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gao_GAO-06-450 | gao_GAO-06-450_0 | After the events surrounding the November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being implemented. Specifically, primarily with respect to federal elections, our objectives were to examine each major stage of the election process to (1) identify changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the issues and challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election. The Election Assistance Commission is to be involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to states implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements to some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop testing for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. States receiving funds to replace punch card voting systems or lever voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1, 2006; otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November 2004 general elections. Scope and Methodology
For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a nationally representative stratified random probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with election officials in 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Under HAVA, this has changed. Under NVRA, in the administration of voter registration for federal elections, states may not remove the names of people who are registered to vote for nonvoting and names may be removed only for certain specified reasons: at the request of the registrant; by reason of criminal conviction, as provided by state law; by reason of mental incapacity, as provided by state law; or pursuant to a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists by reason of the death of the voter or on the ground that the voter has changed address to a location outside the election jurisdiction on the basis of change of address information from the U.S. This distinction has importance on Election Day for first-time voters who registered through registration drives. Some election officials said that the increased early voter turnout during this election resulted in long lines. Since the November 2000 general election, some states have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for all voters. We use paper ballots. However, large and medium jurisdictions encountered difficulties to a greater extent than small jurisdictions. Some of the challenges reported by these officials included keeping poll workers informed about new or changing requirements, conveying a vast amount of information about election processes to a large number of people in a limited time, and ensuring that poll workers understand their tasks and responsibilities. On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways regarding how they implemented HAVA’s provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. As a result, states establish, under their own election codes, the applicable jurisdiction where voters must cast their provisional ballot from in order for such ballot to be eligible to be counted. Specifically, we estimate 66 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) of jurisdictions had a problem with voters not meeting residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction, 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) received insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at motor vehicle agency offices, 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had instances of insufficient evidence that individuals had registered or tried to register directly with the election office, 34 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had registration applications received by the registrar very close to or after the registration deadline, 32 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had voters not providing identification as specified by HAVA for registrants who registered by mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or jurisdiction, 29 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) received insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted voter registration applications at National Voter Registration Act agencies other than motor vehicle agency offices, 28 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) had provisional ballot envelopes or ballots that were incomplete or illegible, and 20 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters who did not sign a sworn statement that they met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precinct or jurisdiction. Not all equipment failures resulted in lost votes, but some did create technical challenges. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail, and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology. It is unclear if and when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce more integrated election system environments. It also includes election operations that affect voting equipment, such as voter processing at the polling place and handling of absentee ballots. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the nation's elections processes, not all which had to be implemented by the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 local election jurisdictions about election administration activities (80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election system characteristics.
What GAO Found
In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary voting systems standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that states made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 election. GAO also found that some challenges continued--such as problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote certification deadlines. |
gao_GAO-05-1008T | gao_GAO-05-1008T_0 | Historically, the time from the date that a patent application is filed to the date that the patent is either granted or the application is abandoned has been called “patent pendency.”
Because of long-standing concerns about the increasing volume and complexity of patent applications, USPTO has been undertaking projects to automate its patent process for about the past two decades. The agency reported spending approximately $1 billion on this initiative from 1983 through 2002. Using the Internet, patent applicants also can review the status of their applications online and the public can electronically access and search existing published patents. Two of the key systems that it is relying on to further enhance its capabilities—the electronic filing system and the Image File Wrapper—have not yielded the processing improvements that the agency has deemed essential to successfully operate in a fully integrated, electronic environment. The officials explained that, to meet the accelerated date for delivering an operational system as outlined in its strategic plan, the agency had decided in 2002 to acquire and use a document-imaging system owned by the European Patent Office, called ePhoenix, rather than develop the integrated patent processing system that had been described in its automation plans. USPTO Lacks Essential Information Technology Investment Management Processes to Support Its Patent Automation
USPTO’s ineffective planning for and management of its patent automation projects, in large measure, can be attributed to enterprise- level, systemic weaknesses in the agency’s information technology investment management processes. USPTO Has Taken Steps to Help Attract and Retain a Qualified Patent Examiner Workforce, but Long- Term Success Is Uncertain
Since 2000, USPTO has also taken steps intended to help attract and retain a qualified patent examination workforce. However, during the past 5 years, its recruiting efforts and use of benefits have not been consistently sustained, and officials and examiners at all levels in the agency told us that the economy has more of an impact on their ability to attract and retain examiners than any actions taken by the agency. USPTO has also used many of the human capital benefits available under federal personnel regulations to attract and retain qualified patent examiners. However, it is too soon to determine the long-term effect of the agency’s efforts, in part because neither its recruiting efforts nor the human capital benefits have been consistently sustained due to budgetary constraints. USPTO Has Made Greater Progress on Strategic Plan Initiatives that Enhance the Agency’s Capability Rather than Productivity and Agility
In carrying out its strategic plan to become a more productive and responsive organization, our work found that USPTO has made greater progress in implementing its initiatives to make the patent organization more capable by improving the quality of examiners’ skills and work processes than it has in implementing its productivity and agility initiatives aimed at decreasing the length of time to process a patent application and improving electronic processing. Nonetheless, after spending over a billion dollars on its efforts, the agency is still not yet effectively positioned to process patent applications in a fully automated environment. Moreover, when and how it will actually achieve this capability is uncertain. Although USPTO’s director and its chief information officer have recognized the need to improve the agency’s planning and management of its automation initiatives, weaknesses in key information technology management processes needed to guide the agency’s investments in patent automation, such as incomplete capital planning and investment controls, could preclude their ability to successfully accomplish this. Given the weaknesses in USPTO’s information technology investment management processes, we recommended that the agency, before proceeding with any new patent automation initiatives, (1) reassess and, where necessary, revise its approach for implementing and achieving effective use of information systems supporting a fully automated patent process; (2) establish disciplined processes for planning and managing the development of patent systems based on well-established business cases; and (3) fully institute and enforce information technology investment management processes and practices to ensure that its automation initiatives support the agency’s mission and are aligned with its enterprise architecture. Further, in light of its need for a more transparent and collaborative work environment, we recommended that the agency develop formal strategies to (1) improve communication between management and patent examiners and between management and union officials and (2) foster greater collaboration among all levels of the organization to resolve key issues, such as the assumptions underlying the quota system and the need for required technical training. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is responsible for issuing patents that protect new ideas and investments in innovation and creativity. However, the volume and complexity of patent applications to the agency have increased significantly in recent years, lengthening the time needed to process patents and raising concerns about the validity of the patents that are issued. Annual applications have grown from about 185,000 to over 350,000 in the last 10 years and are projected to exceed 450,000 by 2009. Coupled with this growth is a backlog of about 750,000 applications. Further complicating matters, the agency has faced difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified staff to process patent applications. USPTO has long recognized the need to automate its patent processing and, over the past two decades, has been engaged in various automation projects. More recently, in its strategic plan, the agency articulated its approach for accelerating the use of automation and improving workforce quality. In two reports issued in June 2005, GAO discussed progress and problems that the agency faces as it develops its electronic patent process, its actions to attain a highly qualified patent examination workforce, and the progress of the agency's strategic plan initiatives. At Congress's request, this testimony summarizes the results of these GAO reports.
What GAO Found
As part of its strategy to achieve an electronic patent process, USPTO had planned to deliver an operational patent system by October 2004. It has delivered important capabilities, for example, allowing patent applicants to electronically file and view the status of their applications and the public to search published patents. Nonetheless, after spending over $1 billion on its efforts from 1983 through 2004, the agency has not yet developed the fully integrated, electronic patent process articulated in its automation plans, and when and how it will achieve this process is uncertain. Key systems that the agency is relying on to help reach this goal--an electronic application filing system and a document imaging system--have not provided capabilities that are essential to operating in a fully electronic environment. Contributing to this situation is the agency's ineffective planning for and management of its patent automation initiatives, due in large measure to enterprise-level, systemic weaknesses in its information technology investment management processes. Although the agency has begun instituting essential investment management mechanisms, such as its enterprise architecture framework, it has not yet finalized its capital planning and investment control process, or established necessary linkages between the process and its architecture to guide the development and implementation of its information technology. The Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and the agency's chief information officer have acknowledged the need for improvement. USPTO has taken steps to attract and retain a highly qualified patent examination workforce by, for example, enhancing its recruiting efforts and using many of the human capital benefits available under federal personnel regulations. However, it is too soon to determine the long-term success of the agency's efforts because they have been in place only a short time and have not been consistently sustained because of budgetary constraints. Long-term uncertainty about the agency's hiring and retention success is also due to the unknown impact of the economy. In the past, the agency had more difficulty recruiting and retaining staff when the economy was doing well. Further, USPTO faces three long-standing challenges that could undermine its efforts: the lack of an effective strategy to communicate and collaborate with examiners, outdated assumptions in production quotas that it uses to reward examiners, and the lack of required ongoing technical training for examiners. Patent examiners said the lack of a collaborative work environment has lowered morale and created an atmosphere of distrust between management and patent examiners. Overall, USPTO has made more progress in implementing its strategic plan initiatives aimed at increasing its patent processing capability through workforce and process improvements than in its initiatives to decrease patent pendency and improve electronic processing. It has fully or partially implemented all 23 capability initiatives, but only 8 of 15 initiatives to reduce patent pendency and improve electronic processing. The agency cited a lack of funding as the primary reason for not implementing all initiatives. |
gao_RCED-99-44 | gao_RCED-99-44_0 | Since 1975, most federal funding for high-speed rail development in the United States has been focused on making infrastructure improvements to Amtrak’s Northeast corridor. However, high-speed rail corridors across the United States may have access to federal funds through the High-Speed Rail program, the Magnetic Levitation Transportation Technology Deployment program, the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing program, and the finance provisions under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA) program. A secured loan would typically provide the project’s sponsors with an infusion of capital needed to help pay for construction costs. The FOX system would link Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, cover 320 miles, and have seven stops along the route. The FOX Project Faces Several Challenges
The FOX project is in the early phases of development and faces several uncertainties regarding its cost, financing, ridership, and schedule. It will be at least 2 more years before sufficient information is available to comprehensively assess the project. From our analyses of the ridership study data, an independent review of the ridership forecast, and other data we found that the ridership forecast for the project may be overstated by 30 percent or more because it relies on optimistic assumptions. Using more conservative assumptions could reduce the ridership forecast to 5.59 million passengers or fewer in 2010. The result of providing the full $2 billion to the FOX project may be that the Department dedicates over one-half of the funds available for subsidy costs under TIFIA to one project, thereby constraining the program’s ability to fund other projects. The Department Must Determine the Risk Level of Credit for Projects Funded Through TIFIA
Under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the Department has to obligate funds to cover the cost of the credit provided through TIFIA. TIFIA, as amended by the TEA-21 Restoration Act, provides $530 million over fiscal years 1999 through 2003 to cover the cost of up to $10.6 billion in credit. The preliminary cost estimates of these systems range from $315 million to $29 billion. Unlike FOX, however, most of the corridors have not determined their funding sources. The Florida Overland Express (FOX) project’s sponsors will ask the Department of Transportation to provide the project with a $2 billion loan in the near future. Currently, there is great uncertainty about whether (1) the project can be built for the $6.3 billion that the project’s most recent finance plan assumes; (2) the project’s sponsors can secure the needed funds to complete the project’s financing; (3) the estimated ridership levels are accurate and, thus, whether the project will be able to generate sufficient revenues to repay the bonds and federal loan; and (4) the sponsors can complete the complex environmental review and mitigation process in time for construction to begin by 2001. Before providing a substantial amount of federal dollars to projects, such as the Florida Overland Express project, the Secretary should obtain and independently evaluate information including (1) a capital cost estimate based on detailed engineering plans, (2) a finance plan that is based on the detailed cost estimate and that specifies the source and security of all public and private-sector financial commitments, and (3) an operating plan that enumerates the project’s future revenues and assesses the risks to the federal credit instrument should revenues be lower than projected. Officials from the Department and FDOT had specific comments on the report’s (1) analyses of the FOX project’s ridership forecast, (2) recommendations, (3) discussion of the impacts of a loan to the FOX project through the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act program, and (4) discussion of the time frames for completing the FOX project’s environmental review. Cost Estimates
The current cost estimates range from $21 billion for the new high-speed rail system to $29 billion for a maglev system. The project’s sponsors have not announced any schedule for the start of high-speed rail service. Status
Plans for a new high-speed rail system are dormant. Status
A ridership and feasibility study is under way. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of high-speed rail development in the United States, focusing on: (1) project plans for the Florida corridor for which detailed studies on building a new high-speed rail system between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa have begun; (2) the estimated cost, financing, ridership, and schedule for the Florida Overland Express (FOX) rail project; (3) the status of a new federal transportation infrastructure financing program and how federal funding decisions for the FOX project might affect the new program; and (4) the status of other planned high-speed rail corridors in the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because the Florida project is in the early phases of development, it faces uncertainties; (2) overall, it will be at least 2 more years before sufficient information is available to comprehensively assess the project's cost, financing, ridership, and schedule; (3) the project's current estimated cost ranges from $6 billion to $8 billion, however, the accuracy of the estimate is uncertain because the project is only at a 5-percent level of engineering design; (4) the finance plan, which relies heavily on debt, is incomplete, and the project's sponsors have secured only 5 percent of the estimated needed funding for the project; (5) the ridership forecast for the project relies on optimistic assumptions and could be overstated by 30 percent or more; (6) adjusting the forecast to reflect more conservative assumptions would reduce expected future system revenues and increase risks to the project's financial viability; (7) the project's ambitious schedule calls for the train to begin operating over a 320-mile route in 2005, but several factors will make it difficult to meet this schedule; (8) to help pay for the Florida project's capital costs, the project's sponsors will seek a $2 billion federal loan under the Department of Transportation's new Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act program; (9) the Department anticipates issuing regulations and guidance for this program in April 1999 and has not yet funded any projects under the program; (10) under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the Department must consider a project's risk of default and estimate the cost to the federal government of the credit provided for each project funded through the program; (11) the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act provided a total of $530 million for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 to cover the costs of providing all selected projects with credit; (12) in order to cover the cost associated with a $2-billion loan to the Florida project, the Department may need to obligate over one-half of the program's $530 million; (13) providing the Florida project with a $2-billion federal loan would constrain the Department's ability to fund other projects that are potential candidates for credit assistance; (14) at least 11 other corridors in the United States are in various stages of developing high-speed rail projects; (15) unlike the Florida project, most of the other corridors have not determined their funding sources; and (16) these 10 projects have preliminary cost estimates ranging from $315 million to $4 billion. |
gao_GAO-02-121 | gao_GAO-02-121_0 | In 1999, GAO surveyed state and local program administrators in 15 states on the overall extent to which their current information systems met different types of information needs for administering and overseeing welfare reform. The majority of the local officials that GAO surveyed reported that their current systems provided half or less of the information needed for each of the three types of information needs. A major shortcoming, cited to varying degrees by officials in these states, is that some of the systems used by the agencies providing services to TANF recipients do not share data on these recipients, thus hampering a case manager’s ability to arrange and monitor the delivery of services in a timely manner. Systems Modernization Efforts Are Underway in Several States
Presenters from North Carolina, Oregon, New Jersey, Utah, and Wisconsin described initiatives that their states had undertaken to modernize information systems for human services. Challenges for Systems Modernization Pertain to Intergovernmental Collaboration, Federal Funding Processes, and Project Management
Conference participants identified and discussed at length three key challenges for systems modernization: enhancing strategic collaboration among different levels of government, simplifying the cumbersome approval process for obtaining federal funding for information systems, and obtaining staff expertise in project management and information technology. To meet such needs, automated systems must be able to share data across the numerous programs that serve low-income families, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Medicaid, child care, job training, vocational rehabilitation, and child welfare. | What GAO Found
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 replaced the Aid to Families With Dependent Children program with a block grant to states that provide Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF strongly emphasizes work and job replacement and sets a five-year lifetime limit on federally funded TANF assistance to adults. To meet information needs for welfare reform, information systems must be able to share data across various programs, including TANF, Medicaid, job training, child care, and vocational rehabilitation. However, previous GAO studies found major gaps in states' information systems. Most of the local TANF administrators in 15 states surveyed by GAO reported that their current systems provide half or less of the information needed to manage individual cases, plan appropriate services for the caseload, and monitor overall program performance. The administrators are missing information because some of the systems used do not share data on these recipients, which constrains the ability of case managers to arrange and monitor the delivery of services. Five states--New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin--are modernizing their information systems to take advantage of recent technological advances. These initiatives have expanded their data-sharing capabilities to enhance program management and service integration. Three key challenges confront systems modernization: enhancing strategic collaboration among different levels of government, simplifying the cumbersome approval process for obtaining federal funding for information systems, and obtaining staff expertise in project management and information technology. |
gao_T-NSIAD-99-86 | gao_T-NSIAD-99-86_0 | Background
The United States has assisted the Mexican government in its counternarcotics efforts since 1973, providing about $350 million in aid. Mexico's Counternarcotics Efforts
Although there have been some difficulties, the United States and Mexico have undertaken some steps to enhance cooperation in combating illegal drug activities. There have been some positive results from the new initiatives, such as the arrest of two major drug traffickers and the implementation of the currency and suspicious transaction reporting requirements. Overall, the results show: drugs are still flowing across the border at about the same rate as 1997, there have been no significant increases in drug eradication and no major drug trafficker has been extradited to the United States, money-laundering prosecutions and convictions have been minimal, corruption remains a major impediment to Mexican counternarcotics most drug trafficking leaders continue to operate with impunity. Cocaine seizures in 1998 were about one-third lower than in 1997. According to U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials, corruption remains one of the major impediments affecting Mexican counternarcotics efforts. These include (1) reorganizing the Attorney General’s office and replacing the previously discredited drug control office with the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes Against Health; (2) firing or arresting corrupt or incompetent law enforcement officials; (3) establishing a screening process to filter out corrupt law enforcement personnel; and (4) establishing special units within the military, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Secretariat of Hacienda—the Organized Crime Unit, the Bilateral Task Forces and Hacienda’s Financial Analysis Unit—to investigate and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border and investigate money-laundering activities. Additionally, the President expanded the counternarcotics role of the military. The Organized Crime Unit and the Bilateral Task Force were involved in several counternarcotics operations in 1998, for example, the capture of two major narcotics traffickers and the recent seizure of properties belonging to alleged drug traffickers in the Cancun area, as well as the seizure of money, drugs, and precursor chemicals at the Mexico City Airport. Additionally, increasing the involvement of the Mexican military in law enforcement activities and establishing screening procedures have not been a panacea for the corruption issues facing Mexico. According to the Justice Department, Mexico has approved the extradition of eight other Mexican nationals charged with drug-related offenses. New Initiatives
Over the past year, Mexico has announced a new drug strategy and instituted a number of new counternarcotics initiatives. During 1998 and 1999, the government of Mexico announced a number of new initiatives. A senior Mexican government official termed this new initiative a “total war against the scourge of drugs.”
Status of U.S. Assistance
Last year we noted that while U.S.-provided assistance had enhanced the counternarcotics capabilities of Mexican law enforcement and military organizations, the effectiveness and usefulness of some assistance were limited. For example, two Knox-class frigates purchased by the government of Mexico lacked the equipment needed to ensure the safety of the crew, thus making the ships inoperative. Finally, the four C-26 aircraft still are not being used for counternarcotics operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the counternarcotics efforts of the United States and Mexico, focusing on: (1) Mexico's efforts in addressing the drug threat; and (2) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to Mexico.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while some high-profile law enforcement actions were taken in 1998, major challenges remain; (2) new laws passed to address organized crime, money laundering, and the diversion of chemicals used in narcotics manufacturing have not been fully implemented; (3) moreover, during 1998, opium poppy eradication and drug seizures remained at about the same level as in 1995; (4) in addition, no major Mexican drug trafficker was surrendered to the United States on drug charges; (5) Mexican government counternarcotics activities in 1998 have not been without positive results; (6) one of its major accomplishments was the arrest of two major drug traffickers commonly known as the Kings of Methamphetamine; (7) although all drug-related charges against the two have been dropped, both are still in jail and being held on extradition warrants; (8) the Mexican foreign ministry has approved the extradition of one of the traffickers to the United States, but he has appealed the decision; (9) in addition, during 1998 the Organized Crime Unit of the Attorney General's Office conducted a major operation in the Cancun area where four hotels and other large properties allegedly belonging to drug traffickers associated with the Juarez trafficking organization were seized; (10) Mexico also implemented its currency and suspicious reporting requirements; (11) the Mexican government has proposed or undertaken a number of new initiatives; (12) it has initiated an effort to prevent illegal drugs from entering Mexico, announced a new counternarcotics strategy and the creation of a national police force; (13) one of the major impediments to U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics objectives is Mexican government corruption; (14) recognizing the impact of corruption on law enforcement agencies, the President of Mexico: (a) expanded the role of the military in counternarcotics activities; and (b) introduced a screening process for personnel working in certain law enforcement activities; (15) since these initiatives, a number of senior military and screened personnel were found to be either involved in or suspected of drug-related activities; (16) since 1997, the Departments of State and Defense have provided Mexico with over $92 million worth of equipment, training, and aviation spare parts for counternarcotics purposes; and (17) the major assistance included UH-1H helicopters, C-26 aircraft, and two Knox-class frigates purchased by the government of Mexico through the foreign military sales program. |
gao_GAO-11-663T | gao_GAO-11-663T_0 | Over time, the use of IT has become increasingly important to the department’s efforts to provide these benefits and services to veterans; VA relies on its IT systems for medical information and records and for processing benefits claims, including compensation and pension and education benefits. We recently reported on two important VA systems development projects. VA’s Scheduling Replacement Project Was Hindered by Systems Development and Acquisition Weaknesses
To carry out VA’s daily operations in providing care to veterans and their families, the department relies on an outpatient appointment scheduling system. However, after spending an estimated $127 million over 9 years, VA had not implemented any of the planned capabilities. VA’s efforts to successfully complete the Scheduling Replacement Project were hindered by weaknesses in several key project management disciplines and a lack of effective oversight. However, VA did not adequately define requirements. Specifically, it deployed the first two of four releases of its long-term system solution by its planned dates, thereby providing regional processing offices with key automated capabilities to prepare original and amended benefits claims. 1. Business priorities. Testing. Oversight. VA Continues to Face Information Security Challenges
Effective information security controls are essential to securing the information systems and information on which VA depends to carry out its mission. To help protect against threats to federal systems, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) sets forth a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets. Weaknesses in Security Controls Have Placed VA’s Systems at Risk
Information security has been a long-standing challenge for the department, as we have previously reported. In addition, VA has consistently had weaknesses in major information security control areas. In fiscal year 2010, for the 11th year in a row, the VA’s Office of Inspector General designated VA’s information security program and system security controls as a major management challenge for the department. Since fiscal year 2006, VA’s progress in fully implementing the information security program required under FISMA and following the policies issued by OMB has been mixed. VA Faces Barriers to Establishing Shared Electronic Health Record Capabilities with DOD
VA and DOD have two of the nation’s largest health care operations, providing health care to 6 million veterans and 9.6 million active duty service members and their beneficiaries at estimated annual costs of about $48 billion and $49 billion, respectively. In February 2011, we reported that VA and DOD lacked mechanisms for identifying and implementing efficient and effective IT solutions to jointly address their common health care system needs as a result of barriers in three key IT management areas—strategic planning, enterprise architecture, and investment management. Strategic planning: The departments were unable to articulate explicit plans, goals, and time frames for jointly addressing the health IT requirements common to both departments’ electronic health record systems. Enterprise architecture: Although VA and DOD had taken steps toward developing and maintaining artifacts related to a joint health architecture (i.e., a description of business processes and supporting technologies), the architecture was not sufficiently mature to guide the departments’ joint health IT modernization efforts. Investment management: VA and DOD did not establish a joint process for selecting IT investments based on criteria that consider cost, benefit, schedule, and risk elements, which would help to ensure that a chosen solution both meets the departments’ common health IT needs and provides better value and benefits to the government as a whole. We recommended several actions that the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense could take to overcome barriers that the departments face in modernizing their electronic health record systems to jointly address their common health care business needs, including the following: Revise the departments’ joint strategic plan to include information discussing their electronic health record system modernization efforts and how those efforts will address the departments’ common health care business needs. However, the department faces challenges in key areas, including systems development, information security, and collaboration with DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
The use of information technology (IT) is crucial to helping the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) effectively serve the nation's veterans, and the department has expended billions of dollars annually over the last several years to manage and secure its information systems and assets. VA has, however, experienced challenges in managing its IT. GAO has previously highlighted VA's weaknesses in managing and securing its information systems and assets. GAO was asked to testify on its past work on VA's weaknesses in managing its IT resources, specifically in the areas of systems development, information security, and collaboration with the Department of Defense (DOD) on efforts to meet common health system needs.
What GAO Found
Recently, GAO reported on two VA systems development projects that have yielded mixed results. For its outpatient appointment scheduling project, VA spent an estimated $127 million over 9 years and was unable to implement any of the planned capabilities. The application software project was hindered by weaknesses in several key management disciplines, including acquisition planning, requirements analysis, testing, progress reporting, risk management, and oversight. For its Post 9/11 GI Bill educational benefits system, VA used a new incremental software development approach and deployed the first two of four releases of its long-term system solution by its planned dates, thereby providing regional processing offices with key automated capabilities to prepare original and amended benefits claims. However, VA had areas for improvement, including establishing business priorities, testing the new systems, and providing oversight. Effective information security controls are essential to securing the information systems and information on which VA depends to carry out its mission. For over a decade, VA has faced long-standing information security weaknesses as identified by GAO, VA's Office of the Inspector General, VA's independent auditor, and the department itself. The department continues to face challenges in maintaining its information security controls over its systems and in fully implementing the information security program required under the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. These weaknesses have left VA vulnerable to disruptions in critical operations, theft, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information. VA and DOD operate two of the nation's largest health care systems, providing health care to 6 million veterans and 9.6 million active duty service members at estimated annual costs of about $48 billion and $49 billion, respectively. To provide this care, both departments rely on electronic health record systems to create, maintain, and manage patient health information. GAO reported earlier this year that VA faced barriers in establishing shared electronic health record capabilities with DOD in three key IT management areas--strategic planning, enterprise architecture (i.e., a description of business processes and supporting technologies), and IT investment management. Specifically, the departments were unable to articulate explicit plans, goals, and time frames for jointly addressing the health IT requirements common to both departments' electronic health record systems. Additionally, although VA and DOD took steps toward developing and maintaining artifacts related to a joint health architecture, the architecture was not sufficiently mature to guide the departments' joint health IT modernization efforts. Lastly, VA and DOD did not have a joint process for selecting IT investments based on criteria that consider cost, benefit, schedule, and risk elements, which would help to ensure that the chosen solution both meets the departments' common health IT needs and provides better value and benefits to the government as a whole. Subsequent to our report, the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense agreed to pursue integrated electronic health record capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
In previous reports in recent years, GAO has made numerous recommendations to VA aimed at improving the department's IT management capabilities. These recommendations were focused on: improving two projects to develop and implement new systems, strengthening information security practices and ensuring that security issues are adequately addressed, and overcoming barriers VA faces in collaborating with DOD to jointly address the departments' common health care business needs. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-148 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-148_0 | Statutes and regulations influence the mix of maintenance work performed by the public and private sectors. Third, it is not consistent with congressional guidance in one key area—the use of public-private competitions. Policy Report Provides Depot Maintenance Framework
In response to the congressional requirement for a comprehensive statement of depot maintenance policy, DOD provided an overall framework for managing DOD depot maintenance activities. Section 311(d)(5) of the act provides that in cases of workload in excess of the workload to be performed by DOD depots, DOD’s policy should provide for competition “between public and private entities when there is sufficient potential for realizing cost savings based upon adequate private-sector competition and technical capabilities.” DOD’s report provides a policy that is inconsistent with this instruction. We have reported that public-private depot maintenance competitions can be a beneficial tool for determining the most optimum cost-effective source of repair for non-core workloads. In May 1995 the CORM concluded that 20 percent savings could be achieved by the privatization of various commercial activities and recommended that DOD transfer essentially all depot maintenance to the private sector. Privatization-In-Place Plans Do Not Appear to Optimize Savings
There have been a number of recent initiatives to privatize depots recommended for closure or realignment by BRAC. On the other hand, if the remaining centers do not receive additional workload, they will continue to operate with significant excess capacity, becoming more and more inefficient and more and more expensive as their workloads continue to dwindle due to downsizing and privatization initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the privatization of defense depot maintenance activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) evolving depot maintenance policy includes a public-private mix and shifts work to the private sector where feasible; (2) depot privatization could worsen excess maintenance capacity and inefficiencies if not carefully managed; (3) DOD's policy report provides an overall framework for managing depot maintenance activities and substantial implementation flexibility, but the policy is not consistent with congressional guidance providing for public-private competition for non-core workloads; (4) privatizing depot maintenance is not likely to achieve the 20-percent savings DOD projects, since the 20-percent savings were for commercial-type activities that more readily led to competition which produced the reported savings; (5) most non-ship depot maintenance private-public competitions have been won by the public sector and averaged fewer than two competitors; (6) DOD plans to privatize in place and delay downsizing and closure of two air logistics centers will probably cost more than closing them and relocating their workloads to underutilized defense or private facilities; and (7) statutes governing competition and base closures may have to be repealed or amended before DOD can proceed with its privatization efforts. |
gao_RCED-99-75 | gao_RCED-99-75_0 | Introduction
The electricity industry is the largest industry in the United States. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the potential costs to decommission nuclear plants and the implications of a competitive electricity environment on the ability of plant owners to finance decommissioning projects, the congressional requesters of this report asked us to determine if (1) there is adequate assurance that NRC’s licensees are accumulating enough funds to decommission their nuclear power plants when the plants are retired and (2) NRC is adequately addressing the effects of electricity deregulation on the funds that will eventually be needed for decommissioning. Our analysis showed that, under likely assumptions about future rates of cost escalation, net earnings on the investments of funds, and other factors, 36 of the licensees had not accumulated funds at a rate that is sufficient for eventual decommissioning. The 17 companies included 15 companies that had not collected sufficient funds through 1997. Under more pessimistic and optimistic assumptions, 66 and 4 licensees, respectively, need to increase the amount of funds that they collect in future years. So far, however, public utility commissions have permitted licensees to continue collecting the funds for decommissioning from the licensees’ electricity customers after these plants were retired. In such a case, NRC now requires a licensee to provide additional financial assurance for the portion of the licensee’s estimated decommissioning cost that would not be guaranteed. NRC will also now require licensees to periodically report financial information on decommissioning; however, NRC did not specify how it would use this information. NRC Amends Decommissioning Financial Assurance Regulations
Effective November 23, 1998, NRC amended its decommissioning financial assurance regulations out of concern that the deregulation and restructuring of the electricity industry could reduce confidence that the owners of nuclear power plants will be able to accumulate sufficient funds to decommission their plants. To NRC’s credit, it recognized its need to increase its oversight of decommissioning financial assurance when it modified its decommissioning regulations by requiring licensees to provide financial reports every 2 years. For example, NRC did not establish the thresholds for clearly identifying acceptable levels of financial assurances or establish criteria for identifying and responding to unacceptable levels of assurances. These variables include, NRC added, (1) the actual rates that licensees are accumulating for decommissioning funds, (2) the stated intents of rate regulators (such as state public utility commissions) on allowing the ultimate collection of decommissioning funds, (3) the provisions for decommissioning funding in state deregulation initiatives, and (4) for licensees no longer subject to the traditional regulation of their electricity rates, the extent to which the future collection of decommissioning funds may be based on non-bypassable wire charges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the potential cost to decommission nuclear power plants and the implications of competition within the electricity industry, focusing on whether: (1) there is adequate assurance that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) licensees are accumulating sufficient funds for decommissioning; and (2) NRC is adequately addressing the effects of electricity deregulation on the funds that will eventually be needed for decommissioning.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although the estimated cost to decommission a nuclear power plant is on the order of $300 million to $400 million in today's dollars, NRC does not know if licensees are accumulating sufficient funds for this future expense; (2) GAO's analysis showed that, under likely assumptions, 36 of 76 licensees had not accumulated sufficient decommissioning funds through 1997; (3) however, all but 15 of these 36 licensees appeared to be making up their funding shortfalls with recent increases in the rates that they are accumulating decommissioning funds; (4) using more pessimistic and optimistic assumptions would increase or decrease the number of underfunded licensees, respectively; (5) although utility commissions have permitted licensees to continue charging their customers for the costs of decommissioning prematurely-retired plants, this financial safeguard could be affected by states' efforts to deregulate the electricity industry; (6) to address the movement toward deregulating the electricity industry, in November 1998 NRC began requiring its licensees to provide additional financial assurances if the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or state utility commissions will no longer guarantee, through the regulation of electricity rates, the collection of sufficient funds for decommissioning; (7) however, one additional form of financial assurance--the early payment of decommissioning costs--may not be practicable or affordable; (8) also, NRC considered requiring licensees to accelerate decommissioning funding as a hedge against the premature retirement of plants but rejected the concept because of possible adverse effects on licensees' finances; (9) on the other hand, NRC's alternative methods to the collection of decommissioning funds earlier essentially rely on the continued financial health of the licensee or its parent company; (10) thus, the effectiveness of NRC's 1998 regulatory changes will likely depend on how vigorously NRC monitors the financial health of its licensees; (11) in this regard, licensees must now provide financial reports every 2 years to NRC so it can monitor financial assurances for decommissioning; and (12) however, NRC did not establish thresholds for clearly identifying acceptable levels of financial assurances or establish criteria for identifying and responding to unacceptable levels of assurances. |
gao_GAO-05-258T | gao_GAO-05-258T_0 | A primary goal of the DTV transition is for the federal government to reclaim spectrum that broadcasters currently use to provide analog television signals. Americans Watch Television through Three Primary Modes
The three primary means through which Americans view television signals are over the air, cable, and direct broadcast satellite (DBS). In 1994, a third primary means of providing television emerged: direct broadcast satellite (DBS). Approximately 48 percent of exclusive over-the-air viewers have household incomes less than $30,000, and 6 percent have household incomes over $100,000. Additionally, nonwhite and Hispanic households are more likely to rely on over-the-air television than are white and non-Hispanic households; over 23 percent of non-white households rely on over-the-air television compared to less than 16 percent of white households, and about 28 percent of Hispanic households rely on over-the- air television compared to about 17 percent of non-Hispanic households. Finally, we found that, on average, exclusive over-the-air households have 2.1 televisions, which is lower than the average for cable and satellite households. We found that 57 percent, or 63.7 million American households, view television through a cable service. Of the cable households surveyed, roughly 29 percent had household incomes of less than or equal to $30,000, and about 13 percent had incomes exceeding $100,000. DBS Households. We found that about 19 percent, or 21.7 million American households, have a subscription to a DBS service. Households’ Equipment Needs for DTV Transition Will Depend on their Mode of Television Viewing and Current Equipment Status, and Will Also Be Affected by Regulatory Decisions
The specific equipment needs for each household to transition to DTV— that is, to be able to view broadcast digital signals—depends on certain key factors: the method through which a household watches television, the television equipment the household currently has, and certain critical regulatory decisions yet to be made. Case One. In this case, there would be no need for cable and DBS subscribers to acquire new equipment; only households viewing television using only an over-the-air antenna must take action to be able to view broadcasters’ digital signals. Case Two. In the second case, we assume that cable and DBS companies would be required to provide the broadcasters’ signals to their subscribers in substantially the same format as it was received from the broadcasters. Because some of the broadcasters’ signals are in a high-definition digital format, cable and DBS subscribers—just like over-the-air households— would need to have the equipment in place to be able to receive high- definition digital signals. To view the high-definition signals transmitted by their subscription provider, the other possibility for cable and DBS households would be to have a set-top box that downconverts the signals so that they can be displayed on their existing analog television sets. Cost of Federal Subsidy for Set-Top Boxes Varies Considerably, Depending on Several Factors
In this section we present the estimated cost of providing a subsidy to consumers for the purchase of a set-top box that would be designed to advance the digital television transition. The estimated subsidy costs presented here vary based on (1) the two cases discussed above about whether cable and DBS providers initially downconvert broadcasters’ digital signals at their facilities before transmitting them to subscribers; (2) varied assumptions about whether a means test is imposed and, if so, at what level; and (3) the expected cost of a simple digital-to-analog set-top box. A means test would limit eligibility for the subsidy to only those households with incomes lower than some specified limit. Table 1 provides the cost of a subsidy program under the assumption that cable and DBS providers downconvert broadcasters’ signals at their facilities in a manner that enables them to continue to transmit those signals to subscribers as they currently transmit broadcasters’ signals. Although subscribers typically rent, rather than purchase, set-top boxes, we assume that the same level of subsidy is provided to these households as is provided to over-the-air households to defray the cost of having to obtain a new or upgraded set-top box from their provider. | Why GAO Did This Study
The digital television (DTV) transition offers the promise of enhanced television services. At the end of the transition, radiofrequency spectrum used for analog broadcast television will be used for other wireless services and for critical public safety services. To spur the digital transition, some industry participants and experts have suggested that the government may choose to provide a subsidy for settop boxes, which can receive digital broadcast television signals and convert them into analog signals so that they can be displayed on existing television sets. This testimony provides information on (1) the current distribution of American households by television viewing methods and whether there are demographic differences among these groups; (2) the equipment required for households to receive digital broadcast signals; and (3) the estimated cost to the federal government, under various scenarios, of providing a subsidy for set-top boxes that would enable households to view digital broadcast signals. We developed estimates of the cost of a subsidy for set-top boxes using data on household television characteristics, expected set-top box costs, and varied assumptions about how certain key regulatory issues will be decided.
What GAO Found
The three primary means through which Americans view television signals are over the air, cable, and direct broadcast satellite (DBS). GAO found that 19 percent, or roughly 21 million American households, rely exclusively on free over-the-air television; 57 percent, or nearly 64 million households, view television via a cable service; and 19 percent, or about 22 million households, have a subscription to a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service. On average, over-the-air households are more likely to have lower incomes compared to cable and DBS households. While 48 percent of over-the-air households have incomes under $30,000, roughly 29 percent of cable and DBS households have incomes less than that level. Also, 6 percent of overthe- air households have incomes over $100,000, while about 13 percent of cable and DBS households have incomes exceeding $100,000. The specific equipment that each household needs to transition to DTV--that is, to be able to view digital broadcast signals--depends on the method through which the household watches television, whether the household has already upgraded its television equipment to be compatible with DTV, and the resolution of certain key regulatory issues. GAO examined two key cases regarding the regulatory issues. The assumption for case one is that cable and DBS providers would continue providing broadcasters' signals as they currently do, thus eliminating the need for their subscribers to acquire new equipment. In this case, only households viewing television using only an over-the-air antenna would need to take action to be able to view broadcasters' digital signals. The assumption for the second case is that cable and DBS providers would be required to provide broadcasters' digital signals to subscribers in substantially the same format as broadcasters transmitted those signals. This would require cable and DBS subscribers, in addition to over-the-air households, to have equipment in place to be able to receive their providers' high-definition digital signals. If a subsidy for set-top boxes is only needed for over-the-air households (case one), GAO estimates that its cost could range from about $460 million to about $2 billion, depending on the price of the set-top boxes and whether a means test--which would limit eligibility to only those households with incomes lower than some specified limit--is employed. If cable and satellite subscribers also need new equipment (case two), the cost of providing the subsidy could range from about $1.8 billion to approximately $10.6 billion. We provided a draft of this testimony to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for their review and comment. FCC staff provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-98-156 | gao_NSIAD-98-156_0 | The legislation required, in part, that a senior DOD official certify that projections of restructuring savings are based on audited cost data;
DOD’s share of projected savings exceeds allowed costs; and the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress on DOD’s experience with defense contractor business combinations, including whether savings associated with each restructuring actually exceed restructuring costs. Restructuring after a business combination includes a wide range of activities, such as the disposal and modification of facilities, consolidation of operations and systems, relocation of workers and equipment, and workforce reductions. Of the $1.2 billion in estimated restructuring costs, disposal and relocation of facilities and equipment was the largest cost category. The business combinations also reported that, at the time of our review, about 18,000 workers or positions had actually been eliminated (see table 3). Costs of Benefits and Services Provided to Laid-Off Workers
The seven business combinations estimated they spent about $115.4 million—or about 10 percent—of the total restructuring costs for benefits and services associated with workforce reductions. The majority of these costs were for severance pay, with less amounts for temporary health benefits and outplacement services. Outplacement included such services as career transition workshops, resume development, career counseling services, job listings, and information on state and federal programs. Overall, DOD estimates that it should realize a net savings of about $3.3 billion from restructuring activities (see table 4). As a result, DOD estimated that it has realized a net benefit of about $1.9 billion, or more than half the $3.3 billion in net savings certified for the seven business combinations. Caution should be exercised when interpreting the reported savings. Also, even when restructuring activities influenced a weapon system’s cost, the impact was often offset by nonrestructuring- related events or used to fund other program-related needs. DOD’s estimate of restructuring savings—which includes those savings that may not be directly related to restructuring—represents a cumulative amount of savings, often spread over a 5-year period, for each business combination. Consequently, DOD’s share of certified savings constitutes less than 1 percent of DOD’s budgets. DOD subsequently agreed not to reduce the proposed budgets to reflect restructuring savings. We did not, however, independently verify the information provided. To determine the budgetary implications of restructuring savings, we compared DOD’s share of certified restructuring savings to DOD’s actual or projected budgets for the period over which the savings were expected to be realized. Comments From the Department of Defense
GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on restructuring costs of defense contractors involved in business combinations since 1993, focusing on the: (1) specific costs associated with workforce reductions; (2) services provided to workers affected by business combinations; (3) savings reached from the business combinations relative to the restructuring costs paid by the Department of Defense (DOD); and (4) budgetary implications of reported restructuring savings.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the seven business combinations estimated they had spent $1.2 billion at the same time of GAO's review for such restructuring activities as the disposal and relocation of facilities and equipment, consolidation of operations and systems, relocation of employees, and workforce reductions; (2) severance pay constituted the majority of these expenses, with less amounts provided for temporary health benefits and outplacement services; (3) outplacement services included career transition workshops, resume development, career counseling services, job listings, and information on state and federal programs; (4) overall, the business combinations reported that about 18,000 workers or positions were eliminated due to restructuring activities; (5) DOD estimated it would realize a net benefit of about $3.3 billion from certified restructuring activities; (6) further, DOD estimated that as of August 1997 it had realized a net savings of about $1.9 billion, or more than half of the certified amount; (7) however, DOD's figures may overstate the amount that is directly attributable to restructuring; (8) the lack of specific DOD guidance on evaluating savings may contribute to this condition; (9) caution should be exercised when using or interpreting estimates of restructuring savings; (10) in a budgetary context, the $3.3 billion of estimated restructuring savings represents a cumulative amount of savings for each business combination, often spread over a 5-year period; (11) such savings constituted less than 1 percent of DOD's research and procurement budgets over the period for which the savings were projected; (12) with one exception, DOD officials told GAO they did not consider restructuring savings when formulating DOD's budget requests; (13) the one case cited by DOD involved two Air Force and Navy missile programs; (14) while DOD had initially proposed reducing the programs' budgets to reflect anticipated restructuring savings, DOD subsequently agreed with the military services that the projected savings were needed to fund other program-related needs; and (15) in cases in which restructuring activities influenced a particular weapon system's cost, projected savings were often offset by nonrestructuring-related events. |
gao_NSIAD-97-260 | gao_NSIAD-97-260_0 | While FAIR May Modestly Increase U.S. Exports, International Factors Are More Important
Agricultural experts predict that FAIR’s domestic policy reforms will likely help expand U.S. agricultural exports, though minimally. Agricultural Exports
The extent to which FAIR’s domestic policy reforms may modestly increase exports is dependent on the degree to which farmers—who were previously constrained by pre-FAIR policies that restricted acreage and planting decisions—add additional land to production and use FAIR’s planting flexibility to respond to international and domestic market conditions. This growth is expected to be largely due to (1) increased demand in East and Southeast Asian nations and in other regions and (2) market opening brought about by Uruguay Round agreements and associated reforms of other nations’ agricultural programs. In addition to Uruguay Round and bilateral trade liberalization (such as the U.S.-Japan beef and citrus agreement), unilateral policy changes have also significantly liberalized the world trading environment. To address this issue, we reviewed the evidence regarding the extent to which the programs benefit the overall U.S. economy, benefit the U.S. agricultural sector and specific U.S. commodities, counter competitor nations’ agricultural export programs, and promote U.S. trade negotiating objectives. Program performance under past conditions may not always be helpful in predicting future program contributions. Nevertheless, we identified applicable economic research and principles as well as expert opinion that provide an indication of the future contributions of these programs in the four key areas previously outlined. Limited Evidence Exists That U.S. We found that because of the lack of transparency in other competitor nations’ export assistance efforts, it is difficult to verify how effectively U.S. export programs counter these foreign practices. While FAIR’s domestic policy reforms removed a primary benefit associated with most U.S. export assistance programs—the exporting of surplus stocks generated by domestic price supports—program proponents state that U.S. agricultural export assistance programs continue to have relevance because they benefit the overall U.S. economy, benefit the agriculture sector and/or specific commodities, counter competitor nations’ agricultural export assistance programs, provide leverage to support U.S. trade negotiating objectives. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Given the mixed evidence concerning the continued relevance of U.S. agricultural export assistance programs, their decreased funding levels, and the trend toward increased liberalization of global agricultural trade from which the U.S. agricultural sector is likely to benefit with or without further government support, the Congress may wish to reassess the continued viability and/or focus of the programs the next time these programs are reviewed. The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 did not reauthorize the SOAP and COAP programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed: (1) the way in which the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) will likely affect U.S. agricultural exports; and (2) the continued relevance of U.S. agricultural export assistance programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) agricultural experts generally expect that FAIR's domestic policy reforms will modestly contribute to increased U.S. agricultural exports; (2) the extent to which FAIR's domestic reforms increase exports is dependent on the degree to which farmers add additional land to production and use FAIR's planting flexibility to respond to international and domestic market conditions; (3) much of the forecasted growth in U.S. agricultural exports is expected to come from: (a) the anticipated rise in income levels in East and Southeast Asian nations and other regions; and (b) the liberalization of agricultural markets brought about by the 1994 Uruguay Round trade agreements, which brought agriculture under multilateral disciplines for the first time, and by unilateral policy changes of other nations; (4) FAIR's domestic policy reforms remove a primary benefit associated with most U.S. export assistance programs--the exporting of surplus stocks generated by domestic price supports; (5) nevertheless, program proponents maintain that U.S. agricultural export assistance programs have continued relevance because they benefit the overall U.S. economy, benefit the U.S. agricultural sector, counter competitor nations' agricultural export programs, and promote U.S. trade negotiating objectives; (6) program performance under past conditions may not always be helpful in predicting future program relevance because of changing conditions in the global trading environment, such as Uruguay Round trade liberalization, or the potential for commodity supply and price volatility; and (7) nevertheless, using applicable economic research and expert opinion, GAO's review provides an indication of these programs' future contribution in four key areas: (a) with regard to the U.S. economy, no conclusive evidence exists that these programs have measurably expanded aggregate employment and output or reduced the trade and budget deficits; (b) concerning the U.S. agricultural sector, while U.S. agricultural export assistance programs may provide some income and employment benefits to the sector, there is limited evidence of these benefits; (c) regarding competitor nations' programs, the lack of transparency in these nations' agricultural export assistance efforts makes it difficult to conclusively determine how effectively U.S. export programs counter these foreign practices; and (d) concerning U.S. trade negotiating objectives, there are widely divergent views about the amount of leverage these programs provided in the past. |
gao_GAO-05-123 | gao_GAO-05-123_0 | However, DOE could use performance incentives more effectively for controlling costs and schedules for its major projects if the department developed criteria for using different performance incentives and assigned responsibility for reviewing a contract’s project management provisions prior to award. Improved guidance could help DOE better control costs and maintain schedules for its major projects. Problems Have Developed Because DOE Has Not Effectively Used Performance Incentives
For many of the 33 major projects we reviewed, DOE has used performance incentives that limit its ability to effectively control cost and schedule performance. DOE’s Implementation of Performance Incentive Provisions Does Not Enable DOE to Effectively Control Costs
For 15 of the 17 major projects that use a cost-plus-award-fee contract, the contract contained a technical, schedule, or other performance incentive without including an associated cost incentive or cost constraint (other than the annual funding level for the contract). However, DOE has not certified the reliability of contractors’ project management systems that generate the target cost data for the 13 major projects. DOE has relied on unvalidated contractor data to monitor contractors’ progress in executing major projects and awarding fees for performance. Specifically, DOE’s self-assessments of its contract administration in 1997 and 2002 both found that field personnel overly relied on contractor accounting systems and contractor-collected project data without significant validation of these data. However, unlike the 1997 self-assessment, the one in 2002 made no recommendation to fix this problem, and no subsequent self-assessment has been initiated to determine if the problem has continued. The Reliability of PARS Data Is Limited
The reliability of the project cost and schedule data that PARS provides to senior DOE managers is limited by problems with the data’s accuracy, completeness, and timeliness. To improve the reliability and usefulness of project performance data in PARS, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the appropriate managers to take the following seven actions: develop a schedule for assessing the reliability of the contractors’ project management systems, giving priority to major projects and those projects with systems believed to be using incorrect methods to generate PARS data; revise DOE manual 413.3-1 to provide guidance that enhances the accurate reporting of total cost and project performance data into PARS, such as the reporting of life-of-project cost and schedule variances; expedite training for major project directors in earned value ensure that program office officials receive currently available project management training so that they can better identify the elements of a project, and apply the project management concepts necessary for them to report performance data in PARS; incorporate forward-looking trend data into PARS reports so that senior managers can better identify negative trends and potentially take corrective action; explore options for ensuring that contractors provide cost and schedule performance data to PARS on a monthly basis, such as making monthly submissions a requirement in all applicable contracts; and explore options for providing senior DOE managers with more timely project performance data by, for example, electronically linking contractors’ project management systems to PARS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) pays its contractors billions of dollars each year to implement its major projects--those costing more than $400 million each. Many major projects have experienced substantial cost and schedule overruns, largely because of contract management problems. GAO was asked to assess, for major departmental projects, (1) DOE's use of performance incentives to effectively control costs and maintain schedules, (2) the reliability of the data DOE uses to monitor and assess contractor performance, and (3) the reliability of the Project Assessment and Reporting System (PARS) data that senior managers use for project oversight.
What GAO Found
DOE could use performance incentives more effectively for controlling costs and schedules if it developed performance incentive guidance and assigned responsibility for reviewing a contract's project management provisions prior to award. DOE has awarded contracts for 15 of 33 major projects that use a schedule or other performance incentive without an associated cost incentive or constraint; thus a contractor could receive full fees by meeting all schedule baselines while substantially overrunning costs. DOE has relied on unvalidated contractor data to monitor contractors' progress in executing major projects and to award fees for performance. In particular, DOE's self-assessment of contract administration in 2002 found that field personnel overly relied on contractors' accounting systems and contractor-collected data in assessing performance, without significant validation of those data. No subsequent self-assessment has been conducted to determine if this problem continues. Furthermore, DOE has not required that its contracting officers receive the training needed to assess the adequacy of contractors' project management systems that generate data used to monitor progress. A lthough development of PARS is a positive step, the reliability of the project performance data that PARS provides to senior DOE managers is limited by problems with accuracy, completeness, and timeliness. Regarding accuracy, DOE has not assessed the reliability of contractors' project management systems that feed data into PARS for 31 of 33 major projects, even though DOE believes that some systems are deficient. Regarding completeness, GAO identified 3 major projects that are not in PARS. As to timeliness, cost and schedule data for 6 major projects in the June 2004 PARS report were significantly out of date because DOE has not required contractors to submit timely performance data. These contract management problems limit DOE's ability to effectively manage its major projects and avoid further cost and schedule slippages. |
gao_GAO-07-581T | gao_GAO-07-581T_0 | PNNL manages the deployment of radiation detection equipment for DHS. DHS’s current plans call for completing the deployment of radiation portal monitors at U.S. ports of entry by September 2013. The current technology portal monitors, known as plastic scintillators or PVTs, cost about $55,000 per unit, while the advanced spectroscopic portal monitors, known as ASPs, will cost around $377,000 per unit. DNDO Ignored Its Own Performance Test Results and Instead Relied on the Potential Performance of New Portal Monitors and Unreliable Estimates of Current Equipment Performance
DHS is developing new portal monitors, known as ASPs that, in addition to detecting nuclear or radiological material, can also identify the type of material. NIST compared the 10 ASP systems, and in June 2006 submitted a report to DHS on the results of that testing. Performance tests of ASPs showed that they did not meet DNDO’s main performance assumption in the cost-benefit analysis of correctly identifying HEU 95 percent of the time it passes through portal monitors. Consequently, DNDO officials told us the analysis was based on the performance of PVT monitors that PNNL tested during 2004 in New York. In our view, the results of such testing are critical to any decision by DNDO to employ new technology, such as ASPs, that might help protect the nation from nuclear smuggling. DNDO’s Cost-Benefit Analysis was Incomplete and Used Inflated Cost Estimates for PVT Equipment
DNDO officials told us they did not follow the DHS guidelines for performing cost-benefit analyses in conducting their own cost-benefit analysis. However, DNDO’s analysis omitted many factors that could affect the cost of new radiation portal monitors. DNDO also underestimated the life-cycle costs for operations and maintenance for both PVT and ASP equipment over time. In recent testimonies before Congress, DNDO’s Director has cited the primary benefit of deploying ASP monitors as reducing unnecessary secondary inspections. For example, it did not estimate the costs of secondary inspections as they are carried out today. DNDO’s analysis needs these baseline costs to compare alternatives because without them, it is impossible to determine whether the use of ASPs, as planned, will result in cost savings for secondary inspections. In addition, the ASP contract award has exceeded DNDO’s estimate for total cost by about $200 million. The cost-benefit analysis shows the total cost for deploying PVT and ASP monitors to be about $1 billion, which covers all costs related to acquisition, design, maintenance, and physical inspection over 5 years (for both PVT and ASP). However, in July 2006, DHS announced that it had awarded contracts to develop and purchase up to $1.2 billion worth of ASP portal monitors over 5 years. According to DNDO’s Director, DNDO chose the highest published price because the current contract for portal monitors at that time was to expire, and the portal monitors will probably cost more in the future. However, the information DNDO provided us does not explain why DNDO assumes that the future price will be more than double what DHS was currently paying, as assumed in DNDO’s analysis. In conclusion, DNDO’s approach to the cost-benefit analysis omitted many factors that could affect the cost of new radiation portal monitors. For these reasons, DHS’s cost-benefit analysis does not meet the intent of our March 2006 report recommendation to fully assess the costs and benefits before purchasing any new equipment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in our national defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored R&D and testing activities to develop a "next generation" portal monitor, known as the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor. However, each one costs 6 times more than a current portal monitor. In March 2006, we recommended that DHS conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the new portal monitors are worth the additional cost. In June 2006, DHS issued its analysis. In October 2006, we issued our report that assessed the DHS study. GAO's statement, based on our October 2006 report, addresses whether DHS's cost-benefit analysis provides an adequate basis for its decision to purchase and deploy the next generation portal monitors.
What GAO Found
DHS's cost-benefit analysis does not provide a sound analytical basis for its decision to purchase and deploy the new portal monitor technology. Our review of the analysis determined that it had the following problems. Regarding the performance of the portal monitors: instead of using the results of its own portal monitor tests conducted in 2005, DHS assumed that the new portal monitor technology would correctly detect and identify highly enriched uranium (HEU) 95 percent of the time--a performance level that far exceeds the new technology's current capabilities. To determine the performance of the current generation of portal monitors in detecting HEU, DHS used data from limited tests carried out in 2004 that test officials concluded were unreliable for such purposes. DHS's analysis of the new technology portal monitors was incomplete because the analysis focused on identifying HEU, but did not fully consider how well the new portal monitor technology could correctly detect or identify other dangerous radiological or nuclear materials. Regarding cost estimates: in comparing the costs of the new and current technologies, the procurement costs of the current generation portal monitors were highly inflated because DHS assumed a unit cost of about $131,000. However, the contract price at the time of the analysis was about $55,000. According to officials who manage the contract, it was to expire and they expected portal monitor prices to increase, but not nearly as much as DHS assumed. DHS stated that the primary benefit of deploying the new portal monitors is reducing unnecessary secondary inspections. However, DHS's analysis does not fully estimate today's baseline costs for secondary inspections, which makes it impossible to determine whether the use of the new portal monitors as currently planned, will result in significant cost savings for these inspections. The new portal monitor contract price has exceeded DHS's total cost estimate by about $200 million. The cost-benefit analysis shows the total cost for deploying both current and new portal monitors to be about $1 billion. However, in July 2006, DHS announced that it had awarded contracts to develop and purchase up to $1.2 billion worth of the new portal monitors over 5 years. DHS's cost-benefit analysis omitted many factors that could affect the cost of new portal monitors, such as understating the life-cycle costs for operating and maintaining the equipment over time. For these reasons, DHS's cost-benefit analysis does not meet the intent of our March 2006 report recommendation to fully assess the costs and benefits before purchasing any new equipment. |
gao_GAO-05-764 | gao_GAO-05-764_0 | Activities that had met or were ahead of the accelerated schedule included packaging nuclear materials for disposition, disposing of low-level and low-level mixed waste, and removing buildings. In contrast, DOE was behind its schedule for key activities that will have a major impact on DOE’s overall cleanup goals. These activities involve some of the more complex cleanup activities, including disposing of transuranic waste, treating high-level liquid waste, and closing tanks that had contained radioactive wastes. Finally, DOE has had problems with other treatment and disposal activities not reflected in its performance measures, such as significant delays in shipping plutonium from sites to final storage locations, and delays in design and construction of key facilities. Progress Has Been Made on Several Cleanup Activities, Such as Disposing of Low-Level Waste and Removing Buildings
DOE’s cleanup was ahead of its planned accelerated schedule for several activities, and other activities appeared to be on track. As of March 2005, DOE was falling behind in three risk reduction measures under two cleanup categories that account for a significant portion of the potential cost reductions DOE was expecting—radioactive tank waste and transuranic waste. DOE Estimates Overstated Potential Cost Reductions
DOE calculated its estimated $50 billion in cost reductions by comparing its fiscal year 2001 cost estimate for the program—the last cost estimate before DOE implemented its accelerated strategy—with its fiscal year 2003 cost estimate for the program—the first complete cost estimate under the new accelerated strategy. DOE estimated that revised contracting strategies would also result in significant cost reductions. In addition, several of the projects that DOE expects to complete in less time are already experiencing problems. However, DOE continues to believe it will achieve some cost reductions with its accelerated strategy. DOE’s Performance Reporting Does Not Clearly Reflect Progress Made toward Achieving the Overarching Goals of the Accelerated Cleanup Plan
DOE’s performance reporting does not present a clear understanding of progress toward meeting the $129 billion cost target and 2035 completion date of the accelerated cleanup plan. First, in reporting on its performance, DOE does not clearly relate cleanup accomplishments with their associated costs. While DOE has made progress toward its cleanup goals, important challenges remain and DOE is not likely to achieve its original goal of $50 billion in estimated cost reductions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DOE and the Congress monitor progress toward meeting DOE’s accelerated cleanup plan cost and schedule goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following two actions: Improve DOE’s performance reporting so that there is a clearer, discernable relationship at the activity level between cleanup accomplishments and the costs incurred in doing the work and Identify in DOE’s performance reporting to the Congress and others those performance measures that are the most critical to achieving cost and schedule goals, and summarize the progress on these measures and the potential impact of any problems that could affect achieving accelerated cleanup plan goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2002, following years of rising costs to its nuclear waste cleanup program, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced a new initiative--the accelerated cleanup plan--and committed to reduce costs of cleanup by $50 billion, shorten the cleanup schedule by 35 years, and reduce risks to human health and the environment. GAO reviewed (1) the progress DOE has made under its accelerated cleanup plan, (2) the likelihood DOE will achieve its estimated $50 billion in cost reductions, and (3) whether DOE's performance reporting allows for a full understanding of progress toward achieving the accelerated plan goals.
What GAO Found
Since implementing its accelerated cleanup plan, DOE's progress in reducing environmental risks has been mixed. By March 2005, DOE was on track or ahead of schedule for many of the 16 cleanup activities it measures, including packaging nuclear materials for disposition, disposing of low-level waste, and removing buildings. In contrast, DOE was behind its accelerated schedule for 3 challenging and costly activities--disposing of transuranic and radioactive tank wastes and closing tanks that had contained radioactive wastes. These three cleanup activities had technical problems, such as developing waste separation technology, or regulatory issues, such as determining when a storage tank is clean enough to close. Furthermore, DOE has had problems with other treatment and disposal activities not reflected in its performance measures, such as delays in shipping plutonium from sites, resulting in additional costs to secure and store the material. DOE is not likely to achieve the full $50 billion estimated cost reduction, a key goal of the accelerated cleanup plan. First, DOE's method of calculating its $50 billion cost reduction likely overstated the potential reductions. Second, DOE based estimated cost reductions on assumed improvements that are highly uncertain, such as technology development, revised contracting strategies, and regulatory requirements. Third, while DOE expected cost reductions to come from most of its sites, key sites are already experiencing delays and, by the end of fiscal year 2004, had incurred cost increases. Recognizing these problems, DOE no longer cites its $50 billion estimate but still expects to achieve some cost reductions. DOE performance reporting does not allow for an adequate understanding of its progress toward achieving overall cleanup goals because of limitations in how DOE uses its performance measures. First, in its performance reporting, DOE does not clearly link accomplishments with the incurred costs. Second, DOE does not clearly highlight critical activities, such as preparing radioactive tank waste for disposal, that have the greatest impact on progress toward meeting overarching cleanup goals. |
gao_GAO-14-619T | gao_GAO-14-619T_0 | CMS Has Improved Key Strategies for Preventing and Recouping Improper Payment, but More Can Be Done
CMS has made progress strengthening provider enrollment procedures and prepayment controls in the Medicare program to help ensure that payments are made correctly the first time, but the agency could further improve upon its efforts by implementing additional enrollment procedures and prepayment strategies. CMS Has Implemented Certain Enrollment Procedures to Better Screen Providers, but Has Not Completed Others
CMS has implemented certain provider enrollment screening procedures authorized by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and put in place other measures intended to strengthen existing procedures. Further, PPACA authorizes CMS to require fingerprint-based criminal background checks of providers and suppliers depending on the risks presented. Although CMS has taken actions to strengthen the provider enrollment process, we and the OIG have found that CMS has not taken other actions authorized by PPACA and that could improve screening and ultimately reduce improper payments. Specifically, we are assessing the process used to enroll and verify the eligibility of Medicare providers in Medicare’s Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System (PECOS) and the extent to which CMS’s controls are designed to prevent and detect the continued enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers in PECOS. CMS Has Improved Prepayment Controls, but More Could Be Done to Prevent Improper Payments
CMS has enhanced its efforts to reduce improper payments by improving prepayment controls, particularly prepayment edits to deny claims that should not be paid. Such inconsistencies could have been identified using automated edits. As we recommended, CMS has taken steps to improve the development of certain prepayment edits that are implemented nationwide. In 2013, we reported that CMS may be missing opportunities to prevent improper payments because it has not systematically evaluated MUE limits to determine whether In national edits should be revised to reflect more restrictive local limits.addition, we found that CMS and its contractors did not have a system in place for examining claims to determine the extent to which providers may be exceeding unpublished MUE limits and whether payments for such services were proper. HHS agreed with these recommendations, but as of April 2014, CMS had not implemented them. Postpayment Claims Reviews Have Increased in Recent Years, but More Could Be Done to Increase Consistency across Contractors
Medicare uses four types of contractors to conduct postpayment claims reviews to identify and recoup overpayments.the same Medicare coverage and payment guidelines. Complex reviews involve manual examinations of each claim and any related documentation requested and received from the provider, including paper files, to determine whether the service was billed properly, and was covered, reasonable, and necessary. Our prior work has found that the overall number of postpayment claims reviews has been increasing in recent years, but remains a very small percentage of total Medicare claims submitted. As a systematic matter, the increase in postpayment claims reviews is one factor causing backlogs and delays at the third level of the Medicare appeals process. In July 2013, we reported that the differences in CMS’s postpayment claims review requirements for the four types of contractors may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of claims reviews by complicating providers’ compliance with the requirements. We are following up on this work with a study reviewing, among other things, whether CMS has strategies for coordinating postpayment review contractors’ claims review activities. In conclusion, given the amount of estimated improper payments in the Medicare program, the imperative for CMS to use all available authorities to prevent and recoup improper payments is clear. Medicare Program Integrity: Contractors Reported Generating Savings, but CMS Could Improve Its Oversight. Program Integrity: Further Action Needed to Address Vulnerabilities in Medicaid and Medicare Programs. Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Needs to Ensure More Widespread Use. Improper Payments: Recent Efforts to Address Improper Payments and Remaining Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to its size, complexity, and susceptibility to mismanagement and improper payments, GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program. In 2013, Medicare financed health care services for approximately 51 million individuals at a cost of about $604 billion, and reported an estimated $50 billion in improper payments—payments that either were made in an incorrect amount or should not have been made at all. Most of these improper payments were made through the Medicare FFS program, which pays providers based on claims and uses contractors to pay the claims and ensure program integrity.
This statement focuses on the progress made and steps still to be taken by CMS to improve improper payment prevention and recoupment efforts in the Medicare FFS program. This statement is based on relevant GAO products and recommendations issued from 2007 through 2014 using a variety of methodologies. GAO also updated information by examining public documents and, in April 2014, GAO received updated information from CMS on its actions related to laws and regulations discussed in this statement.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that oversees Medicare, has made progress improving improper payment prevention and recoupment efforts in the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program, but further actions are needed.
Provider enrollment . CMS has implemented certain provider enrollment screening procedures authorized by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that address past weaknesses identified by GAO and others. The agency has also put in place other measures intended to strengthen existing procedures, but could do more to improve provider enrollment screening and ultimately reduce improper payments. For example, CMS has hired contractors to determine whether providers and suppliers have valid licenses, meet certain Medicare standards, and are at legitimate locations. CMS also recently contracted for fingerprint-based criminal history checks of providers and suppliers it has identified as high-risk. However, CMS has not implemented other screening actions authorized by PPACA that could further strengthen provider enrollment.
Prepayment controls . In response to GAO's prior recommendations, CMS has taken steps to improve the development of certain prepayment edits—prepayment controls used to deny Medicare claims that should not be paid; however, important actions that could further prevent improper payments have not yet been implemented. For example, CMS has implemented an automated edit to identify services billed in medically unlikely amounts, but has not implemented a GAO recommendation to examine certain edits to determine whether they should be revised to reflect more restrictive payment limits. GAO has found that wider use of prepayment edits could help prevent improper payments and generate savings for Medicare.
Postpayment claims reviews . Postpayment claims reviews help CMS identify and recoup improper payments. Medicare uses a variety of contractors to conduct such reviews, which generally involve reviewing a provider's documentation to ensure that the service was billed properly and was covered, reasonable, and necessary. GAO has found that differing requirements for the various contractors may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of such reviews. To improve these reviews, GAO has previously recommended CMS examine ways to make the contractor requirements more consistent. CMS reported that it has begun to address these recommendations. Although the percentage of Medicare claims that undergo postpayment review remains very small, GAO has found that the overall number of postpayment claims reviews has been increasing in recent years. HHS has reported that the increase in claims reviews is one factor causing backlogs in the Medicare appeals process.
GAO has ongoing work focused on how CMS could continue its efforts to reduce improper Medicare payments. For instance, GAO is examining the extent to which CMS's provider enrollment system can help prevent and detect the continued enrollment of ineligible providers in Medicare. GAO also has work underway to examine whether CMS has strategies for coordinating postpayment review contractors' claims review activities. |
gao_GAO-15-485 | gao_GAO-15-485_0 | U.S. and UN Sanctions Specific to North Korea Target a Range of Activities That Include Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Transferring Luxury Goods
U.S. EOs specific to North Korea and the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) authorize the United States to impose sanctions targeting activities that include weapons of mass destruction proliferation, trade in arms and related materiel, and transferring luxury goods. UNSCRs target similar activities, and under the UN Charter, all 193 UN member states are required to implement sanctions imposed by the UNSCRs, such as travel bans, on North Korean and other persons involved in these activities. Process for Imposing Sanctions Related to North Korea
U.S. officials informed GAO that obtaining information on North Korean persons has hindered the U.S. interagency process for imposing sanctions, and that a recent EO has provided them with greater flexibility to sanction persons based on their status as government or party officials rather than evidence of specific conduct. State and Treasury impose sanctions following an interagency process that involves reviewing intelligence and other information to develop evidence needed to meet standards set by U.S. laws and EOs, vetting possible actions within the U.S. government, determining whether and when to sanction, and announcing sanctions decisions. Since 2006, the United States has imposed sanctions on 86 North Korean persons, including 13 North Korean government officials and entities, under EO 13687. The UN process for imposing sanctions on North Korea or related persons relies on a Security Council committee and a UN panel of experts that investigates suspected violations of North Korea sanctions and recommends actions to the UN. The panel has found North Korean persons using illicit techniques to evade sanctions and trade in arms and related material and has designated 32 North Korean or related entities for sanctioning since 2006, including a North Korean company found to be shipping armaments from Cuba to North Korea. However, while the UN calls upon member states to submit reports describing the steps or measures they have taken to implement effectively specified sanctions provisions, fewer than half have done so. Member state delegates to the UN Security Council and U.S. officials agree that the lack of reports from all member states is an impediment to UN sanctions implementation. The United States has complied with UN reporting provisions calling on member states to submit implementation reports. U.S. officials and representatives of the committee agree that the lack of detailed reports from all member states is an impediment to the UN’s effective implementation of its sanctions. Recommendation for Executive Action
GAO recommends the Secretary of State work with the UN Security Council to ensure that member states receive technical assistance to help prepare and submit reports on their implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. Officials from the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and other sources identified the following factors that may influence the types of sanctions imposed by the United States and the UN on these countries. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies the activities that are targeted by U.S. and United Nations (UN) sanctions specific to North Korea, (2) describes how the United States implements its sanctions specific to North Korea and examines the challenges it faces in doing so, and (3) describes how the UN implements its sanctions specific to North Korea and examines the challenges it faces in doing so. We also interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the UN to confirm the universe of North Korea–specific sanctions. | Why GAO Did This Study
North Korea is a closely controlled society, and its regime has taken actions that threaten the United States and other United Nations member states. North Korean tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have prompted the United States and the UN to impose sanctions on North Korea.
GAO was asked to review U.S. and UN sanctions on North Korea. This report (1) identifies the activities that are targeted by U.S. and UN sanctions specific to North Korea, (2) describes how the United States implements its sanctions specific to North Korea and examines the challenges it faces in doing so, and (3) describes how the UN implements its sanctions specific to North Korea and examines the challenges it faces in doing so. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed documents from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, and the UN. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, and the UN.
What GAO Found
U.S. executive orders (EO) and the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act target activities for the imposition of sanctions that include North Korean (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transferring of luxury goods. The EOs and the act allow the United States to respond by imposing sanctions, such as blocking the assets of persons involved in these activities. United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions target similar North Korean activities, and under the UN Charter, all 193 UN member states are required to implement sanctions on persons involved in them.
U.S. officials informed GAO that obtaining information on North Korean persons has hindered the U.S. interagency process for imposing sanctions, and that EO 13687, announced in January 2015, provided them with greater flexibility to sanction persons based on their status as government officials rather than evidence of specific conduct. State and Treasury impose sanctions following an interagency process that involves: reviewing intelligence and other information to develop evidence needed to meet standards set by U.S. laws and EOs, vetting possible actions within the U.S. government, determining whether to sanction, and announcing sanctions decisions. Since 2006, the United States has imposed sanctions on 86 North Korean persons, including on 13 North Korean government persons under EO 13687.
Although UN sanctions have a broader reach than U.S. sanctions, the UN lacks reports from many member states describing the steps or measures they have taken to implement specified sanctions provisions. The UN process for imposing sanctions relies on a UN Security Council committee and a UN panel of experts that investigates suspected sanctions violations and recommends actions to the UN. The Panel of Experts investigations have resulted in 32 designations of North Korean or related entities for sanctions since 2006, including a company found to be shipping armaments from Cuba in 2013. While the UN calls upon all member states to submit reports detailing plans for implementing specified sanctions provisions, fewer than half have done so because of a range of factors including a lack of technical capacity. The committee uses the reports to uncover gaps in sanctions implementation and identify member states that require additional outreach. The United States as a member state has submitted all of these reports. UN and U.S. officials agree that the lack of reports from all member states is an impediment to the UN's implementation of its sanctions.
Source: GAO | GAO-15-485
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of State work with the UN Security Council to ensure that member states receive technical assistance to help prepare and submit reports on their implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. The Department of State concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-827T | gao_GAO-05-827T_0 | Recent attacks and threats have further underscored the need to bolster the cybersecurity of our government’s and our nation’s computer systems and, more importantly, of the critical operations and infrastructures they support. In addition, federal policy establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for the security of cyberspace—including analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for public and private critical infrastructure information systems. Among the many CIP responsibilities established for DHS and identified in federal law and policy are 13 key cybersecurity-related responsibilities. DHS Has Initiated Efforts That Begin to Address Its Responsibilities, but More Work Remains
DHS has initiated efforts that begin to address each of its 13 key responsibilities for cybersecurity; however, the extent of progress varies among these responsibilities, and more work remains to be done on each. For example, DHS (1) has recently issued an interim plan for infrastructure protection that includes cybersecurity plans, (2) is supporting a national cyber analysis and warning capability through its role in US-CERT, and (3) has established forums to build greater trust and to encourage information sharing among federal officials with information security responsibilities and among various law enforcement entities. Further, the department has not yet developed and exercised government and government/industry contingency recovery plans for cybersecurity, including a plan for recovering key Internet functions. DHS Continues to Face Challenges in Establishing Itself as a National Focal Point for Cyberspace Security
DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill its cyber CIP responsibilities. Key challenges include achieving organizational stability, gaining organizational authority, overcoming hiring and contracting issues, increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders (other federal, state, and local governments and the private sector), achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders, and providing and demonstrating the value DHS can provide. However, such effective communications are not yet in place in support of our nation’s cybersecurity. DHS has identified steps in its strategic plan for cybersecurity that can begin to address these challenges. However, until it begins to address these underlying challenges, DHS cannot achieve significant results in coordinating cybersecurity activities, and our nation will lack the effective focal point it needs to better ensure the security of cyberspace for public and private critical infrastructure systems. Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Enhance Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructures
Over the last several years, we have made a series of recommendations to enhance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures, focusing on the need to (1) develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for identifying potential cyberattacks, (2) protect infrastructure control systems, (3) enhance public/private information sharing, and (4) conduct important threat and vulnerability assessments and address other challenges to effective cybersecurity. Effectively implementing these recommendations could greatly improve our nation’s cybersecurity posture. Provides the financial infrastructure of the nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing computer interconnectivity has revolutionized the way that our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks to our nation's computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and federal policy established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for coordinating activities to protect the computer systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO was asked to summarize previous work, focusing on (1) DHS's responsibilities for cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection (CIP), (2) the status of the department's efforts to fulfill these responsibilities, (3) the challenges it faces in fulfilling its cybersecurity responsibilities, and (4) recommendations GAO has made to improve cybersecurity of our nation's critical infrastructure.
What GAO Found
As the focal point for CIP, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has many cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities that GAO identified in law and policy. DHS established the National Cyber Security Division to take the lead in addressing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures. While DHS has initiated multiple efforts to fulfill its responsibilities, it has not fully addressed any of the 13 responsibilities, and much work remains ahead. For example, the department established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team as a public/private partnership to make cybersecurity a coordinated national effort, and it established forums to build greater trust and information sharing among federal officials with information security responsibilities and law enforcement entities. However, DHS has not yet developed national cyber threat and vulnerability assessments or government/industry contingency recovery plans for cybersecurity, including a plan for recovering key Internet functions. DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill its cybersecurity-related CIP responsibilities. These key challenges include achieving organizational stability, increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders, and achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders. In its strategic plan for cybersecurity, DHS identifies steps that can begin to address the challenges. However, until it confronts and resolves these underlying challenges and implements its plans, DHS will have difficulty achieving significant results in strengthening the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructures.
What GAO Recommends
In recent years, GAO has made a series of recommendations to enhance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures that if effectively implemented could greatly improve our nation's cybersecurity posture. |
gao_GAO-15-598 | gao_GAO-15-598_0 | States have discretion in how they conduct oversight of TPP quality, by, for example: defining the types of TPPs that may operate in the state, such as undergraduate or post-baccalaureate TPPs, or alternative route TPPs; reviewing and approving individual TPPs to operate and periodically assessing them for renewal; assessing whether any TPPs in the state are low-performing, as required under the Higher Education Act, using criteria of the state’s choosing; and, setting licensing requirements that teaching candidates must satisfy that often include completing an approved TPP and passing licensing tests that assess subject-matter knowledge or other skills. States Assessed TPPs before Approving Them to Prepare Teachers but Some States Reported Not Having a Process to Identify Low-Performing TPPs as Required by Statute
Almost All States Assessed TPP Program Design and Information about Candidates and More Than Half Assessed TPPs Based on Graduates’ Effectiveness
All states reported that they review traditional TPPs before approving them to prepare new teachers and may renew approval on a periodic basis. However, officials from seven states reported in our survey that they did not have a process for identifying low-performing TPPs in academic year 2014-2015. In response to our follow-up inquiries, state officials who reported not having a process in our survey told us they believed their other oversight procedures are sufficient to ensure quality without having a process to identify low-performing TPPs or that they were in the middle of changing their state’s process for identifying low-performing TPPs, among other reasons. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, an agency’s management should provide reasonable assurance of compliance with applicable laws and regulations. This may impact the quality of training provided to new teachers and result in their being inadequately prepared to educate children. Apart from offering information, most states reported that they modified their oversight activities to verify that TPPs were aligning with new K-12 standards. To Varying Degrees, Select TPPs Took Steps to Incorporate New K-12 Standards
All 14 TPPs we interviewed made changes that ranged from large-scale reforms to more modest modifications.the following three categories: (1) increasing subject-matter knowledge, (2) modifying coursework related to teaching techniques, and (3) using classroom training to provide real world experience. However, Education also noted in the preamble to its December 2014 proposed rule that “data that are collected and reported have not led to an identification of significant improvements in teacher preparation program performance in part because the data are not based on meaningful indicators of program effectiveness.” Education officials told us they have not conducted a study to inform Congress or the agency about whether any current reporting requirements are not useful. Education Has Taken Few Steps to Share Information about Teacher Preparation Program Quality Internally and with States
Education has made few efforts to share expertise about TPP quality among its offices. However, the agency does not have mechanisms in place to promote regular, sustained information-sharing among these offices. Furthermore, Education’s efforts to support or enhance TPP quality reach a limited number of states. However, in our survey, only about one third of states reported receiving information from Education about TPP oversight or enhancing TPP quality, and about half of all states said they would like additional support from Education on this topic. Gaps in the agency’s efforts to disseminate information result from information- sharing being left to individual offices’ initiative rather than an agency-wide mechanism, and Education officials noted that more could be done to share information with states and other stakeholders. Federal internal controls standards emphasize the importance of agencies ensuring adequate information-sharing with key stakeholders. Without such an approach, Education may be missing opportunities to support state efforts to enhance TPP quality. For example, states may be unaware of information about good practices for TPP quality that could assist them in their oversight. The recent shift to college- and career- ready K-12 standards further highlights the importance of such programs. Finally, without increasing information-sharing within the Department and with states, Education may miss opportunities to disseminate information that could enhance TPP quality. Education agreed with our four recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to answer the following questions: (1) How do states oversee teacher preparation programs (TPP); (2) What are states and select TPPs doing to prepare new teachers for new K-12 standards; and (3) To what extent does the U.S. Department of Education’s (Education) data reporting and other information-sharing support and encourage high quality TPPs? We reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; federal internal controls standards; and leading practices for program management. Survey of 50 States and the District of Columbia
To identify how states oversee TPPs, modified their practices in response to new K-12 standards, and used Higher Education Act Title II data and Department of Education information about TPPs, we surveyed state oversight entities from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, achieving a 100 percent response rate. We interviewed Education officials and contractors responsible for collecting, analyzing and reporting such data. | Why GAO Did This Study
TPPs play a vital role in preparing teachers, including helping them teach to new K-12 college- and career-ready standards recently adopted or under development in all states. Under Title II of the Higher Education Act, states collect information on TPPs and report it to Education, which reports it to the public. Education also administers competitive grant programs related to teacher preparation. In light of new K-12 standards and questions about TPP quality, GAO was asked to review TPP, state, and federal efforts.
This report examines: (1) state oversight activities, (2) state and TPP actions related to new K-12 standards, and (3) the extent to which Education shares information about TPP quality. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and documents, surveyed all state oversight offices (with a 100 percent response rate), and interviewed Education officials and various stakeholders, as well as a non-generalizable sample of officials in five states with varied approaches to oversight and 14 TPPs in those states.
What GAO Found
State oversight officials reported that they approve teacher preparation programs (TPP) by assessing the quality of program design and analyzing candidate data such as program graduation rates, according to GAO’s 2014-2015 survey of states and the District of Columbia. However, some states reported that they do not assess whether TPPs are low-performing, as required by federal law. To receive funding under the Higher Education Act, states are required to conduct an assessment to identify TPPs that are low-performing. Seven states reported to GAO that they do not have a process to do so. State officials who reported not having a process in GAO’s survey cited several reasons including that they believed other oversight procedures were sufficient to ensure quality. Education officials told GAO they have not verified states’ processes to identify low-performing TPPs. In accordance with federal internal control standards, Education should provide reasonable assurance of compliance with applicable laws. If states fail to assess whether TPPs are low-performing, potential teaching candidates may have difficulty identifying low-performing TPPs. This could result in teachers who are not fully prepared to educate children.
Officials in most surveyed states and all 14 of the TPPs GAO interviewed reported making changes to prepare teaching candidates for new state K-12 standards. Thirty-seven states reported providing TPPs with guidance about the new standards and a similar number of states reported adjusting their process for approving TPPs. Most states also required prospective teachers to pass licensing tests that have been modified in response to the new standards. Officials from all of the 14 TPPs GAO interviewed reported making changes that generally fell within the following three categories: (1) increasing subject-matter knowledge of teachers, (2) modifying coursework related to teaching techniques, and (3) using classroom training to provide real world experience.
Education missed opportunities to share information about TPP quality internally and with state oversight entities. Federal internal controls standards highlight the value of effective information-sharing with internal and external stakeholders. However, Education does not have mechanisms in place to promote regular, sustained information-sharing among its various program offices that support TPP quality because the workgroup that used to facilitate such information-sharing was discontinued. Without such a mechanism, Education cannot fully leverage information about TPP quality gathered by its various programs. Furthermore, Education's current efforts to share information about TPP quality with states only reach about a third of states, according to GAO's survey, although about half of all states reported that they wanted more of such information. Gaps in the agency's efforts to disseminate information result from information-sharing being left to individual offices' initiative rather than an agency-wide mechanism. Education officials acknowledged that more could be done to share information with states and other stakeholders. Without such efforts, Education may miss opportunities to support state efforts to improve TPP quality. For example, states may be unaware of good practices identified by Education that could assist them in their oversight.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that Education monitor states to ensure their compliance with requirements to assess whether any TPPs are low-performing and develop mechanisms to share information about TPP quality within the agency and with states. Education agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-916T | gao_GAO-03-916T_0 | National Management Plan Lacks Measurable Goals, and Its Implementation Has Been Slow
The National Invasive Species Council’s management plan, Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge, issued in January 2001, calls for actions that are likely to help control invasive species, such as issuing additional regulations to further reduce the risk of species introductions via solid wood packing material, developing methods to determine rapid response measures that are most appropriate for specific situations, and devoting additional resources to strengthening inspection services at ports of entry. For example, the plan does not contain performance-oriented goals and objectives, such as reducing the introduction of new species by a certain percentage or reducing the spread of established species by a specified amount. Instead, the plan contains an extensive list of actions that, while likely to contribute to preventing and controlling invasive species, are not clearly part of a comprehensive strategy. The Council acknowledged in the plan itself that many of the details of the actions called for would require further development in the implementation phase. We found several reasons for the slow progress in implementing the plan. Finally, we also noted a lack of funding and staff specifically devoted to implementing the plan. Current Regulations Concerning Ballast Water Management Are Not Keeping Invasive Species out of the Great Lakes
According to experts and agency officials we consulted, current efforts by the United States are not adequate to prevent the introduction of aquatic invasive species into the Great Lakes via ballast water of ships, and they need to be improved. Federal officials believe that they should do more to develop treatment standards and technologies to protect the Great Lakes from ballast water discharges. In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. State Officials Cited Several Gaps in Existing Federal Legislation and Identified Other Barriers to Addressing Invasive Species
State officials who responded to our survey identified several gaps in, or problems with, existing federal legislation on aquatic and terrestrial invasive species, as well as other barriers to their efforts to manage invasive species. Perceived Gaps in or Problems with Existing Legislation
According to our new work, the lack of legal requirements for controlling already-established or widespread invasive species was the gap in existing legislation on aquatic and terrestrial species most frequently identified by state officials. Many state officials also identified ineffective federal standards for ballast water as a problem for addressing invasive species. Many state officials also identified a lack of public education and outreach as a barrier to managing terrestrial invasive species. State officials identified a lack of cost-effective control measures as a key barrier to addressing aquatic invasive species. State Officials’ Opinions Varied on Effective Leadership Structures for Managing Invasive Species and Whether to Integrate Legislative Authority on Invasive Species
State officials’ opinions varied on the preferred leadership structure for managing invasive species and whether to integrate legislative authority on invasive species. Many state officials indicated that specifically authorizing the National Invasive Species Council would be an effective management option and favored integrated authority, but in both cases, the margins were relatively small. Regarding the drawbacks of integrating authority for aquatic and terrestrial invasive species, many state officials said that it could be difficult to address all possible situations with invasive species and some species or pathways may get overlooked, and were concerned that it may reduce state flexibility implementing invasive species programs. On the other hand, many state officials saw an increased focus on pathways for invasive species—as opposed to on specific species—as a possible benefit of integrating authority for aquatic and terrestrial invasive species. Many state officials also believed that integration of legislative authority could result in increased coordination between federal agencies and states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Invasive species--nonnative plants and animals--have caused billions of dollars in damage to natural areas, businesses, and consumers. In 2001, the federal government issued a National Management Plan to coordinate a national control effort involving the 20 or so federal agencies that are responsible for managing invasive species. In October 2002, GAO reported on the implementation of the management plan and efforts to manage ballast water, among other things. This testimony discusses some of GAO's findings and recommendations in that report. It also presents the results of a subsequent GAO survey of state officials responsible for managing terrestrial and aquatic invasive species. This survey sought state perspectives on (1) the perceived gaps in existing legislation and barriers to addressing terrestrial and aquatic invasive species and (2) the federal leadership structure for addressing invasive species, as well as the integration of federal legislation on terrestrial invasive species with legislation on aquatic invasives.
What GAO Found
In 2002, GAO reported that while the National Management Plan calls for many actions that are likely to contribute to preventing and controlling invasive species in the United States, it does not clearly articulate specific long-term goals toward which the government should strive. For example, it is not clear how implementing the actions in the plan will move national efforts toward outcomes such as reducing new invasive species by a specific number or reducing the spread of established species by a specific amount. Moreover, GAO found that the federal government had made little progress in implementing many of the actions called for by the plan. Reasons for the slow progress included delays in establishing teams to be responsible for guiding implementation of the planned actions, the low priority given to implementation by the National Invasive Species Council and federal agencies, and the lack of funding and staff responsible for doing the work. In addition, GAO reported that current federal efforts are not adequate to prevent the introduction of invasive species into the Great Lakes via the ballast water of ships. Although federal officials believe more should be done to protect the Great Lakes from ballast water discharges, their plans for doing so depend on the development of standards and technologies that will take many years. More recently, state officials who responded to GAO's survey, identified a number of gaps in, or problems with, existing legislation addressing invasive species and other barriers to managing invasives. Many state officials identified a lack of legal requirements for controlling invasive species that are already established or widespread as a key gap in legislation addressing both aquatic and terrestrial invasive species. State officials also often recognized ineffective standards for ballast water as a major problem in aquatics legislation. Regarding barriers to managing invasive species, state officials identified a lack of federal funding for state invasive species efforts, public education and outreach, and cost-effective control measures as major problems. State officials' opinions varied on the preferred leadership structure for managing invasive species and whether to integrate legislative authority on invasive species. Many officials indicated that specifically authorizing the National Invasive Species Council would be an effective management option and favored integrated authority, but in both cases, the margins were relatively small. State officials indicated that the possible benefits of integrated legislation would be increased coordination between federal agencies and states and an increased focus on invasive species pathways, as opposed to focusing on individual species. The possible drawbacks identified included concerns that a single piece of legislation would not be able to address all possible situations dealing with invasive species and might reduce state flexibility in addressing invasives. |
gao_GAO-10-262T | gao_GAO-10-262T_0 | Trade preference programs extend unilateral tariff reductions to over 130 developing countries. Currently, the United States offers the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and three regional programs, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Total U.S. preference imports grew from $20 billion in 1992 to $110 billion in 2008. Most of this growth in U.S. imports from preference countries has taken place since 2000. Critical Policy Trade- offs among U.S. Consumers, Producers, and Foreign Beneficiaries Are Inherent in Preference Programs
Preference programs entail a number of difficult policy trade-offs. A few LDCs in Asia are not included in the U.S. regional preference programs, although they are eligible for GSP-LDC benefits. Two of these countries—Bangladesh and Cambodia—have become major exporters of apparel to the United States and have complained about the lack of duty-free access for their goods. This trade-off concerning what countries to include also involves decisions regarding the graduation of countries or products from the programs. However, some U.S. officials believe that periodic program expirations can be useful as leverage to encourage countries to act in accordance with U.S. interests such as global and bilateral trade liberalization. Potential Areas of Improvement for U.S. Trade Preference Programs
Proliferation of Preference Programs Has Led to a Need for a More Integrated Approach
GAO found that preference programs have proliferated over time and have become increasingly complex, which has contributed to a lack of systematic review. Moreover, we found that there was little to no reporting on the impact of these programs. Experts Provided a Range of Options for Improving AGOA
In addition to the recommendations based on GAO analysis, we also solicited options from a panel of experts convened by GAO in June 2009 to discuss ways to improve the competitiveness of the textile and apparel sector in AGOA beneficiary countries. Modify Rules of Origin among Trade Preference Program Beneficiaries and Free Trade Partners: Some African governments and industry representatives of the textile and apparel inputs industry in Sub-Saharan African countries suggested modifying rules of origin provisions under other U.S. trade preference programs or free trade agreements to provide duty-free access for products that use AGOA textile and apparel inputs. Create Non-Punitive and Voluntary Incentives: Some of the experts we consulted believe that the creation of non-punitive and voluntary incentives to encourage the use of inputs from the United States or its trade preference partners could stimulate investment in beneficiary countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. trade preference programs promote economic development in poorer nations by providing duty-free export opportunities in the United States. The Generalized System of Preferences, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Andean Trade Preference Act, and African Growth and Opportunity Act unilaterally reduce U.S. tariffs for many products from over 130 countries. However, two of these programs expire partially or in full this year, and Congress is exploring options as it considers renewal. This testimony describes the growth in preference program imports, identifies policy trade-offs, and summarizes the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations and options suggested by a panel of experts on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The testimony is based on studies issued in September 2007, March 2008, and August 2009. For those studies, GAO analyzed trade data, reviewed trade literature and program documents, interviewed U.S. officials, did fieldwork in nine countries, and convened a panel of experts.
What GAO Found
Total U.S. preference imports grew from $20 billion in 1992 to $110 billion in 2008, with most of this growth taking place since 2000. The increases from preference program countries primarily reflect the addition of new eligible products, increased petroleum imports from some African countries, and the rapid growth of exports from countries such as India, Thailand, and Brazil. Preference programs give rise to three critical policy trade-offs. First, opportunities for beneficiary countries to export products duty free must be balanced against U.S. industry interests. Some products of importance to developing countries, notably agriculture and apparel, are ineligible by statute as a result. Second, some developing countries, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia, are not included in U.S. regional preference programs; however, there is concern that they are already competitive in marketing apparel to the United States and that giving them greater duty-free access could harm the apparel industry in Africa and elsewhere. Third, Congress faces a trade-off between longer preference program renewals, which may encourage investment, and shorter renewals, which may provide leverage to encourage countries to act in accordance with U.S. interests such as trade liberalization. GAO reported in March 2008 that preference programs have proliferated and become increasingly complex, which has contributed to a lack of systematic review. Moreover, we found that there was little to no reporting on the impact of these programs. In addition, GAO solicited options from a panel of experts in June 2009 for improving the competitiveness of the textile and apparel sector in AGOA countries. Options they suggested included aligning trade capacity building with trade preference programs, modifying rules of origin to facilitate joint production among trade preference program beneficiaries and free trade partners, and creating non-punitive and voluntary incentives to encourage the use of inputs from the United States or its trade preference partners to stimulate investment in beneficiary countries. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-117 | gao_T-AIMD-98-117_0 | Reliance on Computers and Interdependencies Among Sectors Create Risk of Service Disruption
The public faces a risk that critical services could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. Risk of Disruption to Government Services Is High
The federal government is extremely vulnerable to the Year 2000 issue due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations. In addition, the year 2000 also could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years that contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Key economic sectors that could be seriously impacted if their systems are not Year 2000 compliant are information and telecommunications; banking and finance; health, safety, and emergency services; transportation; utilities; and manufacturing and small business. Setting Priorities Is Critical
Agencies have taken longer to complete the awareness and assessment phases of their Year 2000 programs than is recommended. This leaves less time for critical renovation, validation, and implementation phases. Reporting on Agency Progress Needs to Be Improved
OMB’s reports on agency progress do not fully and accurately reflect the federal government’s progress toward achieving Year 2000 compliance because not all agencies are required to report and OMB’s reporting requirements are incomplete. Contingency Plans Imperative
In January 1998, OMB asked agencies to describe their contingency planning activities in their February 1998 quarterly reports. Accordingly, in their February 1998 quarterly reports, several agencies reported that they planned to develop contingency plans only if they fall behind schedule in completing their Year 2000 fixes. Independent Verification of Progress Needed
OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress has been predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently verified or independently reviewed. Success of the New Presidential Council Is Critical
Given the sweeping ramifications of the Year 2000 issue, other countries have set up mechanisms to solve the Year 2000 problem on a nationwide basis. HUD officials recognize the importance of ensuring that its systems are Year 2000 compliant; system failures could interrupt the processing of applications for mortgage insurance, the payment of mortgage insurance claims, and the payment of rental assistance. HUD established a Year 2000 project office in June 1996. To better ensure completion of work on mission-critical systems, HUD officials have recently decided to halt routine maintenance on five of its largest systems, beginning April 1 of this year. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the nation's year 2000 computing crisis as well as the year 2000 program being implemented at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a risk that critical services could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the federal government is extremely vulnerable to the year 2000 issue due to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations; (3) in addition, the year 2000 also could cause problems for many of the facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years that contain embedded computer systems, to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (4) key economic sectors that could be seriously impacted if their systems are not year 2000 compliant are: information and telecommunications, banking and finance, health, safety, and emergency services, transportation, utilities, and manufacturing and small business; (5) agencies have taken longer to complete the awareness and assessment phases of their year 2000 programs than is recommended; (6) this leaves less time for critical renovation, validation, and implementation phases; (7) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) reports on agency progress do not fully and accurately reflect the federal government's progress toward achieving year 2000 compliance because not all agencies are required to report and OMB's reporting requirements are incomplete; (8) in January 1998, OMB asked agencies to describe their contingency planning activities in their February 1998 quarterly reports; (9) accordingly, in their 1998 quarterly reports, several agencies reported that they planned to develop contingency plans only if they fall behind schedule in completing their year 2000 fixes; (10) OMB's assessment of the current status of federal year 2000 progress has been predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently verified or independently reviewed; (11) given the sweeping ramifications of the year 2000 issues, other countries have set up mechanisms to solve the year 2000 problem on a nationwide basis; (12) HUD officials recognize the importance of ensuring that its systems are year 2000 compliant; systems failures could interrupt the processing of applicants for mortgage insurance, the payment of mortgage insurance claims, and the payment of rental assistance; (13) HUD established a year 2000 project office in June 1996; and (14) to better insure completion of work on mission-critical systems, HUD officials have recently decided to halt routine maintenance of five of its largest systems, beginning April 1 of this year. |
gao_GAO-11-515 | gao_GAO-11-515_0 | The Smithsonian points to the definition of inventory added by the 1996 amendments in support of its interpretation, noting that one could easily construe the consultation requirement to apply with greater force to the requirement to use the best available scientific and historical documentation to identify the origins of the human remains and objects rather than to the development of the inventories. The committee report, however, also notes that one intent of the amendments was to ensure that the requirements for the inventory, identification, and repatriation of human remains and funerary objects in the possession of the Smithsonian was being carried out in a manner consistent with NAGPRA, which suggests that the Smithsonian should have included geographic and cultural affiliations in its inventory to the extent practicable based on information held by the Smithsonian. However, more than 21 years later, these efforts are still under way. Smithsonian’s Progress in Offering Human Remains and Objects for Repatriation Has Been Slow
From the passage of the NMAI Act in 1989 through December 2010, the Smithsonian estimates that it has offered to repatriate the Indian human remains in approximately one-third (about 5,280) of the estimated 19,780 catalog numbers identified as possibly including Indian human remains since the act was passed. The Smithsonian generally makes repatriation decisions based on the case reports prepared by case officers at each museum. At the pace the Smithsonian has been going, it could take decades more to prepare case reports for the remaining human remains and funerary objects in its collections. In addition, although the Review Committee has heard few disputes, no independent appeals process exists to challenge the Smithsonian’s cultural affiliation and repatriation decisions. The American Indian Museum did not exist at the time of enactment: Since the American Indian Museum did not exist at the time of the act’s enactment in 1989, the Smithsonian’s legal view is that it did not have any collections that could be subject to the act’s repatriation provisions. The Review Committee Monitors the Natural History Museum but Does Not Report to Congress
To fulfill its responsibility under the NMAI Act to monitor and review the inventory, identification, and return of Indian human remains and objects, the Review Committee has performed a number of activities to oversee the Natural History Museum’s repatriation process including the following: Assessing the Natural History Museum’s progress in implementing the act: The committee generally meets twice annually with Repatriation Office staff and sometimes with other museum staff, including management, to discuss the status of ongoing claims and other repatriation activities. Reviewing museum case reports: The committee’s reviews of the Repatriation Office’s repatriation case reports are intended to offer an “independent appraisal of whether the case reports provide a fair and objective consideration and assessment of all relevant information,” according to the Review Committee annual report. Most Human Remains and Many Objects Offered for Repatriation Have Been Repatriated, but the Smithsonian Has No Policy on Culturally Unidentifiable Items
The Smithsonian estimates that, of the items offered for repatriation, it has repatriated about three-quarters of the Indian human remains, about half of the funerary objects, and almost all the sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony. Some items have not been repatriated for a variety of reasons, including tribes’ lack of resources, cultural beliefs, and tribal government issues. In addition, the Smithsonian has not repatriated some human remains and funerary objects that it has determined to be culturally unidentifiable, and it does not have a policy on how it will undertake the ultimate disposition of these items. The Smithsonian’s Repatriation Policies Do Not Discuss How to Handle Culturally Unidentifiable Items
The NMAI Act requires the Smithsonian, upon request, to repatriate culturally affiliated Indian and Native Hawaiian human remains and funerary objects. In the absence of a Smithsonian policy for these human remains and objects, the Smithsonian’s actions in handling culturally unidentifiable items lack transparency for both tribes and policymakers. This process is lengthy in part because the Smithsonian believes it must base every cultural affiliation decision on the best available scientific and historical documentation because of its legal and fiduciary duties. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress may wish to consider ways to expedite the Smithsonian’s repatriation process including, but not limited to, directing the Smithsonian to make cultural affiliation determinations as efficiently and effectively as possible. Direct the Secretary of the Smithsonian to expand the Review Committee’s jurisdiction to include the American Indian Museum, as required by the NMAI Act, to improve oversight of Smithsonian repatriation activities. We were asked to determine 1. the extent to which the Smithsonian has fulfilled its repatriation requirements and what challenges it faces, if any, in fulfilling its requirements; 2. how the special review committee provisions in the NMAI Act have been implemented and the challenges the committee faces, if any, in fulfilling its requirements; and 3. the number of human remains and objects that have been repatriated and the reasons for those that have not. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Museum of the American Indian Act of 1989 (NMAI Act), as amended in 1996, generally requires the Smithsonian Institution to inventory and identify the origins of its Indian human remains and objects placed with them (funerary objects) and repatriate them to culturally affiliated Indian tribes upon request. It also creates a special committee to oversee this process. According to the Smithsonian, two of its museums--the American Indian and the Natural History Museums-- have items that are subject to the act. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Smithsonian has fulfilled its repatriation requirements, (2) how the special committee provisions have been implemented, and (3) the number of human remains and objects that have been repatriated and reasons for any that have not. GAO reviewed museum records, including 171 repatriation case reports, and interviewed Smithsonian, Repatriation Review Committee, and tribal officials.
What GAO Found
Since the NMAI Act was enacted, in 1989, more than 21 years ago, the Smithsonian has offered to repatriate over 5,000 human remains, which account for approximately one-third of the total estimated human remains in its collections. The Smithsonian has also offered to repatriate over 212,000 funerary objects, but the extent of progress is unknown because the Smithsonian has no reliable estimate of the total number of such objects in its collections. The Smithsonian generally makes repatriation decisions based on detailed case reports, and had completed 171 case reports as of December 31, 2010. Developing these case reports is a lengthy and resource-intensive process, in part because the NMAI Act generally requires the Smithsonian to use the best available scientific and historical documentation to identify the origins of its Indian human remains and funerary objects. The Smithsonian originally estimated that the repatriation process would take about 5 years; however, at the pace that it is progressing, GAO believes it could take several more decades to complete this process. In response to the special committee requirements of the NMAI Act, the Smithsonian established a Repatriation Review Committee to monitor and review the Natural History Museum's repatriation activities. Although the Smithsonian believes Congress intended to limit the committee's jurisdiction to the Natural History Museum, the statutory language and its legislative history do not support that view. Since it was established, the committee has provided no oversight over the repatriation activities of the American Indian Museum. In addition, GAO found that neither the Smithsonian nor the committee has provided regular information to Congress on the repatriation progress at the Smithsonian. Although this reporting is not required by the act, given the length of time this process has taken and is expected to take in the future, policymakers do not have information that would keep them apprised of the Smithsonian's repatriation efforts. The committee also hears disputes concerning decisions over the return of human remains and objects, but it does not make binding decisions. Moreover, the Smithsonian has no independent administrative appeals process by which tribes who would like to challenge a repatriation decision can seek recourse, and judicial review of the Smithsonian's repatriation decisions may not be practical. Through December 31, 2010, the Smithsonian estimates that, of the items it has offered for repatriation, about three-quarters of the Indian human remains (4,330 out of 5,980) and about half of the funerary objects (99,550 out of 212,220) have been repatriated. The remaining items have not been repatriated for various reasons, including tribes' lack of resources and cultural beliefs. Resources needed include staff to work on repatriations and appropriate locations to rebury or house the items. In addition, the Smithsonian has not repatriated approximately 340 human remains and 310 funerary objects because it has determined that they cannot be culturally affiliated with a tribe, and it does not have a policy on the disposition of these items. The lack of such a policy limits the transparency of the Smithsonian's actions in handling culturally unidentifiable items for both tribes and policymakers. GAO suggests that Congress may wish to consider ways to expedite the Smithsonian's repatriation process, and recommends that the Smithsonian take actions to expand the oversight and reporting role of the special committee, establish an administrative appeals process, and develop a policy for the disposition of culturally unidentifiable items. The Smithsonian agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-357T | gao_GAO-06-357T_0 | Within Labor, VETS has primary responsibility for helping the nation’s veterans find employment. Labor and States Acted to Implement Program Reforms, but Accountability Challenges Remain
Labor and states have taken action to implement most JVA provisions to reform veterans’ services since the law was enacted in November 2002, but challenges remain particularly in implementing reforms to improve accountability for the DVOP and LVER programs. However, Labor reports that states will not be held accountable to a common national standard for veterans’ employment until 2007. States also report good progress in implementing provisions, but challenges remain in some local areas in terms of integrating veterans’ staff with other employment services staff in local workforce centers. Staff Roles and Responsibilities
VETS took several steps to prepare veterans’ staff for their new roles and responsibilities under the law, and while the majority of state workforce administrators reported that these staff had transitioned to a greater focus on intensive services for veterans and employer outreach as required by JVA, challenges remained in the areas of training and integrating staff in some one-stop offices. Incentive Awards Program
VETS issued guidance in time to establish an incentive program in the first fiscal year after JVA, and 32 of the 50 state workforce administrators we surveyed reported implementing the program. California, for example, cited that state law prohibited monetary or other gifts to employees for performing their duties. Performance Accountability
Labor has taken action to establish a new accountability system as required by JVA, but reports that more time is needed under the new system before it can hold all states accountable to the same standard for veterans’ employment. State Officials Reported that JVA Reforms Improved Veterans’ Services and Employment Outcomes
While data are not available to link the JVA reforms to changes in veterans’ services and employment outcomes, most state workforce administrators we surveyed believed that the reforms have improved the quality of services to veterans, and have improved their employment outcomes. 1.) These respondents attributed the improvement both to the law’s reforms and to other factors. Other than the reforms themselves, administrators said veterans’ employment was influenced by employer willingness or desire to hire veterans and by the strength of the local job market. 2.) 3.) Program Accountability Weakened by Absence of Local Data and Lack of Coordinated Oversight
Labor oversight and accountability for the DVOP and LVER programs has been affected by the lack of data available from local workforce offices in some states, as well as the lack of coordination among Labor agencies in monitoring and sharing information gathered on program performance. Labor also lacks a strategy for using the monitoring information it gathers to improve performance across states and local areas. Veterans’ Employment and Training: Services Provided by Labor Department Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of service members leaving active duty is likely to increase by 200,000 yearly, according to the Department of Labor. To improve employment and training services for veterans and to encourage employers to hire them, Congress passed the Jobs for Veterans Act in 2002, which reformed Labor's Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program (DVOP) and Local Veterans' Employment Representative (LVER) program. This testimony summarizes GAO's recent review of progress implementing the act, including the development of new staff roles and responsibilities, incentive awards, and performance accountability system. GAO examined (1) actions taken to improve performance and accountability since the law's enactment and any associated challenges, (2) whether available data indicate that such action has resulted in improved employment outcomes for veterans, and (3) factors affecting program oversight an accountability.
What GAO Found
Labor implemented most reforms under the Jobs for Veterans' Act (JVA) to improve the DVOP and LVER programs within the first 2 years of its enactment. However, it has not yet fully implemented measures to improve state accountability for these programs. Specifically, Labor reports that states will not be held accountable to the same standard for veterans' employment until 2007. States also report substantial progress implementing the law, but integrating veterans' staff with other one-stop staff remains challenging in some local areas. In addition, about one-third of the states did not establish incentive programs for their workforce personnel because state laws, policies, or agreements conflict with this JVA provision. Most state workforce administrators surveyed reported that the new legislation has improved both the quality of services to veterans and their employment outcomes. For example, they reported that services provided to disabled veterans have improved. They also credited the greater availability of case management and outreach to new employers for much of the improvement in employment outcomes under JVA. Aside from the law's influence, state administrators cited the willingness of employers to hire veterans and the strength of the local job market as significant factors affecting veterans' employment. About half of state directors of Veterans' Employment and Training reported their new monitoring role had strengthened local program accountability. However, just over a third reported that accountability had either lessened or not improved. Some partly attributed this to absence of local performance data and fewer annual visits to one-stop centers. GAO found, as well, that a lack of coordination among Labor's agencies responsible for certain JVA provisions has weakened accountability. Also, while Labor has developed a system to monitor program performance, it lacks a strategy for using the information it gathers to make improvements and to help states. |
gao_GAO-14-242 | gao_GAO-14-242_0 | Medicare and Medicaid EHR Programs
HITECH provided funding for various activities, including the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs. These programs are intended to help increase the meaningful use of EHR technology by providing incentive payments for, and later imposing penalties on, providers—that is, certain hospitals and health care professionals such as physicians—who participate in Medicare or Medicaid. Challenges Are Reported Related to Standards, Privacy, Patient Matching, and Costs of Electronic Exchange
Providers and stakeholders we interviewed cited key challenges to electronic health information exchange; in particular, they cited issues related to insufficient standards, concerns about how privacy rules can vary among states, difficulties in matching patients to their records, and costs associated with electronic health information exchange. CMS and ONC officials noted that they have several ongoing programs and initiatives to help address some aspects of these key challenges, but concerns in these areas continue to exist. Reported insufficiencies in standards for electronic health information exchange. Although HHS has ongoing efforts to address the patient matching challenge, several providers and stakeholders commented that more work needs to be done on this issue. Providers we interviewed reported challenges covering costs associated with health information exchange, including upfront costs associated with purchasing and implementing EHR systems, fees for participation in state or local HIE organizations, and per-transaction fees for exchanging health information charged by some vendors or HIE organizations. HHS Developed an Electronic Health Information Exchange Strategy That Includes Principles to Address Key Challenges but Lacks Specific Prioritized Actions and Milestones
HHS, including CMS and ONC, developed and issued a strategy document in August 2013 that describes how it expects to advance electronic health information exchange, with principles to guide future actions in three broad areas—accelerating health information exchange, advancing standards and interoperability, and patient engagement. The HHS strategy does not provide milestones with specific time frames to help the agencies gauge their progress in advancing exchange. Determining specific, prioritized actions and exchange- related milestones with specified time frames can help to ensure that the agencies’ principles and future actions result in timely improvements in addressing the key exchange-related challenges reported by providers and stakeholders, which are particularly important because planning for Stage 3 is expected to begin as soon as 2014. This information could also help HHS prioritize its future actions based on whether health information is being exchanged effectively among providers, in order to better achieve the EHR programs’ ultimate goals of improving quality, efficiency, and patient safety. Guidance on planning and implementing effective strategies highlights the importance of key elements, such as specific, prioritized actions and milestones for gauging progress. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address challenges that affect the ability of providers to electronically exchange health information, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct CMS and ONC to take the following two actions: develop and prioritize specific actions that HHS will take consistent with the principles in HHS’s strategy to advance health information exchange; and develop milestones with time frames for the actions to better gauge progress toward advancing exchange, with appropriate adjustments over time. We selected the four states because they were mentioned during interviews with officials from HHS and relevant stakeholders as having ongoing efforts related to health information exchange. Appendix III: CMS and ONC Principles to Facilitate Health Information Exchange
This appendix provides information on the principles that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) plan to use to guide their future actions to facilitate health information exchange. These principles are outlined in a strategy that the agencies released in August 2013 to describe how they expect the principles to lead to future actions that have the potential to address the key challenges providers and stakeholders have identified relative to electronic health information exchange in four areas—standards, patients’ privacy, matching patients with data, and costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) promotes the use of health information technology and identifies the importance of health information exchange. It provides incentive payments to promote the widespread adoption and meaningful use of EHR technology. To be a meaningful user, providers are to demonstrate, among other things, that their certified EHR technology can electronically exchange health information. GAO examined (1) the key challenges to the electronic exchange of health information, if any, that have been reported by providers and stakeholders, and HHS's ongoing efforts to address them, and (2) the extent to which HHS has planned future actions to address those key challenges. GAO reviewed HHS documentation; interviewed HHS officials; and interviewed providers—hospital officials and physicians—and relevant stakeholders about their experiences.
What GAO Found
Providers and stakeholders GAO interviewed in four states with ongoing electronic health information exchange efforts cited key challenges to exchange, in particular, issues related to insufficient standards, concerns about how privacy rules can vary among states, difficulties in matching patients to their records, and costs associated with exchange. Officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC)—agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—noted that they have several ongoing programs and initiatives to help address some aspects of these key challenges, but concerns in these areas continue to exist. For example, several providers GAO interviewed said that they have difficulty exchanging certain types of health information due to insufficient health data standards. Although HHS has begun to address insufficiencies in standards through its Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) programs, such as through the introduction of new 2014 standards for certified EHR technology, it is unclear whether its efforts will lead to widespread improvements in electronic health information exchange. In addition, providers GAO interviewed reported challenges covering costs associated with electronic exchange, such as upfront costs associated with purchasing and implementing EHR systems. While HHS is working to address this challenge through various efforts, including a program that helps fund health information exchange organizations—organizations that provide support to facilitate the electronic exchange of health information—some providers told GAO they do not participate in these organizations because they see limited opportunities for exchanging information through them.
HHS, including CMS and ONC, developed and issued a strategy document in August 2013 that describes how it expects to advance electronic health information exchange. The strategy identifies principles intended to guide future actions to address the key challenges that providers and stakeholders have identified. However, the HHS strategy does not specify any such actions, how any actions should be prioritized, what milestones the actions need to achieve, or when these milestones need to be accomplished. GAO's prior work, consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), sets forth several key elements of strategies that can guide agencies in planning and implementing an effective government program. As noted in GAO's prior work, elements such as specific actions, priorities, and milestones are desirable for evaluating progress, achieving results in specified time frames, and ensuring effective oversight and accountability. Determining specific actions and exchange-related milestones with specified time frames can help to ensure that the agencies' principles and future actions result in timely improvements in addressing the key challenges reported by providers and stakeholders; this is particularly important because planning for Stage 3 of the EHR programs, which focuses on improving outcomes, is expected to begin as soon as 2014. This information could also help CMS and ONC prioritize their future actions based on whether health information is being exchanged effectively among providers, in order to better achieve the EHR programs' ultimate goals of improving quality, efficiency, and patient safety.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS and ONC (1) develop and prioritize specific actions that HHS will take consistent with the principles in HHS's strategy to advance health information exchange, and (2) develop milestones with time frames for the actions to better gauge progress toward advancing exchange, with appropriate adjustments over time. In commenting on the draft report, HHS, including CMS and ONC, concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-1170T | gao_GAO-03-1170T_0 | Using that hearing as a baseline, we evaluated, using primarily USAID IG reports, the progress made to improve USAID’s financial management systems, processes, and human capital (people) in the past 2 years. At the time of the May 2001 hearing, USAID was one of three federal agencies subject to the CFO Act that had such significant problems that they were unable to produce financial statements that auditors could express an opinion on. While USAID has made progress in its financial management since that hearing, it has not achieved the success that it had expected. All but one of USAID’s financial statements received unqualified opinions. The IG reported that “…on the Statement of Net Cost, the opinion was achieved only through extensive effort to overcome material weaknesses in internal control” and “lthough these efforts resulted in auditable information, did not provide timely information to USAID management to make cost and budgetary decisions throughout the year.”
Compounding USAID’s systems difficulties has been the lack of adequate financial management personnel. Since the early 1990s, we have reported that USAID has made limited progress in addressing its human capital management issues. While a viable financial management system is needed, and offers the capacity to achieve reliable data, it is not the entire answer for improving USAID’s financial management information. As financial information improved over the years, it has assisted the USAID IG in identifying additional internal control and system weaknesses. The chronic nature of the reported weaknesses at USAID reflect challenges with people (human capital), processes, and financial management systems. Financial Management Reform Will Require a Long-term Commitment
Transforming USAID’s financial and business management environment into an efficient and effective operation that is capable of providing management and the Congress with relevant, timely, and accurate information on the results of operation will require a sustained effort. Improved financial systems and properly trained financial management personnel are key elements of this transformation. We have reported for years and USAID acknowledges that human capital is one of the management challenges that must be overcome. USAID represented to us that as part of its agencywide human capital strategy, it plans to specifically address its financial management personnel challenges. Conclusion
USAID appears to be making a serious attempt to reform its financial management, as evidenced by initiatives to improve its human capital, internal controls, and business systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has long reported that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) faces a number of performance and accountability challenges that affect its ability to implement its foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs. These major challenges include human capital, performance measurement, information technology, and financial management. Effective financial management as envisioned by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) and other financial management reform laws is an important factor to the achievement of USAID's mission. USAID is one of the federal agencies subject to the CFO Act. In light of these circumstances, the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, House Committee Government Reform asked GAO to testify on the financial management challenges facing USAID, as well as the keys to reforming USAID's financial management and business practices and the status of ongoing improvement efforts.
What GAO Found
USAID has made some progress to improve financial management, primarily in achieving audit opinions on its financial statements. Through the rigors of the financial statement audit process and the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA), USAID has gained a better understanding of its financial management weaknesses. However, pervasive internal control weaknesses continue to prevent USAID management from achieving the objective of the CFO Act, which is to have timely, accurate financial information for day-to-day decision making. USAID's inadequate accounting systems make it difficult for the agency to accurately account for activity costs and measure its program results. Compounding USAID's systems difficulties has been the lack of adequate financial management personnel. Since the early 1990s, we have reported that USAID has made limited progress in addressing its human capital management issues. While some improvements have been made over the past several years, significant challenges remain. Transforming USAID's financial and business environment into an efficient and effective operation that is capable of providing timely and accurate information will require a sustained effort. USAID has acknowledged the challenges it faces to reform its financial management problems and has initiatives underway to improve its systems, processes, and internal controls. USAID has also recognized the need for a specific human capital action plan that addresses financial management personnel shortfalls. |
gao_GAO-10-571T | gao_GAO-10-571T_0 | CRD developed 29 action plans to address the recent 53 recommendations, with 13 focusing on leadership. Table 1 shows a summary of the distribution of these action plans across EEOC’s six model elements. Examples of the action plans that focus on demonstrated commitment from agency leadership include: Develop a comprehensive training program for Civil Rights Service Schedule Office of Civil Rights headquarters and field-level senior staff for the Center for Creative Leadership North America Leadership workshops; and Task regional managers with identifying skills and managing the training needs of their staffs. Although CRD Established Processes to Develop and Review Selected Action Plans, Documentation of Key Decisions and Outcomes Needs Improvement
CRD took several steps to develop and review action plans to address recommendations from the most recent external review, such as developing a functional review team, assigning project officers, meeting with the Commandant and agency leadership, and consulting the agency financial officer. CRD Did Not Consistently Document Key Decisions Related to the Development and Review of the Action Plans
When developing and reviewing the action plans, CRD did not maintain documentation as recommended in federal internal control standards. As a result, CRD lacks transparency and accountability to stakeholders. Lack of documentation also impedes the ability to track progress, make midcourse corrections, and illustrate to stakeholders that it is effectively solving these issues. CRD officials stated that their priority was to complete the action plans in a timely manner rather than assure that development and review processes were documented. Documentation of decisions may also allow CRD to demonstrate to Coast Guard leadership and other stakeholders its progress in addressing long- standing issues identified in the two previous external reviews of CRD. The following seven practices are adapted from generally accepted project management practices: 1. Identifying measurable performance goals; 2. Consulting stakeholders; and 7. We reviewed the following four action plans that are related to key issues identified in the external review. These action plans encompass 13 of the 53 recommendations that were made to CRD. Restructure Civil Rights Operations. Action Plans Only Partially Identified Measurable Performance Goals and Did Not Define How to Evaluate the Success of Completing a Plan
We analyzed the four selected action plans to determine the extent to which generally accepted project management practices have been integrated in their development and implementation process. Three of the four action plans defined specific tasks to complete the action plan; however, the action plan related to attending training to address CRD’s office climate did not. Identified the Person(s) Accountable for Completing the Action Plan. CRD officials stated that they were primarily focused on completing the action plans to address the recommendations to improve the EO/EEO program, and if they had more time, they would have planned to evaluate the action plans. Revise the U.S. Coast Guard service-specific portion of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Equal Opportunity Advisors Program to include training by civilian Equal Employment Opportunity Commission certified trainers who would provide instruction in the areas of Equal Employment Opportunity Counseling and complaint processing. This practice identifies and documents interim milestones and checkpoints to gauge the completion of the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
Allegations of management weaknesses, unsecured personal information, and employee dissatisfaction have been made against U.S. Coast Guard's Civil Rights Directorate (CRD). To address these allegations, the Director of CRD commissioned an external review of civil rights operations. In February 2009, the review made 53 recommendations to improve the civil rights operations. CRD developed action plans to address these recommendations. As requested, GAO reviewed (1) how Coast Guard's action plans align with EEOC's elements of a model equal employment opportunity program (2) how Coast Guard developed and reviewed its action plans, and (3) the extent to which Coast Guard's action plans align with generally accepted project management practices. To conduct this work GAO reviewed documentation from CRD, EEOC, internal control standards, and literature on project management. We also interviewed CRD officials.
What GAO Found
Of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) six equal employment opportunity program model elements, CRD's action plans focus mainly on the first--agency leadership. Of the 29 action plans developed and implemented by CRD to address the 53 recommendations in the recent external review, almost half center on the leadership element. For example, one action plan involved scheduling training for headquarters and field staff. CRD took several steps to develop and review action plans to address recommendations from the external review, such as developing a functional review team, assigning project officers, meeting with the Commandant and agency leadership, and consulting the agency financial officer. However, CRD did not consistently document key decisions related to the development and review of the action plans as recommended in federal internal control standards. As a result, CRD lacks transparency and accountability to stakeholders. Lack of documentation also impedes the ability to track progress, make mid-course corrections, and illustrate to stakeholders that it is effectively solving these issues. According to CRD officials, their priority was to complete the action plans in a timely manner rather than ensure that development and review processes were documented. GAO reviewed four of CRD's action plans in relation to generally accepted project management practices to determine the extent to which recommended practices were followed. The recommended practices are: (1) identifying measurable performance goals, (2) defining specific tasks, (3)identifying the person(s) accountable, (4) identifying interim milestones and checkpoints, (5) identifying the needed resources, (6)consulting stakeholders, and (7) defining how to evaluate success. The selected action plans showed some elements of the project management practices, such as identifying accountable individuals, but fell short in relation to other elements. Specifically, performance goals were identified in the form of a product, such as development of a manual, rather than in relation to a desired outcome, such as demonstrating an increase in the number of staff who know how to properly safeguard personal information. All four action plans we reviewed lacked plans for evaluating their success. CDR officials stated that they were more focused on completing the plans rather than evaluating them, but early evaluation can identify and guide mid-course corrections to ensure positive change. |
gao_GAO-02-563 | gao_GAO-02-563_0 | With increased concern over the contamination of the Great Lakes, the two countries signed the first international Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in 1972 to improve the environmental conditions in the lakes. The agreement binds the United States and Canada to cooperate with state and provincial governments to designate such areas of concern, with the IJC reviewing progress by each government in addressing actions to restore water quality in the lakes. As of April 2002, most of the RAPs for which the United States was responsible were in the second stage of having remedial and regulatory measures selected; none has completed all three stages indicating completion of cleanup. Several EPA actions, such as diffusing RAP responsibility within the agency, reducing federal funding and staff support for the RAP process, and shifting the agency’s attention to other cleanup priorities in the Great Lakes Basin have all contributed to the uneven progress in RAP development and implementation. EPA also reduced its staffing levels for the RAPs. The reduction of toxic substances in the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess what progress had been made in developing and implementing cleanup plans for the contaminated areas around the Great Lakes, we reviewed the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1987, which set forth the United States’ obligation to cooperate with state governments to ensure the cleanup of the contaminated areas and described the process for developing and implementing the cleanup plans. | What GAO Found
To protect the Great Lakes and to address common water quality problems, the United States and Canada entered into the bilateral Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in 1972. The agreement has been amended several times, most recently in 1987. That year, the two countries agreed to cooperate with state and provincial governments to develop and implement remedial action plans (RAPs) for designated areas in the Great Lakes Basin--areas contaminated, for example, by toxic substances. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) leads the effort to meet the goals of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, which include RAP development and implementation. As of April 2002, all of the 26 contaminated areas in the Great Lakes Basin that the United States is responsible for have completed the first stage of the RAP process; however, only half have completed the second stage. Even though EPA has been charged with leading the effort to meet the goals of the agreement, it has not clearly delineated responsibility for oversight of RAPs within the agency, and, citing resource constraints and the need to tend to other Great Lakes priorities, reduced its staff and the amount of funding allocated to states for the purpose of RAP development and implementation. |
gao_GAO-04-915 | gao_GAO-04-915_0 | Fiscal Year 2004 Funds Appropriated for the Global War on Terrorism
To support GWOT in fiscal year 2004, the Congress appropriated $65 billion to DOD in an emergency supplemental appropriation. Funding for GWOT Operation and Maintenance in Fiscal Year 2004 Is Not Likely to Be Sufficient
Our analysis of reported obligations for the first seven months of fiscal year 2004 and the military services’ forecasts as of June 2004 of their likely costs for GWOT through the end of fiscal year 2004 suggest that anticipated costs will exceed the supplemental funding provided for GWOT. These actions include taking steps to reduce costs, transferring funds from the Iraqi Freedom Fund, transferring funds between appropriations accounts, and deferring planned peacetime activities to use those funds to support GWOT. According to this representative, DOD plans to ask the Congress for an additional $1.1 billion in transfer authority, which would give the department sufficient authority to move funds from one service to another and get funds to the operation and maintenance accounts that have the greatest shortfalls. We believe that the deferral of these activities will add to the requirements that will need to be funded in fiscal year 2005 and potentially later years and so could result in a “bow wave” effect in future fiscal years. Congressional Efforts to Improve Accountability of GWOT Funds
Recent congressional committee actions have signaled the Congress’ intent to require greater accountability regarding the use of GWOT funds. The House Committee on Appropriations included provisions in its bill for accountability related to the use of these funds. DOD is taking a variety of actions to cover these shortfalls. It has also asked the Congress to provide a $25 billion contingent reserve for GWOT in fiscal year 2005. Our past work has shown that current cost reporting includes large amounts of funds that have been reported as obligated in miscellaneous categories and so provides little insight on how those funds have been spent. This may result in reduced transparency and accountability to the Congress and the American people. This in turn helps highlight the importance of providing useful information to the Congress for its oversight role. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the adequacy of funding for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), we reviewed (1) the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request for supplemental appropriations, (2) applicable laws appropriating funds for GWOT, and (3) Department of Defense (DOD) reports on the obligation of GWOT funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
To support the Global War on Terrorism in fiscal year 2004, the Congress appropriated $65 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) in an emergency supplemental appropriations act. To assist the Congress in its oversight role, GAO reviewed (1) the adequacy of current funding for fiscal year 2004 war-related activities and (2) actions DOD is undertaking to cover anticipated shortfalls, if any. Based on the body of work GAO has done on the cost of contingency operations, GAO is also making observations on efforts to require greater accountability to the Congress on the use of funds appropriated to DOD for contingency operations.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of reported obligations for the first seven months of fiscal year 2004 through April 2004 and the military services' forecasts as of June 2004 of their likely costs for the Global War on Terrorism for operation and maintenance and military personnel through the end of fiscal year 2004 suggests that anticipated costs will exceed the supplemental funding provided for the war by about $12.3 billion for the current fiscal year. DOD and the services are taking a variety of actions to cover anticipated shortfalls in their war-related funding. These actions include taking steps to reduce costs, transferring funds among appropriations accounts, and deferring some planned activities to use those funds to support the war. Also, DOD plans to ask the Congress for additional transfer authority, which would give it sufficient authority to move funds from one service to another and get funds to the operation and maintenance accounts that have the greatest shortfalls. The deferral of activities planned for fiscal year 2004 adds to the requirements that will need to be funded in fiscal year 2005 and potentially later years and could result in a "bow wave" effect in future fiscal years. GAO's past work has shown that current cost reporting includes large amounts of funds that have been reported as obligated in miscellaneous categories and thus provide little insight on how those funds have been spent. This is likely to result in reduced transparency and accountability to the Congress and the American people. Recent congressional actions have signaled the Congress' intent to require greater accountability regarding the use of GWOT funds. For example, in action on the President's $25 billion request for an Iraqi Freedom Fund Contingent Emergency Reserve in fiscal year 2005, the House Committee on Appropriations included provisions in its bill for cost reporting related to the use of these funds. But additional actions are necessary. |
gao_GAO-02-630 | gao_GAO-02-630_0 | Between 1989 and 1999, DOD downsized its civilian acquisition workforce by almost 50 percent to about 124,000 personnel as of September 30, 1999. DOD estimates that as many as half of the remaining acquisition personnel could now be eligible to retire by 2005. Challenges Involved in Reshaping a Workforce
Reshaping a workforce is challenging for any agency. Specifically, as discussed below, DOD is working to remove barriers to its strategic planning initiatives; continuing with an effort to test various human capital innovations; and beginning to make significant changes to its acquisition workforce-training program. DOD’s Report Generally Complies with Congressional Requirements
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required DOD to summarize its actions and plans to implement the task force’s recommendations. However, information on other actions was unclear or incomplete. To assess the extent that DOD’s report summarizes DOD’s actions and plans to implement the Task Force’s recommendations, we reviewed the DOD report to ascertain whether the report clearly (1) summarized DOD’s actions taken to address the Task Force recommendations, (2) identified milestones to be achieved and the schedule for achieving them, and (3) described how DOD would manage, oversee, and evaluate its efforts to address the Task Force’s concerns. Not provided. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) downsized its acquisition workforce by half in the past decade. It now faces serious imbalances in the skills and experience of its remaining workforce and the potential loss of highly specialized knowledge if many of its acquisition specialists retire. DOD created the Acquisition 2005 Task Force to study its civilian acquisition workforce and develop a strategy to replenish personnel losses. In response to a legislative mandate, DOD reported on its plans to implement the task force's recommendations as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. DOD's report shows that it has made progress in reshaping its acquisition workforce. For example, DOD is working to remove barriers to its strategic planning initiative; continuing to test various human capital innovations; and has begun making significant changes to its acquisition workforce-training program. DOD's report provides information on implementation of the task force's recommendations and their status. However, for many initiatives, DOD did not clearly describe the actions taken or when they occurred, nor did it identify all planned actions and schedules for completing the initiatives. |
gao_GAO-09-462T | gao_GAO-09-462T_0 | To carry out these responsibilities, the Coast Guard operates a number of vessels and aircraft and, through its Deepwater Program, is currently modernizing or replacing those assets. As the systems integrator, ICGS was responsible for designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and integrating the assets. Coast Guard Has Made Improvements but Faces Continued Challenges in Managing Deepwater Acquisitions
Since the Commandant’s April 2007 announcement that the Coast Guard was taking over the lead role in systems integration from ICGS, the Coast Guard has undertaken several initiatives that have increased accountability for Deepwater outcomes within the Coast Guard and to DHS. The Coast Guard has also vested its government project managers with management and oversight responsibilities formerly held by ICGS. The Coast Guard is also now managing Deepwater under an asset-based approach, rather than as an overall system-of-systems as initially envisioned. For example, cost and schedule information is now captured at the individual asset level, resulting in the ability to track and report cost breaches for assets. To manage Deepwater acquisitions at the asset level, the Coast Guard has begun to follow a disciplined project management process using the framework set forth in its Major Systems Acquisition Manual. This process requires documentation and approval of program activities at key points in a program’s life cycle. Other programs within DHS have also experienced cost growth and schedule delays. Consequences of Prior Deepwater Acquisition Approach May Be Costly
While the decision to follow the Major Systems Acquisition Manual process for Deepwater assets is promising, the consequences of not following this acquisition approach in the past—when the contractor managed the overall acquisition—are now apparent for assets already in production, such as the NSC, and are likely to pose continued problems, such as increased costs. The Coast Guard is not fully positioned to manage these aspects under its new acquisition approach but is engaged in efforts to do so. C4ISR is a key aspect of the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its missions. As the Coast Guard transitions from the ICGS-based system-of-systems acquisition strategy to an asset-based approach, it will need to maintain a strategic outlook to determine how many of the various Deepwater assets to procure to meet Coast Guard needs. To that end, the Coast Guard is modeling the planned capabilities of Deepwater assets, as well as the capabilities and operations of existing assets, against the requirements for Coast Guard missions. In fact, one of the reasons the Coast Guard originally contracted with ICGS as a systems integrator was the recognition that the Coast Guard lacked the experience and depth in its workforce to manage the acquisition itself. In the meantime, the lack of a sufficient government acquisition workforce means that the Coast Guard is relying on contractors to supplement government staff, often in key positions such as cost estimators, contract specialists, and program management support. Conflicts of interest, improper use of personal services contracts, and increased costs are also potential concerns of reliance on contractors. Concluding Observations
In response to significant problems in achieving its intended outcomes under the Deepwater Program, the Coast Guard leadership has made a major change in course in its management and oversight by re-organizing its acquisition directorate, moving away from the use of a contractor as the systems integrator, and putting in place a structured, more disciplined acquisition approach for Deepwater assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has a large body of work examining government agencies' approaches to managing their large acquisition projects. GAO has noted that without sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology, and design maturity, programs are subject to cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance that does not meet expectations. The Deepwater Program, intended to replace or modernize 15 major classes of Coast Guard assets, accounts for almost 60 percent of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 appropriation for acquisition, construction and improvements. GAO has reported over the years on this program, which has experienced serious performance and management problems such as cost breaches, schedule slips, and assets designed and delivered with significant defects. To carry out the Deepwater acquisition, the Coast Guard contracted with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) as a systems integrator. In April 2007, the Commandant acknowledged that the Coast Guard had relied too heavily on contractors to do the work of government and announced that the Coast Guard was taking over the lead role in systems integration from ICGS. This testimony reflects our most recent issued work on Deepwater, specifically our June 2008 report, Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management and Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain, GAO-08-745 .
What GAO Found
Over the past two years, the Coast Guard has reoriented its acquisition function to position itself to execute systems integration and program management responsibilities formerly carried out by ICGS. The acquisition directorate has been consolidated to oversee all Coast Guard acquisitions, including the Deepwater Program, and Coast Guard project managers have been vested with management and oversight responsibilities formerly held by ICGS. Another key change has been to manage the procurement of Deepwater assets on a more disciplined, asset-by-asset approach rather than as an overall system of systems, where visibility into requirements and capabilities was limited. For example, cost and schedule information is now captured at the individual asset level, resulting in the ability to track and report breaches for assets. Further, to manage Deepwater acquisitions at the asset level, the Coast Guard has begun to follow a disciplined project management process that requires documentation and approval of program activities at key points in a program's life cycle. These process changes, coupled with strong leadership to help ensure the processes are followed in practice, have helped to improve Deepwater management and oversight. However, the Coast Guard still faces many hurdles going forward and the acquisition outcome remains uncertain. The consequences of not following a disciplined acquisition approach for Deepwater acquisitions and of relying on the contractor to define Coast Guard requirements are clear now that assets, such as the National Security Cutter, have been paid for and delivered without the Coast Guard's having determined whether the assets' planned capabilities would meet mission needs. While the asset-based approach is beneficial, certain cross-cutting aspects of Deepwater--such as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and the overall numbers of each asset needed to meet requirements--still require a system-level approach. The Coast Guard is not fully positioned to manage these aspects. One of the reasons the Coast Guard originally contracted with ICGS as the systems integrator was the recognition that the Coast Guard lacked the experience and depth in workforce to manage the acquisition itself. The Coast Guard has faced challenges in building an adequate government acquisition workforce and, like many other federal agencies, is relying on support contractors--some in key positions such as cost estimating and contract support. GAO has pointed out the potential concerns of reliance on contractors who closely support inherently governmental functions. |
gao_GAO-04-512T | gao_GAO-04-512T_0 | DOL and States Identified 144 Unique Unauthorized Entities Operating from 2000 through 2002 That Left More Than $250 Million in Unpaid Claims
DOL and the states identified 144 unauthorized entities from 2000 through 2002. DOL and the states found that every state had at least 5 entities operating in it. 1.) These entities were concentrated in certain states and regions. At least 15,000 employers purchased coverage from unauthorized entities, affecting more than 200,000 policyholders from 2000 through 2002. At the time of our 2003 survey, DOL and states reported that the 144 entities had not paid at least $252 million in medical claims. Licensed insurance agents who have marketed products offered by these entities have also reimbursed unpaid claims either voluntarily or through state or court action. Most Unauthorized Entities Characterized Themselves as One of Several Types of Arrangements and Some Had Other Approaches in Common
The 144 entities that federal and state governments identified from 2000 through 2002 varied in size and specific characteristics, but most were variations of one of four types of arrangements and some had other approaches in common that enhanced their appearance of legitimacy and attractiveness to prospective purchasers. The operators of these entities often characterized the entities as one of these common types to give the appearance of being exempt from state regulation, but often states found that they actually were subject to state regulation as insurance arrangements or MEWAs. For example, some entities adopted names that were familiar to consumers or similar to those of marketed their products through licensed agents; established relationships with networks of health care providers and with companies that provide administrative services for employers offering health benefits; set premiums below market rates; marketed to employers or individuals that were particularly likely to be seeking affordable insurance alternatives, such as small employers, workers in industries such as construction or transportation who are disproportionately more likely to be uninsured, and self-employed individuals; and paid initial claims while collecting additional premiums before ceasing claims payments. States also took other actions against some entities, sometimes in conjunction with issuing cease and desist orders. Each of these actions affected people in at least 41 states. As a result, further federal actions remain possible. These states, which were among the states with a moderate or high number of entities, and DOL emphasized the need for consumers and employers to check the legitimacy of health insurers before purchasing coverage, thus helping to prevent unauthorized entities from continuing to operate. In addition to increasing public awareness, the four state insurance departments warned insurance agents through bulletins, newsletters, and other methods about these entities, the implications associated with selling their products, and the need to verify the legitimacy of all entities. This has been reflected by the increasing number of these entities identified by federal and state governments in recent years. As many employers and individuals continue to seek affordable health coverage alternatives in this environment of rising premiums, it is especially important that federal and state governments remain vigilant in identifying, stopping, and preventing the establishment of these entities and continue to caution individuals, employers, and their agents to verify the legitimacy of entities offering coverage. Employers Mutual collected approximately $16 million in premiums from over 22,000 people in 2001, and left more than $24 million in unpaid medical claims. August - November 2001 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington take action against Employers Mutual. | Why GAO Did This Study
As health insurance premiums have risen at double-digit rates in recent years, employers and individuals who have sought to purchase more affordable coverage have fallen prey to certain entities that may offer attractively priced premiums but do not fulfill the expectations of those buying health insurance. These unauthorized entities--also known as bogus entities or scams--may not meet the financial and benefit requirements typically associated with health insurance products or other arrangements that are authorized, licensed, and regulated by the states. This testimony is based on GAO's recent report Private Health Insurance: Employers and Individuals Are Vulnerable to Unauthorized or Bogus Entities Selling Coverage, GAO-04-312 (Feb. 27, 2004). In this testimony, GAO was asked to identify the number of entities that operated from 2000 through 2002 and the number of employers and policyholders affected, approaches and characteristics of these entities' operations, and the actions federal and state governments took against these entities. GAO analyzed information obtained from the Department of Labor (DOL) and from a survey of insurance departments in the states; interviewed officials at DOL and at insurance departments in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Texas; and examined the operations of one of the largest entities--Employers Mutual, LLC.
What GAO Found
DOL and the states identified 144 unique entities not authorized to sell health benefits coverage from 2000 through 2002. Although every state was affected by at least 5 of these entities, these entities were most often identified in southern states. These unauthorized entities covered at least 15,000 employers and more than 200,000 policyholders. The entities also left at least $252 million in unpaid medical claims, only about 21 percent of which had been recovered at the time of GAO's 2003 survey. In most cases, the operators characterized their entities as one of several types to give the appearance of being exempt from state regulation, but states found that they actually were subject to state regulation. Other characteristics that were common among at least some of these entities included (1) adopting names that were familiar to consumers or similar to legitimate firms, (2) marketing their products through licensed agents and with other health care or administrative service companies, (3) setting premiums below market rates, (4) marketing to employers or individuals that were particularly likely to be seeking affordable insurance alternatives, and (5) paying initial claims while collecting additional premiums before ceasing claims payments. Employers Mutual adopted many of these characteristics as it collected approximately $16 million in premiums from over 22,000 people in 2001, leaving more than $24 million in medical claims unpaid. Both federal and state governments--individually and collaboratively--took action against these entities and sought to increase public awareness. For example, state insurance departments issued cease and desist orders against 41 of the 144 entities, and DOL obtained court orders against three large entities from 2000 through 2002. States also took other actions against some entities' operators and agents that received commissions for marketing these entities. Further state or federal actions remain possible as many investigations remain ongoing. States and DOL primarily focused their prevention efforts on improving public awareness, including the need for consumers, employers, and insurance agents to verify an entity's legitimacy with insurance departments. |
gao_GAO-15-305 | gao_GAO-15-305_0 | As such, disposal is one of the last steps in the D&D process. 2). The remaining facilities were disposed of through other mechanisms such as transfer to federal entities or sale to local governments. EM Transferred by Sale a Limited Number of Uncontaminated Facilities and Land Parcels for Reuse
EM completed 21 property disposals through the process of transfer by sale from 2003 through 2013, at no cost and with the provision of indemnification. According to EM officials, from 2003 through 2013, 13 facilities totaling more than 331,000 square feet were transferred by sale from the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to the CRO or local government for economic development. None of the facilities, which had been used for a variety of purposes including office buildings and a warehouse, was contaminated and as a result did not require D&D. Data Limitations and an Unclear Policy Impede DOE’s Ability to Effectively Manage Its Decentralized Property Disposal Process
DOE Does Not have Timely and Complete Data to Oversee Its Property Disposal Process
Limitations in its data on facilities that are undergoing or have completed D&D may impede DOE’s ability to effectively manage its real property assets, including their disposal. DOE and EM each maintain a database that contains information on facilities that are undergoing or have completed D&D. However, neither system collects all the information DOE would need to effectively manage this subgroup of its real property portfolio. The Order also states that excess real properties that are appropriate for economic development transfer must be identified and disposed of; however, the policy is unclear as it does not identify who is responsible for these tasks or when they should identify such properties. By not taking a proactive approach to identifying and transferring property that is suitable for economic development purposes, DOE may forgo opportunities to reduce its overall footprint and achieve efficiencies in the disposal process. DOE Has Taken Some Actions to Address Property Disposal Challenges
Stakeholders Cited Renovation Costs, Security Restrictions, and Lengthy Processes as Challenges That Limit Property Disposals
DOE officials at headquarters and the site level, CRO representatives, and local government officials we interviewed identified several challenges to disposing of EM properties. According to DOE officials at headquarters and all seven of the selected sites, as well as all nine stakeholders we interviewed, facility characteristics limit the reuse potential for some EM facilities. Specifically, many of these facilities were built for a unique purpose and their construction makes reuse for other purposes difficult. Facilities require significant renovation prior to reuse. Selling or leasing properties within the boundaries of secure sites may pose security concerns. Similarly, as part of a reindustrialization program at ETTP, EM transferred by sale 13 facilities and 8 land parcels to the CRO for economic development. For DOE, those challenges are compounded by the fact that some of its excess properties have been contaminated as a result of their use in supporting the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research. DOE’s ability to manage the disposal of these properties is impeded by its reliance on data that are not always timely or complete. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DOE make more informed decisions regarding its management and disposal of real property held by EM, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following actions:
DOE should take steps to ensure that its real property data systems provide timely and complete data on the status and major milestones of facilities undergoing D&D at a level of detail that supports sound decision making. With regard to our recommendation that DOE develop and document an approach to property transfer consistent with its policy to identify and transfer properties appropriate for economic development purposes, DOE responded that it will issue a policy memorandum that will (1) assign responsibility for identifying such properties and (2) include the timeframe and manner of identification and any resulting notification. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the number and characteristics of facilities for which the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) completed the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) process from 2003 through 2013, (2) assess DOE’s management of the disposal of properties that were EM’s responsibility, and (3) identify the challenges DOE faced in disposing of these properties and actions it has taken to address those challenges. We did not assess or examine DOE’s management of the D&D process itself in this report. To assess DOE’s management of the disposal of properties that were EM’s responsibility, we analyzed DOE’s policies and guidance related to real property management and interviewed officials at headquarters and at the site level about the disposal of these properties in practice. | Why GAO Did This Study
Disposing of properties that are excess to DOE's current and future needs is complicated because many are contaminated as a result of their use supporting nuclear weapons development and nuclear energy research. As part of this disposal, DOE's EM oversees the environmental cleanup and for facilities, their D&D. GAO was asked to examine DOE's management of the disposal of these types of properties.
This report (1) describes the facilities for which EM completed D&D from 2003 through 2013, (2) assesses DOE's management of the disposal of EM properties, and (3) identifies challenges DOE faced in disposing of these properties and actions taken to address those challenges. GAO analyzed DOE data, reviewed relevant policies and guidance on real property management, and interviewed DOE officials at headquarters and at seven DOE sites selected to represent a variety of sizes, locations, and experiences with property disposal. GAO also interviewed stakeholders from CROs and local governments.
What GAO Found
From 2003 through 2013, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM)—the office responsible for the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of the agency's contaminated facilities—disposed of nearly 2,000 facilities across 19 sites in 13 states, according to EM data. The majority of these facilities were disposed of through demolition because of their contamination levels. During this time, EM also disposed of a limited number of uncontaminated facilities and land parcels through transfer by sale. EM transferred by sale 21 properties—13 facilities and 8 land parcels—at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to a community reuse organization (CRO)—an organization whose purpose is to facilitate the reuse of unneeded DOE properties—and the local government.
DOE's ability to manage its decentralized property-disposal process is impeded by data limitations and an unclear policy. DOE and EM each maintain a database that contains information on facilities that are undergoing or have completed D&D. However, neither system collects all the information DOE officials would need to effectively manage this subgroup of its real property portfolio, such as when D&D of a facility started or was completed. In addition, DOE's database, which serves as the agency's source of information on all real property holdings, is not always timely or complete, a shortcoming that limits the value to officials as a source of information for decision making. Furthermore, although DOE's policy requires that excess real properties appropriate for transfer for economic development purposes be identified and disposed of, it does not identify what entity is responsible for these tasks or when it should identify such properties. As a result, almost none of the officials GAO interviewed at headquarters and at the site-level was proactively or systematically identifying or disposing of these properties. Consequently, DOE may be forgoing opportunities to reduce its overall footprint and achieve efficiencies in the disposal process.
DOE officials at headquarters and the selected sites as well as stakeholders—representatives of CROs and local governments—identified several challenges to disposing of EM properties for reuse, including:
Facilities' characteristics, such as unique construction for a specific purpose, can limit reuse potential.
Facilities may require significant renovation prior to reuse due to their age and condition.
Properties located within the boundaries of secure sites may pose security concerns, making selling or leasing properties difficult.
Property disposal processes are lengthy and may limit reuse.
EM and DOE have taken some actions, such as instituting more flexible cleanup processes, to accelerate D&D and to develop strategies to improve the property disposal process. In addition, at one site, EM transferred properties by sale to the CRO and reported using the cost savings to direct additional funds to D&D, a step that in turn, accelerated the cleanup of the remaining facilities. DOE also established a task force in 2011 that provided sites an opportunity to share information about ways to improve property disposal processes and timelines.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1) take steps to ensure its data systems provide timely and complete data that support sound decision making and (2) develop and document an approach to property transfer—including roles and responsibilities—consistent with DOE's policy to identify and transfer properties for economic development purposes. DOE concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps it plans to take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-12-519 | gao_GAO-12-519_0 | Since 2002, OPM has used a telework survey—the data call—to annually collect information from the executive agencies in order to provide Congress with a report on the status of telework across these agencies. OPM Revised the 2011 Telework Data Call to Prepare for Reporting under the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010
In response to the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010, OPM revised the 2011 data call and provided instructions to executive agency respondents that incorporated common definitions and standards to use in providing OPM with their agency data. While some of the information provided at the two training sessions was similar, each session contained some new information usually in response to questions raised at a previous session. If OPM reports agency telework progress based on data collected using definitions revised year to year, OPM may reach erroneous conclusions, although OPM officials have said they are taking steps to try and prevent this possibility. OPM officials said that they will need to indicate this in their report to Congress. While OPM made changes to the 2011 data call to allow it to meet some of its reporting requirements under the act and better assist agencies in responding to the data call, our analysis found the 2011 data call did not fully meet some generally accepted survey standards. Since 2003, OPM has consistently expressed concerns about the methods agencies use to collect telework data. Executive agencies provide telework participation and frequency data using a variety of methods, such as relying on estimates, counting telework agreements, and using automated time and attendance records to track telework participation. According OPM, agencies will begin piloting these automated data collection systems for the 2012 telework data call. However, continuous improvement efforts sometimes result in a trade-off between the desire for data consistency and a need to improve data collection and maintenance of a consistent data series over time. With the planned change to the method of data collection, it may not be possible to compare the 2011 data to future data. However, these officials said that the 2011 data, notwithstanding its limitations, will be useful in identifying and understanding any major agency changes in reported participation that could occur during a transition to automated data collection. In addition, variation in training sessions and OPM’s uncertainty as to whether all respondents attended training, could lead to respondents’ potential misunderstanding of important terms and instructions. The validity and reliability of the reported 2011 telework data for some of the responding agencies may be questionable, and therefore agency telework participation and frequency data will not likely be comparable with previous data calls because of differences in definitions used, time periods of reporting, and individual agency tracking methods. With the revised 2011 data call, OPM establishes a baseline it could use to conduct a limited crosscheck of data collected through a governmentwide automated telework data collection system, which OPM plans to implement over the course of 2012 and 2013. OPM expects that automated data collection will provide it increasingly more reliable data on which to report progress. However, these efforts to improve future automated data collection may result in changes to agencies’ methods of data collection and a trade-off between the desire for consistency with previous data calls for comparison purposes and a need to improve overall data collection. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve OPM’s annual reporting of telework to Congress, we recommend that the OPM Director take the following two actions:
Ensure that the reliability limitations related to the 2011 telework data call are clearly reported in its June 2012 report to Congress by fully describing how existing measures of telework participation vary widely in validity and reliability and limit the capability of OPM to reliably report the actual level and frequency of telework participation. Continue efforts to improve data collection and gather information that allows for the appropriate qualification of year-to-year comparisons and informs users about the effects of data collection changes going forward. In summary, OPM partially concurred with our first recommendation and fully concurred with the second. OPM also provided a number of technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) actions to respond to the requirements of the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 and (2) assesses how OPM is handling and addressing identified data reliability issues in the 2011 telework data call. This included discussions on the role of the Interagency Telework Measurement Group (ITMG), the process for developing the definitions and key terms used in the data call, the training and assistance provided to executive agency officials responsible for completing the data call, and agency plans to address outstanding data reliability issues associated with the data call. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 requires OPM to report to Congress on the degree of telework participation at executive agencies. To meet this requirement, OPM collects information on agency telework programs through an annual survey, which it refers to as the data call. However, concerns exist about the reliability of these data.
GAO was asked to assess OPMs: (1) actions in response to the requirements of the act and (2) handling of identified data reliability issues in the 2011 telework data call. To address these objectives GAO reviewed its previous reports addressing telework data reliability, and used the Office of Management and Budgets guidance for federal surveys to review OPMs (1) plans to collect telework participation data from agencies and (2) development of a data collection instrument. GAO interviewed key OPM officials about its implementation of the 2011 data call.
What GAO Found
To prepare for its reporting obligations under the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) assembled the Interagency Telework Measurement Group, consisting of officials from several federal agencies, to assist in revising the telework data callthe survey OPM has used since 2002 to collect telework data from executive agencies. This group standardized key terms such as telework, employee, and eligibility to promote a common reporting methodology among the agencies. The revised telework data call also included changes to the time period for which OPM requested agencies report telework data, and included more extensive training for respondents.
Because of changes made to the data call to allow OPM to meet requirements of the act and assist agencies in responding to the data call, OPM officials believe they will be able to provide to Congress an improved report on telework in June 2012. However, these changes also mean that OPM officials will not be able to use participation and frequency data from the 2011 data call to compare to data from previous years and across agencies. OPM officials have noted that this could limit OPMs ability to report agency progress in its first report to Congress. The ability to compare with previous years is affected by:
agencies use of methods of varying reliability to collect telework data, and some agencies made changes to their data collection systems for the 2011 data call. Executive agencies provide telework participation and frequency data by relying on estimates, counting telework agreements, or using automated time and attendance records.
modifications to the data call instrument, including changes to terminology and the time period during which telework data was requested. OPM officials said they expect these changes will improve the consistency of data. But if OPM reports progress based on data collected using changing terminology and from different time periods, the agency may reach erroneous conclusions.
Participants at the two data call training sessions may not have received the same reporting instructions, and uncertainty about whether all agency respondents attended training, created a risk that some respondents may be unaware of important terms and instructions. While some of the information provided at the two training sessions was similar, each session contained some new information, usually in response to questions raised at a previous session.
Future data call improvement efforts could result in a trade-off between the desire for maintenance of a consistent data series over time for comparison with previous data calls and a need to improve data collection. According to OPM, agencies will begin piloting automated telework data collection during 2012 and 2013. OPM expects that this method of data collection will provide it more reliable data than other methods. However, these efforts to standardize methods for tracking telework data may result in changes to agencies methods of data collection. The 2011 data call, notwithstanding its limitations, will be useful to help OPM identify and understand major changes in reported participation data that could occur during a transition to automated data collection.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM (1) clearly report reliability limitations with the 2011 telework data call in its June 2012 report to Congress and (2) continue efforts to improve data collection and gather information to allow for the appropriate qualification of year-to-year comparisons and inform users about the effects of data collection changes going forward. OPM partially concurred with the first recommendation. However, GAO believes it should report limitations in its annual report. OPM fully concurred with the second. OPM provided a number of technical comments which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-09-588 | gao_GAO-09-588_0 | PCASG Fund Recipients Used PCASG Funds to Support Primary Care Services by Hiring Health Care Providers and Other Staff and Adding Services and Sites
PCASG fund recipients reported that they used PCASG funds to hire or retain health care providers and other staff, add primary care services, and open new sites. Recipients also said that the PCASG funds have helped them improve service delivery and access to care. Almost All PCASG Fund Recipients That Responded to Our Survey Used PCASG Funds to Hire or Retain Health Care Providers and Other Staff
Most of the PCASG fund recipients that responded to our survey reported they used PCASG funds to hire health care providers or other staff. PCASG fund recipients also reported using grant funds to add or expand specialty care services or to add ancillary services. For example, one of these recipients reported that it added podiatry services. Other Federal Hurricane Relief Funds Helped PCASG Fund Recipients to Pay Staff, Purchase Equipment, and Expand Mental Health Services to Help Restore Primary Care
PCASG fund recipients also used other federal hurricane relief funds to provide services. Two PCASG Fund Recipients Used SSBG Supplemental Funds Designated for Mental Health Care to Provide a Range of Services, Including Crisis Intervention and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment
The two PCASG fund recipients that received SSBG supplemental funds designated for mental health care used them to provide crisis intervention, substance abuse, and other mental health services. This recipient expended $7.9 million of the $29 million in CCP funds awarded to Louisiana. PCASG Fund Recipients Face Multiple Challenges and Have Various Plans for Sustainability
PCASG fund recipients face significant challenges in hiring and retaining staff, as well as in referring patients outside of their organizations, and these challenges have grown since Hurricane Katrina. For example, 16 of the 23 recipients reported that retaining health care providers was a great or moderate challenge. Specifically, 14 of the 23 recipients reported that the availability of mental health providers willing to accept referrals was a great or moderate challenge, and over two-thirds of those reporting that level of challenge responded that this challenge had grown since Hurricane Katrina. Although PCASG fund recipients have completed or planned actions to increase their ability to be sustainable, it is too early to know whether their various sustainability strategies will be successful. The PCASG funds were targeted to the greater New Orleans area—specifically, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes—because of the impact Hurricane Katrina had on this area. In this report we examine (1) how PCASG fund recipients used the PCASG funds to support the provision of primary care services in the greater New Orleans area, (2) how PCASG fund recipients used and benefited from other federal hurricane relief funds that support the restoration of primary care services in the greater New Orleans area, and (3) challenges the PCASG fund recipients continued to face in providing primary care services, and recipients’ plans for sustaining services after PCASG funds are no longer available. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed data gathered by LDHH related to the incentive payments made under the Professional Workforce Supply Grant and expenditures under the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP). Appendix II: Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant Fund Recipients: Characteristics, Patients, and Services
In July 2007, HHS awarded the $100 million PCASG to LDHH, which in turn provided funds to 25 outpatient provider organizations in the greater New Orleans area in September 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The greater New Orleans area--Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes--continues to face challenges in restoring health care services disrupted by Hurricane Katrina. In 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded the $100 million Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant (PCASG) to Louisiana to help restore primary care services to the low-income population. Louisiana gave PCASG funds to 25 outpatient provider organizations in the greater New Orleans area. GAO was asked to study how the federal government can effectively leverage governmental resources to help area residents gain access to primary care services. This report examines (1) how PCASG fund recipients used the PCASG funds to support primary care services in greater New Orleans, (2) how PCASG fund recipients used and benefited from other federal hurricane relief funds that support the restoration of primary care services in the area, and (3) challenges PCASG fund recipients continued to face in providing primary care, and their plans for sustaining services after PCASG funds are no longer available.
What GAO Found
PCASG fund recipients reported that they used the PCASG funds to hire or retain health care providers and other staff, add primary care services, and open new sites. For example, 20 of the 23 recipients that responded to the GAO survey reported using PCASG funds to hire health care providers, and 17 reported using PCASG funds to retain health care providers. In addition, most of the recipients reported that they used PCASG funds to add primary care services and to add or renovate sites. Recipients also reported that the grant requirements and funding helped them improve service delivery and expand access to care in underserved neighborhoods. Other federal hurricane relief funds helped PCASG fund recipients pay staff, purchase equipment, and expand mental health services to help restore primary care. Eleven recipients received HHS Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) supplemental funds designated by Louisiana for primary care, and two received SSBG supplemental funds designated by Louisiana specifically for mental health care. The funds designated for primary care were used to pay staff and purchase equipment, and the funds designated for mental health care were used to provide a range of services for adults and children, including crisis intervention and substance abuse prevention and treatment. About two-thirds of the PCASG fund recipients benefited from the Professional Workforce Supply Grant incentives. These recipients hired or retained 69 health care providers who received incentives totaling over $4 million to work in the greater New Orleans area. In addition, one PCASG fund recipient expended $7.9 million it received from Louisiana to provide services through the federal Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program. PCASG fund recipients continue to face multiple challenges and have various plans for sustainability. Recipients face significant challenges in hiring and retaining staff, as well as in referring patients outside of their organizations, and these challenges have grown since Hurricane Katrina. For example, 20 of 23 recipients that responded to the GAO survey reported hiring was a great or moderate challenge, and among these 20 recipients over three-quarters reported that this challenge had grown since Hurricane Katrina. Six of the 7 recipients that primarily provide mental health services reported that both hiring and retention of providers were great or moderate challenges. Many PCASG fund recipients also reported challenges in referring patients outside their organization for mental health, dental, and specialty care services. Although all PCASG fund recipients have completed or planned actions to increase their ability to be sustainable, it is too early to know whether their various sustainability strategies will be successful. |
gao_GAO-11-444 | gao_GAO-11-444_0 | Further, CJIS relies on the CSAs to audit all LEAs that enter data into NCIC in each state, to help ensure compliance among all NCIC users. CJIS Has Disseminated Guidelines for Timely Entry into NCIC, but Establishing Minimum Standards for CSA Audits and Assessing Adherence to Standards Could Strengthen CJIS’s Oversight
CJIS and the Board Have Taken Steps to Help Ensure Compliance with the 2-hour Requirement and CJIS Has Issued Audit Recommendations to Non-Compliant CSAs
CJIS and the Board have taken a number of steps to help ensure that LEAs implement the 2-hour entry requirement. Responding officers did not provide the information on the missing child in a timely manner. However, the Board has not taken steps to establish audit standards that require CSAs to assess compliance with the 2-hour entry requirement. In the absence of standards, we found that audit approaches used by the 6 selected CSAs to assess compliance with the 2-hour entry requirement varied. The number of missing children records reviewed ranged from all active records in one state to no records in another. The fact that CSAs were not consistently applying the 2-hour criterion to review a sample of missing children records raises questions about the reliability of CSA information on LEA compliance. For example, in 2006, NCMEC and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, with funding from OJJDP, developed a model missing children’s policy for law enforcement agencies, which agencies could use to establish guidelines and responsibilities for agency personnel in responding to reports of missing children. Officials from the three child welfare agencies we contacted in three of the four states where LEA officials reported challenges in coordinating with child welfare agencies noted that in some cases, foster-care group homes may not have the information law enforcement needs to enter reports of missing children into NCIC, but stated that this situation does not occur very frequently. DOJ, NCMEC, and the Child Welfare League of America have taken steps to try to assist LEAs and child welfare agencies in addressing these issues. The guidance states that collaboration between LEAs and child welfare agencies is necessary to ensure that children missing from care are reported to law enforcement, and provides a sample self-assessment for LEAs to use to help them develop policies and procedures to enhance LEAs’ responses to children missing from care. Existing CJIS and OJJDP Mechanisms Could Be Useful for Collecting and Sharing Information about LEA Challenges to Timely Reporting
The fact that officials from eight of the nine LEAs we contacted reported facing challenges entering missing children information into NCIC within 2 hours due to custody disputes and coordination with child welfare agencies—even in the context of efforts by DOJ to develop and disseminate guidance regarding these issues—raises questions about the extent to which LEAs are well-positioned to comply with the 2-hour entry requirement. DOJ does not know the extent to which the challenges we identified in our LEA interviews exist across all LEAs. However, there are other existing CJIS and OJJDP mechanisms that could be useful for collecting and sharing information about LEA challenges to timely reporting and the ways in which some LEAs have successfully addressed these challenges. For example, the CJIS Advisory Policy Board’s working groups and subcommittees and CJIS’s voluntary annual training for representatives of all CSAs and selected LEAs in each state could be useful for obtaining information on the extent and severity of challenges faced by LEAs. Using existing CJIS and OJJDP mechanisms to (1) obtain information on the extent to which LEAs face the types of challenges we identified, as well as other challenges that may be prevalent or significant and (2) share examples of LEA-reported successes to mitigating the challenges, could better position DOJ to carry out its oversight role over NCIC with respect to helping ensure compliance with the 2-hour requirement. Such minimum standards could better position CSAs to design audits of LEAs to obtain more consistent and reliable information on LEA compliance with the requirement. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following three recommendations: To increase the likelihood that CJIS is positioned to oversee compliance with the requirement that LEAs enter records of missing children into NCIC within 2 hours, we recommend that the Director of the FBI direct CJIS to consider: In collaboration with CSAs and the Board, establishing minimum standards that provide CSAs guidance on assessing compliance with timely entry requirements, including applying the 2-hour criterion and how to sample missing children records; and Ensuring that in future triennial audits, CJIS assesses the extent to which CSA audit programs adhere to the minimum standards. To increase the likelihood that LEAs are better positioned to comply with the requirement to enter missing children records into NCIC within 2 hours, we recommend that the Director of the FBI and the Administrator of OJJDP consider opportunities to use existing mechanisms to obtain information on the extent to which LEAs face challenges—such as custodial determinations and coordination with child welfare agencies—in reporting missing children to NCIC, and share examples of successful efforts to mitigate these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Missing children who are not found quickly are at an increased risk of victimization. The National Child Search Assistance Act, as amended, requires that within 2 hours of receiving a missing child report, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) enter the report into the Department of Justice's (DOJ) National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a clearinghouse of information instantly available to LEAs nationwide. DOJ's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS), the CJIS Advisory Policy Board (the Board), and state criminal justice agencies share responsibility for overseeing this requirement. As requested, GAO examined (1) CJIS's and the Board's efforts to implement and monitor compliance with the requirement; and (2) selected LEA-reported challenges with timely entry and DOJ's actions to assist LEAs in addressing them. GAO reviewed documents, such as agency guidelines, and interviewed officials from DOJ, six state criminal justice agencies, and nine LEAs selected in part based on missing children rates. The results are not generalizable to all states and LEAs, but provided insights on this issue.
What GAO Found
CJIS and the Board have taken steps to help ensure implementation of the 2-hour entry rule, but could strengthen their oversight to better assure compliance with the rule. Starting in 2007, CJIS: (1) informed all state criminal justice agencies that LEAs will have 2 hours to enter reports of missing children into NCIC once they have collected the required data (e.g., child's biographical information); (2) provided guidance on how LEAs could document compliance with the rule; and (3) informed state criminal justice agencies that the Board had authorized CJIS to begin assessing compliance with the rule in audits starting in 2009. To help ensure compliance among all NCIC users, CJIS and the Board require state criminal justice agencies to audit all LEAs in the state that enter data into NCIC. However, CJIS and the Board have not taken steps to establish minimum audit standards for state criminal justice agencies to use in assessing LEAs' compliance with the 2-hour rule. In the absence of such standards, the selected six state criminal justice agencies GAO contacted used varied approaches to assess LEAs' compliance. For example, two were not using the 2-hour criterion, and the number of missing children records the six agencies reviewed to assess timeliness ranged from all records in one state to no records in another. The fact that the state agencies did not consistently apply the 2-hour criterion to review a sample of missing children records raises questions about the reliability of the information the agencies collect on LEA compliance. Establishing minimum standards for state agency audits could help provide CJIS with reasonable assurance that the audits contain reliable information on LEA compliance. Officials from eight of nine LEAs GAO contacted reported challenges to entering information on missing children into NCIC within 2 hours; CJIS and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) could use existing mechanisms to obtain and share information on challenges. Seven LEAs reported challenges determining whether a child is missing when there are custodial disputes. Six LEAs reported challenges obtaining information from child welfare agencies on missing children in the child welfare system. Officials from child welfare agencies in areas where LEAs reported this challenge said that they may not always have the information LEAs need, and are taking steps to ensure timely communication between their staff and LEAs. In association with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and other stakeholders, in 2006 OJJDP developed (1) a model policy stating that LEAs will accept reports of missing children even when custody has not been established and (2) sample self-assessments so LEAs could enhance their responses to missing children in the child welfare system. However, eight of the nine LEAs stated that these challenges persist. DOJ does not know the extent of these challenges across all LEAs and has limited capability to conduct such an assessment. By using existing CJIS and OJJDP mechanisms--such as CJIS's training for state agencies and OJJDP-funded training for LEAs--to obtain information on the extent to which LEAs face these and other challenges and provide examples of how some LEAs have mitigated the challenges, DOJ could be better positioned to carry out its oversight of NCIC with respect to assuring compliance with the 2-hour rule.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CJIS and the Board consider establishing minimum standards for states to use to monitor compliance with the 2-hour rule and CJIS and OJJDP use existing mechanisms to obtain and share information on LEA challenges and successful efforts to mitigate them. DOJ concurred. |
gao_GAO-08-605 | gao_GAO-08-605_0 | In addition, 14 of the 18 panelists were at least moderately certain that the benefits of their suggested portfolio of actions would outweigh the costs. Most of the panelists identified either a tax on emissions or a cap-and-trade program with a safety valve as the preferred mechanism to establish a price on emissions, and the majority believed a portfolio of additional actions to address climate change could complement the market-based mechanism. Some panelists also identified general categories of benefits and costs associated with their recommended actions, and rated the usefulness of benefit and cost estimates derived from integrated assessment models. Overall the panel rated estimates of costs as more useful than estimates of benefits for informing congressional decision making, with some panelists citing uncertainties associated with the future impacts of climate change as a limitation to estimating benefits. All of the Panelists Agreed that the Congress Should Consider Establishing a Price On Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and the Majority Recommended Complementary Policies
All of the panelists agreed that the Congress should consider a market- based mechanism to establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions and supported implementation of the policy by 2015. Under a hybrid approach, the government would establish a cap-and-trade system with a safety valve, a mechanism under which the government would sell additional permits if the market price exceeded a predetermined level, which would represent the maximum permit price and thus an upper limit on control costs. Another panelist recommending an initial market price between $11 and $20 said that the safety valve should depend on the stringency of the policy. Alternatively, a downstream system would regulate sources such as electric utilities that combust fossil fuels and emit greenhouse gases. 2 and app. When asked how certain they were that their recommended portfolio of actions to address climate change were economically justified, 14 of the 18 panelists were at least moderately certain that the benefits of their suggested actions would outweigh the costs. Panelists Rated Estimates of Costs of Actions to Address Climate Change as More Useful than Estimates of Benefits, Citing Uncertainties Associated with Future Impacts
Citing uncertainties associated with the potential future impacts of climate change, and the difficulties of estimating their economic impacts, panelists rated cost estimates from integrated assessment models as more useful for informing congressional decision making than benefit estimates. While some panelists said that the United States should proceed cautiously if it acts unilaterally, 16 of 18 panelists agreed that the United States should establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, regardless of the extent to which other countries adopt similar policies. Nonetheless, the majority of the panelists said that it was important for the United States to participate in international negotiations to facilitate climate agreements or to enhance the credibility or influence of the United States. The Panelists’ Views on the Strengths and Limitations of Policy Options Focused Primarily on the Environmental Certainty of a Cap- and-Trade System versus the Efficiency of a Tax on Emissions
The panel provided their opinions on the strengths and limitations associated with various policy options to address climate change, and focused on the key trade-offs between a tax on emissions or a cap-and- trade system. These expert opinions should be of assistance to the Congress in weighing the potential benefits and costs of different policies for addressing climate change. The Most Important Trade- offs are between the Relative Effectiveness of Cap-and-Trade Systems and the Relative Efficiency of Taxes
When asked to identify their preferred policy options, 8 of the 18 panelists said that they prefer a cap and trade with a safety valve as a way to combine some elements of both a cap-and-trade system and a tax. Some panelists noted that a traditional cap-and-trade system would provide more environmental certainty; that is, it would more likely achieve specific emissions reductions because the policy caps the total amount of emissions at a specific level. Panelists identified the strengths and limitations of other policy options to address climate change, such as subsidy reform for alternative fuels or energy-efficient technologies and research and development into the basic science of climate change. We contracted with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to select and recruit a panel of experts with a range of in-depth experience assessing the economic impacts of climate change policy. Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations. Sea- Level Rise and Global Climate Change: A Review of Impacts to U.S. Nordhaus William D. “To Tax or Not to Tax? | Why GAO Did This Study
Elevated levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the resulting effects on the earth's climate could have significant environmental and economic impacts in the United States and internationally. Potential impacts include rising sea levels and a shift in the intensity and frequency of floods and storms. Proposed responses to climate change include adapting to the possible impacts by planning and improving protective infrastructure, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions directly through regulation or the promotion of low-emissions technologies. Because most U.S. emissions stem from the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, much of this report centers on the effect emissions regulation could have on the economy. In this context, GAO was asked to elicit the opinions of experts on (1) actions the Congress might consider to address climate change and what is known about the potential benefits, costs, and uncertainties of these actions and (2) the key strengths and limitations of policies or actions to address climate change. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify a panel of noted economists with expertise in analyzing the economic impacts of climate change policies and gathered their opinions through iterative, Web-based questionnaires. The findings reported here represent the views of the 18 economists who responded to both questionnaires.
What GAO Found
All of the panelists agreed that the Congress should consider using a market-based mechanism to establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions, and 14 of the 18 panelists recommended additional actions as part of a portfolio to address climate change, such as investment in research and development of low-emissions technologies. Experts differed on the initial stringency of the market-based mechanism, with 14 of the 18 panelists recommending an initial price between less than $1 and $20 per ton of emissions. In addition, 14 of 18 panelists were at least moderately certain that the benefits of their recommended portfolio of actions would outweigh the costs. To establish a price on emissions, most of the panelists preferred either a tax on emissions or a hybrid policy that incorporates features of both a tax and a cap-and-trade program. A tax would set a fixed price on every ton of emissions, whereas a cap-and-trade program would limit or cap total emissions and establish a market for trading (buying and selling) permits to emit a specific amount of greenhouse gases. Under the cap-and-trade system, the market would determine the price of emissions. A hybrid system differs from a traditional cap-and-trade system in that the government would cap emissions, but could sell additional emissions permits if the permit price rose above a predetermined level. Panelists also identified general categories of benefits, such as avoided climate change damages, and costs, such as increases in energy prices, associated with their recommended actions. Overall the panel rated estimates of costs as more useful than estimates of benefits for informing congressional decision making, with some panelists citing uncertainties associated with the future impacts of climate change as limitations to estimating benefits. Further, the majority of panelists agreed that the United States should establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible regardless of the extent to which other countries adopt similar policies. At the same time, the majority of panelists said it was at least somewhat important to participate in international negotiations on climate change. Panelists identified key strengths and limitations of alternative policy approaches that should be of assistance to the Congress in weighing the potential benefits and costs of different policies for addressing climate change. Many panelists said that a cap-and-trade program would be more effective in achieving a desired level of greenhouse gas emissions because, unlike a tax, it would provide certainty that emissions wouldn't exceed a certain level. However, some of the panelists also said that taxes would be more cost-effective than a cap-and-trade program because the price of emissions would be certain and not susceptible to market fluctuations. Eight panelists therefore preferred a hybrid approach that incorporates features of both a tax and a cap-and-trade program. On average, the panelists rated cost effectiveness as the most important criterion for evaluating various policy options. Finally, panelists said an important strength of using a market-based approach is the ability for the government to raise revenue through a tax or the sale of emissions permits and to use that revenue to offset the adverse effects of the policy. |
gao_GAO-02-530 | gao_GAO-02-530_0 | Available Data on Pregnant Victims of Violence Are Incomplete and Lack Comparability
There is no current national estimate of the prevalence of violence against pregnant women. Estimates that are currently available cannot be generalized or projected to all pregnant women. Multiple Strategies Designed to Prevent Violence, But Effect Is Unknown
Violence prevention strategies for both pregnant and nonpregnant women include measures to prevent initial incidents of violence, such as educating women about warning signs of abuse, and intervention activities that identify and respond to violence after it has occurred. Violence Prevention Programs Use Health and Criminal Justice Strategies
Measures to prevent violence against pregnant women are similar to those to prevent violence against all women. Criminal justice strategies to prevent violence against women focus on apprehending, sentencing, incarcerating, and rehabilitating batterers. In addition, limited information is available on the impact of screening on women and their children. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Violence Against Women Act funds programs that shelter battered women, training for law enforcement officers and prosecutors, and research on violence against women. Available data on the number of pregnant women who are victims of violence are incomplete and lack comparability. There is no current national estimate of the prevalence of violence against pregnant women. Available estimates cannot be generalized to all pregnant women, and little information is available on the number of pregnant homicide victims.
What GAO Found
Health and criminal justice officials have designed multiple strategies to prevent violence against women, but their effect is unknown. Strategies to prevent violence against pregnant women are similar to those to prevent violence against all women and include public health efforts to prevent violence in the first place, intervention activities that identify and respond to violence after it occurs, and criminal justice strategies that focus on incarcerating or rehabilitating batterers. |
gao_GAO-08-124T | gao_GAO-08-124T_0 | U.S. Efforts to Build Iraqi Government Capacity Lack Unified Direction
U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government are characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts without overarching direction from a lead entity or a strategic approach that integrates their efforts with Iraqi government priorities and (2) shifting time frames and priorities in response to deteriorating conditions in Iraq. As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing about 53 projects at individual ministries and other national Iraqi agencies. Although State, USAID, and DOD have improved the coordination of their capacity-building efforts since early 2007, there is no lead agency or strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. Low Capacity of the Iraqi Ministries and Other Challenges Pose Risks to U.S. Efforts
U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. Second, Iraq’s government confronts significant challenges in staffing a nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key ministries. Third, according to State, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop the government’s capacity by robbing it of needed resources, some of which are used to fund the insurgency; by eroding popular faith in democratic institutions seen to be run by corrupt political elites; and by spurring capital flight and reducing economic growth. The high level of violence hinders U.S. advisors’ access to their counterparts in the ministries, increases absenteeism among ministry employees, and contributes to “brain drain” as ministry employees join the growing number of Iraqis leaving the country. A senior USAID official indicated that it is uncertain whether the high-level summary will be developed into a strategy, although the administration received $140 million in funding for its capacity development efforts in fiscal year 2007 and requested $255 million for fiscal year 2008. For example: We found little evidence that the U.S. government has clearly defined the purpose, scope, and methodology for developing an overall strategy. While U.S. agencies have clearly identified the overall goals of capacity development at the Iraqi ministries, most U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi priorities for all ministries. U.S. efforts lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. Key components of an overall capacity development strategy should include a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; a clear delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination, including the designation of a lead agency; goals and objectives based on Iraqi-identified priorities; performance measures based on outcome metrics and milestones; and a description of how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end- state. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of the report accompanying this testimony, State and USAID noted (1) their concern over our recommendation to condition future appropriations for capacity development on the completion of a strategy; (2) the recent appointment of an ambassador to supervise all short- and medium-term capacity development programs; and (3) the need to tailor capacity development needs to each Iraqi ministry. In response to the agencies’ first comment, we do not recommend stopping U.S. investment in capacity development; the $140 million in supplemental funding appropriated in fiscal year 2007 remains available for the agencies to continue their efforts. However, this action occurred in July 2007, underscoring our point that U.S. capacity development efforts have lacked overall leadership and highlighting the need for an overall integrated strategy. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The development of competent and loyal government ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The ministries are Iraq's largest employer, with an estimated 2.2 million government workers. U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries include programs to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan programs, execute budgets, and effectively deliver services. The administration received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 to fund U.S. capacity-building efforts and requested an additional $255 million for fiscal year 2008. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop ministry capacity, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy. This statement is based on GAO-08-117 . To accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed reports from and interviewed officials of U.S. agencies, the Iraqi government, the United Nations, and the World Bank. We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; New York City; Baghdad, Iraq; and Amman, Jordan.
What GAO Found
Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading efforts without overarching direction from a lead agency or a strategic plan that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating conditions in Iraq. As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing about 53 projects at individual ministries and other national Iraqi agencies. Although the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have improved the coordination of their capacity-building efforts, there is no lead agency or strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges that pose risks to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. Second, Iraq's government confronts significant challenges in staffing a nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key ministries. Third, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources, some of which are used to fund the insurgency. Finally, violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors' access to Iraqi minstries, increases absenteeism among minstry employees, and contributes to the growing number of professional Iraqis leaving the country. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an overall strategy for ministerial capacity development, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's work in this area shows that an overall strategy for capacity development should include (1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a delineation of U.S. roles and responsibilities and coordination with other donors including the United Nations; (3) goals and objectives linked to Iraqi priorities; (4) performance measures and milestones; and (5) costs, resources needed, and assessment of program risks. U.S. ministry capacity efforts have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state. State and USAID noted concerns over our recommendation to condition further appropriations and cited the appointment of an ambassador to supervise civilian capacity development programs. GAO does not recommend stopping U.S. investment in capacity development. The $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds remains available to continue efforts while developing an integrated strategy. In addition, the U.S. ambassador arrived in Iraq in July 2007 underscoring our point that U.S. efforts lacked overall leadership and highlighting the need for an overall integrated strategy. |
gao_GAO-08-695T | gao_GAO-08-695T_0 | Contractor facilities must be cleared prior to accessing or storing classified information and must implement certain safeguards to maintain their clearance. DSS headquarters works with contractors to determine what, if any, protective measures are needed to reduce the risk of foreign interests gaining unauthorized access to U.S. classified information. DSS Did Not Systematically Collect and Analyze Information to Identify Weaknesses and Institute Corrective Actions
In overseeing contractor facilities and contractors under FOCI, DSS did not systematically collect and analyze information to assess the effectiveness of its operations. Without this analysis, DSS was limited in its ability to detect trends in the protection of classified information across facilities, to determine sources of security vulnerabilities, and to identify those facilities with the greatest risk of compromise. In addition, DSS was unable to determine whether contractors were reporting foreign business transactions as they occurred or how much time a contractor facility with unmitigated FOCI had access to classified information. In overseeing contractor facilities, we found DSS evaluated its performance in terms of process factors, such as the percentage of security reviews completed, percentage of security reviews that covered all pertinent areas of contractors’ security programs, length of time needed to clear contractor facilities for access to classified information, and length of time needed to clear contractor personnel for access to classified information. Specifically, DSS headquarters maintained a central repository of data on contractors under voting trust agreements, proxy agreements, and special security agreements—protective measures intended to mitigate majority foreign ownership. Such analysis would allow DSS to target areas for improved oversight. DSS field staff told us that some contractors reported foreign business transactions as they occurred, while others reported transactions months later, if at all. For example, officials at one contractor stated they reported to DSS that their company had been acquired by a foreign entity. Many Determinations of Information Compromise either Did Not Occur or Were Done Inappropriately
Industrial security representatives often failed to determine whether security violations by facilities resulted in the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information or made determinations that were not in accordance with approved criteria. As a result, the customer’s opportunity to evaluate the extent of damage and take necessary corrective action was delayed. However, for 39 of the 93 security violations that we reviewed, industrial security representatives made no determination regarding the compromise or loss of classified information. In another eight cases at another facility, the representative made no determination despite employees’ repeated failure to secure a safe room to ensure the protection of classified information. The Standards and Quality Branch is the unit within DSS responsible for ensuring that industrial security representatives properly administer the NISP. Branch officials regularly test and review field office chiefs and representatives on NISP requirements, particularly those related to granting clearances and conducting security reviews. As a result, DSS did not know the extent to which representatives understood and were consistently applying Industrial Security Operating Manual requirements related to violations and, therefore, could not take appropriate action. While the Industrial Security Operating Manual did not specify a time requirement for notifying government customers when classified information had been lost or compromised, DSS was often unable to notify customers quickly because of difficulties in identifying the affected customers. For 11 of these 16 violations, DSS did not notify the customer for more than 30 days after the contractor reported that information was lost, compromised, or suspected of being compromised. DSS relied on the facility to provide this information. DSS Did Not Always Provide Adequate Guidance, Training, and Tools to Field Staff
DSS industrial security representatives faced several challenges in carrying out their FOCI responsibilities, largely due to complexities in verifying FOCI cases, limited tools to research FOCI transactions, insufficient FOCI training, staff turnover, and inconsistencies in implementing guidance on FOCI cases. Representatives are required to understand the corporate structure of the legal entity completing the Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests form and to evaluate the types of foreign control or influence that exist for each entity within a corporate family. In addition, industrial security representatives stated they lacked the training and knowledge needed to better verify and oversee contractors under FOCI. In conclusion, we believe that the weaknesses identified in the NISP and other programs designed to protect technologies critical to U.S. national security present significant challenges and need to be addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Industrial Security Program (NISP) aims to ensure contractors appropriately safeguard the government’s classified information. NISP, along with other laws, regulations, policies, and processes, is intended to protect technologies critical to maintaining military technological superiority and other U.S. national security interests.
The Defense Security Service (DSS) within the Department of Defense (DOD) administers NISP on behalf of DOD and other federal agencies. DSS grants clearances to contractor facilities so they can access and, in some cases, store classified information. In 2005, DSS monitored over 11,000 facilities’ security programs to ensure that they meet NISP requirements for protecting classified information.
In 2004 and 2005, GAO issued reports that examined DSS responsibilities related to facilities accessing or storing classified information. The first report assessed DSS oversight of facilities and DSS actions after possible compromises of classified information. The second focused specifically on DSS oversight of contractors under foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI). This testimony summarizes the findings of these reports and their relevance to the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security interests— an area GAO designated as a governmentwide high-risk area in 2007.
What GAO Found
DSS did not systematically collect and analyze the information needed to assess its oversight of both contractor facilities and contractors under FOCI. While DSS maintained files on contractor facilities’ security programs and their security violations, it did not use this information to determine, for example, whether certain types of violations are increasing or decreasing and why. As a result, DSS was unable to identify patterns of security violations across all facilities based on factors such as the type of work conducted, the facilities’ government customer, or the facilities’ corporate affiliation. Identifying such patterns would enable DSS to target needed actions to reduce the risk of classified information being compromised. With regard to contractors under FOCI, DSS did not collect and track the extent to which classified information was left in the hands of such contractors before measures were taken to reduce the risk of unauthorized foreign access. GAO found instances in which contractors did not report foreign business transactions to DSS for several months.
DSS’s process for notifying government agencies of possible compromises to their classified information has also been insufficient. When a contractor facility reports a violation and the possible compromise of classified information, DSS is required to determine whether a compromise occurred and to notify the affected government agency so it can assess any damage and take actions to mitigate the effects of the suspected compromise or loss. However, for nearly 75 percent of the 93 violations GAO reviewed, DSS either made no determination regarding compromise or made a determination that was inconsistent with established criteria. In addition, in many cases in which DSS was required to notify the affected agencies of possible information compromises, the notification took more than 30 days; in one case, notification was delayed 5 months.
Despite the complexities involved in overseeing contactor facilities and contractors under FOCI, DSS field staff lacked the guidance, tools, and training necessary to effectively carry out their responsibilities. According to DSS field staff, they lacked research tools and training to fully understand, for example, the significance of corporate structures, legal ownership, and complex financial relationships when foreign entities are involved— knowledge that is needed to effectively oversee contractors under FOCI. Staff turnover and failure to implement guidance consistently also detracted from field staff’s ability to effectively carry out responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving NISP and DSS’s oversight of classified information that has been entrusted to contractors. Continued weaknesses in this and other areas that require rigorous oversight—such as export control, foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies, and foreign military sales—prompted GAO to designate the protection of critical technologies as high risk. |
gao_GAO-15-483T | gao_GAO-15-483T_0 | Project Risk Heightened Due to Widespread Use of Schedule Reserve to Address Technical Issues
The JWST project continues to report that it remains on schedule and budget with its overall schedule reserve currently above its plan. However, the project is now entering a difficult phase of development— integration and testing—which is expected to take another 3.5 years to complete. Maintaining as much schedule reserve as possible is critical during this phase to resolve known risks and unknown problems that may be discovered. Being one of the most complex projects in NASA’s history, significant risks lie ahead for the project, as it is during integration and testing where problems are likely to be found and as a result, schedules tend to slip. As seen in figure 1, only two of five elements and major subsystems—ISIM and OTE—have entered the integration and testing phase. As a result, all were within weeks of becoming the critical path of the project and driving the project’s overall schedule. The proximity of all the elements and major subsystem schedules to the critical path means that a delay on any of the elements or major subsystems may reduce the overall project schedule reserve further, which could put the overall project schedule at risk. While the project has been able to reorganize work when necessary to mitigate schedule slips thus far, with further progression into subsequent integration and testing periods, flexibility will be diminished because work during integration and testing tends to be more serial, as the initiation of work is often dependent on the successful and timely completion of the prior work. The project is facing additional challenges with the testing of the ISIM and OTE and the manufacturing of the spacecraft in addition to continuing challenges with the cryocooler compressor assembly that further demonstrates continued schedule risk for the project. For example, after the second test for the ISIM—the element of JWST that contains the telescope’s four different scientific instruments—electronic, sensor, and heat strap problems were identified that impact two of the four instruments. The OTE and spacecraft efforts are also experiencing challenges that may impact the schedules for those efforts. The effects of these challenges on the project’s schedule are still being determined. However, we reported in December 2014 that neither NASA nor the prime contractor had updated the cost risk analysis that underpinned the cost and schedule estimates for the 2011 replan. For example, the delivery of the cryocooler compressor assembly is one of the project’s top issues and was not an evident risk when the cost risk analysis was conducted in 2011. GAO’s best practices call for cost estimates to be compared to independent cost estimates in addition to being regularly updated. To better ensure NASA’s efforts would produce a credible cost risk analysis, in December 2014, we recommended that officials follow best practices while conducting a cost risk analysis on the prime contract for the work remaining and update it as significant risks emerged. NASA partially concurred with our recommendation, again noting that it has a range of tools in place to assess all contractors’ performance, the approach the project has in place is consistent with best practices, and officials will update the cost risk analysis again when required by NASA policy. We are currently examining the analysis to assess its quality and reliability and the extent to which it was done in accordance with NASA and GAO best practices. Appendix I: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory
Related GAO Products
James Webb Space Telescope: Project Facing Increased Schedule Risk with Significant Work Remaining. GAO-15-100. GAO-14-72. GAO-11-239SP. GAO-10-227SP. | Why GAO Did This Study
JWST is one of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) most complex and expensive projects. At an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion, JWST is intended to revolutionize understanding of star and planet formation, advance the search for the origins of the universe, and further the search for earth-like planets. Since entering development in 1999, JWST has experienced significant schedule delays and increases to project costs and was rebaselined in 2011. With significant integration and testing planned during the approximately 3.5 years until the launch date in October 2018, the JWST project will need to address many challenges before NASA can conduct the science the telescope is intended to produce. GAO has reviewed JWST for the last 3 years as part of an annual mandate and for the last 7 years as part of another annual mandate to review all of NASA's major projects. Prior to this, GAO also issued a report on JWST in 2006.
This testimony is based on GAO's third annual report on JWST ( GAO-15-100 ), issued in December 2014, with limited updated information provided where applicable. That report assessed, among other issues, the extent to which (1) technical challenges were impacting the JWST project's ability to stay on schedule and budget, and (2) budget and cost estimates reflected current information about project risks. To conduct that work, GAO reviewed monthly JWST reports, interviewed NASA and contractor officials, reviewed relevant policies, and conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data.
What GAO Found
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project officials report that the effort remains on track toward the schedule and budget established in 2011. However, the project is now in the early stages of its extensive integration and testing period. Maintaining as much schedule reserve as possible during this phase is critical to resolve challenges that will likely surface and negatively impact the schedule. JWST has begun integration and testing for only two of five elements and major subsystems. While the project has been able to reorganize work when necessary to mitigate schedule slips thus far, this flexibility will diminish as work during integration and testing tends to be more serial, as initiating work is often dependent on the successful and timely completion of the prior work.
a The cryocooler chills an infrared light detector on one of JWST's four scientific instruments.
In December 2014, GAO reported that delays had occurred on every element and major subsystem schedule, each was at risk of driving the overall project schedule, and the project's schedule reserve had decreased from 14 to 11 months. As a result, further delays on any element or major subsystem would increase the overall schedule risk for the project. At the time of the report, challenges with manufacturing of the cryocooler had delayed that effort and it was the driver of the overall project schedule. Since the December report, the project's overall schedule reserve decreased to 10 months as a result of several problems that were identified following a test of the Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM), which contains the telescope's scientific instruments. ISIM is now driving the overall project schedule. Furthermore, additional schedule impacts associated with challenges on several other elements and major subsystems are still being assessed.
At the time of the December 2014 report, the JWST project and prime contractor's cost risk analyses used to validate the JWST budget were outdated and did not account for many new risks identified since 2011. GAO best practices for cost estimating call for regularly updating cost risk analyses to validate that reserves are sufficient to account for new risks. GAO recommended, among other actions, that officials follow best practices while conducting a cost risk analysis on the prime contract and update the analysis as significant risks emerged. NASA partially concurred, noting that it has a range of tools in place to assess performance and would update the analysis as required by policy. Since then, officials completed the analysis and GAO is currently examining the results. |
gao_OSI-97-1 | gao_OSI-97-1_0 | PCIE Policy and Procedures
Policy and Procedures for Handling Allegations
During the period of our review, the PCIE had not formally adopted written policy or procedures for handling allegations against IGs and Deputy IGs. The informal procedures consisted of (1) the October 1, 1982, draft procedures, entitled “President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency Procedures for Investigating Allegations Concerning Certain Senior Administration Officials” and (2) a description, circulated to the OIG community in early 1994, on how PCIE processed allegations. OIG Policy and Procedures
Fourteen of the 28 OIGs in our review had written procedures for handling allegations of wrongdoing by OIG employees. Our review of the OIGs’ cases showed that their investigations generally met their policies as embodied in the PCIE standards for independence and due professional care, including the aspects of objectivity and thoroughness. PCIE/OIG Allegations Received and Closed in 1990-95 Period
PCIE Allegations Received/Closed
We assessed the 72 allegations that the PCIE had received and closed during the 1990-95 period: 69 against an IG or Deputy IG and 3 against an Assistant IG. None of the investigations substantiated the referred allegation, and none resulted in an administrative action. Of the 35 allegations, 21 resulted in investigations. Two of the 21 investigations resulted in letters of reprimand to the individuals against whom the allegations were made. Most of these problems have also been addressed with the March 1996 Executive Order. Further, the PCIE had no clear authority to review allegations—criminal and noncriminal—against IGs and make appropriate investigative referrals. . . certain staff members of the OIGs. However, several PCIE members believed that allegations against OIG senior staff—the Deputy IG and/or Assistant IGs—should automatically be referred to PCIE for review to preserve the appearance to outside interests that any resultant investigation was independent. Entities Having Presidentially Appointed Inspectors General, as of December 31, 1995
Executive Order No. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the handling of allegations of misconduct made against senior officials between 1990 and 1995 at the 28 Offices of Inspector General (OIG), focusing on: (1) whether the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and OIG had policies and procedures for handling such allegations; (2) whether PCIE and OIG followed these policies and procedures in conducting investigations; and (3) the effect of Executive Order 12993 on the handling of such allegations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although PCIE had not formally adopted written policy or procedures for handling allegations against inspectors general (IG) and deputy IG, it did adhere to 1982 draft procedures and a 1994 description on how it processed allegations; (2) half of the 28 OIG reviewed had written procedures for handling allegations of wrongdoing by OIG employees, 12 had informal procedures, and 2 were developing written procedures; (3) the 72 allegations that PCIE received and closed during the review period resulted in 14 investigations, none of which resulted in criminal charges or administrative action; (4) 21 of the 35 allegations that OIG received and closed against IG, deputy IG, or assistant IG resulted in investigations, and 2 of these resulted in letters of reprimand; (5) most of the investigations were conducted in a manner that met PCIE standards for independence, due professional care, objectivity, and thoroughness, although before 1994, PCIE encountered problems that affected the timeliness of its work; (6) a 1996 executive order formally authorized PCIE to review allegations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate noncriminal allegations, against IG and certain staff members; and (7) while some IG believe that the order allows them to decide what entity should investigate allegations against senior OIG officials, several PCIE members believed that allegations concerning deputy or assistant IG should automatically be referred to PCIE. |
gao_PEMD-95-8 | gao_PEMD-95-8_0 | In 1985, NIH’s National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) initiated the National Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP), which has undertaken a major effort to encourage individuals to measure, track, and reduce their cholesterol levels (notably total and low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholestrol) with the objective of reducing mortality and morbidity from coronary heart disease. How is cholesterol measured? 2. 3. What factors influence cholesterol levels? 4. What is the potential effect of uncertain measurement? No national data are available on the number of laboratories that conduct cholesterol tests, the number of cholesterol testing devices in use in laboratories, or the number of such tests that are done each year. HCFA survey and certification officials and NCEP have expressed concern that cholesterol testing in physicians’ offices or screening settings may differ from that done in clinical and research settings. The Accuracy of Cholesterol Measurements
In this chapter, we answer the second evaluation question: What is known about the accuracy and precision of cholesterol measurement techniques? The discussion first focuses on national accuracy goals and efforts to standardize cholesterol measures. Matrix problems can make it impossible to assign a target value to quality control material that will apply to all routine testing methods. Table 3.1 lists the 37 instrument and reagent systems and calibration bias relative to the reference method. Other factors—diet, exercise, alcohol intake—appear to have differing effects on individuals’ cholesterol levels. Laboratory Factors
How a blood specimen is collected and handled may affect lipid levels. Addressing Measurement Error
Progress has been made in improving analytical accuracy in cholesterol measurement, with the development of better methods and materials in recent years. Even if one could be certain that a laboratory could provide reasonably accurate and precise test results, biological and behavioral factors such as diet, excercise, or illness cause an individual’s cholesterol level to vary. It has been estimated that such factors may account for up to 65 percent of the total variation in an individual’s reported cholesterol measurement. For the purposes of this analysis, which is intended to illustrate the potential range of variability around an actual or known cholesterol level, we used the current goals for total analytical error (+8.9 percent for total cholesterol according to NCEP and +30 percent for HDL according to HCFA) and what is currently known about biological variability from a synthesis of studies (6.1 percent for total cholesterol and 7.4 percent for HDL cholesterol). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute's National Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP), focusing on the: (1) different techniques for measuring cholesterol in laboratory settings; (2) accuracy of these measurement techniques; (3) factors that influence individual cholesterol levels; and (4) potential effect of cholesterol measurement variability.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the natural daily variation in cholesterol levels and instrument measurement errors make it impossible to pinpoint individual cholesterol levels; (2) over 160 different devices with different technologies and chemical formulations are available to perform cholesterol tests; (3) standard cholesterol tests measure two cholesterol components, total cholesterol, and a related blood fat; (4) research, clinical, and hospital laboratories tend to produce reasonably accurate and precise cholesterol measurements, but little is known about cholesterol measurements in other settings such as physicians' offices and public health screenings; (5) two federal agencies have developed reference methods and quality control testing materials for manufacturers and laboratories to use in assessing their equipment's performance; (6) although cholesterol measurement methods have improved in recent years, there is a large variance in the accuracy and precision of tests performed across a broad range of devices and analytical settings; (7) there has been no overall evaluation of the different instruments and technologies laboratories use to conduct cholesterol tests; (8) biological and behavioral factors, many of which are uncontrollable, cause individual cholesterol levels to vary and may account for up to 65 percent of total variation in individual cholesterol levels; (9) the methods for collecting and handling blood specimens affect cholesterol measurements; and (10) uncertain cholesterol measurements can affect individual diagnoses and treatment decisions. |
gao_GAO-07-300 | gao_GAO-07-300_0 | Overview of Testimony
In our testimony, we stated that our audit and investigative work on FEMA disaster relief payments associated with hurricanes Katrina and Rita identified additional indications of fraud, waste, and abuse. Specifically, we found that FEMA made nearly $17 million in potentially improper and/or fraudulent rental assistance payments to individuals after they had moved into FEMA trailers. We also found that nearly $20 million in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments went to individuals who, using the same property, registered for assistance for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, FEMA improperly paid at least $3 million in IHP assistance to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities. FEMA made these payments despite having copies of the work visas for several individuals, which should have alerted FEMA that the temporary workers were not eligible for financial assistance. Because we did not obtain information from all universities in the Gulf region and because of unavailability of detailed data on other nonqualified legal aliens, we were not able to determine the magnitude of improper and/or fraudulent payments in this area. We previously reported that inadequate preventive controls related to the IHP application process resulted in an estimated $1 billion of potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments through February 2006. In contrast, as of November 2006, FEMA had detected through its own processes about $290 million in overpayments. With respect to findings regarding the DHS purchase card program, we found weaknesses and breakdowns in accountability for property items bought for hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts using government purchase cards. The additional examples of potentially fraudulent and improper payments, totaling tens of millions of dollars, that we highlighted in our December 2006 testimony further show that our estimate of $1 billion in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments through February is likely understated. To prevent rental assistance payments from being provided at the same time that FEMA provides free housing (including trailers, mobile homes, and apartments), FEMA should develop processes for comparing IHP registrant data with FEMA direct housing assistance data to prevent IHP registrants from receiving payments for rental assistance covering the time they are living in FEMA-provided housing and provide clear guidance to IHP registrants, including rental assistance registrants, indicating how the payments are to be used. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Ie case, FEMA rovded free housing to 10 inua in apartme in Plano, Texas, whle t the same tme t theinua$46,000 to cover ot-of-ocket housingxpnss. FEMA rovded oteiall roer and/or fraulet IHP assisance to other ineligible -U.S. reside, despite hing docme ining theineligibiy. GAO’s revus work o the DHS purchase crd howed signianrolemth roert ccounabiy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO's previous work identified suspected fraud, waste, and abuse resulting from control weaknesses associated with FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program. Congress asked GAO to follow up on this previous work to determine whether potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments continued to be made. GAO testified on the results of our audit and investigative efforts on December 6, 2006. This report summarizes the results of our follow-up work.
What GAO Found
In our December 6, 2006, testimony, GAO stated that FEMA made tens of millions of dollars of potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments associated with both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include $17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case, FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano, Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance. FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who claimed damages to the same property from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP. For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation indicating their ineligibility. Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November 2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in overpayments and collected about $7 million. Finally, GAO's work on DHS purchase cards showed continuing problems with property accountability, including items GAO investigated that could not be located 1 year after they were purchased. |
gao_GAO-07-1005 | gao_GAO-07-1005_0 | State and Local Governments Can Use Various Types of Federal Programs as Business Incentives
We identified 17 large federal economic development programs that state and local governments can use as incentives to attract and retain businesses, based on a search of the CFDA database, Tax Expenditure Compendium, and state economic development Web sites. Use of Federal Funds as Business Incentives Appears to Be More Limited Than Use of State and Local Funds
Although federal programs are marketed as business incentives, the amount of federal funds used as incentives appears to be more limited than the amount of state and local funds used. For these programs, third-party lenders, development corporations, or the federal government decide which businesses receive funds. All nine programs that we identified with statutory restrictions on employer relocations use job loss in a relocating company’s original location as the primary criterion for applying a nonrelocation provision, but the job loss threshold varies by program. Extent to Which Federal Agencies Had Established and Implemented Procedures to Help Ensure Compliance with Nonrelocation Provisions Was Limited
Federal agencies administering the nine programs with nonrelocation provisions used various procedures to help ensure that program recipients complied with overall program goals and requirements, but the extent to which these procedures specifically addressed nonrelocation provisions was limited. In contrast, officials who administer grant programs we reviewed noted inherent limitations in using screening mechanisms for grant programs, given that program recipients (states and local governments) do not always know at the time of application which businesses later will apply for and obtain assistance through the program. Because of the inherent limitations of screening, the agencies administering grant programs primarily relied on monitoring recipients and subrecipients to help identify instances of potential noncompliance. However, only four of the nine programs—including both loan guarantee programs—used screening mechanisms that specifically addressed a relevant nonrelocation provision. All four agencies had procedures for reviewing applications or plans to help ensure that applicants were eligible to receive funds under the program. While Monitoring Is a Key Control for Helping to Ensure Compliance with Nonrelocation Provisions, Only One Grant Program Had Written Guidance Specific to the Provision
The Guide to Opportunities for Improving Grant Accountability states that once grants are awarded, agencies need to ensure that grant funds are used for intended purposes and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The emphasis on screening rather monitoring seemed appropriate for the two loan guarantee programs since the federal agencies know which specific businesses are requesting funds and the purposes for which the funds will be used. Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which state and local governments use federal funds as business incentives, 9 of 17 large federal economic development programs contain statutory restrictions against using program funds to relocate jobs if the use of such funds creates unemployment. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide greater assurance that grant recipients and subrecipients of federal economic development programs are complying with statutory restrictions against the use of program funds to support employer relocations, we recommend that the Secretaries of Labor (for the WIA Adult, Dislocated Workers, and Youth programs); Agriculture (for the EZ/EC program); and Housing and Urban Development (for the CDBG Entitlement and State programs) direct their respective offices to develop (or finalize the development of) and implement formal and structured approaches for federal reviewers to follow when monitoring for compliance with nonrelocation provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress imposed restrictions on some federal programs to prevent funding of business relocations. Congress expressed concerns about state and local governments using federal funds to attract jobs to one community at a loss of jobs to another and about compliance with relocation restrictions. This report (1) identifies large federal economic development programs that state and local governments can use as incentives, (2) identifies which programs contain statutory prohibitions on funding relocations, and (3) assesses whether federal agencies had established and implemented procedures to help ensure compliance with prohibitions. To address these objectives, GAO searched federal databases, reviewed relevant statutes and regulations, and conducted limited testing of agency procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 17 large federal economic development programs that offer financial assistance and services that state and local governments can use as incentives to attract and retain jobs. While academic studies indicate that it is difficult to quantify the funds used as incentives, particularly given differing definitions of incentives, the use of federal funds for such purposes appears to be more limited than the use of state and local funds. Although academic studies question the overall role and significance of incentives in firms' decisions to (re)locate, researchers with whom GAO spoke noted that incentives could influence firms that already had narrowed their choices. Nine of the 17 large federal economic development programs restrict the use of program funds to support employer relocation. Seven are grant programs, and two are loan guarantee programs. In many grant programs, initial recipients of funds (states and local governments) provide funds to others (e.g., businesses) to facilitate economic development; in loan guarantee programs, third-party lenders approve businesses for eligibility to receive funds. All nine programs prohibit using federal funds to support a business relocation that causes unemployment, but the thresholds for job loss differ. For example, a single lost job would trigger the provision for six programs, but for the other three programs, the job loss threshold is higher. Federal agencies administering the nine programs with a nonrelocation provision used various procedures, including screening applicants and monitoring recipients, to help ensure compliance, but the extent to which these procedures specifically addressed nonrelocation provisions was limited. The two loan guarantee programs emphasized screening procedures to help ensure compliance, and both programs had written guidance and other mechanisms that specifically addressed nonrelocation provisions. Screening may be effective for helping to ensure compliance in loan guarantee programs because federal agencies know at the time of initial application which businesses are requesting funds and how they plan to use them. In contrast, because of the way grant programs are structured, at the time of initial application, grant applicants do not always know which businesses later will apply for or receive assistance. As a result, officials administering grant programs relied more extensively on monitoring than screening to help identify instances of potential noncompliance. Despite this greater reliance on monitoring, only one of the grant programs GAO reviewed had written monitoring guidance that specifically addressed business relocation restrictions. Without formal policies and procedures, federal agencies have limited assurance that grant recipients and subrecipients are complying with statutory requirements that restrict the use of program funds to support employer relocations. |
gao_GAO-09-804T | gao_GAO-09-804T_0 | The Latest Round of Testing Highlights the Limitations of ASPs
Our report on the latest round of ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor of ASP testing in comparison with previous tests and that a particular area of improvement was in the performance testing at the Nevada Test Site, where DNDO compared the capability of ASP and current-generation equipment to detect and identify nuclear and radiological materials. Nevertheless, based on the following factors, we continue to question whether the benefits of the new portal monitors justify the high cost: The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness. DNDO considers detection of such materials to be a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The marginal improvement in detection of such materials required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed efforts to fine-tune PVTs’ software and thereby improve sensitivity to nuclear materials. DNDO has not yet updated its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of the latest round of ASP testing. An updated analysis that takes into account the results from the latest round of testing, including injection studies, might show that DNDO’s plan to replace existing equipment with ASPs is not justified, particularly given the marginal improvement in detection of certain nuclear materials required of ASPs and the potential to improve the current-generation portal monitors’ sensitivity to nuclear materials, most likely at a lower cost. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with GAO’s other recommendations, which we continue to believe remain valid. Procurement Decisions for New Technologies Require Rigorous Testing and Thorough Analysis of Results
The challenges DNDO has faced in developing and testing ASPs illustrate the importance of following existing DHS policies as well as best practices for investments in complex homeland security acquisitions and for testing of new technologies. In addition, many major investments, including DNDO’s ASP program, had not met the department’s requirements for basic acquisition documents necessary to inform the investment review process. As a result, DHS had not consistently provided the oversight needed to identify and address cost, schedule, and performance problems in its major investments. We found that testing programs designed to validate a product’s performance against increasing standards for different stages in product development are a best practice for acquisition strategies for new technologies. In the case of ASPs, the push to replace existing equipment with the new portal monitors led to a testing program that until recently lacked the necessary rigor. Even for the most recent round of testing, DNDO’s schedule consistently underestimated the time required to conduct tests, resolve problems uncovered during testing, and complete key documents, including final test reports. Appendix I: Key Findings and Recommendations from Related GAO Products on Testing and Development of ASPs
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. Prototypes of advanced spectroscopic portals (ASP) were expected to be significantly more expensive than current-generation portal monitors but had not been shown to be more effective. GAO-09-655. With regard to ASP testing, we found that DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests, thereby adding credibility to the test results, but that preliminary results were mixed. The results showed that the new portal monitors performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of certain nuclear materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Finally, we found that DNDO did not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though delays to testing allowed more time to conduct the simulations. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of DNDO to assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness based on a valid comparison with current-generation portal monitors’ full performance potential and revise the schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and completion of all tests, including computer simulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation's defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment being used at ports of entry. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as well as detect radioactive material and thereby to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. However, ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors. Due to concerns about ASPs' cost and performance, Congress has required that the Secretary of Homeland Security certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale ASP procurement. This testimony addresses (1) GAO findings on DNDO's latest round of ASP testing, and (2) lessons from ASP testing that can be applied to other DHS technology investments. These findings are based on GAO's May 2009 report GAO-09-655 and other related reports.
What GAO Found
GAO's report on the latest round of ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests and thereby added credibility to the test results. However, GAO's report also questioned whether the benefits of the ASPs justify the high cost. In particular, the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require only a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, which DNDO considers a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The marginal improvement required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed efforts to fine-tune current-generation equipment to provide greater sensitivity. Moreover, the preliminary test results show that ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but that differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Finally, DNDO has not yet updated its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of the latest round of ASP testing and does not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though test delays have allowed more time to conduct the simulations. DNDO officials believe the other tests are sufficient for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness. GAO recommended that DHS assess ASPs against the full potential of current-generation equipment and revise the program schedule to allow time to conduct computer simulations and to uncover and resolve problems with ASPs before full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with the other recommendations, which GAO believes remain valid. The challenges DNDO has faced in developing and testing ASPs illustrate the importance of following best practices for investments in complex homeland security acquisitions and for testing of new technologies. GAO recently found that many major DHS investments, including DNDO's ASP program, had not met the department's requirements for basic acquisition documents necessary to inform the investment review process, which has adopted many acquisition best practices. As a result, DHS had not consistently provided the oversight needed to identify and address cost, schedule, and performance problems in its major investments. A primary lesson to be learned regarding testing is that the push to replace existing equipment with the new portal monitors led to an ASP testing program that until recently lacked the necessary rigor. Even for the most recent round of testing, DNDO's schedule consistently underestimated the time required to conduct tests and resolve problems uncovered during testing. In contrast, GAO has previously found that testing programs designed to validate a product's performance against increasing standards for different stages in product development are a best practice for acquisition strategies for new technologies. Aspects that improved the latest round of ASP testing could also, if properly implemented, provide rigor to DHS's testing of other advanced technologies. |
gao_GAO-07-1024T | gao_GAO-07-1024T_0 | Background
The DHS Privacy Office was established with the appointment of the first Chief Privacy Officer in April 2003. Reviewing and approving public notices required by the Privacy Act The Privacy Office is required by the Homeland Security Act to assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974. This notice must include information such as the type of information collected, the types of individuals about whom information is collected, the intended “routine” uses of the information, and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct their personal information. The Privacy Office Has Made Significant Progress in Reviewing and Approving PIAs, but Faces an Increasing Workload
One of the Privacy Office’s primary responsibilities is to review and approve PIAs to ensure departmental compliance with the privacy provisions (section 208) of the E-Gov Act of 2002. Specifically, the office has established a five-stage review process. The Privacy Office Has Taken Steps to Integrate Privacy Into DHS Decision Making
The Privacy Office has also taken steps to integrate privacy considerations in the DHS decision-making process. In June 2006, a workshop was held on the policy, legal, and operational frameworks for PIAs and privacy threshold analyses and included a tutorial for conducting PIAs. Although Privacy Act Processes Have Been Established, Little Progress Has Been Made in Updating Public Notices for DHS Legacy Systems- of-Records
The DHS Privacy Office is responsible for reviewing and approving DHS system-of-records notices to ensure that the department complies with the Privacy Act of 1974. Privacy Office Has Generally Not Issued Reports in a Timely Fashion
Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act requires that the Privacy Officer report annually to Congress on “activities of the Department that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, internal controls, and other matters.” The act does not prescribe a deadline for submission of these reports; however, the requirement to report “on an annual basis” suggests that each report should cover a 1-year time period and that subsequent annual reports should be provided to Congress 1 year after the previous report was submitted. For example, a report on the Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange program, initiated in response to a complaint by the American Civil Liberties Union submitted in May 2004, was not issued until two and a half years later, long after the program had been terminated. Late issuance of reports has a number of negative consequences beyond noncompliance with mandated deadlines. Until DHS reviews and updates all of its legacy notices as required by federal guidance, it cannot assure the public that its notices reflect current uses and protections of personal information. In summary, the DHS Privacy Office has made significant progress in implementing its statutory responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act; however, more work remains to be accomplished. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office was established with the appointment of the first Chief Privacy Officer in April 2003, as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Privacy Office's major responsibilities include: (1) reviewing and approving privacy impact assessments (PIA)--analyses of how personal information is managed in a federal system, (2) integrating privacy considerations into DHS decision making and ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, and (3) preparing and issuing annual reports and reports on key privacy concerns. GAO was asked to testify on its recent report examining progress made by the DHS Privacy Office in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. GAO compared statutory requirements with Privacy Office processes, documents, and activities.
What GAO Found
The DHS Privacy Office has made significant progress in carrying out its statutory responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act and its related role in ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government Act of 2002, but more work remains to be accomplished. Specifically, the Privacy Office has established a compliance framework for conducting PIAs, which are required by the E-Gov Act. The framework includes formal written guidance, training sessions, and a process for identifying systems requiring such assessments. The framework has contributed to an increase in the quality and number of PIAs issued as well as the identification of many more affected systems. The resultant workload is likely to prove difficult to process in a timely manner. Designating privacy officers in certain DHS components could help speed processing of PIAs, but DHS has not yet taken action to make these designations. The Privacy Office has also taken actions to integrate privacy considerations into the DHS decision-making process by establishing an advisory committee, holding public workshops, and participating in policy development. However, limited progress has been made in one aspect of ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act--updating public notices for systems of records that were in existence prior to the creation of DHS. These notices should identify, among other things, the type of data collected, the types of individuals about whom information is collected, and the intended uses of the data. Until the notices are brought up-to-date, the department cannot assure the public that the notices reflect current uses and protections of personal information. Further, the Privacy Office has generally not been timely in issuing public reports. For example, a report on the Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange program--a pilot project for law enforcement sharing of public records data--was not issued until long after the program had been terminated. Late issuance of reports has a number of negative consequences, including a potential reduction in the reports' value and erosion of the office's credibility. |
gao_GAO-08-17 | gao_GAO-08-17_0 | More than 50 million persons enrolled in the Medicaid program in fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2006, according to CMS, total outlays for Medicaid (federal and state) were approximately $324 billion, of which about $185 billion was paid by the federal government. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Although the federal government establishes general guidelines for the Medicaid program, requirements are established by each state. Magnitude of Unpaid Federal Taxes of Medicaid Providers
Our analysis found that over 30,000 Medicaid providers at the selected states had over $1 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2006. The amount of unpaid federal taxes we identified among Medicaid providers is likely understated because (1) we intentionally limited our scope to providers with agreed-to federal tax debt for tax periods prior to 2006, and (2) the IRS taxpayer data reflect only the amount of unpaid taxes either reported by the taxpayer on a tax return or assessed by IRS through its various enforcement programs and thus the unpaid tax debt amount does not include entities for which IRS had not identified that they did not file tax returns or underreported their income. Examples of Extent and Nature of Medicaid Providers’ Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
For all 25 cases that we audited and investigated, we confirmed that their activities were abusive and in many instances found criminal activity related to the federal tax system. However, rather than fulfill their role as “trustees” of this money and forward it to IRS, these Medicaid providers diverted the money for other purposes, including their own salaries. The pharmacy received nearly $100,000 in Medicaid payments during fiscal year 2006. Providers with Unpaid Federal Taxes Are Not Prohibited from Enrolling or Receiving Payments from Medicaid
CMS and the selected states do not prevent health care providers who have tax debts from enrolling in or receiving payments from Medicaid. CMS has not developed regulations to require states to (1) screen health care providers for unpaid taxes and (2) obtain consent for IRS disclosure of federal tax debts. CMS officials stated that such a requirement could be a burden to the states in their enrollment of providers and could adversely impact states’ ability to provide health care to the poor. If there had been an effective levy program in place, we estimate that the selected states could have levied payments for the federal government and collected between $70 million to about $160 million of unpaid federal taxes during fiscal year 2006. Many of the individuals involved in our cases have consistently not paid their taxes yet have received millions of dollars in Medicaid payments and have faced no criminal consequences. We selected the states of California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas based on the magnitude of payments made to Medicaid providers and the geographical location of those states. We obtained and analyzed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax debt data as of September 30, 2006. To identify indications of abuse or potentially criminal activity, we selected 25 Medicaid providers for a detailed audit and investigation. The case studies involving businesses primarily involved unpaid payroll taxes. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2006, outlays for Medicaid were about $324 billion; about $185 billion was paid by the federal government. Because GAO previously identified abusive and criminal activity associated with government contractors owing billions of dollars in federal taxes, the subcommittee requested GAO expand our work to Medicaid providers. GAO was asked to (1) determine if Medicaid providers have unpaid federal taxes, and if so, the magnitude of such debts; (2) identify examples of Medicaid providers that have engaged in abusive or criminal activities; and (3) determine whether the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the states prevent health care providers with tax problems from enrolling in Medicaid or participating in the continuous levy program to pay federal tax debts. To perform this work, GAO analyzed tax data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Medicaid data from seven selected states based on magnitude of Medicaid payments and geography. GAO also performed additional investigative activities.
What GAO Found
Over 30,000 Medicaid providers, about 5 percent of those paid in fiscal year 2006, had over $1 billion of unpaid federal taxes. These 30,000 providers were identified from a nonrepresentative selection of providers from seven states: California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. This $1 billion estimate is likely understated because some Medicaid providers have understated their income or not filed their tax returns. We selected 25 Medicaid providers with high federal tax debt as case studies for more in-depth investigation of the extent and nature of abuse and criminal activity. For all 25 cases we found abusive and related criminal activity, including failure to remit individual income taxes or payroll taxes to IRS. Rather than fulfill their role as "trustees" of federal payroll tax funds and forward them to IRS, these providers diverted the money for other purposes. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. Individuals associated with some of these providers diverted the payroll tax money for their own benefit or to help fund their businesses. Many of these individuals accumulated substantial assets, including million-dollar houses and luxury vehicles, while failing to pay their federal taxes. In addition, some case studies involved businesses that were sanctioned for substandard care of their patients. Despite their abusive and criminal activity, these 25 providers received Medicaid payments ranging from about $100,000 to about $39 million in fiscal year 2006. CMS and our selected states do not prevent health care providers who have federal tax debts from enrolling in Medicaid. CMS officials stated that such a requirement for screening potential providers for unpaid taxes could adversely impact states' ability to provide health care to low income people. Further, federal law generally prohibits the disclosure of taxpayer data to CMS and states. No tax debt owed by Medicaid providers has ever been collected through the continuous levy program. During our audit, IRS had not made a determination on whether Medicaid payments are considered "federal payments" and thus eligible for its continuous levy program. For fiscal year 2006, if an effective levy was in place for the seven selected states, GAO estimates that the federal government could have collected between $70 million and $160 million. |
gao_GAO-14-829T | gao_GAO-14-829T_0 | Background
Located in FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety (Aviation Safety), the Aircraft Certification Service (Aircraft Certification) and Flight Standards Service (Flight Standards) issue certificates and approvals for new aviation products to be used in the national airspace system as well as for new operators in the system, such as air carriers, based on federal aviation regulations (see fig. Most FAA Initiatives to Improve Its Aircraft Certification and Approval Process Are on Track
In May 2012, the Certification Process Committee made six recommendations to Aircraft Certification to streamline and reengineer the product certification and approval processes, improve efficiency and effectiveness within Aircraft Certification, and redirect resources for support of certification. In August 2012, FAA reported its plan to Congress for addressing the Certification Process Committee’s recommendations, and, in July 2013, the agency issued an implementation plan with 14 initiatives. Most Initiatives Are on Track for Meeting Planned Completion Milestones
Since the January update, Aircraft Certification has continued its efforts to address the recommendations to improve its certification and approval processes and is implementing the 14 initiatives. These initiatives touch on various aspects of Aircraft Certification’s work and, according to FAA several predate the committee’s recommendations and were part of on- going continuous efforts to address long-standing certification issues and to improve the certification process. The initiatives range from developing a comprehensive road map for major change initiatives, to improving the project sequencing process, to reorganizing the small aircraft certification regulation. Some Initiatives Will Not Meet or Are at Risk of Not Meeting Planned Milestones
Although most initiatives are on track, according to FAA’s May 2014 interim update, 2 of the 14 initiatives will not meet planned milestones: Improve effectiveness of the ODA program: FAA and two aviation industry groups—the Aerospace Industries Association and General Aviation Manufacturers Association—developed a plan to improve the effectiveness of the ODA process, which is used to authorize organizations to act on behalf of FAA in conducting some safety certification work. According to FAA’s May 2014 update, 1 of the 14 initiatives was at risk of not meeting planned milestones, which increases the risk that FAA will miss its established implementation time frames for the initiative for addressing its associated recommendation. However, Aircraft Certification is relying on Flight Standards to complete the implementation plan for addressing the recommendations. For the third phase, working with the Aerospace Industries Association, FAA plans to develop metrics for measuring the global return on investment in implementing all of the initiatives, to the extent that such measurement is possible. FAA Has Made Some Progress in Addressing Recommendations to Improve the Consistency of Its Regulatory Interpretations, but Details Are Unclear
Unlike FAA’s efforts to improve the certification process, although FAA has made some progress towards addressing the regulatory consistency recommendations, the details remain unclear about how FAA will structure its efforts. In July 2013, FAA reported to Congress on its plans for addressing the regulatory consistency recommendations, and included its preliminary plan for determining the feasibility of implementing these recommendations. A Master Source Guidance System
The Regulatory Consistency Committee recommended that Aircraft Certification and Flight Standards (1) review all guidance documents and interpretations to identify and cancel outdated material and electronically link the remaining materials to its applicable rule, and (2) to consolidate Aircraft Certification’s and Flight Standards’ electronic guidance libraries into a master source guidance system, organized by rule, to allow FAA and industry users access to relevant rules and all active and superseded guidance material and related documents. FAA officials also discussed the agency’s conceptual approach and plans for establishing a board—likely by the end of calendar year 2014—to address these two recommendations. Several industry stakeholders we spoke with told us they support FAA’s preliminary plans to establish the board and modify the CSI process as part of this effort. The industry representatives we interviewed had mixed opinions about whether FAA had addressed this recommendation as intended. In this final section of this testimony, we discuss challenges for FAA in implementing the committees’ certification and approval and regulatory consistency recommendations that relate to these key practices. Commitment to Cultural Change
FAA and industry representatives also cited FAA’s organizational culture as a primary challenge for FAA in successfully implementing these initiatives. As we have previously found, the implementation of recommendations that require a cultural shift for employees can be delayed if the workforce is reluctant in accepting such change. We have previously found that agencies that have been successful in assessing performance use measures that demonstrate results and provide useful information for decision making.that FAA had not completed developing performance measures for either the certification improvement or the regulatory consistency initiatives: Earlier in this testimony, we reported
FAA had developed performance measures for 5 of the 14 certification process initiatives as of May 2014 and plans to further develop measures in three phases. Going forward, it is critically important that FAA develop outcome-based performance measures to determine what is actually being achieved through the current and future initiatives, thereby making it easier to determine the overall outcomes of each of the initiatives and to hold FAA’s field and headquarters offices and employees accountable for the results. | Why GAO Did This Study
Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues certificates for new aircraft and parts, and grants approvals for changes to air operations and aircraft, based on federal aviation regulations. Various studies, GAO's prior work, and industry stakeholders have raised questions about the efficiency of FAA's certification and approval processes, as well as the consistency of its staff in interpreting aviation regulations. Over time, FAA has implemented efforts to address these issues, but they persist as FAA faces greater industry demand and its overall workload has increased. The 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act required FAA to work with industry to resolve these issues. In response, FAA chartered two committees—one to address certification processes and another to address regulatory consistency—which recommended improvements in 2012. In 2013, FAA published an implementation plan for addressing the certification process recommendations and promised to publish an implementation plan for addressing the regulatory consistency recommendations at a later date.
This testimony provides information on FAA's progress in implementing the (1) certification and approval process recommendations and (2) regulatory consistency recommendations. It also discusses future challenges industry stakeholders believe FAA will face in implementing these recommendations. This testimony provides the same information as GAO-14-728T , which was based on GAO products issued from 2010 to 2014, updated in July 2014 through reviews of recent FAA documents and interviews of FAA officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Aircraft Certification Service (Aircraft Certification) is responsible for addressing the certification and approval process recommendations, and has made progress. Aircraft Certification is implementing and has set milestones for completing 14 initiatives, several of which were originally begun as part of earlier certification process improvement efforts. The initiatives range from developing a comprehensive road map for major change initiatives, to improving Aircraft Certification's process for prioritizing requests for certifications and approvals (project sequencing), to reorganizing the small aircraft certification regulation. According to an update prepared by FAA in May 2014, one initiative has been completed and most are on track to be completed within 3 years. However, according to this update, two initiatives will not meet planned milestones, including the one for improving FAA's program for delegating authority to organizations to carry out some certification activities. Also, a third initiative for improving consistency of regulatory interpretation was at risk of not meeting planned milestones. Two additional initiatives, while on track for meeting planned milestones in May 2014, faced challenges because of opposition by FAA's labor unions, including one for improving Aircraft Certification's project sequencing process. GAO found in October 2013 that Aircraft Certification continued to lack performance measures for many of these initiatives, a condition that persists. In 2010, GAO had previously recommended that FAA develop a continuous evaluative process with performance goals and measures. FAA agreed but has not yet fully addressed the recommendation. Aircraft Certification officials discussed plans to develop metrics in three phases, beginning in July 2014 and in the future, for measuring (1) the progress of implementing the initiatives throughout FAA, (2) the outcomes of each initiative, and (3) the return on investment for FAA and the industry resulting from implementing the initiatives as a whole.
FAA's Flight Standards Service (Flight Standards) is responsible for addressing the regulatory consistency recommendations, and is finalizing plans to do so. FAA has not published a detailed plan with milestones and performance metrics, and officials told GAO that they intend to publish a plan by August 2014. Flight Standards officials said they were making progress in addressing the committee's top priority recommendation—mapping all FAA policy and guidance to relevant federal aviation regulations and developing an electronic system that maintains this information and that is accessible by FAA and industry users. As part of this effort, officials told GAO that Flight Standards has begun eliminating obsolete guidance and linking existing policy and guidance to the regulations.
Going forward, Aircraft Certification's and Flight Standards' efforts may face challenges that could affect successful implementation of the committees' recommendations. Many of these recommendations represent a significant shift in how FAA normally conducts business, and if the workforce is reluctant to implement such changes, FAA's planned initiatives for addressing the recommendations could be delayed. Also, the fact that FAA has not yet implemented performance measures for most of the initiatives is a concern for both GAO and the industry. As GAO concluded in October 2013, without performance measures, FAA will be unable to gather the appropriate data to evaluate the success of current and future initiatives. |
gao_GAO-15-718 | gao_GAO-15-718_0 | Setting Regulatory User Fees: The Amount Set Can Determine the Level of Regulatory Activity
Congress determines in statute the degree of flexibility to make fee design and implementation decisions that will be retained or delegated to the agency. This has implications for whether agencies issue regulations to set fees, who will determine the amount of regulatory activity, and how costs will be allocated among the various beneficiaries of regulatory programs, including small entities (see figure 1). Congress provided the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) with broad statutory authority to charge fees to fund their operations. In some cases, agencies are required by statute to provide special consideration for small entities. Collecting Regulatory User Fees: Timing Could Have Management Implications
Regulatory user fees are not always collected at the time of a specific service or transaction. Rather, many are collected from an entire industry at regular intervals as prescribed by statute or regulation. One advantage of regular collections is that they can create a predictable revenue stream. Using Regulatory User Fees: Variations in Availability of Fees and Unobligated Balances
Considering key questions about using regulatory user fees can enable Congress and agencies to identify and manage issues related to revenue instability. Collected Fees Are Sometimes Unavailable to the Agency
Some collections are only available to the agencies if Congress appropriates them. Reviewing Regulatory User Fees: Time Frames and Methods Vary, and Transparency and Stakeholder Outreach Are Critical for Fee Reviews
Regulatory user fee reviews provide decision makers with information important for deliberations about fee financing, such as identifying effects of changes in a regulated industry, but the appropriate time frames and methods will vary by individual circumstances. Agencies can promote transparency by providing appropriate information to address the diverse needs of policymakers and stakeholders, including fee payers and the general public. Through appropriate stakeholder involvement and dissemination of information, decision makers can help avoid the appearance of regulatory capture (that fee payers have undue influence on regulatory outcomes) (see figure 5). Transparency and public participation are especially important for regulatory user fees because these fees support a mix of benefits to the general public, not only to fee payers. These products should be used together when designing, implementing, and evaluating regulatory user fees. c. Can the agency withhold service when the fee is not paid? Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify the design and implementation characteristics of regulatory user fees in terms of how these fees are: (1) set, (2) collected, (3) used, and (4) reviewed. Based on these sources and feedback from the agencies we spoke with in the course of our case studies and panel discussion, for the purposes of this report, we define regulatory user fees as a subset of federal user fees which are charged to nonfederal entities subject to federal government regulation, in conjunction with regulatory activities. Case Study Selection
We selected case studies of 10 regulatory user fees within six agencies based on high dollar amounts of regulatory user fee collections, high amounts of rulemaking activity, and diverse fee characteristics, including: agencies that are subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) and agencies that are not; independent regulatory agencies and executive agencies; fees that are intended to recover the full cost of operating an agency or program, as well as fees that are intended to recover partial costs and fees that are not cost based; and fees that are collected at the time of a specific transaction between the user and the regulator, and fees that are collected at regular time intervals (such as annually or quarterly) and not at the time of a transaction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Regulatory user fees are assessed on certain nonfederal entities subject to regulation in conjunction with regulatory activities. They represent a significant source of federal government revenue—some individual regulatory user fees exceed $1 billion in annual collections—and often support agencies' regulatory missions. Well-designed regulatory user fees can help fund regulatory programs while reducing taxpayer burden.
GAO built on its prior user fee work by assessing what additional design and implementation characteristics exist specifically for regulatory user fees in terms of how these fees are: (1) set, (2) collected, (3) used, and (4) reviewed. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant literature and analyzed 10 regulatory user fees within 6 agencies—Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drug Administration, National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Securities and Exchange Commission. GAO selected these agencies based on their high amounts of fee collections and rulemaking activity and diverse fee characteristics. GAO also examined stakeholder views on these selected fees and held a multi-agency panel discussion to ensure the broad applicability of the findings.
What GAO Found
GAO identified key elements of regulatory user fees for decision makers to consider as they design, implement, and evaluate these fees.
Setting regulatory user fees: Congress determines in statute the degree of flexibility to make fee design and implementation decisions that will be retained or delegated to the agency. This has implications for whether agencies issue regulations to set fees, who will determine the level of regulatory activity, and how costs will be allocated among beneficiaries. In setting fees, agencies typically give special consideration to small businesses' ability to pay.
Collecting regulatory user fees: Regulatory user fees are not always collected at the time of a specific service or transaction. While some regulatory user fees are charged for specific services, many are collected from an entire industry at regular intervals as prescribed by statute or regulation. Collecting fees this way can create a stable revenue stream. Agencies may use different methods to ensure collection of fees because they cannot always withhold services until the fee is paid.
Using regulatory user fees: It is important to consider the availability of fee collections and unobligated balances. In some cases, agencies have the authority to use balances to mitigate revenue instability. In other cases, collected fees are only available to the agencies if Congress appropriates them.
Reviewing regulatory user fees: Regulatory user fee reviews provide important information for decision makers, such as identifying the effects of changes in a regulated industry. The appropriate time frames and methods for agency review will vary by individual circumstances. Regulatory programs produce both public benefits and services to fee payers, so it is important that fee review processes provide opportunities for input from stakeholders, including fee payers and the general public. Agencies can promote transparency by providing information on how fees are calculated and used to address the diverse needs of policymakers, stakeholders, and the general public. Decision makers can help mitigate the appearance that fee-payers have undue influence on regulatory outcomes through appropriate stakeholder involvement and dissemination of information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. NCUA provided written comments agreeing with GAO's findings. NCUA and three other agencies also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-10-939T | gao_GAO-10-939T_0 | In fiscal year 2007, VHA recorded over $6.9 billion of miscellaneous obligations for the procurement of mission-related goods and services. Miscellaneous Obligation Control Deficiencies
In September 2008, we reported that VA policies and procedures were not designed to provide adequate controls over the authorization and use of miscellaneous obligations with respect to (1) oversight by contracting officials, (2) segregation of duties, and (3) supporting documentation for the obligation of funds. Our 2008 case studies also identified a lack of adequate supporting documentation at the three medical centers we visited. Our report concluded that without basic controls in place over billions of dollars in miscellaneous obligations, VA is at significant risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. These recommendations aimed at reducing the risks associated with the use of miscellaneous obligations. In response to our recommendations, in January of 2009, VA issued Volume II, Chapter 6, of VA Financial Policies and Procedures— Miscellaneous Obligations, which outlines detailed policies and procedures aimed at addressing control deficiencies identified in our September 2008 report. These noncompliance issues were similar to those we identified in our September 2008 report on VHA miscellaneous obligations. VA Has Had Long- standing Material Weaknesses in Financial Reporting
In November of 2009, we reported that VA had three long-outstanding material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting identified during VA’s annual financial audits. Financial management oversight—reported as a material weaknesses since fiscal year 2005. Financial management system functionality—reported since fiscal year 2000—is linked to VA’s outdated legacy financial systems affecting VA’s ability to prepare, process, and analyze financial information that is timely, reliable, and consistent. We also found that while VA had corrective action plans in place intended to result in near-term remediation of its significant deficiencies, many corrective action plans did not contain the detail needed to provide VA officials with assurance that the plans could be effectively implemented on schedule. VA recognized the need to better oversee and coordinate agencywide oversight activities for financial reporting material weaknesses, and began to staff a new office responsible for, in part, assisting VA and the three administrations and staff offices in executing and monitoring corrective actions plans. Our report concluded that actions to provide a rigorous framework for the design and oversight of corrective action plans will be essential to ensuring the timely remediation of VA’s internal control weaknesses, and that continued support from senior VA officials and administration CFOs would be critical to ensure that key corrective actions are developed and implemented on schedule. We made three recommendations to help improve corrective action plan development and oversight. VA concurred with the recommendations and said that it took some actions to address the recommendations, including developing a manual with guidance on corrective action planning and monitoring, creating a corrective action plan repository, and establishing a Senior Assessment Team of senior VA officials as the coordinating body for corrective action planning, monitoring, reporting, and validation of deficiencies identified during financial audits. In the fiscal year 2009 Performance and Accountability Report, VA officials noted that in fiscal year 2009 they had closed 10 of the underlying significant deficiencies reported in fiscal year 2008, but that their timetables had slipped for remediating the IT security controls and financial management oversight material weaknesses to 2010 and 2012, respectively. In summary, while we have not independently validated the status of VA’s actions to address our 2008 and 2009 reports’ findings concerning VA’s controls over miscellaneous obligations and financial reporting, VA’s recent inspections and financial audit report indicate that the serious, long-standing deficiencies we identified are continuing. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2008, GAO reported internal control weaknesses over the Veteran Health Administration's (VHA) use of $6.9 billion in miscellaneous obligations in fiscal year 2007. In November 2009, GAO reported on deficiencies in corrective action plans to remediate financial reporting control deficiencies. This testimony is based on these previous reports that focused on (1) VHA miscellaneous obligation control deficiencies and (2) Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) financial reporting control deficiencies and VA plans to correct them. For its review of VHA miscellaneous obligations, GAO evaluated VA's policies and procedures and documentation, interviewed cognizant agency officials, and conducted case studies at three VHA medical centers. For its review of financial reporting control deficiencies, GAO evaluated VA financial audit reports from fiscal years 2000 to 2008 and analyzed related corrective action plans.
What GAO Found
In September 2008, we reported that VHA recorded over $6.9 billion of miscellaneous obligations for the procurement of mission-related goods and services in fiscal year 2007. We also reported that VA policies and procedures were not designed to provide adequate controls over the authorization and use of miscellaneous obligations, placing VA at significant risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. We made four recommendations with respect to (1) oversight by contracting officials, (2) segregation of duties, (3) supporting documentation for the obligation of funds, and (4) oversight mechanisms. In January 2009, VA issued new policies and procedures aimed at addressing the deficiencies identified in GAO's September 2008 report. In November of 2009, we reported that VA's independent public auditor had identified two of VA's three fiscal year 2008 material weaknesses--in financial management system functionality and IT security controls--every year since fiscal year 2000 and the third--financial management oversight--each year since fiscal year 2005. While VA had corrective action plans in place that intended to result in near-term remediation of its internal control deficiencies, many of these plans did not contain the detail needed to provide VA officials with assurance that the plans could be effectively implemented on schedule. For example, 8 of 13 plans lacked key information about milestones for steps to achieve the corrective action and how VA would validate that the steps taken had actually corrected the deficiency. While VA began to staff a new office responsible for, in part, assisting VA and the three administrations in executing and monitoring corrective action plans, we made three recommendations to improve corrective action plan development and oversight. VA concurred with our recommendations and took some steps to address them. In fiscal year 2009, VA's own internal VA inspections and financial statement audit determined that the internal control deficiencies identified in our prior reports on miscellaneous obligations and material weaknesses identified in prior financial audits continued to exist. VA conducted 39 inspections, which identified problems with how VHA facilities had implemented VA's new miscellaneous obligation policies and procedures. Similarly, VA's independent auditor reported that VA continued to have material weaknesses in financial management system functionality, IT security controls, and financial management oversight in fiscal year 2009. To the extent that the deficiencies we identified continue, it will be critical that VA have an effective "tone at the top" and mechanisms to monitor corrective actions related to deficient internal controls. In its September 2008 report, GAO made four recommendations to improve VA's internal controls over miscellaneous obligations. In its November 2009 report, GAO made three recommendations to improve VA corrective action plans to remediate financial reporting control deficiencies. VA generally concurred with these recommendations and has since reported taking actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-552T | gao_GAO-04-552T_0 | SSA Faces Difficulties Managing Disability Claims Processing
SSA has experienced difficulty managing its complex disability determination process, and consequently faces problems in ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, and consistency of its disability decisions. Although SSA has made some gains in the short term in improving the timeliness of its decisions, the Commissioner has noted that it still has “a long way to go.” Over the past 5 years, SSA has slightly reduced the average time it takes to obtain a decision on an initial claim from 105 days in fiscal year 1999 to 97 days in fiscal year 2003, and significantly reduced the average time it takes the Appeals Council to consider an appeal of a hearing decision from 458 to 294 days over the same period. We are currently reviewing SSA’s efforts to assess consistency of decision-making between the initial and the hearings levels. SSA’s disability programs remain grounded in an approach that equates impairment with an inability to work despite medical advances and economic and social changes that have redefined the relationship between impairment and the ability to work. In addition, employment assistance that could allow claimants to stay in the workforce or return to work—and thus potentially to remain off the disability rolls—is not offered through DI or SSI until after a claimant has gone through a lengthy determination process and has proven his or her inability to work. Commissioner’s New Strategy for Improving the Disability Determination Process Appears Promising, but Faces Several Challenges
In SSA’s most recent attempt to improve its determination process, the Commissioner, in September 2003, set forth a strategy to improve the timeliness and accuracy of disability decisions and foster return to work at all stages of the decision-making process. In 2000, SSA issued a plan to develop an electronic disability folder and automated case processing systems. While the Commissioner’s proposed approaches for improving the disability determination process appear promising, challenges, including automation, human capital, and workload growth, have the potential to hinder its success. High examiner turnover. Gaps in key knowledge and skill areas. In closing, as stated earlier, SSA is at a crossroads and faces a number of challenges in its efforts to improve and reorient its disability determination process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Delivering high-quality service to the public in the form of fair, timely, and consistent eligibility decisions for disability benefits is one of SSA's most pressing challenges. This testimony discusses (1) the difficulties SSA faces managing disability claims processing; (2) the outmoded concepts of SSA's disability program; and (3) the Commissioner's strategy for improving the disability process and the challenges it faces.
What GAO Found
SSA is at a crossroads in its efforts to improve and reorient its disability determination process. Although SSA has made some gains in the short term in improving the timeliness of its decisions, we found that SSA's disability decisions continue to take a long time to process. Despite some recent progress in improving the timeliness of disability decision-making, individuals who initially are denied disability benefits and who appeal still have to wait almost an additional year before a final hearing decision is made. In addition, evidence suggests that inconsistencies continue to exist between decisions made at the initial level and those made at the hearings level. Also, SSA's disability programs are grounded in an outdated concept of disability that has not kept up with medical advances and economic and social changes that have redefined the relationship between impairment and the ability to work. Furthermore, employment assistance that could allow claimants to stay in the workforce or return to work--and thus to potentially remain off the disability rolls--is not offered through DI or SSI until after a claimant has gone through a lengthy determination process and has proven his or her inability to work. Further, the Commissioner has developed a strategy to improve the disability determination process, including the timeliness and consistency of decisions. While this strategy appears promising, we believe that several key challenges have the potential to hinder its progress, including risks to successfully implementing a new electronic disability folder and automated case processing systems; human capital problems, such as high turnover, recruiting difficulties, and gaps in key knowledge and skills among disability examiners; and an expected dramatic growth in workload. |
gao_RCED-99-90 | gao_RCED-99-90_0 | Farmers’ Use of Risk Management Tools Varied by Size of Farming Operation and Commodity
USDA’s 1996 Agricultural Resource Management Study (Phase 3), based on a statistical sample of farmers, found that about 42 percent of the nation’s 2 million farmers used at least one of the risk management tools--forward contracts, crop insurance, or hedging--to manage their income risk. In 1996, a substantially greater percentage of farmers with agricultural sales of at least $100,000 (large-scale farmers) used each risk management tool than did farmers whose agricultural sales were less than $100,000 (small- scale farmers). Table 3 shows that at least 70 percent of those large-scale farmers who received transition payments purchased crop insurance, at least 66 percent used forward contracts, and at least 34 percent engaged in hedging in 1996. A Larger Proportion of Farmers Who Primarily Grew Major Field Crops Used Crop Insurance and Forward Contracts Than Did Other Farmers
As table 4 shows, among all U.S. farmers, a greater percentage of those whose primary crop was corn, wheat, or cotton purchased crop insurance and engaged in forward contracting than did farmers who grew other field crops or raised livestock in 1996. USDA Focused Risk Management Education Efforts on Developing Public and Private Partnerships
To prepare farmers for managing their risks, USDA has focused primarily on developing regional or state partnerships of government, university, and private organizations to foster a risk management educational program. As of December 1998, USDA’s major conferences had reached a relatively small percentage of the target groups’ members. In June 1998, USDA awarded 17 risk management education grants, ranging from $19,172 to $250,000, and averaging about $178,000. With expected project completion dates ranging from the summer of 1999 through the fall of 2001, the projects are currently ongoing, and thus, in many cases, the training phase has not begun. The grant projects target diverse audiences--ranging from farmers with limited resources, farmers growing specific commodities in individual states or regions, and dairy farmers to crop insurance agents and grain elevator operators across the country--and were for diverse purposes. Electronic Library
In the fourth part of its response to the legislative mandate, USDA entered into a $200,000 contract with the University of Minnesota to develop an Internet website that provides an electronic library of risk management education materials. However, the Department believed that the report should (1) provide more detailed information on how the $5 million for risk management education initiatives was spent, (2) discuss the Risk Management Agency’s regional and local risk management conferences in the context of its broader effort to establish public and private partnerships, and (3) discuss the Risk Management Agency’s efforts to provide risk management education through land grant universities as a separate initiative. To identify education programs and projects USDA has directed or initiated to prepare farmers for managing risk, we interviewed and obtained documentation from USDA headquarters and regional officials, as well as from regional risk management coordinators. To determine the groups or individuals who have participated in or been served by these programs, we interviewed and obtained documentation from cognizant USDA officials, academicians, and other private sector organizations involved in planning and carrying out risk management seminars and other educational and research efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efforts to educate farmers about risk management, focusing on: (1) the extent of farmers' use of risk management tools; and (2) educational programs and projects USDA has directed or initiated to prepare farmers for managing risks and determining the groups or individuals who have participated in or been served by these programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1996, about 42 percent of the nation's 2 million farmers used one or more risk management tools to limit potential income losses resulting from falling market prices or production failures, according to USDA estimates; (2) the use of these tools varied by farmers' level of sales and primary commodity (crop or livestock); (3) the use of crop insurance and forward contracts to reduce risk was more prevalent among farmers: (a) with at least $100,000 in annual sales of agricultural products than among those with annual sales under $100,000; and (b) whose primary crops were corn, wheat, and cotton than among those who primarily grew other crops; (4) of those farmers who received USDA transition payments and had sales of at least $100,000, at least 70 percent purchased crop insurance, at least 66 percent used forward contracts, and at least 34 percent engaged in hedging in 1996; (5) in fiscal year 1998, USDA obligated $5 million for four educational initiatives to prepare farmers for managing risk; (6) to develop government and private sector partnerships to foster risk management education, USDA sponsored a series of risk management conferences targeted at bankers, agricultural educators, crop insurance agents, commodity brokers, and grain elevator operators; (7) however, these initial conferences reached only a relatively small percentage of these target groups' members; (8) USDA intends to use partnerships with private- sector organizations to further expand its educational outreach activities; (9) USDA awarded 17 risk management education and research grants that are primarily designed to develop risk management education curriculums for training such diverse groups as farmers with less than $20,000 in annual income, farmers who grow specific crops in individual states or regions, crop insurance agents, and grain elevator operators across the country; (10) the expected completion dates for these projects range from the summer of 1999 through the fall of 2001; (11) USDA provided funding to supplement land grant universities' risk management education efforts; and (12) USDA contracted with the University of Minnesota to develop an Internet library that, as of January 1999, contained over 700 risk management publications and other education materials for farmers. |
gao_GAO-04-358 | gao_GAO-04-358_0 | Background
In prior reports, we found that a higher percentage of FCCs than USCCs reported no U.S. income tax from 1987 through 1995. To compare FCCs and USCCs based on the tax liabilities they reported on their U.S. income tax returns, we made estimates for a variety of measures of tax liability. We also used the model to compare large FCCs and USCCs— corporations with at least $250 million in assets or $50 million in gross receipts. Our comparisons highlight three measures: (1) the percentage of corporations reporting no tax liability, (2) the percentage of corporations reporting tax liabilities less than 5 percent of their total income, and (3) reported tax liabilities per $1,000 of gross receipts. A Higher Percentage of FCCs Than USCCs Reported No Tax Liabilities
Similar to our 1999 report, a majority of corporations, both FCCs and USCCs, reported no tax liability from 1996 through 2000. However, among large corporations, which owned a majority of assets reported by all corporations, the results were reversed. The relationship was the same for large corporations. Age and Industry Concentration May Explain Some Differences in FCCs and USCCs Reporting No or Little Tax Liability
FCCs and USCCs differ in terms of age and industry concentration. These factors could possibly explain some of the differences in the tax liabilities reported by FCCs and USCCs. However, not all the differences were statistically significant. FCCs and USCCs Were Concentrated in Different Industries
FCCs and USCCs differed in their concentration among industries. In 2000, FCCs were more concentrated in the wholesale trade and financial services industries while USCCs were more concentrated in the nonfinancial services industry. With respect to reporting tax liabilities of less than 5 percent, large FCCs were significantly more likely than USCCs to have reported less than 5 percent in tax liability, after adjusting for age and industry sector, in 1 year (1996), significantly less likely in 2 years (1999 and 2000), and no different than USCCs in the other 2 years (1997 and 1998). | Why GAO Did This Study
In prior reports, GAO found differences in the percentages of foreign-controlled corporations (FCC) and U.S.-controlled corporations (USCC) reporting no tax liability. Based on concerns that FCCs could be avoiding taxes by improperly shifting income to lower tax countries, GAO was asked to compare, for the years 1996 through 2000, (1) FCCs and USCCs, based on the tax liabilities they reported on their U.S. income tax returns--including the percentages reporting zero liabilities--and (2) the differences in FCCs and USCCs in terms of age and industry concentration and the extent to which these differences might explain tax reporting patterns. The report provides information separately for large corporations--those with at least $250 million in assets or $50 million in gross receipts--because, while they account for only 1 percent of all corporations, they own over 93 percent of all assets reported on corporate returns.
What GAO Found
Comparisons of the tax liabilities of FCCs and USCCs from 1996 to 2000 varied depending on the measure. A majority of all corporations reported no tax liabilities during these years, with a higher percentage of FCCs doing so than USCCs. However, the results were reversed for large corporations. A higher percentage of USCCs than FCCs reported tax liabilities of less than 5 percent of their total income, with similar results for large corporations. FCCs reported a lower amount of tax liability per $1,000 in gross receipts than USCCs. The relationship was similar for large corporations. FCCs and USCCs differ with respect to their age and industry concentrations. A greater percentage of FCCs than USCCs were new--incorporated for less than 3 years. FCCs were more concentrated in wholesale trade and financial services while USCC were more concentrated in nonfinancial services. Large FCCs and USCCs also differed in their age and industry concentrations. Age and industry concentration have been cited as possible explanations for the differences in tax liabilities reported by FCCs and USCCs. However, after controlling for age and industry concentration using a simple statistical model, the differences in taxes reported by FCCs and USCCs were not fully explained by these factors. |
gao_GAO-04-881 | gao_GAO-04-881_0 | Several other countries have expressed interest in issuing their own identification cards to their citizens living in the United States but as of late 2003 had not yet done so. CID Cards Are Issued to Help Identify the Citizenship of Persons Residing in a Foreign Country, and Some Institutions Accept Mexican and Guatemalan CID Cards as Valid Identification
Countries May Issue CID Cards to Facilitate Consular Notification
CID cards are issued to help identify the citizenship of persons residing in a foreign country. Thus, CID cardholders can be either undocumented aliens living in the United States or legal residents. Identity Verification Procedures and Security Features Vary, and Some CID Cards May Not Ensure Cardholder’s Identity
Mexico Has Taken Steps to Improve Identity Verification Procedures for Its CID Card Issuance Process, but Risks Remain
A Mexican citizen residing in the United States who seeks to obtain a Mexican CID card is required to present to the Mexican consular field office, in person, three types of documents: proof of Mexican nationality, proof of identity, and proof of local address (see table 1 for types of required documentation). AAMVA also expressed concerns about the Mexican CID card and its issuance procedures. 3.) No other document security features were included in these cards. The Homeland Security Council is leading a task force of executive branch agencies examining this issue. While Treasury does not prohibit or endorse the acceptance of CID cards, an FBI official testified before Congress in June 2003 that the Mexican CID card is not a reliable form of identification. For example, if a card were fraudulently obtained under a false identity, it could be then used to get a driver’s license in some states. DHS also echoed the FBI’s concerns over use of a CID card as a breeder document for obtaining other forms of identification, which in turn may be used for criminal purposes. The State Department has not adopted a policy on foreign-issued identification documents or CID cards. Recommendation for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Homeland Security Council direct its task force, in consultation with key federal agencies, to complete its efforts to develop policies and implement consistent guidance that would reconcile potential conflicts among federal agencies and enable state and local governments, financial institutions, and others to assess the authenticity of CID cards issued by foreign governments. DHS also said that CID cards should not be considered of greater concern than other identity documents used in the United States and that the administration’s position on CID cards is clear: they are not acceptable as proof of legal presence in the United States. To determine steps Mexico and Guatemala have taken to verify the identities of CID card applicants and incorporate security features in CID cards, we interviewed officials from the Mexican and Guatemalan embassies and consulate offices to obtain information and documentation about their CID card programs. To determine the positions and policies of federal agencies regarding the usage and acceptance of CID cards, we interviewed officials from the Department of the Treasury, DHS, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State, and reviewed testimony by the latter three agencies. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Several state and local government agencies and financial institutions accept consular identification (CID) cards, which are issued by foreign governments to their citizens living abroad. Mexico issued more than 2.2 million CID cards in 2002-2003 and Guatemala issued approximately 89,000 from mid-2002 to 2003. Critics of CID cards say their acceptance facilitates the unlawful stay within the United States of undocumented aliens and may provide opportunities for terrorists to remain undetected in this country. GAO examined (1) the purpose of a CID card and how Mexican and Guatemalan CID cards are being used in the United States, (2) steps Mexico and Guatemala have taken to verify the identities of CID card applicants and incorporate security features in CID cards now used in the United States, and (3) the positions and policies of federal agencies regarding CID cards.
What GAO Found
Consular identification cards are issued by some governments to help identify their citizens living in a foreign country. The cards do not certify legal residence within a country; thus, cardholders may be either legal or undocumented aliens. CID cards benefit the bearers by enabling them, in some instances, to use this form of identification to obtain driver's licenses, open bank accounts, show proof of identity to police, and gain access to other services. Mexico and Guatemala each take multiple steps to help ensure that the process for qualifying applicants seeking to obtain CID cards verifies the applicants' identities. After receiving criticism about the reliability of its CID card, Mexico took steps to improve identity verification procedures for its CID card issuance process. However, the Mexican issuance policy still relies on visual, rather than computer-based, verification of some documents used to obtain CID cards, including birth certificates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) says may be fraudulently obtained. Both Mexico and Guatemala incorporate a variety of security features in their CID cards, such as holographic imagery. However, officials of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement warn that incorporating technical security features into identification documents such as CID cards does not guarantee their authenticity. Federal agencies hold different and, in some cases, conflicting views on the usage and acceptance of CID cards, and no executive branch guidance is yet available. A Homeland Security Council task force of executive branch agencies is reviewing identification document security but had not issued its findings at the time of GAO's review. The Department of the Treasury adopted a regulation in 2003 that, in effect, allows CID card acceptance, while an FBI official has stated that the Mexican CID card, in particular, is not a reliable form of identification and that its acceptance could support false identities. DHS expressed security concerns as well. The State Department has publicly expressed concerns about the impact restricting CID card use might have on U.S. citizens abroad, for example, if the United States had to issue its own CID cards in an emergency. |
gao_GAO-11-86 | gao_GAO-11-86_0 | For development work to be accomplished prior to this date, NARA is to prioritize existing requirements and develop realistic cost and schedule estimates to determine what can be accomplished by the deadline. NARA Has Yet to Fully Establish Most EVM Practices to Manage the ERA Acquisition
NARA has, to varying degrees, established certain best practices needed to manage the ERA acquisition through EVM. These weaknesses exist in part because NARA lacks a comprehensive EVM policy, as well as training and specialized resources. NARA also frequently replans the ERA program. Without effectively implement EVM, NARA has not been positioned to identify potential cost and schedule problems early and thus not been able to take timely actions to correct problems and avoid program schedule delays and cost in creases. However, critical weaknesses remain in the following other key practices: program Define the scope of effort using a work breakdown structure. Without a work breakdown structure that is comprehensive, product-oriented, and standardized, ERA cannot efficiently track and measure progress made on contractor deliverables. Forecast estimates at completion. crement 4, they anticipated a cost overrun of $2.0 million. However, in Moreover, while ERA earned value data trends are included in briefing materials provided to NARA senior executives, these cost and schedule performance trends are not Until NARA uses earned value data to make program decisions, it will be unable to effectively identify areas of concern and make recommendati to reverse negative trends. ERA’s Earned Value Data Do Not Reflect True Program Sta tus or the Magnitude of Future Cost and Schedule Increases
ERA’s earned value performance trends do not accurately portray prog status, and our analysis of historical program trends indicate that future cost and schedule increases will likely be significant. We further project that the total cost overrun incurred at the end of the program life cycle will likely be between $205 million and $405 million. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess whether the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is adequately using earned value management (EVM) techniques to manage the Electronic Records Archives (ERA) acquisition and (2) evaluate the earned value data to determine ERA’s cost and schedule performance. Specifically, we compared program documentation with EVM and scheduling best practices as identified in GAO’s cost guide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has been working to develop an Electronic Records Archive (ERA) to preserve and provide access to massive volumes and all types of electronic records. However, in acquiring this system, NARA has repeatedly revised the program schedule and increased the estimated costs for completion from $317 million to $567 million. NARA is to manage this acquisition using, among other things, earned value management (EVM). EVM is a project management approach that, if implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project status and unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at completion. GAO was asked to (1) assess whether NARA is adequately using EVM techniques to manage the acquisition and (2) evaluate the earned value data to determine ERA's cost and schedule performance. To do so, GAO compared agency and contractor documentation with best practices, evaluated earned value data to determine performance trends, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
NARA has, to varying degrees, established selected best practices needed to manage the ERA acquisition through EVM, but weaknesses exist in most areas. For example, the scope of effort in ERA's work breakdown structure is not adequately defined, thus impeding the ability to measure progress made on contractor deliverables. These weaknesses exist in part because NARA lacks a comprehensive EVM policy, training, and specialized resources and also frequently replans the program. As a result, NARA has not been positioned to identify potential cost and schedule problems early and thus has not been able to take timely actions to correct problems and avoid program schedule delays and cost increases. ERA's earned value data trends do not accurately portray program status due to the program's weaknesses in implementing EVM; however, historical program trends indicate that future cost overruns will likely be between $195 million and $433 million to fully develop ERA as planned and between $205 and $405 million at program end. In contrast, the contractor's estimated cost overrun is $2.7 million. Without more useful earned value data, NARA will remain unprepared to effectively oversee contractor performance and make realistic projections of program costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that NARA establish a comprehensive plan for all remaining work; improve the accuracy of earned value performance reports; and engage executive leadership in correcting negative trends. NARA generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-810T | gao_GAO-09-810T_0 | Coast Guard Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2010 Is 4.2 Percent Higher than the Previous Year’s Enacted Budget, but Long-Term Budget Outlook Remains Uncertain
The Coast Guard’s budget request for fiscal year 2010 is $9.73 billion, which is approximately $393 million (or 4.2 percent) more than the service’s enacted budget for fiscal year 2009 (see table 2). Of the $9.73 billion requested for fiscal year 2010, about $6.6 billion, or approximately 67 percent, is for operating expenses (OE). The OE account is the primary appropriation that finances the Coast Guard’s activities, including operating and maintaining multipurpose vessels, aircraft, and shore units. In comparing the 2010 budget request to the 2009 enacted budget, funding for the OE account represents an increase of $361 million (or about 6 percent). The next two largest accounts in the fiscal year 2010 budget request—each with funding at about $1.4 billion—are the acquisition, construction, and improvements account (AC&I) and the retired pay account. In terms of percentage increases in comparing the 2010 budget request to the 2009 enacted budget, the retired pay account reflects the highest percentage increase (about 10 percent) of all accounts. Regarding the drug interdiction mission, for example, the fiscal year goal was to achieve a removal rate of at least 28 percent for cocaine being shipped to the United States via non- commercial means. The Coast Guard reported achieving a removal rate of 34 percent. For example, regarding the search and rescue mission, which has two performance goals, the Coast Guard reported that one goal was met (saving at least 76 percent of people from imminent danger in the maritime environment), but the other goal (saving at least 87 percent of mariners in imminent danger) was narrowly missed, as reflected by a success rate of about 84 percent. For the other 3 statutory missions—defense readiness, migrant interdiction, and living marine resources—the Coast Guard reported that it did not meet fiscal year 2008 performance targets. However, for these missions, the Coast Guard reported falling substantially short of its performance target for only one mission—defense readiness. Although performance for this mission rose slightly—from 51 percent in fiscal year 2007 to 56 percent in fiscal year 2008—the Coast Guard’s goal was to meet designated combat readiness levels 100 percent of the time. In comparison, the Coast Guard met targets for 6 of its 11 statutory missions in fiscal year 2007. The Coast Guard Has an Ongoing Modernization Program, but Work Remains to Develop Performance Metrics
The Coast Guard is currently undertaking a major effort—referred to as the modernization program—which is intended to improve mission execution by updating the service’s command structure, support systems, and business practices. However, as we reported in June 2009, the Coast Guard’s efforts to develop applicable performance measures to evaluate results of the modernization program remain in the early stages. As an example of its workforce planning challenges, the Coast Guard cites continued difficulties in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel—challenges that pose a risk to the successful execution of the service’s acquisition programs. The Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Become the Deepwater Systems Integrator, but Some Concerns Remain Regarding Procurement Processes and Cost Reporting
In addition to workforce planning challenges, the Coast Guard faces other acquisition-related challenges in managing the Deepwater program. Problems in Deepwater Management and Oversight Have Led to Delivery Delays and Other Operational Challenges That the Coast Guard Is Working to Overcome
Other management challenges associated with the Deepwater program have operational or mission performance implications for the Coast Guard. Delays in the delivery of the National Security Cutters and the associated support assets are expected to lead to a projected loss of thousands of anticipated cutter operational days for conducting missions through 2017, and may prevent the Coast Guard from employing the full capabilities of the National Security Cutters and the support assets for several years. GAO-09-530R. GAO-09-620T. Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland Security’s Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Coast Guard, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), conducts 11 statutory missions that range from marine safety to defense readiness. To enhance mission performance, the Coast Guard is implementing a modernization program to update its command structure, support systems, and business practices, while continuing the Deepwater program--the acquisition program to replace or upgrade its fleet of vessels and aircraft. This testimony discusses the Coast Guard's (1) fiscal year 2010 budget, (2) mission performance in fiscal year 2008, the most recent year for which statistics are available; and (3) challenges in managing its modernization and acquisition programs and workforce planning. This testimony is based on GAO products issued in 2009 (including GAO-09-530R and GAO-09-620T) and other GAO products issued over the past 11 years--with selected updates in June 2009--and ongoing GAO work regarding the Coast Guard's newest vessel, the National Security Cutter. Also, GAO analyzed budget and mission-performance documents and interviewed Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2010 budget request totals $9.7 billion, an increase of 4.2 percent over its fiscal year 2009 enacted budget. Of the total requested, about $6.6 billion (or 67 percent) is for operating expenses--the primary appropriation account that finances Coast Guard activities, including operating and maintaining multipurpose vessels, aircraft, and shore units. This account, in comparing the 2010 budget request to the 2009 enacted budget, reflects an increase of $361 million (about 6 percent). The next two largest accounts in the 2010 budget request, at about $1.4 billion each, are (1) acquisition, construction, and improvements and (2) retired pay--with each representing about 14 percent of the Coast Guard's total request. The retired pay account--with an increase of about $125 million in the 2010 budget request compared to the 2009 enacted budget--is second only to the operating expenses account in reference to absolute amount increases, but retired pay reflects the highest percentage increase (about 10 percent) of all accounts. Regarding performance of its 11 statutory missions in fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard reported that it fully met goals for 5 missions, partially met goals for 3 missions, and did not meet goals for 3 missions. One of the fully met goals involved drug interdiction. Specifically, for cocaine being shipped to the United States via non-commercial means, the Coast Guard reported achieving a removal rate of about 34 percent compared to the goal of at least 28 percent. Search and rescue was a mission with partially met goals. The Coast Guard reported that it met one goal (saving at least 76 percent of people from imminent danger in the maritime environment) but narrowly missed a related goal (saving at least 87 percent of mariners in imminent danger) by achieving a success rate of about 84 percent. For missions with unmet goals, the Coast Guard reported falling substantially short of performance targets for only one mission--defense readiness. The Coast Guard reported meeting designated combat readiness levels 56 percent of the time compared to the goal of 100 percent. The Coast Guard continues to face several management challenges. For example, GAO reported in June 2009 that although the Coast Guard has taken steps to monitor the progress of the modernization program, development of performance measures remains in the early stages with no time frame specified for completion. Also, as GAO reported in April 2009, although the Coast Guard has assumed the lead role for managing the Deepwater acquisition program, it has not always adhered to procurement processes, and its budget submissions to Congress do not include detailed cost estimates. GAO also reported that the Coast Guard faces challenges in workforce planning, including difficulties in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel. Further, GAO's ongoing work has noted that delays associated with the Coast Guard's newest vessel, the National Security Cutter, are projected to result in the loss of thousands of cutter operational days for conducting missions through 2017. The Coast Guard is working to manage this operational challenge using various mitigation strategies. |
gao_GAO-06-208T | gao_GAO-06-208T_0 | Background
The tax gap is an estimate of the difference between the taxes—including individual income, corporate income, employment, estate, and excise taxes—that should have been timely and accurately paid and what was actually paid for a specific year. Reducing the Tax Gap Could Improve the Nation’s Fiscal Position but Will Require Multiple Strategies
Given its size, even small or moderate reductions in the net tax gap could yield substantial returns, which could improve the government’s fiscal position. For example, based on IRS’s most recent estimate, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield more than $2.5 billion annually. Thus, a 10 percent to 20 percent reduction of the net tax gap would translate into from $25 billion to $50 billion or more in additional revenue annually. However, reducing the tax gap will be challenging given persistent levels of noncompliance. The tax gap must be attacked on multiple fronts and with multiple strategies on a sustained basis. However, for any given set of tax policies, IRS’s efforts to reduce the tax gap and ensure appropriate levels of compliance will need to be based on a balanced approach of providing service to taxpayers and enforcing the tax laws. Providing quality services to taxpayers is an important part of any overall strategy to improve compliance and thereby reduce the tax gap. Regular Compliance Measurement Can Support Informed Decisions to Reduce the Tax Gap, but IRS Lacks Approved Plans for Such Measurement
Regularly measuring compliance can offer many benefits, including helping IRS identify new or growing types of noncompliance, identify changes in tax laws and regulations that may improve compliance, more effectively target examinations of tax returns, understand the effectiveness of its programs to promote and enforce compliance, and determine its resource needs and allocations. Underreporting Accounted for Most of the Tax Gap Estimate
Using its recently collected compliance data, IRS has estimated that underreporting of individual income taxes represented about half of the tax gap for 2001 (the estimate ranges from $150 billion to $187 billion out of a gross tax gap estimate that ranges from $312 billion to $353 billion), as indicated in table 1. IRS has concerns with the certainty of the overall tax gap estimate in part because some areas of the estimate rely on old data and outdated methodologies. Beyond this study of S corporations, IRS has no approved plans to periodically collect more or better compliance data over the long term. IRS collects data on the reasons for noncompliance for specific tax issues during its operational examinations of tax returns. According to IRS officials, the agency does not have firm or specific plans to develop better data on the reasons for noncompliance. IRS’s strategies for improving compliance, which involve improving taxpayer service and enhancing enforcement of the tax laws, generally lack a clear focus on long-term, quantitative goals and results measurement. Like other agencies, IRS faces challenges in implementing a results- oriented management approach. Concluding Observations
Reducing the tax gap is one approach that would help address the looming fiscal challenges facing the nation. Toward that end, in our July 2005 report on reducing the tax gap, we made recommendations to IRS to develop plans to periodically measure tax compliance, take steps to improve its data on the reasons why taxpayers do not comply, and establish long-term, quantitative goals for voluntary compliance levels with an initial focus on individual income tax underreporting and total tax underpayment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Long-term budget simulations by GAO and others show that we face large and growing structural deficits due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care costs. Reducing the annual tax gap--the difference between what taxpayers timely and accurately pay in taxes and what they should pay under the law--could help the nation cope with these long-term fiscal challenges. The tax gap arises through the underreporting of tax liabilities, underpayment of taxes due or "nonfiling" of required tax returns. This testimony discusses the findings of GAO's recent tax gap report. It addresses the significance of reducing the tax gap, measuring the extent of the tax gap, collecting data on reasons why noncompliance occurs, and the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) strategies for reducing the tax gap.
What GAO Found
IRS's recent estimate of the tax gap in 2001 ranged from $312 billion to $353 billion. IRS estimates it will eventually recover some of this tax gap, resulting in a net tax gap of $257 billion to $298 billion. Reducing the tax gap will be challenging given persistent levels of noncompliance. Still, given its size, even small or moderate reductions in the net tax gap could yield substantial returns, which could improve the government's fiscal position. For example, based on IRS's most recent estimate, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield more than $2.5 billion annually. Thus, a 10 percent to 20 percent reduction of the net tax gap would translate into from $25 billion to $50 billion or more in additional revenue annually. The tax gap must be attacked on multiple fronts and with multiple strategies over a sustained period of time. These strategies could include simplifying the tax code, providing quality service to taxpayers, and enhancing enforcement of tax laws by using tools such as tax withholding and information reporting. Regularly measuring compliance is also critical to IRS's ability to reduce the tax gap. A significant part of IRS's tax gap estimate is based on recently collected data on individual income tax reporting compliance. However, other areas of the tax gap rely on old data and outdated methodologies. IRS does not have approved plans, with one exception, to collect more current compliance data covering the various components of the tax gap. Although it can be challenging to develop, data on the reasons why taxpayers do not comply with the tax laws could help IRS more effectively tailor its efforts to reduce noncompliance. IRS has begun to capture data on the reasons for noncompliance, but it has concerns with the data. Although IRS is developing a system intended to capture better examination data, it does not have specific plans to develop better data on the reasons for noncompliance. IRS's strategies for reducing the tax gap involve improving taxpayer service and enforcing tax laws, but do not have a clear focus on quantitative long-term goals or results measurement. Establishing clear goals and measuring progress toward them would be consistent with results-oriented management principles and would provide IRS with a solid base upon which to develop a more strategic approach to reducing the tax gap. |
gao_GAO-12-429 | gao_GAO-12-429_0 | There was little coordination in data systems across the government. IAE Has Evolved over Two Stages
IAE has developed in two stages using different acquisition strategies. If there was no viable system that could be adapted or adopted to meet an identified need, GSA acquired a new system. GSA also established an IAE funding strategy that consisted of contributions from agencies that use IAE systems. In 2008, to further eliminate redundancy, reduce costs, and improve efficiency, GSA began consolidating its portfolio of systems into one integrated system called the System for Award Management (SAM). Unlike the existing systems (sometimes called “legacy” systems) in which a single contractor designed, developed, and operated each of them, IAE relies on multiple vendors to perform these same tasks for SAM. The intent of this approach is to enhance competition and innovation and for the government to own the software associated with the system. SAM will be developed in phases. In each phase, capabilities from selected IAE systems will be added to SAM and those legacy systems will then be shut down. Initial Strategy Was to Assemble a Portfolio of Standardized Systems
During the first IAE stage, GSA worked to create a portfolio of governmentwide systems through an acquisition strategy known as “adopt, adapt, acquire.” GSA and OMB officials surveyed various government stakeholders to develop an inventory of existing data systems and to identify additional data-related needs of the government. Using this information, the ACE directed GSA to adopt or adapt existing agency-specific systems for governmentwide use. Consolidating the IAE portfolio was intended to reduce costs by eliminating redundancy, streamlining acquisition processes, and consolidating infrastructure. Progress Made in Developing SAM, but Cost Increases and Schedule Delays Could Jeopardize Program Completion
GSA and its contractors have made progress in developing SAM and phase 1 is scheduled to be completed in May 2012. GSA also has worked with contractors to establish a hosting center for the system and a help desk to support users. To a lesser extent, external factors, including recent statutory requirements and policy changes, have contributed to higher operational costs as well by increasing the demand for help desk services. In response to rising costs and resource constraints, GSA officials have delayed SAM’s development schedule and taken other actions to reduce or defer other costs. 1). Most of the cost growth, about $65 million, is due to higher than expected hosting costs. 2). Consequences of Higher SAM Development Costs Threaten IAE Going Forward
Schedule delays and other GSA actions taken in response to cost growth and funding shortages are likely to lead to further cost increases that pose a risk to IAE. While GSA has taken some steps to reduce these costs, it has not reevaluated whether its current acquisition strategy, including its approach to acquire hosting services, is still the most cost-effective approach to implement SAM. In addition, although the SAM development phases have been pushed out several years, GSA has not modified its development contract with IBM to reflect these changes. The program continues to pay the same fixed-price amount to the contractor for system development activities as well as operation and maintenance of SAM, even though there was little to operate and maintain for the first 2 years of development. Despite dramatically different circumstances marked by higher costs and constrained resources, GSA has not reassessed its business case for SAM. Tying contract payments to the migration of the data systems and schedule milestones would ensure that the government is not paying for work that has not yet been accomplished. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that GSA has a sound approach for providing IAE services in the future, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA take the following two actions:
Reassess the SAM business case to compare the costs and benefits of various alternatives such as: terminating SAM development and continuing to operate the legacy systems, maintaining the current acquisition approach to developing SAM, pursuing a different acquisition strategy for SAM, such as using a single contractor to develop and operate the system. If the results of this assessment support continuing the current acquisition approach, then: reevaluate the hosting strategy to ensure that it is the most cost- effective approach that can be supported with available resources, and take steps to ensure that the SAM development contract payments are more closely aligned with the program schedule and delivery of capabilities. In its written comments, GSA concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it will take appropriate action. CCR is the primary registrant database for the U.S. government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Government spends more than $500 billion each year on contracts. To ensure contracts are managed effectively, the government has established policies and procedures for advertising, awarding, administering, and reporting on them. Historically, data systems used to implement these steps have been fragmented and duplicative, with multiple systems across different agencies providing similar services. The Integrated Acquisition Environment (IAE) was initiated in 2001 to bring together different data systems into a unified system. It is intended to reduce duplication and information technology costs, and create a more streamlined and integrated federal acquisition process.
GAO was asked to assess (1) the acquisition strategy being used to develop IAE; (2) progress that has been made in consolidating IAE systems; and (3) any challenges that may affect the completion of IAE. GAO analyzed program costs, schedules, contracts, acquisition documents, and briefings, and interviewed IAE program officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The development of IAE has occurred in two stages using different acquisition strategies. In 2001, GSA began establishing a portfolio of standardized government-wide data systems through an acquisition strategy known as adopt, adapt, acquire. GSA adopted or adapted existing agency-specific systems for government-wide use, or if no viable system met an identified need, GSA acquired a new system. These efforts resulted in a portfolio of nine data systems. In 2008, GSA began consolidating its portfolio of systems into one integrated system called the System for Award Management (SAM). In developing the system, GSA hoped to eliminate redundancy, reduce costs, and improve efficiency. Unlike the existing systems that were each designed, developed, and operated by a single contractor, IAE relies on multiple vendors to perform these same tasks for SAM. The intent of this approach is to enhance competition and innovation and for the government to own the software associated with the system. SAM will be developed in phases. In each phase, capabilities from selected IAE systems will be added to SAM and those legacy systems will be shut down.
GSA has made progress in developing SAM and phase 1, consisting of three systems, is scheduled to be completed in May 2012. GSA also has established a computing center to host SAM and a help desk to support users. Since 2009, however, IAE costs have increased by $85 million, from about $96 to $181 million. Most of the cost growth is due to GSA omitting hardware and other key components in acquiring a hosting infrastructure for SAM. External factors, including recent statutory requirements and policy changes, also have contributed to higher costs by increasing the use of the IAE systems beyond what was anticipated. Higher costs led to the need to supplement existing funding, but the program did not receive all of the additional funding it requested. In response to rising costs and limited funding, GSA officials have delayed SAMs development schedule by almost 2 years, and taken other actions to reduce or defer costs where possible.
Higher costs and constrained resources pose a risk to IAE going forward. GSA will need to continue operating the legacy IAE systems and contend with higher SAM development costs for several more years. While GSA has taken some steps to reduce costs, it has not reevaluated the business case for SAM or determined whether it is the most cost effective alternative. Such a reevaluation is particularly important in light of the increased infrastructure costs, which are now a major impediment to completing SAM. In addition, although the SAM development phases have been pushed out several years, GSA has not modified its primary development contract to align the payment schedule with the delays. The program has continued to pay the same fixed price amount to the contractor for SAM development, operation, and maintenance even though there was little to operate and maintain for nearly 2 years. Aligning contract payments with schedule milestones will ensure that the government is not paying for work that has not yet been accomplished.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA reassess the IAE business case to determine whether the current acquisition strategy is the most cost effective alternative and if so, reevaluate the current hosting strategy and align contract payments with the program schedule. GSA agreed with GAOs recommendations and indicated that it will take appropriate action. |
gao_GAO-12-107 | gao_GAO-12-107_0 | 1). Within an affirmation requirement for the Board, the TVA Act recognizes that TVA’s broad missions and objectives include being a national leader in technological innovation, low-cost power, and environmental stewardship. TVA’s Plans Focus on Building Natural Gas and Nuclear Capacity, and Its Forecasts Are Largely in Line with Others
TVA plans to meet future electricity demand primarily by expanding natural gas-fired and nuclear-powered generating capacity, reducing the amount of coal-fired generating capacity, and expanding energy efficiency programs. These plans were informed by TVA’s planning forecasts, which we determined were largely in line with forecasts from other sources for the Southeast. TVA also plans expansions of energy efficiency programs. TVA’s Resource Planning and Forecasts Are Largely in Line with Plans and Forecasts for the Southeast from Other Sources
The average annual rates of growth in TVA’s long-term plans and forecasts are largely within the range of the average annual rates of growth in long-term plans and forecasts for the Southeast from other sources. TVA expects its peak demand will grow at an annual rate of about 1.2 percent, on average, from 2010 through 2030. Although Expanding Its Energy Efficiency Programs, TVA May Not Be Fully Considering This Resource
TVA plans to expand its energy efficiency efforts to meet future demand for electricity. However, as TVA has not used studies of the energy efficiency potential of its service area as the primary basis for its energy efficiency goal, it cannot be sure that its current plans reflect the full scope and possible extent of energy efficiency programs nor that its current plans are realistic. In addition, TVA’s use of energy efficiency is constrained by several factors, including how TVA treats energy efficiency in its resource planning approach, and the fact that TVA is not subject to certain key mandates or incentives that apply to some other utilities. In March 2011, TVA signed a contract commissioning a third party to study the energy efficiency potential of TVA’s service area, which is scheduled to be completed by October 2011. As a result, TVA does not know whether the model would have identified other potentially more cost-effective levels of energy efficiency resources. TVA’s Financial Condition May Hamper Its Ability to Fund Capital Improvements
TVA’s financial condition may hamper its ability to fund planned capital improvements over the next several years. Therefore, the lack of an effective plan may impede TVA’s long-range financial planning. Other electric utilities have experienced similar issues. TVA is also the only utility with a statutory debt ceiling. Issue new debt for new assets. Consider significant out-year increases in operating expenses. As of September 30, 2010, TVA’s statutory debt was $23.6 billion, and it plans to spend about $10 billion through fiscal year 2013 for capital expenditures related to new and upgraded nuclear, fossil fuel, and hydropower plants. Moreover, pursuant to a settlement with EPA, TVA agreed to invest an additional $3 billion to $5 billion in the next 10 years on pollution control devices on existing power plants. Further, in the absence of a capital expenditure management plan, TVA may also face challenges in achieving the full range of the Board’s stated objectives, including its commitment to be a “national leader in technological innovation, low cost power and environmental stewardship.”
Recommendations for Executive Action
Consistent with TVA’s goals, objectives and policies, including TVA being a national leader in technological innovation, low-cost power, and environmental stewardship, and to better ensure that TVA has the financial resources to accomplish the Board’s broader objectives, we recommend that TVA’s Board: use information on the energy efficiency potential of TVA’s service area from its commissioned study to better ensure that TVA’s future resource planning process reflects the most cost-effective mix of resources to meet the demand for electricity, and develop a written capital expenditure plan that includes the full costs of the assets in which TVA plans to invest and the sources of funding for acquiring those assets. In its written comments, TVA agreed with our first recommendation, and while TVA did not expressly agree with our second recommendation, it noted the importance of utility companies having a written capital expenditure plan. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our report objectives were to examine (1) how the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plans to meet future demand for electricity and how TVA’s resource planning and forecasts compare to plans and forecasts from other sources, (2) TVA’s efforts to use energy efficiency to meet demand for electricity, and (3) TVA’s financial condition and how it affects TVA’s ability to meet its operational and financial goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the nation's largest public power provider, is a self-financing, federal electric utility with annual revenues of about $11 billion. TVA has financed large capital investments mostly by issuing debt and is subject to a $30 billion debt ceiling imposed by the TVA Act. TVA is governed by a 9-member Board. Within an affirmation requirement for the TVA Board, the TVA Act recognizes that TVA's broad missions and objectives include being a national leader in technological innovation, low-cost power, and environmental stewardship. GAO was asked to examine (1) how TVA plans to meet future demand for electricity and how TVA's resource planning and forecasts compare to those from other sources, (2) TVA's efforts to use energy efficiency to meet demand for electricity, and (3) TVA's financial condition and how it affects TVA's ability to meet its operational and financial goals. GAO analyzed data from TVA and third parties, reviewed agency documents, and interviewed federal and state officials and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
According to its 2010 power supply plan, by 2029 TVA plans to meet electricity demand primarily by expanding natural gas-fired generating capacity, adding three nuclear reactors, and expanding energy efficiency programs. TVA also plans to retire some coal-fired capacity. These plans are informed by TVA's resource planning forecasts, which GAO determined were largely in line with plans and forecasts for the southeastern United States from other sources. For example, TVA forecasts that peak demand will grow at an average annual rate of about 1 percent for about the next 20 years, which is within the range of long-term forecasts for the Southeast from other sources, including the Department of Energy and a GAO nonprobability sample of five investor-owned utilities. TVA also plans to increase its generating capacity and total electricity generation by about 1 percent per year on average, both of which are within the range of plans and forecasts from other sources. While TVA plans to expand its energy efficiency efforts to meet future demand for electricity, TVA may not be fully considering this alternative. For example, TVA's plans may not reflect the full energy efficiency potential of its service area, since it has not yet completed a study of that potential. As a result, TVA cannot be sure that its current resource plans reflect the full scope and possible extent of energy efficiency programs or that the plans are realistic. In March 2011, TVA commissioned a study on the energy efficiency potential of its service area, which is scheduled to be completed by October 2011. In addition, TVA's use of energy efficiency is constrained by several factors, including TVA's planning approach, which did not allow for potentially more cost-effective levels of energy efficiency in its planning model. In addition, TVA is not subject to certain key mandates and incentives that apply to some other utilities, such as the requirement in California for utilities to consider energy efficiency before other resources. TVA's financial condition may hamper its ability to fund capital improvements. As of September 30, 2010, TVA's statutory debt was $23.6 billion, and TVA plans to spend almost $10 billion by fiscal year 2013 for various capital investment projects. Given the significant delays and cost overruns that TVA has historically experienced, these projects could potentially face similar issues. In addition, under a settlement with the Environmental Protection Agency, TVA agreed to invest $3 billion to $5 billion in the next 10 years on new and upgraded pollution controls on existing power plants. TVA also anticipates increases in operating costs. All of these factors could reduce the available funds TVA could use for its planned capital investments. TVA's financial condition leaves it with difficult decisions to make in order to meet electricity demand while keeping its debt within the statutory limit. TVA does not have a formal capital expenditure management plan that identifies assets to be acquired, their costs, and funding sources. The lack of such a plan may impede TVA's long range financial planning.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TVA (1) use information from the energy efficiency study it commissioned to inform its future resource planning process and (2) develop a written capital expenditure plan that includes the full costs of the assets TVA plans to acquire and the sources of funding for acquiring those assets. TVA agreed with GAO's first recommendation and generally agreed with the second recommendation. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-116 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-116_0 | Drug-Trafficking Organizations Have Substantial Resources, Capabilities, and Operational Flexibility
A primary reason that U.S. and foreign governments’ counternarcotics efforts are constrained is the growing power, influence, adaptability, and capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Despite some short-term achievements by U.S. and foreign government law enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, drug-trafficking organizations have found ways to continue to meet and exceed the demand of U.S. drug consumers. Obstacles in Foreign Countries Impede U.S. Drug Control Efforts
The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are the source of drug production and are transiting points for trafficking-related activities to reduce the amount of coca and opium poppy being cultivated and to make the drug seizures, arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop the production and movement of illegal drugs. Like the United States, source and transiting countries face long-standing obstacles that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These obstacles, many of which are interrelated, are competing economic, political, and cultural problems, including terrorism and internal unrest; corruption; and inadequate law enforcement resources and institutional capabilities. Inadequate Resources and Institutional Capabilities Limit Arrests and Convictions of Drug Traffickers
Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and legislative tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the source and transiting countries. Other Obstacles Inhibit Success in Fulfilling U.S. International Drug Control Strategy
Our work over the past 10 years has identified other obstacles to implementing the U.S. international drug control strategy: (1) competing U.S. foreign policy objectives, (2) organizational and operational limitations among and within the U.S. agencies involved, and (3) inconsistent U.S. funding levels. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives Compete for Attention and Resources
In carrying out its foreign policy, the United States seeks to promote U.S. business and trade, improve human rights, and support democracy, as well as to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Funding Levels Have Complicated Drug Control Efforts
From 1988 to 1997, the United States spent about $110 billion on domestic and international efforts to reduce the use and availability of illegal drugs in the United States. International drug control efforts aimed at stopping the production of illegal drugs and drug-related activities in the source and transiting countries are only one element of an overall national drug control strategy. We have been reporting since 1988 that U.S. counternarcotics efforts have been hampered by the absence of a long-term plan outlining each agency’s commitment to achieving the goals and objectives of the international drug control strategy. Illicit Drugs: Recent Efforts to Control Chemical Diversion and Money Laundering (GAO/NSIAD-94-34, Dec. 8, 1993). The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991). 1, 1988). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its observations on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat drug production and the movement of drugs into the United States, focusing on: (1) the challenges of addressing international counternarcotics issues; (2) obstacles to implementation of U.S. drug control efforts; and (3) areas requiring attention to improve the operational effectiveness of U.S. drug control efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars, illegal drugs still flood the United States; (2) although U.S. counternarcotics efforts have resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers, the seizure of large amounts of drugs, and the eradication of illicit drug crops, they have not materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United States; (3) the United States and drug-producing and -transiting nations face a number of obstacles in attempting to reduce the production of and trafficking in illegal drugs; (4) international drug-trafficking organizations are sophisticated, multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control efforts; (5) as success is achieved in one area, the drug-trafficking organizations change tactics, thwarting U.S. efforts; (6) there are also other obstacles that impede U.S. and drug producing and -transiting countries' drug control efforts; (7) in the drug-producing and -transiting countries, counternarcotics efforts are constrained by corruption, competing economic and political policies, inadequate laws, limited resources and institutional capabilities, and internal problems such as terrorism and civil unrest; (8) morever, drug traffickers are increasingly resourceful in corrupting the countries' institutions; (9) for its part, the United States has not been able to maintain a well-organized and consistently funded international counternarcotics program; (10) U.S. efforts have also been hampered by competing U.S. foreign policy objectives, organizational and operational limitations, and the lack of clear goals and objectives; (11) since GAO's February 1997 report, some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States; (12) these countries have taken action to extradite drug criminals; enacted legislation to control organized crime, money laundering, and chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs; and instituted reforms to reduce corruption; and (13) while these actions represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact, and challenges remain. |
gao_GAO-11-929T | gao_GAO-11-929T_0 | Oil Shale Development Could Adversely Impact Water Resources, but the Magnitude of These Impacts Is Unknown
In our October report, we found that oil shale development could have significant impacts on the quantity and quality of surface and groundwater resources, but the magnitude of these impacts is unknown. According to these experts, in the absence of effective mitigation measures, impacts from oil shale development to water resources could result from disturbing the ground surface during the construction of roads and production facilities, withdrawing water from streams and aquifers for oil shale operations, underground mining and extraction, and discharging waste waters from oil shale operations. Estimates of Water Needs for Commercial Oil Shale Development Vary Widely
Commercial oil shale development requires water for numerous activities throughout its life cycle; however, we found that estimates vary widely for the amount of water needed to produce oil shale. These variations stem primarily from the uncertainty associated with reclamation technologies for in-situ oil shale development and because of the various ways to generate power for oil shale operations, which use different amounts of water. Based on our calculations, we estimated that about 1 to 12 barrels of water could be needed for each barrel of oil produced from in- situ operations, with an average of about 5 barrels (see table 1); and about 2 to 4 barrels of water could be needed for each barrel of oil produced from mining operations with a surface retort operation, with an average of about 3 barrels (see table 2). Water Is Likely to Be Available Initially from Local Sources, but the Size of an Oil Shale Industry May Eventually Be Limited by Water Availability
In October 2010, we reported that water is likely to be available for the initial development of an oil shale industry, but the eventual size of the industry may be limited by the availability of water and demands for water to meet other needs. For example, substantial population growth and its correlative demand for water are expected in the oil shale regions of Colorado and Utah. A future oil shale industry may also need to contend with a general decreased physical supply of water regionwide due to climate change; Colorado’s and Utah’s obligations under interstate compacts that could further reduce the amount of water available for development; and limitations on withdrawals from the Colorado River system to meet the requirements to protect certain fish species under the Endangered Species Act. Federal Research Efforts on the Impacts of Oil Shale Development on Water Resources Do Not Provide Sufficient Data for Future Monitoring
Since 2006, the federal government has sponsored over $22 million of research on oil shale development and of this amount about $5 million was spent on research related to the nexus between oil shale development and water. Even with this research, we reported that there is a lack of comprehensive data on the condition of surface water and groundwater and their interaction, which limits efforts to monitor and mitigate the future impacts of oil shale development. However, there is general agreement among those we contacted— including state personnel who regulate water resources, federal agency officials responsible for studying water, water researchers, and water experts— that this ongoing research is insufficient to monitor and then subsequently mitigate the potential impacts of oil shale development on water resources. Groundwater movement and its interaction with surface water. As a result of our findings, we made three recommendations in our October 2010 report to the Secretary of the Interior. Specifically, we stated that to prepare for possible impacts from the future development of oil shale, the Secretary should direct the appropriate managers in the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Geological Survey to establish comprehensive baseline conditions for groundwater and surface water quality, including their chemistry, and quantity in the Piceance and Uintah Basins to aid in the future monitoring of impacts from oil shale development in the Green River Formation; model regional groundwater movement and the interaction between groundwater and surface water, in light of aquifer properties and the age of groundwater, so as to help in understanding the transport of possible contaminants derived from the development of oil shale; and coordinate with the Department of Energy and state agencies with regulatory authority over water resources in implementing these recommendations, and to provide a mechanism for water-related research collaboration and sharing of results. Interior generally concurred with our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil shale deposits in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming are estimated to contain up to 3 trillion barrels of oil--or an amount equal to the world's proven oil reserves. About 72 percent of this oil shale is located beneath federal lands managed by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management, making the federal government a key player in its potential development. Extracting this oil is expected to require substantial amounts of water and could impact groundwater and surface water. GAO's testimony is based on its October 2010 report on the impacts of oil shale development (GAO-11-35). This testimony summarizes (1) what is known about the potential impacts of oil shale development on surface water and groundwater, (2) what is known about the amount of water that may be needed for commercial oil shale development, (3) the extent to which water will likely be available for such development and its source, and (4) federal research efforts to address impacts to water resources from commercial oil shale development. For its October 2010 report, GAO reviewed studies and interviewed water experts, officials from federal and state agencies, and oil shale industry representatives.
What GAO Found
Oil shale development could have significant impacts on the quality and quantity of water resources, but the magnitude is unknown because technologies are not yet commercially proven, the size of a future industry is uncertain, and knowledge of current water conditions is limited. In the absence of effective mitigation measures, water resources could be impacted by disturbing the ground surface during the construction of roads and production facilities, withdrawing water from streams and aquifers for oil shale operations, underground mining and extraction, and discharging waste waters produced from or used in such operations. Commercial oil shale development requires water for numerous activities throughout its life cycle, but estimates vary widely for the amount of water needed to commercially produce oil shale primarily because of the unproven nature of some technologies and because the various ways of generating power for operations use differing quantities of water. GAO's review of available studies indicated that the expected total water needs for the entire life cycle of oil shale production range from about 1 barrel (or 42 gallons) to 12 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced from in-situ (underground heating) operations, with an average of about 5 barrels, and from about 2 to 4 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced from mining operations with surface heating, with an average of about 3 barrels. GAO reported that water is likely to be available for the initial development of an oil shale industry but that the size of an industry in Colorado or Utah may eventually be limited by water availability. Water limitations may arise from increases in water demand from municipal and industrial users, the potential of reduced water supplies from a warming climate, the need to fulfill obligations under interstate water compacts, and decreases on withdrawals from the Colorado River system to meet the requirements to protect threatened and endangered fish species. The federal government sponsors research on the impacts of oil shale on water resources through the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Interior. Even with this research, nearly all of the officials and experts that GAO contacted said that there are insufficient data to understand baseline conditions of water resources in the oil shale regions of Colorado and Utah and that additional research is needed to understand the movement of groundwater and its interaction with surface water. Federal agency officials also told GAO that they seldom coordinate water-related oil shale research among themselves or with state agencies that regulate water. In its October report, GAO made three recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior to prepare for the possible impacts of oil shale development, including the establishment of comprehensive baseline conditions for water resources in the oil shale regions of Colorado and Utah, modeling regional groundwater movement, and coordinating on water-related research with DOE and state agencies involved in water regulation. The Department of the Interior generally concurred with the recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-10-558 | gao_GAO-10-558_0 | Agencies Have Begun Planning for Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact of This New Approach Is Not Fully Known and Key Transition Risks Exist
NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to separate acquisitions, but the agencies are at different stages in planning and neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for a new program to fulfill the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. Because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not yet been fully determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to two separate programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and capabilities, added delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs’ costs will continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). NPOESS Development Continues, but Demonstration Satellite Has Been Delayed and New Challenges Threaten Further Delays
While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for separate acquisitions, the development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent months, the critical VIIRS sensor has been completed and integrated onto the NPP spacecraft. In addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and second NPOESS satellites, including sensors and ground systems. However, the expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor, and the development of the VIIRS sensor for the first NPOESS satellite is experiencing cost overruns. In addition, the program is slowing down and may stop work on key components in order to address potential contract liabilities and funding constraints. This would further delay the launches of the NPP satellite and the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs. These components may be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs. Because the NPP demonstration satellite was not designed as an operational asset, it has several limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite lifespan than current or planned operational satellites. These design limitations mean that in some cases, NPP’s data will not be as timely and useful as current polar satellites or as secure as planned satellites. In addition, there is a risk of a gap in the nation’s climate and weather data should the NPP satellite or its sensors fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP data more timely and secure. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor programs is efficiently and effectively managed, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce take the following four actions: direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs; direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to develop plans to address key transition risks, including the loss of skilled staff, delays in contract negotiations and setting up new program offices, loss of support for the other agency’s requirements, and oversight of new program management; direct the NPOESS program office to develop priorities for work slowdown and stoppage to allow the activities that are most important to maintaining launch schedules to continue; and direct NOAA and DOD officials to develop time frames for making key decisions on—or accepting the risks related to—the timeliness of NPP’s data. In their comments, both NOAA and DOD agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess efforts to plan for separate satellite acquisitions; (2) evaluate the status and risks of key program components still under development; and (3) evaluate implications of using the demonstration satellite’s data operationally. We also interviewed agency officials from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and NOAA, as well as members of the NPOESS task force and the NPOESS program office. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 8 years since a contract was awarded, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency program managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and ineffective interagency management. The launch date for a demonstration satellite has been delayed by over 5 years and the cost estimate for the program has more than doubled--to about $15 billion. In February 2010, a Presidential task force decided to disband NPOESS and, instead, have the agencies undertake separate acquisitions. GAO was asked to (1) assess efforts to establish separate satellite programs; (2) evaluate the status and risks of the NPOESS components still under development; and (3) evaluate the implications of using the demonstration satellite's data operationally. To do so, GAO analyzed program management and cost data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
NOAA and DOD have begun planning to transition the NPOESS program to separate acquisitions, but neither has finalized its plans. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new program--called the Joint Polar Satellite Program--to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD expects to make decisions on the spacecraft and sensors by June and October 2010, respectively. Because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on expected costs, schedules, and promised capabilities has not been fully determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs. These risks include the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency's requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program management. Until these risks are effectively mitigated, it is likely that the satellite programs' costs will continue to grow and launch dates will continue to be delayed, which could lead to gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their separate acquisitions, the development of key components of the NPOESS program is continuing. In recent months, a critical imaging sensor has been completed and integrated onto the spacecraft of a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). In addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and second NPOESS satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD to become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months due to technical issues in the development of a key sensor. Further, the program is slowing down and may need to stop work on key components because of potential contract liabilities and funding constraints, but has not developed a prioritized list on what to stop first. This may further delay NPP and the components of the first NOAA and DOD satellites under their new programs. Because the NPP demonstration satellite was designed as a risk-reduction mission, not as an operational asset, it has several limitations. These limitations include fewer ground-based data processing systems, fewer security controls, and a shorter satellite lifespan than exist for current or planned operational satellites. These design limitations mean that, in some cases, NPP's data will not be as timely, useful, and secure as other polar satellites and that there is a risk of a gap in the nation's climate and weather services should NPP fail before the next satellite is launched. Agency officials acknowledge these limitations and are assessing options to make NPP data more timely and secure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for addressing them. GAO is making recommendations to NOAA and DOD to address key risks in transitioning to their respective new programs. Both agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for addressing them. |
gao_GAO-03-986 | gao_GAO-03-986_0 | Medicare Payment for Ambulance Services
CMS recently implemented a Medicare fee schedule that changed the way Medicare pays for ambulance services. Providers’ Total Costs Are Predominantly Readiness Related, and Do Not Vary With Trip Volume
The majority of ambulance providers’ total costs are related to readiness— the need to have an ambulance and crew available when emergency calls are received. Readiness-related costs are fixed, meaning that they do not vary with the number of trips a provider makes, as long as the provider has excess capacity. Fewer Trips Linked to a Higher Cost Per Trip
Providers that make fewer trips tend to have a higher cost per trip than those that make more trips. Medicare Ambulance Payments for Trips in Rural Counties Are Unlikely to Fully Reflect Differences in Providers’ Cost Per Trip
Although Medicare’s payments generally are higher for trips originating in the least densely populated rural counties than in other counties, the payment differential is probably not large enough to account for the higher costs incurred by low-volume providers likely to serve these areas. This suggests that the cost per trip is likely higher for providers serving the least densely populated rural counties. Ambulance providers on average are paid more for trips originating in the least densely populated rural counties than for those in the most densely populated rural counties, but the payment differences are modest and unlikely to reflect the higher cost per trip of low-volume providers. The modest difference in Medicare payment across rural counties is dwarfed by the difference in trip volume: The difference in trip volume between the least and most densely populated quarters of rural counties is nearly eightfold. Because trip volume is an indicator of costs, the Medicare payment differences likely do not fully reflect differences across rural counties in providers’ cost per trip. In implementing the fee schedule, CMS adjusted the mileage rate for rural trips to account for the higher cost per trip of providers serving rural areas. Thus, adjusting the base rates for rural trips—the portion of Medicare’s payment that is designed to pay for providers’ fixed costs—is a more appropriate way of accounting for rural low-volume providers’ higher cost per trip than adjusting the mileage rate. As stated in the report, a base rate adjustment is a more appropriate way of accounting for rural low-volume providers’ higher costs per trip because base rates reflect fixed costs, and because trip volume is a better indicator of providers’ cost per trip than is trip length. We also interviewed several individual ambulance providers. Factors affecting ambulance providers’ costs. Analysis of variation in factors affecting costs across geographic areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently implemented a Medicare ambulance fee schedule in which providers are paid a base payment per trip plus a mileage payment. An adjustment is made to the mileage rate for rural trips to account for higher costs. CMS has stated that this rural adjustment may not sufficiently target providers serving sparsely populated rural areas. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) directed GAO to examine rural ambulance costs. GAO identified factors that affect ambulance costs per trip, examined how these factors varied across geographic areas, and analyzed whether Medicare payments account for geographic cost differences. GAO used survey data on ambulance providers and Medicare claims data.
What GAO Found
Trip volume is the key factor affecting differences in ambulance providers' cost per trip. Ambulance providers' total costs primarily reflect readiness--the need to have an ambulance and crew available when emergency calls are received. Readiness-related costs are fixed, meaning that they do not increase with the number of trips provided, as long as a provider has excess capacity. As a result, providers that make fewer trips tend to have a higher cost per trip than those that make more trips. We also found that the length of providers' trips had little effect on their cost per trip. The modest variation in Medicare payments to ambulance providers that serve rural counties probably does not fully reflect their differences in costs because the key factor affecting provider costs--the number of trips--varies widely across rural counties. In 2001, the least densely populated quarter of rural counties averaged far fewer trips than the most densely populated quarter. This suggests that the cost per trip is likely higher for providers serving the least populated rural counties. On average ambulance providers are paid somewhat more for trips in the least densely populated rural counties than for those in other rural counties. However, those payment differences are dwarfed by the difference in trip volume. Because trip volume is a strong indicator of costs, the Medicare payment differences across rural counties likely do not fully reflect differences in providers' cost per trip. In implementing the fee schedule, CMS adjusted the mileage rate for rural trips to account for the higher cost per trip of providers serving rural areas. However, trip volume is a better indicator of providers' cost per trip than is trip length. Thus, adjusting the base rates for rural trips--the portion of Medicare's payment that is designed to pay for providers' fixed costs--is a more appropriate way of accounting for rural low-volume providers' higher cost per trip than adjusting the mileage rate. |
gao_GGD-96-187 | gao_GGD-96-187_0 | FBSEA also mandated uniform standards for foreign banks establishing operations in the United States. Applications for Foreign Bank Entry
FBSEA increased the Federal Reserve’s supervisory and regulatory power over foreign banks by requiring Federal Reserve approval for all foreign banks seeking to establish U.S. offices, whether licensed by state or federal authorities. Taiwan accounted for the most—7 of the 45 applications. In its decisions approving the applications for branches and agencies and subsidiary banks, the Federal Reserve found that the foreign banks had met the standards required under FBSEA and its implementing regulations. A review of the orders indicated that the Federal Reserve examined the home country supervision of the applicant bank in every representative office case, but a determination that the applicant bank or its parent foreign bank were subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision was not always made. 1.) The act gave the Federal Reserve the responsibility for ensuring that branches and agencies of foreign banks are examined every 12 months and gave it the power to examine representative offices. Examination Results Indicate Most Foreign Branches and Agencies Have Been Rated Satisfactory
Examinations by federal and state supervisors are intended to determine the safety and soundness of foreign branches and agencies. Although the Federal Reserve had authority to initiate enforcement actions against foreign banks and their U.S. branches and agencies under the IBA and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, FBSEA enhanced its enforcement powers. Between 1993 and 1995, federal banking supervisors issued 40 formal enforcement actions against foreign banks operating in the United States.In the most serious case, the Federal Reserve, in conjunction with FDIC, the New York State Banking Department, and several other state bank supervisors, used its termination authority to order Daiwa Bank to cease its U.S. banking operations. Neither OCC nor FDIC issued any civil money penalties during this time. We did not attempt to subjectively evaluate the Federal Reserve’s decisions on foreign bank applications. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Reserve's implementation of the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act, focusing on: (1) the Reserve's examination process and process for approving foreign bank applications for U.S. entry and expansion; and (2) enforcement actions that the Federal Reserve has taken since 1993.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the act established minimum standards for foreign bank entry and expansion into the United States, strengthened federal bank supervision and regulation, and required that the Federal Reserve approve foreign banks' applications for acquiring bank subsidaries; (2) although the Federal Reserve approved 45 applications after determining that the applicant banks met the act's standards, Federal Reserve staff believed that the application process was too lengthy; (3) new guidelines, established in 1993, reduced application processing times; (4) between 1993 and 1995, the Federal Reserve met its mandate to coordinate with the other federal and state bank supervisors to examine foreign branches and agencies once every 12 months; (5) the Federal Reserve also examined over half of the representative offices of foreign banks operating in the United States even though it did not establish a time frame for such examinations; (6) the foreign banks examined were generally in satisfactory condition and only 3 percent of the foreign branches and agencies received low safety and soundness ratings in 1995; and (7) of the 40 formal enforcement actions the Federal Reserve issued against U.S. foreign banks between 1993 and 1995, 6 required voluntary terminations of deposit insurance, 4 required the use of civil money penalty authority, and one foreign bank was ordered to terminate its U.S. banking operations. |
gao_GAO-07-691 | gao_GAO-07-691_0 | When we last reported on NASA’s IEMP effort, in September 2005, NASA had begun to implement a number of recommendations from our earlier reports—including steps toward implementing the disciplined processes necessary to manage IEMP. Develop a risk mitigation plan. Specifically, NASA has, as we previously recommended, implemented more effective requirements management and testing processes, improved its performance metrics program related to tracking system defects, and developed an IEMP risk management strategy. However, until the end of March 2007, the upgrade was in a “stabilization” phase as NASA worked on correcting a number of system errors, including posting errors for certain types of transactions. Because the upgrade was still quite new and NASA was continuing to stabilize the system, we were unable to determine the significance of these weaknesses. NASA Uses a Recognized Industry Best Practice to Move from One Project Phase to the Next
In addition to the disciplined processes discussed above, NASA has also taken action to establish the use of quantitative entry and exit criteria to move from one phase of an IEMP project to another. Improved Requirements Development and Project Scheduling Needed
Weaknesses in the areas of requirements development and project scheduling offset some of the benefits associated with NASA’s improved requirements management and testing processes—causing NASA to assume a greater risk that it would not identify significant system defects prior to implementation. Despite the implementation difficulties, NASA financial managers have indicated that the core financial upgrade is now functioning as expected for most transactions. NASA has not yet fully considered the higher-level strategic issues that affect how useful IEMP will be in addressing long-standing management challenges—including problems associated with stovepiped systems and parochial interests of individual NASA components as well as problems in overseeing contractor performance and properly accounting for its property, plant, and equipment. To achieve this vision, it is critical that NASA develop an agencywide concept of operations and adopt standard business processes that are supported by its software. Concept of Operations Would Provide an Important Foundation for IEMP
NASA officials stated that they have undertaken a critical first step to achieving their vision for IEMP—they have begun developing a concept of operations to describe how all of its business processes should be carried out. NASA created a framework for developing a concept of operations in fiscal year 2006 and plans to complete it by the summer of 2008, according to NASA officials. Ideally, a concept of operations should be completed before system development begins so that it can serve as a foundation for system planning and requirements development. Nonetheless, the completion of such a document even at this late stage in NASA’s IEMP effort would be beneficial for the development of the remaining IEMP modules as well as any future upgrades to the core financial module. Such a document would be invaluable in getting various stakeholders, including those in the programs and administrative activities, to understand how the business systems are expected to operate cohesively and how they fit into “the big picture.”
Adopting Enterprise Business Processes Would Help NASA Transform the Way It Does Business
As part of an agencywide concept of operations, to best leverage its investment in IEMP, NASA should also analyze the agency’s current business processes and determine how these processes can be made more efficient and effective. Specifically, NASA needs to ensure that the business processes supported by this system are developed and implemented to support the enterprise’s needs rather than primarily focusing on the needs of a specific organizational entity. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has improved its management processes for implementing the Integrated Enterprise Management Program (IEMP), we reviewed project management documentation for several IEMP projects, including the core financial upgrade and the contract management module. To determine the extent to which NASA has considered the higher-level strategic issues associated with developing an enterprisewide concept of operations and defining standard business processes, we met with senior management from IEMP and the OCFO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has designated the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) contract management as an area of high risk in part because it lacked modern systems to provide accurate and reliable information on contract spending. In April 2000, NASA began a system modernization effort, known as the Integrated Enterprise Management Program (IEMP). When GAO last reported on the status of IEMP in September 2005, NASA had begun to implement disciplined processes needed to manage IEMP, but had yet to implement other best practices such as adopting business processes that improve information on contract spending. This GAO report addresses (1) actions taken by NASA to effectively implement the disciplined processes needed to manage IEMP and (2) the extent to which NASA has considered the strategic issues associated with developing a concept of operations and defining standard business processes. GAO interviewed NASA officials and obtained and analyzed documentation relevant to the issues.
What GAO Found
Since GAO last reported on NASA's IEMP efforts, NASA implemented its IEMP contract management module and upgraded the software used for its core financial module. NASA has also taken steps to improve its processes for managing IEMP--including implementing improved requirements management and testing processes, enhancing its performance metrics related to tracking system defects, and developing an IEMP risk mitigation strategy. Further, NASA has developed quantitative entry and exit criteria for moving from one phase of an IEMP project to another--a recognized industry best practice. However, NASA has not yet addressed weaknesses in the areas of requirements development and project scheduling, which ultimately caused the agency to assume a greater risk that it would not identify significant system defects prior to implementation of the core financial upgrade. Despite these difficulties, NASA financial managers have stated that the core financial upgrade is now functioning as expected for most transactions. As of the end of GAO's audit work in May 2007, NASA was working to correct a number of system errors, including posting errors for certain types of transactions. Because NASA was still working to stabilize the system, GAO was unable to determine the significance of these weaknesses. Further, NASA has not yet fully considered higher-level strategic issues associated with developing an agencywide concept of operations and defining standard business processes. With a planned investment of over $800 million for IEMP, NASA must immediately and effectively address these strategic building blocks if IEMP is to successfully address long-standing management challenges--including overseeing contractor performance and properly accounting for NASA's property, plant, and equipment. NASA officials stated that they have begun developing a concept of operations to describe how all of its business processes should be carried out. According to NASA officials, they expect to complete the concept of operations by the summer of 2008. Ideally, a concept of operations should be completed before system development begins so that it can serve as a foundation for system planning and requirements development. Nonetheless, while NASA's IEMP efforts are already well under way, the completion of such a document remains essential for guiding the development of the remaining IEMP modules as well as any future upgrades. As part of developing a concept of operations, NASA should also define standard business processes that are supported by its IEMP software. NASA needs to ensure that its business processes and the information that flows from those processes support the enterprise's needs. Efforts that primarily focus on the parochial needs of a specific organizational unit, such as accounting, do not provide reasonable assurance that NASA's agencywide management information needs are addressed. |
gao_GAO-08-1179T | gao_GAO-08-1179T_0 | Numerous Changes Affected Refuge Management
From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, several changes occurred that affected refuge management including changes in funding and staffing levels, refuge system policy initiatives, and the influence of external factors, such as extreme weather and human development. Inflation-adjusted funding (in 2002 dollars) for core refuge system activities—measured as obligations for refuge operations, maintenance, and fire management—peaked in fiscal year 2003, for the celebration of the refuge system’s centennial, at about $391 million—6.8 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels—and then declined quickly to 4.7 percent below peak levels by fiscal year 2005, before increasing again to 2.3 percent below peak levels in fiscal year 2007; it ended 4.3 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels. At the refuge level, inflation-adjusted core funding at refuges varied considerably during the time period, with about as many losing funding as gaining funding since fiscal year 2002. Specifically, core staffing, which includes operations, maintenance, and fire management, peaked in fiscal year 2004 at a level 10.0 percent higher than in fiscal year 2002, but declined after that to 4.0 percent below peak staffing levels in fiscal year 2007. This level, however, was still 5.5 percent higher than the staffing level in fiscal year 2002. Figure 1 compares the trends in the refuge system’s core funding, staffing, and permanent employee levels during our study period. New policy initiatives. To help spread visitor service funds across as many refuges as possible, refuge officials began placing a greater emphasis on constructing smaller visitor facility structures, such as informational kiosks and restrooms, at a larger number of refuges rather than constructing a smaller number of traditional visitor centers. To improve safety and address other concerns, refuge system management began an initiative to increase the number of full-time law enforcement officers and their associated training and experience requirements. The influence of external factors––those outside the control of the refuge system that complicate refuges’ abilities to protect and restore habitat quality, including extreme weather and development on adjacent lands––increased over this period. Changes in Habitat Management and Visitor Services
From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, several changes occurred in refuges’ habitat management and visitor services, creating concerns about the refuges’ abilities to maintain high quality habitat and visitor services in the future. Habitats on refuges for five types of key species— waterfowl, other migratory birds, threatened and endangered species, candidate threatened and endangered species, and state species of concern—improved between fiscal years 2002 and 2007—about two times as often as they worsened (see table 1). Importantly, time spent on developing comprehensive conservation plans, which are required by the Improvement Act, increased for 59 percent of refuges during our study period. In addition, refuges that increased the time spent on habitat management activities were about three times more likely to report that habitat quality for waterfowl and other migratory birds improved rather than worsened. In light of increasing problems and threats affecting refuge conditions, as well as recent funding and staffing constraints, refuge managers and regional and headquarters officials expressed concern about refuges’ abilities to sustain or improve current habitat conditions for wildlife into the future. Even though our survey showed that a large number of refuges increased staff time on habitat management activities, some refuge managers we interviewed explained that staff were simply working longer hours to get the work done. Several managers even said that they have to limit the amount of time staff spend at the refuge, as these employees are working overtime without extra pay. Visitor services. Our survey found that four of the six key visitor services provided to the public were of moderate or better quality at most refuges in 2007, but environmental education and interpretation were reported to be low quality at about one-third of refuges (see table 5). Refuge managers indicated that staffing changes and a lack of resources for increasing and maintaining infrastructure, raise concerns about their ability to provide quality visitor services into the future. Our survey results showed that the time spent by permanent staff on visitor services had been reduced at more than one–third of refuges and more than half of refuge managers reported increasing their reliance on volunteers to help manage visitor centers and deliver education programs, for example. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Wildlife Refuge System, which is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior, comprises 585 refuges on more than 96 million acres of land and water that preserve habitat for waterfowl and other migratory birds, threatened and endangered species, and other wildlife. Refuges also provide wildlife-related activities such as hunting and fishing to about 40 million visitors every year. GAO was asked to testify on a report that is being released today, Wildlife Refuges: Changes in Funding, Staffing, and Other Factors Create Concerns about Future Sustainability (GAO-08-797), which (1) describes changing factors that the refuge system experienced from fiscal years 2002 through 2007, including funding and staffing changes, and (2) examines how habitat management and visitor services changed during this period. For this report, GAO surveyed all refuges, visited 19 refuges in four regions, and interviewed refuge, regional, and national officials.
What GAO Found
In its September 2008 report, GAO reports that for fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the refuge system experienced funding and staffing fluctuations, the introduction of several new policy initiatives, and the increased influence of external factors such as extreme weather that threaten wildlife habitat and visitor infrastructure. Although core funding--measured as obligations for refuge operations, maintenance, and fire management--increased each year, inflation-adjusted core funding peaked in fiscal year 2003 at about $391 million--6.8 percent above fiscal year 2002 funding. Inflation-adjusted core funding ended the period 2.3 percent below peak levels, but 4.3 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels by fiscal year 2007. Core refuge staffing levels peaked in fiscal year 2004 at 3,610 full-time equivalents--10.0 percent above the fiscal year 2002 level--and then declined more slowly than funding. By fiscal year 2007, staffing levels fell to 4.0 percent below peak levels, but 5.5 percent above fiscal year 2002 levels. Through fiscal year 2007, the number of permanent employees utilized by the refuge system declined to 7.5 percent below peak levels. During this period, refuge system officials initiated new policies that: (1) reduced staff positions and reconsidered how they allocate funds and staff among refuges in order to better align staff levels with funding, (2) required refuge staff to focus on a legislative mandate to complete refuge conservation plans by 2012, (3) shifted to constructing a larger number of smaller visitor structures, such as informational kiosks, and fewer large visitor centers to spread visitor service funds across more refuges, (4) increased the number of full-time law enforcement officers and their associated training requirements, and (5) resulted in additional administrative work. During this period, external factors, such as severe storms, that complicate refuge staffs' ability to protect and restore habitat quality also increased. GAO's survey of refuge managers showed that changes in habitat management and visitor service programs varied across refuges during the study period. Habitat conditions for key types of species improved about two times more often than they worsened, but between 7 and 20 percent of habitats were of poor quality in 2007. Certain habitat problems increased at more than half of refuges during thisperiod, and managers reported that they increased the time spent on certain habitat management activities, such as addressing invasive plants, despite declining staffing levels. However, several managers GAO interviewed said that staff were working longer hours without extra pay to get work done, and managers expressed concern about their ability to sustain habitat conditions. While the quality of four key visitor service programs was reported to be stable or improving between fiscal years 2002 and 2007 at the vast majority of refuges, the other two key programs--environmental education and interpretation--were considered poor quality at one-third of refuges in 2007. Changes in the time spent on visitor services varied considerably across refuges, and managers noted that visitor services are generally cut before habitat management activities when resources are limited. Managers are concerned about their ability to provide high quality visitor services in the future given staffing and funding constraints. |
gao_GAO-06-553T | gao_GAO-06-553T_0 | Lessons Learned in Recurring Failures of Federal Agency Financial Management System Implementations
In our recent report, we summarize many of the agencies’ financial management system implementation failures that have been previously reported by us and inspectors general (IG). Our work and that of the IGs over the years has shown that agencies have failed to employ accepted best practices in systems development and implementation (commonly referred to as disciplined processes) that can collectively reduce the risk associated with implementing financial management systems. In our report, we identified key causes of failures within several recurring themes, including disciplined processes and human capital management. Requirements management. Testing. Project management. Strategic workforce planning. Human resources. Change management. The following examples illustrate some of the recurring problems related to human capital management in implementing financial management systems. DHS Faces Serious Financial Management Challenges
DHS faces unique challenges in attempting to develop integrated financial management systems across the breadth of such a large and diverse department. DHS inherited a myriad of redundant financial management systems from 22 diverse agencies along with 180,000 employees, about 100 resource management systems, and 30 reportable conditions identified in prior component financial audits. Among these weaknesses were insufficient internal controls or processes to reliably report financial information such as revenue, accounts receivable, and accounts payable; significant system security deficiencies; financial systems that required extensive manual processes to prepare financial statements; and incomplete policies and procedures necessary to complete basic financial management activities. 2350 (Nov. 26, 2002); the Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act of 2004, Pub. According to DHS officials, because the project was not meeting its performance goals and timeline, DHS officials began considering whether to continue the project and in Spring 2005 started looking at another strategy. Based on industry best practices, we identified four key concepts that will be critical to DHS’s ability to successfully complete its planned migration to shared service providers. Careful consideration of these four concepts, each one building upon the next, will be integral to the success of DHS’s strategy. The four concepts are (1) developing a concept of operations, (2) defining standard business processes, (3) developing a migration strategy for DHS components, and (4) defining and effectively implementing disciplined processes necessary to properly manage the specific projects. How can DHS obtain reliable information on the costs of its financial management systems investments? Strategy for Implementing the Financial Management Shared Services Approach Will Be Key
Although DHS has a goal of migrating agencies to a limited number of shared service providers, it has not yet articulated a clear and measurable strategy for achieving this goal. Based on industry best practices, the following four concepts would help ensure a sound foundation for developing and implementing a DHS-wide solution for the complex financial management problems it currently faces: (1) developing a concept of operations that expresses DHS’s view of financial management and how that vision will be realized, (2) defining standard business processes, (3) developing an implementation strategy, and (4) defining and effectively implementing applicable disciplined processes. With DHS at an important crossroads in the implementation of the eMergefoundation on which to base its efforts and avoid the problems that have plagued so many other federal agencies faced with the same challenge. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, GAO has reported on various agencies' financial management system implementation failures. GAO's recent report (GAO-06-184) discusses some of the most significant problems previously identified with agencies' financial management system modernization efforts. For today's hearing, GAO was asked to provide its perspectives on the importance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following best practices in developing and implementing its new financial management systems and avoiding the mistakes of the past. GAO's testimony (1) discusses the recurring problems identified in agencies' financial management systems development and implementation efforts, (2) points out key financial management system modernization challenges at DHS, and (3) highlights the building blocks that form the foundation for successful financial management system implementation efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO's work and that of agency inspectors general over the years has shown that agencies have failed to employ accepted best practices in systems development and implementation (commonly referred to as disciplined processes) that can collectively reduce the risk associated with implementing financial management systems. GAO's recent report identified key causes of failures within several recurring themes including (1) disciplined processes, such as requirements management, testing, and project management; and (2) human capital management, such as workforce planning, human resources, and change management. Prior reports have identified costly systems implementation failures attributable to problems in these areas at agencies across the federal government. DHS faces unique challenges in attempting to develop integrated financial management systems across the breadth of such a large and diverse department. DHS inherited a myriad of redundant financial management systems from 22 diverse agencies and about 100 resource management systems. Among the weaknesses identified in prior component financial audits were insufficient internal controls or processes to reliably report financial information such as revenue, accounts receivable, and accounts payable; significant system security deficiencies; financial systems that required extensive manual processes to prepare financial statements; and incomplete policies and procedures necessary for conducting basic financial management activities. In August 2003, DHS began a program to consolidate and integrate DHS financial accounting and reporting systems. DHS officials said they recently decided to develop a new strategy for the planned financial management systems integration program, referred to as eMerge2, because the prior strategy was not meeting its performance goals and timeline. DHS's revised strategy will allow DHS components to choose from an array of existing financial management shared service providers. Based on industry best practices, GAO identified four key concepts that will be critical to DHS's ability to successfully complete its planned migration to shared service providers. Careful consideration of these four concepts, each one building upon the next, will be integral to the success of DHS's strategy. The four concepts are developing a concept of operations, defining standard business processes, developing a strategy for implementing DHS's shared services approach across the department, and defining and effectively implementing disciplined processes necessary to properly manage the specific projects. With DHS at an important crossroads in implementing financial management systems, it has an excellent opportunity to use these building blocks to form a solid foundation on which to base its efforts and avoid the problems that have plagued so many other federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-04-773T | gao_GAO-04-773T_0 | Contractors operate each site for DOE. DOE’s Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies, such as the DBT, to guide the department’s safeguards and security programs. Because of these risks, DOE has long employed risk-based security practices. The key component of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. Development of the New DBT Took Almost 2 Years Because of Delays in Developing the Postulated Threat and DOE’s Lengthy Review and Comment Process
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized that the then current DBT, issued in April 1999 and based on a 1998 intelligence community assessment, was obsolete. According to DOE and DOD officials, this delay resulted from other demands placed on the intelligence community after September 11, 2001, as well as from sharp debates among the organizations developing the Postulated Threat over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the resources needed to meet these threats. While waiting for the new Postulated Threat, DOE developed several drafts of its new DBT. As a result, during the time it took DOE to develop the new DBT, its sites were only required to defend against the terrorist group defined in the 1999 DBT, which, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized was obsolete. The May 2003 DBT Identifies a Larger Terrorist Threat, but in Most Cases is Less Than the Terrorist Threat Identified by the Postulated Threat
While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated Threat. Finally, the department’s criteria for determining the severity of radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient. For chemical sabotage standards, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to industry standards. However, we reported March 2003 year that such standards currently do not exist. In response to our concerns, DOE recently agreed to reexamine some of the key aspects and assumptions of the May 2003 DBT. DOE Has Been Slow to Resolve a Number of Significant Issues That May Affect the Ability of its Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT
While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has only recently resolved a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion and is still addressing other issues. Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation guidance. Some sites may be able to move more quickly and meet the department’s deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. As a result, DOE needs to take a series of actions to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level as quickly as possible. | Why GAO Did This Study
A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete, resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO (1) identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat contained in the new DBT.
What GAO Found
DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE's sites are adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world. Specifically, GAO found that DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in developing an intelligence community assessment--known as the Postulated Threat--of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE's lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats. While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry standards;" however, such standards currently do not exist. In response to these concerns, DOE has recently agreed to reexamine some of the key aspects and assumptions of the May 2003 DBT. DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites. |
gao_GAO-09-1048T | gao_GAO-09-1048T_0 | TARP Strategy Has Evolved From Capitalizing Institutions to Stabilizing Securitization Markets and Preserving Homeownership
In the past year, Treasury has implemented a range of TARP programs to stabilize the financial system. As of September 11, 2009, it had disbursed just over $363 billion for TARP loans and equity investments (table 1). In particular, Treasury has received almost $7 billion in dividend payments, about $2.9 billion in warrant liquidations, and over $70 billion in repurchases from institutions participating in CPP, as of August 31, 2009. TARP Program Description and Total Disbursements, as of September 11, 2009 (dollars in billions)
Capital Purchase Program. To provide government assurances for assets held by financial institutions that are viewed as critical to the functioning of the nation’s financial system. Home Affordable Modification Program. Public-Private Investment Program. CPP continues to be the largest and most widely used program under Treasury’s TARP authority for stabilizing the financial system. Over the last year, CPP has made significant capital investments in financial institutions, and although Treasury has made progress in monitoring the activities of CPP participants, challenges remain in ensuring that participants comply with program requirements. For example, Treasury, along with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), provided assistance to AIG, the sole participant in TARP’s Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (SSFI) program. For this reason, the ultimate success of federal efforts to aid AIG’s restructuring and the scope of possible repayments remain unclear at this point. However, whether the new Chrysler and new GM will achieve long-term financial viability remains unclear. Following the early months of TARP implementation, which largely focused on capital investments and amid concerns about the overall strategic direction of the program and lack of transparency, the new administration has attempted to provide a more strategic direction for using the remaining funds and creating a number of programs aimed at stabilizing the securitization markets and preserving homeownership. While TALF has been implemented, HAMP and PPIP face ongoing implementation and operational challenges. For example, HAMP faces a significant challenge that centers on uncertainty over the number of homeowners it will ultimately help. In our July 2009 report, we noted that Treasury’s estimate of the 3 to 4 million homeowners who would likely be helped under the HAMP loan modification program may have been overstated. Treasury’s authority to purchase or insure additional troubled assets will expire on December 31, 2009, unless the Secretary submits a written certification to Congress describing “why the extension is necessary to assist American families and stabilize financial markets, as well as the expected cost to the taxpayers for such an extension.” In the next few months, Treasury will need to make decisions about providing new funding for TARP programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), under which the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), through the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), has the authority to purchase or insure almost $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions. It focuses on (1) the nature and purpose of activities that have been initiated under TARP over the past year and ongoing challenges; (2) Treasury's efforts to establish a management infrastructure for TARP; and (3) outcomes measured by indicators of TARP's performance.
What GAO Found
TARP is one of many programs and activities the federal government has put in place over the past year to respond to the financial crisis. It represents a significant government commitment to stabilizing the financial system. For example, as of September 11, 2009, it had disbursed $363 billion to participating institutions. At the same time, TARP's Capital Purchase Program (CPP) has shown evidence of some success in returning funds to the federal government. Treasury has received almost $7 billion in dividend payments, about $2.9 billion in warrant liquidations, and over $70 billion in repurchases from institutions participating in CPP, as of August 31, 2009. But TARP still faces a variety of challenges. For example, CPP, the largest of the TARP programs, has hundreds of participating institutions. Because of its size, this program requires ongoing strong oversight to ensure that participants comply with the program's requirements as we have recommended in prior reports. In addition, most of the other investment-based TARP programs that have provided assistance to a few large individual institutions present Treasury with the challenge of determining when assistance is no longer needed. Further, amid concerns about the strategic direction of the program and lack of transparency, the new administration has attempted to provide a more strategic plan for using the remaining funds and has created a number of programs aimed at stabilizing the securitization markets and preserving homeownership. While some programs, such as the Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), are fully operational, others including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), are still new and face ongoing implementation and operational challenges. Finally, even though substantial investments have been made to avert the collapse of American International Group, Inc. (AIG), General Motors Corporation (GM), and Chrysler LLC (Chrysler), the ultimate outcomes of these investments are unclear and will be influenced by the long-term viability of these entities. Certain of these TARP investments were made with Treasury's expectation that the disbursements would be returned to the federal government. HAMP funds, however, are direct expenditures which are not expected to be repaid. But given the many challenges and uncertainties facing TARP programs, the total cost to the government of these programs remains unclear at this time. |
gao_GAO-12-1044T | gao_GAO-12-1044T_0 | Background
Section 550 of the DHS appropriations act for fiscal year 2007 requires DHS to issue regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for the security of facilities that the Secretary determines to present high levels of security risk, among other things. Senior ISCD Leaders Developed the ISCD Memorandum to Highlight Various Challenges Hindering CFATS Implementation
ISCD’s Memorandum Based Largely on Observations of Senior ISCD Managers
Our review of the ISCD memorandum and discussions with ISCD officials showed that the memorandum was developed during the latter part of 2011 and was developed primarily based on discussions with ISCD staff and the observations of the ISCD former Director in consultation with the former Deputy Director. In November 2011, the former Director and Deputy Director provided the Under Secretary with the ISCD memorandum entitled “Challenges Facing ISCD, and the Path Forward.” These officials stated that the memorandum was developed to inform leadership about the status of ISCD, the challenges it was facing, and the proposed solutions identified to date. ISCD Management Was Concerned That Challenges Place the CFATS Program at Risk
The ISCD memorandum discussed numerous challenges that, according to the former Director, pose a risk to the program. In addition, the memorandum provided a detailed discussion of the issues or problems facing ISCD, grouped into three categories: (1) human capital management, such as poor staffing decisions; (2) mission issues, such as the lack of an established inspection process; and (3) administrative issues, such as a lack of infrastructure and support, both within ISCD and on the part of NPPD and IP. ISCD Has Begun to Take Various Actions Intended to Address Challenges Identified
ISCD’s Action Plan Included Time Frames and Appears to be Helping Address Some Legacy Issues
ISCD is using an action plan to track its progress addressing the challenges identified in the memorandum, and, according to senior division officials, the plan may be helping them address some legacy issues that staff were attempting to deal with before the memorandum was developed. They said that they agreed that actions being taken in the plan were needed to resolve challenges facing ISCD. ISCD’s June 2012 Plan Update Showed 38 Action Items Completed
Our analysis of the June 2012 version of the ISCD action plan showed that 40 percent of the items in the plan (38 of 94) had been completed. The remaining 60 percent (56 of 94) were in progress. For the remaining 56 items that were in progress as of June 2012, 40 involved human capital management and administrative issues. Action Plan Performance Measures Could Help Gauge Progress
ISCD, through its action plan, appears to be heading in the right direction towards addressing the challenges identified, but it is too early to tell if the action plan is having the desired effect because (1) the division had only recently completed some action items and continues to work on completing more than half of the others, some of which entail long-term changes, and (2) ISCD had not yet developed an approach for measuring the results of its efforts. The agency concurred with our recommendation and developed a new action item (number 95) intended to develop metrics for measuring, where practical, results of efforts to implement action plan items, including processes for periodic monitoring and indicators for corrective actions. ISCD Officials Stated That Almost Half of the Action Items Required Collaboration with or Action by NPPD or IP
According to ISCD officials, almost half of the action items included in the June 2012 action plan either require ISCD to collaborate with NPPD and IP or require NPPD and IP to take action to address the challenges identified in the ISCD memorandum. NPPD, IP, and ISCD officials have been working together to identify solutions to the challenges the memorandum identified and to close pertinent action items. This includes collaborating with NPPD officials representing the NPPD human capital, facilities, and employee and labor relations offices, among others, and with IP’s Directorate of Management Office. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, triggered a national re-examination of the security of facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals in quantities that, in the event of a terrorist attack, could put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious injury or death. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS program to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD, a division of IP, manages the program. A November 2011 internal ISCD memorandum, prepared by ISCD senior managers, expressed concerns about the management of the program. This statement addresses (1) how the memorandum was developed and any challenges identified, (2) what actions are being taken in response to any challenges identified, and (3) the extent to which ISCD's proposed solutions require collaboration with NPPD or IP. GAO's comments are based on recently completed work analyzing the memorandum and related actions. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, DHS's internal memorandum and action plans, and related documents, and interviewed DHS officials.
In a July 2012 report, GAO recommended that ISCD explore opportunities to develop measures, where practical, to determine where actual performance deviates from expected results. ISCD concurred and has taken action to address the recommendation.
What GAO Found
The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadership--factors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCD's management and administrative functions.
ISCD has begun to take various actions intended to address the issues identified in the ISCD memorandum and has developed a 94-item action plan to track its progress. According to ISCD managers, the plan appears to be a catalyst for addressing some of the long-standing issues the memorandum identified. As of June 2012, ISCD reported that 40 percent (38 of 94) of the items in the plan had been completed. These include requiring ISCD managers to meet with staff to involve them in addressing challenges, clarifying priorities, and changing ISCD's culture; and developing a proposal to establish a quality control function over compliance activities. The remaining 60 percent (56 of 94) that were in progress include those requiring longer-term efforts--i.e., streamlining the process for reviewing facility security plans and developing facility inspection processes; those requiring completion of other items in the plan; or those awaiting action by others, such as approvals by ISCD leadership. ISCD appears to be heading in the right direction, but it is too early to tell if individual items are having their desired effect because ISCD is in the early stages of implementing them and has not yet established performance measures to assess results.
According to ISCD officials, almost half of the action items included in the June 2012 action plan require ISCD collaboration with or action by NPPD and IP. The ISCD memorandum stated that IP and NPPD did not provide the support needed to manage the CFATS program when the program was first under development. ISCD, IP, and NPPD officials confirmed that IP and NPPD are now providing needed support and stated that the action plan prompted them to work together to address the various human capital and administrative issues identified. |
gao_GGD-99-133 | gao_GGD-99-133_0 | To develop a more comprehensive list of federal tax requirements that apply to small businesses, we contacted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) in the Department of the Treasury for information on requirements pertaining to the excise taxes that it administers. To determine the actual experience of small businesses in meeting their filing, reporting, and deposit requirements, including their involvement in IRS’ enforcement processes, we (1) interviewed IRS compliance officials specializing in examination, appeals, and collection issues to ascertain how small businesses are affected by the enforcement processes and (2) obtained some computerized information from IRS databases on the filing and enforcement experience of small businesses. Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards between September 1998 and May 1999 at IRS headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Small Businesses Face Multiple Layers of Tax Requirements
Small businesses, like large businesses, are subject to multiple layers of filing, reporting, and deposit requirements that reflect how the business is organized, whether it has employees, and the nature of its business operations. The requirements are designed to implement a variety of tax policies. It is highly unlikely that any business would need to complete all 200 requirements. They reflect the decisions of Congress and the executive branch in keeping with their policy goals and objectives. We identified 10 different federal employment tax deposit requirements that potentially apply to small businesses. Small Businesses’ Experience in Filing and Enforcement Processes Could Not Be Fully Determined
Limitations in IRS’ information systems prevented us from fully determining the extent to which small businesses actually filed various required forms and schedules and which businesses made deposits or the extent of small businesses’ involvement in IRS’ enforcement processes. We were, however, able to obtain and analyze limited data on small businesses’ filing of income tax forms and on some aspects of small businesses’ involvement in IRS’ enforcement processes. The data limitations currently hinder IRS’ ability to effectively manage its activities and serve small businesses and, as IRS has acknowledged, will continue to be a serious impediment until the systems are improved. Our analysis of 1995 IRS data for approximately 44 forms and 46 related schedules that IRS believes are those most commonly filed showed that small businesses, on average, filed one secondary form in addition to their primary income tax return, with little variation among the different types of business. Recommended Additional Taxes and Penalties
Small business audits often result in recommendations for the assessment of additional taxes and penalties. In considering the information presented, it is important to note that the audit recommendations do not equate to final audit outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on small business tax requirements, focusing on: (1) the federal filing, reporting, and deposit requirements that apply to small businesses; and (2) the actual experience of small businesses in meeting these requirements, including their involvement in the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) enforcement process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) small businesses, like large businesses, are subject to multiple layers of filing, reporting, and deposit requirements; (2) GAO identified more than 200 different IRS requirements that potentially apply to small businesses; (3) through such requirements, IRS administers a variety of tax policies--notably those associated with income, employment, and excise taxes; (4) in considering the implications of the number of requirements, it is important to recognize that the requirements reflect the many decisions that have been made by Congress and the executive branch to accomplish their policy goals, including those that might benefit small businesses and other taxpayers; (5) it is equally important to recognize that most businesses do not need to comply with all or even most of these requirements; (6) the ones that apply to a particular small business would depend on how the business is organized, whether it has employees, and the nature of its business operations; (7) limitations on IRS' information systems prevented GAO from fully determining the extent to which small businesses filed the various forms and schedules or their involvement in key stages of IRS' enforcement processes; (8) IRS has acknowledged that these limitations hinder its ability to effectively manage small business activities and will continue to be a serious impediment until the systems are improved; (9) GAO was able to obtain and analyze limited data on small business filings of income tax forms and on some aspects of their involvement in IRS' enforcement processes; (10) GAO's analysis of IRS' 1995 data on the most commonly filed income tax forms and schedules showed that small businesses, on average, filed one secondary form in addition to their primary income tax return, with little variation among types of businesses; and (11) GAO's analysis of small business audits showed that the audit rate for small businesses is higher than the rate for all taxpayers and that about two-thirds of the audits of small businesses result in recommendations for assessment of additional taxes and penalties. |
gao_GAO-12-833 | gao_GAO-12-833_0 | Sixty-eight of the 71 programs that responded to our survey reported that they experienced funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or their planned capabilities changed after initiation. We used this information and our survey results to identify 42 programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both. Cost information DHS submitted to Congress provides insight into the magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs. Using this information, we found total project costs increased from $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent. Programs Proceed without Meeting Sound DHS Acquisition Policy
DHS acquisition policy reflects many key program management practices.critical knowledge that would help leaders make better informed investment decisions when managing individual programs. However, as of April 2012, the department had only verified that four programs documented all of the critical knowledge required to progress through the acquisition life cycle. Officials explained that DHS’s culture has emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions more than sound acquisition management practices, and we have found that most of the department’s major programs are at risk of cost growth and schedule slips as a result. In addition, they lack the reliable cost estimates, realistic schedules, and agreed-upon baseline objectives that DHS acknowledges are needed to accurately track program performance, limiting DHS leadership’s ability to effectively manage those programs and provide information to Congress. DHS recognizes the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but significant work remains. DHS Needs Policy and Process Enhancements to Effectively Manage Its Portfolio of Investments
DHS acquisition policy does not fully reflect several key portfolio- management practices, such as allocating resources strategically, and DHS has not yet reestablished an oversight board to manage its investment portfolio across the department. As a result, DHS has largely made investment decisions on a program-by-program and component-by- component basis. The widespread risk of poorly understood cost growth, coupled with the fiscal challenges facing the federal government, makes it essential that DHS allocate resources to its major programs in a deliberate manner. DHS plans to develop stronger portfolio-management policies and processes, but until it does so, DHS programs are more likely to experience additional funding instability in the future, which will increase the risk of further cost growth and schedule slips. These outcomes, combined with a tighter budget, could prevent DHS from developing needed capabilities. DHS Acquisition Management Initiatives Target Longstanding Challenges, but Key Implementation Issues Remain
DHS has introduced seven initiatives that could improve acquisition management by addressing longstanding challenges we have identified— such as funding instability and acquisition workforce shortfalls—which DHS survey respondents also identified in 2012. Implementation plans are still being developed for all of these initiatives, and DHS is still working to address critical issues, particularly capacity questions. Because of this, it is too early to determine whether the DHS initiatives will be effective, as we have previously established that agencies must sustain progress over time to address management challenges. DHS is also pursuing a tiered-governance structure that it has begun to implement for IT acquisitions. In 2011, DHS began to develop initiatives to address these challenges, and DHS has continued to evolve these plans in 2012. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Management to take the following five actions to help mitigate the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and strengthen the department’s investment management activities:
Modify DHS acquisition policy to more fully reflect the following program management practices:
Require that (1) programs demonstrate technologies in a realistic environment prior to initiating development activities, and (2) manufacturing processes be tested prior to production;
Require that (1) exit criteria be quantifiable to the extent possible, and (2) consistent information be used across programs at ADE 2B and 2C;
State that program managers should remain with their programs until the next major milestone when possible;
Modify DHS acquisition policy to more fully reflect the following portfolio management practices:
Empower portfolio managers to decide how best to invest
Establish that investments should be ranked and selected using a
Establish that (1) resource allocations should align with strategic goals, and (2) the investment review policy should use long-range planning; and
Require portfolio reviews (1) annually to consider proposed changes, (2) as new opportunities are identified, and (3) whenever a program breaches its objectives;
Ensure all major acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy by obtaining department-level approval for key acquisition documents before approving their movement through the acquisition life cycle;
Once the department’s acquisition programs comply with DHS acquisition policy, prioritize major acquisition programs departmentwide and ensure that the department’s acquisition portfolio is consistent with DHS’s anticipated resource constraints; and
Clearly document that department-level officials should not delegate ADE decision authority to component-level officials for programs lacking department approved APBs or not meeting agreed-upon cost, schedule, and performance thresholds. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which: (1) DHS’s major acquisition programs face challenges that increase the risk of poor outcomes; (2) DHS has policies and processes in place to effectively manage individual acquisition programs; (3) DHS has policies and processes in place to effectively manage its portfolio of acquisition programs as a whole; and (4) DHS has taken actions to resolve the high-risk acquisition management issues we have identified in previous reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS invests extensively in major acquisition programs to develop new systems that help the department execute its many critical missions. In 2011, DHS reported to Congress that it planned to invest $167 billion in these major acquisition programs. We previously found that DHS had not managed its investments effectively, and its acquisition management activities have been on GAOs High Risk List since 2005. This report addresses the extent to which (1) major DHS acquisition programs face key challenges; (2) DHS has policies and processes to effectively manage individual acquisition programs; (3) DHS has policies and processes to effectively manage its portfolio of acquisition programs as a whole; and (4) DHS has taken actions to address the high-risk acquisition management issues GAO has identified in previous reports. GAO surveyed all 77 major program offices DHS identified in 2011 (92 percent response rate), reviewed available documentation of acquisition decisions from November 2008 to April 2012, and interviewed officials at DHS headquarters and components.
What GAO Found
Nearly all of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program managers GAO surveyed reported their programs had experienced significant challenges. Sixty-eight of the 71 respondents reported they experienced funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or their planned capabilities changed after initiation, and most survey respondents reported a combination of these challenges. DHS lacks the data needed to accurately measure program performance, but GAO was able to use survey results, information DHS provided to Congress, and an internal DHS review from March 2012 to identify 42 programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both. GAO gained insight into the magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs, which increased from $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent.
DHS acquisition policy reflects many key program management practices that could help mitigate program risks. It requires programs to develop documents demonstrating critical knowledge that would help leaders make better informed investment decisions when managing individual programs. However, DHS has not consistently met these requirements. The department has only verified that four programs documented all of the critical knowledge the policy requires to proceed with acquisition activities. Officials explained that DHSs culture has emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions more than sound acquisition management practices. Most major programs lack reliable cost estimates, realistic schedules, and agreed-upon baseline objectives, limiting DHS leaderships ability to effectively manage those programs and provide information to Congress. DHS recognizes the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but significant work remains.
DHS acquisition policy does not fully reflect several key portfolio management practices, such as allocating resources strategically, and DHS has not yet re-established an oversight board to manage its investment portfolio across the department. As a result, DHS has largely made investment decisions on a program-by-program and component-by-component basis. The widespread risk of poorly understood cost growth, coupled with the fiscal challenges facing the federal government, makes it essential that DHS allocate resources to its major programs in a deliberate manner. DHS plans to develop stronger portfolio-management policies and processes, but until it does so, DHS programs are more likely to experience additional funding instability, which will increase the risk of further cost growth and schedule slips. These outcomes, combined with a tighter budget, could prevent DHS from developing needed capabilities.
DHS has introduced seven initiatives that could improve acquisition management by addressing longstanding challenges GAO and DHS survey respondents have identified, such as funding instability and acquisition workforce shortfalls. Implementation plans are still being developed, and DHS is still working to address critical issues. Because of this, it is too early to determine whether the DHS initiatives will be effective, as GAO has previously established that agencies must sustain progress over time to address management challenges. DHS is also pursuing a tiered-governance structure, but it must reduce risks and improve program outcomes before regularly delegating major milestone decision authority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS modify its policy to better reflect key program and portfolio management practices, ensure acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy, prioritize major acquisition programs departmentwide and account for anticipated resource constraints, and document prerequisites for delegating major milestone decision authority. DHS concurred with all of GAOs recommendations, and noted its progress on a number of fronts, which is accounted for in the report. |
gao_GAO-01-948 | gao_GAO-01-948_0 | Key States Affected by Insurance Fraud Subsequently Receive Reaccreditation
In September 2000, we reported on a $200 million fraud that resulted in insurance company failures in six states. Both Tennessee and Mississippi received their initial accreditation in 1994. NAIC officials, as well as the head of the NAIC accreditation review teams that conducted on-site accreditation reviews in Tennessee and Mississippi, knew of the investment fraud prior to the accreditation reviews. As a result, the existing weaknesses were ignored. Analysis Procedures Contain Many Weaknesses
NAIC’s descriptions of the accreditation program stress the importance to consumers of “effective solvency regulation.” NAIC’s guidance on the standards and the review process for the second round accreditation reviews requires review teams to evaluate the insurance department’s performance in addition to determining whether the departments has the appropriate procedures in place. The program’s inflexibility, which does not allow the review team to focus its limited capacity on material issues, seems counter to the goal of increasing public trust in the solvency regulation process. Conclusions
The accreditation program has been evolving since its inception more than 10 years ago. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Executive Vice President of NAIC Strengthen the accreditation program’s focus on chartering and change of ownership by developing appropriate model laws, regulations, and procedures for chartering insurance companies; reviewing the current standards and guidelines related to change in ownership and make any necessary changes; including the new and improved model laws and regulations in the accreditation standards and developing companion compliance standards for regulatory practices and procedures; and providing appropriate guidance to the review teams to assure better assessment of a state’s performance in these areas of solvency regulation. Among other weaknesses in state regulatory oversight it exposed, the theft uncovered weaknesses in chartering and change in ownership approvals, a key phase of oversight for preventing undesirable individuals from controlling insurance companies and insurer involvement in questionable business strategies. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), governors, and state legislatures realized that in order to preserve state regulatory authority, something had to be done to address the regulatory inconsistencies. | What GAO Found
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) evaluates a state's program for regulating insurer solvency about once every five years to determine if it meets the association's minimum standards. The accreditation program has been in place for about 10 years. During that time, NAIC expanded the standards and modified the process for evaluating the adequacy of states' solvency regulation. Weaknesses in solvency regulation in Tennessee, Mississippi, and three other states allowed a $200 million insurance fraud to continue for eight years, resulting in the failure of seven insurance companies. During 2000, both Tennessee and Mississippi underwent accreditation reviews by NAIC and were reaccredited. NAIC has tried to strengthen its accreditation program by adding model laws and regulations to the required standards. It has also revised the way in which accreditation reviews are performed and scored and has improved training for members of review teams. Accreditation reviews done in Tennessee and Mississippi disclosed gaps and weaknesses in the accreditation program. In particular, the program does not cover a key area of solvency regulation--chartering and change in ownership of insurance companies. Oversight of chartering and change in ownership is key to preventing questionable individuals from gaining control of insurance companies. The insurance fraud exposed weaknesses in state regulation and oversight that are not addressed in NAIC's accreditation program. Moreover, GAO found weaknesses in on-site accreditation review procedures, including incomplete analyses of exam information, a questionable scoring methodology that can give misleading results, limited on-site compliance testing, and insufficient flexibility in tailoring reviews to address the most material issues. |
gao_GAO-17-677 | gao_GAO-17-677_0 | For example, in TANF, income limits are determined by states. Workforce Ages 25 to 64
About 40 percent of U.S. workers ages 25 to 64 earned hourly wages of $16 or less (in constant 2016 dollars) over the period 1995 through 2016, according to our analysis of CPS data (see fig. In each of the 6 years we reviewed, an estimated 1 to 5 percent of these workers earned an hourly wage or less of that year’s federal minimum wage, about 17 percent earned above federal minimum wage to $12 per hour, and about 18 percent earned above $12 per hour to $16 per hour. Limited Hours Compounded Low-Wage Workers’ Income Disadvantage
Low-wage workers, on average, worked fewer hours per week from 1995 through 2016 than similar workers earning higher wages, according to our analysis of CPS data. The combination of low wages and limited hours can affect a worker’s earnings and potential eligibility for federal social safety net programs. 7). Percentage of Working Families in Poverty Has Remained Relatively Constant
The majority of families with a low-wage worker were not in poverty, yet the percentage of families that were in poverty persisted in each of the years we reviewed and in each of the low-wage categories we examined. In addition, while poverty was most prevalent among families with a worker earning the federal minimum wage or below, it was most prevalent among single-parent families earning this amount. Families of Low- Wage Workers Consistently Use Certain Federal Social Safety Net Programs, but Several Factors May Limit Eligible Families’ Use
Families with a low-wage worker may be eligible for and use one or more federal social safety net programs. Our estimates based on CPS data found that the percentage of families with a low-wage worker enrolled in Medicaid rose significantly over the past 2 decades, almost tripling for families with a worker earning more than the federal minimum wage between 1995 and 2016 (see fig. In 2016, about 29 percent of families with a worker earning federal minimum wage or below, 31 percent of families with a worker earning above federal minimum wage to $12 per hour, and 21 percent of families with a worker earning $12.01 to $16 per hour were enrolled in Medicaid. Our estimates showed that 5 percent or less of families with a low-wage worker received TANF cash assistance at least once in the prior calendar year from 1995 through 2016. A low-wage worker’s family type also influenced the extent that families used social safety net programs. For example, among families with a worker earning federal minimum wage or below in 2016, our estimates showed that two-thirds of married families without children and about half of married families with children used none of the aforementioned programs. In contrast, more than half of single-parent families used three or more of the programs (see fig. Several Factors May Affect Eligible Families’ Participation in Social Safety Net Programs
Agencies that administer the selected social safety net programs indicated that eligible working families participate in these programs at a lower rate than the total eligible population for reasons that are not well known. Assumed ineligibility. Minimal benefit amounts. At that time, we will send copies to the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, and other interested parties. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on the following questions: (1) what are the characteristics of the low-wage workforce and how have they changed over time, (2) to what extent are families with low-wage workers in poverty, and (3) to what extent do families with low-wage workers participate in selected social safety net programs and what factors affect their participation. We used the CPS years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2016. In addition to estimates, we generated standard errors or the margin of error for the 95 percent confidence interval, and report them with estimates in figures and tables. However, it excludes certain types of resources, such as in-kind assistance (such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits). We selected organizations from four metropolitan areas: Atlanta, San Francisco, Santa Fe, and Washington, D.C. The metropolitan areas represent a range of local minimum wage levels relative to the federal minimum wage, costs of living, and participation rates in the selected social safety net programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Labor, private-sector employers have added millions of jobs to the economy since the end of the most recent recession in 2009; however, many are in low-wage occupations. GAO was asked to examine several characteristics of low-wage workers and their families, including their use of federally funded social safety net programs over time.
This report answers the following questions: (1) What are the characteristics of the low-wage workforce and how have they changed over time? (2) To what extent are families with low-wage workers in poverty? and (3) To what extent do families with low-wage workers participate in selected social safety net programs and what factors affect their participation?
GAO analyzed CPS data from 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2016 on worker characteristics, family poverty, and participation in social safety net programs. GAO defined low-wage workers as those workers ages 25 to 64 earning $16 or less per hour. In addition, GAO interviewed officials with state and local social safety net programs and other experts in four metropolitan areas—Atlanta, San Francisco, Santa Fe, and Washington, D.C.—representing a range of local minimum wage levels relative to the federal minimum wage, costs of living, and participation rates in five selected federally funded social safety net programs.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's analysis of data in the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS), on average, low-wage workers worked fewer hours per week, were more highly concentrated in a few industries and occupations, and had lower educational attainment than workers earning hourly wages above $16 in each year GAO reviewed—1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2016. Their percentage of the U.S. workforce also stayed relatively constant over time. About 40 percent of the U.S. workforce ages 25 to 64 earned hourly wages of $16 or less (in constant 2016 dollars) over the period 1995 through 2016. The combination of low wages and few hours worked compounded the income disadvantage of low-wage workers and likely contributed to their potential eligibility for federal social safety net programs.
About 20 percent of families with a worker earning up to the federal minimum wage (currently $7.25 per hour), 13 percent of families with a worker earning above federal minimum wage to $12.00 per hour, and 5 percent of families with a worker earning $12.01 to $16 per hour were in poverty in each year GAO reviewed (see figure).The extent of poverty varied considerably by the type of family in which a worker lived. For example, single-parent families earning the federal minimum wage or below comprised a higher percentage of families in poverty. In contrast, married families with no children comprised the lowest percentage of families in poverty, and generally had family incomes at or above the poverty line.
Note: All references to the “federal minimum wage” are based on 110 percent of the hourly federal minimum wage in effect that year or the equivalent hourly calculated wage for salaried workers. Brackets are used to represent margins of error of estimated percentages at a 95 percent confidence level.
Families with a worker earning $16 or less per hour consistently used selected federally funded social safety net programs between 2005 and 2016, with varied factors affecting eligible families' participation. GAO estimated that the percentage of these families enrolled in Medicaid rose significantly over the past 2 decades, almost tripling among families with a worker earning more than the federal minimum wage between 1995 and 2016. In contrast, an estimated 5 percent or less of these families received cash assistance from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program at least once in the prior calendar year from 1995 through 2016. A low-wage worker's family type also influenced the extent that families used selected social safety net programs. For example, among families with minimum wage earners in 2016, GAO estimated that about half or more married families used none of the programs GAO examined—Medicaid, TANF, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Earned Income Tax Credit, and Additional Child Tax Credit—while more than half of single-parent families used three or more. Program officials and others told GAO that eligible working families may not participate in programs for a variety of reasons, including time needed to apply for benefits, low benefit amounts, and assumed ineligibility. |
gao_GAO-02-830T | gao_GAO-02-830T_0 | Prevalence of Identity Theft Appears to be Growing
No single hotline or database captures the universe of identity theft victims. Each of these various sources or measures seems to indicate that the prevalence of identity theft is growing. Fraud alerts constitute a warning that someone may be using the consumer’s personal information to fraudulently obtain credit. In addition to drivers’ licenses, there are web-sites that offer birth certificates, law enforcement credentials (including the FBI), and Internal Revenue Service forms.”
Similarly, the SSA/OIG has noted that, “The ever-increasing number of identity theft incidents has exploded as the Internet has offered new and easier ways for individuals to obtain false identification documents, including Social Security cards.”
Aliens Use Fraudulent Documents to Obtain Entry, Employment, and Other Benefits
Aliens and others have used identity theft or other forms of identity fraud to create fraudulent documents that might enable individuals to enter the country and seek job opportunities. At ports of entry, INS inspectors annually intercept tens of thousands of fraudulent documents presented by aliens attempting to enter the United States. Attempting to Obtain Other Benefits with Fraudulent Documents
Aliens have also attempted to use fraudulent documents or other illegal means to obtain other immigration benefits, such as naturalization or permanent residency. Alien Smugglers Use Fraudulent Documents
In addition to using identity theft or identity fraud to enter the United States illegally and seek job opportunities, some aliens have used fraudulent documents in connection with serious crimes, such as narcotics trafficking and terrorism. | What GAO Found
Identity theft involves "stealing" another person's personal identifying information, such as their Social Security number, date of birth, or mother's maiden name, and using that information to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts. Another pervasive category is the use of fraudulent identity documents by aliens to enter the United States illegally to obtain employment and other benefits. The prevalence of identity theft appears to be growing. Moreover, identity theft is not typically a stand-alone crime; rather identity theft is usually a component of one or more white-collar or financial crimes. According to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials, the use of fraudulent documents by aliens is extensive, with INS inspectors intercepting tens of thousands of fraudulent documents at ports of entry in each of the last few years. These documents were presented by aliens attempting to enter the United States to seek employment or obtain naturalization or permanent residency status. Federal investigations have shown that some aliens use fraudulent documents in connection with more serious illegal activities, such as narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Efforts to combat identity fraud in its many forms likely will command continued attention for policymakers and law enforcement to include investigating and prosecuting perpetrators, as well as focusing on prevention measures to make key identification documents and information less susceptible to being counterfeited or otherwise used fraudulently. |
gao_HEHS-96-72 | gao_HEHS-96-72_0 | Written commitments, which bind research institutions to comply with human subject protection requirements, are an important element of the protection system. By requiring individual researchers and IRBs to uphold their institution’s commitments, the system works to prevent harm to participants in most experimental studies. However, the effectiveness of the HHS human subject protection regulations in ensuring compliance by institutions and individual researchers has not been systematically studied. OPRR, the federal office within NIH that approves assurances for research funded by HHS, requires assurances to (1) include a statement of ethical conduct principles, (2) stipulate that a review board has been designated to approve and periodically review the institution’s studies, and (3) specify the review board’s membership, responsibilities, and process for reviewing and approving proposals. These institutions receive most of HHS’ funding for research with human subjects. Federal Entities’ Education of Research Community Is Another Preventive Measure
Both OPRR and FDA educate the research community on issues related to protecting human research subjects. Federal monitoring efforts for human subject protection violations include reviews of study documentation, IRB operations, and allegations of misconduct. The monitoring includes reviews of progress reports and on-site inspections. IRBs face the pressure of heavy workloads and competing professional demands. Moreover, the complexity and volume of research under review and the difficulty of ensuring that individuals truly understand the risks they may experience as research subjects can weaken the effectiveness of human subject protections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the federal oversight systems for protecting human subjects in federally sponsored scientific experiments, focusing on whether the oversight procedures: (1) have reduced the likelihood of abuses of human subjects; and (2) have weaknesses that could limit their effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) federal efforts to prevent the abuse of human research subjects include establishing institutional review boards, educating the research community, and requiring written commitments from researchers to comply with standards for the protection of human subjects; (2) although these efforts work to prevent harm to participants in most experimental studies, the effectiveness of those standards in ensuring compliance has not been systematically studied; (3) federal monitoring activities for the protection of human research subjects include on-site inspections and reviews of study documentation, institutional review board operations, and allegations of misconduct; (4) actions to enforce the human research subject protection requirements include research restrictions, researcher disqualification, criminal prosecution, and suspensions from conducting further research; and (5) the oversight procedures are impaired by institutional review boards' heavy workloads and competing demands, limited funds for on-site inspections, the complexity and volume of research under review, and reliance on researchers' self-assurances that they are complying with requirements. |
gao_GAO-14-719 | gao_GAO-14-719_0 | However, in an exception to this rule, Ex-Im was granted authority to facilitate the financing of U.S. exports of defense articles and services, provided that it determines that these items are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian end use. The documentation requirements for each transaction vary, but there are three types: (1) progress reports on construction and delivery of the exported item, (2) technical operating reports once the item is in use, and (3) an annual certification and report on end use. As of July 31, 2014, Ex-Im had received most of the information required in its credit agreements regarding the status and end use of the exported items from the three borrowers approved for financing in fiscal year 2012 under the bank’s dual-use authority, but some information was received more than a year late. Ex-Im officials told us they made efforts to obtain missing documentation for all three transactions. They also said that because of their prior vetting of the transactions with the Department of State or Defense and the details they had received about the transactions, they did not think the missing documentation risked the exports being used in a lethal manner or for primarily military purposes. However, we found these efforts were often not timely or documented. Ex-Im therefore did not have complete and timely information about whether the items were actually being used in accordance with the terms of the credit agreements and Ex-Im policy. However, the memorandum does not specify what actions Ex-Im officials should take if the bank does not receive the documents required in the agreements. Ex-Im Did Not Receive All of the Required Reports from the Government of Mexico, and Some Information Was More than a Year Late
Ex-Im received only a few of the reports from the government of Mexico required in the July 2012 credit agreement, and some of the information in a report it did receive was more than a year late. The credit agreement calls for the borrower to submit both progress reports and technical operating reports. Ex-Im Did Not Finance Any Dual- Use Export Transactions in 2013, Based on Application Data and Ex-Im Reviews
Ex-Im did not finance any exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2013, according to Ex-Im officials and our review of relevant data on Ex-Im authorizations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure adequate and consistent oversight for monitoring the end use of dual-use items, the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States should strengthen Ex-Im guidance for monitoring end use. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine Ex-Im’s compliance with its requirements for monitoring the end uses of the dual-use exports it financed in fiscal year 2012, and to identify what dual-use exports, if any, Ex-Im financed in fiscal year 2013, we reviewed Ex-Im documentation regarding its dual-use policy, including a 1997 memorandum on implementing that policy; Ex-Im documentation associated with each of the three dual-use transactions Ex-Im financed in fiscal year 2012; and data on dual-use determinations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1994, Ex-Im has had the authority to facilitate the financing of U.S. exports of defense articles and services, provided that it determines these items are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian use. These “dual-use” exports include aircraft that are used by foreign militaries mainly for humanitarian purposes. After a 9-year hiatus, Ex-Im financed three dual-use exports in fiscal year 2012. These three transactions account for $1.03 billion, or just under 3 percent of Ex-Im's $35.8 billion financing for that year. Federal law requires GAO to report annually on the end uses of dual-use exports financed by Ex-Im during the second preceding fiscal year. This report (1) examines how Ex-Im has complied with its requirements for monitoring the end uses of the dual-use exports it financed in fiscal year 2012 and (2) identifies what dual-use exports, if any, Ex-Im financed in fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Found
The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) has policies for monitoring the end use of defense articles and services it finances, including documentation requirements that are reflected in its financing agreements with borrowers. However, these policies do not specify what actions Ex-Im officials should take if the bank does not receive the required dual-use-related documents. The requirements for each transaction vary, but may include (1) progress reports on construction and delivery, (2) technical operating reports, and (3) an annual certification and report on end use. As of July 31, 2014, Ex-Im had received most of the information it required in its credit agreements regarding the three dual-use transactions it financed in fiscal year 2012, but some of the information it received was late (see figure). For example, Ex-Im received
some but not all of the progress reports required for the satellite transactions with Eutelsat and the Mexican government, and some information from the government of Mexico was more than a year late;
the required technical operating report from Eutelsat, but only one of the two required reports from the Mexican government; and
the annual certification and reports required from the governments of Mexico and Cameroon late.
Ex-Im officials told GAO they made efforts to obtain missing documentation for all three transactions, and, because of their prior vetting of the transactions and the details they had received, they did not think the missing documentation risked the exports being used in a lethal manner or for primarily military purposes. However, GAO found these efforts were often not timely or documented. Ex-Im therefore did not have complete and timely information about whether the items were actually being used in accordance with the terms of the agreements and Ex-Im policy.
Ex-Im did not finance any exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2013, according to Ex-Im officials and Ex-Im authorizations data.
What GAO Recommends
To improve oversight for monitoring dual-use items, Ex-Im should strengthen its guidance for monitoring end use in cases where borrowers do not submit required documentation within specified time frames. Ex-Im agreed with GAO's recommendation and said it would revise its guidance. |
gao_GAO-17-179 | gao_GAO-17-179_0 | Background
VHA provides health care to approximately 6.7 million veterans and their families at an estimated annual cost of about $56 billion. This includes multiple computer applications which have pharmacy capabilities. VA Has Pharmacy System Capabilities, but Inefficiencies Exist in Viewing and Transferring Data
VA currently has system capabilities that support clinicians and pharmacists in prescribing and dispensing medications to patients. Pharmacists Cannot Transfer Prescriptions to Other VHA Pharmacies
Beyond limitations in viewing patient data, pharmacists lack the capacity to electronically transfer prescriptions to other VHA pharmacies or process prescription refills received from other VHA medical sites. Nevertheless, certain limitations impede interoperability with DOD: VA clinicians and pharmacists (1) cannot always view DOD patient data and (2) do not always receive complete order checks that include new DOD medication data. Further, VA has not assessed the impact of its pharmacy system interoperability on service members transitioning care from DOD to VA.
VA’s Pharmacy System Enables Interoperability Capabilities with DOD, but Clinicians and Pharmacists Cannot Always View Data or Receive Complete Order Checks
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required VA and DOD systems to be interoperable, to achieve real-time interface and data exchange, and to have the ability to check prescription drug information for outpatients. In addition, VA pharmacists and clinicians do not always receive complete information from DOD’s pharmacy system that is needed to perform medication order checks on new medications. Further, in the absence of such an assessment, VA lacks assurance regarding the effectiveness of its pharmacy system to adequately support its mission of providing health care to veterans. These practices focus on enabling clinicians and/or pharmacists to (1) order medications electronically, (2) receive drug-to- drug and drug-allergy interaction checks, (3) track the dispensing of controlled prescription drugs, (4) electronically exchange prescriptions with non-VA entities (i.e., private or DOD clinicians and pharmacies), (5) utilize clinical decision support capabilities, and (6) maintain a perpetual inventory management capability to monitor medication inventory levels. VA’s Pharmacy System Has Not Incorporated Three Practices That Could Enhance Its Usefulness
While VA’s system includes capabilities that are consistent with three of the selected industry practices, the department has not implemented capabilities that align with three other selected practices that could enhance its pharmacy system’s usefulness. As a result, veterans must obtain paper prescriptions or have prescriptions faxed from non-VA providers, and submit the prescriptions to their local VA medical sites in order for the VA pharmacy to manually input the prescriptions into the system and fill them—a process that is time consuming and inefficient. VA’s health information system, VistA, including CPRS, does not have capabilities that could enhance clinical decision support for patient treatment. Moreover, VA has not assessed the impact that these shortcomings and its pharmacy system interoperability with DOD have on veterans. Lacking these capabilities, the department will continue to be limited in its ability to exchange prescriptions with non-VA providers, provide additional clinical decision support, and track medication which could impact veteran patient safety. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide clinicians and pharmacists with improved tools to support pharmacy services to veterans and reduce risks to patient safety, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology and the Under Secretary for Health to take the following six actions: establish and implement a plan for updating the pharmacy system to address the inefficiencies with viewing patient medication data in the Outpatient Pharmacy application and between the pharmacy application and viewers; complete a plan for the implementation of an approach to data standardization that will support the capability for clinicians and pharmacists to view complete DOD data and receive order checks that consistently include DOD data; conduct an assessment to determine to what extent interoperability of VA’s pharmacy system with DOD’s pharmacy system is impacting transitioning service members; develop and execute a plan for implementing the capability to send outbound e-prescriptions to non-VA pharmacies, in accordance with National Council for Prescription Drug Programs standards; ensure that the department’s evaluation of alternatives for electronic health records includes consideration for additional generation level 3 capability such as navigating from an alert to medication order in the electronic health record system; and reassess the priority for establishing an inventory management capability to monitor and update medication levels and track when to reorder medications. Our objectives were to determine whether: (1) VA currently possesses a functioning pharmacy system and the extent to which the system enables data to be viewed, shared, and transferred among Veteran’s Health Administration (VHA) pharmacy locations; (2) VA’s pharmacy system is interoperable with the Department of Defense’s (DOD), and whether this system, or the absence thereof, is impacting service members who transition care from DOD; and (3) VA has implemented its pharmacy system in accordance with health care industry practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
VHA provides health care services, including pharmacy services, to approximately 6.7 million veterans and their families. To do so, clinicians and pharmacists rely on VA's health information system. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required VA to ensure it has a pharmacy system that is interoperable with DOD's system.
A provision in Senate Report 114-57 required GAO to examine VA's acquisition and use of a pharmacy system. GAO determined whether (1) VA currently possesses a functioning pharmacy system and the extent to which the system enables data to be viewed, shared, and transferred among VHA pharmacy locations; (2) VA's pharmacy system is interoperable with DOD's, and whether this system, or the absence thereof, is impacting service members who transition care from DOD; and (3) VA has implemented its pharmacy system in accordance with health care industry practices. GAO analyzed documentation describing VA's pharmacy system; observed system demonstrations; analyzed plans and actions taken to achieve interoperability with DOD; and identified industry practices related to pharmacy systems, and compared them to VA's system capabilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has system capabilities through multiple computer applications that support its clinicians and pharmacists in prescribing and dispensing medications to patients. However, pharmacists cannot always efficiently view necessary patient data among Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical sites. In addition, pharmacists cannot transfer prescriptions to other VHA pharmacies or process prescription refills received from other VHA medical sites through the system. As a result, the system does not provide important capabilities for pharmacists to make clinical decisions about prescriptions efficiently, which could negatively affect patient safety.
In its efforts to establish and increase interoperability with the Department of Defense (DOD), VA has developed capabilities to exchange certain patient and medication information. For example, VA's pharmacy system has the ability to check prescription drug information from DOD. Nevertheless, limitations impede interoperability with DOD: (1) VA clinicians and pharmacists cannot always view DOD patient data and (2) VA pharmacists do not always receive complete information from DOD to perform prescription checks on new medications. Also, VA has not assessed the impact of its pharmacy system interoperability on service members transitioning from DOD to VA, and VHA officials stated that doing so would be difficult because there are other personnel related-factors that could affect patient-care outcomes. Without assessing the impact that pharmacy system interoperability is having on veterans, VA lacks assurance regarding the effectiveness of the system to adequately support its mission of providing health care to veterans.
VA's pharmacy system capabilities align with three of six identified health care industry practices. Specifically, the pharmacy system (1) provides the ability to order medications electronically, (2) enables prescription checks for drug-to-drug and drug-allergy interactions, and (3) tracks the dispensing of controlled prescription drugs. However, the pharmacy system lacks capabilities that align with three other practices which could enhance its usefulness:
Pharmacists cannot electronically exchange prescriptions with non-VA providers and pharmacies. Therefore, veterans need to obtain paper prescriptions from external providers or have the providers fax the prescriptions to their local VA pharmacy to fill the prescriptions, which is time consuming and inefficient.
VA's system does not include certain clinical decision and workflow capabilities that, among other things, could improve clinicians' and pharmacists' ability to provide enhanced medical care to veterans. VA has indicated that it plans to implement such capabilities, but its plans for doing so are incomplete.
VA's system does not maintain a perpetual inventory management capability to monitor medication inventory levels. Therefore, pharmacists cannot effectively track when to reorder medications.
In the absence of these capabilities, VA is limited in its ability to interoperate with private providers, provide additional clinical decision support, and more effectively track medications that could impact veterans' patient safety.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations including that VA update its pharmacy system to view and receive complete medication data, assess the impact of interoperability, and implement additional industry practices. VA generally concurred with GAO's six recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-98-178 | gao_T-RCED-98-178_0 | Freight Railroad Operational and Safety Trends
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 prompted many changes in the composition and operations of the freight industry. It established a federal policy that freight railroads would rely, where possible, on competition and the demand for services, rather than on regulation, to establish reasonable rates. As a result, the freight railroad industry has changed substantially over the past 20 years. Class I freight railroads have eliminated, abandoned, or sold 42 percent of their trackage between 1976 and 1996. In general, railroad safety has improved—railroad accident and fatality rates are down from their 1976 levels. While 1996 data and preliminary data for 1997 show improvements in some key indicators, it is still to early to determine whether FRA’s new approach will sustain a long-term decline in accidents and fatalities. To successfully implement the plan, FRA is working with other federal agencies, the states, and the railroads to strengthen education and research activities; enhance federal, state, and local enforcement efforts; and increase or preserve federal rail-highway crossing safety funds. In 1994, DOT established a 10-year goal of reducing the number of rail-highway grade-crossing accidents and fatalities by 50 percent. 2.) FRA plans to continue to monitor each railroad’s progress. Gaps in FRA’s New Partnering Approach
The collaborative approach that FRA has adopted for obtaining voluntary compliance with railroad safety rules has shifted some of FRA’s resources away from site-specific inspections, which have historically served as FRA’s primary means of ensuring compliance with safety regulations. In addition, the agency’s partnering or inspection efforts do not systematically address improving the workplace safety of railroad employees and ensuring that railroad bridges receive inspection oversight that is comparable to other railroad areas. As a result of their additional responsibilities, FRA inspectors have been conducting fewer site-specific inspections. These inspections have served an important oversight function. FRA relies on the voluntary cooperation of the railroads, rather than regulations, to ensure the structural integrity of the nation’s 100,700 railroad bridges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed operational and safety trends in the rail industry over the past 20 years and how the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has revised its rail safety program to address these trends.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the railroad industry has changed significantly since the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 made it federal policy that railroads would rely, where possible, on competition and the demand for services, rather than on regulation, to establish reasonable rates; (2) from 1976 to 1998, mergers and acquisitions have significantly reduced the number of class I freight railroads; (3) these larger railroads have cut costs, increased the tonnage their trains carry, downsized their workforces, and eliminated, sold, or abandoned thousands of miles of unprofitable or little-used track; (4) during this same period, overall railroad safety has improved; (5) reported accident and fatality rates are down 75 and 36 percent, respectively, from 1976 levels; (6) despite this progress, each year about 1,000 people die as a result of grade-crossing accidents and trespassing, at least 9,000 railroad employees are injured, and thousands of people are evacuated from their homes because of hazardous materials released during train accidents; (7) FRA instituted an important shift in its safety program in 1993 to address safety problems in the rail industry; (8) rather than continuing to use violations and civil penalties as the primary means to obtain compliance with railroad safety regulations, FRA decided to emphasize cooperative partnerships with other federal agencies, railroad management, labor unions, and the states; (9) the partnering efforts generally focus on the nation's larger railroads and have resulted in FRA inspectors' conducting fewer site-specific inspections of the railroad industry overall; (10) while 1996 and preliminary 1997 data, the latest data available, show improvements in safety, it is too early to determine if FRA's new approach will sustain a long-term decline in accidents and fatalities; and (11) in addition, FRA's new partnering efforts do not systematically respond to concerns about the level of workplace injuries for railroad employees and about the safety of railroad bridges. |
gao_GAO-14-393 | gao_GAO-14-393_0 | Federal and State Export Promotion Efforts Have Key Similarities but Vary in Staffing and Budgetary Resources, Performance Metrics, and Extent of Collaboration
The federal government and state trade offices across the country work to promote exports, offering similar services to similar types of clients, primarily small businesses. Overlap of Federal and State Services
Like the state trade offices in the five states we visited, most of the 28 state trade offices that responded to a 2013 SIDO survey also provide export promotion outreach, counseling and training, and trade leads. SBA, by law, offers services exclusively to small businesses. Commerce has 930 staff in offices in 72 countries abroad. TPCC Initiatives to Promote Federal- State Collaboration Have Had Limited Results, Due in Part to Inconsistent Use of Key Practices
Three TPCC initiatives utilize networks of state and local governments and other partners to advance federal-state collaboration in promoting U.S. exports. In prior work, we found that collaboration is enhanced when collaborating partners follow certain key practices, such as articulating common outcomes; agreeing on roles and responsibilities; monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on results; and leveraging resources. In states we visited, we found weaknesses in the implementation of Export Outreach Teams, a TPCC initiative that was to be co-led by Commerce and SBA. Similarly, we found that TPCC’s involvement in a Brookings Institution effort to engage metropolitan area economic development groups in export promotion has unknown implications for federal export promotion efforts and resources. Finally, an agreement between Commerce (the TPCC Chair) and a national group representing state trade offices expired without achieving its collaboration objectives and without Commerce addressing ways for it to share within legal restrictions more information about its clients with state trade offices. The enhanced federal-state collaboration in export promotion envisioned in the NEI calls for the implementation of some of these key collaboration practices. Accordingly, the TPCC identified three initiatives intended to increase U.S. exports under the NEI and enhance collaboration between federal and state efforts: (1) Export Outreach Teams, created to increase local awareness of export promotion resources and facilitate collaboration among local networks of export promotion service providers; (2) collaboration with the Brookings Institution to support its Global Cities Exchange (initially referred to as the Metropolitan Export Initiative), as part of TPCC efforts to expand export promotion activities in metropolitan areas; and (3) a memorandum of intent (MOI) with a national organization that represents state trade offices from across the country, as part of TPCC efforts to work with national organizations with common interests. First, the team memberships and activities were inconsistent with the guidance. However, to date, Commerce has not requested these data. Commerce has no plans to monitor results, which is inconsistent with key collaboration practices. Instead, this official stated that Commerce lawyers assess information-sharing requests on a case-by-case basis and offer informal guidance. Nevertheless, collaboration is a two-way street, and the nature and extent of the federal and state relationship varies widely by state, depending on the unique factors in each state. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve federal-state collaboration in providing export promotion services in accordance with the National Export Initiative, and the Export Enhancement Act of 1992, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce, as Chair of the TPCC, take the following three actions: Improve implementation of the Export Outreach Teams to better achieve their intended outcomes. Take steps consistent with key practices for collaboration to enhance TPCC agencies’ partnering on export promotion with nonfederal entities, such as SIDO and Global Cities. Take steps consistent with key practices to enhance, where possible, federal information sharing with state trade offices on Commerce’s export promotion activities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examine (1) the main characteristics of federal and state export promotion efforts, including their collaboration, and (2) the extent to which the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) has advanced collaboration between state and federal efforts to promote U.S. exports. In states we visited, we interviewed staff at state trade offices, federal officials from Commerce and the SBA District Offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2010 National Export Initiative calls for the federal government to coordinate more with state and local governments and other public and private partners on export promotion. Recently, the TPCC identified three key initiatives to enhance collaboration among federal, state, and other partners. Congress requested that GAO review federal and state collaboration in export promotion.
This report examines (1) the main characteristics of federal and state export promotion efforts, including their collaboration, and (2) the extent to which the TPCC has advanced collaboration between state and federal efforts. GAO analyzed federal and state documents and data from 2012 and 2013; interviewed officials from federal, state, and other export promotion organizations; and visited federal and state trade offices and other relevant organizations in five states selected as a nongeneralizable sample based on their participation in the TPCC initiatives and other factors.
What GAO Found
Federal and state governments share a common interest in promoting exports as a tool for economic growth and creating jobs. Both provide similar and overlapping export promotion services to similar clients, but their staffing, budgetary resources, and ways of measuring performance vary. Located across the country, Department of Commerce (Commerce), Small Business Administration (SBA), and state trade offices provide outreach, counseling and training, and trade leads, mostly to small businesses. In some states, state trade offices have more domestic staff than Commerce offices do. However, Commerce provides more overall coverage abroad, with offices in 72 countries, 15 of which have no state trade office representation. In the five states GAO visited, federal and state collaboration on export promotion varied from working closely in the same location to not collaborating at all, depending on unique factors in each state.
The federal interagency Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) has three initiatives designed to advance federal-state collaboration in promoting U.S. exports by strengthening and expanding networks of state and local governments and other partners. Results of these efforts have been limited, however, in part because their implementation has not consistently followed key collaboration practices. In prior work, GAO found that collaboration is generally enhanced by following key practices, such as articulating common outcomes; agreeing on roles and responsibilities; monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on results; and coordinating resource planning. In the states it visited, GAO found weaknesses in the implementation of Export Outreach Teams, a TPCC initiative. For example, in some cases, activities were missing key participants and were inconsistent with the activities' objectives, in part because SBA is not fully monitoring implementation of the teams across its 68 district offices. Similarly, GAO found that TPCC's involvement in a Brookings Institution initiative to engage metropolitan areas in export promotion has unknown implications for federal export promotion efforts and resources because Commerce lacks a means to monitor the initiative's results. Finally, an agreement between Commerce (the TPCC Chair) and a national group representing state trade offices expired without achieving its collaboration objective or enhancing client information sharing so states can share credit with Commerce for helping companies make export sales. According to Commerce, by law, it cannot release its clients' confidential commercial information, and its policy is to make determinations on releasing information case by case, but it does not provide formal guidance to staff on what information sharing is allowable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the TPCC take steps consistent with key practices for collaboration to (1) improve implementation of the Export Outreach Teams to better achieve their intended objectives; (2) enhance TPCC agencies' collaboration on export promotion with nonfederal entities; and (3) enhance federal information sharing with state trade offices, where possible, on Commerce's export promotion activities, for example, by providing formal guidance to staff on allowable information sharing. Commerce and SBA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-525 | gao_GAO-08-525_0 | Background
Virtually all federal operations are supported by automated systems, mobile devices, and electronic media that may contain sensitive information such as Social Security numbers, medical records, law enforcement data, national or homeland security information, and proprietary information that could be inappropriately disclosed, browsed, or copied for improper or criminal purposes. Implementation of a risk-based framework of management, operational, and technical controls that includes controls such as encryption technology can help guard against the inadvertent compromise of sensitive information. Using small, easily pilferable devices such as laptop computers, handheld personal digital assistants, thumb-sized Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drives, and portable electronic media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, employees can access their agency’s systems and information from anywhere. Commercially Available Encryption Technologies Can Help Agencies Reduce Risks
Commercially available encryption technologies can help federal agencies protect sensitive information and reduce the risks of its unauthorized disclosure and modification. While many technologies exist to protect data, implementing them incorrectly—such as failing to properly configure the product, secure encryption keys, or train users—can result in a false sense of security or even render data permanently inaccessible. Key Laws Frame Practices for Information Protection, while Federal Policies and Guidance Address Use of Encryption
Although federal laws do not specifically require agencies to encrypt sensitive information, they give federal agencies responsibilities for protecting it. In addition, other laws frame practices for protecting specific types of sensitive information. Efforts to Encrypt Sensitive Information Varied among Agencies
The extent to which 24 major federal agencies reported that they had implemented encryption and developed plans to implement encryption varied across agencies. As a result of these weaknesses, federal information may remain at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, loss, and modification. Overall, the 24 agencies reported that about 70 percent of laptop computers and handheld devices had not been encrypted. However, while agencies were encrypting sensitive data on mobile computers and devices such as laptop computers and handheld devices (e.g. In addition, agencies had not documented comprehensive plans to guide activities for effectively implementing encryption. We also recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Education direct the chief information officer to take the following five actions to improve the life cycle management of encryption technologies: evaluate, select, and install FIPS 140-compliant products for all encryption needs and document a plan for implementation that addresses protection of all sensitive information stored and transmitted by the agency; configure installed FIPS-compliant encryption technologies in accordance with FIPS-validated cryptographic modules security settings for the product; develop and implement departmentwide policy and procedures for encryption key establishment and management; develop and implement departmentwide procedures for use of FIPS- develop and implement a training program that provides technical support and end-user personnel with adequate training on encryption concepts, including proper operation of the specific encryption products used. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) how commercially available encryption technologies could help federal agencies protect sensitive information and reduce risks; (2) the federal laws, policies, and guidance for using encryption technologies to protect sensitive information; and (3) the extent to which agencies have implemented, or planned to implement, encryption technologies to protect sensitive information. To address the second objective, we reviewed prior GAO and agency inspector general reports to identify relevant laws and guidance such as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) and the Privacy Act of 1974 to identify mandatory and optional practices for protecting sensitive information (including personally identifiable information but excluding classified national security information) that federal agencies collect, process, store, and transmit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many federal operations are supported by automated systems that may contain sensitive information such as national security information that, if lost or stolen, could be disclosed for improper purposes. Compromises of sensitive information at numerous federal agencies have raised concerns about the extent to which such information is vulnerable. The use of technological controls such as encryption--the process of changing plaintext into ciphertext--can help guard against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. GAO was asked to determine (1) how commercially available encryption technologies can help agencies protect sensitive information and reduce risks; (2) the federal laws, policies, and guidance for using encryption technologies; and (3) the extent to which agencies have implemented, or plan to implement, encryption technologies. To address these objectives, GAO identified and evaluated commercially available encryption technologies, reviewed relevant laws and guidance, and surveyed 24 major federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Commercially available encryption technologies can help federal agencies protect sensitive information that is stored on mobile computers and devices (such as laptop computers, handheld devices such as personal digital assistants, and portable media such as flash drives and CD-ROMs) as well as information that is transmitted over wired or wireless networks by reducing the risks of its unauthorized disclosure and modification. For example, information stored in individual files, folders, or entire hard drives can be encrypted. Encryption technologies can also be used to establish secure communication paths for protecting data transmitted over networks. While many products to encrypt data exist, implementing them incorrectly------such as failing to properly configure the product, secure encryption keys, or train users------can result in a false sense of security and render data permanently inaccessible. Key laws frame practices for information protection, while federal policies and guidance address the use of encryption. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 mandates that agencies implement information security programs to protect agency information and systems. In addition, other laws provide guidance and direction for protecting specific types of information, including agency-specific information. For example, the Privacy Act of 1974 requires that agencies adequately protect personal information, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 requires additional protections for sensitive health care information. The Office of Management and Budget has issued policy requiring federal agencies to encrypt all data on mobile computers and devices that carry agency data and use products that have been approved by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) cryptographic validation program. Further, NIST guidance recommends that agencies adequately plan for the selection, installation, configuration, and management of encryption technologies. The extent to which 24 major federal agencies reported that they have implemented encryption and developed plans to implement encryption of sensitive information varied across agencies. From July through September 2007, the major agencies collectively reported that they had not yet installed encryption technology to protect sensitive information on about 70 percent of their laptop computers and handheld devices. Additionally, agencies reported uncertainty regarding the applicability of OMB's encryption requirements for mobile devices, specifically portable media. While all agencies have initiated efforts to deploy encryption technologies, none had documented comprehensive plans to guide encryption implementation activities such as installing and configuring appropriate technologies in accordance with federal guidelines, developing and documenting policies and procedures for managing encryption technologies, and training users. As a result federal information may remain at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, loss, and modification. |
gao_GAO-15-72 | gao_GAO-15-72_0 | In this context, the Denali Commission was established in 1998 as a federal agency to provide, among other things, infrastructure and economic development services to rural Alaskan communities. Accordingly, Commerce officials review and approve his or her time card. Funding for the Commission steadily increased until fiscal year 2005 and peaked in fiscal year 2007 at $141 million. The Commission Faces Two Key Challenges in Fulfilling Part of Its Statutory Purpose, but Several Options Exist to Address Them
The Commission faces two key challenges in fulfilling the statutory purpose to promote rural development and provide for infrastructure needs, but there are options to assist the Commission in addressing them.making to achieve the rural development portion of its statutory purpose in light of significant funding decreases and (2) the application of the conflict-of-interest law which sometimes prevents commissioners—who hold key specialized knowledge—from being actively involved in developing the annual work plan. The Commission’s Reliance on Grant Making May Not Be Sustainable Given Significant Funding Decreases, but Options Exist to Address This Challenge
Significant decreases in funding have raised questions about whether the Commission can sustain its current approach of grant making alone to fulfill its statutory purpose. The Commission could shift its approach to act more as a facilitator of grants. Maintain existing infrastructure. Options Exist to Better Leverage Commissioner Expertise in Developing the Work Plan
Since Justice’s 2006 determination that commissioners were subject to the principal federal conflict-of-interest law, Commission management and commissioners have attempted to implement the Denali Commission Act—which requires the Commission to develop a work plan—while also taking steps to ensure that commissioners did not violate the conflict-of- interest law—which prohibits commissioner participation in matters that would have a direct and predictable effect on their or their employers’ financial interests. These include periodic vacancies in the Federal Cochair position; issues related to the implementation of Dodd- Frank; and not having a Commission attorney. Vacancy in Federal Cochair Position Has Stymied the Commission
The Federal Cochair position has been vacant on two separate occasions, which has stymied the Commission from fulfilling its statutory responsibilities even though the Denali Commission Act states that any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers. Furthermore, unlike enabling legislation for other federal agencies, the act does not contain a “delegation of authority” provision that would allow the Federal Cochair to authorize another person to perform the Federal Cochair’s statutory responsibilities during a vacancy that occurs at any point in the Federal In contrast to a holdover provision, a Federal Cochair Cochair’s term.could use a delegation of authority provision while he was in office or if he left before the end of his term. Without an attorney to help the Commission identify and navigate risks consistent with federal standards for internal control, the Commission is at increased risk for making legal mistakes. The Commission Has Some Administrative Grant Management Procedures, but Has Several Shortcomings in How It Has Managed Its Grants
The Commission has some key procedures in place for administering its grants, but we found several shortcomings in how the Commission has managed its grants. In our review of a sample of projects funded by Commission grants, we found several shortcomings in how the Commission has managed its grants, including not having documented policies for awarding and managing grants; inconsistent monitoring of grant and project recipients; and lengthy delays in closing projects, among other things. Without documented policies to specify such requirements, the Commission may not be setting clear expectations for grantees, making it difficult to hold them accountable for fulfilling the terms of the grant agreement. In addition, while the Commission has faced numerous and complex legal questions, it has never had a full-time attorney providing it legal advice and support on a routine and consistent basis, which has led to avoidable legal mistakes. While the Commission has awarded over $1 billion in grants to help develop the infrastructure and economy of rural communities in Alaska, it has done so without documented policies for how it awards and manages its grants, resulting in inconsistencies in how the Commission awards and monitors grants. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To better leverage the commissioners’ expertise in the development of the annual work plan, Congress should consider amending the Denali Commission Act, potentially with one of the identified options. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the Commission’s operations, we recommend that the Commission’s Federal Cochair direct the Commission to consider options for fulfilling the Commission’s statutory purpose and finalize that new approach in a new strategic plan. The other six commissioners of the Denali Commission also concurred with our conclusions and recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the challenges, if any, the Denali Commission (Commission) and commissioners face in fulfilling the Commission’s statutory purpose and options to address them; (2) the challenges, if any, that have hindered the daily operations of the Commission; and (3) the Commission’s policies and procedures for awarding and managing grants and the extent to which grantees and commission officials complied with these policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since establishment in 1998 by statute, the Denali Commission has awarded over $1 billion in federal grants to help develop Alaska's remote communities. The Commission has a Federal Cochair and six other commissioners.
GAO was asked to review the management of the Commission. This report examines (1) challenges the Commission has faced in fulfilling its statutory purpose and options to address them; (2) challenges that hindered the Commission's daily operations; and (3) the Commission's policies and procedures for managing grants and the extent of compliance with them. GAO reviewed key laws and policies; interviewed former and current commissioners and such stakeholders as state agencies that received grants; and analyzed a random sample of 100 projects funded by Commission grants for fiscal years 1999 through 2013.
What GAO Found
The Denali Commission has faced two key challenges in fulfilling its statutory purpose of providing, among other things, infrastructure and economic development services to rural communities; but options exist to address them. First, a 90 percent decrease in Commission funding from its peak in fiscal year 2007 has raised concerns about whether the Commission can sustain its current approach as primarily a grant-making agency. Given its funding challenge, stakeholders GAO interviewed identified several options for how the Commission could approach fulfilling its statutory purpose in the future, such as shifting its focus to facilitating economic development projects or maintaining existing infrastructure rather than funding new projects. Even though the Commission has taken some steps to reassess its long-term approach, such as conducting statewide listening sessions on how best to assist rural Alaskans in the future, it has not finalized such an approach in a new multiyear strategic plan. Second, the Department of Justice's 2006 determination on the applicability of the principal federal conflict-of-interest law has resulted in a Commission that is, at times, deprived of the expertise of its six commissioners. Concerns about possible criminal prosecution for conflicts of interest have resulted in commissioners regularly recusing themselves from Commission decision-making activities. Based on various sources, GAO identified four options for restructuring the Commission so that it can better leverage the expertise of its commissioners in light of the 2006 determination. Each of the options would require changes to the Denali Commission Act, which established the Commission.
The Commission has faced several challenges that have hindered its daily operations, including having periodic vacancies in the Federal Cochair position and not having an attorney. Having a vacancy in the Federal Cochair position has twice stymied the Commission because only the Federal Cochair is authorized to take certain critical actions, such as approving new grants. The Denali Commission Act does not provide for an acting Federal Cochair and does not allow the Federal Cochair to delegate authority to another person or to remain in office beyond the expiration of his or her 4-year term (holdover). In addition, even in the face of numerous complex legal questions, such as the applicability of the principal federal conflict-of-interest law, the Commission has never had a full-time attorney to provide it with legal advice and support on a routine and consistent basis. Without an attorney to help the Commission identify and navigate risks consistent with federal standards for internal control, the Commission is at increased risk for making legal mistakes.
The Commission has some key procedures in place for administering its grants, but GAO found several shortcomings in how the Commission has managed its grants. Both the Commission's internal checklists and its online grants database meet established criteria for good grant management and oversight. However, the Commission does not have documented grant-making policies in place, leading to inconsistencies in how it awards and manages grants. For example, the Commission's awarding of grants has not always been open or competitive, and its monitoring of grant and project recipients has been inconsistent. Unless it issues grant management policies, the Commission may not be setting clear expectations for grantees, making it difficult to hold them accountable for fulfilling the terms of grant agreements.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider amending the Denali Commission Act to, among other things, restructure the Commission to better leverage the commissioners' expertise, and create a delegation of authority or holdover provision for the Federal Cochair position. GAO recommends, among other things, that the Commission consider options for fulfilling its statutory purpose and finalize its approach in a new strategic plan; obtain a full-time attorney; and issue grants management policies. The Denali Commission, including its commissioners, agreed with GAO's conclusions and recommendations. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-242 | gao_T-HEHS-98-242_0 | Paid donors typically receive between $15 and $20 for the 2 hours of time required to remove whole blood, separate the plasma from the cells and serum, and reinfuse the latter back into the donor. Risk of Infectious Units Entering Plasma Pools Is Somewhat Higher for Donations From Paid Plasma Donors Than for Donations From Volunteers
The risk of incorporating a potentially infectious plasma unit into a plasma pool for HIV, HBV, or HCV is somewhat higher for donations from paid donors than for donations from volunteer donors. These rates include donors who pass the initial screening tests and donate but who subsequently seroconvert and whom a screening test later detects during another donation as being positive. included in that pool if it were made exclusively from donations from paid donors. Manufacturers have recently taken steps to reduce the size of the plasma pools they use for producing plasma derivatives. further manufactured by Baxter Healthcare. Thus, these modeling data suggest that smaller plasma pool sizes will reduce the likelihood of transmission of viral agents to infrequent users of plasma products but will have only a minor impact on frequent recipients of such products. In addition, risk of exposure does not always equate with risk of infection. For example, the recent transmission of HCV by a plasma derivative that had not undergone viral inactivation procedures showed that the risk of seroconversion for recipients of this product increased with the number of positive HCV lots infused and the quantity of HCV viral material infused. Not all recipients experience seroconversions because of two factors: (1) each recipient’s dose and (2) the reduction of infectiousness due to steps in the manufacturing process in addition to viral removal and inactivation. These techniques virtually eliminate enveloped viruses such as HIV, HBV, and HCV. All types of plasma derivatives undergo viral inactivation or removal. Assessing the amount of viral clearance obtained through a particular inactivation or removal process determines the effectiveness of these different procedures. This assessment is based on the amount of virus that is killed or removed and therefore the extent to which these processes eliminate viruses through manufacturing. cause infection, research has shown that infection is much more likely to occur with higher concentrations of virus. Recent Noncompliance With Current Good Manufacturing Practices Could Jeopardize Plasma Products’ Safety
Although viral inactivation and removal techniques have proven to be highly effective, they are only useful if the steps in the manufacturing process are carried out properly. The lack of strict adherence to these practices could compromise the safety of plasma products. In May 1997, FDA authorized the distribution of Centeon’s products from the facility, but, in a subsequent inspection completed in July 1998, FDA found that Centeon had failed to fully comply with the consent decree, and the company was notified to immediately cease manufacturing, processing, packing, holding, and distributing all biological and drug products manufactured at that facility. The company may, however, manufacture products deemed medically necessary. If properly implemented, these actions by plasma manufacturers and FDA should help alleviate the problems related to adherence to current good manufacturing practices and quality assurance. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on blood plasma safety, focusing on: (1) comparing the risks of incorporating infected plasma from donations from volunteer donors with those from paid donors into the manufacturing process; (2) the impact on frequent and infrequent plasma users when pooling large numbers of plasma donations into manufactured plasma products; (3) the safety of end products from plasma after they have undergone further manufacturing and inactivation steps to kill or remove viruses; and (4) the recent regulatory compliance history of plasma manufacturers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) viral clearance techniques have made the risks of receiving an infected plasma product extremely low when manufacturers follow all the procedures in place to ensure safety; (2) although paid plasma donors are over one and a half times more likely to donate potentially infectious units, several initiatives by the paid plasma industry have greatly reduced the chances of these units being included in the plasma production pool; (3) these initiatives include using only repeat donors and a 60-day inventory hold on all units to allow manufacturers to retrieve units from donors who subsequently test positive for disease or are otherwise disqualified; (4) even with those initiatives in place, plasma donated by paid donors poses a higher risk of infection; (5) limiting the number of donors whose plasma is pooled for production into plasma products helps to reduce the risks of viral transmission for recipients of these products; (6) a more significant step in reducing risk of infection takes place in manufacturing, during which all plasma products undergo viral removal or inactivation procedures, which virtually eliminate enveloped viruses; (7) epidemiological and laboratory data on the transmission of viruses through plasma products since the introduction of viral removal and inactivation procedures support the value of these procedures; (8) the effectiveness of these processes is limited, however, in reducing transmission of nonlipid enveloped viruses; (9) voluntary initiatives by the commercial plasma industry, technological advances from increasingly sophisticated screening tests, and viral removal and inactivation procedures are only effective if manufacturers of finished plasma products adhere to current good manufacturing practices; (10) not all of the major manufacturing companies producing plasma products adhere to these practices; (11) recent Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection reports highlight many instances of noncompliance with current good manufacturing practices; (12) this has led to consent decrees between FDA and two companies, temporary suspensions of production at one company's facility, and shortages of some plasma products; (13) a lack of strict adherence to these practices related to viral removal and inactivation procedures could compromise the safety of plasma products; and (14) actions being taken by FDA and the plasma manufacturers since these problems were identified should help to alleviate some of these problems. |
gao_GAO-07-253 | gao_GAO-07-253_0 | Regulatory officials have noted that Basel I continues to be an adequate capital framework for most banks, but its limitations make it increasingly inadequate for the largest and most internationally active banks. Federal Regulators Are Proposing a Regulatory Capital Framework that Differs from the International Basel II Accord in Several Respects
While Basel II is an international framework based on shared regulatory objectives, it is subject to national implementation. Regulators indicated, based on comment letters received, that due to the compliance burden associated with moving to Basel IA, some small banks that are highly capitalized may choose to remain under Basel I.
U.S. Regulators Plan to Retain the Leverage Requirement and Apply Existing Prompt Corrective Action Measures
While the U.S.-proposed Basel II and Basel IA rules address revisions to risk-based regulatory capital, regulators also plan to retain the existing leverage requirements and prompt corrective action (PCA) measures. However, the advanced approaches are not themselves without risks and realizing the benefits of these approaches will depend in part on the sufficiency of credit default and operational loss event data used as inputs to the regulatory and bank models that determine required capital. This improved risk sensitivity could improve the safety and soundness of the banking system. Changes in Capital Requirements Could Affect Competition among Banks
Possible changes in regulatory capital requirements have raised concerns about competition between large and small banks domestically; between large banks headquartered in the United States and foreign banks; and commercial and investment banks in the United States, though the effect of Basel II on bank competition remains uncertain. The Impact of Basel II on the Level of Bank Capital Is Uncertain, but Proposed Safeguards Would Limit Capital Reductions during a Transition Period
While initial estimates of the impact of Basel II showed large drops in minimum required capital, a considerable amount of uncertainty remains about the potential impact of Basel II on the level of regulatory capital requirements and the degree of variability in these requirements over the business cycle in the long term. Many officials also reported that their banks faced challenges in implementing Basel II, including operating without a final rule, obtaining data that meet the minimum requirements for the A-IRB for all asset portfolios and data on operational losses, and difficulty aligning their existing systems and processes with the proposed rules. U.S. Regulators Are Integrating Preparations for Basel II into Their Current Supervisory Process but Face a Number of Impediments
While U.S. regulators have been integrating preparations for Basel II into their current supervisory processes and building on their experience overseeing risk management practices of the banks, a number of issues remain to be resolved as regulators finalize the rule. It is also important for regulators to resolve some of the uncertainty and increase the transparency of their thinking by including in the final rule more specific information about certain outstanding issues, such as how regulators will treat portfolios that lack adequate data to meet regulatory requirements for the advanced approaches, how regulators will calculate reductions in aggregate minimum regulatory capital and what would happen if the reduction exceeds a proposed 10-percent trigger, and how worthwhile public disclosure will be under Pillar 3. Specifically, the proposed rule is ambiguous on a number of important issues that, if left unresolved, could continue to result in regulatory ambiguity for banks and concerns for industry observers, including (1) what regulators plan to do when banks have limited data available, especially for new financial products or portfolios that lack data on the impact of a major economic downturn, and how they will ensure that portfolios with insufficient data are treated prudently and consistently, such as considering options like a higher risk-weight or substituting Basel IA or the Basel Committee’s standardized approach for these portfolios; (2) how regulators will calculate the 10-percent aggregate reduction in minimum regulatory capital and what would happen if this is triggered; and (3) the criteria for determining an appropriate average level of aggregate capital and appropriate cyclical variation in regulatory capital. Finally, Basel II also raises competitiveness concerns between large and small U.S. banks. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to describe (1) the developments leading to the transition to Basel II, (2) the proposed changes to the U.S. regulatory capital framework, (3) the potential implications of Basel II’s quantitative approaches and their potential impact on required capital, (4) banks’ preparations and related challenges, and (5) U.S. regulators’ preparations and related challenges. Market Risk
Regulators have allowed certain banks to use their internal models to determine required capital for market risk since 1996 (known as the Market Risk Amendment or MRA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerned about the potential impacts of the proposed risk-based capital rules, known as Basel II, Congress mandated that GAO study U.S. implementation efforts. This report examines (1) the transition to Basel II and the proposed changes in the United States, (2) the potential impact on the banking system and regulatory required capital, and (3) how banks and regulators are preparing for Basel II and the challenges they face. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed documents related to Basel II and interviewed various regulators and officials from banks that will be required to follow the new rules.
What GAO Found
Rapid innovation in financial markets and advances in risk management have revealed limitations in the existing Basel I risk-based capital framework, especially for large, complex banks. U.S. banking regulators have proposed a revised regulatory capital framework that differs from the international Basel II accord in several ways, including (1) requiring adoption of the most advanced Basel II approaches and by only the largest and most internationally active banks; (2) proposing Basel IA, a simpler revision of Basel I, and retaining Basel I as options for all other banks; and (3) retaining the leverage requirement and prompt corrective action measures that exist under the current regulatory capital framework. While the new capital framework could improve banks' risk management and make regulatory capital more sensitive to underlying risks, its impact on minimum capital requirements and the actual amount of capital held by banks is uncertain. The approaches allowed under Basel II are not without risks, and realizing the benefits of these approaches while managing the related risks will depend on the adequacy of both internal and supervisory reviews. The move to Basel II has also raised competitiveness concerns between large and small U.S. banks domestically and large U.S. and foreign banks internationally. The impact of Basel II on the level of required capital is uncertain, but in response to quantitative impact study results showing large reductions in minimum required capital, U.S. regulators have proposed safeguards, such as transitional floors, that along with the existing leverage ratio would limit regulatory capital reductions during a multiyear transition period. Finally, the impact on actual capital held by banks is uncertain because banks hold capital above required minimums for both internal risk management purposes as well as to address the expectations of the market. Banks and regulators are preparing for Basel II without a final rule, but both face challenges. Bank officials said they were refining their risk management practices, but uncertainty about final requirements has made it difficult for them to proceed further. Banks also face challenges in aligning their existing systems and processes with some of the proposed requirements. While regulators plan to integrate Basel II into their current supervisory process, they face impediments. The banking regulators have differing regulatory perspectives, which has made reaching consensus on the proposed rule difficult. Banks and other stakeholders continue to face uncertainty. Among the issues that regulators have yet to resolve are how the rule will treat bank portfolios that do not meet data requirements, how they will calculate reductions in aggregate minimum regulatory capital and what they will do if the reduction exceeds a proposed 10 percent trigger, and what criteria they will use to determine the appropriate average level of required capital and cyclical variation. Increased transparency going forward could reduce ambiguity and respond to questions and concerns among banks and industry stakeholders about how the rules will be applied, their ultimate impact on capital, and the regulators' ability to oversee their implementation. |
gao_GAO-02-567 | gao_GAO-02-567_0 | Compliance Agreements Are of Three Main Types
The 70 compliance agreements at DOE sites vary greatly but can be divided into three main types: (1) 29 are agreements specifically required by CERCLA to address cleanup of federal sites on EPA’s national priorities list of the nation’s worst hazardous waste sites or by RCRA to address the management of hazardous waste or mixed radioactive and hazardous waste at DOE facilities, (2) 6 are court-ordered agreements resulting from lawsuits initiated primarily by states, and (3) 35 are other agreements, including state administrative orders enforcing state hazardous waste management laws. This agreement also addresses most of the cleanup activities that will occur at that site. These agreements are typically between DOE and states. Many of the milestones completed either have been administrative, such as issuing a report, or have involved completing some kind of step in the cleanup process, such as conducting certain tests. Number of Completed Milestones Is Not a Good Measure of DOE’s Cleanup Progress, but Milestones Are Useful to Regulators
For several reasons DOE’s success in completing milestones on time is not a good measure of progress in cleaning up the weapons complex. Specifically: Many of the milestones do not indicate what cleanup work has been accomplished. Because the total number of milestones associated with those types of agreements is not yet known, DOE’s overall progress in accomplishing the cleanup is difficult to determine. DOE’s Budget Request Does Not Identify the Funding Needed to Meet Compliance Requirements
The president’s budget proposal for DOE, which is the version of the DOE budget submitted to the Congress, does not specifically identify the cost of complying with compliance agreements. As DOE headquarters officials adjust the budget amounts in the process of reconciling various competing funding needs, the final budget submitted to the Congress has, with few exceptions, no clear relationship to the amounts sites estimated were needed to fund compliance requirements. Agency Comments
We provided a copy of our draft report to the Department of Energy for review and comment. | What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) spends between $6 billion and $7 billion annually to store, clean up, and monitor nuclear and hazardous waste at its sites. Various federal and state agencies with jurisdiction over environmental and health issues related to the cleanup are therefore involved in regulating and overseeing DOE's activities. Much of the cleanup activity has been implemented under compliance agreements between the DOE and these agencies. There are three types of compliance agreements governing DOE's sites: (1) legal requirements that address the cleanup of federal sites on the National Priorities List of the nation's most serious hazardous waste sites or that address treatment and storage of mixed hazardous and radioactive waste at DOE facilities; (2) court-ordered agreements resulting from lawsuits initiated primarily by states; and (3) other agreements, such as state administrative orders enforcing state hazardous waste management laws, that do not fall into the first two categories. Through the end of fiscal year 2001, DOE had completed 4,500 milestones, although for several reasons, the number of milestones is not a good indication of cleanup progress. Many of the milestones are administrative in nature, such as issuing a report. Also, some agreements allow for adding more milestones as time goes on, and because the total number of milestones associated with those agreements is not yet known, progress is difficult to determine. Finally, many of the milestones not yet due involve some of the most complex and costly cleanup work to be undertaken. The cost of complying with these agreements is not specifically identified in the DOE budget. Individual DOE sites include the cost of the compliance when preparing their initial budget requests, but as DOE headquarters officials adjust individual site estimates to reflect national priorities and to reconcile various competing demands, the final budget does not identify what portion of the request reflects compliance requirements. However, compliance agreements are site-specific and are not intended to provide a mechanism for DOE to use in prioritizing risks among various sites. |
gao_GAO-02-426 | gao_GAO-02-426_0 | U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling
From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140 million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear smuggling in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the former Soviet Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies
The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided assistance to about 30 countries’ customs, border, and law enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear smuggling. Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in Delivering U.S. Assistance
DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the International Export Control Program (IECP). U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated Approach
Because U.S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries’ border crossings, with the result that some countries’ border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate
The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency group chaired by the State Department. However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. efforts. Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment funded by DOE’s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate Russia’s plans to improve border security. These cases include contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation concern. He stated that the most effective approach to combating nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at civilian and military facilities. Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. Regardless of the number of actual cases of nuclear smuggling, officials stated that the threat posed by illicit trafficking is real and should not be underestimated. Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily Russia. | Why GAO Did This Study
The worldwide trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material has reportedly increased in recent years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. Many of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a "dirty bomb" that could spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country's border through various means. Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that originated in the former Soviet Union. The United States, through the Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program, has helped them secure nuclear material at civilian and defense facilities--the first line of defense against potential theft and diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these countries improve their border security--a second line of defense--but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal agencies--the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials.
What GAO Found
GAO found that U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their efforts through this group. The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at other countries' border crossings; consequently, some countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. U.S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, but serious problems with installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. efforts. These and other problems have largely resulted from a lack of agency oversight and follow-up. |
gao_GAO-09-336 | gao_GAO-09-336_0 | However, instead of decreasing, support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase primarily because past funding for installation support has been insufficient to provide support at the levels called for by either existing or the new common service standards, and in some instances the military services’ approach to implementing joint basing will result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some existing installation support efficiencies. In the long term, DOD officials stated that the increased installation support costs might be at least partially offset as best practices and new operational efficiencies are identified and adopted over time. After working with the military services to develop and obtain concurrence with the new definitions and standards, OSD issued guidance that defined 47 installation support functions—such as installation security services, custodial services, and child care programs—and provided 267 standards to help define the level of service that each joint base is to provide in each area. According to DOD, the new standards represented the service levels needed to fully meet installation mission, facility, and personnel needs in view of existing OSD and military service policies, guidance, and practices; commercial industry standards; guidance from other federal agencies; or military judgment. Facilities sustainment, which DOD had previously defined, includes the maintenance and repair activities necessary to prevent deterioration, maintain safety, and keep facilities in good working order over their service lives. Military Services Have Not Fully Funded Installation Support in the Past
A key reason that installation support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase is that OSD has required that the joint bases deliver installation support in accordance with the 267 new support standards, even though the military services have not previously funded installation support in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. In total during fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the military services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility sustainment requirements. Military Services Have Used Some Budgeted Sustainment Funds for Other Purposes
The military services have further exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by using some of the budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. According to information provided by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes during fiscal years 2006 through 2008. However, even though the officials stated that these projects were needed and other funds to pay for the projects were not available, the consequence was that additional sustainment requirements went unmet. According to DOD, needed sustainment work that is not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities, shortened facility service lives, and increased future costs for facility restoration. Although many facilities at the installations we visited were in good condition, some facilities had fallen into disrepair because funds were not available to pay for all needed sustainment work. Conclusions
While DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of installation support at the planned joint bases, the estimates of potential savings will likely continue to decline and it is unclear whether joint basing will result in any actual savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the expected increased installation support costs from joint basing implementation and the use of budgeted facility sustainment funds for purposes other than sustainment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the following four actions: Periodically review the installation support standards as experience is gained with delivering installation support at the joint bases and make adjustments, if needed, to ensure that each standard reflects the level of service necessary to meet installation requirements as economically as possible. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation support at the planned joint bases, we reviewed the justification supporting the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission’s recommendation that DOD establish 12 joint bases and examined DOD’s implementation plans, guidance, and cost estimates associated with the delivery of installation support at the planned joint bases. Specifically, we reviewed DOD’s facility sustainment requirements for fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as determined by DOD’s facilities sustainment model; reviewed DOD’s installation strategic plans to identify DOD’s goals for facility sustainment budgeting; obtained OSD and military service information for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that showed the amounts budgeted for sustainment, spent on sustainment, and budgeted for sustainment but spent for other purposes; and compared the amounts budgeted and spent to the corresponding requirements and goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint bases by consolidating the management and support of 26 separate installations, potentially saving $2.3 billion over 20 years. In response to a direction from the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, GAO evaluated DOD's (1) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation support at joint bases and (2) funding for facility sustainment, which includes the maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep facilities in good working order, at all installations. GAO compared new support standards with the current support levels, visited nine installations that will become four joint bases, and compared facility sustainment funding levels with requirements and goals.
What GAO Found
DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of installation support is expected to increase rather than decrease as forecasted by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In January 2008, DOD began issuing joint base implementation guidance that for the first time established a set of common definitions and standards for installation support. The guidance defined 47 installation support areas (e.g., airfield operations, grounds maintenance, custodial services, and child and youth programs) and provided 267 standards to define the expected level of service in each area. DOD officials stated that the standards represented the service levels needed to meet mission and personnel requirements in view of DOD policies and guidance, commercial standards, other federal agency guidance, or in some cases, military judgment. However, contrary to the expectations of the commission, for two primary reasons installation support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase above the cost of support provided by the separate installations before consolidation. First, DOD has required the joint bases to deliver installation support in accordance with the new standards even though the military services have not previously funded installation support in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. GAO's comparison of 40 selected standards to the service levels currently provided at the nine installations it visited showed that on average service levels would have to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent of the areas compared. Second, in some instances the services' approach to implementing joint basing will result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some existing installation support efficiencies. Although DOD officials stated that the increased support costs at the joint bases might be at least partially offset over time as experience is gained and new efficiencies are identified and adopted, it is unclear whether joint basing will result in actual savings. The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to meet their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent facility deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget priorities as the reason, the military services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility sustainment requirements during fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and, according to DOD, needed sustainment work that is not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities, shortened facility service lives, and increased future costs for facility restoration. The services have further exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by using some budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the military services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes, primarily to pay for unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects. Although service officials stated that these projects were needed, the consequence was that sustainment requirements were not met. During visits to nine installations, GAO found backlogs of deferred sustainment needs and some facilities that were not in good condition because funds were not available to pay for all needed sustainment work. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-237 | gao_T-AIMD-00-237_0 | Of the $36.2 million, about $33 million was federal appropriations provided to the Authority specifically for management reform.Table 1 shows the total funds provided to the District for management reform for fiscal years 1998 through 2000, the amounts reported as obligated, estimated savings from those initiatives, and reported savings from those initiatives. Fiscal Year 1998 Projects
The status of the funds appropriated for the management reform projects initially identified in fiscal year 1998 and the disposition of those projects is as follows:
The District reported in its Final Fiscal Year 1998 Management Reform Summary of Operating and Capital Funds, as of September 30, 1998, that of the $292.8 million budgeted for management reform, approximately $126.9 million had been spent and about $165.9 million was available at the end of fiscal year 1998. Fiscal Year 1999 Projects
District officials told us that the new administration of Mayor Williams inherited approximately 200 projects in various stages of completion. As of June 1, 2000, of the $10 million expected in savings, District officials reported that about 15 percent, or $1.5 million, had been realized. Conclusion
Since fiscal year 1998, the District Government has budgeted over $300 million to implement management reform initiatives or projects. To date, only $1.5 million of management reform savings have been documented. Additional savings might have been realized, but the Authority and District officials had not systematically assessed project results and savings. In addition, they did not adequately track the costs of these projects and, as a result, sufficient information is not available to show how these funds were spent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the District of Columbia's management reform initiatives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over the past 3 fiscal years, the District government has proposed hundreds of management reform initiatives that were estimated to save millions of dollars as well as improve government services; (2) however, as of June 1, 2000, the District had only reported savings of about $1.5 million related to these initiatives and had not consistently tracked the status of these projects; (3) neither the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility a nd Management Assistance Authority nor the District could provide adequate details on the goals achieved for all of the projects that had been reported as completed or in various stages of completion; (4) the District does not have a systematic process to monitor these management reform projects and determine where savings or customer service improvements have been realized; and (5) the District cannot say for certain how funds designated for management reform have been spent or whether the key goals of these initiatives have been realized. |
gao_GAO-03-180 | gao_GAO-03-180_0 | HMOs and other types of health care organizations contract with CMS to offer M+C health plans. Selected M+C Requirements for HMOs
An HMO that contracts to serve Medicare beneficiaries must meet M+C program requirements specified by CMS regarding benefit package proposals, the beneficiary enrollment process, marketing and enrollee communications, and quality improvement. Benefit Package Proposals
For each M+C health plan that it intends to offer, an HMO must annually submit a benefit package proposal for CMS review and approval. An HMO must cover all services available in the FFS program except hospice. A beneficiary who wants to enroll in a health plan submits an application to the HMO, which then must make a preliminary determination about whether the beneficiary lives in the geographic area served by the health plan and is otherwise eligible to enroll. The HMO then forwards the beneficiary’s information to CMS. Quality Improvement
HMOs must meet M+C requirements designed to improve the quality of care and services they deliver. Marketing and Enrollee Communication Materials
NAIC’s model requirements for marketing materials specify that an HMO must produce advertising that is clear, complete, and does not mislead beneficiaries. Beneficiary Enrollment
M+C and FEHBP have HMO requirements that pertain to beneficiary enrollment. | What GAO Found
Since the early 1980s, health maintenance organizations (HMO) have entered into risk-based contracts with Medicare and offered beneficiaries an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) program. By 1997, 5.2 million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in an HMO. Although Medicare HMOs were available in most urban areas, they were often unavailable in rural areas. Medicare+Choice (M+C) has HMO requirements pertaining to benefit package proposals, the beneficiary enrollment process, marketing and enrollee communication materials, and quality improvement, among other areas. An HMO must annually submit a benefit package proposal to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for each M+C health plan that the HMO intends to offer. M+C requirements for the beneficiary enrollment process specify the information that an HMO must include in its enrollment application and the checks that it must perform to ensure that beneficiaries who submit applications are eligible to enroll in the HMO's health plan. M+C marketing requirements prohibit HMOs from using inaccurate or misleading language in advertisements or materials distributed to enrollees. M+C requirements for quality improvements specify that HMOs must undertake multiyear projects intended to improve the quality of health care and must routinely gather and report performance data to CMS. |
gao_GAO-07-830 | gao_GAO-07-830_0 | Enforcement also is responsible for implementing and overseeing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Fair Fund provision, which allows SEC to combine civil monetary penalties and disgorgement amounts collected in enforcement cases to establish funds for investors harmed by securities laws violations. Enforcement Has Taken Steps to Better Manage the Investigative Process, but These Steps May Not Fully Address Existing Limitations
Enforcement’s approaches for planning, tracking, and closing investigations have had some significant limitations that have hampered its ability to effectively manage its operations, allocate limited staff resources, and ensure the fair treatment of individuals and companies under investigation. While SEC and Enforcement officials are aware of these limitations and have begun addressing them, some of their actions may not fully correct identified weaknesses. Specifically, Enforcement has not (1) established written procedures and criteria for its newly centralized review and approval process for new investigations, which could limit its ability to ensure its consistent implementation and reduce the Commission’s ability to oversee the division’s operations; (2) established controls to help ensure the reliability of the investigative data that division attorneys will be required to enter into a new information system, which could limit the usefulness of management reports generated by the system; and (3) established plans and procedures to ensure that all investigations that are no longer being actively pursued are closed promptly to reduce the negative impact on individuals and companies no longer under review. Enforcement Recently Centralized the Review and Approval of New Investigations, but the Lack of Written Procedures and Criteria Could Limit the Effectiveness of its Approach
To establish overall investigative priorities, Enforcement officials said that they regularly communicate with senior SEC officials and their counterparts in other agency units. In March 2007, Enforcement began using a new, more centralized approach to review and approve investigations. Moreover, the Commission’s ability to oversee how effectively Enforcement is implementing the new approach and generally managing its operations may be limited. Planned Investigative Information System Has Significant Potential Benefits, but Enforcement Has Not Taken Sufficient Steps to Help Ensure Data Reliability
Enforcement officials have consistently stated that the division’s current information system for tracking investigations and enforcement actions— CATS—is severely limited and virtually unusable as a management tool. As a result of the system’s limitations, several senior Enforcement management officials said that they maintain their own manual lists of certain types of investigations (such as those for hedge funds) to assist in managing division activities. Enforcement Has Planned Improvements to Its Investigation Closure Processes, but Plans May Not Fully Address Backlog of Cases
Enforcement may leave open for years many investigations that are not being actively pursued with potentially negative consequences for individuals and companies no longer under review. For example, Enforcement officials at one SEC regional office said that as of March 2007, nearly 300 of 841 open investigations (about 35 percent) were more than 2 years old, had not resulted in an enforcement action, and were no longer being actively pursued. Staff must also prepare draft termination letters, which inform individuals or companies that they are no longer under review. As of March 1, 2007, the backlog consisted of 464 investigations, according to an Enforcement official. While the above steps are a positive development, they do not address the potentially large backlog of investigations that are not likely to result in enforcement actions and for which closing packages have not been completed. Nevertheless, the failure to address this issue—potentially through expedited administrative closing procedures for particularly aged investigations—would limit Enforcement’s capacity to manage its operations and ensure the fair treatment of individuals and companies under its review. Enforcement’s Approach to Managing Fair Funds May Also Have Slowed Distributions, and SEC Has Not Defined Responsibilities of a New Office to Administer the Program
In addition to the factors discussed above, Enforcement’s largely decentralized approach to managing the process may also have contributed to delays in the distribution of Fair Funds. However, Enforcement and SEC have not yet implemented our 2005 recommendation that they document referrals of potential criminal activity to other agencies, although plans to do so have been established as part of the division’s new investigation management information system (the Hub). In some cases, Enforcement details investigative attorneys to Justice to assist in the criminal prosecution of alleged securities law violators. Conclusions
In recent years, SEC’s Enforcement division and investigative attorneys have initiated a variety of high-profile enforcement actions that resulted in record fines and other civil penalties for alleged serious securities violations and contributed to criminal convictions for the most egregious offenses. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the office may better facilitate the distribution of funds to investors harmed by securities frauds and other violations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen Enforcement’s management processes and systems and help ensure compliance with securities laws, we recommend that the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission direct the Division of Enforcement and other agency offices, such as the Office of Information Technology or Office of the Executive Director, as appropriate, to take the following four actions: establish written procedures and criteria on which to base the review and approval of new investigations; establish written procedures that reinforce the importance of attorneys entering investigative data into the Hub, provide guidance on how to do so in a timely and consistent way, and establish a control process by which other division officials can independently assess the reliability of investigative data maintained in the system; consider developing expedited administrative and review procedures for closing investigations that have not resulted in enforcement actions and are no longer being actively pursued; and establish and implement a comprehensive plan for improving the management of the Fair Fund program, to include (1) staffing the new central Fair Fund office, defining its roles and responsibilities, and establishing relevant written procedures and (2) ensuring the consistency of and analyzing final accounting reports on completed Fair Fund plans. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our first objective—evaluating the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Division of Enforcement’s (Enforcement) internal processes and information systems for planning, tracking, and closing investigations and planned changes to these processes and systems—we reviewed relevant SEC and Enforcement documentation and data, including the agency’s strategic plan, annual performance reports, performance measurement data, investigation and enforcement action data from the Case Activity Tracking System (CATS), and Enforcement personnel data. To address the third objective—evaluating Enforcement’s efforts to coordinate investigative activities with other SEC divisions and federal and state law enforcement agencies—we reviewed previous GAO reports on mutual fund trading abuses and Enforcement’s coordination efforts with law enforcement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) ability to conduct investigations and bring enforcement actions for violations of securities laws is critical to its mission to protect investors and maintain fair and orderly markets. SEC's Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) is charged with investigating securities law violations; recommending civil enforcement actions when appropriate, either in a federal court or before an administrative law judge; and negotiating settlements on behalf of the Commission. The types of sanctions that Enforcement can seek on behalf of the Commission include monetary penalties or fines and disgorgements of the profits that individuals or companies may derive by having committed securities violations. While SEC has only civil authority, it also works with various law enforcement agencies, including the United States Department of Justice (Justice), to bring criminal cases when appropriate. In addition, Enforcement is responsible for overseeing the Fair Fund program, which seeks to compensate investors who suffer losses resulting from fraud or other securities violations by individuals and companies. Under the Fair Fund program, SEC can combine the proceeds of monetary penalties and disgorgements into a single fund and then distribute the proceeds to harmed investors. In recent years, Enforcement has initiated high-profile actions that resulted in record civil fines against companies and senior officers and in some cases contributed to criminal convictions. However, the capacity of SEC in general and Enforcement in particular to appropriately plan and effectively manage their activities and fulfill their critical law enforcement and investor protection responsibilities on an ongoing basis has been criticized in the past. Although SEC received a substantial increase in its appropriations as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, questions have been raised in Congress and elsewhere on the extent to which the agency is using these resources to better fulfill its mission. Moreover, we have reported that aspects of Enforcement's information systems and management procedures could limit the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. For example, we found in 2004 that Enforcement faced challenges in developing the advanced information technology necessary to facilitate the investigative process. In addition, we reported in 2005 that the distribution of funds to harmed investors under the Fair Fund program was limited and that Enforcement had not developed adequate systems and data to fulfill its oversight responsibilities. Because of congressional interest in ensuring that SEC effectively manages its resources and helps ensure compliance with securities laws and regulations, Congress requested that we review key Enforcement management processes and systems and follow up on our previous work where appropriate. Accordingly, this report evaluates Enforcement's (1) internal processes and information systems for planning, tracking, and closing investigations and planned changes to these processes and systems; (2) implementation of SEC's Fair Fund program responsibilities; and (3) efforts to coordinate investigative activities with other SEC divisions and federal and state law enforcement agencies.
What GAO Found
Enforcement's processes and systems for planning, tracking, and closing investigations have had some significant limitations that have hampered the division's capacity to effectively manage its operations and allocate limited resources. While Enforcement and SEC officials are aware of these deficiencies and have recently begun addressing them, additional actions are necessary to help ensure that the planned improvements fully address limitations in the division's operations. In March 2007, Enforcement said it would centrally review and approve all new investigations of potential securities law violations by individuals or companies. Under Enforcement's previous, largely decentralized approach, the division was not always able to ensure the efficient allocation of resources or maintain quality control in the investigative process. While the new centralized approach was designed to help address these issues, Enforcement has not yet established written procedures and criteria for reviewing and approving new investigations. Without such procedures and criteria, Enforcement may face challenges in consistently communicating the new approach to existing and new staff. The lack of written procedures and criteria could also limit the Commission's ability to evaluate the implementation of the new approach and help ensure that the division is managing its operations and resources efficiently. Recognizing that the division's current information system for tracking investigations and enforcement actions--Case Activity Tracking System (CATS)--is severely limited as a management tool, Enforcement plans to start using a new system (the Hub) by late 2007. The deficiencies of CATS include its inability to produce detailed reports on investigations of certain types or the status of such investigations. While the Hub is designed to address many of CATS's deficiencies the way that the system is being implemented may not address all existing limitations. More specifically, Enforcement has not established written controls to help ensure that staff enter investigative data in the Hub in a timely and consistent manner. Without such controls, management reports generated by the Hub may have limited usefulness, and the system's capacity to assist Enforcement in better managing ongoing investigations will not be fully realized. In May 2007, Enforcement implemented procedures to help ensure the prompt closure of investigations that are no longer being pursued and thereby better ensure the fair treatment of individuals and companies under review, but these procedures do not fully address the entire backlog of these investigations. One regional Enforcement official said that as of March 2007, nearly 300 of the office's 840 open investigations were 2 or more years old, were no longer being pursued, and had no pending enforcement actions. Enforcement officials said that the failure to close such investigations promptly could have negative consequences for individuals and companies no longer suspected of having committed securities violations. They attributed the failure to close many investigations to several factors, such as time-consuming administrative requirements for attorneys to prepare detailed investigation closing memorandums that then must be routed to senior division officials for review and approval. To address these issues, Enforcement plans to inform individuals and companies more promptly that they are no longer under review and expedite the review and closure of the existing backlog of investigations for which administrative tasks have been completed (as of March 2007, there were 464 such investigations). However, Enforcement's plans do not include clearing the potentially large backlog of investigations for which such administrative tasks have not been completed, which could be negatively impacting individuals and companies no longer actively under review. |
gao_AIMD-96-15 | gao_AIMD-96-15_0 | General computer controls, however, also affect the security and reliability of financial and nonfinancial operations processed by SCC for other Senate offices. Specifically, we evaluated controls intended to protect data, files, and programs from unauthorized access; prevent unauthorized changes to systems and applications software; provide segregation of duties among applications and systems programmers, computer operators, security administrators, and other data center personnel; ensure recovery of computer processing operations in case of a disaster or other unexpected interruption; and ensure adequate computer security administration. SCC officials advised us that they did not plan to implement ACF2 over other mainframe applications due to (1) indications that, for some programs, less rigorous security measures are preferred by user management to provide easier accessibility, (2) resource constraints, and (3) intentions to transition from the mainframe to a decentralized network environment. The technical options that SCC has implemented to control access to the information on its mainframe negate many of the control benefits that the software offers. We identified another area in which SCC could improve its access monitoring controls. SCC did not have a formal change control process to document management’s authorization and approval of routine and emergency changes to systems software. At SCC, we found inadequate segregation of duties, particularly in the granting of powerful security privileges. A comprehensive strategic plan that integrates and controls access and processing for all Senate files, programs, and data is crucial to ensuring that Senate computer resources are adequately safeguarded. Develop, implement, and test a disaster recovery plan for all critical SCC operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated and tested the general computer controls that affect the overall security and effectiveness of the Senate Computer Center's (SCC) financial systems, focusing on whether those controls: (1) protect data, files, and programs from unauthorized access; (2) prevent unauthorized changes to systems and applications software; (3) provide segregation of duties among computer, security, and other SCC personnel; (4) ensure recovery of computer processing operations in case of unexpected interruption; and (5) ensure adequate computer security administration.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SCC general computer controls do not adequately protect sensitive data files and computer programs from unauthorized disclosure and modification; (2) SCC has not fully implemented its access control software to control access to other mainframe programs due to a preference for easier access, resource constraints, the planned transition to decentralized networks, conflicting technical options, and poor access monitoring capabilities; (3) SCC lacks formal software change control and documentation procedures; (4) SCC has not adequately segregated computer duties, particularly regarding security privileges; (5) although SCC is developing off-site disaster recovery and contingency capabilities, the Senate could be exposed to significant security risk as it moves toward a decentralized network environment because it does not have a comprehensive strategic plan for its computer resources; and (6) the two Senate offices responsible for Senate receipts and disbursements supplement SCC general computer management controls to ensure data integrity and authorization when reconciling disbursement information with independent records. |
gao_GAO-08-651T | gao_GAO-08-651T_0 | TSA’s aviation security mission includes strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport areas; hiring and training a screening workforce; prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports nationwide, among other responsibilities. TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes with federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation’s Aviation and Surface Transportation Systems, but More Work Remains
DHS, primarily through TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems. However, as we reported in June 2004, the agency can further strengthen its efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security- related technologies and reduce the risks posed by airport employees, among other things. However, TSA has not developed a plan to guide and support individual airports and the commercial airport system as a whole with respect to future technology enhancements for perimeter security and access controls. TSA also established numerous programs to train and test the performance of its screening workforce. Over the past several years, TSA has faced a number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, which will allow TSA to assume responsibility from air carriers for comparing domestic passenger information against the No Fly List and Selectee List. With regard to checkpoint screening technologies, TSA and S&T have researched, developed, tested, and initiated procurements of various technologies to address security vulnerabilities that may be exploited; however, limited progress has been made in fielding emerging technologies. Our work assessing DHS’s efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface transportation modes is being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway infrastructure security. TSA has taken actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, but its efforts related to commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure are in the early stages. TSA has taken actions to develop and issue security standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail transportation modes. However, TSA has not yet developed or issued security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, or determined whether standards are necessary for these modes of transportation. TSA has hired and deployed surface transportation security inspectors who conduct compliance inspections for both passenger and freight rail modes of transportation; however, questions exist regarding how TSA will employ the inspectors to enforce new regulations proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and regulations to be developed in accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. We have made numerous recommendations to DHS and its components, including TSA, to strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in implementing some of these recommendations. For example, with regard to TSA’s efforts to secure air cargo, we reported in October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk-management approach to securing the nation’s domestic air cargo system, and that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines. In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of key stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. Concluding Observations
The magnitude of DHS’s and TSA’s responsibilities in securing the nation’s transportation system is significant, and we commend the department on the work it has done and is currently doing to secure this network. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to protect the nation's transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation and surface modes of transportation. Other DHS components, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector also play a role in transportation security. GAO has examined (1) the progress TSA and other DHS components have made in securing the nation's aviation and surface transportation systems, and the challenges that remain, and (2) crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA's efforts in strengthening security. This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from February 2004 to February 2008 and ongoing work regarding the security of the nation's aviation and surface transportation systems, as well as selected updates to this work conducted in April 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents related to TSA security efforts and interviewed TSA and transportation industry officials.
What GAO Found
DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in securing the aviation and surface transportation networks, but more work remains. With regard to commercial aviation, TSA has undertaken efforts to strengthen airport security; hire, train, and measure the performance of it screening workforce; prescreen passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. With regard to surface transportation modes, TSA has taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highways; establish security standards for certain transportation modes; and conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly passenger and freight rail. TSA also hired and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger and freight rail systems. While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the transportation network, DHS and TSA still face a number of key challenges in further securing these systems. For example, regarding commercial aviation, although TSA has made significant progress in its development of an advanced passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, challenges remain, including unreliable program cost and schedule estimates, among other things. In addition, TSA's efforts to enhance perimeter security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for effective security. For example, TSA has initiated efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems, but has not developed a plan for guiding airports with respect to future technology enhancements. While TSA is pursuing the procurement of several checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, it has not deployed technologies on a wide-scale basis, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. Further, TSA's efforts to develop security standards for surface transportation modes have been limited to passenger and freight rail, and TSA has not determined what its regulatory role will be with respect to commercial vehicles or highway infrastructure. A number of crosscutting issues have impeded DHS's and TSA's efforts to secure the transportation network, including the need to strengthen strategic planning and performance measurement, and more fully adopt and apply risk-based principles in the pursuit of its security initiatives. |
gao_GAO-07-86 | gao_GAO-07-86_0 | Background
There are some similarities in how Medicare pays ASCs and hospital outpatient departments for the procedures they perform. APC Groups Accurately Reflect the Relative Costs of ASC Procedures
The APC groups reflect the relative costs of procedures provided by ASCs as well as they reflect the relative costs of procedures provided in the hospital outpatient department setting. Specifically, 45 percent of procedures performed in ASCs fell within a 0.10 point range of the ASC-to-APC median cost ratio, and 33 percent of those procedures fell within a 0.10 point range of the OPPS-to-APC median cost ratio in the hospital outpatient department setting (see figs. Among all procedures in our analysis, the median ASC-to-APC cost ratio was 0.39. When weighted by Medicare volume based on 2004 claims data, the median ASC- to-APC cost ratio was 0.84. We determined that the median OPPS-to-APC cost ratio was 1.04. Although costs for individual procedures vary, in general, the median costs for procedures are lower in ASCs, relative to the median costs of their APC groups, than the median costs for the same procedures in the hospital outpatient department setting. Comparison of Per- Procedure Costs
To compare the relative costs of procedures performed in ASCs and hospital outpatient departments, we first compiled information on ASCs’ costs and procedures performed. We then calculated a ratio between each procedure’s ASC median cost, as determined by the survey, and the median cost of each procedure’s corresponding APC group under the OPPS, referred to as the ASC-to-APC cost ratio. We also calculated a ratio between each ASC procedure’s median cost under the OPPS and the median cost of the procedure’s APC group, using the data obtained from CMS, referred to as the OPPS-to-APC cost ratio. To assess how well the relative costs of procedures in the OPPS, defined by their assignment to APC groups, reflect the relative costs of procedures in the ASC setting, we evaluated the distribution of the ASC-to-APC and OPPS-to-APC cost ratios. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare pays for surgical procedures performed at ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) and hospital outpatient departments through different payment systems. Although they perform a similar set of procedures, no comparison of ASC and hospital outpatient per-procedure costs has been conducted. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 directed GAO to compare the relative costs of procedures furnished in ASCs to the relative costs of those procedures furnished in hospital outpatient departments, in particular, how accurately the payment groups used in the hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) reflect the relative costs of procedures performed in ASCs. To do this, GAO collected data from ASCs through a survey. GAO also obtained hospital outpatient data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
What GAO Found
GAO determined that the payment groups in the OPPS, known as ambulatory payment classification (APC) groups, accurately reflect the relative cost of procedures performed in ASCs. GAO calculated the ratio between each procedure's ASC median cost, as determined by GAO's survey, and the median cost of each procedure's corresponding APC group under the OPPS, referred to as the ASC-to-APC cost ratio. GAO also compared the OPPS median costs of those same procedures with the median costs of their APC groups, referred to as the OPPS-to-APC cost ratio. GAO's analysis of the ASC-to-APC and OPPS-to-APC cost ratios showed that 45 percent of all procedures in the analysis fell within a 0.10 point range of the ASC-to-APC median cost ratio, and 33 percent of procedures fell within a 0.10 point range of the OPPS-to-APC median cost ratio. These similar patterns of distribution around the median show that the APC groups reflect the relative costs of procedures provided by ASCs as well as they reflect the relative costs of procedures provided in hospital outpatient departments and can be used as the basis for the ASC payment system. GAO's analysis also identified differences in the cost of procedures in the two settings. The median cost ratio among all ASC procedures was 0.39 and when weighted by Medicare claims volume was 0.84. The median cost ratio for OPPS procedures was 1.04. Thus, the cost of procedures in ASCs is substantially lower than the corresponding cost in hospital outpatient departments. |
gao_GAO-03-927 | gao_GAO-03-927_0 | The executive order stated that the commission’s mission shall be to examine the state of USPS and submit a report to the President by July 31, 2003, that articulates a proposed vision for USPS, along with recommendations for the legislative and administrative reforms needed to ensure the viability of postal services. Worksharing Involves Activities Mailers Must Perform to Qualify for Lower Rates
Postal worksharing activities generally involve mailers preparing, barcoding, sorting, or transporting mail to qualify for reduced postage rates, that is, worksharing rates. Worksharing rates are based on what are commonly referred to as worksharing discounts because the rates are reduced based on the costs that USPS is estimated to avoid as a result of mailer worksharing activities. Key worksharing activities include (1) barcoding and preparing mail so it can be sorted by USPS automated equipment, which reduces manual sorting and other USPS handling of the mail; (2) presorting mail, such as by ZIP Code or specific delivery location, to reduce the number of times USPS must sort the mail to route it to the addressee; and (3) entering mail at a USPS facility that is generally closer to the final destination of the mail, which is commonly referred as entering the mail deeper into USPS’s network used to move the mail. Mailers must also perform numerous other worksharing activities. In fiscal year 2002, nearly three- quarters of domestic mail received worksharing rates (see fig. Second, they credit worksharing with benefiting mailers and the mailing industry. While stakeholders generally support the concept of worksharing, they have raised differing concerns in this area. Worksharing Is Credited with Benefiting USPS
According to USPS and PRC, worksharing benefits USPS by enabling it to improve its operations and help minimize its workforce and infrastructure, and by stimulating mail volume growth. As we have reported, USPS’s business model relies on growth in mail volume to generate revenues to help cover rising costs. Worksharing Is Credited with Benefiting the Nation
According to USPS and PRC, worksharing benefits the nation, in part by lowering business costs, and in part by creating associated benefits that consumers can realize. For example, APWU has asserted that worksharing discounts are too large, but some members of the mailing industry have asserted that worksharing discounts are not large enough (see table 3). Specifically, the act requires that, in recommending changes to postage rates, PRC consider nine factors, including “the degree of preparation of mail for delivery into the postal system performed by the mailer and its effect upon reducing costs to USPS.” The nine factors that PRC must consider when recommending domestic postage rates and fees are as follows: the establishment and maintenance of a fair and equitable schedule; the value of mail service actually provided each class of mail or type of mail service to both the sender and the recipient, including, but not limited to, the collection, mode of transportation, and priority of delivery; the requirement that each class of mail or type of mail service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to that class or type plus that portion of all other costs of USPS reasonably assignable to such class or type; the effect of rate increases upon the general public, business mail users, and enterprises in the private sector of the economy engaged in the delivery of mail matter other than letters; the available alternative means of sending and receiving letters and other mail matter at reasonable costs; the degree of preparation of mail for delivery into the postal system performed by the mailer and its effect upon reducing costs to USPS; simplicity of structure for the entire schedule and simple, identifiable relationships between the rates or fees charged the various classes of mail for postal services; the educational, cultural, scientific, and informational value to the recipient of mail matter; and such other factors as PRC deems appropriate. These proceedings have established precedents that have further clarified the legal basis for worksharing rates. (2) What is the rationale for worksharing, according to the U.S. We did not assess the benefits that USPS and PRC claimed are derived from worksharing. To obtain information on the legal basis for worksharing, we reviewed pertinent laws, decisions in postal rate cases interpreting legal criteria for worksharing rates, and pertinent USPS and PRC regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) faces major financial, operational, and human capital challenges that call for a transformation if USPS is to remain viable in the 21st century. Given these challenges, the President established a commission to examine the state of USPS and submit a report by July 31, 2003, with a proposed vision for USPS and recommendations to ensure the viability of postal services. The presidential commission has addressed worksharing (activities that mailers perform to obtain lower postage rates) in the course of its work. About three-quarters of domestic mail volume is workshared. Worksharing is fundamental to USPS operations, but is not well understood by a general audience. To help Congress and others better understand worksharing, GAO was asked to provide information on the key activities and the rationale for worksharing and the legal basis for worksharing rates. GAO discusses USPS's and the Postal Rate Commission's rationale for worksharing but did not assess the benefits that they claimed for worksharing. GAO will issue a second report later this year on worksharing issues raised by stakeholders. In commenting on this report, USPS and the Postal Rate Commission reemphasized the benefits of worksharing.
What GAO Found
Postal worksharing activities generally involve mailers preparing, sorting, or transporting mail to qualify for reduced postage rates, that is, worksharing rates. These rates are based on what are referred to as worksharing discounts because the rates are reduced based on the costs that USPS is estimated to avoid as a result of mailer worksharing activities. Key activities include (1) barcoding and preparing mail to be sorted by USPS automated equipment, which reduces manual sorting; (2) presorting mail by ZIP Code or specific delivery location, which reduces USPS sorting; and (3) entering mail at a USPS facility that generally is closer to the final destination of the mail. Worksharing also requires mailers to perform numerous other activities, such as updating addresses to improve their accuracy. According to USPS and the Postal Rate Commission, the rationale for worksharing is that it benefits USPS, mailers and the mailing industry, and the nation. They said worksharing benefits (1) USPS by enabling it to improve its operations and thereby help minimize its workforce and infrastructure, and by stimulating mail volume growth that generates revenues to cover rising costs; (2) mailers by reducing mail-related costs and improving delivery service, and the mailing industry that performs worksharing activities; and (3) the nation, in part by lowering business costs, and in part by the associated benefits that consumers can realize. While stakeholders generally support the concept of worksharing, they have raised differing concerns in this area. For example, the American Postal Workers Union has asserted that worksharing discounts are too large, but some mailers and members of the mailing industry have asserted that the worksharing discounts are not large enough. The primary legal basis for worksharing rates is the requirement in law that, when recommending postage rates, the Postal Rate Commission consider mail preparation and its effect upon reducing USPS costs. Postal rate cases have established precedents clarifying the basis for worksharing rates. |
gao_GAO-08-456T | gao_GAO-08-456T_0 | In accordance with the act, we reviewed (1) TSA’s efforts to develop reliable cost and schedule estimates for Secure Flight; (2) progress made by TSA in developing and implementing the Secure Flight system, including the implementation of security controls; (3) TSA’s efforts to coordinate with CBP to integrate Secure Flight with CBP’s watch-list matching function for international flights; (4) TSA’s plans to protect private passenger information under Secure Flight; and (5) DHS’s efforts to assess the effectiveness of the current redress process for passengers misidentified as being on or wrongly assigned to the No Fly or Selectee list. Figure 1 identifies reported aviation security funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. For example, TSA developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions, and implemented several initiatives intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised explosives. We reported that TSA also proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability information), among other factors, but, as we previsouly reported, could do more evaluation of proposed procedures before they are implemented to help ensure that they achieve their intended results. Finally, TSA is exploring new technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other threats, but continues to face management and funding challenges in developing and fielding technologies at airport checkpoints. Since that time, TSA has developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. However, FSDs identified that some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006 staffing model did not reflect actual operating conditions. TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger Screening Procedures, but Could Improve Its Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Procedures
In addition to TSA’s efforts to deploy a federal TSO workforce, TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger checkpoint screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited items. For example, TSA has issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that focused on securing the domestic air cargo supply chain. TSA Is Working to Revise Inspection Exemptions, Enhance Its Compliance Inspection Acitivites, and Develop Technologies for Air Cargo
In October 2005 and April 2007, we also reported that TSA had established requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, but had exempted some domestic and inbound cargo from screening. TSA Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Secure Flight Program, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts
TSA has made substantial progress in instilling more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and implementation since we last reported on the program in February 2007, but challenges remain that may hinder the program’s progress moving forward. However, despite these successes, TSA continues to face some program management challenges in developing the program. We also found that TSA can strengthen its systems development efforts by demonstrating that it has fully implemented its risk management plan, incorporated end-to-end testing as part of the program’s testing strategy, and more fully addressed system security requirements and vulnerabilities. key privacy protection principles. Information security. DHS and TSA Lack Performance Measures to Fully Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Redress Process, But Plan Additional Measures under Secure Flight
DHS and TSA have not developed a complete set of performance measures to assess the effectiveness of the redress process for passengers inconvenienced as a result of watch-list matching. Conclusions
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for these efforts. More specifically, TSA developed processes to more efficiently allocate and deploy the TSO workforce, strengthened screening procedures, is working to develop and deploy more effective screening technologies, strengthened the security of air cargo, and improved the development of a program to prescreen passengers against the terrorist watch-list. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist TSA in further strengthening the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration to take the following three actions:
Fully incorporate best practices into the development of Secure Flight life-cycle cost and schedule estimates, to include: updating life-cycle cost and schedule estimates; demonstrating that the Secure Flight schedule has the logic in place to identify the critical path, integrates lower level activities in a logical manner, and identifies the level of confidence in meeting the desired end date; and developing and implementing a plan for managing and mitigating cost and schedule risks, including performing a schedule risk analysis and a cost and schedule risk assessment. We incorporated technical changes to this statement based on TSA’s comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system through passenger screening, air cargo, and watch-list matching programs, and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued between February 2004 and April 2007, including selected updates in February 2008. This testimony also addresses TSA's progress in developing the Secure Flight program, based on work conducted from August 2007 to January 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed systems development, privacy, and other documentation, and interviewed Department of Homeland Security (DHS), TSA, and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's commercial aviation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. Specifically, TSA developed and implemented a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions, and proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk information. However, GAO reported that some assumptions in TSA's Staffing Allocation Model did not accurately reflect airport operating conditions, and that TSA could improve its process for evaluating the effectiveness of proposed procedural changes. In response, TSA developed a plan to review Staffing Allocation Model assumptions and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA has also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including conducting vulnerability assessments at airports and compliance inspections of air carriers. However, TSA has not developed an inspection plan that included performance goals and measures to determine whether air carriers transporting cargo into the United States were complying with security requirements. In response to GAO's recommendations, TSA has since established a working group to strengthen its compliance activities. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen aviation security. For example, TSA has made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. Further, TSA continues to face some program management challenges in developing Secure Flight. Specifically, TSA has not (1) developed program cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; (2) fully implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned for system end-to-end testing in test plans; and (4) ensured that information security requirements are fully implemented. If these challenges are not addressed effectively, the risk of the program not being completed on schedule and within estimated costs is increased, and the chances of it performing as intended are diminished. DHS and TSA lack performance measures to fully evaluate the effectiveness of current processes for passengers who apply for redress due to inconveniences experienced during the check-in and screening process. Without such measures, DHS and TSA lack a sound basis to monitor the effectiveness of the redress process. |
gao_GAO-03-670 | gao_GAO-03-670_0 | Key Differences Between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions
Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist event has altered some military operations. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001. The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement
The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. §831); assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (10 U.S.C. DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military Missions, but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made
In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. We could not assess the adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the time of our review because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed. Domestic military missions provide less opportunity to practice varied skills required for combat and consequently offer limited training value; thus, some forces have not been tailored to perform their domestic military missions. These factors indicate that the current mission approach may not be sustainable and risks eroding readiness. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform domestic military missions. When performing domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills through practice in normal training. Moreover, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of personnel exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased substantially, an indicator that the present force structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military missions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the Department of Defense’s (DOD) military and nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since September 11, 2001, we conducted in-depth interviews with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited to the Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Assistant for Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the General Counsel; the Joint Staff’s J-3 Directorate for Operations and J-5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy; U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security; the Director of Military Support; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; the National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the Army and Air National Guard. GAO Comments
1. Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to encompass traditional military threats from hostile states, asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, and asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. 2. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states. GAO was asked to review DOD's domestic missions, including (1) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ; (2) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions have changed since September 11, 2001; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act affects DOD's nonmilitary missions; and (4) the extent to which DOD's organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the current mission approach.
What GAO Found
DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example, as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command) and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess the adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed. DOD's force structure is not well tailored to perform domestic military missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of operations that preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. While on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training value. In addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention. |
gao_GAO-06-175T | gao_GAO-06-175T_0 | The Volume of Prescription Drug Imports Is Unknown but Believed to Be Substantial, and the Safety of These Drug Imports Is Not Assured
My statement will now focus on what the available data show about the volume and safety of prescription drugs imported into the United States for personal use through the international mail and private carriers. CBP and FDA Do Not Know the Scope of Prohibited Prescription Drug Importation, but They Believe it to Be Substantial
In our report, we state that CBP and FDA do not systematically collect data on the volume of prescription drugs and controlled substances they encounter at the mail and carrier facilities. The Safety of Prescription Drug Imports Is Not Assured
Regarding the safety of prescription drug imports, we report that FDA officials have said that they cannot provide assurance to the public regarding the safety and quality of drugs purchased from foreign sources, which are largely outside of their regulatory system. The results of these efforts have raised questions about the safety of some of the drugs. New Procedures Should Encourage Uniform Practices, but They Still Allow Many Packages Containing Prescription Drugs to Be Released
With regard to procedures and practices used at selected facilities to inspect and interdict prescription drugs unapproved for import, our report cites our July 2004 testimony in which we reported that CBP and FDA officials at selected mail and carrier facilities used different practices and procedures to inspect and interdict packages that contain prescription drugs. Factors beyond Inspection and Interdiction Complicate Efforts to Enforce the Prohibitions on Personal Importation of Prescription Drugs
My statement will now focus on the three factors that our report identified as affecting federal agency efforts to enforce the prohibition on prescription drug importation for personal use through international mail and carrier facilities. Internet Pharmacies Challenge Law Enforcement Efforts
According to our report, Internet pharmacies, particularly foreign-based sites, which operate outside the U.S. regulatory system, pose a challenge for regulators and law enforcement agencies. Before any imported item is refused, the current law requires FDA to notify the owner or consignee that the item has been held because it appears to be prohibited and give the product’s owner or consignee an opportunity to submit evidence of admissibility. As of July 2005, according to FDA officials and an HHS official, the Secretary had not responded with a specific legislative proposal to change FDA’s notification requirement. Federal Efforts to Coordinate Law Enforcement Activities Could Benefit from a Strategic Framework
My statement will now focus on efforts federal agencies have undertaken to coordinate the enforcement of the prohibitions on personal importation of prescription drugs. CBP officials and other members of the task force provided examples of activities being carried out or planned by task force working groups. According to our report, the challenges we identify could be more effectively addressed by using a strategic framework that more clearly defines the scope of the problem by estimating the volume of drugs entering international mail and carrier facilities, establishes milestones and performance measures, determines resources and investments needed to address the flow of imported drugs entering the facilities and where those resources and investments should be targeted, and evaluates progress. CBP and other agencies have taken a step in the right direction by establishing a task force designed to address many of the challenges discussed in this report. In addition to the issues addressed by the task force, FDA has also expressed continuing concern to Congress that it encounters serious resource constraints enforcing the law at mail facilities because packages containing personal drug imports must be handled in accordance with FDA’s time-consuming and resource- intensive notification process. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes a GAO report on federal efforts to address the importation of prohibited prescription drugs through international mail and carrier facilities for personal use. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), work with other federal agencies at international mail and express carrier facilities to inspect for and interdict these drugs. This testimony addresses (1) available data about the volume and safety of these drugs, (2) the procedures and practices used to inspect and interdict them, (3) factors affecting federal efforts to enforce the laws governing these drugs, and (4) federal agencies' efforts to coordinate enforcement of the prohibitions on personal importation of these drugs.
What GAO Found
The information currently available on the safety of illegally imported prescription drugs is very limited, and neither CBP nor FDA systematically collects data on the volume of these imports. Nevertheless, on the basis of their own observations and limited information they collected at some mail and carrier facilities, both CBP and FDA officials said that the volume of prescription drugs imported into the United States is substantial and increasing. FDA officials said that they cannot assure the public of the safety of drugs purchased from foreign sources outside the U.S. regulatory system. FDA has issued new procedures to standardize practices for selecting packages for inspection and making admissibility determinations. While these procedures may encourage uniform practices across mail facilities, packages containing prescription drugs continue to be released to the addressees. CBP has also implemented new procedures to interdict and destroy certain imported controlled substances, such as Valium. CBP officials said the new process is designed to improve their ability to quickly handle packages containing these drugs, but they did not know if the policy had affected overall volume because packages may not always be detected. GAO identified three factors that have complicated federal enforcement of laws prohibiting the personal importation of prescription drugs. First, the volume of imports has strained limited federal resources at mail facilities. Second, Internet pharmacies can operate outside the U.S. regulatory system and evade federal law enforcement actions. Third, current law requires FDA to give addressees of packages containing unapproved imported drugs notice and the opportunity to provide evidence of admissibility regarding their imported items. FDA and HHS have testified before Congress that this process placed a burden on limited resources. In May 2001, FDA proposed to the HHS Secretary that this legal requirement be eliminated, but according to FDA and HHS officials, as of July 2005, the Secretary had not respondedwith a proposal. FDA officials stated that any legislative change might require consideration of such issues as whether to forgo an individual's opportunity to provide evidence of the admissibility of the drug ordered. Prior federal task forces and working groups had taken steps to deal with Internet sales of prescription drugs since 1999, but these efforts did not position federal agencies to successfully address the influx of these drugs imported from foreign sources. Recently, CBP has organized a task force to coordinate federal agencies' activities to enforce the laws prohibiting the personal importation of prescription drugs. The task force's efforts appear to be steps in the right direction, but they could be enhanced by establishing a strategic framework to define the scope of the problem at mail and carrier facilities, determine resource needs, establish performance measures, and evaluate progress. Absent this framework, it will be difficult to oversee task force efforts; hold agencies accountable; and ensure ongoing, focused attention to the enforcement of the relevant laws. |
gao_GAO-04-232T | gao_GAO-04-232T_0 | Background
Ensuring the security of our nation’s commercial aviation system has been a long-standing concern. Limited Information Exists on the Effectiveness of Aviation Security Initiatives
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation security but has collected little information on the effectiveness of these initiatives. However, TSA is taking steps to collect objective data to assess its performance. Another key source of data on screener performance in detecting threat objects is the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which places images of threat objects on the X-ray screen during actual operations and records whether screeners identify the threat object. TSA Is Developing Performance Evaluation Tools
TSA has recognized the need to strengthen the assessment of its performance, and has initiated efforts to develop and implement strategic and performance plans to clarify goals, establish performance measures, and measure the performance of its security initiatives. TSA also plans to increase its focus on measuring the effectiveness of various aspects of the aviation security system in its 5- year performance plan. According to TSA’s current draft strategic plan, which outlines its overall goals and strategies for fiscal years 2003 through 2008, its efforts to measure the effectiveness of the aviation security system will include random and scheduled reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of oversight of compliance with security standards and approved programs through a combination of inspections, testing, interviews, and record reviews—to include TIP; measurement of performance against standards to ensure expected standards are met and to drive process improvements; and collection and communication of performance data using a state-of-the- art data collection and reporting system. In recent years, we have consistently advocated the use of a risk management approach to respond to various national security and terrorism challenges, and have recommended that TSA apply this approach to strengthen security in aviation as well as in other modes of transportation. Accordingly, a risk management approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions. Figure 1 describes the risk management approach. A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from attack. TSA has not yet fully implemented its risk management approach, but it has taken steps in this direction. TSA Faces Additional Programmatic And Management Challenges
In addition to collecting performance data and implementing a risk management approach, TSA faces a number of other programmatic and management challenges in strengthening aviation security. These challenges include implementing the new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System; strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and general aviation security; managing the costs of aviation security initiatives; and managing human capital. In addition to fielding the EDS systems at airports, difficulties exist in integrating these systems into airport baggage handling systems. Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead. | Why GAO Did This Study
It has been 2 years since the attacks of September 11,2001, exposed vulnerabilities in the nation's aviation system. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on a wide range of initiatives designed to enhance the security of commercial aviation. However, vulnerabilities in aviation security continue to exist. As a result, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of established initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft from threat objects, and whether additional measures are needed to further enhance security. Accordingly, GAO was asked to describe the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to (1) measure the effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives, particularly its passenger screening program; (2) implement a risk management approach to prioritize efforts and focus resources; and (3) address key challenges to further enhance aviation security.
What GAO Found
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness of these initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent work on passenger screening found that little testing or other data exist that measures the performance of screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking steps to collect data on the effectiveness of its security initiatives, including developing a 5-year performance plan detailing numerous performance measures, as well as implementing several efforts to collect performance data on the effectiveness of passenger screening--such as fielding the Threat Image Projection System and increasing screener testing. TSA has developed a risk management approach to prioritize efforts, assess threats, and focus resources related to its aviation security initiatives as we previously recommended, but has not yet fully implemented this approach. A risk management approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key decisions. TSA is developing and implementing both a criticality and a vulnerability assessment tool to provide a basis for risk-based decision-making. TSA is currently using some components of these tools and plans to fully implement its risk management approach by the summer 2004. TSA faces a number of programmatic and management challenges as it continues to enhance aviation security. These include the implementation of the new computer-assisted passenger prescreening system, as well as strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and general aviation security. TSA also must manage the costs associated with aviation security and address human capital challenges, such as sizing its workforce as efficiency is improved with security-enhancing technologies--including the integration of explosive detection systems into in-line baggage-handling systems. Further challenges in sizing its workforce may be encountered if airports are granted permission to opt out of using federal screeners. |
gao_GAO-03-664 | gao_GAO-03-664_0 | For blanket order cases, the system uses criteria such as an item’s national item identification number, a federal supply class, or a federal supply group to restrict the parts available to foreign military sales customers. We found that (1) controls based on supply class restrictions were ineffective and resulted in erroneously approved requisitions for shipment, and that written policies for recovering the erroneously shipped items did not exist; (2) the Air Force did not validate modifications to its Security Assistance Management Information System related to blanket orders or test the system’s logic for restricting requisitions, and (3) command country managers did not always document reasons for overriding either the Security Assistance Management Information System or foreign military sales case manager recommendations not to ship classified spare parts. As a result of these inadequate internal controls, classified and controlled spare parts were shipped to countries not authorized to receive them. We found that because the Security Assistance Management Information System was not properly programmed, it erroneously validated 35 blanket order requisitions (of the 123 in our review), even though an incorrect supply class number was used, because the countries used supply classes that were not restricted. The restriction included an outline sequencer (national stock number –1377010539320) used on ejection seats for various aircraft. Because supply class 1680 (miscellaneous aircraft accessories and components) was not restricted and the Security Assistance Management Information System did not verify that 1680 was the correct supply class for national item identification number 010539320, the system approved the requisition. Had the system validated the entire 13-digit national stock number, it would have found that the number was incorrect and would not have approved the requisition. Failure to Validate the System Could Allow Unauthorized Shipments of Classified Spare Parts
The Air Force has not validated modifications to the Security Assistance Management Information System that restrict parts that countries can requisition, and has not tested the system’s logic for restricting requisitions since 1998 to ensure that it is working properly. As a result, modifications that were not properly made went undetected, and foreign countries were able to requisition and obtain controlled spare parts that the Air Force was trying to restrict. Although the Air Force later determined that the bushings should not have been restricted, this example nevertheless demonstrates the need to validate system changes. For 19 of the requisitions, command country managers overrode the system recommendations and shipped classified and controlled spare parts without documenting the reasons for overriding the system. For example, the command country manager overrode the system and shipped four classified target-detecting devices, but the case file did not contain any documentation explaining why the command country manager did so, and managers we queried could not provide an explanation for the override. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve internal controls over the Air Force’s foreign military sales program and to minimize countries’ abilities to obtain classified or controlled spare parts under blanket orders for which they are not eligible, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Secretary of the Air Force to require the appropriate officials to take the following steps: Modify the Security Assistance Management Information System so that it validates country requisitions based on the requisitioned item’s complete national stock number. Scope and Methodology
To determine the adequacy of the Department of the Air Force’s key internal control activities aimed at preventing countries from requisitioning and receiving classified and controlled spare parts that they are ineligible to receive, we held discussions with officials from the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Support) International Security Program Directorate; Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (International Affairs); and the Air Force Materiel Command’s Security Assistance Center, Dayton, Ohio. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1990 through 2001, the Department of Defense delivered over $138 billion in services and defense articles--including classified and controlled parts--to foreign governments through its foreign military sales programs. Classified spare parts are restricted for national security reasons, while controlled parts contain technology that the military does not want to release. GAO was asked to review the Air Force's internal controls aimed at preventing countries from requisitioning and receiving classified or controlled spare parts that they are ineligible to receive.
What GAO Found
The Air Force's internal controls for its foreign military sales program using blanket orders are not adequate, placing classified and controlled spare parts at risk of being shipped to countries not authorized to receive them. The Air Force's system has erroneously approved foreign country requisitions for classified and controlled spare parts based on incorrect federal supply classes. The system approves items for shipment based in part on an item's federal supply class--not the item's entire national stock number, which is a combination of the supply class number and a part number unique to the item. GAO found that because the system was not properly programmed and countries used unrestricted supply class numbers, the system erroneously approved 35 of 123 selected requisitions reviewed. For example, one country ordered a controlled outline sequencer used on various aircraft by using a supply class that was unrestricted, but incorrect for the part it requisitioned. Because supply class 1680 was not restricted and the system did not verify that 1680 was the correct supply class for national item identification number 010539320, the system approved the requisition. Had the system validated the entire 13-digit national stock number, it would have found that the number was incorrect and would not have approved the requisition. In addition, the Air Force has no written policies or procedures in place for recovering items that have been shipped in error. The Air Force has not validated modifications to the Security Assistance Management Information System that restrict parts available to foreign countries and has not tested the system since 1998 to ensure that it is working properly. Because modifications were not validated, the Air Force did not detect improperly made modifications to the system, and foreign countries were able to requisition and obtain controlled spare parts that, at the time, the Air Force was trying to restrict. GAO identified 18 instances in which countries requisitioned and received a controlled part for which they were not eligible because programmers had entered the restrictions in the wrong area of the system. Although Air Force officials subsequently told us that the part was improperly restricted, this example nevertheless demonstrates the need to validate system changes. Air Force command country managers did not always document reasons for overriding the recommendations of the system or the foreign military sales case manager. For 19 of the 123 requisitions GAO reviewed, command country managers overrode the system recommendations and shipped classified and controlled spare parts without documenting the reasons for overriding the system. For example, a command country manager overrode the system and shipped four classified target-detecting devices without documenting the reasons for overriding the system. |
gao_GAO-06-821 | gao_GAO-06-821_0 | Rail transit operations that do not receive FTA formula funds are not subject to oversight through FTA’s program. Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. As the program administrator, FTA is responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. For example, the program standard must include, at a minimum, areas dealing with the oversight agency’s responsibilities, how the program standard will be modified, how the oversight agency will oversee the transit agency’s internal safety and security reviews, how the oversight agency will conduct the triennial audits, and requirements for the rail transit agency to report accidents. Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress. Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security
The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and security in their organizations. In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit systems’ safety and security. In addition, it has not issued a report since 2003. However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency’s priorities shifted in the wake of the attacks. FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety Oversight Program
Despite the program’s popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges in implementing the program’s revised rule and continuing to manage the program. Officials at several transit agencies were also confused about what standards they would be required to meet. Recommendations
In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff resources to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient information to evaluate the performance of the program, and supports state oversight agencies in adequately training their staff to perform their oversight duties, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following two actions: Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity presented by having new program leadership to set short- and long-term goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program is making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance goals for the agency’s other approaches for evaluating the impact of this program on safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining FTA’s stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once every 3 years. Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the potential duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of TSA to: coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to state oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and responsibilities TSA develops for its rail inspectors; and work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security audits whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help ensure effective coordination with these agencies. To determine how the program functions in regions where transit systems cross state boundaries, we visited three systems that crossed state boundaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the program's impact; and (3) challenges facing the program. We also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program.
What GAO Found
FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for developing a program standard that transit agencies must meet and reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against that standard. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort. |
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