id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_GAO-16-574 | gao_GAO-16-574_0 | The National Guard Has Developed Cyber Capabilities That Could Support Civil Authorities, but DOD Does Not Have Full Visibility of National Guard Units’ Capabilities
The National Guard Has Cyber Capabilities That Could Support Civil Authorities
The National Guard in the 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia have capabilities that could be used—if requested and approved—to perform DOD or state missions to support civil authorities in a cyber incident. DOD does not have visibility into all National Guard units’ cyber capabilities because the department has not maintained a database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities during a cyber incident. Without such a database, DOD may not have timely access to these capabilities when requested by civil authorities during a cyber incident. DOD Has Conducted and Participated in Exercises to Support Civil Authorities in a Cyber Incident, but Has Not Addressed Challenges with the Exercises
DOD Has Conducted and Participated in Exercises to Prepare to Support Civil Authorities During or After a Cyber Incident
From fiscal years 2013 through 2015, DOD conducted or participated in 9 exercises that were designed to explore the application of policies for supporting civil authorities or to test the response to simulated attacks on cyber infrastructure owned by civil authorities. DOD Has Experienced Challenges in Its Civil- Support Exercises and Has Not Conducted a Tier 1 Exercise That Could Address Challenges
We identified three types of challenges with DOD’s exercises that could limit the extent to which DOD is prepared to support civil authorities in a cyber incident; DOD has not addressed the challenges. Specifically,
Limited access because of classified exercise environments: According to documents we reviewed and officials we interviewed, DOD’s tendency to exercise in a classified environment limited the ability of other federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners to participate in DSCA exercises. In addition to these challenges, we also observed that DOD has not addressed its goals by conducting a tier 1 exercise involving various partners in highly complex environments. Similarly, U.S. Northern Command and ODASD for Cyber Policy officials told us that the department needs to conduct a tier 1 exercise to explore a disaster with physical and cyber effects. DOD’s Cyber Strategy planning document states and officials agree that the department needs to conduct such an exercise to prepare its forces to support civil authorities during or after a cyber incident. Until DOD identifies and conducts a tier 1 exercise, DOD will miss an opportunity to fully test response plans, evaluate response capabilities, assess the clarity of established roles and responsibilities, and improve proficiency in supporting DHS, other federal agencies, and state and local authorities, if directed, in an emergency. For example, while National Guard computer network defense teams could serve as first responders for states for cyber emergencies and may provide surge capacity to national capabilities, the readiness system will not include these teams. Because the Defense Readiness Reporting System and the National Guard report do not currently enable DOD leaders to identify National Guard cyber capabilities that could facilitate a quick response in a cyber incident, we continue to believe that DOD should maintain a database—as required by law—that can fully and quickly identify the cyber capabilities that the National Guard possesses. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the extent to which the National Guard has developed cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities in response to a cyber incident and the Department of Defense (DOD) has visibility over those capabilities, we reviewed DOD policies and guidance to identify the National Guard’s role in providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities, National Guard cyber capabilities, and the mechanisms used to identify National Guard capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DOD 2015 Cyber Strategy reported that a cyber attack could present a significant risk to U.S. national security. House Report 114-102 included a provision that GAO assess DOD's plans for providing support to civil authorities for a domestic cyber incident.
This report assesses whether (1) the National Guard has developed and DOD has visibility over capabilities that could support civil authorities in a cyber incident; and (2) DOD has conducted and participated in exercises to support civil authorities in cyber incidents and any challenges it faced. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD and National Guard reports, policies, and guidance and interviewed officials about the National Guard's capabilities in defense support to civil authorities. GAO also reviewed after-action reports and interviewed DOD officials about exercise planning.
What GAO Found
National Guard units have developed capabilities that could be used, if requested and approved, to support civil authorities in a cyber incident; however, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have visibility of all National Guard units' capabilities for this support. GAO found three types of cyber capabilities that exist in National Guard units:
Communications directorates : These organizations operate and maintain the National Guard's information network.
Computer network defense teams : These teams protect National Guard information systems, could serve as first responders for states' cyber emergencies, and provide surge capacity to national capabilities.
Cyber units : These teams are to conduct cyberspace operations.
However, DOD does not have visibility of all National Guard units' cyber capabilities because the department has not maintained a database that identifies the National Guard units' cyber-related emergency response capabilities, as required by law. Without such a database to fully and quickly identify National Guard cyber capabilities, DOD may not have timely access to these capabilities when requested by civil authorities during a cyber incident.
DOD has conducted or participated in exercises to support civil authorities in a cyber incident or to test the responses to simulated attacks on cyber infrastructure owned by civil authorities, but has experienced several challenges that it has not addressed. These challenges include limited participant access because of a classified exercise environment, limited inclusion of other federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners, and inadequate incorporation of joint physical-cyber scenarios. In addition to these challenges, DOD has not identified and conducted a “tier 1” exercise—an exercise involving national-level organizations and combatant commanders and staff in highly complex environments. A DOD cyber strategy planning document states, and DOD officials agreed, that such an exercise is needed to help prepare forces in the event of a disaster with physical and cyber effects. Until DOD identifies and conducts a tier 1 exercise, DOD will miss an opportunity to fully test response plans, evaluate response capabilities, assess the clarity of established roles and responsibilities, and address the challenges DOD has experienced in prior exercises. The table below shows selected DOD-conducted exercises.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD maintain a database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities, conduct a tier 1 exercise to prepare its forces in the event of a disaster with cyber effects, and address challenges from prior exercises. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations, stating that current mechanisms and exercises are sufficient to address the issues highlighted in the report. GAO believes that the mechanisms and exercises, in their current formats, are not sufficient and continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as described in the report. |
gao_GAO-08-108T | gao_GAO-08-108T_0 | BSL-3 and BSL-4 Labs
The BSL labs are classified by the type of agents used and the risk posed to personnel, the environment, and the community by those agents. Expansion of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Labs Is Taking Place across Many Sectors and All over the United States
An expansion in the number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs is taking place across most of the United States, according to the literature, federal agency officials, and experts. Information on expansion is available about high-containment labs that are (1) registered with the CDC-USDA’s Select Agent Program, and (2) federally funded. However, much less is known about the expansion of labs outside the Select Agent Program and the nonfederally funded labs, including location, activities, and ownership. The number of BSL-4 laboratories has increased from 5, before 2001, to 15, including at least 1 in planning. No Federal Agency Has the Mission to Track High- Containment Labs in the United States
No single federal agency has the mission to track and determine the risk associated with the expansion of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs in the United States, and no single federal agency knows how many such labs there are in the United States. Consequently, no one is responsible for determining the aggregate risks associated with the expansion of these high- containment labs. For example, the FBI has a need to know the number and location of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs for forensic purposes. Lessons Learned from Three Recent Incidents Highlight the Risks Inherent in the Expansion of High-Containment Labs
We identified six lessons from three recent incidents: failure to report to CDC exposures to select agents, in 2006, by TAMU (see appendix V); power outage at CDC’s new BSL-4 lab, in 2007; and the release of foot-and- mouth disease virus, in 2007, at Pirbright, the U.K. These lessons highlight the importance of (1) identifying and overcoming barriers to reporting in order to enhance biosafety through shared learning from mistakes and to assure the public that accidents are examined and contained; (2) training lab staff in general biosafety as well as in specific agents being used in the labs to ensure maximum protection; (3) developing mechanisms for informing medical providers about all the agents that lab staff work with to ensure quick diagnosis and effective treatment; (4) addressing confusion over the definition of exposure to aid in the consistency of reporting; (5) ensuring that BSL-4 labs’ safety and security measures are commensurate with the level of risk these labs present; and (6) maintenance of high-containment labs to ensure integrity of physical infrastructure over time. Finally, we reviewed documents these agencies provided, including pertinent legislation, regulation, and guidance, and reviewed scientific literature on risks associated with high-containment labs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to the global spread of emerging infectious diseases and the threat of bioterrorism, high-containment biosafety laboratories (BSL)--specifically biosafety level (BSL)-3 and BSL-4--have been proliferating in the United States. These labs--classified by the type of agents used and the risk posed to personnel, the environment, and the community--often contain the most dangerous infectious disease agents, such as Ebola, smallpox, and avian influenza. This testimony addresses (1) the extent to which there has been a proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs, (2) federal agencies' responsibility for tracking this proliferation and determining the associated risks, and (3) the lessons that can be learned from recent incidents at three high-containment biosafety labs. To address these objectives, GAO asked 12 federal agencies involved with high-containment labs about their missions and whether they tracked the number of labs overall. GAO also reviewed documents from these agencies, such as pertinent legislation, regulation, and guidance. Finally, GAO interviewed academic experts in microbiological research.
What GAO Found
A major proliferation of high-containment BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs is taking place in the United States, according to the literature, federal agency officials, and experts. The expansion is taking place across many sectors--federal, academic, state, and private--and all over the United States. Concerning BSL-4 labs, which handle the most dangerous agents, the number of these labs has increased from 5--before the terrorist attacks of 2001--to 15, including at least 1 in planning stage. Information on expansion is available about high-containment labs that are registered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Select Agent Program, and that are federally funded. However, much less is known about the expansion of labs outside the Select Agent Program, as well as the nonfederally funded labs, including location, activities, and ownership. No single federal agency, according to 12 agencies' responses to our survey, has the mission to track the overall number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs in the United States. Though several agencies have a need to know, no one agency knows the number and location of these labs in the United States. Consequently, no agency is responsible for determining the risks associated with the proliferation of these labs. We identified six lessons from three recent incidents: failure to report to CDC exposures to select agents by Texas A&M University (TAMU); power outage at the CDC's new BSL-4 lab in Atlanta, Georgia; and release of foot-and-mouth disease virus at Pirbright in the United Kingdom. These lessons highlight the importance of (1) identifying and overcoming barriers to reporting in order to enhance biosafety through shared learning from mistakes and to assure the public that accidents are examined and contained; (2) training lab staff in general biosafety, as well as in specific agents being used in the labs to ensure maximum protection; (3) developing mechanisms for informing medical providers about all the agents that lab staff work with to ensure quick diagnosis and effective treatment; (4) addressing confusion over the definition of exposure to aid in the consistency of reporting; (5) ensuring that BSL-4 labs' safety and security measures are commensurate with the level of risk these labs present; and (6) maintenance of high-containment labs to ensure integrity of physical infrastructure over time. |
gao_GAO-04-205T | gao_GAO-04-205T_0 | On October 15, a staff member in Senator Daschle’s office opened the contaminated envelope. The Postal Service closed the facility on October 21, 2001, after CDC confirmed that the employee had the disease. It is in the process of being decontaminated. Brentwood Employees Questioned Whether the Decision to Wait for Confirmation of Inhalation Anthrax Adequately Protected Their Health
The Postal Service’s decision to wait for CDC’s confirmation of a case of inhalation anthrax before closing Brentwood and referring the facilities’ employees for medical treatment was consistent with the public health advice the Postal Service received and the health risk information available at the time. Three days later, on October 21, 2001, CDC confirmed that a Brentwood employee had inhalation anthrax, and the Postal Service closed the facility and referred its employees for medical treatment. The Decisions Made at Brentwood and Capitol Hill Differed Because the Circumstances and Decisionmakers Differed
The Postal Service’s decision to wait for a confirmed case of inhalation anthrax before closing the facility and referring employees for medical treatment differed from the decision to implement precautionary measures immediately after anthrax contamination was identified at the Hart Building. The decisions differed, in part, because there was an observable incident at the Hart Building, but not at Brentwood. Communication Problems Exacerbated Postal Service Employees’ Concerns
The Postal Service communicated health risk and other information to its Brentwood employees during the anthrax crisis, but some of the information it initially provided changed as public health knowledge evolved, intensifying employees’ concerns about whether adequate measures were being taken to protect them. Other factors, including difficulties in communicating the uncertainty associated with health recommendations and employees’ long-standing distrust of postal managers, also challenged efforts to communicate effectively. The Postal Service has made additional efforts to communicate with Brentwood employees since the facility’s closure, but challenges remain, particularly the need to effectively communicate information on any possible residual risks. Among the lessons learned are that the risk to employees of contracting anthrax through contaminated mail is greater than was previously believed and more caution is needed to respond to that greater risk. Another important lesson learned during the 2001 anthrax incidents is that clear and accurate communication is critical to managing the response to an incident. The Postal Service agrees that although the Brentwood facility has been tested and certified as safe for occupancy, the Postal Service cannot assert that the building is 100 percent free of anthrax contamination. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issues an alert about bioterrorism, providing information about preventive measures for anthrax. (On or about) Daschle letter passes through Brentwood. Part of the Hart Senate Office Building is closed in the morning, and the remainder of the building is closed in the evening. | Why GAO Did This Study
On October 21, 2001, the U.S. Postal Service closed its Brentwood mail processing facility after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed that an employee there had contracted inhalation anthrax, an often-fatal form of the disease. On October 21 and 22, two other Brentwood employees died of inhalation anthrax. The contamination was linked to a letter that passed through the facility on or about October 12, before being opened in the office of Senator Daschle in the Hart Senate Office Building on October 15. The Hart Building was closed the next day. The Brentwood facility has since been decontaminated and will soon reopen. This testimony, which is based on ongoing work, provides GAO's preliminary observations on the decisions made in closing the facility and problems experienced in communicating with employees, as well as lessons learned from the experience.
What GAO Found
The Postal Service's decision to wait to close the Brentwood facility and refer employees for medical treatment until CDC confirmed that a postal employee had contracted inhalation anthrax was consistent with the advice the Postal Service received from public health advisers and the information about health risk available at the time. However, because circumstances differed at Brentwood and the Hart Building--an observed spill at the Hart Building and no observable incident at Brentwood--the Postal Service's response differed from the response at Capitol Hill, leading some Brentwood employees to question whether the Postal Service was taking adequate steps to protect their health. The Postal Service communicated information to its Brentwood employees during the anthrax incident, but some of the health risk information changed over time, exacerbating employees' concerns about the measures being taken to protect them. Notably, employees later learned that their risk of contracting the disease was greater than originally stated. Other factors, including difficulties in communicating the uncertainty associated with health recommendations and employees' distrust of postal managers, also challenged efforts to communicate effectively. Recently, the Postal Service informed employees that Brentwood, which has been tested and certified as safe for occupancy, is "100 percent free of anthrax contamination." However, in discussions with GAO, the Service agreed to revise future communications to acknowledge that although any remaining risk at the facility is likely to be low, complete freedom from risk cannot be guaranteed. The Postal Service and others have learned since the 2001 anthrax incidents that (1) the risk of contracting anthrax through the mail is greater than was previously believed and more caution is needed to respond to that greater risk and (2) clear, accurate communication is critical to managing the response to an incident and its aftermath. The Postal Service is revising its guidance to respond more quickly and to communicate more effectively to employees and the public in the event of a future incident. |
gao_GAO-08-65 | gao_GAO-08-65_0 | Results from Performance Year 1
In July 2007, CMS reported that in PY1, 2 of the 10 participating physician groups earned bonuses for achieving cost-saving and quality-of-care targets, while all 10 participants achieved 7 or more of the 10 quality-of- care targets. Participating Physician Groups Implemented Care Coordination Programs Designed to Achieve Cost Savings and Management Processes to Meet CMS-Set Diabetes Quality-of-Care Targets in PY1
The participating physician groups implemented care coordination programs to achieve cost savings and improved their management processes to meet quality improvement targets CMS set for particular diabetes measures in PY1. Only 1 of the 10 participants had all of its programs in place for all 12 months of PY1. In particular, three aspects of the PGP Demonstration design were consistent with established methodological practices considered effective: a rigorous research study design to isolate the effects of the demonstration’s incentives, a risk- adjustment approach to adjust for changes in patient health status, and a quality component to help ensure that participating physician groups did not achieve cost savings at the expense of quality. Certain Aspects of the Demonstration Design Made Providing Timely Feedback and Bonus Payments Challenging
Overall, participants did not receive performance feedback or bonus payments for their PY1 efforts until after the beginning of the third performance year. While CMS’s provision of ongoing quarterly data sets to participants is timelier than the information provided before, most participants told us they do not have the necessary resources to analyze these data sets in a timely manner. In PY1, for example, that would have included reporting progress on 4 of the 10 claims-based quality targets on diabetes, such as whether a beneficiary received an eye exam. Participating Physician Groups Had Several Size-Related Advantages, Which May Pose Challenges in Broadening the Payment Approach Used in the Demonstration to More Participants
The large size of the 10 participating physician groups compared with the majority of physician practices operating in the U.S. gave the participants certain size-related advantages that might make broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to more participants challenging. Specifically, the participating physician groups generally had three unique size-derived advantages: institutional affiliations that allowed greater access to financial capital, access to and experience using EHR systems, and experience prior to the PGP Demonstration with pay-for-performance programs. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For the first performance year, we examined three objectives: (1) what actions the participating physician groups took to achieve cost savings and meet the diabetes quality-of-care targets selected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), (2) the extent to which the demonstration design was a reasonable approach to rewarding participating physician groups for cost savings and quality performance, and (3) potential challenges involved in broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration from the 10 large participating physician groups to other physician groups and nongroup practices. A director position was created and charged with coordinating program interventions and with overseeing all care for Medicare patients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress mandated in 2000 that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) conduct the Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration to test a hybrid payment methodology for physician groups that combines Medicare fee-for-service payments with new incentive payments. The 10 participants, with 200 or more physicians each, may earn annual bonus incentive payments by achieving cost savings and meeting quality targets set by CMS in the demonstration that began in April 2005. In July 2007, CMS reported that in the first performance year (PY1), 2 participants earned combined bonuses of approximately $7.4 million, and all 10 achieved most of the quality targets. Congress mandated that GAO evaluate the demonstration. GAO examined, for PY1, the programs used, whether the design was reasonable, and the potential challenges in broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to other physician groups. To do so, GAO reviewed CMS documents, surveyed all 10 groups, and conducted interviews and site visits.
What GAO Found
All 10 participating physician groups implemented care coordination programs to generate cost savings for patients with certain conditions, such as congestive heart failure, and initiated processes to better identify and manage diabetes patients in PY1. However, only 2 of the 10 participants earned a bonus payment in PY1 for achieving cost savings and meeting diabetes quality-of-care targets. The remaining 8 participants met most of the quality targets, but did not achieve the required level of cost savings to earn a bonus. Many of the participants' care coordination programs were not in place for all of PY1. CMS's design for the PGP Demonstration was generally a reasonable approach for rewarding participating physician groups for achieving cost-savings and quality-of-care targets, but created challenges. CMS's decision to use comparison groups, adjust for Medicare beneficiaries' health status, and include a quality component in the design helped ensure that bonus payments were attributable to demonstration-specific programs and that cost-savings were not achieved at the expense of quality. However, the design created challenges. For example, neither bonuses nor performance feedback for PY1 were given to participants until after the third performance year had begun. CMS provides participants with quarterly claims data sets, but most participants report they do not have the resources to analyze these data sets and generate summary reports on their progress and areas for improvement. The large relative size of the 10 participating physician groups (all had 200 or more physicians) compared with most U.S. physician practices (less than 1 percent had more than 150 physicians) gave the participants certain size-related advantages that may make broadening the payment approach used in the demonstration to other physician groups and non-group practices challenging. Their larger size provided the participants with three unique size-related advantages: institutional affiliations that allowed greater access to financial capital, access to and experience with using electronic health records systems, and prior experience with pay-for-performance programs. |
gao_GAO-16-349 | gao_GAO-16-349_0 | The first is through local broadcast television stations, which provide free over- the-air programming for reception in consumers’ households by television antennas. This table does not include information about how joint sales agreements among local stations and interconnects among MVPDs affect local advertising sales, which is discussed later in the report. Stations are not required to disclose shared service agreements in their public files. In 2014, FCC promulgated a final rule declaring that if a JSA provides that one station sells more than 15 percent of the weekly advertising time of another station located in the same market, both stations will be counted toward the ownership limit of the owner of the station selling the advertising (i.e., the sales-agent station). The 86 JSAs we reviewed generally covered similar terms. FCC officials said they do not monitor the contents of stations’ public files on an ongoing basis and have not reviewed stations’ JSA filings to ensure they are complete and up to date. FCC officials said they typically review compliance with public inspection file requirements in connection with a station’s license renewal application or in response to complaints from the public. However, FCC’s approach puts the burden of discovering the incompleteness of an inspection file on the public, and in the case of a file that is missing a JSA, it is not clear how a member of the public would be likely to know that a JSA is missing without undertaking a review of all stations’ JSA files, as we did, in order to uncover whether any other station has put a JSA agreement with that station in its file. Interconnects Allow MVPDs in a Local Market to Sell Advertising from a Single Point and Exist in Most Markets, According to Stakeholders
An interconnect involves two or more MVPDs combining a portion of their advertising time in a local market, creating a single-point for advertising sales across multiple MVPDs within a DMA (see fig. Through technological means, these advertisements are then distributed simultaneously across the MVPDs participating in the interconnect. Some Selected Stakeholders Said That Advertising Agreements Provide Economic Benefits, but Others Raised Concerns over the Market Effects of these Agreements
Some stakeholders that filed comments in FCC proceedings and who we interviewed stated that local stations and MVPDs benefit economically from JSAs and interconnects, respectively. However, some stakeholders expressed concerns with how these agreements may impact local markets. Station Owners Said That JSAs Allow Stations to Cut Costs, but Other Stakeholders Raised Concerns about Effects on Competition, Diversity, and Localism
According to most of the local station owners that commented in FCC’s JSA rulemaking and all that we interviewed, a primary benefit of JSAs, as well as other sharing agreements, is that they allow local stations to cut costs. Furthermore, two station owners and two financial analysts told us that stations in smaller markets are more likely to use JSAs than stations in larger markets because local stations earn less advertising revenue in small markets than in large markets, while they said their costs are roughly the same regardless of market size. Specifically, according to some of these stakeholders, such influence could occur because the agreements create a financial interest. Furthermore, one MVPD, two public- interest groups, and two labor unions that filed FCC comments, as well as both of the public-interest groups and one of the two academic stakeholders we interviewed, said JSAs and other sharing agreements allow station owners to circumvent FCC’s media ownership rules. As previously discussed, FCC’s ownership rules limit the number of local stations an entity can control in a local market. Six of these MVPDs said this increased reach enables MVPDs participating in interconnects to better compete with other local media, particularly local broadcast television stations, since it enables them to have a market reach that is closer to that of a local station. Additionally, five small MVPD stakeholders and an advertising representation firm that works with small MVPDs that commented in the Comcast/Time Warner merger proceeding said that larger MVPDs that manage interconnects treat smaller MVPDs unfairly—or have the potential to—by applying conditions to the smaller MVPDs’ participation in interconnects, such as excluding some smaller MVPDs from interconnects if the smaller MVPDs use an advertising representation firm that competes with the large MVPD’s national advertising arm. Recommendation
We recommend that the Chairman of FCC review JSAs filed in stations’ public inspection files to identify stations involved in those JSAs and take action to ensure that each station involved has filed its JSA as required. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this report were to examine (1) what available information indicates about the prevalence and characteristics of advertising sales agreements among local broadcast television stations (local stations) or multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD), and (2) selected stakeholders’ perspectives on the impacts of advertising sales agreements among local stations or MVPDs. To determine the prevalence and characteristics of advertising sales agreements—specifically joint sales agreements (JSA)—among local broadcast television stations (local stations), we obtained and analyzed all JSAs found in the stations’ public inspection files on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) website. We also interviewed FCC officials and the following stakeholders about their perspectives on JSAs and interconnects: eight local station owners that we selected to represent companies of various sizes and those that do and do not have JSAs; five MVPDs selected to represent cable, satellite, and telecommunications providers and two companies selling advertising on their behalf; five media industry associations selected because they represent broadcasters, large and small MVPDs, and advertising sellers; two public interest groups and two academic stakeholders selected because they filed comments in the FCC JSA rulemaking or were recommended by other stakeholders; and five financial analysts selected based on our prior work and our research on their backgrounds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Television stations, which provide free, over-the-air programming, and MVPDs, which provide subscription television services, compete with other local media for advertising revenue. FCC rules limit the number of local stations an entity can own in one market to promote competition and other public interests. Some station owners created joint sales agreements to potentially cut costs. In 2014, finding that such agreements confer influence akin to ownership, FCC adopted rules that require that where such agreements encompass more than 15 percent of the weekly advertising time of another station, they will count toward FCC's ownership limits. MVPDs also have arrangements (“interconnects”) for jointly selling advertising in a local market.
GAO was asked to examine the role of advertising agreements in local media markets. This report examines (1) the prevalence and characteristics of such agreements, and (2) stakeholders' perspectives on these agreements. GAO examined publicly available joint sales agreements and interviewed FCC officials and media, public interest, academic, and financial stakeholders about their views. Stakeholders were selected to represent a range of companies and from those who submitted comments on FCC's rules, among other reasons.
What GAO Found
Agreements among station owners allowing stations to jointly sell advertising—known as “joint sales agreements”—are mostly in smaller markets and include provisions such as the amount of advertising time sold and how stations share revenue. Some of these agreements also included provisions typical of other types of sharing agreements. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requires each station involved in a joint sales agreement to file the agreement in the station's public inspection file. According to FCC, these files are meant to provide the public increased transparency about the operation of local stations and encourage public participation in ensuring that stations serve the public interest. GAO reviewed all joint sales agreements found in stations' public files and identified 86 such agreements among stations. GAO also found inconsistencies in the filing of these agreements. Specifically, 25 of these agreements were filed by one station but not by others involved in the agreements. FCC addresses compliance with this filing requirement through its periodic reviews of station licensing and in response to complaints. However, FCC officials said neither of these approaches has identified agreements that should be filed but have not been, and FCC has not reviewed the completeness of stations' joint sales agreement filings. If stations with joint sales agreements are not filing these agreements as required, a member of the public reviewing such a station's public file would not see in the file that the station's advertising sales involve joint sales with another station. Most multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) stakeholders GAO interviewed said that interconnects exist in most markets. These arrangements allow an advertiser to purchase advertising from a single point to be simultaneously distributed to all MVPDs in a local market participating in the interconnect.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed—including station owners, MVPDs, media industry associations, and financial analysts—said that joint sales agreements and interconnects can provide economic benefits for television stations and MVPDs, respectively. Joint sales agreements allow stations to cut advertising costs, since one station generally performs this role for both stations. For example, some station owners said they used the savings from joint sales agreements and other service-sharing agreements to invest in and improve local programming. Some selected station owners and financial analysts said that stations in smaller markets are more likely to use joint sales agreements because stations in smaller markets receive less advertising revenue while having similar costs as stations in larger markets. Other stakeholders, including public-interest groups and academics, raised concerns about how these agreements may negatively affect local markets. For example, some public-interest groups said that using these agreements reduces competition in the local market and allows broadcasters to circumvent FCC's ownership rules. MVPDs stated that interconnects allow MVPDs to better compete with broadcasters for local advertising revenue by increasing the potential reach of an advertisement to subscribers of MVPDs participating in the interconnect. Some small MVPDs raised concerns that large MVPDs that manage interconnects may impose unfair terms as a condition of their participation in the interconnect. However, large MVPDs said they do not engage in such practices.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should review joint sales agreements filed in stations' public files to identify missing agreements and take action to ensure the files are complete. FCC said it would take action to ensure compliance with its public file requirement. |
gao_GAO-17-291 | gao_GAO-17-291_0 | The FAR now prohibits rollover of unearned award fees from one evaluation period requires award fees to be linked to cost, schedule, and technical performance acquisition objectives; restricts payment of award fees in instances of unsatisfactory contractor performance; and requires agencies to collect relevant data on incentive and award fee payments and evaluate the effectiveness of these contract types in achieving desired outcomes. DOD Has Changed Regulations, Policies, and Practices to Improve Its Use of Incentive Contracts, in Particular by Emphasizing Use of Objective Incentives
Since 2010, DOD has taken steps to improve its use of incentive contracts—often beyond what is required by the FAR—by revising the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), instituting its Better Buying Power initiative, and developing new guidance and training courses. These efforts are reflected in DOD’s reported use of incentive contracts since 2010, which indicate a substantial growth in obligations for incentive fee contracts and a corresponding decrease in obligations for award fee contracts. DOD Has Updated Regulations, Policy, and Guidance
DOD made changes to the DFARS and its accompanying Procedures, Guidance, and Information in recent years intended to support appropriate use of incentive contracts. Consistent with DOD’s emphasis on using incentive fee contracts and decreasing the use of award fee contracts, our analysis of DOD’s reported contract obligations from fiscal years 2005 through 2015 shows a shift toward using incentive fee contracts (see figure 2). DOD Expects to Achieve Cost Objectives on Selected Contracts, but Lacks Full Information on Outcomes for Incentive Contracts
DOD expects to achieve positive cost outcomes—with contractors’ estimated costs coming in lower than target costs—for most of the 21 selected incentive fee contract actions we were able to measure. Overall, the estimated costs for the incentivized portions of these selected contract actions were about $30 million—or about 5 percent—below target costs. The nine award fee actions in our sample, which were mainly used to procure services, did not allow for rollover and payments for unsatisfactory performance—both of which were issues we found in our prior work. In two cases, although the contractor met specific schedule and technical performance goals, overall outcomes were either unsatisfactory or were yet to be determined (see table 4). DOD Conducts Limited Data Collection on Incentive and Award Fee Contracts and Does Not Assess Incentive Outcomes Across Contracts
DOD has not consistently assessed how the selection of a particular contract type or incentive arrangement has promoted the achievement of cost, schedule, or technical performance goals. As some of our prior work has found, however, incentives do not always lead to better outcomes. Federal acquisition regulations require DOD to collect and analyze information on the use of incentives. However, it may not be necessary for DOD to embark on a broad, manual data collection effort similar to what has been tried in the past. DOD stated it will complete this process by the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to (1) identify steps the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to improve its use of incentive contracts since 2010, and (2) assess the extent to which selected DOD incentive contracts achieved desired acquisition outcomes. To determine the extent to which incentive provisions in selected DOD contracts achieved desired outcomes in cost, schedule, and technical performance, we assessed a nongeneralizable sample, drawn from FPDS-NG data, of incentive contracts and orders that DOD awarded between fiscal years 2011 and 2015 and that were reported as completed by the end of fiscal year 2015. We chose these timeframes so as to select awards that were made after regulatory and policy changes starting in 2010 and had completed performance by the time of our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2015, DOD obligated $274 billion on contracts for products and services, a portion of which was for contracts that used incentive and award fee provisions—or incentive contracts—intended to improve cost, schedule, and technical performance outcomes. Work by GAO and others has shown that such contracts, when not well managed, can lead to unnecessary costs shouldered by the American taxpayer. Beginning in 2010, DOD made regulatory and policy changes related to incentives.
GAO was asked to review DOD's use of incentives. This report (1) identifies steps DOD has taken to improve its use of incentive contracts since 2010, and (2) assesses the extent to which selected DOD incentive contracts achieved desired acquisition outcomes.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant federal and DOD guidance; analyzed DOD obligations and new contract award data for fiscal years 2005 through 2015, before and after regulatory and policy changes; and analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 26 contracts and task orders that contained incentives and 9 contract actions providing for award fees that were awarded between fiscal years 2011 and 2015 and reported as completed by the end of fiscal year 2015 to assess contract outcomes.
What GAO Found
Since 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made changes to its regulations, policies, and guidance and taken other steps to improve its use of incentive contracts. DOD has promoted greater use of objective incentives—which measure contractor performance toward predetermined targets using a formula—through incentive fee contracts, partly to better motivate cost control. These changes are reflected in DOD's increased use of incentive fee contracts and decreased use of award fee contracts, which involve fees paid based on a more subjective evaluation of contractor performance and have not always been linked to acquisition outcomes (see figure).
DOD expects to achieve cost objectives on 15 of the 21 incentive fee contract actions that GAO reviewed and for which costs could be assessed. GAO could not assess cost performance on five additional selected incentive fee contracts because comparable cost estimates were not available. Across the 21 incentive fee contract actions, estimated costs for the incentivized portions were about 5 percent below target costs. Schedule and technical performance incentives mostly resulted in good outcomes. In two cases, however, although the contractor met specific schedule and technical performance goals, overall outcomes were either unsatisfactory or not yet determined. In the nine award fee contracts GAO reviewed, consistent with prior GAO recommendations, DOD did not allow unearned fees to be earned in a subsequent period, and GAO did not find evidence of award fees paid for unsatisfactory performance. Federal regulations require DOD to collect and evaluate information on incentives. In 2015, DOD stopped its previous effort to manually collect data twice a year on incentives valued at more than $50 million, which was burdensome and collected information that DOD did not use, according to DOD officials. GAO's review of current DOD systems found that they provide some useful data but do not allow DOD to determine how well incentives are achieving desired cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. Without such information, DOD may be disadvantaged in establishing incentive arrangements that achieve intended results.
What GAO Recommends
DOD should identify the type of information on incentives needed and collect and analyze relevant data to assess outcomes. DOD agreed to do so and stated it will take actions in fiscal year 2018 to address GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-49 | gao_GAO-02-49_0 | (See app. In 1999, tribes collected about $10 billion in gambling revenue. Federal recognition is not necessarily an eligibility requirement for these programs. Process Ill Equipped to Provide Timely Response
Because of limited resources, a lack of time frames, and ineffective procedures for providing information to interested third parties, the length of time involved in reaching final decisions is substantial. The number of BIA staff assigned to evaluate petitions peaked in 1993 at 17. While resources have not kept pace with workload, the process also lacks effective procedures for addressing the workload in a timely manner. The process lacks any real timelines that impose a sense of urgency on the process. However, weaknesses in the process create uncertainty about the basis for recognition decisions, and the amount of time it takes to make those decisions impede the process from fulfilling its promise as a uniform approach to tribal recognition. There are 556 tribes on the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) most recent list of recognized tribes published in March 2000. Tribal governments had been severely weakened by earlier federal Indian policy. There has been a general increase in the number of petitions received per year since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, which regulates Indian gambling, as shown in figure 2. | What GAO Found
The Indian gambling industry has flourished since the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988. Nearly 200 tribes generated about $10 billion in annual revenues in 1999 from their gambling operations. Because of weaknesses in the federal recognition process, the basis for tribal recognition decisions by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is not always clear and the length of time involved can be substantial. Despite an increasing workload, the number of BIA staff assigned to evaluate the petitions has fallen by about 35 percent since 1993. Just as important, the process lacks effective procedures for promptly addressing the increased workload. In particular, the process does not impose effective deadlines that create a sense of urgency, and procedures for providing information to interested third parties are ineffective. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Indian Issues: More Consistent and Timely Tribal Recognition Process Needed, by Barry T. Hill, Director for Natural Resources and Environment, before the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, House Committee on Government Reform. GAO-01-415T , Feb. 7 (nine pages). |
gao_GAO-04-55 | gao_GAO-04-55_0 | Phase II wireless E911 service is more complex to implement than Phase I because of the need to install equipment to determine the geographic coordinates of the caller, transfer that information through the telephone networks, and have a mapping system in place at the PSAP that can display the latitude and longitude coordinates of the caller as a map location for dispatching assistance. PSAP readiness remains a state and local issue because PSAPs serve an emergency response function that has traditionally fallen under state or local jurisdiction. Thus, the full rollout of wireless E911 services nationwide depends in great part on the implementation efforts of the more than 6,000 PSAPs. Looking forward, our survey of state 911 contacts found that less than half of them believe that wireless E911 services will be fully in place in their state by 2005. According to NENA, as of October 2003, nearly 65 percent of PSAPs nationwide had implemented Phase I wireless E911 services, which provides the call taker with the callback number and the location of the cell tower and cell sector receiving the 911 call. Phase II, which locates the caller with more precise geographic coordinates, has been implemented with at least one wireless carrier in 18 percent of PSAPs. Currently, the DOT/NENA database does not differentiate between PSAPs that will need to be upgraded and those that will not, which limits usefulness of the database in accurately assessing progress toward full wireless E911 implementation. As the estimates from state contacts indicate, no clear picture is emerging on when Phase II will be fully deployed nationwide, raising the prospect of piecemeal availability of this service across the country for an indefinite number of years to come. In addition, poor coordination among the parties is a factor affecting wireless E911 deployment, although some states and localities have eased this problem with active and knowledgeable state 911 coordinators who help oversee the process and work with all the parties. Our survey of state E911 contacts found that 13 states and the District of Columbia had used wireless E911 funds for expenditures unrelated to wireless E911 implementation, and 9 other states had attempted to do so. Wireless carriers also incur various costs to implement E911. The Recent Actions of FCC and DOT Are Focused on Enforcing Deadlines on Wireless Carriers and Improving Deployment Coordination
FCC and DOT have been involved in the implementation of wireless E911, but federal authority in overseeing the deployment is limited because of the traditional state and local jurisdiction over emergency response services. Beyond enforcing deadlines on wireless carriers, FCC has taken actions to identify both roadblocks and best practices in wireless E911 implementation. One major aspect of this plan is the creation of a clearinghouse of wireless E911 planning, implementation, and operations resources. 5. However, successful wireless E911 deployment is possible, as illustrated in some areas of the country. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to provide the Congress and federal and state officials with an accurate assessment of the progress being made toward the goal of full deployment of wireless E911, we recommend that the Department of Transportation work with state-level E911 officials, the National Emergency Number Association, and other public safety groups to determine which public safety answering points will need to have their equipment upgraded. | Why GAO Did This Study
When an emergency call is placed to 911, prompt response depends on knowing the location of the caller. Enhanced 911 (E911) service automatically provides this critical information. E911 is in place in most of the country for traditional wireline telephone service, where the telephone number is linked to a street address. Expanding E911 capabilities to mobile phones is inherently more challenging because of the need to determine the caller's geographic location at the moment the call is made. Concerns have been raised about the pace of wireless E911 implementation and whether this service will be available nationwide. GAO reviewed the progress being made in implementing wireless E911 service, the factors affecting this progress, and the role of the federal government in facilitating the nationwide deployment of wireless E911 service.
What GAO Found
Implementation of wireless E911 is several years away in many states, raising the prospect of piecemeal availability of this service across the country for an indefinite number of years to come. Successful implementation depends on coordinated efforts by wireless carriers, local telephone companies, and more than 6,000 public safety answering points (PSAPs)--the facilities that receive 911 calls and dispatch assistance. According to a database sponsored by the Department of Transportation (DOT), as of October 2003, nearly 65 percent of PSAPs had Phase I wireless E911 service, which provides the approximate location of the caller, while only 18 percent had Phase II, which provides a more precise location and is the ultimate goal of wireless E911 service. Though valuable, the database does not differentiate between PSAPs that will require equipment upgrades and those that will not, thereby limiting its usefulness in accurately assessing progress toward full implementation. Looking forward, 24 state 911 contacts said in response to a GAO survey that their state will have Phase II implemented by 2005 or sooner; however, all other state contacts estimated dates beyond 2005 or were unable to estimate a date. Key factors hindering wireless E911 implementation involve funding and coordination. The wireless carriers, states, and localities must devise the means to fund more than $8 billion in estimated deployment costs over the next 5 years. Some states and localities have established funding mechanisms (such as E911 surcharges on phone bills), but others have not done so or have used their E911 funds for unrelated purposes. In addition, there is also a lack of coordination in some cases among the wireless carriers, local telephone companies, and PSAPs that can lead to delays in wireless E911 implementation. States with knowledgeable and involved coordinators were best able to work through these coordination issues. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and DOT are involved in promoting wireless E911, but their authority in overseeing its deployment is limited because PSAPs traditionally fall under state and local jurisdiction. FCC has set deadlines on the wireless carriers' E911 responsibilities and has taken actions to identify best practices and improve coordination among the parties. DOT is developing an action plan and clearinghouse for wireless E911 planning, implementation, and operations. |
gao_GAO-15-812 | gao_GAO-15-812_0 | When all physical construction at a site is complete, all immediate threats have been addressed, and all long-term threats are under control, EPA generally considers the site to be construction complete. Annual Federal Superfund Appropriations Decreased, and EPA Expenditures on Remedial Cleanup Activities Declined
Annual federal appropriations (appropriations) to EPA’s Superfund program generally declined from about $2 billion to about $1.1 billion from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. EPA expenditures—from these federal appropriations—of site-specific cleanup funds (funds spent on remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal NPL sites) declined from about $0.7 billion to about $0.4 billion during the same time period. EPA spent the largest amount of cleanup funds in Region 2, which accounted for about 32 percent of cleanup funds spent at nonfederal NPL sites from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. During the same time period, EPA spent the majority of cleanup funds in seven states, with the most in New Jersey— over $2.0 billion or more than 25 percent of cleanup funds. The remedial program generally funds cleanups of contaminated nonfederal NPL sites. The Number of Nonfederal Sites on the NPL Remained Relatively Constant, while the Number of Remedial Action Project Completions and Construction Completions Generally Declined
According to our analysis of EPA data, the total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL annually remained relatively constant, while remedial action project completions and construction completions generally declined during fiscal years 1999 through 2013. The total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL increased from 1,054 in fiscal year 1999 to 1,158 in fiscal year 2013 and averaged about 1,100 annually. According to our analysis of EPA data, the number of remedial action project completions at nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 37 percent during the 15-year period. Similarly, from fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the number of construction completions at nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 84 percent. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the objectives, scope of work, and the methodology used to determine, for fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the trends in (1) the annual federal appropriations to the Superfund program and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) expenditures for remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal sites on the National Priorities List (NPL) and (2) the number of nonfederal sites on the NPL, the number of remedial action project completions, and the number of construction completions at nonfederal NPL sites. To determine the trend in the number of nonfederal sites on the NPL, the number of remedial action project completions, and the number of construction completions at nonfederal NPL sites from fiscal years 1999 through 2013, we analyzed EPA’s program data from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Superfund program, EPA places some of the most seriously contaminated sites on the NPL. At the end of fiscal year 2013, nonfederal sites made up about 90 percent of these sites. At these sites, EPA undertakes remedial action projects to permanently and significantly reduce contamination. Remedial action projects can take a considerable amount of time and money, depending on the nature of the contamination and other site-specific factors. In GAO's 2010 report on cleanup at nonfederal NPL sites, GAO found that EPA's Superfund program appropriations were generally declining, and limited funding had delayed remedial cleanup activities at some of these sites.
GAO was asked to review the status of the cleanup of nonfederal NPL sites. This report examines, for fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the trends in (1) the annual federal appropriations to the Superfund program and EPA expenditures for remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal sites on the NPL; and (2) the number of nonfederal sites on the NPL, the number of remedial action project completions, and the number of construction completions at nonfederal NPL sites. GAO analyzed Superfund program and expenditure data from fiscal years 1999 through 2013 (most recent year with complete data available), reviewed EPA documents, and interviewed EPA officials.
What GAO Found
Annual federal appropriations to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund program generally declined from about $2 billion to about $1.1 billion in constant 2013 dollars from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. EPA expenditures—from these federal appropriations—of site-specific cleanup funds on remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal National Priorities List (NPL) sites declined from about $0.7 billion to about $0.4 billion during the same time period. Remedial cleanup activities include remedial investigations, feasibility studies, and remedial action projects (actions taken to clean up a site). EPA spent the largest amount of cleanup funds in Region 2, which accounted for about 32 percent of cleanup funds spent at nonfederal NPL sites during this 15-year period. The majority of cleanup funds was spent in seven states, with the most funds spent in New Jersey—over $2.0 billion in constant 2013 dollars, or more than 25 percent of cleanup funds.
From fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL annually remained relatively constant, while the number of remedial action project completions and construction completions generally declined. Remedial action project completions generally occur when the physical work is finished and the cleanup objectives of the remedial action project are achieved. Construction completion occurs when all physical construction at a site is complete, all immediate threats have been addressed, and all long-term threats are under control. Multiple remedial action projects may need to be completed before a site reaches construction completion. The total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL increased from 1,054 in fiscal year 1999 to 1,158 in fiscal year 2013, and averaged about 1,100 annually. The number of remedial action project completions at nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 37 percent during the 15-year period. Similarly, the number of construction completions at nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 84 percent during the same period. The figure below shows the number of completions during this period.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. EPA agreed with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-09-648T | gao_GAO-09-648T_0 | As shown in the figure, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The declining investment in the later years is the result of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program no longer being considered a major acquisition program and the cancellation and proposed cancellation of two development efforts which would have significantly increased DOD’s major space acquisition investment. As figure 3 notes, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS and NPOESS. Underlying Reasons for Cost and Schedule Growth
Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. Observations on the Space Industrial Base
We have not performed a comprehensive review of the space industrial base, but our prior work has identified a number of pressures associated with contractors that develop space systems for the government that have hampered the acquisition process. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems on which we have reported. Although these actions are a step in the right direction, additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs in the Department of Defense's (DOD) space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. The cost resulting from acquisition problems along with the ambitious nature of space programs have resulted in cancellations of programs that were expected to require investments of tens of billions of dollars. Along with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 7 years--resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and weather monitoring. This testimony focuses on (3) the condition of space acquisitions, (1) causal factors, (2) observations on the space industrial base, and (4) recommendations for better positioning programs and industry for success. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied on its body of work in space and other programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and DOD's acquisition policies.
What GAO Found
Estimated costs for major space acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. As seen in the figure below, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. Several causes behind the cost growth and related problems consistently stand out. First, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages, among other things, low cost estimating and optimistic scheduling. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources. GAO and others have identified a number of pressures associated with the contractors that develop space systems for the government that have hampered the acquisition process, including ambitious requirements, the impact of industry consolidation, and shortages of technical expertise in the workforce. Although DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems on which GAO has reported, additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold. |
gao_GAO-02-670 | gao_GAO-02-670_0 | The Extent to Which Credit Cards Are Used in Money Laundering Is Unclear
The consensus from industry, bank regulatory, and law enforcement officials we interviewed was that credit card accounts were not likely to be used in the initial stage of money laundering when illicit cash is first placed in the financial system, primarily because of restrictions on cash payments. Some credit card industry representatives and bank regulators we interviewed acknowledged that credit cards could be used in the layering or integration stages of money laundering; however, the extent to which this may be occurring is unknown. They indicated that issuing and acquiring banks’ application screening processes, systems to monitor fraud, and policies restricting cash payments and prepayments made credit cards less vulnerable to money laundering. Regulatory officials told us that, in their view, credit cards were considered a low risk to money laundering because the banks’ application screening process, systems for monitoring fraud, and policies restricting cash payments and prepayments made credit cards less vulnerable to money laundering than other areas of the bank. | What GAO Found
Money laundering is a serious issue; an estimated $500 billion are laundered annually. The extent to which money laundering through credit cards may be occurring, however, is unknown. Bank regulators, credit card industry representatives, and law enforcement officials interviewed by GAO indicated that credit card accounts were not likely to be used in the initial stage of money laundering, when illicit cash is first placed into the financial system, because the industry generally restricts cash payments. Industry representatives reported that, in their view, the banks' application screening processes, systems to monitor fraud, and policies restricting cash payments made credit cards less vulnerable to money laundering. At the time of GAO's review, the primary regulatory oversight mechanism to ensure the adequacy of anti-money laundering programs was the Bank Secrecy Act examination, which applies in the credit card industry to issuing and acquiring banks. The regulators said that the issuing banks' application screening process, fraud monitoring systems, and policies restricting cash payments lowered the risk of money laundering through credit cards. |
gao_GAO-04-722 | gao_GAO-04-722_0 | In particular, they fully incorporate 1 best practice, partially incorporate 2, and do not incorporate the remaining 5. Until this is accomplished, DOD is increasing the risk that important and beneficial best practices will not be followed and that DOD business systems investments will not deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. The 5000 Series Largely Incorporates Best Practices Relevant to Any Business Systems Acquisition
Of the 10 best practices that we categorized as relevant to the acquisition of any business system, whether custom-developed or developed using commercial packages and products, essentially all have been incorporated into DOD’s acquisition policies and guidance. In turn, this increases the risk that acquisition projects will fall short of expectations. The 5000 Series Generally Does Not Incorporate Best Practices Relevant to Commercial Component-Based Business Systems Acquisitions
Of the 8 best practices relevant to acquiring commercial component-based business systems, few have been incorporated into DOD systems acquisition policies and guidance. According to these officials, 80 to 90 percent of the revision has been completed and reviewed and their goal is to publish the initial version of the revised guidebook by September 30, 2004. DOD’s acquisition policy requires program managers and investment decision authorities to examine and, as appropriate, adopt best practices. However, other practices that, if followed, could increase the odds of acquisitions delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget have yet to be similarly included. Therefore, it is important for DOD to treat further revisions of its acquisition policy and guidance relative to business systems as a priority and move quickly to incorporate missing best practices and associated controls for ensuring that the practices are followed. To ensure that the best practices provided for in DOD acquisition policies and guidance are appropriately followed, we also recommend that the above recommended plan incorporate steps to include in DOD’s acquisition policies a provision for measurement and verification of best practices. As another example, we do not agree with DOD’s comment that 2 of the best practices that we recommended for incorporation in its policies and guidance—preparing users for the impact that business process changes embedded in commercial components will have on their roles and responsibilities, and actively managing changes in how users will use new systems—are already sufficiently contained in the 5000 series. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the Department of Defense’s (DOD) revised systems acquisition policies for acquiring information technology (IT) business systems (1) are consistent with industry best practices, including those pertaining to commercial component-based systems, and (2) provide the necessary controls to ensure that the department’s component organizations adhere to the practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The way in which the Department of Defense (DOD) has historically acquired its business systems has been cited as a root cause for its limited success in delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. In response, DOD recently revised its systems acquisition policies and guidance to incorporate best practices, including those pertaining to business systems. GAO was asked to determine whether DOD's revised systems acquisition policies and guidance (1) are consistent with industry best practices, including those pertaining to commercial component-based systems, and (2) provide the necessary controls to ensure that DOD component organizations adhere to the practices.
What GAO Found
DOD's revised policies and guidance largely incorporate 10 best practices for acquiring any type of information technology (IT) business system. For example, the revisions include the requirement that acquisitions be economically justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks. However, the revisions generally do not incorporate 8 best practices relating to the acquisition of commercial component-based systems. For example, they do not address basing any decision to modify commercial components on a thorough analysis of the impact of doing so or on preparing system users for the business process and job roles and responsibilities changes that are embedded in the functionality of commercial IT products. In total, GAO found that DOD's acquisition policies and guidance fully incorporate 8 of the 18 best practices that they were evaluated against, partially incorporate 5 practices, and do not incorporate the remaining 5 practices. DOD intends to expand its acquisition guidance to incorporate additional best practices by September 30, 2004, but department officials cite other priorities as a reason why they have not been able to complete this effort and could not provide a plan specifying how this will be accomplished. Until DOD's revised policies and guidance incorporate key systems acquisition best practices, the risk that system investments will not consistently deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget is increased. DOD's revised policies also do not contain sufficient controls to ensure that DOD components appropriately follow the best practices that are incorporated in its policies and guidance. According to acquisition best practices experts, as well as GAO's internal control guidance, controls are effective if they are backed by measurements that are verified. Although the revised policies and guidance require acquisition managers to examine and, as appropriate, adopt best practices, they do not cite what that examination entails. DOD believes existing controls are sufficient, even though these controls do not provide for measuring and validating the practices' use. Without specific requirements to measure and validate the use of best practices, the risk that they will not be followed increases, which, in turn, increases the risk that system investments will not meet expectations. |
gao_GAO-11-75 | gao_GAO-11-75_0 | Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities Are Spread across DOD, and DOD Is Reorganizing to Better Address Cybersecurity Threats
DOD’s organization to address cybersecurity threats is decentralized and spread across various offices, commands, military services, and military agencies. DOD cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are vast and include developing joint policy and guidance and operational functions to protect and defend its computer networks. DOD is taking proactive measures to better address cybersecurity threats, such as developing new organizational structures, led by the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command, to facilitate the integration of cyberspace operations. However, it is too early to tell if these organizational changes will help DOD better address cybersecurity threats. DOD Recognizes the Need to Update Cyber-Related Joint Doctrine and Guidance, but Lacks a Timetable for Completion
Several joint doctrine publications address aspects of cyberspace operations, but DOD officials acknowledge that this is insufficient. None of the joint publications that mention “cyberspace operations” contains a sufficient discussion of cyberspace operations. DOD recognizes the need to develop and update cyber-related joint doctrine and is currently debating the merits of developing a single cyberspace operations joint doctrine publication in addition to updating all existing doctrine. However, there is no timetable for completing the decision-making process or for updates to existing doctrine. DOD determined that it has addressed cyberspace-related topics in at least 16 DOD joint doctrine publications and mentions “cyberspace operations” in at least 8 joint publications. Conflicting Guidance and Unclear Responsibilities Have Created Challenges for Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations
DOD has assigned authorities and responsibilities for implementing cyberspace operations among combatant commands, military services, and defense agencies. However, the supporting relationships necessary to achieve command and control of cyberspace operations remain unclear. In response to a major computer infection in 2008, U.S. Strategic Command identified confusion regarding command and control authorities and chains of command because the exploited network fell under the purview of both its own command and a geographic combatant command. Without complete and clearly articulated guidance on cyber command and control responsibilities that is well- communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD may have difficulty in building unity of effort for carrying out cyber operations. Both classified studies evaluated DOD’s command and control organization and recommended improvements in 2008. DOD Has Identified Some Capability Gaps in Cyber Operations, but Lacks a Comprehensive Assessment of Departmentwide Cyberspace Needs and an Implementation Plan to Address Any Gaps
DOD has identified some cyberspace capability gaps. However, it has not completed a comprehensive, departmentwide assessment of needed resources associated with the capability gaps and an implementation plan to address any gaps. While the department’s review of cyberspace capability gaps and various studies on cyberspace operations are steps in the right direction, it remains unclear whether these gaps will be addressed, since DOD has not conducted the kind of comprehensive capabilities-based assessment outlined in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System or established an implementation plan to resolve any resulting gaps. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen DOD’s cyberspace doctrine and operations to better address cybersecurity threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and U.S. Strategic Command to establish a time frame for (1) deciding whether or not to proceed with a dedicated joint doctrine publication on cyberspace operations and for (2) updating the existing body of joint doctrine to include complete cyberspace-related definitions, and direct the appropriate officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff, to clarify DOD guidance on command and control relationships between U.S. Strategic Command, the services, and the geographic combatant commands regarding cyberspace operations, and establish a time frame for issuing the clarified guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of a global cyberspace crisis as foreign nation states and other actors, such as hackers, criminals, terrorists, and activists exploit DOD and other U.S. government computer networks to further a variety of national, ideological, and personal objectives. This report identifies (1) how DOD is organized to address cybersecurity threats; and assesses the extent to which DOD has (2) developed joint doctrine that addresses cyberspace operations; (3) assigned command and control responsibilities; and (4) identified and taken actions to mitigate any key capability gaps involving cyberspace operations. It is an unclassified version of a previously issued classified report. GAO analyzed policies, doctrine, lessons learned, and studies from throughout DOD, commands, and the services involved with DOD's computer network operations and interviewed officials from a wide range of DOD organizations..
What GAO Found
DOD's organization to address cybersecurity threats is decentralized and spread across various offices, commands, military services, and military agencies. DOD cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are vast and include developing joint policy and guidance and operational functions to protect and defend its computer networks. DOD is taking proactive measures to better address cybersecurity threats, such as developing new organizational structures, led by the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command, to facilitate the integration of cyberspace operations. However, it is too early to tell if these changes will help DOD better address cybersecurity threats. Several joint doctrine publications address aspects of cyberspace operations, but DOD officials acknowledge that the discussions are insufficient; and no single joint publication completely addresses cyberspace operations. While at least 16 DOD joint publications discuss cyberspace-related topics and 8 mention "cyberspace operations," none contained a sufficient discussion of cyberspace operations. DOD recognizes the need to develop and update cyber-related joint doctrine and is currently debating the merits of developing a single cyberspace operations joint doctrine publication in addition to updating all existing doctrine. However, there is no timetable for completing the decision-making process or for updates to existing doctrine. DOD has assigned authorities and responsibilities for implementing cyberspace operations among combatant commands, military services, and defense agencies; however, the supporting relationships necessary to achieve command and control of cyberspace operations remain unclear. In response to a major computer infection, U.S. Strategic Command identified confusion regarding command and control authorities and chains of command because the exploited network fell under the purview of both its own command and a geographic combatant command. Without complete and clearly articulated guidance on command and control responsibilities that is well communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DOD will have difficulty in achieving command and control of its cyber forces globally and in building unity of effort for carrying out cyberspace operations. DOD has identified some cyberspace capability gaps, but it has not completed a comprehensive, departmentwide assessment of needed resources, capability gaps, and an implementation plan to address any gaps. For example, U.S. Strategic Command has identified that DOD's cyber workforce is undersized and unprepared to meet the current threat, which is projected to increase significantly over time. While the department's review of some cyberspace capability gaps on cyberspace operations is a step in the right direction, it remains unclear whether these gaps will be addressed since DOD has not conducted a more comprehensive departmentwide assessment of cyber-related capability gaps or established an implementation plan or funding strategy to resolve any gaps that may be identified.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) establish a timeframe for deciding on whether to complete a separate joint cyberspace publication and for updating the existing body of joint publications, (2) clarify command and control relationships regarding cyberspace operations and establish a timeframe for issuing the clarified guidance, and (3) more fully assess cyber-specific capability gaps, and (4) develop a plan and funding strategy to address them. DOD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-733 | gao_GAO-11-733_0 | In April 2011, DOT issued its second “Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections” rule. As a result, DOT data provides an incomplete picture of delay, cancellation, and diversion trends. This information corroborates what we were told by various stakeholders, including airline officials and aviation researchers. 5). DOT has historically not collected flight performance information from smaller airlines because of the burden it has perceived would be placed on these airlines. New Rule Has Nearly Eliminated Long Tarmac Delays but is Correlated with an Increase in the Likelihood of Flight Cancellations
The Number of Long Tarmac Delays Has Declined in Recent Years
Since 2004, tarmac delays of more than 3 hours peaked in 2007, three years before the tarmac delay rule was implemented. Since these rules took effect in April 2010, tarmac delays greater than 4 hours have been eliminated, and tarmac delays of more than 3 hours nearly eliminated, reducing the hardship of long on-board delays for some passengers. As a result of challenges rebooking passengers, such cancellations can lead to long overall delay times. Our Analysis Finds That the Tarmac Delay Rule is Correlated with an Increased Likelihood of Flight Cancellations
Since a variety of factors in addition to the tarmac delay rule may be correlated with airline cancellation decisions, we developed logistic regression models that control for several factors that are likely to be associated with these decisions in order to measure the likely effect of the tarmac delay rule. We used two models to analyze cancellations. EU Requirements Provide More Comprehensive Passenger Protections, but May Also Increase Costs for Airlines and Passengers
Passenger Protections Requirements Are More Extensive in the EU than in the United States or Canada
Passenger protections requirements for flight delays, cancellations, and denied boarding are overall more extensive in the EU than they are in the United States or Canada. Some airlines in the United States and the EU told us that compliance costs such as these can lead to higher fares. The amount of a sanction also differs between the two member states. Conclusions
Flight disruptions remain costly for passengers, airlines, and the economy. Although DOT’s rules have benefited some passengers, DOT’s current flight performance data may not fully inform consumers of airlines’ quality of service as intended. By collecting data only from the largest airlines, DOT does not obtain and therefore cannot provide consumers with a complete picture of flight performance, particularly at airports in rural communities or among smaller airlines. To enhance DOT’s understanding of the impact of tarmac delays and flight cancellations, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following action: Fully assess the impact of the tarmac delay rule, including the relationship between the rule and any increase in cancellations and how they effect passengers and, if warranted, refine the rule’s requirements and implementation to maximize passenger welfare and system efficiency. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examined how (1) trends in and reasons for flight delays and cancellations in the United States differ for smaller and larger communities; (2) the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) tarmac delay rule has affected passengers and airlines; and (3) requirements and practices for protecting passengers from flight delays, cancellations, and denied boardings in the United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) have affected passengers and airlines. It also provides information on airline- reported sources of delays and cancellations, based on our analysis of DOT data. Incidence of Flight Cancellations in 2010 Relative to 2009
To examine the incidence of flight cancellations before and after the tarmac rule’s implementation, we collected data on flights for May through September in 2009—before the rule went into effect—and for the same months in 2010, after the rule’s implementation. The data show that flights are rarely canceled after leaving the gate. Airport on-time performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Flight delays and cancellations are disruptive and costly for passengers, airlines, and the economy. Long tarmac delays have created hardships for some passengers. To enhance passenger protections in the event of flight disruptions, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) recently introduced passenger protection regulations, including a rule that took effect in April 2010 designed to prevent tarmac delays more than 3 hours (the tarmac delay rule), as well as other efforts to improve passenger welfare. As requested, this report addresses (1) whether flight delays and cancellations differ by community size; (2) how DOT's tarmac delay rule has affected passengers and airlines; and (3) how passenger protection requirements in the United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) affect passengers and airlines. GAO analyzed DOT data, including through the use of regression models, as well as data from FlightStats, a private source of flight performance information. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed government, airline, and consumer group officials in the United States, Canada, and the EU.
What GAO Found
Airports in rural communities have higher rates of delays and cancellations than airports in larger communities, but DOT data provide an incomplete picture of this difference. DOT's data include flights operated by the largest airlines, representing about 70 percent of all scheduled flights. GAO analysis of FlightStats data, representing about 98 percent of all scheduled flights, show more substantial differences in flight performance trends by community size than DOT data. DOT has historically not collected data from smaller airlines because of the burden it could impose on these airlines, but without this information, DOT cannot fully achieve the purpose of providing consumers with information on airlines' quality of service. DOT's tarmac delay rule has nearly eliminated tarmac delays of more than 3 hours (180 minutes), declining from 693 to 20 incidents in the 12 months following the introduction of the rule in April 2010. While this has reduced the hardship of long on-board delays for some passengers, GAO analysis suggests the rule is also correlated with a greater likelihood of flight cancellations. Such cancellations can lead to long overall passenger travel times. Airlines and other aviation stakeholders maintain that the tarmac delay rule has changed airline decision-making in ways that could make cancellations more likely. To test this claim, GAO developed two regression models, which controlled for a variety of factors that can cause cancellations and measured whether the time period following the imposition of the tarmac delay rule is correlated with an increase in cancellations. The two models assessed flights canceled before and after leaving the gate, for the same 5 months (May through September) in 2009 and 2010. In both cases, GAO found that there was an increased likelihood of cancellation in 2010 compared to 2009. EU requirements provide airline passengers with more extensive protections, such as care and compensation, for flight delays, cancellations, and denied boardings than do U.S. or Canadian requirements. But these protections may also increase costs for airlines and passengers. For example, some airline officials in the United States and the EU told GAO that increases in the amount of denied boarding compensation has increased their overall costs. Additionally, enhanced passenger protections, such as those in the EU, can create enforcement challenges if regulations are unclear or not universally enforced.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT collect and publicize more comprehensive data on airlines' on-time performance and assess the full range of the tarmac delay rule's costs and benefits and, if warranted, refine the rule's requirements and implementation. DOT did not comment directly on the recommendations, but indicated that it would soon begin a study of the effect of the tarmac delay rule. |
gao_GAO-03-605 | gao_GAO-03-605_0 | The Bureau goes to great lengths to develop a quality address list and maps, working with the U.S. Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) review the adequacy of the Bureau’s operations for locating migrant farm workers and their dwellings during the 2000 Census, and (2) identify how, if at all, the Bureau can improve those operations for the next decennial census in 2010. The Bureau’s Listing Operations Addressed Some of the Barriers to Locating Migrant and Seasonal Farm Workers but Significant Challenges Remain
The Bureau used more than a dozen operations to help ensure a complete and accurate address list. Although the operations were designed to locate various types of dwellings, not population groups as a whole, if properly implemented their design appears to have been adequate for identifying the hidden living arrangements in which a number of migrant and seasonal farm workers live. However, the operations were generally not as well suited to overcoming language and other challenges associated with locating these population groups. Overall, to the extent that they were properly implemented, the design of the Bureau’s MAF-building operations appears to have been adequate for identifying the hidden and unconventional dwellings in which many migrant farm workers reside. However, most of these operations were not as well suited to overcoming other challenges to locating migrant farm workers, such as a distrust of outsiders and language and literacy issues. The Bureau appeared to do a better job surmounting these challenges when it worked with local people who knew where and how migrant farm workers lived, and could help facilitate the Bureau’s access to those communities. Greater Use of Partnership Program and Innovative Practices Could Improve the Bureau’s Ability to Locate Migrant Farm Workers in the Future
Bureau officials told us that because it is relatively early in the decade, its plans for locating and enumerating migrant farm workers are still being developed. The Bureau partnered with state, local, and tribal governments as well as religious, media, educational, and other community organizations to improve participation in the 2000 Census and to mobilize support for other operations. Make use of address information from local organizations. Use Census data strategically to help plan and manage address listing operations. 2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010 Census. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) long-standing challenges has been counting migrant farm workers. Although the Bureau goes to great lengths to locate these individuals, its efforts are often hampered by the unconventional and hidden housing arrangements, distrust of outsiders, and language and literacy issues often associated with this population group. To help inform the planning for the 2010 Census, we were asked to review the adequacy of the Bureau's procedures for locating migrant farm workers and their dwellings during the 2000 Census, and the steps, if any, that the Bureau can take to improve those procedures.
What GAO Found
The Bureau used over a dozen operations to ensure a complete address list and accurate maps for the 2000 Census. To the extent that the operations were properly implemented, their design appears to have been adequate for identifying the hidden dwellings in which some migrant farm workers live, such as basement apartments. However, the operations were not as well suited to overcoming other difficulties associated with locating migrant farm workers such as language and literacy issues and a distrust of outsiders. These challenges were surmounted more effectively by relying on local advocacy groups and others in the community who knew where and how migrant farm workers lived, and could facilitate the Bureau's access to those areas. The Bureau's plans for the 2010 Census include an ambitious program to make its maps more accurate. However, additional steps will be needed. Local and regional census offices employed innovative practices during the 2000 Census that could help improve the Bureau's ability to locate migrant farm workers in 2010. They include partnering with state and local governments earlier in the decade when many address-listing operations take place (during the 2000 Census, the Bureau's partnership program was used largely to get people to participate in the Census, but these activities took place after the Bureau had completed most of its address list development activities). Other innovations included making use of address information from local advocacy groups to help find migrant farm workers, and using census and other demographic data strategically to plan operations and target resources to those areas with high numbers of migrant farm workers. |
gao_AIMD-96-86 | gao_AIMD-96-86_0 | States and local governments also have supported consumer health informatics and have provided medical information and health articles via the Internet. This inquiry included questions on the costs, potential benefits, and other issues associated with the development and use of such systems; we also examined federal, state, and local government and private-sector activities that develop and/or sponsor these projects. Consumers’ high and increasing demand for health information has been demonstrated in a number of studies. Advances in technology make access to consumer health information easier, responding to this increasing consumer demand. Experts Identify Issues and Options
While technology provides various advantages and may reduce unnecessary medical costs, the health informatics experts in our study acknowledged that computer systems also raise issues that need to be addressed regarding the development and use of consumer informatics. Other issues identified as important to ensuring effective development and use of consumer informatics included security and privacy, computer literacy, copyright, systems development, and information overload. Views on copyright and systems development issues were also expressed. The importance of following sound systems-development guidelines in developing a consumer health information system—such as developing a systems plan, identifying user information needs, and developing technical specifications—was underscored by most of the experts. Peer reviews of informatics systems developed could also help ensure information quality. Government Involvement: Present Activities, Future Plans
The federal government is performing activities to support and review informatics. HHS has recently developed a report that contains information on customer access, the creation of more public- and private-sector partnerships, and efforts to ensure access for various disadvantaged groups. While many federal agencies are involved in providing health information to the public, and many agencies provide health care funding through grants for research, clinical studies, new technology demonstrations, and disease prevention, no single, comprehensive inventory of all this federal activity exists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed consumer health informatics, focusing on: (1) the demand for health information and expanding technological capabilities; (2) users' and developers' views on potential systems advantages and issues surrounding systems development and use; (3) federal, state, and local government involvement in developing these technologies; and (4) the status of related Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) increasing consumer demand for more detailed health information has driven the expansion of better health information systems; (2) studies on consumer health informatics show that these systems can respond quickly and efficiently to consumers' information needs, provide customized information, and reduce health care costs by limiting unnecessary medical services; (3) the systems' technologies, sponsors, and costs vary widely; (4) developers and users believe that consumer health systems provide additional benefits, such as anonymity, outreach, convenience, scope, and emotional support; (5) issues that need to be addressed to ensure effective and efficient system development, maintenance, and use include access, cost, information quality, security, privacy, computer literacy, and information overload; (6) options to address these issues include encouraging public- and private-sector partnerships and more research, involving interdisciplinary teams of professionals in systems development, and using sound systems development practices; (7) the federal government disseminates huge amounts of health care data through various means and supports systems development efforts; (8) states and local governments also support informatics projects and provide online health information to the public; (9) total government costs are unknown because there is no comprehensive inventory of informatics projects; and (10) HHS has outlined future steps to enhance health information for consumers and promote federal agency collaboration. |
gao_GAO-01-820T | gao_GAO-01-820T_0 | Thus, the goal of a national system much like Amtrak’s current system and the goal of operational self-sufficiency appear to be incompatible. In fact, Amtrak was created because other railroads were unable to profitably provide passenger service. In addition, Amtrak needs more capital funding than has been historically provided in order to operate a safe, reliable system that can attract and retain customers. Developing high-speed rail systems is also costly, requiring additional tens of billions of dollars. If intercity passenger rail is to have a future in the nation’s transportation system, the Congress needs to be provided with realistic assessments of the expected public benefits and resulting costs of these investments as compared with investments in other modes of transportation. Such analyses would provide sound bases for congressional action in defining the national goals that will be pursued, the extent that Amtrak and other intercity passenger rail systems can contribute to meeting these goals, state and federal roles, and whether federal and state funds would likely be available to sustain such systems over the long term. | What GAO Found
Congress faces critical decisions about the future of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) and intercity passenger rail. In GAO's view, the goal of a national system, much like Amtrak's current system, and the goal of operational self-sufficiency appear to be incompatible. In fact, Amtrak was created because other railroads were unable to profitably provide passenger service. In addition, Amtrak needs more capital funding than has been historically provided in order to operate a safe, reliable system that can attract and retain customers. Developing a high-speed rail system is also costly, requiring additional tens of billions of dollars. If intercity passenger rail is to have a future in the nation's transportation system, Congress needs realistic assessments of the expected public benefits and the resulting costs of these investments as compared with investments in other modes of transportation. Such analyses would provide sound bases for congressional action in defining the national goals that will be pursued, the extent that Amtrak and other intercity passenger rail systems can contribute to meeting these goals, and whether federal and state money would be available to sustain such systems over the long term. |
gao_RCED-98-53 | gao_RCED-98-53_0 | Applicants must provide a Social Security number for each household member. Inclusion of Deceased Individuals in Food Stamp Households Costs Millions in Overpayments
During calendar years 1995 and 1996, about $8.5 million in food stamp benefits were improperly collected by households that included deceased individuals—nearly 26,000 in total—in the four states we examined. States’ Matching Efforts Have Had Mixed Results
Although some state agencies have employed their own computer matches as a means of identifying deceased individuals who are included in food stamp households, the practice does not appear to be widespread. However, because the agency’s Social Security numbers are not verified, and the information is limited to California, mismatches may occur, and some deceased individuals may not be identified. Because SSA already has a system in place for providing death information to the states, it would be even more cost-effective for SSA to routinely provide death information on food stamp participants to the states rather than having the states conduct computer matches of the food stamp rolls and their death records. The availability of such information would provide ancillary benefits, such as helping state agencies identify deceased individuals in other assistance programs. SSA’s information on deceased individuals could also be used to identify agency errors. Specifically, we determined (1) how many deceased individuals were included as members of households that received food stamp benefits and the estimated value of improper benefits that were issued to the households, (2) how these individuals could be included without being detected, and (3) whether computer matching or other methods could effectively identify such individuals. To determine if deceased individuals were included as members of households that received food stamp benefits and the estimated value of benefits that were issued to the households, we matched the food stamp records of the four states with the largest benefits in the Food Stamp Program and the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Death Master File. The state agencies had verified the Social Security numbers for the data on food stamp beneficiaries through SSA’s Enumeration Verification System. 2. 3. 4. However, SSA states that it does not have the authority to disclose such information to USDA or the states. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Food Stamp Program, focusing on: (1) how many deceased individuals were included as members of households that received food stamp benefits and the estimated value of improper benefits that were issued to the households; (2) how these individuals could be included without being detected; and (3) whether computer matching or other methods could effectively identify such individuals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO identified nearly 26,000 deceased individuals in the four states GAO reviewed who were included in households receiving food stamps for the 2-year period 1995 through 1996; (2) these households improperly collected an estimated $8.5 million in food stamps benefits; (3) the inclusion of deceased individuals in food stamp households goes undetected because agencies rely primarily on unverified information on household membership provided by food stamp applicants and participants; (4) states are not required to match applicant-provided social security numbers with the social security numbers of deceased individuals; (5) however, several state agencies match information on the applicant's household members with information on deceased individuals from their state's vital statistics agency; (6) these states' efforts have had mixed success because the states have not always had verified, comprehensive death information; (7) while the Social Security Administration (SSA) makes information on its deceased beneficiaries available to state agencies through its State Verification and Exchange System, this information is limited to the recipients of specific SSA benefits; (8) states' computer matching of individuals in food stamp households with data in SSA's more comprehensive Death Master File would provide a cost-effective mechanism to accurately and independently identify deceased individuals included in food stamp households; (9) it would be even more cost-effective, however, for SSA to notify the states when a food stamp participant dies, rather than having the states conduct computer matches, because SSA already has a system in place to identify deceased individuals who received food stamp benefits but not social security benefits; and (10) furthermore, some states place restrictions on the use of the death data they provide to SSA; the agency currently does not have the authority to disclose restricted death information to other states administering federal benefit programs. |
gao_GAO-15-347 | gao_GAO-15-347_0 | SBA Has Not Resolved Many of Its Long-Standing Management Challenges
In the last 15 years, we and the SBA OIG have identified management challenges at SBA, many of which are related to specific programs. To address SBA’s challenges, we and the SBA OIG have made various recommendations. While SBA has made some progress in addressing these challenge areas, many of our recommendations remain unimplemented. We maintain that these recommendations continue to have merit and should be fully implemented. Loan guarantee purchases. 8(a) business development program. For example, he stated that the agency was considering how to expand SBA One—an initiative designed to create a single application for most SBA loans and allow borrowers and lenders to populate forms from secure information storage—to include the 8(a) program. SBA generally agreed with our recommendation and subsequently revised its review procedures. SBA has recently completed its LMAS projects. Disaster loan processing. SBA generally agreed with the recommendations. SBA officials said that the agency had also begun to update its SOP on internal control and plans additional revisions after OMB has updated its Circular A-123, which is expected to include guidance on implementing the new standards. SBA has not resolved many of these long-standing management challenges due to a lack of sustained priority attention over time. In a September 2008 report, we noted that frequent turnover of political leadership in the federal government, including at SBA, often made it difficult to sustain and inspire attention to needed changes. Senior SBA leaders have not prioritized long-term organizational transformation in management challenge areas such as human capital and information technology. Furthermore, in an April 2013 House committee hearing on SBA’s proposed fiscal year 2014 budget, the committee Chairman stated that SBA’s proposed budget focused on the agency’s priorities but ignored some long-standing management deficits. These examples raise questions about SBA’s sustained commitment to addressing management challenges that could keep it from effectively assisting small businesses. Workforce plan. In addition, a senior SBA official stated that improving human capital management was a priority for the Administrator and that SBA was focused on developing different ways to recruit a younger and more diverse workforce. Evaluation. Planning. Design and development. Evaluation. 6). In later reports, we and others—including SBA itself—identified organizational challenges that affected SBA’s program oversight and human capital management. Implementation and monitoring. Operational analysis of IT investments. SBA did not agree nor disagree with our recommendations, but SBA officials told us that as of May 2015, they had begun to take steps to address them. 6. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) (1) has addressed previously identified management challenges related to specific programs, including those related to internal controls; (2) is following federal requirements for strategic planning; (3) is following key principles or internal controls for human capital management, organizational structure, enterprise risk management, acquisition management, and procedural guidance; and (4) is making progress in implementing the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) high-priority management practices for information technology. To review SBA’s organizational structure, we reviewed prior GAO and SBA OIG reports that discussed, among other things, the effect of the agency’s structure on its human capital management and program oversight. Appendix IV: Results of the Small Business Administration’s Internal Review of Its Standard Operating Procedures, as of March 2015
In fiscal year 2014, the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of the Chief Operating Officer, Office of Administrative Services began a review of the status of all standard operating procedures (SOP), working with the program offices to determine whether any updates were needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
SBA has provided billions of dollars in loans and guarantees to small businesses. As of March 31, 2015, SBA’s total loan portfolio was about $116.9 billion, including $110.3 billion in direct and guaranteed loans and $6.6 billion in disaster loans. GAO has previously reported on management challenges at SBA. GAO was asked to review SBA management, including whether those challenges were ongoing. This report discusses SBA’s efforts to address management challenges related to specific programs and internal controls. It also looks at challenges in strategic planning, human capital, organizational structure, enterprise risk, procedural guidance, and IT. To do this work, GAO reviewed SBA policies and compared them with federal requirements, key principles for human capital management, and internal control standards. GAO also interviewed officials at SBA headquarters, all 10 regional offices, and 10 of 68 district offices selected on the basis of location and size.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has not resolved many of its long-standing management challenges due to a lack of sustained priority attention over time. Frequent turnover of political leadership in the federal government, including at SBA, has often made sustaining attention to needed changes difficult (see figure below). Senior SBA leaders have not prioritized long-term organizational transformation in areas such as human capital and information technology (IT). For example, at a 2013 hearing on SBA's budget, the committee Chairman stated that SBA's proposed budget focused on the agency's priorities but ignored some long-standing management deficits. This raises questions about SBA's sustained commitment to addressing management challenges that could keep it from effectively assisting small businesses.
Many of the management challenges that GAO and the SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG) have identified over the years remain, including some related to program implementation and oversight, contracting, human capital, and IT (see figure below). SBA has generally agreed with prior GAO recommendations that were designed to address these issues and other challenges related to the lack of program evaluations. The agency has made limited progress in addressing most of these recommendations but has recently begun taking some steps. A senior SBA official told us that improving human capital management, IT, and the 8(a) program (a business development program) were priorities for the new administrator. For example, he stated that SBA was exploring creative ways to recruit staff and plans to expand SBA One—a database currently used to process loan applications—to include the 8(a) program. Also, SBA has begun addressing some internal control weaknesses that GAO and the SBA OIG identified as contributing to the agency's management challenges. SBA officials noted that the agency had begun to update its standard operating procedure (SOP) on internal controls and planned more revisions after the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) updated its Circular A-123, which is expected to include guidance on implementing GAO's 2014 revisions to federal internal control standards. OMB issued a draft of the revised circular in June 2015 and is reviewing comments it received.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes eight new recommendations designed to improve SBA's program evaluations, strategic and workforce planning, training, organizational structure, ERM, procedural guidance, and oversight of IT investments. SBA generally agreed with these recommendations and provided additional context. In response, GAO clarified one of its recommendations. GAO also maintains that 69 recommendations it made in prior work have merit and should be fully implemented. |
gao_GAO-17-625 | gao_GAO-17-625_0 | SSA began CAL in October 2008 with the stated goal of providing expedited benefit processing to those with certain medical conditions whose claims are likely to be approved. Certain expedited processing rules apply to claims that are flagged for CAL. Since 2011, SSA has also relied on advocates for individuals with certain diseases and disorders to bring conditions to the agency’s attention, rather than proactively and systematically reviewing conditions to identify potential additions to the CAL list. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should use quality information to achieve their objectives. Absent clear guidance to advocates on how to make suggestions through its CAL webpage, SSA is missing an opportunity to gather quality information to inform its selection of CAL conditions. SSA Does Not Have Clear, Consistent Criteria for Designating CAL Conditions or a Formal Process for Documenting Its Decisions
SSA has generally described CAL conditions as those that “invariably qualify as allowances under the Listing of Impairments based on minimal objective medical evidence,” according to SSA officials. However, SSA has not developed or communicated clear, consistent criteria for designating conditions as CAL conditions. Because some claimants misspell words describing their conditions, the selection software may also omit a CAL flag on claims that should be flagged. Without clear guidance on when to make manual changes, DDS examiners may continue to take actions that are not timely and may hinder expedited processing for appropriate claims and accurate tracking of CAL claims. SSA Takes Some Steps to Ensure Accurate and Consistent CAL Decisions But Does Not Regularly Update CAL Condition Descriptions or Leverage Available Data
SSA Has Procedures to Ensure Accurate and Consistent Claim Decisions But Does Not Regularly Update CAL Condition Descriptions
SSA has various procedures in place, including the use of detailed CAL condition descriptions, to help ensure the accuracy and consistency of CAL claims decisions. Although CAL impairment summaries are a key tool used by examiners to make a decision on whether to allow or deny a CAL claim, SSA has not regularly updated the impairment summaries. This is because SSA does not have a process for regularly updating all of these summaries. As a result, since the initiative’s inception in fiscal year 2009, about two-thirds of the summaries have not been updated. 5). Several advocates (4 of 6) and medical experts (2 of 3) we interviewed suggested that the impairment summaries should be updated every 1 to 3 years because medical research and advancements may have implications for disability determinations. Develop a plan to regularly review and use available data to assess the accuracy and consistency of CAL decision-making. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, SSA agreed with our eight recommendations. This report examines the extent to which the Social Security Administration (SSA) has procedures for (1) identifying conditions for the CAL list; (2) identifying claims for CAL processing; and (3) ensuring the accuracy and consistency of CAL decisions. Management Information Data
We analyzed SSA data on CAL from SSA’s Management Information Disability database, including the number of allowance (approval) and denial decisions for disability claims identified with CAL conditions from fiscal year 2009, when CAL was implemented, through fiscal year 2016. Interviews with SSA and DDS Staff
To gather information on how SSA identifies conditions for the CAL list, identifies claims for CAL processing, and ensures the accuracy and consistency of CAL decisions, we conducted interviews with staff from SSA headquarters and select DDS offices. Claim File Review
We conducted a non-generalizable review of 74 claim files with fiscal year 2016 initial determinations to confirm our understanding of how claims are identified as CAL by the selection software and manually by DDS officials and to assess the reliability of CAL management data. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA in October 2008 implemented CAL to fast track individuals with certain conditions through the disability determination process by prioritizing their disability benefit claims. Since then, SSA has expanded its list of CAL conditions from 50 to 225. GAO was asked to review SSA's implementation of CAL.
This report examines the extent to which SSA has procedures for (1) designating CAL conditions, (2) identifying claims for CAL processing, and (3) ensuring the accuracy and consistency of CAL decisions. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed SSA data on disability decisions for CAL claims from fiscal years 2009 through 2016 and on CAL claims with manual actions in fiscal year 2016; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 74 claim files with fiscal year 2016 initial determinations; and interviewed medical experts, patient advocates, and SSA officials in headquarters and six DDS offices selected for geographic dispersion and varied CAL caseloads.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) does not have a formal or systematic approach for designating certain medical conditions for the Compassionate Allowance initiative (CAL). CAL was established in 2008 to fast track claimants through the disability determination process who are likely to be approved because they have certain eligible medical conditions. In lieu of a formal process for identifying conditions for the list of CAL conditions, SSA has in recent years relied on advocates for individuals with certain diseases and disorders to bring conditions to its attention. However, by relying on advocates, SSA may overlook disabling conditions for individuals who have no advocates, potentially resulting in individuals with these conditions not receiving expedited processing. Further, SSA does not have clear, consistent criteria for designating conditions for potential CAL inclusion, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. As a result, external stakeholders lack key information about how to recommend conditions for inclusion on the CAL list.
To identify disability claims for expedited CAL processing, SSA primarily relies on software that searches for key words in claims. However, if claimants include incorrect or misspelled information in their claims the software is hindered in its ability to flag all claimants with CAL conditions or may flag claimants for CAL processing that should not be flagged. SSA has guidance for disability determination services (DDS) staff on how to manually correct errors made by the software, but the guidance does not address when such corrections should occur (see figure). Without clear guidance on when to make manual changes, DDS examiners may continue to take actions that are not timely and may hinder expedited processing for appropriate claims, and this can also impact the accurate tracking of CAL claims.
SSA has taken some steps to ensure the accuracy and consistency of decisions on CAL claims, including developing detailed descriptions of CAL conditions, known as impairment summaries. These summaries help examiners make decisions about whether to allow or deny a claim. However, nearly one-third of the summaries are 5 or more years old. Experts and advocates that GAO spoke to suggested that summaries should be updated every 1 to 3 years. This leaves SSA at risk of making disability determinations using medically outdated information. In addition, GAO found that SSA does not leverage data it collects to assess the accuracy and consistency of CAL adjudication decisions. Without regular analyses of available data SSA is missing an opportunity to ensure the accuracy and consistency of CAL decision-making.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations including that SSA develop a process to systematically gather information on potential CAL conditions, communicate criteria for designating CAL conditions, clarify guidance for manual corrections on CAL claims, update CAL impairment summaries, and use available data to ensure accurate, consistent decision-making. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-410 | gao_GAO-02-410_0 | FDL’s Budget and Staffing Were Somewhat Higher in Fiscal Year 2001 than Fiscal Year 1999 and Will Increase Substantially in the Future
FDL’s budget was about $4.1 million in fiscal year 2001, about 15 percent higher than in fiscal year 1999 (see table 1). In fiscal year 2001, FDL’s total staff level was 35 full-time equivalent staff, up from FDL’s fiscal year 1999 level of 31 full-time equivalent staff. In contrast, the number of forensic cases pending at the beginning of each year increased between 1999 and 2001. According to FDL officials, staff shortages have made it difficult for FDL to stay current with its workload and produce timely responses to requests for forensic document examination. | What GAO Found
With nearly 200 countries using unique passports, official stamps, seals, and visas, the potential for immigration document fraud is great. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Forensic Document Laboratory is the only federal laboratory dedicated to fraud detection. The Laboratory's budget was $4.1 million in fiscal year 2001, 15 percent higher than in fiscal year 1999. The Laboratory had 35 full-time equivalent staff, three more than in fiscal year 1999. Although the Laboratory's total forensic caseload declined from fiscal years 1999 to 2001, the number of forensic cases pending at the beginning of each year increased. According to laboratory officials, staff shortages have affected the Laboratory's ability to process cases promptly. |
gao_AIMD-98-82 | gao_AIMD-98-82_0 | 2550-2552 of the District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995, called for the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide technical assistance to the District public schools in the area of facilities management and for the Mayor and the District of Columbia Council, in consultation with the Administrator of GSA, the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (Authority), the Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Schools, to design and implement a comprehensive long-term program for the repair, improvement, maintenance, and management of District public school facilities and to designate or establish an agency within the District of Columbia government to administer the program. GSA contracted for and managed roof work at 10 schools—initially 7 schools at the Authority’s request. In June 1997, DCPS requested GSA’s assistance, and GSA managed work on an additional three schools. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) when funds were made available to pay for roof repairs, (2) the cost of the roof repairs, including the cost per square foot, and (3) whether there are additional roofs to be repaired in fiscal year 1998 and beyond. According to the COO, when the Plan was presented at the end of February 1997, he had believed that the work could not be completed until the end of October 1997 but had hoped that a substantial number of schools could be completed prior to September 30, 1997. A significant, but not determinable amount of these costs was attributable to factors other than what would be strictly interpreted as roof replacement/repair work. Based on our review and analysis of the data, the average cost per square foot for roof repair work performed on schools managed by both DCPS and GSA in fiscal year 1997 was about $20 per square foot—with costs at individual schools ranging from about $4 to $77. Among these are the compressed schedule under which most of the 1997 roof work was performed; the diversity and complexity of the roofs on the D.C. public school buildings; the extensive deferred maintenance and other roof-related work, including additional work required to secure the long-term warranties from materials suppliers and contractors; and other factors such as the District’s history of paying vendors. According to a Montgomery County Public Schools roofing specialist, roof replacement work would typically be done over the full summer session, from about June 20 to August 31. Work was completed in 18 days, involving extensive overtime. They stated that patching would have been only a short-term solution to a long-standing problem. DCPS officials also stated that while some of the school roofs that were replaced this summer may have had existing warranties, they believe that since the roofs were not well maintained and protected, DCPS would not have prevailed in a warranty claim. In addition, DCPS incurred about $2.1 million for consulting, contract administration, and construction management fees. DCPS officials informed us that as of November 3, 1997, they had completed roof repair work on five schools for which the scope of work and cost estimates had been completed in fiscal year 1997. The District of Columbia Public Schools proposed Capital Improvements Plan for fiscal years 1999-2004 indicates that an additional $63 million in roof replacement is anticipated during this period. Those commenting generally agreed with the facts presented in this report. However, table 1 in the report shows that DCPS had about this same amount of funds ($86.5 million) available for capital projects during the fiscal year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the District of Columbia Public Schools' (DCPS) efforts to repair school roofs during the summer of 1997, focusing on the conflicting information on the availability of funds to pay for the roof work and the cost, including cost per square foot, of the work completed in fiscal year (FY) 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) sufficient funding was available to begin roof work when schools were closed for the summer June 20, 1997; (2) the District's records show that the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority had about $18 million available in March 1997 for DCPS-managed roof work, with the available amount increasing to about $38 million by June 1997; (3) a series of events preceeding the efforts to repair D.C. school roofs contributed to the delayed start; (4) although it was decided that DCPS would manage the majority of this work, DCPS was not prepared to start immediately because it had not completed sufficient planning, such as determining the scope of work on individual projects which would be the basis for seeking bids for that work; (5) a contributing factor to this delay was the almost complete turnover in technical capital project staff during the school year; (6) these problems were compounded by difficulties in securing bids, resulting in DCPS-managed work not starting until the third week of July; (7) DCPS stated that at the time the long-range plan was submitted in February 1997, it had expected to complete roof work by the end of October 1997 but accelerated it in response to a court order that roof work would not be done while classes were in session; (8) consequently, the work was accomplished under a highly compressed schedule; (9) GAO's review showed that DCPS spent about $37 million for roof replacement or repair in FY 1997; (10) this included a extensive amount of work not only on the roofs, but also on adjacent upper portions of the buildings to achieve structurally sound, watertight facilities; (11) as a result, the costs were higher than what would have been incurred for roofing work only; (12) considering all of these costs, the average cost per square foot of roof surface replaced or repaired was about $20, with DCPS-managed contracts somewhat higher than those managed by the General Services Administration; (13) insufficient data exist to ascertain with any certainty the added cost associated with the degree of deferred maintenance encountered in this extensive project; (14) years of neglect and inadequate repair and maintenance practices all served to increase costs over what could be expected in well-managed, adequately financed entities; (15) DCPS plans for FY 1998 show additional roof work at 40 more schools at an approximate cost of $35 million; and (16) in addition, DCPS proposed Capital Improvement Program Plan for fiscal years 1999-2004 indicates that an additional $63 million is anticipated for roof replacement or repairs during this period. |
gao_GAO-15-769T | gao_GAO-15-769T_0 | Mandatory Functions and Priorities for PERC and NORA’s Programs and Projects
As discussed in our June 2010 report, both the Propane and Oilheat Acts specify three areas as mandatory functions and priorities for PERC’s and NORA’s programs and projects.follows: The three mandatory areas are as
Research and development: The Propane Act requires PERC to develop programs that provide for research and development of clean and efficient propane utilization equipment. The Oilheat Act directs similar oilheat-related research and development and directs NORA to fund projects in the demonstration stage of development. Safety and training/education and training: Both the Propane Act and the Oilheat Act require development of programs to enhance consumer and employee safety and training. PERC refers to this program area as “safety and training,” and NORA refers to it as “education and training.” Projects that fall into this spending category include developing employee training materials and conducting training courses for industry personnel. Public/consumer education: The Propane Act directs PERC to develop projects to inform and educate the public about safety and other issues associated with the use of propane. Similarly, the Oilheat Act directs NORA to develop programs that provide information to assist consumers and other persons in making evaluations and decisions regarding oilheat. Such activities have included the development of radio, television, and print advertising directed at consumers and industry professionals. To fund their operations, PERC and NORA assess each gallon of propane or heating oil, respectively. Specifically, to fund PERC operations, each gallon of odorized propane gas sold is assessed $0.004. Certain Activities Raised Issues about Whether They Were Covered by Restrictions in the Acts
In our June 2010 report, we found that some PERC and NORA activities appeared to meet the requirements of the acts, but certain other activities, such as some activities involving Congress or politically affiliated entities, raised issues as to whether they were covered by the Propane and Oilheat Acts’ specific lobbying restrictions. Even when we assumed PERC’s and NORA’s activities were permitted, issues remained about whether Congress anticipated that the assessment funds would be used for these activities, particularly when PERC and NORA had classified this spending as “consumer education,” one of the functions that the acts require PERC and NORA to carry out. Issues also remained about whether Congress anticipated that such a high proportion of the groups’ funding would go to consumer education activities (i.e., more than half), in comparison to the relatively little support given to research and development (i.e., 8 percent for PERC and less than 6 percent for NORA), which had been a key area of congressional interest as the laws were debated prior to enactment. Federal Oversight of PERC and NORA Has Been Limited, Unlike Federal Oversight of Agriculture Check-off Programs
In our June 2010 report, we found that the federal oversight of PERC and NORA was limited, which was in contrast to the routine federal oversight of agriculture check-off programs that had existed. This lack of oversight is part of a long-standing pattern. For example, in a June 2003 report, we found that DOE’s oversight of PERC was lacking and recommended that the department take corrective action.Commerce rather than DOE had oversight responsibility and, therefore, DOE did not act on our recommendation. Consistent with our suggestion, when Congress reauthorized NORA in 2014, it amended the Oilheat Act to, among other things, provide that in the event of a violation of the act, the Secretary of Energy is to notify Congress of the noncompliance and provide notice of the noncompliance With respect to PERC, although Congress made on NORA’s website.technical clarifications to the Propane Act in 2014 as noted above, it did not address this suggestion we made in 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congressionally authorized research and promotion programs, also known as check-off programs, may be established under federal law at the request of their industries. These programs are designed to increase the success of businesses that produce and sell certain commodities, such as milk and beef. To fund such programs, producers set aside a fraction of the wholesale cost of a product and deposit the monies into a common fund.
In June 2010, GAO reported on two such programs, PERC and NORA, for the propane and oilheat industries (GAO-10-583). Legislation is currently being considered for a check-off program for the concrete and masonry industry. For this testimony, GAO focused on (1) mandatory functions and priorities for PERC and NORA programs and projects, (2) whether PERC and NORA activities were covered by certain legal requirements, and (3) federal oversight of PERC and NORA. For the 2010 report, GAO reviewed relevant laws, financial statements, annual reports, meeting minutes, and other reports. GAO also interviewed officials from the departments of Energy and Commerce and the private sector. GAO updated legislative information in July 2015.
GAO's June 2010 report suggested that Congress consider clarifying certain requirements and specifying priority ranking, expenditures, and a DOE oversight role. When Congress reauthorized NORA in 2014, it amended the Oilheat Act by, among other things, taking actions on GAO's suggestions.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in June 2010, the Propane Education and Research Act of 1996 (the Propane Act) and the National Oilheat Research Alliance Act of 2000 (the Oilheat Act), which authorized the establishment of the Propane Education and Research Council (PERC) and National Oilheat Research Alliance (NORA), specified the following areas as mandatory functions and priorities:
Research and development : The Propane Act requires PERC to develop programs for research and development of clean and efficient propane utilization equipment. The Oilheat Act directs similar oilheat-related research and development and directs NORA to fund demonstration projects.
Safety and training/education and training : Both acts require development of programs to enhance consumer and employee safety and training. PERC refers to this area as “safety and training,” and NORA refers to it as “education and training.”
Public/consumer education : The Propane Act directs PERC to develop projects to inform and educate the public about safety and other issues associated with the use of propane. Similarly, the Oilheat Act directs NORA to develop programs that provide information to assist consumers and other persons in making evaluations and decisions regarding oilheat. Such activities have included developing radio, television, and print advertising.
To fund their operations, the acts require PERC and NORA to assess each gallon of odorized propane gas or heating oil sold at $0.004 and $0.002, respectively.
GAO found that some PERC and NORA activities appeared to meet the requirements of the acts, but certain other activities raised issues. For example, activities involving Congress or politically affiliated entities raised issues about whether they were covered by the acts' specific lobbying restrictions. Even if these activities were permitted, issues remained about whether Congress anticipated that assessment funds would be used to fund them, particularly when PERC and NORA classified this spending as “consumer education”—one of the functions required by the acts. Other issues GAO identified related to whether Congress anticipated that PERC and NORA would allocate the majority of their funding to education activities over the past decade (more than half), while allocating relatively little financial support to research and development (8 percent for PERC and less than 6 percent for NORA). When the laws were debated and before they were enacted, research and development had been a key area of congressional interest and ultimately was reflected as both a mandatory “function” and a high-focus “priority” in the final version passed by Congress
GAO found limited federal oversight of PERC and NORA. As of June 2010, the Department of Energy had not used the oversight authority granted by the Propane and Oilheat acts, such as by reviewing budgets or making recommendations to PERC and NORA, as authorized by law. This lack of oversight was long-standing. For example, in a 2003 report GAO had found that DOE's oversight of PERC was lacking and recommended corrective action. |
gao_GAO-06-272 | gao_GAO-06-272_0 | One significant cause for this uncertainty is that some deadlines for completing research do not have firm dates, while other deadlines that have been set continue to slip. Bureau studies initially estimated that during the 2000 Census, about 2.4 million duplicate addresses existed in the MAF. However, the operation was not able to determine with certainty whether the remaining 1 million addresses were duplicates. The Bureau is aware of the overlapping schedules, but officials stated that they need to start LUCA in 2007 in order to complete the operation in time for address canvassing— an operation where census workers walk every street in the country to verify addresses and update maps. Meeting the demands of the shortened time frame for completing address canvassing is a concern because the workload for address canvassing has significantly expanded from including only urban areas in 2000 to including the entire country for 2010. Reliability of MCD to Conduct Address Canvassing Activities is Unknown
The Bureau’s ability to collect and transmit address and mapping data using the MCD is not known. During 2006 testing, the MCD used to collect address and map data was slow and locked up frequently. Bureau officials have acknowledged that the MCD’s performance is an issue but believe that a new version of the MCD, to be developed under the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) contract awarded on March 30, 2006, will be reliable and functional. However, because the 2008 Dress Rehearsal will be the first time this new MCD will be tested under census-like conditions, it is uncertain how effective that MCD will be, and if problems do emerge, little time will be left for the contractor to develop, test, and incorporate any refinements. To conduct address canvassing, each MCD was loaded with address information and maps and was also equipped with GPS. Bureau officials do not believe a specific plan is needed to update the address and map files for those areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, new housing and street construction in the areas affected by the hurricanes could require more frequent updates of the Bureau’s address file and maps. However, if after the Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found to be unreliable, the Bureau could be faced with the remote but daunting possibility of having to revert to the costly paper-based census used in 2000. Recommendations for Executive Action
To mitigate potential risks facing the Bureau as it plans for 2010 and to ensure a more complete and accurate address file for the 2010 Census, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the U.S. Census Bureau to take the following three actions: Establish firm deadlines to complete research, testing, and evaluations of the MAF to prevent missed, deleted, and duplicate addresses, as well as map errors, and develop an action plan that will allow sufficient time for the Bureau to revise or establish methodologies and procedures for building the 2010 MAF. Finally, to determine the extent to which the Bureau has a plan to update the address file and maps in areas impacted by hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we interviewed Bureau top management officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
To conduct a successful census, it is important that the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) produce the most complete and accurate address file and maps for 2010. For this review, GAO's specific objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) the Bureau's efforts to modernize the address file and maps are addressing problems experienced during the 2000 Census, (2) the Bureau is managing emerging address file and map issues, (3) the Bureau is able to collect and transmit address and mapping data using mobile computing devices (MCD) equipped with global positioning system (GPS) technology, and (4) the Bureau has a plan to update the address file and maps in areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO reviewed the Bureau's progress in modernizing both the address file and maps.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's address and map modernization efforts have progressed in some areas. The Bureau is researching how to correct addresses that were duplicated, missed, deleted, and incorrectly located on maps. However, some deadlines for completing research are not firm, while other deadlines that had been set continue to slip. Thus, whether research will be completed in enough time to allow the Bureau to develop new procedures to improve the 2010 address file is unknown. Also, the Bureau has not fully addressed emerging issues. For one such issue, the Bureau has acknowledged the compressed time frame for completing address canvassing--an operation where census workers walk every street in the country to verify addresses and maps--but has not reevaluated the associated schedule or staffing workloads. Also, the Bureau has allotted only 6 weeks to conduct address canvassing it completed in 18 weeks in 2000 and expanded the operation from urban areas in 2000 to the entire country in 2010. Whether the Bureau can collect and transmit address and mapping data using the MCD is unknown. The MCD, tested during 2006 address canvassing, was slow and locked up frequently. Bureau officials said the MCD's performance is an issue, but a new MCD to be developed through a contract awarded in March 2006 will be reliable. However, the MCD will not be tested until the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, and if problems emerge, little time will remain to develop, test, and incorporate refinements. If after the Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found unreliable, the Bureau could face the remote but daunting possibility of reverting to the costly paper-based census of 2000. Bureau officials do not believe a specific plan is needed to update the addresses and maps for areas affected by the hurricanes. Securing a count is difficult under normal conditions, and existing procedures may insufficient to update addresses and maps after the hurricanes' destruction--made even more difficult as streets, housing, and population will be in flux. |
gao_NSIAD-95-17 | gao_NSIAD-95-17_0 | Overview
Key Findings From Investment Options Analysis
The Navy can maintain a 12-carrier force for less cost than that projected in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and the Navy’s Recapitalization Plan by using one of several options that consider cost and employment levels. The least expensive investment option that also maintains employment levels at or above minimum levels authorizes building the CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995 and then transitions to a conventional carrier construction program. This option costs approximately 25 percent less than the BUR and the Navy’s Recapitalization Plan options. Building CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995, as proposed by the BUR, the Navy’s Recapitalization Plan, and other options in our report (see table 1.1), stops the downward trend in Newport News Shipbuilding employment at about the minimum sustaining level of 10,000 employees. Options to delay building the carrier result in a continuing decline to about 7,500 employees. However, in the long term the employment levels in the BUR and the Navy’s Recapitalization Plan also fall below 10,000 employees. In addition, options that include building CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995 require building carriers sooner than they are needed for force structure purposes and therefore incur expenses sooner than necessary. Moreover, the option to build nuclear carriers at the historical rate of one every 3 years maintains stable employment levels but costs about 40 percent more than options in the BUR and the Navy’s Recapitalization Plan. Options for using carriers for their full service lives (options 1A and 1B) are less expensive than those in the BUR and the Navy’s Recapitalization Plan, especially if the force transitions to a conventional carrier construction program. However, in the near term, the employment levels fall below the Navy’s estimated critical minimum sustaining level of 10,000 employees. Since affordability of the future force is an important concern, a transition to constructing conventionally powered carriers would save the largest amount of investment resources (see table 1.1). Other considerations include the availability and location of homeports and nuclear-capable shipyards for maintenance and repairs and other supporting infrastructure, such as for training; the effect of out-of-homeport maintenance on the amount of time personnel are away from their homeport; and the disposal of nuclear materials and radioactively contaminated materials. 3. 4. 2.7). 2.9). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy's aircraft carrier program, focusing on: (1) the budget implications of the options for meeting the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) force structure requirement for 12 carriers; and (2) each option's effect on the shipbuilding contractor's employment levels.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there are several available options for maintaining the 12-carrier force at less cost than projected in the BUR and the Navy Recapitalization Plan; (2) the least expensive option maintains employment levels at or above minimum levels, authorizes building the proposed nuclear carrier in fiscal year 1995, switches to construction of conventionally powered carriers in later years, and would cost 25 percent less than the BUR and Navy Recapitalization Plan options; (3) options to build CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995 would stop the downward trend in employment at about the minimum sustaining employment level of 10,000 employees, require building carriers sooner than they are needed for force structure purposes, and incur expenses sooner than necessary; (4) options to delay building the carrier would result in a continuing decline in employment to about 7,500 employees; (5) in the long term the employment levels in the BUR and the Navy Recapitalization Plan also fall below 10,000 employees; (6) the option to build nuclear carriers at the historical rate of one every 3 years maintains stable employment levels but costs about 40 percent more than the options in the BUR and the Navy Recapitalization Plan; (7) options for using carriers for their full service lives are less expensive than those in the BUR and Navy Recapitalization Plan, but in the near term the employment levels fall below the minimum sustaining level; (8) a transition to constructing conventionally powered carriers would save the largest amount of investment resources; and (9) criteria for comparing nuclear and conventional carriers include affordability, operational effectiveness, potential utilization, availability of homeports and shipyards for maintenance, and supporting infrastructure such as training and disposal of nuclear materials. |
gao_NSIAD-98-130 | gao_NSIAD-98-130_0 | DOD is seeking to contract out more of its depot maintenance requirements. In March 1996, DOD issued regulations directing that new systems and major upgrade programs “shall maximize the use of contractor provided, long-term, total life-cycle logistics support that combines depot-level maintenance along with wholesale and selected retail materiel management functions.”
DOD’s approach to assuring product quality and fair prices for depot maintenance work that is contracted out to the private sector where competition is limited is through contract management and oversight requirements. The military services manage and oversee depot maintenance contracts with assistance from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC). DOD expects that commercial products and services, which are subject to competitive market forces, will result in high-quality products and services at a lower cost. DCAA’s staffing has decreased by 1,046 personnel—over 18 percent—from fiscal year 1993 to July 1997. For example, as part of DOD’s plan to rely more on contractor self-oversight, DCAA can reduce its oversight after determining that strengthened contractor internal controls can be relied upon. They are also relying more on sampling methods to assure quality and contract compliance rather than having inspectors doing 100-percent inspections. Most of this work is awarded on a sole-source basis to original equipment manufacturers that own the technical data rights. Undefined Requirements Are a Characteristic of Many Maintenance Workloads
We examined 345 depot maintenance contracts awarded by 12 contracting organizations, and found that 212, or 61 percent, were fixed-price type contracts that had price and performance generally defined at the time of contract award. DOD also has developed a strategic plan for improving logistics functions and activities. Although the plan provides guidance and implementation strategy for some important objectives related to depot maintenance, it does not specifically address the contract depot maintenance issues raised in this report. In response to that recommendation, DOD has stated that a specific plan for improving the efficiency and reducing the cost of DOD’s logistics programs, including depot maintenance, is not needed because the QDR and DRI provide an overall strategic plan and strategy for reducing DOD’s infrastructure. Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the development of a detailed implementation plan to guide future management improvement efforts to increase the cost effectiveness of DOD’s depot maintenance program, including issues related to improving the management and cost-effectiveness of contract depot maintenance workloads. Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110, Mar. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Department of Defense (DOD) manages contracting for depot maintenance, focusing on the: (1) characteristics of that contracting; and (2) implications of those characteristics for future depot maintenance contract management processes and procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD is attempting to rely more on competitive market forces to assure quality products at fair prices; (2) consistent with recent declines in the defense budget, resources for administering and auditing contracts have been cut significantly, with DOD reducing its total acquisition workforce at all levels; (3) from fiscal year (FY) 1993 to July 1997, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) reduced their personnel levels by more than 18 and 24 percent, respectively, and further reductions are planned; (4) in making these reductions, both organizations are reengineering their processes; (5) they are attempting to rely more on competitive market forces and contractor internal processes and controls to assure quality products at fair prices, but it is uncertain whether these processes and conditions will function as expected; (6) at present, depot maintenance contracting represents a challenge to relying on commercial market forces; (7) about 91 percent of the depot maintenance contracts GAO reviewed were awarded noncompetitively, mostly to original equipment manufacturers that own the data rights; (8) other factors, including difficulties in precisely defining requirements, also impact efforts to rely on competitive market forces; (9) as DOD continues transitioning from its traditional contract management and oversight structure, it will need to increase the use of competitively awarded depot maintenance contracts; (10) to the extent that competition for some maintenance workloads is not possible or practicable, DOD will need to address how best to assure product quality and reasonable prices when competitive market forces are not present; (11) DOD has developed a logistics strategic plan that lays out specific objectives and strategies for improving DOD's logistics activities; (12) however, the plan does not address the depot maintenance issues raised in this report; (13) GAO has previously recommended that the Secretary of Defense require the development of a detailed implementation plan for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's logistics activities to include depot maintenance; and (14) the challenges that DOD faces in successfully relying on competitive market forces for depot maintenance require management attention and actions to address the unique characteristics of DOD's depot maintenance activities and assure that expected savings can be achieved. |
gao_GAO-05-1026T | gao_GAO-05-1026T_0 | Collectively, these and other aquatic species transported in ballast water have caused billions of dollars in damage to our economy and unmeasured damage to the environment. History of Ballast Water Management
The federal government has been taking steps to address the introduction of potentially invasive species via the ballast water in ships for well over a decade. Congress recognized ballast water as a serious problem in 1990 with the passage of the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act, legislation intended to help reduce the number of species introduced into U.S. waters, focusing on the Great Lakes. In addition to these domestic developments, members of the United Nation’s International Maritime Organization have adopted a convention on ballast water management that, if ratified by a sufficient number of countries, could affect the global fleet. This law was a response to the introduction of the zebra mussel in the Great Lakes and findings that the discharge of ballast water results in unintentional introductions of nonindigenous species. NANPCA required the task force and the Secretary to cooperate in conducting a number of studies within 18 months of enactment of the act on such issues as: The environmental effects of ballast water exchange on native species in Alternate areas, if any, where ballast water exchange does not pose a threat of infestation or spread of aquatic invasive species in the Great Lakes and other U.S. waters; The need for controls on ships entering U.S. waters other than the Great Lakes to minimize the risk of unintentional introduction and dispersal of aquatic invasive species in those waters; and, Whether aquatic invasive species threaten the ecological characteristics and economic uses of U.S. waters other than the Great Lakes. Major Issues with Current Ballast Water Management Program
The federal government has continued to take steps to strengthen controls over ballast water as a conduit for potentially harmful organisms. Since 1998, Coast Guard data show that compliance with conducting ballast water exchange, when required, has generally been high. However, key agencies and stakeholders recognize that the recently adopted mandatory national program for ballast water exchange is not a viable long-term approach to minimizing the risks posed by ballast water discharges. In addition, the ANSTF has not recommended alternate areas for ballast water exchange and thus, the Coast Guard has not established alternate discharge zones that could be used by ships. And lastly, ballast water exchange is not always effective at removing or killing potentially harmful species. Many Ships with Potentially Harmful Organisms in Their Ballast Water Are Not Required to Conduct Ballast Water Exchange or Retain Their Ballast Water
Although the Coast Guard believes that compliance with ballast water management regulations is high, U.S. waters may still not be adequately protected because many ships are not required to conduct ballast water exchange even though they may discharge ballast water in U.S. waters. The effectiveness of this process, however, has not been demonstrated. Technologies Are Being Developed to Treat Ballast Water, but Challenges Remain Before They Can Be Used
Developers are pursuing technologies for use in treating ballast water, some of which show promise that a technical solution can be used to provide more reliable removal of potentially invasive species. However, the development of such technologies and their eventual use to meet regulatory requirements face many challenges, including the daunting technological challenges posed by the need for shipboard treatment systems and the lack of a discharge standard that would provide a target for developers to aim for in terms of treatment efficiency. States Are Moving Forward With Programs Because of Frustration with Lack of Federal Progress
As we reported in 2002, some states have expressed frustration with the federal government’s progress on establishing a more protective federal program for managing the risks associated with ballast water discharges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Numerous invasive species have been introduced into U.S. waters via ballast water discharged from ships and have caused serious economic and ecologic damage. GAO reported in 2002 that at least 160 nonnative aquatic species had become established in the Great Lakes since the 1800s--one-third of which were introduced in the past 30 years by ballast water and other sources. The effects of such species are not trivial; the zebra mussel alone is estimated to have caused $750 million to $1 billion in costs between 1989 and 2000. Species introductions via ballast water are not confined to the Great Lakes, however. The environment and economy of the Chesapeake Bay, San Francisco Bay, Puget Sound, and other U.S. waters have also been adversely affected. The federal government has been taking steps since 1990 to implement programs to prevent the introduction of invasive species from ships' ballast water discharges. However, species introductions are continuing. This testimony discusses the legislative and regulatory history of ballast water management and identifies some of the issues that pose challenges for the federal government's program for preventing the introduction of invasive species via ships' ballast water.
What GAO Found
Congress recognized ballast water as a serious problem in 1990 with passage of the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act, legislation intended to help reduce the number of species introductions in the Great Lakes. A reauthorization of this law in 1996, the National Invasive Species Act, elevated ballast water management to a national level. As directed by the legislation, the federal government has promulgated several regulations requiring certain ships to take steps, such as exchanging their ballast water in the open ocean to flush it of potentially harmful organisms, to reduce the likelihood of species invasions via ballast water. Initially these regulations applied only to certain ships entering the Great Lakes; now they apply to certain ships entering all U.S. ports. In addition to these domestic developments, the United Nation's International Maritime Organization has recently adopted a convention on ballast water management that could affect the global fleet. Since 1998, Coast Guard data show that compliance with existing ballast water exchange requirements has generally been high. However, key agencies and stakeholders recognize that the current ballast water exchange program is not a viable long-term approach to minimizing the risks posed by ballast water discharges. The primary reasons for this are that: (1) many ships are exempt from current ballast water exchange requirements, (2) the Coast Guard has not established alternate discharge zones that could be used by ships unable to conduct ballast water exchange for various reasons, and (3) ballast water exchange is not always effective at removing or killing potentially invasive species. Developers are pursuing technologies to provide more reliable alternatives to ballast water exchange, some of which show promise. However, development of such technologies and their eventual use to meet ballast water regulatory requirements face many challenges including the daunting technological task of developing large scale water treatment systems that ships can accommodate, and the lack of a federal discharge standard that would provide a target for developers to aim for in terms of treatment efficiency. As a result, ballast water exchange is still the only approved method for treating ballast water despite the concerns with this method's effectiveness. Consequently, U.S. waters remain vulnerable to the introduction of invasive species via ships' ballast water. State governments and others have expressed frustration over the seemingly slow progress the federal government has made on more effectively protecting U.S. waters from future species invasions via ballast water. As a result, several states have passed legislation that authorizes procedures for managing ballast water that are stricter than federal regulations. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-62 | gao_T-HEHS-99-62_0 | Similarly, state public health laboratories commonly performed tests to support state surveillance of tuberculosis, pertussis, cryptosporidiosis, and virulent strains of E. coli. However, over half of the laboratories did not test for hepatitis C, and about two-thirds did not test for penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae. Over three-quarters of the responding epidemiologists told us that their surveillance programs either leave out or do not focus sufficient attention on important infectious diseases. Officials Report That Staffing Constraints and Weak Information Sharing Impede Surveillance of Emerging Infections
As part of our surveys and field interviews, we asked state officials to identify the problems they considered most important in conducting surveillance of emerging infectious diseases. Public health officials told us that the multitude of databases and data systems, software, and reporting mechanisms burdens staff at state and local health agencies and leads to duplication of effort when staff must enter the same data into multiple systems that do not communicate with one another. Further, the lack of integrated data management systems can hinder laboratory and epidemiologic efforts to control outbreaks. Public Health Consensus on Core Capacities Needed to Conduct Surveillance Does Not Exist
Although many state officials are concerned about their staffing and technology resources, public health officials have not developed a consensus definition of the minimum capabilities that state and local health departments need to conduct infectious diseases surveillance. Many state laboratory directors and epidemiologists said such assistance has been essential to their ability to conduct infectious diseases surveillance and to take advantage of new laboratory technology; however, a small number of laboratory directors and epidemiologists believe CDC’s assistance has not significantly increased their ability to conduct surveillance of emerging infections. Laboratory Testing, Consultation, and Training Assistance Are Viewed as Critical
Many state laboratory directors and epidemiologists told us that CDC’s testing, consultation, and training services are critical to their surveillance efforts. Where almost all states and most state laboratories reported that they monitor antibiotic-resistance in tuberculosis, far fewer reported monitoring penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae. In response to state and local requests for greater integration of systems, CDC established a board to formulate and enact policy for integrating public health information and surveillance systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed public health surveillance of emerging infectious diseases, focusing on the role of state laboratories.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) surveillance of and testing for important emerging infectious diseases are not comprehensive in all states; (2) GAO found that most states conduct surveillance of five of the six emerging infections GAO asked about, and state public health laboratories conduct tests to support state surveillance of four of the six; (3) however, over half of state laboratories do not conduct tests for surveillance of penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae and hepatitis C; (4) also, most state epidemiologists believe their surveillance programs do not sufficiently study antibiotic-resistant and other diseases they consider important; (5) many state laboratory directors and epidemiologists reported that inadequate staffing and information-sharing problems hinder their ability to generate and use laboratory data in their surveillance; (6) however, public health officials have not agreed on a consensus definition of the minimum capabilities that state and local health departments need to conduct infectious diseases surveillance; (7) this lack of consensus makes it difficult for policymakers to assess the adequacy of existing resources or to evaluate where investments are needed most; (8) most state officials said the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) testing and consulting services, training, and grant funding support are critical to their efforts to detect and respond to emerging infections; (9) however, both laboratory directors and epidemiologists were frustrated by the lack of integrated systems within CDC and the lack of integrated systems linking them with other public and private surveillance partners; and (10) CDC's continued commitment to integrating its own data systems and to helping states and localities build integrated electronic data and communication systems could give state and local public health agencies vital assistance in carrying out their infectious diseases surveillance and reporting responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-08-767T | gao_GAO-08-767T_0 | Background
Medicare is the federal program that helps pay for a variety of health care services for about 44 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries. Competitive Bidding Could Reduce Program Payments by Creating an Incentive for Suppliers to Accept Lower Payment Amounts
Competitive bidding could reduce Medicare program payments by providing an incentive for suppliers to accept lower payment amounts for items and services to retain their ability to serve beneficiaries and potentially increase their market share. Using competition to obtain market prices in order to set payments for medical equipment and supplies is a new approach for Medicare that is fundamentally different than relying on fee schedules based on suppliers’ historical charges to Medicare. Competitive bidding allows the market to provide information to CMS on what amounts suppliers will accept as payment to serve beneficiaries. The new fee schedules were based on the winning suppliers’ bids for items included in the demonstration. The demonstration’s independent evaluators also estimated that beneficiaries saved $1.9 million. The demonstration provided evidence to health policy experts, including us and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, that competitive bidding for medical equipment and supplies could be a viable way for the program to use market forces to set lower payments without significantly affecting beneficiary access. About a year after the demonstration ended, the MMA required CMS to implement competitive bidding on a large scale and added requirements that suppliers would have to meet to participate in the competitive bidding program. CMS then evaluated the bids based on demand, capacity, and price and chose bids that were at or under a certain amount. CMS estimates that the first round of its competitive bidding program will result in payment amounts that overall average 26 percent less than the current fee schedule amounts for the groups of items included, leading to savings for the Medicare program and its beneficiaries. Competitive bidding changes Medicare’s relationship with suppliers. The competitive bidding process was designed to limit the number of suppliers to those whose bids were at or under a certain amount while ensuring that enough suppliers were included to meet beneficiary demand. In the demonstration, 50 percent to 55 percent of the suppliers’ bids were selected. Furthermore, competitive bidding could help reduce improper payments because it provides CMS with the authority to select suppliers, based in part on new scrutiny of their financial documents and other application materials. Providing additional scrutiny of suppliers gives CMS the opportunity to screen out those whose finances do not indicate that they are stable, legitimate businesses. Adequate Oversight Is Critical to Ensure Quality and Access
Because of concerns that competitive bidding may prompt suppliers to cut their costs by providing lower-quality items and curtailing services, ensuring quality and access through adequate oversight is critical. We indicated that quality assurance steps could include monitoring beneficiary satisfaction, setting standards for suppliers, providing beneficiaries with a choice of suppliers, and selecting winning bidders based on quality, in addition to the dollar amounts of bids. Therefore, continued monitoring of beneficiary satisfaction will be critical to identifying problems with suppliers or with items provided to beneficiaries. We will be assessing CMS’s implementation of the competitive bidding program. As part of the MMA, we are required to review and report on the program’s impact on suppliers and manufacturers and on quality and access of items and services provided to beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, GAO has reported that Medicare has paid higher than market rates for medical equipment and supplies provided to beneficiaries under Medicare Part B. Since 1989, Medicare has used fee schedules primarily based on historical charges to set payment amounts. But this approach lacks flexibility to keep pace with market changes and increases costs to the federal government and Medicare's 44 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 required the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--the agency that administers Medicare--to test competitive bidding as a new way to set payments. CMS did this through a demonstration in two locations in which suppliers could compete on the basis of price and other factors for the right to provide their products. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required CMS to conduct competitive bidding on a large scale and suppliers to obtain accreditation. GAO was asked to describe the effects that competitive bidding could have on Medicare program payments and suppliers and the need for adequate oversight to ensure quality and access for beneficiaries in a competitive bidding environment. This testimony is based primarily on GAO work conducted from May 1994 to January 2007, which GAO updated by interviewing CMS officials and reviewing agency documents.
What GAO Found
Competitive bidding could reduce Medicare program payments by providing an incentive for suppliers to accept lower payments for items and services to retain their ability to serve beneficiaries and potentially increase their market share. Fundamentally different from fee schedules based on historical charges to Medicare, competitive bidding allows the market to help CMS determine payment amounts. In the demonstration, the new fee schedule amounts were based on the winning suppliers' bids for items included and 50 percent to 55 percent of the bids from suppliers were selected. Evidence from CMS's competitive bidding demonstration suggests that competition saved Medicare $7.5 million and saved beneficiaries $1.9 million--without significantly affecting beneficiary access. For the competitive bidding program, CMS required suppliers to obtain accreditation based on quality standards and provide financial documents to participate. This added scrutiny gives CMS the chance to screen out suppliers that may not be stable, legitimate businesses, which could contribute to lower rates of improper payment. CMS also evaluated the bids based on demand, capacity, and price and chose suppliers whose bids were at or under a certain amount. CMS estimates that the first round of its competitive bidding program will result in payment amounts that average 26 percent less than the current fee schedule amounts. Competitive bidding also changes Medicare's relationship with suppliers and departs from Medicare's practice of doing business with any qualified provider, because it is designed to limit the number of suppliers to those whose bids are at or under a certain amount. Because of concerns that competitive bidding may prompt suppliers to cut their costs by providing lower-quality items and curtailing services, ensuring quality and access through adequate oversight is critical for the success of the competitive bidding program. In September 2004, GAO indicated that quality assurance steps could include monitoring beneficiary satisfaction, setting standards for suppliers, giving beneficiaries a choice of suppliers, and selecting winning bidders based on quality and the dollar amount of the bids. As competitive bidding expands, problems that beneficiaries might experience could be magnified. Therefore, continued monitoring of beneficiary satisfaction will be critical to identify problems with suppliers or with items provided to beneficiaries. As required in the MMA, GAO will review and report on the competitive bidding program's impact on suppliers and manufacturers and its effect on quality and access for beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-09-692T | gao_GAO-09-692T_0 | As of January 2009, the 12 MV-22s deployed in Iraq and utilized by three separate squadrons had successfully completed all missions assigned to them including general support—moving people and cargo—in what was considered an established, low-threat theater of operations. These deployments confirmed that the MV-22’s enhanced speed and range enable personnel and internally carried cargo to be transported faster and farther than is possible with the legacy helicopters the MV-22 is replacing. However, questions have arisen about whether the MV-22 is the aircraft best suited to accomplish the full mission repertoire of the helicopters it is intended to replace, and some challenges in operational effectiveness have been noted. Also, aircraft suitability challenges, such as unreliable parts and supply chain weaknesses, drove availability significantly below minimum required levels. Operational Tests and Training Exercises Have Identified Challenges to Accomplishing Full Range of Possible Operations
V-22 missions in Iraq represent only a portion of the operations envisioned for the aircraft, but operational tests and training exercises have identified challenges in the V-22’s ability to conduct operations in high-threat environments, carry the required number of combat troops and transport external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct missions operating in more extreme environments throughout the world. While efforts are underway to address these challenges, success is uncertain since some of them arise from the inherent design of the V-22. V-22 Costs Rose While Performance Requirements Were Modified
The V-22’s original program cost estimates have changed significantly as research and development, and procurement costs have risen sharply above initial projections. V-22 Business Case and Acquisition Strategy Have Eroded as Costs Have Increased Significantly and Are Expected to Continue to Rise
From initial development in 1986 through the end of 2007, the program’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation cost increased over 200 percent—from $4.2 to $12.7 billion—while its procurement cost increased nearly 24 percent from $34.4 to $42.6 billion. This increase coincided with significant reductions in the number of aircraft being procured—from nearly a thousand to less than 500 (most of which will be procured for the Marine Corps)—resulting in a 148 percent increase in procurement unit cost for each V-22. One indication they may rise is the current cost per flying hour, which is over $11,000—more than double the target estimate for the MV-22 as well as 140 percent higher than the cost for the CH-46E. DOT&E did not report on the 2007 test. Concluding Observations
After more than 20 years in development and 14 years since the last cost and operational effectiveness analysis was developed to reaffirm the decision to proceed with the V-22 program, the MV-22 experience in Iraq demonstrated that the Osprey can complete missions assigned in low- threat environments. Its speed and range were enhancements. However, challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks will need to be fulfilled by some other alternative. Furthermore, suitability challenges that lower aircraft availability and affect the operations and support funding that may be required to maintain the fleet need to be addressed. The V-22 program has already received or requested over $29 billion in development and procurement funds. The estimated funding required to complete the development and procure additional V-22s is almost $25 billion (then-year dollars). In addition, the program continues to face a future of high operations and support cost funding needs, currently estimated at $75.4 billion for the life cycle of the program. Before committing to the full costs of completing production and support the V- 22, the uses, cost, and performance of the V-22 need to be clarified and alternatives should be reconsidered. This is why we recommended in our May 11 report that the Secretary of Defense (1) re-examine the V-22 by requiring a new alternatives analysis and (2) require the Marine Corps to develop a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future budget requests. DOD concurred with our second recommendation, but not the first. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1980s, the V-22, developed to transport combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps and to support other services' operations, has experienced several fatal crashes, demonstrated various deficiencies, and faced virtual cancellation--much of which it has overcome. Although recently deployed in Iraq and regarded favorably, it has not performed the full range of missions anticipated, and how well it can do so is in question. Given concerns about the V-22 program, GAO recently reviewed and on May 11, 2009, reported on MV-22 operations in Iraq; strengths and deficiencies in terms of the capabilities expected of the V-22; and past, current, and future costs. In that report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense require (1) a new alternatives analysis of the V-22 and (2) that the Marine Corps develop a prioritized strategy to improve system suitability, reduce operational costs, and align future budget requests. The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the second recommendation, but not the first. GAO believes both recommendations remain valid. This testimony highlights GAO's findings from that report. In speaking of the V-22, we are actually speaking of two variants of the same aircraft. The MV-22 is used by the Marine Corps; and the CV-22 by the Air Force to support special operations. This statement largely focuses on the MV-22, but also refers to the V-22 and CV-22.
What GAO Found
As of January 2009, the 12MV-22sin Iraq successfully completedall missions assigned in a low-threat theater of operations--using their enhanced speed and range to deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. However, challenges to operational effectiveness were noted that raise questions about whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates. Additional challenges have been identified with the MV-22's ability to operate in high-threat environments, carry the required number of combat troops and transport external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct missions in more extreme environments throughout the world. While efforts are underway to address these challenges, it is uncertain how successful they will be as some of them arise from the inherent design of the V-22. The V-22's original program cost estimates have changed significantly. From 1986 through 2007, the program's Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation cost increased over 200 percent--from $4.2 to 12.7 billion--while the cost of procurement increased 24 percent from $34.4 to $42.6 billion. This increase coincided with significant reductions in the number of aircraft being procured--from nearly 1,000 to less than 500--resulting in a 148 percent increase in cost for each V-22. Operations and support costs are expected to rise. An indication is the current cost per flying hour, which is over $11,000--more than double the target estimate for the MV-22. After more than 20 years in development, the MV-22 experience in Iraq demonstrated that the Osprey can complete missions assigned in low-threat environments. Its speed and range were enhancements. However, challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks will need to be fulfilled by some other alternative. Additionally, the suitability challenges that lower aircraft availability and affect operations and support costs need to be addressed. The V-22 program has already received or requested over $29 billion in development and procurement funds. The estimated funding required to complete development and procure additional V-22s is almost $25 billion (then-year dollars). In addition, the program continues to face a future of high operations and support cost funding needs, currently estimated at $75.4 billionfor the life cycle of the program. Before committing to the full costs of completing production and supporting the V-22, the uses, cost, and performance of the V-22 need to be clarified and alternatives should be re-considered. |
gao_RCED-98-244 | gao_RCED-98-244_0 | Thus, systems that provide water through constructed conveyances other than pipes may avoid regulation as public water systems if, for some or all of their connections, the water is used exclusively for purposes other than drinking, bathing, and cooking, or other similar uses; the EPA Administrator or state primacy agency has determined that alternative water (e.g., bottled or hauled water) is provided for drinking and cooking and that this water achieves a level of public health protection equivalent to that provided by the applicable national primary drinking water regulations; or the EPA Administrator or state primacy agency has determined that the water provided for drinking, cooking, and bathing is treated centrally or at the point of entry by the provider, a pass-through entity, or the user to achieve a level of public health protection equivalent to that provided by the applicable national primary drinking water regulations. Households Using Water From Irrigation Systems Are Limited in Location and Number
According to EPA officials, California and Texas are likely to contain the largest concentrations of people relying on water from irrigation systems in the United States. Given the wide availability of irrigation water within these two counties and the lack of alternative sources, state and local officials believe that a significant number of these households are likely to be using irrigation water for at least some of the purposes defined as human consumption, such as bathing or washing dishes. Difficulties Exist in Determining Precise Extent of Reliance on Water From Irrigation Systems
Although precise data are not available, our review suggests that in both California and Texas, several thousand households are probably using untreated water from irrigation systems for one or more of the purposes EPA defines as human consumption, including drinking, cooking, bathing, showering, dish washing, and maintaining oral hygiene. Rather, such customers are, for the most part, believed to be buying bottled or hauled water for drinking and cooking or to be relying on point-of-entry water treatment units to process all of the water entering the home. While several types of financial assistance are available to offset the cost of some alternatives, in most instances these programs serve multiple purposes, and water suppliers will have to compete with other types of projects to obtain the funding needed to meet the new requirements. Overall, we found that the cost of buying bottled or hauled water for drinking and cooking ranges from about $120 to $650 per year. Considering the relatively low median income in some areas, some alternative water sources may not be feasible without financial assistance. For example, under the 1996 amendments to SDWA, irrigation districts and other special purpose systems that also have residential users must be regulated as public water systems unless they can meet certain exclusion criteria. To determine the number and location of households that rely on irrigation systems for some or all of their residential water needs, we gathered data using a case study approach in California and Texas. The state and local officials we interviewed in California and Texas also provided information on the sources and costs of the water used by households relying on irrigation systems and the cost and feasibility of alternative sources. To identify implementation issues that are likely to affect the states’ and irrigation systems’ ability to comply with the new definition of a public water system, we interviewed EPA officials responsible for developing guidance on the new requirements as well as state and irrigation district officials responsible for implementing the new requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the: (1) location and number of households that rely on irrigation systems or other special purpose water systems for some or all of their residential water needs; (2) cost of the water used by such households and the cost and feasibility of alternative sources; and (3) implementation issues that are likely to affect the states' and special purpose water systems' ability to meet the new requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to officials of the Environmental Protection Agency, California and Texas are likely to contain the largest concentrations of people relying on water from irrigation systems in the United States; (2) preliminary estimates by irrigation systems managers indicate that in California, in the counties where residential use of irrigation water is believed to be most prevalent, several thousand households are relying on such water for some or all of their residential water needs; (3) several factors make it difficult to obtain precise data on the extent of usage, particularly the uncertainty about whether and how water from irrigation and other special purpose systems is being used inside the home; (4) given the extensive availability of irrigation water within these Texas counties and the lack of alternative sources, state and local officials believe that a significant number of these households are probably using irrigation water for at least some residential water needs; (5) the vast majority of the households relying on such water in both California and Texas are believed by state, local, and irrigation system officials to be purchasing bottled or hauled water for drinking and cooking and using the water from irrigation and other special purpose systems for other uses; (6) residential users of irrigation systems currently pay from $100 to $700 per year for untreated water that is supposed to be used only for nondomestic purposes; (7) the cost of buying bottled or hauled water currently ranges from $120 to $650 per year; (8) other alternatives can be considerably more expensive and may not be affordable without financial assistance; (9) several factors affect the cost of treatment, including the quality of the source water, the terrain, the distance between residential customers, and the proximity of existing community water systems; (10) most residential users of special purpose water systems are located in areas with relatively low median incomes, but federal and state funding is available to help offset the cost of some alternatives; (11) both the difficulty of identifying residential users and the costs and technical issues associated with finding alternatives to irrigation water are likely to present major challenges to states and special purpose water systems when implementing the new requirements established in the 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act; and (12) state officials also indicated that their ability to implement the new requirements would be affected by competing demands for the limited resources of the states' drinking water programs. |
gao_GAO-04-198 | gao_GAO-04-198_0 | Background
The Office of Science and Technology (OST) was created in fiscal year 1995 following a long history of science and technology efforts within the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The Act specified OST’s mission “to serve as the national focal point for work on law enforcement technology; and to carry out programs that, through the provision of equipment, training, and technical assistance, improve the safety and effectiveness of law enforcement technology and improve access to such technology by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.” The Act defined the term “law enforcement technology” to include “investigative and forensic technologies, corrections technologies, and technologies that support the judicial process.” The Act also specified OST’s duties to include the following, among others: establishing and maintaining advisory groups to assess federal, state, and establishing and maintaining performance standards, and testing, evaluating, certifying, validating, and marketing products that conform to those standards; carrying out research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analysis of certain technologies; and developing and disseminating technical assistance and training materials. Budgetary resources for OST increased significantly, from $13.2 million in fiscal year 1995 to $204.2 million in fiscal year 2003 (in constant 2002 dollars), totaling over $1 billion. About $749.7 million, or 72 percent, of OST’s total budgetary resources was either directed to specific recipients or projects by public law, subject to congressional committee report guidance designating specific recipients or projects, or directed from the reimbursements from other Justice and federal agencies in exchange for OST managing their projects. Range of OST’s Program Responsibilities Has Changed
The range of OST’s program responsibilities has changed over the years from primarily law enforcement and corrections to include broader public safety technology R&D. OST’s program responsibilities have also changed to expand the focus on investigative and forensic sciences. OST Delivers Three Groups of Products Through Various Methods
OST delivers many products, which we categorized into three groups, and uses various methods to deliver them. These three groups are (1) information dissemination and technical assistance; (2) the application, evaluation, and demonstration of existing and new technologies for field users; and (3) technology R&D. According to OST, as of April 2003, it had delivered 945 products since its inception. Furthermore, OST identified an additional 500 products expected from ongoing awards. While OST does not directly commercialize the results of its technology R&D, it does provide prototypes to local users for field-testing and assists in linking prototypes with potential commercial developers. OST’s Methods for Delivering its Products
OST delivers its products to its customers through a variety of methods. To help Justice comply with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), OST establishes goals and develops performance measures to track its progress. GPRA, which mandates performance measurements by federal agencies, requires, among other things, that each agency measure or assess relevant outputs and outcomes of each program activity. Outputs count the goods and services produced by a program or organization. Intermediate measures can be used to show progress to achieving intended results. We recognize that OST’s task in relation to measuring the results of even non-basic research is complex in part because of the wide array of activities it sponsors, and because of inherently difficult measurement challenges involved in assessing the types of programs it undertakes. This information indicates how the program is achieving its intended results in addressing unsolved cases. As stated in our report, we recognize that measuring results using outcome measures is difficult and may be especially so in relation to some of the types of activities undertaken by OST. 1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the Office of Science & Technology (OST), within the Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice (NIJ), is to improve the safety and effectiveness of technology used by federal, state, and local law enforcement and other public safety agencies. Through NIJ, OST funds programs in forensic sciences, crime prevention, and standards and testing. To support these programs, Congress increased funding for OST from $13.2 million in 1995 to $204.2 million in 2003 (in constant 2002 dollars). GAO reviewed (1) the growth in OST's budgetary resources and the changes in OST's program responsibilities, (2) the types of products OST delivers and the methods used for delivering them; and (3) how well OST's efforts to measure the success of its programs in achieving intended results meet applicable requirements.
What GAO Found
OST's budgetary resources grew significantly in recent years, along with the range of its program responsibilities. From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2003, OST received over $1 billion through Department of Justice appropriations and the reimbursement of funds from other federal agencies in exchange for OST's agreement to administer these agencies' projects. Of the over $1 billion that OST received, approximately $749 million, or 72 percent, was either directed to specific recipients or projects by public law, subject to guidance in congressional committee reports, or directed though reimbursable agreements. At the same time that spending expanded, OST's program responsibilities have changed--from primarily law enforcement and corrections to broader public safety technology. OST delivers three groups of products through various methods. The three groups include (1) information dissemination and technical assistance; (2) the application, evaluation, and demonstration of existing and new technologies for field users; and (3) technology research and development. According to OST, as of April 2003, it has delivered 945 products since its inception. Furthermore, OST identified an additional 500 products associated with ongoing awards. OST makes its products available through a variety of methods, such as posting information on its Web site and providing research prototypes to field users for testing and evaluation. OST has been unable to fully assess its performance in achieving its goals as required by applicable criteria because it does not use outcome measures to assess the extent to which it achieves the intended results of its programs. OST's current measures primarily track outputs, the goods and services produced, or in some cases OST uses intermediate measures, which is a step toward developing outcome measures. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides that federal agencies measure or assess the results of each program activity. While developing outcome measures for the types of activities undertaken by OST is difficult, we have previously reported on various strategies that can be used to develop outcome measures, or, at least intermediate measures, for similar types of activities. |
gao_NSIAD-99-138 | gao_NSIAD-99-138_0 | The other three pilots are described below. Status of the Navy Pilot As of March 1999, 223 servicemembers have participated in the pilot. Program results thus far show (1) participation has been relatively low compared to the other pilots that are under way or planned, (2) servicemembers are satisfied arranging their own move, according to limited survey data, and (3) workload would increase for personal property officials because this option adds an alternative to the current program. Of the 30 surveys, 23 indicate that the pilot was a better quality move than other military moves. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is currently in the process of developing and coordinating an evaluation plan with the services to evaluate the personal property pilot tests, and it will make a recommendation as to the follow-on course of action. Presently, the pilot has only been tested as an option to the current program at a few Navy sites and not as an option at the other pilot sites. Conclusions
The Navy pilot program differs from other ongoing or proposed pilot programs because it adds an option to the current program; it is not intended to replace the current program. Further, the draft evaluation plan does not identify a specific method for assessing the pilot’s unique features. Doing so would test the Navy pilot in an environment that is more consistent with the changes being considered and likely to be implemented. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Navy Personal Property Pilot.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between January 1998 and March 1999, 223 servicemembers have used the pilot program to arrange their own move rather than use the current program; (2) participation has been relatively low compared to the other three pilots under way or planned, which involve substantially more shipments--approximately 1,400 to 45,000 shipments annually; (3) survey data indicate that participants are satisfied with the pilot and would use the option again; (4) because the pilot offers servicemembers a choice between the current program and arranging their own move, implementing the option increases the workload for local personal property officials; (5) the member arranged move option is not featured in any of the other pilots, which are broader in scope and are intended to replace the current program; (6) while the U.S. Transportation Command is responsible for evaluating all of the pilots to determine which one could provide better long-term results, its plan for doing so has not been finalized; and (7) in addition, the U.S. Transportation Command's draft evaluation plan proposes to collect information on the extent the Navy pilot works as an option within the current program at a few Navy sites, which may not provide adequate data to assess the Navy pilot's feasibility or its compatibility with the other pilots' results. |
gao_GAO-16-116T | gao_GAO-16-116T_0 | Background
The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports that handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. Moreover, entities within the maritime port environment are vulnerable to cyber-based threats because they rely on various types of information and communications technologies to manage the movement of cargo throughout the ports. All of these systems are potentially vulnerable to cyber-based attacks and other threats, which could disrupt operations at a port. It details the roles and responsibilities of DHS in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures; identifies agencies that have lead responsibility for coordinating with federally designated critical infrastructure sectors (maritime is a component of one of these sectors—the transportation sector); and specifies how other federal, state, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector stakeholders should use risk management principles to prioritize protection activities within and across sectors. These coordination activities are carried out through sector coordinating councils and government coordinating councils. MTSA also codified the Port Security Grant Program, which is to help defray the costs of implementing security measures at domestic ports. The Nation and Its Ports Face an Evolving Array of Cyber-Based Threats
Like threats affecting other critical infrastructures, threats to the maritime IT infrastructure are evolving and growing and can come from a wide array of sources. For example, according to Europol’s European Cybercrime Center, a cyber incident was reported in 2013 (and corroborated by the FBI) in which malicious software was installed on a computer at a foreign port. DHS and Other Stakeholders Have Taken Limited Actions to Address Maritime Port Cybersecurity
In June 2014 we reported that DHS and the other stakeholders had taken limited steps with respect to maritime cybersecurity. In particular, risk assessments for the maritime mode did not address cyber-related risks; maritime-related security plans contained limited consideration of cybersecurity; information-sharing mechanisms shared cybersecurity information to varying degrees; and the guidance for the Port Security Grant Program did not take certain steps to ensure that cyber risks were addressed. Maritime Risk Assessment Did Not Address Cybersecurity
In its 2012 National Maritime Strategic Risk assessment, which was the most recent available at the time of our 2014 review, the Coast Guard did not address cyber-related risks to the maritime mode. As called for by the NIPP, the Coast Guard completes this assessment on a biennial basis, and it is to provide a description of the types of threats the Coast Guard expects to encounter within its areas of responsibility, such as ensuring the security of port facilities, over the next 5 to 8 years. However, we found that while the 2012 assessment contained information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and the mitigation of potential risks in the maritime environment, none of the information addressed cyber- related risks or provided a thorough assessment of cyber-related threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. We therefore recommended that DHS direct the Coast Guard to ensure that the next iteration of the maritime risk assessment include cyber- related threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. However, the assessment does not identify vulnerabilities of cyber-related assets. Coast Guard officials and other stakeholders stated that the area and facility-level security plans did not adequately address cybersecurity because the guidance for developing the plans did not require a cyber component. While DHS concurred with this recommendation, as noted above, the revised maritime risk assessment does not address vulnerabilities of systems supporting maritime port operations, and thus is limited as a tool for informing maritime cybersecurity planning. Further, it is unclear to what extent the updated port area and facility plans include cyber risks because the Coast Guard has not yet provided us with updated plans. In our June 2014 report, we noted that in the absence of a sector coordinating council, the maritime mode lacked a body to facilitate national-level information sharing and coordination of security-related information. Port Security Grant Program Did Not Take Key Steps to Effectively Address Cyber Risks
In 2013 and 2014 FEMA identified enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a funding priority for its Port Security Grant Program and provided guidance to grant applicants regarding the types of cybersecurity-related proposals eligible for funding. However, in our June 2014 report we noted that the agency’s national review panel had not consulted with cybersecurity-related subject matter experts to inform its review of cyber- related grant proposals. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS direct FEMA to (1) develop procedures for grant proposal reviewers, at both the national and field level, to consult with cybersecurity subject matter experts from the Coast Guard when making funding decisions and (2) use information on cyber- related threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences identified in the revised maritime risk assessment to inform funding guidance for grant applicants and reviewers. As a result, we continue to be concerned that port security grants may not be allocated to projects that will best contribute to the cybersecurity of the maritime environment. Until DHS fully implements our recommendations, the nation’s maritime ports will remain susceptible to cyber risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's maritime ports handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo each year: a disruption at one of these ports could have a significant economic impact. Increasingly, port operations rely on computerized information and communications technologies, which can be vulnerable to cyber-based attacks. Federal entities, including DHS's Coast Guard and FEMA, have responsibilities for protecting ports against cyber-related threats. GAO has designated the protection of federal information systems as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997, and in 2003 expanded this to include systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure.
This statement addresses (1) cyber-related threats facing the maritime port environment and (2) steps DHS has taken to address cybersecurity in that environment. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on work supporting its June 2014 report on cybersecurity at ports. (GAO-14-459)
What GAO Found
Similar to other critical infrastructures, the nation's ports face an evolving array of cyber-based threats. These can come from insiders, criminals, terrorists, or other hostile sources and may employ a variety of techniques or exploits, such as denial-of-service attacks and malicious software. By exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications technologies supporting port operations, cyber-attacks can potentially disrupt the flow of commerce, endanger public safety, and facilitate the theft of valuable cargo.
In its June 2014 report, GAO determined that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other stakeholders had taken limited steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime environment. Specifically:
DHS's Coast Guard had not included cyber-related risks in its biennial assessment of risks to the maritime environment, as called for by federal policy. Specifically, the inputs into the 2012 risk assessment did not include cyber-related threats and vulnerabilities. Officials stated that they planned to address this gap in the 2014 revision of the assessment. However, when GAO recently reviewed the updated risk assessment, it noted that the assessments did not identify vulnerabilities of cyber-related assets, although it identified some cyber threats and their potential impacts.
The Coast Guard also did not address cyber-related risks in its guidance for developing port area and port facility security plans. As a result, port and facility security plans that GAO reviewed generally did not include cyber threats or vulnerabilities. While Coast Guard officials noted that they planned to update the security plan guidance to include cyber-related elements, without a comprehensive risk assessment for the maritime environment, the plans may not address all relevant cyber-threats and vulnerabilities.
The Coast Guard had helped to establish information-sharing mechanisms called for by federal policy, including a sector coordinating council, made up of private-sector stakeholders, and a government coordinating council, with representation from relevant federal agencies. However, these bodies shared cybersecurity-related information to a limited extent, and the sector coordinating council was disbanded in 2011. Thus, maritime stakeholders lacked a national-level forum for information sharing and coordination.
DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) identified enhancing cybersecurity capabilities as a priority for its port security grant program, which is to defray the costs of implementing security measures. However, FEMA's grant review process was not informed by Coast Guard cybersecurity subject matter expertise or a comprehensive assessment of cyber-related risks for the port environment. Consequently, there was an increased risk that grants were not allocated to projects that would most effectively enhance security at the nation's ports.
GAO concluded that until DHS and other stakeholders take additional steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime environment—particularly by conducting a comprehensive risk assessment that includes cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and potential impacts—their efforts to help secure the maritime environment may be hindered. This in turn could increase the risk of a cyber-based disruption with potentially serious consequences.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2014 report on port cybersecurity, GAO recommended that the Coast Guard include cyber-risks in its updated risk assessment for the maritime environment, address cyber-risks in its guidance for port security plans, and consider reestablishing the sector coordinating council. GAO also recommended that FEMA ensure funding decisions for its port security grant program are informed by subject matter expertise and a comprehensive risk assessment. DHS has partially addressed two of these recommendations since GAO's report was issued. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-111 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-111_0 | Second, the act provides that a solicitation may be issued for a single contract for the performance of multiple depot-level maintenance or repair workloads. Our lack of access to information is seriously impairing our ability to carry out our reporting responsibilities under this act. We experienced this problem in doing our work for our recent report to Congress concerning DOD’s determination to combine individual workloads at the two closing logistics centers into a single solicitation. Processes for C-5 Aircraft Competition Appear Reasonable
In response to congressional concerns regarding the appropriateness of its plans to privatize-in-place the Sacramento and San Antonio maintenance depot workloads, the Air Force revised its strategy to allow the public depots to participate in public-private competitions for the workloads. After assessing the issues required under the act relating to the C-5 aircraft competition, we concluded that (1) the Air Force provided public and private offerors an equal opportunity to compete without regard to where work would be performed, (2) the procedures did not appear to deviate materially from applicable laws or the FAR; and (3) the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the government, based on Air Force assumptions and conditions at the time of award. Under the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, DOD issued the required determinations that the workloads at these two depots “cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and to be awarded a contract to perform those individual workloads.” As required, we reviewed the DOD reports and supporting data and issued our report to Congress on January 20, 1998.We found that the accompanying DOD reports and supporting data do not provide adequate information supporting the determinations. Consequently, there was no support for the Department’s determination that the individual workloads cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination. However, all recurring cost elements were not considered. Concerns Raised Regarding the Sacramento and San Antonio Competitions
As part of our mandated review of the solicitations and awards for the Sacramento and San Antonio engine workloads, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress in connection with the workloads, draft requests for proposals, and other competition-related information. These participants raised several concerns that they believe may affect the competitions. Determining the current and future public-private sector mix using the revised criteria is essential before awards are made for the Sacramento and San Antonio workloads. Preliminary data indicates that using the revised criteria, about 47 to 49 percent of the Air Force’s depot maintenance workload is currently performed by the private sector. During the recent C-5 workload competition evaluation, the Air Force included a $153-million overhead savings estimate for the impact that the added C-5 workload would have on reducing the cost of DOD workload already performed at the military depot’s facilities. In response to private sector concerns, the Air Force is considering limiting the credit given for overhead savings in the Sacramento and San Antonio competitions. The second year savings, if supportable, will be allowed but discounted for risk. DOD Letters on Access to Records Regarding Public-Private Competitions
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the public-private competitions for workloads at two maintenance depots identified for closure, focusing on: (1) the problems GAO is having in obtaining access to Department of Defense (DOD) information; (2) the recent competition for C-5 aircraft workload and GAO's assessment of it; (3) the adequacy of DOD's support for its determination that competing combined, rather than individual workloads of each maintenance depot is more logical and economical; and (4) concerns participants have raised about the upcoming competitions for the workloads at the air logistics centers in Sacramento, California, and San Antonio, Texas.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its lack of access to information within DOD is seriously impairing its ability to carry out its reporting requirements; (2) GAO completed, with difficulty, its required report to Congress concerning DOD's determination to combine individual workloads at two closing logistics centers into a single solicitation at each location; (3) if DOD continues to delay and restrict GAO's access to information it needs to do its work, GAO will be unable to provide Congress timely and thorough responses regarding the competitions for the Sacramento and San Antonio depot maintenance workloads; (4) in assessing the competition for the C-5 aircraft workloads, GAO found that: (a) the Air Force provided public and private sources an equal opportunity to compete for the workloads without regard to where the work could be done; (b) the Air Force's procedures for competing the workloads did not appear to deviate materially from applicable laws or the Federal Acquisition Regulation; and (c) the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the government, based on Air Force assumptions at the time; (5) for the remaining workloads at Sacramento and San Antonio, DOD reports and other data do not support the Defense Secretary's determination that using a single contract with combined workloads is more cost-effective than using separate contracts for individual workloads; (6) much remains uncertain about the upcoming competitions for the Sacramento and San Antonio depot maintenance workloads; (7) potential participants have raised several concerns that they believe may affect the conduct of the competitions; (8) one concern is the impact of the statutory limit on the amount of depot maintenance work that can be done by non-DOD personnel; (9) the Air Force has not yet determined the current and projected public-private sector workload mix using criteria provided in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, but is working on it; (10) nonetheless, preliminary data indicates there is little opportunity to contract out additional depot maintenance workloads to the private sector; (11) another concern is the Air Force's proposed change in the overhead savings the Department may factor into the cost evaluations; (12) for the C-5 workload competition, overhead savings were considered for the duration of the performance period; and (13) however, for the Sacramento and San Antonio competitions, the Air Force is considering limiting overhead savings to the first year and possibly reducing the savings for the second year. |
gao_GAO-05-252 | gao_GAO-05-252_0 | In addition to its proposed mercury rule, EPA has proposed another rule for power plants, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, which is intended to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide beginning in 2010. EPA’s Economic Analysis Is of Limited Use for Informing Decision Makers about the Economic Trade-offs of Different Policy Options
We identified four major shortcomings in the economic analysis underlying EPA’s proposed mercury rule that limit its usefulness for informing decision makers and the public about the economic trade-offs of the two options. Second, EPA did not document some of its analysis or provide consistent information on the anticipated economic effects of different mercury control levels under the two options. Third, the agency did not estimate the economic benefits directly related to decreased mercury emissions. EPA Did Not Consistently Analyze Each Policy Option or Provide a Complete Accounting of Costs and Benefits
EPA’s estimates of the costs and benefits of its two proposed policy options are not comparable because the agency used inconsistent approaches in analyzing the two options. In contrast, EPA analyzed the effects of the cap-and-trade option in combination with the proposed interstate rule by combining the costs and benefits of the two proposed rules without separately identifying and documenting those associated with the cap-and-trade option alone. They also said it would have been useful to analyze the technology-based option alongside the interstate rule, but the agency did not do so because of time constraints. First, while EPA provides substantial information on its analysis of the technology-based option in the documents supporting its economic analysis of the proposed rule, the agency does not do so for the cap-and-trade option. In contrast, the agency provides only a summary of its findings for the cap-and-trade option in the rule’s preamble and refers to its findings as “rough estimates” that are based on consideration of available analysis of the interstate rule, the technology-based option, and the proposed Clear Skies legislation. EPA does not describe specifically how the agency used this analysis of other proposed rules and legislation to estimate the costs and benefits of the cap-and-trade option, and it does not identify the key analytical assumptions underlying its cost-and-benefit estimates. Instead, EPA estimated only some of the health benefits it anticipates would occur from decreased exposure to fine particles and discussed other impacts qualitatively. In addition, EPA did not analyze the key uncertainties surrounding its benefit estimates. In doing this work, we did not independently estimate the costs or benefits of the mercury control options, evaluate EPA’s process for developing the options, or assess legal issues surrounding the extent to which the options comply with the provisions of the Clean Air Act or its amendments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mercury is a toxic element that can cause neurological disorders in children. In January 2004, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed two options for limiting mercury from power plants, and plans to finalize a rule in March 2005. The first would require each plant to meet emissions standards reflecting the application of control technology (the technology-based option), while the second would enable plants to either reduce emissions or buy excess credits from other plants (the cap-and-trade option). EPA received over 680,000 written comments on the proposal. EPA is directed by statute and executive order to analyze the costs and benefits of proposed rules, and the agency summarized its analysis underlying the two options in the proposal. In this context, GAO was asked to assess the usefulness of EPA's economic analysis for decision making. In doing so, GAO neither independently estimated the options' costs and benefits nor evaluated the process for developing the options or their consistency with the Clean Air Act, as amended.
What GAO Found
GAO identified four major shortcomings in the economic analysis underlying EPA's proposed mercury control options that limit its usefulness for informing decision makers about the economic trade-offs of the different policy options. First, while Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance directs agencies to identify a policy that produces the greatest net benefits, EPA's analysis is of limited use in doing so because the agency did not consistently analyze the options or provide an estimate of the total costs and benefits of each option. For example, EPA analyzed the effects of the technology-based option by itself, but analyzed the effects of the cap-and-trade option alongside those of another proposed rule affecting power plants, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (the interstate rule), without separately identifying the effects of the cap-and-trade option. As a result, EPA's estimates are not comparable and are of limited use for assessing economic trade-offs. EPA officials said they analyzed the cap-and-trade option alongside the interstate rule because the agency views the two proposed rules as complementary. Nonetheless, to provide comparable estimates, EPA would have to analyze each option alone and in combination with the interstate rule. Second, EPA did not document some of its analysis or provide information on how changes in the proposed level of mercury control would affect the cost-and-benefit estimates for the technology-based option, as it did for the cap-and-trade option. Third, EPA did not estimate the value of the health benefits directly related to decreased mercury emissions and instead estimated only some secondary benefits, such as decreased exposure to harmful fine particles. However, EPA has asked for comments on a methodology to estimate the benefits directly related to mercury. Fourth, EPA did not analyze some of the key uncertainties underlying its cost-and-benefit estimates. |
gao_GAO-10-245 | gao_GAO-10-245_0 | The state offices are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Wyoming, and Eastern States. According to BLM officials, the primary purpose of idle-well reviews is to ensure that these wells do not become orphaned—that is, they lack a bond sufficient to cover reclamation costs and there are no responsible or liable parties to perform reclamation. BLM Holds Nearly 4,000 Bonds, Valued at $162 Million, but Amounts Are Based on Regulatory Minimums and Not on Full Reclamation Costs
As of December 2008, oil and gas operators had provided 3,879 surety and personal bonds, valued at approximately $162 million, to ensure compliance with all lease terms and conditions for 88,357 wells, according to our analysis of BLM data. Specifically, the bond minimum of $10,000 for individual bonds was last set in 1960, and the bond minimums for statewide bonds—$25,000—and for nationwide bonds—$150,000—were last set in 1951. BLM Spent Nearly $4 Million to Reclaim 295 Orphaned Wells since Fiscal Year 1988 and Has Identified Another 144 Orphaned Wells to Be Reclaimed
According to BLM data, the agency spent about $3.8 million to reclaim 295 orphaned wells in 10 states from fiscal years 1988 through 2009. The amount spent per reclamation project varied from a high of $582,829 for a single well in Wyoming in fiscal year 2008, to a low of $300 for three wells in Wyoming in fiscal year 1994. BLM has identified an additional 144 orphaned wells on BLM and other federal land that need to be reclaimed in seven states. Although BLM reclamation estimates were not available for all of these wells, officials in BLM field offices have completed reclamation cost estimates for 102 of the 144 wells, for a total estimated cost of $1,683,490. States Have Different Approaches for Determining Bonding Amounts and Generally Require Bond Amounts Equal to or Higher Than Those of BLM
The 12 western states have bonding requirements for oil and gas operations that differ in their approach from BLM’s onshore oil and gas bonding requirements. Federal Regulations for Other Resources Generally Require Bond Amounts That Cover Reclamation Costs or the Minimum Bond Amounts Have Been More Recently Set
Regulations governing the extraction of other resources owned by the federal government generally require (1) bond amounts that consider the cost of reclamation, which reduces the government’s potential liability for reclamation costs; or (2) use minimum amounts that were established more recently than the amounts for BLM oil and gas bonds. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
GAO provided Interior with a draft of this report for its review and comment. Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to examine three aspects of the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) Bureau of Land Management (BLM) bonding requirements for BLM oil and gas leases and reclamation of oil and gas wells. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the types, value, and coverage of bonds held by BLM for oil and gas operations; (2) determine the amount that BLM has paid to reclaim orphaned wells over the past 20 years, and the number of orphaned wells BLM has identified but has not yet reclaimed; and (3) compare BLM’s bonding requirements for oil and gas operations with the bonding requirements the 12 western states use for oil and gas operations on state and private lands and other Interior agencies’ bonding requirements for other resources. Individual lease bond. Individual lease bond. Statewide bond (to cover all leases of the same mineral). cover all leases of the same mineral). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 directs the Department of the Interior (Interior) to manage lands for multiple uses while also taking any action to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation" of the land. To do this, Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), among other things, requires oil and gas operators to reclaim the land they disturb and post a bond to help ensure they do so. Despite these requirements, not all operators perform reclamation. If the bond is not sufficient to cover well plugging and surface reclamation and there are no responsible or liable parties, the well is considered "orphaned," and BLM uses federal dollars to fund reclamation. The 12 western states where most oil and gas production occurs and other Interior agencies also require bonds to ensure reclamation. GAO was asked to (1) determine the number, value, and coverage of bonds held by BLM for oil and gas operations; (2) determine the amount that BLM has paid to reclaim orphaned wells over the past 20 years and the number of orphaned wells BLM has identified but has not yet reclaimed; and (3) compare BLM's bonding requirements for oil and gas operations with those the 12 western states use for oil and gas operations on state and private lands and other Interior agencies' bonding requirements for other resources. Among other things, GAO analyzed BLM data on wells and BLM-held bonds, and interviewed BLM officials.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's analysis of BLM data, as of December 2008, oil and gas operators had provided 3,879 bonds, valued at $162 million, to ensure compliance with lease terms and conditions for 88,357 wells. BLM regulations establish minimum bond amounts: $10,000 for an individual lease, $25,000 to cover all leases of a single operator in a state, and $150,000 to cover all leases of a single operator nationwide. The bond amount for individual leases was set in 1960, while the statewide and nationwide bond amounts were set in 1951. For fiscal years 1988 through 2009, BLM spent about $3.8 million to reclaim 295 orphaned wells in 10 states and has identified an additional 144 orphaned wells in 7 states that need to be reclaimed, according to BLM. The amount spent per reclamation project varied greatly, from a high of $582,829 for a single well in Wyoming in fiscal year 2008 to a low of $300 for 3 wells in Wyoming in fiscal year 1994. BLM reclamation cost estimates were not available for all of the wells it has yet to reclaim, but BLM field office officials have completed reclamation cost estimates of approximately $1.7 million for 102 of the 144 orphaned wells. The 12 western states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) and other Interior agencies and offices have bonding approaches that differ from BLM's oil and gas bonding requirements. The states generally require higher bond amounts than the minimum amounts established by BLM regulations for individual and statewide oil and gas leases. Regulations governing the extraction or use of other federally owned resources generally require bond amounts based on the cost of reclamation or use minimum amounts that were established more recently than the bond amounts for oil and gas. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Interior for review and comment. The Department provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-978 | gao_GAO-01-978_0 | Accordingly, SEC adopted a rule on October 1, 1997, requiring transfer agents to conduct searches and annually report to SEC aggregate data on the accounts of lost security holders. Transfer Agents and Broker-dealers Reported Limited Numbers of Lost Accounts, but Little Historical Data Were Available
In 2000, the year for which the data are most complete, the average number of lost security holders for transfer agents and broker-dealers was approximately 2 percent of total accounts. Most of the transfer agents and broker-dealers that were unable to provide us with data reported to us that they believed that the lost account ratio has remained the same or decreased in the last 2 years. When searches for lost security holders are unsuccessful, transfer agents and broker-dealers are required to remit the property to the state unclaimed property administrators under the state escheat laws. Both transfer agents and broker-dealers used telephone calls and mail for over 75 percent of their searches. Transfer agents used credit bureaus and professional search firms less frequently, but they still used these firms more than broker-dealers. However, when transfer agents began reporting the data, SEC staff found differences in the way that firms interpreted the questions. Because of these inconsistencies, SEC staff have not been able to review the operation of the rule after 3 years as instructed by the Commission in 1997. SEC Relies on Inspections to Ensure Compliance
SEC relies primarily on its general inspections of transfer agents to ensure that these firms comply with the securities laws and regulations, including the lost security holder rule. SEC found violations relating to compliance with the 1997 rule in about a quarter of the inspections it made between 1998 and 2000. This is consistent with our survey results, which indicated that about 22 percent of the transfer agents who responded to our survey were in violation of the lost security holder rule because they did not have written policies or procedures for searching for lost security holders. Yet, only transfer agents are subject to SEC’s 1997 rule. In addition, SEC directed its staff to assess the operation of the rule after 3 years. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide information on (1) the extent to which accounts are lost, whether this has changed over time, and the reasons security holders were separated from their accounts; (2) the techniques used by transfer agents, broker-dealers, and other entities to find lost customers and the costs of these searches; (3) the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) effort to use the data reported by transfer agents to review the operation of its 1997 rule; and (4) SEC’s methods for ensuring that transfer agents comply with the rule’s requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
One in eight Americans are entitled to unclaimed and abandoned assets, according to the National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators. These unclaimed and abandoned assets include savings and checking accounts, securities, paychecks, insurance settlements, and utility and rental deposits. Most of this money is unclaimed because the owner moved and simply forgot about the account, changed his or her name, or died. After a period of dormancy, the funds are turned over to state unclaimed property offices. To protect investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a rule in 1997 requiring transfer agents to search for lost security holders, maintain written procedures for searching for lost security holders, and annually report to SEC on the accounts of lost security holders. However, the rule excluded the broker-dealers that are involved in the buying and selling of securities and that hold the vast majority of owners' assets. Legislation was introduced in Congress in 2000 that would have expanded the SEC rule to cover broker-dealers. GAO surveyed broker-dealer and transfer agents survey respondents and found that the number of lost accounts was about two percent of total accounts.
What GAO Found
Survey respondents said that they believe the number of lost security holders has remained steady since 1998. Transfer agents and broker-dealers said that the main reason for lost accounts was that owners forgot to send a change of address when they moved. Both transfer agents and broker-dealers generally resorted to telephone calls and mailings to locate lost security holders, using each method at least 75 percent of the time. Transfer agents and broker-dealers used credit bureaus and professional search firms the least and found these methods to be the least effective. About 40 percent of the responding transfer agents and broker-agents spent less than $10 trying to locate each lost customer. SEC has been unable to use data provided by transfer agents to assess the operation of the 1997 rule because of differences in the way agents interpreted the questions. In addition, the requested information was insufficient for SEC staff to review the operation of the rule after three years as they were directed when the Commission adopted the rule. SEC relies primarily on its general inspections of transfer agents to ensure that these firms comply with the 1997 rule. SEC found violations in compliance with the 1997 rule's reporting and procedural requirements in about one quarter of the inspections it made between 1998 and 2000. Given that only transfer agents are covered by the 1997 rule, the extent of the lost security holder issue may be small. |
gao_GAO-10-467T | gao_GAO-10-467T_0 | California is estimated to receive approximately $85 billion in Recovery Act funds, or about 10 percent of the funds available nationally. California’s State and Local Governments Continue to Grapple with Budget Problems, but Recovery Act Funds Have Helped Preserve Services
California used Recovery Act funds to help balance the state fiscal year 2009-2010 budget, when the state faced a nearly $60 billion budget gap, and future budget shortfalls are expected. Nonetheless, the budget gap constitutes roughly one-quarter of the state’s annual budget expenditures. Local city and county governments in California are also struggling with declining revenues and budget problems. Officials we met with in the City of Los Angeles (Los Angeles) and the County of Sacramento said that they face budget shortfalls this fiscal year due to declines in state funding for programs, tax revenues, and fees. 2 highlights information about the two local governments we reviewed.) According to government officials in both localities, Recovery Act funds are helping to preserve the delivery of essential services and repair infrastructure but have generally not helped stabilize their base budgets. The Recovery Act also required that 30 percent of these funds be suballocated, primarily based on population, for metropolitan, regional, and local use. California Has Dedicated Most of Its Recovery Act Highway Funds for Pavement Projects and Continues to Monitor Federal Reimbursements
The majority of Recovery Act highway obligations for California have been for pavement improvements—including resurfacing, rehabilitating, and constructing roadways. California Reported Meeting the 1-Year Obligation Deadline and Is Taking Steps to Meet Other Recovery Act Requirements
The Recovery Act required states to ensure that all apportioned Recovery Act funds were obligated within 1 year after apportionment and, according to Caltrans officials, as of February 18, 2010, 100 percent of California’s highway infrastructure Recovery Act apportionment has been obligated. The Department of Labor (Labor) first established prevailing wage rates for weatherization in all of the 50 states and the District by September 3, 2009. In late July, the state legislature approved CSD’s use of these funds. Home Weatherization Has Started in California, but Service Providers Are Still Being Developed for Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area
According to CSD, as of January 25, 2010, CSD had awarded about $66 million of the $77 million to 35 local service providers throughout the state for planning, purchasing equipment, hiring and training, and weatherizing homes. Also, according to CSD, 849 homes were weatherized as of February 26, 2010, which is less than 2 percent of the approximately 43,000 homes that CSD currently estimates will be weatherized with Recovery Act funds. In response to the State Auditor’s findings, the Task Force stated that it is working with CSD to improve internal controls and streamline contract approvals and that the Task Force is committed to ensuring that California “does not leave one dollar of Recovery Act funding on the table.”
California Primarily Used Recovery Act Education Funds to Retain Jobs and Is Working to Address Its Cash Management Issues
As of February 19, 2010, California disbursed approximately $4.7 billion in Recovery Act education funds for three programs—SFSF; ESEA Title I, Part A, as amended; and IDEA, Part B. Numerous State Entities and Agencies Are Engaged in Overseeing Recovery Act Funds
Since the Recovery Act was enacted in February 2009, California oversight entities and state agencies have taken various actions to oversee the use of Recovery Act funds. Although certain federal agencies and Inspectors General also have various oversight roles, our review has focused on the state efforts. Their key oversight roles are summarized in table 3. Table 4 provides an overview of selected oversight and auditing activities of these agencies. California Reported That Over 70,000 Jobs Were Funded during the Last Quarter of 2009, but OMB’s New Reporting Guidance Was Not Consistently Implemented
As reported on Recovery.gov, as of February 23, 2010, California recipients reported funding 70,745 jobs with Recovery Act funds during the second quarterly reporting period ending on December 31, 2009. As a result, some vendor jobs funded by the Recovery Act were not reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) specifies several roles for GAO, including conducting bimonthly reviews of selected states' and localities' use of funds made available under the act. This testimony is based on GAO's bimonthly work in California, where the Recovery Act provided more than $85 billion--or about 10 percent of the funds available nationally--for program funding and tax relief. This testimony provides a general overview of: (1) California's use of Recovery Act funds for selected programs, (2) the approaches taken by California agencies to ensure accountability for Recovery Act funds, and (3) the impacts of these funds. This testimony focuses on selected programs that GAO has covered in previous work including the use of Recovery Act funds by the state and two localities' --City of Los Angeles and County of Sacramento, Highway Infrastructure Investment, and the Weatherization Assistance Program. GAO also updated information on three education programs with significant Recovery Act funds being disbursed--the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF), and Recovery Act funds for Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended, and Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),. GAO provided a draft of this statement to California state and local officials and incorporated their comments where appropriate.
What GAO Found
(1) State and Local Budgets: Despite the influx of Recovery Act funds, California continues to face severe budgetary pressures and estimates a current shortfall of as much as $21billion --roughly one-quarter of the state's annual budget expenditures. California's cities and counties are also struggling with budget problems. According to officials from the City of Los Angeles and County of Sacramento, Recovery Act funds are helping to preserve essential services and repair infrastructure but have generally not helped stabilize their base budgets. (2) Transportation Infrastructure: According to California officials, 100 percent of California's $2.570 billion highway infrastructure Recovery Act apportionment has been obligated. The state has dedicated most of these funds for pavement improvements--including resurfacing and rehabilitating roadways. (3) Weatherization Assistance: As of January 25, 2010, California had awarded about $66 million to 35 local service providers throughout the state for weatherization activities. State and federal requirements, such as prevailing wage rates, as well as the implementation of these requirements, have delayed weatherization and, as of February 26, 2010, the state had weatherized only 849 homes--less than 2 percent of the 43,000 homes that are estimated to be weatherized with Recovery Act funds. (4) Education: As of February 19, 2010, California had distributed approximately $4.7 billion for three education programs, including the SFSF. Local education agencies plan to use more than half of these funds to retain jobs; however, a majority reported that they still expect job losses. Also, cash management issues, related to federal cash balances and the calculation and remittance of interest, remain, but the California Department of Education has taken preliminary steps to resolve them.(5) Accountability: California oversight entities and state agencies have taken various actions to oversee Recovery Act funds, including training, risk assessments, on-site monitoring, and audits. The Governor established the Recovery Task Force to ensure funds are spent efficiently and effectively, and the State Auditor and Inspector General also have key oversight roles. (6) Jobs Reporting: Recipients reported that 70,745 jobs were funded in California during the last quarter of 2009. However, about 70 percent of these jobs were in education and were not reported using the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) latest guidance, and therefore were not calculated consistently with other jobs reported. |
gao_GAO-05-896T | gao_GAO-05-896T_0 | ATSA required that TSA screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002. Explosive detection systems include EDS and ETD machines. EDS machines, which cost approximately $1 million each, use computer-aided tomography X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. In addition to installing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in airport lobbies and baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated with some airport operators and air carriers to install integrated in-line EDS baggage screening systems within their baggage conveyor systems. Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install In-line Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not Been Made Available to Fund These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis
Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS baggage screening systems because of the expected benefits of these systems. TSA and airport operators are relying on LOI agreements as their principal method for funding the modification of airport facilities to incorporate in- line baggage screening systems. In addition, perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these capital-intensive in-line EDS systems. TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the Efficient and Cost- Effective Screening for Explosives while Enhancing Security Benefits
At the time of our March 2005 report, TSA has not completed a systematic, prospective analysis of individual airports or groups of airports to determine at which airports installing in-line EDS systems would be cost-effective in terms of reducing long-term screening costs for the government and would improve security. TSA officials stated that they had not conducted the analyses related to the installation of in-line systems at individual airports or groups of airports because they have used available staff and funding to ensure all airports have a sufficient number of EDS or ETD machines to meet the congressional mandate to screen all checked baggage with explosive detection systems. TSA estimated that in- line baggage screening systems at these airports would save the federal government about $1 billion compared with stand-alone EDS systems and that TSA would recover its initial investment in a little over 1 year. Concluding Observations
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation’s airports—mainly as part of interim lobby screening solutions—to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives, as mandated by Congress. Also, for airports, where in-line systems may not be economically justified because of high investment costs, a cost effectiveness analysis could be used to determine the benefits of additional stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place of the more labor-intensive ETD machines that are currently being used at the more than 300 airports. In fact, the analysis showed that using in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at these nine airports would save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years and that TSA’s initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1 year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This testimony discusses (1) TSA's deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening systems.
What GAO Found
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines--mainly in airport lobbies--that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency's ability to initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems. TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis. Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at each airport are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these systems. TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line systems may not be economically justified, by making greater use of stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-intensive and less efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed that these in-line systems could save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years. TSA further estimated that it could recover its initial investment in the in-line systems at these airports in a little over 1 year. |
gao_GAO-12-222 | gao_GAO-12-222_0 | The excise taxes are imposed on airline ticket purchases and aviation fuel, as well as the shipment of cargo. FAA’s three capital accounts include (1) the Facilities and Equipment account, which funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system, including the modernization of the air traffic control system called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen); (2) the Research, Engineering, and Development account, which funds research on issues related to aviation safety, mobility, and NextGen technologies; and (3) the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), which provides grants for airport planning and development. These provisions require that the total budget resources made available each fiscal year from the trust fund— that is, the appropriation from the trust fund—equal the President’s baseline budget projection, or forecast, for excise taxes and interest credited to the trust fund for the coming fiscal year (budget year).2000, appropriations from the trust fund have generally followed the forecast amounts, but they can, and have, varied—a point we discuss in more detail later in this report. FAA recently estimated the cost for NextGen for the agency to be between $15 billion and $22 billion, and another $5 billion to $7 billion for equipping aircraft with NextGen technology, for fiscal years 2012 through 2025—much of which will be funded from the trust fund. It Is Too Soon to Compare the Accuracy of FAA’s and Treasury’s Budget Year Forecasting Approaches
After just 1 year and without certified receipts for the fourth quarter of 2011, it is too soon to tell whether Treasury’s demand-based econometric approach will provide more accurate revenue forecasts for the budget year than FAA’s more detailed, capacity-based approach. Overforecasting of Revenues Due to Aviation Shocks and Other Factors Has Contributed to a Significant Decline in the Trust Fund’s Uncommitted Balance
Overforecasting of Revenues for 9 of the Past 11 Years Has Contributed to a Decline in the Trust Fund’s Uncommitted Balance
During the past 11 years, FAA overforecasted trust-fund revenues by a net total of $9.34 billion, with overforecasts in 9 of the 11 years. For example, for fiscal year 2005, Congress appropriated $59 million less than the forecast revenues, and the revenue forecast was $414 million higher than the actual revenues. Unexpected events causing changes in aviation demand or airline capacity can considerably affect trust-fund revenues and the accuracy of trust-fund revenue forecasts. Developed over a year in advance, the forecasts often cannot account for the effects of unexpected events, such as the September 11 attacks or changes in economic conditions. These various factors—exogenous shocks, the timing of forecasts, and lags in recognizing structural changes to the airline industry—affect forecast accuracy for key activity and pricing measures, such as enplanements and ticket prices. Options Exist to Reduce, but Not Eliminate, the Risk of Overcommitting Trust-Fund Resources
Although the trust fund’s uncommitted balance was used to offset lower- than-forecast trust-fund revenues in the past, the current trust-fund balance provides less protection against overcommitting trust-fund resources. OMB, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and FAA budget officials noted that if the trust fund were to become overcommitted, there would be some time to determine what actions, if any, FAA might have to take and to address this issue through the appropriations process, given capital programs are paid for—or outlayed—over several years and because the trust fund maintains a cash balance ($9.4 billion as of the end-of-fiscal-year 2010), for which revenues are continually paid into the trust fund. 658) includes a provision that would limit the budget resources made available for appropriation from the trust fund to 90 percent, rather than 100 percent, of forecast revenues and apply any differences between actual trust-fund revenues and appropriations from the trust fund to a subsequent year. These options would increase the likelihood that uncommitted resources would be available to FAA if actual revenues fell short of forecast revenues. In addition, these options could result in the availability of fewer resources for some period of time than under current law, unless a general-revenue appropriation made up the difference. The Extent to Which Trust-Fund Revenues Might Support Future FAA Expenditures Will Depend on Differing Assumptions and Other Factors
The President’s Budget Forecasts Show FAA Expenditures Continuing to Exceed Trust-Fund Revenues
According to the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request and mid- session review, FAA expenditures (as reflected by OMB’s estimates of FAA’s budget authority) are expected to continue to exceed forecast trust- fund revenues through fiscal year 2021 (see fig. 7). 8). By contrast, applying the AIR-21 approach to current revenue and expenditures forecasts would reduce the amount of additional general revenues needed to cover forecast expenditures but would maintain the current uncommitted balance level and still require some level of additional general revenues or increases in aviation tax levels or sources into the trust fund to fund FAA expenditures as compared to OMB’s approach (fig. In particular, congressional decisions, including the level of FAA’s appropriations or the trust-fund tax structure; unexpected changes affecting trust-fund revenues and FAA expenditures; and FAA’s implementation and management of programs, such as NextGen, could significantly affect trust-fund revenues and FAA expenditures in future years. Deciding on the appropriate mechanism for determining the level of appropriations from the trust fund requires Congress to weigh trade- offs between the amount available for appropriations from the trust fund, the amount of general revenues in a given year, and the overall level of FAA expenditures, all while ensuring stable and sustainable funding for aviation investment. Each entity provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1970, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (trust fund) is the primary source of funding for the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) investments in the airport and airway system. Trust-fund revenues come largely from taxes on airline tickets and aviation fuel. The financial health of the trust fund is important to ensure sustainable funding for FAA without increasing demands on general revenues. Current law authorizes appropriations from the trust fund equal to forecast trust-fund revenues. However, if forecasts overestimate actual revenues and Congress appropriates the forecast level, the trust funds uncommitted balancethat is, the balance in excess of what has been appropriated from the fund or authorized as contract authorityis drawn down.
Among its objectives, GAO was asked to examine (1) the accuracy of the trust-fund revenue forecasts and factors affecting forecast accuracy, (2) different options for determining appropriations from the trust fund that would reduce the risk of overcommitting the fund, and (3) the extent to which trust-fund revenues might cover planned FAA expenditures through fiscal year 2021. GAO reviewed the Department of the Treasurys (Treasury) and FAAs forecasting methods, analyzed trust-fund revenue and forecast data, and interviewed federal officials and aviation-industry and forecasting experts. The Departments of Transportation and Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated into the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Actual trust-fund revenues fell short of FAAs revenue forecasts for 9 of the past 11 years, contributing to a decline in the trust funds uncommitted balance from over $7 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $770 million in fiscal year 2010. Inaccurate forecasts for the taxes related to domestic passenger tickets, which account for over 70 percent of trust-fund revenues, drove the aggregate overforecast, but inaccurate forecasts for other taxes also had an effect. This inaccuracy is largely attributable to unexpected events affecting aviation, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the recession in 2009; the budget process requiring the forecasts to be developed over a year in advance of the fiscal year; and lags in recognizing structural changes in the airline industry, such as airlines increased reliance on ancillary fees for which excise taxes for the trust fund are not collected. Changes in the methodology for forecasting trust-fund revenues and the assumption of forecasting responsibility by Treasury, begun in fiscal year 2011, may also affect the future accuracy of forecasts, but it is too soon to tell what effect the changes will have after just 1 fiscal year.
Alternative options for how Congress determines available resources for appropriation from the trust fund could provide for substantially greater protection against overcommitting trust-fund resourcesthat is, help ensure that trust-fund revenues would be sufficient to cover FAAs expendituresor requiring additional general-revenue contributions than the current approach outlined in law. To this end, Congress could limit budget resources available for appropriation from the trust fund to less than the forecast revenuesfor example, the current House FAA Reauthorization bill has a provision that would make only 90 percent of forecast revenues available for appropriation from the trust fund as well as any prior year differences between actual trust-fund revenues and appropriations from the trust fund. Other options would make only actual revenues from the prior year available, or base appropriations on the maintenance of a target level for the trust funds balance. However, unless a sufficiently large minimum balance is established, there would still be some risk of overcommitting trust-fund resources under these options. The alternatives could also result in greater swings in trust-fund appropriations, requiring varying levels of general revenues to maintain overall stable spending levels for FAA.
The extent to which trust-fund revenues might cover FAAs future expenditures will depend on whether trust-fund revenue and FAA expenditure forecasts are realized. Under current revenue and expenditure forecasts, between 8 percent and 32 percent of FAAs annual expenditures for fiscal years 2013 through 2021 could have to be paid for by general revenues unless spending is reduced or additional taxes are paid into the trust fund. However, congressional decisions, including the level of FAAs appropriations; unexpected events affecting trust-fund revenues and FAA expenditures; and FAAs implementation and management of programs could significantly change forecast revenues and expenditures in future years. For example, FAAs modernization of the air traffic control system, called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), is currently estimated to cost FAA $15 billion to $22 billion, and an additional $5 billion to $7 billion for equipping aircraft with NextGen technology, but those costs could change depending upon the speed of implementation and other factors. |
gao_GAO-03-1058T | gao_GAO-03-1058T_0 | Background
SARS is an emerging respiratory disease that has been reported principally in Asia, Europe, and North America. As of July 11, 2003, WHO reported that there were an estimated 8,427 “probable” cases from 29 countries, with 813 deaths from SARS. General Infectious Disease Control Measures
In the United States, the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), a federal advisory committee made up of 14 infection control experts, develops recommendations and guidelines regarding general infectious disease control measures for CDC. Case identification and contact tracing are considered by health care providers to be important first steps in the containment of infectious diseases in both the community and health care settings. Exposure Management. Experts Recommend Case Identification and Contact Tracing, Transmission Control, and Exposure Management Measures To Prevent the Spread of SARS
Infectious disease experts emphasized that existing infectious disease control measures played a pivotal role in containing the spread of SARS in both health care and community settings. The combinations of measures that were used depended on either the prevalence of the disease in the community or the number of SARS patients served in a health care facility. No new measures were introduced to contain the SARS outbreak in the United States; instead, experts said strict compliance with and additional vigilance to enforce the use of current measures was sufficient. The successful implementation of all of the infectious disease control measures depended, in part, on effective communication among health care professionals and the general public. For SARS, public health and hospital officials in California and New York said hospital emergency room or other waiting room staff routinely used questionnaires to screen incoming patients for fever, cough, and travel to a country with active cases of SARS. Contact tracing—the identification and tracking of individuals who had close contact with a “suspect” or “probable” case—is an important component of case identification. For the inpatient setting, the guidelines included: Routine standard precautions, including hand washing. Isolation of SARS infected individuals occurred in both health care and home settings. Federal, State, and Local Health Officials Are Preparing for a Possible SARS Resurgence, But Implementing Plans May Pose Challenges if the Resurgence Is Large-Scale
While no one knows whether there will be a resurgence of SARS, federal, state, and local health care officials we interviewed agree that it is necessary to prepare for the possibility. As part of these preparations, CDC, along with national associations that represent state and local health officials, and others, is involved in developing SARS-specific guidelines for using infectious disease control measures and contingency response plans. In addition, these associations have collaborated with CDC to develop a checklist of preparedness activities for state and local health officials. Such preparation efforts also improve the health care system’s capacity to respond to other infectious disease outbreaks, including those precipitated by bioterrorism. However, implementing these plans may prove difficult due to limitations in both hospital and workforce capacity. A large-scale SARS outbreak could create overcrowding, as well as shortages in medical equipment (including N-95 respirators) and in health care personnel, who are at higher risk for infection due to their more frequent exposure to a contaminated environment. Lessons to carry forward are the importance of early identification of infected individuals and their contacts, the effectiveness of safety precautions to control transmission and ensure the protection of health care workers, and the need to use, in some cases, isolation and quarantine. | Why GAO Did This Study
SARS is a highly contagious respiratory disease that infected more than 8,000 individuals in 29 countries principally throughout Asia, Europe, and North America and led to more than 800 deaths as of July 11, 2003. Due to the speed and volume of international travel and trade, emerging infectious diseases such as SARS are difficult to contain within geographic borders, placing numerous countries and regions at risk with a single outbreak. While SARS did not infect large numbers of individuals in the United States, the possibility that it may reemerge raises concerns about the ability of public health officials and health care workers to prevent the spread of the disease in the United States. GAO was asked to assist the Subcommittee in identifying ways in which the United States can prepare for the possibility of another SARS outbreak. Specifically, GAO was asked to determine 1) infectious disease control measures practiced within health care and community settings that helped contain the spread of SARS and 2) the initiatives and challenges in preparing for a possible SARS resurgence.
What GAO Found
Infectious disease experts emphasized that no new infectious disease control measures were introduced to contain SARS in the United States. Instead, strict compliance with and additional vigilance to enforce the use of current measures was sufficient. These measures--case identification and contact tracing, transmission control, and exposure management--are well established infectious disease control measures that proved effective in both health care and community settings. The combinations of measures that were used depended on either the prevalence of the disease in the community or the number of SARS patients served in a health care facility. For SARS, case identification within health care settings included screening individuals for fever, cough, and recent travel to a country with active cases of SARS. Contact tracing, the identification and tracking of individuals who had close contact with someone who was infected or suspected of being infected, was important for the identification and tracking of individuals at risk for SARS. Transmission control measures for SARS included contact precautions, especially hand washing after contact with someone who was ill, and protection against respiratory spread, including spread by large droplets and by smaller airborne particles. The use of isolation rooms with controlled airflow and the use of respiratory masks by health care workers were key elements of this approach. Exposure management practices--isolation and quarantine--occurred in both health care and home settings. Effective communication among health care professionals and the general public reinforced the need to adhere to infectious disease control measures. While no one knows whether there will be a resurgence of SARS, federal, state, and local health care officials agree that it is necessary to prepare for the possibility. As part of these preparations, CDC, along with national associations representing state and local health officials, and others, is involved in developing both SARS-specific guidelines for using infectious disease control measures and contingency response plans. In addition, these associations have collaborated with CDC to develop a checklist of preparedness activities for state and local health officials. Such preparation efforts also improve the health care system's capacity to respond to other infectious disease outbreaks, including those precipitated by bioterrorism. However, implementing these plans during a large-scale outbreak may prove difficult due to limitations in both hospital and workforce capacity that could result in overcrowding, as well as potential shortages in health care workers and medical equipment--particularly respirators. |
gao_GAO-06-364 | gao_GAO-06-364_0 | Due to the degree of international participation at both a governmental and an industry level in the JSF program, a large number of export authorizations are necessary to share project information with governments, solicit bids from partner suppliers, and execute contracts. The transfer of technologies necessary to achieve aircraft commonality goals for the JSF program is expected to far exceed past transfers of advanced military technology for other systems. Actions Taken to Expedite License Processing and Avoid Program Delays
DOD and the JSF program office have taken the following four key actions to avoid the potential negative effects on the program from delays in obtaining licenses for transferring technology to partner countries and foreign suppliers: In response to our 2003 recommendation, the JSF Program Office directed the prime contractor to develop an international industrial plan to anticipate time frames for national disclosure and technology transfer decisions. Agencies involved in the JSF export-licensing process are expediting the processing of license applications by dedicating staff to the JSF- licensing process, providing consultation to applicants on draft licenses, administering a prescreening process for the transfer of low technology and nonsensitive items, and by allowing addendums to be attached to license applications. The JSF prime contractor and agency officials have used options available to them under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), such as Global Project Authorization (GPA) and an exemption used in obtaining foreign contractor bids and proposals, to help facilitate the export control process and avoid program delays. Issues related to the releasability of classified information, technology, or systems to foreign partners are addressed as they arise in the JSF program because of the involvement of international partners in the early design phase of the program. Specifically, the plan identifies the need for a license to transfer certain technologies to foreign industry. In addition to the creation of the JSF prime contractor’s international industrial plan, DOD has added guidance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Acquisition Guidebook calling for the development of similar industrial-planning tools in all programs with significant international involvement prior to the system design and demonstration phase. While the GPA is designed to approve transfers within 5 days, its usefulness has been limited. Addressing Disclosure Issues Early in the Program
To prevent potential delays, decisions related to the releasability of classified information, technologies, or systems to partner countries are addressed as they arise throughout the development of the system. July 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the Department of Defense's (DOD) largest international cooperative effort to develop and produce a major weapon system. Due to the breadth of international participation, the number of export authorizations needed to share information with partner governments, solicit bids from suppliers, and execute contracts is expected to far exceed past transfers of advanced military technology. In July 2003, GAO reported that managing these transfers and partner expectations while avoiding delays has been a key challenge and recommended that industrial planning tools be developed and used to anticipate time frames for national disclosure and technology transfer decisions. This report examines DOD's response to this recommendation and identifies the practices DOD is using to expedite license processing and avoid program delays.
What GAO Found
Agencies have taken four key actions to expedite the processing of licenses for transferring technology to partner countries and foreign suppliers. Each of these practices is intended to anticipate time frames needed for the processing of licenses or avoid delays to the JSF program schedule. In response to GAO's 2003 recommendation, the JSF Program Office instructed the prime contractor to develop an international industrial plan that identifies the type of license needed to transfer certain technologies to foreign industry. The contractor's plan provides mechanisms for anticipating "need" dates for submitting license applications and for identifying and addressing potential issues related to the releasability of classified information, technologies, or systems. In addition to the contractor's plan, DOD has developed guidance calling for industrial planning tools in all programs with significant international involvement. Agencies involved in the JSF program are expediting the processing of license applications by dedicating staff to the JSF licensing process, providing consultation to applicants on draft licenses, administering a prescreening process for the transfer of low technology and nonsensitive items, and allowing addendums to be attached to license applications. The JSF prime contractor and agency officials have used options available to them under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, such as Global Project Authorization (GPA) and an exemption used in obtaining foreign contractor bids and proposals, to help facilitate the export control process and avoid program delays. While GPA is designed to approve exports within 5 days, its use has been limited. Due to the early involvement of international partners in the design phase of the program, decisions related to the releasability of classified information, technologies, or systems to partner countries have been addressed as they arise throughout the development of the system. |
gao_GGD-95-160 | gao_GGD-95-160_0 | IRS records sole proprietor information on a third file, the Cross-Reference Entity File (CREF). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with the Joint Committee, our objectives were to determine whether IRS (1) accurately cross-references sole proprietor identification numbers on the Individual Master File, Business Master File, and CREF and (2) needs to take any actions to improve the accuracy of its cross-reference files. IRS Problems in Cross-Referencing Sole Proprietors’ Accounts
IRS cross-references the SSN and EIN that a sole proprietor reports. However, we found that the cross-references were not always correct. IRS’ computer screening process prevented certain erroneous identification numbers from being posted to CREF. Erroneous Cross-References Can Lead to False Underreporter Leads
IRS collects tax information by taxpayer identification number and decides whether to contact a taxpayer for potentially underreporting income on the basis of the information collected. The Social Security Administration uses EINs to track employers’ contributions to the Social Security trust funds. Recommendations
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue establish returns-processing and compliance-screening procedures to help remove erroneous cross-referenced taxpayer identification numbers from sole proprietors’ tax records, and evaluate the feasibility of eliminating the requirement that sole proprietors use EINs for filing business returns. Our draft report had already noted that computer programs and computer files would have to be changed. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS): (1) accurately cross references the two identification numbers that self-employed individuals report on their tax returns; and (2) needs to take any actions to improve the accuracy of its cross-reference files.
What GAO Found
GAO found that IRS: (1) uses information from different computer files to identify sole proprietors that may have tax compliance problems; (2) requires certain taxpayers to have a valid social security number (SSN) and employer identification number (EIN) so that it can cross-reference the taxpayers' accounts from one file to another; and (3) records a sole proprietor's identification numbers on three computer files and uses the SSN to establish an account on the Individual Master File. In addition, GAO found that: (1) the identification numbers that IRS records for cross-referencing purposes are not always reliable and cause IRS to generate false underreporter leads; (2) the IRS computerized screening process limits the number of false underreporter leads created by the Cross-Reference Entity File; and (3) if IRS and the Social Security Administration eliminate sole proprietors' EIN, they will have to modify their computer programs to accept SSN instead of EIN. |
gao_GAO-11-475 | gao_GAO-11-475_0 | For more than a decade, CMS and its contractors have applied such tools to access data from various sources to analyze patterns of unusual activities or financial transactions that may indicate fraudulent charges or other types of improper payments. According to program officials, these data, called “shared systems” data, are needed to support the agency’s plans to incorporate tools to conduct predictive analysis of claims as they are being processed, helping to prevent improper payments. While CMS has developed and begun using IDR, the repository does not include all the planned data, such as Medicaid and shared systems data. In addition, the agency has developed and deployed One PI, but the system is being used by less than 7 percent of the intended user community and does not yet provide as many tools as planned. IDR Has Been Developed and Is in Use, but Does Not Yet Include All Data Needed to Enhance Program Integrity Efforts
IDR has been in use by CMS and contractor program integrity analysts since September 2006 and currently incorporates data related to claims for reimbursement of services under Medicare Parts A, B, and D. Specifically, CMS incorporated Part D data into IDR in September 2006, as planned, and incorporated Parts A and B data by the end of fiscal year 2008. Specifically, the shared systems data that are needed to allow predictive analyses of claims are not incorporated. Table 3 shows the original planned dates for incorporating the various types of data and the data that were incorporated into IDR as of the end of fiscal year 2010. Program planning documentation from August 2009 indicated that One PI program officials planned for 639 program integrity staff and analysts to be trained and using the system by the end of fiscal year 2010; however, CMS confirmed that by the end of October 2010 only 42 of those intended users were trained to use One PI, and 41 were actively using the portal and tools. Of these, 31 were contractors and 10 were CMS staff who performed analyses of claims to detect potential cases of fraud, waste, and abuse. Until officials measure and track financial benefits related to program goals, CMS officials cannot be assured that the use of the system is helping the agency prevent or recover funds lost as a result of improper payments of Medicare and Medicaid claims. Additionally, while program officials defined and reported to OMB performance targets for IDR related to some of the program’s goals, they do not reflect its goal to provide a single source of Medicare and Medicaid data for program integrity efforts. CMS Is Not Yet Positioned to Demonstrate Improvements in Its Ability to Meet Goals and Objectives for Detecting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse through the Use of One PI
The Center for Program Integrity’s overall goal for One PI was to provide robust tools for accessing a single source of information to enable consistent, reliable, and timely analyses to improve the agency’s ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. They subsequently revised this estimate to approximately $21 billion. However, of the analysts in the discussion groups, most did not use One PI as their only source of information and analysis for detecting improper payments. Additionally, the limited use of the system has not generated enough data to quantify the amount of funds recovered from improper payments. Until it does so, CMS officials will lack the means to determine whether the use of the systems contributes to the agency’s goal of reducing the number and amounts of improper payments made as a result of fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive claims for Medicare and Medicaid services. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the development and implementation of IDR and One PI are successful in helping the agency meet the goals and objectives of its program integrity initiatives, we are recommending that the Administrator of CMS take the following seven actions: finalize plans and develop schedules for incorporating additional data into IDR that identify all resources and activities needed to complete tasks and that consider risks and obstacles to the IDR program; implement and manage plans for incorporating data in IDR to meet schedule milestones; establish plans and reliable schedules for training all program integrity analysts intended to use One PI; establish and communicate deadlines for program integrity contractors to complete training and use One PI in their work; conduct training in accordance with plans and established deadlines to ensure schedules are met and program integrity contractors are trained and able to meet requirements for using One PI; define any measurable financial benefits expected from the implementation of IDR and One PI; and with stakeholder input, establish measurable, outcome-based performance measures for IDR and One PI that gauge progress toward meeting program goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) assess the extent to which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has developed and implemented the Integrated Data Repository (IDR) and One Program Integrity (One PI) systems and (2) determine the agency’s progress toward achieving defined goals and objectives for using the systems to help detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare and Medicaid as high-risk programs, in part due to their susceptibility to improper payments--estimated to be about $70 billion in fiscal year 2010. Improper payments have many causes, such as submissions of duplicate claims or fraud, waste, and abuse. As the administrator of these programs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for safeguarding them from loss. To integrate claims information and improve its ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in these programs, CMS initiated two information technology system programs: the Integrated Data Repository (IDR) and One Program Integrity (One PI). GAO was asked to (1) assess the extent to which IDR and One PI have been developed and implemented and (2) determine CMS's progress toward achieving its goals and objectives for using these systems to help detect fraud, waste, and abuse. To do so, GAO reviewed system and program management plans and other documents and compared them to key practices. GAO also interviewed program officials, analyzed system data, and reviewed reported costs and benefits.
What GAO Found
CMS has developed and begun using both IDR and One PI, but has not incorporated into IDR all data as planned and has not taken steps to ensure widespread use of One PI to enhance efforts to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. IDR is intended to be the central repository of Medicare and Medicaid data needed to help CMS program integrity staff and contractors prevent and detect improper payments of Medicare and Medicaid claims. Program integrity analysts use these data to identify patterns of unusual activities or transactions that may indicate fraudulent charges or other types of improper payments. IDR has been operational and in use since September 2006. However, it does not include all the data that were planned to be incorporated by fiscal year 2010. For example, IDR includes most types of Medicare claims data, but not the Medicaid data needed to help analysts detect improper payments of Medicaid claims. IDR also does not include data from other CMS systems that are needed to help analysts prevent improper payments, such as information about claims at the time they are filed and being processed. According to program officials, these data were not incorporated because of obstacles introduced by technical issues and delays in funding. Further, the agency has not finalized plans or developed reliable schedules for efforts to incorporate these data. Until it does so, CMS may face additional delays in making available all the data that are needed to support enhanced program integrity efforts. One PI is a Web-based portal that is to provide CMS staff and contractors with a single source of access to data contained in IDR, as well as tools for analyzing those data. While One PI has been developed and deployed to users, few program integrity analysts were trained and using the system. Specifically, One PI program officials planned for 639 program integrity analysts to be using the system by the end of fiscal year 2010; however, as of October 2010, only 41--less than 7 percent--were actively using the portal and tools. According to program officials, the agency's initial training plans were insufficient and, as a result, they were not able to train the intended community of users. Until program officials finalize plans and develop reliable schedules for training users and expanding the use of One PI, the agency may continue to experience delays in reaching widespread use and determining additional needs for full implementation of the system. While CMS has made progress toward its goals to provide a single repository of data and enhanced analytical capabilities for program integrity efforts, the agency is not yet positioned to identify, measure, and track benefits realized from its efforts. As a result, it is unknown whether IDR and One PI as currently implemented have provided financial benefits. According to IDR officials, they do not measure benefits realized from increases in the detection rate for improper payments because they rely on business owners to do so, and One PI officials stated that, because of the limited use of the system, there are not enough data to measure and gauge the program's success toward achieving the $21 billion in financial benefits that the agency projected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that CMS take steps to finalize plans and reliable schedules for fully implementing and expanding the use of the systems and to define measurable benefits. In its comments, CMS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-1059T | gao_GAO-10-1059T_0 | Detailed examples of these effects are presented in appendix I.
DOD is required by various statutes to improve its financial management processes, controls, and systems to ensure that complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information is prepared and responsive to the financial information needs of agency management and oversight bodies, and to produce audited financial statements. To further draw the department’s attention to the need to improve its strategy for addressing financial management weaknesses and achieve audit readiness the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 made the FIAR Plan a statutory mandate, requiring the FIAR Plan to include, among other things specific actions to be taken and costs associated with (a) correcting the financial management deficiencies that impair DOD’s ability to prepare timely, reliable, and complete financial management information; and (b) ensuring that DOD’s financial statements are validated as ready for audit by no later than September 30, 2017, and actions taken to correct and link financial management deficiencies with process and control improvements and business system modernization efforts described in the business enterprise architecture and enterprise transition plan required by 10 U.S.C. DOD’s Strategy for Improving Its Financial Management Operations and Achieving Audit Readiness Continues to Evolve
Over the years, the department has initiated several broad-based reform efforts, including the 1998 Biennial Strategic Plan for the Improvement of Financial Management within the Department of Defense and the 2003 Financial Improvement Initiative, intended to fundamentally transform its financial management operations and achieve clean financial statement audit opinions. In August 2009, DOD’s Comptroller directed that the department focus on improving processes and controls supporting information that is most often used to manage the department, while continuing to work toward achieving financial improvements aimed at achieving unqualified audit opinions on the department’s financial statements. As a result, in 2010 DOD revised its FIAR strategy, governance framework, and methodology to support these objectives and focus financial management improvement efforts primarily on achieving two interim departmentwide priorities— first, strengthening processes, controls, and systems that produce budgetary information and support the department’s Statements of Budgetary Resources; and second, improving the accuracy and reliability of management information pertaining to the department’s mission-critical assets, including military equipment, real property, and general equipment, and validating improvement through existence and completeness testing. The Success of DOD’s Current Strategy Is Dependent Upon Effective Implementation
Based on what we’ve seen of the revised FIAR Plan strategy and methodology to date, we believe the current strategy reflects a reasonable approach. We are hopeful that a consistent focus provided through the shared priorities of the FIAR strategy will increase the department’s ability to show incremental progress toward achieving auditability in the near term, if the strategy is implemented properly. We will continue to monitor DOD’s progress in addressing its financial management weaknesses and transforming its business operations. Developing sound plans and a methodology and getting leaders and organizations in place is only a start. Consistent with our previous reports regarding the department’s CMO positions, including the CMO, Deputy CMO and military department CMOs, and our May 2009 recommendations to improve DOD’s FIAR Plan as a strategic and management tool for addressing financial management weaknesses and achieving and sustaining audit readiness, DOD needs to define specific roles and responsibilities—including when and how the CMO and military department CMOs and other leaders are expected to become involved in problem resolution or efforts to ensure cross-functional area commitment and support to financial management improvement efforts; effectively execute its plans; gauge actual progress against goals; strengthen accountability; and make adjustments as needed. DOD has identified 10 ERPs, 1 of which has been fully implemented, as essential to its efforts to transform its business operations. According to DOD, as of December 2009, it had invested approximately $5.8 billion to develop and implement these ERPs and will invest additional billions before the remaining 9 ERPs are fully implemented. Whether promising signs, such as shared priorities and approaches, develop into sustained progress will ultimately depend on DOD leadership and oversight to help achieve successful implementation. GAO will continue to monitor progress of the department’s financial management improvement efforts and provide feedback on the status of DOD’s financial management improvement efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
As one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces many challenges in resolving its pervasive and long-standing financial management and related business operations and systems problems. DOD is required by various statutes to (1) improve its financial management processes, controls, and systems to ensure that complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information is prepared and responsive to the financial information needs of agency management and oversight bodies, and (2) produce audited financial statements. DOD has initiated numerous efforts over the years to improve the department's financial management operations and ultimately achieve unqualified (clean) opinions on the reliability of reported financial information. The Subcommittee has asked GAO to provide its perspective on DOD's current efforts to address its financial management weaknesses and achieve auditability, including the status of its Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system implementations. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work related to DOD's financial improvement and audit readiness strategy and related activities, including its ERP implementation efforts.
What GAO Found
DOD has initiated numerous efforts over the years to address its financial management weaknesses and achieve audit readiness. In 2005, DOD issued its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan to define the department's strategy and methodology for improving financial management operations and controls, and reporting its progress. In 2009, DOD Comptroller directed that the department's FIAR efforts be focused on improving processes and controls supporting information most often used to manage operations, while continuing to work toward achieving financial statement auditability. To support these objectives, DOD established two priority focus areas: budget information and information pertaining to mission-critical assets. In 2010, DOD revised its FIAR strategy, governance framework, and methodology to support the DOD Comptroller's direction and priorities and to comply with fiscal year 2010 defense authorizing legislation, which incorporated GAO recommendations intended to improve the FIAR Plan as a strategic plan. Based on what GAO has seen to date, DOD's revised FIAR Plan strategy and methodology reflects a reasonable approach. Moreover, GAO supports prioritizing focus areas for improvement and is hopeful that a consistent focus provided through shared FIAR priorities will increase incremental progress toward improved financial management operations. However, developing sound plans and methodology, and getting leaders and organizations in place is only a start. DOD needs to define specific roles and responsibilities for the Chief Management Officers (CMO)--including when and how the CMOs are expected to become involved in problem resolution and in ensuring cross-functional area commitment to financial improvement activities. A key element of the FIAR strategy is successful implementation of the ERPs. According to DOD, as of December 2009, it had invested approximately $5.8 billion to develop and implement these ERPs and will invest additional billions before these efforts are complete. However, as GAO has previously reported inadequate requirements management, systems testing, ineffective oversight over business system investments, and other challenges have hindered the department's efforts to implement these systems on schedule and within cost. Whether DOD's FIAR strategy will ultimately lead to improved financial management capabilities and audit readiness depends on DOD leadership and oversight to help achieve successful implementation. Sustained effort and commitment at the department and component levels will be needed to address weaknesses and produce financial management information that is timely, reliable, and useful for managers throughout DOD. GAO will continue to monitor DOD's progress and provide feedback on the status of DOD's financial management improvement efforts. |
gao_GAO-10-735T | gao_GAO-10-735T_0 | SBA Continues to Make Progress in Addressing the Act’s Provisions, but Has Not Yet Established Milestones for Implementing Remaining Requirements
As of May 2010, SBA fully addressed requirements for 15 of 26 provisions of the Act; partially addressed 6; and took no action on 5 that are not applicable at this time (see fig. Since then, SBA has fully addressed two additional provisions. As we recommended and the Act requires, SBA issued an updated DRP. SBA also issued regulations on coordinating with FEMA to ensure that disaster assistance applications are submitted in a timely manner. For example, SBA officials told us that the agency has taken additional steps to address the marketing and outreach provision, including that they (1) began an ongoing dialogue with the SBDC state directors in the Gulf Coast about disseminating disaster planning and preparation informatio 2) in the five most hurricane-prone states before the hurricane season, ( detailed an SBA employee who works with the SBDCs to the Offic Entrepreneurial Development to help the agency develop a strategic approach for its disaster role, and (3) issued some public service announcements tailored to specific regions. In our 2009 report, we recommended that SBA should fulfill the region-specific marketing and outreach requirement, including making this information readily av to regional entities prior to the likely occurrence of a disaster. However, the steps recently taken by SBA have not been discussed in public documents or venues, such as in the DRP or on the SBA Web site, which would make the information more transparent and easily accessible to public and Congress. According to SBA officials, the agency has not yet completely addressed some provisions because to do so, the agency would have to make extensive changes to current programs or implement new programs––suc as the Immediate and Expedited Disaster Assistance Programs––to satisf y requirements of the Act. A s we reported in 2009, SBA plans to conduct pilots of these programs before fully implementing them. For example, as required by the Act and as we recommended, the agency issued its first annual report on disaster assistance in November 2009 but the report was due in November 2008. Not having an implementation plan in place for addressing the remaining requirements can lead to a lac of transparency about the agency’s Disaster Loan Program, capacity to reform the program and program improvements, as well as its ability to e adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. Recently, SBA officials told us th would provide a plan or report that addressing the Act’s requirements. SBA’s Response Followi 2008 Disasters Aligned with Some DRP Components, but Its Responses to Disaster Victims’ Feedback on the Application Pr Be Improved
SBA’s initial response following the 2008 Midwest floods and Hurricane Ike aligned with major components of its DRP, such as infrastructu human capital, information technology, and communications. In addition, our review of SBA’s 2008 Disaste r Loan Program Customer Satisfaction Survey also showed that respond were somewhat satisfied with the assistance SBA provided during othe recent disasters. However, both the individuals we interviewed and survey results indicated areas for improvement and opportunities to increase satisfaction. Furthermore, SBA does not appear to have a formal process for addressing identified problem areas and using the information gained to improve the experience of future applicants. By establishing such a process to address identified problem areas, SBA could better demonstrate its commitment to improving the Disaster Loan Prog Because the agency has missed opportunities to further improve its Disaster Loan Program, and in particular improve the application p for future applicants, we recommended in our July 2009 report that SBA develop and implement a process to address identified problems in the disaster loan application process. However, SBA has not provided information to us on how it would implement a formal process to address identified problem areas in the disaster loan application process. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the Small Business Administration (SBA) was widely criticized for its performance following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the agency took steps to reform its Disaster Loan Program. Congress also enacted the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008 (Act), which places new requirements on SBA to ensure it is prepared for catastrophic disasters. This testimony discusses (1) the extent to which SBA has addressed the Act's requirements, and (2) how SBA's response to major disasters in 2008 aligned with key components of its June 2007 Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). In completing this statement, GAO reviewed and updated, as appropriate, the July 2009 report, Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Should Be Taken to Address Reforms to the Disaster Loan Program and Improve the Application Process for Future Disasters (GAO-09-755). In that report, GAO recommended that SBA should fulfill the Act's region-specific marketing and outreach requirements; complete its annual report to Congress; issue an updated DRP; develop an implementation plan for remaining requirements; and develop procedures to further improve the application process for the Disaster Loan Program.
What GAO Found
SBA has made some progress since GAO's July 2009 report in addressing provisions of the Act and continued attention to certain provisions will be important for sustained progress. As of May 2010, SBA met requirements for 15 of 26 provisions of the Act and partially addressed 6. Five provisions do not require any action at this time. Since July 2009 SBA has taken a number of actions. For example, SBA issued an updated DRP in November 2009. In addition, SBA issued regulations on coordinating with the Federal Emergency Management Agency on timely submission of disaster assistance applications. SBA also has taken steps to address the Act's requirements for region-specific marketing and outreach. For example, SBA has begun a dialogue with the Small Business Development Center state directors in the Gulf Coast about disseminating disaster planning information in the five most hurricane-prone states before the hurricane season. However, these steps have not been discussed in public documents or venues, such as in the DRP or on the SBA Web site, which would make the information more transparent and easily accessible to the public and Congress. SBA officials told GAO the agency has not yet completely addressed some provisions because the agency must make extensive changes to current programs or implement new programs. In particular, for two requirements that will involve private lenders, SBA plans to implement pilots before finalizing regulations. SBA officials recently said that they had formed a cross-functional work group and began reaching out to lenders about the planned pilots. SBA has not yet developed an implementation plan with milestone dates for addressing the remaining requirements, but recently said it would provide a plan or report that included milestone dates for addressing the Act's requirements. SBA's initial response after the 2008 Midwest floods and Hurricane Ike aligned with certain components of its initial DRP, such as using technology and outreach efforts to better ensure timely assistance. The individuals GAO interviewed and results from SBA's 2008 Disaster Loan Program Customer Satisfaction Survey provided somewhat positive feedback about SBA's performance following the disasters. However, interviewees and survey results indicated areas for improvement; in particular, both indicated that application paperwork was burdensome and that the application process needed improvement. The agency did not appear to have a formal process for identifying problems in the application process and making needed improvements. SBA officials told GAO that they have been taking steps to improve the application process. However, SBA has not provided information to GAO on how it would implement a formal process to address identified problem areas in the disaster loan application process. |
gao_GAO-04-306 | gao_GAO-04-306_0 | The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 enhanced the tax benefits available to businesses in newly designated EZs and made these new tax benefits available to EZs that had been designated in previous rounds, but not to ECs. In Rounds I and II, ECs received much smaller grant benefits than EZs. The EZ/EC and RC Programs Are Well Under Way, but Data on the Use of Some Benefits Are Limited
To date, the federal agencies have selected three rounds of EZs, two rounds of ECs, and one round of RCs; provided program benefits, outreach, and technical assistance; and established oversight procedures. The lack of data on the use of some of the tax benefits available to businesses in EZs and RCs limits the ability of HUD and USDA to administer the programs. However, EZ and RC officials have had difficulty in obtaining tax information directly from businesses. Among the Few EZ/EC Evaluations That Have Been Conducted, Research Methods and Results Have Varied
The few evaluations that have systematically collected and analyzed data on the effectiveness of the EZ/EC program involved a variety of research methods and reported results that varied depending upon the aspect of the program studied. The most comprehensive of these evaluations—the HUD Interim Assessment—found, among other things, that employment of Round I EZ residents had increased from 1995 to 2000, that larger businesses were more likely to use tax benefits than smaller businesses, and that resident participation in EZ or EC governance had been uneven. Conclusions
HUD, USDA, HHS, and IRS have implemented the EZ/EC and RC programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to describe (1) the features of the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) program and Renewal Community (RC) program; (2) the extent to which the programs have been implemented; and (3) the methods that have been used and the results that have been found in evaluations of the programs’ effectiveness, especially on poverty, unemployment, and economic growth in the participating communities. To describe the features of each round of the program, we relied on a review of congressional legislation related to the EZ/EC and RC programs; the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations; and HUD, USDA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and HHS publications. However, Round II EZs and ECs received grant funds from HUD’s and USDA’s annual appropriations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) program in 1993 and the Renewal Community (RC) program in 2000 to provide assistance to the nation's distressed communities. To date, Congress has authorized three rounds of EZs, two rounds of ECs, and one round of RCs. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 mandated that GAO audit and report in 2004, 2007, and 2010 on the EZ/EC and RC programs and their effect on poverty, unemployment, and economic growth. This report describes (1) the features of the EZ/EC and RC programs, (2) the extent to which the programs have been implemented, and (3) the methods used and results found in evaluations of their effectiveness.
What GAO Found
Both the EZ/EC and RC programs were designed to improve conditions in distressed American communities; however, the features of the programs have changed over time. Round I and II EZs and ECs received different combinations of grant funding and tax benefits, while Round III EZs and RCs received mainly tax benefits. To implement the programs, federal agencies have, among other things, designated participating communities and overseen the provision of program benefits. Since 1994, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) have designated a total of 41 EZs and 115 ECs, and HUD has designated 40 RCs. Available data show that Round I and II EZs and ECs are continuing to access their grant funds and IRS data show that businesses are claiming some tax benefits. However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not collect data on other tax benefits and cannot always identify the communities in which they were used. Also, efforts by HUD to obtain these data by survey were limited to Round I designees, and EZ and RC officials have had difficulty obtaining such information directly from businesses. The lack of tax benefit data limits the ability of HUD and USDA to administer and evaluate the programs. The few evaluations that systematically collected and analyzed data on EZ/EC program effectiveness used a variety of research methods to study different aspects of the program. The most comprehensive of these studies--the HUD Interim Assessment--found that employment of Round I EZ residents had increased from 1995 to 2000, that larger businesses were more likely to use tax benefits than smaller businesses, and that resident participation in EZ or EC governance has been uneven, among other things. |
gao_GAO-16-773T | gao_GAO-16-773T_0 | Background
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated polar-orbiting satellite systems that obtain environmental data to support weather observations and forecasts. Specifically, a single afternoon polar satellite provides NOAA 45 percent of the global coverage it needs for its numerical weather models. While NOAA satellite timelines show continuous coverage in the afternoon orbit, the JPSS program still faces the potential for a near-term gap in satellite coverage. As a result, the JPSS program continues to face a potential gap of 8 months between the end of S-NPP’s expected life in October 2016, and when the JPSS-1 satellite is launched and completes post-launch testing in June 2017. Uncertainties Remain on Key Future JPSS Development Dates
In addition to its work in completing the JPSS-1 satellite, NOAA has begun planning for new satellites to ensure the future continuity of polar satellite data. Until NOAA ensures that its plans for future polar satellite development are based on the full range of estimated lives of potential satellites, the agency may not be making the most efficient use of the nation’s sizable investment in the polar satellite program. As a result of this uncertainty, we recommended that NOAA evaluate the costs and benefits of different launch scenarios for the JPSS PFO program, based on updated satellite life expectancies, to ensure satellite continuity while minimizing program costs. However, the agency did not provide sufficient supporting evidence or artifacts showing that it had evaluated costs and benefits of launch scenarios in this way. In a draft report currently at the Department of Commerce for comment, we reported that NOAA has updated its polar flyout charts three times in the last 2-and-a-half years. However, while NOAA regularly updates its charts and most of the data on them were aligned with other program documentation, the agency has not consistently ensured that its charts were accurate, supported by stringent analysis, and fully documented. NOAA did not consistently document the justification for updates to its polar satellite flyout charts. Consequently, the information that NOAA provides Congress on the flyout charts is not as accurate as it needs to be, which could result in less-than-optimal decisions. To address these weaknesses, our draft report includes a series of recommendations to NOAA, including requiring satellite programs to perform regular assessments of satellite availability, implementing a consistent approach to depicting satellites beyond their design lives, and revising and finalizing the policy for updating flyout charts. As we reported in May 2016, NOAA had established information security policies in key areas detailed by FISMA and recommended by NIST guidance and the JPSS program had made progress in implementing these policies. Key controls not fully implemented. Security incidents reported but not consistently tracked. Specifically, NOAA officials reported 10 medium and high-severity incidents related to the JPSS ground system, including incidents involving unauthorized access to web servers and computers, between August 2014 and August 2015. To address these deficiencies, we recommended in our May 2016 report that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to establish a plan to address the limitations in the program’s efforts to test security controls, including ensuring that (1) any changes in the system’s inventory do not materially affect test results; (2) critical and high-risk vulnerabilities are addressed within 30 days, as required by agency policy; and (3) the agency and program are tracking and closing a consistent set of incident response activities. NOAA concurred with our recommendations. In summary, NOAA is making progress in developing and testing the JPSS-1 satellite as it moves toward a March 2017 launch date, but continues to experience issues in remaining ground system development, and faces a potential near-term data gap in the period before this satellite becomes operational. Further, findings from a draft report show that NOAA’s efforts to depict and update key polar satellite information, such as timelines and operational life, need to be improved. This is in part because NOAA has not finalized a policy that includes standard steps for updating its charts. However, the program has not fully implemented the policy in several areas. Until NOAA addresses these weaknesses, the JPSS ground system remains at high risk of compromise. | Why GAO Did This Study
Polar-orbiting satellites provide data that are essential to support weather observations and forecasts. NOAA is preparing to launch the second satellite in the JPSS program in March 2017, but a near-term gap in polar satellite coverage remains likely. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts and the potential impact of a satellite data gap, GAO added this area to its High-Risk List in 2013. This statement addresses the status of the JPSS program and plans for future satellites, NOAA's efforts to depict and update satellite timelines, and the JPSS program's implementation of key information security protections. This statement is based on a May 2016 report on JPSS and a draft report on satellite timelines. To develop the draft report, GAO reviewed agency procedures for updating satellite timelines, compared timelines to best practices and agency documentation, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
As highlighted in a May 2016 report, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program has continued to make progress in developing the JPSS-1 satellite for a March 2017 launch. However, the program has experienced technical challenges which have resulted in delays in interim milestones. In addition, NOAA faces the potential for a near-term gap in satellite coverage of 8 months before the JPSS-1 satellite is launched and completes post-launch testing (see figure). NOAA has also begun planning for future polar satellites. However, uncertainties remained on the best timing for launching these satellites, in part because of the potential for some satellites already in orbit to last longer. NOAA did not provide sufficient evidence that it had evaluated the costs and benefits of launch scenarios for these new satellites based on updated life expectancies. Until this occurs, NOAA may not make the most efficient use of investments in the polar satellite program.
Note: The afternoon orbit is one of three primary polar orbits providing needed coverage for numerical weather models.
As noted in a draft GAO report, NOAA publishes “flyout charts” depicting satellite timelines to support budget requests and appropriations discussions. The agency regularly updates its charts when key changes occur. However, the charts do not always accurately reflect data from other program documentation such as the latest satellite schedules or assessments of satellite availability. NOAA also has not consistently documented its justification for chart updates or depicted lifetimes for satellites beyond their design life, and has not finalized a policy for updating its charts. As a result, the information NOAA provides Congress on the flyout charts is not as accurate as it needs to be, which could result in less-than-optimal decisions.
GAO reported in May 2016 that, although NOAA has established information security policies in key areas recommended by guidance, the JPSS program has not yet fully implemented them. Specifically, while the program has implemented multiple relevant security controls, it has not yet fully implemented almost half of the recommended security controls, did not have all of the information it needed when assessing security controls, and has not addressed key vulnerabilities in a timely manner. Furthermore, NOAA has experienced 10 key information security incidents related to the JPSS ground system, including incidents regarding unauthorized access to web servers and computers. Until NOAA addresses these weaknesses, the JPSS ground system remains at high risk of compromise.
What GAO Recommends
In its May 2016 report, GAO recommended that NOAA assess the costs and benefits of different launch decisions based on updated satellite life expectancies, and address deficiencies in its information security program. NOAA concurred with these recommendations. GAO's draft report includes recommendations to NOAA to improve the accuracy, consistency, and documentation supporting updates to satellite timelines, and to revise and finalize its draft policy governing timeline updates. This report is currently at the Department of Commerce for comment. |
gao_GAO-17-661 | gao_GAO-17-661_0 | Background
Excise Tax on High-cost Employer-sponsored Health Insurance
PPACA’s excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health insurance is imposed when the value of employees’ health coverage exceeds a threshold, referred to as the tax’s applicable dollar limit. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 delayed the tax’s implementation until 2020. Experts Cited Benefits and Limitations of the FEHBP BCBS Standard Plan Data and Identified Alternative Data Sources, Which Also Have Limitations
The BCBS Standard plan has many characteristics that experts cited as important when considered for use as the basis of the age and gender adjustment. Experts identified alternative cost data sources, but these data sources also have limitations. Experts Noted That the BCBS Standard Plan Is a Large and Convenient Source of Cost Data, but Underlying and Changing Member Demographics Limit Its Strengths
According to industry and actuarial experts we interviewed and stakeholders that commented on IRS’s notices for the age and gender adjustment, BCBS Standard plan data have several benefits when considered for use as the basis of an age and gender adjustment, as stipulated in the law. Be convenient. Finally, it is convenient in that it is already available and familiar to the federal government, and BCBSA already provides summary cost and enrollment data to OPM on an annual basis. Officials from OPM noted, and our review of two years of cost data confirm, that members in the BCBS Standard plan generally have higher health care costs than their counterparts in BCBS Basic and that this is particularly true for younger members. Experts and stakeholders noted that the selection bias within the FEHBP of more young members with higher health care costs in the BCBS Standard plan may result in an age and gender adjustment that is not adequate. For example, in part because the BCBS Standard plan disproportionately covers young members with higher health care costs, the ratio of the average claims costs of the older age groups to the average claims costs of the younger age groups is smaller than it would be in a plan that did not have that particular selection bias issue. Declining enrollment. Finally, OPM, IRS, and Treasury officials all noted that any one plan offering could be discontinued. However, because of its noted limitations, its use could result in adjustments to the tax threshold that are not as effective as they could be for certain employers—in particular, for employers with older employees. As stipulated by PPACA, the age and gender adjustment would increase the applicable dollar limit by “…an amount equal to the excess of aa) the premium cost of the [BCBS Standard plan], if priced for the age and gender characteristics of all employees of the individual’s employer, over bb) the premium cost of the , if priced for the age and gender characteristics of the national workforce.”
This could be achieved by establishing a dollar value for the adjustment by taking an employer-specific premium cost and subtracting a national premium cost, both priced using the BCBS Standard plan costs applied to the national and employer-specific workforces, respectively. The BCBS Standard plan is a relatively expensive plan within the FEHBP and covers members with higher health care costs compared to other less expensive plans, including the BCBS Basic plan. We found that combining the data from these two plans could mitigate this selection bias. 1.) Using combined FEHBP data as the basis for the age and gender adjustment to include a broader selection of younger members could result in a different adjustment that could increase the adjustment amount for some employers. Standards for internal control suggest that effective information is vital for an entity to achieve its objectives. Although the current law specifies the use of premium cost data from the BCBS Standard plan, relying on BCBS Standard plan data alone does not provide IRS with the comprehensive information it may need to determine an appropriate and adequate age and gender adjustment. Conclusion
The age and gender adjustment was designed to increase the applicable dollar limit of the tax for employers with employees that are expected to be costlier than average so that taxes are owed based on the plan design and not based on member costs. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that, in implementing the age and gender adjustment, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue consider taking steps to mitigate the limitations of the BCBS Standard plan premium cost data—such as by combining data from multiple FEHBP plans. In its written comments, IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation, but stated that it would consider the recommendation as it continues to review comments received in response to an agency notice and work with the Department of the Treasury to issue guidance on the age and gender adjustment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some stakeholder groups have questioned the use of the BCBS FEHBP Standard plan premium costs as the basis of the age and gender adjustment, as stipulated by PPACA. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 includes a provision for GAO to report on the suitability of using these data for this purpose.
This report examines: 1) the benefits and limitations of using FEHBP BCBS Standard plan data as the basis of the age and gender adjustment, and what alternatives to these data could be considered; and 2) how any limitations to BCBS Standard plan data could be mitigated. GAO reviewed IRS documentation; interviewed industry experts and officials from IRS, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Department of Treasury, and other agencies; reviewed comment letters submitted in response to IRS notices; and analyzed 2010 and 2015 cost and enrollment data from OPM.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) included a revenue provision for a 40 percent excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health coverage to be administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The tax would be imposed when an employee's annual cost of coverage exceeds an established dollar limit. This limit could be adjusted upward if an employer's workforce—based on its age and gender characteristics—was likely to have higher health costs than the national workforce, on average. This adjustment, known as the age and gender adjustment, is based on the premise that older individuals and younger females tend to have higher health care costs than other individuals. It is designed to lower the tax burden so that taxes are owed based on the plan design and not based on the health care costs of its members. PPACA stated that this adjustment would be made based on the premium costs of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) Standard plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).
The BCBS Standard plan has benefits and limitations for use as the basis of the adjustment. The benefits include that it is a large, national, decades-old, convenient data source, in that it is already known by, and available to, the federal government. However, there are some specific limitations to its use.
The BCBS Standard plan has selection bias within FEHBP because members have a choice among many plans, and, compared to other options available to federal employees, it is a relatively expensive plan that covers members with higher health care costs. GAO's analysis of OPM data found that these higher costs are particularly true for younger members.
The plan's enrollment has declined in recent years. Furthermore, officials noted that any one plan offering could be discontinued.
The selection bias in the BCBS Standard plan may result in an age and gender adjustment that is not adequate. For example, because the BCBS Standard plan covers young members with higher health care costs, the ratio between the average claims costs of the younger and older members in that plan is smaller than it would be in a plan that did not have that particular selection bias issue. Therefore, the age and gender adjustment could be too small. While experts GAO spoke with identified several potential alternative sources of cost data for use as the basis of the adjustment, those alternatives also had limitations, such as not being convenient sources of data and potentially not being representative of the national workforce.
To mitigate limitations of the BCBS Standard plan, these data could be supplemented with data from other FEHBP plans, such as the BCBS Basic plan, which is known to have younger members with lower health care costs and increasing enrollment. GAO found that using combined data from these two sources could result in a different adjustment for some employers—in particular, for those with older employees. Standards for internal control suggest that effective information is vital for an entity to achieve its objectives. Relying on BCBS Standard plan data alone does not provide IRS with the comprehensive information it may need to determine an adequate age and gender adjustment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, in implementing the age and gender adjustment, IRS consider taking steps to mitigate the limitations of the BCBS Standard premium cost data, such as by combining data from multiple FEHBP plans. IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation, but stated that it would consider the recommendation as it works to implement the age and gender adjustment. |
gao_HEHS-98-66 | gao_HEHS-98-66_0 | Overall Medigap Market
In the 1988-95 period, the Medigap insurance market grew from about $7 billion to over $12 billion (see fig. For the 8-year period, the average loss ratio was 81 percent with a low of 76 percent in 1993 and a high of 86 percent in 1995. 2). Moreover, loss ratios varied among insurers within a state. 3). In 1995, the number of policies not meeting the standards was 141 or 4 percent of the total, and the premiums were $203 million. However, we identified only two policies that made refunds in 1995. To determine why policies with loss ratios below the applicable standard in 1994 or 1995 did not have to make refunds, we selected a random sample of these policies with earned premiums under $1 million and asked the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico to send us copies of the refund calculation forms for the sample and for all policies with premiums over $1 million. Most of the policies with earned premiums of $1 million or more did not have to pay refunds because, although their loss ratios in 1994 or 1995 were below standards, their cumulative loss ratio since inception was greater than the benchmark ratio for the year in question. Medigap policies representing most of the premium dollars had loss ratios in 1994 and 1995 that were higher than federal law requires. Most policies with loss ratios below standards in 1994 and 1995 were not considered credible and, thus, were not subject to the refund provision. The primary reason for requiring refunds and credits is to give insurers incentives to meet loss ratio standards and thereby avoid possibly unfavorable public relations consequences. The relatively low amount of premiums for policies with loss ratios below the standards indicates that the incentive is working. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed insurers' compliance with Medigap loss ratios and standards, focusing on: (1) the overall Medigap market; (2) which Medigap policies had loss ratios below the standards in 1994 and 1995; and (3) which policies resulted in refunds or credits, or, if not, why.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from 1988 through 1995, the Medigap insurance market grew from $7 billion to over $12 billion with most of the growth occurring before 1993; (2) during this 8-year period, loss ratios averaged 81 percent in 1995; (3) in 1994 and 1995, over 90 percent of the policies in force for 3 years or more, representing most of the premium dollars, met loss ratio standards; (4) premiums for policies with loss ratios below standards totalled $448 million in 1994 and $203 million in 1995; (5) loss ratios varied substantially among states, among different benefit packages, and among insurers; (6) although thousands of individual policy forms had loss ratios below standards, no refunds were required in 1994 and only two were required in 1995; (7) the refund provision did not apply because most of these policies' loss experience was based on too few policyholders to be considered credible under the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) refund calculation methodology; (8) a number of policies had a cumulative loss ratio--the factor used to measure compliance--above that required under NAIC's refund calculation method; and (9) a primary reason for requiring refunds was to give insurers an incentive for meeting loss ratio standards, and the high proportion of premium dollars for policies doing so indicates the incentive is working. |
gao_GAO-13-678 | gao_GAO-13-678_0 | For example, DOD was not reporting on borrowed manpower, personnel morale, and training funding. DOD Addressed Most, but Not All, Required Elements in Its Recent Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress
In its quarterly readiness reports that covered the period from April 2012 through March 2013, DOD addressed most of the 26 reporting elements required by section 482 but partially addressed some elements and did not address some other elements. Further, we found that information may exist in the department on some of the reporting elements DOD did not address, but that DOD has not analyzed alternative information that it could provide to meet the required reporting elements. Specifically, as shown below, for the three required reporting elements that DOD partially addressed, the information was incomplete, with only some services providing information on personnel stability, training operations tempo, and deployed equipment:
Personnel stability: The Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy provided information on retention rates, but the Army did not provide any information on this element. Further, in instances when the services reported information on a required element, they sometimes did so inconsistently, with varying amounts and types of information. The services all reported information on training commitments and deployments, but did not report the same amounts and types of information. We found that the services have submitted different amounts and types of information to meet reporting elements because the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not provided guidance on the information to be included in the quarterly reports. Training funding: DOD’s fiscal year 2014 budget request contained various types of information on training funding. Borrowed manpower: We found that the Army now requires commanders to report on the readiness impacts of borrowed military manpower in internal monthly readiness reports. DOD Has Taken Steps to Add Information to Its Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress
Over time, based on its own initiative and specific congressional requests for information, DOD has added information to its reports. In that report, DOD added:
Narrative information detailing the impact of readiness deficiencies on overall readiness. Discussions of how the military services’ fiscal year 2014 budgets support their long-term readiness goals. Additional Contextual Information in the Quarterly Reports Would Be Useful
We found several areas where adding contextual information to the quarterly readiness reports, such as benchmarks or goals, and clearer linkages between reported information and readiness ratings, would provide Congress with a more comprehensive and understandable report. Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need complete and relevant information to manage risks. In some instances, the services report significant amounts of quantitative data, but do not always include information on benchmarks or goals that would enable the reader to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable levels in the data reported. For example, when responding to the required reporting element on equipment that is not mission capable:
The Marine Corps and Air Force report mission capable rates for all of their equipment, but do not provide information on related goals, such as the percentage of each item’s inventory that should be kept at various mission capability levels. In other instances, the services have not fully explained the voluminous data presented on the required reporting elements or set the context for how it may or may not be connected to the information DOD provides in the report on unit equipment, training, and personnel readiness ratings and overall readiness. Conclusions
To oversee DOD’s efforts to maintain a trained and ready force, and make decisions about related resource needs, congressional decision makers need relevant, accurate, and timely readiness information on the status of the military forces. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the information available to Congress in its quarterly readiness reports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following three actions:
Analyze alternative sources of information within DOD that it could provide to meet required reporting elements that DOD has not addressed in past reports; Issue guidance to the services on the type and amount of information to be included in their submissions for the quarterly readiness report; and Incorporate contextual information in the quarterly readiness reports such as clear linkages between reported information on the required elements and readiness ratings, and benchmarks for assessing provided data to enable the reader to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable levels in the data reported. DOD stated the iterative process that is used to improve quarterly readiness reports to Congress will continue to seek alternative sources of information that could provide a more holistic picture of readiness across the force and that improvements in reporting capabilities and adjustments to reported readiness information should be available to provide all of the information required by section 482 of Title 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and DOD need relevant, accurate, and timely readiness information to make informed decisions about the use of military forces, and related resource needs. To that end, Congress requires DOD to submit a quarterly readiness report addressing various elements related to overall readiness, personnel, training, and equipment. A committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO report on the type of readiness information available to Congress and DOD decision makers and the reported readiness of U.S. forces. In May 2013, GAO provided a classified report on readiness trends of DOD forces. For this report, GAO evaluated (1) the extent to which DOD addressed required reporting elements in its quarterly readiness reports to Congress, and (2) what additional information, if any, could make the reports more useful. GAO analyzed various readiness reports and supporting documentation, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
In its quarterly readiness reports that covered the period from April 2012 through March 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed most but not all required reporting elements. Section 482 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to report on 26 elements including readiness deficiencies, remedial actions, and data specific to the military services in the areas of personnel, training, and equipment. In analyzing DOD's reports, GAO found that DOD addressed 18 of the 26 elements, partially addressed 3 elements and did not report on 5 elements. For the elements partially addressed--personnel stability, training operations tempo, and deployed equipment--reporting was incomplete because some services reported information and others did not report. When all the services reported on an element, they at times did so inconsistently, with varying amounts and types of information. For example, the services all reported information on training commitments and deployments, but used different timeframes when providing information on planned training events in the future. The services reported differently because DOD has not provided guidance on the information to be reported. For the elements that DOD did not address, including borrowed manpower and training funding, GAO found that information may exist in the department but is not being reported to Congress. For example, the Army now requires commanders to report monthly on the readiness impacts of borrowed military manpower and DOD's budget requests include data on training funding. However, DOD has not taken steps to analyze whether this information could be used to meet the related reporting element. Without issuing guidance on the type and amount of information to be included by each service and analyzing alternative information it could provide to meet the required elements, DOD risks continuing to provide inconsistent and incomplete information to Congress.
DOD has taken steps to improve its quarterly readiness reports to Congress, but additional contextual information would provide decision makers a more complete picture of DOD's readiness. Over time, based on its own initiative and congressional requests, DOD has added information to its reports, such as on operational plan assessments. In its most recent report, DOD added narrative information detailing the impact of readiness deficiencies on overall readiness and a discussion of how the services' budgets support their long-term readiness goals. Federal internal control standards state that decision makers need complete and relevant information to manage risks, and GAO found several areas where DOD could provide Congress with more comprehensive and understandable information if it added some additional context to its reports. For example, in some instances, the services report significant amounts of quantitative data, but do not include information on benchmarks or goals that would enable the reader to determine whether the data indicate a problem or the extent of the problem. For example, the Marine Corps and Air Force report mission capable rates for their specific equipment items, but do not provide information on related goals, such as the percentage of the inventory that should be kept at various capability levels. In other instances, the services have not fully explained any connections between the voluminous data they report on the required elements and the information DOD provides in the report on unit and overall readiness ratings. Without providing additional contextual information, DOD's quarterly reports may not provide clear information necessary for congressional oversight and funding decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD analyze alternative sources of information that could be used to meet the required reporting elements, issue guidance on the type and amount of information to be included by each service, and incorporate contextual information to improve the clarity and usefulness of reported information. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-651 | gao_GAO-09-651_0 | As required by the 9/11 Act, FEMA changed the definition it used to identify the UASI regions included in its risk analysis model. However, FEMA has not assessed how UASI regions’ collaboration efforts have helped build regional preparedness capabilities. Of these 446 projects, 303 projects funded a single preparedness capability. 1). FEMA Does Not Assess How Collaborative Efforts Help Build UASI Regional Preparedness Capabilities
While executive, departmental, and agency guidance all direct FEMA to assess how regional collaboration builds national preparedness capabilities, FEMA has not yet established measures to do so. However, FEMA has no measures in place to assess the extent to which the funds appropriated by Congress—approximately $5 billion for the UASI program since 2003—have achieved the goal to build regional preparedness through collaboration efforts. FEMA’s Federal Preparedness Report acknowledges this limitation, citing a lack of specific targets that define how or whether national priorities— including the National Priority to Expand Regional Collaboration—are achieved. While these factors are related to states’ and urban areas’ efforts to enhance regional collaboration, they do not provide a means to assess how regional collaboration activities help build preparedness capabilities. While we previously reported challenges FEMA faces in developing and implementing the comprehensive assessment system, FEMA could build upon its current efforts to assess overall preparedness by developing and including measures related to the collaboration efforts of UASI regions and their effect on building regional preparedness. However, developing measures to assess how UASI regions’ collaborative efforts enhance regional preparedness capabilities could provide FEMA with more meaningful information on the national return on investment for the approximately $5 billion in grant expenditures for regional collaboration through the UASI program to date. UASI Officials Described Program Features That Support Regional Collaboration but Cited Continuing Challenges; Some UASI Regions Increased their Membership in Response to Changes in the 9/11 Act
UASI program officials described program features that support regional collaboration, many of which reflect practices we have identified that can enhance and sustain collaboration. Of the 49 UASI regions we surveyed, 46 said they have active mutual aid agreements, of which 38 identified that such an agreement either “greatly helps” or “somewhat helps” measure regional capability-building. In addition, 44 of the 49 UASI regions we surveyed reported that their UASI-wide training and exercises are an activity they use regionwide that builds regional capabilities. missions, goals and objectives) from the full spectrum of stakeholders on the design and management of preparedness programs.” The report notes that these challenges are common to the management and coordination of homeland security preparedness initiatives but that the resulting recommendations will help to overcome those challenges, noting, for example, that “efforts are already underway in updating policy, and coordinating preparedness assistance.” Moreover, as FEMA implements the recommendations from our report on the National Preparedness System to improve development of policies and plans, national capability assessments, and strategic planning—all of which contain preparedness goals and objectives—should help better align local, state, regional, and federal missions. Some UASI Regions Reported Changes in Membership Planned or Undertaken in Response to FEMA’s Use of MSAs to Assess Risk
A provision within the 9/11 Act required FEMA to perform a risk assessment for the 100 largest MSAs by population, beginning in fiscal year 2008. UASI officials’ responses to the grant guidance varied. Of the 27 UASI regions that said there were jurisdictions within the MSA that weren’t part of their UASI region: Twenty-two said that they either had taken or had plans to take some action(s) in response to FEMA’s risk calculation change; 5 UASI regions said they had not taken and did not plan to take any of the actions cited (e,g., initiating a dialogue and assessing the need to include new jurisdictions) to expand their membership. Seventeen UASI regions reported that they already assessed and evaluated the need to include new jurisdictions and 3 UASI regions said they plan to do this, while 7 UASI regions said they had no plans to assess and evaluate the need to include new jurisdictions. Appendix II: Results of GAO’s Telephone Survey of 49 UASI Regions
In the absence of objective measures to determine the impact of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions’ collaboration efforts on regional preparedness, we surveyed UASI regions to solicit officials’ views on the impact of program activities on regional collaboration and challenges they faced to support regional collaboration. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) allocated about $5 billion for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program to enhance regional preparedness capabilities in the nation's highest risk urban areas (UASI regions). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers this program. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required FEMA to change the size of the geographical areas used to assess UASI regions' risk. The conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008 directed GAO to assess FEMA's efforts to build regional preparedness through the UASI program, and determine how the 9/11 Act change affected UASI regions. This report addresses (1) the extent to which FEMA assesses how UASI regions' collaborative efforts build preparedness capabilities, and (2) how UASI officials described their collaboration efforts and changes resulting from the 9/11 Act. GAO surveyed all 49 UASI regions that received funding prior to the 9/11 Act change, and visited 6 regions selected based on factors such as length of participation. GAO also reviewed FEMA's grant guidance and monitoring systems.
What GAO Found
Although FEMA has gathered and summarized data on UASI regions' funding for specific projects and related preparedness priorities and capabilities, it does not have measures to assess how UASI regions' collaborative efforts have built preparedness capabilities. An executive directive, Departmental policy, and agency guidance all require that preparedness priorities and capabilities be measurable so that FEMA can determine current capabilities, gaps, and assess national resource needs. To report on the performance of the UASI program, FEMA has gathered data on UASI regions' funding for projects and the goals and objectives those projects support, including the National Priority to Expand Regional Collaboration. However, FEMA's assessments do not provide a means to measure the effect UASI regions' projects have on building regional preparedness capabilities--the goal of the UASI program. FEMA acknowledged a lack of specific measures that define how or whether national priorities--including expanding regional collaboration--are achieved. In the absence of measures, FEMA directed states to describe their collaborative activities. However, these state activities do not provide a means to assess how regional collaboration activities help build preparedness capabilities. FEMA has an effort underway to establish a comprehensive assessment system to appraise the nation's preparedness capabilities. FEMA could build upon its current efforts to assess overall preparedness by developing and including measures related to the collaboration efforts of UASI regions and their effect on building regional preparedness. This could provide FEMA with more meaningful information on the return on investment of the $5 billion it has allocated to the UASI program to date. UASI officials described program activities that they said greatly or somewhat helped support regional collaboration, reflecting factors GAO identified that can enhance and sustain collaboration, and also described a variety of actions taken in response to the 9/11 Act change to assess risk. Regarding program activities that support regional collaboration, of the 49 UASI regions GAO surveyed, 46 said they have active mutual aid agreements in part to share resources among jurisdictions, and 44 described training and exercises as activities they use to build regional preparedness capabilities. Some UASI regions reported changes in membership in response to FEMA's change in the size of the geographical areas used to assess UASI regions' risk. For example, of the 49 regions GAO surveyed, 27 reported that additional jurisdictions were included within the geographical area FEMA used to assess risk that were not included in the region's membership. However, 17 of these regions reported that they had assessed and evaluated the need to include these new jurisdictions in their membership and 3 UASI regions said they plans to do this, while 7 UASI regions said they had no plans to do this. |
gao_GAO-12-459T | gao_GAO-12-459T_0 | To help encourage sponsorship, federal agencies conduct education and outreach activities and provide information about retirement plans for small employers. Number of Employees and Average Pay Level Greatly Influence Plan Sponsorship
More Employees and Higher Average Wages Increase the Likelihood of Plan Sponsorship
We found that the number of employees and average wages greatly influence the likelihood that a small employer will sponsor a retirement plan. A separate analysis we conducted using Labor and IRS data found an overall small employer sponsorship rate of 14 percent in 2009. important to note, however, that this sponsorship rate does not include small employers that sponsor SEP IRA plans because IRS currently does not have a means to collect data on employers that sponsor this plan type. The sponsorship rate cited in this testimony is limited to single employers that sponsor a plan. Plan Complexity and Resource Constraints Were Most Frequently Cited Barriers to Retirement Plan Sponsorship
Many Small Employers Find Retirement Plans Complex and Burdensome to Start and Administer
Small employers and other stakeholders we interviewed identified various plan options, administration requirements, fiduciary responsibilities, and top-heavy testing requirements as complex and burdensome—often citing these factors as barriers to sponsoring retirement plans or as reasons for terminating them. For example, some retirement experts said that small employers whose plans are found to be top-heavy may encounter a number of additional costs in the effort to make their plans compliant. Federal Guidance Is Available to Address the Complexities Associated with Plan Sponsorship But May Lack Visibility among Small Employers
Federal agencies provide guidance that can assist small employers in addressing some of the challenges they face in starting and maintaining retirement plans. As a result, both types of workers were not demanding retirement benefits. These options included simplifying plan administration rules, revising or eliminating top-heavy testing requirements, and increasing tax credits. Such a proposal would provide employers who do not sponsor any retirement plans with a mechanism that allows their employees to save for retirement. Based on the limited data available, we found the rate of plan sponsorship among small employers, a segment of the economy which employs about one third of all private sector workers, was only 14 percent in 2009. Our discussions with small employers and other stakeholders identified a variety of challenges small employers face in sponsoring retirement plans. However, even if federal information about retirement plans were more accessible to small employers, our interviews with small employers identified a number of other significant challenges to plan sponsorship, including plan administration requirements that are perceived to be unduly complicated and burdensome, not having sufficient financial and personnel resources to sponsor a plan, and insufficient incentives to create and maintain a plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the challenges that small employers face when sponsoring retirement plans for their workers. About 42 million workers, or about one third of all private-sector employees, work for employers with less than 100 employees and recent federal data suggest many of these workers lack access to a work-based retirement plan to save for retirement. An estimated 51 to 71 percent of workers at employers with less than 100 workers do not have access to a work-based retirement plan, compared to an estimated 19 to 35 percent of those that work for employers with 100 or more workers. Small employers face a number of barriers to starting and maintaining a plan for their workers. Certain characteristics associated with small employers may contribute to the challenges of sponsoring a plan. For example, in 2008, we reported on challenges that can limit small employer sponsorship of Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA) plans, including administrative costs, contribution requirements, and eligibility based on employee tenure and compensation, among others. Additionally, federal data suggest that about half of all new businesses (nearly all of which are small) do not survive for more than 5 years.
This testimony is based on our report released today that examines (1) the characteristics associated with small employers that are more or less likely to sponsor a retirement plan, (2) challenges small employers face in establishing and maintaining a retirement plan, and (3) options that exist to address those challenges and increase small employer sponsorship.
What GAO Found
We found that the likelihood that a small employer will sponsor a retirement plan largely depends on the size of the employers workforce and the workers average wages. Small employers, retirement experts, and other stakeholders also identified a number of challenges such as plan complexity and resource constraintsto starting and maintaining retirement plans. In addition, stakeholders offered options for addressing some challenges to plan sponsorship, which included simplifying federal requirements for plan administration and increasing the tax credit for plan startup costs. Although Labor, IRS, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) collaborate in conducting education and outreach on retirement plans, agencies disseminate information online through separate websites and in a largely uncoordinated fashion. In addition, IRS currently does not have the means to collect information on employers that sponsor a certain type of IRA plan. As a result of our findings, we are recommending efforts for greater collaboration among federal agencies to foster small employer plan sponsorship and more complete collection of IRA plan sponsorship data. |
gao_GAO-04-893 | gao_GAO-04-893_0 | However, The Veterans Corporation faces several challenges, described in our previous report, that still impede its progress in fulfilling other mandates under the Act. Since then, The Veterans Corporation has expanded or added several services primarily in the areas of finance, accounting, and contracting-related opportunities: Veterans Marketplace. Veterans Small Business Finance Program. L. No. 106-50). For example, the VET program provides small business training to veterans. In June 2004, The Veterans Corporation began a marketing effort to identify the veteran-owned business population. Additionally, without meaningful performance measures, The Veterans Corporation has been unable to provide Congress, through its annual report, with an assessment of its progress or outcomes of its efforts. Thus, they tended to focus on program outputs and activities, such as the number of veterans receiving training, rather than on their impact on veterans, such as the number of new businesses opened by program participants or the amount of revenue generated by veteran- owned businesses. Without outcome-oriented goals, The Veterans Corporation will have difficulty demonstrating that achieving all its goals and objectives would lead to the fulfillment of its mission to assist veteran entrepreneurs. Thus, it was output-, rather than outcome-oriented. Challenges to Achieving Financial Self-sufficiency Included Lack of Comprehensive Self- sufficiency Plan
The Veterans Corporation continues to face several challenges in achieving financial self-sufficiency. In its current plan, The Veterans Corporation has pushed back its estimated date for becoming self-sufficient from fiscal year 2004 to 2009 and based its revenue assumptions on three major sources—an electronic marketplace for veteran-owned goods and services; affinity programs including a credit card, loans, and insurance offered to veteran-owned businesses; and fund-raising. The Veterans Corporation Has Revised Its Self- sufficiency Plan
The Act requires that The Veterans Corporation implement a plan to generate private funds and become a self-sustaining corporation. As a result, The Veterans Corporation has developed another strategy in an effort to identify this population. Notably, its self-sufficiency plan, which did not contain meaningful information on the key assumptions underlying revenue projections, is dependent on building an extensive database of veteran-owned businesses and marketing its services effectively to this population. To evaluate The Veterans Corporation’s internal controls including strategic planning and its use of federal funds, we obtained and analyzed The Veterans Corporation’s fiscal year 2003 financial statements, audit reports, and management letter for 2003; we did not evaluate the quality of the external auditor’s work on the financial statement or conduct our own tests of the financial statement balances; analyzed 10 functional expenses to determine the nature of the expense and a description of how the expense benefited The Veterans Corporation; obtained and reviewed The Veterans Corporation’s check registers for reviewed The Veterans Corporation’s contract with the external auditor responsible for the 2003 financial statement audit to understand the nature of the audit services to be provided and what work the auditor proposed to assess internal controls; communicated with The Veterans Corporation’s external auditor to determine the audit procedures performed to assess internal controls during its audit of The Veterans Corporation; obtained and reviewed minutes of meetings of the board of directors and the board’s executive committee to determine the board’s policies as they related to the disbursement and use of federal funds; interviewed The Veterans Corporation’s Chief Executive Officer/Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President, and staff to obtain an understanding of internal controls related to cash disbursements; tested relevant internal controls over cash disbursements to determine if the controls were operating effectively; interviewed members of the board of directors to determine the board’s oversight roles and responsibilities; reviewed The Veterans Corporation’s planning and reporting consulted with government and nonprofit strategic planning experts; reviewed strategic planning literature; gathered and analyzed salary surveys and literature about nonprofit interviewed representatives from the Urban Institute’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy to discuss executive compensation in the nonprofit sector. Establish Professional Certification Advisory Board. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Veterans Business Development Corporation (The Veterans Corporation) was created under Pub. L. No. 106-50 to provide veterans with small business and entrepreneurship assistance. The Act authorized, and Congress has appropriated to the corporation, $12 million in funding over 4 years, ending September 30, 2004. The Act also required that The Veterans Corporation implement a plan to raise private funds and become a self-sustaining corporation. GAO evaluated the corporation's: (1) efforts in providing small business assistance to veterans; (2) internal controls, including strategic planning; and (3) progress in becoming financially self-sufficient.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's April 2003 report (GAO-03-434), The Veterans Corporation has continued to expand programs and refocus services in its efforts to provide small business assistance to veterans while achieving financial self-sufficiency. The centerpiece of The Veterans Corporation's efforts remains its Veterans Entrepreneurial Training program, which offers classroom instruction to veterans on how to successfully start and expand their own businesses. It also has expanded or added several services primarily in the areas of finance, accounting, and contracting. However, The Veterans Corporation reported that it continues to face ongoing challenges to fulfilling its mission. These problems stem from its responsibility for the Professional Certification Advisory Board, difficulties in identifying the veteran-owned business population, and conflicting views about its legal status as a private versus public entity. Additionally, The Veterans Corporation lacked important internal or operational controls. Specifically, its strategic plan and annual report to Congress lacked measurable goals and outcome-oriented measures. Without outcome-oriented measures, such as the number of new veteran-owned businesses or the amount of revenue generated for veteran-owned businesses, it was difficult to determine what the impact of the programs on veterans has been. In the same vein, without meaningful performance measures, The Veterans Corporation has been unable to provide Congress with significant data on its progress or the outcomes of its efforts. Finally, The Veterans Corporation faces a number of challenges in achieving self-sufficiency. Dramatically lower-than-expected revenues have resulted in the corporation revising its currently estimated date for achieving self-sufficiency from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009. Its self-sufficiency strategy is heavily dependent on its ability to develop a database of veteran-owned businesses and successfully marketing its services to these businesses. However, the plan did not discuss how The Veterans Corporation will identify this population or contain meaningful information on key assumptions underlying revenue projections. As such, it would be difficult for Congress and other stakeholders to judge the feasibility or reasonability of the corporation's estimates and projections. |
gao_GAO-06-1071T | gao_GAO-06-1071T_0 | Given the level of the federal government’s participation in providing health care, it has been urged to take a leadership role in driving change to improve the quality and effectiveness of medical care in the United States, including an expanded adoption of IT. In April 2004, President Bush called for the widespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records within 10 years and issued an executive order that established the position of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology within HHS. The National Coordinator’s responsibilities include the development and implementation of a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health IT in both the public and private sectors. The first National Coordinator was appointed in May 2004, and two months later HHS released The Decade of Health Information Technology: Delivering Consumer-centric and Information-rich Health Care—Framework for Strategic Action, the first step toward the development of a national strategy. To further accelerate the adoption of interoperable health information systems, we recommended that HHS establish detailed plans and milestones for meeting the goals of its framework for strategic action and take steps to ensure that those plans are followed and milestones are met. The department agreed with our recommendation. HHS Is Continuing Efforts to Advance the Nationwide Implementation of Health IT and Complete a National Strategy
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have made progress through the work of the American Health Information Community and several contracts in five major areas: (1) advancing the use of electronic health records, (2) establishing standards to facilitate the exchange of patient data, (3) defining requirements for the development of prototypes of the Nationwide Health Information Network, (4) incorporating privacy and security policy, practices, and standards into the national strategy, and (5) integrating public health into nationwide health information exchange. These activities and others are being used by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT to continue its efforts to complete a national strategy to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health IT. Since the release of its initial framework in 2004, the office has taken additional steps to define a complete national strategy, building on its earlier work. However, while HHS has made progress in these areas, it still lacks detailed plans, milestones, and performance measures for meeting the President’s goals. Without it, HHS risks not meeting the President’s goal for health IT. | Why GAO Did This Study
As GAO and others have reported, the use of information technology (IT) has enormous potential to improve the quality of health care and is critical to improving the performance of the U.S. health care system. Given the federal government's role in providing health care in the U.S., it has been urged to take a leadership role in driving change to improve the quality and effectiveness of health care, including the adoption of IT. In April 2004, President Bush called for widespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records within 10 years and issued an executive order that established the position of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. A National Coordinator within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was appointed in May 2004 and released a framework for strategic action two months later. In May 2005, GAO recommended that HHS establish detailed plans and milestones for each phase of the framework and take steps to ensure that its plans are followed and milestones are met. GAO was asked to identify progress made by HHS toward the development and implementation of a national health IT strategy. To do this, GAO reviewed prior reports and agency documents on the current status of relevant HHS activities.
What GAO Found
In late 2005, to help define the future direction of a national strategy, HHS awarded several health IT contracts and formed the American Health Information Community, a federal advisory committee made up of health care stakeholders from both the public and private sectors. Through the work of these contracts and the community, HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have made progress in five major areas associated with the President's goal of nationwide implementation of health IT. These activities and others are being used by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT to continue its efforts to complete a national strategy to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health IT. Since the release of its initial framework in 2004, the office has defined objectives and high-level strategies for accomplishing its goals. Although HHS agreed with GAO's prior recommendations and has made progress in these areas, it still lacks detailed plans, milestones, and performance measures for meeting the President's goals. |
gao_GAO-06-347 | gao_GAO-06-347_0 | Estimating Improper Payments at the State Level Is Limited
State responses to our survey show that the number of state-administered federal programs (state programs) estimating improper payments significantly decreases if there is no federal requirement to estimate or if the states are not participating in a federally administered pilot to estimate. Programs with Federal Requirements
Only 2 of the 25 major programs in our review had federal requirements for all the states to annually estimate improper payments—the Food Stamp and UI programs. In total, 47 states reported estimating improper payments for one or more major programs, which represented 97 program surveys for fiscal year 2003, fiscal year 2004, or both. In addition, selected programs reported that federal incentives and penalties are in place to help reduce improper payments. Fifty of the 51 states representing 21 different programs reported in their surveys that they used computer- related techniques to prevent or detect improper payments. As with incentives, most of the penalties identified related to the Food Stamp Program. States have a fundamental responsibility to ensure the proper administration of federal awards by using sound management practices and maintaining internal controls to ensure distribution of federal funding to subrecipients or beneficiaries in accordance with federal and state laws and regulations. Given their involvement in determining eligibility and distributing benefits, states are in a position to assist federal agencies in reporting on IPIA requirements. Specifically, we recommend that the Director, Office of Management and Budget, revise IPIA policy guidance to clearly define state-administered programs so that federal agencies can consistently identify all such programs; expand IPIA guidance to provide criteria that federal agencies should consider when developing a plan or methodology for estimating a national improper payment estimate for state-administered programs, such as criteria that address the nature and extent of data and documentation needed from the states to calculate a national improper payment estimate; require federal agencies to communicate, and make available to the states, guidance on conducting risk assessments and estimating improper payments for federally funded, state-administered programs; and share ideas, concerns, and best practices with federal agencies and states regarding improper payment reporting requirements for federally funded, state-administered programs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what actions are being taken by states to assist federal agencies in estimating improper payments; (2) what techniques, related to detecting, preventing, or reducing improper payments, have states employed to ensure proper administration of federal awards; and (3) what assistance can be provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that state program administrators would find helpful in supporting the respective federal agencies with the implementation of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). Survey Development and Implementation
The surveys were developed based on IPIA, the National Defense Reauthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, and our executive guide on managing improper payments, and included questions about state-issued policies or guidance on internal controls or on estimating statewide risk assessments for improper payments; state recovery auditing efforts; state program efforts to prevent, detect, and reduce improper payments; state program participation in improper payment pilots; and additional assistance needed by state programs to support efforts in measuring and reporting improper payments. We did not assess the reliability of these data. UI overpayments at a national level have fluctuated over the past 16 years. We also noted that since 2001, UI’s national error rate has steadily increased. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past several years, GAO has reported that federal agencies are not well positioned to meet requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). For fiscal year 2005, estimated improper payments exceeded $38 billion but did not include some of the highest risk programs, such as Medicaid with outlays exceeding $181 billion for fiscal year 2005. Overall, state-administered programs and other nonfederal entities receive over $400 billion annually in federal funds. Thus, federal agencies and states share responsibility for the prudent use of these funds. GAO was asked to determine actions taken at the state level to help federal agencies estimate improper payments for state-administered federal programs and assistance needed from the federal level to support the respective federal agencies' implementation of IPIA.
What GAO Found
To date, states have been subject to limited requirements to assist federal agencies in estimating improper payments. For the 25 major state-administered federal programs surveyed, only 2 programs--the Food Stamp and Unemployment Insurance programs--have federal requirements for all states to estimate improper payments. A limited number of federal agencies are conducting pilots to estimate improper payments in other programs, but state participation is voluntary. Where no federal requirement or pilot is in place, 5 programs involving 11 states had estimated improper payments during fiscal years 2003 or 2004. States have a fundamental responsibility to ensure the proper administration of federal awards by using sound management practices and maintaining internal controls. To do this, states reported using a variety of techniques to prevent and detect improper payments. All states, except for one, responded that they use computer-related techniques, such as fraud and abuse detection programs or data matching, to prevent or detect improper payments. Other techniques selected states used included performing statewide assessments and recovery auditing methods. States also reported receiving federal incentives and penalties to assist with reducing improper payments, although most of these actions related to the Food Stamp Program, which gives incentives and penalties to states having error rates below and above the program's national error rate. Of the 240 state program officials surveyed, 100 identified tools that would be needed to estimate improper payments and help federal agencies meet various IPIA requirements, including guidance on estimating improper payments and performing risk assessments. OMB has begun planning for increased state involvement in measuring and reporting improper payments via the Erroneous and Improper Payments Workgroup and IPIA guidance. However, much work remains at the federal level to identify and estimate improper payments for state-administered federal programs, including determining the nature and extent of states' involvement to assist federal agencies with IPIA reporting requirements. |
gao_GAO-02-351 | gao_GAO-02-351_0 | DOD’s lodging programs are classified as either permanent- change-of-station (PCS) or temporary duty (TDY). In addition, they can serve military personnel and their families who are changing permanent duty stations. Proposed Policy Change Impacts the Marine Corps’ MWR Program
Except for the Marine Corps, DOD’s proposed policy change will not impact the services’ MWR programs. This practice violates department and Army regulations. If these lodging earnings are no longer available to the MWR programs, Marine Corps officials said that they would have to make changes to their MWR programs, such as reducing the quality-of-life services, raising rates, or seeking additional appropriations to compensate for lost revenues. Proposed Policy Change Based on Resolving a Perceived Regulatory Conflict and Achieving Other Management Objectives
DOD officials provided two primary reasons for changing the PCS lodging policy. In DOD’s view, resolution of the conflict required separation of lodging revenues from those used for MWR purposes. The PCS Policy Change Intended to Resolve a Perceived Conflict with Travel Regulation
In its May 2001 report to Congress, DOD based the proposed policy change on a determination that its current PCS policy is in conflict with requirements of the Joint Federal Travel Regulation. Therefore, the policy change, by itself, will not allow DOD to accomplish them. While the proposed policy will prevent the Marine Corps from using PCS lodging revenues to support MWR programs, it does not change the guidance relating to the construction of PCS lodges. DOD Guidance Allows Services to Build PCS Lodges in Excess of Official Traveler Needs
The services’ plans for building new PCS lodges are consistent with department guidance. This surcharge generated about $100 million from fiscal years 1996 through 2000. Regardless of whether the proposed policy is implemented, the assistant secretary of defense for force management policy should: Provide the military services with a policy framework including improved lodging guidance to help achieve DOD’s desired lodging-program management objectives, including consistent lodging policy and operations, reduced room rates, improved lodging facilities, and limitations on new construction not focused on official PCS and TDY travelers; and Require the Army to adhere to DOD’s and its own regulations by discontinuing the transfer of lodging revenues (unofficial-traveler surcharge) to installation MWR funds and returning the proceeds collected thus far to the Army’s lodging fund. | What GAO Found
The military services primarily operate two types of hotels, or lodges, to support official travelers. The first, called permanent-change-of-station (PCS) lodges, support military personnel and their families moving to new duty stations. These are intended to provide military travelers and their families with a clean, affordable place to stay while they prepare to move and while they wait for permanent quarters at their new station. The second type, called temporary duty (TDY) lodges, support military and civilians temporarily traveling on official business. PCS lodges are the subject of a proposed policy change by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD's current policy permits PCS lodges to be managed as part of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs. The proposed policy would change this practice by requiring separation of lodge revenues from those used for MWR purposes. Except for the Marine Corps, the proposed policy change will not impact the services' MWR programs. Only the Marine Corps currently uses PCS lodge earnings to support its MWR programs. From fiscal years 1996 through 2000, the net profits reported by the Marine Corps' lodges steadily increased from $1.8 million to $5.1 million. Marine Corps officials do not believe the policy change is required and said that, if implemented, the Corps would have to make changes, such as reducing quality-of-life programs at some installations or seeking additional appropriations to compensate for the loss of this revenue. The proposed policy is predicated on resolving a perceived regulatory conflict and achieving other management objectives. DOD officials believe separation of PCS lodging funds from MWR funds is required to resolve a conflict with the Joint Federal Travel Regulation. However, the regulation does not apply to lodging management, and the policy change, by itself, is likely to have little direct effect on DOD's broader management objectives. The services' plans for building new PCS lodges are consistent with department guidance. The proposed change will not, by itself, change that guidance. |
gao_GAO-04-513 | gao_GAO-04-513_0 | In 1978, Public Law 95-356 authorized the Secretary of each military department to develop, for the use or benefit of the Department of Defense, any geothermal energy source within lands under the department’s jurisdiction, other than public lands administered by the Secretary of the Interior. A contract between the Navy and the power plant operator has established three sources of annual revenue to the Navy: (1) royalty payments on the sale of electricity, (2) payments toward the base’s electricity bill, and (3) bonus payments for voluntarily conserving electricity usage at the base. The power plant operator paid, on average, $2.7 million annually toward the Navy’s electricity bill between 1987 and 2003. Navy Has Spent Its Geothermal Revenues on Energy Conservation Programs and Oversight and Development of Geothermal Resources
Since fiscal year 1990, the first year the Navy spent geothermal revenues, most of the Navy’s revenues have been used to develop and implement energy savings projects throughout the Navy and the Marine Corps and at the China Lake base. The Navy also funded its Geothermal Program Office, which manages the geothermal resource at China Lake and assesses other military sites for geothermal development. Navy Has Also Spent Its Geothermal Revenues to Oversee the China Lake Project and to Develop New Geothermal Resources
Between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 2003, the Navy spent about $56.6 million, or about the remaining one-third of its expenditures from geothermal revenues, on the Geothermal Program Office at China Lake. Navy’s Internal Energy Policy Board Oversees Budgeting of Most Geothermal Funds
The Navy’s Shore Energy Policy Board oversees the budgeting of the Navy’s about $11.5 million in average annual geothermal royalties. The board reviews the amounts allocated to each program in the draft budget, determines whether the funding levels are appropriate, agrees on final allocations, and approves the budget. Navy’s Geothermal Program Differs from BLM’s Program in its Approach and in Some Key Contractual Provisions
The Navy’s approach to developing and managing geothermal resources on military lands involves (1) making case-by-case decisions regarding development, (2) investing in the initial exploration to identify and characterize geothermal resources, (3) providing close and frequent oversight of geothermal resources in production, and (4) keeping all geothermal revenues for use by the military. Also, 50 percent of BLM’s geothermal revenues are shared with the states of origin. An official from the company that currently operates the power plants at China Lake told us that the level of oversight the Navy provides is burdensome and costly. In contrast, BLM leases have a primary term of 10 years. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided the Department of Defense and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management a draft of our report for review and comment. In commenting for the Department of Defense, the Navy’s Geothermal Program Office provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. In response, we do not believe the report implies BLM is improperly managing its program. As such, the report does not address whether BLM's management and oversight are, or are not, proper. To determine how the Navy uses the revenues it collects from the geothermal facility, we obtained information from (1) the managers of the Navy’s Energy Program and the Renewable Energy Program office at China Lake about the principal activities of the energy conservation programs funded with geothermal revenues and (2) the manager of the Geothermal Program Office on the principal activities conducted by this office. To determine how the Navy’s geothermal program differs from BLM’s program, we reviewed the contract between the Navy and its power plant operator at China Lake that establishes key elements of the Navy’s approach to geothermal development and the law and regulations that establish BLM’s approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
Geothermal energy is heat from the earth that can be used to generate electricity. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has the primary responsibility for leasing public lands to private companies for geothermal development. In addition, the Secretary of each military department has the authority to develop geothermal resources on military lands and to keep the proceeds from the sale of electricity generated from those resources for use by the Department of Defense. The Navy's Geothermal Program Office, located at the China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station in California, manages and develops geothermal resources for the military. Currently, two geothermal power plants at China Lake are the only ones on military lands. A private company, which built, owns, and operates the power plants at China Lake, sells the electricity to a utility company and pays the Navy royalties on these sales as well as other types of compensation. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the Navy's annual revenues from the geothermal facility at China Lake, (2) how the Navy uses the revenues it collects from the geothermal facility, (3) the budget oversight the Navy provides programs funded from geothermal revenues, and (4) how the Navy's geothermal program differs from BLM's program.
What GAO Found
The Navy received three types of payments from the geothermal power plant operator at China Lake that totaled, on average, $14.7 million annually between 1987 and 2003. During these years, the average annual royalty payment on the sale of electricity was about $11.5 million, payments toward the base's electricity bill were about $2.7 million annually, and bonus payments to the base for using less electricity than it had projected averaged about $500,000 annually. The Navy spent about two-thirds of its geothermal revenues on a variety of energy conservation projects, including solar energy systems and updated climate control systems, as well as other energy conservation programs. The Navy spent the other one-third of its geothermal revenues on its Geothermal Program Office, which oversees the activities of the power plant operator and assesses other military sites for geothermal development. The Navy's Shore Energy Policy Board, which includes representatives of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, oversees the budget for most of the programs funded from the geothermal revenues. Typically, at its annual meeting, the board reviews the draft budget for energy conservation programs, determines whether the funding levels are appropriate, and agrees on final allocations. The China Lake base's Renewable Energy Program office oversees the budget for the remaining geothermal revenues. The Navy's geothermal program differs from BLM's program in significant ways. The Navy makes case-by-case decisions regarding geothermal development, invests in the initial exploration to identify geothermal resources, provides close oversight over geothermal production, and keeps all revenues for use by the military. In contrast, BLM uses a standard approach to geothermal development, does not invest in exploration, and does not provide the same level of oversight over resources in production. Also, 50 percent of BLM's geothermal revenues are shared with the state of origin, with the remainder paid to the Department of the Treasury. The Department of Defense provided technical comments on a draft of the report, which GAO addressed as appropriate. BLM said that the report implies that its program is not properly managed. GAO's report is focused on the Navy's program and does not evaluate BLM's program. |
gao_GAO-04-474T | gao_GAO-04-474T_0 | In fiscal year 2003, GAO served the Congress and the American people by helping to identify steps to reduce improper payments and credit card fraud in government programs; restructure government and improve its processes and systems to maximize homeland security; prepare the financial markets to continue operations if terrorism update and strengthen government auditing standards; improve the administration of Medicare as it undergoes reform; encourage and help guide federal agency transformations; contribute to congressional oversight of the federal income tax system; identify human capital reforms needed at the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and other federal agencies; raise the visibility of long-term financial commitments and imbalances in the federal budget; reduce security risks to information systems supporting the nation’s critical infrastructures; oversee programs to protect the health and safety of today’s workers; ensure the accountability of federal agencies through audits and serve as a model for other federal agencies by modernizing our approaches to managing and compensating our people. In fiscal year 2003, our work generated $35.4 billion in financial benefits— a $78 return on every dollar appropriated to GAO. Many of the benefits that flow to the American people from our work cannot be measured in dollar terms. This is especially important in light of the nation’s large and growing long- term fiscal imbalance. With the Congress’s support, we have demonstrated that becoming world class does not require substantial staffing increases, but rather maximizing the efficient and effective use of the resources available to us. We have worked with you to make changes in areas where we were facing longer-term challenges when I came to GAO, such as in the critical human capital, information technology, and physical security areas. GAO’s Fiscal Year 2005 Request to Support the Congress
GAO is requesting budget authority of $486 million for fiscal year 2005. The funding we received in fiscal year 2004 is allowing us to conduct work that addressed many difficult issues confronting the nation. By providing professional, objective, and nonpartisan information and analyses, we help inform the Congress and executive branch agencies on key issues, and covered programs that continue to involve billions of dollars and touch millions of lives. I am proud of the outstanding contributions made by GAO employees as they work to serve the Congress and the American people. In keeping with my strong belief that the federal government needs to exercise fiscal discipline, our budget request for fiscal year 2005 is modest, but would maintain our ability to provide first class, effective, and efficient support to the Congress and the nation to meet 21st century challenges in these critical times. Enhancing Quality of Care in Nursing Homes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO's work covers virtually every area in which the federal government is or may become involved, anywhere in the world. Perhaps just as importantly, our work sometimes leads us to sound the alarm over problems looming just beyond the horizon--such as our nation's enormous long-term fiscal challenges--and help policymakers address these challenges in a timely and informed manner. This testimony focuses on GAO's (1) fiscal year 2003 performance and results; (2) efforts to maximize our effectiveness, responsiveness, and value; and (3) budget request for fiscal year 2005 to support the Congress and serve the American people.
What GAO Found
In summary, the funding GAO received in fiscal year 2003 allowed it to conduct work that addressed many of the difficult issues confronting the nation, including diverse and diffuse security threats, selected government transformation challenges, and the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance. Perhaps the foremost challenge facing the government decision makers this year was ensuring the security of the American people. By providing professional, objective, and nonpartisan information and analyses, GAO helped inform the Congress and the executive branch agencies on key security issues, such as the nature and scope of threats confronting the nation's nuclear weapons facilities, its information systems, and all areas of its transportation infrastructure, as well as the challenges involved in creating the Department of Homeland Security. Its work was also driven by changing demographic trends, which led it to focus on such areas as the quality of care in the nation's nursing homes and the risks to the government's single-employer pension insurance program. Its work in these and other areas covered programs that involve billions of dollars and touch millions of lives. Importantly, in fiscal year 2003, GAO generated a $78 return for each $1 appropriated to the agency. With the Congress's support, GAO has demonstrated that becoming world class does not require a substantial increase in the number of staff authorized, but rather maximizing the efficient and effective use of the resources available to us. GAO has worked with Congress to obtain targeted funding for areas critical to GAO such as information technology, security, and human capital management. In keeping with the Comptroller General's belief that the federal government needs to exercise a greater degree of fiscal discipline, GAO has kept its request to $486 million, an increase of only 4.9 percent over fiscal year 2004. In keeping with the Congress' intent, GAO is continuing its efforts to revamp its budget presentation to make the linkages between funding and program areas more clear. |
gao_GAO-15-388T | gao_GAO-15-388T_0 | DHS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Its Management Functions, but Considerable Work Remains
DHS Progress in Meeting Criteria for Removal from the High-Risk List
DHS’s efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have resulted in progress addressing our criteria for removal from the high-risk list. In particular, in our 2015 high-risk update report, which we released earlier this month, we found that DHS has met two criteria and partially met the remaining three criteria, as shown in table 1. In our 2015 report, we found that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under Secretary for Management at DHS, and other senior officials have continued to demonstrate commitment and top leadership support for addressing the department’s management challenges. Senior DHS officials, including the Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Management, have also routinely met with us over the past 6 years to discuss the department’s plans and progress in addressing this high-risk area. We found that DHS has established a plan for addressing this high-risk area. In October 2014, DHS identified that it had resources needed to implement 7 of the 11 initiatives the department had under way to achieve the actions and outcomes, but did not identify sufficient resources for the 4 remaining initiatives. In particular, we found that DHS has implemented a number of actions demonstrating the department’s progress in strengthening its management functions. In addition, DHS does not have modernized financial management systems. This affects its ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making. DHS Progress in Achieving Key High-Risk Actions and Outcomes
Key to addressing the department’s management challenges is DHS demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across the 30 actions and outcomes we identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. In our 2015 report, we found that DHS has fully implemented 9 of these actions and outcomes, with additional work remaining to fully address the remaining 21. In particular, DHS has made important progress in several areas to fully address 9 actions and outcomes, 5 of which it has sustained as fully implemented for at least 2 years. For instance, DHS fully met 1 outcome for the first time by obtaining a clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years and fully met another outcome by establishing sufficient component-level acquisition capability. DHS has also mostly addressed an additional 5 actions and outcomes, meaning that a small amount of work remains to fully address them. Specifically, DHS has partially addressed 12 and initiated 4 of the actions and outcomes. As previously mentioned, addressing some of these actions and outcomes, such as modernizing the department’s financial management systems and improving employee morale, are significant undertakings that will likely require multiyear efforts. Human capital management. In our 2015 report, we further concluded that in the coming years, DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and achieving outcomes. In doing so, it will be important for DHS to maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective actions through completion; continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and periodically report its progress to us and Congress; identify and work to mitigate any resource gaps, and prioritize initiatives as needed to ensure it can implement and sustain its corrective actions; closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments as needed; and make continued progress in achieving the 21 actions and outcomes it has not fully addressed and demonstrate that systems, personnel, and policies are in place to ensure that progress can be sustained over time. Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made; Significant Work Remains in Addressing High-Risk Areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has regularly reported on government operations identified as high risk because of their increased vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. In 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one department, and failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. While challenges remain for DHS across its range of missions, it has made considerable progress. As a result, in its 2013 high-risk update, GAO narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening and integrating DHS management functions (human capital, acquisition, financial, and information technology). As requested, this statement discusses, among other things, DHS's progress and actions remaining in strengthening and integrating its management functions. This statement is based on GAO's 2015 high-risk update and reports and testimonies from September 2011 through February 2015. Among other things, GAO analyzed DHS strategies and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in its 2015 high-risk update report earlier this month, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have resulted in the department meeting two and partially meeting three of GAO's criteria for removal from the high-risk list (see table).
b “Partially met”: Some but not all actions necessary to generally meet the criterion have been taken.
c “Not met”: Few, if any, actions toward meeting the criterion have been taken.
For example, the department's Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary for Management, and other senior officials have continued to demonstrate leadership commitment by frequently meeting with GAO to discuss the department's plans and progress in addressing the high-risk area. DHS has also established a plan for addressing the high-risk area, which it has updated seven times since 2010. However, DHS needs to show additional progress in other areas. For example, in October 2014, DHS identified that it had resources needed to implement 7 of 11 initiatives the department had under way to address the high-risk area, but did not identify sufficient resources for the 4 remaining initiatives.
Key to addressing the department's management challenges is DHS demonstrating the ability to achieve sustained progress across 30 actions and outcomes that GAO identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. GAO found in its 2015 high-risk update report that DHS fully addressed 9 of these actions and outcomes, while work remains to fully address the remaining 21. Of the 9 actions and outcomes that DHS has addressed, 5 have been sustained as fully implemented for at least 2 years. For example, DHS fully met 1 outcome for the first time by obtaining a clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years. DHS has also mostly addressed an additional 5 actions and outcomes, meaning that a small amount of work remains to fully address them. However, DHS has partially addressed 12 and initiated 4 of the remaining actions and outcomes. For example, DHS does not have modernized financial management systems, a fact that affects its ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making. Addressing some of these actions and outcomes, such as modernizing the department's financial management systems and improving employee morale, are significant undertakings that will likely require multiyear efforts. In GAO's 2015 high-risk update report, GAO concluded that in the coming years, DHS needs to continue to show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its key management initiatives and achieving the remaining 21 actions and outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
This testimony contains no new recommendations. GAO has made about 2,200 recommendations to DHS since 2003 to strengthen its management efforts, among other things. DHS has implemented more than 69 percent of these recommendations and has actions under way to address others. |
gao_GAO-06-625 | gao_GAO-06-625_0 | In fiscal year 2005, EPA awarded about $2.4 billion in nondiscretionary grants. EPA Has Strengthened the Award Process, but Lack of Key Documentation Raises Accountability Concerns
EPA has strengthened its award process by, among other things, (1) expanding the use of competition to select the most qualified applicants and (2) issuing new policies and guidance to improve the awarding of grants. However, EPA’s internal reviews of program and regional offices have found weaknesses in documenting the review of grantees’ cost proposals. This documentation weakness may hinder EPA’s ability to ensure the reasonableness of its grantees’ expenditure of federal funds. In March 2005, EPA issued a policy establishing additional internal controls for awarding grants to nonprofit organizations. EPA Has Improved In- depth Monitoring to Identify Agencywide Problems, but Weaknesses Remain in Ongoing Monitoring and in Closing Out Grants
EPA has improved some aspects of monitoring, but long-standing problems in documentation and grant closeouts continue. Inadequate Documentation of Ongoing Monitoring Hinders Accountability
Ongoing monitoring is critical because, in contrast to in-depth monitoring, it is conducted on every grant at least once a year throughout the life of the grant, and the results are used to determine whether the grantee is on track to meeting the terms and conditions of its grant agreement. During closeout, EPA ensures that the grant recipient has met all financial requirements and provided final technical reports, and ensures that any unexpended balances are “deobligated” and returned to the agency. EPA’s Grants Management Plan identified measures with targets that were developed to assess EPA’s closeout performance. In reviewing EPA’s management of grant closeouts, we found that EPA (1) has effectively reduced its historic backlog of grants due for closeout; (2) does not always close out grants in a timely way—within 180 days after the project period ends, as required by agency policy; and (3) does not always close out grants properly based on the regional files we reviewed. EPA Has Initiated Actions to Obtain Results from Grants, but Its Efforts Are Not Complete
EPA has taken steps to obtain environmental results from its grants, but its efforts are not complete. While EPA has taken these positive steps, OMB’s evaluations of EPA grant programs in 2006 indicate that EPA must continue its concerted efforts to achieve results from its grants. EPA Has Taken Steps to Manage Grants Staff and Resources More Effectively but Still Faces Major Management Problems
EPA has taken steps to manage grants staff and resources more effectively in four key areas: (1) analyzing workload; (2) providing training on grant policies; (3) assessing the reliability of the agency’s grants management computer database—the Integrated Grants Management System; and (4) holding managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their grant responsibilities. Because much remains to be accomplished, management attention to these issues is still needed. EPA Is Examining Grants Staff Workload
As we reported in 2003 and found again in this review, regional grants managers and staff are concerned that staff do not have sufficient time to devote to effective grants management. Furthermore, the agency’s lack of documentation indicates weaknesses at all levels: staff do not always document their monitoring; supervisors do not always effectively review grant files; and managers are not always meeting their commitments to address known problems with lack of documentation. While EPA has made strides in trying to identify and obtain results from its grants by issuing an environmental results policy, it has not yet established a performance measure and target that reflect the policy’s direction. It is too early to tell whether this plan will effectively hold managers and staff accountable for grants management. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix details the methods we used to assess the progress the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made in implementing its grant reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has faced challenges for many years in managing its grants, which constitute over one-half of the agency's budget, or about $4 billion annually. EPA awards grants through 93 programs to such recipients as state and local governments, tribes, universities, and nonprofit organizations. In response to concerns about its ability to manage grants effectively, EPA issued its 5-year Grants Management Plan in 2003, with performance measures and targets. GAO was asked to assess EPA's progress in implementing its grant reforms in four key areas: (1) awarding grants, (2) monitoring grantees, (3) obtaining results from grants, and (4) managing grant staff and resources. To conduct this work, GAO, among other things, examined the implementation of the reforms at the regional level for two Clean Water Act programs in 3 of EPA's 10 regional offices.
What GAO Found
EPA has made important strides in achieving the grant reforms laid out in its 2003 Grants Management Plan, but weaknesses in implementation and accountability continue to hamper effective grants management in four areas. First, EPA has strengthened its award process by, among other things, (1) expanding the use of competition to select the most qualified applicants and (2) issuing new policies and guidance to improve the awarding of grants. Despite this progress, EPA's reviews found that staff do not always fully document their assessments of grantees' cost proposals; GAO also identified this problem in one region. Lack of documentation may hinder EPA's ability to be accountable for the reasonableness of the grantee's proposed costs. EPA is reexamining its cost review policy to address this problem. Second, EPA has made progress in reviewing its in-depth monitoring results to identify systemic problems, but long-standing issues remain in documenting ongoing monitoring and closing out grants. EPA and GAO found that staff do not always document ongoing monitoring, which is critical for determining if a grantee is on track in meeting its agreement. Without documentation, questions arise about the adequacy of EPA's monitoring of grantee performance. This lack of documentation occurred, in part, because managers have not fulfilled their commitment to improve monitoring documentation. In addition, grant closeouts are needed to ensure that grantees have met all financial requirements, provided their final reports, and returned any unexpended balances. For fiscal year 2005, EPA closed out only 37 percent of grants within 180 days after the grant project ended, as required by its policy. EPA also did not always close out grants properly in the regional files GAO reviewed. Third, EPA has initiated actions to obtain environmental results from its grants, but these efforts are not complete. For example, EPA's 2005 environmental results policy establishes criteria grants should meet to obtain results. However, EPA has not established a performance measure that addresses these criteria. Furthermore, EPA has not yet identified better ways to integrate its grant reporting systems. Finally, the Office of Management and Budget's 2006 assessment indicates that EPA needs to continue its concerted efforts to achieve results from grants. Finally, EPA has taken steps to manage grant staff and resources more effectively by analyzing workload, providing training, assessing the reliability of its grants management computer database, and holding managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their grant responsibilities. Management attention is still needed because, among other things, EPA has just begun to implement its performance appraisal system for holding managers and staff accountable for grants management. |
gao_RCED-98-239 | gao_RCED-98-239_0 | According to DOE laboratory officials, project discussions began in the summer of 1996, a peer review committee was formed in November 1996, and official authorization and a budget of $500,000 were provided in December 1996 to “analyze the impact of energy efficiency technology on energy demand growth in the United States.” Requested by DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the five-lab study had a central goal of quantifying the potential for energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies to reduce carbon emissions in the United States by 2010 for four sectors of the U.S. economy—buildings, industry, transportation, and electricity production. Limitations of the Study
The five-lab study is an important step in evaluating the role that energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies can play in the nation’s efforts to reduce global warming gases, according to several groups that we contacted; however, the study’s scope and methodology may limit its usefulness. Additionally, the study does not address the broader economic effects on the nation’s economy, such as how the $50 per ton carbon fee may affect energy prices, energy consumption; and, eventually, economic activity and employment levels in the rest of the economy. DOE laboratory officials agreed that the study does not discuss the policies needed to achieve carbon savings by 2010 but explained that this was not a study objective or task from DOE. However, this methodology focuses on one aspect of the economy—energy—and does not consider the broader impacts on other non-energy related aspects of the U.S. economy. In their opinion, these impacts would be minor because only one sector—electricity generation—relies primarily on the increased price of carbon as an economic stimulus to achieve significant carbon reductions. Most of the representatives of seven industries that used about 80 percent of the manufacturing energy consumed in the United States in 1994 indicated that the capital recovery factor assumed for the industrial sector may not realistically consider the capital constraints, market conditions, and existing manufacturing processes these industries operate under today. Changes in the Electricity Sector
Some groups believed the study’s assumptions about changes that would occur in the electricity sector may be too optimistic. For example, the Treasury Department questioned the study’s conclusion that carbon emissions can be reduced in ways that reduce energy costs more than they increase other societal costs, noting that in its view the study “substantially understates the costs of government policies to promote technology.” Additionally, as noted in the section on key assumptions, the study’s finding that a widespread adoption of energy-efficient technologies can be achieved with a low to no net cost to the nation is heavily dependent on the assumptions made, and we found a disparity of views on some of the key assumptions that may have influenced the study’s results. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In view of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) five-lab study’s potential influence on U.S. climate change policy, Senators Larry Craig, Chuck Hagel, Jesse Helms, and Frank Murkowski asked us to provide information on (1) how the study’s scope and methodology may limit its usefulness, (2) key assumptions that may have influenced the study’s results, and (3) the study’s role in the formulation of the October 1997 climate change proposal and the Kyoto Conference’s emission-reduction goals for the United States. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the study conducted by five Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories on reducing U.S. emissions through energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies, focusing on: (1) how the study's scope and methodology may limit its usefulness; (2) key assumptions that may have influenced the study's results; and (3) the study's role in the formulation of the October 1997 climate change proposal and the Kyoto Conference's emission-reduction goals for the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the five-lab study is an important step in evaluating the role that energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies can play in the nation's efforts to reduce global warming gases; (2) however, the study's usefulness is limited because it does not discuss the specific policies needed to achieve its estimate of 394 million metric tons of carbon reductions by 2010 and does not fully consider the costs to the nation's economy of reaching this goal; (3) according to DOE laboratory officials, specifying the types of policies needed to achieve such significant reductions by 2010 was not one of the study's objectives; (4) furthermore, the study assumes a fee of $50 per ton for carbon emissions, which would increase the cost of energy; however, the study does not evaluate the broader impacts that this cost may have on the economy; (5) DOE officials acknowledge that the study does not examine the broader economic impacts of such a carbon fee on the U.S. economy but said that, in their opinion, these broader economic impacts would be minor; (6) the study's finding that the widespread adoption of energy-efficient technologies can be achieved with low to no net cost to the nation is heavily dependent on the assumptions made for four sectors of the U.S. economy--buildings, industry, transportation, and electricity production; (7) among the groups that GAO interviewed, GAO found a disparity of views on key assumptions that may have influenced the study's results; (8) several of the groups questioned some of these assumptions as being too optimistic, such as those about the payback period, rate of adoption of new technologies, or timing of technological breakthroughs; (9) however, most of the representatives of the seven industries that used about 80 percent of the manufacturing energy consumed in the United States in 1994 indicated this assumption may be too optimistic given their current capital constraints, market conditions, and existing manufacturing processes; (10) on the other hand, some groups believed that certain assumptions in the study appear reasonable; (11) the study has been cited as one of many documents considered in formulating the administration's October 1997 climate change proposal; and (12) according to the Department's Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the study was one of the documents considered in formulating the emission-reduction goals for the United States at the December 1997 Kyoto Conference. |
gao_HEHS-95-155 | gao_HEHS-95-155_0 | After awarding a Medicare contract to an HMO, HCFA monitors its performance for continued compliance with federal requirements. HCFA has a variety of tools available to enforce compliance with standards. Private Sector Building on Federal Standards
HMO care has become widespread in the private sector. Since 1987, HCFA repeatedly found that the HMO’s South Florida operations did not meet federal standards for quality assurance. Limited Oversight of Medicare HMO Quality Assurance
HCFA’s monitoring and certification process has not been adequate to ensure that Medicare HMOs comply with standards for ensuring quality care. The agency does not routinely assess whether HMO risk-sharing arrangements create a significant incentive to underserve, although the Congress gave the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) authority, beginning April 1, 1991, to limit arrangements that it found provided excessive incentive to underserve. One HMO that a PRO identified as having an unusually high number of quality of care problems has been a concern to HCFA reviewers for several years because of its financial risk arrangements with providers. About 45 percent required about 3-1/2 months. The HMO denied the beneficiary’s request. Although HCFA, to its credit, has taken a number of positive actions, it has not adequately developed and staffed routine monitoring of HMOs’ quality assurance and other key operations to protect beneficiaries’ interests; taken actions to obtain prompt compliance with existing quality-of-care or other beneficiary protection standards from those HMOs that are slow to correct problems; or given Medicare beneficiaries available information that could help them decide to enroll or to remain enrolled in an HMO. In addition, HCFA could strengthen its quality assurance review efforts and streamline its beneficiary appeal process. But HCFA has remained reluctant to take strong enforcement actions and continues to rely on reviews of HMOs’ quality assurance practices that do not verify their effectiveness. Our report also highlights another method of enforcing HMO compliance, which focuses on providing comparative HMO performance information to Medicare beneficiaries, who make marketplace decisions in selecting particular HMOs. HCFA evaluates HMO’s response. Medicare: Issues Raised by Florida Health Maintenance Organization Demonstrations (GAO/HRD-86-97, July 16, 1986). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal oversight of health maintenance organizations (HMO) that enroll Medicare beneficiaries, focusing on: (1) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) monitoring of HMO compliance with federal quality assurance standards; (2) HCFA enforcement actions against HMO that do not meet federal standards; (3) the process available to beneficiaries to appeal HMO decisions to deny care; and (4) approaches the private sector is taking to assure HMO beneficiaries of quality care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although HCFA has instituted promising improvements, its process for monitoring and enforcing Medicare HMO performance standards still suffers because: (1) HCFA quality assurance reviews are not comprehensive; (2) HCFA does not adequately assess the financial risk arrangements that HMO have with providers that can create incentives to underserve beneficiaries; (3) HCFA has been reluctant to use available enforcement tools to correct HMO deficiencies and improprieties; and (4) beneficiaries who appeal HMO denials often wait 6 months or more for resolution, causing them to incur extraneous costs. In addition, GAO found that HCFA could improve its regulatory approach to ensuring good HMO performance by adopting private-sector practices, such as: (1) requiring that HMO undergo accreditation reviews to obtain contracts with Medicare; and (2) requiring information about the care provided to beneficiaries to evaluate HMO performance when making contract decisions. |
gao_GAO-12-593 | gao_GAO-12-593_0 | 3. 1). The Process to Complete Highway Projects Is Complex and Lengthy Due to Multiple Factors
Completing a highway project can involve many stakeholders—including federal, state, and local government agencies; nongovernmental organizations (NGO); and private citizens—and, for major highway projects, as many as 200 steps from planning through construction (see fig. Regardless, there are a host of stakeholders that could become involved in a highway project as follows:
Transportation agencies. Federal resource agencies. State resource agencies. These state-level agencies are generally responsible for managing and protecting the state’s natural and cultural resources. The federal government is not directly involved in construction, but does have an oversight role. Additional Factors That Can Affect Time Frames
In addition to the many stakeholders and tasks involved, a number of other factors can complicate the process and lead to longer highway project time frames such as the following: The availability of funding for large highway projects can affect how long it takes to complete a project. State DOTs Generally Agree That SAFETEA- LU Provisions Could Decrease Project Time Frames but Find Some Provisions More Useful Than Others
States identified both benefits and challenges with each of the SAFETEA- LU provisions meant to help expedite highway projects but acknowledged alternative solutions for some of the provisions that better served their purposes. In our survey, state DOTs most frequently agreed that the Minor Impacts to Protected Public Land provision of SAFETEA-LU has the potential to save time (see table 2) and has relatively few challenges to implementation. Potential benefits. States and FHWA Have Initiated Efforts to Develop and Share Innovative Practices for Expediting Highway Projects
States have implemented a variety of efforts to expedite highway projects, and FHWA has initiated efforts to share innovative practices. Other state efforts are more recent, prompted by new authorities provided by SAFETEA-LU or by streamlining concepts recently promoted by FHWA. For example, the North Carolina Department of Transportation designed a project development process, implemented in 1997, that promotes early involvement of state and federal stakeholders. This process reduces permit processing times from years to months, according to North Carolina Department of Transportation officials. Using Programmatic Agreements. Every Day Counts includes 13 specific initiatives to streamline time frames for all four phases of highway projects, including the environmental review phase. While FHWA has collected data to address the U.S. DOT target noted above and data on the Every Day Counts initiatives, states have only had about 1 year to implement the Every Day Counts initiatives and, according to an FHWA official, it is too soon to tell if those initiatives have had a positive effect on expediting the completion of highway projects. However, given that state DOTs noted in our survey that there are other solutions outside of the SAFETEA-LU provisions that better serve their needs and are within their authority to implement, it is unlikely that state DOTs will greatly increase their participation in some of the SAFETEA-LU provisions we analyzed, particularly those that delegate environmental review decision-making authority from FHWA to state DOTs and require the state to accept federal court jurisdiction for such decisions. DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. (2) What are state departments of transportation (DOT) views on the benefits and challenges of implementing initiatives to expedite highway projects established by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)? (3) What practices have state DOTs and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) implemented to expedite highway projects? The resource agencies we interviewed were: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. The full universe for this survey was 52 state DOTs: all states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. To describe the practices state DOTs have implemented on their own to help expedite highway projects, we included a series of questions in our survey of state DOTs asking respondents to identify practices they have implemented in each highway project phase: planning, preliminary design and environmental review, final design and right-of-way acquisition, and construction. Under Every Day Counts, FHWA urged state DOTs to consider use of 15 specific initiatives. This initiative promotes use of planning documents and decisions from the project planning process in the environmental review process. 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
Projects to construct, improve, and repair roads and bridges are fundamental to meeting the nations mobility needs. However, completing highway projectswhich generally involves four phases consisting of (1) planning, (2) preliminary design and environmental review, (3) final design and right-of-way acquisition, and (4) constructioncan sometimes take a long time. In 2005, SAFETEA-LU established provisions to help expedite highway projects, including streamlining some portions of the environmental review process, allowing states to assume greater environmental review responsibilities under certain conditions, and establishing efforts that permitted delegation of some authority from the federal government to states. GAO was asked to (1) describe the process and factors that could affect highway project time frames, (2) examine state DOTs views on the benefits and challenges of the provisions to expedite highway projects established in SAFETEA-LU, and (3) describe additional initiatives that state DOTs and FHWA have implemented to expedite the completion of highway projects. GAO surveyed officials from 52 state DOTs, including all states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; interviewed officials at FHWA, state DOTs, and federal resource agencies (agencies tasked with protecting natural, historic, or cultural resources); and analyzed legislation, regulations, and other reports and publications. U.S. DOT provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The process to complete highway projects is complicated and lengthy due to multiple factors. Specifically, highway projects can involve many stakeholders, including agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the public. These stakeholders perform a number of tasksfor major highway projects, as many as 200 steps from planning to constructionbut their level of involvement varies. For example, resource agencies like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service generally only become involved in a highway project if it affects the environmental or cultural resources that agency is tasked with protecting. Additional factors can lengthen project time frames, including the availability of funding, changes in a states transportation priorities, public opposition, or litigation.
State departments of transportation (DOT) that GAO surveyed generally agreed that the provisions meant to help expedite highway projects established in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) could decrease time frames but found some provisions more useful than others. They most frequently agreed that the provision allowing for the use of protected public landif such use has minor impacts on the property and is approved by relevant resource agencieshas the potential to save time and has few challenges to implementation. State DOTs reported that the other SAFETEA-LU provisions GAO studied have both potential benefits and challenges but, in some cases, they identified alternative solutions that could better serve their needs. For example, although respondents indicated that they could save time by implementing the issue resolution process established in SAFETEA-LU, they also noted that the use of written agreements between highway project stakeholderssuch as federal resource agenciescould better serve their purposes. Survey respondents also indicated that they are generally not interested in implementing two SAFETEA-LU provisions that would delegate environmental review decision-making authority from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to states, primarily because the states did not want to accept federal court jurisdiction for the decisions made under those provisions.
States have implemented a variety of efforts to expedite highway projects and FHWA has initiated efforts to expedite projects by sharing innovative practices. For example, in 1997, the North Carolina DOT implemented a project development process that promotes early involvement of highway stakeholders and reduces permit processing times from years to months. Other state efforts are more recent, prompted by streamlining concepts promoted by FHWA beginning in 2010 under an effort known as Every Day Counts. Through Every Day Counts, FHWA encouraged states to consider implementing 15 specific innovative practices during 2011 and 2012, including 13 practices that could help expedite highway project completion. FHWA plans to introduce a new set of initiatives during 2012 for implementation during 2013 and 2014. FHWA developed performance measures for Every Day Counts and is currently collecting data to determine if these initiatives have had a positive impact on expediting highway projects. |
gao_GAO-13-642 | gao_GAO-13-642_0 | DOD Analysis of Potential Duplication Does Not Address All NGJ Roles and Planned Acquisition Programs
DOD has assessed whether the planned NGJ program is duplicative using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system’s planned roles or take into account the military services’ evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. However, these analyses do not address potential duplication or overlap between the NGJ and other systems being developed for other roles, such as communications jamming in irregular warfare environments. DOD’s analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ is not duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role—the joint suppression of enemy air defenses in a modified escort setting, which includes defended airspace outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. Based on our analysis of DOD airborne electronic attack systems and missions, none of the systems we reviewed that have emerged since DOD’s NGJ analysis was completed duplicate planned capabilities; however, there is some overlap in the roles that the systems are intended to perform. Ongoing DOD Efforts Provide Another Mechanism to Address Potential Overlap and Duplication
DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication related to the NGJ and other airborne electronic attack investments, including its annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress, a U.S. Strategic Command review of DOD’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems, and the NGJ capability development document. However, we found weaknesses in two of the three efforts. DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in its electronic warfare strategy report to Congress. However, the analysis was limited and did not examine potential overlap between capabilities or explain why that overlap was warranted. Capability development documents, which define the performance requirements of acquisition programs, are another vehicle to discuss potential redundancies across proposed and existing programs. The NGJ is not intended to meet all of the military services’ airborne electronic attack needs, and the services are planning to make additional investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting roles. The military services may be able to leverage the NGJ program in support of their own acquisition priorities and programs because its current acquisition strategy is based on a modular open systems approach, which allows system components to be added, removed, modified, replaced, or sustained by different military customers or manufacturers without significantly impacting the remainder of the system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its technologies into other systems in the future. EA-18Gs can use the NGJ jamming capabilities in these settings to disrupt enemy radar and communications and suppress enemy air defenses. While the Navy’s NGJ is expected to provide airborne electronic attack capabilities to support all military services in both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments, the other services are also planning to make additional investments in airborne electronic attack systems that are tailored to their specific warfighting roles. At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the NGJ represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack capabilities. Redundancy in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable, but pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can also result in the same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled. Identifying existing and planned systems across all of the NGJ’s planned roles in its capability development document could help ensure that DOD’s analysis of potential overlap and duplication is complete. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
To help ensure that the NGJ does not unnecessarily duplicate existing or planned capabilities, require the Navy, in coordination with the Joint Staff, to address overlap and duplication between the NGJ and other systems in all of its planned roles in the NGJ capability development document. DOD responded that it concurs with the need to continue to assess unnecessary duplication and redundancy, but it does not concur with including the assessment in the capability development document. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) assessed duplication among the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), existing capabilities, and other acquisition programs, we reviewed key NGJ and DOD electronic warfare documents, including the 2004 Airborne Electronic Attack Initial Capabilities Document, the 2009 Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, the NGJ Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), and the DOD Annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress, to determine whether potential duplication was considered as DOD developed NGJ requirements and prepared for initiation of the NGJ acquisition program. | Why GAO Did This Study
At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the Navy's NGJ program represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack capabilities. Jammers, like the planned NGJ, fly on aircraft, such as Navy EA-18Gs, and transmit electronic signals that can neutralize or temporarily degrade enemy air defenses and communications, thus aiding combat aircraft and ground forces' freedom to maneuver and strike. Senate Report 112-196 mandated GAO to review the NGJ program and potential duplication. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD assessed whether there is duplication among NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition programs, and (2) NGJ is being managed as a joint solution. GAO reviewed key NGJ requirements and acquisition documents and DOD and military service documents describing airborne electronic attack capabilities.
What GAO Found
Generation Jammer (NGJ) program is duplicative using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system's planned roles or take into account the military services' evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. DOD analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ meets a valid need and is not duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role--suppressing enemy air defenses from outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. However, these analyses do not address all planned NGJ roles, such as communications jamming in irregular warfare environments, or take into account the military services' evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. According to GAO's analysis, none of the systems that have emerged since DOD completed its NGJ analyses duplicate its planned capabilities; however there is some overlap in the roles they are intended to perform. Redundancy in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable. However, pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled. Therefore, continued examination of potential overlap and duplication among these investments may be warranted.
DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication to address these shortcomings as the program moves forward. However, GAO found weaknesses in two of these efforts as well.
Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress : DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in this report. However, to date, the analysis of overlap and duplication in this report has been limited and did not examine potential overlap between capabilities or explain why overlap was warranted.
NGJ Capability Development Document : Redundancies are required to be considered when a capability development document--which defines the performance requirements for an acquisition program--is validated. The draft NGJ capability development document does not identify the systems the Navy considered when analyzing potential redundancies, so it is difficult to evaluate whether its analysis includes existing and proposed programs across all of the NGJ's planned roles.
The NGJ is not being managed as a joint acquisition program, which is a distinction related to funding, but it is expected to provide the Navy with airborne electronic capabilities that will support all military services in both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments. The NGJ's capabilities are not intended to meet all of the military services' airborne electronic attack needs and the services are planning to make additional investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting roles. The military services might be able to leverage the NGJ program in support of their own acquisition priorities because it plans to use a modular open systems approach, which allows for components to be added, removed, or modified without significantly impacting the rest of the system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its technologies into other systems in the future.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that DODs analysis of potential overlap and duplication is complete, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense: (1) require the NGJ capability development document to discuss potential redundancies between NGJ and existing and proposed programs across all of its planned roles and (2) ensure that the Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress includes information on potentially overlapping capabilities and why that overlap is warranted. DOD agreed to continue to assess duplication and redundancies but not with using the capability development document to do so. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. DOD agreed with the second recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-110 | gao_GAO-09-110_0 | Women and Minorities in the Career SES and the SES Developmental Pool Increased Governmentwide between 2000 and 2007, and Their Representation in the SES Increased in More Than Half of the Agencies
The data that we are reporting provide a demographic snapshot of the career SES as well as the levels that serve as the SES developmental pool for October 2000 and September 2007. As shown in table 2, the percentage of both women and minorities in the SES increased in 15 of the 24 CFO Act agencies by 2007. In 2007, the representation of women and minorities, both overall and in more than half of the individual agencies, was higher than it was in October 2000. In our 2003 report, we (1) reviewed actual appointment trends from fiscal years 1995 to 2000 and actual separation experience from fiscal years 1996 to 2000; (2) estimated by race, ethnicity, and gender the number of career SES who would leave government service from October 1, 2000, through October 1, 2007; and (3) projected what the profile of the SES would be if appointment and separation trends did not change. Racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the SES is an important component for the effective operation of the government. Minimal Changes Occurred in the Average Age at Appointment to and Retirement from the Career SES and in Targeted Disabilities among the Career SES between 2000 and 2007
Individuals do not typically enter the career SES until well into their careers. As of the end of fiscal years 2000 and 2007, the average age of women and minorities at the time of their appointment to the SES was about age 50 and did not change dramatically over this 7-year period except for certain groups, as shown in table 5. Similarly, the average age of women and minorities at the time of retirement from the career SES did not change much between 2000 and 2007. In addition to examining the average age of individuals at the time of their appointment to and retirement from the career SES, we analyzed the length of time that a cohort of individuals served in the SES and differences in length of service. Table 7 also shows that women stayed in the SES longer than men; women who voluntarily retired stayed, on average, for 11.4 years, and men who voluntarily retired stayed, on average, for 8.8 years. The average length of service among minorities ranged from 4.1 years for Asian/Pacific Islander women to 12 years for American Indian/Alaska Native men. We also reviewed the representation of career SES members who reported having targeted disabilities. Processes Used for Selecting Career SES Members Are to Follow Competitive Merit Staffing Requirements
Executive branch agencies have processes for selecting members into the career SES and developmental programs that are designed to create pools of candidates for senior positions. ERBs review the executive and technical qualifications of each eligible candidate and make written recommendations to the appointing official concerning the candidates. Candidates who are selected must have their executive qualifications certified by an OPM- administered Qualifications Review Board (QRB) before being appointed to the SES. We first identified SES and SES developmental pool data for 2000 in our 2003 report (GAO-03-34), in which we excluded the FBI from the SES and the SES developmental pool because that report contained projected SES and the SES developmental pool levels for the end of fiscal year 2007 based on separation and appointment data, and the FBI did not submit separation and appointment data to the CPDF for 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
A diverse Senior Executive Service (SES), which generally represents the most experienced segment of the federal workforce, can be an organizational strength by bringing a wider variety of perspectives and approaches to policy development and implementation, strategic planning, problem solving, and decision making. In a January 2003 report (GAO-03-34), GAO provided data on career SES members by race, ethnicity, and gender as of October 2000 and a statistically estimated projection of what the profile of the SES would be in October 2007 if appointment and separation trends did not change. In response to a request for updated information on the diversity in the SES, GAO is providing information from the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Central Personnel Data File (1) on the representation of women and minorities in the SES and the SES developmental pool (i.e., GS-15 and GS-14 positions) for the executive branch as of fiscal year 2007 and comparing this representation to fiscal year 2000 levels and to levels GAO projected for October 2007 in its 2003 report; (2) for fiscal years 2000 and 2007, the average age at which women and minorities were appointed to and retired from the SES as well as information on those in the SES reporting targeted disabilities; and (3) on the overall processes used in executive branch agencies for selecting and certifying members into the SES.
What GAO Found
The representation of women and minorities in the SES and the SES developmental pool increased governmentwide from October 2000 through September 2007, but increases did not occur in all agencies. Over these 7 years, increases occurred in more than half of the 24 major executive branch agencies, but in both 2000 and 2007 the representation of women and minorities continued to vary significantly at those agencies. In 2003, we projected that increases would occur in the representation of women and minorities in the SES and SES developmental pool by 2007. These increases generally did occur. Looking beyond racial, ethnic, and gender profiles, GAO also reviewed the average age at appointment to and retirement from the career SES as well as the disability status reported by career SES employees for fiscal years 2000 and 2007. For the most part, career SES members were, on average, about age 50 at the time of their appointment to the SES and about age 60 at the time of their retirement. The average age at appointment to and retirement from the career SES generally did not vary much by race, ethnicity, or gender. GAO also calculated how long, on average, individuals served in the SES, and found that the length of their stay in the SES did vary. For example, women stayed in the SES longer than men; women who voluntarily retired stayed, on average, for 11.4 years, and men who voluntarily retired stayed, on average, for 8.8 years. The average length of service among minorities ranged from 4.1 years for Asian/Pacific Islander women to 12 years for American Indian/Alaska Native men. Governmentwide less than 1 percent of the career SES in 2000 and 2007 had self-reported targeted disabilities, and their representation declined slightly over this time. Executive branch agencies have established processes for selecting members into the SES and have developmental programs that are designed to create pools of candidates from which new members can be selected. These agencies use Executive Resources Boards to review the executive and technical qualifications of eligible candidates for initial SES career appointments and make recommendations based on the best qualified. An OPM-administered board reviews candidates' qualifications before appointment to the SES. |
gao_GAO-09-894 | gao_GAO-09-894_0 | Background
CARE Act base grants are distributed through a formula that includes HIV/AIDS case counts. Part B grants include grants for HIV/AIDS services that are awarded by formula, AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP) grants that are awarded by formula, emerging community grants that are awarded by formula for HIV/AIDS services, Part B supplemental grants for HIV/AIDS services, and ADAP supplemental grants. RWTMA contained a hold-harmless provision that protects funding for Part B base grants and ADAP base grants. If the exemption permitting code-based reporting is not extended, it is likely that future fiscal year funding will be based exclusively on name-based counts. In addition to having unobligated funds canceled and recovered unless a carryover waiver is granted, grantees with unobligated Part A, Part B, and ADAP base grant funds in excess of 2 percent of the grant award incur a penalty—a corresponding reduction in grant funds for the first fiscal year beginning after the fiscal year in which the Secretary receives the FSR. Not All Grantees Had HRSA Use Their Name-Based HIV Case Counts for Fiscal Year 2009 Formula Funding, but Most Part B Grantees Are Collecting Name- Based HIV Case Counts in Their Reporting Systems
Most Part B grantees were collecting name-based HIV case counts in their reporting systems as of December 31, 2007, but not all grantees had HRSA use these case counts to determine fiscal year 2009 CARE Act funding. For 47 of the 59 Part B grantees, HRSA used name-based HIV case counts, as provided by CDC, to determine CARE Act funding. The remaining 12 grantees had HRSA use their code-based HIV case counts to determine fiscal year 2009 CARE Act funding. RWTMA allows grantees to submit code-based case counts to HRSA to determine funding for fiscal years 2007 through 2009; without an extension as part of the upcoming reauthorization, it is likely that HRSA would determine CARE Act funding for fiscal year 2010 using name-based case counts collected through December 2008. Hold-Harmless Funding Was More Widely Distributed among EMAs in Fiscal Year 2009 Than in Fiscal Year 2004, but the Range of Funding Differences per Case Decreased
Part A hold-harmless funding was more widely distributed among EMAs in fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2004. About 71 percent of EMAs received hold-harmless funding in fiscal year 2009, while 41 percent received hold-harmless funding in fiscal year 2004. In addition to hold-harmless funding being more widely distributed in fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2004, the total amount of hold-harmless funding provided to EMAs was larger in fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2009, $24,836,500 in hold-harmless funding was distributed compared to $8,033,563 in fiscal year 2004. The range of CARE Act funding differences among EMAs, as measured by funding per case, was smaller in 2009 than in 2004. In fiscal year 2004, the funding per case ranged from $1,221 to $2,241, a range of $1,020. However, in fiscal year 2009, San Francisco received $208 in hold- harmless funding per case, while in fiscal year 2004 it received $1,020 in hold-harmless funding per case. Sixteen Grantees Had Reductions in Their 2009 Grants Due to Their Unobligated Part B Balances at the End of Grant Year 2007
Sixteen Part B grantees received reduced funding in grant year 2009 because they had unobligated balances over 2 percent in grant year 2007. Part B base funding penalties ranged from $6,433 in Palau to $1,493,935 in Ohio. ADAP base funding penalties ranged from $26,233 in Maine to $12,670,248 in Pennsylvania. Thus, grantees receiving drug rebates must prioritize spending these funds and several grantees said that this makes it more difficult to obligate grant funds in the grant year. HRSA sought to address the interaction between drug rebate funds and the RWTMA unobligated balance provisions by requesting from HHS permission to seek an exemption from the regulation for grantees from the Office of Management and Budget. HHS stated that while federal regulations and the unobligated balance provisions create significant challenges for rebate states, the justification HRSA presented for the class deviation was “not compelling.”
Agency Comments
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Funds are made available under the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 (CARE Act) for individuals affected by HIV/AIDS. Part A provides for grants to metropolitan areas and Part B provides for grants to states and territories and associated jurisdictions for HIV/AIDS services and for AIDS Drug Assistance Programs (ADAP). The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act of 2006 (RWTMA) reauthorized CARE Act programs for fiscal years 2007 through 2009. RWTMA requires name-based HIV case counts for determining CARE Act funding, but an exemption allows the use of code-based case counts through fiscal year 2009. RWTMA formulas include hold-harmless provisions that protect grantees' funding at specified levels. RWTMA also included provisions under which Part A and B grantees with unobligated balances over 2 percent at the end of the grant year incur a penalty in future funding. GAO was asked to examine CARE Act funding provisions. This report provides information on (1) how many Part B grantees collect and use name-based HIV case counts for CARE Act funding; (2) the distribution of Part A hold-harmless funding; and (3) reductions in Part B grantees' funding due to unobligated balance provisions. GAO reviewed agency documents and analyzed data on CARE Act funding. GAO interviewed 19 grantees chosen by geography, number of HIV/AIDS cases, and other criteria. GAO also interviewed federal government officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
Forty-seven of the total 59 Part B grantees had the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) use their name-based HIV case counts to determine CARE Act formula funding for fiscal year 2009. The remaining 12 grantees had HRSA use their code-based HIV case counts to determine fiscal year 2009 CARE Act funding. If the exemption permitting code-based reporting is not extended, it is likely that future fiscal year funding will be based exclusively on name-based counts. Any Part B grantees who currently have name-based HIV reporting systems, but that had not been collecting name-based HIV case counts long enough to include all cases, could face a reduction in fiscal year 2010 funding. Part A hold-harmless funding was more widely distributed among eligible metropolitan areas (EMA) in fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2004, the last year for which we reported this information. Seventy-one percent of EMAs received hold-harmless funding in fiscal year 2009, whereas 41 percent received hold-harmless funding in fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2009, $24,836,500 in hold-harmless funding was distributed compared to $8,033,563 in fiscal year 2004. However, the range of CARE Act hold-harmless funding among EMAs, as measured by funding per case, was smaller in 2009 than in 2004. In fiscal year 2009, EMAs received from $0 to $208 in hold-harmless funding per case. In fiscal year 2004, EMAs received between $0 and $1,020 in hold-harmless funding per case. The hold-harmless funding resulted in EMAs receiving formula funding ranging from $645 to $854 per case in fiscal year 2009 and from $1,221 to $2,241 per case in fiscal year 2004. Sixteen Part B grantees had reductions in their grant year 2009 funding due to their unobligated balances at the end of grant year 2007. Part B base grant penalties ranged from $6,433 in Palau to $1,493,935 in Ohio. ADAP base grant penalties ranged from $26,233 in Maine to $12,670,248 in Pennsylvania. Part B grantees with unobligated funds provided various reasons for these balances, and said that some of these reasons were beyond their control. Grantees and HRSA stated that a requirement to spend drug rebate funds before obligating federal funds makes it more difficult to avoid unobligated balances. Twenty- seven ADAPs purchase drugs exclusively through a federal drug discount program, under which they pay full price and receive a rebate at some point in the future. HRSA sought to address the interaction between drug rebate funds and the RWTMA unobligated balance provisions by requesting from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) permission to seek an exemption for grantees from the relevant regulations from the Office of Management and Budget. However, HHS denied this request, stating that the justification HRSA presented for requesting the exemption was "not compelling." HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-413 | gao_GAO-03-413_0 | Litigation History
In February 1981, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on a class action lawsuit, commonly known as the Segar case, finding that DEA had discriminated against African American special agents. At the time of our review, DEA, working with the plaintiff class and other employees, had developed a recommendation process. (See table 2.) DEA’s hiring procedures appear job related and consistent with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures in that they are based on criteria in regulations, professional standards, or standards established by subject matter experts. In fact, African American applicants had a significantly lower passing rate under BA-20-00, as table 9 shows. DEA officials had not studied physical task test trends and did not know which test tasks accounted for lower pass rates. To come to a determination about an applicant’s suitability, the three panel members must be in agreement. However, we found that minorities met DEA’s hiring standards at lower rates than white applicants, with African American and Hispanic applicants meeting the standards and being selected at substantially lower rates. Our analysis showed that although African American and Hispanic special agents received promotion recommendations at lower rates than white agents, particularly for promotions to GS-14, there were no statistically significant differences in promotion rates among the various race, ethnic, and gender groups. Higher Proportion of African American, Hispanic, and Women Special Agents Disciplined
Our analysis of disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents disciplined was substantially higher than their representation in the DEA special agent workforce and that this difference was statistically significant. During the 1997-2002 time frame, the board had a similar makeup. Our work showed that African American, Hispanic, and women special agents had a proportionately higher number of allegations of misconduct lodged against them and that a higher proportion of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in disciplinary actions. However, the results of two studies by outside contractors, approved by an oversight group and which we found methodologically sound, found DEA’s disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of DEA direct that a process be initiated to monitor the results of decisions at the various steps in the hiring process to identify differences in selection rates among groups, and where substantial differences are found, determine why they occur and what, if anything, can be done to reduce the differences while maintaining the high standards necessary for the job of special agent; a workforce analysis be done, which takes into account retirement eligibility, expected retirements, and other attrition, to guide the development of DEA’s recruiting and hiring plans and strategies; the plans to monitor the results of the SAC/office head recommendation process by race and ethnicity be expanded to include monitoring by gender; steps be taken to develop, maintain, and ensure the reliability of a discipline database and that the study of disciplinary actions taken against African American and white special agents be expanded to analyze disciplinary actions against all racial, ethnic, and gender groups of special agents; and appropriate, aggregate statistical data on the outcomes of the promotion and discipline processes for all racial, ethnic, and gender groups are available to its special agent workforce to help special agents formulate informed views about the fairness and equity of the agency’s promotion and discipline processes. Rather, they were designed to provide information about race, ethnicity, and gender differences in DEA’s hiring, promotion, and disciplinary actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
A 1981 U.S. District Court decision found that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had discriminated against African American special agents in a number of personnel practices. Over the years, the plaintiffs and DEA had agreed to remedies in many of these areas. However, minority representatives continued to raise issues in three areas--hiring, promotion, and discipline. GAO was asked to examine DEA's current processes for hiring, promoting, and disciplining special agents, and provide information about racial, ethnicity, and gender differences in these three areas.
What GAO Found
During the October 1997 through March 2002 period, African American, Hispanic, and white applicants to be special agents passed DEA's medical requirements and interview process at about the same rates. However, African American and Hispanic applicants had lower passing rates on (1) the test of an applicant's ability to recall and write about a video of a drug-related enforcement action and (2) suitability requirements measured through a background investigation and other tests. DEA's hiring procedures are based on criteria in federal regulations, professional standards, and standards established by subject matter experts. However, DEA had not studied its hiring requirements to see why its procedures resulted in different selection rates and whether they could be modified to reduce differences while maintaining the high standards necessary for special agents. There were no statistically significant differences in promotion rates among the various racial, ethnic, and gender groups during fiscal years 1997 through 2001. DEA has a rigorous and validated competency-based process that uses job simulations to assess capabilities at the target grade level. However, the job-relatedness of a key step involving recommending special agents for promotion had not been established and our analysis showed that African American and Hispanic special agents were recommended for promotion at significantly lower rates. Despite differences in recommendation rates, DEA's promotion decisions mirrored the race, ethnic, and gender makeup of the agency's special agent workforce. Additionally, the agency, working with a diverse panel of special agents, subsequently developed a revised recommendation process. At the time of GAO's review, DEA and the African American representatives were involved in mediation to reach final agreement. Disciplinary data for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 showed that the proportion of African American, Hispanic, and women special agents disciplined for misconduct was significantly higher than their representation in the DEA special agent workforce. These higher rates reflect that African Americans, Hispanics, and women had a significantly higher percentage of allegations of misconduct lodged against them and that a significantly higher percentage of these allegations were substantiated by investigations and resulted in disciplinary action. A recent study by an outside contractor found DEA's disciplinary process to be fair and nondiscriminatory, but that study only considered African Americans and whites and not women or other minority groups. |
gao_GAO-17-440T | gao_GAO-17-440T_0 | Action Is Needed to Address Ongoing Cybersecurity and Privacy Challenges
Our work has identified the need for improvements in the federal government’s approach to cybersecurity of its systems and those supporting the nation’s critical infrastructures and in protecting the privacy of PII. While previous administrations and agencies have acted to improve the protections over the information and information systems supporting federal operations and U.S. critical infrastructure, additional actions are needed. Federal agencies need to effectively implement risk-based entity- wide information security programs consistently over time. Implement sustainable processes for securely configuring operating systems, applications, workstations, servers, and network devices. Patch vulnerable systems and replace unsupported software. Develop comprehensive security test and evaluation procedures and conduct examinations on a regular and recurring basis. Strengthen oversight of contractors providing IT services. The federal government needs to improve its cyber incident detection, response, and mitigation capabilities. Expand capabilities, improve planning, and support wider adoption of the government-wide intrusion detection and prevention system. Update federal guidance on reporting data breaches and develop consistent responses to breaches of PII. In addition, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 contains a provision for us to study and publish a report by December 2018 on the effectiveness of the approach and strategy of the federal government to secure agency information systems, including the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities and the government’s intrusion assessment plan. The federal government needs to expand its cyber workforce planning and training efforts. Enhance efforts for recruiting and retaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce. The federal government needs to expand efforts to strengthen cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructures. Similar to federal systems, the systems supporting critical infrastructures face an evolving array of cyber-based threats. Develop metrics to measure and report on the effectiveness of cyber risk mitigation activities and the cybersecurity posture of critical infrastructure sectors. The federal government needs to better oversee protection of PII. Protect the security and privacy of electronic health information. Ensure privacy when face recognition systems are used. Protect the privacy of users’ data on state-based marketplaces. Several Recommendations Made by the Cybersecurity Commission and CSIS Are Generally Consistent with GAO’s Recommendations for Improving Cybersecurity
Recent reports by the Cybersecurity Commission and CSIS identify topical areas and numerous recommendations for the new administration to consider as it develops and implements cybersecurity strategy and policy. In its study, the Commission focused on 10 cybersecurity topics including international issues, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity research and development, cybersecurity workforce, and the Internet of Things. Nevertheless, several of our recommendations are generally consistent with or similar to recommendations made by the Commission and CSIS in the following areas: International cybersecurity strategy. Protecting cyber critical infrastructure. Promoting Use of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Specifically, federal agencies need to address control deficiencies and fully implement organization-wide information security programs, cyber incident response and mitigation efforts needs to be improved across the government, maintaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce needs to be a priority, efforts to bolster the cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructure needs to be strengthened, and the privacy of PII needs to be better protected. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cyber-based intrusions and attacks on federal systems and systems supporting our nation's critical infrastructure, such as communications and financial services, are evolving and becoming more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include the protection of cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015.
This statement (1) provides an overview of GAO's work related to cybersecurity of the federal government and the nation's critical infrastructure and (2) identifies areas of consistency between GAO recommendations and those recently made by the Cybersecurity Commission and CSIS. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work and its review of the two recent reports issued by the Commission and CSIS.
What GAO Found
GAO has consistently identified shortcomings in the federal government's approach to ensuring the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure as well as its approach to protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information (PII). While previous administrations and agencies have acted to improve the protections over federal and critical infrastructure information and information systems, the federal government needs to take the following actions to strengthen U.S. cybersecurity:
Effectively implement risk-based entity-wide information security programs consistently over time . Among other things, agencies need to (1) implement sustainable processes for securely configuring operating systems, applications, workstations, servers, and network devices; (2) patch vulnerable systems and replace unsupported software; (3) develop comprehensive security test and evaluation procedures and conduct examinations on a regular and recurring basis; and (4) strengthen oversight of contractors providing IT services.
Improve its cyber incident detection, response, and mitigation capabilities . The Department of Homeland Security needs to expand the capabilities and support wider adoption of its government-wide intrusion detection and prevention system. In addition, the federal government needs to improve cyber incident response practices, update guidance on reporting data breaches, and develop consistent responses to breaches of PII.
Expand its cyber workforce planning and training efforts . The federal government needs to (1) enhance efforts for recruiting and retaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce and (2) improve cybersecurity workforce planning activities.
Expand efforts to strengthen cybersecurity of the nation's critical infrastructures . The federal government needs to develop metrics to (1) assess the effectiveness of efforts promoting the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and (2) measure and report on effectiveness of cyber risk mitigation activities and the cybersecurity posture of critical infrastructure sectors.
Better oversee protection of personally identifiable information . The federal government needs to (1) protect the security and privacy of electronic health information, (2) ensure privacy when face recognition systems are used, and (3) protect the privacy of users' data on state-based health insurance marketplaces.
Several recommendations made by the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Commission) and the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) are generally consistent with or similar to GAO's recommendations in several areas including: establishing an international cybersecurity strategy, protecting cyber critical infrastructure, promoting use of the NIST cybersecurity framework, prioritizing cybersecurity research, and expanding cybersecurity workforces.
What GAO Recommends
Over the past several years, GAO has made about 2,500 recommendations to federal agencies to enhance their information security programs and controls. As of February 2017, about 1,000 recommendations had not been implemented. |
gao_GAO-12-569 | gao_GAO-12-569_0 | Specifically, we identified 13 grant programs that DOJ administered from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 that recipients could use for this purpose. Unless Required, Few Recipients Allocated or Planned to Use Any Federal Funding for Indigent Defense, in Part Due to Competing Priorities
Recipients of the four grant programs requiring funds to be used in whole or in part for indigent defense from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 allocated or planned to use $13.3 million out of $21.2 million—or 63 percent—of available funds for state, local, and tribal indigent defense. When Recipients Allocated Funding for Indigent Defense, in General, the Amount Was Small Relative to the Total Award and Funding Was Used for Personnel and Training
Those recipients who chose to allocate or use funding for indigent defense generally reported providing a small amount of funding for indigent defense relative to their total awards. DOJ Could More Consistently Collect Data on the Amount of Funding Allocated for Indigent Defense When Programs Identify It as a Priority
For grant programs that require funding be used at least in part for indigent defense, DOJ collects data on whether recipients have allocated funding for indigent defense and the allocation amounts, which allows DOJ to determine if funding was used in accordance with grant requirements. DOJ Assesses the Impact of Indigent Defense Grant Funding and Has Mechanisms to Help Indigent Defense Providers Evaluate Services
DOJ Has Measures to Assess the Impact of Indigent Defense-Related Grant Funding
According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), performance measurement indicates what a program is accomplishing and whether results are being achieved. We found that all nine of the DOJ grant programs that required or prioritized funding for indigent defense included output measures that described the level of grant activity. In addition, seven of the nine grant programs included outcome-oriented performance measures that described the intended results of the program. Indigent Defense Providers Generally Reported That Evaluations of Their Services Have Not Been Conducted; DOJ Has Mechanisms to Support Such Evaluations
With its indigent defense-related performance measures, DOJ can assess the impact of a grantee’s use of funds, such as whether the funding resulted in an increase in the number of defenders hired. Of the 118 public defender offices or agencies that responded to our survey, 9 provided us with copies of evaluations that they had conducted of their office or agency or that another entity conducted, such as a consultant or oversight body.oversight committee for a local jurisdiction’s indigent defense services— collected data and used it to assess compliance with local indigent defense standards. Respondents who reported reasons for not conducting an evaluation most frequently cited lack of personnel (46 percent, 29 of 63) and lack of expertise and/or the need for technical assistance (43 percent, 27 of 63) as the reasons. Specifically, by increasing awareness among JAG, JABG, and JJDP grantees, as well as indigent defense providers, that funding is available for indigent defense, DOJ could be in a better position to ensure that eligible grantees are aware that they can access federal funding to help address their needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that OJP is best positioned to identify and address critical needs in the indigent defense community, determine whether it has met its commitment to indigent defense, and improve accountability in grants administration, we recommend that the Assistant Attorney General of OJP take the following three actions: take steps to increase JAG, JABG, and JJDP grantees’ awareness that funding can be allocated for indigent defense; inform indigent defense providers about grants for which they are eligible to apply; and take steps to collect data on allocations and spending for indigent defense in the JABG and TJADG programs. In its written comments, DOJ concurred with the recommendations in this report. Collecting such data would position DOJ to better assess if it is meeting its commitment to indigent defense. 2. 3. 4. To what extent does DOJ collect data on indigent defense funding when the grant program specifies that funds be allocated or awarded for this purpose or highlights it as a priority? 5. To determine the extent to which state, local, and tribal governments allocated federal funding for indigent defense, the factors that influenced their decisions, and the amounts allocated, we conducted separate Web- based surveys of all recipients of fiscal year 2005 through 2010 DOJ formula grants that could be allocated for indigent defense—the JAG, JJDP, and JABG grants—and tribal governments that received BIA Tribal Courts TPA distributions from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.develop the survey questionnaires, we reviewed existing literature about the provision of indigent defense, and interviewed state JAG, JABG, and JJDP recipients, local JAG recipients, and tribes. We drew a stratified sample of 253 of the 841 public defenders nationwide. However, the responses provide insights into the factors that influence public defenders’ decisions to apply for federal funding. We also reviewed DOJ’s guidance to recipients to determine the extent to which DOJ communicated that funding could be used for indigent defense programs. For grants in which we found that it was, we spoke with DOJ officials about why they chose to do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees every person accused of a crime the right to counsel. States and localities generally fund indigent defense services, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) also provides funding that can be used for these services. GAO was asked to review federal support for indigent defendants. This report addresses, for fiscal years 2005 through 2010, the (1) types of support DOJ provided for indigent defense; (2) extent to which eligible DOJ funding was allocated or awarded for indigent defense, the factors affecting these decisions, and DOJs actions to address them; (3) percentage of DOJ funding allocated for indigent defense and how it was used; (4) extent to which DOJ collects data on indigent defense funding; and (5) extent to which DOJ assesses the impacts of indigent defense grants, indigent defense programs have been evaluated, and DOJ has supported evaluation efforts. GAO surveyed (1) all 4,229 grant recipients about funding allocations and (2) a sample of 253 public defender offices about factors influencing their decisions to apply for funding. Though not all survey results are generalizable, they provide insights. GAO also analyzed grant related documents and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) administered 13 grant programs from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 that recipients could use to support indigent defense, 4 of which required recipients to use all or part of the funding for this purpose. DOJ also provides training to indigent defense providers, among other things.
From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, recipients of the 4 grants that required spending for indigent defense allocated or planned to use $13.3 million out of $21.2 million in current dollars for indigent defense. However, among the 9 grants that did not require allocations or awards for indigent defense, two-thirds or more of state, local, and tribal respondents to GAOs surveys reported that they did not use funds for this purpose, partly due to competing priorities. DOJ has listed the grants on its website. However, no more than 54 percent of grantees or public defender offices responding to GAOs surveys were aware that such funding could be used to support indigent defense. Taking steps to increase awareness would better position DOJ to help ensure that eligible grantees are aware that they can access federal funding to help address their needs. DOJ officials acknowledged that opportunities exist to enhance grantees awareness.
When recipients allocated funding for indigent defense, the amount was generally small relative to the total award and most commonly used for personnel and training. For instance, among grant recipients who reported in GAOs surveys that they had allocated funding for indigent defense, allocations as a percentage of total awards ranged from 2 percent to 14 percent.
DOJ generally collects data on funding allocated for indigent defense when the grant program requires such funding or identifies it as a grant priority, but does not do so in two juvenile-focused grants. According to DOJ, it does not collect such data in these two programs because indigent defense is 1 of 17 purposes for which grant funds can be used. GAO has previously reported that agencies should collect data to support decision making, and the Attorney General has committed to focusing on indigent defense issues. Collecting data on the amount of funding from these two grants that is used to support indigent defense would position DOJ to better assess if it is meeting the Attorney Generals commitment.
DOJ assesses the impact of indigent defense grant funding and has mechanisms to help indigent defense providers evaluate services. All 9 of the DOJ grant programs that required or prioritized funding to be used for indigent defense included output measures that described the level of grant activity, such as the number of defenders hired, and 7 of the 9 included outcome measures that described the intended results of the funds, such as the percent increase in defendants served. Nine of the 118 public defender offices or agencies that responded to GAOs survey provided GAO with a copy of an evaluation that had been conducted of their office; those that did not most frequently cited lack of personnel (28 of 62) and lack of expertise or the need for technical assistance (26 of 62) as the reasons. DOJ has mechanisms that could address these challenges. For instance, DOJ provides technical assistance through a website.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ increase grantees awareness that funding can be allocated for indigent defense and collect data on such funding.
DOJ concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-98-3 | gao_RCED-98-3_0 | Few Facilities Have Completed Cleanups Under the Program
Since 1984, companies have completed cleanup action at about 8 percent (301) of the universe of 3,698 nonfederal facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste, according to EPA’s data. These cleanups include about 5 percent (69) of the 1,304 facilities that EPA considers to be a high priority because they pose the highest potential risk to human health or the environment. At that time, EPA data showed that only about 1 percent of the facilities that needed cleanups had undertaken cleanup actions. While some of these cleanup activities are likely to qualify as corrective action, according to EPA program managers, the extent of these types of cleanup actions is unknown. Second, EPA, the states, and companies often disagree on how to approach cleanup at a facility, including the standards and remedies that facilities should use. Finally, EPA and some states lack the resources needed to direct more companies to begin cleanups at the facilities not yet in the program and to provide timely oversight of cleanups already under way. However, the industry representatives stated that the duplicative and restrictive nature of the cleanup process EPA and the states have implemented adds more time and cost than warranted. We determined, however, that the companies in our survey appear to undertake more comprehensive cleanup actions only when they have an economic incentive to do so because the corrective action process can be so costly and time-consuming. EPA’s and States’ Initiatives May Begin to Address the Cleanup Backlog
EPA, the states, and industry have recognized the need to improve the cleanup process. The state has also streamlined the process by which companies must ensure the quality of their cleanup work. While companies’ cleanup managers favor the flexibility that many of these initiatives provide, several of them expressed reservations about EPA’s and the states’ willingness to adopt these new approaches nationwide. Therefore, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA (1) devise a strategy with milestones for ensuring that cleanup managers in EPA’s regions and the states authorized to implement the program have a consistent understanding of the new approaches provided by the guidance or regulations as well as how to apply these approaches to cleanup decisions and (2) oversee program implementation to determine if cleanup managers are appropriately using the new approaches as they direct cleanups. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Commerce was interested in the current status of the Corrective Action Program under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), he asked us to determine (1) the progress made in cleaning up facilities under the program, (2) factors affecting progress, and (3) any initiatives that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the states, and industry have taken to accomplish cleanups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program, focusing on: (1) the progress made in cleaning up facilities under the program; (2) factors affecting progress; and (3) any initiatives that EPA, the states, and industry have taken to accomplish cleanups.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) only about 8 percent of the nonfederal facilities nationwide that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste, including about 5 percent of the facilities considered to pose the highest risk, have completed cleanup actions, according to EPA's data; (2) about 56 percent of the facilities, including about 35 percent of those posing the highest risk, have yet to begin the formal cleanup process; (3) some facilities have undertaken cleanup actions outside of the program; however, the extent of these efforts is unknown because they are not reflected in EPA's program data; (4) according to EPA, state, and company cleanup managers: (a) cleaning up the contaminated facilities under the program is time-consuming and costly because the process EPA developed for cleanups, and which some states authorized to implement the program have adopted, has multiple reporting and review requirements; (b) EPA, the states, and companies often disagree on how cleanup should be pursued, which prolongs the cleanup process because more time is needed to negotiate cleanup terms, and companies must sometimes meet the duplicate requirements of both federal and state regulators; (c) unless EPA or the states direct the companies to begin cleanup, the companies appear to perform cleanups only when they have business incentives to do so; and (d) EPA and the states lack the resources they need to direct more companies to begin their cleanups and to provide timely oversight at the facilities already performing cleanups; (5) EPA, some states, and industry have undertaken initiatives to streamline the cleanup process and make cleanup decisions on the basis of risk, rather than on the basis of the more generic process specified for the program; (6) EPA and the states are looking for ways to leverage their limited resources to accomplish cleanups more quickly, including putting facilities into alternative programs that streamline cleanups; (7) while these initiatives promise to allow faster and cheaper cleanups, some of them may involve tradeoffs in the stringency of the standards applied, the permanence of the remedies selected, and the level of public participation required; (8) these tradeoffs increase the need for long-term oversight to ensure that the remedies continue to protect human health and the environment; (9) although companies' cleanup managers favor many of the initiatives, several of them expressed reservations about EPA's and the states' willingness to use these initiatives; and (10) EPA's strategy of adopting new approaches to corrective action may not be sufficient to ensure that the approaches are implemented nationwide. |
gao_GAO-04-805 | gao_GAO-04-805_0 | Congressional Rationale for DOD’s Family Separation Allowance Eligibility Requirements
In 1963, Congress established the $30-per-month family separation allowance to help offset the additional expenses incurred by the dependents of servicemembers who are away from their permanent duty station for more than 30 consecutive days. According to statements made by members of Congress during consideration of the legislation establishing the family separation allowance, additional expenses could stem from costs associated with home repairs, automobile maintenance, and childcare that could not be performed by the deployed servicemember. Over the years, the eligibility requirements for the family separation allowance have changed. For example, while the family separation allowance was initially authorized for enlisted members in pay grades E-5 and above as well as to enlisted members in pay grade E-4 with 4 years of service, today the family separation allowance is authorized for servicemembers in all pay grades at a flat rate of $250 per month. The rationale for establishing the 30-day threshold is unknown. DOD Has Not Identified Frequent Deployments Less Than 30-days as a Family Separation Allowance Issue
DOD has not identified frequent short-term deployments less than 30-days as a family separation allowance issue. No proposals seeking modifications to the family separation allowance because of frequent short-term deployments have been provided to DOD for consideration as part of DOD’s Unified Legislation and Budgeting process, which reviews personnel compensation proposals. To analyze concerns that might be raised by those experiencing frequent short-term deployments, we conducted group discussions with Air Force strategic C-5 airlift aircrews at Travis Air Force Base, which we identified as an example of servicemembers who generally deploy for periods less than 30 days. We did not identify any specific concerns regarding compensation received as a result of short-term deployments. We found that the C-5 aircrews were generally more concerned about the high pace of operations and associated unpredictability of their schedules, due to the negative impact on their quality of life, than about qualifying for the family separation allowance. Personnel Deployed Less Than 30 Days May Be Eligible to Receive Additional Compensation
In addition to basic compensation, DOD has several special pays and allowances available to further compensate servicemembers deployed for less than 30 days. Servicemembers who are deployed domestically or overseas for less than 30 days may be eligible to receive regular per diem. The per diem amount varies depending upon location. However, DOD has not implemented one special allowance designed, in part, to compensate those frequently deployed for short periods. Congress supported DOD’s legislative proposal to authorize a monthly high-deployment allowance with passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. This provision allows the services to compensate their members for lengthy deployments as well as frequent shorter deployments. The rates range from $86 to $284 per day within the continental United States and from $20 to $533 per day when outside the continental United States, depending on whether government meals and lodging are provided. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in concert with the Service Secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to take the following three actions set a timetable for establishing criteria to implement the high deployment define, as part of the criteria, what constitutes frequent short-term deployments within the context of the cumulative day requirement as stated in the high deployment allowance legislation; and determine, as part of the criteria, eligibility requirements targeting the high deployment allowance to selected occupational specialties. To assess what special pays and allowances are available, in addition to basic compensation, to further compensate servicemembers deployed for less than 30 days, we identified special pays and allowances that do not have a time eligibility factor through the DOD’s Military Compensation Background Papers, legislative research, and discussions with OSD officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to assess the special pays and allowances for servicemembers who are frequently deployed for less than 30 days, and to specifically review the family separation allowance. GAO's objectives were to assess (1) the rationale for the family separation allowance eligibility requirements, including the required duration of more than 30 consecutive days away from a member's duty station; (2) the extent to which DOD has identified short-term deployments as a family separation allowance issue; and (3) what special pays and allowances, in addition to basic military compensation, are available to compensate members deployed for less than 30 days.
What GAO Found
In 1963, Congress established the family separation allowance to help offset the additional expenses that may be incurred by the dependents of servicemembers who are away from their permanent duty station for more than 30 consecutive days. Additional expenses may include the costs associated with home repairs, automobile maintenance, and childcare that could have been performed by the deployed servicemember. Over the years, the eligibility requirements for the family separation allowance have changed. Today, the family separation allowance is authorized for officers and enlisted in all pay grades at a flat rate. The rationale for establishing the 30-day threshold is unknown. DOD has not identified frequent short-term deployments as a family separation allowance issue. No proposals seeking modifications to the family separation allowance because of frequent short-term deployments have been provided to DOD for consideration as part of DOD's Unified Legislation and Budgeting process, which reviews personnel pay proposals. Further, DOD officials were not aware of any specific concerns that have been raised by frequently deployed servicemembers about their eligibility to receive the family separation allowance. Based on group discussions with Air Force strategic airlift aircrews, who were identified as examples of those most likely to be experiencing short-term deployments, we did not identify any specific concerns regarding the lack of family separation allowance compensation associated with short-term deployments. Rather, many aircrew members indicated the high pace of operations and associated unpredictability of their schedules was a greater concern due to the negative impact on their quality of life. In addition to basic military compensation, DOD has several special pays and allowances to further compensate servicemembers deployed for short periods. Servicemembers who are deployed for less than 30 days may be eligible to receive regular per diem. The per diem amount varies depending upon location. For example, these rates range from $86 to $284 per day within the United States and from $20 to $533 per day when outside the United States. However, DOD has not implemented the high deployment allowance designed, in part, to compensate those frequently deployed for shorter periods. Congress supported DOD's legislative proposal to authorize a monthly high deployment allowance. This allowance permits the services to compensate members for lengthy as well as frequent shorter deployments. The most recent amendment to this provision provides DOD with the authority to adjust a cumulative day threshold to help compensate servicemembers experiencing frequent short deployments. DOD has flexibility to exclude all occupations except those that it wishes to target for additional pay. However, DOD has not established criteria to implement this allowance, nor has DOD set a timetable for establishing such criteria. |
gao_GAO-06-626T | gao_GAO-06-626T_0 | Space Acquisition Problems Persist
The majority of satellite programs we have reviewed over the past 2 decades experienced problems during their acquisition that drove up costs and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100-percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return on its investment. Along with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as 6 years—postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same capability. While DOD is planning to undertake the new systems, broader analyses of the nation’s fiscal future indicate that spending for weapon systems may need to be reduced, rather than increased, to address growing deficits. Underlying Causes of Acquisition Problems
Our reviews have identified a number of causes behind the problems just described, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding which encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, over promising, suppressing bad news, and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially better alternatives. Second, DOD starts its space programs too early, that is, before it has assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. A companion problem for all weapon systems is that DOD allows new requirements to be added well into the acquisition phase. Since we last testified before this subcommittee in July 2005, DOD has appointed a new Under Secretary of the Air Force to be in charge of space acquisitions, who, in turn, has embraced adopting best practices, or, as he terms it, “going back to the basics.” Specifically, the Under Secretary has expressed a desire to Delegate the maturation of technologies—to the point of being tested in a relevant environment or operational environment, if appropriate— to the S&T community. Adopt an evolutionary development approach in which new systems would be developed in a series of increments, or blocks. Fund S&T appropriately so that significant technology breakthroughs can be continually pursued. Keys to Realizing DOD’s New Goals for Space Acquisitions
DOD’s desire to adopt best practices for space acquisition is a positive and necessary first step toward reform. However, these changes will not be easy to undertake. They require significant shifts in thinking about how space systems should be developed; changes in incentives and perceptions; as well as further policy and process changes. There are steps, however, that DOD can take to substantially mitigate these challenges. Third, DOD could continue to address other capacity shortfalls. Table 1 highlights recent findings from our reports on cost and schedule overruns for DOD’s current and planned space programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years, and increased performance risks. GAO was asked to testify on its findings on space acquisition problems and steps needed to improve outcomes.
What GAO Found
DOD's space acquisition programs continue to face substantial cost and schedule overruns. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100-percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return on its investment. Along with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 6 years--postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same capability. These problems are having a dramatic effect on DOD's space investment portfolio. Over the next 5 years, there will be about $12 billion less dollars available for new systems as well as for the discovery of promising new technologies because of cost growth. And while DOD is pushing to start new, highly ambitious programs such as the Transformational Satellite and Space Radar, broader analyses of the nation's fiscal future indicate that spending for weapon systems may need to be reduced, rather than increased, to address growing deficits. GAO has identified a number of causes behind these problems, but several stand out. First, DOD starts more space and weapons programs than it can afford, which pressures programs to under estimate costs and over promise capabilities. Second, DOD starts its space programs too early, that is, before it is sure the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. DOD has also allowed new requirements to be added well into the acquisition phase. DOD has appointed a new leadership to oversee space acquisitions who have committed to adopting practices GAO has recommended for improving outcomes. These include delegating the maturation of technologies to the S&T community; adopting an evolutionary development approach in which new systems would be developed in a series of discrete increments, or blocks; fund S&T appropriately so that significant technology breakthroughs can be continually pursued; and improving collaboration on requirements. Adopting best practices for space acquisitions will not be an easy undertaking. DOD, as a whole, still operates in an environment that encourages competition for funding, and thus, behaviors that have been detrimental to meeting cost and schedule goals. Moreover, the changes being proposed will require significant shifts in thinking about how space systems should be developed and changes in incentives. By establishing investment priorities, embedding best practices in policy, and addressing capacity shortfalls, DOD can mitigate these challenges and better position programs for success. |
gao_GAO-17-243 | gao_GAO-17-243_0 | Board of Governors. The Reserve Banks use earnings to pay operational expenses and dividends to member banks and to fund their capital surplus accounts. Stock Purchase Requirement for Member Banks and Membership Benefits
Under the Federal Reserve Act, a member bank (a national bank or state- chartered bank that applies and is accepted to the Federal Reserve) must subscribe to capital stock of the Reserve Bank of its district in an amount equal to 6 percent of the member bank’s capital and surplus. The boards of directors of Reserve Banks play a role in the conduct of monetary policy in three primary ways: (1) by providing input on economic conditions to the Reserve Bank president (all 12 Reserve Bank presidents attend and participate in deliberations at each FOMC meeting); (2) by participating in establishing discount rate recommendations (interest rate charged to commercial banks and other depository institutions on loans received from their regional Reserve Bank’s discount window) for Board of Governors’ review and determination; and (3) for the Class B and C directors, by appointing Reserve Bank presidents with the approval of the Board of Governors. Stock Purchase Requirement Established an Ownership and Control Structure for Reserve Banks as a Counterbalance in the Federal Reserve
According to the legislative history and historical accounts related to the Federal Reserve Act, debate over the creation of the Federal Reserve focused on the balance of power among economic regions of the United States and between the private sector and government. Potential Implications of Modifying the Capital Surplus Account and Dividend Rate
Based on our interviews with Federal Reserve officials, the cap on the aggregate Reserve Banks’ surplus account had little effect on Federal Reserve operations, and we found that the modification to the Reserve Bank stock dividend rate has had no immediate effect on membership. While it is debatable whether transferring funds from the Federal Reserve to Treasury when the FAST Act also funded specific projects should be viewed any differently than the recurring transfers that occur on a regular basis, some stakeholders raised concerns about future transfers that could ultimately affect, among other things, the Federal Reserve’s financial independence and consequently, autonomy in monetary policy decision making (instrument independence). The FAST Act, which authorized the Highway Trust Fund for fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2020, requires that the aggregate of the Reserve Banks’ surplus funds not exceed $10 billion and directed that amounts in excess of $10 billion be transferred to Treasury’s General Fund. The modified dividend rate for the larger member banks reduced the dividend payment for the first half of 2016 by nearly two-thirds from the payment for the first half of 2015 (from approximately $850 million to approximately $300 million). Four of the 6 large member banks stated that they would likely act to recoup this lost revenue. This discussion assumes that the goals reflected in the original construction of the Federal Reserve remain (independence, balance of power, and geographical diversity). Diminished Reserve Bank autonomy. According to Reserve Bank officials, all else being equal, retirement of the stock coupled with elimination of the current corporate structure of the Reserve Banks could result in removal of Reserve Bank boards of directors or limit the benefits currently provided by their participation. Specifically, this action could limit the diversity of views in monetary policy by weakening the link to regional input in FOMC discussions. For example, converting the Reserve Banks to field offices could preclude them from conducting critical banking functions, and the activities they could undertake as fiscal agents for the government if they were to become government entities are unclear. Voluntary Stock Ownership
Making stock ownership voluntary could have a number of policy implications. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) examine the historical rationale for the Reserve Banks’ stock purchase requirement and 6 percent dividend, (2) assess the potential implications of capping the Reserve Banks’ aggregate surplus account and modifying the Reserve Bank stock dividend rate, and (3) analyze the potential policy implications of modifying the Reserve Bank stock ownership requirement for member banks under three scenarios. We interviewed Federal Reserve officials, including from the Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks; former members of the Board of Governors who had written about the changes in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act); academics who had written extensively about the Federal Reserve; other federal bank regulators, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); and, banking industry associations. The scenarios are illustrative and do not represent all of the ways in which the Federal Reserve structure might be altered nor does our analysis account for all of the potential consequences of stock ownership modifications. | Why GAO Did This Study
Member banks of the Federal Reserve must purchase stock in their regional Reserve Bank, but historically received a 6 percent dividend annually on paid-in stock. A provision of the 2015 FAST Act modified the dividend rate formula for 85 larger member banks—and currently reduces the amount these banks receive. The FAST Act also capped the surplus capital the Reserve Banks could hold and directed that any excess be transferred to Treasury's general fund. Congress offset payments into the Highway Trust Fund by, among other things, instituting the Reserve Bank surplus account cap.
GAO was asked to report on the effects of these changes and the policy implications of modifying the stock ownership requirement. Among its objectives, this report (1) examines the effects of capping the Reserve Banks' aggregate surplus account and reducing the Reserve Bank stock dividend rate, and (2) evaluates the potential policy implications of modifying the stock ownership requirement for member banks under three scenarios.
GAO reviewed legislative history and relevant literature about the Federal Reserve, prior GAO reports, and interviewed academics and current and former officials of the Board of Governors, Reserve Bank, other banking regulators, and industry associations. In addition, GAO conducted structured interviews with 17 commercial banks, selected based on bank size and regulator.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO requested comments from the banking regulators and Treasury, but none were provided.
What GAO Found
According to Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) officials, capping the surplus account had little effect on Federal Reserve operations, and GAO found that modifying the stock dividend rate formula had no immediate effect on membership. Reserve Banks fund operations, pay dividends to member banks, and maintain a surplus account before remitting excess funds to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Whether the transfers to Treasury's General Fund in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) when the act also funds specific projects should be viewed any differently than the recurring transfers of Reserve Bank earnings to Treasury is debatable. Some stakeholders raised concerns about setting a precedent—future transfers could affect the Federal Reserve's independence and, consequently, autonomy in monetary policymaking. Dividend payments to 85 banks decreased by nearly two-thirds (first half of 2016 over first half of 2015), but GAO found no shifts in Reserve Bank membership as of December 2016. Some member banks affected by the rate change told GAO they had a few concerns with it and some said they might try to recoup the lost revenue, but none indicated they would drop membership.
Assuming that the policy goals—independence, balance of power, and geographical diversity—reflected in the original private-public Federal Reserve structure remain important, the implications of modifying the stock ownership requirement and therefore the Federal Reserve structure could be considerable. The scenarios discussed in this report are illustrative and do not represent all the ways in which the Federal Reserve structure might be altered. Also, the discussion of effects is limited because exact replacement structures are unknown. Retiring the stock could result in changes to the existing corporate structure of the 12 Reserve Banks. These changes could
diminish Reserve Bank autonomy in relation to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors) by removing or changing Reserve Banks' boards of directors, which could limit the diversity of economic viewpoints in monetary policy discussions and centralize monetary policy decision making in the hands of the Board of Governors,
eliminate the private corporate characteristics of Reserve Banks and convert them to government entities (such as field offices of the Board of Governors), which could lead to less private sector involvement and reduced financial independence of the Federal Reserve, and
remove the authority the Reserve Banks currently have to conduct activities critical to the Federal Reserve, such as executing monetary policy through open market operations and those related to the Reserve Banks' role as fiscal agents for the federal government.
Making stock ownership voluntary could increase fluctuations in outstanding shares, affecting Federal Reserve governance and complicating the Reserve Banks' processes for managing their balance sheets. While modifying the stock ownership requirement could give member banks greater control of the capital tied to the stock, member and nonmember banks with which GAO spoke indicated that they likely would not change their membership in response to any modifications discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-03-251 | gao_GAO-03-251_0 | Attacks Severely Affected Financial Markets but Heroic Efforts Were Made to Restore Operations
Although the facilities of the stock and options exchanges and clearing organizations in lower Manhattan were largely undamaged by the attacks, many market participants were affected by the loss of telecommunications and lack of access to lower Manhattan. In addition, connectivity between market participants and exchanges had not been tested. Disruptions in Government Securities and Money Markets Severely Affected Clearance and Settlement, Liquidity, and Trade Volumes
The attacks also severely disrupted the markets for government securities and money market instruments primarily because of the impact on the broker-dealers that trade in the market and on one of the key banks that perform clearing functions for these products. For example, some firms had difficulties in locating key staff in the confusion after the attacks. Financial Market Participants Have Taken Actions to Reduce Risks of Disruption, but Some Limitations Remain
Since the attacks, exchanges, clearing organizations, ECNs, and payment system processors implemented various physical and information security measures and business continuity capabilities to reduce the risk that their operations would be disrupted by attacks, but some organizations continued to have limitations in their preparedness that increases their risk of disruption. However, at the time we conducted our review, 9 of the 15 organizations, including 2 we considered critical to the functioning of the financial markets, had not taken steps to ensure that they would have the staff necessary to conduct their critical operations if the staff at their primary site were incapacitated—including 8 organizations that also had physical vulnerabilities at their primary sites. If a wide- scale disaster caused damage or made a region greater than these distances inaccessible, these 4 organizations would be at greater risk for not being able to resume operations promptly. The remaining 6 organizations faced increased risk of being disrupted by a wide-scale disaster because 4 lacked backup facilities, while 2 organizations had backup facilities that were located 4 to 10 miles from their primary operations facilities. 3 of this report). SEC and SROs Generally Did Not Review Physical and Information System Security and Business Continuity at Broker- Dealers
SEC and the securities market SROs generally have not examined broker- dealers’ physical and information system security and business continuity efforts, but planned to increase their focus on these issues in the future. However, the bank regulators’ guidance did not specifically address measures to protect facilities from terrorist or other physical attacks. Conclusions
Financial market regulators have begun to develop goals and a strategy for resuming operations along with sound business continuity practices for a limited number of organizations that conduct clearing functions. Given the increased threats demonstrated by the September 11 attacks and the need to ensure that key financial market organizations are following sound practices, securities and banking regulators’ oversight programs are important mechanisms for ensuring that U.S financial markets are resilient. | Why GAO Did This Study
September 11 exposed the vulnerability of U.S. financial markets to wide-scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the nation's economy, GAO assessed (1) the effects of the attacks on market participants' facilities and telecommunications and how prepared participants were for attacks at that time, (2) physical and information security and business continuity plans market participants had in place after the attacks, and (3) regulatory efforts to improve preparedness and oversight of market participants' risk reduction efforts.
What GAO Found
The September 11 attacks severely disrupted U.S. financial markets, resulting in the longest closure of the stock markets since the 1930s and severe settlement difficulties in the government securities market. While exchange and clearing organization facilities were largely undamaged, critical broker--dealers and bank participants had facilities and telecommunications connections damaged or destroyed. These firms and infrastructure providers made heroic and sometimes ad hoc and innovative efforts to restore operations. However, the attacks revealed that many of these organizations' business continuity plans (BCP) had not been designed to address wide-scale events. GAO reviewed 15 organizations that perform trading or clearing and found that since the attacks, these organizations had improved their physical and information security measures and BCPs to reduce the risk of disruption from future attacks. However, many of the organizations still had limitations in their preparedness that increased their risk of being disrupted. For example, 9 organizations had not developed BCP procedures to ensure that staff capable of conducting their critical operations would be available if an attack incapacitated personnel at their primary sites. Ten were also at greater risk for being disrupted by wide-scale events because 4 organizations had no backup facilities and 6 had facilities located between 2 to 10 miles from their primary sites. The financial regulators have begun to jointly develop recovery goals and business continuity practices for organizations important for clearing; however, regulators have not developed strategies and practices for exchanges, key broker-dealers, and banks to ensure that trading can resume promptly in future disasters. Individually, SEC has reviewed exchange and clearing organization risk reduction efforts, but had not generally reviewed broker-dealers' efforts. The bank regulators that oversee the major banks had guidance on information security and business continuity and reported examining banks' risk reduction measures annually. |
gao_GAO-08-413T | gao_GAO-08-413T_0 | GAO Experience in Governmentwide Human Capital Issues and Other Management Areas Can Assist Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reforms
For decades, we have assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped agencies with disparate missions to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of their operations and the need for interagency collaboration in addressing 21st century challenges, and we could assist the intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees in their oversight of the Intelligence Community as well. Our work also provides important insight on matters such as best practices to be shared and benchmarked and how government and its nongovernmental partners can become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation. In addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by highlighting the long- term implications of today’s decisions and identifying key trends and emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis proportions. Human Capital Transformation and Management Are Governmentwide High- Risk Issues also Affecting the Intelligence Community
GAO has identified a number of human capital transformation and management issues over the years, such as acquisition, information technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, financial and knowledge management, and personnel security clearances, as cross- cutting, governmentwide issues that affect most federal agencies, including those within the Intelligence Community. Personnel Security Clearances Continue to Experience Delays and Impediments
For more than 3 decades, GAO’s reviews of personnel security clearances have identified delays and other impediments in DOD’s personnel security clearance program, which maintains about 2.5 million clearances, including clearances for intelligence agencies within DOD. GAO’s Work on the Space Acquisition Workforce Recommended Management Improvements
Our work on the space acquisition workforce is another example of in- depth programmatic reviews we have been able to perform addressing intelligence-related matters. GAO’s Access to Perform Audit Work Could be Affected If the ODNI Assumes Management of Personnel Security Clearances
Our ability to continue monitoring security clearance-related problems in DOD as well as other parts of the federal government and to provide Congress with information for its oversight role could be adversely affected if the ODNI assumes management responsibility over this area. First, in 2006, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management has suggested that the agency’s oversight role of the governmentwide security clearance process might be transferred to the ODNI. Although we have established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship with the ODNI, limitations on our ability to perform meaningful audit and evaluation work persist. If the ODNI were to take leadership or oversight responsibilities for governmentwide personnel security clearances, it might be prudent to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce GAO’s access to the information needed to conduct audits and reviews in the personnel security clearance area. GAO Comments on the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007
Finally, GAO supports S. 82 and we would be well-positioned to provide Congress with an independent, fact-based evaluation of Intelligence Community management reform initiatives with the support of Congress and S. 82. Specifically, S. 82 would, if enacted, reaffirm GAO’s authority, under existing statutory provisions, to audit and evaluate financial transactions, programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence Community, and to access records necessary for such audits and evaluations. GAO has clear audit and access authority with respect to elements of the Intelligence Community, subject to a few limited exceptions. In addition, for many years, the executive branch has not provided GAO with the level of cooperation needed to conduct meaningful reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community. As previously noted, this issue has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in the post-9/11 context, especially since the Director of National Intelligence has been assigned responsibilities addressing issues that extend well beyond traditional intelligence activities, such as information sharing. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to ensure that GAO’s audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, GAO has assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped federal departments and agencies with disparate missions to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their operations. GAO's work provides important insight on matters such as best practices to be shared and benchmarked and how government and nongovernmental partners can become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation. In addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by highlighting the long-term implications of today's decisions and identifying key trends and emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis proportions. For this hearing, GAO was asked to (1) highlight governmentwide issues where it has made a major contribution to oversight and could assist the intelligence and other congressional committees in their oversight of the Intelligence Community, and (2) comment on the potential impact on GAO's access to perform audit work on personnel security clearances if the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were to assume management of this issue from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Given historical challenges to GAO's ability to audit the Intelligence Community's programs and activities, this testimony also discusses GAO's views on Senate bill S. 82, known as the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007.
What GAO Found
GAO has considerable experience in addressing governmentwide management challenges, including such areas as human capital, acquisition, information technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, and financial and knowledge management, and has identified many opportunities to improve agencies' economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and the need for interagency collaboration in addressing 21st century challenges. For example, over the years, GAO has addressed the human capital issues, such as acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; strategic workforce planning; building results-oriented cultures; pay for performance; contractors in the workforce; and personnel security clearances, which affect all federal agencies, including the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, GAO identified delays and other impediments in the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which also maintains clearances for intelligence agencies within DOD. GAO designated human capital transformation and personnel security clearances as high-risk areas. GAO also recently issued reports addressing Intelligence Community-related management issues, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; space acquisitions; and the space acquisition workforce. If ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over security clearances across the federal government, GAO's ability to continue monitoring this area and provide Congress information for its oversight role could be adversely affected. In 2006, OMB's Deputy Director for Management suggested that OMB's oversight role of the governmentwide security clearance process might be transferred to the ODNI. GAO has established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship with the ODNI, but limitations on GAO's ability to perform meaningful audit and evaluation work persist. While GAO has the legal authority to audit the personnel security clearance area, if the ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over this issue, then it may be prudent to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce GAO's access to information needed to conduct such audits and reviews. GAO supports S. 82 and believes that if it is enacted, the agency would be well-positioned to assist Congress in oversight of Intelligence Community management reforms. S. 82 would reaffirm GAO's existing statutory authority to audit and evaluate financial transactions, programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence Community, and to access records necessary for such audits and evaluations. GAO has clear audit and access authority with respect to elements of the Intelligence Community, subject to a few limited exceptions. However, for many years, the executive branch has not provided GAO the level of cooperation needed to conduct meaningful reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community. This issue has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in the post-9/11 context, especially since the ODNI's responsibilities extend well beyond traditional intelligence activities. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to ensure that GAO's audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the future. |
gao_RCED-96-16 | gao_RCED-96-16_0 | Shortly after the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) developed the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Protocol), the Congress added title VI to the Clean Air Act to supplement the Protocol’s terms and conditions. 1.) Effectiveness of Efforts to Identify Replacements Is Unclear
According to EPA, there are many chemical and nonchemical alternatives to methyl bromide. Methyl bromide and a number of pesticides that have been approved for use on pests now controlled by methyl bromide are included in this group of chemicals. If Mexico or other developing countries expand their use of methyl bromide, the environmental benefits gained by phasing out the pesticide’s use in the United States would be at least partially offset. We identified no current uses of methyl bromide in medical devices, and it appears that an exemption for this purpose would not be applicable. Less effective than methyl bromide. Specifically, we agreed to develop information on (1) the scientific evidence that human uses of methyl bromide contribute to the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, (2) the availability of economical and effective alternatives to methyl bromide, (3) the impact of the ban on U.S. trade in agricultural commodities, and (4) EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, as amended, to grant exemptions to the ban for essential uses. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the phaseout of methyl bromide in the United States, focusing on the: (1) scientific evidence that emissions of methyl bromide are depleting the ozone layer; (2) availability of economical and effective alternatives to the pesticide; (3) effects of banning the pesticide on U.S. trade in agricultural commodities; and (4) Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) authority under the Clean Air Act to exempt essential uses of methyl bromide from the phaseout.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) world scientists participating in the United Nation's Environment Programme believe that emissions of methyl bromide contribute significantly to ozone depletion; (2) although several chemical and nonchemical pest-control alternatives to methyl bromide are available, none are as economical and effective as methyl bromide; (3) if other countries continue to use methyl bromide after it is phased out in the United States, they will have an unfair advantage in international markets for the various agricultural commodities produced with the substance; and (4) the Clean Air Act does not authorize EPA to grant exemptions on producing and importing methyl bromide except for use in medical devices and for export to developing countries that have signed the Montreal Protocol. |
gao_GAO-01-1158T | gao_GAO-01-1158T_0 | The government must be able to prevent and deter threats to our homeland as well as detect impending danger before attacks or incidents occur. First, I will discuss the need for clearly defined and effective leadership with a clear vision of what needs to be accomplished. One of these recommendations is that the government needs more clearly defined and effective leadership to develop a strategy for combating terrorism, to oversee development of a new national threat and risk assessment, and to coordinate implementation among federal agencies. The Country Needs a Comprehensive National Security Threat and Risk Assessment
The United States does not have a national threat and risk assessment to help guide federal programs for homeland security. How the Country Should Develop the National Strategy
Now, I would like to discuss some elements that may need to be included in the development of the national strategy and a means to assign roles to federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. Our strategy, to be comprehensive in nature, should include steps designed to reduce our vulnerability to threats, for example, by hardening targets to minimize the damage from an attack; use intelligence assets to identify threats; stop attacks before they occur; and manage the consequences of an incident. Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
Federal critical infrastructure-protection initiatives have focused on preventing mass disruption that can occur when information systems are compromised because of computer-based attacks. | What GAO Found
The United States now faces increasingly diverse threats that put great destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals. These threats range from cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction or infectious diseases. Efforts to combat this threat will involve federal agencies as well as state and local governments, the private sector, and private citizens. GAO believes that the federal government must address three fundamental needs. First, the government needs clearly defined and effective leadership with a clear vision carry out and implement a homeland security strategy and the ability to marshal the necessary resources to get the job done. Second, a national homeland security strategy should be based on a comprehensive assessment of national threats and risks. Third, the many organizations that will be involved in homeland security must have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms. Any strategy for homeland security must reduce risk where possible, assess the nation's vulnerabilities, and identify the critical infrastructure most in need of protection. To be comprehensive, the strategy should include steps to use intelligence assets or other means to identify attackers and prevent attacks before they occur, harden potential targets to minimize the damage from an attack, and effectively manage the consequences of an incident. |
gao_NSIAD-96-64 | gao_NSIAD-96-64_0 | Recognizing that undue foreign control or influence over management or operations of companies working on sensitive classified contracts could compromise classified information or impede the performance of classified contracts, DOD requires that foreign-owned U.S. firms operate under control structures known as voting trusts, proxy agreements, and special security agreements (SSA). Each of these agreements requires that the foreign owners select and DOD approve cleared U.S. citizens to be placed on the board of directors of the foreign-owned company to represent DOD’s interests by ensuring against (1) foreign access to classified information without a clearance and a need to know and (2) company actions that could adversely affect performance on classified contracts. 2) and the high degree of contact with foreign interests at foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors (see ch. Information at Risk
Contracts requiring access to classified information at the levels shown in table 2.1 have been awarded to foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors. Some of the contracts these foreign-owned U.S. companies are working on are Special Access Programs. Visitation Agreements Give Foreign Owners a High Degree of Access
“In every case where a voting trust agreement, proxy agreement, or special security agreement is employed to eliminate risks associated with foreign ownership, a visitation agreement shall be executed . . .” “The visitation agreement shall provide that, as a general rule, visits between the foreign stockholder and the cleared U.S. firm are not authorized; however, as an exception to the general rule, the trustees, may approve such visits in connection with regular day-to-day business operations pertaining strictly to purely commercial products or services and not involving classified contracts.”
The visitation agreements are to guard against foreign owners or their representatives obtaining access to classified information without a clearance and a need to know. None of these security arrangements is intended to deny U.S. defense contractors the opportunity to do business with their foreign owners. We also observed that some DOD-approved trustees appeared to have conflicts of interest. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed security arrangements used to protect sensitive information from foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors that perform on classified Department of Defense (DOD) contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) security arrangements are intended to protect foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors from undue foreign control and to prevent foreign owners' access to classified information; (2) there are 54 foreign-owned U.S. defense contractors operating under security arrangements, such as voting trusts, proxy agreements, and special security agreements; (3) although special security agreement companies are not permitted access to the highest levels of classified information due to the risk of foreign control, DOD authorized such access to 12 of 33 special security agreement companies; (4) each foreign-owned U.S. defense contractor must have a visitation agreement with its parent company to protect against foreign owners' unauthorized access to classified information; (5) individuals contacted by the parent company are required to report on the technical discussions that took place under visitation agreements; (6) U.S. citizens are selected for the boards of directors of foreign-owned U.S. defense firms to protect against undue foreign control and unauthorized access to classified information; and (7) most trustees have limited oversight roles and do not actively check on the implementation of security policies or engage in management issues, and some appear to have conflicts of interest. |
gao_GAO-08-261T | gao_GAO-08-261T_0 | Congress Has Established a Statutory Framework to Promote Agency Telework Programs and Increase Employee Participation
Through a number of legislative actions, Congress has indicated its desire that agencies create telework programs to accomplish a number of positive outcomes. 106-346 in October 2000, which provides the current mandate for telework in the executive branch of the federal government by requiring each executive agency to establish a policy under which eligible employees may participate in telework.In this law, Congress required each executive branch agency to establish a telework policy under which eligible employees of the agency may participate in telework to the maximum extent possible without diminishing employee performance. The legislative framework has provided both the General Services Administration (GSA) and OPM with lead roles for the governmentwide telework initiative—to provide services and resources to support and encourage telework, including providing guidance to agencies in developing their program procedures. Although agency telework policies meet common requirements and often share some common characteristics, each agency is responsible for developing its own policy to fit its mission and culture. Better Performance Measures and Program Evaluations Could Improve the Assessment of Telework in the Federal Government
In our 2003 study of telework in the federal government, we identified 25 key practices that federal agencies should implement in developing their telework programs. A business case analysis of telework can ensure that an agency’s telework program is closely aligned with its own strategic objectives and goals. We have recently noted instances where agency officials cited their telework programs as yielding some of the benefits listed above. The fifth agency reported the number of participants based on a survey of supervisors who were expected to track teleworkers. As for the fourth key practice closely related to managing for program results—identifying problems or issues with the telework program and making appropriate adjustments—none of the four agencies we reviewed for our 2003 study had fully implemented this practice and one of the four had taken no steps to do so despite the importance of using data to evaluate and improve their telework programs. To help agencies better manage for results through telework programs, in our 2005 study we had said that Congress should determine ways to promote more consistent definitions and measures related to telework. In particular, we suggested that Congress might want to have OPM, working through the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Council, develop a set of terms, definitions, and measures that would allow for a more meaningful assessment of progress in agency telework programs. Program management and oversight could be improved by more consistent definitions, such as eligibility. Some information may take additional effort to collect, as for example, on actual usage of telework. Other valuable information may already be available through existing sources. The Federal Human Capital Survey, for example—which is administered biennially—asks federal employees about their satisfaction with telework, among other things. In any case, OPM and the agency CHCO Council are well situated to sort through these issues and consider what information would be most useful. The CHCO Council and OPM could also work together on strategies for agencies to use the information for program improvements, including benchmarking. | Why GAO Did This Study
Telework continues to receive attention within Congress and federal agencies as a human capital strategy that offers various flexibilities to both employers and employees. Increasingly recognized as an important means to achieving a number of federal goals, telework offers greater capability to continue operations during emergency events, as well as affording environmental, energy, and other benefits to society. This statement highlights some of GAO's prior work on federal telework programs, including key practices for successful implementation of telework initiatives, identified in a 2003 GAO report and a 2005 GAO analysis of telework program definitions and methods in five federal agencies. It also notes more recent work where agency officials cite their telework programs as yielding benefits. As GAO has previously recommended, Congress should determine ways to promote more consistent telework definitions and measures. In particular, Congress might want to have the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council develop definitions and measures that would allow for a more meaningful assessment of progress in agency telework programs.
What GAO Found
Through a number of legislative actions, Congress has indicated its desire that agencies create telework programs to accomplish a number of positive outcomes. Many of the current federal programs were developed in response to a 2000 law that required each executive branch agency to establish a telework policy under which eligible employees may participate in telecommuting to the maximum extent possible without diminishing employee performance. The legislative framework has provided OPM and the General Services Administration with lead roles for the governmentwide telework initiative--providing services and resources to support and encourage telework. Although agency telework policies meet common requirements and often share characteristics, each agency is responsible for developing its own policy to fit its mission and culture. In a 2003 report, GAO identified a number of key practices that federal agencies should implement in developing their telework programs. Four of these were closely aligned with managing for program results: (1) developing a business case for telework, (2) establishing measurable telework program goals, (3) establishing systems to collect data for telework program evaluation, and (4) identifying problems and making appropriate adjustments. None of the four agencies we reviewed, however, had effectively implemented any of these practices. In a related review of five other agencies in 2005, GAO reported that none of the agencies had the capacity to track who was actually teleworking or how frequently, relying mostly on the number of telework agreements as the measure of program participation. Consistent definitions and measures related to telework would help agencies better manage for results through their telework programs. For example, program management and oversight could be improved by more consistent definitions, such as eligibility. Some information may take additional efforts to collect, for example, on actual usage of telework rather than employees' potential to telework. However, other valuable information may already be available through existing sources, such as the Federal Human Capital Survey. The survey--which is administered biennially--asks federal employees about their satisfaction with telework, among other things. OPM and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council are well-situated to sort through these issues and consider what information would be most useful. The council and OPM could also work together on strategies for agencies to use the information for program improvements, including benchmarking. |
gao_GAO-06-448T | gao_GAO-06-448T_0 | According to Coast Guard officials, much of the additional $328 million in this fiscal year’s budget request, which is about 4 percent over and above the fiscal year 2006 budget of $8.1 billion, covers such things as salary and benefit increases and maintenance. Coast Guard Reported Progress Made in Meeting Program Performance Targets
Even with sustained homeland security responsibilities, aging assets, and a particularly destructive hurricane season stretching resources across the agency, in fiscal year 2005 the Coast Guard reported that 7 of its 11 programs met or exceeded program performance targets. In addition, the agency reported that it anticipates meeting the target for 1 additional program when final results become available in July 2006, potentially bringing the total met targets to 8 out of 11 programs. We will provide final results on this work in a report to be published later this summer. Although the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina required substantial response and relief efforts, the Coast Guard was well prepared to act since it places a priority on training and contingency planning. The Coast Guard’s organizational structure and practices facilitated the agency’s response. In terms of Coast Guard practices, according to the hurricane and severe weather plans we reviewed for Coast Guard Districts 7 (Florida region) and 8 (Gulf region), and discussions we had in Washington, D.C., Virginia, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana with Coast Guard officials responsible for implementing those plans, the Coast Guard tracks the likely path of an approaching storm, anticipates the necessary assets to address the storm’s impact, and repositions personnel and aircraft out of harm’s way, with a focus on reconstituting assets to respond to local needs once it is safe to do so. While acknowledging the importance of these operational principles, it is equally important to note that the response to Hurricane Katrina also hinged on discipline and adherence to critical plans. The Coast Guard Continues with Organizational Changes and Expanded Partnerships to Meet Growing Responsibilities
Coast Guard organizational changes and expanded partnerships have helped to alleviate some resource pressures posed by added responsibilities or further deterioration of assets, as well as help accomplish its mission responsibilities. Progress Made with Ongoing Acquisition Efforts, but Continued Attention Is Warranted
Our recent reviews indicate that while the Coast Guard has made progress in managing the Deepwater program, further actions are needed and the lessons learned from this effort have not been applied to other ongoing acquisitions. For example, even with the Coast Guard’s improved management and oversight of its Deepwater program, further steps are needed before all of our past recommendations for improving accountability and program management can be considered fully implemented. The first challenge is to find the resources to replace some additional assets, not included in the Deepwater program, for its non-homeland security missions. To report on the status and cost of Coast Guard’s Rescue 21 program, we drew from our work examining (1) the reasons for significant implementation delays and cost overruns against Rescue 21’s original 2002 proposal; (2) the viability of the Coast Guard’s revised cost and implementation schedule that is projected to reach full operational capability in 2011; and (3) the impact of Rescue 21’s implementation delay upon the Coast Guard’s field units which are awaiting modernization of antiquated communications equipment. Programs Meeting Fiscal Year 2005 Performance Targets
U.S. Program Expected to Meet Fiscal Year 2005 Target
Illegal drug interdiction. Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 budget request total $8.4 billion, an increase of 4 percent ($328 million) over the approved budget for fiscal year 2006 and a slowing of the agency's budget increases over the past 2 fiscal years. This testimony, which is based on both current and past GAO work, synthesizes the results of these reviews as they pertain to meeting performance goals, adjusting to added responsibilities, acquiring new assets (especially the Deepwater program--to replace or upgrade cutters and aircraft, and the Rescue 21 program--to modernize rescue communications), and meeting other future challenges.
What GAO Found
According to the Coast Guard, the agency's fiscal year 2005 performance, as self-measured by its ability to meet program goals, was the highest since the terrorist attacks in September 2001. Even with the need to sustain new homeland security duties, respond to particularly destructive hurricanes, and cope with aging assets, the Coast Guard reported meeting or exceeding performance targets for 7 of 11 mission programs, and it anticipates meeting the target for 1 more program once final results for the year are available. In particular, based on our discussions with Coast Guard and other officials, as well as our review of pertinent documents, the Coast Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted three elements key to its mission performance: a priority on training and contingency planning, a flexible organizational structure, and the agency's operational principles. Three organizational changes appear to be helping the Coast Guard adjust to added responsibilities. First, according to agency officials, a realigned field structure will allow local commanders to manage resources more efficiently. Second, according to the Coast Guard, a new response team for maritime security is expected to provide greater counterterrorism capability. Finally, new and expanded partnerships inside and outside the federal government have the potential to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency. While some progress in acquisition management has been made, continued attention is warranted. Within the Deepwater program, additional action is needed before certain past recommendations can be considered as fully implemented. Also, the program recently had difficulties in acquiring Fast Response Cutters to replace aging patrol boats. For the Rescue 21 program, deficiencies in management and oversight appear similar to those that plagued the Deepwater program, leading to delays and cost overruns, and demonstrating that the Coast Guard has not translated past lessons learned into improved acquisition practices. Two additional future challenges also bear close attention: deteriorating buoy tenders and icebreakers that may need additional resources to sustain or replace them, and maintaining mission balance while taking on a new homeland security mission outside the agency's traditional focus on the maritime environment. |
gao_GAO-13-619 | gao_GAO-13-619_0 | Many organizations play a role in DOD’s efforts to account for missing persons. JPAC reports to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). As of May 2013, DOD reported that more than 83,000 persons remained missing or unaccounted for from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and World War II. Leadership Weaknesses and Fragmented Organizational Structure Undermine DOD’s Capability and Capacity to Accomplish Missing Persons Accounting Mission
While DOD has made some progress in promoting collaboration and communication among members of the missing persons accounting community, its capability and capacity to accomplish its missing persons accounting mission is being undermined by longstanding top-level leadership weaknesses and a fragmented organizational structure. Leadership from both the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD Policy) and PACOM have not been able to resolve disagreements between key members of the accounting community. However, as of June 2013, DOD had not completed a community-wide plan enabling it to increase its capability and capacity to account for missing persons so that the community has sufficient resources to ensure that at least 200 missing persons are accounted for annually beginning in fiscal year 2015. Moreover, the fragmented organizational structure—with each member of the accounting community reporting to a different line of authority—has exacerbated these problems, such that a majority of accounting community members believe that alternative structures would be more effective. Development of Community-wide Plan Is Impeded by a Fragmented Approach to Planning and Disputes among Community Members
While DOD has made some progress in drafting a community-wide plan to increase its capability and capacity, as of June 2013 DOD had not completed a community-wide plan. Law No. Without a community-wide plan, the accounting community organizations have had varied success in identifying and obtaining funds and resources to meet the accounting-for goal. DOD guidance is also unclear with respect to defining investigation responsibilities for DPMO and JPAC, and this lack of clarity has enabled each organization to develop its own operational roles, which overlap one another. DOD Does Not Have Agreements in Place to Conduct Missing Persons Operations Outside of PACOM’s Area of Responsibility
While JPAC has negotiated an agreement with European Command governing JPAC’s operations in Europe, JPAC has not established agreements or other appropriate mechanisms with the other combatant commands to conduct operations outside of PACOM’s area of responsibility. DOD estimates that more than 73,000 persons are missing from World War II and are located in the areas of responsibility of all geographic combatant commands (see figure 2 above). DOD Accounting Community Has Not Established Criteria to Prioritize Potentially Recoverable Missing Persons from Conflicts Other Than the Vietnam War
While DPMO has established criteria to prioritize recovery efforts for missing persons from the Vietnam War, the DOD accounting community is hampered in its ability to estimate how many recoveries can reasonably be expected from other conflicts, because DPMO has not established criteria that can be used to prioritize missing persons cases by reflecting feasibility of recovery. Furthermore, the December 2009 memo from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, directing the DASD to begin planning a response to the accounting-for goal, noted that reorganizing the personnel accounting community to improve efficiency could be included as part of the planning process. We found that 12 of the 13 survey respondents who answered the question ranked an option with a more centralized chain of command as the most effective in enabling the accounting community to achieve its mission. Until the Secretary of Defense ensures that activities associated with the accounting mission are efficiently and effectively carried out with unity of command and effort, the inefficient and potentially avoidable overlap and disagreements among the community members may continue, and recovery operations could be hindered by unexpected operational concerns and a lack of standard procedures. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.
In agreeing with our first eight recommendations, DOD stated that it: needs to examine options to unify the personnel accounting community’s fragmented organizational structure; will clarify the roles and responsibilities of members of the accounting will negotiate a new memorandum of agreement between JPAC and the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory; will finalize its community-wide plan to develop increased capability and capacity to account for missing persons; will establish criteria that can be used to prioritize efforts to recover will establish a mechanism for community-wide communications; needs to formalize communication procedures for the organizations identified by the GAO; and will develop personnel files for all unaccounted-for persons. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD reports that more than 83,000 persons are missing from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and World War II. Several DOD organizations, known as the accounting community, have a role in accounting for the missing. Between 2002 and 2012, DOD accounted for an average of 72 persons each year. In 2009, Congress mandated DOD to increase its capability and capacity such that the community could account for at least 200 missing persons annually by 2015. The law also added all World War II losses to the list of conflicts for which DOD was responsible, thus increasing from about 10,000 to 83,000 the number of missing persons for whom DOD must account. A committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review DOD's efforts to address the accounting-for goal. GAO assessed DOD's capability and capacity to accomplish the missing persons accounting mission. In doing so, GAO analyzed guidance and requirements, discussed accounting efforts and the structure of the community with community members, and surveyed accounting community members and related entities.
What GAO Found
While the Department of Defense (DOD) has made some progress in promoting communication among the several organizations responsible for accounting for missing persons--known collectively as the accounting community--DOD's capability and capacity to accomplish its missing persons accounting mission is being undermined by longstanding leadership weaknesses and a fragmented organizational structure. Leadership from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD Policy) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) have not been able to resolve disagreements among accounting community members, thereby impacting DOD's ability to meet the mandated goal of increasing its capability and capacity to account for 200 missing persons a year by 2015. DOD averaged 72 identifications annually in the decade ending in 2012. GAO found the following areas of progress and continuing areas of weakness:
In response to a 2009 direction from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the accounting community has begun drafting a community-wide plan to meet the accounting-for goal, but as of July 2013 this plan had not been completed due to a fragmented approach to planning and disputes among community members. Without a community-wide plan, members have had varied success in obtaining resources to meet the goal.
DOD is working to clarify its guidance, but roles and responsibilities for community members are not well defined, and this lack of clarity has led to overlap in key aspects of the mission such as investigations.
DOD does not have agreements with all combatant commands to conduct operations to find missing persons outside of PACOM's area of responsibility. JPAC negotiated an updated agreement with European Command, signed in April 2013, but it has not negotiated similar agreements with any of the other four geographic combatant commands.
While DOD has established criteria to prioritize recovery efforts for missing persons from the Vietnam War, it has not established criteria to prioritize potentially recoverable missing persons from other conflicts.
DOD has not established mechanisms to sustain recent improvements in communication among community members.
Statute and DOD guidance assign responsibility for the accounting mission to many organizations and each reports through a different line of authority. Thus, no single entity is responsible for communitywide personnel and resources. This fragmented organizational structure has exacerbated weaknesses in leadership, and most community organizations GAO spoke to believe alternative structures would be more effective. A majority of community members GAO surveyed conveyed a lack of confidence about the organizational structure. For example, 12 out of 13 survey respondents ranked an option with a more centralized chain of command as the most effective in enabling the accounting community to achieve its mission. Until top-level leaders at USD Policy and PACOM can ensure that all mission activities are carried out with unity of effort, inefficient and potentially avoidable overlap, unexpected operational concerns, and disagreements among members could continue to hinder the mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making nine recommendations to DOD, including for example: examining options to reorganize; clarifying responsibilities for the accounting community; improving planning, guidance, and criteria to prioritize cases; and sustaining communication. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-99-128 | gao_T-RCED-99-128_0 | CERCLA authorizes EPA to compel the parties responsible for the contaminated sites to clean them up. States accomplish cleanups under three types of programs: (1) voluntary cleanup programs that allow parties, who are often interested in increasing sites’ economic value, to clean them up without state enforcement actions; (2) brownfields programs that encourage the voluntary cleanup of sites in urban industrial areas to enable their reuse; and (3) enforcement programs that oversee the cleanup of the most serious sites and force uncooperative responsible parties to clean up their sites. Superfund Has Made Progress Cleaning Up Sites
Even though cleanups have taken a long time to accomplish, if it maintains its current pace, the Superfund program will complete the construction of cleanup remedies at the great majority of current NPL sites within the next several years. Now, however, most NPL sites have been in the cleanup process for a long time and have moved beyond the remedy selection phase. Groundwater cleanups will continue at many of these sites after the completion of remedy construction. About 89 percent of the NPL sites were placed on the list between 1982 and 1990. Uncorrected Problems Make Superfund A High-Risk Program
For several years, GAO has included the Superfund program on its list of federal programs that pose significant financial risk to the government and the potential for waste and abuse. EPA has partially corrected this problem. EPA classified these sites as “awaiting an NPL decision.” Information about the nature and the extent of the threat that these sites pose to human health and the environment, the extent of states' or EPA's cleanup actions at the sites, and the states' or EPA's cleanup plans for the sites is important to determining the future size of the Superfund program. We surveyed EPA regions, other federal agencies, and the states to (1) determine how many of the over 3,000 sites remain potentially eligible for the NPL; (2) identify the characteristics of these sites, including their health and environmental risks; (3) determine the status of any actions to clean up these sites; and (4) collect the opinions of EPA and other federal and state officials on the likely final disposition of these sites, including the number of sites that are expected to be placed on the NPL. Because few sites have been admitted to the program in recent years, the NPL pipeline is clearing out. On the other hand, there are many sites in EPA’s inventory of potential NPL sites that still need attention and possible cleanup, but EPA and the states have postponed decisions, sometimes for up to 10 years or longer, on how to address them. We have recommended that EPA work with the states to assign responsibility among themselves for these sites. The Superfund reauthorization process gives the Congress an opportunity to help guide EPA and the states in allocating responsibility for addressing these sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the status and management of the Superfund program and the outlook for the program's future, focusing on: (1) progress made toward cleaning up sites in the program; (2) continuing management problems; and (3) factors affecting Superfund's future workload.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in the past GAO has called attention to the slow pace of cleanups in the Superfund program; (2) however, 17 years after sites were first placed on the Superfund list, many of the sites have progressed a considerable distance through the cleanup process; (3) decisions about how to clean up the great majority of these sites have been made, and the construction and cleanup remedies have been completed at over 40 percent of the sites; (4) the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) goal is to complete the construction of remedies at 1,200 sites by 2005; (5) work to clean up groundwater will continue at many sites after remedies are constructed; (6) despite the progress that Superfund has made toward site cleanups, certain management problems persist; (7) these problems include the: (a) difficulty in controlling contract costs; (b) failure to recover certain federal cleanup costs from the parties who are responsible for the contaminated sites; and (c) selection of sites for cleanup without assurance that they are the most dangerous sites to human health and the environment; (8) these problems have caused GAO to include the program on its list of federal programs vulnerable to waste and abuse; (9) furthermore, GAO's analysis indicates that the costs of on-site work by cleanup contractors represent less than half of the spending in the program; (10) there is considerable uncertainty about the future workload of the Superfund program; (11) resolving this uncertainty depends largely on deciding how to divide responsibility for the cleanup of sites between EPA and the states; (12) the number of sites that have entered the Superfund program in recent years has decreased as EPA has focused its resources on completing work at existing sites and the states have developed their own programs for cleaning up sites; (13) according to EPA and state officials who responded to the survey, a large number of sites in EPA's inventory of potential Superfund sites are contaminating groundwater and drinking water sources and causing other problems and may need cleanup; (14) GAO recommended that EPA work with the states to assign responsibility for these sites among themselves; and (15) the Superfund reauthorization process gives Congress an opportunity to help guide EPA and the states in allocating responsibility for addressing these sites. |
gao_GAO-08-119T | gao_GAO-08-119T_0 | In the electric power industry, control systems can be used to manage and control the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power. Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Face Increasing Risks Due to Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and the Potentially Serious Impact of an Attack
Cyber threats can be intentional and unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Federal and industry experts believe that critical infrastructure control systems are more vulnerable today than in the past due to the increased standardization of technologies, the increased connectivity of control systems to other computer networks and the Internet, insecure connections, and the widespread availability of technical information about control systems. Reported Control Systems Incidents Reveal the Potential for Substantial Impact
Reported attacks and unintentional incidents involving critical infrastructure control systems demonstrate that a serious attack could be devastating. In October 2006, a foreign hacker penetrated security at a water filtering plant. The intruder planted malicious software that was capable of affecting the plant’s water treatment operations. In August 2006, two circulation pumps at Unit 3 of the Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear power plant failed, forcing the unit to be shut down manually. The Private Sector Has Multiple Initiatives Under Way to Help Secure Control Systems
Industry-specific organizations in various sectors, including the electricity, oil and gas, and water sectors, have initiatives under way to help improve control system security, including developing standards and publishing guidance. Federal Agencies Have Multiple Initiatives to Help Secure Critical Infrastructure Control Systems, but More Remains to Be Done
Over the past few years, federal agencies— including DHS, DOE, and others—have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems. DHS, however, has not yet established a strategy to coordinate the various control systems activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Without a trusted focal point for sharing sensitive information on vulnerabilities, there is an increased risk that attacks on control systems could cause a significant disruption to our nation’s critical infrastructures. Implementation of GAO Recommendations Would Help Improve Federal Control Systems Security Efforts
Control systems are an essential component of our nation’s critical infrastructure and their disruption could have a significant impact on public health and safety. Given the importance of control systems, in our report being released today, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security implement the following two actions: develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing control systems, including agencies’ responsibilities, as well as overall goals, milestones, and performance measures and establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive control system vulnerability information with critical infrastructure control system stakeholders, including vendors, owners, and operators. The public and private sectors have begun numerous activities to improve the cyber security of control systems. However, the federal government lacks an overall strategy for coordinating public and private sector efforts. DHS also lacks an efficient process for sharing sensitive information on vulnerabilities with private sector critical infrastructure owners. | Why GAO Did This Study
Control systems--computer-based systems that monitor and control sensitive processes--perform vital functions in many of our nation's critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission, and distribution; oil and gas refining; and water treatment and distribution. The disruption of control systems could have a significant impact on public health and safety, which makes securing them a national priority. GAO was asked to testify on portions of its report on control systems security being released today. This testimony summarizes the cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks on control systems; identifies private sector initiatives; and assesses the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the cyber security of control systems. To address these objectives, GAO met with federal and private sector officials to identify risks, initiatives, and challenges. GAO also compared agency plans to best practices for securing critical infrastructures.
What GAO Found
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the serious potential impact of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. Threats can be intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Control systems are more vulnerable to cyber attacks than in the past for several reasons, including their increased connectivity to other systems and the Internet. Further, as demonstrated by past attacks and incidents involving control systems, the impact on a critical infrastructure could be substantial. For example, in 2006, a foreign hacker was reported to have planted malicious software capable of affecting a water filtering plant's water treatment operations. Also in 2006, excessive traffic on a nuclear power plant's control system network caused two circulation pumps to fail, forcing the unit to be shut down manually. Multiple private sector entities such as trade associations and standards setting organizations are working to help secure control systems. Their efforts include developing standards and providing guidance to members. For example, the electricity industry has recently developed standards for cyber security of control systems and a gas trade association is developing guidance for members to use encryption to secure control systems. Federal agencies also have multiple initiatives under way to help secure critical infrastructure control systems, but more remains to be done to coordinate these efforts and to address specific shortfalls. Over the past few years, federal agencies have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems. However, there is as yet no overall strategy to coordinate the various activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Further, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lacks processes needed to address specific weaknesses in sharing information on control system vulnerabilities. Until public and private sector security efforts are coordinated by an overarching strategy, there is an increased risk that multiple organizations will conduct duplicative work. In addition, until information-sharing weaknesses are addressed, DHS risks not being able to effectively carry out its responsibility for sharing information on vulnerabilities with the private and public sectors. |
gao_GAO-02-528T | gao_GAO-02-528T_0 | GAO’s Model of Strategic Human Capital Management
Our model of strategic human capital management is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision-making and the program results they seek to achieve. In so doing, the model highlights the importance of a sustained commitment by agency leaders to maximize the value of their agencies’ human capital and to manage related risks. As I noted before, OPM and OMB have developed tools that are being used to assess human capital management efforts. As such, the model reflects two principles central to the human capital idea: People are assets whose value can be enhanced through investment. As with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk. An organization’s human capital approaches should be designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help the organization pursue its mission and achieve desired results or outcomes. Specifically, agency leaders, political and career alike, must embrace strategic human capital management and related change management approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the federal government's human capital challenges.
What GAO Found
The basic problem has been a longstanding lack of a consistent strategic approach to marshalling, managing, and maintaining the government's human capital needs. To overcome this problem, GAO has developed a model of strategic human capital management that highlights the importance of a sustained commitment by agency leaders to maximize the value of their workforce. The Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget have developed tools to assess human capital management efforts that are conceptually consistent with GAO's model. GAO's model emphasizes two central principles. First, people are assets whose value can be enhanced through investment. As with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk. Second, an organization's human capital approaches should be designed, implemented, and assessed by how well they help pursue its mission and achieve desired results. GAO has also identified a preliminary list of key practices that will enable agencies to acquire, develop, and retain talent. Successful organizational change depends on a willingness by agency leaders to embrace strategic human capital management and related change management approaches. |
gao_GAO-15-455T | gao_GAO-15-455T_0 | HRSA is responsible for administering and overseeing the 340B Program, which, according to federal internal control standards, includes designing and implementing necessary policies and procedures to enforce agency objectives and assess program risk. Additionally, they must be (1) owned or operated by a state or All drug manufacturers that supply outpatient drugs are eligible to participate in the 340B Program and must participate in order to have their drugs covered by Medicaid. GAO Previously Found Inadequacies in HRSA’s Oversight of the 340B Program and Made Recommendations for Improvement
In our September 2011 report, we found that HRSA’s oversight of the 340B Program was inadequate because it relied primarily on self-policing by program participants and because HRSA’s guidance on key program requirements lacked the necessary level of specificity to provide clear We also found that changes in the settings direction for participants.where the 340B Program was used resulted in heightened concerns about HRSA’s inadequate oversight. We made four recommendations to address these oversight inadequacies and to ensure appropriate use of the program. Lack of Specificity in Program Guidance
We found that HRSA’s guidance on key program requirements lacked the necessary level of specificity to provide clear direction, making it difficult for participants to self-police or monitor others’ compliance and raising concerns that the guidance could be interpreted in ways that were inconsistent with its intent. HRSA’s nondiscrimination guidance was not specific in the practices that manufacturers should follow to ensure that drugs were equitably distributed to covered entities and non-340B providers when distribution was restricted. We concluded that increased use of the 340B Program by contract pharmacies and hospitals may have resulted in a greater risk of drug diversion to ineligible patients, in part because these facilities were more likely to serve patients that did not meet the definition of a patient of the program. Recommendations to Improve Program Oversight
To address these oversight inadequacies and to ensure appropriate use of the program, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS instruct the administrator of HRSA to take the following four actions: (1) conduct selective audits of covered entities to deter potential diversion; (2) further specify its nondiscrimination guidance for cases in which distribution of drugs is restricted and require reviews of manufacturers’ plans to restrict distribution of drugs at 340B prices; (3) finalize new, more specific guidance on the definition of an eligible patient; and, (4) issue guidance to further specify the criteria that hospitals that are not publicly owned or operated must meet to be eligible for the 340B Program. HRSA Has Implemented Two of GAO’s Four Recommendations and Reported Plans for Addressing the Other Two
In fiscal year (FY) 2012, HRSA implemented two of the four recommendations from our 2011 report. Specifically, in response to our recommendation that HRSA conduct selective audits of 340B covered entities to deter potential diversion (that is, diversion of 340B drugs to non-eligible patients), the agency implemented a systematic approach to conducting audits of covered entities that is outlined on its website. HRSA had planned to address both of these issues in a comprehensive 340B Program regulation that it submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review in April 2014. However, HRSA withdrew this proposed comprehensive regulation in November 2014 following a May 2014 federal district court ruling that addressed whether HRSA had statutory authority to issue a regulation After the concerning the ineligibility of certain drugs for 340B pricing.district court ruled that HRSA lacked statutory rulemaking authority under the 340B statute except in three specified areas, HRSA officials reported that they had to assess the impact of the ruling on the proposed comprehensive regulation. The outcome of this assessment is that HRSA plans to issue guidelines to address 340B program areas where it does not have explicit rulemaking authority. HRSA officials said they expect to publish proposed guidelines later this year and that they will address areas such as the definition of a patient and hospital eligibility under the 340B program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 340B Drug Pricing Program requires drug manufacturers to sell outpatient drugs at discounted prices to eligible hospitals, clinics, and other entities—commonly referred to as covered entities—in order to have their drugs covered by Medicaid. HRSA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for administering and overseeing the 340B Program. In recent years, questions have been raised regarding HRSA's oversight of the program, particularly given growth in the program since its inception in 1992. According to HRSA officials, as of 2015, more than 11,000 covered entities were participating in the 340B Program—an increase of approximately 30 percent since 2008.
In September 2011, GAO identified inadequacies in HRSA's oversight of the 340B Program and made recommendations to improve program oversight and ensure appropriate use of the program. This testimony describes (1) inadequacies in 340B Program oversight that GAO previously identified, and (2) progress HRSA has made implementing GAO's recommendations to improve program oversight.
This testimony is based largely on GAO's September 2011 report. For this testimony, GAO also obtained information and documentation from HRSA officials about any significant program updates and steps they have taken to implement GAO's 2011 recommendations.
What GAO Found
In its September 2011 report, GAO found that the Health Resources and Services Administration's (HRSA) oversight of the 340B Program was inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that program participants—covered entities and drug manufacturers—were in compliance with program requirements. Specifically, GAO found the program
lacked guidance on key requirements with the level of specificity necessary to provide clear direction, making self-policing difficult, and raising concerns that the guidance could be interpreted in ways that were inconsistent with its intent. In particular, GAO found HRSA's guidance lacked needed specificity on the definition of a patient eligible for drugs discounted under the program, criteria hospitals not publicly owned or operated needed to meet to qualify for the program, and nondiscrimination guidance manufacturers needed to follow to ensure drugs were distributed equitably to both covered entities and non-340B providers.
had increasingly been used in settings, such as hospitals, where the risk of diverting 340B drugs to ineligible patients was greater, because these settings were more likely to serve such patients.
To address these oversight inadequacies and to ensure appropriate use of the program, GAO recommended HRSA (1) conduct selective audits of covered entities to deter potential diversion; (2) further specify its nondiscrimination guidance for cases in which distribution of drugs is restricted and require reviews of manufacturers' plans to restrict distribution of drugs at 340B prices; (3) finalize new, more specific guidance on the definition of a patient eligible to receive discounted drugs; and (4) issue guidance to further specify the criteria that hospitals not publicly owned or operated must meet to be eligible for the 340B Program.
In fiscal year 2012, HRSA implemented two of GAO's four 2011 recommendations. Specifically, the agency implemented a systematic approach to conducting audits of covered entities and issued updated nondiscrimination guidance. With regard to the other two recommendations, HRSA planned to address the definition of a patient and hospital eligibility criteria in a comprehensive 340B Program regulation it submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in April 2014. However, HRSA withdrew this proposal following a May 2014 federal district court ruling addressing HRSA's statutory authority to issue a separate 340B regulation, which found that HRSA's rulemaking authority for the 340B Program is limited to specified areas. HRSA reported that after assessing this ruling, it plans to issue proposed guidelines later this year to address 340B Program areas where it does not have explicit rulemaking authority, including the definition of a patient and hospital eligibility. |
gao_GAO-10-219T | gao_GAO-10-219T_0 | Background
The PRO-IP Act of 2008 eliminates the old structure for coordinating IP efforts and creates a new interagency advisory committee composed of eight federal entities. U.S. IP Coordinating Structure and Strategy Lacked Strong Leadership and Permanence
The PRO-IP Act of 2008 enacted several changes that address weaknesses that we described with the prior IP coordinating structure. The prior structure was initiated under two different authorities and lacked clear leadership and permanence, hampering its effectiveness and long-term viability. In 1999, Congress created the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC) as a mechanism to coordinate U.S. efforts in the United States and overseas. In 2004, the Bush Administration announced the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP), which included a similar group of U.S. agencies under a Presidential Initiative. In our reporting, we described how NIPLECC had struggled to define its purpose and retained an image of inactivity within the private sector. In a report undertaken for this Committee in 2004, we noted that NIPLECC had little discernible impact and had not undertaken any independent activities since it was created, according to interviews with agency officials and its own reports. Congress subsequently made enhancements to NIPLECC in December 2004 to strengthen its role, but we reported to this Committee in 2006 that it continued to have leadership problems. In contrast, the presidential initiative called STOP had a positive image compared to NIPLECC, but lacked permanence, since there was no assurance that its authority and influence would continue in successive administrations. Unlike NIPLECC, STOP from its beginning was characterized by a high level of active coordination and visibility. Many agency officials said that STOP has increased attention to IP issues within their agencies and the private sector, as well as abroad, and attributed that to the fact that STOP came out of the White House, thereby lending it more authority and influence. STOP was also a first step toward an integrated strategy to protect and enforce U.S. IP rights. However, we found that STOP’s potential as a national strategy was limited because it did not fully address important characteristics of an effective strategy. For example, its performance measures lacked targets to assess how well the activities were being implemented. In addition, the strategy lacked a risk management framework and a discussion of current or future costs—important elements to effectively balance the threats from counterfeit products with the resources available. Although STOP identified organizational roles and responsibilities with respect to individual agencies’ STOP activities, it did not specify who would provide oversight and accountability among the agencies carrying out the strategy. In September 2009, the administration announced that the IPEC would be located within the Office of Management and Budget. The PRO-IP Act repeals NIPLECC upon confirmation of the IPEC by the Senate. Facing Significant Challenges Overseas, USPTO IP Attachés Have Adopted Practices to Enhance Collaboration
An additional theme of the PRO-IP Act is the emphasis on federal efforts to strengthen the capacity of foreign governments to protect and enforce IP rights. In September 2009, we reported that the USPTO IP attachés were generally effective in collaborating with other agencies at the four posts we visited, primarily by adopting practices, such as acting as effective focal points, establishing working groups and leveraging resources through joint activities. U.S. government officials in our three case study countries face a range of challenges in their efforts to promote the protection and enforcement of IP rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
Intellectual property (IP) is an important component of the U.S. economy. U.S. government efforts to protect and enforce IP rights domestically and overseas are crucial to safeguarding innovation and preventing significant losses to U.S. industry and IP rights owners as well as addressing health and safety risks resulting from the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. The Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act) created a new interagency IP enforcement advisory committee and authorized the President to appoint an Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) position within the Executive Office of the President to chair the new committee. In September 2009, the President submitted his nomination to the Senate for confirmation and, on December 3, 2009, the Senate confirmed Victoria Espinel as the first IPEC. This testimony will address two topics on IP protection and enforcement in anticipation of some of the challenges ahead in implementing the PRO-IP Act: (1) lessons learned from past efforts to coordinate IP protection and enforcement and (2) observations on a recent initiative to place IP attaches overseas to promote and protect IP rights, based on our field work at four posts in three case study countries. These remarks are based on a variety of assignments that GAO has conducted over the past 3 years on the international and domestic efforts undertaken by U.S. agencies to coordinate their efforts to address IP theft and piracy issues. Most recently, we conducted field work in March 2009 at four posts in three countries: Beijing and Guangzhou, China; New Delhi, India; and Bangkok, Thailand.
What GAO Found
The PRO-IP Act of 2008 enacted several changes that address weaknesses that we described with the prior IP coordinating structure. The prior structure was initiated under two different authorities and lacked clear leadership and permanence, hampering its effectiveness and long-term viability. In 1999, Congress created the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC) as a mechanism to coordinate U.S. efforts in the United States and overseas. In 2004, the Bush Administration announced the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP), which included a similar group of U.S. agencies under a Presidential Initiative. In our reporting, we described how NIPLECC had struggled to define its purpose and retained an image of inactivity within the private sector. In a report undertaken for this Committee in 2004, we noted that NIPLECC had little discernible impact and had not undertaken any independent activities since it was created, according to interviews with agency officials and its own reports. Congress subsequently made enhancements to NIPLECC in December 2004 to strengthen its role, but we reported, in 2006, that it continued to have leadership problems. In contrast, the presidential initiative called STOP had a positive image compared to NIPLECC, but lacked permanence, since there was no assurance that its authority and influence would continue in successive administrations. Unlike NIPLECC, STOP from its beginning was characterized by a high level of active coordination and visibility. Many agency officials said that STOP has increased attention to IP issues within their agencies and the private sector, as well as abroad, and attributed that to the fact that STOP came out of the White House, thereby lending it more authority and influence. STOP was also a first step toward an integrated strategy to protect and enforce U.S. IP rights. However, we found that STOP's potential as a national strategy was limited because it did not fully address important characteristics of an effective strategy. For example, its performance measures lacked targets to assess how well the activities were being implemented. In addition, the strategy lacked a risk management framework and a discussion of current or future costs--important elements to effectively balance the threats from counterfeit products with the resources available. Although STOP identified organizational roles and responsibilities with respect to individual agencies' STOP activities, it did not specify who would provide oversight and accountability among the agencies carrying out the strategy. An additional theme of the PRO-IP Act is the emphasis on federal efforts to strengthen the capacity of foreign governments to protect and enforce IP rights. In September 2009, we reported that the USPTO IP attaches were generally effective in collaborating with other agencies at the four posts we visited, primarily by adopting practices, such as acting as effective focal points, establishing working groups and leveraging resources through joint activities. |
gao_GGD-98-46 | gao_GGD-98-46_0 | The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to (1) develop strategic plans covering a period of at least 5 years and submit the first of these plans to Congress and OMB by the end of fiscal year 1997, (2) develop and submit annual performance plans to OMB and Congress beginning for fiscal year 1999 containing the agencies’ annual performance goals and the measures they will use to gauge progress toward achieving the goals, and (3) submit annual reports on program performance for the previous fiscal year to Congress and the President beginning with fiscal year 2000. These included cuts of 14 percent at HUD, 13 percent at DOI, 22 percent at GSA, 13 percent at NASA, and 42 percent at OPM. Scope and Methodology
To determine which components within HUD, DOI, GSA, NASA, and OPM were downsized and to what extent, we examined agency FTE data for fiscal years 1993 through 1996. To determine what actions were taken to maintain performance in the selected components as a result of downsizing, the results of these actions on performance, the effects of downsizing on customer satisfaction, and lessons learned, we interviewed officials from the parent agencies, components, unions, and employee associations. The lessons learned by components reflect the judgment of component officials. The downsizing of components at the five parent agencies we reviewed ranged from around 2 percent to 100 percent. In addition, the effect of each component’s downsizing on the parent agency’s total reductions varied. Components Took Three Categories of Actions to Maintain Performance
Although officials told us it was difficult to isolate actions that agencies and their components took to maintain performance independently of downsizing from those taken because of downsizing, the actions they said were taken to maintain performance amid downsizing fell into three categories: refocusing their missions, reengineering their work processes, and taking steps to build and maintain employee skills. According to component officials, most of the five components, under the guidance of their parent agencies, refocused their missions primarily to increase their efficiency. Nevertheless, some officials were concerned about the sufficiency of current or future workforces for some components. According to Component Officials and Employees, Actions Taken to Maintain Performance Were Generally Successful
Officials, employee representatives, and employees we spoke with at all five components said that they generally believed performance had been maintained; however, some officials expressed concern about whether performance could be maintained with additional downsizing. However, the data that were available showed that the components generally met performance goals they set for themselves. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the heads of each of the five agencies or their designees from which we had obtained information. Another union official believed that customers had generally remained satisfied in spite of downsizing because the extra time employees were devoting to their jobs enabled the Office of Housing to continue providing levels of service after downsizing that were comparable to those provided before downsizing. Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior
Extent of Downsizing Varied by Component
The Department of the Interior (DOI) reduced its workforce by almost 10,200 FTEs between fiscal years 1993 and 1996. Table IV.1 shows the components with the largest percentage in downsizing. The officials said communication with employees should be open and honest. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of the Interior, the General Services Administration (GSA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to obtain information on the effects downsizing has had on their performance and what actions were taken to maintain performance, focusing on: (1) which components within the five agencies were downsized and to what extent; (2) what actions were taken to maintain performance for one selected downsized component at each parent agency, the results of those actions on the component's performance, and the effect of the downsizing on customer service; and (3) the lessons that the five components learned about maintaining performance during a period of downsizing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) most components within the five parent agencies were downsized to some extent, although how much varied considerably; (2) the percentage of agency components' full-time equivalent reductions from fiscal year (FY) 1993 through 1996 ranged from 3 percent to 100 percent at HUD, 2 percent to 87.5 percent at Interior, 10 percent to 37 percent at GSA, 3 percent to 42 percent at NASA, and 2 percent to 100 percent at OPM; (3) according to officials of the parent agencies and the five selected components, several actions helped the components maintain performance levels during the period of downsizing; (4) they explained that it was difficult to isolate actions taken independently of downsizing from those taken because of downsizing; (5) however, the actions the officials told GAO about generally fell into three categories: (a) refocusing of missions; (b) reengineering of work processes; and (c) building and maintaining employee skills; (6) the officials stated that the five components were generally able to maintain performance and fulfill the requirements of their missions despite the relatively large downsizing that occurred from FY 1993 to FY 1996; (7) although the officials stated that they could not connect specific actions taken with specific outcomes, they stated that without the three actions mentioned, the performance levels of the components would not have been maintained; (8) officials at some components stated that additional downsizing could hamper future performance; (9) it should be noted that GAO's results primarily reflect the viewpoints of officials from the agencies and components and are a snapshot at the time of its review; (10) performance measurement data, particularly baseline data with which current data could be compared, that would support agency officials' views or enable policymakers to track program performance and make informed decisions were limited; (11) the data that were available tended to substantiate the views of component officials that they were meeting goals they had set for themselves; (12) according to component officials and employees or their representatives at the five components, customers remained satisfied with the components' performance during the period of downsizing; and (13) among the lessons learned, officials stated that the most important was the need for early planning and open communication with employees. |
gao_GAO-07-92 | gao_GAO-07-92_0 | IPIA requires executive branch agency heads to review their programs and activities annually and identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments. Given that total outlays for these 9 programs exceeded $58.2 billion in fiscal year 2005, the improper payment estimate for these programs would likely have been much greater had statistically valid methods been used. Some Agencies Continue to Lack Improper Payment Estimates for Susceptible Programs
The fiscal year 2005 governmentwide improper payments estimate of $38 billion did not include any amounts for 10 programs, with fiscal year 2005 outlays totaling over $234 billion. Agencies’ Reporting of Recovery Auditing Information Questionable
We noted discrepancies in selected agencies’ reporting of recovery audit information and limited reviews over contract payments. For example, for fiscal year 2005, NASA reported in its PAR that it had identified and recovered $617,442 in contract payments, a 100 percent recovery rate. Yet, the NASA OIG reported it had identified over $515 million in questioned contract costs during fiscal year 2005. When comparing the $51 million in questioned contract costs identified for recovery to the $617,442 NASA actually recovered, the recovery rate decreases from the reported 100 percent recovery rate to a 1.2 percent rate. In addition, another factor that may call into question the reported high recovery rate is that 5 of the 21 agencies did not review all of their agency components as part of their recovery audit efforts, and 2 agencies reported that recovery auditing was not cost beneficial. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making four recommendations to OMB to help further the progress toward meeting the goals of IPIA and ensuring the integrity of payments. We view this as a positive step. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the extent to which agencies have included required improper payment information in their performance and accountability reports (PAR), (2) the annual improper payment estimate reported by agencies for fiscal year 2005, (3) whether the definition and types of improper payments reported in the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) and the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) implementing guidance provide adequate disclosure of the extent of improper payments at the agencies, and (4) the reported amount of improper payments recouped through recovery audits. As part of our review and analysis of agencies’ reported improper payment information in their fiscal year 2005 PARs or annual reports, we determined whether agencies’ had reviewed all programs and activities for risk-susceptible programs and reviewed details of agencies’ risk- assessment methodologies when reported; identified program improper payment estimates, including error amounts and error rates, a breakdown of overpayments and underpayments, and program outlays; identified agencies’ sampling methodologies used to estimate program determined the extent and level of detail agencies reported on key improper payment reporting elements, including manager accountability, causes of improper payments, corrective actions, and statutory barriers; conducted an analysis of OMB’s assessment criteria—exceeding $10 million in improper payments and 2.5 percent of program outlays— to identify programs that met only one of OMB’s criteria and thus would not be required to estimate and report improper payment information based on these criteria alone; analyzed OIG-reported major management challenges for various programs and activities; and analyzed the amount of improper payments recouped through agencies’ recovery audit activities. Financial Management: Challenges Remain in Meeting Requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fiscal year 2005 marked the second year that executive agencies were required to report improper payment information under the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). As a steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal government is accountable for how its agencies and grantees spend billions of taxpayer dollars and is responsible for safeguarding those funds against improper payments. GAO was asked to determine the progress agencies have made in their improper payment reporting and the total amount of improper payments recouped through recovery auditing. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed improper payment information reported by 35 agencies in their fiscal year 2005 performance and accountability or annual reports.
What GAO Found
While making progress, agencies' fiscal year 2005 reporting under IPIA does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies. Major challenges remain in meeting the goals of the act and ultimately improving the integrity of payments. GAO found that these challenges continue to hinder full reporting of improper payment information because of the following three factors: (1) Existing reporting incomplete. Although 18 agencies collectively identified and estimated improper payments for 57 programs and activities totaling $38 billion, some agencies still had not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs, resulting in their identification of none or only a few programs as susceptible to significant improper payments. In many cases, these same agencies had well-known and documented financial management weaknesses as well as fraudulent, improper, and questionable payments. Further, improper payment estimates totaling about $389 million for 9 programs were not based on a valid statistical sampling methodology as required. Higher estimates would have been expected had the correct methods been used, given that total outlays for these 9 programs exceeded $58.2 billion. (2) Large programs still not included. Improper payment estimates for 10 risk-susceptible programs with outlays totaling over $234 billion still have not been provided. Most of these programs were subject to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reporting requirements that preceded IPIA. (3) Threshold criteria limit reporting. The act includes broad criteria to identify risk-susceptible programs. OMB's implementing guidance includes more specific criteria that limit the disclosure and transparency of agencies' improper payments. With regard to agencies' recovery audit efforts, GAO found that the data reported may present an overly optimistic view of these efforts. While 21 agencies were required to report on their recovery audit efforts, GAO identified discrepancies in several agencies' information and found limited reviews over contract payments. For example, for fiscal year 2005, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported that it had identified and recovered $617,442 in contract payments, a 100 percent recovery rate. Yet, the NASA Office of Inspector General reported it had identified over $515 million in questioned contract costs during fiscal year 2005, of which NASA management decided to pursue recovery of $51 million. Had this amount been compared to the $617,442 NASA actually recovered, its recovery rate would drop from the reported 100 percent to 1.2 percent. In addition, we noted that 5 of the 21 agencies did not review all of their agency components as part of their recovery audit efforts while 2 agencies reported that recovery auditing was not cost beneficial without reporting any details to support this determination. |
gao_GAO-03-405 | gao_GAO-03-405_0 | FAA’s purchase card program also includes the use of convenience checks to pay vendors that do not accept credit cards. With respect to its purchase card program, we found inadequacies in the segregation of purchasing duties, the supervisory review and approval process, and the tracking of accountable property and award inventories; improper purchases, such as purchases that were split to circumvent purchase limits, restricted items that were purchased without required approvals, and items that were not bought from required vendors and lacked the necessary waivers to do so; purchases of expensive items such as flat panel computer monitors costing over $3,000 each and PDAs ranging from $300 to over $500 each; and a decentralized operating environment and a lack of training that contributed to these weaknesses. Our May 2002 report on FAA’s Alaskan Region purchases and this report identified many of the same weaknesses reported by the OIG as well as other findings. As described above, our review of FAA’s purchase card activities identified numerous policy violations that resulted in improper purchases. Poor Controls Resulted in Some Wasteful and Questionable Purchases
The inadequacies and ineffectiveness of internal controls were also evident in the number of transactions identified that we classified as wasteful— that is, were excessive in cost compared to other available alternatives and/or were for questionable government needs. Poor Controls Contributed to Wasted or Missing Assets
In reviewing purchases of computers and other portable assets bought with purchase cards, we found that FAA lacked adequate controls over such purchases to ensure that they were properly recorded and accounted for. As a result, we identified 262 asset-related transactions totaling $4.1 million that contained one or more property items that had not been recorded in FAA’s property management system. In addition to the items we found missing, the property management division at one FAA location identified during its physical inventory counts over 800 items totaling almost $2 million that were lost or stolen in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Given the systemic weaknesses we identified in FAA’s property controls, the actual amount of missing or stolen equipment agencywide could be much higher. Of the 692 items we attempted to observe, we found that FAA could not locate 238 items (34 percent) totaling $287,766 at the time of our observation. Order by Mail or Phone
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Public Affairs | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2002, GAO reported on breakdowns in purchasing controls at the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Alaskan Region that resulted in improper and wasteful purchases. Many of the weaknesses were associated with the use of government credit cards--referred to as purchase cards--and raised concerns that similar problems might exist FAA-wide. As a result, GAO was asked to determine whether FAA's purchase card controls reasonably ensured that purchases were proper, at a reasonable cost, and for valid government needs. GAO also assessed whether assets bought with purchase cards were being properly safeguarded and recorded.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses in FAA's purchase card controls resulted in instances of improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases, as well as missing and stolen assets. These internal control weaknesses included inadequate segregation of duties, lax supervisory review and approval, missing purchase documentation, inadequate training, and insufficient program monitoring activities, all of which created an environment vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. These weaknesses contributed to the $5.4 million of improper purchases GAO identified. Among these were purchases that were split into two or more segments to circumvent single purchase limits. GAO also identified over $630,000 in purchases that were considered wasteful--that is, excessive in cost, for questionable government needs, or both--or were considered questionable because they were missing a receipt to show what was actually purchased. In addition, over half of the asset purchases--such as computers and other equipment--that GAO examined had not been recorded in FAA's property system, increasing the risk of loss or theft. As a result, FAA could not locate or document the location of over a third of the 692 items that GAO attempted to observe. These missing items totaled almost $300,000. In separate internal reviews, one FAA location identified over 800 items, totaling almost $2 million, that were lost or stolen in fiscal years 2001 through 2002. Given systemic weaknesses in FAA's property controls, the actual amount of missing or stolen equipment FAA-wide could be much higher. |
gao_GAO-07-627 | gao_GAO-07-627_0 | 3.) Grant recipients. Assessment of grant recipients’ capacity. Grant renewal process. Global Fund Has Improved Documentation of Its Basis for Funding Decisions
The Global Fund has improved its documentation of information supporting its performance-based funding decisions. For example, the Global Fund’s system now requires that portfolio managers consistently document factors that may affect the decision to continue funding a grant, especially when the grant falls short of its performance targets. In addition, the Global Fund grant files that we reviewed consistently contained explanations of funding decisions and contextual data informing the decisions. Although we found many reports submitted by grant recipients to the Global Fund do not provide explanations for all unmet grant performance targets, according to Global Fund officials, fund portfolio managers are able to obtain the needed information directly from the grant recipients or other stakeholders. Grant Files Demonstrate Improved Documentation Supporting Funding Decisions
Our review of random samples of disbursement and phase 2 grant files indicated that most files systematically explain a number of key factors used to support disbursement and grant renewal decisions. Global Fund Did Not Implement Earlier Risk Model but Is Developing Comprehensive Risk Framework That Includes Early Alert and Response System
The Global Fund did not implement the risk assessment model that it was developing at the time of our 2005 report, because it determined that the model did not accurately identify grant risk. The organization relies on elements of its structures and processes, including its initial technical review, disbursement decision-making form, periodic grant ratings, CCM oversight, information from technical partners, and LFA oversight, to identify potential risks. Recognizing the need to establish a more comprehensive approach to risk management, the Global Fund has begun developing a risk assessment framework for the organization that includes an early warning and response system to address poorly performing grants. Rating grant progress for each disbursement request. Global Fund Has Limited Ability to Manage and Oversee Local Fund Agents’ Performance
The Global Fund lacks the information it needs to manage and oversee the LFAs because of a lack of systematic assessments of LFAs’ performance. As a result, the Global Fund has limited records of, and data on, LFA performance. Although the Global Fund made a previous attempt to assess LFAs more systematically, this effort was unsuccessful. However, Global Fund officials with LFA management responsibility stated that formalizing the process would allow the agency to establish LFA performance records and identify situations in which more oversight of LFAs by the Global Fund may be required. Agency Comments
Written comments on a draft of this report from the Departments of State and Health and Human Services and the U.S. Agency for International Development are represented in the unified response received from the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. The Office of the U.S. the Global Fund) phase 2 Fund portfolio manager/cluster identification of material issues with reliability of principal recipient’s data Fund portfolio manager/cluster explanation for phase 2 rating Fund portfolio manager/cluster explanation for phase 2 recommendation (LFA phase 2 assessment) report-specific conditions identified by LFA for ‘Conditional Go’ recommendations Time-bound actions identified by portfolio manager/cluster for ‘Conditional Go’ recommendations To assess the Global Fund’s progress in implementing a risk assessment model and early warning systems for its grants, we followed up on the risk assessment model and early warning system described in our 2005 report with Global Fund officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has approved about $7 billion in grants to developing countries; the U.S. has contributed $1.9 billion. The State Department's Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) coordinates the U.S. government's overseas AIDS programs, with participation from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2003, Congress directed GAO to report on the Global Fund every 2 years. This report assesses the Global Fund's (1) documentation of information used to support performance-based funding decisions, (2) progress in implementing a risk assessment model and early warning system, and (3) oversight of the performance of "local fund agents" (LFAs), which monitor grant progress in recipient countries. GAO reviewed the documentation for funding decisions and interviewed key officials.
What GAO Found
Since our 2005 review, the Global Fund has improved its documentation for decisions to disburse funds and renew grants. The Global Fund now requires that fund portfolio managers more consistently document factors, such as grant ratings and contextual information that support disbursement and grant renewal decisions. Our current review of 80 grant disbursements and 45 grant renewal decisions confirmed that Global Fund grant files consistently contained explanations of the information used in its funding decisions. For example, all grant disbursement files in our sample contained a written narrative explaining the ratings that portfolio managers gave the grants, based in part on reports completed by grant recipients. Although we noted that many of the grant recipients' reports lacked some information needed for disbursement and renewal decisions, Global Fund officials said that portfolio managers obtain this information informally from the recipients or other stakeholders. The Global Fund did not implement the risk assessment model that it was developing at the time of our 2005 report, because it determined that the model did not accurately identify grant risk. To identify risks that may affect grant implementation, the organization currently relies on elements of its structures and processes, including its initial technical review, disbursement decision-making form, periodic grant ratings, oversight by country stakeholders, information from technical partners, and LFA oversight. Recognizing the need for a more comprehensive approach to risk management, the Global Fund has begun developing a risk assessment framework for the organization that includes an early alert and response system to address poorly performing grants. The Global Fund has limited access to the information it needs to manage and oversee LFAs because it does not require systematic assessments of LFAs' performance. As a result, the Global Fund has limited ability to determine the quality of LFAs' monitoring and reporting and to identify situations in which more oversight of LFAs' performance may be required. Previously, the Global Fund introduced a tool to assess LFA performance more systematically; however, this effort was unsuccessful, because use of the tool was not mandatory. Numerous sources raise concerns about the quality of grant monitoring and reporting provided by LFAs, particularly their ability to assess and verify recipients' procurement capacity and program implementation. |
gao_GAO-09-302 | gao_GAO-09-302_0 | In a series of reports, we have identified numerous problems in DOD’s processes for recording and reporting obligations, raising significant concerns about the overall reliability of DOD’s reported obligations. DOD and the Military Services Continue to Take Steps to Improve Some Aspects of the Accuracy and Reliability of GWOT Cost Reporting
DOD and the military services continue to take steps to improve some aspects of the accuracy and reliability of GWOT cost reporting. DOD’s goals are to automate the collection of GWOT cost data from DOD components and improve the timeliness of cost-of-war reporting. Military Services Have Taken Actions to Correct Weaknesses in the Reliability of GWOT Cost Data
The military services have also taken actions to correct weaknesses in the reliability of their GWOT cost data. DOD’s Approach to GWOT Cost Reporting Does Not Reliably Represent the Costs of Each Contingency Operation
Although DOD has taken steps to improve certain aspects of its GWOT cost reporting, its approach to identifying the costs of specific operations has, in some cases, resulted in the overstatement of costs, particularly for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in other cases, for both contingencies. Since 2001, DOD has reported significant costs in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. While the Army and Marine Corps are capturing totals for procurement and certain operation and maintenance costs, they do not have a methodology for determining what portion of these GWOT costs is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom versus Operation Enduring Freedom. Without a methodology for determining what portion of total GWOT obligations is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, reported costs for Operating Iraqi Freedom may be overstated and cost information for both operations will remain unreliable. Air Force guidance defines “long war” costs as all incremental costs related to the war on terror beyond costs strictly limited to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Navy
The Navy reported costs for forward-presence missions as part of GWOT contingency operations even though the Navy routinely deploys its forces around the globe in peacetime as well as wartime. Until DOD reconsiders whether expenses not directly attributable to specific GWOT contingency operations are incremental costs, the military services may continue to include these expenses as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Furthermore, reported costs for both operations may be overstated and costs not directly attributable to either operation may continue to be included in DOD’s GWOT funding requests rather than the base budget. Expenses beyond those directly attributable to either operation may be more reflective of the enduring nature of GWOT and the United States’ changed security environment since 9/11 and thus should be part of what DOD would request and account for as part of its base budget. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the transparency and reliability of DOD’s reported obligations for GWOT by contingency operation, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to (1) ensure DOD components establish an auditable and documented methodology for determining what portion of GWOT costs is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom versus Operation Enduring Freedom when actual costs are not available, and (2) develop a plan and timetable for evaluating whether expenses not directly attributable to specific GWOT contingency operations are incremental costs and should continue to be funded outside of DOD’s base budget. To assess DOD’s methodology for reporting GWOT costs by contingency operation, including the types of costs reported for those operations, we analyzed GWOT obligation data in DOD’s monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports, including the source data for those reports in the military services’ individual accounting systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in addition to funding in DOD's base budget. Prior GAO reports have found DOD's reported GWOT cost data unreliable and found problems with transparency over certain costs. In response, DOD has made several changes to its cost-reporting procedures. Congress has shown interest in increasing the transparency of DOD's cost reporting and funding requests for GWOT. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO assessed (1) DOD's progress in improving the accuracy and reliability of its GWOT cost reporting, and (2) DOD's methodology for reporting GWOT costs by contingency operation. For this engagement, GAO analyzed GWOT cost data and applicable guidance, as well as DOD's corrective actions.
What GAO Found
While DOD and the military services continue to take steps to improve the accuracy and reliability of some aspects of GWOT cost reporting, DOD lacks a sound approach for identifying costs of specific contingency operations, raising concerns about the reliability of reported information, especially on the cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, the department has undertaken initiatives such as requiring components to sample and validate their GWOT cost transactions and launching a new contingency cost-reporting system that will automate the collection of GWOT cost data from components' accounting systems and produce a new report comparing reported obligations and disbursements to GWOT appropriations data. Also, the military services have taken several steps to correct weaknesses in the reliability of their cost data. Limitations in DOD's approach to identifying the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom may, in some cases, result in the overstatement of costs, and could lead to these costs being included in DOD's GWOT funding requests rather than the base budget. DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of accurately reporting the cost of contingency operations. However, while the Army and Marine Corps are capturing totals for procurement and certain operation and maintenance costs, they do not have a methodology for determining what portion of these GWOT costs are attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom versus Operation Enduring Freedom and have reported all these costs as attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, the military services have reported some costs, such as those for Navy forward-presence missions, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, even though they are not directly attributable to either operation. In September 2005, DOD expanded the definition of incremental costs for large-scale contingencies, such as those for GWOT, to include expenses beyond direct incremental costs. This expanded definition provides no guidance on what costs beyond those attributable to the operation can be considered incremental and reported. Consequently, the military services have made their own interpretations as to whether and how to include costs not directly attributable to GWOT contingency operations. Without a methodology for determining what portion of GWOT costs is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, reported costs for Operation Iraqi Freedom may be overstated. Furthermore, unless DOD reconsiders whether expenses not directly attributable to specific GWOT operations should be included as incremental costs, the military services may continue to include these expenses as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, reported costs for both operations may be overstated, and DOD may continue to request funding for these expenses in GWOT funding requests instead of including them as part of the base budget. Expenses beyond those directly attributable to either operation may be more reflective of the enduring nature of GWOT and its cost implications should be part of the annual budget debate. |
gao_GAO-09-44 | gao_GAO-09-44_0 | In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the Schedules of Federal Debt; assessed the accounting principles used and any significant estimates evaluated the overall presentation of the Schedules of Federal Debt; obtained an understanding of the entity and its operations, including its internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2008, related to financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations (including execution of transactions in accordance with budget authority); tested relevant internal controls over financial reporting and compliance, and evaluated the design and operating effectiveness of internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2008; considered the design of the process for evaluating and reporting on internal control and financial management systems under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act; and tested compliance in fiscal year 2008 with the statutory debt limit (31 U.S.C. § 3101), the latter of which is referred to as intragovernmental debt holdings. As of September 30, 2008 and 2007, outstanding gross federal debt managed by the bureau totaled $10,011 and $8,993 billion, respectively. The increase in gross federal debt of $1,018 billion during fiscal year 2008 was due to an increase in gross intragovernmental debt holdings of $258 billion and an increase in gross debt held by the public of $760 billion. (in billions)
Debt held by the public primarily reflects how much of the nation’s wealth has been absorbed by the Federal Government to finance prior federal spending in excess of total federal revenues. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held by over 230 individual federal government accounts with either the authority or the requirement to invest excess receipts in special U.S. Treasury securities that are guaranteed for principal and interest by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. Section 3083 of this law increased the statutory debt limit from $9,815 billion to $10,615 billion. On September 18, 2008, the Bureau of the Public Debt began issuing specific cash management bills to fund the Supplementary Financing Program (SFP). Overview, Schedules, and Notes Significant Events in Fiscal Year 2008, cont. Over the past 4 fiscal years, intragovernmental debt holdings increased by $1,130 billion, from $3,072 billion as of September 30, 2004, to $4,202 billion as of September 30, 2008. Section 122 of the Act increased the statutory debt limit by $700 billion to $11,315 billion. Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt
Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt For the Fiscal Years Ended September 30, 2008 and 2007 (Dollars in Millions)
Note 1. The Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow monies to operate the federal government within a statutory debt limit. Interest Expense Interest expense on Federal Debt Managed by BPD for fiscal years 2008 and 2007 consisted of the Federal Debt Held by the Public Net Amortization of Premiums and Discounts Total Interest Expense on Federal Debt Held by the Public Net Amortization of Premiums and Discounts (1,505) (1,116)
Total Interest Expense on Intragovernmental Debt Holdings Total Interest Expense on Federal Debt Managed by BPD The valuation of TIPS is adjusted daily over the life of the security based on the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers. This act increased the statutory debt limit by $700 billion to $11,315 billion. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required to audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Due to the significance of the federal debt held by the public to the governmentwide financial statements, GAO audits the Bureau of the Public Debt's (BPD) Schedules of Federal Debt annually. The audit of these schedules is done to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) the schedules are reliable and (2) BPD management maintained effective internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Further, GAO tests compliance with a significant provision of law related to the Schedule of Federal Debt (statutory debt limit). Federal debt managed by BPD consists of Treasury securities held by the public and by certain federal government accounts, referred to as intragovernmental debt holdings. The level of debt held by the public primarily reflects how much of the nation's wealth has been absorbed by the federal government to finance prior federal spending in excess of federal revenues. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held by federal government accounts, primarily federal trust funds such as Social Security, that typically have an obligation to invest their excess annual receipts over disbursements in federal securities.
What GAO Found
In GAO's opinion, BPD's Schedules of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2008 and 2007 were fairly presented in all material respects, and BPD maintained effective internal control relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2008. GAO found no instances of noncompliance in fiscal year 2008 with the statutory debt limit. As of September 30, 2008 and 2007, federal debt managed by BPD totaled about $10,011 billion and $8,993 billion, respectively. Total federal debt increased over each of the last 4 fiscal years. During the last 4 fiscal years, managing the federal debt has continued to be a challenge as evidenced by the growth of total federal debt by $2,632 billion, or 36 percent, from $7,379 billion as of September 30, 2004, to $10,011 billion as of September 30, 2008. In fiscal year 2008 alone, total federal debt increased by $1,018 billion, the single largest annual increase in history. Of this amount, about $760 billion was from the increase in debt held by the public, which included $300 billion in cash management bills issued in September 2008 under the Supplementary Financing Program initiated by Treasury. The remaining increase in federal debt of about $258 billion was from intragovernmental debt holdings. On July 30, 2008, legislation was enacted to raise the statutory debt limit from $9,815 billion to $10,615 billion. In addition, in response to the nation's growing financial crisis, on October 3, 2008, the President signed into law legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion in troubled assets from financial institutions. This legislation increased the statutory debt limit by $700 billion to $11,315 billion. These increases in the statutory debt limit were the fourth and fifth such occurrences since fiscal year 2004. |
gao_GAO-14-261 | gao_GAO-14-261_0 | Its members include 19 countries and the European Union. Since 2008, the G20 leaders have met at least annually. The G20 leaders generally have called on their national authorities— along with FSB; standard setting bodies, such as the Basel Committee and IOSCO; and other bodies—to convert their broad financial reform commitments into more specific standards (including policies, principles, practices, or guidance). United States Has Played an Active Role in International Financial Regulatory Reforms but Has Faced Challenges
The United States has been active in the international financial regulatory reforms intended to address regulatory and other weaknesses revealed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. According to Treasury officials, during the acute phase of the financial crisis in 2008, the United States proposed elevating the G20 forum from the traditional level of finance ministers and central banks to the level of heads of state or government. To that end, the G20 leaders, including the U.S. President, held a summit for the first time in Washington, D.C., in November 2008. Among other things, the G20 leaders established principles for financial regulatory reform and developed a list of initial reform commitments. For example, in the lead-up to the London G20 summit in 2009, the United States publicly supported increasing capital requirements for banks, creating FSB, and expanding the scope of regulation to systemically important institutions and markets. As members of FSB and international standard setting bodies, U.S. financial regulators and Treasury have been actively involved in developing many of the international financial standards (including policies, principles, practices, or guidance) that implement the G20 financial reform commitments. United States and Other Jurisdictions Report Having Made Progress Implementing International Reforms, but Most Reforms Have Not Been Fully Implemented
The United States and other jurisdictions report having made progress implementing the G20’s international financial reforms, but most reforms have not been implemented by all jurisdictions. In collaboration with standard setting bodies, FSB established a framework in 2011 to monitor and report on the implementation of the G20 financial reform commitments, including In addition, FSB and IMF the related international financial standards.have programs to assess members’ compliance with international financial standards and foster a level playing field. FSB selects the areas based on the importance of their consistent and comprehensive implementation to global financial stability. Jurisdictional Differences and Other Factors May Create Implementation Challenges for the G20 Financial Reforms
As recognized by regulators, industry associations, and academics, a broad range of legal, economic, and political factors can create implementation challenges for jurisdictions. Finally, domestic regulators may apply or interpret the standards differently from other domestic regulators. For example, financial markets or services could migrate to less-regulated or unregulated jurisdictions. Our report summarizes the international financial reform process, drawing a clear line between the development of international standards under the auspices of FSB or standard-setting bodies (or both) and the voluntary adoption of rules or policies consistent with these standards by jurisdictions, such as through legislation or regulations. To address the first objective, we reviewed and analyzed declarations, communiqués, and other statements issued by the G20 leaders about their agreed-to commitments to reform financial regulations. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed reports or other documents issued since 2008 by various international bodies—including the Financial Stability Board (FSB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organization of Securities Commissions, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, and International Accounting Standards Board—about their role in implementing the G20 reforms, such as through the development of international financial standards, or monitoring the implementation status of the G20 reforms at the international and jurisdictional levels. We reviewed the accuracy of U.S. responses to questionnaires administered by FSB or a standard setting body that covered U.S. progress implementing Basel II, 2.5, and III and the G20’s OTC derivatives reforms, including the requirements for OTC derivatives transactions to be centrally cleared, traded on organized trading platforms, and reported to trade repositories, and we generally found the U.S. responses were accurate. We also asked audit offices of 14 jurisdictions that are members of FSB—and which are participating in an International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions working group on financial reforms—to do the same for their regulators’ responses. Finally, as identified above, we interviewed officials representing U.S. regulators, FSB, IMF, industry associations, and academics about challenges or concerns that uneven implementation of the G20 financial reforms across jurisdictions could present. Appendix IV: Implementation Status of the Group of Twenty’s Reform Commitments Reported by Select Member Jurisdictions of the Financial Stability Board
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Group of Twenty’s (G20) financial reform commitments and reporting implementation progress to the G20. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cross-border interconnections in the financial markets and other factors helped spread disruptions during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and increased systemic risk. In response to the crisis, the G20 positioned itself as the main international forum for reforming financial regulations. In 2008, the G20 leaders committed to implement a broad range of reforms designed to strengthen financial markets and regulatory regimes.
In light of the G20's reform efforts and the potential implications of the reforms for the United States, GAO examined (1) the U.S. role in the international financial reform efforts and (2) the implementation status of recent international financial reforms in the United States relative to other countries and challenges that uneven implementation may present. To address these issues, GAO reviewed and analyzed reports or other documents issued by the G20, FSB, IMF, and other international bodies since 2008 and studies on the G20 reforms by academics, industry associations, and others. GAO reviewed the accuracy of U.S. responses to select questionnaires administered by FSB and asked other countries' national audit offices to do the same for their regulators' responses. Finally, GAO interviewed officials representing U.S. agencies, FSB Secretariat, IMF, industry associations, and academics.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The United States has played an active role in helping to reform financial regulations to address weaknesses revealed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. According to Treasury officials, during the acute phase of the crisis, the United States proposed elevating the Group of Twenty (G20) forum—representing 19 countries (including the United States) and the European Union—from the level of finance ministers and central banks to the level of heads of state or government. In 2008, the U.S. President and other G20 leaders held their first summit in Washington, D.C., in part to establish a framework to help prevent financial crises. The G20 leaders established principles for financial regulatory reform and agreed on a series of financial reforms, which they have revised or expanded at subsequent summits. To implement their reforms, the G20 leaders generally have called on their national authorities—finance ministries, central banks, and regulators—and international bodies, including the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and standard setting bodies, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In 2009, the G20 leaders established FSB to coordinate and promote implementation of the financial reforms, which typically involves standard setting bodies developing international standards (e.g., principles, policies, or guidance) and then jurisdictions voluntarily adopting rules or policies consistent with these standards, such as through legislation or regulations. As members of FSB and international standard setting bodies, U.S. federal authorities have actively helped formulate the standards that implement the G20 reforms and cover, among other things, banking, derivatives, and hedge funds.
The United States and other jurisdictions have made progress implementing many of the G20 financial reform commitments, but most reforms have not been fully implemented by all jurisdictions. FSB and standard setting bodies collaboratively monitor and report on the implementation status of the G20 reforms. According to recent progress reports, the United States, like most FSB members, has implemented or is implementing G20 reforms that FSB designated as a priority based on their importance to global financial stability—including higher capital standards, derivatives reforms, compensation practices, policy measures for systemically important financial institutions, and regimes for resolving failing financial institutions. However, implementation varies among jurisdictions. For example, according to a September 2013 progress report, only the United States reported having rules at least partly in effect to implement the G20 reforms requiring derivatives to be centrally cleared, traded on organized trading platforms, and reported to trade repositories, while many other jurisdictions reported having rules in effect for only some of these reforms or adopted or proposed legislation to implement the reforms. To promote and monitor the adoption of the international standards by each jurisdiction, such as to ensure a level playing field, FSB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Basel Committee have established programs to review and assess their members' implementation of the standards. At the same time, legal, economic, and political factors can create implementation challenges for jurisdictions. For example, regulators in different jurisdictions may apply or interpret the standards differently. However, in some cases, inconsistent implementation of international financial standards could lead to certain activities migrating to less regulated jurisdictions (regulatory arbitrage) or adversely affect financial stability. |
gao_GAO-10-54 | gao_GAO-10-54_0 | Labor also wanted to ensure that plan officials obtain the information they need to assess the compensation paid for services rendered to the plan, taking into consideration revenue-sharing arrangements among plan service providers and potential conflicts of interest. Labor’s New Reporting Requirements Remain Unclear to Sponsors, but Coordination with Other Regulatory Initiative May Help
Sponsors Report That Labor’s New Requirements Remain Unclear
Even though Labor has provided guidance on their recent changes to the Form 5500 Schedule C, plan sponsors and service providers reported that they were unclear about Labor’s new reporting requirements. Specifically, plan sponsors and experts told us that they have questions regarding the distinction between eligible and ineligible indirect compensation, and several said that they were unclear about what types of compensation qualified as EIC. Uncertainty Regarding the Reporting of Indirect Compensation May Result in Incomplete Data Being Reported to Labor
Because service providers may have difficulty determining what elements of compensation qualify as EIC, different interpretations and reporting practices may ensue and could result in inconsistent and incomplete data being reported to Labor. In addition, since amounts categorized as EIC will not be reported, Labor will have no way of using these data to determine whether the amounts being paid by plans are reasonable and will be unable to compare these types of compensation across plans. Labor has already noted on its Web site that there is flexibility regarding reporting for the 2009 plan year, stating that as long as sponsors receive a statement from their service providers that, despite a good-faith effort, they were unable to provide the newly required information to them, sponsors will not be required to report those service providers on the Schedule C.
Coordination with Other Regulatory Initiative Could Alleviate Compliance Burden
According to industry experts and plan sponsors with whom we spoke, the coordination of one of Labor’s other initiatives on fee disclosure with the current Form 5500 requirements could make it easier for plan sponsors to comply. Labor has requirements that govern the entering of a service agreement between a sponsor and service provider, referred to as the 408(b)(2) requirements, and has proposed changes to them that have not yet been finalized. In our discussions with Labor officials, they noted that the better scenario would have been publishing the finalized 408(b)(2) regulation before the new Form 5500 requirements and acknowledged the importance of coordinating the finalization of the proposed regulation with the Form 5500 requirements. Labor Is Unclear about How It Will Use the New Information Reported on the Form 5500, and the Form 5500 May Continue to Not Provide Useful Fee Information to Labor and Others
Labor officials told us that they do not have specific plans for using the data received as a result of the new requirements, and we found that even with the changes, the Form 5500 may not be useful to Labor, sponsors, or others. Labor’s efforts are also meant to effect a behavioral change in plan sponsors and service providers. Finally, the Form 5500 continues to have limited use for Labor, sponsors, and participants. As we have previously reported, the form does not explicitly list all of the fees paid from plan assets. For example, plan sponsors were not required to report mutual fund investment fees to Labor, even though they received this information for each of the mutual funds they offered in the 401(k) plan in the form of a prospectus. Without information on all of the fees charged directly or indirectly to 401(k) plans, Labor is limited in its ability to identify fees that may be questionable. Coordinating these initiatives may reduce the burden and the cost to service providers and clarify for plan sponsors the information they need for the service provider selection and renewal processes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To minimize the possibility that inconsistent and incomparable information will be reported on the Schedule C and to ensure that the data collected results in meaningful information for Labor, sponsors, and participants, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor take the following action: Provide additional guidance regarding the reporting of indirect compensation and require that all indirect compensation be disclosed on the Schedule C.
Furthermore, consistent with our previous recommendation, to ensure comparable disclosure among all types of service providers and ensure that all investment products’ fees are fairly disclosed, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor take the following action: Require asset-based fees that are netted from an investment fund’s performance (and, as such, are not paid with plan assets) be explicitly reported on the Form 5500. Private Pensions: Information That Sponsors and Participants Need to Understand 401(k) Plan Fees. Private Pensions: Changes Needed to Provide 401(k) Plan Participants and the Department of Labor Better Information on Fees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Labor (Labor) collects information on fees charged to 401(k) plans primarily through its Form 5500. Labor issued final regulations in November 2007, making changes to, among other things, Schedule C of the Form 5500. Labor put emphasis on reporting the indirect compensation paid to service providers and between service providers, in an effort to capture all of the costs that plan sponsors incur. Congress and others are concerned that Labor's rules could result in duplicative and confusing reporting. Given these concerns, Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine the new requirements and determine whether Labor's new requirements will provide (1) clear and understandable guidance to plan sponsors and (2) useful information to Labor and others. GAO analyzed Labor's regulations and interviewed Labor and other officials about disclosure and reporting practices.
What GAO Found
Sponsors and service providers report confusion over Labor's new reporting requirements for the Form 5500 Schedule C and over how plan expenses are defined. Specifically, they have questions regarding the distinction between eligible and ineligible indirect compensation, that is, which types of indirect compensation must be reported on the Form 5500 (compensation that qualifies as "eligible" does not have to be reported). Labor's guidance on its Web site thus far has been limited, and, according to sponsors and service providers GAO spoke with, has raised additional questions that remain unanswered. Specifically, Labor has not provided sufficient guidance for sponsors and providers to accurately determine what elements of compensation qualify as eligible indirect compensation (fees or expense reimbursements charged to investment funds and reflected in the value of the investment). Therefore, interpretations have been left up to sponsors and providers and may result in a range of reporting practices, causing Labor to receive inconsistent and incomplete data. In addition to the new Form 5500 requirements, Labor has proposed another regulation on service provider fee disclosure (its 408(b)(2) regulation), but it has not yet been finalized. Sponsors and service providers GAO talked with stressed the importance of coordinating this initiative with the new Form 5500 requirements. Doing so may reduce the burden and the cost to service providers of making changes to their data gathering and reporting systems and clarify for plan sponsors the information they need to understand and compare the fees charged by various service providers. In GAO's discussions with Labor officials, they agreed that there was a need to coordinate the two regulations, and said that although they are working to finalize the proposed 408(b)(2) regulation, it is uncertain when it will be published. Labor officials told GAO that they do not have specific plans for using the data received as a result of the new Form 5500 requirements and will wait to see what information is reported before deciding what to do with the data. Although Labor's new requirements are meant to ensure that plan sponsors obtain the information they need to assess the compensation paid to service providers for services rendered to the plan, the Form 5500 may not provide useful information to Labor and others. Because plan sponsors are likely to report indirect compensation in varying formats, it is unclear how Labor will be able to compare such data across plans. In addition, GAO previously reported that the information provided to Labor on the Form 5500 has limited use for effectively overseeing fees paid by 401(k) plans because it does not explicitly list all of the fees paid from plan assets, yet these types of fees comprise the majority of fees in 401(k) plans. For example, plan sponsors are not required to explicitly report asset-based fees that are netted from an investment fund's performance, even though they receive this information for each of the mutual funds they offer in the 401(k) plan. Thus, despite the changes to the Form 5500, the new information provided may not be very useful to Labor, plan sponsors, and others. |
gao_GAO-05-455T | gao_GAO-05-455T_0 | Eligibility Determinations
The Millennium Challenge Act requires that the MCC board base its eligibility decisions, “to the maximum extent possible,” on objective and quantifiable indicators of a country’s demonstrated commitment to the criteria enumerated in the act. MCC is to sign compacts only with national governments. Finally, we found that reliance on the indicators carried certain inherent limitations. MCC Used Quantitative Indicators and Judgment to Determine Eligibility
MCC used the 16 quantitative indicators, as well as the discretion implicit in the Millennium Challenge Act, to select 17 countries as eligible for MCA compact assistance for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 (see fig. Fiscal year 2005: In October 2004, the MCC board selected 16 countries as eligible for fiscal year 2005 funding. MCC Is Refining Its Compact Development Process
MCC has received compact proposals, concept papers, or both, from 16 countries; of these, it has approved a compact with one country and is negotiating with four others. As part of this process, MCC has identified elements of country program implementation and fiscal accountability that can be adapted to eligible countries’ compact objectives and institutional capacities. MCC’s $110 million compact with Madagascar, averaging $27.5 million per year, would make it the country’s fifth largest donor (see app. In addition, MCC is exploring ways—such as providing grants—to facilitate compact development and implementation. MCC Is Taking Steps to Coordinate with Key Stakeholders
MCC has received advice and support from USAID, State, Treasury, and USTR and has signed agreements with five U.S. agencies for program implementation and technical assistance. MCC Is Consulting with Other Donors and Using Donor Expertise
MCC has received information and expertise from key multilateral and bilateral donors in the United States and eligible countries. MCC Has Made Progress in Developing Management Structures but Has Not Completed Corporatewide Plans, Strategies, and Time Frames
Since starting up operations, MCC has made progress in developing key administrative infrastructures that support its program implementation. MCC has also made progress in establishing corporatewide structures for accountability, governance, internal control, and human capital management, including establishing an audit and review capability through its IG, adopting bylaws, providing ethics training to employees, and expanding its permanent full-time staff. However, MCC has not yet completed plans, strategies, and time frames needed to establish these essential management structures on a corporatewide basis. We also provided the Departments of State and Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative an opportunity to review a draft of this statement for technical accuracy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed MCC’s activities in its first 15 months of operations, specifically its (1) process for determining country eligibility for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, (2) progress in developing compacts, (3) coordination with key stakeholders, and (4) establishment of management structures and accountability mechanisms. We determined the data to be reliable for the purposes of this study. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to administer the Millennium Challenge Account. MCC's mission is to promote economic growth and reduce extreme poverty in developing countries. The act requires MCC to rely to the maximum extent possible on quantitative criteria in determining countries' eligibility for assistance. MCC will provide assistance primarily through compacts--agreements with country governments. MCC aims to be one of the top donors in countries with which it signs compacts. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated nearly $2.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation; for fiscal year 2006, the President is requesting $3 billion. GAO was asked to monitor MCC's (1) process for determining country eligibility, (2) progress in developing compacts, (3) coordination with key stakeholders, and (4) establishment of management structures and accountability mechanisms.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the MCC board used the quantitative criteria as well as judgment in determining 17 countries to be eligible for MCA compacts. Although MCC chose the indicators based in part on their public availability, our analysis showed that not all of the source data for the indicators were readily accessible. In addition, we found that reliance on the indicators carried certain inherent limitations, such as measurement uncertainty. Between August 2004 and March 2005, MCC received compact proposals, concept papers, or both, from 16 eligible countries. It signed a compact with Madagascar in April 2005 and is negotiating compacts with four countries. MCC's 4-year compact with Madagascar for $110 million would make it the country's fifth largest donor. MCC is continuing to refine its compact development process. In addition, MCC has identified elements of program implementation and fiscal accountability that can be adapted to eligible countries' compact objectives and institutional capacities. MCC is taking steps to coordinate with key stakeholders to use existing expertise and conduct outreach. The U.S. agencies on the MCC Board of Directors--USAID, the Departments of State and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative--have provided resources and other assistance to MCC, and five U.S. agencies have agreed to provide technical assistance. Bilateral and multilateral donors are providing information and expertise. MCC is also consulting with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and abroad as part of its outreach activities. MCC has made progress in developing key administrative infrastructures that support its mission and operations. MCC has also made progress in establishing corporatewide structures for accountability, governance, internal control, and human capital management, including establishing an audit capability through its Inspector General, adopting bylaws, providing ethics training to employees, and expanding its permanent full-time staff. However, MCC has not yet completed comprehensive plans, strategies, and related time frames for establishing these essential management structures and accountability mechanisms on a corporatewide basis. |
gao_NSIAD-93-241 | gao_NSIAD-93-241_0 | Involuntary reductions can occur anywhere along this personnel pipeline due to misconduct. We determined (1) what progress DOD has made toward meeting reduction targets, (2) how downsizing actions are affecting new recruiting or accessions, (3) what range of voluntary and involuntary reduction actions are being taken to meet downsizing objectives, (4) how downsizing is being accomplished across various groupings of officer and enlisted personnel by years of service and how this is affecting force profiles, and (5) what issues might be important to future reduction decisions. DOD’s action also reflects budgetary decisions to increase the ratio of entry level to more senior personnel in the career force to reduce the cost of the force. Various Tools Used to Downsize the Force Across Career Groups, but Some Less Than Voluntary Reductions Are Required
The services have used a number of authorities or “tools” to reduce and shape its force by various year groupings of officer and enlisted personnel. Table 4.8 shows changes in average enlisted pay grades for fiscal years 1980, 1987, and 1992. These issues include continuing changes in overall force profiles, pace of future reductions, correlating such reductions to changes in force structure, and determining what accession levels should be, factoring in multiple trade-offs. Conclusions
DOD has accomplished a majority of its previously planned active duty force reductions; however, senior DOD officials have indicated that further reductions are planned as the result of a recently completed review of future DOD needs. DOD and the services have reduced accession levels over previous years, but are still recruiting large numbers of personnel each year as part of their efforts to preserve and sustain a balanced force for the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) compliance with congressional guidance and authorizations in military downsizing, focusing on: (1) DOD progress towards meeting reduction targets; (2) the effects of downsizing on new recruiting or accessions; (3) voluntary and involuntary reduction actions to meet downsizing objectives; (4) the accomplishment of downsizing across various groups of officers and enlisted personnel by years of service and its effect on force profiles; and (5) issues important to future reduction decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD has accomplished the majority of its planned active duty force reductions, and its fiscal year (FY) 1993 personnel level will be about 21 percent below its FY 1987 personnel level; (2) as a result of the DOD bottom-up review, further reductions below planned FY 1995 levels are probable; (3) DOD and the services have reduced planned personnel accession levels by 34 percent, but they are continuing to recruit large numbers of personnel in order to sustain a balanced force across various pay grades and skill areas and preserve future career opportunities and military capabilities; (4) personnel turnover rates are higher than force reduction rates due to uncertainties, career anxiety, and force-shaping decisions; (5) DOD has given priority to voluntary separations through early release, retirement, and financial incentives, but the pool of likely candidates for voluntary separation is declining; (6) involuntary reduction actions involve higher retention standards, mandatory retirement of selected personnel, and reduction-in-force for nonretirement-eligible personnel; (7) the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel and average pay grades have increased slightly during downsizing; and (8) issues that could impact future force reduction decisions include future force profiles, how quickly the force can be reduced, what accession levels should be, and what cost trade-offs are most desirable between a younger or a more experienced force. |
gao_GAO-10-551T | gao_GAO-10-551T_0 | DOD Continues to Face Challenges in Providing Management and Oversight of Contractors in Ongoing Operations
Based on preliminary observations from our ongoing work in Iraq and Afghanistan, we found that DOD continues to be faced with five challenges related to providing management and oversight of contractors in ongoing operations. While DOD has acknowledged shortages of personnel and has made some efforts to address them, these efforts are in the early stages of implementation. Second, training non-acquisition personnel such as CORs and unit commanders to work with contractors continues to be a problem. Challenges in Providing an Adequate Number of Contract Oversight and Management Personnel in Deployed Locations Are Likely to Continue to Hinder DOD’s Oversight of Contractors
As we noted in several of our previous reports, having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is crucial to ensuring that DOD receives the best value for the billions of dollars spent on contractor-provided services supporting contingency operations. Additionally, as our previous work has shown, poor contract oversight and the poor contractor performance that may result can negatively affect the military’s mission. In July 2009 we reported that DOD had not developed department-wide procedures to screen local national and third-country national contractor personnel, in part because two offices within the department—–that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—could not agree on the level of detail that should be included in background screening for third country and local national employees, and therefore lacked assurance that all contractor personnel were properly screened. However, in Afghanistan, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR- A) has not established a command-wide policy for screening and badging contractors. DOD Lacks Reliable Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
Since 2002, we have reported on the challenges faced by commanders and other leaders to obtain accurate information on the number of contractors and the services they are providing in contingencies and have made recommendations to improve DOD’s ability to obtain contractor information. Challenges in Identifying Operational Contract Support Requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan
DOD guidance highlights the need to plan for operational contract support early in an operations planning process because of the challenges associated with using contractors in contingencies. These challenges include overseeing and managing contractors in contingency operations. Our preliminary observations from ongoing work continue to show that DOD has not fully planned for the use of contractors in support of ongoing contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While DOD Has Taken Some Actions to Institutionalize Operational Contract Support, Much Remains to Be Done
In response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations, DOD has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract support, however much remains to be done. In addition, the department needs to take additional actions to improve its planning for operational contract support for future operations. DOD Has Taken Some Department-wide Steps to Institutionalize Operational Contract Support
In October 2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness established the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to act as a focal point for leading DOD’s efforts to improve contract management and oversight at deployed locations. We also noted that DOD was developing an Expeditionary Contracting Policy to address the requirement to develop a joint policy on contingency contracting, and was revising the October 2005 version of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces, to meet the congressional direction to develop a joint policy on requirements definition; program management, including the oversight of contractor personnel supporting a contingency operation; and training. Until the DOD instruction is revised and issued, the department’s overarching policy document will not reflect the department’s current approach to operational contract support. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies greatly on contractors to support its current operations and is likely to continue to depend on contractors in support of future operations. As of December 2009, DOD estimated that over 207,000 contractor personnel were supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD expects to increase the number of contractors as more troops deploy to Afghanistan. The use of contractors in contingencies has challenged DOD in overseeing and managing contractors. This testimony addresses (1) the challenges DOD faces when trying to provide management and oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and (2) the extent to which DOD has made progress in institutionalizing a department- wide approach to managing and overseeing operational contract support. Today's testimony is based on GAO's ongoing audit work in Iraq and Afghanistan, looking at planning for operational contract support and at DOD's efforts to manage and oversee contractors, as well as on recently published related GAO reports and testimonies.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to face a number of challenges overseeing and managing contractors in ongoing operations. These challenges include: (1) Providing an adequate number of personnel to conduct oversight and management of contractors. (2) Training personnel, including non-acquisition personnel such as unit commanders, on how to work effectively with contractors in operations. (3) Ensuring that local and third-country nationals have been properly screened, given the lack of standardized documents, the lack of national police agencies in many countries, and poor record keeping in many countries. (4) Compiling reliable data on the number of contractor personnel supporting U.S. forces in contingencies. (5) Identifying requirements for contractor support in ongoing operations, although GAO notes that some steps have been taken at the individual unit level.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made many recommendations in the past aimed at addressing each of these challenges. While DOD has implemented some of our recommendations, it has been slow to implement others. For example, DOD has not developed agency-wide procedures to screen foreign national contractor personnel. In addition, the department has not fully addressed congressional direction to include operational contract support in predeployment training. Until DOD has fully implemented GAO's recommendations and congressional direction, it will not be in a position to ensure adequate management and oversight of contractors in contingency operations. Furthermore, inattention to these challenges may negatively affect the military's mission through the inefficient use of personnel, may increase the risk to U.S. personnel through inadequate background screenings, and may result in increased waste of taxpayer dollars. While DOD has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract support, significant work remains to be done. For example, in 2006 DOD established the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to act as a focal point for DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight at deployed locations. In addition, the department has issued a variety of contractor-related guidance, including the Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook and a Joint Publication that establishes doctrine for operational contract support; however, other guidance, including an Expeditionary Contracting Policy and an update of the DOD Instruction on Contractors Accompanying the Force, has yet to be finalized. Our ongoing work has also shown that the department continues to face challenges identifying contractor requirements in its plans for future operations. Until DOD institutionalizes operational contract support by incorporating it into its guidance, training, and planning, the department may continue to confront the challenges it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan in future operations. |
gao_GAO-07-483 | gao_GAO-07-483_0 | Specifically, the A380 is much larger than other aircraft, with a wingspan of about 262 feet, a tail fin reaching almost 80 feet high, a maximum takeoff weight in excess of 1.2 million pounds, and seating between 555 and 853 passengers. Due to the size of the A380, it is subject to the FAA’s design standards for the largest aircraft (Airplane Design Group VI standards). A380 Poses a Number of Potential Safety Challenges at Airports
The A380 will be the first of a new category of large passenger aircraft introduced into the national airspace system in the coming years. As a result, airports expecting A380 service need to modify their infrastructure or impose operating restrictions on the A380 and other aircraft to assure that safety is maintained. In addition, research data suggests that the wake turbulence created by the A380 is stronger than any aircraft in use today and would require greater separation from other aircraft during landing and takeoff. Although the A380 is equipped with some safety enhancements, such as new internal and exterior materials designed to reduce flammability and an external taxiing camera system to enhance pilot vision on the ground, the A380 poses safety challenges for fire and rescue officials due to its larger size, upper deck, fuel capacity, and the number of passengers. FAA, ICAO, Airbus, and airports have taken several steps to mitigate these challenges. U.S. A380’s Impact on Capacity at U.S. The extent of disruptions and delays caused by possible operating restrictions, increased separation requirements, and gate restrictions would depend on the time of day, the number of A380 operations, and the volume of overall traffic. Potential operating restrictions and the increased separation requirements imposed to ensure the safety of the A380 and other aircraft at airports and during flight could result in a reduction in the number of flights that airports can accommodate. Operating Restrictions on the A380 at U.S. Foreign Airports Have Taken Different Approaches to Prepare for the A380
Selected foreign airports we visited have taken different approaches to prepare for the introduction of the A380. These differences reflect the age and the expected level of A380 traffic at the airports—and, in some cases, the anticipated economic benefits of the A380 flights. The different approaches include adopting alternative airport design standards to accommodate new large aircraft, making significant investment in existing infrastructure, and designing airports that allow for new large aircraft. By implementing these approaches, officials from the foreign airports we visited do not anticipate that the introduction of the A380 will result in delays or disruptions at their airports, despite higher levels of expected A380 traffic compared to most U.S. airports because these airports will not have to impose operating restrictions on the A380 to the extent of U.S. airports. The A380 was designed, in part, to help alleviate these capacity constraints. However, the impact of its arrival on airport capacity in the United States is uncertain. FAA officials generally agreed with the report’s findings. The report includes information on the potential impact of the A380 on passenger throughput—specifically, that the A380 could accommodate more passengers and freight on each flight than any other aircraft in use today. Airbus also provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. In May 2006, we issued a report that estimated the costs of infrastructure changes that U.S. airports plan to make to accommodate the A380. This report discusses (1) the safety issues associated with the introduction of the A380, and how U.S. airports are addressing them, (2) the potential impact of A380 operations on the capacity of U.S. airports, and (3) how selected foreign airports are addressing these safety and capacity issues. We also conducted site visits to 11 Asian, Canadian, and European airports that will be receiving the A380. | Why GAO Did This Study
Airbus S.A.S. (Airbus), a European aircraft manufacturer, is introducing a new aircraft designated as the A380, which is expected to enter service in late 2007. The A380 will be the largest passenger aircraft in the world, with a wingspan of about 262 feet, a tail fin reaching 80 feet high, and a maximum takeoff weight of 1.2 million pounds. The A380 has a double deck and could seat up to 853 passengers. GAO was asked to examine the impact of the A380 on U.S. airports. In May 2006, GAO issued a report that estimated the costs of infrastructure changes at U.S. airports to accommodate the A380. This report discusses (1) the safety issues associated with introducing the A380 at U.S. airports, (2) the potential impact of A380 operations on the capacity of U.S. airports, and (3) how selected foreign airports are preparing to accommodate the A380. To address these issues, GAO reviewed studies on operational and safety issues related to the A380 and conducted site visits to the 18 U.S. airports and 11 Asian, Canadian, and European airports preparing to receive the A380. GAO provided the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Airbus a copy of the draft report for review. Both generally agreed with the report's findings. FAA and Airbus also provided technical clarifications, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The A380 will be the first of a new category of large passenger aircraft introduced into the national airspace system in the coming years. The size of the A380 poses some potential safety challenges for U.S. airports. As a result, airports expecting A380 service may need to modify their infrastructure or impose operating restrictions, such as restrictions on runway use, on the A380 and other aircraft to ensure an acceptable level of safety. In addition, increased separation between the A380 and other aircraft during landing and departure is also required because research data indicate that the air turbulence created by the A380's wake is stronger than the largest aircraft in use today. The A380 also poses challenges for fire and rescue officials due to its larger size, upper deck, fuel capacity, and the number of passengers. FAA, Airbus, airports, and other organizations have taken several steps to mitigate these safety challenges. For example, the A380 is equipped with some safety enhancements, such as materials designed to reduce flammability and an external camera taxiing system to enhance pilot vision on the ground. The impact of A380 operations on capacity is uncertain. The A380 was designed, in part, to help alleviate capacity constraints faced by many large airports in the United States and around the world by accommodating more passengers and freight on each flight than any aircraft currently in use. However, potential operating restrictions and the increased separation requirements imposed to ensure the safety of the A380 and other aircraft at airports and during flight could reduce the number of flights that airports can accommodate. The extent to which possible operating restrictions, increased separation, and gate utilization impact capacity would depend on the time of day, the number of A380 operations, and the volume of overall airport traffic. Selected foreign airports that GAO visited have taken different approaches than U.S. airports in preparing for the introduction of the A380. These differences reflect the expected level of A380 traffic at the airports--and in some cases, the anticipated economic benefits of the A380 flights. The different approaches include adopting alternative airport design standards, making significant investment in existing infrastructure, and designing airports that allow for new large aircraft. By implementing these approaches, officials from the foreign airports that GAO visited do not anticipate that the introduction of the A380 will result in delays or disruptions at their airports, despite higher levels of expected A380 traffic compared to most U.S. airports. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.