the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid Program, with outlays exceeding $175 billion annually, or the Department of Education's Title I Program, with outlays of over $10 billion annually. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-215 | gao_T-HEHS-96-215_0 | also requesting information on health plans to help them make their health care purchasing decisions. Because accreditation standards do not directly measure quality, however, many purchasers use a combination of accreditation and an analysis of performance indicators, including outcomes. Performance indicators may not be comparable. According to a recent survey of 384 U.S. employers conducted by Watson Wyatt, a benefits consulting organization, and WBGH, 60 percent of large corporations consider accreditation status by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) when deciding to purchase health insurance from an HMO. The clinical care measures continue to focus on providers’ actions, however, rather than outcomes. While NCQA was developing new HEDIS measures, a large group of corporate purchasers and HCFA established the Foundation for Accountability (FAcct) to develop standardized outcome measures. HCFA’s Quality Assessment Methods for Medicare Risk Contract HMOs
Like other large corporate purchasers, HCFA uses an inspection process and analysis of performance indicators to evaluate the quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries in risk contract HMOs. We concluded that HCFA’s HMO Qualification Program is inadequate to ensure that Medicare HMOs comply with standards for ensuring quality of care. Although HCFA collects performance information that could be useful to beneficiaries, it does not routinely make such information available to them nor does it have immediate plans to do so. Medicare: Enhancing Health Care Quality Assurance (GAO/T-HEHS-95-224, July 27, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) efforts to provide health care quality information to Medicare beneficiaries joining health maintenance organizations (HMO).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) corporate purchasers use accreditation and performance measurement monitoring to ensure that HMO furnish quality health care; (2) HCFA is starting to use similar methods to ensure HMO quality; (3) while the use of performance measurement indicators has become popular, such indicators may not be reliable or comparable, and may not be valid measures of quality; (4) 60 percent of large corporations consider HMO accreditation status by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), before contracting with HMO; (5) NCQA developed a set of standardized information on HMO focusing on provider actions, rather than patient care outcomes; (6) NCQA recently released in draft form a set of measures based on patient care outcomes; (7) HCFA has joined with a group of corporate purchasers to develop another set of standardized outcome measures; (8) HCFA uses a qualification review program similar to accreditation, along with peer review, to assess health care organizations' quality; and (9) HCFA does not routinely make quality assessment information available to Medicare beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-05-741T | gao_GAO-05-741T_0 | In such situations, mechanical treatments are required, generating large amounts of wood—particularly small-diameter trees, limbs, brush, and other material that serve as fuel for wildland fires. Most Woody Biomass Utilization Activities Are Implemented by the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior and Include Grants, Research, and Education
Most of the federal government’s woody biomass utilization efforts are being undertaken by USDA, DOE, and Interior. Forest Service researchers are conducting research into a variety of woody biomass issues. DOE Is Engaged Primarily in Biomass Research and Development Activities
Most of DOE’s woody biomass activities are overseen by its Office of the Biomass Program and focus primarily on research and development, although the department does have some grant and technical assistance activities. Three other agencies—the National Science Foundation, Office of Science and Technology Development, and Office of the Federal Environmental Executive—also are involved in woody biomass activities through their membership on the Biomass Research and Development Board, which is responsible for coordinating federal activities for the purpose of promoting the use of biobased industrial products. Woody Biomass Coordination Efforts among and within Federal Agencies Include Both Formal and Informal Mechanisms, and the Forest Service, DOE, and Interior Have Assigned Responsibility for Overseeing Woody Biomass Activities
Two groups serve as formal vehicles for coordinating federal agency activities related to woody biomass utilization. The Forest Service—the USDA agency with the most woody biomass activities—developed a woody biomass policy in January 2005, and, in March 2005, in response to a recommendation in our draft report, the agency assigned responsibility for overseeing and coordinating its woody biomass activities to an official within the Forest Service’s Forest Management branch. DOE coordinates its woody biomass utilization activities through its Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Most Officials Cited Economic Obstacles to Woody Biomass Utilization, and While Agencies Generally Targeted These Obstacles, Some Officials Believe Additional Steps beyond the Agencies’ Authority Are Needed
Agency officials cited two principal obstacles to increasing the use of woody biomass: the difficulty in using woody biomass cost-effectively and the lack of a reliable supply of the material. Agency activities are generally targeted toward the obstacles identified by agency officials, but some officials told us that their agencies are limited in their ability to fully address these obstacles and that additional steps beyond the agencies’ authority to implement are needed. According to several officials, the obstacles to using woody biomass cost- effectively are simply too great to overcome by using the tools—grants, outreach and education, and so forth—currently at the agencies’ disposal. Rather than incentives or subsidies, some officials noted the potential for increased use of woody biomass through state requirements—known as renewable portfolio standards—that utilities procure or generate a portion of their electricity by using renewable resources, which could include woody biomass. Further, not all agree that the market for woody biomass should be expanded. | Why GAO Did This Study
In an effort to reduce the risk of wildland fires, many federal land managers--including the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management--are placing greater emphasis on thinning forests and rangelands to help reduce the buildup of potentially hazardous fuels. These thinning efforts generate considerable quantities of woody material, including many smaller trees, limbs, and brush--referred to as woody biomass--that currently have little or no commercial value. GAO was asked to determine (1) which federal agencies are involved in efforts to promote the use of woody biomass, and the actions they are undertaking; (2) how these agencies coordinate their activities; and (3) what the agencies see as obstacles to increasing the use of woody biomass, and the extent to which they are addressing the obstacles. This testimony is based on GAO's report Natural Resources: Federal Agencies Are Engaged in Various Efforts to Promote the Utilization of Woody Biomass, but Significant Obstacles to Its Use Remain (GAO- 05-373), being released today.
What GAO Found
Most woody biomass utilization activities are implemented by the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy (DOE), and the Interior and include awarding grants to businesses, schools, Indian tribes, and others; conducting research; and providing education. Most of USDA's woody biomass utilization activities are undertaken by the Forest Service and include grants for woody biomass utilization, research into the use of woody biomass in wood products, and education on potential uses for woody biomass. DOE's woody biomass activities focus on research into using the material for renewable energy, while Interior's efforts consist primarily of education and outreach. Other agencies also provide technical assistance or fund research activities. Federal agencies coordinate their woody biomass activities through formal and informal mechanisms. Although the agencies have established two interagency groups to coordinate their activities, most officials we spoke with emphasized informal communication--through e-mails, participation in conferences, and other means--as the primary vehicle for interagency coordination. Internally, DOE coordinates its woody biomass activities through its Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, while Interior and the Forest Service--the USDA agency with the most woody biomass activities--have appointed officials to oversee, and have issued guidance on, their woody biomass activities. The obstacles to using woody biomass cited most often by agency officials were the difficulty of using woody biomass cost-effectively and the lack of a reliable supply of the material; agency activities generally are targeted toward addressing these obstacles. Some officials told us their agencies are limited in their ability to address these obstacles and that incentives--such as subsidies and tax credits--beyond the agencies' authority are needed. However, others disagreed with this approach for a variety of reasons, including the concern that expanding the market for woody biomass could lead to adverse ecological consequences if the demand for woody biomass leads to excessive thinning. |
gao_GAO-17-173 | gao_GAO-17-173_0 | To help inform its oversight, CMS relies on data that states submit from their respective Medicaid Management Information Systems (MMIS). 1.) CMS’s Oversight Is Hindered by Insufficient Expenditure and Utilization Data
Based on our review of reports issued by GAO and other entities, we determined that available Medicaid expenditure and utilization data do not provide CMS with sufficient information to consistently ensure that payments are proper or that beneficiaries have access to covered services, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. CMS should rely on quality information to oversee the Medicaid program. Expenditure Data
The CMS-64, which serves as the basis of calculating the amount of federal matching funds for states, and MSIS, which is designed to report individual beneficiary claims data, have the potential to offer a robust view of payments and overall spending in the Medicaid program. However, CMS does not collect accurate and complete data on state sources of funds to finance the Medicaid program, thus complicating CMS’s ability to fully assess whether state financing of the nonfederal share complies with federal law, or the extent to which the increased reliance on providers and local governments serves to provide fiscal relief to states and shifts costs to the federal government. We and MACPAC found that CMS does not have complete data on the sources or amounts of local government funds states use to finance their nonfederal share. Without better MSIS data, CMS may not be able to identify billing patterns that indicate inappropriate provider billing or ensure that beneficiaries have access to covered services. CMS Has a Key Initiative to Improve Medicaid Data, but Uncertainty Exists Regarding its Implementation and Effect on Program Oversight
CMS officials identified the Transformed Medicaid Statistical Information System (T-MSIS) initiative as the agency’s primary effort to improve Medicaid expenditure and utilization data, and highlighted aspects of the initiative intended to improve their accuracy, completeness, and timeliness. CMS Officials Cite T-MSIS as the Key Effort among Several to Improve Medicaid Data and Program Oversight
CMS has acknowledged the need for improved Medicaid data, and has undertaken a number of steps aimed at streamlining and improving the quality of data currently reported by states and available to CMS for oversight purposes. In addition to its ongoing implementation of T-MSIS, CMS has taken other actions—for example, issuing regulations and guidance—to improve data reporting and enhance available data; however, given the recent nature or future implementation dates of these actions, their effect on CMS’s ability to oversee the Medicaid program is not fully known. The original date for nationwide submission was July 2014; as of October 2016, 18 states were submitting T-MSIS data, and CMS officials were uncertain as to when the remaining 33 states would begin submitting these data. CMS officials currently estimate that states representing over 70 percent of the Medicaid population will be submitting T-MSIS data by the end of calendar year 2016. CMS and state officials identified several factors contributing to states’ delayed T-MSIS implementation. Conclusion
The continuing increase in federal Medicaid improper payments— estimated at over $36 billion in fiscal year 2016—underscores the need for improved program oversight. We and others have expressed long- standing concerns about the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of available Medicaid data, and the effect of these insufficiencies on CMS’s ability to ensure the fiscal integrity of the program. CMS’s continued reliance on inaccurate, incomplete, and untimely data, and the ongoing uncertainty about the scope and timing of its remedial actions, is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. T-MSIS includes aspects aimed at improving the quality of state data available to CMS, yet uncertainty remains as to when these data will be available from all states; how CMS will ensure their quality; or how CMS will use these data for oversight purposes. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of CMS take immediate steps to assess and improve the data available for Medicaid program oversight, including, but not limited to, T-MSIS. Medicaid: Service Utilization Patterns for Beneficiaries in Managed Care. | Why GAO Did This Study
To inform its oversight of Medicaid, CMS relies on state-reported data that contain information on multiple aspects of the program, including expenditures and service utilization. Recent increases in Medicaid improper payments, which were an estimated $36 billion in fiscal year 2016, have exacerbated concerns about the quality of data available to CMS for program oversight.
GAO was asked to examine the usefulness of Medicaid data for oversight purposes and any efforts to improve known limitations. This report (1) describes how available Medicaid expenditure and utilization data affect CMS's ability to oversee the Medicaid program; and (2) examines CMS's efforts to improve these data. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency guidance, laws, regulations, and federal internal control standards; reviewed reports from GAO and others published from March 2010 through September 2016; and interviewed CMS officials about continuing data challenges and initiatives to improve data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that available Medicaid expenditure and utilization data do not provide CMS with sufficient information to consistently ensure that payments are proper or that beneficiaries have access to covered services. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers the Medicaid program, relies on two key data sources for program oversight: the CMS-64, which serves as the basis for calculating the amount of federal matching funds for states, and the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS), which is designed to report individual beneficiary claims data. The CMS-64 and MSIS have the potential to offer a robust view of payments, overall spending, and services in the Medicaid program; however, GAO found that the usefulness of these data is limited because of issues with completeness, accuracy, and timeliness.
Available expenditure data do not provide complete or accurate information on how states finance their portion of program costs, such as complete data on the sources or amounts of local government funds used to finance states' share of Medicaid costs, thus complicating CMS's ability to assess the appropriateness of states' financing.
Available utilization data, particularly for Medicaid managed care, are incomplete and are reported up to 3 years late, complicating CMS's ability to identify billing patterns that indicate inappropriate provider behavior or ensure that beneficiaries have access to covered services.
CMS has acknowledged the need for improved Medicaid data and cites the Transformed Medicaid Statistical Information System (T-MSIS) as its key initiative to improve Medicaid data and program oversight. T-MSIS includes aspects aimed at improving the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of state data available to CMS, yet uncertainty remains as to when these data will be available from all states as implementation has been delayed for several years. As of October 2016, 18 states were submitting T-MSIS data. Although CMS officials were uncertain when the remaining states would begin submitting data, they estimated that states representing over 70 percent of the Medicaid population would be submitting T-MSIS data by the end of calendar year 2016. CMS officials identified several factors contributing to states' delayed T-MSIS implementation, such as coinciding with the ongoing efforts of over 30 states to redesign or replace their Medicaid information technology systems. Moreover, CMS has not fully developed its plans to ensure the quality of T-MSIS data, and its plans for using these data for oversight purposes remain preliminary. Through rulemaking and other guidance, CMS has taken other actions to improve data; however, given that these actions have recently or not yet been implemented, it is unclear how they will affect CMS's oversight. CMS's continued reliance on inaccurate, incomplete, and untimely data, and the ongoing uncertainty about the scope and timing of its remedial actions, hamper effective oversight and are inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which require entities to rely on quality and timely information to oversee their programs and take timely actions to improve deficiencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take immediate steps to improve Medicaid data available for program oversight, such as expediting efforts to assess and ensure the quality of T-MSIS data. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_OSI-96-2 | gao_OSI-96-2_0 | The two most senior DOE officials in OCRWM’s Yucca Mountain Project at the time—the Project Manager (1987-Oct. 1993) and the Deputy Project Manager (Oct. 1990-Jan. 1994)—had personal relationships with contractor employees that violated Executive Order 12674 and DOE regulations by creating at least the appearance of a loss of impartiality. . . avoid any action, whether or not specifically prohibited by the regulations, which might result in, or create the appearance of: (1) using public office for private gain; (2) giving preferential treatment to any person; (3) impeding government efficiency or economy; (4) losing complete independence or impartiality; (5) making a government decision outside official channels; or (6) affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the government.”
Appearance of Loss of Impartiality and DOE’s Untimely Response
Then Project Manager’s Actions Violated DOE Ethics Regulations
DOE’s Manager for the Yucca Mountain Project from 1987 to 1993 had a personal relationship with a female official of a major project contractor, SAIC. Our investigation and an April 1995 report by the DOE Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that because of this relationship, the Project Manager, as the Fee-Determining Official and the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative for the SAIC contract, had lost the appearance of impartiality in the performance of his official duties, contrary to regulations regarding the ethical conduct of employees. During the Deputy Project Manager’s relationship, the previously discussed Project Manager did not act on his deputy’s potential ethical problem. In doing so, it exposed a number of other relationships between DOE and contractor employees that posed potential ethical problems. By mid-1994, an internal memorandum by the Yucca Mountain Project Chief Counsel listed 14 relationships between DOE employees and employees of several contractors that might have posed the appearance of the lack of impartiality and independence. These were in addition to the previously discussed relationships of the Project Manager and Deputy Manager and represented almost 18 percent of the 80 DOE Yucca Mountain Project employees. Upon examination, the Chief Counsel determined that four of these relationships required a recusal or waiver. Specifically, he precipitated SAIC’s hiring of a project subcontractor, Integrated Resources Group (IRG), primarily because of IRG’s political connections that could provide him an opportunity to promote his positions, which were contrary to those of DOE. Further, the Project Manager’s lobbying activities included his improper attendance at a meeting with congressional and contractor officials to discuss the project’s future. SAIC’s Second Subcontract Award
SAIC awarded a second subcontract in July 1990 to IRG for over $224,000 after receiving consent from a DOE Contracting Officer pursuant to F.A.R. That part prescribes policies and procedures for consent to subcontract. Scope and Methodology
We conducted this inquiry between May 1994 and April 1996 at several locations including the DOE/Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C.; DOE/Yucca Mountain Project Office and Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada; SAIC Corporate Headquarters, LaJolla, California, and SAIC, Las Vegas, Nevada; and IRG, Metairie, Louisiana, and Las Vegas, Nevada. DOE awarded the management contract to TRW in February 1991. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO investigated allegations of conflicts of interest at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Yucca Mountain Project, focusing on whether: (1) the DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) properly implemented and adequately enforced federal standards of ethical conduct and DOE ethics regulations; and (2) failure to implement DOE ethics standards may have contributed to contract award and management abuses.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Principles of Ethical Conduct for federal employees contained in Executive Order 12674 and DOE's regulations for ethical conduct by its employees prohibit, among other things, any action that might result in or create the appearance of the loss of impartiality or independence; (2) however, GAO's investigation and DOE's own reviews revealed the appearance of the loss of impartiality by DOE officials at the Yucca Mountain Project; (3) for example, both the Manager of DOE's Yucca Mountain Project from 1987 to October 1993 and the Deputy Manager from October 1990 to January 1994 had long-term personal relationships with personnel of major project contractors, including the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC); (4) moreover, by 1994, DOE had learned that 14 additional, or almost 18 percent of, DOE employees at the project were engaged in relationships that might have created problems concerning the lack of impartiality and independence; (5) DOE determined that four of these relationships represented potential ethical problems, requiring recusal or waiver; (6) although senior OCRWM officials in Washington, D.C., knew by 1991 that potential ethical problems existed at the Yucca Mountain Project, they did not act to resolve the situation until late 1993; (7) further, GAO's investigation disclosed that this Yucca Mountain Project Manager had engaged in other questionable actions; (8) evidence shows that he encouraged SAIC to hire a certain subcontractor largely because of the subcontractor's stated political connections that could be used to promote the Project Manager's, as well as SAIC's, priorities for the project rather than DOE's priorities; (9) SAIC awarded a small subcontract to the firm after soliciting bids from it and a second firm in which SAIC held a major interest; (10) within a few months, and after soliciting bids from the same two firms, SAIC received DOE's consent to award a second contract, much larger in cost and different in scope, to the same subcontractor; (11) the Project Manager also violated DOE policy by improperly participating in a meeting with congressional and contractor officials, where he lobbied for his own positions concerning the project without, as required, first notifying his superiors. |
gao_GAO-11-871 | gao_GAO-11-871_0 | OIOS Role Clarified and Independence Strengthened, but Some Funding and Oversight Issues Remain
The UN General Assembly is addressing some previously identified impediments to OIOS’s ability to provide independent oversight, but certain UN funding arrangements and oversight relationships continue to limit the independence and authority of OIOS. An independent review of UN oversight commissioned by the Secretary- General noted, however, that the arrangements used to fund OIOS’s audits of those separately administered entities that choose to utilize its audit services do not meet Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) standards for independence. OIOS also reported that it is not able to issue consolidated audit reports for joint UN activities that included entities over which OIOS does not have oversight authority, even when directed to do so by the General Assembly. In January 2003, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that reaffirmed the prerogatives of separately administered funds and programs to decide their own oversight mechanisms and their relationship with OIOS. In May 2011, in response to her request, the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs issued a memorandum to the Under-Secretary-General stating that the General Assembly, through the 2003 resolution, clarified OIOS’s jurisdiction over the funds and programs, which suggested that the involvement of OIOS in their internal oversight functions is contingent on the consent of the funds and programs. The UN General Assembly has supported OIOS’s independence in audits of organizations within the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions by creating the Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC), which reviews OIOS’s audit plans and budget requests, and compares them to the Secretary-General’s proposed budgets for oversight to ensure that they reflect the resources OIOS needs to audit identified risks. Staffing Shortages Have Hindered OIOS Performance, but Efforts Are Under Way to Address Them
High vacancy rates for authorized positions, for both rank-and-file and senior staff, have historically hindered OIOS’s ability to provide sufficient oversight. OIOS has had staffing shortages in its three divisions, and the UN’s external auditors (the Board of Auditors) found that these shortages hampered the Internal Audit Division’s completion of its work plans. The UN Secretariat and OIOS have prioritized filling vacant positions, particularly since the start of the new Under-Secretary-General’s term in 2010. The IAAC also expressed concern that vacancies at the senior management level would make it difficult for OIOS to accomplish its work, but OIOS has recently filled the two director-level positions that had been vacant for more than a year. Further, the Under-Secretary-General has begun an initiative within OIOS to strengthen OIOS’s management and coordination; this involves a comprehensive review of the office’s responsibilities and capabilities, and may result in requests for additional management resources. As of the end of July 2011, OIOS data indicated that 19 percent of its approved staff positions were unfilled and that, as shown in figure 6, the vacancy rates were highest in the Internal Audit and Investigations Divisions, with the highest rate (30 percent) for investigations of peacekeeping activities. The UN and OIOS have made reducing staffing shortages a priority. The UN General Assembly has taken steps to help strengthen OIOS— most notably, by creating the IAAC to review OIOS’s budgets and work plans for audits of entities within the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions to ensure that OIOS resources are sufficient to address risks in the UN. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations work with the General Assembly and member states to address remaining impediments to OIOS’s ability to provide independent oversight resulting from its relationships with certain UN funds and programs and other clients. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine actions being taken to address (1) impediments to OIOS’s ability to provide independent oversight and (2) staffing issues that may have hindered its performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has long advocated for strong oversight of the United Nations (UN). In 2005, GAO raised long-standing concerns that the ability of the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to carry out its mandate was constrained in scope and authority, and in 2006, GAO found that funding arrangements impeded OIOS's ability to operate independently. The U.S. Mission to the UN also expressed concern that OIOS's independence is limited in that it cannot make final hiring decisions for senior staff. In response to such concerns, the UN General Assembly in 2006 created an Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC). GAO was asked to examine actions taken to address (1) impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight and (2) staffing issues that may have hindered its performance. GAO assessed OIOS's independence based on internationally recognized auditing standards, analyzed OIOS and other UN documents and data, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The UN has taken worthwhile steps to enhance OIOS's independence, but certain UN funding and oversight arrangements continue to impede OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight. The General Assembly has supported OIOS's independence by creating the IAAC, which reviews OIOS's budgets and work plans for audits of the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions, and by recommending that OIOS base its planning and budget requests on risk in accordance with standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). The General Assembly also clarified the role OIOS plays in internal oversight of funds and programs by adopting a resolution that reaffirmed the prerogatives of separately administered funds and programs to decide their own oversight mechanisms and relationship with OIOS. However, an independent review found that the arrangements for funding OIOS audits of those entities that choose to utilize its audit services do not meet IIA standards for independence. OIOS also remains constrained in its ability to issue consolidated audit reports for joint UN activities that include entities over which it does not have oversight authority, even when directed to do so by the General Assembly. High vacancy rates for authorized positions have hindered OIOS's ability to provide sufficient oversight, but the UN and OIOS are taking steps to address this issue. As of July 2011, 19 percent of OIOS staff positions were unfilled, and 30 percent were vacant for investigations of peacekeeping activities--the most challenging positions to fill. The UN's external auditor found that OIOS's staffing shortages hampered its Internal Audit Division's completion of its work plans. The UN and OIOS have made filling vacant positions a priority, and OIOS has hired 82 staff members since the start of the term of the new Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services in September 2010. The IAAC also expressed concern that vacancies at the senior management level would make it difficult for OIOS to accomplish its work. In August 2011, OIOS filled two director-level positions that had been vacant for more than a year. Further, the Under-Secretary-General has begun an initiative to strengthen OIOS's management and coordination and has requested an additional staff position for her front office. The Secretary-General has concurred with this request.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN work with the General Assembly and member states to address remaining impediments to OIOS's ability to provide independent oversight resulting from its relationships with certain UN funds and programs and other clients. State and OIOS generally concurred with GAO's findings and recommendation. However, State misinterpreted the report's discussion of OIOS's oversight authority. GAO added language to the report to clarify this discussion. |
gao_HEHS-98-94 | gao_HEHS-98-94_0 | Three federal program design features appear critical: (1) objectives—whether the national objectives involved are performance-related or fiscal, (2) nature of operations—whether the grant operates as a program or a funding stream, and (3) diversity of activities—whether the grant supports a single activity or diverse activities. In combination, these features are associated with differences in flexibility, accountability, level of government that is accountable for performance, availability of performance information, and the need to draw from additional sources in order to obtain the information needed to support program decisions at the national level. Considering design features and their implications can help policymakers ensure that accountability and information needs are met. Background
Flexible grants are an adaptable policy tool and are used in fields from urban transit to community mental health. They are alike in that each addresses a national purpose but gives state or local grantees the flexibility to adapt funded activities to fit the state or local context. However, there are vast differences among them as well. Some offer flexibility within a narrow range, as do many so-called ’categorical’ programs, while others offer choice so broad that they come close to resembling revenue sharing. The “programs” supported are state or local programs. Statement Balancing Flexibility and Accountability: Grant Program Design in Education and Other Areas programs? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed balancing flexibility and accountability in federal grant programs, focusing on education programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) flexible grants are an adaptable policy tool and are used in fields from urban transit to community mental health; (2) they are alike in that each addresses a national purpose but gives state or local grantees the flexibility to adapt funded activities to fit the state or local context; (3) however, there are vast differences among them as well; (4) some offer flexibility within a narrow range, as do many so-called categorical programs, while others offer choices so broad that they come close to resembling revenue sharing; (5) these differences reflect three critical design features on whether: (a) the national objectives involved are performance-related or fiscal; (b) the grant funds a distinct program or contributes to the stream of funds supporting state and local activities; and (c) it supports a single activity or diverse activities; (6) in combination, these features are associated with differences in flexibility, accountability, and the level of government that is accountable for performance; (7) combinations that produce greater flexibility lodge accountability at the state or local level and complicate the task of obtaining program-wide measures of performance through grantee reporting; (8) additional sources of information may be needed to support program decisions at the national level; and (9) considering design features and their implications can help policymakers ensure that accountability and information needs are met, whatever type of design is selected. |
gao_GAO-11-198 | gao_GAO-11-198_0 | Some Truck Drivers May Experience Detention Time Regularly Due to Several Contributing Factors
About Two-Thirds of Interviewed Drivers Experienced Detention Time within the Last Month
While there are no industry-wide data providing information on the occurrence of detention time, interviews with drivers, industry representatives, and motor carrier officials indicate that detention time occurs with some regularity. For those drivers that reported previously experiencing detention time, the amount of detention time ranged from less than 2 hours to over 8 hours, and occurred at a variety of different facilities, including production facilities and distribution centers. These limitations can occur, for example, when facilities overschedule appointments for pickup or delivery or do not have enough staff or equipment to handle the number of trucks scheduled, thereby creating a backlog of vehicles that need to be loaded or unloaded. Poor service provided by facility staff: About 39 percent of drivers reported that poor service by the facility staff was the reason they experienced detention time. Scheduling practices: About 34 percent of drivers reported that facility scheduling practices at some facilities led to detention time. Other factors: Drivers, industry representatives, and company officials noted there are some other factors not under the control of the facility that can contribute to detention time. Detention Time Can Result in Reduced Driving Time and Lost Revenue
Detention Time Can Impact the Ability of Drivers to Make Scheduled Deliveries within the Hours of Service Requirements
Detention time can impact drivers’ ability to make scheduled deliveries within the hours of service requirements by putting drivers behind schedule and reducing available driving time. According to industry representatives, the lost revenue can result from either missing an opportunity to secure another load or having to pay late fees to the receiver. In addition, some larger carrier companies are better able to handle logistical challenges that could result from detention time. Additional Information on Factors Contributing to Hours of Service Violations Could Help FMCSA Determine the Impact of Detention Time on These Violations
Although FMCSA collects data from roadside inspections, which provides information on the number of hours of service violations, the agency currently does not collect—nor is it required to collect—information to assess the extent to which detention time contributed to these violations. While FMCSA does not collect information on what factors contribute to hours of service violations, officials and industry representatives stated that detention time could be one of many such factors. To date, research conducted by FMCSA has not specifically included efforts to determine the extent to which detention time occurs. In addition to FMCSA’s planned studies on detention time, collecting information on the factors that contribute to detention time through driver and vehicle inspections or other means could help FMCSA determine whether detention time is a significant factor in contributing to drivers violating hours of service requirements and, consequently, whether additional federal action by DOT or Congress might be warranted to mitigate detention time as a potential safety issue. Any federal action to address issues associated with detention time beyond hours of service requirements would require careful consideration. Recommendations for Executive Action
To support the primary mission of FMCSA in improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles, we recommend the Secretary of DOT direct the Administrator of FMCSA to examine the extent to which detention time contributes to drivers violating hours of service requirements in its future studies on driver fatigue and detention time, and through data collected from its driver and vehicle inspections. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT officials provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how regularly truck drivers experience detention time, the factors that contribute to detention time, and how detention time affects the interstate commercial motor carrier industry, we reviewed hours of service regulations, legislation related to the regulation of the trucking industry, and relevant Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations; agency reports such as motor carrier efficiency studies; Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) freight facts and figures; and an Office of Motor Carriers study on trucking operations and hours of service. To determine what federal actions, if any, could be taken to address the issues associated with detention time, we reviewed existing research and studies conducted by the Department of Transportation, such as FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Efficiency Study and FHWA’s report that provided an overview of the volume and value of freight flows in the United States. 11. 14. | Why GAO Did This Study
The interstate commercial motor carrier industry moves thousands of truckloads of goods every day, and any disruption in one truckload's delivery schedule can have a ripple effect on others. Some waiting time at shipping and receiving facilities--commonly referred to as detention time--is to be expected in this complex environment. However, excessive detention time could impact the ability of drivers to perform within federal hours of service safety regulations, which limit duty hours and are enforced by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). This report discusses: (1) How regularly do truck drivers experience detention time and what factors contribute to detention time? (2) How does detention time affect the commercial freight vehicle industry? (3) What federal actions, if any, could be taken to address detention time issues? GAO analyzed federal and industry studies and interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of truck drivers, as well as other industry stakeholders and FMCSA officials.
What GAO Found
While there are no industry-wide data on the occurrence of detention time, GAO interviews with over 300 truck drivers and a number of industry representatives and motor carrier officials indicate that detention time occurs with some regularity and for a variety of reasons. About 59 percent of interviewed drivers reported experiencing detention time in the past 2 weeks and over two-thirds reported experiencing detention time within the last month. Drivers cited several factors that contribute to detention time. About 43 percent of drivers identified limitations in facilities, such as the lack of sufficient loading and unloading equipment or staff. These limitations can occur when facilities overschedule appointments, creating a backlog of vehicles. Another factor cited by about 39 percent of drivers was the product not being ready for shipment. Other factors include poor service provided by facility staff, facility scheduling practices that may encourage drivers to line up hours before the facility opens, and factors not under the control of the facility, such as drivers filing paperwork incorrectly. Some facilities are taking steps to address these factors, such as using appointment times. Detention time can result in reduced driving time and lost revenue for drivers and carriers. For those drivers that reported previously experiencing detention time, about 80 percent reported that detention time impacts their ability to meet federal hours of service safety requirements--a maximum of 14 hours on duty each day, including up to 11 hours of driving--by reducing their available driving time. About 65 percent of drivers reported lost revenue as a result of detention time from either missing an opportunity to secure another load or paying late fees to the shipper. Some practices can mitigate these economic impacts, such as charging detention time fees and developing relationships with facilities so drivers become familiar with a facility's process. According to industry representatives, carrier companies are better positioned than independent owner operators to use such practices and are better able to handle logistical challenges that may result from detention time. While FMCSA collects data from drivers during roadside inspections, which provide information on the number of hours of service violations, the agency currently does not collect--nor is it required to collect--information to assess the extent to which detention time contributes to these violations. Agency officials stated that FMCSA does not identify the factors that contribute to hours of service violations, and detention time could be just one of many factors. To date, FMCSA research has focused on an overview of freight movement, but not the extent to which detention time occurs or how it may impact hours of service violations. FMCSA plans to conduct a 2012 study to better understand the extent to which detention time occurs. Obtaining a clearer industry-wide picture about how detention time contributes to hours of service violations could help FMCSA determine whether additional federal action might be warranted. However, any additional federal actions to address issues associated with detention time beyond hours of service would require careful consideration to determine if any unintended consequences may flow from federal action to regulate detention time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FMCSA examine the extent to which detention time contributes to hours of service violations in its future studies on driver fatigue and detention time. We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review. DOT officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-899T | gao_GAO-06-899T_0 | Federal requirements currently address security at some U.S. chemical facilities. DHS Has Taken Actions to Develop a Plan for Protecting the Chemical Sector, Assess Facilities’ Vulnerabilities, and Interact with the Industry and Other Federal Agencies
DHS is developing a plan for protecting the chemical sector that will establish a framework for reducing the overall vulnerability of the sector in partnership with the industry and state and local authorities. DHS officials told us that the final plan—which they now expect to complete and release in the fall of 2006—will reflect the basic principles and content described in the draft plan. On the basis of our review of the draft plan and discussions with DHS officials, the final plan will, among other things, (1) present background information on the sector; (2) describe the process DHS will use to develop an inventory of chemical sector assets; (3) describe DHS’s efforts to identify and assess chemical facilities’ vulnerabilities and plans to prioritize these efforts on the basis of the vulnerability assessments; (4) outline the protective programs that will be created to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from attacks on chemical facilities, and describe how DHS will work with private sector and government entities to implement these programs; (5) explain the performance metrics DHS will use to measure the effectiveness of DHS and industry security efforts; and (6) outline the department’s challenges in coordinating the efforts of the chemical sector. Finally, DHS has implemented a number of programs to assist the private sector and local communities in reducing vulnerabilities. DHS also coordinates with EPA and other federal agencies through a government coordinating council. Other industry associations have encouraged their members to address security by a variety of means. Despite industry associations’ efforts to encourage or require members to voluntarily address security, the extent of participation in the industry’s voluntary initiatives is unclear. Chemical industry officials told us they face a number of challenges in preparing facilities against a terrorist attack. Industry stakeholders also cited the need for guidance on what level of security is adequate. DHS Needs Additional Authority to Ensure That Chemical Facilities Are Addressing Security Issues
Existing laws give DHS limited authority to address chemical sector security, but DHS currently lacks specific authority to require all high-risk facilities to assess their vulnerabilities and take corrective actions, where needed. As a result, DHS cannot ensure that all high-risk facilities are assessing their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and taking corrective action, where necessary. DHS has concluded that its existing patchwork of authorities does not permit it to regulate the chemical industry effectively, and that the Congress should enact federal requirements for chemical facilities. Stakeholders’ Views on Safer Technologies Requirement in Chemical Security Legislation Are Mixed
While many stakeholders—including representatives from industry, research centers, and government—agreed on the need for additional legislation that would place federal security requirements on chemical facilities, they expressed divergent views on whether such legislation should require the use of inherently safer technologies. On this basis, DHS has concluded—as we did in 2003 and again in January 2006—that its existing authorities do not allow it to effectively regulate chemical sector security. Furthermore, implementing inherently safer technologies potentially could lessen the consequences of a terrorist attack by reducing the chemical risks present at facilities, thereby making facilities less attractive targets. However, substituting safer technologies can be prohibitively expensive and can shift risks onto other facilities or the transportation sector. 2360, making appropriations for DHS for fiscal year 2006, directed DHS to submit a report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations by February 10, 2006, describing (1) the resources needed to implement mandatory security requirements for the chemical sector and to create a system for auditing and ensuring compliance with the security standards and (2) the security requirements and any reasons why the requirements should differ from those already in place for chemical facilities that operate in a port zone; complete vulnerability assessments of the highest risk U.S. chemical facilities by December 2006, giving preference to facilities that, if attacked, pose the greatest threat to human life and the economy; and complete a national security strategy for the chemical sector by February 10, 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist attacks on U.S. chemical facilities could damage public health and the economy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates federal efforts to protect these facilities from attacks. GAO was asked to provide a statement for the record based on its report Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed ( GAO-06-150 , January 27, 2006), GAO reviewed (1) DHS's actions to develop a strategy to protect chemical plants, assist with the industry's security efforts, and coordinate with other federal agencies, (2) industry security initiatives, (3) DHS's authorities and the need for additional security legislation, and (4) stakeholders' views on any requirements to use safer technologies.
What GAO Found
DHS is developing a Chemical Sector-Specific Plan, which is intended to, among other things, describe DHS's ongoing efforts and future plans to coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector; identify chemical facilities to include in the sector, assess their vulnerabilities, and prioritize them; and develop programs to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from attacks on chemical facilities. DHS officials told GAO that they now expect to complete and release the plan in the fall of 2006. In addition, DHS has taken a number of actions to protect the chemical sector from terrorist attacks. DHS identified 3,400 facilities that, if attacked, could pose the greatest hazard to human life and health and has initiated programs to assist the industry and local communities in protecting chemical plants. DHS also coordinates with the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, an industry-led group that acts as a liaison for the chemical sector, and with EPA and other federal agencies. The chemical industry is voluntarily addressing plant security, but faces challenges. Some industry associations require member companies to assess plants' vulnerabilities, develop and implement mitigation plans, and have a third party verify that security measures were implemented. Other associations have developed guidelines and other tools to encourage their members to address security. Industry officials said that high costs and limited guidance on how much security is adequate create challenges in preparing facilities against terrorism. Because existing laws provide DHS with only limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it has relied primarily on the industry's voluntary security efforts. However, the extent to which companies are addressing security is unclear. DHS does not have the authority to require chemical facilities to assess their vulnerabilities and implement security measures. Therefore, DHS cannot ensure that facilities are taking these actions. DHS has stated that its existing authorities do not permit it to effectively regulate the chemical industry, and that the Congress should enact federal requirements for chemical facilities. Many stakeholders agreed--as GAO concluded in 2003 and again in January 2006--that additional legislation placing federal security requirements on chemical facilities is needed. Stakeholders had mixed views on whether any chemical security legislation should require plants to substitute safer chemicals and processes, which could lessen the potential consequences of an attack, but could be costly or infeasible for some plants. DHS has stated that safer practices may make facilities less attractive to terrorist attack, but may shift risks rather than eliminate them. Environmental groups told GAO that they favored including or considering inherently safer technologies in any federal requirements, but most industry officials GAO contacted opposed a requirement to use safer technologies because they may shift risks or be prohibitively expensive. |
gao_HEHS-96-49 | gao_HEHS-96-49_0 | Contractors do not review each of the millions of Medicare claims they process each year to determine if the services are medically necessary. Only 6 of the 17 contractors had prepayment screens to review chest X ray claims for medical necessity, although HCFA had alerted Medicare contractors that providers frequently bill for chest X rays that are not warranted by medical symptoms and are thus medically unnecessary. HCFA can take a more active role in controlling spending for widely overused procedures without intruding on the contractors’ responsibilities to establish their own prepayment screens. This has been an important step in promoting greater efficiency in developing local medical policies. More model policies can help contractors control spending for nationally overused procedures by providing them with generally accepted criteria for identifying and denying claims for unnecessary services. We also reviewed HCFA’s list of 200 medical procedure codes, ranked by total Medicare-allowed charges, and obtained Medicare contractors’ views on procedures that are likely to be overused. To estimate the Medicare payments for unnecessary services that could be prevented by broader use of prepayment screens, we tested autoadjudicated prepayment screens on claims paid by seven contractors in six states. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on Medicare payments for unnecessary medical services, focusing on the: (1) extent to which Medicare contractors employ medical necessity prepayment screens for procedures that are likely to be overused; (2) potential impact of autoadjudicated prepayment screens on Medicare spending; and (3) federal government's role in reducing overused medical procedures billed to Medicare.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Medicare spending for unnecessary medical services is widespread; (2) more than half of the 17 contractors surveyed do not use prepayment screens to check whether claimed services are necessary; (3) seven of the contractors paid between $29 and $150 million for unnecessary medical services; (4) many Medicare claims are paid because contractors' criteria for identifying unnecessary medical services vary; and (5) the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) needs to take a more active role in promoting local medical policies and prepayment screens for overused medical procedures. |
gao_GAO-11-270 | gao_GAO-11-270_0 | Further, provisions in annual USPS appropriations since 1984 mandate 6-day-a-week delivery and rural mail delivery at certain levels. USPS estimated that if 5-day delivery had been in effect in fiscal year 2009, it would have realized $3.1 billion in net savings—including $3.3 billion in gross savings less $0.2 billion in revenue losses due to a slight volume decline. USPS plans to achieve these work-hour reductions by attrition, involuntary separations, or other strategies to reduce work hours. USPS has not reported how many years this transition would take, but has noted that it would include realigning USPS’s workforce through attrition and other changes. USPS Should Achieve Significant Cost Savings from 5-Day Delivery, but the Extent of Savings Will Depend on How Well the Change Is Implemented
Cost Savings from 5-Day Delivery Are Likely to Be Significant, but Some Savings Will Depend on Increasing City-Carriers’ Productivity
USPS is likely to achieve significant cost savings by reducing delivery from 6 days to 5 days because it would eliminate costs associated with carriers traversing their routes on Saturday. During the PRC proceeding, however, stakeholders raised a variety of criticisms about the assumptions, methodology, and conclusions USPS used to determine its cost-savings estimate. Concerns have been raised, however, that USPS may have understated the potential volume losses based on questions about the methodology USPS used to develop its estimate and the impact of other factors that can affect mail volumes. PS’s ability to implement these plans and achieve its Stakeholders have raised a variety of operational issues about USPS’s proposal, such as the extent to which USPS will be able to maintain high- quality service; align its processing, retail, and delivery network with changes in workload; and communicate changes with stakeholders. Key benefits would include improving USPS’s financial condition by reducing costs; reducing the size of its workforce; and increasing efficiency by better aligning delivery operations with reduced mail volumes. On the minus side, it would reduce service; put mail volumes and revenues at risk; eliminate jobs; decrease USPS advantages over competitors that do not have Saturday delivery; and, by itself, be insufficient to solve USPS’s financial challenges. Twenty-eight percent opposed USPS’s proposal, often stating it would reduce mail volume and harm USPS’s business. Action by Congress and USPS is urgently needed to comprehensively restructure USPS’s operations, networks, and workforce and to modernize its organization. We recently reported that Congress and USPS urgently need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS’s financial viability and enable it to begin making necessary changes. Additional uncertainties remain as factors other than delivery frequency— e.g., price increases—can also affect mail volumes and revenues. USPS’s role in providing universal postal services can affect all American households and businesses, so fundamental changes to universal postal services involve key public policy issues for Congress to decide. If Congress decides 5- day delivery is necessary, Congress and USPS could factor the savings from 5-day delivery into deliberations about what package of actions should be taken to restore USPS’s financial viability. Conversely, if Congress maintains the mandate for 6-day delivery, Congress and USPS would need to find other ways for USPS to achieve other substantial financial savings. This would entail difficult decisions with implications for USPS’s infrastructure, workforce, and service. Because GAO previously recommended that Congress consider providing USPS with financial relief, and in doing so, consider all options available to reduce costs, this report contains no new recommendations. USPS generally agreed with our findings, but provided additional context for these findings. Postal Service’s (USPS) cost and volume estimates and the operational impacts associated with its 5-day delivery proposal and (2) the trade-offs and other implications associated with this proposal. Much of this information was submitted as part of PRC’s review of USPS’s proposal to move to 5-day delivery. After applying these criteria, we further analyzed two issues that may significantly affect USPS’s net financial savings estimate—(1) USPS’s assumption and judgment that most of the Saturday workload transferred to weekdays would be absorbed through more efficient city delivery operations and (2) USPS’s methodology for estimating the effect of its 5- day delivery proposal on mail volume, including reducing mailers’ estimates based on their responses to the question asking about the likelihood that their mail volumes would change if USPS implemented its proposal. March 18, 2010. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial outlook has deteriorated as customers have shifted to electronic alternatives. Mail volumes have declined over 20 percent since fiscal year 2006 and are expected to continue declining. To help its financial outlook, in March 2010, USPS presented a detailed proposal to the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) to move from a 6-day to a 5-day delivery schedule. USPS projected this would save about $3 billion annually and reduce mail volume by less than l percent. This proposal factors in widespread changes to USPS's workforce and networks. USPS has also asked Congress to not include language in its annual appropriation requiring 6 day-a-week delivery. As requested, GAO assessed (1) USPS's cost and volume estimates and the operational impacts associated with its 5-day delivery proposal and (2) the trade-offs and other implications associated with this proposal. GAO reviewed USPS's proposal (including its assumptions, methodologies, and conclusions) and other information from the PRC's 5-day delivery proceeding, surveyed postal employee and mailer groups, and interviewed USPS officials and postal employee groups. Because GAO previously recommended that Congress consider providing financial relief to USPS, as well as other cost-saving options, this report contains no new recommendations. USPS generally agreed with GAO's findings and provided additional context on its proposed change to end Saturday delivery.
What GAO Found
USPS's proposal to move to 5-day delivery by ending Saturday delivery would likely result in substantial savings; however, the extent to which it would achieve these savings depends on how effectively this proposal is implemented. USPS's $3.1 billion net cost-savings estimate is primarily based on eliminating city- and rural-carrier work hours and costs through attrition, involuntary separations, or other strategies. USPS also estimated that 5-day delivery would result in minimal mail volume decline. However, stakeholders have raised a variety of concerns about USPS's estimates, including, (1) First, USPS's cost-savings estimate assumed that most of the Saturday workload transferred to weekdays would be absorbed through more efficient delivery operations. If certain city-carrier workload would not be absorbed, USPS estimated that up to $500 million in annual savings would not be realized. (2) Second, USPS may have understated the size of the potential mail volume loss due to questions about the methodology USPS used to develop its estimates of how 5-day delivery may affect mail volumes. The extent to which USPS can achieve cost savings and mitigate volume and revenue loss depends on how well and how quickly it can realign its operations, workforce, and networks; maintain service quality; and communicate with stakeholders. USPS has spent considerable time and resources developing plans to facilitate this transition. Nevertheless, risks and uncertainties remain, such as how quickly it can realign its workforce through attrition; how effectively it can modify certain finance systems that cannot be changed until congressional approval for 5-day delivery is granted; and how mailers will respond to this change in service. Further, uncertainties remain as factors other than delivery frequency--e.g., price increases--can also affect mail volumes and revenues. USPS's proposal involves several factors that need to be considered. It would improve USPS's financial condition by reducing costs, increasing efficiency, and better aligning its delivery operations with reduced mail volumes. However, it would also reduce service; put mail volumes and revenues at risk; eliminate jobs; and, by itself, be insufficient to solve USPS's financial challenges. USPS's role in providing universal postal services can affect all American households and businesses, so fundamental changes involve key public policy decisions for Congress. If Congress decides 5-day delivery is necessary, then Congress and USPS could factor the savings into deliberations about what package of actions should be taken to restore USPS's financial viability. Conversely, if Congress maintains the mandate for 6-day delivery, Congress and USPS would need to find other ways to achieve equivalent financial savings, so that the package is sufficient to restore USPS's financial viability. This would likely entail difficult decisions with broad implications for USPS's infrastructure, workforce, and service. As GAO has reported, a package of actions by Congress and USPS is urgently needed to modernize USPS's operations, networks, and workforce. |
gao_GAO-02-526 | gao_GAO-02-526_0 | Within the charitable community, various organizations have been concerned about the accuracy of charitable expense reporting, with concerns often focusing on fundraising expenses. First, IRS does not have a process to proactively share data that it is allowed to provide to states, such as data on the denial or revocation of tax-exempt status. State officials believe that accessing IRS’s oversight data would help them allocate resources in overseeing charities. In this oversight framework, IRS has a limited role in considering how well charities are spending funds or accomplishing charitable purposes. However, due to suspected but unmeasured inaccuracy in some charities’ reporting of their expenses and to the range of discretion that charities have in charging and allocating expenses, Form 990 expense data alone are not adequate for public oversight of charities and should be used with caution. IRS’s investment in reviewing charity applications and examining charity returns has not kept pace with the growth in the number of applications and returns. Furthermore, certain issues related to charities, such as the extent to which their fundraising activities may be misleading, can be addressed by state officials. Recommendations
To improve oversight by the public, IRS, and the states, we recommend that the commissioner of Internal Revenue ensures (either through the planned market segment studies or other means) that IRS obtains reliable data on compliance issues (including expense reporting) for the full charity community; develops results-oriented goals, strategies (including levels of staffing and other resources to accomplish the goals), and measures to gauge progress in accomplishing those goals when overseeing the charity community; and develops, in consultation with state charity officials, a procedure to regularly share IRS data with states as allowed by federal tax law. To obtain recognition of its tax-exempt status, a charity must apply to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The tremendous outpouring of charitable donations in response to September 11 has raised concerns about whether some charities are spending too much on fundraising and management and too little on the charitable purposes related to their tax-exempt status.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Form 990 expense data is inadequate for public oversight purposes because charities have considerable discretion in recording their expenses when it comes to fundraising, management, and charitable services. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) lacks data on the type and extent of possible compliance issues among charities. Moreover, IRS oversight of charities suffers from a lack of results-oriented goals and strategies. Concerns have also been raised that IRS's resources have not kept pace with the growth in the charitable sector, and some measures suggest that available resources may not be used as effectively as in the past. State officials consider inadequate the charity data IRS shares with them. IRS does not proactively share some data that states are permitted to receive, such as denials and revocations of charities' tax-exempt status. Federal law prohibits sharing some data that state officials believe would be valuable, such as the status and results of examinations of charities' returns. |
gao_GAO-07-1196 | gao_GAO-07-1196_0 | Of the 425 applications for conscientious objector status the components reported that they processed during this period, 224, or about 53 percent, were approved; 188, or about 44 percent, were denied; and 13, or about 3 percent, were pending, withdrawn, closed, or no information was provided. Conscientious Objector Application Process Is Consistent Across Components
All components of the Armed Forces follow the same basic steps to administer their conscientious objector application processes. As shown in the process flowchart, the components attempt to reassign an applicant to noncombatant duties while an application is pending. Officials responsible for the conscientious objector process for each component said that the commanding officer reassigns the applicant. Officials from the active and reserve components of the Air Force and the Marine Corps stated that, in the event that an applicant’s unit is deployed while the application is pending, the applicant will not be deployed. On the basis of data provided by the components for calendar years 2002 through 2006, the military services took an average of about 7 months to process an application—this includes the time allowed for applicants to submit their rebuttals. According to the components, the commanding officer typically informs an applicant if he or she has or has not met the burden of proof necessary to establish the claim. In accordance with VA guidance, conscientious objector status generally is not considered when determining eligibility for any of the benefits VA offers; the primary determinant for these benefits is the characterization of discharge. In addition to the characterization of discharge, a servicemember may have to meet other eligibility requirements—including years of service, period of service (e.g., during a period of war), or an injury or disease that was incurred or aggravated during military activity— to receive certain VA benefits. If the board upholds the decision to deny benefits, the veteran can appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which is an independent court and not part of the VA.
Of the 224 servicemembers who were approved for conscientious objector status during calendar years 2002 through 2006, 207 (92 percent) were granted honorable discharges; 14 (6 percent) were granted under honorable conditions (general) discharges; and no information on the discharges of the remaining 3 (1 percent) was available (see table 5). The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) does not maintain separate data on the numbers of applications for conscientious objector status; however, it does maintain data on personnel, including demographics and reasons for separation, dating back to the early 1970s. We reviewed component-provided data to determine the characterization of discharge (e.g., honorable) received by the servicemembers separated as conscientious objectors. 3). These numbers are very small, given the size of the total force—approximately 2.3 million servicemembers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 587 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 required GAO to address (1) the trends in the number of conscientious objector applications for the active and reserve components during calendar years 2002 through 2006; (2) how each component administers its process for evaluating conscientious objector applications; and (3) whether, upon discharge, conscientious objectors are eligible for the same benefits as other former servicemembers. GAO's review included the Coast Guard components. GAO compiled numbers of applications based on data provided by the Armed Forces. However, these numbers do not include the numbers of applications that are not formally reported to the components' headquarters. Also, the Defense Manpower Data Center does not maintain separate data on numbers of applications for conscientious objector status; it does maintain data on reasons for separation. GAO used these data to help assess the reasonableness of the component-provided data and to compile demographic data.
What GAO Found
During calendar years 2002 through 2006, the active and reserve components reported processing 425 applications for conscientious objector status. This number is small relative to the Armed Forces' total force of approximately 2.3 million servicemembers. Of the 425 applications the components reported processing, 224 (53 percent) were approved; 188 (44 percent) were denied; and 13 (3 percent) were pending, withdrawn, closed, or no information was provided. Each component considers applications from servicemembers who wish to be classified as conscientious objectors. Each component's process is essentially the same, taking an average of about 7 months to process an application. After the servicemember submits an application, arrangements are made for a military chaplain and a psychiatrist to interview the applicant. An investigating officer holds a hearing and prepares a report. An authorized official or board makes the final decision and informs the commanding officer, who informs the applicant that he or she has or has not met the burden of proof necessary to establish the claim. Officials from all the components stated that they attempt to temporarily reassign applicants to noncombatant duties while their applications are pending. Conscientious objector status is not considered when determining eligibility for benefits; the primary determinant is the type of discharge--honorable or under honorable conditions (general). Of those 224 servicemembers whose applications were approved for conscientious objector status, 207 received honorable discharges, 14 received general discharges, and information on the remaining 3 was not available. In addition to the characterization of discharge, a servicemember may have to meet other eligibility requirements--including years of service--to receive certain Veterans Affairs benefits. |
gao_NSIAD-95-2 | gao_NSIAD-95-2_0 | DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Reducing Acquisition Leadtimes
The value of DOD inventory requirements needed to support acquisition leadtime grew from about $8 billion in 1979 to about $21 billion in 1989. None of the DOD components have fully implemented DOD’s 1990 leadtime reduction initiatives or its 1993 policy guidance for reducing leadtime, but some have made greater efforts than others. As shown in table 1, the Navy had the greatest success and the Air Force had the least success in reducing acquisition leadtime. Renewed Emphasis and Improved Oversight Needed to Reduce Leadtime
With the exception of the Navy, the military services and DLA placed no timely emphasis on the effective implementation of DOD’s 1990 leadtime reduction initiatives or its 1993 leadtime reduction policy. These inaccuracies resulted from the failure to periodically validate and update leadtime data in the requirement computation database. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce acquisition leadtimes.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD has made only limited progress in reducing its acquisition leadtimes because the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have unevenly implemented the leadtime reduction initiatives; (2) no DOD agency has fully implemented the 1990 initiatives or the 1993 policy guidance for reducing leadtimes; (3) the Navy has been the most successful and the Air Force the least successful in reducing acquisition leadtimes; (4) additional leadtime reductions can be achieved by prompt implementation of DOD initiatives, periodic validation and updating of leadtime data, and purchasing spare parts directly from the original manufacturer; and (5) DOD could reduce costs by $1 billion over a 4-year period by reducing acquisition leadtimes. |
gao_GAO-17-112 | gao_GAO-17-112_0 | The Capitol Police Board is charged with overseeing and supporting the Capitol Police. The Board’s Scope is Unique Among Law Enforcement Oversight Entities
As depicted in Figure 2, the Board’s current scope is wide, ranging from making security decisions and establishing unified schedules of rates of pay, to approving terminations. According to officials representing two of the four law enforcement expert groups with whom we spoke, such a wide ranging scope for an oversight body is atypical. The Board’s Manual Has Fully or Partially Incorporated Leading Practices to Facilitate Accountability, Transparency, and Effective External Communication, but the Board Has Not Always Implemented Manual Provisions as Designed
The Board’s Manual of Procedures fully incorporated one of the six leading practices and partially incorporated the other five to facilitate accountability, transparency, and effective external communication. The Manual has not incorporated this activity. Nevertheless, Board members and staff told us that, in their opinion, stakeholders face no barriers to information. Therefore, the Board has not fully incorporated some leading practices into its Manual because it believes that some of them address areas beyond what is required in statute. Adjustments That Would Not Require Statutory Change
1. Recommendation
To ensure that the Capitol Police Board’s current and any new approaches help enhance accountability, transparency, and effective external communication with its stakeholders, we recommend that the Board revise its Manual of Procedures to fully incorporate each of the leading practices for internal control and governance standards discussed in this report. In its written comments, the Board did not state whether or not it concurred with the contents of our draft report or our recommendation. To examine the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the Chief of the Capitol Police as set out in statute and in the Board’s Manual of Procedures (Manual) and to determine how the Board’s scope compares to other law enforcement oversight entities, we reviewed the relevant statutes that set out the Board and the Chief’s roles and responsibilities. To examine the extent to which the Board’s Manual incorporates leading practices from internal control and other standardized governance practices to facilitate accountability, transparency and effective external communication and describe the ways the Board has implemented these practices, we first assessed the Manual using internal control and corporate governance principles. In addition, we interviewed Board officials to understand their practices. To identify the Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the degree to which the Board is accountable, transparent, and effective in its communication approaches and options that exist to enhance the Board’s approaches, we sought stakeholder views from the majority and minority staff of the committees who engage with the Board – Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Committee on House Administration, and the Senate and House Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees – as well as the majority and minority staff representing the leadership from the Senate and the House, to provide insight into how the Board’s practices were meeting their needs for accountability, transparency, and effective communication when interacting with the Board and to solicit feedback on the options to alternative Board structures that we found in our prior work on the Board, options proposed by the Congressional Research Service in 2009, and to identify any other options that may address any concerns they have in interacting with the Board. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Board is charged with overseeing and supporting the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Board's operations, including the Board's accountability and level of communication. This report examines (1) the roles and responsibilities of the Board and the Police Chief and the comparability of the Board's scope to other law enforcement oversight entities; (2) the extent to which the Board's Manual incorporates leading practices for accountability, transparency, and external communication, and how the Board implements these practices; and (3) Congressional stakeholder perspectives on the Board's approaches and adjustments to enhance them.
To complete this review, GAO analyzed relevant statutes and Board governing documents and operations. GAO also used internal control and corporate governance standards to articulate the key principles of accountability, transparency, and effective external communication; identified six leading practices that facilitate these principles; and analyzed the Board's Manual against each. GAO also interviewed Board members and staff, Congressional stakeholders, and experts selected for their knowledge of law enforcement oversight.
What GAO Found
The Capitol Police Board (Board) has wide-ranging responsibilities and according to experts with knowledge of law enforcement oversight bodies, like civilian oversight boards, the Board's scope is unique by comparison. For example, the Board has authority for security decisions, as well as certain human capital and personnel matters, including the approval of officer terminations.
In 2013, the Board adopted a Manual of Procedures (Manual) that references its operations and establishes protocols for outreach with the Congressional committees and leadership offices (stakeholders) with whom the Board interacts. This Manual fully incorporated one and partially incorporated five of the six leading practices that facilitate the principles of accountability, transparency, and effective external communication; however, the Board has not always implemented these practices, such as notifying stakeholders that certain information on the Board's decisions and operations is available to them.
Some stakeholders raised concerns, such as the Board not adequately soliciting their input, and suggested adjustments to enhance the Board's approaches. Board officials told us that the Manual has not incorporated some leading practices, in part because they address activities beyond statutory requirements. Leading practices note that effective governing bodies make commitments to stakeholders that exceed basic requirements, and GAO found the Manual includes activities that go beyond what is statutorily prescribed. Working to fully incorporate leading practices into its Manual and operations would help the Board enhance its accountability, transparency, and effective external communication with stakeholders.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Board revise its Manual to fully incorporate leading practices, including evaluating its performance, and engage with stakeholders and incorporate their views, as appropriate, on any changes. The Board did not state whether it concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-874 | gao_GAO-11-874_0 | According to the Bureau, several factors were behind the escalating costs of the 2010 Census, such as the need to hire about 585,000 temporary field staff to count the more than 46- million households that did not mail back their census forms, and substantial investments in updating the Bureau’s address list—including address canvassing, a door-to-door effort to verify the address list’s accuracy in 2009. 2). Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Partnership between the Bureau and USPS
The Bureau and USPS Plan Additional Collaborative Efforts for the 2020 Census
The Bureau and USPS are engaging in efforts to enhance their collaboration. The Bureau and USPS also plan to update their 1995 memorandum of understanding to, among other matters, reflect routine changes that have occurred over time (e.g., update contact information), and help ensure that both agencies benefit from their collaborative efforts. Bureau officials explained that under the 1995 memorandum, the agencies’ collaboration typically benefited the Bureau more than USPS. Now both agencies would like to improve each other’s address and geographic information. One new effort anticipated under the revised memorandum of understanding would provide USPS with the Bureau’s geographic data products and support, which USPS hopes to use to improve its mail routing and other business decisions. The revised memorandum of understanding is expected to be approved later this year. The Bureau Could Better Leverage USPS Local Knowledge by Recruiting USPS Mail Carriers to Work Temporarily for the Census
Opportunities exist for the Bureau to take advantage of the knowledge and experience of USPS mail carriers, including retirees. Bureau and USPS officials agree that USPS city and rural mail carriers are familiar with the local living conditions in their communities and that this knowledge could help the Bureau conduct aspects of the 2020 Census more effectively. Regarding cost, in 2010, the average USPS mail carrier was paid about $41 (city) or $34 (rural) per hour including benefits for regular time worked, compared to the average hourly pay of about $15 paid to census enumerators. Reducing the Number of “Undeliverable as Addressed” Mailings Could Improve the Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness of USPS Operations
During the 2010 Census, USPS personnel were concerned about resources spent attempting to deliver census mailings with undeliverable addresses. In responding to a copy of our draft report the Bureau provided a summary of preliminary reason codes for why approximately 12-million initial forms were not delivered. Thus, now that the Bureau has compiled this information it will be important for the Bureau to work with USPS to assess whether strategies can be developed to reduce the number of undeliverable as addressed mailings such as not delivering to housing units that do not have a complete address or that do not have a mail box. The Bureau works with GSA to identify, convert, and lease space for its local offices during the census. USPS officials stated that ongoing efforts to downsize USPS will probably increase availability of facility space that could be used by the Bureau in the next census, but USPS hopes to sell these facilities, and it is uncertain how many will be available in 2020 (and what condition those facilities would be in if they were available). Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the importance of Bureau and USPS collaboration in successfully executing census operations, as part of future partnership activities, we recommend that the Postmaster General and the Secretary of Commerce direct their agencies to expand their collaborative efforts by: determining if there are ways that the Bureau could work with USPS to target recruitment opportunities to mail carriers, and assessing whether strategies can be developed to reduce the number of undeliverable as addressed mailings. The Bureau in its comments was silent on whether it agreed with the recommendation to target recruitment opportunities to mail carriers, however, in a subsequent discussion stated that it did agree with that first recommendation. The Bureau believes much of the undeliverable as addressed operational and waste-disposal costs for USPS and additional postage fees for the Bureau were both anticipated and unavoidable. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Census Bureau (Bureau) and U.S. Postal Service (USPS) collaborated on aspects of the 2010 Census and prior decennials, and those efforts generally went well in such areas as address list development. But both agencies face challenges: the Bureau needs to control the escalating cost of the decennial census and maintain its accuracy, while USPS must improve its financial condition. As requested, GAO examined opportunities to enhance collaboration in such areas as technology, personnel, and facilities that could improve the cost-effectiveness of the 2020 Census and generate revenue for USPS. GAO analyzed Bureau and USPS data and documents, compared the agencies' existing collaborative efforts with prior GAO work, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Bureau and USPS are expanding collaborative efforts for the 2020 Census. The collaborative efforts include a new Bureau initiative to continuously update its master address list using USPS and local address information. This could allow the Bureau to limit the size of field operations needed to develop an accurate and complete address list for the 2020 Census. The Bureau and USPS also plan to update their 1995 memorandum of understanding to, among other matters, help ensure that both agencies benefit from their collaborative efforts. Bureau officials explained that under the 1995 memorandum, the agencies' collaboration typically benefited the Bureau more than USPS. Now both agencies would like to improve each other's address and geographic information. One new effort anticipated under the revised memorandum of understanding would provide USPS with the Bureau's geographic data products and support, which USPS hopes to use to improve its mail routing and other business decisions. The revised memorandum of understanding is expected to be approved later this year. Additional opportunities exist for the Bureau to take advantage of the knowledge and experience of USPS mail carriers, including retirees. Bureau and USPS officials agree that USPS mail carriers are familiar with their communities, so hiring mail carriers as temporary census workers could allow the Bureau to, among other things, develop a more accurate address list for the 2020 Census. However, using mail carriers to conduct census field operations at USPS pay rates would not be cost-effective. In 2010, USPS mail carriers cost on average about $41 (city) or $34 (rural) per hour compared to about $15 per hour for census enumerators. In the 2010 Census, about 19-million forms could not be delivered--also known as undeliverable as addressed mailings. The Bureau, in its comments to a copy of this draft report, provided a summary of reasons for why forms were not delivered. These reasons include the house was vacant or there was no mail box. Thus, now that the Bureau has compiled this information, it will be important for the Bureau to work with USPS to assess strategies to reduce the number of undeliverable as addressed mailings, as undelivered mail results in additional operational and waste-disposal costs for USPS and additional postage fees for the Bureau. The Bureau works with the General Services Administration to lease space for its local offices during the census. For the 2010 Census, the Bureau leased two USPS locations for a total cost of $330,000. While USPS officials stated that ongoing efforts to downsize the USPS could increase the availability of facility space that could be used by the Bureau in the next census, USPS hopes to sell these facilities, and it is uncertain how many will be available in 2020 (and what condition those facilities would be in if they were available).
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of Commerce and USPS consider (1) expanding their current collaborative efforts to include recruiting mail carriers, including retirees, for the 2020 Census, and (2) assessing whether strategies can be developed to reduce the number of "undeliverable as addressed" census mailings. USPS agreed with GAO's recommendations. Commerce disagreed with the second draft recommendation concerning analyzing the reasons for undelivered mailings. GAO revised the recommendation to focus on developing a strategy to help reduce costs involved with processing undelivered mail. |
gao_GAO-16-227T | gao_GAO-16-227T_0 | Development and Implementation of VBMS Is Ongoing; Activities Can Benefit from Increased Management Attention
Our September 2015 report noted that, since completing rollout of the initial version of VBMS at all regional offices in June 2013, VBA has continued developing and implementing additional system functionality and enhancements that support the electronic processing of disability compensation claims. As a result, 95 percent of records related to veterans’ disability claims are electronic and reside in the system. However, while the Under Secretary for Benefits stated in March 2013 that the development of the system was expected to be completed in 2015, implementation of functionality to fully support electronic claims processing was delayed until beyond 2015. VBA’s progress toward developing and implementing appeals processing capabilities in VBMS also has been limited. In the Director’s view, the fact that VBMS requires additional development beyond 2015 does not reflect a delay in completing the system’s development. Nevertheless, due to the department’s incremental approach to developing and implementing VBMS, VBA has not yet produced a plan that identifies when VBMS will be completed and can be expected to fully support disability and pension claims processing and appeals. Thus, it will be difficult for the department to hold its managers accountable for meeting the time frame and for demonstrating progress. Further, without a reliable estimate of the total costs associated with completing work on VBMS, stakeholders will have a limited view of VBMS’s future resource needs and the program is at risk of not being able to secure appropriate funding to fully develop and implement the system. VBA Has Made Progress toward Improving VBMS Operation, but Does Not Have Key System Performance Goals
Our and other federal IT guidance recognize the importance of defining program goals and related performance targets, and using such targets to assess progress in achieving the goals. Performance targets and goals for VBMS response times would provide users with an expectation of the system response times they should anticipate, and management with an indication of how well the system is performing relative to performance goals. Continuing to deploy system releases with defects that impact system functionality increases the risk that these defects will diminish users’ ability to process disability claims in an efficient manner. Accordingly, we recommended that VA reduce the incidence of high and medium severity level defects that are present at the time of future VBMS releases. The department agreed with this recommendation. Nevertheless, while VA has taken these various steps to obtain feedback on the performance and implementation of VBMS, it has not established goals to define user satisfaction that can be used as a basis for gauging the success of its efforts to promote satisfaction with the system. In addition, VBA has not employed a customer satisfaction survey of claims processing employees who use the system on a daily basis to process disability claims. Such a survey could provide a more comprehensive picture of overall customer satisfaction and help identify areas where the system’s development and implementation efforts might need additional attention. Most Types of Users Reported Satisfaction with VBMS, but Decision Review Officers Were Generally Dissatisfied
In response to a statistical survey that we administered, most of the VBMS users reported that they were satisfied with the system that had been implemented at the time of the survey. The department concurred with this recommendation. Further, in the absence of a plan that identifies when and at what cost the system can be expected to fully support disability compensation and pension claims processing and appeals, holding VA management accountable for meeting a schedule, while ensuring sufficient program funding, will be difficult. Also, without goals for system response times, users do not have an expectation of the response times they can anticipate, and management lacks an indication of how well the system is performing. Lastly, although the results of our survey provide VBA with useful data about users’ satisfaction with VBMS (e.g., the majority of users are satisfied), without having goals to define user satisfaction, VBA does not have a basis for gauging the success of its efforts to improve the system. As we stressed in our report, attention to these issues can improve VA’s efforts to effectively complete the development and implementation of VBMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
VBA pays disability benefits for conditions incurred or aggravated while in military service, and pension benefits for low-income veterans who are either elderly or have disabilities unrelated to military service. In fiscal year 2014, the department paid about $58 billion in disability compensation and about $5 billion in pension claims.
The disability claims process has been the subject of attention by Congress and others, due in part to long waits for processing claims and a large backlog of claims. To process disability and pension claims more efficiently, VA began development and implementation of an electronic, paperless system—VBMS—in 2009.
This statement summarizes GAO's September 2015 report ( GAO-15-582 ) on (1) VA's progress toward completing the development and implementation of VBMS and (2) the extent to which users report satisfaction with the system.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in September 2015, the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made progress in developing and implementing the Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS), with deployment of the initial version of the system to all of its regional offices as of June 2013. Since then, VBA has continued developing and implementing additional system functionality and enhancements that support the electronic processing of disability compensation claims. As a result, 95 percent of records related to veterans' disability claims are electronic and reside in the system. However, VBMS is not yet able to fully support disability and pension claims, as well as appeals processing. Nevertheless, while the Under Secretary for Benefits stated in March 2013 that the development of VBMS was expected to be completed in 2015, implementation of functionality to fully support electronic claims processing has been delayed beyond 2015. In addition, VBA has not yet produced a plan that identifies when the system will be completed. Accordingly, holding VA management accountable for meeting a time frame and for demonstrating progress will be difficult.
As VA continues its efforts to complete development and implementation of VBMS, three areas could benefit from increased management attention.
Cost estimating: The program office does not have a reliable estimate of the cost for completing the system. Without such an estimate, VA management and the department's stakeholders have a limited view of the system's future resource needs, and the program risks not having sufficient funding to complete development and implementation of the system.
System availability: Although VBA has improved its performance regarding system availability to users, it has not established system response time goals. Without such goals, users do not have an expectation of the system response times they can anticipate and management does not have an indication of how well the system is performing relative to performance goals.
System defects : While the program has actively managed system defects, a recent system release included unresolved defects that impacted system performance and users' experiences. Continuing to deploy releases with large numbers of defects that reduce system functionality could adversely affect users' ability to process disability claims in an efficient manner.
VA has not conducted a customer satisfaction survey that would allow the department to compile data on how users view the system's performance, and ultimately, to develop goals for improving the system. GAO's survey of VBMS users found that a majority of them were satisfied with the system, but decision review officers were considerably less satisfied. Although the results of GAO's survey provide VBA with data about users' satisfaction with VBMS, the absence of user satisfaction goals limits the utility of survey results. Specifically, without having established goals to define user satisfaction, VBA does not have a basis for gauging the success of its efforts to promote satisfaction with the system, or for identifying areas where its efforts to complete development and implementation of the system might need attention.
What GAO Recommends
In its September 2015 report, GAO recommended that VA develop a plan with a time frame and a reliable cost estimate for completing VBMS, establish goals for system response time, minimize the incidence of high and medium severity system defects for future VBMS releases, assess user satisfaction, and establish satisfaction goals to promote improvement. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_PEMD-97-3 | gao_PEMD-97-3_0 | While many of DOD’s recent acquisition reform efforts were embodied in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, DOD has made other efforts to adapt to the post-Cold War period of smaller procurement budgets, shrinking defense industry, and increased international competitiveness. In your request, you asked for information on productivity and competition in the defense industrial base. In this report, we describe the trends in available data on productivity and competition and the related issues of trends in defense industry employment, the status of major defense contractors in the post-Cold War, and trends in defense budgets and outlays. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As stated previously, in this report we describe (1) overall trends in productivity, competition, and other financial indicators in the defense industry over time and (2) the relationship between these trends and indicators of defense spending over time. What are the trends in DOD’s total, procurement, and RDT&E budgets? Where the industrial output of these manufacturing industries is not purchased by DOD, it may be purchased by commercial companies, other U.S. government agencies, or international companies. This fourth one follows the peacetime defense buildup of the early 1980s. We found a statistical relationship between the available indicators of employment levels and procurement outlays for the period 1975-91 that was not large in size and is less than values considered moderate in size (r =.27 to .36, depending upon the indicator used). There is little consensus on how to measure competition. Within its current Defense Acquisition Reform vision, DOD has recently implemented several new acquisition reform programs intended to increase efficiency and value in weapons procurement and to reduce unnecessary costs. An assessment of the effect of recent acquisition reforms on DOD’s weapons procurement process and the broader defense industrial base would supplement the information presented here. DOD finds that most of the defense firms it has assessed have been profitable in the drawdown. Officials at the major defense contractors we visited, the defense industry experts we interviewed, and the annual reports from major defense contractors we reviewed indicate that, in order to survive and remain viable in the funding drawdown, the top companies have, among other things, been (1) attempting to gain market share and to be more competitive for future defense business through mergers and acquisitions; (2) reorganizing and restructuring internally, in ways that involve job losses and layoffs, and reconfiguring job duties; (3) reducing their supplier-subcontractor base; (4) engaging in team concepts or entering joint ventures in which several firms subcontract with one another; (5) expanding defense markets to broaden the international customer base and increase sales; or (6) selling the defense business segments that are not core business units or that do not represent niche markets, as well as exiting segments of the defense industry. For productivity, they included the value of production output in defense-concentrated industries from DOL’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These data provide an indication of the processes DOD uses (that is, competitive or noncompetitive) in awarding weapon procurement contracts to defense contractors. A number correlated with itself returns a correlation of 1. We statistically compared total employment in the defense-concentrated industrial sectors where data were available (aircraft, ammunition and ordnance, shipbuilding, electronics and communications equipment, and tank manufacturing) to an indicator of defense spending linked to those sectors (total amount of contract awards for major hard goods procurement) for the years data were available (1975-91). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed productivity and competition in the defense industrial base since the end of the Cold War, focusing on: (1) overall trends in productivity, competition, and other financial indicators in the defense industry over time, where possible; and (2) the relationship between these trends and indicators of defense spending over time, where possible.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the size and nature of the defense industrial base is critically shaped by the amount and emphasis of U.S. defense outlays; (2) with regard to trends in the actual expenditures in segments of the defense industrial base, after adjustments for inflation, recent spending on procurement and RDT&E contract awards is similar to spending just prior to the peacetime defense buildup of the early 1980s; (3) aside from outlays there are other differences in today's industrial base compared to past periods; (4) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Labor (DOL) data on productivity in defense-concentrated industries, and other studies on productivity, indicate that the value of output has increased over time while the quantity of output has decreased; (5) the business environment for defense industry has also changed over the years; (6) recent defense contractor mergers and acquisitions are seen as a trend that will perpetuate constraints on the number and nature of businesses that may be willing and able to compete for business with DOD; (7) these fewer contractors are operating in an environment where DOD tends to award more money on weapon procurement contracts using other than full and open competition; (8) little is known about how the ongoing reconfiguration of the defense industrial base will affect or be affected by these trends in DOD weapon procurement processes; (9) defense industry employment is another key factor affected by changes in the industrial base; (10) the loss of jobs related to the reduction in defense budgets is widely documented, although estimates and projections vary; (11) GAO found a correlation, or statistical relationship, between an indicator of employment in defense-concentrated industrial sectors and an indicator of procurement outlays in those sectors for the period 1975-91 that is not large and is less than values considered moderate in size; (12) market forces and expectations about future trends in DOD budgets have facilitated the restructuring of the defense industrial base; (13) DOD's industrial assessments indicate that companies have been profitable since the funding drawdown and that its needs can be met in the segments it has assessed; (14) as part of its current "Defense Acquisition Reform vision" and under the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, DOD has recently engaged and piloted several new acquisition reform programs intended to achieve greater efficiency and value in weapons procurement and to reduce unnecessary costs; and (15) although these efforts are aimed at addressing critical and relevant issues for the defense industrial base, it is too early to tell what their full effects will be. |
gao_GAO-04-697 | gao_GAO-04-697_0 | DOD Issued a Space Human Capital Strategy but Has No Implementation Plan
DOD’s space human capital strategy, which we believe is a significant first step, promotes the development and integration of the military services’ space cadres; however, DOD has not developed a plan to implement actions to achieve the strategy’s goals and objectives. An implementation plan for the strategy could include specific actions, responsibilities, time frames, and evaluation measures. DOD’s Space Human Capital Strategy Established Direction for the Future
In February 2004, DOD issued its space human capital strategy that established direction for the future and included overall goals for developing and integrating space personnel. Extent of Services’ Initiatives to Develop Space Cadres Varies
The military services vary in the extent to which they have identified and implemented initiatives to develop and manage their space cadres. The Air Force and the Marine Corps have completed space human capital strategies and established organizational focal points with responsibility for managing their space cadres, but the Army and the Navy have not completed these important first steps. The services are executing some other actions to develop and manage their space cadres, and the actions have been implemented to varying extents. Even though the services have completed some of these initiatives, many are not complete and will require years to fully implement. Air Force Has Taken Actions in Developing Its Space Cadre
The Air Force approved its space cadre strategy in July 2003, and it is implementing the initiatives it has identified to meet the strategy’s goals. The Marine Corps’ strategy specifies 10 objectives for developing and maintaining space professionals: establish an identifiable cadre of space-qualified enlisted and civilian create and staff additional space personnel positions in the operating create and staff additional space positions at national security space organizations; improve space operations professional military education for all Marine Corps officers; focus the graduate education of Marine Corps space operations students to support Marine Corps needs; leverage interservice space training to ensure the development and proficiency of the space cadre; develop a management process through which interested officers can be assigned to multiple space-related positions during their careers and still compete for promotion with their peers; develop a process and structure for space professionals in the Marine Corps reserves through which they can support operations, training, and exercises through augmentation and mobilization; fully participate in the DOD Executive Agent for Space’s efforts to create a space cadre; and incorporate appropriate space professional certification processes into the management of the Marine Corps’ space cadre. Army Has Taken Some Actions to Develop Its Space Cadre, but It Does Not Have a Strategy or Focal Point
The Army has taken some actions to develop its space cadre, but it does not have clear goals and objectives for the future because it has not developed a space cadre strategy or identified a focal point to manage its space cadre. Without such an implementation plan, developed jointly by the DOD Executive Agent for Space and the military services, DOD will not be in a sound position to effectively monitor and evaluate implementation of the strategy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space human capital strategy and management approach to implementing the strategy promote the development and integration of the military services’ space cadres, we reviewed and analyzed the strategy and compared it to other human capital strategies, the human capital models in our prior reports, and the management principles contained in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space for many critical capabilities, and its continued success in space operations depends on having sufficient space-qualified personnel. Space-qualified personnel are needed to develop technology, doctrine, and concepts and operate complex systems. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress required DOD to develop a strategy for developing and integrating national security space personnel. DOD completed it in February 2004. Congress also required GAO to assess DOD's space human capital strategy and the military services' efforts to develop their space personnel. In the first of two required reports, GAO assessed (1) whether DOD's space human capital strategy and management approach promote development and integration of the services' space personnel and (2) the extent of the services' initiatives to develop and manage their space personnel.
What GAO Found
DOD's space human capital strategy is a significant first step that promotes the development and integration of DOD's space personnel by providing strategic goals and objectives; however, DOD does not have a complete results-oriented management approach to implement the strategy because it does not include an implementation plan that details specific actions, time frames, and evaluation measures. The space human capital strategy provides general direction for developing and integrating DOD space personnel, and it identified key actions needed for implementation. DOD has not completed any of these actions. Without an implementation plan, DOD will not be in a sound position to effectively monitor and evaluate implementation of the strategy and achieve the strategy's purpose of integrating the services' space personnel into a cohesive DOD total force. The military services vary in the extent to which they have identified and implemented initiatives to develop and manage their space personnel. The Air Force and the Marine Corps have taken significant actions in developing and managing their space personnel, including developing space human capital strategies and designating organizational focal points. The Air Force, which has the largest number of space personnel, approved its space human capital strategy in July 2003, and it is implementing its initiatives. The other services are working on similar initiatives and have completed some, but many will take years to fully implement. The Army's and the Navy's actions in developing their space personnel have been limited because they do not have clear goals and objectives for developing their space personnel or organizational focal points to manage them. Without these tools, the Army and the Navy may not be able to determine their requirements for space personnel and develop sufficient numbers of space personnel with the necessary training, education, and experience to meet service and joint needs. |
gao_GAO-06-518 | gao_GAO-06-518_0 | With total damage estimated at $14.2 billion, Ivan became the fourth costliest hurricane in U.S. history through 2005. It was responsible for 13 U.S. deaths, according to the Red Cross, and 28 U.S. deaths, according to NOAA/NCDC. Known questioned costs are those specifically identified by the auditor. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our audit were to determine whether (1) FEMA and the Red Cross established criteria for allowable reimbursable expenses related to hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne; (2) Red Cross reimbursements did not duplicate funding paid by other federal programs; (3) Red Cross reimbursable claims were paid only for services in states and territories declared eligible for disaster relief; and (4) Red Cross reimbursable claims were paid only for allowable categories of services and support and were supported by adequate documentation. The purpose of these meetings was to refine the criteria to be consistent with FEMA and Red Cross policies and procedures for disaster relief and Public Law 108-324. Criteria Were Established for Reimbursement
We found that FEMA and the Red Cross had properly established criteria for Red Cross reimbursement requests through a May 2005 agreement that identified allowable categories for disaster relief, recovery, and emergency services associated with hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Controls Avoided Duplication of Expenses Reimbursed by Other Federal Funds
Consistent with the law, the May 2005 FEMA/Red Cross agreement provided that the Red Cross would not seek reimbursement for any expenses reimbursed by other federal funding sources. We identified about $0.3 million of FEMA paid transient accommodations and deployment costs that were properly deducted by the Red Cross from its reimbursement requests, so as not to duplicate funding by other federal sources. The Red Cross also deducted from the reimbursements $60.2 million of private donations designated for disaster relief related to the four hurricanes. Expenses Were Incurred in Eligible States and Territories
The Red Cross reported $88.6 million of incurred expenses in states and territories eligible for disaster relief under the four hurricanes in accordance with the FEMA/Red Cross agreement. From August 11, 2004, through June 30, 2005, the Red Cross reported incurred expenses of $88.6 million in connection with hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Incurred Expenses Were Generally for Eligible Services and Were Adequately Supported
The Red Cross’s requested reimbursements of $28.1 million related to the four 2004 hurricanes were included in a schedule of $50.0 million of federal funds from other programs operated by the Red Cross for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005. We concur with that determination. However, KPMG identified six weaknesses in the Red Cross’s internal controls related to the reimbursement for the four 2004 hurricanes that it considered to be reportable conditions. We found that we could rely upon the KPMG audit work. The Red Cross subsequently reduced its final request to FEMA for the 2004 hurricane reimbursement to $28.1 million after adjusting for the amount of the bank reporting error. | Why GAO Did This Study
In accordance with Public Law 108-324, GAO is required to audit the reimbursement of up to $70 million of appropriated funds to the American Red Cross (Red Cross) for disaster relief associated with 2004 hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. The audit was performed to determine if (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established criteria and defined allowable expenditures to ensure that reimbursement claims paid to the Red Cross met the purposes of the law, (2) reimbursement funds paid to the Red Cross did not duplicate funding by other federal sources, (3) reimbursed funds assisted only eligible states and territories for disaster relief, and (4) reimbursement claims were supported by adequate documentation. The 2004 hurricane season was one of the most destructive in U.S. history. Fifteen named storms resulted in 21 federal disaster declarations. Four hurricanes affecting 19 states and 2 U.S. territories from August 13 through September 26, 2004, triggered the nation's biggest natural-disaster response up to that time. Over 150 deaths and $45 billion of estimated property damage are attributed to hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne in the United States alone. Through 2005, these four storms rank among the seven costliest in U.S. history.
What GAO Found
The signed agreement between FEMA and the Red Cross properly established criteria for the Red Cross to be reimbursed for allowable expenses for disaster relief, recovery, and emergency services related to hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. The Red Cross incurred $88.6 million of allowable expenses. Consistent with the law, the agreement explicitly provided that the Red Cross would not seek reimbursement for any expenses reimbursed by other federal funding sources. GAO identified $0.3 million of FEMA paid costs that the Red Cross properly deducted from its reimbursement requests, so as not to duplicate funding by other federal sources. The Red Cross also reduced its requested reimbursements by $60.2 million to reflect private donations for disaster relief for the four hurricanes, for a net reimbursement of 28.1 million. Red Cross expenses were incurred in states and territories eligible for disaster relief associated with the four hurricanes in accordance with the FEMA/Red Cross agreement. The Red Cross requested reimbursement of $28.1 million for the period August 11, 2004, through June 30, 2005, for payment from federal appropriated funds under Public Law 108-324. After review and some retesting, GAO relied upon audit work conducted by the CPA firm of KPMG, LLP, which determined that most Red Cross expenses were incurred for eligible disaster services and were supported by adequate documentation. However, KPMG identified six weaknesses in the Red Cross's internal controls related to expenses incurred for the four hurricanes and reported $712,000 of known questioned costs, with which Red Cross concurred. The Red Cross also concurred with the content of the GAO report. |
gao_GAO-08-717T | gao_GAO-08-717T_0 | Tax Preferences Differ from Title IV Assistance in Timing, Distribution, and Students’ and Families’ Responsibility for Obtaining Benefits
Postsecondary student financial assistance provided through programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act and the tax code differ in timing of assistance, the populations that receive assistance, and the responsibility of students and families to obtain and use the assistance. Students and Families Have More Responsibility for Obtaining Benefits of Tax Preferences in Comparison to Title IV Aid
The federal government and postsecondary institutions have significant responsibilities in assisting students and families in obtaining assistance provided under Title IV programs but only minor roles with respect to tax filers’ use of education-related tax preferences. Unlike Title IV programs, users must understand the rules, identify applicable tax preferences, understand how these tax preferences interact with one another and with federal student aid, keep records sufficient to support their tax filing, and correctly claim the credit or deduction on their return. Some Tax Filers May Not Effectively Use Postsecondary Tax Preferences, Possibly Due to Complexity
According to our analysis of 2005 IRS data on the use of Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits and the tuition deduction, some tax filers appear to make less-than-optimal choices among them. Regarding those making a poor choice among the provisions, for example, 27 percent of tax filers that claimed the tuition deduction could have further reduced their tax liability by an average of $220 by instead claiming the Lifetime Learning Credit; 10 percent of this group could have reduced their tax liabilities by over $630. Nonetheless, anti-double-dipping rules are potentially difficult for tax filers to understand and apply, and misunderstanding them may have consequences for a filer’s tax liability. In this case, reducing the number of choices students and their families have to make would likely reduce tax filers’ confusion and mistakes. To date, we have not undertaken any studies of how current Title IV student aid programs or tax preferences could be simplified and, as a result, have not developed any such models or proposals. Research on Effectiveness of Federal Postsecondary Assistance Is Incomplete
Little is known about the effectiveness of federal grant and loan programs and education-related tax preferences in promoting attendance, choice, and the likelihood that students either earn a degree or continue their education (referred to as persistence). Appendix I: Postsecondary Aid Programs
The federal government helps students and families save, pay for, and repay the costs of postsecondary education through grant and loan programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, and through tax preferences—reductions in federal tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions in the tax code, such as exemptions and exclusions from taxation, deductions, credits, deferrals, and preferential tax rates. The federal tax code now contains a range of tax preferences that may be used to assist students and families in saving for, paying, or repaying the costs of postsecondary education. Our review of tax preferences did not include exclusions from income, which permit certain types of education-related income to be excluded from the calculation of adjusted gross income on which taxes are based. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal assistance helps students and families pay for postsecondary education through several policy tools--grant and loan programs authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and more recently enacted tax preferences. This testimony summarizes our 2005 report and provides updates on (1) how Title IV assistance compares to that provided through the tax code (2) the extent to which tax filers effectively use education tax preferences, (3) potential benefits and costs of simplifying federal student aid, and (4) what is known about the effectiveness of federal assistance. This hearing is an opportunity to consider whether changes should be made in the government's overall strategy for providing such assistance or to the individual programs and tax provisions that provide the assistance. This statement is based on updates to previously published GAO work and reviews of relevant literature.
What GAO Found
Title IV student aid and tax preferences provide assistance to a wide range of students and families in different ways. While both help students meet current expenses, tax preferences also assist students and families with saving for and repaying postsecondary costs. Both serve students and families with a range of incomes, but some forms of Title IV aid--grant aid, in particular--provide assistance to those whose incomes are lower, on average, than is the case with tax preferences. Tax preferences require more responsibility on the part of students and families than Title IV aid because taxpayers must identify applicable tax preferences, understand complex rules concerning their use, and correctly calculate and claim credits or deductions. While the tax preferences are a newer policy tool, the number of tax filers using them has grown quickly, surpassing the number of students aided under Title IV in 2002. Some tax filers do not appear to make optimal education-related tax decisions. For example, our analysis of a limited number of 2005 tax returns indicated that 41 percent of eligible tax filers did not claim either the tuition deduction or a tax credit. In so doing, these tax filers failed to reduce their tax liability by $219, on average, and 10 percent of these filers could have reduced their tax liability by over $500. One explanation for these taxpayers' choices may be the complexity of postsecondary tax provisions, which experts have commonly identified as difficult for tax filers to use. Simplifying the grants, loans, and tax preferences may reduce complexities in higher education financing, including reducing the number of eligible tax filers that do not claim tax preferences, but more research would be necessary to understand the full benefits and costs of any such changes. Little is known about the effectiveness of Title IV aid or tax preferences in promoting, for example, postsecondary attendance or school choice, in part because of research data and methodological challenges. As a result, policymakers do not have information that would allow them to make the most efficient use of limited federal resources to help students and families. |
gao_GAO-01-1007T | gao_GAO-01-1007T_0 | To address the federal government’s human capital challenges as a whole, we believe a three-stage approach is appropriate. First, agencies must take all administrative steps available to them under current laws and regulations to manage their people for results. Second, the Administration and the Congress should pursue selected legislative opportunities to put new tools and flexibilities in place that will help agencies attract, retain, and motivate employees—both overall and, especially, in connection with critical occupations such as those in IT. Third, all interested parties should work together to determine the nature and extent of more comprehensive human capital (or civil service) reforms that should be enacted over time. These reforms should include greater emphasis on skills, knowledge, and performance in connection with federal employment and compensation decisions, rather than the passage of time and rate of inflation, as is often the case today. GAO Has Taken Steps To Meet Human Capital Challenges, Including Those In The It Area
At GAO, we have faced human capital challenges similar to those facing the federal government in general and the IT area specifically. In this regard, we believe it is worth exploring selective legislative proposals to enhance the federal government’s ability to attract, retain, and motivate skilled employees, particularly in connection with critical occupations, on a governmentwide basis. As I noted earlier, we are concerned that federal agencies’ human capital problems are eroding the ability of many agencies—and threatening the ability of others—to perform their missions economically, efficiently, and effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the federal government's strategic human capital management challenges, particularly in the information technology (IT) area.
What GAO Found
No management issue facing federal agencies could be more critical to the nation than their approach to attracting, retaining, and motivating people. Having enough people with the right mix of knowledge and skills will make the difference between success and failure. This is especially true in the information technology area, where widespread shortfalls in human capital have undermined agency and program performance. The federal government today faces pervasive human capital challenges that are eroding the ability of many agencies--and threatening the ability of others--to economically, efficiently, and effectively carry out their missions. How successfully the federal government acquires and uses information technology will depend on its ability to build, prepare, and manage its information technology workforce. To address the federal government's human capital challenges as a whole, GAO believes that (1) agencies must take all administrative steps available to them under current laws and regulations to manage their people for results; (2) the Administration and Congress should pursue opportunities to put new tools and flexibilities in place that will help agencies attract, retain, and motivate employees--both overall, and especially, in connection with critical occupations such as those in IT, and; (3) all interested parties should work together to determine the nature and extent of more comprehensive human capital (or civil service) reforms that should be enacted over time. These reforms should include greater emphasis on skills, knowledge, and performance in connection with federal employment and compensation decisions, rather than the passage of time and rate of inflation, as is often the case today. |
gao_GAO-14-515 | gao_GAO-14-515_0 | The most recent wave of consolidation has raised new questions about the state of competition in the industry. Airline Industry
The U.S. Our analysis of the latest available financial data reported by airlines to DOT showed that the industry generated operating profits of approximately $21.7 billion from 2007 through 2012. This recovery follows operating losses of $5.6 billion for the U.S. passenger airline industry as a whole in 2008, due largely to the economic recession and volatility in the price of fuel. U.S. airlines as a whole have increased their cash reserves from approximately $8 billion in 2007 to approximately $13 billion in 2012. This growth has been aided by three factors: (1) an increase in passenger traffic; (2) capacity restraint (i.e., limiting the supply of available seats in relation to the level of demand), which has contributed to a rise in airfares; and (3) increased revenues from ancillary fees. 3). In 2012, the U.S. airline industry generated approximately $6 billion in checked baggage and reservation change fees, up from approximately $1.4 billion in 2007. Despite Industry Consolidation, the Average Number of Competitors Has Not Substantially Changed in the Markets Traveled by the Majority of Passengers
Since 2007, there has been little change in the average number of competitors in the most heavily traveled domestic markets. The latter results may have occurred in part due to growth in network size and new connections created since the mergers. In addition, we found that since 2007, low-cost airlines have expanded into the largest passenger markets, adding new competitors in some markets where mergers may have reduced competition. Examples include New York to Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. to Boston. For example, during this period, the average number of effective competitors each year ranged from 4.3 to 4.5 in the markets represented in the first quintile (see fig. Additional changes to the structure of the market may occur after the three recent airline mergers are fully implemented and conditions for approving the fourth and most recent merger are fully met, as well as due to other economic circumstances. For example, Southwest Airlines increased its dominant position at Chicago Midway International Airport from 74 percent of passenger traffic to 85 percent from 2007 through 2012. Consumers Have Experienced a Rise in Fares, Additional Fees, and Fewer Flights in Certain Markets, but Benefit from New Services and Expanded Networks
Domestic Fares Have Recently Risen
As the economy has been slowly recovering from the recent recession, demand for air travel has also been recovering. We found that consumers paid approximately 4 percent more in real terms, on average, for air travel in 2012 than they did in 2007. Fares have continued to rise since 2012. larger airports in larger cities). The study concluded that airlines have been consolidating service at the nation’s largest airports, while cutting back on service to medium- and small-hub airports. Passengers may benefit from these new planes because they are quieter and offer enhanced entertainment options and other in-flight amenities. However, according to both consumer advocacy organizations we spoke with, as network and low-cost airlines compete more on service, attempt to differentiate their brands, and take steps to increase consumer loyalty, an adverse effect is that consumers have less ability to comparison shop and airlines compete less on price. Most Stakeholders Cited Barriers to Entry as a Challenge
A majority of the stakeholders we interviewed cited barriers to entry as a key challenge to competition in the domestic passenger airline industry. As entry, or the threat thereof, may have a disciplining effect on incumbent firms’ behavior, barriers that make entry more difficult can hamper competition and enable incumbent firms to charge higher prices without fear that doing so will attract new competitors. Stakeholders Offered a Limited Range of Potential Federal Actions to Address Challenges, and Differed on Priorities
Stakeholders offered contrasting perspectives regarding the role of the federal government in addressing the competition challenges they identified. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and DOT for review and comment. Both DOJ and DOT provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how the financial health of the U.S. airline industry has changed since 2007; (2) changes to the structure of the market since 2007; (3) how consumers have been affected by changes in the financial health and market structure of the U.S. airline industry; and (4) what stakeholders believe are the key challenges to airline competition and actions the federal government could take to address these challenges. City-pair markets are typically viewed as the basic, relevant market for airline travel in the U.S.
For each version of the data, we calculated (1) the proportion of total passengers carried by each airline in the market; (2) the weighted and un- weighted average number of effective competitors (defined as having at least 5 percent of total passenger traffic in the market); and (3) the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a measure of the level of concentration in a market and provides an indication of changes in the level of competition. We identified and selected these stakeholders based on prior GAO work, a review of relevant academic literature, and expertise in their field. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, there have been four major airline mergers. As a result of this consolidation, about 85 percent of passengers in the U.S. flew on four domestic airlines in 2013. Certain industry observers have raised concerns that consolidation could have adverse effects on airline competition, such as higher airfares and reduced service. Others argue that consumers stand to benefit from recent changes in the industry as profitable airlines reinvest in new planes and expand their networks.
To assist Congress in overseeing changes in the airline industry, GAO was asked to examine the state of competition in the domestic passenger airline industry. This report addresses (1) changes to the financial health of the U.S. airline industry since 2007; (2) changes to the structure of the market since 2007; (3) how consumers have been affected by these changes; and (4) views of stakeholders on the key challenges to airline competition and actions the federal government could take to address these challenges.
GAO analyzed airline financial data reported to DOT, as well as DOT passenger itinerary data from 2007 through 2012, the latest year available. GAO interviewed DOT and DOJ officials and 26 stakeholders, selected based on prior work and their expertise in the field, from organizations in sectors such as academia, airlines, consumer advocacy, and finance. Their views are not generalizable, but provide perspectives on a range of competition issues. Both DOJ and DOT provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The U.S. passenger airline industry has returned to profitability following the recent economic recession. From 2007 through 2012, the industry generated approximately $21.7 billion in operating profits despite losing about $5.6 billion in 2008. U.S. airlines maintained approximately $13 billion in cash reserves in 2012. Growth in revenue has driven industry profits, aided by increased passenger traffic, “capacity restraint,” (i.e., limiting the supply of available seats in relation to the level of demand), and revenue from ancillary fees for checking bags and other services. For example, baggage and reservation change fees collected by U.S. airlines increased from about $1.4 billion in 2007 to $6 billion in 2012. Additionally, unlike prior recoveries when airline capacity growth undermined the ability to charge profitable fares, airlines since 2009 have restrained capacity growth even though demand for air travel has risen with the economic recovery.
In recent years, the average number of competitors has not substantially changed in markets traveled by the majority of passengers, despite several major airline mergers. From 2007 through 2012, the average number of effective competitors (defined as airlines with more than a 5 percent market share) ranged from 4.3 to 4.5 in the markets with the most passengers. During this period, the average number of effective competitors in markets with the fewest passengers decreased slightly from 3.3 to 3 airlines. While these results reflect market changes that have occurred since several airlines merged, the American-US Airways merger occurred after GAO's analysis. The mergers created larger networks and new connections in some markets. Also, low-cost airlines have expanded since 2007, thereby adding new competitors into some larger markets. The structure of the market will continue to evolve as economic conditions change and the recent airline mergers are fully implemented.
In recent years, consumers have experienced higher airfares, additional fees, and fewer flights in certain markets, but also new services and expanded networks. Consumers paid about 4 percent more in real terms, on average, for air travel in 2012 than in 2007, without considering additional fees. The airline industry has reduced flights, especially to smaller airports, and consolidated service at large airports. Airlines have also invested in new aircraft and introduced new services, such as early boarding and entertainment options, in an attempt to differentiate products and increase revenue.
Most airline stakeholders cited barriers to market entry, especially restrictions on takeoff and landing slots at four U.S. airports—Washington, D.C.'s Reagan National and three New York City area airports—as a major challenge to airline competition. Barriers that make airline entry more difficult can hamper competition and enable incumbent firms to charge and maintain higher prices. In addition, access to capital and the size advantages of major airlines present a formidable challenge for any new airline. Stakeholders suggested addressing challenges to competition by increasing capacity at congested airports, enhancing fare transparency, and allowing states a greater role in consumer regulation of airlines. However, stakeholders differed regarding the role of the federal government in addressing competition challenges, in part because changes to the airline industry due to consolidation are ongoing. |
gao_GAO-13-292 | gao_GAO-13-292_0 | NSF spends most of its annual budget of about $7 billion to fund grants to universities and other research entities, but the agency also spent more than $446 million in fiscal year 2011 acquiring goods and services in support of its mission. NSF officials must decide on a contract pricing arrangement for every contract or order. Acquisition Planning Practices Conducted to Varying Degrees, but NSF Lacks Guidance on Time Needed for Early Planning Activities
The NSF contract files we reviewed reflected the use of selected key acquisition planning practices to varying degrees, but the agency has not provided guidance on the time needed to complete early planning phase activities. Allowing sufficient time to plan procurements may facilitate an increased use of lower risk contracting vehicles by providing time for the contracting officer to consider including more fixed-priced elements. For example, NSF had to extend one streamlined order in our review on a non-competitive basis for more than a year and a half in order to complete planning tasks for the follow-on order. In another case, the delayed award of one of the orders in our review caused a compressed period for data collection for a report with firm deadlines. The schedule risk from these delays could lead to higher overall costs. NSF Generally Followed Key Practices in the Award Phase
Contract documentation for negotiated and streamlined acquisitions showed that NSF generally followed key practices in the award phase. Contract file documentation indicates that NSF has improved in this area, with most of the negotiated contracts we reviewed having documentation of more recent accounting system and CAS disclosure statement reviews, and the most recent contract having documentation of pre-award audits of all contractors in the competitive range. Further, NSF-OIG’s fiscal year 2009 financial statement audits recommended that NSF obtain incurred cost submissions and audits for its largest cost-reimbursable contracts, depending on materiality and risk, to assure the validity of costs billed to NSF. Around the same time, in August 2009, NSF-OIG and the NSF Office of the Director signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides procedures to ensure appropriate coordination between the NSF-OIG and NSF for the performance and funding of contract audits. The NSF Director and NSF-OIG identified the need for incurred costs audits of an ocean drilling contract in our sample. Despite the MOU, the agency has not made arrangements for these audits of the contract. According to officials, an audit of a prime subcontractor for this contract resulted in $1.5 million in recovered funds. But at the time of our review, despite agreement on the importance of additional audits, the findings from the prior year’s audits, and NSF’s continued relationship with the contractor, the agency had yet to make arrangements to plan and fund incurred cost audits for more recent fiscal years for this contract, according to officials. Consistent with the terms of the existing MOU with the Office of the Inspector General, take steps to arrange, and fund as necessary, timely audits of major contracts. In written comments, NSF agreed with our recommendations. We are sending a copy of this report to the Director of the National Science Foundation. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which the NSF incorporates key contracting practices in the three major phases of the contracting process: (a) acquisition planning, (b) contract award, and (c) post-award contract monitoring. We also reviewed internal NSF guidance and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) for additional key practices. To determine the extent to which NSF’s contracting practices incorporate key practices and address prior NSF-OIG recommendations, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 11 contracts and orders with funding obligations over $3 million in fiscal year 2011, the latest year for which data were available when we began our work. Although the 11 contracts were active during the time of our review , some of the selected contracts were awarded more than 7 years ago—before NSF updated its contracting manual to provide more procedural guidance— and some more recently. We reviewed the files for the selected contracts and used practices identified in the FAR, NSF internal guidance, and prior GAO reports to assess NSF’s use of key practices and procedures for the acquisition planning, award, and contract monitoring phases. To assess progress NSF made in response to prior NSF-OIG findings, we reviewed prior NSF-OIG recommendations and corrective action plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The NSF spends more than $400 million of its $7 billion annual budget acquiring goods and services in support of its mission to promote science and engineering. Much of this spending involves exploration activities in remote locations throughout the world, such as the Arctic and Antarctic. GAO examined the extent to which NSF uses key contracting practices in three phases of the acquisition process: (a) acquisition planning, (b) contract award, and (c) post-award contract monitoring. GAO selected and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 11 contracts or orders with at least $3 million in funding obligations for fiscal year 2011, which accounted for about 70 percent of NSF's total contract obligations for that year. Although all 11 contracts and orders received funding during fiscal year 2011, some were awarded more than 7 years ago. Some were awarded more recently. We reviewed each of the 11 contracts to determine the extent to which they reflected the use of key contracting practices based on the Federal Acquisition Regulation, our prior work, and NSF-OIG findings. GAO also reviewed NSF contracting policies and met with NSF contracting and program officials.
What GAO Found
For the contracts GAO reviewed, the National Science Foundation (NSF) generally used key contracting practices in each of the three phases of the acquisition process, but the agency needs additional guidance on early acquisition planning as well as arrangements for contract audits.
The contracts GAO reviewed all involved some degree of acquisition planning, but NSF's guidance does not address appropriate time frames for early planning activities. Without such guidance, NSF contract and program officials said they could not convince their colleagues of the need to initiate early planning activities. Delays in these activities can lead to further delays later. For example, NSF had to extend one order on a non-competitive basis for more than a year to complete planning tasks for the follow-on order. In another case, the delayed award of an order compressed the data collection period for a report with firm deadlines, which could lead to higher overall costs. Further, having sufficient time for early planning may facilitate an increased use of lower risk contracting approaches.
Contract documentation showed that NSF generally followed key practices in the award phase. An NSF corrective action plan, in response to NSF's Office of Inspector General's (NSF-OIG) 2009 financial statement audits, clarifies the agency's procedures for reviewing contractors' accounting practices and financial disclosure statements to better align with key practices. Contract file documentation shows NSF improved in this area, with most of the negotiated contracts having documentation of accounting system reviews. Further, NSF generally documents price reasonableness determinations.
NSF updated its guidance and took steps to incorporate key contract monitoring practices. NSF-OIG's 2009 financial statement audits recommended that NSF obtain incurred cost submissions and audits for its largest cost-reimbursable contracts to ensure the validity of costs billed to NSF. Around the same time, the NSF-OIG and the NSF Office of the Director signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a process for arranging for contract audits. Audits for one of the ocean drilling contracts completed in 2012 resulted in $1.5 million in recovered funds. The NSF Director and NSF-OIG have both identified additional audits of this contract as a top priority. However, despite the terms of the MOU, and the agreement between NSF and the NSF-OIG on the need for further audits, arrangements have not been made to conduct additional audits of this contract for more recent fiscal years, according to officials. Similarly, despite requests from the contracting officer, NSF has not made arrangements for incurred cost audits for another large contract GAO reviewed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of NSF (1) supplement existing guidance on acquisition planning to address the time needed for the early stages of the process, and (2) arrange for audits to be performed on major contracts, consistent with the terms of the memorandum of understanding with NSF-OIG. NSF agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-186 | gao_GAO-16-186_0 | Background
As Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Vietnam are in a region of growing economic power. Indonesia is the world’s fourth-largest country by population. In 2008, the two countries agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership that enhanced cooperation in multiple areas, such as trade and investment. U.S. and Chinese Trade and Investment, Competition, and Actions to Further Economic Engagement in Indonesia
China Has Surpassed the United States in Trade in Goods with Indonesia, but U.S. Investment Has Exceeded Chinese Investment
The value of China’s total trade in goods with Indonesia surpassed the United States’ in 2005 and was more than double the United States’ in 2014, when Chinese imports and exports both exceeded U.S. imports and exports. Given these limitations, available data show that U.S. FDI flows to Indonesia in 2007 through 2012 totaled about $10.2 billion, exceeding China’s reported FDI flows of about $2.7 billion. 4). United States and China Compete Most Often with Other Countries in Goods Exports and Win Government Contracts in Different Sectors
Data on U.S. and Chinese goods exports to Indonesia indicate that from 2006 through 2014, U.S. exports of goods to Indonesia were more similar to Japanese and EU exports than to Chinese exports, suggesting that the United States is more likely to compete directly with Japan and EU countries than with China. According to a State official, Indonesia’s economic growth is not likely to increase without significant investment in infrastructure. In contrast, China and Indonesia are both parties to ongoing negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), which negotiating parties have said they hope to complete in 2015. Agencies Have Provided Less Financing for Investment Projects in Indonesia Than Chinese Agencies
Our analysis of U.S. agency data showed that in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provided about $2.5 billion in financing to support U.S. exports to, and investment in, Indonesia (see table 2). U.S. and Chinese Trade and Investment, Competition, and Actions to Further Economic Engagement in Vietnam
China’s Total Trade in Goods with, and Investments in, Vietnam Have Exceeded the United States’
The value of China’s total trade in goods with Vietnam surpassed that of the United States in 2007 and was more than double the value of the United States’ total trade in goods with Vietnam in 2014. 6). Given these limitations, available data show that from 2007 through 2012, China’s reported FDI flows to Vietnam totaled approximately $1.2 billion, more than twice the U.S. FDI flows of approximately $500 million. United States and China Compete More Often with Other Countries in Goods Exports to Vietnam and Win Government Contracts in Different Sectors
Data on U.S. and Chinese goods exports to Vietnam indicate that since 2008, U.S. exports of goods to Vietnam have been more similar to Japanese and EU exports than to Chinese exports, suggesting that the United States is more likely to compete directly with Japan and EU countries than with China. United States and China Are Engaging Vietnam through Separate Regional Trade Agreement Negotiations
The United States and Vietnam are participants in the proposed TPP, while China and Vietnam are participants in the ongoing RCEP negotiations. China is not a party to the TPP negotiations. 10). This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that we are issuing concurrently. Because of the limited availability of data and the differing contexts for the data sets we report, the time period for each of these data sets varied. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and China have each sought to increase their economic engagement in Southeast Asia. U.S. agencies have identified Indonesia and Vietnam as important emerging U.S. partners that contribute to regional stability and prosperity. Indonesia has the world's 10th largest economy in terms of purchasing power, and Vietnam is one of the most dynamic economies in East Asia. Both the United States and China have established comprehensive partnerships with each country that are designed to enhance their bilateral cooperation in key areas.
GAO was asked to examine the United States' and China's economic engagement in Southeast Asia. GAO issued a report on 10 Southeast Asian countries in August 2015. In this report, GAO presents case studies for two of these countries, Indonesia and Vietnam, providing greater detail about the United States' and China's trade and investment, competition, and actions to further economic engagement in the two countries. GAO analyzed publicly available economic data and documentation from 10 U.S. agencies and the Chinese government. The data that GAO reports have varying time periods because of the data sets' limited availability and differing contexts. GAO interviewed U.S., Indonesian, and Vietnamese officials and private sector representatives.
This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that is being issued concurrently. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Indonesia. In 2014, China's imports from, and exports to, Indonesia exceeded the United States' (see figure). The United States and China compete more often with other countries than with each other in goods exported to Indonesia and win contracts in different sectors. In contrast to the United States, which is not involved in a free trade agreement (FTA) with Indonesia, China is a party to a regional FTA that includes Indonesia and is negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with Indonesia and 14 other countries. In fiscal years 2009 through 2014, U.S. agencies' financing for exports to, and investment in, Indonesia totaled about $2.5 billion, compared with at least $34 billion in Chinese financing, according to the Department of State. In 2007 through 2012, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) of $9.6 billion exceeded China's reported $2.7 billion, according to available data.
Vietnam. In 2014, U.S. imports from Vietnam exceeded China's, while Chinese exports to Vietnam exceeded U.S. exports (see figure). As in Indonesia, the United States and China compete more often with other countries than with each other in goods exported to Vietnam and win contracts in different sectors. The United States and Vietnam are both participants in the proposed regional Trans-Pacific Partnership, while China and Vietnam are both parties to a regional FTA and the RCEP negotiations. In fiscal years 2009 through 2014, U.S. agencies' financing for exports to, and investment in, Vietnam totaled about $205 million, compared with at least $4.5 billion in Chinese financing, according to the Department of State. In 2007 through 2012, China's reported FDI of $1.2 billion was more than twice the United States' reported FDI of $472 million, according to available data. |
gao_GAO-08-437 | gao_GAO-08-437_0 | Policies and Insurance Amounts Increased, Premiums Decreased, and Losses Fluctuated from 1997 through 2006 with Hurricane Activities
Overall, data relating to the number of NFIP policies and amount of insurance coverage indicated upward trends for the period we reviewed and most losses were paid for hurricane-related claims, primarily due to losses from the 2005 hurricane season. The number of policies in force increased 36 percent and the average amount of coverage increased 78 percent from 1997 through 2006, consistent with average rising home values. Over this period, total losses fluctuated from a low of $302 million in 2000 to a high of $2 billion in 2004 before reaching more than $17.7 billion in 2005. For 2005, as a result of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA paid out more than $17.7 billion in losses. From 1997 through 2006, 79 percent of the funds paid out in losses were for hurricane-related claims, but the percentages in individual years varied widely (correlating to hurricane activity). Funding for Mitigation Programs Has Increased, but FEMA Cannot Readily Track Real-time Property Acquisitions
Funding for NFIP mitigation programs that can be used to acquire properties that are at risk of repetitive flooding has increased from 1997 through 2006, but FEMA’s ability to track the effectiveness of these programs is limited because it does not track property acquisitions real time. However, FEMA headquarters cannot reliably account for the actual number of properties acquired because it does not collect data on individual acquisitions until a project closes, and no mixed mitigation projects have been reported as closed since 1999. According to FEMA officials, the data on property acquisitions are limited because they include only data for completed, or closed, projects. The lack of an explicit requirement for FEMA regional offices to record property acquisitions data in a consistent and timely manner hinders FEMA’s ability to account for the extent to which flood-damaged and repetitive loss properties have been acquired through its mitigation programs (thereby decreasing the inventory of these properties). While FEMA relies upon contractors to implement the NFIP, our review of FEMA’s monitoring documentation for the BSA contract showed that FEMA did not consistently follow its own monitoring procedures for preparing, maintaining, and reviewing monitoring reports, and was unable to provide copies of the majority of the monitoring reports we requested. Moreover, key FEMA offices that have responsibilities for addressing contractor deficiencies did not coordinate information and actions related to deficiencies identified for the BSA and DSA contractors. As a result, FEMA could not ensure adherence to contract requirements and lacked information critical for effective oversight on key NFIP contractors. In March 2008, FEMA provided GAO with a set of contract monitoring procedures that are applicable to all Risk-Insurance NFIP contracts that have performance requirements. Federal standards for internal control call for appropriate documentation of significant events. Given the reliance of NFIP upon contractors, poor contractor performance could diminish the overall quality of program operations and management. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe trends for National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policies, insurance amounts, premiums, and losses from 1997 through 2006 and the extent to which NFIP losses were attributable to hurricanes and repetitive loss properties; (2) assess how the amounts available for the purchase of flood-damaged properties changed over time, and the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) purchased flood-damaged properties; and (3) evaluate the extent to which FEMA followed its procedures for monitoring selected NFIP- related contracts. FEMA officials also stated that because not all properties approved for acquisition are ultimately acquired, it may take several years for a project to close. The average amount of flood insurance purchased gradually increased in the high risk and moderate- to low-risk zones from 1997 through 2006 (see fig. Repetitive loss properties are those with two or more flood insurance claims filed against them in a 10-year period. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its contractors administer and implement the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). GAO designated NFIP as a high-risk area in March 2006, and as of December 2007, FEMA owed more than $17.3 billion to the Treasury for hurricane-related losses. Concerns have been raised about the financial condition of NFIP and FEMA's efforts to mitigate losses and monitor NFIP contractors. This report (1) describes statistical and financial trends for NFIP from 1997 through 2006, (2) assesses the extent to which flood-damaged properties were purchased to mitigate risk, and (3) evaluates procedures for monitoring NFIP-related contracts. For this study, GAO analyzed financial and statistical data on the NFIP and its mitigation programs, reviewed documentation of contract monitoring activities, and interviewed FEMA officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The number of federal flood insurance policies in force nationwide increased 36 percent from 1997 through 2006, but most homeowners at risk of flooding still lacked such insurance. While average insurance amounts (per policy) increased 78 percent from 1997 through 2006--consistent with rising home values--the average premium decreased 3 percent from 1997 through 2006, likely driven in part by the increase in policies sold in moderate- to low-risk areas. Conversely, loss amounts fluctuated by year, peaking at more than $17.7 billion in 2005. Seventy-nine percent of the funds paid out through NFIP from 1997 through 2006 were for hurricane-related claims, but the percentages in individual years varied widely (correlating with hurricane activity). Finally, the extent of claim payments attributed to repetitive loss properties (those with two or more claims in a rolling 10-year period) increased from 1997 through 2006, from $3.7 billion to nearly $8 billion, with the most significant increases resulting from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Because of data limitations, GAO was not able to determine the actual number of properties acquired through FEMA mitigation programs, which are intended to minimize the damage and financial impact of floods. Information on completed mitigation projects (which encompass multiple properties) indicates that about one-third of properties approved for acquisition from 1997 to 2006 were acquired. However, these data are limited because they do not include a count of properties acquired in ongoing projects. Projects may take several years to complete, and FEMA does not report properties acquired until a project is complete. Further, FEMA collected property acquisition data (for completed projects) in an ad hoc manner because FEMA's grants management system lacks the capability to record acquisition data. As a result, FEMA cannot readily determine the extent to which flood-damaged and repetitive loss properties have been acquired through its mitigation programs. Lack of monitoring records, inconsistent application of procedures, and lack of coordination have diminished the effectiveness of FEMA monitoring of NFIP-related contracts. While federal internal control standards state that records should be properly maintained, FEMA did not consistently follow its monitoring procedures for preparing or maintaining monitoring reports and was unable to provide copies of the majority of monitoring reports GAO requested. Further, FEMA offices did not coordinate information and actions relating to contractor deficiencies and payments. In some cases, key officials were unaware of decisions on contractor performance. As a result, FEMA cannot consistently ensure adherence to contract requirements and lacks information critical for effective oversight of key contractors. Given the reliance of NFIP upon contractors, it is important that FEMA have in place adequate controls that are consistently applied to all contracts. |
gao_GAO-03-137T | gao_GAO-03-137T_0 | Major problem areas have included shortfalls in equipment, training, and reporting and weaknesses in coordinating program research and development activities. Unit Equipment Levels Have Improved, but Shortages Remain in Key Areas
When we looked again in 2000 at the readiness of early deploying U.S. forces to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment, we found the situation generally improved. In September 2001, we reported that DOD’s criteria for assessing the risk of wartime shortages for protective clothing are unreliable. At that time we found that DOD had inaccurately reported the risk in most cases as “low.” We reported that the process for determining risk is fundamentally flawed because (1) DOD determines requirements by individual pieces of protective equipment — suits, masks, breathing filters, gloves, boots, and hoods — rather than by the number of complete protective ensembles that can be provided to deploying service members, and (2) the process for determining risk combines individual service requirements and reported inventory data into general categories, masking specific critical shortages that affect individual service readiness. The risk for protective clothing shortages may therefore increase dramatically during this period. This act required the Secretary of Defense to assign responsibility for overall coordination and integration of the Chemical and Biological Defense program to a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and to designate the Army as executive agent to coordinate and integrate the chemical and biological research, development, test and evaluation, and acquisition requirements of the military departments. We believe these OSD vacancies adversely affected the high-level attention received by the program as well as its ability to compete for funding against other defense needs, thereby sending a message throughout the Department about the relative priority and importance attached to the program. DOD has recently implemented this change. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is increasingly likely that an adversary of the United States will use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to degrade superior U.S. conventional warfare capabilities, placing service members' lives and effective military operations at risk. During the past 6 years, GAO has identified many problems with DOD's capabilities to defend against chemical and biological weapons and sustain operations in the midst of their use. Although GAO has found that DOD has made some improvements--in equipment, training, and reporting, and in the coordination of research and development activities--it has continuing concerns in each of these areas. One particular issue is the supply of chemical protective clothing and the way associated risk is assessed. Due to the upcoming expiration of existing protective suits, the slower rate at which new suits are entering the inventory, and DOD's method of assessing risk for individual items rather than complete protective ensembles, GAO believes that the risk for protective clothing shortages may increase dramatically from now through 2007. GAO is also concerned that certain management weaknesses, such as program organizational complexity and prolonged vacancies in key leadership positions, may have sent a message throughout the department about the relative priority and importance of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. |
gao_GAO-10-108 | gao_GAO-10-108_0 | The misrepresentations case-study firms made included a firm whose owner was not a service-disabled veteran, a serviced-disabled veteran who did not control the firm’s day-to-day operations, a service- disabled veteran who was a full-time contract federal employee at MacDill Air Force Base, and firms that served as a “pass-through” for large and sometimes foreign-based corporations. Our investigation found that the owner of the SDVOSB passed through all of the work for this furniture design and installation contract to a furniture dealer that his wife worked for, who then passed the work to a furniture manufacturer that actually designed and installed the furniture. The lack of effective fraud-prevention controls by SBA and agencies awarding contracts allowed these ineligible firms to receive approximately $100 million of sole-source or set-aside SDVOSB contracts over the last several years. The only process in place to detect fraud in the SDVOSB program involves a formal bid protest process at the SBA, whereby interested parties to a contract award can protest if they feel a firm misrepresented its small business size or SDVOSB eligibility in its bid submission. For example, bid- protest decisions do not always result in the termination of contracts with ineligible firms, even when termination costs would be minimal in cases where contract work had not begun. Lack of Governmentwide Fraud-Prevention Controls Leaves the Government Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse
Our 10 case studies clearly show that fraud and abuse exist within the SDVOSB program. In addition, the SBA and agencies awarding contracts do not have access to a database listing individuals that are valid service-disabled veterans. This is especially important in a program like the SDVOSB program where even firms identified as receiving contracts through fraud or abuse face no real consequences as discussed below. Recommendations for Executive Action
In an effort to minimize the potential for fraud and abuse in the Service- Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program and to assure that legitimate service-disabled veterans and their firms reap the benefits of this program, we recommend that the Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Secretary of the Veterans Affairs (VA) coordinate with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to explore the feasibility of expanding the use of the VA VetBiz “verified” database governmentwide for purposes of validating all SDVOSB eligible firms for contracting and, requiring that all contractors who knowingly misrepresent their status as an SDVOSB be debarred for a reasonable period of time. While we acknowledge that there are shared responsibilities between SBA and agency contracting officers when attempting to prevent fraud in the SDVOSB program, we do not agree that SBA does not have responsibility or authority to develop and implement a process to provide reasonable assurance that only eligible SDVOSB firms are awarded set aside and sole source SDVOSB contracts. We also reviewed allegations of fraud and abuse sent to our fraud hotline, FraudNET. For the purposes of our investigation, we defined a case as one or more affiliated firms or joint ventures that obtained an SDVOSB contract. To assess overall program vulnerabilities, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations governing the SDVOSB program. To determine whether the program has effective fraud-prevention controls in place, we interviewed agency officials from SBA, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and various agency contracting officials about their responsibility over the program and controls currently in place to prevent, detect, and monitor fraud and abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program is intended to provide federal contracting opportunities to qualified firms. In fiscal year 2007, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reported $4 billion in governmentwide sole source and set aside SDVOSB contract awards. Given the amount of federal contract dollars being awarded to SDVOSB firms, GAO was asked to determine (1) whether cases of fraud and abuse exist within the SDVOSB program, and (2) whether the program has effective fraud-prevention controls in place. To identify whether cases exist, GAO reviewed SDVOSB contract awards and protests since 2003, and complaints sent to our fraud hotline. GAO defined a case as one or more affiliated firms who were awarded one or more SDVOSB contracts. To assess fraud-prevention controls, GAO reviewed laws and regulations and conducted interviews with SBA and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) officials. GAO did not attempt to project the extent of fraud and abuse in the program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the SDVOSB program is vulnerable to fraud and abuse, which could result in legitimate service-disabled veterans' firms losing contracts to ineligible firms. The 10 case-study firms identified in this report received approximately $100 million from SDVOSB contracts through fraud or abuse of the program, or both. For example, contracts for Hurricane Katrina trailer maintenance were awarded to a firm whose owner was not a service-disabled veteran. GAO also found SDVOSB companies used as a pass-through for large, sometimes multinational corporations. In another case a full-time federal contract employee at MacDill Air Force Base set up a SDVOSB company that passed a $900,000 furniture contract on to a company where his wife worked, which passed the work to a furniture manufacturer that actually delivered and installed the furniture. GAO found that the government does not have effective fraud-prevention controls in place for the SDVOSB program. Specifically, SBA and agencies awarding SDVOSB contracts do not have processes in place to validate a firm's eligibility for the program prior to bid submission. SBA and contracting agencies also currently do not have a database of individuals that are service-disabled veterans, a key eligibility requirement for the program. According to VA, it is developing a database, called VetBiz, of validated SDVOSBs, but currently it is only used for contracting by the VA. SBA's bid-protest process is the only governmentwide control over the SDVOSB program. However, although ineligible firms have been identified through bid protests, firms found ineligible do not face real consequences, can be allowed to complete the contracts received, and are not suspended or debarred. |
gao_GAO-10-220 | gao_GAO-10-220_0 | CBP Adapted Existing Mechanisms to Comply with the Verification Requirements under the Act
As required by the act, CBP has developed processes to verify the importer declaration, which includes verifying that the export price declared by the importer is the same as the export price provided on the export permit, if any, issued by the country of export; the estimated export charge is consistent with the applicable export charge rate as provided by Commerce; and importers have “made appropriate inquiry, including seeking appropriate documentation from the exporter,” and to the best of the importer’s knowledge and belief that the exporter has paid or committed to pay all applicable export charges. Agency Officials Believe That the Act’s Requirements Add Little to Their Efforts to Monitor Compliance with the Bilateral Trade Agreement; Requirements Are Likely to Continue after the Agreement Expires
CBP, Commerce, and USTR officials stated that the information produced through the reconciliation and verification requirements under the act do not directly help them monitor compliance with the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement with Canada. The 2006 agreement with Canada contains mechanisms for monitoring compliance, and, according to U.S. government officials, the added reconciliation and verification requirements of the Softwood Lumber Act of 2008 do not provide the U.S. government with additional assurance of compliance with the bilateral agreement. Similarly, CBP officials said the verification process for imports from Canada does not provide the agency with additional information about whether Canadian exporters are complying with the provisions of the bilateral trade agreement, because the U.S. government does not have access to the Canadian government’s tax records and therefore has no means to confirm whether Canadian companies actually paid the export charge. Some of the act’s requirements are to ensure the proper implementation and operation of international agreements on softwood lumber and assist in the enforcement of these obligations. The 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement is in force until 2013; however, the act does not have an expiration date. CBP officials said they have not yet determined how they will fulfill their requirements under the act when the agreement expires, but assume that they will have to continue implementing the verification and importer declaration requirements. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide Congress with sufficient time to clarify the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s requirements under the Softwood Lumber Act of 2008, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of CBP to report to Congress on how the agency plans to fulfill the requirements of the act upon the expiration of international agreements related to softwood lumber. To better understand how the act’s requirements for reconciliations and verifications contribute to U.S. monitoring of the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement, we interviewed knowledgeable officials, and obtained information from the Department of Commerce (Commerce), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and CBP. Appendix III: CBP Continues to Address Challenges to Reconciling Value Data under the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement
In June 2009, GAO reported on the challenges that U.S. and Canadian officials identified in reconciling the U.S.-entered value and the Canadian export price data. However, CBP provided us with data on U.S. imports from Canada at the regional level. According to USTR and Commerce officials, the United States is now reviewing and analyzing these data and other information provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the United States and Canada signed the Softwood Lumber Agreement. The agreement, among other things, imposed export charges and quotas on Canadian lumber exports to the United States. To assist in monitoring compliance with the agreement, in 2008 Congress passed the Softwood Lumber Act, which imposed several data collection and analysis requirements on the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and required two reports from GAO. This report discusses (1) CBP's processes for meeting the act's requirements and (2) how these requirements contribute to U.S. efforts to monitor compliance with the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement. GAO issued a report in June 2009 on U.S. agency efforts to monitor compliance with the 2006 agreement. This report includes an update on these efforts. GAO analyzed information from relevant U.S. agencies, interviewed knowledgeable officials, and discussed these issues with U.S. and Canadian industry representatives.
What GAO Found
CBP has developed processes to reconcile and verify data provided by the exporter and importer as required by the act, but officials acknowledge continuing issues with data quality. CBP reconciles aggregated export prices from the U.S. entry forms with aggregated export prices from Canadian export permits. To meet the act's verification requirement that the importer has correctly reported the export price, the tax to be paid by exporters to the Canadian government (the export charge), and other information, CBP has created a process within its existing data system to collect these data. However, CBP has acknowledged continuing problems with data quality. For example, CBP port officials manually enter data into this system, which could lead to miscoding. CBP reported that the initial implementation of the act required extensive effort for the agency, but officials stated that ongoing activities need fewer resources. According to CBP, Department of Commerce, and Office of U.S. Trade Representative officials, the information produced through the reconciliation and verification requirements under the act adds little assurance of compliance with the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement. Some of the act's requirements are to ensure the proper operation of international agreements on softwood lumber and enforcement of these obligations. The agreement with Canada contains mechanisms for monitoring compliance, and, according to U.S. government officials, the added requirements of the 2008 U.S. legislation do not provide the U.S. government with additional assurance of compliance with the bilateral trade agreement. Specifically, CBP officials told GAO the requirements under the act do not provide the United States with assurance that the Canadian exporter paid the export charge, because the United States does not have access to company-level tax data from Canada. While the agreement is scheduled to expire in 2013, the act does not have an expiration date. CBP officials said they have not yet determined how they will fulfill their requirements under the act when the agreement expires, but they would no longer have the estimated export charge data that are used in implementing the act. |
gao_GAO-04-98 | gao_GAO-04-98_0 | Both developed and developing nations are required to follow this guidance—Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories—when preparing their inventories. The nations have been encouraged, but not required, to follow the good practice guidance. The parties to the Framework Convention also agreed to report periodically to the Secretariat on their levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Annually, each Annex I nation is required to submit inventory data—in a common reporting format the parties themselves agreed to—as well as a national inventory report that explains how the data in the common reporting format were derived. According to the parties to the Framework Convention, the goal of the expert reviews is to identify areas in the inventories needing improvement; for this reason, the experts’ reports do not rate the overall quality of the submissions, and the reports do not identify some findings as being more important than others. Recent Reviews Found That U.K. and U.S. The reviews of the submissions of the United Kingdom and the United States found they were largely complete and noted only relatively minor problems. They found that all four nations’ submissions contained most of the required data as well as the required national inventory reports. Little Nation-Specific Inventory Information Is Available for the Three Developing Nations
The Secretariat has not assessed any inventories from China and India because, as of November 2003, neither nation had submitted one. The Secretariat assessed Mexico’s 2001 submission, but the Secretariat’s practice is to issue one report on the findings of its assessments of all the inventories submitted during the year, with few nation-specific details. Developed Nations Must Use Quantitative Methods to Assess Their Confidence in Their Data in 2004
In November 2002, the parties decided to require developed nations to use the quantitative methods in the IPCC good practice guidance to develop estimates of data uncertainty beginning with the 2004 submissions. The Parties Are Taking Steps to Improve the Quality of Emissions Data
To improve the quality of data on greenhouse gas emissions, the parties to the Framework Convention are refining their requirements for both Annex I and non-Annex I nations. In contrast, Annex I nations are required to report data for all six gases. Scope and Methodology
To examine the results of the most recent expert reviews of the greenhouse gas inventories submitted by the four economically developed nations included in our study—Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—we reviewed and analyzed the Secretariat’s status reports showing the results of its initial reviews (called stage 1 reviews by the Secretariat) of the most recently submitted inventories (2003). We also reviewed the reports on the parties’ most recent expert reviews (called in- depth reviews by the Secretariat) of the four nations’ inventories (2000 for Japan, 2000 and 2002 for the United Kingdom, 2000 for the United States, and 2001 for Germany) and related documentation on reporting requirements and review processes issued by the Secretariat. To describe the results of any assessments of inventories of the three developing nations included in our study—China, India, and Mexico—we reviewed and analyzed the Secretariat’s reports on its assessments of inventories submitted by non-Annex I nations, including the latest inventory submitted by Mexico (2001); related documentation on non- Annex I nation reporting requirements and assessment processes; and other Secretariat information documenting which non-Annex I nations have submitted inventories. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1992, the United States and other parties, including both developed and developing nations, agreed to try to limit dangerous human interference with the climate by participating in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The parties agreed, among other things, to report on their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other gases whose buildup in the atmosphere is believed to affect the climate. The parties developed standards for these reports and processes for periodically evaluating the reports. Expert teams selected by the parties review the developed nations' reports; staff of the Framework Convention's administrative arm (the Secretariat) assess developing nations' reports. GAO agreed to describe the results of the most recent reviews and assessments of reports from selected economically developed and developing nations, as well as the parties' plans to improve the reports. For the developed nations, GAO agreed to study four geographically dispersed nations with high levels of emissions--Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the developing nations, GAO studied China, India, and Mexico, which also have high emissions levels and are geographically dispersed. These nations are not representative of others; therefore, GAO's findings cannot be generalized.
What GAO Found
In their most recent reviews, expert teams found that the United Kingdom's 2000 and 2002 reports on greenhouse gas emissions and the United States's 2000 report were largely complete, although the teams noted minor findings, such as the lack of information on quality assurance methods, which the nations were encouraged, but not required, to include in their submissions. In contrast, they found that Germany's 2001 and Japan's 2000 reports lacked critical elements, such as the required documentation that was essential to understanding them. Preliminary checks found that all four nations' 2003 reports were largely complete. Secretariat staff have not assessed inventories from China and India because these nations have not submitted them. According to Secretariat records, China and India plan to submit inventories in February 2004 and November 2003, respectively. Secretariat staff assessed Mexico's most recent inventory, but they reported few details about it because their policy is to consolidate the findings of all the developing nations' inventories submitted during a year. To improve the inventories, the parties are changing the reporting standards and review process. For example, starting in 2004, developed nations must present their inventory reports in a standardized format to facilitate review, and developing nations must report data for more years and gases than before. Also, in 2003, the parties began conducting more rigorous reviews of developed nations' inventories, but no such changes for developing nations are planned. |
gao_AIMD-98-51 | gao_AIMD-98-51_0 | Scope and Methodology
To evaluate how SEC’s report discussed the agency’s efforts to address the Year 2000 problem for its internal systems and identify any ways that future reports could be improved, we interviewed officials in SEC’s Office of Information Technology. We also reviewed documents SEC had collected from market participants to assess what type of information the agency had analyzed and thus could summarize in future reports. In addition, we assessed the extent to which SEC’s report contained information that related to the various criteria set out in our own guidance for addressing Year 2000 issues and in the OMB guidance for selected federal agencies reporting on their Year 2000 efforts. SEC’s report provided a high-level description of the status of Year 2000 remediation efforts for SEC internal systems, including detailed information on the status of SEC mission-critical systems. SEC’s Report Did Not Include Detailed Information on Major Systems Critical to the Continued Functioning of the U.S. Securities Markets
Although it provided an overview of the status of its own and securities industry participants’ efforts to address the Year 2000 problem, the report did not identify those systems that might be critical to the continued functioning of the U.S. securities markets. The officials said that they generally had not collected similar information from market participants such as broker-dealers or investment companies because they had concentrated on ensuring that these participants were aware of and beginning to focus on Year 2000 problems. However, this information was not included in the June 1997 report. Annual Reporting May Not Be Adequate as the Year 2000 Approaches
Monitoring an organization’s efforts to ensure that its computer systems are ready will become even more critical as the year 2000 draws nearer. Specifically, SEC reports should include information on the systems critical to the continued functioning of the U.S. securities markets; the progress made in moving critical systems through the various phases of achieving Year 2000 compliance; the time frames required to complete each phase of the process; the efforts necessary to address systems that are behind schedule; and the contingency plans for systems that may not be ready in time. Such systems likely include those related to trading, clearing, and other functions important to market operations, as well as those used by major market participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) report on the status of its efforts to ensure that its computer systems, as well as those used by participants in the securities industry, are ready for the date changeover in the year 2000, focusing on: (1) SEC's June 1997 report on the status of year 2000 compliance by SEC, the securities industry, and public companies to identify any ways that future reports might be improved; (2) the adequacy of SEC's oversight of the year 2000 remediation efforts directed at its internal systems, self-regulatory organizations (SRO), broker-dealers, and other regulated entities; and (3) the guidance SEC has provided to public companies for disclosing year 2000 remediation efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SEC's first report in June 1997 provided an overview of the efforts that SEC and various industry participants had made to address year 2000 issues, but did not contain the specific, detailed information that Congress will need to assess progress as the year 2000 approaches; (2) according to an agency official, SEC had collected more detailed information from some market participants, such as SROs; (3) the official said that SEC did not include this information in the report because SEC had been focused on assessing the extent to which market participants were aware of the year 2000 problem and had begun taking steps to address it; (4) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) reporting format offers guidance on the type of detailed information SEC might provide Congress in future reports; (5) such information includes: (a) the systems considered critical to the continued functioning of the U.S. securities markets; (b) the progress made in moving these systems through the various phases of achieving year 2000 compliance; (c) the timeframes required to complete each phase; (d) the efforts necessary to address systems that are behind schedule; and (e) the contingency plans for systems that may not be ready in time; and (6) also, as the year 2000 approaches and less time to make adjustments is available, SEC's yearly progress updates may be too infrequent for congressional needs. |
gao_GGD-97-15 | gao_GGD-97-15_0 | The corresponding average annual prison population growth rate during this period was 8.5 percent (9.9 percent for the federal population and 8.4 percent for the state populations). The state prison population grew from 305,458 inmates in 1980 to 1,026,882 inmates in 1995, which is an increase of about 236 percent. Particularly noteworthy has been the trend regarding drug offenders as a percentage of the total inmate population. In June 1996, BOP projected that the federal prison population could reach about 125,000 inmates by 2000, which is a 25-percent increase over the 1995 level (see table 1). In July 1995, NCCD projected that, under sentencing policies in effect in 1994, the total inmate population for federal and state prisons could reach 1.4 million by 2000, which is an increase of 24 percent over the 1995 level. As figure 3 shows, total U.S. prison operating costs grew from about $3.1 billion in fiscal year 1980 to about $17.7 billion in current dollars in fiscal year 1994. BOP also projected that its capital costs for new federal prisons scheduled to begin operations during fiscal years 1996 to 2006 could total about $4 billion. Models and Methodologies Used to Project Prison Populations
BOP, NCCD, California, and Texas each use microsimulation models to project prison inmate populations. For example, according to BOP, its projections of federal prison inmate populations for 1991 to 1995 were within 1.4 percent (on average) of the actual populations. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We initiated this review to identify (1) the trends in federal and state prison inmate populations and operating and capital costs since 1980, including projections for 2000 and beyond and the reasons for these trendsand (2) the models and methodologies used by federal and statecorrections agencies and nongovernmental forecasting organizations to make these projections, including whether any validity or reliability assessments had been done. In 1987, BOP and the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the trends in U.S. prison inmate populations and operating and capital costs since 1980, including projections for 2000 and beyond and the reasons for the trends and the models and methodologies used by federal and state corrections agencies and nongovernmental forecasting organizations to make these projections.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the total U.S. prison population grew from about 329,800 inmates in 1980 to about 1.1 million inmates in 1995, which is an increase of about 242 percent; (2) during this period, the federal inmate population grew about 311 percent, and the inmate populations under the jurisdiction of state prisons grew about 237 percent; (3) the corresponding average annual growth rates were 9.9 percent of federal populations and 8.4 percent for state populations; (4) in June 1996, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) projected that the federal prison population could reach about 125,000 inmates by 2000, an increase of 25 percent over the 1995 level; (5) in July 1995, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) projected that the total federal and state prison population under sentencing policies in effect in 1994 could reach 1.4 million inmates by 2000, representing an increase of about 24 percent over the 1995 level; (6) in recent years, inmate population growth can be traced in large part to major legislative initiatives that are intended to get tough on crime, particularly on drug offenders; (7) U.S. prison annual operating costs grew from about $3.1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1980 to about $17.7 billion in current dollars in FY 1994; (8) BOP projected that its capital costs for new federal prisons scheduled to begin operations during fiscal years 1996 to 2006 could total about $4 billion; (9) BOP, NCCD, California, and Texas each use a form of microsimulation modeling to forecast prison inmate populations; and (10) according to BOP, its projections of federal prison inmate populations for 1991 to 1995 were within 1.4 percent, on average, of the actual populations. |
gao_GAO-10-867 | gao_GAO-10-867_0 | Assess risks: Evaluate risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. PSD Has Developed a Pipeline Risk Assessment Model, but Could Strengthen Data in the Model and Better Prioritize Security Reviews and Inspections
PSD Identified the Most Critical Pipeline Systems and Developed a Risk Model, but Some Model Components Could be Strengthened
PSD identified the 100 most critical pipeline systems in the United States, consistent with the NIPP, and developed a pipeline risk assessment model to generate a risk score for those systems; however, some components of PSD’s model are incomplete. Within its risk assessment model, PSD uses the annual energy throughput of a pipeline system to help measure the possible adverse economic impact of a terrorist attack or other event on a pipeline system, but does not take into account other possible adverse impacts, such as on public health and safety. This suggests that a system’s risk ranking was not the primary consideration in scheduling these reviews. PSD Has Taken Actions to Implement Agency Guidance and 9/11 Commission Act Requirements, but Lacks a System for Following Up on Its Recommendations to Operators
PSD Established a Program for Reviewing Pipeline Security Plans
PSD established an on-site CSR program in April 2003 that has been evolving in response to, and consistent with, agency guidance— specifically, DOT’s September 2002 Pipeline Security Information Circular (the 2002 circular)—and the 9/11 Commission Act. Standard practices for project management call for developing a plan that includes defined approaches as well as start dates for activities. PSD officials agreed that by following up more frequently on whether operators are implementing the recommendations PSD makes as a result of its CSRs and developing a process for following up on the recommendations it makes as a result of its CFIs, they could be better informed of the state of the nation’s pipeline security, including whether their recommendations have been implemented. PSD Has Taken Steps to Measure Its Performance, but Could Better Measure and More Reliably Report Industry Improvements
PSD has initiated efforts to measure its performance in helping strengthen the security of pipeline systems, but could improve its performance measures to better evaluate and reliably report on the extent of security improvements in the pipeline industry. The vulnerability gap focuses on what PSD measures through its CSR program—primarily improvements in pipeline operators’ security planning and preparedness—but provides limited information on improvements in other areas, such as physical security. PSD officials explained that they are in the early stages of performance measurement and have not yet developed additional outcome measures or established time frames for doing so. In addition, documenting a methodology for scheduling CSRs and CFIs that includes a pipeline system’s risk ranking as the primary criteria, while recognizing other considerations that can affect scheduling, could help PSD ensure it prioritizes its oversight of pipeline systems that are most at risk. However, PSD’s dependence on a single outcome measure hinders its ability to evaluate the extent of improvements related to all of its pipeline security objectives. To ensure that PSD is managing risk effectively, Develop a plan with time frames and milestones for improving the data in the pipeline risk assessment model by, for example, adding more data to the consequence component. Document a methodology for scheduling Corporate Security Reviews (CSR) and Critical Facility Inspections (CFI) that considers a pipeline system’s risk ranking as the primary scheduling criteria and balances it with other practical considerations. To help PSD maximize its CSR and CFI efforts and keep its knowledge of the security posture of the pipeline industry current, Develop a plan that includes a defined approach and time frame for how and when PSD intends to begin transmitting CSR recommendations in writing to pipeline operators. DHS concurred with our seventh recommendation that TSA develop additional outcome measures that are directly linked to sector goals and modal objectives and track progress towards its stated pipeline security objectives. However, to fully address the intent of our recommendation, TSA should ensure that its performance measurement guidance calls for outcome measures to be directly linked to sector goals and modal objectives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
You requested that we review the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to help ensure pipeline security. To what extent has PSD taken actions to implement agency guidance and requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) regarding the security of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline systems? Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which PSD used a risk management process to help strengthen the security of pipelines, we reviewed PSD’s efforts to (1) identify critical pipeline systems, (2) assess risk, and (3) prioritize its pipeline review and inspection efforts. We also compared PSD’s processes for transmitting and following up on CSR and CFI recommendations with criteria in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government regarding the monitoring of deficiencies found during evaluations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States depends on avast network of pipelines to transport energy. GAO was asked to review the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to help ensure pipeline security. This report addresses the extent to which TSA's Pipeline Security Division (PSD) has (1) assessed risk and prioritized efforts to help strengthen pipeline security, (2) implemented agency guidance and requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) regarding pipeline security, and (3) measured its performance in strengthening pipeline security. GAO reviewed PSD's risk assessment process and performance measures and observed 14 PSD reviews and inspections scheduled during the period of GAO's review. Although these observations are not generalizable, they provided GAO an understanding of how PSD conducts reviews and inspections.
What GAO Found
PSD identified the 100 most critical pipeline systems and developed a pipeline risk assessment model based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence, but could improve the model's consequence component and better prioritize its efforts. The consequence component takes into account the economic impact of a possible pipeline attack, but not other possible impacts such as public health and safety, as called for in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk management guidance. PSD plans to improve its model by adding more vulnerability and consequence data, but has no time frames for doing so. Establishing a plan with time frames, as called for by standard management practices, could help PSD enhance the data in, and use of, its risk assessment model. Also, PSD procedures call for scheduling Corporate Security Reviews (CSR)--assessments of pipeline operators' security planning--based primarilyon a pipeline system's risk, but GAO's analysis of CSR data suggests a system's risk was not the primary consideration. Documenting a methodology for scheduling CSRs that includes how to balance risk with other factors could help PSD ensure it prioritizes its oversight of systems at the highest risk. PSD has taken actions to implement agency guidance that outlines voluntary actions for pipeline operators and 9/11 Commission Act requirements for pipeline security, but lacks a system for following up on its security recommendations to pipeline operators. PSD established CSR and Critical Facility Inspection (CFI) Programs in 2003 and 2008, respectively, and has completed CSRs of the 100 most at-risk systems, started conducting second CSRs, and completed 224 of 373 one-time CFIs. Both programs result in recommendations, but PSD does not generally send CSR recommendations to operators in writing or follow up to ensure that CSR and CFI recommendations were implemented. Standard project management practices call for plans that define approaches and start dates and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for monitoring to ensure review findings are resolved. Developing a plan for how and when PSD will begin transmitting CSR recommendations to operators, and following up on CSR and CFI recommendations could better inform PSD of the state of pipeline security and whether operators have addressed vulnerabilities. PSD has taken steps to gauge its progress in strengthening pipeline security, but its ability to measure improvements is limited. In its pipeline security strategy, PSD does not include performance measures or link them to objectives, which GAO previously identified as desirable in security strategies. In addition, PSD developed performance measures, including one outcome measure to gauge its efforts to help operators reduce vulnerabilities identified in CSRs. However, the outcome measure does not link to all three of PSD's objectives and provides limited information on improvements in areas such as physical security. According to DHS risk management guidance, outcome measures should link to objectives. Including measures linked to objectives in its strategy and developing more outcome measures directly linked to all of its objectives could help PSD improve accountability and assess improvements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA, among other things, establish time frames for improving risk model data, document its method for scheduling reviews, develop a plan for transmitting recommendations to operators, follow up on its recommendations, include performance measures linked to objectives in its pipeline strategy, and develop more outcome measures. DHS concurred with the recommendations and discussed planned actions, but not all will fully address the recommendations, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-03-746 | gao_GAO-03-746_0 | The agency’s R&D program is aimed at advancing the most promising technologies for ensuring the safe operations of pipelines. From 1998 through 2002, a total of 1,770 pipeline accidents occurred, resulting in 100 fatalities and $621 million in property damage. OPS’s R&D Funding Is Aligned with Its Mission and Pipeline Safety Goals
Since fiscal year 2001, OPS has allocated its rising R&D funding to three main areas of pipeline safety R&D that were identified at its 2001 workshop: (1) developing new technologies for preventing damage to pipelines and detecting leaks, (2) improving technologies for operating, controlling, and monitoring the condition of pipelines, and (3) improving the performance of pipeline materials. On the basis of our work, we believe that the agency’s R&D funding is generally aligned with its mission and pipeline safety goals. Finally, the agency plans to allocate the smallest portion of its R&D budget, 14 percent, or $1.2 million, to the area of Mapping and Information Systems, which includes efforts to improve the collection, integration, and analysis of data on the location and safety performance of pipelines. OPS started funding Improved Materials Performance research in fiscal year 2002, increasing funding in this area to a level of $1.7 million in fiscal year 2003. The agency has described how new and improved technologies resulting from its R&D funding can help achieve these performance goals. In response, OPS is continuing to involve various experts and stakeholders in its R&D planning. Experts Generally Support OPS’s R&D Priorities
The pipeline safety R&D priorities of the experts who completed our questionnaire are generally consistent with OPS’s R&D priorities. Such a process is needed to demonstrate the program’s progress toward achieving its objectives, such as the development and use of new technologies that can improve pipeline safety. OPS has taken some preliminary steps toward developing an evaluation process for its R&D program and could benefit from adopting identified best practices for systematically evaluating the outcomes of federal R&D programs. Leading research organizations, the Office of Management and Budget, and GAO have identified a number of such practices, including setting clear R&D goals and measuring progress toward these goals, using expert review to evaluate the quality of research outcomes, and reporting periodically on evaluation results. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve OPS’s ability to demonstrate the effectiveness of its R&D program and make the most effective use of program funds, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct OPS to develop a systematic process for evaluating the outcomes of its R&D program that incorporates identified best practices and include in the annual reports to Congress, which are required by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, information on the results of R&D evaluations. Experts’ Views on R&D Priorities and OPS’s R&D Funding, by Type of R&D
We asked selected experts to review the following descriptions of specific types of pipeline safety research and development (R&D) and assign a funding priority to each, based on its importance in achieving the Office of Pipeline Safety’s (OPS) mission of ensuring the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of the nation’s pipeline transportation system. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1998 through 2002, a total of 1,770 pipeline accidents occurred, resulting in 100 fatalities and $621 million in property damage. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) within the Department of Transportation operates a research and development (R&D) program aimed at advancing the most promising technologies for ensuring the safe operation of pipelines. In fiscal year 2003, OPS received $8.7 million for its R&D program, a sevenfold increase since fiscal year 1998. In response to a directive from the House Committee on Appropriations, GAO (1) assessed OPS's distribution of funding among various areas of R&D and the alignment of this funding with its mission and goals, (2) surveyed experts to obtain their views on R&D priorities, and (3) determined how OPS evaluates R&D outcomes.
What GAO Found
OPS distributes its R&D budget among four main areas. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the office plans to allocate its $8.7 million budget as follows: 46 percent ($4.0 million) to developing new technologies to prevent damage to pipelines and prevent leaks; 21 percent ($1.9 million) to improving technologies for operating, controlling, and monitoring the condition of pipelines; 19 percent ($1.7 million) to improved pipeline materials, such as materials that are resistant to damage and defects; and 14 percent ($1.2 million) to efforts to improve data on the location and safety performance of pipelines. On the basis of our work, we believe that OPS's R&D funding is generally aligned with its mission and pipeline safety goals. OPS has taken a number of steps to ensure this alignment. For example, it obtained the views of a variety of experts and stakeholders in deciding on its R&D priorities and has described in various plans how its R&D efforts can lead to new and improved technologies that can help achieve its safety performance goals, such as reducing the impacts of pipeline accidents. The pipeline safety R&D priorities of the experts we surveyed are generally consistent with OPS's R&D priorities. For example, most assigned a high priority to the two areas of R&D that receive the highest amount of funding from OPS. OPS's efforts to evaluate the outcomes of its R&D have been limited. The agency has taken some preliminary steps toward developing an evaluation process for its R&D program, such as identifying possible measures of program results. Leading research organizations, the Office of Management and Budget, and GAO have identified a number of best practices for systematically evaluating the outcomes of federal R&D programs, such as setting clear R&D goals, measuring progress toward goals, and reporting periodically on evaluation results. These best practices can help OPS to determine the effectiveness of its R&D program in achieving desired outcomes, such as the development and use of new and improved technologies that can enhance pipeline safety. |
gao_GAO-13-663 | gao_GAO-13-663_0 | Thus, Census data cannot be used to provide a reliable count FTC has called on the information reseller industry to improve the transparency of its practices, and in December 2012 issued orders requiring nine information resellers to provide FTC with information about how they collect and use data about consumers.about the nature and sources of the consumer information that information resellers collect; how they use, maintain, and disseminate the information; and the extent to which the companies allow consumers to access and correct their information or opt out of having their personal information sold. The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) are a set of internationally recognized principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information. In the United States, the FIPPs served as the basis for the Privacy Act—which governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal agencies—and as the basis for many of the privacy recommendations of agencies such as FTC and Commerce. In the United States, the federal privacy framework for private-sector companies comprises a set of more narrowly tailored laws that govern the use and protection of personal information—that is, the laws apply for specific purposes, in certain situations, to certain sectors, or to certain types of entities. The primary federal laws with regard to consumer privacy include the following: Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Enacted in 1970, FCRA protects the security and confidentiality of personal information collected or used to help make decisions about individuals’ eligibility for such products as credit or for insurance or employment. Existing Privacy Laws Have Limited Scope over Personal Data Used for Marketing
For consumer data used for marketing purposes, the privacy protections provided under federal law have been limited. Although the FIPPs call for restraint in the collection and use of personal information, the scope of protections provided under current law has been narrow in relation to (1) individuals’ ability to access, control, and correct their personal data; (2) collection methods and sources and types of consumer information collected; and (3) new technologies, such as tracking of web activity and the use of mobile devices. In relation to data used for marketing purposes, no federal statute provides consumers the right to learn what information is held about them and who holds it. As noted earlier, FCRA provides individuals with rights to access information from consumer reports used for eligibility determinations, but does not apply to personal information used for marketing (other than prescreened marketing offers). Current Law Does Not Directly Address Some Privacy Issues Raised by New Technology
The current privacy framework does not fully address new technologies. Mobile applications. For example, they have noted that the FTC Act grants In contrast, privacy advocates and others have stated that the current privacy scheme left significant gaps. Industry and privacy advocates also have disagreed on the need for more legislation or regulation and the efficacy of self-regulatory approaches to protect privacy. Potential Disadvantages of Comprehensive Privacy Legislation
Industry stakeholders have argued a comprehensive privacy law would amount to a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation, which could be overly burdensome because no single law can be tailored to fit the practices of each individual company and industry. Changes in the marketplace for consumer data include a vast increase in recent years in the number and types of companies that collect and share such data with third parties. Views on the Potential Impact of New Regulation on Consumers and Commerce
Benefits of Information Sharing for Consumers
Representatives of the marketing and reseller industries have argued that regulatory restrictions on the use of consumer data unintentionally could reduce the benefits consumers reap from the use and sharing of personal information. The challenge will be providing appropriate privacy protections without unduly inhibiting the benefits to consumers, commerce, and innovation that data sharing can accord. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider strengthening the current consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace—particularly in relation to consumer data used for marketing purposes—while also ensuring that any limitations on data collection and sharing do not unduly inhibit the economic and other benefits to industry and consumers that data sharing can accord. In written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III, Commerce agreed that evolving technology and business practices are changing the ways that consumers’ personal information is collected and used, and that strengthened privacy protections could better protect consumers and support innovation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) existing federal laws relating to the privacy of consumer information held by information resellers, (2) any gaps that may exist in this legal framework, and (3) views on approaches for improving consumer data privacy. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, information resellers--companies that collect and resell information on individuals--dramatically increased the collection and sharing of personal data for marketing purposes, raising privacy concerns among some in Congress. Recent growth in the use of social media, mobile applications, and other technologies intensified these concerns. GAO was asked to examine privacy issues and information resellers. This report addresses (1) privacy laws applicable to consumer information held by resellers, (2) gaps in the law that may exist, and (3) views on approaches for improving consumer data privacy.
To address these objectives, GAO analyzed laws, studies, and other documents, and interviewed representatives of federal agencies, the reseller and marketing industries, consumer and privacy groups, and others. GAO focused primarily on consumer information used for marketing purposes.
What GAO Found
No overarching federal privacy law governs the collection and sale of personal information among private-sector companies, including information resellers. Instead, a variety of laws tailored to specific purposes, situations, or entities governs the use, sharing, and protection of personal information. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act limits the use and distribution of personal information collected or used to help determine eligibility for such things as credit or employment, but does not apply to information used for marketing. Other laws apply specifically to health care providers, financial institutions, videotape service providers, or to the online collection of information about children.
The current statutory framework for consumer privacy does not fully address new technologies--such as the tracking of online behavior or mobile devices--and the vastly increased marketplace for personal information, including the proliferation of information sharing among third parties. With regard to data used for marketing, no federal statute provides consumers the right to learn what information is held about them and who holds it. In many circumstances, consumers also do not have the legal right to control the collection or sharing with third parties of sensitive personal information (such as their shopping habits and health interests) for marketing purposes. As a result, although some industry participants have stated that current privacy laws are adequate--particularly in light of self-regulatory measures under way--GAO found that gaps exist in the current statutory framework for privacy. And that the framework does not fully reflect the Fair Information Practice Principles, widely accepted principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information that have served as a basis for many of the privacy recommendations federal agencies have made.
Views differ on the approach that any new privacy legislation or regulation should take. Some privacy advocates generally have argued that a comprehensive overarching privacy law would provide greater consistency and address gaps in law left by the current sector-specific approach. Other stakeholders have stated that a comprehensive, one-size-fits-all approach to privacy would be burdensome and inflexible. In addition, some privacy advocates have cited the need for legislation that would provide consumers with greater ability to access, control the use of, and correct information about them, particularly with respect to data used for purposes other than those for which they originally were provided. At the same time, industry representatives have asserted that restrictions on the collection and use of personal data would impose compliance costs, inhibit innovation and efficiency, and reduce consumer benefits, such as more relevant advertising and beneficial products and services. Nonetheless, the rapid increase in the amount and type of personal information that is collected and resold warrants reconsideration of how well the current privacy framework protects personal information. The challenge will be providing appropriate privacy protections without unduly inhibiting the benefits to consumers, commerce, and innovation that data sharing can accord.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the increased market for consumer information. Any changes should seek to provide consumers with appropriate privacy protections without unduly inhibiting commerce and innovation. The Department of Commerce agreed that strengthened privacy protections could better protect consumers and support innovation. |
gao_GAO-02-857T | gao_GAO-02-857T_0 | Background
In 1986, the United States and the FSM and the RMI entered into the Compact of Free Association. It also represented a continuation of U.S. rights and obligations first embodied in a U.N. trusteeship agreement that made the United States the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Unlike economic assistance provisions, the Compact’s migration provisions are not scheduled to expire in 2003. Compact Proposals Would Cost Billions and Create Trust Funds
Under the most recent (May 2002) U.S. proposals to the FSM and the RMI, new congressional authorizations of approximately $3.4 billion would be required for U.S. assistance over a period of 20 years (fiscal years 2004 through 2023). This new assistance would be provided to each country in the form of annual grant funds, extended federal services (that have been provided under the original Compact but are due to expire in 2003), and contributions to a trust fund for each country. At a 6 percent rate of return (the Department of State’s assumed rate) the U.S. proposal to the RMI would meet its goal of creating a trust fund that yields earnings sufficient to replace expiring annual grants, while the U.S. proposal to the FSM would not cover expiring annual grant funding, according to our analysis. In sum, many of our recommendations regarding future Compact assistance have been addressed with the introduction of strengthened accountability measures in the current U.S. proposals. | What GAO Found
The United States entered into the Compact of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) In 1986. The Compact has provided U.S. assistance to the FSM and the RMI in the form of direct funding as well as federal services and programs. The Compact allows for migration from both countries to the United States and established U.S. defense rights and obligations in the region. Provisions of the Compact that deal with economic assistance were scheduled to expire in 2001; however, they will remain in effect for up to 2 additional years while the affected provisions are renegotiated. Current U.S. proposals to the FSM and the RMI to renew expiring assistance would require Congress to approve $3.4 billion in new authorizations. The proposals would provide decreasing levels of annual grant assistance over a 20-year term. Simultaneously, the proposals would require building up a trust fund for each country with earnings that would replace grants once those grants expire. The U.S. proposals include strengthened accountability measures, though details of some key measures remain unknown. The proposals have addressed many, but not all, recommendations that GAO made in past reports regarding assistance accountability. |
gao_GAO-12-160 | gao_GAO-12-160_0 | The Federal Reserve regulations governing S&L holding companies state that an S&L holding company “shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary savings associations.” The Dodd-Frank Act defines the term “source of strength” as the ability of a company that directly or indirectly owns or controls an insured depository institution to provide financial assistance in the event of financial distress of the insured institution. Exempt Financial Institutions Vary by Size, Ownership, Activities, and Risks
Financial institutions that are exempt from the BHC Act definition of bank make up a small percentage of the overall banking system—1,002 institutions (about 7 percent)—and include ILCs, limited-purpose credit card banks, municipal deposit banks, trust banks with insured deposits, and S&Ls. If S&Ls, which are different from the other types of exempt institutions in that they are regulated by the Federal Reserve at the holding company level, are excluded, the percentage drops to less than 1 percent, or 57 institutions. Views on the Adequacy of Federal Regulation of Exempt Institutions Are Mixed
Representatives from the exempt financial institutions and an academic told us that the current regulatory framework was sufficiently robust. FDIC officials believe that they can adequately supervise exempt institutions but acknowledged the safety and soundness benefits of consolidated supervision. Federal Reserve and Treasury officials said while exempt institutions have access to federal deposit insurance, most are not subject to consolidated supervision. Removing the Exemptions Would Likely Have a Limited Impact on the Overall Credit Market and Would Not Increase Concentration in Most Credit Markets
Market Shares for Exempt Institutions Limit Potential Impact on Overall Credit Market of Removing Exemptions
Removing the exemptions to the BHC Act would likely have a limited impact on the overall credit market given the small portion of the credit market that exempt institutions represent. Views Varied on How Removing the Exemptions Would Impact Institutions’ Safety and Soundness and Financial System Stability
Representatives from three exempt institutions stated that if the exemptions were removed, they would see no additional improvement in safety and soundness. Federal Reserve and Treasury officials maintained that the safety and soundness of exempt institutions would be improved if the BHC Act exemptions were removed because exempt institutions—and their holding companies— would be subject to consolidated supervision. In contrast, the other exempt institutions are few in number and size, but their holding companies are not subject to Federal Reserve’s supervision. Treasury provided written comments that have been reprinted in appendix III. We also received technical comments from the New York State Department of Financial Services, FDIC, and OCC, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the number of certain institutions in the U.S. banking system that are exempt from the definition of bank in the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act) and identifies general characteristics of these institutions; (2) the federal regulatory system for the exempt financial institutions and views of exempted entities; and (3) the potential implications of subjecting holding companies for the exempt institutions to the BHC Act relating to the types of activities in which such institutions and their holding companies may engage, the availability and allocation of credit, the stability of the financial system and the economy, and the safe and sound operations of such institutions. Number of Institutions and General Characteristics
To determine the extent to which certain financial institutions were exempt from the BHC Act, we requested data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) relating to the number of exempt institutions, their geographic location, their asset size, and the parent holding company. To determine whether ILCs, limited-purpose credit card banks, municipal deposit banks, and trust banks were owned by commercial holding companies, we reviewed information from the federal bank regulators on the holding companies of the exempt institutions and analyzed public information, if available, on the holding companies to identify the business segments of the company. Finally, we used FDIC’s SOD data to identify commercial banks and all institutions that are subsidiaries of bank holding companies. These exempt institutions include savings and loans (S&L), industrial loan corporations, limited-purpose credit card banks, municipal deposit banks, and trust banks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) establishes the legal framework under which bank holding companiesthat is, companies which own or control banksoperate and restricts the type of activities that these companies may conduct. The BHC Act excludes from these restrictions certain companies because the financial institutions they own are exempt from the BHC Act definition of bank. However, these exempt institutions are eligible for FDIC insurance raising questions about continuing to exempt their holding companies from BHC Act requirements.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act directs GAO to study the implications of removing the exemptions. This report examines (1) the number and general characteristics of certain institutions in the U.S. banking system that are exempt from the definition of bank in the BHC Act, (2) the federal regulatory system for exempt financial institutions, and (3) potential implications of subjecting the holding companies of exempt institutions to BHC Act requirements. GAO analyzed data and exams from exempt institutions and regulators, and examined regulators guidance and policies. GAO also interviewed regulators and officials from 31 exempt financial institutions.
We provided a draft of this report to the relevant agencies. Treasury provided written comments and we received technical comments from other agencies which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The 1,002 exempt financial institutions make up a small percentage of the assets of the overall banking systemabout 7 percentand include industrial loan corporations (ILC), limited-purpose credit card banks, municipal deposit banks, trust banks with insured deposits, and savings and loans (S&L). Although exempt from the BHC Act, S&L holding companies are regulated by the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (Federal Reserve) under the Home Owners Loan Act as amended. Excluding S&Ls, the number of exempt institutions drops to 57 that comprise less than 1 percent of banking system assets and there is a 3-year moratorium on the approval of federal deposit insurance on select exempt institutions that ends in 2013. These institutions vary by size, activities, and risks. Larger institutions such as ILCs provide banking services similar to those of commercial banks and carry many of the same risks. Other exempt institutions are smaller, provide only a few services such as credit card loans and related services, and thus have lower risk profiles.
Federal regulation of the holding companies of exempt institutions and their affiliates varies. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) oversee ILCs, credit card banks, and trust banks, and focus their supervision on the institutions, not the parent holding companies. They examine the institutions for safety and soundness and for potential conflicts of interest in transactions with affiliates and the holding company. In contrast, the Federal Reserve oversees bank and, more recently, S&L holding companies using consolidated supervision that allows examiners to look at all entities and affiliates in the structure. OCC officials and representatives of exempt institutions viewed the current oversight was sufficiently robust. FDIC officials indicated that supervision of the exempt institutions themselves was adequate, but noted that consolidated supervision authorities provide important safety and soundness safeguards. Officials from the Federal Reserve and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) stated that the exemptions should be removed, given that exempt institutions have access to FDIC insurance and the holding companies of most types of exempt institutions are not subject to consolidated supervision.
The implications of subjecting exempt institutions and their holding companies to the BHC Act vary. While many officials from the exempt institutions owned by commercial holding companies said that the institutions would be divested, data suggest that removing the exemptions would likely have a limited impact on the overall credit market given the overall market share of exempt institutions is small. Views varied on how removing the exemptions would improve safety and soundness and financial stability. Some officials from exempt institutions said that financial stability could be adversely affected by further concentrating market share. Federal Reserve officials noted that institutions that remain exempt are not subject to consolidated supervision but could grow large enough to pose significant risks to the financial system, an issue they plan to continue to watch. |
gao_HEHS-00-144 | gao_HEHS-00-144_0 | During fiscal years 1994 through 1998, more than half of OSHA’s inspections were programmed. OSHA Inspections at Establishments With and Without Labor Unrest
During fiscal years 1994 through 1998, OSHA inspected, on average, about 8.6 percent of the approximately 22,000 establishments each year that experienced labor unrest (about 1,900 inspections a year). 1). Statutory Requirement and OSHA Policy May Be Associated With Higher Inspection Rate for Establishments With Labor Unrest
The statutory requirement that OSHA investigate valid complaints and its long-standing policy to investigate fatalities and catastrophes may help to explain the higher rate of inspection for establishments with labor unrest. In contrast, only 27 percent of all inspections OSHA conducted during this period were the result of a complaint (22 percent) or a fatality or catastrophe (5 percent) (see fig. Thus, OSHA inspections at establishments experiencing labor unrest were 2.5 times more likely to result from a complaint, fatality, or catastrophe than OSHA inspections in general. Higher Representation of Unionized Establishments in Inspections of Establishments With Labor Unrest
Approximately 76 percent of the OSHA inspections at establishments experiencing labor unrest during fiscal years 1994 through 1998 were conducted at unionized establishments. 3). Under these policies, federal and state OSHA officials stated that inspections resulting from complaints, fatalities, and catastrophes are to be conducted even during periods of labor unrest. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which employers experiencing labor unrest are more likely to be inspected than employers not experiencing labor unrest, and (2) whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has policies for performing inspections during labor unrest and whether these policies are being followed. To determine whether employers experiencing labor unrest are more likely to be inspected than employers not experiencing labor unrest, we (1) identified the universe of establishments that experienced labor unrest and determined how many of these were inspected by OSHA and (2) determined how many of the establishments that did not experience labor unrest were inspected by OSHA. This accounted for approximately 40,000 cases each year. 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed worker protection, focusing on: (1) the extent to which employers experiencing labor unrest are more likely to be inspected than employers not experiencing labor unrest; and (2) whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has policies for performing inspections during labor unrest and whether these policies are followed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) establishments experiencing labor unrest are about 6.5 times more likely to be inspected by OSHA than establishments not experiencing labor unrest (8.6 percent inspected compared with about 1.3 percent) during fiscal years (FY) 1994 through 1998; (2) the statutory requirement that OSHA investigate valid complaints and OSHA's policy to investigate a fatality or catastrophe may be related to the higher rate of inspection for establishments experiencing labor unrest; (3) about 68 percent of the approximately 1,900 OSHA inspections conducted each year at establishments experiencing labor unrest resulted from complaints, fatalities, or catastrophes; (4) in contrast, only about 27 percent of the approximately 100,000 total inspections OSHA conducted each year resulted from complaints, fatalities, or catastrophes; (5) about 76 percent of the establishments with labor unrest that were inspected by OSHA from FY 1994 through FY 1998 were unionized, as compared with about 24 percent of all establishments inspected by OSHA over this period; (6) while it did not appear that unionized establishments were in general more likely to receive a complaint-based inspection than nonunionized establishments, GAO's analysis did find that, among establishments experiencing labor unrest, there were a higher proportion of complaint-based inspections at unionized establishments than at nonunionized establishments; (7) OSHA's policy concerning inspections during labor unrest provides discretion for programmed inspections; (8) OSHA may delay programmed inspections during periods of labor unrest, such as a strike, which would prevent OSHA inspectors from witnessing actual work operations; (9) however, OSHA officials said that it has rarely delayed these inspections; and (10) statutory requirements or OSHA's long-standing policy dictate that inspections resulting from valid complaints, fatalities, or catastrophes--which accounted for the majority of OSHA's inspections at establishments with labor unrest during FY 1994 through FY 1998--must be performed, regardless of whether labor unrest exists. |
gao_GAO-05-836T | gao_GAO-05-836T_0 | States Have Used Intergovernmental Transfers to Facilitate Financing Schemes That Inappropriately Increase Federal Medicaid Reimbursements
For many years, states have used varied financing schemes, sometimes involving IGTs, to inappropriately increase federal Medicaid reimbursements. These transactions create the illusion of valid expenditures for services delivered by local-government providers to Medicaid-eligible individuals and enable states to claim large federal reimbursements. Table 2 describes some of the states’ financing schemes over the years and how Congress and CMS have responded to them. Although states are allowed, under law and CMS policy, to claim federal reimbursements for supplemental payments they make to providers up to the UPL ceilings, we have reported earlier that payments in excess of the provider’s costs that are not retained by the provider as reimbursement for services actually provided are inconsistent with Medicaid’s federal-state partnership and fiscal integrity. We previously estimated that one state effectively increased the federal share of its total Medicaid expenditures from 59 percent to 68 percent in state fiscal year 2001, by obtaining excessive federal funds and using these as the state’s share of other Medicaid expenditures. Our work in this area has addressed claims for Medicaid school-based health services and administration. We further found that, in some states, funding arrangements among schools, states, and private consulting firms created adverse incentives for program oversight and caused schools to receive a small portion—as little as $7.50 for every $100 in Medicaid claims—of Medicaid reimbursement for school-based administrative and service claims. According to a state official and documents provided by the state, the state retained $3.9 million, or 16 percent, of federal reimbursements that were claimed on behalf of the school districts for state fiscal year 2003, most of which was used to pay its contingency-fee consultant and about $1 million of which was used to cover the salaries and administrative costs of the five state employees who administered school- based claims in Georgia. States’ Use of Contingency-Fee Consultants to Maximize Federal Reimbursements Highlights Need for Improved Federal Oversight
A growing number of states are using consultants on a contingency-fee basis to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements. CMS reported that, according to a survey it conducted in 2004, 34 states had used consultants on a contingency-fee basis for this purpose, an increase from 10 states reported to have such arrangements in 2002. We identified claims from contingency-fee consultant projects that appear to be inconsistent with current CMS policy and claims that are inconsistent with federal law; we also identified claims from projects that undermine Medicaid’s fiscal integrity. First, many projects were in categories of Medicaid claims where federal requirements for the services have been inconsistently applied, are evolving, or were not specific. Some Contingency-Fee Projects in Georgia and Massachusetts Resulted in Problematic Federal Reimbursements
For the five categories of claims we reviewed where states frequently used contingency-fee consultants to maximize their federal Medicaid reimbursements, we identified problematic claims in each category in either Georgia or Massachusetts or in both states. As of May 2005, however, this guidance had not been issued. CMS has undertaken important steps to improve its financial management of the Medicaid program. GAO-05-748. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid--the federal-state health care financing program covering almost 54 million low-income people at a cost of $276 billion in fiscal year 2003--is by its size and structure at significant risk of waste and exploitation. Because of challenges inherent in overseeing the program, which is administered federally by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), GAO added Medicaid to its list of high-risk federal programs in 2003. Over the years, states have found various ways to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements, sometimes using consultants paid a contingency fee to help them do so. From earlier work and a report issued today (GAO-05-748), GAO's testimony addresses (1) how some states have inappropriately increased federal reimbursements; (2) some ways states have increased federal reimbursements for school-based Medicaid services and administrative costs; and (3) how states are using contingency-fee consultants to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements and how CMS is overseeing states' efforts.
What GAO Found
For many years, GAO has reported on varied financing schemes and questionable methods used by states to increase the federal reimbursements they receive for operating their state Medicaid programs. These schemes and methods can undermine Medicaid's federal-state partnership and threaten its fiscal integrity. For example, some states make large supplemental payments to government-owned or government-operated entities for delivery of Medicaid services while requiring these entities to return the payments to the state. This process creates the illusion of valid expenditures in order to obtain federal reimbursement, effectively shifting a portion of the state's share of program expenditures to the federal government and increasing the federal share beyond that established by formula under law. Medicaid funding is available for local school districts for certain health services for eligible children and for administrative costs. To claim increased federal Medicaid reimbursement, however, some states and school districts have used methods lacking sufficient controls to ensure that claims were legitimate. GAO also found funding arrangements among schools, states, and private consulting firms where some states retained up to 85 percent of reimbursements for administrative costs. In some cases, school districts paid contingency fees to consultants. A growing number of states are using consultants on a contingency-fee basis to maximize federal Medicaid reimbursements. As of 2004, 34 states--up from 10 states in 2002--used contingency-fee consultants for this purpose. GAO identified claims in each of five categories of claims from contingency-fee projects that appeared to be inconsistent with current CMS policy, inconsistent with federal law, or that undermined the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program. Problematic projects often were in categories where federal requirements were inconsistently applied, evolving, or not specific. CMS has taken steps to improve its fiscal management of Medicaid, but a lack of oversight and clear guidance from CMS has allowed states to develop new financing methods or continue existing ones that take advantage of ambiguity and generate considerable additional federal costs. |
gao_GAO-15-722T | gao_GAO-15-722T_0 | For example, the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 designated the U.S Operating Segment of the ISS as a national laboratory and the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 directed the NASA Administrator to provide initial financial assistance and enter into a cooperative agreement with a not-for-profit organization to manage the activities of the ISS National Laboratory for non-NASA utilization of the ISS research capabilities and available facilities. CASIS is also charged with maximizing the use of the ISS for advancing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. In late June 2015, SpaceX experienced a launch failure during a cargo resupply launch that resulted in the loss of that mission. Based on our analysis of NASA’s fiscal year 2016 budget estimate, the agency anticipates that the costs to operate, sustain, perform research, and provide crew and cargo transportation to the ISS are projected to increase by almost $1 billion—or almost 53 percent—from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2020 when the projected costs are expected to exceed $4 billion. The majority of the total projected cost increase for ISS is due to the ISS program’s need to pay for commercial crew and cargo transportation. The budget for ISS cargo and crew transportation is currently planned to increase by over $700 million from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2020, at which point it will comprise over 55 percent of the total ISS budget. ISS program officials told us that in fiscal year 2017, the program will begin to fund commercial crew missions that are expected to take place in fiscal NASA has also initiated steps to purchase six Soyuz seats year 2019.from Russia for flights to the ISS in 2018, the cost of which ISS program officials said was accounted for in the projected transportation costs. Based on our analysis of NASA’s fiscal year 2016 budget estimate, the cost to operate the ISS is expected to be relatively stable with only slight increases through fiscal year 2020. NASA and CASIS Face Challenges to Increase Utilization and Sustain the ISS Which Could Affect Return on Investment
As we reported in April 2015, NASA and CASIS must overcome several challenges to increase utilization and sustain the ISS until 2024 and achieve a better return on the investment. According to NASA and CASIS officials, as CASIS increases the number of experiments for the ISS National Laboratory, the demand for crew time and certain research facilities aboard the ISS is expected to increase and officials project the ISS National Laboratory will be challenged to meet that demand. This pressure will likely be increased because of the June 2015 launch failure of a SpaceX cargo resupply mission. Absorbing the increased cost has been a challenge for CASIS given its limited research budget, but it is addressing the cost increases due to delays by asking researchers that have biological payloads to identify the impact and associated costs for launch delays in their budgets so it can plan for budget reserves, as necessary. Objective Assessment of Progress Needed to Demonstrate Return on Investment
Despite these challenges, in April 2015, we reported that CASIS had taken steps to carry out its responsibilities to manage and promote research activities on the ISS National Laboratory as outlined in its cooperative agreement. While we noted this progress, we found that CASIS and NASA could do more to objectively define, assess, and report progress toward increased utilization. Specifically, we found that while CASIS had established annual metrics that met most of the key attributes of successful performance measures, it did not establish measurable targets or goals for either fiscal year 2014 or 2015 metrics. We have previously reported that performance metrics should have quantifiable, numerical targets or other measurable values, which help assess whether overall goals and objectives were achieved. To enable such assessments, in April 2015 we recommended that the ISS program manager work with CASIS to collectively develop and approve measurable targets for CASIS’s metrics for fiscal year 2016 and beyond. NASA concurred with this recommendation and indicated that these targets should be established by December 31, 2015. Also in our April 2015 report, we found that while NASA performs an annual assessment of CASIS’s performance, the assessment is not documented. This type of documented information is important to support decision making and to support future assessments of return on investment. However, without definitive and documented assessment factors, NASA will also be challenged to take action in response to CASIS performance. NASA concurred with the recommendation and stated that officials would begin documenting the agency’s annual program assessment in response to CASIS’s 2015 annual report. Because CASIS is allocated at least 50 percent of ISS research capacity, ensuring that CASIS continues to make progress promoting research activities and achieving its goal to increase utilization of the ISS is essential. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has spent tens of billions of dollars to develop, assemble, and operate the ISS over the past two decades. NASA plans to spend about $22 billion more from fiscal year 2016 through 2020—with over half of that planned for transportation—on the ISS. In January 2014, the Administration proposed extending the life of the ISS to at least 2024 to take further advantage of the investment in the ISS. Since 2005, Congress enacted several laws to increase utilization of the ISS by commercial and academic researchers. The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 required NASA to enter into a cooperative agreement with a not-for-profit entity to manage the ISS National Laboratory and in 2011 it did so with CASIS. CASIS is charged with maximizing use of the ISS for scientific research by executing several required activities.
This statement will provide an overview of (1) NASA's budget for ISS and the factors affecting budget levels through 2020, (2) several challenges that could impact effective utilization of ISS by both NASA and CASIS, and (3) steps that NASA and CASIS could take to better document and assess CASIS's progress in this regard.
This statement is based primarily on GAO's April 2015 report (GAO-15-397) as well as other prior reports and testimonies. GAO also conducted a limited amount of additional audit work in June 2015 to update certain information.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO analysis of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) fiscal year 2016 budget estimate, the agency anticipates that the costs to operate, sustain, perform research, and provide crew and cargo transportation to the International Space Station (ISS) are projected to increase by almost $1 billion—or almost 53 percent—from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2020 when the projected costs are expected to exceed $4 billion. The majority of the total projected cost increase for ISS is attributable to commercial crew and cargo transportation. The budget for ISS cargo and crew transportation is currently planned to increase by over $700 million from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2020—or over 55 percent of the total ISS budget—which includes the purchase of six Russian Soyuz seats in 2018 and commercial crew missions beginning in fiscal year 2019. The costs to operate the ISS and perform research are expected to be stable with only slight increases through fiscal year 2020.
NASA and the Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS)—a non-profit entity selected to manage non-NASA research on the ISS National Laboratory—must overcome several challenges to increase utilization and achieve a better return on investment. NASA and CASIS officials told GAO that the ISS will be challenged to meet an expected increase in demand for crew time and certain research facilities. Securing cargo transportation has also presented challenges. CASIS-sponsored researchers have experienced cost increases of almost $500,000 because of a cargo resupply launch failure in October 2014 and delays to other cargo resupply missions. GAO found that absorbing the increased cost has been a challenge for CASIS given its limited research budget and it could be faced with additional cost increases given the June 2015 launch failure of another cargo resupply mission.
In April 2015, GAO found that CASIS had taken steps to manage and promote research activities on the ISS National Laboratory, but that CASIS and NASA could do more to objectively define, assess, and report progress toward increased utilization. While CASIS had established annual metrics, it did not establish measurable targets for these metrics. GAO has previously reported that performance metrics should have quantifiable targets to help assess whether overall goals are achieved. Consequently, GAO recommended that the ISS program and CASIS develop measurable targets for CASIS's metrics for fiscal year 2016 and beyond. NASA concurred with this recommendation and indicated that these targets should be established by the end of 2015. GAO's April 2015 report also found that while NASA performs an annual assessment of CASIS's performance, the assessment is not documented. This type of documented information can support future assessments of return on investment. GAO recommended that NASA document the annual program assessment of CASIS performance. NASA concurred with this recommendation and plans to take action in response to CASIS's 2015 annual report. Because CASIS is allocated at least 50 percent of ISS research capacity, ensuring that CASIS continues to make progress promoting research activities and achieving its goal to increase utilization of ISS is essential to demonstrate a return on investment for the tens of billions of dollars already invested and that will continued to be invested in ISS. |
gao_AIMD-98-39 | gao_AIMD-98-39_0 | Establishing. These comments are discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section and are reprinted in appendix I.
SSA Has Initiated Actions to Improve Its Software Development Capability
Recognizing the need to improve its software development capability, SSA has launched a formal software process improvement program and initiated pilot projects to test improved software development processes. SSA acquired the assistance of SEI to help formulate and implement the improvement program. It has put in place the initial management infrastructure to support and facilitate its software process improvement initiatives by establishing a management steering committee to raise organizational awareness of the improvement program and a software engineering process group to oversee the development and implementation of the software process activities. With SEI’s assistance, SSA conducted a self-assessment to determine the strengths and weaknesses of its current processes for developing and maintaining software, which are primarily mainframe-oriented. Software Process Improvement Program Lacks Measurable Goals
Although SSA has made important progress in its efforts to improve its software development processes, its improvement program does not yet include specific, measurable goals and baseline data that are essential to helping it achieve a repeatable (level 2) software development capability. Without measurable goals and baseline data, SSA does not yet have critical information needed to guide its improvement efforts and to provide evidence that the efforts are resulting in more consistent, cost-effective, and timely production of higher quality products. At that time, we will send copies to the Commissioner of Social Security; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) software development process improvement efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA has initiated a number of actions to improve its software development capability; (2) among other things, it has: (a) launched a formal software process improvement program and initiated pilot projects to test improved software development processes; (b) acquired the assistance of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) to help it assess the strengths and weaknesses in its current software development processes and to assist in implementing the improvement program; and (c) established a management steering committee and a software engineering process group within the Office of Systems to oversee software process improvement activities; (3) these are positive steps that should help position SSA to improve its software development capability; (4) although these initiatives are under way, SSA has not yet established key elements of its software process improvement program that are needed to measure the progress and success of its improvement efforts; (5) in particular, SSA has not yet defined specific, measurable goals for its software process improvement program or established the baseline data that it will use to assess its progress in achieving these goals; and (6) without this essential information, SSA cannot be assured of the extent to which its improvement efforts will result in the consistent and cost-effective production of high-quality products. |
gao_GAO-04-657 | gao_GAO-04-657_0 | WIA Performance Data Provide a Long- Term National Picture of Outcomes, but Are Less Useful for Gauging Current Performance and Represent a Small Portion of WIA Participants
WIA performance data are useful for providing a long-term national picture of program outcomes; however, these data are less useful for providing information about current performance, and represent only a small portion of job seekers that received WIA services. UI wage recordsthe primary data source for tracking WIA performance—provide a fairly consistent national view of WIA performance and allow for tracking outcomes over time. In addition, the states’ annual reports reflect only a small portion of job seekers who receive WIA services because, under the law and Labor’s guidance, not all job seekers who utilize one-stop services are required to be included in the performance reports. The amount of time between when participants receive services and when their outcomes are reported to Labor varies, but it is about 1½ years at a minimum. Despite the progress states and local areas have made in developing and using interim outcome information, nearly all states and local areas reported they would like more help from Labor in collecting and disseminating promising practices on interim indicators to assess WIA performance. Nonetheless, most states and local areas have developed ways to assess the performance of their one-stops, using four basic types of indicatorsjob seeker measures, employer measures, program partnership measures, and family and community indicators. Labor Has Taken Actions to Improve WIA’s Performance Measurement System and Assess One-Stops but Could Do More
Although Labor has taken steps to improve WIA’s performance measurement system and assess one-stops, some of its efforts do not go far enough. Labor has commissioned a study of adjustment methods that would better take into account economic and demographic differences when negotiating performance levels. While Labor has plans to conduct impact studies, the department will not meet WIA’s requirement to conduct an impact study by 2005, and without such a study, little will be known about WIA’s effectiveness. While most of Labor’s policies for the common measures can advance measurement across one-stop partners, Labor plans to rely almost entirely on the UI wage records and discontinue the use of supplemental data for filling gaps in UI wage records. But in order to meet their performance levels, some states must continue to rely on other data sources to fill gaps. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, And Methodology
We examined (1) how useful WIA performance data are in gauging program performance, (2) what local areas are doing to manage their WIA performance and assess one-stop success on a timely basis and how states are assisting these efforts, and (3) to what extent Labor is trying to improve WIA’s performance measurement system and assess one-stop success. | Why GAO Did This Study
With rising federal deficits and greater competition for public resources, it is increasingly important for federal programs, such as the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs, to show results. This report examines (1) how useful WIA performance data are for gauging program performance; (2) what local areas are doing to manage their WIA performance and assess one-stops on a timely basis, and how states assist these efforts; and (3) the extent to which the Department of Labor is trying to improve WIA's performance measurement system and assess one-stop success.
What GAO Found
WIA performance data provide a long-term national picture of outcomes, but these data offer little information about current performance and represent a small portion of job seekers who received WIA services. Unemployment Insurance wage records--the primary data source for tracking WIA performance--provide reliable outcome information over time. But they have shortcomings, such as not including some categories of workers, and considerable time lags before data are available. Many states rely on alternative data sources to fill gaps in the wage records. However, the time between when a participant receives services and when their outcomes are reported to Labor can range from about 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years or longer. In addition, states' annual reports reflect only a small portion of job seekers who receive WIA services because of restrictions in the law and policies of Labor. With assistance from states, many local areas collect interim outcome information from former participants or employers and use other interim indicators to track WIA performance levels long before wage record data are available. However, states and local areas would like more help from Labor in disseminating best practices on interim performance measures. In addition, these efforts tell them little about the performance of their overall one-stop systems. Many states and local areas rely on other indicators--job seeker measures, employer measures, program partnership measures, and family and community indicators to assess their one-stops. Labor has taken steps to improve WIA's performance system and assess onestops, but could do more. Although Labor is studying adjustment methods that could better take into account local differences when negotiating performance levels, it has not committed to using such a method nationally. Labor also has efforts to improve the quality of WIA's performance data and is developing a set of common measures for one-stop partner programs. Yet as part of the common measures, Labor plans to restrict the use of alternative data. Labor has also delayed plans to conduct an impact evaluation and will not meet its statutory requirement to do so by 2005. |
gao_GAO-11-863 | gao_GAO-11-863_0 | The National Foster Care Data System Offers Limited Information, but Shows Thousands of These Children Enter Foster Care Annually
HHS data provided by states identified at least several thousand children nationwide who entered foster care due to the incarceration of a parent in a recent year, but this does not include the total population of foster care children with incarcerated parents. When a parent is incarcerated sometime after the child enters foster care. The fact that foster care children of incarcerated parents are not a well- identified population nationally precludes analyzing those children’s characteristics and experiences, or determining whether they differ from other foster care children in terms of their backgrounds, case management, or outcomes. Strategies for Preserving Families Include Flexibility in Timelines for Terminating Parental Rights, Programs for Parents, and Interagency Collaboration
In our examination of 10 states and their child welfare and corrections agencies, we found states employed a number of strategies to support family ties for all children of incarcerated parents, including some strategies designed specifically for children in foster care. Colorado does not require courts to consider the fact that the child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months when deciding whether to terminate parental rights if the reason for the child’s length of stay is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control, such as the parent’s incarceration “for a reasonable period of time.”
While many of the state child welfare officials we spoke to said that federal timelines were difficult to meet for parents serving lengthier sentences, many state and local child welfare officials as well as child advocacy representatives did not think that such timelines should be changed specifically for incarcerated parents. HHS and DOJ Provide Some Relevant Information and Assistance, but State Agencies Are Not Always Aware of These Resources
HHS and DOJ each provide information and assistance to child welfare and corrections agencies related to children with incarcerated parents, albeit not usually focused on foster care children in particular. Both HHS and DOJ post information on their websites relevant to practitioners working with children or their incarcerated parents. Although the Second Chance Act gives DOJ discretionary authority to collect and disseminate information on best practices in collaboration between state corrections and welfare agencies, DOJ has not taken initiative in this area. BOP has also not developed any protocols to the federal prisons under its own jurisdiction for working with child welfare agencies and their staff. Moreover, a number of child welfare officials, local caseworkers, and dependency court judges told us that it can be particularly difficult to establish appropriate contact with federal prisons and several said that more collaboration from federal prisons would help facilitate their work with foster care children with incarcerated parents. This is in keeping with one of BOP’s strategic planning goals that aims to build partnerships with other entities to help improve the effectiveness of its services and promote reintegration of offenders into communities. Officials said that corrections agencies would benefit from practices that could improve prison visits for foster care children, tools that could facilitate communication between child welfare and corrections staff, and ways to share their data on affected families. Recommendations
We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services: 1. For example, HHS could take steps to update and more centrally organize relevant information posted on the Child Welfare Information Gateway, which is meant to serve as a comprehensive information resource for the child welfare field, such as by regularly updating the information listed under the Gateway’s relevant topic areas (e.g., “Children in Out-of-Home-Care With Incarcerated Parents”) with links to more recent material posted on other HHS-supported websites; identify or provide additional information on promising approaches, such as those listed by the Office of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation; use relevant findings from the CFSR process as an opportunity to remind states about available resources and post information on promising approaches identified in the reviews; or facilitate awareness among all child welfare agencies about HHS’s available resources through an e-mail or a teleconference/webinar that would allow state and local agencies to share information on practices or strategies. Specifically, we examined pertinent data from two federal data sources; conducted phone interviews with 10 state child welfare and corrections agencies and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and reviewed relevant state laws and policies pertaining to children in foster care with incarcerated parents; conducted site visits in 4 of the 10 phone interview states; and conducted interviews with federal agencies, as well as professionals from a range of national organizations, including family resource centers, corrections associations, and child welfare organizations. State Phone Interviews
We administered structured telephone interviews to both the state child welfare and corrections agencies in 10 selected states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law sets timelines for states' decisions about placing foster care children in permanent homes, and, in some cases, for filing to terminate parental rights. Some policymakers have questioned the reasonableness of these timelines for children of incarcerated parents and expressed interest in how states work with these families. GAO was asked to examine: (1) the number of foster care children with incarcerated parents, (2) strategies used by child welfare and corrections agencies in selected states that may support contact or reunification, and (3) how the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have helped these agencies support affected children and families. GAO analyzed national data, reviewed federal policies, interviewed state child welfare and corrections officials in 10 selected states that contain almost half of the nation's prison and foster care populations, and visited local child welfare agencies and prisons.
What GAO Found
Foster care children with an incarcerated parent are not a well-identified population, although they are likely to number in the tens of thousands. HHS data collected from states show that, in 2009 alone, more than 14,000 children entered foster care due at least partly to the incarceration of a parent. This may be an undercount, however, due to some underreporting from states and other factors. For instance, the data do not identify when a parent is incarcerated after the child entered foster care--a more common occurrence, according to case workers GAO interviewed. HHS is currently developing a proposal for new state reporting requirements on all foster care children; however, officials had not determined whether these new requirements would include more information collected from states on children with incarcerated parents. In 10 selected states, GAO found a range of strategies that support family ties. Some state child welfare agencies have provided guidance and training to caseworkers for managing such cases; and local agencies have worked with dependency courts to help inmates participate in child welfare hearings by phone or other means. For their part, some corrections agencies ease children's visits to prisons with special visitation hours and programs. In several cases, corrections agencies and child welfare agencies have collaborated, which has resulted in some interagency training for personnel, the creation of liaison staff positions, and video visitation facilitated by non-profit providers. HHS and DOJ each provide information and assistance to child welfare and corrections agencies on behalf of these children and families. For example, both federal agencies post information on their websites for practitioners working with children or their incarcerated parents, with some specific to foster care. The HHS information, however, was not always up to date or centrally organized, and officials from most of the state child welfare and corrections agencies GAO interviewed said they would benefit from information on how to serve these children. Further, DOJ has not developed protocols for federal prisons under its own jurisdiction for working with child welfare agencies and their staff, although GAO heard from some state and local child welfare officials that collaboration between child welfare and corrections agencies would facilitate their work with foster care children and their parents. This would also be in keeping with a DOJ agency goal to build partnerships with other entities to improve services and promote reintegration of offenders into communities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS improve its data on the foster care children of incarcerated parents and that it more systematically disseminate information to child welfare agencies. GAO also recommends that DOJ consider ways to promote collaboration between corrections and child welfare agencies, including establishing protocols for federal prisons to facilitate communication between these entities. HHS and DOJ agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
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