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gao_GAO-05-707T | gao_GAO-05-707T_0 | IRS Has Improved Taxpayer Service but Enforcement and BSM Remain High Risk
IRS has made noticeable progress in improving taxpayer service since passage of RRA 98. Tax law enforcement is also high risk because past declines in IRS’s enforcement activities threatened to erode taxpayer compliance. Modernization has encountered a long history of continuing delays and design difficulties and the impact of these problems on IRS’s operations led GAO to designate IRS’s systems modernization as a high-risk area in 1995 and it remains so today. Future deliveries of additional functionality of deployed systems and the implementation of other BSM projects are expected to have a significant impact on IRS’s taxpayer services and enforcement capability as well as its efforts to continue to improve its financial management. Continued Progress Depends on IRS Addressing Resource Constraints and Realizing Efficiency and Systems Improvements
For IRS to build on the gains made since passage of RRA 98, the agency must address numerous challenges related to resource management. IRS faces budgetary constraints that may be addressed in part through the development of goals for assessing performance and to help in making budget decisions, looking for opportunities to enhance its funding, and leveraging the resources of nonfederal partners. IRS also faces the challenges of improving efficiency in taxpayer service and tax law enforcement, developing useful cost accounting tools, and improving productivity. Finally, IRS faces information systems challenges in both BSM and systems security shortfalls. Current examples of resource enhancers—user fees and private debt collection—may provide useful models for IRS and Congress to consider. However, as we also noted earlier, there have been concerns raised about the quality of service at both walk-in and volunteer sites. Generally, as indicated in the budget, the menu of taxpayer services that IRS provides covers assistance, outreach, and processing. Targeting Enforcement Could Make More Efficient Use of Resources
Multiple enforcement strategies could help IRS reduce the tax gap. For any given set of tax policies, IRS’s efforts to reduce the tax gap and ensure appropriate levels of compliance will need to be based on a balanced approach of providing service to taxpayers and enforcing the tax laws. Accurate Cost Information Would Help IRS Make Resource Allocation Decisions
Managing a federal agency as large and complex as IRS requires managers to constantly weigh the relative costs and benefits of different approaches to achieving the goals mandated by the Congress. Productivity Improvements Could Help Offset Budget Cuts
IRS needs to make the most use of its available resources and a key to this is improved productivity. Additional Management Improvements Needed for BSM Success
The BSM program has a long history of significant cost increases and schedule delays, which, in part, has led us to report this program as high risk since 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the passage of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has faced the challenge of managing its resources to simultaneously improve service to taxpayers, assure taxpayers' compliance with the tax laws, and modernize its antiquated information systems. As requested, this statement provides our assessment of IRS's current performance in the areas of taxpayer service, tax law enforcement, and systems modernization. Looking ahead, this statement also describes the challenges that IRS faces in addressing resource constraints as well as realizing efficiency and information systems improvements.
What GAO Found
IRS's most noticeable progress has been in IRS's taxpayer service, which has been of special concern to the Congress. Since the passage of RRA 98, improvements in access to IRS by telephone, the accuracy of answers given to taxpayer inquiries, and the growth of IRS's Web site, which now provides a variety of services, have been noteworthy accomplishments. IRS experienced declines in enforcement staffing after 1998, but recently stopped the declines and begun to show increases. Despite this, enforcement remains a high risk area because of the continued need to improve enforcement and make progress towards reducing the tax gap. IRS has made significant progress in establishing management controls and acquiring infrastructure as part of the BSM program, as well as significant progress in addressing financial management issues. However, BSM remains at risk because of the scope and complexity of modernization activities and the need for better management capacity to avoid repeating the program's history of schedule delays and cost overruns. Looking ahead, continuing the progress described above depends on IRS addressing resource constraints and realizing efficiency and systems improvements. We highlight several such opportunities: (1) developing long-term goals would help IRS and Congress assess agency performance and make budget decisions, (2) considering additional funding enhancements such as user fees and private debt collection which may help mitigate budget constraints, (3) leveraging nonfederal partners such as states to assist with tax law enforcement and volunteers to help provide taxpayer service, (4) prioritizing taxpayer service activities could help IRS minimize the impact of budget cuts, (5) targeting enforcement resources could help IRS make more efficient use of available resources and help the agency make progress towards reducing the tax gap, (6) creating the necessary systems to enable IRS to develop accurate cost accounting information would help IRS make resource allocation decisions, (7) developing and using better productivity data would help IRS make productivity improvements and thereby make better use of available resources, (8) making needed management improvements would help IRS bring planned new information systems on-line in a timely and cost-effective manner, and (9) making needed improvements to assure information systems security would reduce vulnerabilities. |
gao_GAO-03-149 | gao_GAO-03-149_0 | DOD’s budget for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program has more than tripled in recent years—from $235 million in fiscal year 1997 to an estimated $789 million in fiscal 2002. By not doing so, they broadened the number of eligible specialties and reenlistees who received bonuses. Some Services Do Not Consistently Use All of the Criteria They Have Established for Selecting Specialties That Receive Bonuses
Some services are not consistently using all of the criteria they have established to select critical specialties for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program. Growth in the Number of Specialties and Reenlistees
The services, with the exception of the Marine Corps, have not been applying all of their criteria for selecting specialties to include in their Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. Overall, we found that the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not manage their programs to stay within their budgets appropriated by Congress. DOD Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance and Oversight
DOD canceled the instruction containing criteria for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program in 1995 and has not replaced it. Without this instruction, the services have not had clear direction on how to manage their programs. Moreover, it has not reviewed the services’ processes for establishing their reenlistment bonus programs. To improve DOD’s oversight and the services’ management of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require that the Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness issue an instruction that provides the services with guidance for administering and selecting specialties for inclusion in their programs and conduct annual reviews of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program as required by DOD’s directive. Consequently, without these essential management controls, it is not clear how the Department can be sure that the program is being implemented as intended. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because of the recent growth in DOD's Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, the House Appropriations Committee asked GAO to determine (1) the extent to which the services have followed their criteria for managing their programs and (2) whether DOD has provided adequate guidance for and oversight of the program.
What GAO Found
The Navy and Air Force have not used all of the criteria they have established for selecting critical military specialties eligible for bonuses under their Selective Reenlistment Bonus Programs. The Army's guidance does not include specific criteria for selecting critical specialties. Since these services have not used all of their criteria, the number of eligible specialties and the number of enlisted personnel who receive bonuses have expanded. Moreover, the services did not manage their programs to stay within their budgets appropriated by Congress. The Department of Defense's (DOD) budget for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program has more than tripled in recent years--from $235 million in fiscal year 1997 to an estimated $789 million in fiscal year 2002. DOD has not provided adequate guidance for and oversight of its Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program. DOD canceled an instruction that established criteria for selecting specialties for the program. Without this instruction, DOD cannot be sure that the program is being implemented as intended. Also, DOD has not reviewed the services' processes for selecting critical specialties or for establishing their corresponding bonus levels, despite requirements to do so annually. Thus, DOD has not ensured that the services are implementing their programs appropriately to help improve short-term retention in critical military specialties |
gao_GAO-17-619T | gao_GAO-17-619T_0 | Space systems can take a long time to develop and often consist of multiple components, including satellites, ground control stations, terminals, and user equipment. DOD satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion. Many major DOD space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, had grown 118 percent since its first estimate as of our March 2017 review and its first satellite was launched over 3.5 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile warning satellite program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs are now in the production phase where fewer problems tend to surface, and where there is typically less risk of cost and schedule growth. The only major satellite program with systems in the development phase is the Global Positioning System (GPS), which has seen an almost 4-year delay and unit cost growth of 9 percent due to technical issues. Cost and schedule growth has also been a challenge for satellites and their ground systems. In fact, delays with ground systems have been so lengthy, that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key capabilities can be fully exploited. Figure 1 provides more details on the current status of DOD’s major space programs. Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space technology; however, over the past 8 years we have identified a number of other management and oversight problems that can worsen the situation. Ongoing Work Shows GPS Acquisitions Are Still High Risk
In 2015, we reported that the Air Force was experiencing significant difficulties developing the GPS ground system, OCX, and consistently overstated its progress to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Preliminary results from our ongoing review of GPS shows that the satellites, ground systems, and user equipment are all still on a high risk path; though satellite delays are still somewhat mitigated by the longer than anticipated performance of older GPS satellites. Fragmented Space Leadership Exacerbates Acquisition Problems
We have reported over the years that DOD’s culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented responsibilities have made it difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. For example, in 2012 we found that although some improvements in leadership have been made, there was no single person or organization held accountable for balancing acquisition needs against wants, ensuring coordination among the many organizations involved with space systems acquisitions, and ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed. In 2016 we determined it was too early to gauge whether the PDSA has sufficient authority to consolidate space leadership responsibilities. In our ongoing work on the Global Positioning System, Army officials have also observed that the lack of a central point of authority and accountability is hampering coordination on GPS user equipment. In conclusion, given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership and consequent challenges faced by DOD in synchronizing its extensive space enterprise, other, more significant reform measures may deserve a closer look. They include allowing time for the recent PDSA change to work; combining military space functions into one agency; combining Air Force and NRO space acquisition functions into a space acquisition agency; and creating a new military department for the space domain - a Space Force. Space Acquisitions: Challenges Facing DOD as it Changes Approaches to Space Acquisitions. GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems and User Equipment Production Readiness. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future Efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's space systems provide critical capabilities that support military and other government operations and can take a long time to develop, produce, and launch. These systems can also be expensive to acquire and field, amounting to billions of dollars each year. Given the time and resource demands of DOD's space systems and the need to ensure taxpayer dollars are used effectively, especially in light of today's constrained government budget environment, it is essential that DOD manage system acquisitions carefully and avoid repeating past problems.
This statement focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions, (2) GPS, which is the only large DOD satellite program with systems currently in the development cycle, and (3) leadership for space acquisitions.
This statement highlights the results of GAO's work on space acquisitions over the past 8 years and presents preliminary observations from ongoing work on the Global Positioning System. For the ongoing work, GAO analyzed program documents and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
Many major Department of Defense (DOD) space programs GAO reviewed have experienced cost and schedule increases. For example, costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program grew 118 percent and its first satellite was launched more than 3.5 years late. Costs for the Space Based Infrared System grew nearly 300 percent and its scheduled launch was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs are now in the production phase during which fewer technical problems tend to surface. Satellite ground systems have also been challenged by cost and schedule growth. In fact, ground system delays have been so lengthy that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key capabilities can be fully utilized. The table below provides some examples of program status.
GAO's preliminary results from an ongoing review of the Global Positioning System (GPS) show that the satellites, ground systems, and user equipment continue to be on a high-risk path. The launch of the first GPS satellite has been delayed almost 4 years because of technical problems. Additionally, development challenges for the satellite's ground system have resulted in delays so significant that the Air Force has started two other ground system efforts as workarounds to mitigate risk of delayed GPS capability. Additionally, it remains unclear how DOD will overcome a number of challenges that create high risk to the timely fielding of upgraded GPS user equipment for the warfighter.
GAO has reported over the years that DOD's culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented responsibilities have made it difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Although some changes in leadership have been made, such as providing the Secretary of the Air Force with additional space responsibilities, it is too early to gauge whether these changes are sufficient to provide leadership for balancing needs against wants, ensure coordination among the many organizations involved with space, and ensure that resources are directed where they are most needed. Given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership and consequent challenges DOD faces in synchronizing its extensive space enterprise, discussions with DOD officials and experts indicate further-reaching changes, ranging from establishing a space acquisition agency to instituting a new military department for space, may deserve a closer look.
What GAO Recommends
Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt acquisition best practices to help ensure cost and schedule goals are met. DOD has generally agreed and taken some actions to address space acquisition problems; however, additional actions are still needed. |
gao_RCED-97-250 | gao_RCED-97-250_0 | She also said, however, that the executive order had “created a more open and accountable review process” and that she had heard “no complaints about accountability and transparency.”
We believe that these public disclosure requirements in the executive order, combined with the administration’s assertion of their effectiveness, have resulted in a public perception that changes made to a regulation while at OIRA and by OIRA are readily identifiable. There have been several previous requirements by both Congress and previous presidents that federal agencies review their existing regulations. According to the order, the purpose of the review was to make the agencies’ regulatory programs more effective, less burdensome, or better aligned with the President’s priorities and the principles in the order. Lessening the frequency with which this information must be submitted should reduce the paperwork burden imposed on the states. Regulatory Analysis
Although both S. 981 and Executive Order 12866 require agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses for major rules and to make the results available to the public, the bill goes farther than the order in requiring disclosure of how those analyses are conducted. For example, one of the bill’s “findings” states that cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments “should be presented with a clear statement of the analytical assumptions and uncertainties including an explanation of what is known and not known and what the implications of alternative assumptions might be.” Section 623 of the bill requires agencies to include an executive summary of the regulatory analyses, including the benefits and costs of reasonable alternatives and “the key assumptions and scientific or economic information upon which the agency relied.”
In January 1996, OMB issued guidance to executive agencies on preparing the economic analyses called for in Executive Order 12866. Conclusions
S. 981 contains a number of provisions to improve regulatory management. Peer reviews of those analyses can help ensure that regulatory proposals are scientifically grounded. Passage of S. 981 would provide a statutory foundation for such principles as openness, accountability, and sound science in rulemaking. Enactment of S. 981 would provide a sound basis for that oversight. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO addressed issues in regulatory management as part of consideration of S. 981, the proposed Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) S. 981 represents a continuation of efforts that have been made by both the legislative and executive branches to improve the rulemaking process and, as a result, produce better regulations; (2) during the past 20 years, Congress has enacted a series of statutory requirements intended to, among other things, reduce paperwork, lessen regulatory burden on small entities, and curb mandates imposed on state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector; (3) in the same vein, each of the last six presidents has issued executive orders or taken other actions intended to improve the regulatory process; (4) Executive Order 12866, issued in September 1993, is the Clinton administration's statement of policy on regulatory planning and review; (5) the executive order makes the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) responsible for carrying out regulatory reviews and, to the extent permitted by law, for providing guidance to agencies; (6) S. 981 addresses many of the same issues as Executive Order 12866, including cost benefit analysis, agency reviews of existing regulations, interagency coordination, and transparency in the regulatory review process; (7) the bill goes beyond the order's requirements on these issues and adds some new elements to the rulemaking process; (8) GAO's work indicates that some of the executive order's requirements have not always been met; and (9) enactment of S. 981 would help ensure that the underlying purposes of the order's requirements are more consistently achieved by OMB and regulatory agencies and provide a sound basis for congressional oversight of regulatory management issues. |
gao_GAO-17-618 | gao_GAO-17-618_0 | CBP’s Priority Trade Issues
CBP’s Priority Trade Issues are high-risk issue areas in which violations can cause significant revenue loss, harm the U.S. economy, or threaten the health and safety of the American people, according to CBP. The Office of Trade develops policies to guide trade enforcement efforts, while the Office of Field Operations conducts a range of trade processing and enforcement activities at ports. CBP’s previously port-centric approach to trade enforcement has shifted to a national-level, industry- focused approach with the establishment of the Office of Field Operations’ 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise. Centers of Excellence and Expertise Change the Way CBP Conducts Trade Operations by Enhancing Industry Focus at a National Level
CBP’s 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise have changed the way in which CBP conducts trade operations, centralizing the processing of imported goods on a national scale through a single industry-related Center rather than through individual ports of entry. CBP Enforces Its Priority Trade Issues through a Layered, Risk-Based Approach but Generally Does Not Have Performance Targets for Its Activities
CBP uses a layered, risk-based approach to guide its trade enforcement activities across its Priority Trade Issues but generally does not set performance targets to assess the effectiveness of its activities. 8 for an example of goods seized as a result of targeting). For example, CBP can seize imported goods if it believes there is a violation of a trade law. CBP Has Not Met Its Staffing Targets for Some of Its Trade Positions, Which Can Impact CBP’s Trade Enforcement Efforts
Over the past 5 fiscal years, CBP generally has not met the minimum staffing levels set by Congress for four of nine positions that perform customs revenue functions, and it generally has not met the optimal staffing level targets set by the agency for these positions. Staffing shortfalls can lead to decreased effectiveness of trade enforcement. Staffing shortfalls in trade positions can impact CBP’s trade processing and enforcement efforts, including CBP’s ability to enforce trade effectively. Conclusions
As an agency tasked with collecting revenue and identifying harmful and noncompliant imports, such as counterfeit products and goods that are misclassified to evade duties, CBP needs to ensure that it effectively enforces U.S. customs and trade laws while at the same time facilitating legitimate trade. In 2015, CBP officials processed more than $2.4 trillion in imports through more than 300 ports of entry and collected around $46 billion in revenue, making CBP the second-largest revenue collection agency in the United States. However, these plans generally lack performance targets, contrary to leading management practices. CBP officials cited several challenges to filling staffing gaps, including that hiring for trade positions is not an agency-wide priority. Contrary to leading practices in human capital management, CBP has not articulated how it plans to reach its staffing targets for trade positions over the long term. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) structure for carrying out trade enforcement, (2) how CBP conducts trade enforcement across its high-risk issue areas and ensures that its enforcement activities are effective, and (3) the extent to which CBP meets its staffing needs for trade enforcement. We visited CBP ports and field offices in Baltimore, Maryland; Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; and New York, New York to observe trade enforcement activities and interviewed CBP officials located at the sea and air ports. We subsequently worked with CBP in May 2017 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive but unclassified report for public release. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2015, CBP processed more than $2.4 trillion in imports through more than 300 ports of entry, collecting around $46 billion in revenue. CBP facilitates legitimate trade coming into the United States and enforces U.S. trade laws. CBP is tasked with collecting revenue and identifying harmful and noncompliant imports, such as counterfeit goods and goods that evade duties.
In February 2016, Congress passed an Act that included a provision for GAO to review the effectiveness of CBP's trade enforcement activities. In this report, GAO examines (1) CBP's structure for carrying out trade enforcement , (2) how CBP conducts trade enforcement across its high-risk issue areas and ensures that its enforcement activities are effective, and (3) the extent to which CBP meets its staffing needs for trade enforcement. GAO reviewed agency documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted field work at ports in Baltimore, Maryland; Los Angeles/Long Beach, California; and New York, New York. GAO selected ports to visit based on factors including volume of imports and number of trade enforcement units at each port.
What GAO Found
Two offices within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforce U.S. trade laws and protect revenue. The Office of Trade develops policies to guide CBP's trade enforcement efforts, while the Office of Field Operations conducts a range of trade processing and enforcement activities at U.S. ports. CBP's previously port-centric approach to trade enforcement has shifted to a national-level, industry-focused approach with the establishment of the Office of Field Operations' 10 Centers of Excellence and Expertise. These Centers represent a shift in trade operations, centralizing the processing of certain imported goods on a national scale through a single Center rather than individual ports of entry.
CBP conducts trade enforcement across seven high-risk issue areas using a risk-based approach, but its plans generally lack performance targets that would enable it to assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities. Violations in the high-risk issue areas can cause significant revenue loss, harm the U.S. economy, or threaten the health and safety of the American people. CBP's trade enforcement activities reduce risk of noncompliance and focus efforts on high-risk imports, according to CBP. For example, CBP conducts targeting of goods, conducts audits and verifications of importers, seizes prohibited goods, collects duties, and assesses penalties. However, CBP cannot assess the effectiveness of its activities without developing performance targets as suggested by leading practices for managing for results.
Over the past 5 fiscal years, CBP generally has not met the minimum staffing levels set by Congress for four of nine positions that perform customs revenue functions, and it generally has not met the optimal staffing level targets identified by the agency for these positions. Staffing shortfalls can impact CBP's ability to enforce trade effectively, for example, by leading to reduced compliance audits and decreased cargo inspections, according to CBP officials. CBP cited several challenges to filling staffing gaps, including that hiring for trade positions is not an agency-wide priority. Contrary to leading practices in human capital management, CBP has not articulated how it plans to reach its staffing targets for trade positions over the long term, generally conducting its hiring on an ad hoc basis.
This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report that GAO issued in April 2017. Information that CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
To strengthen its trade enforcement efforts, CBP should (1) include performance targets in its plans covering high-risk issue areas, and (2) develop a long-term hiring plan specific to trade positions that articulates how it will reach its staffing targets. CBP concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-17 | gao_GAO-03-17_0 | The Department of Defense Inspector General and GAO have issued numerous reports dating back to 1994 identifying systemic problems—such as questionable and inconsistently applied data, inconsistent processes among and between services, and unclear guidance—that have inflated the services’ requirements for certain categories of munitions and understated requirements for other categories. However, despite the department’s efforts to enhance the requirements determination process, one problem area remains—inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based on computations derived from the department’s munitions requirements determination process. Munitions Requirements Process Provides Varying Answers for Acquisition Decisions
The department’s munitions requirements process provides varying answers for current munitions acquisitions because of the inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the munitions requirements computed by the military services. As a result, the services are purchasing some critically needed munitions based on available funding and the contractors’ production capacity. While this approach may be needed in the short term, it raises questions whether over the long term it would position the services to make the most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs of combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) planned to spend $7.9 billion on acquiring munitions in fiscal year 2002. Ongoing military operations associated with the global war on terrorism have heightened concerns about the unified combatant commands having sufficient quantities of munitions. Since 1994, the DOD Inspector General and GAO have issued numerous reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns about the accuracy of the process used by the department to determine munitions requirements. DOD has improved its munitions requirements process by eliminating most of the systematic problems--correcting questionable and inconsistently applied data, completing target templates, and resolving issues involving the level of detail that should be included in planning guidance. However, a fundamental problem remains unaddressed--inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based on computations derived from the department's munitions requirement determination process. The department's munitions requirements process provides varied answers for current munitions acquisitions questions because of the aforementioned disjunction. As a result, the services, in the short term, are purchasing some critically needed munitions based on available funding and contractors' production capacity. Although this approach may be necessary in the short term, it raises questions as to whether over the long term it would position the services to make the most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs of combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met. |
gao_NSIAD-99-168 | gao_NSIAD-99-168_0 | Under its Articles of Agreement, as amended, the IMF limits financial assistance to those countries with a balance-of-payments need. The specific conditions that the IMF and the country authorities negotiate are intended to address the underlying problems that contributed to the country’s balance-of-payments difficulty, while ensuring repayment to the IMF. After the country completes any “prior actions” and the IMF Executive Board approves the financial arrangement, the program is to take effect and the country is eligible to receive its first disbursement of funds. We found that the IMF generally followed this process for the six countries we reviewed. The IMF’s review of a country’s economy is an iterative process that is often based on country-provided data, projections of key macroeconomic variables, and judgment by the IMF staff and country officials. The IMF Has a Broad Framework for Assessing Countries’ Balance of Payments
Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, as amended, the IMF considers any of the following three elements to be a basis for providing financial assistance from the GRA: the country’s balance of payments, the country’s reserve position, and developments in its reserves. The IMF’s Process for Monitoring Conditionality Is Intended to Respond to Individual Borrower Country Progress in Implementing Its Program
The IMF’s process for monitoring conditionality is intended to respond to individual country progress in meeting required conditions. IMF staff appraises a country’s progress and makes a recommendation to the Executive Board. According to IMF staff, this process involves a considerable amount of judgment and allows for a number of options depending on the country’s performance and the effect of both internal and external events on that performance. The documents we reviewed demonstrated that this process was generally followed for the six countries in our study, as summarized in table 3. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe how the IMF establishes financial arrangements with borrower countries and the types of conditions set under these programs and assess how this process was used for six borrower countries; and (2) describe how the IMF monitors countries’ performance and assess how this process was used for six borrower countries, detailing the conditions met and not met, the reasons why conditions were not met, and the actions the IMF took in response. The IMF’s Process for Establishing and Monitoring Countries’ Financial Arrangements
The process that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) generally uses to establish and monitor financial assistance arrangements is intended to be flexible and applied on a case-by-case basis to address the specific balance-of-payments problems of member countries. The IMF staff monitors the program continuously and the program is subject to periodic reviews by the IMF Executive Board in order to evaluate if the country’s progress in meeting the conditions under the program justifies the continuation of disbursements. In some cases, IMF disbursements are conditioned only on the determination by IMF staff that the country has met prenegotiated quantitative criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the International Monetary Fund (IMF), focusing on how the IMF: (1) establishes financial arrangements with borrower countries and the types of conditions set under these arrangements and assess how this process was used for six borrower countries; and (2) monitors countries' performance and assess how this process was used for the same six borrower countries, detailing the conditions met and not met, the reasons why conditions were not met, and the actions IMF took in response.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under IMF's Articles of Agreement, as amended, IMF limits financial assistance to those countries with a balance-of-payments need; (2) continued disbursement of assistance to a country is based on IMF's consideration of data on and judgment of the country's progress in meeting the agreed-upon conditions; (3) IMF has developed a broad framework for establishing a financial assistance arrangement that is to be applied on a case-by-case basis considering each country's circumstances; (4) the specific conditions that IMF and the country authorities establish are intended to address the immediate and underlying problems that contributed to the country's balance-of-payments difficulty, while ensuring repayment to IMF; (5) after a country fulfills any early IMF requirements and the IMF Executive Board then approves the financial arrangement, the program is to take effect and the country is eligible to receive its first disbursement of funds; (6) according to information GAO reviewed for the six countries in its study, IMF generally followed this process to establish the financial assistance package and the conditions for the assistance; (7) the underlying causes and magnitude of the balance-of-payments difficulty varied among the countries but generally stemmed from concerns about their continued access to external financing; (8) the IMF's process for monitoring a country's progress toward overall program goals and compliance with program conditions is designed to respond to an individual country's progress and situation; (9) according to IMF staff, many disbursements are conditioned only on the determination by IMF staff that the country has met prenegotiated quantitative criteria; other disbursements are subject to reviews by IMF Executive Board; (10) the process for conducting IMF Board reviews, which involves the borrower country and IMF, is designed to incorporate data on a country's economic performance as well as the judgment of the IMF Executive Board and staff; (11) according to the information GAO reviewed, the monitoring of the IMF's conditionality program in the six countries in GAO's study was generally consistent with this approach; (12) IMF missions to each country reviewed the country's economy and documented the country's progress in satisfying conditions; and (13) in some cases, IMF determined that country progress in meeting the conditions had not been sufficient, and its response varied depending on the specifics of the condition and the judgment of the IMF staff and Executive Board on the country's overall progress. |
gao_GAO-03-145 | gao_GAO-03-145_0 | The medical documentation process involves properly documenting the health care provided to patients by physicians and other health care providers. Collections Are Increasing, but Operational Problems Limit Insurance Payments
For fiscal year 2002, VA collected third-party payments of $687 million, a 32 percent increase over its fiscal year 2001 collections. Nevertheless, VA’s ability to collect was limited by problems such as missed billing opportunities. Increased collections for fiscal year 2002 reflected VA’s improved ability to manage the volume and billing processes required to produce multiple bills under reasonable charges, according to three network revenue managers. Operational Problems Limit Collections, but VA Lacks an Estimate of Uncollected Dollars
Studies have suggested that operational problems—missed billing opportunities, billing backlogs, and inadequate pursuit of accounts receivable—limited VA’s collections in the years following the implementation of reasonable charges. VA Is Implementing Planned Actions and Developing Other Initiatives to Address Problems in Collections Operations
VA continues to implement its 2001 improvement plan and is planning more improvements. These problems include unidentified insurance for some patients, insufficient documentation for billing, shortages of coding staff, gaps in the automated capture of billing data, insufficient pursuit of accounts receivable, and uneven performance across collections sites. The plan had scheduled 15 of the 24 actions for completion through May 25, 2002, but, as shown in figure 3, VA had designated only 8 as completed, as of the last formal status report on the plan in May 2002. VA has been improving its billing and collecting under the new fee schedule established in 1999, but VA has not completed its efforts to address problems in collections operations. However, it is too early to evaluate the extent to which VA will be able to address operational problems and further increase collections by fully implementing its 2001 plan and new approach. VA generally agreed with our findings that it continues to make improvements in increased collections and VHA’s Business Office is developing new initiatives to further enhance collections. VA’s new initiatives also address problems, such as gaps in automated capture of billing data, that have been previously identified. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA’s) progress with collections in fiscal year 2002, we obtained and examined data on VA’s third-party bills and collections. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) collects health insurance payments, known as third-party collections, for veterans' health care conditions it treats that are not a result of injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated during military service. In September 1999, VA adopted a new fee schedule, called "reasonable charges," that it anticipated would increase revenues from third-party collections. In 2001, GAO testified that problems in VA's collections operations diminished VA's collections. For this report, GAO was asked to examine VA's third-party collections and problems in collections operations for fiscal year 2002 as well as its initiatives to improve collections.
What GAO Found
VA's fiscal year 2002 third-party collections rose by 32 percent, continuing an upward trend that began in fiscal year 2001. The increase in collections reflected VA's improved ability to manage the larger billing volume and more itemized bills required under its new fee schedule. Billings increased mainly due to a reduction of billing backlogs and improved collections processes--such as better medical documentation prepared by physicians, more complete identification of billable care by coders, and more bills prepared per biller--according to VA managers in three regional health care networks. However, VA continues to address operational problems, such as missed billing opportunities, that limit the amount VA collects. To address operational problems and further increase collections, VA has several initiatives under way and is developing additional ones. VA has been implementing initiatives in its 2001 improvement plan that was designed to address operational problems, such as unidentified insurance for some patients, insufficient documentation of services for billing, shortages of coding staff, and insufficient pursuit of accounts receivable. VA's last formal status report in May 2002 designated only 8 of the plan's 15 initiatives scheduled for completion by that time as having been completed. VA continues implementation of this plan and is also developing new initiatives, such as an automated financial system to better serve billing needs. It is too early to evaluate the extent to which VA's full implementation of its 2001 plan and new initiatives will be able to address operational problems and further increase third-party collections. In commenting on a draft of this report, VA generally agreed with our findings. |
gao_GAO-06-49 | gao_GAO-06-49_0 | UAS Have Achieved Certain Mission Successes but DOD Faces Emerging Interoperability and Other Challenges on Joint Operations
DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS including collecting intelligence with unmanned aircraft sensor payloads and conducting offensive strike missions with weapons payloads in Afghanistan and Iraq. In operations in Iraq or Afghanistan since 2002, U.S. forces have used UAS in integral roles on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike joint or service-specific missions. However, slow intelligence data transmission can undermine U.S. forces’ ability to attack time-critical targets or allow the targets to escape. At the same time, DOD continues to develop and field UAS without adjusting the standards, likely causing the problem to become even more widespread. In addition to communications interoperability problems, payload interoperability (commonly referred to as “payload commonality”) problems also exist. However, many sensor payloads can be attached to only one type of unmanned aircraft because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard even though this problem was identified nearly 20 years ago. In addition to the flexibility inherent in the communications standards, according to U.S. Central Command based on its experience in Persian Gulf operations, unmanned aircraft development has been service-centric and lacks an overarching employment doctrine to shape development to achieve aircraft and sensor interoperable communications and payload commonality. Inclement Weather Limits Some Unmanned Aircraft Operations
Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded by inclement weather than manned aircraft due in part to their lighter weight. DOD Has Made Little Progress in Addressing the Challenges
While DOD has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address bandwidth and weather constraints that undermine unmanned aircraft operations, little progress has been made. DOD views these changes as means to more effectively manage service UAS programs. Third, DOD’s guidance requires interoperability but the detailed standards have not been developed. DOD’s Approach to Evaluating Joint UAS Performance on Operational Deployments Has Been Unsound
DOD’s approach to evaluating joint UAS performance on operational deployments is unsound because it has not implemented a systematic approach to evaluating such performance. To date, DOD has relied on service-specific information that addressed certain UAS performance. For example, some forces filed after-action reports and maintenance reports addressing UAS performance. While producing some useful information, these reports have not necessarily been specifically targeted to joint UAS operations, nor do they systematically identify key indicators for collection which could be used to develop joint operational performance baselines and permit performance measurement against the baseline. DOD’s UAS Joint Performance Reporting Has Not Been Routine
In addition to anecdotal performance reporting, DOD has not established routine performance reporting mechanisms for UAS operations but instead has relied on sometimes short-duration study teams to gather relevant joint operational performance information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the challenges emerging in joint operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and other appropriate organizations to work together to take the following four actions develop or adjust communications interoperability standards and electromagnetic frequency reprogramming capabilities standards and ensure that they are applied to new or modified unmanned aircraft, sensor and communications payloads, ground stations, and related equipment; develop sensor and other payload commonality standards where practical and enforce such standards when modifying existing unmanned aircraft or payloads and developing new ones; develop appropriately detailed UAS interoperability standards; and determine whether unmanned aircraft need all-weather flying capabilities, identify any performance degradation associated with all- weather flying capabilities, and obtain all-weather capabilities where appropriate. To improve joint operational performance reporting, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command to ensure that the performance measurement system being developed by the command at a minimum measures how effectively UAS perform their missions by identifying quantifiable goals and comparing results with desired outcomes; identifies the specific performance indicator information that needs to be collected to adequately assess joint performance; develops indicators that assess communications and payload interoperability, and the extent to which electromagnetic spectrum congestion is undermining joint operations; establishes baselines and applies the identified indicators against the baselines to gauge success in joint UAS performance; and develops a way to systematically collect identified performance information and routinely reports it to organizations that develop and field UAS. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) consist of an unmanned aircraft; sensor, communications, or weapons, carried on board the aircraft, collectively referred to as payloads; and ground controls. UAS have been used successfully in recent operations, and are in increasingly high demand by U.S. forces. To meet the demand, the Department of Defense (DOD) is increasing its investment in and reliance on UAS, and often deploying them while still in development. GAO has previously found that DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAS risked interoperability problems which could undermine joint operations. GAO was asked to review (1) UAS performance in recent joint operations and (2) the soundness of DOD's approach to evaluating joint UAS operational performance.
What GAO Found
DOD has achieved certain operational successes using UAS, including identifying time-critical targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, and striking enemy positions to defeat opposing forces. Some missions effectively supported joint operations, and in other cases, the missions were service-specific. DOD has encountered challenges which have hampered joint operations at times. First, some UAS cannot easily transmit and receive data with other communication systems because they are not interoperable. Although DOD guidance requires interoperability, detailed standards for interoperability have not been developed; DOD has relied on existing, more general standards; and the services developed differing systems. For now, U.S. forces have developed technical patches permitting transmission but slowing data flow, potentially hampering time-critical targeting. Second, some sensor payloads cannot be interchangeably used on different UAS because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard. Some UAS missions may have to be delayed if compatible unmanned aircraft and payloads are not available. Based on its experience with UAS in Persian Gulf operations, U.S. Central Command believes communications interoperability and payload commonality problems occur because the services' UAS development programs have been service-specific and insufficiently attentive to joint needs. Lastly, the electromagnetic spectrum needed to control the flight of certain unmanned aircraft and to transmit data is constrained and no standard requiring the capability to change frequencies had been adopted because the problem was not foreseen. Thus, some systems cannot change to avoid congestion and consequently some missions have been delayed, potentially undermining time-critical targeting. In addition to the joint operational challenges, inclement weather can also hamper UAS operations. Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded in inclement weather than manned aircraft and DOD had not decided whether to require all-weather capability. While DOD has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address bandwidth and weather constraints, little progress has been made. Until DOD adopts and enforces interoperability and other standards, these challenges will likely remain and become more widespread as new UAS are developed and fielded. DOD's approach to evaluating UAS joint operational performance has been unsound because it was not systematic or routine. DOD has deployed UAS before developing a joint operations performance measurement system, even though results-oriented performance measures can be used to monitor progress toward agency goals. DOD has generally relied on after-action and maintenance reports which have useful but not necessarily joint performance information. DOD has also relied on short-duration study teams for some performance information but had not established ongoing or routine reporting systems. Thus, while continuing to invest in UAS, DOD has incomplete performance information on joint operations on which to base acquisition or modification decisions. In May 2005, U.S. Strategic Command began developing joint performance measures. |
gao_HEHS-98-193 | gao_HEHS-98-193_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) determine, given the data available, the extent and prevalence of children (defined as anyone under 18) working in agriculture, including their injuries and fatalities; (2) describe and analyze the federal legislative protections and those in selected states for children working in agriculture; (3) assess the enforcement of these laws as they apply to children working in agriculture; and (4) identify federal educational assistance programs and describe how they address the needs of children in migrant and seasonal agriculture, focusing on those aged 14 to 17. Estimates derived from CPS show that, on average, about 155,000 15- to 17-year-olds worked in agriculture in 1997. Severe Safety Problems More Likely for Children Working in Agriculture Than in Other Industries
For 1992 through 1995, BLS data show that between 400 and 600 workers under 18 suffered work-related injuries each year while working in agriculture. BLS data show that between 1992 and 1996, 59 children under 18 died while working as hired agricultural workers. Children Working in Agriculture Receive Less Legal Protection Than Children Working in Other Industries
FLSA and state laws provide less protection for children working in agriculture than they do for children working in other industries; therefore, children may work in agriculture in settings that would be illegal in other industries. For example, Vermont has no lower age limitation for children working in agriculture outside of school hours. Weaknesses in Enforcement and Data Collection Procedures Mean Violations Are Not Being Detected
Weaknesses in current enforcement and data collection procedures limit enforcement agencies’ ability to detect all violations of illegal child labor in agriculture. However, resources devoted to agriculture by federal and selected state enforcement agencies have declined in the past 5 years as have the number of cases of detected agricultural child labor violations. In addition, other types of labor law violations most likely involve children. Although both Education and Labor administer programs that target children with educational and economic disadvantages, the extent to which children involved in migrant and seasonal agricultural work participate in, or are helped by, these programs is generally unknown. Program operations and associated data limitations preclude, however, measuring program results for these youths. Recommendations
To improve Labor’s detection and reporting of illegal child labor in agriculture, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary of Employment Standards to take the following actions: issue national enforcement procedures specifying the actions WHD inspectors should take during agricultural inspections when documentation for verifying a child’s age is missing or potentially fraudulent or when existing documentation does not reflect a child’s possible employment; take steps to ensure that procedures specified in the existing agreements among WHD and other federal and state agencies—especially regarding referrals to and from other agencies, joint inspections, and exchange of information—are being followed and, as required in some agreements, are being recorded and tracked; develop a method for identifying the number of record-keeping violations resulting from employers not having children’s ages on file as required by FLSA; and test the feasibility of collecting data on the number of minimum-wage and other labor law violations that involve individuals under 18. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the extent and prevalence of children working in agriculture, including their injuries and fatalities; (2) the federal legislative protections and those in selected states for children working in agriculture; (3) the enforcement of these laws as they apply to children working in agriculture; and (4) federal educational assistance programs and how they address the needs of children in migrant and seasonal agriculture, focusing on those aged 14 to 17.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to one nationally representative estimate, about 116,000 15- to 17-year-olds worked as hired agricultural workers in 1997; (2) this estimate may undercount the number of children employed in agriculture because of methodological limitations in making the estimates; (3) of all children working in agriculture, between 400 and 600 suffer work-related injuries each year; (4) between 1992 and 1996, 59 children lost their lives while working in agriculture; (5) changes to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) have resulted in more protection for children working in agriculture than when the law was first passed; (6) nevertheless, FLSA and state laws provide less protection for children working in agriculture than for children working in other industries; (7) consequently, children may work in agriculture under circumstances that would be illegal in other industries; (8) weaknesses in current enforcement and data collection procedures limit the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division's (WHD) ability to detect violations involving children working in agriculture; (9) enforcement activities devoted to agriculture have declined in the past 5 years, as has the number of detected cases of agricultural child labor violations; (10) WHD has not established the procedures necessary for documenting whether children are working in agriculture in violation of child labor laws, nor has it routinely followed established procedures for facilitating enforcement coordination for better detecting illegal child labor in agriculture; (11) WHD's enforcement database does not identify all child labor-related violations under FLSA, nor can WHD and other enforcement agencies identify the extent to which children are involved in other types of labor law violations; (12) the Departments of Education and Labor have many programs to improve educational opportunities for disadvantaged school-aged children; however, few of these programs specifically target migrant and seasonal agricultural child workers or children of such workers, and most collect no information on the number of such children served; and (13) even for the two largest programs that target some or all of this population, program operations and subsequent data limitations impede a national evaluation of these programs' results for this target population. |
gao_GAO-14-511 | gao_GAO-14-511_0 | However, since the time of award to March 31, 2014, approximately 14 percent of the awarded BIP infrastructure projects (42 out of 297) were terminated. According to RUS officials, these projects were turned down by the awardee or terminated by RUS for a variety of reasons, such as awardee financial difficulties or inability to meet requirements. RUS’s Oversight Indicates Most Projects Will Be Completed on Time and As Approved but Faces Challenges Given the Program’s Scope
RUS Monitors BIP Projects and Expects Most Will Be Completed by the 2015 Deadline, but Awardees Face Challenges
RUS monitors projects and takes oversight actions through all BIP project phases, as shown in figure 2. Specifically, 87 percent of the 255 BIP infrastructure projects were completed, meaning they were providing service throughout the entire approved service area, or were partially operational, meaning they were providing service to some subscribers in the approved service area (see table 3). Based on data RUS tracks on project status and funds disbursed, RUS officials stated that they expect almost all BIP projects to be completed by the 2015 deadline. As mentioned above, RUS officials said they did not allow changes to project service areas although they did allow other types of changes, such as changes in technology. Although RUS has met the Recovery Act reporting requirements, it has provided limited reporting on BIP program status and results during project implementation. However, it plans to now publish reports quarterly until at least September 2015. The Recovery Act required that RUS submit quarterly reports to Congress on the use of BIP funds until all funds were obligated. Therefore, BIP’s subscribership measures do not indicate the extent to which Recovery Act funding was used to deploy broadband access in rural areas. USDA Annual Performance Reports Do Not Track BIP’s Performance against a Related Goal
In addition, USDA has missed opportunities to report on BIP’s impact. The GPRA Modernization Act requires that each year agencies establish performance goals in performance plans and provide an update by comparing actual performance achieved against performance goals in annual performance reports. A USDA official told us that BIP performance was not included in USDA’s annual performance report because it was part of the Recovery Act reports. Regarding reporting on BIP performance, instead of reporting actual results, RUS reported its performance goal, or estimate of BIP subscribership, as results. As previously reported by the USDA OIG, RUS officials said the results were reported in fiscal year 2010 because that was the year the funds were obligated. As we found in 2012, this total did not reflect actual program results, because it was calculated by RUS using estimates contained in applications and developed prior to the Further, the estimated number of execution of the funded projects.subscribers to receive new or improved service through BIP that RUS reported in fiscal year 2010—847,239—is now out of date given that as of March 31, 2014, RUS reduced this estimate to 728,733, as we explained earlier in this report. As a result, RUS has not shown how the approximately $3 billion in funds awarded to BIP projects have affected broadband availability. Reporting on and tracking the number of subscribers receiving service through BIP is particularly important given that the majority of projects are ongoing and that projects are to continue to add, and awardees are to continue to report, BIP subscribers for at least 5 years after construction is completed. Without reliable and regular information on the results of BIP projects, it will be difficult for USDA, RUS, and policy makers to determine the impact of Recovery Act funds and BIP’s progress on improving broadband availability. Recommendation
To provide information on the impact of federal investments in expanding broadband infrastructure, we recommend the Secretary of Agriculture include BIP performance information as part of the USDA’s annual performance plan and report by comparing actual results achieved against the current subscribership goal. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Agriculture for review and comment. In an email received June 4, 2014, a Management Analyst with USDA on behalf of USDA Rural Development stated that RUS generally agreed with the report and its recommendation and will institute procedures to fully address the recommendation. RUS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses (1) how the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) ensures that funded Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP) projects are completed within required time frames and as approved, including within designated service areas and (2) the extent to which RUS is providing information to show the program’s impact on broadband availability. To further characterize RUS’s oversight actions, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of six ongoing infrastructure projects and one completed project. To determine the extent to which RUS is providing information to show the program’s impact on broadband availability, we reviewed publicly available RUS performance information, such as BIP project directories, BIP quarterly and status reports, and USDA annual performance plans and reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to affordable broadband is seen as vital to economic growth and improved quality of life, yet its deployment in rural areas can be costly. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) appropriated funding for BIP, a USDA RUS program to fund broadband projects to provide service to end users in mostly rural areas. By 2010, RUS had awarded over $3 billion, primarily to 297 infrastructure projects, and required that projects be completed by June 2015 in approved areas.
GAO was asked to review BIP's results and impact. This report addresses (1) how RUS ensures that projects are completed by the deadline and as approved and (2) the extent to which RUS provides information to show BIP's impact. GAO interviewed RUS officials, reviewed policies, and analyzed RUS project data as of March 2014. GAO also interviewed five awardees from a nongeneralizable sample of seven BIP projects selected in part based on award size and location.
What GAO Found
The Rural Utilities Service (RUS) expects most Recovery Act-funded Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP) projects will be completed by the June 2015 deadline and as approved, but RUS faces challenges given the large scope of the program. As of March 2014, approximately 14 percent (42 of 297) of BIP infrastructure projects were terminated for a variety of reasons according to RUS officials, such as financial difficulties or inability to meet requirements. Of the 255 projects remaining, 87 percent were completed (39 projects) or partially operational (184 projects), meaning they provide service to some subscribers. To monitor projects and ensure they are completed within approved service areas, RUS relies on general field representatives to conduct in-person inspections and report monthly on project status. RUS officials said that they did not allow changes to service areas, but approved other types of changes such as changes in technology. GAO could not confirm this since RUS did not systematically track changes and did not provide GAO with information on project changes. Also, several challenges affect RUS's ability to oversee projects. For example, reduced staffing and travel funding levels during BIP's implementation will challenge RUS to complete inspections given the scope of the program, including 216 ongoing infrastructure projects to be completed by the June 2015 deadline.
RUS has reported limited information on BIP's impact since awarding funds to projects, and BIP results are not tracked in the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) annual performance reporting. Consequently, RUS has not shown how much the program's approximately $3 billion in project funding—an unprecedented level of federal investment in broadband—has affected broadband availability. RUS met the Recovery Act requirement to report to Congress quarterly until all funds were obligated. However, since the Recovery Act's reporting requirement ended, RUS has provided limited reporting on BIP program status and results during project implementation. A senior RUS official says RUS will now issue quarterly status reports until at least September 2015. USDA also has missed opportunities to report on BIP's impact as part of its annual performance plan and report. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 directs agencies to establish performance goals in annual performance plans and report the progress made toward these goals in annual performance reports. USDA's annual performance plan included a performance goal to provide new or improved broadband, but USDA did not include BIP results in its annual performance reports. USDA reported its BIP goal and results for fiscal year 2010 only and used the same estimate of BIP subscribership—developed before project execution—for both. RUS officials say the results were reported in fiscal year 2010 because that was the year funds were obligated. More recently, in March 2014, RUS updated the estimated number of subscribers from 847,239 to 728,733 to account for terminated projects. Reporting on and tracking BIP actual results against the updated goal is particularly important given that the majority of projects are ongoing and awardees are to continue to report the number of BIP subscribers added for at least 5 years after construction is completed. Without an updated performance goal and regular information reported on the results of BIP projects, it will be difficult for USDA, RUS, and policy makers to determine the impact of Recovery Act funds or BIP's progress on improving broadband availability.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture include as part of the USDA annual performance plan and report, actual BIP results achieved against the updated subscribership goal. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA said it agreed with the recommendation and will institute procedures to fully address it. USDA also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-562 | gao_GAO-02-562_0 | One such program was the Full Count Review program, which was designed to rapidly examine, rectify if possible, and clear census data files and products for subsequent processing or public release. The Numbers and Kinds of Issues Identified During Full Count Review
Bureau data show that after reviewing census data for 39 states and Puerto Rico, FSCPE members identified a total of 1,402 issues, or about 29 percent of the 4,809 issues collectively flagged during Full Count Review (see table 1). Table 1 also shows that group quarters issues were those most frequently identified by the bureau, accounting for 1,599 of the 4,809 issues identified (33 percent). Group quarters issues relate to suspected discrepancies in the population counts and locations of prisons, dormitories, nursing homes, and similar group living arrangements. With housing unit issues, the count of occupied housing units differed from what analysts expected while household issues had population data for occupied residences that differed from what analysts expected. None were found. It will be important for the bureau to address these shortcomings as its preliminary plans call for a similar operation as part of the 2010 Census. Specifically, consideration should be given to (1) planning the Full Count Review program early in the census cycle and testing procedures under conditions as close to the actual census as possible, (2) integrating the Full Count Review program with other census organizational units and operations to ensure the bureau has sufficient time and field support to investigate issues, (3) developing clear guidelines on the minimum documentation needed for the bureau to investigate individual data issues, (4) categorizing issues on the basis of the quality and precision of the documentation, and investigating first those issues that are best documented and thus more easily resolved, and (5) exploring the feasibility of using staff from the bureau’s regional offices to help investigate data issues in the field prior to the release of public law data. GAO-02-4. | What GAO Found
To ensure the completeness and accuracy of the 2000 census data, Bureau of the Census analysts were to identify, investigate, and document suspected data discrepancies or issues to clear census data files and products for subsequent processing or public release. They were to determine whether and how to correct the data by weighing quality improvements against time and budget constraints. Because the bureau lacked sufficient staff to conduct a full count review on its own, it contracted out some of the work to members of the Federal-State Cooperative Program for Population Estimates (FSCPE). FSCPE documented 1,402 data issues, 29 percent of the 4,809 issues identified by both FSCPE and bureau analysts during the full count review. Of the 4,809 issues, 1,599 dealt with "group quarters," where counts for prisons, nursing homes, dormitories, and other group living facilities differed from what analysts expected. Of the 1,599 group quarters issues, FSCPE identified 567. Discrepancies relating to housing unit counts, population data, and demographic characteristics accounted for 1,150 issues, 375 of which were identified by FSCPE. Overall, of the 4,809 issues identified during review, 4,267 were not subjected to further investigation by the bureau because of insufficient documentation. Because the bureau's preliminary plans for the 2010 Census include a Full Count Review program, several areas warrant improvement. Foremost among these is the need for the bureau to investigate and resolve a larger number of issues before releasing the public law data. |
gao_GAO-13-164T | gao_GAO-13-164T_0 | Potential Benefits from Replacing the $1 Note with the $1 Coin
In February 2012, we reported that the increased seigniorage resulting from replacing $1 notes with $1 coins could potentially offer $4.4 billion in net benefits to the government over 30 years. We determined that seigniorage was the sole source of the net benefits and not lower production costs due to switching to the coin, which lasts much longer than a note. This gain equals the difference between the face value of currency and its costs of production, which reflects a financial transfer to the federal government because it reduces the government’s need to raise revenues through borrowing. With less borrowing, the government pays less interest over time, resulting in a financial benefit. Other key assumptions included the expected rate of growth in the demand for currency over 30 years, the costs of producing and processing both coins and notes, and the differential life spans of coins and notes. This estimate differs from our 2011 estimate, which found that replacement would result in a net benefit of about $5.5 billion over 30 years (an average of about $184 million per year) because the 2012 estimate takes into account two key actions that occurred since our 2011 report, specifically: In April 2011, the Federal Reserve began using new equipment to process notes, which has increased the expected life of the $1 note to an average of 56 months (or 4.7 years), according to the Federal Reserve, compared with the 40 months we used in our 2011 analysis.over 30 years and thus reduces the expected net benefits of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin. This new policy would reduce the cost associated with producing $1 coins that we estimated in the status quo scenario and, therefore, would reduce the net benefit, which is the difference in the estimated costs between the status quo scenario and the replacement scenario. However, like all estimates, there are uncertainties involved in developing these analyses. Moreover, changes to the inputs and assumptions used in our analysis could significantly change the estimated net benefit. If Americans come to rely more heavily on electronic payments, the demand for cash could grow more slowly than we assumed or even decrease. Our estimates of the discounted net benefit to the government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin differ from the method that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) would use to calculate the impact on the budget of the same replacement. Because we found no quantitative estimates that could be evaluated or modeled, our estimate did not consider factors such as the broader societal impact of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin or attempt to quantify the costs to the private sector. Based on our interviews with stakeholders representing a variety of cash-intensive industries, we believe that the costs and benefits to the private sector should be carefully weighed since some costs could be substantial. In 2011 we reported that stakeholders identified potential shorter- and longer-term costs that would likely result from the replacement. Our 2012 estimate assumes that the $1 coin would be widely accepted and used by the public. We have noted in past reports that efforts to increase the circulation and public acceptance of the $1 coins—such as changes to the color of the $1 coin and new coin designs—have not succeeded, in part, because the $1 note has remained in circulation. Experiences of Other Countries
Over the last 48 years, Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, among others, have replaced lower-denomination notes with coins. For example, Canada replaced its $1 and $2 notes with coins in 1987 and 1996, respectively. Stopping production of the note and actions to overcome public resistance have been important in Canada and the United Kingdom as the governments transitioned from a note to a coin. While observing that the public was resistant at first, Canadian and United Kingdom officials said that with the combination of stakeholder outreach, public relations efforts, and ending production and issuance of the notes, public dissatisfaction dissipated within a few years. In our analysis of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin, we assumed that the U.S. government would conduct a public awareness campaign to inform the public during the first year of the transition and assigned a value of approximately $7.8 million for that effort. We continue to believe that the government would receive a financial benefit from making the replacement. First, the costs are immediate and certain while the benefits are further in the future and more uncertain. In fact, public opinion has consistently been opposed to the $1 coin. Keeping those caveats in mind, many other countries have successfully replaced low denomination notes with coins, even when initially faced with public opposition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since coins are more durable than notes and do not need replacement as often, many countries have replaced lower-denomination notes with coins to obtain a financial benefit, among other reasons. Six times over the past 22 years, GAO has reported that replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin would provide a net benefit to the federal government of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
This testimony provides information on what GAOs most recent work in 2011 and 2012 found regarding (1) the net benefit to the government of replacing the $1 note with a $1 coin, (2) stakeholder views on considerations for the private sector and the public in making such a replacement, and (3) the experiences of other countries in replacing small-denomination notes with coins. This testimony is based on previous GAO reports. To perform that work, GAO constructed an economic model to assess the net benefit to the government. GAO also interviewed officials from the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department, currency experts, officials from Canada and the United Kingdom, and representatives of U.S. industries that could be affected by currency changes.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in February 2012 that replacing $1 notes with $1 coins could potentially provide $4.4 billion in net benefits to the federal government over 30 years. The overall net benefit was due solely to increased seigniorage and not to reduced production costs. Seigniorage is the difference between the cost of producing coins or notes and their face value; it reduces government borrowing and interest costs, resulting in a financial benefit to the government. GAOs estimate takes into account processing and production changes that occurred in 2011, including the Federal Reserves use of new equipment to determine the quality and authenticity of notes, which has increased the expected life of the note thereby reducing the costs of circulating a note over 30 years. (The $1 note is expected to last 4.7 years and the $1 coin 30 years.) Like all estimates, there are uncertainties surrounding GAOs estimate, especially since the costs of the replacement occur in the first several years and can be estimated with more certainty than the benefits, which are less certain because they occur further in the future. Moreover, changes to the inputs and assumptions GAO used in the estimate could significantly increase or decrease the results. For example, if the public relies more heavily on electronic payments in the future, the demand for cash could be lower than GAO estimated and, as a result, the net benefit would be lower.
In March 2011, GAO identified potential shorter- and longer-term costs to the private sector that could result from the replacement of the $1 note with a $1 coin. Industry stakeholders indicated that they would initially incur costs to modify equipment and add storage and that later their costs to process and transport coins would increase. However, others, such as some transit agencies, have already made the transition to accept $1 coins and would not incur such costs. In addition, for such a replacement to be successful, the $1 coin would have to be widely accepted and used by the public. Nationwide opinion polls over the last decade have indicated lack of public acceptance of the $1 coin. Efforts to increase the circulation and public acceptance of the $1 coins have not succeeded, in part, because the $1 note has remained in circulation.
Over the last 48 years, many countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have replaced low denomination notes with coins because of expected cost savings, among other reasons. The Canadian government, for example, saved $450 million (Canadian) over 5 years by converting to the $1 coin. Canada and the United Kingdom found that stopping production of the note combined with stakeholder outreach and public education were important to overcome public resistance, which dissipated within a few years after transitioning to the low denomination coins.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has recommended in prior work that Congress replace the $1 note with a $1 coin. GAO continues to believe that replacing the $1 note with a coin is likely to provide a financial benefit to the federal government if the note is eliminated and negative public reaction is effectively managed through stakeholder outreach and public education. |
gao_HEHS-98-109 | gao_HEHS-98-109_0 | Specifically, this report (1) describes states’ efforts to require and encourage welfare recipients and potential recipients to assume greater personal responsibility, (2) examines how states are providing services to support the objectives of TANF, and (3) reviews early reported data to assess states’ progress in achieving program objectives. States’ Policies Are Shifting Emphasis From Entitlement to Self-Sufficiency
Consistent with the thrust of the federal welfare reform law of 1996, states are shifting away from a welfare system that focuses on a family’s entitlement and eligibility determination to one focused on moving recipients—and potential recipients—to self-sufficiency. For example, increasing the percentage of recipients required to participate in work-related activities has required states to change caseworker roles from emphasizing eligibility determination to helping recipients address barriers to work by providing more and different services to those previously exempted from work requirements. 2.1). States Have Modified Policies to Encourage Self-Sufficiency
States’ reform programs have generally included various policy changes to reinforce the expectation that recipients will move from welfare to work and that welfare should be temporary, not a way of life. Applicants Are Being Diverted With Focus on “What’s Needed”
A major new strategy states are using to reduce the need for welfare is “diversion”—that is, families are diverted from receiving monthly cash payments if they can be assisted through other means. Training workers to perform their expanded roles has been among the most challenging and widespread implementation issues reported by states. Training staff to perform their new roles has been one of the major challenges of welfare reform. As discussed earlier, states do face many limits on how they use federal TANF funds—notably time limits. Finding ways to involve these recipients in work activities was one of the most challenging and widespread implementation issues cited in the states we visited. Moreover, some areas have weaker economies than others. Devolution of Responsibility to Localities Is a Key Component of Some States’ Welfare Reforms
Just as the 1996 welfare reform law provided states greater flexibility to design and administer their assistance programs for needy families, some states have in turn given local administrative entities greater flexibility to design programs tailored to the needs of their recipients. Nonetheless, little is known about the impacts states’ programs are having on the well-being of children and families. 5 and 6 of table 4.3). At the same time, states are modifying their programs to better support welfare recipients in meeting these expectations, such as by expanding the role of welfare workers to include job counseling, transforming local welfare offices into job centers, enhancing support services, expanding efforts to establish partnerships with employers and other organizations, and giving local administrative entities more flexibility to tailor programs to local needs. Increases in job placement rates and levels of participation in work activities are early encouraging signs of progress toward some of the objectives of the federal welfare reform law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, focusing on: (1) states' efforts to require and encourage welfare recipients and potential recipients to assume greater personal responsibility; (2) how states are providing services to support the objectives of TANF; and (3) early reported data to assess states' progress in achieving program objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) consistent with the thrust of the federal welfare reform law, states are moving away from a welfare system focused on entitlement to assistance to one that emphasizes finding employment as quickly as possible and becoming more self-sufficient; (2) in the seven states GAO visited, welfare offices are generally being transformed into job placement centers; (3) adults with mental and physical impairments and those caring for small children are less likely than before to be exempt from participating in work activities; (4) in the states GAO reviewed, the average proportion of adult recipients required to participate in work activities increased; (5) to reinforce the expectation that welfare is temporary, states have established time limits on receiving cash assistance and have modified various policies to help make welfare recipients financially better off if they obtain jobs than if they do not; (6) states also have devised strategies to reduce the need for monthly cash assistance; (7) states also have modified their programs to better support welfare recipients in becoming more self-sufficient; (8) in their efforts to change the culture of welfare offices, states are expanding welfare workers' roles by shifting their priorities from determining eligibility and cash assistance levels to helping recipients obtain work and become more self-sufficient; (9) at the same time, states plan to use some of the additional budgetary resources available under the welfare reform law to enhance support services; (10) moreover, some states have given local administrative entities greater flexibility to design welfare-to-work programs tailored to the needs of their recipients; (11) implementing all these changes has not been quick or easy: among the most challenging and widespread implementation issues reported by the states have been training staff to perform their new roles and finding ways to involve recipients with multiple barriers to participation in work activities; (12) it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the success of states' programs because it is uncertain how states' programs will perform as more of the most job-ready recipients leave welfare and states face increasing proportions of recipients with multiple problems, or if the current strong economy undergoes a major downturn; (13) moreover, little is known about program impacts; and (14) future monitoring of states' programs will need to focus on areas such as job retention and earnings progression, children's welfare, and family stability. |
gao_GAO-11-730 | gao_GAO-11-730_0 | Also, some foreign governments may restrict foreign tax authorities from conducting investigative activities within their borders. Agreements That Authorize Exchange of Information between the United States and its Treaty Partners Differ in Content and Application
The United States Has 143 Information Exchange Agreements with 90 Treaty Partners
As of April 30, 2011, the United States had 143 bilateral agreements authorizing exchange of information with 90 treaty partners. There were 4,217 foreign-initiated incoming requests, and 894 U.S.-initiated outgoing requests closed during this period. Corporate records, tax return data, and third-party interviews constituted about 78 percent of closed incoming requests for which we received data on information type. As shown in figure 5, our model estimates that most information exchange requests are likely to close about 50 to 200 days after being opened, but some can take much longer. Also, with respect to the processing time differences across the treaty partner groupings, IRS officials noted that country-specific factors, such as the sophistication or complexity of a country’s tax rules and the existence of administrative arrangements such as automatic exchange arrangements, can influence the nature of the information requested and the amount of time required to obtain it. The volume of information exchange activity, especially outgoing requests from the United States, can be influenced by the time it takes for partner countries to respond to requests. While agreements have many similar features, the specific parameters under which information can be exchanged are unique to the legal and administrative arrangements negotiated by the United States and each separate treaty partner. Although the IRS collects data on exchanges between the United States and its treaty partners, the agency does not assemble or make use of information such as the extent to which requests for information are fulfilled or the type of information requested, and does not consistently collect customer feedback. Better performance information could not only help improve administrative operations, but could also enhance the usefulness of this important tax law enforcement tool. Recommendation for Executive Action
To identify opportunities to improve the administrative processes and procedures that the IRS uses to exchange information between the United States and its treaty partners, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determine the key types of information that exchange program managers could use to ensure the program is working as well as possible. The commissioner should specifically require the collection of (1) consistent and accurate data on specific tax information exchange cases, such as the extent to which requests for information are satisfied and the type of information requested, and (2) feedback from information exchange program users on how well the program is working and how it might be improved. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report (1) identifies all bilateral income tax treaties, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA), and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) between the United States and other countries in force, proposed, or signed as of April 30, 2011, and describes the legal framework and administrative processes that the United States uses to exchange information with its treaty partners; (2) describes the volume and types of information exchanged between the United States and its treaty partners and the time to process requests for information; and (3) identifies opportunities to improve the effectiveness of current U.S. information exchange processes and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
With trillions of dollars in cross-border financial activity, U.S. tax authorities and others around the world exchange information with each other to administer and enforce compliance with the tax laws of their respective countries. GAO was asked to (1) identify and describe all income tax treaties and other such agreements between the United States and other countries, (2) describe the volume of exchange activity, types of information exchanged between the United States and its treaty partners, and request processing times, and (3) identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness of current U.S. information exchange processes and procedures. GAO analyzed agreement documents, IRS data on information exchanges, and interviewed program officials and the users of exchanged information.
What GAO Found
Treaties and other agreements authorizing information exchange provide tax authorities in the United States and abroad with a useful tax law enforcement tool. As of April 30, 2011, the United States had such agreements in force with 90 foreign jurisdictions. Agreements have many similar features, but the bounds within which information can be exchanged are unique to the legal and administrative arrangements agreed to by the United States and each partner. Between 2006 and 2010, 5,111 requests for information to or from the United States and 75 foreign jurisdictions were completed; 4,217 were incoming requests for information such as tax returns or corporate records and 894 were outgoing requests from the United States. IRS's enforcement presence also relies on several other methods to obtain relevant information, including a mechanism which yields about 2.1 million records annually from treaty partners. GAO estimates that most requests close about 50 to 200 days after being opened, but some take much longer. The time it takes to close requests can be influenced by factors such as the complexity of the requested information and the legal system of the treaty partner. GAO analysis of IRS data shows that the United States takes more time to close incoming requests for some groups of countries than others. Although IRS collects data on exchanges between the United States and its treaty partners, the agency does not consistently collect or analyze performance information, such as the type of information requested, whether the information was collected successfully, or feedback from staff making the requests about the usefulness of the information or their views on the process for obtaining it. Collecting this information could help program managers assess how well the IRS is managing the information exchange process, and whether changes to administrative processes and procedures could improve the exchange of information between the United States and its treaty partners.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determine the key types of performance information that exchange program managers could use to ensure the program is working as well as possible. Specifically, the Commissioner should require the collection of (1) consistent and accurate data on specific tax information exchange cases and (2) feedback from program users on a routine basis as part of regular program operations. IRS concurred with our recommendation. The agencies discussed in this report also suggested technical changes to a draft of this report which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-769 | gao_GAO-06-769_0 | States’ Unemployment Insurance-Financing Systems Limit the Degree of Experience Rating
tax rates, and (2) the equitable allocation of costs of unemployment benefits. . Nearly All States Base Experience-Rated Tax Rates on Benefits Paid to a Firm’s Former Workers
All state unemployment insurance programs adjust the tax rates of individual firms on the basis of their experience with unemployment, and 50 of the 53 systems do so based on one of two basic systems—the reserve ratio system or the benefit ratio system. Maximum Tax Rates
While all states vary an employer’s tax rate on the basis of experience rating, all states have also established maximum tax rates that limit an employer’s tax liability. In a single year, the employer’s workers would receive about $31,500 more in benefits than taxes paid by the employer. Minimum tax rates ensure that an employer’s tax rate will not drop below a specified floor, no matter how much its experience rating improves. Benefits Charged to Inactive Firms
State unemployment programs also pay benefits to unemployed workers whose former employer has gone out of business. The studies we reviewed found that such cross-subsidies favor seasonal and cyclical industries, such as construction and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, whereas firms in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry regularly pay subsidies. Studies have also found that new firms that are not yet experience-rated, regardless of industry, tend to pay subsidies. According to the studies, certain industries, such as construction and agriculture, consistently received subsidies, which can be substantial. Our more recent tax data also show a similar pattern with regard to those industries that paid subsidies. Among the several ways states could improve experience rating, some of the key adjustments would be to raise the maximum tax rate, increase the taxable wage base, or adopt some combination of these two modifications.A 2003 analysis of the Massachusetts unemployment insurance program indicates that making an adjustment can have a substantial effect on closing the gap between benefits charged to and taxes paid by firms that get a subsidy. Reducing Noncharged Benefits Would Restrict UI Eligibility or Impose Additional Costs on Employers
Noncharged benefits—benefits payments that are not charged to a specific employer—detract from experience rating because they are shared—that is, they are borne to some degree by all employers, thus adding to the costs of employers who had no responsibility for the unemployment. However, each approach has its drawbacks. Concluding Observations
Cross-subsidies in state unemployment insurance systems are a long- standing part of the system, and the subsidies occur because unemployment insurance taxation systems are not fully experience- rated—a fully experience-rated system would ensure that, over time, the costs that an employer imposed on the unemployment insurance programs were equal to the taxes it paid. Several aspects of state unemployment insurance systems cause this shortfall from full experience rating, and states could improve experience rating and reduce these cross-subsidies by adjusting these aspects. Under the current framework, state policy makers decide the appropriate balance between experience rating and the other policy objectives of a state’s unemployment insurance program. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor for its review. How have states ensured that individual employers pay unemployment insurance taxes based on their experience with unemployment, and what aspects of state unemployment insurance systems limit such experience rating? To what extent do employers pay unemployment insurance taxes commensurate with unemployment benefits paid to their former employees, and how does this vary by industry? 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program is expected to collect over $37 billion in taxes from employers to pay $34 billion in benefits to unemployed workers. Under state UI programs, employers' tax contributions are experience-rated--that is, they reflect the extent to which they laid off workers who then collected benefits. To examine the equity of this system, we met with officials from five states, reviewed prior studies, and examined state data to determine (1) how states ensure that employers pay UI taxes based on their experience with unemployment, and the aspects of state unemployment insurance systems that limit experience rating; (2) the extent to which employers pay unemployment insurance taxes commensurate with unemployment benefits paid to their former employees; and how this varies by industry; and (3) steps states could take to increase the degree of experience rating. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor (Labor) for its review. Overall, Labor agreed with our findings.
What GAO Found
All state Unemployment Insurance-financing systems are experience-rated, but several aspects of these systems limit the connection between an employer's tax contributions and the employer's experience with unemployment. For example, a state's maximum tax rate limits the size of an employer's tax payment, regardless of the costs an employer may have imposed on the system. Similarly, a minimum tax rate ensures that an employer's tax rate will not drop below a specified floor, no matter how much its experience rating improves. Other aspects of state systems allow the cost of some benefits to be charged to all employers rather than to a single employer. These shared costs include, for example, benefits paid to unemployed workers of a firm that has gone out of business. When the cost of benefits is shared in this way, it reduces experience rating and imposes additional costs on all employers. A series of studies that examine experience rating in state UI systems show that a number of industries used more in benefits than they paid in taxes to finance the system. Certain industries, such as construction and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, as a whole, consistently received such subsidies, while other industries, such as finance, insurance, and real estate tended to pay subsidies. Newer firms that are not yet experience-rated, regardless of industry, also tend to pay subsidies. Our analysis of more recent data from three states found a similar pattern of subsidies. States could increase experience rating and reduce subsidies by adjusting aspects of the unemployment insurance tax structure, such as the maximum tax rate. However, each of these adjustments has trade-offs that would have to be considered by a state because the adjustments would raise costs for some employers or reduce costs for others. In addition, such adjustments would have to be evaluated based on the implications for other policy objectives established for a state's unemployment insurance program. |
gao_GAO-16-110 | gao_GAO-16-110_0 | OMB issued guidance to agencies to clarify how agencies were to satisfy the law and otherwise implement IQA. The guidance required agencies to develop and post IQA guidelines and related information on their websites. We reported in August 2006 that expanded oversight and clearer guidance by OMB could improve agencies’ implementation of the Act. Most Agencies in Our Review Reported Receiving Relatively Few IQA Correction Requests; the Majority of Requests Questioned Data Use and Resulted in No Corrections Agencies’ Websites Show a Total of 87 IQA Correction Requests from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014
According to IQA information posted on the 30 agency websites in our review, 16 agencies reported receiving 87 IQA correction requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 (see table 1). In August 2004, the OIRA Administrator issued a memorandum to the President’s Management Council directing that agencies post all information quality correspondence, including a copy of each correction request, the agency’s formal response(s), and any communications regarding appeals on agency web pages to increase the transparency of the process. Eight agencies who reported receiving IQA correction requests did not post on their website the same number of IQA correction requests that they reported to OMB. Timely reporting of IQA data would increase the transparency of the process and allow the public to view all current correction requests, agency responses to those requests, and any appeals. On June 11, 2010, a trade association sent a correction request to both EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on, among other things the accuracy of data used in a public service advertising on childhood lead poisoning prevention. In this review, we found that one-fourth (15 of 59) of the IQA correction requests that resulted in no corrections were processed through an administrative mechanism other than the dedicated IQA request for correction process. Also, the “report was generated as part of the adjudicative process of this personnel matter; it is not subject to review under the IQA.”
OMB and Agencies’ IQA Guidelines and Related Information Is Generally Available Online, but Usability Varied
OMB Makes IQA Information, Including Agency-Reported Data, Publicly Available; However Data Are Not Centrally Located
OMB staff told us they rely heavily on their own website to disseminate IQA, OMB-specific, and government-wide guidance. These guidelines are aimed at helping federal agencies improve their communications and interactions with customers through websites. OMB officials acknowledged that consolidating and centralizing IQA information on OMB’s website could improve transparency and access to its IQA data. Agencies Posted Required IQA Guidelines and Data Online as of November 2015 but the Usability Could Be Improved
In addition to posting correction requests and agency responses on agency websites, agencies are required by IQA to post their IQA guidelines and administrative mechanisms by which affected persons could petition for correction of inaccurate agency information. Twenty- eight of 30 agencies posted the required IQA documents online as of November 2015. However, the Department of Defense did not include administrative mechanisms on its website. OMB concurred with our review of these agencies’ IQA information and told us it would work with the agencies to improve the information provided on their websites, but as of December 2015, they had not completed that process. Until that step occurs, the public may be unaware of the steps the agencies would take upon receiving a correction request, or even how to submit a correction request. Ensuring that online content is accurate is one of the guidelines for federal digital services. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also has a centralized IQA correction process. For example, by consolidating summaries of agency IQA information, working with agencies to ensure all IQA requirements are met, and providing additional guidance about posting accessible, user- oriented information on agency websites, OMB could help increase the public’s access to and confidence in that information, thereby helping to further the goal of disseminating quality information. Work with the Department of Defense and the Federal Housing Finance Agency to help ensure that they post their IQA administrative mechanisms and IQA guidance online. Provide additional guidance for agencies to help improve the transparency and usability of their IQA websites to help ensure the public can easily find and access online information about agency IQA implementation. Such guidance should include specific time frames for agencies to post information on the IQA correction requests they have received, including making it clear when agencies have not received IQA requests; instructions for agencies to include a statement on their IQA websites that the agencies may address correction requests through other administrative processes; instructions for agencies to include, when responding to correction requests, whether those agencies plan to address the request through another administrative processes, and if so, which process they will use; and suggestions for improving usability of agencies’ websites including fixing broken links. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) identify the number, source, and final disposition of IQA correction requests received by the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act and other agencies for fiscal years 2010 through 2014; (2) assess the extent to which the 24 CFO Act and other agencies that received correction requests made IQA information publicly available; and (3) identify how selected agencies have implemented IQA. To identify other agencies that had received correction requests during the same time frame, we reviewed the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) annual reports to Congress for fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2013 and identified those agencies outside of the 24 CFO Act agencies that reported receiving Information Quality Act (IQA) correction requests. | Why GAO Did This Study
IQA, passed in fiscal year 2001, required OMB to issue government-wide guidelines by the end of that fiscal year to ensure the quality of information disseminated by federal agencies. OMB issued guidance to agencies to clarify how agencies were to satisfy the law and otherwise implement IQA. The guidance required agencies to develop and post IQA guidelines and related information on their websites. GAO reported in 2006 that expanded oversight and clearer guidance by OMB could improve agencies' implementation of IQA. GAO was asked to conduct an updated study on IQA. This report (1) identifies the number, source, and final disposition of IQA correction requests received by the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act and other agencies for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 and (2) assesses the extent to which the 24 CFO Act and other agencies that received correction requests made IQA information publicly available, among other objectives. GAO obtained data on IQA guidelines and other IQA-related information from the 24 CFO Act agencies and 6 additional agencies that reported receiving IQA correction requests for fiscal years 2010 through 2014. GAO also reviewed agency websites and interviewed OMB and agency officials.
What GAO Found
Of the 30 agencies in GAO's review, 16 reported on their respective websites receiving a total of 87 Information Quality Act (IQA) correction requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, while 14 agencies did not post any requests during this time. Three agencies—the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Interior—reported receiving 61 of the 87 requests. Agencies are required to post all IQA correspondence, including a copy of each correction request and the agencies' formal response on their websites. However, 8 agencies who reported receiving IQA correction requests did not post on their website the same number of IQA correction requests that they reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In most cases, agencies indicated that the discrepancies were due to the time frames for posting information to their respective websites. OMB officials said they are communicating with agencies to address these discrepancies. GAO found that trade associations and advocacy organizations (50 of 87) submitted the most IQA correction requests, followed by private citizens (16), and businesses (13). GAO also found that IQA correction requests either (1) questioned agencies' use of or agencies' interpretation of data used or (2) cited administrative errors. For example, a trade association questioned the accuracy of data used in public service advertising on childhood lead poisoning prevention. Agencies did not make the requested corrections in 59 of the 87 IQA correction requests. IQA is one of several processes available to the public for requesting corrections of agency information. In one-fourth (15 of 59) of the requests where agencies determined that no change should be made, agencies addressed those requests through an administrative mechanism other than the dedicated IQA request for correction process.
OMB posts IQA information online, including links to agency-specific IQA guidelines; however, there is no central location on OMB's website where a user could access all IQA data, making specific IQA data more difficult to find and hindering transparency of the process. Twenty-eight of the 30 agencies in GAO's review posted the required IQA information online as of November 2015. The Department of Defense's (DOD) posted IQA information did not include the administrative mechanisms needed to submit a correction request to the agency as required. The Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) online information did not include its required IQA guidance. Without this information, the public may be unaware of the steps the agencies would take upon receiving a correction request, or even how to submit a correction request. OMB staff stated they would work with the agencies to improve the information on their websites, but as of December 2015, they had not completed that process. Ensuring that online content is accurate is one of the guidelines for federal digital services. These guidelines are aimed at helping federal agencies improve their communications and interactions with customers through websites. GAO found at least five agencies did not include any information regarding correction requests and other agencies' posts included outdated information or contained broken hyperlinks. The Department of Energy's web page includes a link to its IQA processes but as of November 2015 the page to submit correction requests online was under construction. OMB requires agencies to post information quality correspondence on agency websites to increase the transparency of the process but has not provided specific guidance to agencies for posting accessible, user-oriented information, including specific time frames for posting information, explanations of and links to other available correction processes, and other suggestions for improving website usability. Providing such guidance will help increase transparency and allow the public to view all IQA related information including correction requests, appeal requests, and agency responses to those requests.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB (1) consolidate and centralize on its website a summary of IQA correction requests, (2) work with DOD and FHFA to help ensure they post required IQA administrative mechanisms and guidance online, and (3) provide additional guidance to help improve the transparency and usability of IQA websites to ensure the public can easily find and access online information. OMB agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-95-171 | gao_HEHS-95-171_0 | Payments for medical supplies are made under either of Medicare’s two parts. Under this process, HCFA did not require its contractors to implement basic controls before payment that would identify and set aside for review those claims with unusually high per-patient expenditures or improbably large quantities of supplies. First, the ability of suppliers to shop for contractors with the highest payments and weakest controls has been eliminated. These data will allow HCFA to identify, on a nationwide basis, DME and medical supplies that may be subject to overutilization and inappropriate billing. Conclusions
HCFA has taken some initial steps to address Medicare medical supply and surgical dressing payment abuses. Medicare’s vulnerability to overpaying for surgical dressing claims will persist, however, for several reasons:
Many claims for surgical dressings lack sufficient detail for Medicare fiscal intermediaries to assess what they are being asked to pay for. Medicare’s payment rates for dressings are high compared with wholesale and many retail prices. Recommendations to the Secretary of HHS
The Secretary should direct the Administrator of HCFA to require that bills submitted to fiscal intermediaries itemize supplies; develop and implement prepayment review policies as part of the process of implementing any new or expanded Medicare coverage; and establish procedures to prevent duplicate payments by fiscal intermediaries and carriers. Specifically mentioned were the use of information from processed claims to identify for prepayment review suspicious suppliers and high-dollar, high-volume claims; prepayment screens to detect egregious utilization of a supply item; and comprehensive medical reviews of suppliers whose billing patterns indicate possible overutilization. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicare payments for medical supplies, focusing on the: (1) circumstances surrounding payments for unusually high surgical dressing claims; and (2) adequacy of Medicare's internal controls to prevent paying such claims.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has eliminated medical suppliers' ability to select contractors with the highest payment rates, unwarranted expenditures still persist; (2) reasons for the unwarranted expenditures include inadequate systematic payment controls and noncompetitive payment rates for surgical dressings; (3) many Medicare contractors lack itemized bills, fail to automatically review high-dollar claims for newly covered surgical dressings, and lack a systematic method for detecting duplicate bills submitted to different types of Medicare carriers; (4) Medicare payment rates for new surgical dressings and other medical supplies are considerably higher than wholesale and retail prices; (5) HCFA could curtail these overpayments by establishing procedures to require itemized claims, preventing duplicate payments to Medicare suppliers, and identifying high-dollar, high-volume claims that should be reviewed before payment; (6) the initiative will provide comprehensive national payment data that will allow HCFA and its contractors to detect inappropriate billing and overutilization; and (7) HCFA needs legislative authority to set competitive payment rates that are favorable for high-volume purchasers. |
gao_GAO-06-1091T | gao_GAO-06-1091T_0 | Background
The U.S. commercial aviation industry, with less than one fatal accident per 5 million flights from 2002 through 2005 has an extraordinary safety record. The National Work Program Guidelines (NPG) is the original oversight program for these airlines. 1.) FAA’s Safety Oversight System Includes Programs That Focus on Risk Management and Leveraging Resources, but System Is Hindered by Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations
FAA’s safety oversight system has programs that focus on identifying and mitigating risk through a system safety approach, leveraging resources, and enforcing safety regulations, but the programs lack fully developed evaluative processes. Both programs emphasize a system safety approach of using risk analysis techniques, which allow for the efficient use of inspection staff and resources by prioritizing workload based on areas of highest risk and require that inspectors verify that corrective actions are taken. With the expansion of the ATOS program, it will be important to monitor the magnitude of the shift in resources and the effect it may have on FAA’s overall capability to oversee the industry as well as any changes to the current ATOS program that may be required by the expansion. We reported that designees perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities, thus greatly leveraging the agency’s resources and enabling inspectors to concentrate on what FAA considers the most safety-critical activities. Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations Limit FAA’s Ability to Manage Risk and Are Particularly Critical as FAA’s Oversight Becomes More Indirect
Effective processes for evaluating FAA’s safety oversight programs, along with accurate nationwide data on those programs would provide FAA’s program managers and other officials with assurance that the programs are having their intended effect, especially as FAA’s oversight becomes more indirect. Our most recent work has shown that FAA had not evaluated its safety programs, and we recommended that the agency establish continuous evaluative processes for the SEP program, designee programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement program. However, FAA does not plan to evaluate the SEP program because it intends to discontinue the program after December 2007. Training Is an Integral Part of FAA’s Safety Oversight System, but Several Actions Could Improve Results
FAA’s use of a risk-based system safety approach to inspections requires inspectors to apply data analysis and auditing skills to identify, analyze, assess, and control potential hazards and risks. It is also important that FAA’s large cadre of designees is well-trained in federal aviation regulations and FAA policies. FAA has made training an integral part of its safety inspection system by establishing mandatory training requirements for its workforce as well as designees. We have reported that FAA has generally followed effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices have yet to be fully implemented. On the other hand, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall curriculum for each inspector specialty—such as air carrier operations, maintenance, and cabin safety—because the agency has not systematically identified the technical skills and competencies each type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections. FAA has begun to address these recommendations. FAA Faces a Number of Challenges in Overseeing Aviation Safety
FAA faces a number of key safety challenges, including meeting its performance target for commercial air carrier safety, which it will not meet in fiscal year 2006 because of recent fatal accidents. FAA Faces Challenges in Human Resources
FAA’s ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and anticipated trends in attrition of its inspectors compounded, in some cases, by delays in hiring and increased workload. 3.) FAA is taking actions to address these issues. FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology to Increase Air Traffic Safety
To enhance runway safety, FAA intends to rely on new technologies— beginning with the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X)—that are expected to reduce runway accidents. Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve FAA’s Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an extraordinary safety record in recent years. However, expected increases in air-traffic--including the introduction of new vehicles into the national airspace, such as unmanned vehicles and very light jets--and human resource issues, present challenges that have the potential to strain the existing safety oversight system. GAO's testimony focuses on these questions: (1) How is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ensuring that the areas of highest safety risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its staff maintain the skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the agency's oversight programs? and (3) What are the key safety challenges facing FAA? This statement is based on our recent reports on FAA's inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement and training programs. It is also based on interviews with FAA and relevant industry officials.
What GAO Found
FAA's aviation safety oversight system includes programs that focus on identifying and mitigating risks through a system safety approach and by leveraging resources, but as FAA is still developing evaluations for some of these programs, it remains unclear the extent to which they are achieving their intended effects. FAA's system safety approach for overseeing airlines--through the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) and Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP)--uses inspection staff efficiently by prioritizing workload based on areas of highest risk and ensuring that corrective actions have been taken. However, recent and planned changes that would move inspections of about 100 airlines from SEP to ATOS will shift inspector workload and might affect FAA's capability to oversee the industry. FAA also concentrates its limited staff resources on the most safety-critical functions and through its designee programs delegates other, less critical activities to designees. Designees perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities, and thus allow FAA to better leverage resources. GAO's recent work found some weaknesses in FAA's system safety approach and recommended that FAA develop effective evaluative processes and accurate nationwide data on its safety oversight programs to address these weaknesses so that program managers and other officials have assurance that the programs attain their intended effect. FAA has begun implementing those recommendations but does not plan to evaluate SEP, which it intends to discontinue after December 2007. Training--including mandatory training requirements for FAA's workforce as well as designees--is an integral part of FAA's safety oversight system. GAO has reported that FAA has generally followed effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices have yet to be fully implemented. However, several actions could improve the results of its training efforts. For example, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall curriculum for each type of inspector, such as inspectors of operations or cabin safety, because the agency has not systematically identified the technical skills and competencies each type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections. FAA has recognized the need to improve its training program in this and other areas. FAA faces several key safety challenges, including not meeting its performance target for commercial air carrier safety this year because of recent fatal accidents. Further, FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and anticipated trends in inspector and air traffic controller attrition. Also, FAA intends to enhance runway safety by relying on new technologies that are expected to reduce runway accidents. However, schedule delays and cost increases challenge FAA's ability to deploy this technology. Finally, new types of aviation vehicles are changing the aviation industry and will require new areas of expertise for FAA's inspectors and controllers. |
gao_GAO-16-524 | gao_GAO-16-524_0 | On December 31, 2009, the program was closed to new investments. CPP Largely Has Wound Down and Program Income Surpassed Original Investments
Treasury largely has wound down its CPP investments, and as of February 29, 2016, had received $226.7 billion in repayments and income from its CPP investments, exceeding the amount originally disbursed by almost $22 billion. Treasury’s most recent estimate of lifetime income for CPP (as of Nov. 30, 2015) was about $16 billion. As of February 29, 2016, 16 of the 707 institutions that originally participated in CPP remained in the program (see fig. Most of the Remaining CPP Institutions Continue to Exhibit Signs of Financial Weakness
Our analysis of financial condition metrics over the past 4 years indicates that among the 16 institutions remaining in CPP as of February 29, 2016, several have continued to face challenges. Although the median return on average assets—a key indicator of a company’s profitability—was higher in the fourth quarter of 2015 than in 2011, 9 of the 16 institutions had negative returns in 2015. Furthermore, 6 of the 16 institutions had a lower return on assets in 2015 than they did at the end of 2011. Treasury officials stated that the remaining CPP institutions generally had weaker capital levels and worse asset quality relative to institutions that had exited the program. Of the 16 CPP institutions remaining as of February 29, 2016, 1 of the 14 required to pay dividends made the most recent scheduled dividend or interest payment. Treasury Expects Most Remaining Institutions to Exit through Restructurings
Treasury officials expect most of the remaining CPP institutions to exit through restructurings but do not have a specific end date for exiting all their CPP investments and winding down the CPP program. Restructurings allow troubled financial institutions to negotiate new terms or discounted redemptions for their investments. With this option, Treasury receives cash or other securities that generally can be sold more easily than preferred stock, but the restructured investments are sometimes sold at a discount to par value. The method by which institutions have exited the program has varied over time. From 2012 to 2014, auctions were the predominant exit strategy. Treasury expects to rely on restructurings and auctions because the overall financial condition of the remaining institutions makes full repayment unlikely. Agency Comments
We provided Treasury with a draft copy of this report for review and comment. Treasury provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
CPP was established as the primary means of restoring stability to the financial system under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under CPP, Treasury invested almost $205 billion in 707 eligible financial institutions between October 2008 and December 2009. CPP recipients have made dividend and interest payments to Treasury on the investments. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 includes a provision that GAO report at least every 60 days on TARP activities. This report examines (1) the status of CPP, (2) the financial condition of institutions remaining in the program, and (3) Treasury's strategy for winding down the program.
To assess the program's status, GAO reviewed Treasury reports on the status of CPP. In addition, GAO used financial and regulatory data to assess the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP. Finally, GAO interviewed Treasury officials to examine the agency's exit strategy for the program.
GAO provided a draft of this report to Treasury for its review and comment. Treasury provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) largely has wound down and the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) returns on CPP investments surpassed the original amount disbursed. As of February 29, 2016, Treasury had received $226.7 billion in repayments and income from its CPP investments, exceeding the amount originally disbursed by almost $22 billion. As of the same date, 16 of the 707 institutions remained in the program. Treasury's most recent estimate of lifetime income for CPP (as of Nov. 30, 2015) was about $16 billion.
Most of the remaining CPP institutions have continued to exhibit signs of financial weakness. Specifically, 9 of the 16 institutions had negative returns on average assets (a common measure of profitability) in 2015. Also, 6 institutions had a lower return on assets in 2015 than they did at the end of 2011. Treasury officials stated that the remaining CPP firms generally had weaker capital levels and worse asset quality than firms that had exited the program. Also, nearly all the firms that are required to pay dividends have continued to miss payments.
Treasury expects most remaining CPP institutions to exit through restructurings but has not set time frames for winding down the program. Over the past 6 years, repayment of Treasury's investment and Treasury's auction of CPP securities to interested investors were the primary means by which institutions exited CPP. Restructurings—the expected exit method for the remaining firms—allow institutions to negotiate terms for their investments and require institutions to raise new capital or merge with another institution. With this option, Treasury agrees to receive cash or other securities, typically at a discount. Treasury officials expect to rely primarily on restructurings because the overall financial condition of the remaining institutions makes full repayment unlikely. |
gao_GAO-12-133 | gao_GAO-12-133_0 | In our 2007 report, we noted that the Army’s reset implementation strategy did not specifically target shortages of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to mitigate operational risk. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to assess the Army’s approaches to equipment reset to ensure that its priorities address equipment shortages in the near term to minimize operational risk and ensure that the needs of deploying units could be met. For example, in April 2008, the Army issued its Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan noting that filling materiel shortages within warfighting units is a key challenge facing the depot maintenance enterprise, and called for changes in processes, programs, and policies to ensure the timely repair of equipment to address these shortages. In 2010, the Army, recognizing that retrograde operations are essential to facilitating depot level reset and redistribution of equipment, developed the retrograde, reset, and redistribution (R3) initiative to synchronize retrograde, national depot-level reset efforts, and redistribution efforts. In March 2011, an initial R3 equipment priority list was issued, based primarily on shortages identified by U.S Army Forces Command. According to Army officials, this initial list was revised and reissued at the end of fiscal year 2011 to include critical equipment shortages identified and fully endorsed by all Army commands. Army Reporting Does Not Provide Visibility over Multiyear Reset Costs or Fully Capture Deviations between Planned and Executed Reset
The Army has taken steps under its own initiative to report its reset execution quantities to Congress since 2007, but this reporting does not capture important elements of the Army’s reset efforts, including its estimated future reset costs and the amount of equipment planned for reset each year that is successfully reset. We have reported that agencies and decision makers need visibility into the accuracy of program execution in order to ensure basic accountability and to anticipate future costs and claims on the budget. As table 1 shows, the Army reports aggregate information on reset activity in broad categories, such as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles or Aviation Support Equipment. To illustrate this point, our analysis of Army data from fiscal year 2010 shows that 4,144 tactical wheeled vehicles were planned for reset in fiscal year 2010 and a total of 3,563 vehicles were executed (see table 2). According to the Army’s current reporting method, this would result in a reported total completion rate of 86 percent. However, our analysis showed that, of the total number of items executed, 1,647 items or approximately 40 percent of the equipment reset was actually equipment that had been planned and programmed. This information is important because it has cost implications. For example, both the M1200 Knight (an armored security vehicle) and the M1151 HMMWV are categorized as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles in the Army’s monthly reports to Congress. However, in 2010 more M1200s were repaired than planned, thus accounting for a larger share of the budgeted reset funds. At the same time, with fewer funds remaining, some equipment planned and budgeted for repair was not reset, pushing that workload to future fiscal years. Without information on the multiyear reset liability and additional details within current reports, Congress may not have a complete picture of both the Army’s progress in meeting its reset plan as well as the long-term cost implications of reset. Since our 2007 review, the Army has taken steps to incorporate deploying units’ equipment needs into their reset planning, including the implementation of the R3 equipment list, but it is too early to tell whether this initiative will provide a consistent and transparent process. Recommendations for Executive Actions:
To ensure that the Army provides information to Congress that is useful for assessing its short and long-term reset progress, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Logistics to take the following two actions:
Revise the monthly congressional reset reports to include the Army’s multiyear reset liability, which should include the anticipated cost to reset all equipment in-theater as well as all equipment returned to the United States that has not yet been reset; and
Revise the monthly congressional reset reports to include information on the percentage of equipment reset according to the initial reset plan by vehicle type. However, DOD stated that the Army plans to include the Army’s estimate of future equipment reset liability in its summary report to Congress for the fiscal year. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine any steps the Army has taken to improve its equipment reset strategy and address target shortages since our 2007 report, we reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) comments in that report. To determine the extent to which the Army’s monthly reset reports to Congress provide visibility over reset costs and execution, we obtained data published in the Reset Execution Order on the Army’s annual sustainment-level reset workload requirements estimates from fiscal years 2007 through 2012 to determine the quantities of equipment planned for reset. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 2007 to 2012, the Army received about $42 billion to fund its expenses for the reset of equipmentincluding more than $21 billion for depot maintenancein support of continuing overseas contingency operations in Southwest Asia. Reset is intended to mitigate the effects of combat stress on equipment by repairing, rebuilding, upgrading, or procuring replacement equipment. Reset equipment is used to supply non-deployed units and units preparing for deployment while meeting ongoing operational requirements. In 2007, GAO reported that the Armys reset strategy did not target equipment shortages for units deploying to theater. For this report, GAO (1) examined steps the Army has taken to improve its equipment reset strategy since 2007, and (2) determined the extent to which the Armys reset reports to Congress provide visibility over reset costs and execution. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and Army documentation on equipment reset strategies and monthly Army reports to Congress, and interviewed DOD and Army officials.
What GAO Found
Since GAOs 2007 review, the Army has taken steps to improve its use of reset in targeting equipment shortages. In 2007, GAO noted that the Armys reset implementation strategy did not specifically target shortages of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to mitigate operational risk. GAO recommended that the Army act to ensure that its reset priorities address equipment shortages in the near term to ensure that the needs of deploying units could be met. The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur, and stated that there was no need to reassess its approaches to equipment reset. However, in 2008, the Army issued its Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, noted that filling materiel shortages within warfighting units is a key challenge facing the depot maintenance enterprise, and called for changes in programs and policies to address materiel shortages within warfighting units. Further, recognizing that retrograde operationsthe return of equipment from theater to the United Statesare essential to facilitating depot level reset and redistribution of equipment, the Army in 2010 developed the retrograde, reset, and redistribution (R3) initiative to synchronize retrograde, national depot-level reset efforts, and redistribution efforts. In March 2011, the Army issued an R3 equipment priority list, and revised and reissued an updated list at the end of fiscal year 2011 with full endorsement from all Army commands. The R3 initiative has only begun to be fully implemented this year, and thus it is too early to tell whether it will provide a consistent and transparent process for addressing the Armys current or future equipping needs.
GAO found that the Armys monthly reports to Congress do not include expected future reset costs or distinguish between planned and unplanned reset of equipment. GAO has reported that agencies and decision makers need visibility into the accuracy of program execution in order to ensure basic accountability and to anticipate future costs. However, the Army does not include its future reset liability in its reports to Congress, which DOD most recently estimated in 2010 to be $24 billion. Also, the Army reports to Congress include the number of items that it has repaired in a given month using broad categories, such as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, which may obscure progress on equipment planned for reset. For example, GAOs analysis of Army data showed that 4,144 tactical wheeled vehicles were planned for reset in fiscal year 2010, while 3,563 vehicles were executed. According to the Armys current reporting method, this would result in a reported completion rate of 86 percent, but GAOs analysis showed that only approximately 40 percent of the equipment that was reset had been planned and programmed. This reporting method may also restrict visibility over the Armys multiyear reset liability. For example, both the M1200 Knight and the M1151 HMMWV are categorized as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, but anticipated reset costs for the M1200 are significantly higher. In 2010 more M1200s were repaired than planned, thus accounting for a larger share of the budgeted reset funds. With fewer funds remaining, some equipment planned and budgeted for repair was not reset, pushing that workload to future fiscal years. These differences are not captured in the Armys monthly reports, and thus Congress may not have a complete picture of the Armys short- and long-term progress in addressing reset.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army revise its monthly congressional reset reports to include its future reset liability and status information on equipment reset according to the initial reset plan by vehicle type. DOD did not concur. DOD stated that the Army would report its reset liability annually instead of monthly. Because DOD did not agree to report its reset status by vehicle type, GAO included a matter for congressional consideration to direct the Army to report this information. |
gao_GAO-09-727 | gao_GAO-09-727_0 | In recent years, several employee groups and unions representing law enforcement-related personnel who have not been found by their employing agencies and OPM to meet the applicable LEO definitions have sought to obtain enhanced retirement benefits directly through separate legislation. As of fiscal year 2008, approximately half of law enforcement personnel receiving enhanced retirement benefits did not receive these benefits through the application of the LEO definitional criteria from their employing agency and OPM via the administrative process, but received these benefits directly through legislation that either (1) provided benefits similar to those received by LEOs or (2) added their occupation to the statutory LEO definition. Finally, providing enhanced retirement benefits to certain employee groups directly through legislation has created perceived inequities across certain law enforcement-related occupations and some agencies report that future action to provide enhanced retirement benefits to certain employee groups could affect their strategic workforce planning. However, when we asked the employee groups and unions seeking enhanced retirement benefits for those they represent for data to substantiate this rationale, they did not consistently provide these data. Specifically, the average government-wide attrition rate from fiscal years 2004 through 2008 for law enforcement-related personnel not receiving enhanced retirement benefits was 4.7 percent, compared to 3.2 percent for law enforcement personnel receiving enhanced retirement benefits and 3.5 percent for law enforcement-related personnel who received special pay and no enhanced retirement benefits. However, analyzing attrition data alone may not fully indicate why personnel are leaving a particular agency because, as we have previously reported, a variety of organizational, personal, and economic factors, in addition to compensation, influence separation decisions. Attorneys stated that, in addition to addressing retention challenges, Assistant U.S. In addition, officials from the Executive Office of U.S. Costs of Providing Enhanced Retirement Benefits to Law Enforcement Personnel are Generally Higher Than Those for Regular Federal Employees
Overall, the short-term costs to a federal agency for providing enhanced retirement benefits for law enforcement personnel under FERS are higher than providing retirement benefits to regular federal employees. Attorneys and others. Using Human Capital Tools Could Offer A More Cost Efficient Alternative Than Granting Enhanced Retirement Benefits For Retaining Select Law Enforcement Related Personnel
Federal agencies, including those that employ law enforcement and law enforcement-related personnel, such as DOJ, DHS, and Treasury, can use a variety of human capital tools, such as student loan reimbursements and monetary retention incentives, to retain such personnel. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, DOJ, IRS, and OPM. OPM generally concurred with the report. (2) What are the rationales and potential costs for extending such benefits to additional occupations or employee groups? As agreed upon with your offices, our review focused on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of the Treasury because these federal entities employed approximately 84 percent of all law enforcement and law enforcement- related personnel in fiscal year 2008. To identify the processes that have been used to grant enhanced retirement benefits to federal law enforcement personnel, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, as well as legislation introduced in the 110th Congress that would have provided such benefits to additional employee groups. We also obtained information on the extent to which granting such benefits may affect other employees and agencies’ workforce planning. In comments on the then pending 1948 legislation, the Civil Service Commission noted that it was “not in favor of special legislation for individual groups of employees, but inasmuch as Congress has approved special legislation for the investigatory personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation it would not oppose benefits for similar groups of employees.” Committee report language noted that the “committee believes it is only fair to grant such retirement benefits as are provided for under the bill to law-enforcement agents in all parts of the Government at an earlier age, because it is physically impossible to carry on the necessary strenuous activities after reaching 50 years of age.”
Currently, law enforcement personnel performing certain specified types of duties can fall within the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) statutory and regulatory retirement-related definitions of the term “law enforcement officer” (LEO) and thus be eligible for enhanced retirement benefits under the respective retirement plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2000 through 2008, the number of persons employed by federal agencies who perform various law enforcement functions and receive either special pay or enhanced retirement benefits, in the form of a faster-accruing pension, has increased by 55 percent. In addition, as of September 2008, approximately 51,000 personnel were employed in law enforcement-related occupations that could seek enhanced retirement benefits in the future. GAO was asked to conduct a review of the retirement benefits provided to law enforcement personnel. This report addresses (1) the processes used to grant enhanced retirement benefits to federal law enforcement personnel, (2) the rationales and potential costs for extending benefits to additional occupations, and (3) the extent to which federal agencies used human capital tools to retain law enforcement and other related personnel. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and other documentation, such as agency reports describing the processes used to grant enhanced benefits, and interviewed officials from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) because these entities employed approximately 84 percent of all law enforcement and law enforcement-related personnel in fiscal year 2008. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS, DOJ and OPM generally concurred with the report. IRS stated that it had no comments on the report.
What GAO Found
In order for certain employees to receive enhanced retirement benefits, agencies generally determine that a certain group of employees meets the statutory and regulatory definitions of a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)--which includes such activities as conducting investigations--and submit the determination to OPM. As of the end of fiscal year 2008, about half of federal employees receiving enhanced retirement benefits met the statutory and regulatory definitions. In recent years, several employee groups and unions representing law enforcement personnel whose agencies and OPM have determined that they do not meet the LEO definitions have sought such benefits directly through legislation. Currently, about half of law enforcement personnel receiving enhanced benefits have obtained these benefits directly through legislation. Law enforcement-related employee groups that sought enhanced retirement benefits directly through legislation have cited a number of rationales to justify receiving these benefits, including high attrition rates. The provision of such retirement benefits may result in additional costs to the agency and federal government because these costs are generally higher than providing retirement benefits to regular federal employees. GAO's analysis of available data showed that attrition for law enforcement-related personnel not receiving enhanced retirement benefits was higher than law enforcement personnel receiving such benefits but not as high as all other federal employees. While attrition data are available, when asked to provide such data, the employee groups and unions seeking enhanced retirement benefits did not consistently provide it to us. Analyzing attrition data alone may not fully indicate why personnel are leaving a particular agency because a variety of organizational and economic factors, as well as compensation, influence separation decisions. GAO's analysis also showed that such benefits increase agency short-term costs and could increase the government's long-term pension liability. Finally, providing such benefits to some groups but not others has created perceived inequities and DHS and DOJ acknowledge that it could affect their strategic workforce planning. Federal agencies have the authority to use human capital tools, such as retention incentives, to assist with their efforts to address specific retention challenges. Some department and agency officials to whom we spoke said these tools are effective for retaining law enforcement personnel, while others maintained they need enhanced retirement benefits to effectively retain law enforcement-related personnel. The targeted use of these tools may present a cost-efficient alternative for retaining law enforcement-related personnel. |
gao_GAO-12-563T | gao_GAO-12-563T_0 | Significant schedule delays of as much as 9 years have resulted in potential capability gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. The Current Status of Space System Acquisitions
In 2011, we testified that though problems still existed on many programs, DOD was beginning to make progress by finally launching satellites that These included the Missile Defense had been lagging behind schedule.Agency’s (MDA) Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), the Air Force’s first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite and the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite although AEHF had not yet reached its final planned orbit at the time we testified because of an anomaly with the satellite’s propulsion system. Progress has continued since we testified last year. DOD launched the first of the Navy’s Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellites in February 2012, and the second is scheduled for launch in July 2013. The first of six SBIRS geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites The successfully launched in May 2011, after a roughly 9 year delay. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program continues to successfully launch DOD and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) satellites, and is planning 11 launches in 2012. While these launches represent solid progress, there have been some drawbacks to the programs that have launched their first satellites. For instance, the second GPS IIF satellite experienced technical problems that could possibly shorten the satellite’s operational lifetime. Though the first SBIRS satellite has launched, and the second is close to delivery, program officials are predicting a 1-year delay on production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites due in part to technical challenges, parts obsolescence and test failures. Along with the production delay, program officials are predicting a $438 million cost overrun for the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites. Even though DOD has finally overcome some technical and production difficulties and begun to launch high risk satellites such as SBIRS and AEHF, the department is still contending with the effects of their significant cost growth on its investment portfolio. In fact, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs have increased by about $11.6 billion—321 percent—from initial estimates for fiscal years 2011 through 2016.investment in the later years is the result of mature programs that have planned lower out-year funding, cancellation of a major space acquisition It should also be noted that the declining program and several development efforts, and the exclusion of several major space acquisition efforts for which total cost data were unavailable. GAO Space-Related Reviews over the Past Year
Over the past year, we have reported on of the need for sound and sufficient information for the new DOD acquisition strategy for the EELV program; parts quality problems in major DOD, MDA, and NASA programs; and greater content and coordination in the space Science and Technology (S&T) strategy. We found that DOD lacked critical knowledge needed to develop a new acquisition strategy. The DOD is in the process of adopting these recommendations. DOD concurred with these recommendations. We expect to issue our report based on this review later this fall. Actions Being Taken to Address Space Acquisition Problems
Though our reports over the year indicate there is more room for improvement, DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions it has been taking are intended to address root causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are successful and they need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and support space activities. DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations, and, as described below, has undertaken an array of actions to establish a better foundation for acquisition success. DOD and the Air Force are also working to streamline management and oversight of the national security space enterprise. Congress and DOD have taken major steps toward reforming the defense acquisition system in ways that may increase the likelihood that weapon programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives. But there are still significant barriers to ensuring investments are optimized, including fragmented leadership, the high cost of launch, uncertainty about the future for technology advancements, and disconnects between the fielding of satellites with user equipment and ground systems needed to take advantage of expensive new capabilities. ORS was intended to provide short-term and low-cost tactical capabilities to warfighters. Moreover, given the nation’s fiscal challenges, DOD’s focus on streamlining leadership, fixing problems, and implementing reforms is promising. But there are still significant barriers to achieve acquisition success that need to be addressed to maintain space superiority in an era of fiscal austerity. All of the barriers— leadership fragmentation, launch costs, S&T planning, and disconnects between space and ground assets—require action from the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the participation and cooperation of all the military services, the intelligence community, and other agencies such as NASA and NOAA. Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the DOD spends billions on large space acquisition programs, which have in the past experienced cost and schedule overruns and increased technical risk. At present, though, the worst of these problems may be over, and programs long troubled are finally being launched. Challenges persist, but they are less significant than they were. With todays fiscal constraints, however, DOD must find ways to keep its new major space acquisitions on track, as operating in space is expensive and DOD is still replenishing legacy programs like missile warning, protected communications, and environmental monitoring. Significant barriers exist to ensuring such investments are optimized.
To address the progress DOD has made this year, this testimony will focus on (1) the current status of space system acquisitions; (2) results of GAOs space-related reviews this past year; (3) actions taken to address DOD space acquisition problems; and (4) remaining challenges that stand in the way of DOD fully realizing the benefits of satellite acquisition improvements. This testimony is based on previously issued GAO products as well as analysis of DOD funding estimates.
GAO does not make recommendations in this testimony. However, in previous reports GAO has generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices for developing space systems such as separating technology development from product development. DOD is in the process of implementing such practices.
What GAO Found
Last year, GAO testified that though acquisition problems still existed in many space programs, the Department of Defense (DOD) was beginning to launch satellites that had long been lagging behind schedule and it had taken positive actions to instill better practices and more focused leadership for space. Progress has continued. Over the past year, DOD launched the first Navy Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite; the first, after a nine-year delay, of six Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites; and the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satelliteall of which will bring important capability to the warfighter. While these launches represent solid progress, there have also been some drawbacks. For instance, the second Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite experienced technical problems that could shorten its operational lifetime. The cost of the first two GPS III satellites is at least18 percent higher than first estimated, up to $1.6 billion today. A 1-year delay is expected by SBIRS program officials on production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites along with a $438 million cost overrun. And, a termination of the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) may result in a capability gap. Moreover, even though problems have been overcome, DOD must still contend with the effects of its previous difficulties on its investment portfolio.
Recent GAO reviews highlight other difficulties facing DOD space programs. GAOs review of a new acquisition strategy for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, for instance, identified a need for more knowledge about the industrial base as well as cost and pricing in order to optimize a sizable investment in launch vehicles. GAOs review of parts quality problems in major DOD, Missile Defense Agency, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs illustrated that acquisition reforms need to be buttressed with closer attention to the quality of piece parts as issues have vexed most major programs. GAO, however, credited the agencies with instituting collaborative efforts to address supplier quality.
Though it still faces an array of challenges, DOD continues to work to ensure its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. For example, DOD intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes and it has acted to streamline management and oversight of the national security space enterprise. The agency has taken steps toward reforming the defense acquisition system to help its programs to meet planned cost and schedule objectives. Because DOD intends to address the root causes of problems, it will take time to determine if these actions are successful or need further actions on how best to lead, organize, and support space activities.
Moreover, there are significant barriers to ensuring investments are optimized. These include fragmented leadership, the rising cost of launch, uncertainty about the future for technology advancements, and disconnects between the fielding of satellites with user equipment and ground systems needed to take advantage of expensive new capabilities. Addressing all of these challenges are needed to maintain space superiority in an era of fiscal austerity, but their resolution also requires the participation and cooperation of all the military services, the intelligence community, and agencies such as NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. |
gao_GAO-02-190 | gao_GAO-02-190_0 | Background
The R&D Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers share responsibility with other programs created by the Congress for education research, research-based activities, and technical assistance. Laws Mandate Missions and Activities of the R&D Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers
The Congress created a separate primary focus for the R&D Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers and gave them the responsibility of performing specific activities. Education’s Ability to Shape R&D Center, Regional Lab, and Comprehensive Center Agendas Varies
Education shapes the activities of the R&D Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers through its funding documents and program monitoring. Specifically, Education has little control over Regional Labs because regional boards govern them. The programs reported they are most likely to engage in collaborative and coordinated activities when they share a common interest in a specific student population, such as English language learners, or a specific topic, such as assessment. Conclusions
The Regional Labs are unlike most federal education programs because neither the federal government nor state governments have oversight responsibility for their programs. As a result, Education lacks information that would be useful in making funding decisions or improving the performance of each organization. | What GAO Found
Research and Development (R&D) Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers support the Department of Education's research agenda to various degrees. Because statutes define different missions and activities for these programs, the amount and focus of the research and other research-based activities they support varies. Education shapes the priorities that guide the research done by the R&D Centers and targets the technical assistance provided by the Comprehensive Centers through requirements in agreements with these entities. However, Education has little control over the activities of the Regional Labs because, unlike most federal education programs, neither federal nor state governments have oversight responsibility for their programs. The R&D Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers reported collaborating and coordinating with each other and Education and cited various factors that have either facilitated or hindered such activities. They said that they were most likely to engage in these activities when they shared a common interest in a specific student population, such as English language learners, or in a specific topic, such as assessment. Current evaluation practices for assessing the R&D Centers, Regional Labs, and Comprehensive Centers have provided only limited information about the performance of these organizations and have not been useful for making future funding decisions. |
gao_GAO-06-883 | gao_GAO-06-883_0 | The S&T community controls the budget for basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development. Prior GAO reports have said that DOD launches new weapon programs with immature technology. Leading Companies Rely on Strategic Planning, a Gated Process, and Tools to Transition Needed Technologies
To successfully develop and transition technologies from their labs to their product lines, leading commercial companies depend on three key techniques: strategic planning at the corporate level; a gated management review process that ensures a technology’s relevancy, feasibility, and transition readiness; and effective tools to solidify commitment, address transition issues, and gauge project progress and process effectiveness. This report touches briefly on strategic planning, which precedes technology development. Technology transition agreements are formal documents that detail the specific cost, schedule, and performance attributes of the technology that labs must demonstrate before transition can occur. Relationship Managers
3M, IBM, and Motorola use lab and product line relationship managers to smooth transition. DOD Lacks Breadth and Depth of Techniques That Leading Companies Use to Effectively Transition Technologies
DOD has taken some steps over the past few years to improve its technology transition processes, but the practice of accepting high levels of technology risk at the start of major weapon system acquisition programs continues to be the norm. This shortcoming is a major contributor to DOD’s poor cost and schedule outcomes. The collection and use of meaningful metrics, however, remain a problem. However, these programs represent a small portion of $13 billion DOD spends on science and technology development. It must rely on the acquisition community to identify advanced component development and prototype funding for transitioning the technologies. Examples from past initiatives serve as reminders that just changing the mechanics of technology transition processes, without changing the environment that determines incentives, may not produce better outcomes. Funding for technology development largely comes from the corporate level, with the research labs having responsibility for technology development until technology is matured and transitioned to the product line. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) identify techniques that commercial companies use to transition mature technologies before the start of product development and (2) assess the extent to which DOD is using these techniques. We synthesized information from GAO’s past best practices work about technology and product development. Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD’s Environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on its science and technology community to develop innovative technologies for weapon systems, spending $13 billion on basic, applied, and advanced technology research. Several GAO reports have addressed problems in transitioning technologies to the acquisition community. This report, which was prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations, compares DOD's technology transition processes with commercial best practices. Specifically, GAO identifies technology transition techniques used by leading companies and assesses the extent to which DOD uses the techniques
What GAO Found
Leading commercial companies use three key techniques for successfully developing and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that technologies must be mature before transitioning to the product line side. (1) Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic planning precedes technology development so managers can gauge market needs, identify the most desirable technologies, and prioritize resources. (2) Gated management reviews: A rigorous process is used to ensure a technology's relevancy and feasibility and enlist product line commitment to use the technologies once the labs are finished maturing them. (3)Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology transition agreements solidify and document specific cost, schedule, and performance metrics labs need to meet for transition to occur. Relationship managers address transition issues within the labs and product line teams and across both communities. Meaningful metrics gauge project progress and process effectiveness. Not only does DOD lack the breadth and depth of these techniques, the department routinely accepts high levels of technology risk at the start of major weapon acquisition programs. The acquisition community works with technologies before they are ready to be transitioned and takes on responsibility for technology development and product development concurrently. A defined phase for technology transition is not evident. These shortcomings contribute significantly to DOD's poor cost and schedule outcomes. A stark contrast exists between DOD's and private industry's environments for developing technology. The numerous examples of DOD programs that have incurred cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced performance serve as reminders that inserting a few best practices and changing the mechanics of technology transition processes without changing the environment that determines incentives may not produce better outcomes. |
gao_GAO-03-566 | gao_GAO-03-566_0 | 1). In addition, U.N. officials and their security subconsultant followed a process consistent with recognized guidelines to develop plans for improving security at the U.N. complex. Estimated Financial Impact of the Renovation to the United States
The Secretary-General has indicated that the United Nations anticipates that the United States would provide a no-interest loan to finance the U.N. renovation. This amount would vary depending on the terms and conditions of the financing arrangement. Financial Impact of the Renovation to the Federal Government Is over $700 Million
We estimate the potential financial impact to the federal government as both lender to United Nations and member state would be over $700 million for a $1.2 billion no-interest loan. Key Milestones in the Renovation Process
To continue the planning process, key efforts must be pursued and critical milestones met. However, U.S. and U.N. officials stated that neither the United States nor the United Nations have specified the nature of a financing commitment. Furthermore, with established mission and program goals, the department could specify resource needs, including appropriate skills needed to achieve a successful outcome of the project. Conclusions
The United Nations has used a reasonable process thus far to develop its renovation plans, but it is still early in the project and changes in the schedule and cost estimates are to be expected. While the General Assembly has funded the project’s design, a commitment to finance the renovation will be needed by October 2003 for the United Nations to remain on its current schedule and sign a lease for the swing space. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate administration officials and other U.N. members, direct the U.S. representative to the United Nations to encourage the United Nations to complete and implement an effective project management plan that will guide decision making and coordination throughout the renovation project, and encourage the United Nations to provide the Office of Internal Oversight and the Board of Auditors with the resources needed to conduct effective oversight of the Capital Master Plan as the project progresses. To assess U.N. and Department of State efforts to monitor and oversee the renovation, we reviewed U.N. documents such as the Capital Master Plan, the U.N. renovation project management plan, the U.N. resolution pertaining to oversight of the Capital Master Plan, and the mission statements of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of Auditors. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United Nations (U.N.) estimates that its planned renovation of the seven buildings on the Headquarters complex could cost almost $1.2 billion. As the host country and the largest contributor to the United Nations, the United States has a significant interest in this project. This report (1) assesses the reasonableness of the U.N. process to develop the renovation plans, (2) analyzes the potential cost to the United States, (3) identifies critical milestones before construction can begin, and (4) discusses efforts to monitor and oversee the project.
What GAO Found
U.N. officials followed a reasonable process consistent with leading industry practices and recognized guidelines in developing the headquarters renovation plan--the first phase of a five-phase renovation process. As the project advances, changes in scope, schedule, and cost are to be expected. To finance the renovation, the Secretary-General anticipates a no-interest loan from the United States. However, U.S. and U.N. officials stated that neither the United States nor the United Nations have specified the nature of any financing commitment. GAO estimates that the financial impact of the renovation to the federal government, including providing a $1.2 billion no-interest loan and repaying a share as a U.N. member, would be over $700 million, depending on the loan terms and conditions. Several critical milestones must be met for construction to begin as planned, including securing a financing commitment and signing a lease for a building where U.N. staff and delegates would relocate during the renovation. As the renovation project progresses, additional management, oversight, and monitoring is needed. The United Nations plans to complete a project management plan, which would help the United Nations control cost and schedule. While the United Nations has approved initial funding for the Board of Auditors to conduct oversight of the renovation and the board is preparing its audit strategy, the Office of Internal Oversight Services does not have the resources or audit strategies needed to effectively conduct oversight of the renovation. The Department of State has assembled a task force to monitor the renovation, but the department will need to define the task force's mission and program goals. Doing so would allow the department to develop strategies for employing the appropriate skill mix needed to achieve a successful outcome for the task force. |
gao_GAO-05-469 | gao_GAO-05-469_0 | In 2002, DOD’s attention again turned to studying the potential for transferring DOD’s domestic elementary and secondary education program over to LEAs. DOD Does Not Have Specific Criteria for Closing Schools
While DOD has previously urged its components to examine for potential divestiture or outsourcing of functions not core to warfighting efforts to the private sector, neither DODEA nor DOD has policy guidance related to closing the dependent elementary and secondary schools operated by the department. While expansion and contraction of the number of domestic schools operated by DOD occurred between the 1950s and early 1970s, relatively few have been closed or transferred since then, and most of these have been related to base closure activities. For affected military families, the retention of these schools is seen as a quality-of-life issue, but there are varying perspectives on this issue within DOD. DOD housing privatization officials indicated they do not currently anticipate similar transfers of schools in the future. Nonetheless, the basis for these recommendations is difficult to ascertain based on study report documents. For example, in a few instances, the panel recommended transfers to LEA districts even though the district schools were considered to be “underperforming” while another adjacent LEA’s schools were considered “overperforming” and with lower per pupil costs; or a LEA was recommended over DDESS even though the LEA’s per pupil costs were higher and its schools were cited as mostly “underperforming.” Appendix V highlights examples of the divergent information contained in various transfer study documents for four installations. However, study data indicate that DOD could incur costs of about $125 million to repair and upgrade existing DDESS school facilities,. Other Issues Could Impact Decision Making
Apart from issues identified in the transfer study, there are other factors/issues that were not present when the transfer study began that could impact DDESS and LEA schools and further complicate school transfer decisions. The study did not consider ongoing DOD plans to realign U.S. bases overseas and announced plans to restation about 70,000 military personnel and approximately 100,000 family members currently stationed overseas to bases in the United States. The study also does not reflect efforts under way by the Army to reorganize its force structure, creating new units of action with the potential for increased numbers of personnel assigned to selected military bases in the United States. DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions are finalized later this year. Once the results of the domestic base closure process and overseas rebasing plans are known, a decision on the school transfer issue should be made sooner rather than later to ensure adequate planning, funding and siting of new school facilities in the United States that may be needed to support increasing populations of military dependent students. Recommendations for Executive Action
Should a decision be made to transfer some or all of DDESS domestic schools to LEAs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness require that such efforts be accompanied by a more complete assessment of the impact of troop redeployments and other force structure changes on educational facility requirements on affected installations and surrounding communities to facilitate needed facility and operational planning by DOD, the Department of Education and LEAs to meet changing needs. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which DOD has established a school closure policy and the effect such policies have on quality-of-life issues for servicemembers and their dependents, we discussed the issue with cognizant officials within DODEA and other departmental officials. To assess the transfer study completed for DODEA by the Donahue Institute, including the clarity of the basis for conclusions reached, the overall financial impact, and issues identified but not resolved by the study, we first reviewed the various summary reports prepared by the Donahue Institute, the results of the facility condition assessment performed by Parkhill, Smith, and Cooper, Inc., and a summary of the phase 3 quality-of- life assessment. The study was completed by Rand under the sponsorship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Force Management and Personnel as the result of Congress incorporating into the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1986, a request to the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan “which provides for the orderly transfer, not later than July 1990, of all Section 6 schools to the appropriate local school districts of the states in which such schools are located.” DOD later reported to the Congress, in December 1988, that based on the results of a detailed study of the schools, it had decided to suspend efforts to transfer educational responsibilities for the schools to LEAs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) operates 59 elementary and secondary schools serving over a dozen military bases in the continental United States Periodically, questions have been raised concerning the continuing need for such schools. In 2002, DOD commissioned the Donahue Institute of the University of Massachusetts to examine the potential for transferring these schools to local education agencies (LEAs). GAO's assessment focused on (1) the extent to which DOD has established a school closure policy and the effect such policies have on quality-of-life issues for servicemembers and their dependents; and (2) the transfer study, including the clarity of the basis for conclusions reached, the overall financial impact, and issues identified but not resolved by the study. GAO's report also identifies issues not addressed in the transfer study that could impact the future of DOD's domestic schools.
What GAO Found
Officials in the DOD Education Activity, which administers the DOD school program, said that neither DOD nor Department of Defense Education Activity has specific policy guidance related to closing domestic dependent elementary and secondary schools. While some expansion and contraction of the number of domestic schools operated by DOD occurred between the 1950s and early 1970s, relatively few have been closed or transferred since then, and most of those have been related to base closure activities. For affected military families, the retention of these schools is seen as an important quality-of-life issue. The basis for the expert panel recommendations to transfer selected DOD schools to LEAs is difficult to ascertain. Specifically, it is often unclear how various analytical factors examined led to recommendations being made. For example, in one instance the panel recommended transfer of educational responsibilities to the neighboring LEA even though the LEA's per pupil costs were higher than DOD's and the LEA schools were cited as mostly "underperforming." Moreover, the study data indicate that DOD could incur an estimated $125 million to repair and upgrade existing schools. Under the panel's recommendations, DOD would also have a continuing obligation to maintain the schools even after program transfers to the LEAs. Some long-term savings in operating costs could accrue to DOD, but many of these costs would need to be absorbed by LEAs or other federal programs. The transfer study also indicates that various legal restrictions in some states would need to be resolved. Finally, ownership of the schools DOD operates needs to be clarified in order to ensure that it is properly reflected in property records. There are other factors, most not present when the transfer study began, that could further complicate school transfer decisions, including ongoing DOD plans to relocate about 70,000 military personnel and approximately 100,000 family members currently stationed overseas to bases in the United States within the next few years; Army efforts to reorganize its force structure, with the potential for increased numbers of personnel assigned to selected military bases in the United States; and the impact of the 2005 base realignment and closure round. Likewise, current DOD efforts to privatize housing on its military bases could also impact future requirements for schools serving military dependents. DOD has appropriately said that it is postponing decision making on the results of the transfer study until after base closure decisions are finalized later this year. However, the impact of troop redeployments and other force structure changes on schools has not yet been fully assessed. Given the expected increase of school age military dependents on various stateside military bases over the next few years, a clear decision on school transfer issues should be made after the results of the base closure process and overseas rebasing plans are known to ensure adequate planning for facilities by DOD and LEAs. |
gao_GAO-05-663 | gao_GAO-05-663_0 | CBP headquarters allocates staff to ports. International Passengers’ Wait Times Vary by Airport and Are Affected by Three Primary Factors
The amount of time passengers from international locations have to wait before completing CBP inspections to enter the United States varies within individual airports and across the 20 airports at which CBP records wait times. Although wait times vary across airports, on average, CBP processed passengers within 45 minutes during the 2-month period for which data were available. Based on our observations and analysis of wait time data, as well as our discussions with airport and airline officials, we concluded that the primary factors affecting wait time are passenger volume, the number of inspection stations available at an airport, and the number of CBP officers available to conduct inspections. The U.S. Specifically, three of the five international airports we visited had built new or expanded federal inspection facilities to accommodate future growth in passenger volume and minimize wait times for internationally arriving passengers. Additionally, three of these airports assigned staff to assist passengers in preparing documentation to minimize wait times. Airline officials we spoke to acknowledged that large volumes of arriving passengers may increase wait times, but said that, to accommodate market demand, airlines do not spread flight arrivals evenly throughout the day. Airports and airlines also have taken other steps to minimize passenger wait times. CBP officials said this program is essential for increasing staff flexibility so that staff can conduct different types of inspections within airports. CBP is also developing a staffing model to assist in determining officer allocation levels. Recommendations
To assist CBP in its efforts to develop a staffing model that will help provide a basis for budget justifications and management decision-making and to establish goals and performance measures to assess its progress in completing its staffing model and its cross-training program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, to take the following five actions provide ports with targets and milestones for having staff cross-trained to measure the progress of its One Face at the Border program while being sensitive to work demands in setting training schedules; incorporate wait time performance measures in the staffing model currently under development as required by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Protection Act of 2002; use the staffing model under development to determine the optimal number of staff at each airport nationwide; systematically solicit input from the field on staffing needs and include uniform, agencywide guidance on how they should assess their needs and environment; and set out milestones for completing CBP’s planned staffing model. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess CBP’s progress in minimizing wait times for international air passengers while ensuring security, we analyzed (1) the wait times at the 20 U.S. international airports that receive most of the international traffic and factors affecting wait times; (2) the steps airports and airlines have taken to minimize passenger wait times; and (3) how CBP has managed staffing to minimize wait times across airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
While the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Protection Act repealed a 45 minute standard for inspecting international passengers, minimizing wait times at airports remains an area of concern for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Shortly after its creation in March 2003, CBP assumed inspection functions from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Department of Agriculture. The new agency's priority missions are to prevent terrorism and to facilitate travel and trade. To assess CBP's efforts to minimize wait times for international air passengers while ensuring security, this report answers the following questions: (1) What are the wait times at the 20 U.S. international airports that receive most of the international traffic and what factors affect wait times? (2) What steps have airports and airlines taken to minimize passenger wait times? (3) How has CBP managed staffing to minimize wait times across airports?
What GAO Found
The amount of time passengers from international locations have to wait before completing CBP inspections to enter the United States varies within and across airports. On average, CBP processed passengers within 45 minutes during the 2-month period for which data were available, although some flights had significantly longer wait times. Based on our observations and analysis as well as our discussions with airport and CBP officials, we determined that the primary factors affecting wait time are passenger volume, the number of inspection stations available at an airport, and the number of CBP officers available to conduct inspections. These factors, in different combinations at each airport, affect passenger wait times. Three of the five international airports we visited had built new or expanded federal inspection facilities to accommodate future growth in passenger volume and minimize wait times for internationally arriving passengers. Additionally, some airports assigned staff to assist passengers in preparing documentation to minimize wait times. Airline officials we spoke to acknowledged that large volumes of arriving passengers may increase wait times, but said that, to accommodate market demand, airlines do not spread flight arrivals throughout the day. CBP, in its efforts to minimize passenger wait times at airports, has taken steps to increase the efficient use of existing staff at airports. For example, CBP is cross-training its officers so that they can conduct different types of inspections. CBP is also developing a staffing model to allocate staff among its ports. However, the new model fails to address weaknesses identified in assessments of staffing models used previously by Customs and INS, such as not including wait times as a performance measure. CBP also has not developed milestones for completing its staffing model and cross-training program at all ports. Until these weaknesses are addressed, CBP will be hampered in forming a basis for management decision-making concerning staff allocation and staff needs and providing budget justifications. |
gao_GAO-04-747 | gao_GAO-04-747_0 | To evaluate reform proposals, we have suggested that policy makers should consider three basic criteria: 1. the extent to which the proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how the proposal would affect the economy and the federal budget; 2. the balance struck between the twin goals of individual equity (rates of return on individual contributions) and income adequacy (level and certainty of benefits); and 3. how readily such changes could be implemented, administered, and explained to the public. In 2001, the President created the Commission to Strengthen Social Security to develop reform plans that strengthen Social Security and increase its fiscal sustainability while meeting certain principles: no changes to benefits for retirees or near retirees, dedication of entire Social Security surplus to Social Security, no increase in Social Security payroll taxes, no government investment of Social Security funds in the stock market, preservation of disability and survivor components, and inclusion of individually controlled voluntary individual retirement accounts. Different Distributional Measures Reflect Different Perspectives
To assess the extent to which the Social Security program or reform options are progressive—distributes in a way that favors lower earners— researchers first select a number of measures and then compare how different groups of earners fare according to those measures. One way to assess the distributional effect of the current Social Security program or of various reform options is to look at how these adequacy measures are distributed across earners. If, for example, benefits collected by individuals in the 20th percentile of the earnings distribution relative to benefits collected by those in the 80th percentile increased from one Social Security system to the next, the adequacy perspective would conclude that, other things being equal, the second is more progressive, that it is tilted toward lower earners. Program’s Distributional Effects Reflect Various Program Features and Demographic Patterns
Social Security’s distributional effects reflect program features, such as its benefit formula, and demographic patterns among its recipients, such as marriage between lower and higher earners. Consequently, the benefit formula replaces a higher proportion of pre-retirement earnings for lower lifetime earners than for higher lifetime earners. Disability Insurance favors lower earners because it uses the same progressive benefit formula as retired worker benefits and because DI recipients are more likely to be lower earners. A number of studies suggest that lower earners do not live as long as higher earners. When fully implemented, initial benefits for certain low-wage workers with steady work histories could be raised by as much as 40 percent. General revenue transfers are problematic when calculating equity measures because it is difficult to determine who ultimately pays for the additional financing. For example, households in the bottom fifth of earnings received about 12.5 percent of all lifetime benefits under both benchmark scenarios. Greater exposure to risk may not affect the shares of benefits received by the bottom and top fifths of earnings. The Ferrara proposal also would have significant distributional effects from an equity perspective due to its revenue provisions. GEMINI simulates all types of Social Security benefits including retired workers’, spouses’, survivors’, and disability benefits. However, the distributional effects of Model 2 might change over time. Since wages generally grow faster than prices, Social Security defined benefits will decline as a proportion of total benefits, reducing the importance of the progressive benefit formula, disability benefits, and the enhanced benefits for low earners and survivors. In particular, it should try to reflect the goals and effects of the current system with respect to redistribution of income. We demonstrated the distributional neutrality of this benefit reduction by showing that if all individuals earned exactly the cohort rate of return on their individual accounts, then their income under the proposal from Social Security and the new accounts would be exactly the same as under the current system. Social Security Reform: Potential Effects on SSA’s Disability Programs and Beneficiaries. Social Security: Different Approaches for Addressing Program Solvency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the current Social Security benefit formula, retired workers receive benefits that equal about 50 percent of pre-retirement earnings for a low-wage worker but only about 30 percent for a relatively high-wage worker. Factors other than earnings also influence the distribution of benefits, including the program's provisions for disabled workers, spouses, children, and survivors. Changes in the program over time also affect the distribution of benefits across generations. Social Security faces a long-term structural financing shortfall. Program changes to address that shortfall could alter the way Social Security's benefits and revenues are distributed across the population and affect the income security of millions of Americans. To gain a better understanding of the distributional effects of potential program changes, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked us to address (1) how to define and describe "progressivity," that is, the distribution of benefits and taxes with respect to earnings level, when assessing the current Social Security system or proposed changes to it; (2) what factors influence the distributional effects of the current Social Security program; and (3) what would be the distributional effects of various reform proposals, compared with alternative solvent baselines for the current system.
What GAO Found
Two distinct perspectives on Social Security's goals suggest different approaches to measuring "progressivity," or the distribution of benefits and taxes with respect to earnings level. Both perspectives provide valuable insights. An adequacy perspective focuses on benefit levels and how well they maintain pre-entitlement living standards. An equity perspective focuses on rates of return and other measures relating lifetime benefits to contributions. Both perspectives examine how their measures are distributed across earnings levels. However, equity measures take all benefits and taxes into account, which is difficult for reform proposals that rely on general revenue transfers because it is unclear who pays for those general revenues. The Social Security program's distributional effects reflect both program features and demographic patterns among its recipients. In addition to the benefit formula, disability benefits favor lower earners because disabled workers are more likely to be lower lifetime earners. In contrast, household patterns reduce the system's tilt toward lower earners, for example, when lower earners have high-earner spouses. The advantage for lower earners is also diminished by the fact that they may not live as long as higher earners and therefore would get benefits for fewer years on average. Proposals to alter the Social Security program would have different distributional effects, depending on their design. Model 2 of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security proposes new individual accounts, certain benefit reductions for all beneficiaries, and certain benefit enhancements for selected low earners and survivors. According to our simulations, the combined effect could result in lower earners receiving a greater share of all benefits than promised or funded under the current system if all workers invest in the same portfolio. |
gao_GGD-98-176 | gao_GGD-98-176_0 | Live Loan Checks Have Certain Characteristics
While comprehensive data on live loan checks are not available, data provided by one lender depict its loans as amortizing loans with interest rates below credit card rates. According to Fleet, borrowers receive live loan checks ranging from $3,000 to $10,000, based on the lender’s estimate of the recipient’s predicted ability to repay the loan. According to Fleet and Chase officials, interest rates on loans resulting from live loan checks have ranged from 12.9 percent to 15.9 percent. The repayment terms for these loans ranged from 48 months to 60 months and are amortized. Chase officials told us that, under their policy, a customer is to be called by a Chase bank official when the check is presented by the depository bank to Chase for payment, to ensure that the intended person actually deposited the check. Major Participants Offering Live Loan Check Programs
Public and private sector officials told us that, while there was no comprehensive list of institutions with live loan check programs, several institutions were known to have offered such programs. Nonbanks included Capital One in Falls Church, Virginia, and Beneficial Corporation in Wilmington, Delaware. First Chicago NBD had conducted test marketing of live loan checks; a First Chicago official told us that the bank discontinued the program because the level of loss in a pilot program was not acceptable. Benefits and Risks Are Associated With Live Loan Checks for Both Borrowers and Lenders
Public and private sector officials identified some benefits and risks associated with live loan checks for both borrowers and lenders. The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) told us that these loans could compound problems caused by high consumer debt. For lenders, the loans were often seen as profitable, with manageable risks. First Chicago, however, discontinued making the loans because the losses during a pilot program were “not acceptable.”
Borrowers Experienced Benefits and Risks With Live Loan Checks
In the view of lenders, borrowers enjoyed benefits and risks comparable to those associated with conventionally marketed unsecured loans. To date, it does not appear that many potential borrowers have been exposed to the risk of fraudulently cashed loan checks. Fleet officials said that live loan checks were moderately profitable loans. With 155,000 loans accepted between 1995 and 1997, for example, Fleet reported 68 confirmed cases of fraud. Scope and Methodology
To determine the characteristics of live loan checks, we gathered information on various aspects of individual loans, as well as on the average live loan check profile and the average borrower’s profile. We obtained Fleet’s volume of live loan check lending in 1995, 1996, and 1997 and the expected volume in 1998 by interviewing Fleet officials; other lenders were not willing to provide volume data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on live loan checks, focusing on the: (1) characteristics of live loan checks and the major organizations that provide unsolicited loan checks; (2) volume of live loan checks in 1995, 1996, and 1997 and the expected volume in 1998; and (3) benefits and risks of live loan checks for the borrowers and lenders.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) once cashed, live loan checks result in unsecured consumer loans; (2) bank officials GAO interviewed told it that live loan checks are aimed at the most creditworthy customers--that is, those least likely to be delinquent or in default in making loan payments; (3) according to bank officials, such loans are made at interest rates ranging from 12.9 percent to 15.9 percent, compared to an average 16 percent for credit cards; (4) Fleet Bank officials told GAO that it has sent potential borrowers live loan checks ranging from $3,000 to $10,000 based on its estimate of the borrower's ability to repay the loan; (5) the repayment terms for these loans ranged from 48 months to 60 months, and the loans were amortized; (6) Fleet officials stated that borrowers generally have used the loan amounts for expenses such as home improvements, debt consolidation, and school expenses; (7) according to bank officials GAO interviewed, at least eight financial institutions have offered live loan checks; (8) of these eight financial institutions, six were banks: Chase Manhattan, Fleet, First USA Bank, Signet Bank, BancOne Corporation, and First Chicago NBD; (9) two were nonbanks: Capital One and Beneficial Corporation; (10) First Chicago stopped offering these loans after suffering a level of losses that it considered not acceptable during a pilot program; (11) public- and private-sector officials told GAO that comprehensive data on the volume of data were not available; (12) Fleet provided GAO with quantitative data on its live loan check program; (13) between 1995 and 1997, Fleet mailed 4.35 million live loan checks; (14) of these, approximately 155,000 borrowers cashed the checks and accepted the loans; (15) Fleet made over $680 million in loans through this program; (16) Fleet officials told GAO that it experienced 68 confirmed cases of fraud, which generally involved someone other than the intended recipient cashing the check; (17) public- and private-sector officials identified benefits and risks associated with live loan checks; (18) borrowers benefit from live loan checks because these checks meet their needs for immediate access to funds at interest rates competitive with those offered by credit cards; (19) risks to the borrowers include the potential for these loans to compound problems associated with high levels of consumer borrowing; and (20) Fleet and Chase informed GAO that, while loans initiated from cashing live loan checks were a small percentage of their bank assets, the programs thus far have been profitable, with manageable risks. |
gao_GAO-14-684 | gao_GAO-14-684_0 | The six designated providers offer TRICARE Prime to eligible beneficiaries through civilian provider networks in their service areas. The USFHP Duplicates the Role of the MCSCs in offering the TRICARE Prime Option and is not Integrated with the Rest of the MHS
The USFHP’s role within the current MHS is duplicative because it offers military beneficiaries the same TRICARE Prime benefit that is offered by the MCSCs across much of the same geographic service areas and through many of the same providers. There is also significant overlap in the geographic service areas in which the USFHP designated providers and the MCSCs offer TRICARE Prime. As of October 1, 2013, four of the six USFHP designated providers had more than 80 percent of their service area zip codes overlapping with the See table 1 for the percent of USFHP zip MCSCs’ Prime Service Areas. codes included in areas where the MCSCs also offer TRICARE Prime. The MCSCs currently serve over 4.5 million Prime enrollees—therefore, adding 134,000 USFHP enrollees would not appear to be a significant burden, according to MCSC officials. All three MCSCs told us that they would likely have the capacity and capability to provide TRICARE coverage to all of the current USFHP enrollees, including the TRICARE Prime option or other options, as appropriate, depending on the enrollees’ locations. The duplication and related overlap between the USFHP and the MCSCs’ TRICARE Prime option has been longstanding in part because the program’s role has not been reassessed since TRICARE was implemented in the 1990s. DOD officials told us that there is not a function that the USFHP designated providers serve that the MCSCs could not perform. The USFHP Limits DOD’s Ability to Maximize Use of Its Direct Care System Because it Operates Independently of the Integrated MHS
One of the goals of the MHS is to maximize use of the direct care system’s MTFs, a goal most recently articulated in DOD’s budget request for fiscal year 2015. Unlike Prime beneficiaries enrolled with the MCSCs, USFHP enrollees are generally precluded from receiving care at MTFs due to the program’s fixed-price capitation payment structure that is intended to cover all enrollees’ health care costs. The USFHP’s Duplicative Role Results in Added Costs and Inefficiencies for DOD
Because the USFHP’s role of offering TRICARE Prime is duplicative of the role played by the MCSCs, DOD has incurred added costs by paying the designated providers to simultaneously administer the same benefit as the MCSCs. DOD Incurs Added Costs by Paying the Designated Providers to Simultaneously Administer the Same Benefit as the MCSCs
Because the USFHP is a statutorily required component of the MHS, DOD must pay the USFHP designated providers to administer the same benefit to the same population of eligible beneficiaries in many of the same locations as the MCSCs. Although DOD would incur health care costs for the USFHP enrollees regardless of with whom they are enrolled, DOD must also pay administrative costs and profits to two different groups of contractors for providing the same TRICARE Prime benefit. However, our estimate may not represent the total administrative costs and profit realized since DOD’s knowledge of the actual cost components underlying these negotiated payments is limited.requirement to share certified cost or pricing data, DOD has requested that they share uncertified cost or pricing data. However, according to DOD officials, the designated providers have been unwilling to do so when asked. Thus, DOD does not know how much of the approximately $1.1 billion it pays the USFHP designated providers annually goes toward their actual administrative costs and profit versus the cost of health care services for USFHP enrollees. Managing the USFHP is an Inefficient Use of DOD’s Resources
In addition to the costs associated with the USFHP designated providers’ capitation payments and support contracts, DOD must expend resources managing various aspects of the USFHP. These annual payment negotiations are not necessary for the managed care support contracts, which are structured differently. Eliminating this statutorily required program would not only eliminate unnecessary costs and inefficiencies but would also free up departmental resources that could be better used to manage and oversee the TRICARE program. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To eliminate unnecessary program duplication and to achieve increased efficiencies and potential savings within the integrated MHS, Congress should terminate the Secretary of Defense’s authority to contract with the USFHP designated providers in a manner consistent with a reasonable transition of affected USFHP enrollees into TRICARE’s regional managed care program or other health care programs, as appropriate. DOD also reiterated our statement that if the USFHP were to be eliminated, it will be important to make provisions to carefully transition USFHP enrollees to other health care programs. In its response, DOD confirmed that our factual determinations about the USFHP are correct. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD provides health care to about 9.6 million eligible beneficiaries through its TRICARE program. The department contracts with MCSCs to administer TRICARE's benefit options in three regions across the United States. Separately, DOD contracts with six USFHP designated providers to offer TRICARE Prime—the managed care option—to enrollees in certain locations across the country.
Senate Report 112-173, which accompanied a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, mandated that GAO review DOD's health care contracts, citing concerns with the growing costs of these contracts, including the USFHP. For this report, GAO examined (1) the role of the USFHP within the MHS, and (2) the extent to which the USFHP affects DOD's health care costs. GAO analyzed information about the USFHP and the MCSCs, reviewed available USFHP cost data, and interviewed officials from DOD, the designated providers, and the MCSCs.
What GAO Found
The role of the US Family Health Plan (USFHP) within the Department of Defense's (DOD) current military health system (MHS) is duplicative because it offers military beneficiaries the same TRICARE Prime benefit that is offered by the regional TRICARE managed care support contractors (MCSC). The USFHP is an association of six health care providers, referred to as designated providers, which took ownership and control of U.S. Public Health Service hospitals in 1982 when Congress enacted legislation that made these facilities part of DOD's health care system. During the implementation of TRICARE in the 1990s, Congress required the designated providers to offer the TRICARE Prime benefit to their enrollees. While the USFHP is a relatively small program—approximately 134,000 enrollees—there is significant overlap with the MCSCs in several key areas, including benefits, geographic service areas, and provider networks. For example, four of the six USFHP designated providers have more than 80 percent of their service area zip codes included in areas where the MCSCs offer TRICARE Prime. Furthermore, the USFHP remains a distinct statutory program that is not integrated with the rest of the MHS. This limits DOD's ability to increase efficiency by maximizing the use of its direct care system of military treatment facilities (MTF), which USFHP enrollees are generally precluded from using because the USFHP's payment structure is intended to cover all enrollees' health care costs. The role of the USFHP has not been reassessed since TRICARE was implemented in the 1990s. However, DOD officials told us that there is not a function that the USFHP designated providers serve that the MCSCs could not perform. Furthermore, officials from all three MCSCs—which together serve over 4.5 million Prime enrollees—said that they would likely have the capacity and capability to provide TRICARE coverage to all current USFHP enrollees, if needed.
Because the USFHP's role of offering TRICARE Prime is duplicative of the role of the MCSCs, DOD has incurred added costs and inefficiencies. Although DOD would incur health care costs for the USFHP enrollees regardless of with whom they are enrolled, DOD pays administrative costs and profits to two different groups of contractors for providing the same TRICARE Prime benefit to the same population of eligible beneficiaries in many of the same areas. However, outside of the negotiated payment amounts, no one knows the designated providers' actual costs for administering the program since the USFHP contracts are characterized in statute as commercial item contracts. This means that the designated providers are exempt from sharing certified cost or pricing data with DOD, and they have been unwilling to share uncertified cost or pricing data when requested. As a result, DOD does not know how much of the approximately $1.1 billion it pays the USFHP designated providers annually actually goes toward their administrative costs and profit versus the cost of health care services. DOD also incurs other expenses for the USFHP through support contracts, including a $21 million data support contract, and through the management of various aspects of the program. Eliminating this statutorily required program would not only eliminate unnecessary costs and inefficiencies, but would also free up departmental resources that could be better used to manage other aspects of the TRICARE program.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should terminate DOD's authority to contract with the USFHP designated providers in a manner consistent with a reasonable transition of affected USFHP enrollees into TRICARE's regional managed care program or other health care programs as appropriate. DOD confirmed that GAO's factual determinations about the USFHP are correct and agreed that this program is duplicative and results in unnecessary costs and other inefficiencies. DOD reiterated the importance of carefully transitioning USFHP enrollees to other health plans if the USFHP were eliminated. |
gao_GAO-06-85 | gao_GAO-06-85_0 | While a disruption at a large insurer has the potential to affect a large number of consumers and businesses, the effects would likely be limited to that insurer’s policyholders and would not spread to other insurers or the larger insurance sector. For most health insurers, such goals for customer service functions, including telephone information lines and authorizations necessary to receive medical services, was 1 day or less. And while a disruption to a regulator’s operations could delay the provision of these services, almost all of the insurers we spoke with said that a delay of even 1 or 2 weeks would likely not have a significant negative effect on insurers or consumers. Insurers, Most State Regulators, and NAIC Have Taken Actions Designed to Protect and Recover Their Critical Operations
Each of the insurers we spoke with, most of the state insurance regulators we met with, and NAIC all indicated that they had taken actions designed to protect their critical operations from disruption and recover them should a disruption occur. As discussed earlier, most insurers told us they could recover their most critical operations within a day and most other operations within 3 days. Insurers Have Implemented Security and Business Continuity Capabilities Designed to Meet Their Own and Their Customers’ Needs
As discussed more fully later in this report, while NAIC examination guidelines provide some criteria for insurers to use in developing their information and business continuity capabilities, they do not establish specific recovery time objectives for insurers’ critical operations. For example, 10 of the 18 insurers we spoke with felt that their individual company’s need to recover quickly was less than it was for other financial market organizations. 2). All of the property/casualty and life insurers we spoke with considered their investment management functions one of their highest priorities, with all 6 of the life insurers and 6 of the 7 property/casualty insurers telling us they could restore such operations within 24 hours. Four of the insurers had outsourced part or all of their data centers’ backup functions, and three had outsourced some portion of their claims-processing operations. Specifically, all of the state regulators had procedures in place to back up critical data, most had plans for how they would operate if their primary facilities were inaccessible, and most had backup computer systems. Similarly, while state insurance examiners also review insurers’ business continuity programs, they do so as part of the larger objective of reviewing internal controls over information systems and do not require that insurers have minimum capabilities or meet minimum recovery times. In addition, while regulators have informal expectations for how soon after a disruption insurers should be able to recover certain critical operations, such as claims processing, the examination process does not require examiners to determine whether insurers can meet these informal expectations. Finally, although we visited a limited number of state insurance regulators, and did not observe any specific problems as a result of current examination guidelines and practices, we recommend that state regulators, working through NAIC, use their regular review of the adequacy of state examination guidelines and practices as an opportunity to consider whether any changes to the following are warranted: the manner and extent to which current examinations review insurers’ business continuity capabilities, including the placement of business continuity within the examination guidelines and the minimum recovery time objectives for certain insurer services; and current examination guidelines and practices related to the review of insurers’ outsourcing of critical functions. Specifically, we (1) described the potential effects of disruptions to the operations of insurers, state regulators, and National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC); (2) determined what actions insurers, state regulators, and NAIC have taken to prepare for, protect against, and recover from business disruptions; and (3) assessed the extent to which certain current laws and regulations require reviews of insurers’ efforts in these areas and the extent to which state examinations include such reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
The insurance sector is a key part of the U.S. financial sector, particularly following a terrorist attack or other disaster where there has been loss of life and damage to property. To determine the insurance sector's preparedness to protect and recover critical insurance operations, GAO was asked to (1) describe the potential effects of disruptions to the operations of insurers, state insurance regulators, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC); (2) identify actions taken by those organizations to protect and restore their operations; and (3) assess the extent to which regulations require reviews of insurer efforts in these areas.
What GAO Found
Adequate business continuity capabilities are necessary to prevent terrorist attacks or natural disasters from severely disrupting the operations of large insurers and leaving the companies unable to provide important services to policyholders when needed. And while a disruption to a large insurer could potentially affect millions of policyholders, any effects would likely not spread throughout the insurance sector because of limited interdependencies among insurers and, unlike the securities markets, the lack of a single point through which insurance transactions must pass. Further, while state insurance regulators and NAIC provide important services to consumers and insurers, such services are generally not time sensitive and a disruption of 1 or 2 weeks would not have a significant effect. All of the 18 insurers and most of the five state regulators GAO spoke with, as well as NAIC, indicated that they had taken actions designed to protect their operations from disruption and recover critical operations should a disruption occur. For insurers, these actions typically included establishing geographically dispersed backup sites and conducting critical operations at multiple geographically dispersed facilities. Among property/casualty and life insurers, the highest priority was generally to recover investment and cash management functions, while among health insurers it was customer service and claims processing. Most insurers said they could recover their highest priority operations within 1 day, and most other operations within 3 days. While all of the state regulators GAO spoke with had processes in place to back up critical data, one had no backup computer systems, one had no business continuity plans, and one had neither. NAIC has also taken steps to protect critical data and has implemented business continuity capabilities designed to recover critical operations within 24 hours. Current federal and state regulations, as well as NAIC examination guidelines, require insurers to have information security programs and business continuity plans, but do not require minimum recovery times. For example, state insurance examinations review information security and business continuity as part of the larger objective of reviewing insurers' internal controls and insurer solvency, and do not require insurers to meet specific recovery objectives. However, while state regulators stated they had informal expectations that insurers would recover certain critical operations, such as claims processing, within 2 days after a disruption, half of the insurers GAO spoke with had set recovery goals for their claims processing operations that would appear not to meet these expectations. Further, it is not clear whether current examination guidelines and practices adequately address the trend among insurers to outsource certain functions, especially information technology functions. For example, some of the insurers GAO spoke with were outsourcing their computer system backup functions or portions of their claims-processing operations, but only one of the regulators said they had ever conducted audit work at such a service provider. |
gao_GAO-03-951 | gao_GAO-03-951_0 | State Has Expanded Its Efforts in Muslim- majority Countries Since September 11
Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war on terrorism. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim countries—and plans to continue these initiatives in the future. The absence of an integrated strategy could impede State’s ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. State Does Not Have an Integrated Public Diplomacy Strategy
After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives. However, the strategy is still in the development stage. The lack of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. State Lacks Measurable Indicators of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals
State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign publics’ understanding and attitudes about the United States. Public affairs officers responding to our survey reported that their missions had insufficient staff to conduct systematic program evaluations. State Faces Other Significant Challenges
State’s public diplomacy efforts face some additional significant challenges. Public affairs officers also reported that burdensome administrative and budgetary processes often divert their attention from public diplomacy programs. A significant number of Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. About 58 percent of the officers responding to our survey reported that the amount of time available for such training is inadequate. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives; consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research; designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State’s assignment process. We also met with officials in State’s Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of International Information Programs, and regional bureaus in Washington, D.C.
To assess whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures the effectiveness of these programs, we reviewed relevant planning, program, and other documentation; analyzed survey results; and met with cognizant State, academic, and private sector officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the need to improve public diplomacy efforts to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. However, recent opinion research indicates that many foreign publics, especially in countries with significant Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO examined changes in the State Department's (State) public diplomacy efforts since September 11, whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy programs, how it measures their effectiveness, and challenges it faces in implementing these programs.
What GAO Found
Since September 11, State expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased program funding and the number of Foreign Service officers in South Asia and the Near East. It also launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries--and plans to continue them in the future. After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for, a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities. Such a strategy is still in the development stage. The absence of an integrated strategy could impede State's ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. Furthermore, an interagency public diplomacy strategy has not been completed that would help State and other federal agencies convey consistent messages and achieve mutually reinforcing benefits overseas. State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than indicate progress in changing foreign publics' understanding and opinions of the United States. State's efforts face significant challenges, including insufficient time and staff to conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs officers responding to our survey said that burdensome administrative and budgetary processes divert their attention from public diplomacy programs. In addition, about 21 percent of Foreign Service officers in language-designated public diplomacy positions overseas lack sufficient foreign language skills. We also found that about 58 percent of public affairs officers responding to our survey believe the amount of time to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate. |
gao_GAO-12-504 | gao_GAO-12-504_0 | Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act, which authorizes the Health Center Program, requires health centers to provide a comprehensive set of primary health care services, including enabling services—such as language translation and transportation—that facilitate access to health care. HRSA Revised 2011 Award Process, and Most New Access Point Grants Went to Health Centers Serving Special Populations
HRSA revised its New Access Point award process for fiscal year 2011 to increase the emphasis on need and on the designated special populations. As a result of these changes and HRSA’s receiving less fiscal year 2011 funding than it had anticipated, a high proportion of grants went to health centers serving the designated special populations. HRSA Increased Weight Given to Need and Emphasized Special Populations in 2011 Award Process
HRSA revised the New Access Point grant application and award process for fiscal year 2011. HRSA did this to help it continue to meet the Public Health Service Act requirements regarding these populations.applicants seeking to serve high-poverty areas to further increase the emphasis on need in the award process. Health Centers and Other Providers Reported Collaboration and Little or No Competition, but Rural Areas Have Greater Potential for Competition
Health centers in the communities we studied collaborate with other providers in their service area. Health centers and other providers said they generally did not compete for patients, but we found greater potential for competition in rural areas. Health Centers in Communities We Studied Collaborate with Other Providers
Health centers in the communities we studied collaborate with other providers to meet the health care needs of patients in the health center’s service area. Officials we interviewed from each of the health centers described at least one collaborative relationship with another provider— such as local hospitals and specialty care providers—to provide access to services not available through the health center. Health Centers and Other Providers Generally Did Not Encounter Significant Competition for Patients, but Rural Areas Have Greater Potential for Competition
In the communities we studied, health centers and other providers in their service area generally do not compete for patients. HRSA and PCA officials told us that health centers typically serve patients not treated elsewhere, such as uninsured and Medicaid patients. HRSA’s service area overlap policy is designed to help the agency avoid awarding grants for new delivery sites in areas where other safety net providers are already serving the population’s need, and this may reduce competition between health centers and other safety net providers. care if health centers did not offer these services, because some dentists are unwilling to serve Medicaid patients. receive grant funding for construction or renovations, which gives them a competitive advantage. PCA and health center officials we interviewed more frequently raised concerns about the potential for competition between health centers and rural health clinics, in part because there are more similarities in the services they provide to patients in rural communities. Certain populations—migrant and seasonal farmworkers, homeless people, and residents of public housing—are particularly vulnerable and often have specific health and access problems. However, because the extra points were not sufficient to ensure that HRSA met its statutorily required funding proportion for migrant health centers, HRSA also moved applicants serving this population ahead of other applicants to ensure the required proportion was met, a step that was not specifically described in the application guidance. Although HRSA had used such an approach before, the effect in fiscal year 2011 was magnified by the combined effect of the reduction in program funding and HRSA’s need to increase the share of funding awarded to the designated special populations as a result of not applying the proportions when awarding grants with Recovery Act funds in fiscal year 2009. HRSA has periodically needed to take actions to meet its statutory obligations and may face such a situation in the future. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that in the future HRSA can effectively target limited Health Center Program resources through a transparent grant award process, the Secretary of HHS should direct the Administrator of HRSA to evaluate the fiscal year 2011 New Access Point grant award process to identify lessons learned and potential improvements for future funding cycles, including consideration of (1) the effect of the change in the need score on targeting grants to communities with demonstrated need, (2) the effect of actions taken to target grants to applicants proposing to serve the designated special populations and sparsely populated and high-poverty areas, and (3) the transparency of the process to applicants, Congress, and the public. HHS agreed with our findings and recommendation. GAO-11-643T. Health Resources and Services Administration: Many Underserved Areas Lack a Health Center Site, and the Health Center Program Needs More Oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health centers funded in part by grants from HRSAs Health Center Program, under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act, provide comprehensive primary care services for the medically underserved, including many poor, uninsured, and Medicaid patients. Legislation enacted in 2009 and 2010 provided additional funding that could significantly expand health center capacity over the next several years. GAO was asked to review HRSAs process for awarding grants for new delivery sites and possible effects of health centers, such as competition, on other providers. This report examines (1) the actions HRSA has recently taken to target its grants for new delivery sites to health centers in communities with demonstrated need and the outcome of HRSAs award process in recent years, and (2) the extent to which HRSA-funded health centers collaborate and compete with other health care providers in their service area. GAO focused its work on NAP grants, HRSAs primary means of establishing new health centers and delivery sites, during fiscal years 2008 through 2011. GAO analyzed HRSA documents and interviewed HRSA officials, and interviewed officials from 11 health centers and providers and officials in their service areas.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) revised its New Access Point (NAP) competitive award process in fiscal year 2011 to increase the emphasis on the need for services in the applicants proposed service area, and on the three special populationsmigrant and seasonal farmworkers, homeless people, and residents of public housingdesignated by the Public Health Service Act. The act requires that certain proportions of Health Center Program funding go to health centers serving the special populations. To increase the emphasis on need, HRSA increased the weight given to need in the application review process. To target health centers serving special populations, HRSA gave extra points in the application process to applicants proposing to serve them. When this was insufficient to meet the required proportions, HRSA moved some applicants ahead of others in the award rank order list, a method it had used in the past. The effect of HRSAs actions on the award outcome was magnified in fiscal year 2011 because (1) HRSA received less program funding than it had anticipated, and (2) it needed to increase the share of grants going to health centers serving the special populations because HRSA had not applied the statutory proportions when it used American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding to award grants in fiscal year 2009. As a result, HRSA awarded 67 NAP grants in fiscal year 2011, 57 of which went to applicants proposing to serve at least one special population; 13 of the 57 received grants by being moved ahead of other applicants with equal or higher review scores. HRSA announced the extra points in application guidance, but not the potential moving of some applicants ahead of others. As HRSA has periodically needed to take actions to meet its statutory obligations and may need to do so again, evaluating the effectiveness and transparency of its most recent New Access Point grant award process could help it identify lessons and possible improvements for the future.
Health centers in the communities GAO studied collaborate with other providers and generally do not compete with them for patients, but GAO found greater potential for competition in rural areas. Health center officials described collaborative relationships with other providers that give patients access to services not available through the health center. Health centers and other providers told GAO they generally do not compete for patients; health centers typically serve patients not treated elsewhere, such as uninsured and Medicaid patients. However, because the health center grant covers, on average, about 20 percent of a centers budget, other funding must also be secured, such as by serving insured patients, for the center to be financially sustainable. This can result in competition with other providers in its service area. During the award process, HRSA takes steps to reduce competition by identifying nearby safety net providers and assessing whether the level of unmet need in the area warrants a grant for a new health center or delivery site. Greater potential for competition exists in rural areas because patients there are more likely to be insured and rural health clinics and certain hospitals might seek to serve some of the same patients as health centers, although they may not offer all of the services required of health centers.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of HHS should direct the Administrator of HRSA to evaluate the fiscal year 2011 NAP grant award process for effectiveness and transparency, identify lessons learned, and incorporate any improvements for future funding cycles. HHS agreed with GAOs findings and recommendation and said HRSA has begun to take action. |
gao_GAO-02-66 | gao_GAO-02-66_0 | Both the service center operations units and district office investigative units may open possible benefit fraud cases on the basis of information that they receive from adjudication officers; from other INS components, including Investigations, Inspections, and Intelligence; from INS regional offices, the public, including informants; and from other federal and local law enforcement agencies. Outcome Measures for Benefit Application Fraud Have Not Been Established
INS does not have established outcome-based performance measures in place that would help it assess the results of its benefit application fraud activities. Additionally, INS has not established outcome-based goals or measurement criteria for the service center operations units that are responsible for fraud investigation activities. Conclusions
Immigration benefit fraud has been a long-standing problem for INS that has grown more intense and serious as criminal aliens and terrorists have used the application process for illegal activities, such as crimes of violence, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. Institutionally, INS has not done much to combat this significant problem, which threatens the integrity of the legal immigration system because it results in INS’s granting valuable benefits to ineligible aliens. Specifically, any restructuring plan should address the need to coordinate the efforts of the investigation units in the district offices and service centers; balance the responsibility for timely adjudication of immigration benefit applications and the need to detect and investigate fraudulent applications; establish guidance for deciding which immigration fraud investigations to pursue; track immigration benefit fraud investigations; determine the optimum means of providing adjudicators with access to INS’s databases; and establish outcome-based performance measures. | What GAO Found
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials believe that some aliens are using the benefit application process to carry out illegal activities, such as crimes of violence, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. The extent of immigration benefit fraud is unknown, but INS officials and others believe that this problem will increase as smugglers and other criminal enterprises use fraud to bring illegal aliens, including criminals, into the United States. INS investigative units in both the service centers and the district offices investigate possible benefit fraud on the basis of information they receive from staff who process benefit applications, other INS units, the public, and law enforcement agencies. Providing immigration benefits in a timely manner may conflict with the goal of preserving the integrity of the legal immigration system. Although INS recognizes the need to balance these competing goals, it has not always succeeded. INS has several performance measures in place to gauge the results of its benefit fraud enforcement activities. However, INS has not established outcome-based performance measures to assess the results of fraud activities. Additionally, INS has not established goals or measurement criteria for the service center units that are responsible for fraud investigations. |
gao_GAO-13-865T | gao_GAO-13-865T_0 | Background
Since the 1960s, the United States has used polar-orbiting and geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean, atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in a nearly north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth’s surface twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space. Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. Geostationary satellites provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns and provide short-term warning. These weather products and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects. The JPSS Program Has Made Progress, but Faces Development Challenges, Has Weaknesses in Schedule Quality, and Lacks a Comprehensive Contingency Plan
NOAA has made progress towards JPSS program objectives of sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite capabilities through the S-NPP, JPSS-1, and JPSS-2 satellites by (1) delivering S-NPP data to weather forecasters and (2) completing significant instrument and spacecraft development for the JPSS-1 satellite. In summary, NOAA has made progress on both the JPSS and GOES-R programs, but key challenges remain to ensure that potential gaps in satellite data are minimized or mitigated. However, NOAA does not expect to validate key S-NPP products until nearly 3 years after the satellite’s launch, and there are remaining issues with the JPSS schedule that decrease the confidence that JPSS-1 will launch by March 2017 as planned. On the GOES-R program, progress in completing the system’s design has been accompanied by continuing milestone delays, including delays in the launch dates for both the GOES-R and GOES-S satellites. The potential for further milestone delays also exists due to remaining weaknesses in developing and maintaining key program schedules. Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a potential gap in the geostationary satellite program, NOAA has taken steps to study alternatives and establish mitigation plans. However, the agency does not yet have comprehensive contingency plans that identify specific actions with defined timelines, and triggers. Until NOAA establishes comprehensive contingency plans that addresses these shortfalls, its plans for mitigating potential gaps may not be effective in avoiding significant impacts to its weather mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
As requested, this statement summarizes two reports being released today on (1) the JPSS program's status and plans, schedule quality, and gap mitigation strategies, and (2) the GOES-R series program's status, requirements management, and contingency planning.
Since the 1960s, the United States has used polar-orbiting and geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, ocean, atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in a nearly north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth's surface twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.
Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance--including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. Geostationary satellites provide the graphical images used to identify current weather patterns and provide short-term warning. These weather products and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate its effects.
What GAO Found
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has made progress on both the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and Geostationary Operational Environment Satellite-R series (GOES-R) programs, but key challenges remain to ensure that potential gaps in satellite data are minimized or mitigated. On the JPSS program, NOAA has made noteworthy progress in using Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP) data in weather forecasts and developing the JPSS-1 satellite. However, NOAA does not expect to validate key S-NPP products until nearly 3 years after the satellite's launch, and there are remaining issues with the JPSS schedule that decrease the confidence that JPSS-1 will launch by March 2017 as planned. On the GOES-R program, progress in completing the system's design has been accompanied by continuing milestone delays, including delays in the launch dates for both the GOES-R and GOES-S satellites. The potential for further milestone delays also exists due to remaining weaknesses in developing and maintaining key program schedules. Faced with an anticipated gap in the polar satellite program and a potential gap in the geostationary satellite program, NOAA has taken steps to study alternatives and establish mitigation plans. However, the agency does not yet have comprehensive contingency plans that identify specific actions with defined timelines, and triggers. Until NOAA establishes comprehensive contingency plans that addresses these shortfalls, its plans for mitigating potential gaps may not be effective in avoiding significant impacts to its weather mission. |
gao_GAO-02-273 | gao_GAO-02-273_0 | In the Air Force, the focal point for science and technology investments is the Air Force Research Laboratory. As required, the Air Force established a task force consisting of representatives from the Air Force Chief of Staff and combatant commands to identify short-term objectives. While these are not new concepts, they still present significant technological challenges. As required, it established an integrated product team to address each short-term objective. The act required the secretary of the Air Force to conduct a timely review of the science and technology programs and to assess the budgetary resources needed to address the long- and short-term needs. The secretary delegated this responsibility to the deputy assistant secretary for Science, Technology and Engineering. The deputy also complied with the provision to evaluate whether the ongoing and projected science and technology programs addressed the long- and short-term science and technology needs. Finally, the act required the secretary to review the long-term challenges and short-term objectives and to identify additional work that should be undertaken to meet the challenges and objectives. Scope and Methodology
To document the extent to which the Air Force complied with the long- term planning process specified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, we obtained appointment letters, membership rosters, initial guidance and work plans, meeting schedules, biographies of each technical coordinator, and a comprehensive listing of the initial long-term challenge ideas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and the scientific community are concerned that the Air Force's investment in science and technology may be too low to meet the challenges presented by new and emerging threats. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 requires the Air Force to review its science and technology programs to assess the budgetary resources currently used and those needed to adequately address the challenges and objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Air Force complied with the requirements of section 252 of the act. The Air Force established an integrated product team to identify long-term science and technology challenges and a task force to identify short-term objectives. For each challenge or objective that was identified, the Air Force established teams to identify technological capabilities needed to achieve these goals. Each team chose research projects that addressed the criteria specified in the act. The Air Force also complied with the act's process provisions. The Deputy Assistant Director for Science, Technology and Engineering is required to review the teams' results and to identify any science and technology research not currently funded. |
gao_GAO-01-461 | gao_GAO-01-461_0 | 1). 2). Detailed Plans Did Not Apply to Operation Allied Force
According to EUCOM officials, there was no prepared plan that could be used for executing Operation Allied Force because it was a combination of peacetime and combat operations. NATO had detailed plans only for what it considered wars in defense of its member partners or for peacetime operations. No One Organization Directed and Coordinated Combat Aircraft Basing
Despite EUCOM’s role as the U.S. focal point in the European theater, EUCOM officials told us that they had neither the resources nor the responsibility to work out detailed combat aircraft basing arrangements for the individual services. As a result, the services, for the most part, planned their own deployments and worked out individual arrangements with the host countries. However, during Operation Allied Force, the United States did not have such agreements worked out in advance with many of the countries involved. A USAFE official believes that the United States could have paid excessive prices for supplies and services purchased “in the heat of battle” during Operation Allied Force because the United States had not negotiated supplemental agreements with countries in Europe where the United States based combat aircraft and purchased logistical support. The program was successfully used to provide parts and services to allies and to the United States. Scope and Methodology
To determine what plans were in place to determine where and how to deploy combat aircraft for Operation Allied Force and how combat aircraft basing decisions were coordinated among the services and allied nations, we visited the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and interviewed officials who had participated in the operation. To determine whether the United States had the necessary international agreements in force to enable it to quickly execute plans for Operation Allied Force, we interviewed officials in the Operations Law Division of the Judge Advocate General’s Office at the U.S. Air Forces, Europe. 3. We agree that U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) combat basing plans should consider existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) basing plans and have included this wording in our recommendation (see p. 15). | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the failure of peace talks and escalating violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the United States provided military support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat operations against Yugoslavia in March 1999. This report reviews how well the United States was prepared for basing its combat aircraft during this operation, called Operation Allied Force. Specifically, GAO determines (1) whether plans were in place to determine where and how to deploy combat aircraft for an operation like Allied Force, (2) how combat aircraft basing decisions were coordinated among the services and allied nations, and (3) whether the United States had the necessary international agreements in place to enable it to quickly execute plans for such an operation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the United States had no specific and detailed advanced plans that could be used to determine where and how to deploy its combat aircraft during Operation Allied Force because it was a combination of peacetime and combat operations. Overall plans for operations in defense of NATO members did not apply to this conflict. Although part of the U.S. European Command's mission is to plan for NATO conflicts, the Command had no prepared plan that could be applied to the conflict in Kosovo. Neither the U.S. European Command nor any U.S. military service coordinated combat aircraft basing decisions for all the U.S. service components and for all allies. The U.S. European Command serves as the focal point for American support to NATO, but the services generally planned their own deployments. Finally, the United States had general agreements with most countries involved in Operation Allied Force to cover the legal status and protections of U.S. citizens. However, the United States did not have more specific agreements with many countries on such issues as which host countries would provide what airfield access and what rates would be charged for the logistics services provided. |
gao_GAO-17-119 | gao_GAO-17-119_0 | When algae bloom in significant numbers and produce toxic or harmful effects, such events are termed HABs. Twelve Federal Agencies Reported Expending Roughly $101 Million from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015 on Various HAB-Related Activities
Twelve federal agencies expended an estimated total of roughly $101 million from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 to fund various HAB-related activities—such as research and analysis, forecasting, surveillance and monitoring, outreach, and response—according to data reported by the agencies. Based on the data, the 5 agencies with the largest HAB- related expenditures for this period—totaling roughly $86 million—were NOAA ($39.4 million), NSF ($15.4 million), EPA ($14.5 million), USGS ($9.0 million), and NIEHS ($8.0 million). In addition, other agencies—such as FDA, CDC, and NASA—expended millions of dollars funding activities to address HABs, associated with their respective missions. For example, from fiscal years 2013 through 2015, NASA reported expending nearly $2 million on basic and applied research to use satellite imagery to improve the detection of algal blooms. Federal Agencies Reported Coordinating HAB- Related Activities in a Variety of Ways
Federal officials reported that their agencies coordinate in a variety of ways with each other and with state, international, and academic stakeholders to share information, expertise, and opportunities for collaboration on HAB-related activities. In addition, federal agencies participate in numerous groups, task forces, and other coordination efforts led by federal agencies, states, international organizations, or academics (see table 3 for examples of these efforts). Furthermore, federal officials reported a number of partnerships between two or more federal agencies (federal interagency partnerships) directly related to their HAB work in recent years. For example, NIEHS and NSF have collaborated and provided joint funding for some HAB-related research projects since 2005. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, and the Interior; EPA; NASA; NSF; and the Executive Office of the President for review and comment. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) how much federal agencies expended on activities related to marine and freshwater harmful algal blooms (HAB), and the types of activities funded, from fiscal years 2013 through 2015; and (2) how federal agencies have coordinated their HAB-related activities with each other and with nonfederal stakeholders. Some agencies provided actual expenditure data, while other agencies provided estimated expenditure data or obligated funding data. To determine how federal agencies coordinate their HAB-related activities with each other and with nonfederal stakeholders, we collected and analyzed information from the agencies through interviews and our questionnaire on (1) their participation with each other and nonfederal stakeholders in interagency working groups or other mechanisms to share information and coordinate on HABs research, monitoring, or other activities; (2) efforts taken by federal agencies to minimize duplication; and (3) gaps, if any, in federal HAB-related activities. In the past several years, CDC has been involved with a number of HAB-related activities, including the following: collaborating with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to engage citizen scientists to identify and report freshwater HAB events; collaborating with NOAA to improve a module to forecast cyanobacterial blooms; providing technical assistance and expert guidance to states that convening a workgroup to identify surveillance indicators and measures for bloom events and public health consequences; developing health surveillance definitions for reporting HAB-related human cases of illnesses, animal cases of illness, and HAB events; creating the One Health Harmful Algal Bloom System, a nationally available, online system for health agencies and their animal and environmental health agency partners to report HAB-related illnesses in animals and people, and the environmental conditions associated with the HABs; providing resources to state health departments to build capacity for HAB-related illness surveillance; and creating a CDC website about HAB-associated illnesses (http://www.cdc.gov/habs/). The Drinking Water Protection Act (Pub. Legal Authority to Address HABs
According to agency officials, NSF’s authority to address HABs is provided under the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Since 2014, the Interagency Working Group on the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act (IWG- HABHRCA) has been the primary, government-wide mechanism through which federal agencies coordinate their HAB-related activities, develop plans for future work, and identify remaining gaps related to federal HAB activities and capabilities. Environmental Protection: Coordinated Federal Efforts Are Being Undertaken to Address Harmful Algae. | Why GAO Did This Study
Harmful algal blooms are an environmental problem in all 50 states, according to EPA. While algae are essential to the ecosystem, providing food for all types of animals, these blooms can produce toxins that hurt the environment and local economies. Specifically, they can cause human illness or death from the consumption of seafood or water contaminated by toxic algae; harm aquatic and other animal species through neurological or liver damage or severe oxygen depletion; and hurt the seafood industry, recreation, and tourism. Harmful algal blooms occur naturally, but their prevalence, frequency, and severity are increasing—and this increase is influenced by climate, pollution, and human activities such as agriculture and wastewater, according to an interagency working group report.
The Drinking Water Protection Act included a provision for GAO to review federally funded activities related to harmful algal blooms. This report examines (1) how much federal agencies expended on these activities from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 and (2) how federal agencies coordinate their activities with each other and with nonfederal stakeholders. GAO collected information from federal agencies by using a questionnaire and interviewing agency officials.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, and the Interior; EPA; NASA; and the Executive Office of the President for comment. Most of the agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Twelve federal agencies reported expending an estimated total of roughly $101 million from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 to fund various research, monitoring, and other activities related to harmful algae—overgrowths of algae that can create toxic “blooms” in marine or freshwater environments. The agencies provided a mix of actual and estimated expenditure data and used different methods for collecting the data, making comparisons among agencies, and a federal total, inexact. Based on the data, the 5 agencies with the largest expenditures related to harmful algal blooms for this period—totaling roughly $86 million—were the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, $39.4 million; National Science Foundation (NSF), $15.4 million; Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), $14.5 million; U.S. Geological Survey, $9 million; and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), $8 million. According to agency officials, these 5 agencies funded efforts to research and analyze harmful algal blooms; forecast, monitor, and respond to their occurrence; and investigate human and ecological health effects. In addition, other agencies expended millions of dollars funding activities to address harmful algae. For example, from fiscal years 2013 through 2015, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration reported expending nearly $2 million on research to improve the detection of algal blooms using satellite imagery.
Federal officials reported that their agencies coordinate in a variety of ways with each other and with nonfederal stakeholders to share information, expertise, and opportunities for collaboration on activities to address harmful algae. For example, since 2014, an interagency working group has been the primary, government-wide mechanism through which federal agencies coordinate such activities, develop plans for future work, and identify any gaps in federal activities and capabilities. In addition, federal officials reported that agencies participate in numerous groups, task forces, and other coordination efforts led by federal agencies, states, international organizations, or academics. Furthermore, federal officials reported a number of interagency partnerships directly related to their harmful algae work, such as NIEHS' and NSF's collaboration since 2005 to jointly fund research projects. |
gao_GAO-05-540 | gao_GAO-05-540_0 | Background
In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the range of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad, which consisted of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also conventional and nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive capabilities. DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP
DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in the FYDP to date. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about resource data relating to these efforts. DOD has also identified and directed resources for some New Triad programs. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in an organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. DOD has not identified a specific date for when this will occur. DOD Does Not Plan to Develop a New Triad Long-term Investment Approach Until Concepts Mature
In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need for a long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to the plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing an integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities, defensive capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and missile defense concepts are mature. DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long term as some existing nuclear weapons platforms begin reaching the end of their expected service lives within the next 15 years and as missile defense capabilities are expanding. Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges, future funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is not fully known. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen DOD’s implementation of the New Triad and provide greater transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, acquiring, and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to (1) develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements in the FYDP, which support activities for developing, acquiring, and sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating new data fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New Triad-related program elements to provide increased visibility of the resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year the funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the department’s summary FYDP report to Congress. GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program
To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend on the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending associated with New Triad capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its definition and conceptual framework for its strategic capabilities to include not only the nuclear capabilities of the old Triad that consisted of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also the capabilities of offensive conventional strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage future spending for the New Triad.
What GAO Found
Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans to spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next few years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to make informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD has identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not identified all associated spending. GAO's notional analysis of New Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall spending could be significantly greater than DOD's limited analyses have identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a "virtual major force program," could help DOD address these obstacles and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad. DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to identify the projected resource requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term capital investment planning is an important tool to help organizations establish priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to implement the vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and missile defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan. |
gao_GAO-15-42 | gao_GAO-15-42_0 | The Airport Privatization Pilot Program Has Resulted in Few Privatizations
Airports That Participated in APPP Sought Financial or Economic Benefits
Since the FAA started accepting applications in 1997, 10 airports (5 commercial service and 5 general aviation or general aviation reliever airports) have applied to the pilot program. Those 10 airports are identified in figure 3. Public-sector airport owners’ objectives for full privatization varied; however, the overriding reason for privatization for nearly all applicants was to gain some financial benefit. Airports despite APPP
Financial considerations reduce both public and private sector demand for privatizing airports in the U.S. as demonstrated by only two airports successfully completing the privatization process under the APPP since 1997.operator must be able to make a profit and the public-sector airport owner must believe that more will be gained than lost in the transaction. Potential Effects of Airport Privatization Are Difficult to Determine
We found that the potential effects of airport privatization on airport efficiency, the Federal Airport and Airway Trust Fund, federal tax revenues, and airport employees and concessionaires are difficult to estimate. The factors that would determine the net effect of a full airport privatization on federal tax revenues include: whether the government owner of the airport provides tax-exempt financing for the airport facilities through qualified private activity bonds under the privatization arrangement; the type of entity the new investor is and, if it is a pass-through entity such as a partnership, the type of taxpayers its partners are; the profitability of the new investor, as determined according to federal tax rules; the extent to which the taxable incomes of independent concessionaires operating at the airport are affected by the privatization; the amount of federal taxes, if any, that the investor would have paid on income from the alternative investment it would made if it did not participate in the airport privatization; and the use that the public owner makes of whatever payment it receives from the investor. Airport Privatization Is More Prevalent in Other Countries and Stakeholders’ Views on Privatization Vary Widely
Different Airport Ownership Structures, Motivations, and Financing Drives Airport Privatization in Other Countries
There are several reasons why privatized airports are more prevalent in other countries than in the United States. At least 450 airports around the world have some form of private-sector participation in their management or ownership. Meanwhile, instead of privatization under the APPP, many public- sector airport owners have engaged the private sector through a variety of partnerships ranging from management contracts to development agreements to help reduce costs, improve services, and obtain capital investment without transferring airport control. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for its review and comment. DOT also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the experience with the APPP since inception; (2) the challenges airport owners and investors face when seeking to privatize U.S. airports within and outside the APPP; (3) the potential effects of airport privatization; and (4) the lessons that can be learned from U.S. and international airports that have been privatized. We reviewed the legal history of the APPP including the original legislation creating the program and the 2012 FAA reauthorization law that modified the program. We selected these stakeholders based on our review of the public docket documents for applicants to the APPP, our prior work on airports, and the stakeholders’ work on U.S. or foreign airport privatizations. The results of these interviews are not generalizable. We reviewed the United Nation’s International Civil Aviation Organization’s country reports on airport and air navigation service privatization reports for 25 countries to determine basic elements of airport privatization initiatives around the world as well as ACRP’s and CRS’s recent reports on airport privatization in the U.S.
Out of the 42 total stakeholders we interviewed (see table 1 below), 31 (airport stakeholders from the FAA, public-sector airport owners, airlines, and private-sector airport owners, operators and consultants) mentioned lessons learned from airport privatization in the United States or abroad. | Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly all the 3,330 airports in the national airport system in the United States are publicly-owned and operated. However, some argue that the private sector could better fund and operate airports than public owners. GAO reported in 1996 that many barriers to full privatization existed in the United States. In 1996, Congress created the APPP which reduced some of the barriers to privatization. However, over the program's 18 years only two airports have privatized and one of them has reverted to public control.
To better understand airport privatization, GAO was asked and mandated to review several aspects of privatization. Specifically, this report describes (1) the experience with the APPP; (2) challenges airport owners and investors face to full airport privatization; (3) the potential effects of airport privatization; and, (4) reasons why airport privatization is more prevalent outside of the U.S. and stakeholder views on the APPP.
GAO reviewed airport application and docket information and interviewed applicants. GAO also interviewed 42 airport stakeholders including airports, airlines, airport consultants, labor groups, and private airport operators and financiers to gain their views on airport privatization in the U.S. and other countries. This non-generalizable group was mainly selected from our review of APPP docket documents and our prior work on airports.
DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since the FAA started to accept applications to the Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP) in 1997, 10 airports have applied to the pilot program (see figure). Of these 10, 2 were privatized, 7 did not complete the program, and one application is currently under FAA review. Public-sector airport owners' objectives for full privatization varied, but the overriding reason cited was financial benefit. The 7 applicants that withdrew did so for varied reasons, such as changes in market conditions that reduced expected privatization benefits.
Several factors reduce both public and private sector interest in airport privatization in the U.S.—such as higher financing costs for privatized airports and the possible lack of state and local property tax exemptions. Also, while the APPP reduces some of the challenges to privatization that we identified in 1996, privatization still requires considerable time and cost to navigate. Furthermore, public sector airport owners have found ways to gain some of the potential benefits of privatization without ceding control under full privatization, such as entering airport management contracts and joint development agreements for managing and building an airport terminal.
The potential effects of airport privatization on airport efficiency, the federal aviation trust fund, federal tax revenues, and airport employees and concessionaires are difficult to determine. Privatization's impact on these areas depends on many different factors such as how each airport privatization is structured, making it difficult to estimate the overall impact.
Different airport ownership and financing structures and motivations have driven more extensive overseas privatization efforts, as at least 450 airports around the world have been privatized to some degree. Stakeholders mentioned a variety of lessons learned from the U.S. and international experience, including ensuring public-sector due diligence, involving all stakeholders and creating a transparent privatization process. Stakeholders also provided a range of suggestions for modifying the APPP, from increasing the clarity of the program's rules to reducing the federal role in airport privatizations. |
gao_GAO-06-1087T | gao_GAO-06-1087T_0 | Recent attacks and threats have further underscored the need to bolster the cybersecurity of our government's and our nation's computer systems and, more importantly, of the critical operations and infrastructures they support. Prior Reports Identified DHS’s Efforts to Fulfill Cybersecurity Responsibilities
As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has many cybersecurity- related roles and responsibilities that are called for in law and policy. Since that report was issued, DHS has made progress on its responsibilities, but none have been completely addressed. The department had also started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation’s ability to recover from Internet disruptions, including establishing working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to cyber events. Also, the relationships among these initiatives were not evident. Key challenges in fulfilling DHS’s broad responsibilities include increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders, achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders, and demonstrating the value it can provide to private sector infrastructure owners. Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet disruptions include addressing innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, achieving consensus on DHS’s role and on when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, addressing legal issues affecting DHS’s ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, and overcoming reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS. Further, the department faces a particular challenge in attaining the organizational stability and leadership it needs to gain the trust of other stakeholders in the cybersecurity world—including other government agencies as well as the private sector. In May 2005, we reported that multiple senior DHS cybersecurity officials had recently left the department. In July 2005, DHS underwent a reorganization which elevated responsibility for cybersecurity to an assistant secretary position. NCSD and the National Communication System were placed in the Preparedness Directorate under a new position, called the Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and Telecommunications—in part to raise the visibility of cybersecurity issues in the department. However, over a year later, this position remains vacant. Implementation of GAO’s Recommendations Should Enhance DHS’s Ability to Fulfill Cybersecurity Responsibilities and Address Challenges
To strengthen DHS’s ability to implement its cybersecurity responsibilities and to resolve underlying challenges, GAO has made about 25 recommendations over the last several years. These recommendations focus on the need to (1) conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, (2) develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for identifying potential cyber attacks, (3) protect infrastructure control systems, (4) enhance public/private information sharing, and (5) facilitate recovery planning, including recovery of the Internet in case of a major disruption. Together, the recommendations provide a high-level roadmap for DHS to use to improve our nation’s cybersecurity posture. Until it addresses these recommendations, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as a federal focal point for cybersecurity of critical infrastructures. Threat and Vulnerability Assessments: In May 2005, we reported that while DHS had made progress in planning and coordinating efforts to enhance cybersecurity, much more work remained to be done for the department to fulfill its basic responsibilities— including conducting important threat and vulnerability assessments. More recently, in June 2006, we reported that DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but that these efforts were not complete or comprehensive. Coordinating and integrating applicable national preparedness goals with its National Infrastructure Protection Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing computer interconnectivity has revolutionized the way that our nation and much of the world communicate and conduct business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks to our nation's computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and federal policy establish DHS as the focal point for coordinating activities to protect the computer systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO was asked to summarize recent reports on (1) DHS's responsibilities for cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection and for recovering the Internet in case of a major disruption (2) challenges facing DHS in addressing its cybersecurity responsibilities, including leadership challenges, and (3) recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of national critical infrastructures, including the Internet.
What GAO Found
In 2005 and 2006, GAO reported that DHS had initiated efforts to address its responsibilities for enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures, but that more remained to be done. Specifically, in 2005, GAO reported that DHS had initiated efforts to fulfill 13 key cybersecurity responsibilities, but it had not fully addressed any of them. For example, DHS established forums to foster information sharing among federal officials with information security responsibilities and among various law enforcement entities, but had not developed national threat and vulnerability assessments for cybersecurity. Since that time, DHS has made progress on its 13 key responsibilities--including the release of its National Infrastructure Protection Plan--but none have been completely addressed. Moreover, in 2006, GAO reported that DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts were not complete or comprehensive. For example, DHS established working groups to facilitate coordination among government and industry infrastructure officials and fostered exercises in which government and private industry could practice responding to cyber events, but many of its efforts lacked timeframes for completion and the relationships among its various initiatives were not evident. DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill its cybersecurity responsibilities, including establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders, demonstrating the value it can provide to private sector infrastructure owners, and reaching consensus on DHS's role in Internet recovery and on when the department should get involved in responding to an Internet disruption. DHS faces a particular challenge in attaining the organizational stability and leadership it needs to gain the trust of other stakeholders in the cybersecurity world--including other government agencies as well as the private sector. In May 2005, we reported that multiple senior DHS cybersecurity officials had recently left the department. In July 2005, DHS undertook a reorganization which established the position of the Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and Telecommunications--in part to raise the visibility of cybersecurity issues in the department. However, over a year later, this position remains vacant. To strengthen DHS's ability to implement its cybersecurity responsibilities and to resolve underlying challenges, GAO has made about 25 recommendations over the last several years. These recommendations focus on the need to (1) conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, (2) develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for identifying potential cyber attacks, (3) protect infrastructure control systems, (4) enhance public/private information sharing, and (5) facilitate recovery planning, including recovery of the Internet in case of a major disruption. These recommendations provide a high-level road map for DHS to use to help improve our nation's cybersecurity posture. Until they are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results as the federal cybersecurity focal point. |
gao_GAO-17-136 | gao_GAO-17-136_0 | Park Service Maintenance Needs, Past GAO Findings, and Government-Wide Asset Guidance
The Park Service defines deferred maintenance as maintenance that was not performed when it should have been or was scheduled to be and is delayed for a future period. Park Service Allocated $1.16 Billion on Average in Fiscal Years 2006 through 2015 to Maintain Assets
In fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the Park Service allocated $1.16 billion on average to operate and maintain the agency’s assets. Most recently, in fiscal year 2015, the Park Service allocated $1.08 billion to maintenance, which was about one-third of the total funding the agency received that year. Deferred Maintenance Averaged $11.3 Billion from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015, and Paved Road Maintenance Accounted for Nearly Half
The Park Service’s deferred maintenance averaged about $11.3 billion from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2015. In each of those years, deferred maintenance for paved roads made up the largest share of the agency’s deferred maintenance. The majority of the Park Service’s deferred maintenance in fiscal year 2015 was for assets in park units that were established more than 40 years ago. Specifically, about $10.5 billion in deferred maintenance was for park units established more than 40 years ago. Park Service Uses Information on the Importance and Condition of Assets to Prioritize Maintenance Decisions, but the Agency Has Not Evaluated This Process
The Park Service uses several tools to rate an asset’s importance and condition and assign maintenance priority to its assets. Once projects are identified, park unit staff use the Park Service’s Capital Investment Strategy to rank maintenance projects for funding decisions. Park unit staff also enter projects into the agency’s Project Management Information System. Fiscal year 2015 was the first budget year in which projects ranked using the strategy were funded, and as such some regional and park unit officials said that it is too soon to determine if the Capital Investment Strategy is meeting its objectives, such as maintaining the condition of its high-priority assets. The Park Service does not have a plan or time frame for evaluating whether the strategy has been successful. A senior official said that the agency had not determined what is needed to begin such an evaluation and that it would be beneficial to verify that the Capital Investment Strategy is achieving intended outcomes and if changes need to be made. According to the National Academies Federal Facilities Council, investments made in assets are not often immediately visible or measurable but are manifest over a period of years, and it is important that agencies track the outcomes of those investments to improve decision making about those investments and to improve asset management. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the elements of the agency’s process for making asset maintenance decisions are achieving desired outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Park Service to evaluate the Capital Investment Strategy and its results to determine if it is achieving its intended outcomes or if changes need to be made. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) how much the National Park Service (Park Service) has allocated to maintain assets in fiscal years 2006 through 2015, (2) the amount and composition of the Park Service’s deferred maintenance in fiscal years 2009 through 2015, (3) how the Park Service makes asset maintenance decisions, and (4) the actions the Park Service is taking to help address its maintenance needs. According to the Park Service, deferred maintenance data from the end of fiscal year 2015 were the most current data available when we began this review. This sample is not generalizable to all park units. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Park Service manages more than 75,000 assets, including buildings, roads, and water systems, at 413 park units across all 50 states. In 2015, the agency estimated that its deferred maintenance on these assets was $11.9 billion.
GAO was asked to review how the Park Service manages its maintenance needs. This report examines, among other things, (1) agency allocations to maintain assets in fiscal years 2006 through 2015, (2) the amount and composition of the agency's deferred maintenance in fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and (3) how the agency makes maintenance decisions. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Park Service allocation data for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 and deferred maintenance data in fiscal years 2009 (first year data for all assets was available) through 2015 (most current data available); reviewed planning and guidance documents and compared the process for making asset management decisions to guidance developed by the National Academies, among others; and interviewed Park Service officials at headquarters, all seven regions, and 21 park units selected to include those with large and small amounts of deferred maintenance, among other things. This sample is not generalizable to all park units.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the Department of the Interior's National Park Service (Park Service) allocated, on average, $1.16 billion annually to maintain assets. In fiscal year 2015, allocations to maintenance accounted for about one-third (or $1.08 billion) of the agency's total funding of $3.3 billion. The largest portion of maintenance funds in fiscal year 2015 was allocated to facility operations, which includes maintenance that is routine in nature, such as maintenance of trails.
The Park Service's deferred maintenance—maintenance of its assets that was not performed when it should have been and is delayed for a future period—averaged $11.3 billion from fiscal years 2009 through 2015. Bridges, tunnels, and paved roadways consistently made up the largest share of the agency's deferred maintenance, accounting for half of all deferred maintenance in fiscal year 2015. Older park units have the most deferred maintenance, with $10.5 billion in fiscal year 2015 in park units established more than 40 years ago.
The Park Service uses several tools to determine an asset's importance and condition and assign maintenance priority. Park unit staff assess the condition of the asset and identify maintenance projects. Once identified, park unit staff use the agency's Capital Investment Strategy to evaluate and rank projects. Projects score higher if they target critical assets with deferred maintenance. Fiscal year 2015 was the first budget year in which projects ranked using the strategy were funded, and regional and park unit officials said that it is too soon to determine if the strategy is meeting its objectives, such as maintaining the condition of its most important assets. However, the Park Service does not have a plan or timeframe for evaluating whether the strategy has been successful. A senior official said that the agency has not determined what is needed to begin such an evaluation and that it would be beneficial to verify that the Capital Investment Strategy is achieving intended outcomes. According to the National Academies Federal Facilities Council, it is important that agencies track the outcome of investments to improve decision making and asset management. Evaluating the strategy may help the Park Service determine if the strategy is achieving intended outcomes or if changes need to be made.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Park Service evaluate the Capital Investment Strategy and results to assess whether it has achieved its intended outcomes. The Department of the Interior agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-277 | gao_GAO-17-277_0 | CMS’s Oversight of Medicaid Program Integrity
CMS’s Center for Program Integrity is the agency’s focal point for Medicaid and Medicare program integrity issues. Medicaid Integrity Institute. State provider enrollment and screening. CMS also provides states with information and opportunities for collaboration with the federal government and other states in a number of ways, including through Medicaid Fraud, Waste and Abuse TAG meetings; quarterly teleconferences with regional program integrity directors; and webinars (separate from the training webinars of the MII) for state Medicaid program integrity staff on topics such as the use of the CMS Fraud Investigation Database. CMS Tailors Its Focused Reviews of State Program Integrity Efforts to Managed Care and Other High-Risk Areas
CMS has tailored its focused program integrity reviews to states’ managed care delivery systems and other areas that are at high risk for improper payments. CMS’s Focused Reviews Have Emphasized Oversight of Managed Care and Other High-Risk Areas
From fiscal years 2014 through 2016, CMS conducted focused reviews of state program integrity efforts in 31 states, reviewing 10 or 11 states annually. As a result, CMS officials recommended that states take steps to improve their oversight of plans. CMS Uses Targeted Desk Reviews to Expand Oversight of High-Risk Areas
To expand its oversight to conduct more frequent reviews of states, CMS recently began supplementing its focused reviews with targeted desk reviews—off-site reviews of certain program integrity efforts designed to address high-risk areas. Collaborative Audits Identified Substantial Potential Overpayments, but Some States Reported Barriers to Audit Participation and Success
Collaborative audits identified substantial potential overpayments to health care providers. 1.) CMS encourages states to use collaborative audits, but states determine whether to have collaborative audits. 2.) Several States Had Positive Collaborative Audit Experiences, While Others Reported Barriers that May Limit Audit Participation and Success
Officials from the eight states we interviewed reported mixed experiences with and interest in collaborative audits. Federal internal control standards indicate that organizations should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving objectives. Unless CMS can successfully address the potential barriers encountered by states, some states may choose not to pursue collaborative audits—or may pursue audits only to encounter challenges that were not effectively minimized or prevented. 3.) CMS Lacks a Systematic Approach to Collecting and Communicating States’ Promising Program Integrity Practices
CMS uses focused state program integrity reviews as its primary method of collecting and communicating promising program integrity practices; however, these practices are not collected in a consistent manner and the published reports are not timely nor easily searched electronically. In addition, CMS officials said that individuals who perform the reviews ask states to identify promising practices. This statement is consistent with federal internal control standards that stipulate that agencies should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives and externally communicate necessary quality information. Both CMS and the states have a role in identifying promising program integrity practices that can be shared in order to help improve oversight of the Medicaid program. To better support states’ efforts to reduce improper payments and communicate effective program integrity practices across the states, CMS should collaborate with states to develop a systematic approach to collect promising state program create and implement a communication strategy for sharing promising program integrity practices with states in an efficient and timely manner. With regard to our recommendation that CMS identify opportunities to address barriers that limit states’ participation in collaborative audits, HHS noted that it continually seeks to collaborate with states on Medicaid provider audits, and seeks to work through issues so that actions to identify potentially improper payments may proceed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid remains a high-risk program, partly due to concerns about improper payments. CMS oversees and supports states, in part, by reviewing their program integrity activities, hiring contractors to audit providers, and providing training. In recent years, CMS made changes to its Medicaid program integrity efforts, including a shift to collaborative audits.
GAO was asked to examine CMS's oversight and support of states' Medicaid program integrity efforts. GAO examined, among other issues, (1) how CMS tailors its reviews to states' circumstances; (2) states' experiences with collaborative audits; and (3) CMS's steps to share promising program integrity practices. GAO reviewed CMS documents, including state program integrity reports, and data on collaborative audits. GAO interviewed officials from CMS and eight states selected based on expenditures, managed care use, and number of collaborative audits, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has tailored its state program integrity reviews—in which the agency reviews states' program integrity activities—to states' managed care delivery systems and other areas at high risk for improper payments. From 2014 through 2016, CMS conducted on-site reviews in 31 states. The reviews usually addressed state oversight of managed care plans, and some reviews addressed other high-risk areas such as provider enrollment. CMS and states have found the reviews to be beneficial in identifying areas for improvement. To expand oversight to more states, CMS also began off-site desk reviews of certain state program integrity efforts.
Collaborative audits—in which CMS contractors and states work in partnership—have identified substantial potential overpayments to providers, but barriers have limited their use. CMS encourages states to use collaborative audits, but states decide whether to pursue them. Several states reported positive collaborative audit experiences, while others cited barriers—such as staff burden or problems communicating with contractors—that prevented them from seeking audits or hindered the success of audits. Federal internal control standards indicate that organizations should identify and respond to risks related to achieving objectives. Absent additional CMS action to address barriers, some states may choose not to pursue collaborative audits, or may encounter challenges after doing so.
CMS lacks a systematic approach to collecting promising state progam integrity practices and communicating them to other states. CMS's main approach—the state program integrity reviews—inconsistently identified promising practices, and those identified are neither published in a timely way nor easily searched electronically. Other CMS approaches, such as courses offered by the Medicaid Integrity Institute (a national training program for states), were not designed for sharing promising practices and do not systematically communicate them to all states. Both CMS and the states have a role in identifying promising program integrity practices. Absent further agency action, states may not have access to the range of promising state program integrity practices, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards on the use and external communication of necessary quality information to achieve program objectives.
What GAO Recommends
To further improve its support of states' Medicaid program integrity activities, CMS should identify opportunities to address barriers that limit states' participation in collaborative audits, and, in collaboration with states, take additional steps to collect and share promising program integrity practices. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-203 | gao_GAO-09-203_0 | To support its financial operations and store the sensitive information it collects, SEC relies extensively on computerized systems interconnected by local and wide-area networks. SEC Has Made Important Progress Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses and Improving Security
SEC has corrected or mitigated 18 of the 34 security control weaknesses that we had reported as unresolved at the time of our prior audit report in 2008. For example, it has adequately validated electronic certificates from connections to its physically secured the perimeter of the operations center, monitored unusual and suspicious activities at its operations center, and removed network system accounts and data center access rights from separating employees. For example, the commission has developed, documented, and implemented a policy on remedial action plans to help ensure that deficiencies are mitigated in an effective and timely manner, and provided individuals with training for incident handling. While SEC has made important progress in strengthening its information security controls, it has not completed actions to correct or mitigate 16 of the previously reported weaknesses. For example, SEC has not adequately documented access privileges for the EDGAR application, always implemented patches on vulnerable workstations and enterprise database servers, or always sufficiently protected passwords. Control Weaknesses Continue to Place Financial Information at Risk
In addition to the 16 previously reported weakness that remain uncorrected, we identified 23 new weaknesses in controls intended to restrict access to data and systems, as well as weaknesses in other information security controls, that continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC’s financial and sensitive information and information systems. Organizations accomplish this by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computer resources (e.g., data, programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and loss. SEC did not consistently enforce identification and authentication controls for its users and systems. SEC did not adequately configure several database systems to enable auditing and monitoring of security-relevant events. Specifically, it did not always document, evaluate, or approve changes to a system’s baseline. SEC Has Not Fully Implemented Its Information Security Program
SEC has made important progress in implementing its information security program. However, a key reason for the information security weaknesses is that it has not effectively or fully implemented key program activities. However, SEC did not sufficiently conduct periodic testing and evaluation of controls. A key reason for these weaknesses is that the agency has not yet fully implemented critical elements of its agencywide information security program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist the commission in improving the implementation of its agencywide information security program, we recommend that the SEC Chairman direct the CIO to take the following four actions: designate a senior agency information security officer who will be responsible for managing SEC’s information security program, provide full information for management oversight of information security conduct comprehensive periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of security controls for the general support system and key financial applications, and certify and accredit subsystems that support the production of SEC’s financial statements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were (1) to determine the status of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) to determine whether controls over key financial systems were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In carrying out its mission to ensure that securities markets are fair, orderly, and efficiently maintained, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies extensively on computerized systems. Effective information security controls are essential to ensure that SEC's financial and sensitive information is protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of SEC's financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of SEC's actions to correct previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of SEC's controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. To do this, GAO examined security policies and artifacts, interviewed pertinent officials, and conducted tests and observations of controls in operation.
What GAO Found
SEC has made important progress toward correcting previously reported information security control weaknesses. Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 18 of 34 weaknesses previously reported as unresolved at the time of our prior audit. For example, SEC has adequately validated electronic certificates from connections to its network, physically secured the perimeter of its operations center and put in place a process to monitor unusual and suspicious activities, and removed network system accounts and data center access rights from separating employees. In addition, the commission has made progress in improving its information security program. To illustrate, it has developed, documented, and implemented a policy on remedial action plans to ensure that deficiencies are mitigated in an effective and timely manner, and provided individuals with training for incident handling. Nevertheless, SEC has not completed actions to correct 16 previously reported weaknesses. For example, it did not adequately document access privileges granted to users of a key financial application, and did not always implement patches on vulnerable workstations and enterprise database servers. In addition to the 16 previously reported weakness that remain uncorrected, GAO identified 23 new weaknesses in controls intended to restrict access to data and systems, as well as weaknesses in other information security controls, that continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC's financial and sensitive information and information systems. The commission has not fully implemented effective controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to computing resources. For example, it did not always (1) consistently enforce strong controls for identifying and authenticating users, (2) sufficiently restrict user access to systems (3) encrypt network services, (4) audit and monitor security-relevant events for its databases, and (5) physically protect its computer resources. SEC also did not consistently ensure appropriate segregation of incompatible duties or adequately manage the configuration of its financial information systems. A key reason for these weaknesses is that the commission has not yet fully implemented its information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating as intended. Specifically, SEC has not effectively or fully implemented key program activities. For example, it has not (1) filled the vacancy for a senior agency information security officer, (2) fully reported or assessed risks, (3) sufficiently tested and evaluated the effectiveness of its information system controls, and (4) certified and accredited a key intermediary subsystem. Although progress has been made, significant and preventable information security control deficiencies create continuing risks of the misuse of federal assets, unauthorized modification or destruction of financial information, inappropriate disclosure of other sensitive information, and disruption of critical operations. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-110 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-110_0 | DOD has implemented various reform initiatives in the past to achieve efficiencies and reduce costs. DOD’s quadrennial review is likely to identify additional plans and initiatives for reducing infrastructure costs. However, the total amount of actual savings is uncertain because DOD’s systems do not provide this information. Opportunities for Achieving Future Infrastructure Savings
As we recently reported, despite DOD’s initiatives, it is critical for DOD to further reduce infrastructure and support costs. While there are many opportunities to reduce this excess capacity and improve the cost-effectiveness of DOD support operations, DOD faces many challenges in doing so. Challenges DOD Faces as It Implements and Considers Proposals to Achieve Infrastructure Savings
Over the last several years, DOD has renewed its efforts to achieve infrastructure savings through the use of the A-76 process. We agree that substantial savings can be achieved by outsourcing and privatizing; consolidating similar functions to reduce excess capacity; reengineering remaining functions, processes, and organizations; more effectively using technology innovations; and through other initiatives.Our recent report on downsizing the defense infrastructure provides 13 options that could result in savings of about $11.8 billion from fiscal years 1997 to 2001. However, based on the lessons learned from past initiatives and principally our work on depot maintenance and base support operations, we are concerned that savings of the magnitude projected by DOD, the CORM, and the DSB may not be achievable. Last, as noted by DOD, the CORM, and DSB, a number of legislative requirements restrict or affect implementation of these proposals. Our work shows that while opportunities for savings exist, it is questionable whether they will be in the magnitude currently being projected. Privatize-in-place testing and evaluation facilities. The report also recommended a series of base realignment and closure reviews. We have found that outsourcing savings are dependent on or highly influenced by (1) the continual existence of a competitive commercial market; (2) the ability to clearly define the tasks to be done and measure performance; (3) the assumption that the private sector can do the required work more cost-effectively than a reengineered DOD activity; (4) the extent that commercial contracting and contract management practices can be applied to the outsourced activity; (5) the relative cost-effectiveness of the public activity being outsourced; and (6) the ability to reduce the existing public infrastructure and personnel costs associated with the outsourced activity. Also, 10 U.S.C. Conclusions
In conclusion, we agree with DOD that its infrastructure costs can and should be substantially reduced, and we believe that DOD should identify key functions and activities where it should focus to identify requirements—including core—and begin to reengineer those activities and functional areas that appear to offer the best opportunities for savings. However, breaking down cultural resistance to change, overcoming service parochialism, making decisions to eliminate cross functional stovepipes, and setting forth a clear framework for a reduced defense infrastructure are key to avoiding waste and inefficiency and generating the maximum savings from DOD’s infrastructure accounts. To do this, the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries need to give greater structure to their efforts by developing an overall strategic plan that establishes time frames and identifies organizations and personnel responsible for accomplishing fiscal and operational goals. The Congress can then oversee the plan and allow the affected parties to see what is going to happen, and when. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) goal to save billions of dollars by outsourcing work to the private sector and through other initiatives for activities which DOD generally refers to as its support infrastructure, focusing on: (1) DOD's past experience in achieving infrastructure savings; (2) key infrastructure areas that offer the greatest potential for savings; and (3) challenges DOD faces in reaching goals to reduce infrastructure in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO agrees with DOD and others that significant opportunities exist to reduce DOD's infrastructure and support costs; (2) however, GAO questions whether the magnitude of savings anticipated by DOD and others is attainable within the current strategy and force structure; (3) GAO's past and ongoing work shows that while DOD's past savings initiatives yielded significant savings, they often fell short of the initial goal; (4) while DOD has substantially reduced its infrastructure through the base realignment and closure process and significant savings will ultimately be achieved, savings will not be as great as initially estimated or achieved as quickly as initially hoped; (5) today's future years defense plan shows that, despite these initiatives, future infrastructure costs will only slightly decline as a relative percentage of DOD's budget; (6) because of GAO's concern about the waste and inefficiencies in DOD's support structure and operations, GAO has designated DOD's infrastructure as one of 24 high-risk areas that are vulnerable to waste and mismanagement within the federal government; (7) GAO believes that DOD could reap significant savings by: (a) reducing excess capacity in its testing and evaluation areas and its laboratories and centers; (b) reducing excess capacity within DOD's depot maintenance system; (c) reducing the costs of managing its $67-billion inventory, of which almost half is beyond war reserve and operating requirements; (d) reducing installation support costs; and (e) reducing training costs; (8) new ideas about reducing infrastructure costs have recently been proposed to DOD that focus largely on outsourcing and privatization to achieve savings; (9) GAO's analysis of such proposals shows that there is reason for caution about whether the magnitude of hoped for savings can be achieved; (10) there are also various legislative requirements that will restrict and otherwise affect DOD's ability to implement some proposed initiatives; (11) GAO thinks that DOD's effort to reduce costs and achieve savings is extremely important and encourages DOD to move forward as quickly as possible; (12) breaking down cultural resistance to change, overcoming service parochialism, and setting forth a clear framework for a reduced defense initiative are key to effectively implementing savings; and (13) DOD and the services need to give greater structure to their efforts by developing an overall strategic plan, which would provide a basis for the Congress to oversee DOD's plan and allow affected parties to see what is going to happen and when. |
gao_GAO-10-997 | gao_GAO-10-997_0 | IRS estimates suggest that for about 61,000 to 93,000 of the returns with a Form 982, forgiven debt for a qualified principal residence was the only type of forgiven debt, and taxpayers excluded about $6.4 billion to $11.8 billion from taxable income. Additionally, because taxpayers excluding multiple types of debt from income are only required to report the total amount being excluded and not the amount for each individual type, IRS lacks data to determine the dollar amount of forgiven mortgage debt excluded for these taxpayers. IRS faces several compliance challenges in administering this complicated tax provision. IRS officials reported that it may be difficult to collect additional taxes on forgiven debts, particularly when taxpayers are already insolvent and defaulting on debts, and that this and other considerations, such as IRS’s return on investment, would affect IRS’s decisions about allocating resources for enforcing this provision. However, as noted above, there is evidence some taxpayers have the ability to pay additional tax if owed, and certain housing market data show that the potential for significant noncompliance with the exclusion of forgiven mortgage debt exists. Current IRS forms provide limited information on mortgage debt forgiveness and IRS is not making full use of all available data. For example, Form 982 does not contain enough information to allow IRS to check for compliance because the form cannot be easily matched against information received from lenders on Form 1099-C. Form 982, Part 1 uses check boxes instead of dollars to report the amount of forgiven debt being excluded. As a result, IRS cannot determine what dollar amounts are being excluded for each type of qualified cancelled debt. Form 1099-C instructions ask lenders to provide an open-ended description of the type of cancelled debt, but do not require the lender to uniformly identify the specific type of cancelled debt. For example, the form does not use a series of check boxes or apply codes so that lenders could select among a list of common cancelled debt types (e.g., mortgage, home equity line of credit, credit card, auto loan, etc.). According to IRS officials, collecting such information might not result in a perfect match in all cases across the two forms. Further, we previously recommended, that IRS consider collecting the address of the secured property on Form 1098, “Mortgage Interest Statement,” for taxpayers deducting mortgage interest to help determine the home’s use and eligibility for the deduction and improve compliance for taxpayers reporting rental real estate activity. IRS agreed to study the issue. Without being able to systematically identify whether the forgiven debt is for a mortgage, IRS also cannot identify taxpayers who may be eligible for the provision, but are not taking advantage of it. IRS is not using available internal or third-party data to determine whether taxpayers with forgiven mortgage debt own multiple homes— also a potential indicator that the forgiven debt is not for a principal residence. To enhance IRS’s ability to detect noncompliance with mortgage debt forgiveness provisions, (1) modify Form 982, Part 1 to segregate the total dollar amount of forgiven debt by exclusion type and capture the information in IRS’s databases; (2) modify Form 1099-C to require lenders to identify in a more useable format (check boxes or coding, for example) the specific type of cancelled debt and capture the information in IRS’s databases; (3) modify the Form 982 and Form 1099-C so that filers disclose the address of the secured property for which the debt is being forgiven and capture the information in IRS’s databases; (4) determine if available data (including IRS and third-party data) would allow IRS to better identify whether the debt being excluded is for a principal residence; and (5) use the additional data reported on the revised Form 982 and Form 1099-C to assess the extent to which taxpayers are compliant. What challenges, if any, does IRS face in administering the exclusion of
forgiven mortgage debt from taxable income and how effectively is IRS addressing the challenges? 3. What challenges, if any, could taxpayers face in understanding whether forgiven mortgage debt can be excluded from taxable income and what steps can be taken to address these challenges? Background
The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (P.L. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. The mortgage debt must have been used to buy, build, or substantially improve a principal residence and must be secured by the property. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates originally suggested that the exclusion of forgiven mortgage debt from taxable income may result in about $968 million in federal revenue losses from fiscal year (FY) 2008 through FY 2013 and more recent estimates suggest that the revenue losses could be closer to $1.9 billion.The Department of Treasury estimates suggest that the exclusion may result in federal revenue losses of about $1.4 billion from FY 2008 through FY 2013.2 This suggests that not all taxpayers with forgiven mortgage debt are bankrupt or insolvent and may have the ability to pay taxes on forgiven debts. Objective 1: IRS Estimates Suggest the Dollar Amount of Forgiven Mortgage Debt Excluded from Income Could be Significant
Based on a sample of 2008 tax returns, IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) officials estimate that for tax year (TY) 2008, about 126,000 to 169,000 returns included a Form 982, excluding a total of about $15.2 billion to $24.6 billion of forgiven debt from taxable income. Over the last 5 years, vacation home and investment property purchases are estimated to have ranged from 40 percent (2005) to 27 percent (2009) of home sales. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist the growing number of taxpayers facing foreclosure or mortgage restructuring, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, and its 3-year extension as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, allows taxpayers to generally exclude from taxable income forgiven mortgage debt used to buy, build, or substantially improve a principal residence. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates originally suggested that the exclusion of forgiven mortgage debt from taxable income may result in about $968 million in federal revenue losses from fiscal year (FY) 2008 through FY 2013 and more recent estimates suggest that the revenue losses could be closer to $1.9 billion. The Department of Treasury estimates suggest that the exclusion may result in federal revenue losses of about $1.4 billion from FY 2008 through FY 2013. Some taxpayers with forgiven mortgage debts may be bankrupt or insolvent; however, others are not and therefore may have the ability to pay taxes on forgiven mortgage debts. The briefing slides summarize our assessment of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) administration of this tax provision. In response to your request, our objectives were to identify 1. the number of taxpayers who have reported the exclusion of forgiven mortgage debt since the program's inception and the dollar amount excluded; 2. the challenges, if any, IRS faces in administering the exclusion and evaluate how effectively IRS is addressing the challenges; and 3. the challenges, if any, taxpayers could face in understanding whether forgiven mortgage debt can be excluded from taxable income and evaluate how to address these challenges.
What GAO Found
IRS estimates suggest the dollar amount of forgiven mortgage debt excluded from income could be significant. IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) officials estimate that for tax year 2008, the most current tax year for which data are available, about 126,000 to 169,000 returns included a Form 982, excluding a total of about $15.2 billion to $24.6 billion of forgiven debt from taxable income. IRS estimates suggest that for about 61,000 to 93,000 of the returns with a Form 982, forgiven debt for a qualified principal residence was the only type of forgiven debt, and taxpayers excluded about $6.4 billion to $11.8 billion from taxable income. Additionally, because taxpayers excluding multiple types of debt from income are only required to report the total amount being excluded and not the amount for each individual type, IRS lacks data to determine the dollar amount of forgiven mortgage debt excluded for these taxpayers. IRS faces several compliance challenges in administering this complicated tax provision. IRS officials reported that it may be difficult to collect additional taxes on forgiven debts, particularly when taxpayers are already insolvent and defaulting on debts, and that this and other considerations, such as IRS's return on investment, would affect IRS's decisions about allocating resources for enforcing this provision. However, there is evidence some taxpayers have the ability to pay additional tax if owed, and certain housing market data show that the potential for significant noncompliance with the exclusion of forgiven mortgage debt exists. Over the last 5 years, vacation home and investment property purchases are estimated to have ranged from 40 percent (2005) to 27 percent (2009) of home sales. Current IRS forms provide limited information on mortgage debt forgiveness and IRS is not making full use of all available data. For example, 1) Form 982 does not contain enough information to allow IRS to check for compliance because the form cannot be easily matched against information received from lenders on Form 1099-C. Form 982, Part 1 uses check boxes instead of dollars to report the amount of forgiven debt being excluded. As a result, IRS cannot determine what dollar amounts are being excluded for each type of qualified cancelled debt. 2) Form 1099-C instructions ask lenders to provide an open-ended description of the type of cancelled debt, but do not require the lender to uniformly identify the specific type of cancelled debt. For example, the form does not use a series of check boxes or apply codes so that lenders could select among a list of common cancelled debt types (e.g., mortgage, home equity line of credit, credit card, auto loan, etc.). 3) Neither Form 982 nor Form 1099-C requires the taxpayer or lender to disclose the address of the property secured by the forgiven debt. According to IRS officials, collecting such information might not result in a perfect match in all cases across the two forms. However, it would allow IRS to better determine whether the forgiven debt is for a principal residence. Further, we previously recommended, that IRS consider collecting the address of the secured property on Form 1098, "Mortgage Interest Statement," for taxpayers deducting mortgage interest to help determine the home's use and eligibility for the deduction and improve compliance for taxpayers reporting rental real estate activity. IRS agreed to study the issue. 4) Without being able to systematically identify whether the forgiven debt is for a mortgage, IRS also cannot identify taxpayers who may be eligible for the provision, but are not taking advantage of it. 5) IRS is not using available internal or third-party data to determine whether taxpayers with forgiven mortgage debt own multiple homes--also a potential indicator that the forgiven debt is not for a principal residence. |
gao_HEHS-99-12 | gao_HEHS-99-12_0 | Prevalence of Domestic Violence Among Welfare Recipients
Available studies on the prevalence of domestic violence among welfare recipients consistently indicate that a sizable proportion of welfare recipients have been or are victims of some type of abuse by an intimate partner. Finally, the samples of welfare recipients surveyed varied across studies. The study was based on a representative sample of 734 women aged 20 and older who were receiving AFDC in Massachusetts between January and June 1996. This study found that almost 20 percent of respondents had been victims of domestic violence in the 12 months preceding the survey and that about 65 percent had been victims of domestic violence at some point in their lives. Implications of Domestic Violence for Employment Among Welfare Recipients and Other Low-Income Women
Research on the implications of domestic violence for the employment of welfare recipients and other low-income women presents a complex picture. Similarly, a study of women in a low-income Chicago neighborhood found that, at the time of the survey, women in the sample who had been abused in the past 12 months or had ever been abused were employed at rates similar to those of women who reported that they had never been abused. Research Findings Regarding the Potential Effects of Current Domestic Violence on Victims’ Employment
While it appears that having experienced domestic violence at some point does not rule out employment for many welfare recipients and other low-income women, in the studies we reviewed, program staff who work with welfare recipients, as well as abused women themselves, consistently report that obtaining and maintaining employment can be difficult for many current victims of domestic violence. “The Effects of Battering on the Employment Status of Women.” Affilia, Vol. 3, No. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the effects of family violence on the use of welfare programs, focusing on the: (1) prevalence of domestic violence among welfare recipients; and (2) implications of domestic violence for the employment of welfare recipients and other low-income women.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while studies on the prevalence of domestic violence among welfare recipients do not provide national estimates of prevalence and vary substantially in terms of methodology and the samples studied, these studies consistently indicate that a sizable proportion of welfare recipients have been or are victims of domestic violence; (2) the one study of those reviewed that was specifically designed to provide a statewide prevalence estimate was based on a representative sample of Aid to Families with Dependent Children recipients in Massachusetts in 1996; (3) this study found that almost 20 percent of the welfare recipients surveyed had experienced domestic violence in the prior 12 months, and about 65 percent had been victims of domestic violence at some time in their lives; (4) the research available on the effect of domestic violence on the employment of welfare recipients and other low-income women presents a more complex picture; (5) some research indicates that welfare recipients and other low-income women who reported ever having been abused were employed at the same rates as those who had never been abused; (6) but no studies compared employment rates among women currently in abusive relationships, as opposed to women who reported having been abused in the past, with employment rates of women who are not now in abusive relationships; and (7) however, several studies do identify potential negative effects of current domestic violence on victims' employment. |
gao_GAO-02-85 | gao_GAO-02-85_0 | The first wave of the baby boom generation will start to turn age 65 in 2011 and the last of the boomers will be 65 in 2029. As the baby boom generation ages, the aged dependency ratio will rise. A Growing Number of Older Workers Are in the Labor Force
The number of older workers will grow substantially over the next two decades and they will become an increasingly significant proportion of all workers. Older Workers Are Less Likely to Lose Jobs Than Younger Workers, But More Likely to Exit the Labor Force if Job Loss Occurs
While older workers are less likely than younger workers to lose a job, older workers who do lose a job are somewhat less likely than younger workers to return to work. Some public employers are using other pension incentives to retain teachers. Most employers are not yet facing labor shortages or other economic pressures requiring them to consider phased retirement or related programs. | What GAO Found
The impending retirement of the "baby boom" generation is receiving considerable attention. The number of older workers will grow substantially during the next two decades, and they will become an increasingly significant share of the U.S. workforce. Although older workers are less likely than younger workers to lose a job, when they do lose a job, they are less likely than younger workers to find other employment. To retain older workers and extend their careers, some public and a few private employers are providing options, including flexible hours and financial benefits, reduced workloads through the use of part-time or part-year schedules, and job-sharing. Most employers are not yet facing labor shortages or other economic pressures that would require them to consider flexible employment arrangements because the retirement of the baby boom generation will occur gradually during the next several decades. |
gao_GAO-03-557T | gao_GAO-03-557T_0 | and foreign service nationals— work at these locations. Since the 1970s, U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas have been increasingly at risk from terrorist attacks and other acts of violence. In the 1998 bombings, terrorists attacked the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In addition, the bombings injured more than 4,000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Americans. The fourth standard requires blast-resistant construction techniques and materials. State’s fifth security standard is controlled access at the perimeter to the compound. State Has Done Much to Improve Facility Security but Most Facilities Still Do Not Meet Security Standards
Over the last 4 years, State has accomplished much in improving posts’ security through various security upgrades. As a result, many buildings and their occupants remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks. To assess the security of embassy and consulate facilities, we analyzed State Department data to determine if the primary facilities meet State’s five key standards that I discussed earlier. Figure 4 shows the portion of posts where the primary office building meets or does not meet four of the five security standards: setback, perimeter wall or fence, anti-ram barrier, and compound access control. We found that 120 primary facilities lack an adequate perimeter wall/fence, while 147 lack adequate anti-ram barriers. Ambassadors and security officers at three of the four posts we visited emphasized that in addition to facilities not meeting standards, there were security difficulties associated with the number of office facilities at their post that were spread out around the city. At 133 posts, the primary office building has certain fire/life safety deficiencies. For the primary office buildings alone, maintenance needs exceed $316 million, with the primary building at more than one- third of all posts having more than $1 million in maintenance requirements. OBO projects that maintenance costs will increase over time because many of the facilities are so old and antiquated, some dating back to the late 19th and early 20th century. In 1999, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel reported that many posts are equipped with obsolete systems that prevent effective interagency information sharing. Replacing Buildings Is State’s Long-term Solution to Physical Security Problems
State continues to make security upgrades at some posts, but it is shifting its resources toward replacing existing facilities with new, secure embassy compounds or substantially retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings. As shown in figure 12, funding for State’s capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. I will discuss this program briefly and then make several preliminary observations regarding State’s management of this program. OBO officials estimated that beginning in fiscal year 2004, it will cost an additional $16 billion to replace facilities at the remaining 160 posts. State is in the early stages of its expanded construction program and, therefore, has not yet established a clear track record that would provide complete answers to these questions. Moreover, senior OBO management has increased its oversight of ongoing capital and other projects. Exhibit 5, a video clip from the State Department showing the performance of new windows and building materials, indicates that these technologies show promise of providing an even greater level of physical security for personnel operating in new buildings. Without adhering to a systematic process for developing future staffing needs at U.S. embassies and consulates, the U.S. government risks building the wrong-sized facilities, which could lead to security concerns, additional costs, and other work inefficiencies. As shown in figure 15, at the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of replacement, it would take about 20 years to fund and 22 years to complete construction of the estimated 160 remaining posts (assuming a 2-year design and construction period). | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000, highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure overseas facilities. In November 1999, an independent advisory group, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, said that thousands of Americans representing our nation abroad faced an unacceptable level of risk from terrorist attacks and other threats. The panel called for accelerating the process of addressing security risks to provide overseas staff with the safest working environment, consistent with the nation's resources and the demands of their missions. Moreover, the panel concluded that many U.S. overseas facilities were insecure, decrepit, deteriorating, overcrowded, and "shockingly shabby," and it recommended major capital improvements to redress these problems. GAO was asked to (1) assess the current conditions of overseas diplomatic facilities, including security, maintenance, office space, and information technology; and (2) provide some preliminary observations regarding State's efforts to improve facility conditions by replacing existing buildings with new, secure embassy compounds.
What GAO Found
The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts. For example, State has constructed perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities. However, even with these improvements, most office facilities do not meet security standards. As of December 2002, the primary office building at 232 posts lacked desired security because it did not meet one or more of State's five key current security standards of (1) 100-foot setback between office facilities and uncontrolled areas; (2) perimeter walls and/or fencing; (3) anti-ram barriers; (4) blast-resistant construction techniques and materials; and (5) controlled access at the perimeter of the compound. Only 12 posts have a primary building that meets all five standards. As a result, thousands of U.S. government and foreign national employees may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Moreover, many of the primary office buildings at embassies and consulates are in poor condition. In fact, the primary office building at more than half of the posts does not meet certain fire/life safety standards. State estimates that there is a backlog of about $730 million in maintenance at overseas facilities; officials stated that maintenance costs would increase over time because of the age of many buildings. At least 96 posts have reported serious overcrowding. While State continues to fund some security upgrades at embassies and consulates, State is shifting its resources from these upgrades toward constructing new buildings and substantially retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings. Funding for these capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. In addition to completing ongoing construction projects, State believes it needs to replace facilities at about 160 posts at an estimated cost of $16 billion. At the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of funding, it will take more than 20 years to fully fund and build replacement facilities. While GAO has not fully analyzed State's performance in the early stages of this large-scale building program, GAO has observed that State has taken a number of positive steps to improve its program management. Because of the high costs and importance of this program, GAO believes the program merits extensive oversight. |
gao_GAO-16-526 | gao_GAO-16-526_0 | For example, in 2012 we found that selected agencies were only leveraging a fraction of their buying power through contracts as a result of strategic sourcing analysis. Four Agencies Took Steps to Identify Cost Savings through Analysis of Purchase Card Data; Two Agencies Could Do More
All of the agencies in our review incorporated purchase card data into aggregate spend analysis to support strategic sourcing initiatives as required by OMB; however, many officials pointed to data challenges, such as a lack of specificity, that make it difficult to conduct more detailed analysis. Moreover, two of these four agencies identified opportunities for savings through such analysis, demonstrating that savings can be found. Further, Energy did not perform agency-wide analysis of purchase card data. Without more focused efforts on this type of analysis, these agencies may be missing opportunities to find cost savings with purchase card buys. The OMB guidance also states that agency purchase card program coordinators should further conduct a more specific analysis of purchase card data, reviewing spending patterns and levels—independent of the aggregate agency spend analysis—to identify opportunities for savings through negotiation of discounts, improvements to the buying process, and increased volume purchases. Despite Challenges, Most Agencies Performed Specific Analysis of Purchase Card Data, With Some Positive Outcomes
Despite concerns with the data, four agencies in our review—DHS, EPA, VA, and Interior—took additional steps to analyze purchase card spending patterns as recommended by OMB guidance. However, other components of DOD, such as the Air Force and Navy, did not report any purchase card spend analysis activity. Federal internal control standards state that management should internally communicate the necessary information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Without communication of any local efforts taking place, agencies may be missing opportunities to leverage the buying power when using purchase cards. To ensure that good practices are shared within agencies, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, the Interior, Homeland Security, and Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency develop guidance that encourages local officials to examine purchase card spend patterns to identify opportunities to obtain savings and to share information on such efforts. DOD, VA, DHS, and Energy concurred with our recommendations and Interior partially concurred. The Office of Management will also update the VA’s purchase card policy to encourage agency officials to analyze purchase card spending patterns for cost-saving opportunities and share the results of these analyses. A-123 Appendix B requires agencies to incorporate purchase card spending data into overall spend analysis to support strategic sourcing initiatives and recommends that agencies analyze purchase card spending patterns and levels to identify opportunities for negotiation of discounts and increased savings based on volume. In response to a congressional committee request, we assessed the extent to which selected (1) agencies analyze purchase card data to identify opportunities to leverage buying power agency-wide and (2) local purchase cardholders take advantage of opportunities to achieve cost savings when using purchase cards. We met with General Service Administration (GSA) officials who manage the SmartPay purchase card program as well as officials from the Office of Management and Budget responsible for issuing government-wide guidance on managing purchase card programs to gain insight into what purchase card transaction data are available to individual agencies and the requirements placed upon these agencies to analyze purchase card spending. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Energy (Energy), each having spent less than $100 million. To examine the extent to which cardholders seek opportunities to achieve cost savings when making purchases, we collected purchase card documentation and conducted interviews with 20 purchase cardholders from DOD and VA. We selected cardholders from these two agencies because DOD and VA have the highest amount of purchase card spending, representing nearly 78 percent of total government purchase card spending in fiscal year 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
The purchase card program was designed to streamline relatively small dollar value acquisitions of goods and services. In fiscal year 2015, the government spent approximately $19 billion using purchase cards.
GAO was asked to review whether agencies are effectively leveraging their buying power when using purchase cards. This report assesses the extent to which selected (1) agencies analyze purchase card data to identify opportunities to leverage buying power agency-wide and (2) purchase cardholders seek opportunities to achieve cost savings when using purchase cards.
GAO analyzed data from the three banks that work with the six selected agencies—selected in part on varying levels of purchase card spend volume—to manage their purchase card programs. GAO evaluated policies, reviewed strategic sourcing efforts related to purchase cards, and interviewed officials. GAO also interviewed officials from the General Services Administration who manage the government's purchase card contracts, and interviewed selected cardholders at the two agencies with the highest purchase card spend.
What GAO Found
The agencies in GAO's review—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Veterans Affairs (VA), the Interior (Interior), Homeland Security, and Energy (Energy), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—have made varied use of purchase card data, and additional opportunities exist to negotiate discounts and leverage buying power. As the chart below shows, spending with government purchase cards represents billions of dollars each year.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance that prescribes policies for agencies on how to manage their purchase card programs (1) requires agency officials to incorporate purchase card data into strategic sourcing analysis and (2) recommends that agencies review and analyze purchase card spending patterns for opportunities to negotiate discounts, improve buying processes, and leverage buying power. All the agencies in GAO's review incorporated purchase card data into overall spend analysis to support strategic sourcing efforts as required by OMB, but officials noted challenges that impede review of purchase card data. For example, purchase card data do not always include enough specificity to identify particular commodities to target for savings. Despite these challenges, four of the six agencies GAO reviewed took additional steps to independently analyze purchase card spending patterns as recommended by OMB. Two agencies—EPA and Interior—identified opportunities for savings through such analysis, demonstrating that savings can be found. However, Energy and certain DOD components, such as the Air Force and Navy, did not perform analysis of purchase card spending. Without more focused efforts, these agencies may be missing opportunities to find cost savings.
GAO also found instances where regional VA offices were successful in identifying opportunities for local or agency-wide savings on items procured with purchase cards. For example, one office recognized an opportunity for savings when purchasing wheelchair ramps for disabled veterans, resulting in savings of $1.1 million and faster delivery. Federal internal controls state that management should communicate the necessary information to achieve objectives. Given the examples GAO found, developing guidance and sharing information may help agencies identify opportunities to leverage buying power with purchase cards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Energy analyze purchase card data and DOD ensure its components do the same. GAO also recommends that each agency develop guidance to encourage local officials to examine purchase card spend patterns and share this information. Four agencies concurred, Interior partially concurred, and EPA did not comment. |
gao_NSIAD-97-12 | gao_NSIAD-97-12_0 | To ensure its effective implementation, the plan, among other things, established that
UNHCR, with the financial support of the donor community, would be in charge of continuing liaison and coordination with concerned governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to implement the agreement;
UNHCR was to participate in the refugee status determination process in an observer and advisory capacity; and
UNHCR would be responsible for (1) providing training to first-asylum country officials to help ensure fairness and consistency in the screening process; (2) coordinating the timely resettlement of those found to be refugees; and (3) administering a safe, dignified repatriation program for those found to be nonrefugees. About 75,500 had returned to Vietnam. On the basis of available documentation, it appears these cases were reasonably adjudicated. Indonesia’s Procedures and Criteria Consistent With CPA Guidelines
Both Indonesian government and UNHCR officials stated that refugee screening procedures were generally carried out under UNHCR guidelines, in accordance with internationally accepted refugee status determination criteria. Corruption Apparent in Indonesia’s Screening Process
Rumors of corruption began appearing in Indonesia at the inception of the status determination process. The allegations included assertions that asylum seekers with genuine refugee claims were screened out due to their inability to met corruption demands. And, residents in the camp indicated that corruption existed. Monitoring Efforts Identified No Evidence of Persecution Among Returnees
Both UNHCR and British monitoring officials told us they had found no evidence of persecution among the returnee population. It received substantially less in contributions, expending an estimated $444 million in Special Program (CPA) and General Program (regional) funds between 1989 and 1995. Table 4 shows U.S. contributions of $150.83 million to UNHCR’s General and Special Programs in support of the CPA during fiscal years 1990-96. To obtain an understanding of the program and its alleged weaknesses, we interviewed UNHCR officials currently involved in the CPA program and numerous officials who had first-hand knowledge of the status determination process from their tours of duty in Geneva and the countries of first-asylum during the early stages of the CPA. However, UNHCR’s case files contained the Hong Kong authorities’ decisions and the stated reasons for them; the asylum seekers’ biographical profiles; written appeals of first-instance screening decisions by the asylum seekers and/or their UNHCR-provided or private legal counsellors; and statements by UNHCR officials reviewing the cases for mandate status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was to participate in the process in an observer and advisory capacity and was to institute a comprehensive regional training program for the national officials involved in the process. However, according to Hong Kong government documents, it became increasingly clear during the mid-1980s that the large majority of arriving Vietnamese migrants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Vietnam and thus were not entitled to refugee status. We also noted errors. However, we believe the process was generally implemented in accordance with CPA guidelines. Hong Kong’s Procedures and Criteria Were Consistent With CPA Guidance
We interviewed UNHCR and Hong Kong government officials and reviewed various documents they provided us in developing a description of Hong Kong’s refugee screening procedures. Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Indonesia
Refugee screening in Indonesia was a two-phased process that met basic international structural screening standards but did not contain some of the checks and balances we found in the Hong Kong process. However, an independent observer with long experience at Galang told us UNHCR provided the asylum seekers ample information on the screening process and that asylum seekers were well prepared for the screening process. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for the resettlement of asylum seekers from Vietnam and southeast Asia, focusing on: (1) whether Hong Kong and Indonesia implemented CPA refugee status determination procedures in accordance with international standards and criteria; (2) alleged corruption in the program; (3) whether asylum seekers who returned to Vietnam encountered persecution; and (4) U.S. and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) costs associated with CPA implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the CPA agreement stipulated that the first-asylum countries' refugee screening procedures be carried out in accordance with established international criteria and procedures; (2) GAO's examination in Hong Kong and Indonesia indicated that both programs met the CPA's basic structural requirements for refugee adjudication criteria and screening procedures; (3) GAO believes Hong Kong's screening process contained sufficient checks and balances to provide reasonable assurances that asylum seekers' cases could be heard and errors could be identified and corrected; (4) Hong Kong government and UNHCR officials acknowledged screening errors, but officials told GAO they had worked to correct the errors and that the process had improved over time; (5) GAO believes the Hong Kong government and UNHCR officials' screening decisions appeared to be reasonable in 9 of the 10 cases GAO examined; (6) in Indonesia, GAO believes the large majority of asylum seekers with strong claims for refugee status were screened in, due in part to UNHCR's heavy involvement in the screening process; (7) the process in Indonesia provided for both first-instance screening and an appeals procedure involving Indonesian authorities and UNHCR legal consultants; however, few asylum seekers received individual legal assistance; (8) according to UNHCR, it concentrated its efforts in Indonesia on trying to ensure that those with well-founded refugee claims were screened in; (9) rumors of corruption in Indonesia's screening process began at the inception of the screening process; (10) reports, files, and documents provided to GAO by nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, former asylum seekers, UNHCR, and other knowledgeable sources indicated widespread corruption in the Indonesia process; (11) GAO did not conduct an independent investigation of allegations of corruption, but, on the basis of documentation available to GAO, discussions with UNHCR officials in Geneva and Indonesia, and UNHCR reviews of the process in 1995, it appeared that corruption was likely; (12) UNHCR monitors in Vietnam have reported that they found no evidence of persecution of returned asylum seekers by Vietnamese authorities; (13) UNHCR had implemented a comprehensive monitoring program that provides reasonable assurance that returnees were not persecuted; (14) UNHCR spent an estimated $444 million on the CPA from 1989 through 1995, excluding unpaid obligations of $139 million in Hong Kong; (15) U.S. contributions to UNHCR for the CPA during the period were an estimated $151 million; and (16) the United States also contributed about $9 million to voluntary agencies in support of CPA activities. |
gao_GAO-07-671 | gao_GAO-07-671_0 | DOD Has Taken Some Initial Steps for Families First, but DPS Delays Put Achievement of Program Goals and Benefits at Risk
DOD has taken some initial steps to achieve the goals and benefits of the Families First program, but delays in developing a new information management system have put achieving the program’s goals and benefits at risk. To improve the personal property program, DOD has established three goals for Families First: (1) improving the quality of service from moving companies by using a best-value approach that incorporates performance-based service contracts; (2) streamlining the claims process used for claiming losses or damages incurred during a move; and (3) developing an integrated information management system, known as DPS. In addition, the legacy system’s hardware has been breaking down. DOD Has a Plan to Provide Full Replacement Value without DPS, but Does Not Have a Plan to Implement the Other Goals and Benefit of Families First without DPS
Because of the delays implementing DPS, DOD has developed a backup plan to provide servicemembers with the full replacement value coverage benefit, but its plan to implement the other goals and benefit of Families First still relies on DPS. Families First Program Could Increase DOD Costs by About $1.4 Billion over Current Program Costs through Fiscal Year 2011
The Families First program could increase costs to DOD by about $1.4 billion over current program costs through fiscal year 2011 for two main reasons: (1) DOD estimates the program will increase costs to the services by 13 percent and (2) DOD has significantly increased the cost estimate for a new information management system since our last assessment. Actual Growth in Costs of Families First Program Cannot Be Assessed, Although DOD Continues to Estimate a 13 Percent Increase in Services’ Costs to Implement Families First
We could not assess the actual growth in costs of Families First because the program has not been implemented; however, DOD continues to estimate that the costs to the services of the Families First program will be 13 percent higher than costs under the current program. In a 2002 report, DOD estimated that implementing the information technology improvements to enhance its data management capabilities for Families First would cost $4 million to $6 million. Based on our analysis of program office budget planning documents from February 2007, the DPS program office estimated that the costs for maintaining a program office, sustaining the legacy system through retirement, developing and sustaining DPS, and implementing a future household goods program through fiscal year 2011will be $180 million if all of the requirements are funded. DOD Faces Management Challenges for Families First Program and Has Not Developed a Comprehensive Implementation Plan
DOD faces management challenges for the Families First program, and it has not employed comprehensive planning that incorporates many sound management principles and practices. Comprehensive planning should include many things, such as integrated approaches to manage training and workforce redeployment issues; a qualified, trained, and well-led team to reengineer the program; stakeholder agreement about key elements of a program, including the program’s business rules and its priorities; and full cost information and funding resources. For example, DOD has a draft transition plan for organizational changes and the DPS program office has a plan for DPS development. If this is not resolved, DOD may be challenged to meet the program’s goal of improving the quality of service from moving companies. Further, the moving industry expected that DPS would interface with their computer systems, but this is not yet part of DPS. Additional delays in the schedule because of problems developing the software will likely increase the costs associated with the program. Conclusions
Despite DOD’s recent focus on its personal property program, long- standing problems persist. However, DOD’s comments did not address how the department intends to develop an investment strategy to cover the over $1 billion in increased costs associated with implementing Families First. To assess the steps DOD has taken to achieve the goals and benefits of the Families First program with or without a new information management system, we identified the goals and benefits of the Families First program by analyzing Families First planning documents and related studies, such as briefings to the U.S. Transportation Command, and verified these goals with personal property officials from the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. We also interviewed officials and stakeholders. Defense Transportation: Efforts to Improve DOD’s Personal Property Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been working to improve its personal property program since the mid-1990s to fix long-standing problems, such as excessive loss or damage to servicemembers' property and poor quality of service from moving companies. DOD plans to replace its current program with Families First, a program that promises to offer servicemembers an improved claims process and quality of service. GAO was mandated to (1) assess the steps DOD has taken to achieve the goals and benefits of the Families First program; (2) evaluate the growth in costs of the program, including the costs for a new information management system, since GAO's last assessment in 2003; and (3) assess the extent to which DOD faces management challenges--such as staffing--in implementing Families First. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD's program, funding and staffing data, and interviewed personal property officials and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken some initial steps to achieve the goals and benefits of Families First, but delays in developing a new information management system have put the overall goals of improving the quality of service from moving companies and streamlining the claims process at risk. The information management system, the Defense Personal Property System (DPS), is now more than 2 years behind schedule. DOD has missed DPS milestones because of software development issues and is now working to address issues identified in recent software testing. Since DPS has been delayed, DOD is in the process of implementing a backup plan to meet a statutory mandate to provide servicemembers with the full replacement value of goods lost or damaged during a move by March 1, 2008. However, there are risks and costs associated with DOD's backup plan because it relies on an increasingly unreliable legacy computer system; also, DOD's plan may not cover all moves by March 1, 2008. The Families First program could increase costs to DOD by $1.4 billion over current program costs through fiscal year 2011 for two main reasons: (1) DOD estimates the program will increase costs to the services' household goods budgets by 13 percent and (2) DOD has significantly increased the cost estimate for a new information management system since GAO's last assessment. While DOD's estimate that the Families First program will increase costs by 13 percent has not changed since 2005, all of the services have not yet fully budgeted for this cost increase, which GAO analysis shows could be about $1.2 billion. Additionally, DOD has increased its estimate for an information management system for Families First because it decided to develop DPS rather than upgrade the legacy system. DOD estimated that the upgrade would cost $4 million to $6 million, and the program office estimated that DPS will cost about $180 million through fiscal year 2011. DOD's personal property program faces many management challenges--especially staffing, in addition to program requirements and funding problems--because it has not employed comprehensive planning. Sound management practices require a comprehensive approach that includes plans to assemble a qualified, trained, and well-led team; gain stakeholders' agreement about key program elements, such as business rules to define how the moving industry will serve military members; and estimate and plan for adequate resources. DOD has developed several draft plans to address individual portions of Families First and DPS, such as the draft transition plan for moving the DPS program office as part of a base realignment and closure move from Virginia to Illinois, but there is no overall plan that addresses how DOD will (1) fill significant staffing shortfalls in the newly formed DPS program office, (2) gain agreement from stakeholders, and (3) fund the significant and growing costs associated with the program. For example, DOD has not identified sources to fully fund DPS development and operations. Without a comprehensive plan, achieving the goals of the Families First program will likely remain difficult. |
gao_GGD-00-35 | gao_GGD-00-35_0 | Some Congressional Information Needs Were Met Through Formal and Informal Means
Congressional staff identified a great diversity of information they wanted to have to enable them to address key questions about program performance—either on a regular basis, to answer recurring questions, or in response to ad hoc inquiries as issues arose. Formal Annual Reports Met Some Recurring Information Needs
Congressional staff identified a number of recurring information needs, some of which were met through annual documents, such as agencies’ budget justification materials, GPRA annual performance plans, or other annual reports. If hearings or other more formal deliberations were planned, some kind of formal document might be requested. Several Factors Accounted for Gaps in Meeting Congressional Information Needs
Information needs that congressional staff reported as unmet were similar in content to, but often more specific or detailed than, those that were met. The key factors accounting for the gaps in meeting congressional information needs were the following: the presentations of information were not clear, sufficiently detailed, or the information was not readily available to congressional staff; or the information was not available to the agency. Lastly, some information was not available because it is difficult to obtain. Options for Increasing Access to Existing Information
Agency officials said that increased communication between agency and congressional staff could have prevented some of the unmet information needs because they believed that, if requested, they could have provided most of the information congressional staff said they wanted, or arranged for the special analysis required. Also, although the three agencies aimed to increase the volume of material that was publicly available by posting it on their Internet sites, the information was often not available to congressional staff unless they knew that it existed and where to look for it. Options for Improving GPRA and Other Existing Reports
Our analysis of the types of information the congressional staffs said they wanted on a recurring basis suggests ways the agencies might improve the usefulness of their performance plans and other reports to these committees. In addition, increased communication about the specifics of congressional information needs might help ensure that those needs are understood and addressed. The congressional staff also said that they wanted, on a recurring basis, data on the quantity, quality, and efficiency of a program’s activities; the characteristics of the population served; and indicators of a program’s progress in meeting its objectives. As we previously reported, agency consultation with both authorizing and appropriations committees as performance measures are selected is likely to make the agencies’ performance plans more useful to those committees. Some of the program and agency descriptions on agency Internet sites were designed for the general public and were not detailed enough to meet the congressional staffs’ needs. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed three agencies' annual performance plans to determine whether the plans met congressional requirements, focusing on: (1) which aspects of congressional information needs were met by the agency's annual performance plan or some other source; (2) where those needs were not met, and what accounted for the discrepancies or gaps in the information provided; and (3) what options agencies could use to practically and efficiently provide the desired performance information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the congressional staff GAO interviewed identified a great diversity of information they would like to have to address key questions about program performance; (2) the agencies GAO studied met some, but not all, of these recurring and ad hoc congressional information needs through both formal and informal means; (3) the congressional staffs were looking for recurring information on spending priorities within programs, the quality, quantity, and efficiency of program operations, the populations served or regulated, as well as the program's progress in meeting its objectives; (4) some of these recurring needs were met through formal agency documents, such as annual budget request justification materials, annual performance plans, or other recurring reports; (5) other congressional information needs were ad hoc, requiring more detailed information or analysis as issues arose for congressional consideration; (6) information needs that the congressional staffs reported as unmet were similar in content to, but often more specific or detailed than, those that were met; (7) several factors accounted for the gaps in meeting congressional information needs; (8) some information the agencies provided did not fully meet the congressional staffs' needs because the presentation was not clear, directly relevant, or sufficiently detailed; (9) other information was not readily available to the congressional staffs; (10) in some cases, the agencies said they did not have the information because it was either too soon or too difficult to obtain it; (11) improved communication between congressional staff and agency officials might help ensure that congressional information needs are understood, and that arrangements are made to meet them; (12) greater consultation on how best to distribute agency documents might improve congressional access to existing reports; (13) posting publications on Internet sites can increase congressional staffs' access to agency information without their having to specifically request it, but staff still need to learn that the information exists and where to look for it; and (14) agencies' annual Government Performance and Results Act performance plans and other reports might be more useful to congressional committees if they addressed the issues congressional staff said they wanted addressed on a recurring bases, and if agency staff consulted with the committees on their choice of performance measures. |
gao_GAO-14-96 | gao_GAO-14-96_0 | Military Department SBIR Programs Use a Variety of Practices, Tools, and Administrative Funds to Support Technology Transition Efforts
The military department SBIR programs use several management practices and tools to support technology transition efforts. We identified some common transition elements across the programs, but also found some differences in how each program approaches its technology transition efforts. The programs’ technology transition efforts are supported through use of administrative funds coming from their SBIR budgets and other funds provided by their respective military department. Transition facilitators: Each military department SBIR program has a network of transition facilitators who manage the Commercialization Readiness Program and other enhancement efforts, as well as broader SBIR activities that support technology transition. It provides consulting services focused on improving the small businesses’ abilities to transition their SBIR products, including assistance in transition planning and developing marketing tools. Administrative funds: The technology transition practices and tools used by the programs are supported by administrative funds provided through their SBIR budgets as well as non-SBIR sources from their respective agencies. DOD Lacks Comprehensive Data on SBIR Technology Transition Outcomes, but Some Transition Successes Have Been Identified
We were unable to assess the extent of technology transition associated with the military department SBIR programs because comprehensive and reliable technology transition data are not collected. Tracking mechanisms used by DOD—Company Commercialization Reports (CCR) and the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS- NG)—provide some information on SBIR Phase III activities, but these mechanisms have significant gaps in coverage and data reliability concerns that limit their transition tracking capabilities. The military departments have additional measures through which they have identified a number of successful SBIR transitions to DOD acquisition programs and directly to fielded systems, but these efforts capture a limited amount of transition information. DOD Is in the Early Stages of Developing a Plan to Improve Technology Transition Tracking and Reporting
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that DOD report new transition-related information to the Administrator of the Small Business Administration who will report this information annually to designated congressional committees. Standards for internal control state that management should establish procedures to ensure that it is able to achieve its objectives, such as being able to compile and report consistent, complete, and accurate data.according to SBIR officials, tracking transition outcomes can be Additionally, challenging because the sometimes lengthy period between SBIR project completion and transition to a DOD user can obscure a project’s SBIR linkages. Although the Office of Small Business Programs acknowledges the limitations of CCR data, the initial plan is to use this data source—viewed by DOD as the best available—as the primary means for beginning to address the new transition reporting requirements. Additionally, in an effort to improve DOD’s future technology transition reporting and its understanding of transition results in general, the Office of Small Business Programs has initiated an assessment of different options for enhancing transition data. However, SBIR officials indicated that addressing technology transition reporting requirements is viewed as a longer-term effort because of the challenges we have discussed, and no specific plan including a time line has been established for when DOD will be able to support those requirements. Without a plan that establishes a time line, it is unclear how and when DOD will begin to provide the technology transition information expected by Congress. Although Congress did not specify when reporting was to begin, it expects DOD to report new transition-related information to the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to meet the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requirement. Further, unless DOD communicates its plan and accompanying time line, these committees may be unaware that the transition-related information DOD plans to provide in the near-term to address the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requirements has data quality issues. Establish a common definition of technology transition for all SBIR projects to support annual reporting requirements; 2. Develop a plan to meet new technology transition reporting requirements that will improve the completeness, quality, and reliability of SBIR transition data; and 3. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. With the military department SBIR programs as our focus, we interviewed DOD officials from the Office of Small Business Programs and the SBIR program offices at the Air Force, Army, and Navy on practices and tools used to facilitate technology transition. Similarly, to assess the extent to which SBIR technologies are transitioning to DOD users, we met with officials in the Office of Small Business Programs, military department SBIR program offices, and the aforementioned military acquisition organizations to discuss what data are available to measure transition of SBIR technologies to acquisition programs, or directly to warfighters in the field. | Why GAO Did This Study
To compete in the global economy, the United States relies heavily on innovation through research and development. The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 initiated SBIR programs across federal agencies in an effort to stimulate innovation through small businesses. DOD spends over $1 billion annually to support SBIR awards. The Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO assess the transition of technologies developed through the DOD SBIR program. This report examines (1) practices the military department SBIR programs use to facilitate the transition of SBIR technologies, and (2) the extent to which SBIR technologies are transitioning to DOD users, including major weapon system acquisition programs. GAO reviewed SBIR program documentation and data. GAO also interviewed officials from DOD's Office of Small Business Programs and the military departments to determine the practices used to facilitate technology transition and assess SBIR transition outcome data.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs within the military departments use a variety of practices and tools to facilitate technology transition--the act of passing technologies developed in the science and technology environment on to users such as weapon system acquisition programs or warfighters in the field. GAO identified some common transition practices and tools across SBIR programs. For example, specific initiatives, such as the Commercialization Readiness Program, are used by each SBIR program and focus resources on enhancing technology transition opportunities. Transition facilitators are also used by each program to provide a network of personnel who manage SBIR activities that support technology transition. GAO also found some different practices and tools used to support technology transition efforts, such as the Navy Transition Assistance Program, which provides consulting services and helps showcase SBIR projects in an effort to improve small businesses' abilities to transition their projects. Transition facilitation efforts are supported by administrative funds provided through each program's SBIR budget and from other funds received from their respective military department. A recent increase in the amount of administrative funding that can come from SBIR budgets is expected to help the programs enhance their transition facilitation efforts.
GAO was unable to assess the extent of technology transition associated with the military department SBIR programs because comprehensive and reliable technology transition data for SBIR projects are not collected. Transition data systems used by DOD provide some transition information but have significant gaps in coverage and data reliability concerns. The military departments have additional measures through which they have identified a number of successful technology transitions, but these efforts capture a limited amount of transition results. SBIR transition reporting requirements recently established by Congress have led DOD to evaluate its options for providing transition data. GAO identified several challenges to attaining complete and accurate technology transition data. For instance, the lack of a common definition for technology transition across SBIR programs could cause reporting inconsistencies. Additionally, tracking transition can be challenging because of the sometimes lengthy period between SBIR project completion and transition to a DOD user. DOD initially plans to use transition data from Company Commercialization Reports--viewed by DOD as the best available source--to meet the new transition reporting requirements. However, SBIR officials indicated that addressing transition reporting requirements is a longer-term effort, and there is no specific plan including a time line for when DOD will be able to support those requirements. Without a plan that establishes a time line, it is unclear how and when DOD will begin to provide the technology transition information expected by Congress. Although Congress did not specify when reporting was to begin, it expects DOD to report new transition-related information to the Administrator of the Small Business Administration to meet the new reporting requirements. However, unless DOD communicates its plan and accompanying time line, the congressional committees to whom the Small Business Administration reports may be unaware of the data quality issues with the transition-related information DOD plans to use to support reporting in the near term.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish a common definition of technology transition for SBIR projects, develop a plan to track transition that will improve the completeness, quality, and reliability of transition data, and report to Congress its plan for meeting new SBIR technology transition reporting requirements. DOD partially concurred with these recommendations, but cited challenges to improving transition data. GAO believes options are available to address the challenges. |
gao_GAO-04-965 | gao_GAO-04-965_0 | Specifically, the rule provides the following: Access to and amendment of health information. Although many provider and health plan organizations reported dealing with various ongoing problems, they noted that two provisions were particularly burdensome: the requirement to maintain a record of certain disclosures of patient information and the requirement to create business associate agreements with downstream users of protected health information. In addition to difficulties experienced when tracking disclosures of protected health information, provider and health plan representatives also expressed concern about the volume of disclosures that must be tracked. Researchers pointed to increased difficulty in obtaining patient data to conduct clinical or health services research. State and Federal Agencies Have Had to Increase Efforts to Obtain Data for Public Health Monitoring
Organizations representing state public health officials told us that the Privacy Rule has hindered access to patient health information because some providers are reluctant to report to public health authorities. BCBSA reported that some plans are confused about how to implement the Privacy Rule’s provisions for releasing information to families, friends, and others. Evidence Suggests Patients Are Not Aware of Privacy Rights or May Misunderstand the Privacy Rule
Numerous organizations reported that patients are not aware of their rights under the Privacy Rule, either because they do not understand the notice of privacy practices, or because they have not focused their attention on privacy issues when the notices are presented to them. Representatives of providers and health plans also stated that patients are largely unaware of their rights. MGMA told us that OCR has placed the burden of patient education on private organizations—such as professional associations, providers, and health plans—and that some of these organizations interpret the rule incorrectly. Complaints Filed with HHS OCR Indicate That Patients May Misunderstand the Privacy Rule
In the first year that entities were required to be compliant with the Privacy Rule, consumers and others filed 5,648 privacy-related complaints with OCR. For the rest of these germane complaints (11.5 percent of total closed cases), OCR determined that no violation had occurred. Nevertheless, for each of these major provider types, as well as for all other entities cited in privacy complaints, OCR found that a clear majority of the complaints it closed were not germane to the regulation because they either involved accusations of actions that were not prohibited by the regulation, involved entities that were not “covered entities” as defined by the Privacy Rule, or involved actions that occurred before covered entities were required to be compliant (see fig. However, some operational issues and misconceptions about the rule continue to raise concerns. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that to reduce unnecessary burden on covered entities and to improve the effectiveness of the Privacy Rule, the Secretary of HHS take the following two actions: Modify the Privacy Rule to (1) require that patients be informed in the notice of privacy practices that their information will be disclosed to public health authorities when required by law and (2) exempt such public health disclosures from the accounting-for-disclosures provision. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, HHS agreed with our finding that implementation went more smoothly than expected during the first year, confusion has diminished, and new privacy procedures have become routine practice for staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
Issued under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the Privacy Rule provided new protections regarding the confidentiality of health information and established new responsibilities for providers, health plans, and other entities to protect such information. GAO reviewed (1) the experience of providers and health plans in implementation; (2) the experience of public health entities, researchers, and representatives of patients in obtaining access to health information; and (3) the extent to which patients appear to be aware of their rights.
What GAO Found
Organizations representing providers and health plans told us that implementation of the Privacy Rule went more smoothly than expected during the first year after most entities were required to be compliant. In addition, they reported that new privacy procedures have become routine practice for their members' staff. However, provider and health plan representatives also raised a variety of issues about provisions that continue to be problematic. In particular, many organizations emphasized that two provisions--the requirement to account for certain information disclosures and the requirement to develop agreements with business associates that extend privacy protections "downstream"--are unnecessarily burdensome. Some organizations suggested that difficulties with these provisions could be ameliorated with modification of certain provisions and further guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Organizations reported a number of challenges faced by entities that rely on access to health information for public health monitoring, research, and patient advocacy. Public health entities noted that some states have had to take concerted action to ensure that providers' concerns about complying with the Privacy Rule do not impede the flow of important information to state health departments and disease registries. Some research groups asserted that the rule has delayed clinical and health services research by reducing access to data. Some consumer advocacy groups told us that patients' families, friends, and other representatives have experienced unnecessary difficulty in assisting patients. These groups perceived that while providers and plans are allowed, in certain cases, to disclose health information without written patient authorization, they are reluctant to do so. Consumer and provider representatives contend that the general public is not well informed about their rights under the Privacy Rule. According to these organizations, patients may not understand the privacy notices they receive, or do not focus their attention on privacy issues when the notices are presented to them. Some evidence of patients' lack of understanding is reflected in the 5,648 complaints filed with OCR in the first year after the Privacy Rule took effect. Of the roughly 2,700 complaint cases OCR closed as of April 13, 2004, nearly two-thirds were found to fall outside the scope of the Privacy Rule because they either involved accusations of actions that were not prohibited by the regulation, involved entities that were not "covered entities" as defined by the Privacy Rule, or involved actions that occurred before covered entities were required to be compliant. Of those cases that were germane to the rule, OCR determined that about half represented cases in which no violation had occurred. |
gao_GAO-08-37 | gao_GAO-08-37_0 | LSC uses the majority of its funding to provide grants to local legal-service providers. Internal Control Weaknesses Impede LSC’s Ability to Adequately Assure Grant Funds Are Used as Intended and in Compliance with Laws and Regulations
We found weaknesses in LSC’s internal controls that negatively affected LSC’s ability to monitor and oversee grants and left grant funds vulnerable to misuse. We also found poor fiscal practices and improper or potentially improper expenditures at grantees we visited. LSC’s control environment contains several weaknesses, including the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibility among the three different organizational units providing for oversight of grantees—OPP, OCE, and the OIG. We also found that communication and coordination of grantee site visits between OCE and OPP need improvement in order to achieve effective oversight and avoid gaps and duplication in oversight. Timing and Scope of Grantee Site Visits Is Not Based on a Risk Assessment
LSC does not utilize a structured or systematic approach for assessing risk associated with its 138 grantees as a basis for determining the timing and scope of its grantee oversight visits. LSC’s Control Activities for Monitoring Grantees Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That Grant Funds Are Being Used Properly and in Compliance with Laws and Regulations
LSC’s control activities for monitoring grantee internal control systems do not reasonably assure that grant funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance with laws and regulations. At both of our observation visits, we noted that staff did not follow-up on questionable transactions and relied too heavily on information obtained through interviews without corroborating the information. As of September 17, 2007, LSC had not yet issued to grantee management almost 19 percent (10 out of 53) of the 2006 LSC reports for which grantee site visits had been completed. LSC’s Delays in Reporting Findings Prevented Grantees from Correcting Deficiencies in a Timely Manner
LSC’s reports of site visits are crucial to communicating and resolving instances of noncompliance in grantee internal controls. LSC Oversight Did Not Identify Control Weaknesses at Nine Grantees
Based on our limited reviews, we identified internal control weaknesses at 9 of the 14 grantees we visited that LSC could have identified with a more effective oversight review regimen. While control deficiencies at the grantees were the immediate cause of improper and potentially improper expenditures, weaknesses in LSC’s oversight controls discussed above negatively affected the effectiveness of its monitoring of grantees’ controls and compliance. Among the control weaknesses we found were grantee use of LSC grant funds for expenditures with insufficient supporting documentation, and for unusual contractor arrangements, alcohol purchases, employee interest-free loans, lobbying fees, late fees, and earnest money. Conclusions
Effective internal controls over grants and grantee oversight are critical to LSC as its very mission and operations rely extensively on grantees to provide legal services to people who otherwise could not afford to pay for adequate legal counsel. At all of these locations, we analyzed key records and interviewed entity officials to obtain an understanding of LSC’s internal control framework, including the oversight of grantees, and assessed compliance of expenditures. LSC grant funds are required by law to be used to support the provision of legal assistance in civil matters to low-income people for everyday legal problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was created as a private nonprofit to support legal assistance for low-income people to resolve their civil legal matters and relies heavily on federal appropriations. In 2006, LSC distributed most of its $327 million in grants to support such assistance. Effective internal controls over grants and oversight of grantees are critical to LSC's mission. GAO was asked to determine whether LSC's internal controls over grants management and oversight processes provide reasonable assurance that grant funds are used for their intended purposes. GAO analyzed key records and interviewed agency officials to obtain an understanding of LSC's internal control framework, including the monitoring and oversight of grantees, and performed limited reviews of internal controls and compliance at 14 grantees.
What GAO Found
GAO found weaknesses in LSC's internal controls over grants management and oversight of grantees that negatively affect LSC's ability to provide assurance that grant funds are being used for their intended purposes in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Effective internal controls over grants and grantee oversight are critical to LSC as its very mission and operations rely extensively on grantees to provide legal services to people who otherwise could not afford to pay for adequate legal counsel. GAO also found poor fiscal practices and improper and potentially improper expenditures at grantees it visited. Weaknesses in LSC's control environment include the lack of clear definition in the responsibilities of two of the three organizational units that oversee the work of grantees. GAO also found that communication between oversight units and coordination of grantee site visits is not sufficient to prevent gaps or duplication of effort, or both. The timing and scope of site visits is not based on a systematic analysis of the risk of noncompliance or financial control weakness across LSC's 138 grantees, so LSC cannot determine whether its resources are being used effectively and efficiently to mitigate risk among its grantees. LSC control activities performed in the monitoring of grantee internal control were not sufficient in scope to achieve effective oversight, and GAO noted implementation weaknesses. For example, in the site visits GAO observed, staff did not follow up on questionable transactions and relied heavily on information obtained through interviews. Feedback to grantees was often delayed, preventing grantees from correcting deficiencies in a timely manner. As of September 2007, LSC had not yet issued reports to grantee management for about 19 percent (10 out of 53) of the 2006 site visits. LSC grantee reviews missed potential control deficiencies at grantees that could have been detected with more effective oversight as evidenced by weaknesses GAO found at 9 of the 14 grantee sites it visited. While control deficiencies at the grantees were the immediate cause of the problems GAO found, weaknesses in LSC's controls over its oversight of grantees did not assure effective monitoring of grantee controls and compliance. Among the questionable expenditures GAO found were grantee use of funds for expenditures with insufficient supporting documentation, unusual contractor arrangements, alcohol purchases, employee interest-free loans, lobbying fees, late fees, and earnest money. |
gao_NSIAD-97-35 | gao_NSIAD-97-35_0 | In 1995, State received funding for 26 “other” special-purpose international organizations through appropriations made to its Contributions to International Organizations account. Interests and Funding Priority for Each Organization
In response to congressional directives, State conducted a comprehensive review beginning in May 1995 to decide whether each international organization to which it makes assessed contributions continued to serve important U.S. interests. Permanent Representative to the United Nations said the criteria that are applied in determining whether to retain membership in international organizations are (1) the level of direct U.S. benefit in political, strategic, or economic terms determined on the basis of consultations with end users; (2) the percentage of the organization’s budget that is devoted to activities that benefit the United States; (3) the scope and depth of the U.S. constituency; (4) the relevancy of the organization’s mandate to contemporary global issues; (5) the organization’s program effectiveness and quality of management; (6) the organization’s budgetary restraint and transparency; and (7) the organization’s responsiveness to the U.S. government’s overall reform efforts. State’s December 1996 report to the Congress assembled the 50 organizations, including the 27 discussed in this report, into 3 broad cluster groups according to a priority ranking based on the importance of their mandates to the U.S. national interest and their cost-effectiveness. Our analysis indicated that none of the 27 organizations discussed in this report were included in State’s top priority category (peace and security); 4 were in State’s second priority category (health, safety, and economic well-being); 20 were in State’s third priority category (selective interest); and 3 were no longer being funded by State. Benefit of U.S. Membership in the Organizations
For most of the organizations that we examined, U.S. government officials we contacted believe either that the benefits derived from them clearly exceeded the cost of membership or that it was very worthwhile for the United States to be represented and have an active voice in their activities, but there were mixed views on the value of continuing membership in some organizations. Further, they considered most of the organizations’ program focus to be generally clear, valid, and in conformity with U.S. interests, but some primarily benefited their related industries. Nonetheless, there are benefits to U.S. membership. Efforts to Keep U.S. Government Costs Low
State officials said they recognize that stringent government budgets make it imperative that costs be kept low in all areas, including the cost of membership in international organizations. Thus, they have attempted to link funding decisions for the small special-purpose international organizations to performance indicators, established a more systematic budget review and coordination process, and tried to secure increased private sector funding for the organizations in an effort to keep assessed contributions low. Additional Information on 25 International Organizations
This appendix provides supplemental data on the 25 international organizations covered in this study that received funds from the Department of State in 1995. The United States has been a participant since 1922. Comments From the Department of State
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated December 20, 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO obtained information on U.S. government membership in 25 special-purpose international organizations and 2 inter-American organizations that received funding support of $10.8 million in 1995 through assessed contributions provided by the Department of State, focusing on: (1) the Department of State's efforts to assess whether U.S. government membership in these organizations continues to serve U.S. interests, including a summary description of the organizations' missions and issues that have been raised about the benefits of U.S. membership; and (2) steps that have been taken to keep the government's contribution costs low.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in May 1995, State began a comprehensive interagency assessment of U.S. membership in all of the international organizations to which it makes assessed contributions; (2) in May 1996, after being urged by Congress to prioritize its funding requirements for international organizations, State announced the criteria that it had used in 1995 in reviewing and evaluating U.S. membership in international organizations; (3) these criteria included the extent to which the United States directly benefits from the organizations' activities, how much of the organizations' budgets are devoted to activities benefitting the United States, the scope and depth of the organizations' constituencies, and their responsiveness to management improvement efforts; (4) in December 1996, State reported to Congress its decisions concerning the allocation of funds from the Contributions to International Organizations account for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 based on an assessment and prioritization of U.S. interests in these organizations; (5) State categorized the organizations according to a priority ranking based on the importance of their mandates to the U.S. national interest and their cost-effectiveness; (6) none of the 27 organizations discussed in this report were in State's top priority category, 4 were in State's second priority category, and 20 were in the third priority category; (7) GAO's interviews with U.S. agency officials indicate that all of the 27 organizations appear to have missions that are broadly consistent with a U.S. interest, but there were mixed views as to the value of the benefits the United States receives from membership; (8) the key concerns raised included the cost of membership in some organizations relative to the benefit received and that some organizations primarily benefit their related industries; (9) State has attempted to keep the U.S. government's assessed contributions to the special-purpose international organizations low; (10) it has sought actual reductions in their budgets, established a systematic coordination process with U.S. agencies having lead programming responsibility, and tried to secure more private sector contributions to these organizations; and (11) however, according to State officials, private financing of membership dues for these international organizations is generally not a viable option under their existing charters or State's funding policy. |
gao_GAO-07-765 | gao_GAO-07-765_0 | Potential Conflicts of Interest Exist among Proxy Advisory Firms That Could Affect Their Vote Recommendations, but SEC Has Not Identified Any Major Violations in Its Examinations of Registered Firms
In the proxy advisory industry, various conflicts of interest can arise that have the potential to influence the research conducted and voting recommendations made by proxy advisory firms. Some industry professionals also contend that corporations could feel obligated to subscribe to ISS’s consulting services in order to obtain favorable proxy vote recommendations on their proposals and favorable corporate governance ratings. For example, on its Web site, ISS explains that it is “aware of the potential conflicts of interest that may exist between proxy advisory service … and the business of ISS Corporate Services, Inc. .” The Web site also notes that “ISS policy requires every ISS proxy analysis to carry a disclosure statement advising the client of the work of ICS and advising ISS’s institutional clients that they can get information about an issuer’s use of ICS’s products and services.” In addition, some institutional investors we spoke with noted that ISS has on occasion disclosed to them, on a case-by-case basis, the existence of a specific conflict related to a particular corporation. All of the institutional investors—both large and small—we spoke with that subscribe to ISS’s services said that they are satisfied with the steps that ISS has taken to mitigate its potential conflicts. According to SEC, to date, the agency has not identified any major violations of applicable federal securities laws in its examinations of proxy advisory firms that are registered as investment advisers and has not initiated any enforcement action against these firms. Analysts Cite ISS’s Long-standing Position in the Industry as a Potential Barrier to Competition, Although Firms Have Entered the Market in Recent Years
As the dominant proxy advisory firm, ISS has gained a reputation with institutional investors for providing reliable, comprehensive proxy research and recommendations, making it difficult for competitors to attract clients and compete in the market. For example, while firms may need to offer comprehensive coverage of corporate proxies in order to attract clients and although ISS might have access to corporate information that other firms do not, much of the information needed to conduct research and offer voting recommendations is easily accessible. Specifically, they have attempted to differentiate themselves from ISS by providing only proxy advisory services to institutional investor clients. While some of these newer proxy advisory firms have attracted clients, it is too soon to tell what the firms’ ultimate effect on competition will be. Large Institutional Investors Reportedly Rely Less Than Small Institutional Investors on Advisory Firms, Limiting the Influence These Firms Have on Proxy Voting Results
We conducted structured interviews with 31 randomly selected institutional investors to gain an understanding of the ways in which they use proxy advisory firms and the influence that such firms have on proxy voting. The following summarizes several of the reasons that large institutional investors’ reliance on proxy advisory firms’ research and recommendations is limited: Most of the large institutional investors we spoke with (15 out of 20) reported that they generally rely more on their own in-house research and analyses to make voting decisions than on the research and recommendations provided by their proxy advisory services providers. They explained that they use the research and recommendations provided by proxy advisory firms to supplement their own analysis and as one of many factors they consider when deciding how to vote. In particular, large institutional investors, which cast the great majority of proxy votes made by all institutional investors with over $1 billion in assets, reportedly place relatively less emphasis on the firms’ research and recommendations than smaller institutional investors. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify potential conflicts of interest that exist with proxy advisory firms and the steps that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken to oversee these firms; (2) review the factors that might impede or promote competition in this industry; and (3) analyze institutional investors’ use of proxy advisory services to help vote proxies and the influence proxy advisory firms may have on proxy voting. | Why GAO Did This Study
At annual meetings, shareholders of public corporations can vote on various issues (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) through a process called proxy voting. Institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds and pension funds) cast the majority of proxy votes due to their large stock holdings. In recent years, concerns have been raised about a group of about five firms that provide research and recommendations on proxy votes to their institutional investor clients. GAO was asked to report on (1) potential conflicts of interest that may exist with proxy advisory firms and the steps that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken to oversee these firms; (2) the factors that may impede or promote competition within the proxy advisory industry; and (3) institutional investors' use of the firms' services and the firms' potential influence on proxy vote outcomes. GAO reviewed SEC examinations of proxy advisory firms, spoke with industry professionals, and conducted structured interviews with 31 randomly selected institutional investors. GAO is not making any recommendations.
What GAO Found
Various potential conflicts of interest can arise at proxy advisory firms that could affect vote recommendations, but SEC has not identified any major violations in its examinations of such firms. In particular, the business model of the dominant proxy advisory firm--Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)--has been the most commonly cited potential conflict. Specifically, ISS advises institutional investors how to vote proxies and provides consulting services to corporations seeking to improve their corporate governance. Critics contend that corporations could feel obligated to retain ISS's consulting services in order to obtain favorable vote recommendations. However, ISS officials said they have disclosed and taken steps to mitigate this potential conflict. For example, ISS discloses the potential conflict on its Web site and the firm's policy is to advise clients of relevant business practices in all proxy vote analyses. ISS also maintains separate staff who are located in separate buildings for the two businesses. While all institutional investors GAO spoke with that use ISS's services said they are satisfied with its mitigation procedures, some industry analysts continue to question their effectiveness. SEC conducts examinations of advisory firms that are registered as investment advisers and has not identified any major violations. Although new firms have entered the market, ISS's long-standing position has been cited by industry analysts as a barrier to competition. ISS has gained a reputation for providing comprehensive services, and as a result, other firms may have difficulty attracting clients. Proxy advisory firms must offer comprehensive coverage to compete and need sophisticated systems to provide the services clients demand. But firms interested in entering the market do have access to much of the information needed to make recommendations, such as publicly available documents filed with SEC. Competitors have attempted to differentiate themselves from ISS by, for example, providing only proxy advisory services and not corporate consulting services. While these firms have attracted clients, it is too soon to tell what their ultimate effect on enhancing competition will be. Among the 31 institutional investors GAO spoke with, large institutions reportedly rely less than small institutions on the research and recommendations offered by proxy advisory firms. Large institutional investors said that their reliance on proxy advisory firms is limited because, for example, they have in-house staff to assess proxy vote issues and only use the research and recommendations offered by proxy advisory firms to supplement such research. In contrast, small institutional investors have limited resources to conduct their own research and tend to rely more heavily on the research and recommendations offered by proxy advisory firms. The fact that large institutional investors cast the great majority of proxy votes made by institutional investors and reportedly place relatively less emphasis on advisory firm research and recommendations could serve to limit the firms' overall influence on proxy voting results. |
gao_GAO-14-423T | gao_GAO-14-423T_0 | We found that the agencies had conducted more retrospective reviews, and a greater variety of these reviews (such as ones examining the efficiency and effectiveness of regulations and others identifying opportunities to reduce regulatory burdens) than was readily apparent, especially to the public. Reviews mandated by requirements in statutes or executive orders and related OMB memorandums were sometimes the impetus for reviews, but agencies more often exercised their own discretionary authorities to review regulations. Multiple factors helped or impeded the conduct and usefulness of retrospective reviews. Among the elements that we recommended incorporating in policies, procedures, or guidance were: minimum standards for documenting and reporting completed review results; inclusion of public input as a factor in regulatory review decisions; and consideration of how agencies will measure the performance of new regulations. For example, in 2011 and 2012, the administration issued new directives to agencies on how they should plan and conduct analyses of existing regulations, among other subjects, that addressed each of our prior recommendations. In essence, OIRA is responsible for the coordinated review of agencies’ draft proposed and final rules to ensure that regulations are consistent with applicable law, the President’s priorities, and the principles set forth in executive orders. OIRA is also to ensure that decisions made by one agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by another agency. Multiple products we issued from 1996 through 2009 consistently found that the OIRA regulatory review process often resulted in changes to agencies’ rules but the transparency and documentation of the review process could be improved. For example, these aspects included addressing a lack of documentation requirements regarding (1) staff-level exchanges during the review process, (2) the reasons for withdrawal of a rule, or (3) the source or impetus of changes made to rules. In 2009, based on similar findings, we made 4 additional recommendations that OMB provide guidance to agencies to improve transparency and documentation of the OIRA review process. OIRA to date has implemented only 1 of those 12 recommendations—to more clearly indicate in the posted information which regulatory action was being discussed and the affiliations of participants when meeting with outside parties regarding draft rules under OIRA review. We believe that our past recommendations still have merit and, if acted upon, would improve the transparency of the OIRA review process. Additional Opportunities Exist to Facilitate Congressional Oversight and Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process
Our recent work has continued to highlight both progress made in facilitating transparency, oversight, and public participation in regulatory actions as well as room for improvement. We found that agencies, though not required, often requested comments on major final rules issued without an NPRM, but they did not always respond to the comments received. In our 2013 review of international regulatory cooperation we again found opportunities to better facilitate public participation in regulatory activities. Agency officials stated that they cooperate with their foreign counterparts (1) because they are operating in an increasingly global environment and many products that agencies regulate originate overseas and (2) in an effort to gain efficiencies—for example, by sharing resources or avoiding duplicative work. In addition to effective collaboration with affected nonfederal stakeholders, effective international regulatory cooperation requires interagency coordination and effective collaboration with federal agency officials’ foreign counterparts. If the current administration retains Executive Order 12866, or establishes similar transparency requirements, to improve the monitoring and evaluation of rules development and the transparency of the review process, the Director of OMB, through the Administrator of OIRA, should define in guidance what types of changes made as a result of the OIRA review process are substantive and need to be publicly identified to more consistently implement the order’s requirement to provide information to the public “in a complete, clear, and simple manner.”
If the current administration retains Executive Order 12866, or establishes similar transparency requirements, to improve the monitoring and evaluation of rules development and the transparency of the review process, the Director of OMB, through the Administrator of OIRA, should direct agencies to clearly state in final rules whether they made substantive changes as a result of the OIRA reviews to more consistently implement the order’s requirement to provide information to the public “in a complete, clear, and simple manner.”
If the current administration retains Executive Order 12866, or establishes similar transparency requirements, to improve the monitoring and evaluation of rules development and the transparency of the review process, the Director of OMB, through the Administrator of OIRA, should standardize how agencies label documentation of these changes in public rulemaking dockets to more consistently implement the order’s requirement to provide information to the public “in a complete, clear, and simple manner.”
Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget Recommendation If the current administration retains Executive Order 12866, or establishes similar transparency requirements, to improve the monitoring and evaluation of rules development and the transparency of the review process, the Director of OMB, through the Administrator of OIRA, should instruct agencies to clearly attribute those changes “made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA to more consistently implement the order’s requirement to provide information to the public “in a complete, clear, and simple manner.” Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Could Take Additional Steps to Respond to Public Comments, GAO-13-21: Published: Dec. 20, 2012. Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements in Federal Rulemaking. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue thousands of regulations each year to achieve public policy goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, foods, and drugs are safe; that the nation's air, water and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes is collected. Congresses and Presidents have taken a number of actions to refine and reform the regulatory process over the last several decades. Among the goals of such initiatives are enhancing oversight of rulemaking by Congress and the President, promoting greater transparency and participation in the process, and reducing regulatory burdens on affected parties.
Over the past two decades Congress has often asked GAO to evaluate the implementation of procedural and analytical requirements that apply to the rulemaking process. The importance of improving the transparency of the rulemaking process emerged as a common theme throughout GAO's body of work. Based on that body of work, this testimony addresses (1) GAO's findings and recommendations regarding federal agencies' retrospective reviews, (2) GAO's findings and OIRA's progress to date on GAO recommendations to improve the transparency of the regulatory review process, and (3) other opportunities for increasing congressional oversight and public participation in the rulemaking process.
GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
In 2007, GAO found that agencies had conducted more retrospective reviews of the costs and benefits of existing regulation than was readily apparent, especially to the public. Requirements in statutes or executive directives were sometimes the impetus for reviews, but agencies more often conducted these retrospective reviews based on their own discretionary authorities. Agencies reported that discretionary reviews more often generated actions, such as amending regulations or changes to guidance. GAO also found that multiple factors, such as data limitations and lack of transparency, impeded agencies' reviews. GAO made 7 recommendations in 2007 to improve the effectiveness and transparency of retrospective regulatory reviews. Among GAO's recommendations were: minimum standards for documenting and reporting completed review results; including public input as a factor in regulatory review decisions; and consideration of how agencies will measure the performance of new regulations. In 2011 and 2012, the administration issued new directives to agencies on how they should plan and conduct analyses of existing regulations that addressed each of GAO's recommendations.
By executive order, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reviews draft proposed and final rules from executive agencies, other than independent regulatory agencies. Among the purposes of these reviews are ensuring that regulations are consistent with applicable law and the President's priorities and that decisions made by one agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by another. Both OIRA and executive agencies are also required to disclose certain information about the review process. In 2003 and 2009, GAO found that the OIRA regulatory review process often resulted in changes to agencies' rules, but the transparency and documentation of the review process could be improved. GAO made 12 recommendations to OMB about the review process. For example, GAO recommended that OMB provide guidance to agencies regarding documentation of the reasons for an agency's withdrawal of a draft rule from OIRA review and the source or impetus of changes made to rules. OMB to date has implemented only 1 of those 12 recommendations—to clarify information posted about the topic and participants in meetings with outside parties on rules under review. GAO believes that its past recommendations still have merit and would improve the transparency of the OIRA review process.
GAO's recent work continues to highlight progress in facilitating transparency and public participation as well as room for improvement. In 2012, GAO found that agencies often requested comments when issuing major rules without a notice of proposed rulemaking but missed an opportunity to improve those rules because they did not always respond to the comments. GAO's 2013 review of international regulatory cooperation also found opportunities to better facilitate public participation in these activities. GAO also found that effective international regulatory cooperation requires interagency coordination and effective collaboration with federal agency officials' foreign counterparts. Agency officials stated that they cooperate with their foreign counterparts (1) because they are operating in an increasingly global environment and many products that agencies regulate originate overseas and (2) in an effort to gain efficiencies—for example, by sharing resources or avoiding duplicative work. |
gao_GAO-14-655 | gao_GAO-14-655_0 | In addition, State acquired—purchased or leased—over 1,125 work facilities. State Manages Risk to Overseas Facilities through Several Activities and Has Recently Taken Steps to Improve These Activities
State conducts several key activities to manage risk to overseas facilities:
OBO tracks facilities in a property inventory database, and OBO and other bureaus rely on the information in this database to inform a number of security-related decisions. DS Assesses Threat Levels at Posts Overseas
DS assesses six types of threats at each overseas post by evaluating the post’s security situation and assigning a corresponding threat level, which is used to determine the security standards required for facilities at that post. Problems with Categorizing Facilities and Ensuring Data Reliability May Impact State’s Tracking and Ranking of Facilities
Although State conducts a range of ongoing activities to manage risk to facilities overseas, we identified facility categorization and data reliability problems that may impact these activities:
DS and OBO have not defined the conditions that would determine when a warehouse with desk positions should be categorized as an office facility and meet appropriate office physical security standards. State Lacks Standard Terminology for Different Facility Categories
GAO-12-1022. Although State Has Developed Security Standards for Most Types of Facilities, It Lacks OSPB Standards for Several Others
State has developed security standards for a variety of facilities—such as offices and warehouses—but it has not developed OSPB standards for several other types of facilities. Although it may take years for State to update some security standards, we found that State at times took steps to address identified threats in advance of approving updates to the security standards. For example, the OSPB standards include requirements for anti-ram perimeter walls at medium- and higher-threat posts, but the Physical Security Handbook used to include this requirement only for higher- threat posts. State Does Not Systematically Reassess Standards against Evolving Threats and Risks
Although OSPB is required to review its security standards on a regular basis, State does not have a systematic process for evaluating the existing security standards against evolving threats and risks. Interagency Security Assessment Teams recommended security upgrades above current standards: Following the attacks of September 2012, the teams traveled to a judgmental sample of high- threat, high-risk posts and made recommendations at each post, many of which exceeded the threat standards at the post. State Mitigates Vulnerabilities for Work Facilities That Do Not Meet Security Standards, but Its Waivers and Exceptions Process Has Weaknesses
State takes steps to mitigate vulnerabilities for older, acquired, and temporary work facilities that do not meet security standards, primarily through a waivers and exceptions process to document vulnerabilities and corresponding mitigation measures; however, the waivers and exceptions process has several weaknesses. When Security Vulnerabilities Are Identified, a Post Must Obtain Waivers or Exceptions That Define Agreed-Upon Mitigation Steps
Diplomatic work facilities are required to meet two sets of physical security standards, SECCA requirements and OSPB standards; however, when facilities do not or cannot meet all of the standards, post officials are required to request waivers to SECCA requirements, exceptions to OSPB standards, or both. Furthermore, we found that posts we visited did not always request waivers and exceptions when required. While DS outlined some principles for a risk management policy, it did not fully develop and implement the policy. In addition, we found examples in which the data informing DS’s risk assessments of facilities had changed, but DS lacked processes to re-evaluate the risk to those facilities. We also found that State lacked a process to re-evaluate interim and temporary facilities that have been in use longer than anticipated. State’s Risk Management Activities Do Not Operate as a Continuous Process and Do Not Continually Incorporate New Information
While many of State’s activities align with the DS risk management policy statement, in this report we have identified a number of problems with these activities. For example, we found that DS does not use all available information when establishing threat levels at posts. Unless State implements a risk management policy that addresses the problems we identified with State’s current security efforts, State cannot be assured that the most effective security measures are in place at a time when personnel working at U.S. diplomatic facilities are facing ever increasing threats to their safety and security. Direct M/PRI, DS, and OBO to harmonize the terminology State uses to categorize facilities in State’s physical security standards and property databases. Direct OBO to establish a routine process for validating the accuracy of the data in OBO’s property database. Direct DS to establish a routine process for validating the accuracy of the data in DS’s risk matrix. Develop physical security standards for facilities not currently covered by existing standards. Clarify existing flexibilities in the FAH to ensure that security and life- safety updates to the OSPB standards and Physical Security Handbook are updated through an expedited review process. Develop a process to routinely review all OSPB standards and the Physical Security Handbook to determine if the standards adequately address evolving threats and risks. Develop a policy for the use of interim and temporary facilities that includes definitions for such facilities, time frames for use, and a routine process for reassessing the interim or temporary designation. Direct DS to routinely ensure that necessary waivers and exceptions are in place for all work facilities at posts overseas. Direct DS to develop a process to ensure that mitigating steps agreed to in granting waivers and exceptions have been implemented. Develop a risk management policy and procedures for ensuring the physical security of diplomatic facilities, including roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and a routine feedback process that continually incorporates new information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to evaluate (1) how the Department of State (State) manages risks to work facilities under chief-of-mission authority overseas; (2) the adequacy of State’s physical security standards for these work facilities; (3) State’s processes to mitigate vulnerabilities when older, acquired, and temporary work facilities overseas do not meet physical security standards; and (4) how State’s risk management activities align with its risk management policy and risk management best practices. To provide context and background and address our objectives, we reviewed classified, sensitive-but-unclassified, and unclassified documents, including U.S. laws; State’s physical security policies and procedures as found in memoranda, guidance, the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), and Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAH)—most notably, the Physical Security Handbook and the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards; DS documentation of anti-U.S. attacks, overseas posts’ physical security surveys, threat and risk ratings, and physical security waivers and exceptions; post-specific documents pertaining to physical security; State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) facility, construction, and physical security upgrade documentation; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) facility and physical security documentation; classified and unclassified Accountability Review Board (ARB) reports resulting from physical security attacks and State’s documents evaluating their response to ARB recommendations; past GAO, State Office of Inspector General (OIG), and Congressional Research Service reports; and reports by congressional committees and independent panels. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. policy can call for U.S. personnel to be posted to high-threat, high-risk posts overseas. To maintain a presence in these locations, State has often relied on older, acquired (purchased or leased), and temporary work facilities that do not meet the same security standards as more recently constructed permanent facilities.
GAO was asked to review how State assures the security of these work facilities. GAO evaluated (1) how State manages risks at work facilities overseas; (2) the adequacy of State's physical security standards for these facilities; (3) State's processes to address vulnerabilities when older, acquired, and temporary overseas facilities do not meet physical security standards; and (4) the extent to which State's activities to manage risks to its overseas work facilities align with State's risk management policy and with risk management best practices. GAO reviewed U.S. laws and State's policies, procedures, and standards for risk management and physical security. GAO reviewed facilities at a judgmental sample of 10 higher-threat, higher-risk, geographically dispersed, overseas posts and interviewed officials from State and other agencies in Washington, D.C., and at 16 overseas posts, including the 10 posts at which GAO reviewed facilities.
What GAO Found
To manage risks at its overseas work facilities, the Department of State (State) tracks information about each facility, assesses threat levels at posts, develops security standards to meet threats facing different types of facilities overseas, identifies vulnerabilities, and sets risk-based construction priorities. For example, State assesses six types of threats, such as terrorism, and assigns threat levels, which correspond to physical security standards at each overseas post. However, GAO found several inconsistencies in terminology used to categorize properties and within the property inventory database used to track them, raising questions about the reliability of the data. For example, GAO identified a facility categorized as a warehouse that included offices and therefore should have been subject to more stringent standards. Gaps in categorization and tracking of facilities could hamper the proper implementation of physical security standards.
Although State has established physical security standards for most types of overseas facilities, GAO identified some facility types for which standards were lacking or unclear, instances in which the standards were not updated in a timely manner, and inconsistencies within the standards. The following are examples:
It is unclear what standards apply to some types of facilities.
In some instances, updating standards took more than 8 years.
One set of standards requires anti-ram perimeter walls at medium- and higher-threat posts; another required them only at higher-threat posts.
Furthermore, GAO found that State lacks a process for reassessing standards against evolving threats and risks. GAO identified several posts that put security measures in place that exceed the standards because the standards did not adequately address emerging threats and risks. Without adequate and up-to-date standards, post officials rely on an ad hoc process to establish security measures rather than systematically drawing upon collective subject-matter expertise.
Although State takes steps to mitigate vulnerabilities to older, acquired, and temporary work facilities, its waivers and exceptions process has weaknesses. When posts cannot meet security standards for a given facility, the posts must submit requests for waivers and exceptions, which identify steps the post will take to mitigate vulnerabilities. However, GAO found neither posts nor headquarters systematically tracks the waivers and exceptions and that State has no process to re-evaluate waivers and exceptions when the threat or risk changes. Furthermore, posts do not always request required waivers and exceptions and do not always take required mitigation steps. With such deficiencies, State cannot be assured it has all the information needed to mitigate facility vulnerabilities and that mitigation measures have been implemented.
GAO found that State has not fully developed and implemented a risk management policy for overseas facilities. Furthermore, State's risk management activities do not operate as a continuous process or continually incorporate new information. State does not use all available information when establishing threat levels at posts, such as when posts find it necessary to implement measures that exceed security standards. State also lacks processes to re-evaluate the risk to interim and temporary facilities that have been in use longer than anticipated. Without a fully developed risk management policy, State may lack the information needed to make the best security decisions concerning personnel and facilities.
To manage risk to overseas work facilities, State conducts a range of ongoing activities, including the setting of security standards. However, GAO identified a number of problems with these activities. Moreover, GAO found that State lacked a fully developed risk management policy to coordinate these activities (see figure).
This is the public version of a Sensitive but Unclassified report by the same title.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 13 recommendations for State to address gaps in its security-related activities, standards, and policies. State generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations.
Specifically, GAO is recommending that the Secretary of State:
1. Define the conditions when a warehouse should be categorized as an office facility and meet appropriate security standards.
2. Harmonize the terminology State uses to categorize facilities in its security standards and property databases.
3. Establish a routine process for validating the accuracy of the data in State’s property database.
4. Establish a routine process for validating the accuracy of the data in State’s risk matrix.
5. Identify and eliminate inconsistencies between and within State’s physical security guidance.
6. Develop physical security standards for facilities not currently covered by existing standards.
7. Clarify existing flexibilities to ensure that security and life-safety updates to the security standards are updated through an expedited review process.
8. Develop a process to routinely review all security standards to determine if the standards adequately address evolving threats and risks.
9. Develop a policy for the use of interim and temporary facilities that includes definitions for such facilities, time frames for use, and a routine process for reassessing the interim or temporary designation.
10. Automate waivers and exceptions documentation, and ensure that headquarters and post officials have ready access to the documentation.
11. Routinely ensure that necessary waivers and exceptions are in place for all work facilities at posts overseas.
12. Develop a process to ensure that mitigating steps agreed to in granting waivers and exceptions have been implemented.
13. Develop a risk management policy and procedures for ensuring the physical security of diplomatic facilities, including roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and a routine feedback process that continually incorporates new information. |
gao_GAO-13-682 | gao_GAO-13-682_0 | Congress has set limits on the size of the forward mortgages FHA may insure, which can vary by county. In 2012, FHA insured about $227 billion in single- family mortgages, and its overall insurance portfolio was about $1.1 trillion. Changes to Product Terms and Conditions Could Help Mitigate Risk and Increase Financial Viability but Could Also Limit Borrowers’ Access to Credit
Mortgage industry observers have suggested changes to FHA’s product terms and conditions to lower its exposure to risk and improve its capital position. FHA recently revised TOTAL to tighten its underwriting standards. In addition, borrowers also must pay for related closing costs. Pricing Changes Could Raise the Cost of Credit for Some Borrowers
FHA has raised premiums several times in recent years, but such increases have not been risk-based. However, we and others have noted that increases in the cost of mortgage insurance could increase the likelihood of adverse selection for That is, low-risk FHA if its pricing were far different from its competitors.borrowers with fewer down-payment constraints could choose less costly loans from other sources, effectively making private mortgage insurance more competitive with FHA insurance. Mortgage industry observers have proposed options that would limit FHA’s market presence as a way of either reducing FHA’s liability or better ensuring that it serves a certain market—that is, low- or moderate-income borrowers and first-time homebuyers. These options include changes that would have a direct effect on FHA’s market share, such as reducing loan limits from current levels and determining borrower eligibility based on income. Options that could have an indirect effect on FHA’s market presence include reducing FHA’s insurance coverage to less than 100 percent of the value of the loan and entering into risk- sharing agreements with private partners. Concerns have been raised that options affecting FHA’s market presence might also affect its ability to serve its traditional countercyclical role to stabilize the housing market during times of increased stress or credit contraction. Currently, the loan limits vary by county, ranging from $271,050 to $729,750 for one-unit properties in the contiguous United States. They note that lower loan limits would not have a significant effect on FHA lending but would allow high-wealth buyers to be served in the conventional market, a shift they consider appropriate at this time. In recent congressional hearings, industry observers encouraged a system of assessing borrowers according to area median income targets to determine program eligibility.on reforming the housing finance market that was developed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and HUD, the administration presented one option for reform that would strictly limit FHA eligibility to In a 2011 white paper low- and moderate-income borrowers, leaving the risk for high-income borrowers to the private market. Also, for some lenders the additional exposure might prompt the purchase of additional insurance coverage from third parties, the cost of which could be passed on to borrowers. Another risk-sharing arrangement between FHA and other partners could be a model similar to FHA’s Multifamily Risk-Sharing Programs through which the agency shares proportional risk at varying levels between 10 and 90 percent with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and housing finance agencies among others. Some argue that the federal government would still absorb catastrophic risk regardless of how risk sharing and premiums are structured. Some of these authorities would bring FHA’s corporate powers more in line with other government corporations. For example, mortgage industry observers have suggested giving FHA enhanced enforcement powers, greater authority to make changes to program requirements, and additional authorities to invest in technology and staff. In its proposed budget for fiscal year 2014, FHA requested a number of additional enforcement powers. To help make loss mitigation more effective, FHA is seeking authority to, on a case-by-case basis, transfer servicing of loans to institutions better equipped to reduce losses.allow FHA to require any of the following actions when a servicer underutilized FHA’s loss-mitigation tools or the agency deemed the action necessary to protect the interests of the Fund: (1) transfer servicing from the current servicer to a specialty servicer designated by FHA; (2) require a servicer to enter into a subservicing arrangement with an entity identified by FHA; or (3) require a servicer to engage a third-party contractor to assist in some aspect of loss mitigation such as borrower outreach. For example, some said that FHA needed these additional powers to more effectively manage risk and avoid unnecessary losses. Similarly, the other observer said that FHA could make some changes through mortgagee letters and the rulemaking process. However, some mortgage industry observers said FHA should be provided with additional funding to enhance its information technology. However, FHA has not met its statutory capital ratio requirement since 2009 and using premium income for technology enhancement would further reduce the ratio. Even with no changes to its existing organizational structure and authorities, FHA can do more to enhance program efficiency and effectiveness and protect taxpayers. We have made a number of recommendations aimed at improving FHA’s information technology, loss mitigation efforts, management of real-estate owned inventories, risk assessment, and human capital management. Since our report, FHA has taken several actions, including developing a plan for conducting an inaugural risk assessment and a workforce analysis and succession plan. Broader Housing Market Reforms Could Impact FHA’s Role
Following the collapse of the mortgage market, policymakers proposed a number of mortgage reforms that could impact FHA’s market share and role. These reforms could affect the willingness of the conventional market to serve future home buyers of varying credit risk profiles and the fees that lenders would charge for conventional loans. The administration has put forth several options for reforming the federal role in the mortgage market, including reforming the enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Each of these options has potential implications for FHA. Because of continuing uncertainty over the resolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the potential impact of their resolution on FHA, and concerns about FHA’s financial condition, in February 2013 we included FHA in this high-risk area, now called “modernizing the U.S. financial regulatory system and the federal role in housing finance.”
As of March 31, 2013, over 90 percent of new mortgage volume had federal backing, either through FHA and Ginnie Mae or the enterprises. The heightened federal role in mortgage lending and the increased reliance on FHA insurance highlights the need for policymakers to ensure that changes made to FHA and the enterprises recognize the interdependence of these entities and that changes to federal regulations governing the mortgage market consider the interaction between public and private capital and reflect the roles and capacities of the agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine options that have been proposed for improving the long-term viability of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or reducing its market presence and the implications of these options. Specifically, we discuss the implications of options related to (1) changing FHA’s product terms and conditions for single-family mortgage insurance, (2) restricting FHA’s presence in the single-family housing market, and (3) enhancing FHA’s operations and powers within its single- family program. In addition, we discuss the possible effects of broader housing finance reform on FHA. We reviewed and summarized the literature identifying options for change at FHA, including congressional testimonies and other documents from mortgage market participants (such as the Mortgage Bankers Association) and researchers (such as the Urban Institute, Cato Institute, and others). We obtained FHA data on (1) loans originated in 2009, including credit scores and down-payment percentages, (2) the effect of a potential increase in the down-payment requirement on loans for which applications were submitted in August 2010 through July 2011, (3) the percentage of loan originations in 2009 and 2010 that had seller concessions of more than 3 percent of the property value, (4) the percentage of loans that FHA insured in fiscal year 2012 that were above $450,000, by state, (5) the income distribution of FHA borrowers in fiscal years 2000-2013 (October through April), and (6) delinquency rates for all active loans as of October 31, 2011, by loan size. | Why GAO Did This Study
FHA has historically provided mortgage guarantees for home buyers, particularly first-time, minority, and lower-income borrowers. In 2012, FHA insured about $227 billion in single-family mortgages, and its overall insurance portfolio was about $1.1 trillion. Its market presence expanded during the recent housing crisis as the conventional market contracted and Congress increased the limit on the size of loans FHA may insure. But FHA's financial condition has weakened, and FHA has not met its 2 percent statutory minimum capital ratio since 2009. In its most recent budget, the agency stated that its capital reserve account might require an infusion of federal funds.
FHA, industry participants, and researchers have suggested a number of options for improving FHA's long-term viability or for limiting FHA's market presence. These options have potential implications for taxpayers, borrowers, and others. This report discusses the options--which fall into three broad categories: (1) changes to product terms and conditions, (2) changes that would restrict FHA's market presence, and (3) changes to FHA's operations and powers--and their implications. It also describes the possible effects of broader housing finance reform on FHA.
GAO interviewed a variety of industry stakeholders and researchers and reviewed studies and other documents to identify options for reforming FHA and their implications.
What GAO Found
GAO identified a number of proposed options for adjusting product terms and conditions to help improve the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) long-term viability. FHA has raised the premiums that it charges borrowers several times in recent years and has taken steps to tighten its underwriting standards--for example, by setting a minimum required credit score. Some mortgage market observers have argued that further changes such as revising underwriting standards to focus on borrowers' residual income, requiring higher down payments, or reducing seller concessions (that is, funds sellers provide to buyers to help pay for closing costs) could help FHA better manage credit risk. However, such changes would entail trade-offs. For instance, some said that raising down-payment requirements would improve loan performance, but others said that this move would delay homeownership for many borrowers. Similarly, raising premiums could potentially increase revenue, but this potential would be constrained if it caused volume to decline. Further, low-risk borrowers with fewer down-payment constraints could choose less costly loans from other sources, leaving FHA with more high-risk borrowers. These changes could have a direct effect on the availability of credit for borrowers.
GAO also identified options that could either directly or indirectly change FHA's market presence, which increased after the housing crisis, or address its financial viability. Among the proposals that would have a direct effect are those limiting FHA insurance to loans below a lowered ceiling or to borrowers who met new income guidelines. Many stakeholders and FHA itself view FHA's current loan limits, which range from $271,050 to $729,750 for one-unit properties in the contiguous United States, as too high. Some note that the agency may insure larger loans than the housing enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The current FHA limits were put in place in response to declines in mortgage lending during the housing crisis, when the private sector's role in financing mortgages shrank. However, as the market has improved, some have noted that lowering loan limits would allow private capital to return to the market and focus FHA on low- and moderate-income and first-time home buyers, a shift that many observers consider appropriate. Other proposed changes, such as reducing insurance coverage to less than 100 percent of the loan amount or entering into risk-sharing agreements with private partners, may indirectly reduce FHA's market presence. However, applying a partial coverage model would limit availability of credit to some borrowers. For some lenders, the additional exposure might prompt the purchase of additional insurance coverage from third parties, the cost of which would be passed on to borrowers. Some argue that under a risk-sharing structure private partners would assume and better manage credit risk. But creating such a structure would require careful consideration of how risks are borne, how pricing is determined, how incentives are aligned between FHA and its partners, and how FHA's role in stabilizing mortgage markets would be impacted. Others point to the additional counterparty risk posed by risk-sharing arrangements, which would necessitate greater federal oversight. Finally, these options might also affect FHA's ability to respond to changing market conditions.
FHA and industry observers have also suggested changes to FHAs structure and powers that could enhance its flexibility and capacity to manage risk. Some of these changes would bring FHAs corporate powers more in line with those of other government corporations and increase its autonomy, providing it with enhanced enforcement powers and greater authority to change program requirements and invest in staff and technology. FHA has already requested additional enforcement authority. FHA and other observers have also argued that FHA needs greater power to change loan products or loan features without a lengthy rulemaking process and additional information technology resourcesresources for which FHA must currently compete within HUD. Expanding FHAs operational and managerial powers would give the agency more flexibility, and increasing its enforcement powers would allow it to more effectively oversee lenders. But any expansion of FHAs authority may need to be limited and transparency requirements heightened, including for the rulemaking process. Even with no changes to its existing organizational structure and authorities, FHA can do more to enhance program efficiency and effectiveness and protect taxpayers. GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at improving FHAs loss mitigation efforts, management of real-estate owned inventories, risk assessment, human capital management, and information technology systems. In response to these recommendations, FHA has taken steps, such as developing a plan for conducting an inaugural risk assessment and a workforce analysis and succession plan.
Finally, efforts to further regulate housing finance and the continuing uncertainty over resolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac present challenges to any efforts to reform FHA. Following the collapse of the mortgage market, Congress passed a number of mortgage reforms that could impact FHAs market share and role because they could affect the price at which the conventional market will be able to serve future home buyers of varying credit risk profiles. Similarly, the administration has put forth several options for reforming the federal role in the mortgage market, including reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Each of these options could have an impact on FHAs role in the mortgage market. Partly for this reason, GAO identified modernization of the federal role in housing finance as a high-risk area in early 2013. Any changes to the federal tools that support housing finance should be made in concert and with full recognition of the interdependence among FHA, the enterprises, and federal regulation. |
gao_GAO-07-195 | gao_GAO-07-195_0 | Most Reservists Have Civilian Health Insurance, and Many Reservists Choose to Maintain Their Civilian Insurance When Mobilized
Most reservists have civilian health insurance, and over half of all reservists choose to maintain their civilian health insurance during mobilization. Reservists with dependents are also more likely to have coverage than those that do not have dependents. Reservists obtained coverage through a variety of sources, and some reservists had more than one source of coverage. Reservists Covered by Health Insurance at Rates Similar to Those Found in the General Population
The percentage of reservists with health insurance—80 percent—is similar to that of the U.S. population between 18 and 64 years old. According to the survey and our interviews with DOD officials, many reservists maintained their civilian health insurance to avoid disruptions associated with changing to TRICARE and to ensure that their dependents could continue seeing their current providers who may not accept TRICARE. These briefings are supplemented by family support programs, Web sites, toll-free customer assistance numbers, and print materials. DOD Is Educating an Increased Number of Reservists and Dependents about TRICARE
Increased mobilizations of reservists and continuing changes to TRICARE eligibility have increased the number of reservists and dependents that DOD must educate about TRICARE. DOD Uses a Variety of Tools to Educate Reservists and Their Dependents about TRICARE
DOD relies on a several methods to educate reservists and their dependents about TRICARE. According to DOD officials, these days of training are often so full of critical information that it is difficult for the reservist to absorb all of the details of TRICARE. These briefings also occur at a time when a reservist may have already been eligible for TRICARE for up to 90 days without realizing it. In addition, briefings at mobilization and demobilization sites typically do not include reservists’ dependents. Additionally, 70 percent of reservists thought that TRICARE was either equal to or better than their civilian health insurance. However, when reservists did experience problems with TRICARE, the most commonly reported difficulties were (1) a general lack of understanding about the TRICARE program, (2) establishing TRICARE eligibility, (3) obtaining TRICARE assistance, and (4) finding a health care provider. DOD’s 2003 Status of Forces Survey showed that over 60 percent of the reservists who used TRICARE reported being satisfied with their own TRICARE benefits and with their dependents’ TRICARE benefits. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004 directed that we study the health insurance coverage of reservists and their dependents, DOD’s efforts to provide assistance specifically to reservists and their dependents to facilitate their access to and use of TRICARE benefits, and reservists’ and their dependents’ experiences using TRICARE. To do this, we (1) identified the extent to which reservists have civilian health insurance, (2) examined DOD’s efforts to educate reservists and their dependents about TRICARE, and (3) described reservists’ level of satisfaction with TRICARE and the types of problems reservists and their dependents experienced when using TRICARE. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the number of reservists mobilized for active duty has increased dramatically. Congress has expanded reservists' and their dependents' eligibility for TRICARE, the Department of Defense's (DOD) health insurance program. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2004 directed GAO to examine the health insurance coverage of reservists and their dependents. This report (1) identifies the extent to which reservists have civilian health insurance, (2) examines DOD's efforts to educate reservists and their dependents about TRICARE, and (3) describes reservists' level of satisfaction with TRICARE and the types of problems reservists and their dependents experienced when using it. To do this, GAO relied on interviews with DOD and DOD's survey data. GAO also administered a survey of TRICARE benefit assistance coordinators.
What GAO Found
Eighty percent of mobilized reservists have civilian health insurance--a rate similar to that of the U.S. population between 18 and 64 years old. The number of reservists with civilian health insurance varies among reservists, with older reservists and reservists of higher rank having a greater rate of insurance than younger reservists and reservists of more junior rank, and reservists with dependents being more likely to have insurance than reservists without dependents. Reservists and their dependents obtained coverage through a variety of sources and over half of all reservists kept their civilian health insurance during mobilizations, even though they were eligible to enroll in TRICARE. Many reservists reported that they maintained their civilian coverage to avoid disruptions associated with a change to TRICARE and to ensure that their dependents could continue seeing their current providers who might not accept TRICARE. Increased mobilizations of reservists and successive legislative changes that have increased reservists' and their dependents' eligibility for TRICARE have complicated DOD's efforts to educate reservists about TRICARE. DOD's primary educational tools are the TRICARE briefings provided at mobilization sites and demobilization sites. According to DOD officials, these days of training are often so full of critical information that it is difficult for reservists to absorb all of the details of TRICARE. These briefings also occur at a time when a reservist may have already been eligible for TRICARE for up to 90 days without realizing it. These briefings are supplemented by family support programs, Web sites, toll-free customer assistance numbers, and print materials. DOD officials recognize the need to improve TRICARE education, but do not plan to provide additional TRICARE briefings for reservists and their dependents. When reservists used TRICARE, most reported that they were satisfied with TRICARE, although some reported experiencing difficulties. Over 60 percent of reservists who used TRICARE reported being satisfied. In addition, 70 percent of reservists thought TRICARE was either equal to or better than their civilian health insurance. However, according to DOD's and GAO's surveys, when reservists and their dependents did experience problems with TRICARE, a few of the most frequently reported problems include difficulties understanding TRICARE, establishing TRICARE eligibility, obtaining TRICARE assistance, and finding a health care provider that accepts TRICARE. |
gao_GAO-16-568 | gao_GAO-16-568_0 | Medicaid is a joint federal-state health care program that provides health insurance coverage to low income and medically needy individuals. Multiple Sources of Federal Support for Hospital Uncompensated Care Totaled Nearly $50 Billion Annually in 2013 and 2014
In fiscal years 2013 and 2014, the federal government made multiple types of payments to hospitals to help offset uncompensated care costs mainly through two programs—Medicare and Medicaid—totaling nearly $50 billion each year. Three Types of Payments Are Made in the Medicaid Program That Help Offset Hospital Uncompensated Care Costs, with Payments of over $35 Billion Annually in 2013 and 2014
In fiscal years 2013 and 2014, state Medicaid programs spent over $35 billion in each year for payments that helped hospitals offset their uncompensated care costs. These are Medicaid payments that Congress established for hospitals serving large numbers of Medicaid and low-income individuals to help offset their uncompensated costs. Federal Tax Law Provides Additional Financial Benefits for Tax-Exempt Non-Profit Hospitals Incurring Uncompensated Care Costs with Benefits Estimated in the Billions Annually
In addition to payments from Medicaid and Medicare that offset hospital uncompensated care costs, federal tax law provides additional financial benefits to hospitals that qualify for tax-exempt status. Medicaid and Medicare Payments That Help Offset Hospital Uncompensated Care Costs Are Generally Based on Similar Factors
The basis for determining the different types of Medicaid and Medicare payments that help offset hospital uncompensated care costs varies somewhat by type of payment. However, the majority of the different payment types are based on similar factors—generally hospitals’ costs or workloads related to providing services to Medicaid, uninsured, or low- income Medicare patients, or some combination of these patients. Second, CMS does not account for Medicaid payments made to hospitals that help offset uncompensated care costs, even though the bulk of Medicare UC payments are based on Medicaid patients treated. Medicare UC Payments Are Not Well Aligned with Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs As CMS Does Not Base Payments on the Costs of Treating Uninsured Patients
Medicare UC payments are not aligned with hospitals’ uncompensated care costs because CMS bases these payments mainly on hospitals’ historical Medicaid patient days rather than actual costs hospitals incurred treating uninsured patients. CMS officials acknowledged that using Medicaid patient days as a basis for Medicare UC payments could result in hospitals located in Medicaid expansion states receiving disproportionately higher payments. In addition, the hospitals in seven states that had expanded their Medicaid programs prior to 2014 may have also received higher Medicare UC payments through CMS’s use of Medicaid patient days to calculate Medicare UC payments. In an April 2016 proposed rule, the agency announced that it is considering using hospitals’ actual uncompensated care costs as the sole basis for making Medicare UC payments by fiscal year 2020 Additional steps will be needed to ensure that Medicare UC payments are aligned with hospital uncompensated care costs, including taking into account Medicaid payments that hospitals receive for treating the uninsured. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure efficient use of federal resources, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following two actions: 1. Improve alignment of Medicare UC payments with hospital uncompensated care costs by basing these payments on hospital uncompensated care costs; and 2. Account for Medicaid payments a hospital has received that offset uncompensated care costs when determining hospital uncompensated care costs for the purposes of making Medicare UC payments to individual hospitals. In its written comments, HHS concurred with both our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospitals have historically incurred billions of dollars in costs for services provided to uninsured and other low-income individuals. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) offered ways for states to increase insurance levels including by expanding their Medicaid programs. In anticipation of the expected decline in the uninsured and uncompensated hospital costs, PPACA also reduced federal support for hospitals serving a disproportionate share of low-income and uninsured individuals and redirected some support to Medicare UC payments for hospital uncompensated care costs.
GAO was asked to examine federal support for hospital uncompensated care. GAO examined (1) the key sources and amounts of federal support for hospital uncompensated care costs; (2) the basis for determining hospital uncompensated care payments made under Medicaid and Medicare; and (3) the extent to which Medicare UC payments align with hospital uncompensated care costs. GAO analyzed federal payment data for fiscal years 2013 and 2014, the most recent available, reviewed relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
Key sources of federal support for hospitals incurring costs for services provided to uninsured and other low-income individuals (uncompensated care costs) include multiple types of Medicaid and Medicare payments totaling about $50 billion annually. GAO's analysis shows that through Medicaid, a joint federal-state program for low-income individuals, states made three types of payments that helped offset uncompensated care in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 totaling over $35 billion annually. Medicare, a federal program for aged and certain disabled individuals, made two types of payments in 2013 and three in 2014—including a new type called Medicare Uncompensated Care (UC) payments—totaling over $14 billion annually. Federal tax law also provides tax benefits—estimated by researchers to be billions of dollars annually—to tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals that incur uncompensated care costs.
The basis for determining these different types of Medicaid and Medicare payments varies somewhat by type of payment. As shown in the table, however, the payment types are based on similar factors—generally hospitals' costs or workloads related to providing services to Medicaid, uninsured, or low-income Medicare patients, or some combination of these.
Medicare's UC payments are not well aligned with hospital uncompensated care costs for two reasons. First, payments are largely based on hospitals' Medicaid workload rather than actual hospital uncompensated care costs. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) officials acknowledge this could result in payments not aligned with uncompensated costs, particularly in states that have expanded Medicaid resulting in fewer uninsured individuals and lower uncompensated costs. In an April 2016 proposed rule, the agency announced that it is considering using hospitals' actual uncompensated care costs as the basis for making Medicare UC payments. Second, CMS does not account for hospitals' Medicaid payments that offset uncompensated care costs when making Medicare UC payments, even though the bulk of Medicare's payments—about 85 percent or $7.7 billion in 2014—were made on the basis of hospitals' Medicaid workloads, for which hospitals may have also received Medicaid payments. CMS officials said that the Medicaid and Medicare programs are operated separately. Medicare UC payments that are not aligned with uncompensated care costs or adjusted to reflect Medicaid payments undermine CMS's efforts to efficiently pay for health care services.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take two actions: (1) improve alignment of Medicare UC payments with hospital uncompensated care costs; and (2) account for Medicaid payments made when making Medicare UC payments to individual hospitals. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-289 | gao_GAO-05-289_0 | Economic Reviews Did Not Always Provide Decision Makers with an Environmental Justice Analysis
EPA is required under the Clean Air Act, other statutes, and executive orders to prepare an economic review for proposed rules, and the type of economic review to be prepared depends on the rule’s impact on the economy. All Three Proposed Rules Mentioned Environmental Justice, but the Discussion Appeared Contradictory in One Case
According to EPA’s director of regulatory management, the agency did not have any guidance on whether environmental justice should be included in the preamble of a rule at the time the gasoline and diesel rules were developed. In one section, EPA stated that it did not believe the rule would raise any environmental justice issues, but in another section, it specifically invited comments on an option to concentrate commercial, industrial, and residential growth, which it said “may raise environmental justice concerns.”
EPA Considered Environmental Justice to Varying Degrees in Finalizing Three Rules
In all three cases, EPA received and generally responded to public comments on environmental justice, although in one case it did not explain the basis for its response. EPA published all three final rules, and EPA officials told us that they believed that these rules did not create an environmental justice issue. The Diesel Rule
In response to an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, several commenters expressed concern that the diesel rule would lead to increased refinery emissions of regulated pollutants. In addition, because EPA decided to finalize the ozone implementation rule in two phases, the addendum addressed only the part of the rule that was finalized, not the entire proposed rule. Thus, the assessment of the final rule did not change the conclusion of the assessment of the proposed rule, namely that the ozone implementation rule did not create any environmental justice issues. Conclusions
We found some evidence that EPA officials considered environmental justice when drafting or finalizing the three clean air rules we examined. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure that environmental justice issues are adequately identified and considered when clean air rules are being drafted and finalized, we recommend that the EPA Administrator take the following four actions: ensure that the workgroups devote attention to environmental justice while drafting and finalizing clean air rules; enhance the workgroups’ ability to identify potential environmental justice issues through such steps as (1) providing workgroup members with guidance and training to help them identify potential environmental justice problems and (2) involving environmental justice coordinators in the workgroups when appropriate; improve assessments of potential environmental justice impacts in economic reviews by identifying the data and developing the modeling techniques that are needed to assess such impacts; and direct cognizant officials to respond fully, when feasible, to public comments on environmental justice, for example, by better explaining the rationale for EPA’s beliefs and by providing its supporting data. EPA’s Consideration of Environmental Justice in the Drafting of Three Proposed Clean Air Rules
Because of substantial congressional interest, we are including information about how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considered environmental justice during the drafting of three additional proposed clean air rules, up through their publication in the Federal Register. GAO Comments
1. 2. However, our objective was not to identify such issues with the rules, but to review how EPA considered environmental justice in developing the rules. As we stated, public commenters did raise such issues about all three rules as they were proposed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Executive Order 12898 made achieving "environmental justice" part of the mission of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies. According to EPA, environmental justice involves fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and incomes. EPA developed guidance for considering environmental justice during the development of rules under the Clean Air Act and other activities. GAO was asked to examine how EPA considered environmental justice during two phases of developing clean air rules: (1) drafting the rule, including activities of the workgroup that considered regulatory options, the economic review of the rule's costs, and making the proposed rule available for public comment, and (2) finalizing the rule, including addressing public comments and revising the economic review. GAO reviewed the three clean air rules described in the next column.
What GAO Found
When drafting the three clean air rules, EPA generally devoted little attention to environmental justice. While EPA guidance on rulemaking states that workgroups should consider environmental justice early in this process, GAO found that a lack of guidance and training for workgroup members on identifying environmental justice issues may have limited their ability to identify such issues. In addition, while EPA officials stated that economic reviews of proposed rules consider potential environmental justice impacts, the gasoline and diesel rules did not provide decision makers with environmental justice analyses, and EPA has not identified all the types of data necessary to analyze such impacts. Finally, in all three rules, EPA mentioned environmental justice when they were published in proposed form, but the discussion in the ozone implementation rule was contradictory. In finalizing the three clean air rules, EPA considered environmental justice to varying degrees. Public commenters stated that all three rules, as proposed, raised environmental justice issues. In responding to such comments on the gasoline rule, EPA published its belief that the rule would not create such issues, but did not publish the data and assumptions supporting its belief. Specifically, EPA did not publish (1) its estimate that potentially harmful air emissions would increase in 26 of the 86 counties with refineries affected by the rule or (2) its assumption that this estimate overstated the eventual increases in refinery emissions. For the diesel rule, in response to refiners' concerns that their permits could be delayed if environmental justice issues were raised by citizens, EPA stated that the permits would not be delayed by such issues. Moreover, after reviewing the comments, EPA did not change its final economic reviews to discuss the gasoline and diesel rules' potential environmental justice impacts. Finally, the portions of the ozone implementation rule that prompted the comments about environmental justice were not included in the final rule. Overall, EPA officials said that these rules, as published in final form, did not create an environmental justice issue. |
gao_GAO-08-646T | gao_GAO-08-646T_0 | The act defined the department’s missions to include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages, and assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United States. DHS began operations in March 2003. DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Management Functions, but Has Faced Challenges in Its Implementation Efforts
DHS has made progress in implementing its management functions in the areas of acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property management. DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition outcomes and taken some positive steps to organize and assess the acquisition function, but continues to lack clear accountability for the outcomes of acquisition dollars spent. In September 2007, we reported on continued acquisition oversight issues at DHS, identifying that the department has not fully ensured proper oversight of its contractors providing services closely supporting inherently government functions. However, since its establishment, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified or “clean” audit opinion on its financial statements. For fiscal year 2007, the independent auditor issued a disclaimer on DHS’s financial statements and identified eight significant deficiencies in DHS’s internal control over financial reporting, seven of which were so serious that they qualified as material weaknesses. DHS has taken steps to prepare corrective action plans for its internal control weaknesses by, for example, developing and issuing a departmentwide strategic plan for the corrective action plan process and holding workshops on corrective action plans. Human Capital Management. DHS has since taken actions to implement its human capital system. For example, DHS has not yet taken steps to fully link its human capital planning to overall agency strategic planning nor has it established a market-based and more performance- oriented pay system. DHS’s information technology management efforts should include: developing and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain system investments; defining and following a corporate process for informed decision making by senior leadership about competing information technology investment options; applying system and software development and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; establishing a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect information and systems; having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer. DHS has also developed an information technology human capital plan that is largely consistent with federal guidance and associated best practices. Real Property Management. However, in August 2007 we reported that DHS had yet to demonstrate full implementation of its asset management plan and full use of asset inventory information and performance measures in management decision making. Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS’s Implementation Efforts
Our work has identified various cross-cutting issues that have hindered DHS’s progress in its management areas. DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts, has not yet issued an updated strategic plan, and has not yet fully developed adequate performance measures or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. Accountability and transparency are critical to the department effectively integrating its management functions and implementing its mission responsibilities. Since we highlighted this issue last year to this subcommittee, our access to information at DHS has improved. Such a transformation is a difficult undertaking for any organization and can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less daunting circumstances. Nevertheless, DHS’s 5-year anniversary provides an opportunity for the department to review how it has matured as an organization. As part of our broad range of work reviewing DHS management and mission programs, we will continue to assess in the coming months DHS’s progress in addressing high-risk issues. In particular, we will continue to assess the progress made by the department in its transformation and information sharing efforts, and assessing whether any progress made is sustainable over the long term. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in March 2003 with missions that include preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing damages from attacks that occur, and helping the nation recover from any attacks. GAO has reported that the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous management challenge. GAO's prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. This testimony addresses (1) the progress made by DHS in implementing its management functions; and (2) key issues that have affected the department's implementation efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2007 report evaluating DHS's progress between March 2003 and July 2007; selected reports issued since July 2007; and GAO's institutional knowledge of homeland security and management issues.
What GAO Found
Within each of its management areas--acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property management--DHS has made some progress, but has also faced challenges. DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition outcomes and taken some positive steps to organize and assess the acquisition function, but continues to lack clear accountability for the outcomes of acquisition dollars spent. The department also has not fully ensured proper oversight of its contractors providing services closely supporting inherently government functions. DHS has designated a Chief Financial Officer and taken actions to prepare corrective action plans for its internal control weaknesses. However, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified audit opinion of its financial statements, and for fiscal year 2007 the independent auditor identified significant deficiencies in DHS's internal control over financial reporting. DHS has taken actions to implement its human capital system by, for example, issuing a departmental training plan and human capital operational plan. Among other things, DHS still needs to implement a human capital system linked to its strategic plan, establish a market-based and more performance-oriented pay system, and seek more routine feedback from employees. DHS has taken actions to develop information technology management controls, such as developing an information technology human capital plan and developing policies to ensure the protection of sensitive information. However, DHS has not yet fully implemented a comprehensive information security program or a process to effectively manage information technology investments. DHS has developed an Asset Management Plan and established performance measures consistent with Federal Real Property standards. However, DHS has yet to demonstrate full implementation of its Asset Management Plan or full use of asset management inventory information. Various cross-cutting issues have affected DHS's implementation efforts. For example, DHS has not yet updated its strategic plan and put in place structures to help it manage for results. Accountability and transparency are critical to effectively implementingDHS's management functions. GAO has experienced delays in obtaining access to needed information from DHS, though over the past year, GAO's access has improved. GAO is hopeful that planned revisions to DHS's guidance for working with GAO will streamline our access to documents and officials. DHS's 5 year anniversary provides an opportunity for the department to review how it has matured as an organization. As part of our broad range of work, GAO will continue to assess DHS's progress in addressing high-risk issues. In particular, GAO will continue to assess the progress made by the department in its transformation efforts and whether any progress made is sustainable over the long term. |
gao_GAO-04-490 | gao_GAO-04-490_0 | In addition, FDA’s primary responsibilities as a regulatory body focus on human health and animal drug safety. Many of the studies we reviewed found that this transference poses significant risks for human health. Many Studies Have Found That Transference of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria from Animals to Humans Is a Human Health Risk, but Researchers Disagree About the Extent of Risk
The extent of harm to human health from the transference of antibiotic- resistant bacteria from animals is uncertain. However, a small number of studies contend that the health risks of the transference are minimal. Federal Agencies Have Increased Surveillance of Antibiotic Resistance from Animals to Assess Human Health Risk; Effectiveness of Risk Reduction Efforts Is Not Yet Known
FDA, CDC, and USDA have increased their surveillance activities related to antibiotic resistance in animals, humans, and retail meat since beginning these activities in 1996. FDA has not made drugs that are critically important for human health its top priority for review. To develop and evaluate strategies to mitigate resistance. The United States and Its Key Trading Partners and Competitors Differ in the Restrictions They Place on the Use of Antibiotics in Animals
The United States and several of its key trading partners, such as Canada and South Korea, and its competitors, such as the EU, differ in their use of antibiotics in animals in two important areas: the specific antibiotics that can be used for growth promotion and the availability of antibiotics to producers (by prescription or over the counter). Denmark, an EU member, already prohibits all over-the-counter sales. However, the presence of antibiotic residues in meat has had some impact on trade. For example, according to some government and industry officials, the United States’ use of antibiotics could become a trade issue with the EU as it phases out its use of all antibiotics for growth promotion by 2006. Although FDA has recently begun the reviews using this approach, its initial reviews have been for drugs other than those that are critically important for human health. Additionally, because more data on antibiotic use in animals—such as the total quantity used, by class; the species in which they are used; the purpose of the use, such as disease treatment or growth promotion; and the method used to administer—are needed to further address the risk of antibiotic resistance, we also recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Health and Human Services jointly develop and implement a plan for collecting data on antibiotic use in animals that will adequately (1) support research on the relationship between this use and emerging antibiotic-resistant bacteria, (2) help assess the human health risk related to antibiotic use in animals, and (3) help the agencies develop strategies to mitigate antibiotic resistance. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the (1) scientific evidence regarding the transference of antibiotic resistance from animals to humans through the consumption or handling of contaminated meat, and the extent of potential harm to human health, (2) progress federal agencies have made in assessing and addressing the human health risk of antibiotic use in animals, (3) types of data that federal agencies need to support research on the human health risk of antibiotic use in animals and the extent to which these data are collected, (4) use of antibiotics in animals in the United States compared with antibiotic use by its key agricultural trading partners and competitors, and (5) information that is available on the degree to which antibiotic use in animals has affected U.S. trade. We interviewed officials from HHS’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to determine how these agencies are assessing the human health risk of antibiotic use in animals. FDA is conducting risk assessments of some antibiotics important in human medicine. | Why GAO Did This Study
Antibiotic resistance is a growing public health concern; antibiotics used in animals raised for human consumption contributes to this problem. Three federal agencies address this issue--the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA). GAO examined (1) scientific evidence on the transference of antibiotic resistance from animals to humans and extent of potential harm to human health, (2) agencies' efforts to assess and address these risks, (3) the types of data needed to support research on these risks and extent to which the agencies collect these data, (4) use of antibiotics in animals in the United States compared with its key agricultural trading partners and competitors, and (5) information on how use has affected trade.
What GAO Found
Scientific evidence has shown that certain bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics are transferred from animals to humans through the consumption or handling of meat that contains antibiotic-resistant bacteria. However, researchers disagree about the extent of harm to human health from this transference. Many studies have found that the use of antibiotics in animals poses significant risks for human health, but a small number of studies contend that the health risks of the transference are minimal. Federal agencies have expanded their efforts to assess the extent of antibiotic resistance, but the effectiveness of their efforts to reduce human health risk is not yet known. FDA, CDC, and USDA have increased their surveillance activities related to antibiotic resistance. In addition, FDA has taken administrative action to prohibit the use of a fluroquinolone in poultry. FDA has identified animal drugs that are critically important for human health and begun reviewing currently approved drugs using a risk assessment framework that it recently issued for determining the human health risks of animal antibiotics. However, because FDA's initial reviews of approved animal drugs using this framework have focused on other drugs and have taken at least 2 years, FDA's reviews of critically important drugs may not be completed for some time. Although federal agencies have made some progress in monitoring antibiotic resistance, they lack important data on antibiotic use in animals to support research on human health risks. These data, such as the type and quantity of antibiotics and purpose for their use by species, are needed to determine the linkages between antibiotic use in animals and emerging resistant bacteria. In addition, these data can help assess human health risks from this use and develop and evaluate strategies for mitigating resistance. The United States and several of its key agricultural trading partners and competitors differ in their use of antibiotics in animals in two important areas: the specific antibiotics allowed for growth promotion and availability of antibiotics to producers (by prescription or over the counter). For example, the United States and Canada allow some antibiotics important in human medicine to be used for growth promotion, but the European Union (EU) and New Zealand do not. Regarding over the counter sales of antibiotics, the United States is generally less restrictive than the EU. Antibiotic use in animals has not yet been a significant factor affecting U.S. international trade in meat and poultry, although the presence of antibiotic residues in meat has had some impact, according to government and industry officials. Instead, countries raise other food safety issues, such as hormone use and animal diseases. However, according to these officials, antibiotic use in animals may emerge as a factor in the future. They particularly noted that the EU could object to U.S. use of antibiotics for growth promotion as its member countries are phasing out that use. |
gao_HEHS-95-31 | gao_HEHS-95-31_0 | Labor Certification More Timely
We found that the timeliness of the certification process has improved. 1). State Role Ensures Intervention
We found that the states’ role in the certification process ensures intervention in the form of rapid response services for workers filing a NAFTA-TAA petition. All dislocated workers are eligible for EDWAA services regardless of the reason for the dislocation. The state officials believed that accessing these benefits might be difficult because of limited guidance from Labor, unclear authority, and a slow and cumbersome funding mechanism. For example, they told us that Labor has not provided regulations that clearly define secondary workers. Benefits More Closely Tied to Training, but Restrictions Hamper Tailoring
The NAFTA-TAA law more closely tied income benefits to adjustment assistance by eliminating waivers and requiring participants to enroll in training. While linking cash benefits to training helps to ensure that workers get the assistance needed, especially with delays in notification, NAFTA-TAA restrictions have resulted in some participants receiving incomplete assessments and remedial assistance, and a limited mix of services. Like TAA, the NAFTA-TAA program does not require ongoing support, follow-up, or a system to monitor performance. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether Labor made the changes needed to provide services to NAFTA-affected workers, we interviewed officials from the Department of Labor’s Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance regarding the implementation of the NAFTA-TAA program and analyzed nationwide petition data collected by Labor. I.1). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Labor's efforts to provide services to workers affected by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), focusing on: (1) shortening the time frame for certification; (2) including states in the certification process; (3) broadening eligibility requirements; and (4) tying income support more closely to retraining and eliminating waivers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Labor has shortened its certification process for the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Program, resulting in 94 percent of NAFTA-TAA determinations being made in 40 days or less; (2) the states' added role in the NAFTA-TAA certification process has ensured rapid response services for dislocated workers; (3) although Labor has broadened the NAFTA-TAA eligibility requirements to include secondary workers, limited guidance, unclear authority, and a slow and cumbersome funding mechanism make it difficult for such workers to access benefits; (4) while Labor has more closely tied cash benefits to training by eliminating waivers and requiring workers to enroll in training, these restrictions have resulted in some workers receiving incomplete assessments and remedial assistance, and a limited mix of services; (5) Labor has not adequately addressed the lack of ongoing support, follow-up, and performance monitoring for NAFTA-TAA; and (6) while Labor has encouraged closer coordination between federal dislocated worker programs, it has not formally required states to track NAFTA-TAA participants. |
gao_GAO-13-638 | gao_GAO-13-638_0 | Background
Having sufficient quantities of qualified personnel to design, oversee, and acquire space assets—on which DOD expects to spend $8 billion in fiscal year 2013—is critical to DOD’s ability to carry out its mission. Funding for other DOD civilian personnel is generally located in the O&M appropriation. Following the implementation of the Acquisition Improvement Plan, as part of the budget process for fiscal year 2012 the Air Force requested that Congress approve a pilot program to move funding for SMC acquisition civilian personnel to its RDT&E appropriation. The Air Force Did Not Evaluate the Impact of the Pilot Program
Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget Submission: Air Force Justification Book Volume 2, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation. Further, the Air Force has not made plans to evaluate the outcome of the pilot program. However, Air Force financial management officials told us that moving funding to its RDT&E appropriation would not necessarily mean that space acquisition personnel would be excluded from any general reductions to civilian personnel funding, and SMC officials confirmed that SMC acquisition civilian personnel funding has continued to be impacted by general reductions following the pilot program. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) officials told us that—while they do not have an opinion of the pilot program—they are relying on the Air Force to report to them on the pilot’s outcomes. However, because the Air Force did not establish clear and consistent program objectives or a data collection plan to evaluate the benefits of its pilot program, they were unable to evaluate whether potential impacts resulting from the pilot were advantages or disadvantages. Without establishing goals and completing a data collection plan to evaluate the pilot program, the Air Force also has not applied the remaining two established practices—developing processes for approving, reporting, and monitoring the pilot program as well as communicating evaluation results to stakeholders. The Air Force Used Existing Approval Processes Identified by DOD to Realign Funds Appropriated for Acquisition Civilian Personnel to Other Programs
Following the move of SMC acquisition civilian personnel funding to its RDT&E appropriation, the Air Force did not obligate $29.5 million of the $187.1 million appropriated for SMC acquisition civilian personnel in fiscal year 2012, and Air Force officials told us that these funds were unneeded due to the civilian hiring controls the Air Force began implementing in May 2011. Specifically, the Air Force used the following processes to realign SMC acquisition civilian personnel funding to other purposes:
First, the Air Force realigned $6.7 million to other programs within its RDT&E appropriation, including $5.7 million to the Small Business Innovative Research fund.fund did not require congressional notification because it did not use DOD’s general transfer authority and was used to address mandatory spending requirements; the realignment of an additional $1 million to other Air Force needs was below the $10 million threshold DOD has identified for prior approval by the congressional defense committees. According to Air Force officials, the Omnibus Reprogramming request process does not identify where specific funds are realigned to—instead the request identifies funding increases or decreases by individual program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To determine the impact of moving funds for SMC acquisition civilian personnel to the RDT&E appropriation, and whether this change should be expanded to other acquisition civilian workforce communities, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force direct the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller, to take the following four actions:
Develop objectives that link to the goals of the pilot program. Develop processes and procedures for approving, reporting, and monitoring the pilot program. Develop and implement a data collection and analysis plan for evaluating pilot performance. Communicate the evaluation results to stakeholders. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our four recommended actions (see app. In concurring with our recommendations, DOD stated that the Air Force will evaluate the pilot program to ensure any conversion places the control of the resources at the appropriate level as they are vetted through the Air Force for approval. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and DOD depend on space assets to support national security, civil, and commercial activities. Having sufficient quantities of qualified personnel to acquire space assets--on which DOD expects to spend $8 billion in fiscal year 2013--is critical to DOD's ability to carry out its mission. Approximately 1,800 federal civilians at the Air Force SMC manage the acquisition of space systems. During fiscal year 2012, the Air Force implemented a pilot program that moved $187.1 million for SMC's acquisition civilian personnel from its O&M to its RDT&E appropriation.
GAO was mandated to review the Air Force pilot program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the Air Force evaluated the impact of the pilot, and (2) the processes in place to manage realignment of the funds. GAO obtained and reviewed documentation of the pilot implementation; compared the implementation with established practices GAO has identified for implementing and evaluating pilot programs; and interviewed officials at the Air Force and DOD. GAO also reviewed applicable regulations and guidance about realigning funds and interviewed knowledgeable officials.
What GAO Found
The Air Force did not evaluate its pilot program that moved funding for Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) acquisition civilian personnel from its 1-year Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation to its 2-year Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation. In addition, the Air Force is considering using this pilot program to inform funding changes for other sections of its civilian workforce. GAO's prior work has identified the following practices for implementing and evaluating pilot programs: (1) develop objectives that link to the goals of the pilot; (2) develop processes for monitoring the pilot; (3) develop and implement a data collection and analysis plan for evaluating the pilot; and (4) communicate evaluation results to stakeholders. When implementing the pilot program, the Air Force did not follow these practices, and primarily focused on ensuring that administrative changes were made accurately such as ensuring employees received pay on time. For example, while a variety of potential goals were identified for the pilot program by the Air Force in various documents; they were not clear or consistent. As a result, anecdotal opinions on the advantages or disadvantages of the pilot varied significantly. Air Force acquisition officials stated that the pilot program could protect the funding from general reductions, while conversely, Air Force financial management officials said that the pilot would not necessarily mean that space acquisition personnel would be excluded from general reductions to civilian personnel funding. Further, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) officials stated that they are relying on the Air Force to report to them on the pilot's outcomes, but the Air Force has not completed a data collection plan to evaluate the pilot program and has not developed processes for monitoring the pilot program and communicating evaluation results to stakeholders. Without systematically evaluating the pilot program, the Air Force cannot determine if there is an advantage to expanding the pilot to other sections of the civilian workforce.
The Air Force used existing approval processes identified by DOD to realign funds appropriated for acquisition civilian personnel to other purposes. Following the move of SMC acquisition civilian personnel funding to its RDT&E appropriation, the Air Force determined that $29.5 million of the $187.1 million appropriated for SMC acquisition civilian personnel in fiscal year 2012 was unneeded due to the civilian hiring controls the Air Force began implementing in May 2011. The Air Force realigned these funds to other requirements. Specifically, the Air Force realigned $6.7 million to other programs within its RDT&E appropriation--including $5.7 million to the Small Business Innovative Research fund--and obtained prior approval from Congress to realign $22.8 million out of the RDT&E appropriation as part of an Omnibus Reprogramming request. The Omnibus Reprogramming request process does not identify where specific funds are to be realigned--instead the request identifies funding increases or decreases by individual program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force evaluate the pilot program, to determine the impact of moving funding for acquisition civilian personnel to the RDT&E appropriation, and the value of expanding this change to other Air Force civilian workforces. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all four recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-124 | gao_GAO-05-124_0 | BLM, Forest Service, BIA, and MMS each have similar processes for managing oil and gas activity on land within their jurisdiction. For example, BLM planning decisions can be protested to the BLM director prior to challenging the decision in federal court, while Forest Service planning decisions can be appealed to the next highest officer prior to any challenge of the decision that might be brought in federal court. An appeal is a request to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA)—a body of administrative judges within the Department of the Interior—to review a BLM decision. The public can challenge leasing decisions through protests, appeals to IBLA, and litigation. A Forest Service official has 160 days to render a decision on an appeal. IBIA decisions may be litigated in federal court. The appeal and litigation process is the same as for the exploration stage. At the planning and leasing stages, MMS decisions involving its 5-year plan and lease sales are not subject to informal reviews or appeals to IBLA, but can be litigated in federal court. IBLA has no time frame to decide appeals. BLM Does Not Systematically Gather and Use Public Challenge Information to Manage Its Oil and Gas Program
BLM headquarters does not systematically gather and use nationwide information on public challenges to manage its oil and gas program. While there is an agencywide system that state offices use to collect data on public challenges during leasing, it is not used to collect public challenge data during the planning, exploration, or operations stages. However, the system is used inconsistently because BLM has not issued clear guidance on which data the state offices are required to enter into the system. Because the agencywide system does not track all the public challenge data necessary for managing workload, headquarters and state offices also use multiple, independent data collection systems for the various stages of oil and gas development. BLM is in the process of developing a new national Lease Sale System that provides an opportunity to standardize collection of data on public challenges at the leasing stage. However, BLM has not decided whether the new system will track public challenge information. The spreadsheets are not integrated with LR2000 or one another. Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf Open to Offshore Oil and Gas Development Experienced Few Public Challenges
According to data provided by MMS officials, during fiscal years 1999 through 2003, MMS was challenged on only one of its 1,631 decisions approving offshore oil and gas development and production and only one of its 1,997 decisions approving oil and gas exploration. Both of the challenged MMS decisions concerned access to mineral resources on the outer continental shelf off the coast of Alaska. Table 2 shows the number of exploration and operations decisions approved by MMS between 1999 and 2003 and the number that were challenged by the public. The new agencywide system that BLM is developing will provide an opportunity for the agency to maintain public challenge data in a standardized format at least for the leasing stage and provide it with more reliable data from which to make resource allocation decisions, but the agency has not yet determined whether it will include public challenge data in the system. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix presents the scope and methodology we used to gather information on the stages when agency decisions about oil and gas development can be challenged by the public and the extent to which the Bureau of Land Management gathers and uses public challenge data to manage its onshore oil and gas program. To describe the stages when oil and gas development decisions can be challenged by the public, we analyzed pertinent laws, rules, and regulations and interviewed agency officials pertaining to oil and gas development processes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and Minerals Management Service (MMS) in the Department of the Interior and Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. consumption of oil and natural gas increasingly outpaces domestic production, a gap that is expected to grow rapidly over the next 20 years. There has been increasing concern about U.S. reliance on foreign energy sources. One option being considered is to increase domestic production of resources on land under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service. GAO determined (1) the stages when agency decisions about oil and gas development can be challenged by the public, (2) the extent to which BLM gathers and uses public challenge data to manage its oil and gas program, and (3) for fiscal years 1999-2003, the number of MMS offshore development decisions that were challenged.
What GAO Found
At the four stages of developing oil and gas resources--planning, exploration, leasing, and operations, BLM, the Forest Service, BIA, and MMS allow for public challenges to agency decisions. However, the agencies have different procedures for processing challenges that occur within the stages. For example, BLM leasing decisions can be challenged to a BLM state director, further appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), and litigated in federal court. Forest Service leasing decisions, however, sometimes can be appealed through the Forest Service supervisory chain of command and litigated in federal court. The Forest Service has no separate appeals board within the Department of Agriculture, such as IBLA, to review decisions. In addition, unlike BLM, the Forest Service has specific time frames during which appeals must be decided. BIA procedures offer opportunities for public challenges at the exploration and leasing stages, which are the only stages BIA makes decisions related to oil and gas development. MMS regulations do not provide for appeals at the planning or leasing stages, but do provide for appeals to IBLA during the exploration and operations stages. All MMS decisions could potentially be litigated in federal court. BLM does not systematically gather and use nationwide information on public challenges to manage its oil and gas program. BLM has a system that state offices use to collect data on public challenges during leasing, but the state offices use it inconsistently because they lack clear guidance from headquarters on which data to enter. As a result, the system does not provide consistent information that BLM headquarters can use to assess workload impacts on its state offices and to make staffing and funding resource allocation decisions. Because this system does not track all the public challenge data necessary for managing workload, headquarters and state offices also use multiple, independent data collection systems that are not integrated with one another or BLM's system. BLM is in the process of developing a new system that provides an opportunity to standardize collection of data on public challenges at the leasing stage. However, it has not decided whether the new system will be used to track public challenge information. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, MMS was challenged on only one of its 1,631 decisions approving offshore oil and gas development and production and only one of its 1,997 decisions approving offshore oil and gas exploration. Both decisions concerned land on the outer continental shelf off the coast of Alaska and were challenged by Alaskans, a Native American tribe, or an environmental interest group on the basis that the decisions violated the National Environmental Policy Act and other laws. One of the decisions was litigated in federal court and the court decided against the challenges. The other decision was appealed to IBLA but the company discontinued work before a decision was reached. |
gao_HEHS-95-58 | gao_HEHS-95-58_0 | To identify the characteristics of immigrant recipients who could lose benefits under the proposals, we reviewed current SSI and AFDC policies and four key welfare reform proposals. Legal Immigrants More Likely to Receive Benefits Than Citizens
Overall, immigrants as a group are more likely than citizens to be receiving SSI or AFDC benefits. Researchers have noted that immigrant households have larger numbers of small children and elderly or disabled persons and contain more members with relatively little schooling and low skill levels. Immigrants Represent a Growing Percentage of SSI and AFDC Caseloads
As a percentage of all SSI recipients, immigrants receiving SSI benefits have increased dramatically. In total, immigrants received an estimated $3.3 billion in SSI benefits in 1993. Between 1983 and 1993, the number of immigrants receiving aged benefits quadrupled (106,600 to 416,420), while the number of citizens receiving aged benefits decreased by 25 percent (1,408,800 to 1,058,432). In 1993, almost 722,000 immigrants, including adults and children, received an estimated $1.2 billion in AFDC benefits. Moreover, immigrant recipients are more likely than citizen recipients to be 75 years old or older. 2.) 3.) Most immigrants receiving AFDC were either lawful permanent residents or refugees or asylees. 4.) The Impacts of Welfare Reform Proposals Vary
The estimated number of immigrants affected by welfare reform proposals varies. 4, only two groups of immigrants would remain eligible for benefits—refugees residing in the country fewer than 6 years and lawful permanent residents 75 years old or older who have resided in the United States for at least 5 years. CBO estimated that federal savings from this proposal for the SSI and AFDC programs would be $9.2 billion and $1 billion, respectively, over the period 1996-99. Recognizing these limitations, CBO estimated that the administration’s proposal would save nearly $2.9 billion in SSI, Medicaid, and AFDC benefits over the next 4 years. Immigrants may also change their naturalization and immigration patterns. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effect of proposed welfare reform legislation on legal immigrant welfare recipients, focusing on: (1) legal immigrants' and citizens' use of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs; (2) the numbers of legal immigrants receiving SSI or AFDC benefits; (3) the immigrant recipients that could lose benefits under the welfare reform proposals; and (4) the possible impacts of restricting immigrants' SSI and AFDC benefits on federal welfare programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) a greater percentage of legal immigrants receive SSI or AFDC benefits than do citizens; (2) immigrants tend to be poorer than citizens and have more small children, more elderly or disabled family members, and more family members with minimal education and skill levels; (3) the number of immigrants receiving SSI benefits more than quadrupled between 1983 and 1993 and these immigrants now comprise over 11 percent of all SSI recipients; (4) legal immigrants received an estimated $1.2 billion in AFDC benefits in 1993; (5) most immigrant recipients are lawful permanent residents or refugees and are 75 years old or older; (6) one welfare reform proposal would save $9.2 billion in SSI benefits and $1 billion in AFDC benefits over 4 years by dropping about 500,000 immigrant recipients from each program; (7) the Administration's proposal would affect fewer immigrants and extend the length of sponsorship and tighten eligibility standards; (8) the two welfare reform proposals could save between $3.3 billion and $21.7 billion over 4 years; and (9) the loss of benefits could cause immigrants to change their immigration, work, and naturalization patterns or to turn to state welfare programs for support. |
gao_GAO-07-629 | gao_GAO-07-629_0 | Over the years since we first began auditing IRS’s financial statements in fiscal year 1992, we have closed out over 200 financial management-related recommendations we made based on actions IRS has taken to improve its internal controls and operational efficiency. These internal control issues, and the resulting recommendations, can be directly traced to the control activities in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Appendix I presents a list of (1) recommendations we have made based on our financial statement audits and other financial management-related work that we had not previously reported as closed prior to our fiscal year 2006 audit, (2) the status of each of these recommendations and corrective actions taken or planned as of April 2007 as reported to us by IRS, and (3) our analysis of whether the issues that gave rise to the recommendations have been effectively and fully addressed based on the work performed during our fiscal year 2006 financial statement audit. Open Recommendations Grouped by Control Activity
Linking the open recommendations from our financial audits and other financial management-related work, and the issues that gave rise to them, to internal control activities that are central to IRS’s tax administration responsibilities provides insight regarding their significance. IRS is charged with collecting over $2 trillion in taxes each year, a significant amount of which is collected in the form of checks and cash accompanied by tax returns and related information. However, IRS also has a number of internal control issues that relate to recording transactions, documenting events, and tracking the processing of taxpayer receipts or information, which do not depend upon improvements in information systems. The following three open short-term recommendations would assist IRS in its management of human capital. IRS has made substantial progress in improving its financial management since its first financial audit, as evidenced by consecutive clean audit opinions on its financial statements for the past 7 years, resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and the closing of hundreds of financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work throughout IRS and sustained commitment of IRS leadership. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to fully address the financial management challenges the agency faces. Effective implementation of the recommendations we have made and continue to make through our financial audits and related work could greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management. We will review the effectiveness of further corrective actions IRS has taken or will take and the status of IRS’s progress in addressing all open recommendations as part of our audit of IRS’s fiscal year 2007 financial statements. IRS’s actions to address this issue are currently in process. Management Report: Improvements Needed in IRS’s Internal Controls (GAO-07-689R, May 11, 2007)
Because this is a recent recommendation, GAO did not obtain information on IRS’s status in addressing it. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its role as the nation's tax collector, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in annually collecting over $2 trillion in taxes, processing hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. Since its first audit of IRS's financial statements in fiscal year 1992, GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in IRS's financial management operations. In related reports, GAO has recommended corrective action to address those weaknesses. Each year, as part of the annual audit of IRS's financial statements, GAO not only makes recommendations to address any new weaknesses identified but also follows up on the status of weaknesses GAO identified in previous years' audits. The purpose of this report is to (1) assist IRS management in tracking the status of audit recommendations and actions needed to fully address them and (2) demonstrate how the recommendations relate to control activities central to IRS's mission and goals. GAO is making no new recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
IRS has made significant progress in improving its internal controls and financial management since its first financial statement audit in 1992, as evidenced by 7 consecutive years of clean audit opinions on its financial statements, the resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and the closing of over 200 financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work and commitment at the top levels of the agency. However, IRS still faces financial management challenges. At the beginning of GAO's audit of IRS's fiscal year 2006 financial statements, 72 financial management-related recommendations from prior audits remained open because IRS had not fully addressed the issues that gave rise to them. During the fiscal year 2006 financial audit, IRS took actions that enabled GAO to close 25 of those recommendations. At the same time, GAO identified additional internal control issues resulting in 28 new recommendations. In total, 75 recommendations currently remain open. To assist IRS in evaluating and improving internal controls, GAO categorized the 75 open recommendations by various internal control activities which, in turn, were grouped into three broad control activity groupings. The continued existence of internal control weaknesses that gave rise to these recommendations represents a serious obstacle that IRS needs to overcome. Effective implementation of GAO's recommendations can greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management and can help enable it to more effectively carry out its tax administration responsibilities. IRS acknowledged the status of GAO's recommendations and indicated its desire to ensure that its corrective actions appropriately address its internal control issues. |
gao_GAO-04-663 | gao_GAO-04-663_0 | In 2002, of the 42,815 fatalities on the nation’s roadways, 25,849 (60 percent) were on rural roads. Four Factors Contribute to Rural Road Fatalities
One or more of four factors contribute to rural road fatalities—human behavior, roadway environment, vehicles, and the degree of care for victims after a crash. Human behavioral factors involve actions taken by or the condition of the driver and passenger of the automobile, including the use or nonuse of safety belts, the effects of alcohol or drugs, speeding and other traffic violations, and being distracted or drowsy when driving. Vehicle factors include vehicle- related failures and vehicle design issues that contribute to a crash and are important in both rural and urban crashes. Not using safety belts contributes to fatalities in rural crashes. As a result of these features, fatal crashes on two-lane rural roads are significant. For example, FHWA reports that over 70 percent of single-vehicle run-off-the-road fatalities occur on rural roadways and that about 90 percent of these were on two-lane rural roads. In addition, the Emergency Medical Services Division Chief at NHTSA told us that providing adequate medical care in rural areas is more challenging due, in part, to the lack of trauma services. The states are ultimately responsible for deciding on the use of the funding provided. Funding Is Provided to States to Eliminate Roadway Hazards and Improve Driving Behavior but Portion Used for Rural Safety Is Unknown
FHWA and NHTSA provide the states funding to support a variety of programs, part of which was used to improve rural road safety. In fiscal year 2003, FHWA provided states and the District of Columbia with about $27.4 billion in federal-aid highway funds. For fiscal year 2003, about $648 million went to the states for hazard elimination and highway-rail crossings programs—about $330 million of which went to improve rural road safety. The following are examples of rural-related projects supported in the five states we visited. Safety Improvements to Rural Roads Limited by the Combination of the Millions of Miles of Rural Roads, Low Volume of Traffic, and High Cost of Construction
Due to the extensive size of the rural highway system, the low volume of traffic on many rural roads and the high costs that would be incurred to make major safety changes, state and local governments find it difficult to undertake major safety construction programs on some rural roads. In addition, most of the rural mileage is on the lowest functional class of rural roads—local rural roads— that account for about 68 percent of the rural roads (about 2.1 million miles). States Are Limited in Using Federal Aid Highway Funds for Certain Rural Roadways
Because of program requirements, states cannot use all categories of federal-aid highway funds for certain rural roads. Proposals for New Safety Research. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for its review and comment. In discussing this report, agency officials noted that safety should be part of every project designed and built with federal-aid funds. To meet this requirement, we identified (1) factors contributing to rural road fatalities, (2) federal and state efforts to improve safety on the nation’s rural roads, and (3) challenges that may hinder making improvements in rural road safety. To identify the factors contributing to rural road fatalities, we supplemented an earlier GAO report, Highway Safety: Research Continues on a Variety of Factors That Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes (GAO-03-436, March 2003), with information from the Federal Highway Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and other organizations with knowledge of this issue, such as the National Association of Counties and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. Examples of State Activities to Improve Rural Road Safety
We obtained information from five states (California, Georgia, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Texas) on the number of fatalities on their roadways, the federal funding they receive for safety purposes, and a description of the types of projects these funds support. | Why GAO Did This Study
Traffic crashes are a major cause of death and injury in the United States. In 2002, there were 42,815 fatalities and over 2.9 million injuries on the nation's highways. Crashes on rural roads (roads in areas with populations of less than 5,000) account for over 60 percent of the deaths nationwide, or about 70 deaths each day. Further, the rate of fatalities per vehicle mile traveled on rural roads was over twice the urban fatality rate. GAO identified (1) the factors contributing to rural road fatalities, (2) federal and state efforts to improve safety on the nation's rural roads, and (3) the challenges that may hinder making improvements in rural road safety. GAO obtained information from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and other organizations with knowledge of these issues. In addition, GAO analyzed fatal crash data on rural roads from Department of Transportation databases and visited five states that account for about 20 percent of the nation's rural road mileage. GAO also contacted academic experts and examined legislative proposals for improving rural road safety. We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for its review and comment. In discussing this report, agency officials noted that safety should be part of every project designed and built with federal-aid highway funds.
What GAO Found
Four primary factors contribute to rural road fatalities--human behavior, roadway environment, vehicles, and the care victims receive after a crash. Human behavior involves the actions taken by or the condition of the driver and passengers. Human behaviors are important because almost 70 percent of the unrestrained (unbelted) fatalities between 2000 and 2002 occurred in rural crashes. Additionally, the majority of alcohol- and speeding-related fatalities occurred on rural roads. Roadway characteristics that contribute to rural crashes include narrow lanes, sharp curves, trees, and animals. Vehicle factors include problems that arise due to the design of vehicles and are important for both urban and rural roads. Care of crash victims also contributes to rural fatalities because of the additional time needed to provide medical attention and the quality of rural trauma care. In fiscal year 2003, FHWA provided about $27.4 billion in federal-aid highway funds to states. While many projects using these funds have safety features, the amount used for safety is not tracked. However, about $648 million of these funds went to the Hazard Elimination and Rail-Highway Crossings Programs and were specifically provided for safety purposes--about $330 million of which went to improve rural road safety. NHTSA provided about $671 million to states for activities that influence both rural and urban drivers' behavior in such areas as safety belt use, drunk driving, or speeding. States are ultimately responsible for selecting the projects to support with federal funding. The five states we visited used a portion of the funding received for rural road safety. Many challenges hinder efforts to improve rural road safety--for example, not all states have adopted safety belt and drunk driving laws that might curb behavior contributing to rural road fatalities. In addition, states are limited in using federal-aid highway funds for certain rural roads, and most rural roads are the responsibility of local governments that may lack the resources to undertake costly projects to improve road safety. Further, some states lack adequate crash data to support planning and evaluation of safety projects. Lastly, the nature of rural areas makes it difficult to provide adequate emergency medical care. |
gao_AIMD-96-106 | gao_AIMD-96-106_0 | IRS Does Not Yet Have a Comprehensive Strategy to Maximize Electronic Filings
IRS has identified increasing electronic filings as critical to achieving its modernization vision. This review included only TSM projects under development. It did not address operational systems, infrastructure, or management and technical support activities. Systems Architectures, Integration, and Testing Are Incomplete
We reported that IRS’ systems architectures, integration planning, and system testing and test planning were incomplete. No Single IRS Entity Controls All Information Systems Efforts
We reported that IRS had not established an effective organizational structure to consistently manage and control systems modernization organizationwide. IRS plans to increase the use of private-sector integration and development expertise by expanding the use of contractors to support TSM. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Because IRS still does not have (1) effective strategic information management practices needed to manage TSM as an investment, (2) mature and disciplined software development processes needed to assure that systems built will perform as intended, (3) a completed systems architecture that is detailed enough to guide and control systems development, and (4) a schedule for accomplishing any of the above, the Congress could consider limiting TSM spending to only cost-effective modernization efforts that (1) support ongoing operations and maintenance, (2) correct IRS’ pervasive management and technical weaknesses, (3) are small, represent low technical risk, and can be delivered in a relatively short time frame, and (4) involve deploying already developed systems, only if these systems have been fully tested, are not premature given the lack of a completed architecture, and produce a proven, verifiable business value. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) actions to correct GAO-identified management and technical weaknesses that jeopardize its tax systems modernization (TSM) efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS does not have a comprehensive strategy to maximize electronic filing because the present strategy targets only a small portion of the taxpayers likely to file electronically; (2) IRS strategic information management practices remain ineffective because information systems are not managed as investments; (3) IRS reengineering efforts lag behind the development of TSM projects; (4) IRS is improving its software development activities, but these improvements are not complete or institutionalized; (5) the IRS technical infrastructure, including systems architecture, integration planning, and system testing and test planning, is incomplete; (6) IRS has not established an effective organizational structure to consistently manage and control TSM; and (7) IRS plans to increase its use of contractors to facilitate TSM, but it has not been successful in managing all of its contractors. |
gao_GAO-16-261 | gao_GAO-16-261_0 | Reporting on more types of federal spending. Improving data quality. Table 2 provides a summary of our findings applying the ISO leading practices for formulating data definitions to the definitions developed by OMB and Treasury as part of DATA Act implementation. For example, OMB and Treasury standardized the definition of Program Activity as required by the DATA Act and we found that this definition adhered to all 13 ISO leading practices. Agencies must begin reporting data using the data definitions established under the DATA Act by 2017. OMB and Treasury Addressed Initial Challenges with the Technical Schema, but the Lack of Finalized Technical Guidance Could Impede Agency Implementation
The DATA Act calls for OMB and Treasury to establish government-wide data standards, to the extent reasonable and practicable, that produce consistent and comparable data available in machine-readable formats. In addition to the draft technical schema, Treasury is developing an intermediary service called a “broker” to standardize data formatting and assist reporting agencies in validating their data submissions before they are submitted to Treasury. Selected Agencies Have Taken Initial Steps to Implement Data Standards
The three agencies in our review—the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA)—have begun addressing the requirements of the DATA Act by forming DATA Act teams, participating in government-wide deliberations on data standards, developing an inventory of their data, identifying systems containing pertinent data and the associated business practices, and assessing the policy, process, and technology changes that may be needed for successful implementation. If guidance is not timed to coincide with agencies’ expected milestones for key steps in the implementation process, agencies could incur additional costs as they revise implementation plans to align with later versions of the guidance or could be forced to delay implementation. To help ensure that agencies report consistent and comparable data on federal spending, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Treasury, provide agencies with additional guidance to address potential clarity, consistency, or quality issues with the definitions for specific data elements including Award Description and Primary Place of Performance and that they clearly document and communicate these actions to agencies providing this data as well as to end-users. To ensure that federal agencies are able to meet their reporting requirements and timelines, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Treasury, take steps to align the release of finalized technical guidance, including the DATA Act schema and broker, to the implementation time frames specified in the DATA Act Implementation Playbook. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies steps taken by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to establish government-wide data element definitions and the extent to which those definitions are consistent with leading practices or face challenges that could affect data quality; (2) reviews efforts by OMB and Treasury to provide agencies with technical implementation guidance to standardize how data are collected and reported and related challenges; and (3) examines the status of selected federal agencies’ progress in meeting DATA Act requirements. We reviewed applicable agency guidance and documentation related to the data standards and technical schema on OMB’s and Treasury’s websites. Provisions of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 could address this recommendation, but implementation will take several years. Open. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DATA Act directed OMB and Treasury to establish government-wide data standards by May 2015 to improve the transparency and quality of federal spending data. Agencies must begin reporting spending data in accordance with these standards by May 2017 and must publicly post spending data in machine-readable formats by May 2018. Consistent with GAO’s mandate under the act, this report is part of a series of products that GAO will provide to the Congress as DATA Act implementation proceeds.
This report (1) identifies steps taken by OMB and Treasury to standardize data element definitions and the extent to which those definitions are consistent with leading practices or face challenges that could affect data quality; (2) reviews efforts by OMB and Treasury to provide agencies with technical implementation guidance and related challenges; and (3) examines the implementation status of selected federal agencies. GAO analyzed data standards against leading practices; reviewed key implementation documents, technical specifications, and applicable guidance; and interviewed staff at OMB, Treasury, and other selected agencies.
What GAO Found
As required by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) issued definitions for 57 federal spending data elements. GAO found that most definitions adhered to leading practices derived from international standards for formulating data definitions. Specifically, 12 of the 57 definitions met all 13 leading practices and none met fewer than 9. However, GAO found several definitions that could lead to inconsistent reporting. For example, as shown in the figure below, the Primary Place of Performance definitions’ inclusion of the word “predominant“ leaves much open to interpretation. Without more interpretive clarification, agencies run the risk of reporting data that cannot be aggregated government-wide.
OMB and Treasury addressed some of GAO’s earlier concerns on draft technical guidance for implementing data standards. However, final technical guidance has not been issued, which could impede agency implementation. While OMB and Treasury have released interim versions of technical guidance, they have not yet released final guidance to provide a stable base for agency implementation. They also are developing an intermediary service (“broker”) to standardize and validate agency data submissions. GAO’s review of selected implementation plans found that agencies need the technical guidance and the intermediary service to be finalized before they can develop detailed agency-level plans. If this guidance is not aligned with agency implementation timelines, agencies may delay taking key steps or need to revise existing plans once final technical guidance is released, thereby hindering their ability to meet DATA Act requirements and timelines.
GAO found that the three agencies it reviewed—the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, as well as the Corporation for National and Community Service—have formed internal teams and are inventorying their data and assessing any needed changes to policies, processes, and technology to implement the DATA Act.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB and Treasury (1) provide agencies with clarifications to address potential quality issues with the definitions, and (2) take steps to align the release of finalized technical guidance and the broker service with agency implementation time frames. OMB and Treasury generally concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-97-5 | gao_HEHS-97-5_0 | Cash benefits under FECA and the workers’ compensation programs and those provided under VA’s disability compensation program are provided for different purposes. Workers’ Compensation Programs
Workers’ compensation programs attempt to provide adequate benefits to injured workers while limiting employers’ liabilities strictly to workers’ compensation benefits. These programs provide cash benefits to employees for wage loss and permanent impairments. Employees whose injuries or illnesses result in lost wages may be entitled to receive wage-loss benefits. To be eligible for monetary benefits under workers’ compensation, workers must experience an actual loss in wages or a permanent impairment. Thus, like workers’ compensation for permanent impairments, veterans can receive compensation even if they are working and regardless of the amount they earn. Workers are paid a percentage of their wages or the wages they lose as a result of their work-related injury or disease, depending on whether they are being compensated for lost wages or permanent impairments. Most programs compensate for lost wages for the duration of the wage loss. As of January 1995, the FECA, District of Columbia, and most state workers’ compensation programs each maintained a schedule that specified the maximum number of weeks of compensation a worker under their jurisdiction could receive for specific permanent impairments that result in the total loss or loss of use of certain members (such as a hand, arm, or foot), organs, and functions of the body. Determining Disability Compensation Amounts Under VA’s Program
The amount of compensation veterans are awarded for their service-connected conditions is based on a percentage evaluation, commonly called the disability rating, which VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities assigns to a veteran’s specific condition. Veterans with the same condition at the same level of severity usually receive the same basic cash benefit. The rating schedule contains medical criteria and disability ratings. In contrast to many workers’ compensation programs, VA’s program does not place any limits on the total amount of monetary benefits veterans can receive or the time period for which they can receive these benefits. Cash Benefit Comparisons
Monthly benefits for workers with higher earnings under FECA for selected scheduled permanent impairments will likely be higher than VA’s monthly disability compensation because schedule award amounts for permanent impairments under the workers’ compensation programs are based on workers’ wages. However, a federal employee at the GS-5, step 1, salary level would receive about $1,065 a month (see table 4). In the long run, at the GS-12, step 1, salary level and below, compensation under VA’s disability program is generally higher than FECA compensation for selected permanent impairments. Assumptions Underlying the Comparison of Benefits Under FECA and the VA Disability Compensation Program
This appendix presents the specific assumptions that we adopted to estimate the present value, or lump-sum equivalent, benefits of FECA and VA disability compensation for this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the: (1) criteria used by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation program and federal and state workers' compensation programs to determine compensation; and (2) compensation individuals with selected work-related injuries and diseases would receive under VA's disability program and what they would receive for the same impairments under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the VA disability compensation program and workers' compensation programs, including FECA, differ with respect to program goals, types of benefits provided, and eligibility requirements for benefits; (2) most workers' compensation programs provide separate cash payments for wages lost and permanent impairment, while VA provides compensation only for service-connected conditions, which need not be permanent; (3) unlike the VA program, workers' compensation programs emphasize returning employees to work while limiting employers' liability, and the vast majority who receive workers' compensation receive only medical benefits, not cash awards; (4) to be eligible for wage loss benefits under workers' compensation programs, workers must actually lose all or a portion of their wages for a specified minimum period of time, then they receive a portion, usually 66 and two-thirds percent, of their actual lost wages for the duration of the period that wages are lost; (5) to collect compensation for permanent impairments, workers must sustain permanent loss or loss of use of a body part or function, but they need not lose wages to receive compensation for their permanent impairments; (6) unlike workers' compensation programs, the amount of basic compensation veterans may receive is established by statute and is not based on their individual wage loss or usual wages, but it is based on the rating VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities assigns to that veteran's specific condition; (7) all veterans whose conditions are assigned the same rating receive the same basic benefits amount; (8) unlike workers' compensation for permanent impairments, there is no limit on the length of time veterans can receive benefits or the total amount they can receive for permanent conditions; (9) the monthly cash benefits for permanent impairments under FECA for employees at the GS-12, step 1, salary level tend to be higher than the benefits under VA's disability program for the same types of conditions; (10) this is likely to be the case for those at higher, but not lower, salary levels under FECA because workers' compensation is based on workers' usual wages, whereas veterans' benefits are not; and (11) unless workers' compensation continues under the wage loss provision after the cash awards for permanent impairment and, the amount and present value of VA compensation could be higher than FECA's over the long term. |
gao_GAO-15-696 | gao_GAO-15-696_0 | Prospective immigrant investors seeking to participate in the EB-5 Program must complete three forms and provide supporting documentation that USCIS or State officials, as appropriate, assess to ensure that they have met (1) the terms of participation for the program, (2) conditions for lawful admission for permanent residence on a conditional basis either through adjustment of status if already in the United States under other lawful immigration status or the immigrant visa process if abroad, and (3) requirements of the program to have lawful permanent resident conditions removed. 1.) USCIS and Others Have Identified Unique Fraud Risks to the EB-5 Program and Could Benefit from Planning and Conducting Regular Future Risk Assessments
USCIS has identified fraud and national security risks in the EB-5 Program in various assessments it conducted over time and in collaboration with its interagency partners. For example, in 2012, USCIS met with its interagency partners and National Security Staff to assess fraud and national security risks in the EB-5 Program. FDNS officials noted that fraud risks and schemes in the EB-5 Program were constantly evolving, and that updating their 2015 risk assessment helped them better understand the nature and scope of fraud risks to the program. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the petition. USCIS established an organizational structure to better address fraud risks. Specifically, USCIS’s information systems and processes limit its ability to collect and use data on the EB-5 Program to identify fraud related to individual investors or investments or to determine any fraud trends across the program. For example, information that could be useful in identifying program participants linked to potential fraud is not required to be entered into USCIS’s database, such as the applicant’s name, address, and date of birth on the Form I- 924 used to apply for regional center participation in the EB-5 Program.Moreover, FDNS officials told us that some data fields are also not standardized, a fact that presents significant barriers to conducting basic fraud-related searches. As we reported in May 2015, USCIS ELIS is nearly 4 years delayed and program costs increased by over $1 billion. USCIS does not collect certain applicant information that could help mitigate fraud. Given that information system improvements with the potential to expand USCIS’s fraud mitigation efforts will not take effect until 2017 at the earliest and that gaps exist in USCIS’s other information collection efforts, developing a strategy to capitalize on existing opportunities for collecting additional information would better position USCIS to identify and mitigate potential fraud. USCIS Has Increased Its Capacity for Verifying Job Creation but Does Not Use a Valid and Reliable Methodology for Reporting Program Outcomes and Economic Benefits USCIS Strengthened Its Workforce, Guidance, Training, and Process for Verifying Job Creation
USCIS has taken action to increase its capacity to verify job creation in response to past GAO and DHS OIG reports that found that USCIS did not have staff with the expertise to verify job creation estimates and that the agencies’ methodologies for verifying such estimates were not rigorous. A targeted employment area is defined as a rural area or an area that has experienced unemployment of at least 150 percent of the national average rate. USCIS’s Methodology for Reporting Program Outcomes Is Not Valid and Reliable in Certain Instances
USCIS’s methodology for reporting EB-5 Program outcomes and economic benefits is not valid and reliable because it may overstate or understate results in certain instances as it is based on the minimum program requirements for job creation and investment instead of the number of jobs and actual investment amounts investors report on EB-5 Program forms. However, USCIS officials said that they report EB-5 Program outcomes using minimum program requirements because these are the required economic benefits stated in law, and that they are not statutorily required to develop a more comprehensive assessment of overall program benefits. Developing a strategy to expand its data collection efforts, such as interviewing investors who apply to remove conditions on their permanent resident status and requesting additional information on applicant and petitioner forms, could better position USCIS to address these limitations. Tracking and using more comprehensive information it collects on project investments and job creation on the Forms I-526 and I-829 submitted by immigrant investors and verified by USCIS would enable USCIS to more reliably report on EB-5 Program outcomes and economic benefits. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen USCIS’s EB-5 Program fraud prevention, detection, and mitigation capabilities, and to more accurately and comprehensively assess and report program outcomes and the overall economic benefits of the program, we recommend that the Director of USCIS take the following four actions: plan and conduct regular future fraud risk assessments of the EB-5 develop a strategy to expand information collection, including considering the increased use of interviews at the I-829 phase as well as requiring the additional reporting of information in applicant and petitioner forms; track and report data that immigrant investors report, and the agency verifies on its program forms for total investments and jobs created through the EB-5 Program; and include a discussion of the types and reasons any relevant program costs were excluded from the Commerce study of the EB-5 Program. In its comments, DHS concurred with the four recommendations and described actions under way or planned to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the EB-5 visa category to promote job creation by immigrant investors in exchange for visas providing lawful permanent residency. Participants are required to invest $1 million in a business that is to create at least 10 jobs--or $500,000 for businesses located in an area that is rural or has experienced unemployment of at least 150 percent of the national average rate. Upon meeting program requirements, immigrant investors are eligible for conditional status to live and work in the United States and can apply to remove the conditions for lawful permanent residency after 2 years.
GAO was asked to review fraud risks and economic benefits for the EB-5 Program. This report examines USCIS efforts under the EB-5 Program to (1) work with interagency partners to assess fraud and other related risks, (2) address any identified fraud risks, and (3) increase its capacity to verify job creation and use a valid and reliable methodology to report economic benefits. GAO reviewed risk assessments and processes to address fraud risks, verify job creation, and report economic benefits.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers the Employment-Based Fifth Preference Immigrant Investor Program (EB-5 Program) and collaborated with its interagency partners to assess fraud and national security risks in the program in fiscal years 2012 and 2015. Unique fraud risks identified in the program included uncertainties in verifying that the funds invested were obtained lawfully and various investment-related schemes to defraud investors. These assessments were onetime efforts; however, USCIS officials noted that fraud risks in the EB-5 Program are constantly evolving, and they continually identify new fraud schemes. USCIS does not have documented plans to conduct regular future risk assessments, in accordance with fraud prevention practices, which could help inform efforts to identify and address evolving program risks.
USCIS has taken steps to address the fraud risks it identified by enhancing its fraud risk management efforts, including establishing a dedicated entity to oversee these efforts. However, USCIS's information systems and processes limit its ability to collect and use data on EB-5 Program participants to address fraud risks in the program. For example, USCIS does not consistently enter some information it collects on participants in its information systems, such as name and date of birth, a fact that presents barriers to conducting basic electronic searches that could be analyzed for potential fraud, such as schemes to defraud investors. USCIS plans to collect and maintain more complete data in its new information system; however, GAO reported in May 2015 that the new system is nearly 4 years delayed. In the meantime, USCIS does not have a strategy for collecting additional information, including some information on businesses supported by EB-5 Program investments, that officials noted could help mitigate fraud, such as misrepresentation of new businesses. Given that information system improvements with the potential to expand USCIS's fraud mitigation efforts will not take effect until 2017 at the earliest and that gaps exist in USCIS's other information collection efforts, developing a strategy for collecting such information would better position USCIS to identify and mitigate potential fraud.
USCIS increased its capacity to verify job creation by increasing the size and expertise of its workforce and providing clarifying guidance and training, among other actions. However, USCIS's methodology for reporting program outcomes and overall economic benefits is not valid and reliable because it may understate or overstate program benefits in certain instances as it is based on the minimum program requirements of 10 jobs and a $500,000 investment per investor instead of the number of jobs and investment amounts collected by USCIS on individual EB-5 Program forms. For example, USCIS reported 4,500 jobs for 450 investors on one project using its methodology instead of 10,500 jobs reported on EB-5 Program forms for that project. Further, investment amounts are not adjusted for investors who do not complete the program or invest $1 million instead of $500,000. USCIS officials said they are not statutorily required to develop a more comprehensive assessment. However, tracking and analyzing data on jobs and investments reported on program forms would better position USCIS to more reliably assess and report on the EB-5 Program economic benefits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, USCIS conduct regular future risk assessments, develop a strategy to expand information collection, and analyze the data collected on program forms to reliably report on economic benefits. DHS concurred with our four recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-780 | gao_GAO-15-780_0 | Background
Legislative Contract Services Limitation Requirements
Section 808 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2012, as amended by section 802 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014, limited DOD’s total obligations for contract services in fiscal years 2012 through 2014 to the amount requested for these services in the fiscal year 2010 President’s Budget Request. These functions may include personal services or other positions that may put the government at risk of contractors inappropriately influencing government decisions. Prior GAO Work
In December 2014, we reported on DOD’s implementation of the section 808 limitations in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. As a result, we recommended that DOD identify additional data sources beyond the inventory of contracted services to help ensure that funding reductions called for in the law are implemented. DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD Adhered to the 2014 Contract Services Spending Limit Due in Part to Increased Oversight from the Comptroller and Military Departments
DOD obligated $54.6 billion, or $280 million less than the limit on contract services in fiscal year 2014. In addition, the Comptroller’s office improved planning and oversight of contract services for fiscal year 2014 by seeking input when setting spending targets and implementing a waiver request process to allow for adjustments during the year. However, Army and Navy budget officials identified additional steps they plan to take to better manage the contract services spending limit in the future. Military Departments Took Steps to Improve Fiscal Controls, but Varied in Adherence to Obligation Targets
For fiscal year 2014, the military departments continued to improve their management of contract services obligations, but experienced varied success in adhering to their targets. Military Departments Achieved Required Funding Reduction for Key Functions Based on Revised Approach to Measure Compliance
Our analysis of DOD obligation data indicate that all of the military departments achieved funding reductions greater than 20 percent for closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions by fiscal year 2014. Section 813 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2015 facilitated DOD’s implementation of our December 2014 recommendation by encouraging DOD to use different data sources, such as advisory and assistance services, to measure compliance with closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation funding reductions. Advisory and assistance service is a budget category that includes many of the types of contractor services that are considered closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions. This new measure was adopted after a lack of data hindered DOD’s previous attempts to demonstrate compliance. In May 2015, the Comptroller issued guidance instructing components to submit a separate budget exhibit for the fiscal year 2017 budget submission with advisory and assistance service obligations for fiscal years 2010 through 2015 to demonstrate the required funding reductions in closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation contracts. As shown in table 2, the Air Force and Navy achieved reductions in advisory and assistance service obligations greater than 30 percent from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. The Army achieved a 9 percent reduction by fiscal year 2013, but achieved a 32 percent reduction in fiscal year 2014. Agency Comments
Because DOD has efforts underway to address our December 2014 recommendations, we are not making new recommendations in this report. Specifically, we assessed DOD’s implementation of the 1) contract services spending limit for fiscal year 2014 and 2) funding reductions for contracts with closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. To determine the extent to which DOD implemented the contract services spending limit in fiscal years 2014, we reviewed relevant laws and DOD guidance, analyzed budget and obligation data from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller for fiscal years 2010 and 2014 from the program resource collection process (PRCP) system, and interviewed DOD and military department budget officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Paying contractors for services, such as program management support, accounted for more than half of DOD's $285 billion in total acquisition obligations for fiscal year 2014. Congress limited DOD's contract services obligations for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 and required funding reductions of 10 percent per year in 2012 and 2013 for contracts with closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions. Subsequently, Congress extended the time period for DOD to achieve required funding reductions in select contract services through 2014. In December 2014, GAO reported on DOD's implementation for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and made several recommendations to improve DOD's management of contract services.
The House Armed Services Committee Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of the contract services limits. This report addresses the extent to which, DOD implemented (1) the contract services spending limit for fiscal year 2014 and (2) funding reductions for closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. GAO reviewed relevant guidance; analyzed DOD financial, inventory, and other contract services data; and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) obligated $54.6 billion, or $280 million less than the limit on contract services for fiscal year 2014 due, in part, to increased oversight by the DOD Comptroller's office and military departments. The Comptroller's office sought input from components—military departments and defense agencies—when setting obligation targets and implemented a waiver request process to allow for adjustments, which it had not done in 2012 or 2013. The military departments also implemented a variety of controls over contract services obligations, but experienced varying degrees of success in adhering to their targets.
Moreover, Army and Navy budget officials identified additional actions their departments' plan to take to improve adherence to the spending limit. For example, Army budget officials are soliciting contract services budget estimates from commands and the Navy has increased monitoring of contract services obligations from twice a year to monthly.
GAO analysis of DOD obligation data from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 indicate that all of the military departments achieved required funding reductions for contractors performing closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation functions—positions that run the risk of contractors inappropriately influencing government decisions. DOD initiated a different approach in fiscal year 2015 to measure compliance after GAO found in December 2014 that DOD lacked the data necessary to demonstrate reductions and recommended that DOD identify additional data sources to ensure funding reductions were achieved. Congress facilitated DOD's implementation of this recommendation in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2015, encouraging DOD to use advisory and assistance services—a budget category that includes many of the types of contract services that are considered closely associated with inherently governmental and staff augmentation—to measure compliance with funding reductions. DOD issued guidance in May 2015 adopting the alternative measure and instructed components to submit these data as part of the fiscal year 2017 budget request. Based on currently available obligation data through fiscal year 2014, GAO found that the Air Force and Navy achieved reductions greater than 20 percent as required by Congress from 2010 through 2013. The Army achieved a 9 percent reduction by 2013, but achieved a 32 percent reduction in 2014. The DOD Comptroller plans to assess compliance for all DOD components, including the military departments, after the submission of the fiscal year 2017 budget request, which is expected in February 2016.
What GAO Recommends
DOD has efforts underway to address GAO's December 2014 recommendations; therefore, GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. DOD concurred with the findings of this report. |
gao_NSIAD-99-15 | gao_NSIAD-99-15_0 | Summit Produced a Plan of Action to Achieve Goal
To reach their goal, summit participants approved an action plan that included 7 broadly stated commitments, 27 objectives, and 181 specific actions (see app. Although the summit action plan is not binding, countries also agreed to (1) review and revise as appropriate national plans, programs, and strategies with a view to achieving food security; (2) establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities and develop and implement the components of the summit action plan within designated time frames, based on both national and local needs, and provide the necessary resources; and (3) cooperate regionally and internationally in order to reach collective solutions to global issues of food insecurity. They also agreed to monitor implementation of the summit plan, including periodically reporting on their individual progress in meeting the plan’s objectives. According to other observers, there is a growing acceptance on the part of developing countries that policy reform must be addressed if food security is to be achieved. Factors Affecting Summit Goal
Among factors that may affect whether the summit’s goal is realized are trade reforms, conflicts, agricultural production, and safety net programs and food aid. Need to Develop a Food Security Information System
Many countries participating in the summit acknowledged that they do not have adequate information on the status of their people’s food security. In addition, CFS has requested that the information provided allow for analysis of which actions are or are not successful in promoting summit goals. Furthermore, some countries chose to provide a report that was more descriptive than analytical, and some countries reported only on certain aspects of food security action, such as food stocks or reserve policies. A progress report on the remaining objectives will be made in 2002. USAID said that, although an unfortunate circumstance, it believes the level of effort by donor and developing countries will probably fall short of achieving the summit’s goal of reducing chronic global hunger by one-half. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of Senator Russell D. Feingold, Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator John Ashcroft, and Congressman Tony P. Hall, we reviewed the outcome of the 1996 World Food Summit and key factors that could affect progress toward achieving the summit’s goal. To address the current status of global food security, the summit’s approach to reducing food insecurity, and the summit’s possible contribution to reducing hunger and undernutrition, we did the following: reviewed documents and studies by the FAO, the U.N. Children’s Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the World Food Program; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research; IFPRI; USDA, USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Health and Human Services; and various academics, NGOs, and private sector entities concerned with past and possible future efforts to reduce poverty and undernutrition; discussed issues concerning the extent and causes of undernutrition with national and international experts in food security, including experts at FAO, the World Food Program, the World Bank, IFPRI, USDA, USAID, the Department of State, various NGOs, and universities and international food companies; observed presummit negotiations over the text to be included in the World Food Summit’s policy declaration and plan of action, the World Food Summit, and subsequent FAO follow-up meetings to the summit (the latter include the April 1997 CFS meeting, the November 1997 FAO Conference meeting, and the June 1998 CFS meeting; attended various other conferences and seminars where food security and related issues were discussed; and developed a database on country-level estimates of undernutrition and various economic, political, and social variables possibly associated with food insecurity. These issues concern the ability and willingness of countries to reasonably measure the prevalence of undernourishment and the possible effects of trade liberalization, grain reserves, food aid, conflict, increased agricultural production, policy reforms, resources, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of progress in reducing food insecurity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the outcome of the 1996 World Food Summit, focusing on factors that could affect progress toward meeting world food security goals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the 1996 World Food Summit brought together officials from 185 countries and the European Community to discuss the problem of food insecurity and produced a plan to guide participants' efforts in working toward a common goal of reducing undernutrition; (2) to reach this goal, they approved an action plan, the focus of which is to assist developing countries to become more self-reliant in meeting their food needs by promoting broad-based economic, political, and social reforms at local, national, regional, and international levels; (3) the participants endorsed various actions but did not enter into any binding commitments; (4) they also agreed to review and revise national plans, programs, and strategies, where appropriate, so as to achieve food security consistent with the summit action plan; (5) according to U.S. officials, a willingness on the part of food-insecure countries to undertake broad-based policy reforms is a key factor affecting whether such countries will achieve the summit goal; (6) other important factors that could affect progress toward achieving the summit goal are: (a) the effects of trade reform; (b) the prevalence of conflict and its effect on food security; (c) the sufficiency of agricultural production; and (d) the availability of food aid and financial resources; (7) also needed are actions to monitor progress, such as the ability and willingness of the participant countries to develop information systems on the status of food security and to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate progress in implementing the summit's plan; (8) given the complexity of the problems in each of these areas, participants acknowledged that progress will be difficult; (9) the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Committee on World Food Security requested that countries report to the FAO Secretariat on their progress in meeting the summit's goal in 1998, but many countries did not respond in a timely fashion; (10) in addition, some reports were more descriptive than analytical, and some reported only on certain aspects of food security actions; (11) thus, the Secretariat was unable to draw general substantive conclusions on progress made to reduce food insecurity; and (12) the Agency for International Development said that the level of effort by both donor and developing countries will probably fall short of achieving the summit's goal of reducing chronic global hunger by one-half. |
gao_GAO-13-569 | gao_GAO-13-569_0 | Background
Investment advisers provide a wide range of investment advisory services and help individuals and institutions make financial decisions. Nearly 10,000 advisers were registered with SEC as of April 1, 2013.Collectively, these advisers managed nearly $54 trillion in assets for about 24 million clients. The rule requires advisers that have custody of client assets to have a reasonable basis, after due inquiry, for believing that the custodian sends periodic statements directly to the clients. The SEC custody rule requires advisers with custody of client assets to hire an independent public accountant to conduct an annual surprise examination, unless the advisers qualify for an exception. In 2003, SEC amended the custody rule by generally requiring an adviser to maintain client assets with qualified custodians and relieving the adviser from the examination requirement if its qualified custodian sent account statements directly to the adviser’s clients. As shown in figure 3, advisers meeting the following conditions may not be required to undergo a surprise examination: an adviser that is deemed to have custody of client assets solely because of its authority to deduct fees from client accounts; an adviser that is deemed to have custody because a related person has custody, and the adviser is “operationally independent” of the related person serving as the custodian; or an adviser to a pooled investment vehicle (e.g., hedge fund) that is subject to an annual financial statement audit by an independent public accountant registered with and subject to regular inspection by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and distributes the audited financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles to its clients is deemed to have satisfied the surprise examination requirement. Instead, the rule generally imposes more stringent requirements on advisers whose custodial arrangements, in SEC’s view, pose greater risk of misappropriation or other misuse of client assets. Importantly, these advisers vary widely in terms of the number of their clients under custody—reported by advisers as ranging from 1 client to over 1 million clients—and other factors that affect the cost of surprise examinations. Consequently, the cost of surprise examinations varies widely across the advisers. In response to SEC’s 2009 proposed amendments to the custody rule, industry associations provided SEC with cost estimates. Similar to surprise examination costs, the cost of internal control reports varies based on a number of factors, such as the size of and services offered by the qualified custodian. A Limited Number of Advisers Do Not Undergo Surprise Examinations Because They Use Related but Operationally Independent Custodians
As of April 1, 2013, 169 registered advisers reported having custody of client assets and using related but operationally independent custodians and not undergoing an annual surprise examination for certain clients.These advisers account for around 2 percent of all SEC-registered advisers and about 42 percent of the approximately 400 SEC-registered advisers that have a related person holding client assets. According to SEC staff, this outcome is to be expected given that the adviser and custodian staff cannot be considered operationally independent while under common supervision and sharing the same premises. Similarly, the amount of client assets under their custody ranged from $680,000 to $320 billion. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes (1) the requirements of and costs associated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) custody rule, including any related record-keeping requirements, for registered investment advisers, and (2) SEC’s rationale for not requiring advisers using related but operationally independent custodians to undergo surprise examinations, and the number and characteristics of such advisers. To obtain data on the costs of complying with the SEC custody rule, particularly its surprise examination and internal control report requirements, and other information, we interviewed a limited number of investment advisers and accounting firms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Investment advisers provide a wide range of services and collectively manage around $54 trillion in assets for around 24 million clients. Unlike banks and broker-dealers, investment advisers typically do not maintain physical custody of client assets. However, under federal securities regulations, advisers may be deemed to have custody because of their authority to access client assets, for example, by deducting advisory fees from a client account. High-profile fraud cases in recent years highlighted the risks faced by investors when an adviser has custody of their assets. In response, SEC amended its custody rule in 2009 to require a broader range of advisers to undergo annual surprise examinations by independent accountants. At the same time, SEC provided relief from this requirement to certain advisers, including those deemed to have custody solely because of their use of related but "operationally independent" custodians. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act mandates GAO to study the costs associated with the custody rule. This report describes (1) the requirements of and costs associated with the custody rule and (2) SEC's rationale for not requiring advisers using related but operationally independent custodians to undergo surprise examinations.
To address the objectives, GAO reviewed federal securities laws and related rules, analyzed data on advisers, and met with SEC, advisers, accounting firms, and industry and other associations.
What GAO Found
Designed to safeguard client assets, the Securities and Exchange Commission's(SEC) rule governing advisers' custody of client assets (custody rule) imposes various requirements and, in turn, costs on investment advisers. To protect investors, the rule requires advisers that have custody to (1) use qualified custodians (e.g., banks or broker-dealers) to hold client assets and (2) have a reasonable basis for believing that the custodian sends account statements directly to clients.
The rule also requires advisers with custody, unless they qualify for an exception, to hire an independent public accountant to conduct annually a surprise examination to verify custody of client assets. According to accountants that GAO interviewed, examination cost depends on an adviser's number of clients under custody and other factors. These factors vary widely across advisers that currently report undergoing surprise examinations: for example, their reported number of clients under custody ranged from 1 client to over 1 million clients as of April 2013. Thus, the cost of the examinations varies widely across the advisers. The rule also requires advisers maintaining client assets or using a qualified custodian that is a related person to obtain an internal control report to assess the suitability and effectiveness of controls in place. The cost of these reports varies across custodians based on their size and services.
SEC provided an exception from the surprise examination requirement to, among others, advisers deemed to have custody solely because of their use of related but "operationally independent" custodians. According to SEC, an adviser and custodian under common ownership but having operationally independent management pose relatively lower client custodial risks, because the misuse of client assets would tend to require collusion between the firms' employees. To be considered operationally independent, an adviser and its related custodian must not be under common supervision, not share premises, and meet other conditions. About 2 percent of the SEC-registered advisers qualify for this exception for at least some of their clients. If the exception were eliminated, the cost of the surprise examination would vary across the advisers because the factors that affect examination cost vary widely across the advisers. |
gao_HEHS-96-163 | gao_HEHS-96-163_0 | SSI is a program based on need. In addition to expanding on-line access to other states, however, SSA could also use it to improve the accuracy of its payments. If SSA field offices nationwide had used on-line access to state databases, SSI program dollars could have been saved because the overpayments might have been prevented or more quickly detected. On-Line Access Could Replace Current Computer-Matching Efforts That Rely on Older Data
Two of SSA’s predominant methods of detecting unreported and underreported earnings are (1) requiring that clients self-report all non-SSI income that they receive and (2) conducting computer matches to detect any unreported income once clients are on the rolls. Scope and Methodology
This report focuses on the extent to which on-line access can (1) improve the administration of the SSI program, (2) reduce overpayments, and (3) be easily implemented in SSA offices nationwide. We did this by analyzing information contained in the data regarding why these overpayments occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) use of online access to state databases on income information to determine whether it could: (1) improve the administration of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program; (2) reduce overpayments; and (3) easily implement online access nationwide in SSA field offices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the use of online access to state-maintained income data could: (1) improve the administration of the SSI program by cutting the time needed to verify client information; (2) prevent or detect overpayments due to underreported and unreported benefit income; (3) replace the current computer-matching system that relies on old data; (4) enable necessary security measures to protect client confidentiality; and (5) be inexpensively implemented nationwide with minimal programming. |
gao_HEHS-95-200 | gao_HEHS-95-200_0 | HHS has two such systems: The Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) system identifies underservice caused by a shortage of health professionals, and the Medically Underserved Area (MUA) system more broadly identifies areas and populations not receiving adequate health services for any reason, including provider shortages. To review the extent to which the HPSA and MUA systems identify areas with primary care shortages, we reviewed past evaluations of the criteria and methodology for designating primary care HPSAs and MUAs and discussed the results with responsible HHS officials, identified the number of primary care providers in HPSAs and compared it to the number reported by the HPSA system, selected a random sample of primary care HPSA applications and reviewed whether designations were appropriate and accurately reflected in the HPSA database, and compared how often the HPSA and MUA data were updated with requirements in the law and HHS policy. Systems Do Not Consider All Primary Care Resources in Making Shortage Determinations
Both systems rely on a population-to-physician ratio in establishing the need for additional primary care providers. MUA Methodology Is Limited in Ability to Identify Underserved Areas
The MUA methodology has a number of flaws that limit its ability to accurately identify geographic areas and populations that have the greatest shortages of health care services. 2.1). Designation Systems Do Not Provide Information Necessary to Target Funding to the Underserved
Even when the HPSA and MUA designations identify needy areas, they generally do not provide the type of information needed by federal programs to target assistance best suited to meet a location’s particular needs. The needed improvements may be difficult and costly, and all but one federal program already have their own screening processes in place that may be more easily modified to better match federal resources with the needs of underserved communities. Second, they are based on flawed methodologies that have not been effective at specifically identifying which parts of the population are underserved and why. The Bureau of Primary Health Care is proposing changes to consolidate and streamline the administrative processes of the two systems. However, they believe that maintaining a national system is needed for developing planning documents and monitoring primary care access. While we agree, HHS already has another effort under way that may serve this purpose. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) systems for identifying geographical areas where access to medical care is limited, focusing on: (1) how well the systems identify areas with primary care shortages; (2) how well the systems target federal funding to the underserved; and (3) whether the HHS proposal to combine the systems would lead to improvements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the two HHS systems do not reliably identify areas with primary care shortages or help target federal resources to the underserved; (2) the systems have widespread data and methodology problems which severely limit their ability to pinpoint needy areas; (3) both systems tend to overstate the need for additional primary care providers because they do not consider all of the categories of providers already in place; (4) the Health Professional Shortage Area System (HPSA) does not consider the extent to which available resources are being used; (5) the Medically Underserved Area System (MUA) is limited in its ability to identify underserved areas and populations; (6) neither system identifies the specific subpopulations that have difficulty obtaining medical care; (7) while the systems can sometimes accurately identify needy areas, they do not provide the necessary data to determine which programs are best suited to those areas; (8) the proposed consolidation and streamlining of the systems is not likely to solve system problems, since the underlying causes of the problems have not been addressed; (9) it may be more cost-effective to modify individual programs and application processes to identify where needs exist and the appropriate program to meet those needs and to target resources better; and (10) HHS officials believe that they need to maintain a national shortage designation system to monitor primary care access, but HHS has another initiative under way that could serve those purposes. |
gao_NSIAD-96-173 | gao_NSIAD-96-173_0 | Specifically, section 733 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P. L. 102-190, December 5, 1991) required, among other things, that DOD determine the size and composition of the military medical system needed to support U.S. forces during a war or other conflict and identify ways of improving the cost-effectiveness of medical care delivered during peacetime. Service Models Estimate Medical Personnel Requirements Much Higher Than the 733 Study
Following the 733 study, each service used its own model to determine wartime medical personnel requirements. However, the models’ results depend largely on the values of the input data and assumptions. We found that the services’ modeling techniques were consistent with the 733 study in that they used (1) current defense planning guidance for two MRCs, (2) DOD-approved policies for evacuating casualties from the theater, and (3) casualty projections. These assumptions, not the modeling techniques, accounted for a major difference between the results of the 733 study and the services’ models. The 733 study concluded that about 50 percent of the active duty physicians projected for fiscal year 1999 were not needed to meet wartime medical readiness requirements, while the services’ models supported a need for 96 percent of the fiscal year 1999 active duty physicians. DOD’s current study of medical requirements will examine the appropriateness of the mix between active duty and reserve medical forces. If, for example, the study assumes that medical forces will be needed sooner than assumed in the 733 study, most, if not all, of the reductions in active duty medical personnel estimated in the original study could be nullified. 733 Update Is Using a Process Intended to Supplant Individual Service Models
DOD is currently updating its 733 study using a process intended to replace the individual service models for determining wartime medical personnel requirements. The update was directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in August 1995, to respond to the continuing debate over the estimates for wartime medical personnel. However, the March 1996 completion has been delayed because of disagreements over some assumptions, such as the population-at-risk and casualty rates. DOD officials believe that, in the future, this model—the DOD Medical Sizing Model—will be used to determine total wartime medical personnel levels. Since the update is still ongoing, we are at this time unable to fully assess the reasonableness of the data inputs and assumptions, the appropriateness of the active/reserve component split, and the degree to which DOD integrates the medical requirements of the three services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO studied the reasonableness of the models each military service uses to determine appropriate wartime medical personnel force levels, focusing on the models' results, their methodologies, and their inclusion of active duty and reserve medical personnel.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in 1995, each service used its own model to determine wartime medical personnel requirements instead of adopting the results of the Department of Defense's (DOD) "733 study," which, among other things, sought to determine the size and composition of the military medical system needed to support U.S. forces during a war or other conflict; (2) taken together, the services' models offset nearly all of the reductions estimated in the 733 study, supporting instead, a need for about 96 percent of the active duty physicians projected for fiscal year (FY) 1999; (3) much of this difference resulted because the services assumed that significantly more people were needed for training and maintaining personnel to relieve deployed medical forces; (4) given these results, DOD has not planned significant reductions in future medical forces; (5) by comparison, the overall DOD active duty end strengths are expected to decline by twice the rate of decline in medical forces from FY 1987 to FY 1999; (6) the modeling techniques the services used to determine medical requirements appear reasonable; (7) however, the results of the models depend largely on the values of the input data and assumptions used; (8) although their techniques differed in some ways, the services appropriately considered factors, such as current defense planning guidance, DOD policies for evacuating patients from the theater, and casualty projections; (9) the service models also included requirements for both active duty and reserve medical personnel; (10) at the time of GAO's review, the services had done more detailed analyses of the active duty requirements than the reserve portion; (11) given the dichotomy between the results of the service models and the 733 study, in August 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the 733 study be updated and improved; (12) this ongoing study is intended to form the basis for a single DOD position on wartime medical demands and associated personnel; (13) as such, it is to resolve differences in the key assumptions that drive medical force requirements; (14) while the study was to be completed by March 1996, DOD has encountered difficulty in reaching agreement over some assumptions, such as the population-at-risk and casualty rates, and thus, the study has been delayed; and (15) the 733 update is using a unified DOD sizing model, which will supplant individual service models. |
gao_GAO-13-696T | gao_GAO-13-696T_0 | EPA’s authority to ensure that chemicals in commerce do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment is established in five major sections of TSCA. Chemical companies can claim certain information, such as data disclosing chemical processes, as confidential business information. Historical Challenges EPA Has Faced Regulating Chemicals under TSCA
We have previously reported that EPA has historically faced challenges implementing many of the provisions of TSCA, in particular (1) obtaining adequate information on chemical toxicity and exposure through testing provisions; (2) banning or limiting chemicals; and (3) disclosing chemical data and managing company assertions of confidentiality. Obtaining Adequate Information on Chemical Toxicity and Exposure
EPA has found it difficult to obtain adequate information on chemical toxicity and exposure because TSCA does not require companies to provide this information and, instead, requires EPA to demonstrate that chemicals pose certain risks before it can ask for such information. Banning or Limiting Chemicals
EPA has had difficulty demonstrating that chemicals should be banned or have limits placed on their production or use under section 6—provisions for controlling chemicals. Specifically, we reported, in June 2005, that since Congress enacted TSCA in 1976, EPA has issued regulations under section 6 to ban or limit the production or restrict the use of five existing chemicals or chemical classes out of tens of thousands of chemicals listed for commercial use on the agency’s TSCA inventory. EPA’s 1989 asbestos rule illustrates the difficulties EPA has had in issuing regulations to control existing chemicals. Because EPA has not routinely challenged these assertions, the extent to which companies’ confidentiality claims are warranted is unknown. EPA Has Made Progress to Implement Its New Approach to Managing Chemicals, but Some Challenges Persist
In March 2013, we reported on progress EPA has made implementing its new approach to manage toxic chemicals under its existing TSCA authority—particularly by increasing efforts to (1) obtain toxicity and exposure data, (2) assess risks posed by chemicals, and (3) discourage the use of some chemicals. However, the results of EPA’s activities, in most cases, have yet to be realized. We also reported that it is unclear whether EPA’s new approach will position the agency to achieve its goal of ensuring the safety of chemicals. EPA Has Increased Efforts to Collect Data on Toxicity and Exposure, but It May Take Several Years to Produce Results
EPA has increased its efforts to collect toxicity and exposure data, but because rules can take years to finalize and additional time for companies to execute, these efforts may take several years to produce results. Specifically, EPA has required companies to test 34 chemicals and provide EPA with the resulting toxicity and other data. In addition, EPA announced, but has yet to finalize, plans to require testing for 23 additional chemicals. EPA Has Begun Assessing Chemical Risks, but It Is Too Early to Tell What, If Any, Risk Management Actions Will Be Taken
EPA has increased its efforts to assess chemical risks, but because EPA does not have the data necessary to conduct all risk assessments, it is too early to tell what, if any, risk management actions will be taken. Specifically, in February 2012, EPA announced a plan that identified and prioritized 83 existing chemicals for risk assessment— known as the TSCA Work Plan. From this list of 83 chemicals, EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics—the office responsible for implementing TSCA—initiated risk assessments for 7 chemicals in 2012—5 of which were released for public comment—and announced plans to start risk assessments during 2013 and 2014 for 18 additional chemicals. Moreover, assuming EPA meets its 2014 target for completing these 7 assessments and initiating new assessments, at its current pace, it would take EPA at least 10 years to complete risk assessments for the 83 chemicals in the TSCA Work Plan. Consequently, EPA could be investing valuable resources, time, and effort without being certain that its efforts will bring the agency closer to achieving its goal of ensuring the safety of chemicals. As a result, we recommended that the EPA Administrator direct the appropriate offices to develop strategies for addressing challenges that impede the agency’s ability to meet its goal of ensuring chemical safety to better position EPA to ensure chemical safety under its existing TSCA authority. Toxic Substances Control Act: Legislative Changes Could Make the Act More Effective. EPA’s Efforts To Identify and Control Harmful Chemicals in Use. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1976, Congress passed TSCA to give EPA the authority to obtain more health and safety information on chemicals and to regulate chemicals it determines pose unreasonable risks of injury to human health or the environment. GAO has reported that EPA has found many of TSCA's provisions difficult to implement. In 2009, EPA announced TSCA reform principles to inform ongoing efforts in Congress to strengthen the act. At that time, EPA also initiated a new approach for managing toxic chemicals using its existing TSCA authorities.
This testimony summarizes GAO's past work describing: (1) challenges EPA has faced historically in regulating chemicals and (2) the extent to which EPA has made progress implementing its new approach, and challenges, if any, which persist. This statement is based on GAO reports issued between 1994 and 2013.
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. In prior reports, GAO suggested that Congress consider statutory changes to TSCA to give EPA additional authorities to obtain information from the chemical industry and shift more of the burden to chemical companies for demonstrating the safety of their chemicals. In these reports, among other things, GAO recommended that EPA require companies to provide chemical data they submitted to foreign governments, require companies to reassert confidentiality claims, and develop strategies for addressing challenges that impeded EPA's ability to ensure chemical safety. EPA's responses to these recommendations have varied.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in June 2005 that EPA has historically faced the following challenges in implementing the provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA):
Obtaining adequate information on chemical toxicity and exposure . EPA has found it difficult to obtain such information because TSCA does not require companies to provide it; instead, TSCA requires EPA to demonstrate that chemicals pose certain risks before it can ask for such information.
Banning or limiting chemicals . EPA has had difficulty demonstrating that chemicals should be banned or have limits placed on their production or use under section 6--provisions for controlling chemicals. The agency issued regulations to ban or limit production or use of five existing chemicals, or chemical classes, out of tens of thousands of chemicals listed for commercial use. A court reversal of EPA's 1989 asbestos rule illustrates the difficulties EPA has had in issuing regulations to control existing chemicals.
Disclosing data and managing assertions of confidentiality . EPA has not routinely challenged companies' assertions that data they provide are confidential business information and cannot be disclosed. As a result, the extent to which companies' confidentiality claims are warranted is unknown.
GAO reported in March 2013 that EPA has made progress implementing its new approach to managing toxic chemicals under its existing TSCA authority but, in most cases, results have yet to be realized. Examples are as follows:
EPA has increased efforts to collect toxicity and exposure data through the rulemaking process, but because rules can take 3 to 5 years to finalize and 2 to 2 1/2 years for companies to execute, these efforts may take several years to produce results. Specifically, since 2009, EPA has (1) required companies to test 34 chemicals and provide EPA with the resulting toxicity and other data, and (2) announced, but has not yet finalized, plans to require testing for 23 additional chemicals.
EPA has increased efforts to assess chemical risks, but because EPA does not have the data necessary to conduct all risk assessments, it is too early to tell what, if any, risk management actions will be taken. In February 2012, EPA announced a plan that identified and prioritized 83 existing chemicals for risk assessment; the agency initiated assessments for 7 chemicals in 2012 and announced plans to start 18 additional assessments during 2013 and 2014. At its current pace, it would take EPA at least 10 years to complete risk assessments for the 83 chemicals.
In addition, it is unclear whether EPA's new approach to managing chemicals will position the agency to achieve its goal of ensuring the safety of chemicals. EPA's Existing Chemicals Program Strategy, which is intended to guide EPA's efforts to assess and control chemicals in the coming years, does not discuss how EPA will address identified challenges. Consequently, EPA could be investing valuable resources, time, and effort without being certain that its efforts will bring the agency closer to achieving its goal of ensuring the safety of chemicals. |
gao_GAO-11-159 | gao_GAO-11-159_0 | IV provides additional detail on the annual and total incentive payments an eligible provider could receive from the EHR Program based on the initial year the provider receives an incentive payment.) CMS Analyzed Medicare Part B Claims to Pay Electronic Prescribing Program Incentive Payments to about 8 Percent of Certain Medicare Providers for 2009
To determine which providers should receive the Electronic Prescribing Program’s incentive payments, CMS analyzes information reported by providers on their Medicare Part B claims, which are used to submit charges for covered services. Specifically, for 2009, CMS first examined 2009 Part B claims to determine whether, after each applicable patient visit, providers marked any one of three electronic prescribing reporting codes used to report information on the adoption and use of electronic prescribing systems. Second, CMS analyzed the 2009 Part B claims to determine which of the providers who submitted the electronic prescribing reporting codes also met or exceeded both components of the following reporting requirement: the provider submitted one of the three electronic prescribing reporting codes at least 50 percent of the time that the provider had an applicable visit; and at least 10 percent of the provider’s total allowed Medicare Part B charges for the year were from the services designated as applicable patient visits. From 2012 through 2014, the Electronic Prescribing Program will assess penalties on individual providers and group practices that do not adopt and use electronic prescribing. CMS officials expect that the number of Medicare providers reporting the electronic prescribing reporting code in 2010 will increase over 2009 and noted that lowering the reporting requirement for 2010 to submitting the applicable electronic prescribing reporting code for at least 25 visits may increase the number of providers receiving incentive payments. The EHR Program provides incentives from 2011 to 2016 and introduces penalties beginning in 2015, while the Electronic Prescribing Program provides incentives from 2009 to 2013 and introduces penalties beginning in 2012. The EHR Program requires providers to adopt certified EHR technology and the Electronic Prescribing Program requires providers to adopt qualified electronic prescribing systems. To help encourage the adoption of such technologies among Medicare providers, Congress first established the Electronic Prescribing Program and then the EHR Program, both of which provide incentive payments to eligible providers that adopt and use the appropriate health information technologies and impose penalties on those eligible providers that fail to do so. Despite both programs having a goal to expand the adoption and use of health information technologies by health providers, and in particular, physicians—the largest and only group of providers eligible to earn incentive payments in both programs—we found inconsistencies in the requirements. First, we found that because the Electronic Prescribing Program lacks a certification process like that established for the EHR Program, physicians and other health care providers who want to obtain incentive payments or avoid penalties from the former program have no assurance that the systems they invest in will meet that program’s technology requirements. Second, we also found that the two programs have established separate reporting requirements related to electronic prescribing, requiring some physicians who elect to report to the EHR Program to report to both programs in 2011 and potentially requiring physicians to report to both programs through 2014, when penalties for the Electronic Prescribing Program end. CMS recognizes that this duplication places additional burden on physicians, and we believe this duplication could affect the decision of physicians to adopt and use health information technology. However, CMS is still in the process of studying possible ways to address this duplication, and if the agency wants to eliminate the burden for providers in 2012, it would need to do so during its 2011 rulemaking. Expedite efforts to remove the overlap in reporting requirements for physicians who may be eligible for incentive payments or subject to penalties under both the Electronic Prescribing and EHR Programs by, for example, aligning the reporting requirements so that successfully qualifying for incentive payments or for avoiding penalties under the EHR Program would likewise result in meeting the requirements for the Electronic Prescribing Program. CMS agreed in full with two recommendations, agreed in principle with one recommendation, and disagreed with a fourth recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established two CMS-administered programs--the Electronic Prescribing Program and the Electronic Health Records (EHR) Program--that provide incentive payments to eligible Medicare providers who adopt and use health information technology, and penalties for those who do not. The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 required GAO to report on the Electronic Prescribing Program. To do so, GAO examined how CMS determines which providers receive incentive payments and avoid penalties from that program and how many providers received incentive payments in 2009. Also, GAO was asked to examine how the requirements of the two programs compare. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations, interviewed CMS officials, and analyzed CMS data on incentive payments made for 2009, which were the most recent data available for a full year.
What GAO Found
CMS analyzes information reported by eligible providers on their Medicare Part B claims--which are used to submit charges for covered services--to determine which Medicare providers should receive Electronic Prescribing Program incentive payments or be subject to penalties. In 2009--the first year the program provided incentive payments--CMS paid approximately $148 million in incentive payments to about 8 percent of the approximately 600,000 Medicare providers who had an applicable patient visit--that is, supplied 1 of 33 CMS-designated services typically provided in the office or outpatient setting. For 2009, CMS examined Part B claims to determine whether, after each applicable patient visit, providers marked any one of three electronic prescribing reporting codes used to report information on the adoption and use of electronic prescribing systems. To receive an incentive payment that year, the provider had to report the codes for at least 50 percent of applicable patient visits, and at least 10 percent of the provider's total allowed Medicare Part B charges for the year had to be from the applicable patient visits. CMS made changes in the reporting requirements for 2010. For example, the agency reduced the number of reporting codes to one and required that individual providers report the code after at least 25 applicable visits, instead of for 50 percent of applicable visits. From 2012 through 2014, the Electronic Prescribing Program will assess penalties on providers that do not adopt and use electronic prescribing. Individual providers will have to submit the electronic prescribing reporting code at least 10 times in the first 6 months of 2011 to avoid penalties in 2012. Although GAO found similarities in the technology and reporting requirements for both programs, GAO also found that the requirements of the two programs are inconsistent in several areas. The EHR Program provides incentives from 2011 to 2016 and introduces penalties beginning in 2015, while the Electronic Prescribing Program provides incentives from 2009 to 2013 and provides for penalties from 2012 to 2014, when the program ends. Both the EHR and Electronic Prescribing Programs require providers to adopt and use technology that can perform similar electronic prescribing-related activities. However, the EHR Program requires providers to adopt and use certified EHR systems that meet criteria established by HHS, which include electronic prescribing-related capabilities, while the Electronic Prescribing Program does not have a certification requirement. As a result, providers have no assurance that the systems they invest in will meet the Electronic Prescribing Program's requirements. Additionally, the two programs have established separate reporting requirements related to electronic prescribing, potentially requiring physicians--the largest and only group of providers eligible to earn incentive payments in both programs--to report to both programs from 2011 through 2014. CMS recognizes that this duplication places additional burden on physicians; however, CMS is still in the process of developing a strategy to address this duplication.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the CMS Administrator take four actions, including (1) encourage physicians and other providers in the Electronic Prescribing Program to adopt certified technology and (2) expedite efforts to remove the overlap in reporting requirements for physicians who may be eligible for incentive payments or subject to penalties under both programs. CMS generally agreed with three recommendations and disagreed with a fourth recommendation, which GAO clarified based on CMS's comments. |
gao_GAO-08-305 | gao_GAO-08-305_0 | demonstrate and deploy other types of fuel cells for stationary and portable applications. DOE further focused its hydrogen R&D in response to the National Energy Policy issued in 2001, which highlighted hydrogen as one of several R&D priorities. The effort is designed to construct a prototype integrated gasification combined- cycle coal power plant to be operational by 2015 that will demonstrate production of hydrogen as well as reduced emissions. The Hydrogen Fuel Initiative Has Made Important Progress, but Some Target Dates Have Slipped, and Some Targets Require Significant Scientific Advances
According to DOE, key R&D targets to achieve technology readiness in 2015 focus primarily on (1) extracting hydrogen from diverse, domestic resources at a cost equivalent to about $2 to $3 per gallon of gasoline, (2) storing hydrogen on-board vehicles to enable a driving range of at least 300 miles for most light duty vehicles, (3) delivering hydrogen between two points for less than $1 per kilogram, and (4) developing proton exchange membrane fuel cells that cost about $30 per kilowatt and deliver at least 5,000 hours of service for vehicles—which compares to about 150,000 miles in conventional gasoline-powered vehicles—and at least 40,000 hours for stationary applications. Because steam reformation of natural gas reflects the most mature technology, natural gas is expected to be the primary source of hydrogen through the next 20 years. DOE’s R&D focus is on developing new materials that can store hydrogen without requiring high pressures or cryogenic temperatures. In particular, DOE has announced its intention to fund R&D for commercial scale manufacture of fuel cells for stationary applications. DOE Has Not Updated Its Plan to Assess the Impact of Delays in Meeting Some Key Target Dates on Technology Readiness or Projected the Initiative’s Costs through 2015
DOE has made important progress in many areas of R&D, but some target dates have been pushed back, primarily as a result of technical challenges and budget constraints, according to DOE officials. DOE Has Partnered Well with Industry on Vehicle Technologies, but Efforts to Develop Stationary and Portable Technologies Are Too New to Evaluate
DOE has effectively solicited industry input and has worked to align R&D priorities, particularly for developing vehicle technologies. Nevertheless, industry representatives stated that DOE generally has managed and coordinated its hydrogen R&D resources well. Industry representatives stated that workshops are an important collaboration channel. These teams, co-chaired by industry and DOE, meet monthly and include industry representatives with requisite expertise in hydrogen technologies. DOE Has Effectively Coordinated with Other Federal Agencies at the Working Level, but Efforts at the Policy Level Have Just Begun
DOE’s interagency coordination efforts among working level managers and scientists have been productive and useful, but coordination with senior officials at the policy level just began with the August 2007 establishment of the Interagency Task Force. In response, DOE created the Interagency Task Force—a new entity composed of deputy assistant secretaries, program directors, and other senior officials—which held its inaugural meeting August 2007. DOE and industry officials attribute this progress to DOE’s (1) planning process that involved industry and university experts from the earliest stages; (2) use of annual merit reviews, technical teams, centers of excellence, and other coordination mechanisms to continually involve industry and university experts to review the progress and direction of the program; (3) emphasis on both fundamental and applied science, as recommended by independent experts; and (4) continued focus on such high priority areas as hydrogen storage and fuel cell cost and durability. Furthermore, developing a nationwide commercial market for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles is expected to cost tens of billions of dollars for production facilities, fueling stations, pipelines, and other support infrastructure and take decades to achieve, requiring a sustained investment by government and industry in R&D and the infrastructure. Recommendation
To accurately reflect progress made by the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative and the challenges it faces, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy update the Hydrogen Posture Plan’s overall assessment of what DOE reasonably expects to achieve by its technology readiness date in 2015, including how this updated assessment may differ from prior posture plans and a projection of anticipated R&D funding needs. More specifically, we reviewed DOE’s 2004 and 2006 Hydrogen Posture Plans and R&D project reports, attended DOE’s annual review of its projects in May 2007, and interviewed DOE hydrogen program managers and scientists at DOE’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. To determine the extent to which DOE has worked with other federal agencies to develop and demonstrate hydrogen technologies, we reviewed pertinent documents and spoke with officials at DOE, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States consumes more than 20 million barrels of oil each day, two-thirds of which is imported, leaving the nation vulnerable to rising prices. Oil combustion produces emissions linked to health problems and global warming. In January 2003, the administration announced a 5-year, $1.2 billion Hydrogen Fuel Initiative to perform research, development, and demonstration (R&D) for developing hydrogen fuel cells for use as a substitute for gasoline engines. Led by the Department of Energy (DOE), the initiative's goal is to develop the technologies by 2015 that will enable U.S. industry to make hydrogen-powered cars available to consumers by 2020. GAO examined the extent to which DOE has (1) made progress in meeting the initiative's targets, (2) worked with industry to set and meet targets, and (3) worked with other federal agencies to develop and demonstrate hydrogen technologies. GAO reviewed DOE's hydrogen R&D plans, attended DOE's annual review of each R&D project, and interviewed DOE managers, industry executives, and independent experts.
What GAO Found
DOE's hydrogen program has made important progress in all R&D areas, including both fundamental and applied science. Specifically, DOE has reduced the cost of producing hydrogen from natural gas, an important source of hydrogen through the next 20 years; developed a sophisticated model to identify and optimize major elements of a projected hydrogen delivery infrastructure; increased by 50 percent the storage capacity of hydrogen, a key element for increasing the driving range of vehicles; and reduced the cost and improved the durability of fuel cells. However, some of the most difficult technical challenges lie ahead, including finding a technology that can store enough hydrogen on board a vehicle to achieve a 300-mile driving range, reducing the cost of delivering hydrogen to consumers, and further reducing the cost and improving the durability of fuel cells. The difficulty of overcoming these technical challenges, as well as hydrogen R&D budget constraints, has led DOE to push back some of its interim target dates. However, DOE has not updated its 2006 Hydrogen Posture Plan's overall assessment of what the department reasonably expects to achieve by its technology readiness date in 2015 and how this may differ from previous posture plans. In addition, deploying the support infrastructure needed to commercialize hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles across the nation will require an investment of tens of billions of dollars over several decades after 2015. DOE has effectively involved industry in designing and reviewing its hydrogen R&D program and has worked to align its priorities with those of industry. Industry continues to review R&D progress through DOE's annual peer review of each project, technical teams co-chaired by DOE and industry, and R&D workshops. Industry representatives are satisfied with DOE's efforts, stating that DOE generally has managed its hydrogen R&D resources well. However, the industry representatives noted that DOE's emphasis on vehicle fuel cell technologies has left little funding for stationary or portable technologies that potentially could be commercialized before vehicles. In response, DOE recently increased its funding for stationary and portable R&D. DOE has worked effectively with hydrogen R&D managers and scientists in other federal agencies, but it is too early to evaluate collaboration among senior officials at the policy level. Agency managers are generally satisfied with the efforts of several interagency working groups to coordinate activities and facilitate scientific exchanges. At the policy level, in August 2007, DOE convened the inaugural meeting of an interagency task force, composed primarily of deputy assistant secretaries and program directors. The task force is developing plans to demonstrate and promote hydrogen technologies. |
gao_RCED-98-77 | gao_RCED-98-77_0 | Trafficking Accounts for a Relatively Small Percentage of the Total Program and Occurs Mostly in Small Stores
According to a 1995 FNS study, about $815 million, or about 4 percent of the food stamps issued, was trafficked—exchanged for cash—by about 9 percent of the authorized retailers during fiscal year 1993. Supermarkets and large grocery stores redeemed 82.5 percent of all food stamp benefits and had an average trafficking rate of 1.9 percent of the benefits redeemed. In contrast, smaller stores redeemed 17.5 percent of the benefits and had an average trafficking rate of 13.0 percent of the benefits redeemed. Therefore, an analysis of the extent of trafficking using electronic data may indicate that violations are now occurring at a greater or lesser rate. USDA Identifies Food Stamp Traffickers and Imposes Administrative Sanctions
Within USDA, FNS and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) are responsible for monitoring program compliance by the approximately 185,000 stores currently authorized to redeem food stamps. FNS takes administrative action against identified violators, such as disqualifying them from the program permanently or temporarily and/or imposing civil fines up to $40,000. Department of Justice Is Involved With Significant Food Stamp Trafficking Cases
The OIG has the sole authority for referring trafficking cases to federal, state, or local authorities for prosecution under criminal statutes. According to USDA data, during fiscal years 1990 through 1997, Justice and state and local governments prosecuted about 2,650 trafficking cases that had been investigated by the OIG, resulting in about 4,800 indictments, 4,300 convictions, and over $70 million in fines, restitutions, and recoveries. Justice can prosecute traffickers criminally and may pursue civil recovery under the False Claims Act. Since 1992, when USDA began referring cases to Justice, 566 false claims totaling over $5.9 million have been settled. Clerks Are Involved in Trafficking Food Stamps More Often Than Store Owners, and Penalties Vary
Our analysis of the 432 cases of food stamp trafficking shows that store owners alone were involved in 40 percent of the cases, clerks alone were involved in 47 percent of the cases, and store owners and clerks together were involved in 13 percent of the cases. In every case, FNS disqualified the store owner from participating in the Food Stamp Program or assessed a monetary penalty against the store owner. In addition, FNS assessed administrative financial penalties totaling $1,077,062 against store owners in 175 cases. Store clerks were caught trafficking by USDA investigators in 260 cases. Scope and Methodology
To identify information on the extent of retailer trafficking and the characteristics of the stores engaged in such trafficking, we obtained and used USDA’s 1995 report on the extent of trafficking in the Food Stamp Program and interviewed the USDA personnel responsible for that study. To determine the roles and efforts of various federal agencies in minimizing food stamp trafficking by retailers, we interviewed and obtained information from officials of the departments of Agriculture and Justice. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed food stamp trafficking at the retail level, focusing on: (1) the extent of retailer trafficking and the characteristics of the stores engaged in such trafficking; (2) the roles and efforts of federal agencies in minimizing food stamp trafficking by retailers; and (3) whether store owners or clerks were generally caught for trafficking food stamps and the extent of discipline for the trafficking.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to the most recent Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) study available, about $815 million, or about 4 percent of the food stamps issued, was trafficked at retail stores during fiscal year 1993; (2) supermarkets and large grocery stores redeemed 82.5 percent of all food stamp benefits and had a combined trafficking rate of 1.9 percent of all benefits redeemed; (3) smaller grocery stores redeemed 17.5 percent of the benefits and had a combined trafficking rate of 13 percent of the benefits redeemed; (4) this study did not reflect the electronic redemption of food stamps; (5) therefore, an analysis of the extent of trafficking that includes electronic data may detect that violations are now occurring at a greater or lesser rate; (6) the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Justice (DOJ) are the principal federal agencies responsible for minimizing food stamp trafficking by retailers; (7) within USDA, both the FNS and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) are responsible for identifying and investigating retail stores engaged in trafficking; (8) FNS can take administrative actions against store owners engaged in trafficking, including disqualifying them from participating in the program and assessing fines; (9) OIG conducts criminal investigations and can refer store owners or clerks engaged in trafficking to DOJ or state or local governments for prosecution; (10) during fiscal years 1990 through 1997, FNS identified food stamp trafficking in over 5,700 retail stores, OIG investigated and reported on 5,551 trafficking cases, and DOJ and state and local governments prosecuted about 2,650 cases referred by OIG; (11) DOJ, in some jurisdictions, will pursue civil actions against store owners to collect money under the False Claims Act when it has not allocated resources to conduct criminal prosecutions or when it has a case in which the evidence for criminal prosecution is insufficient; (12) since 1992, when USDA began referring cases to DOJ, 566 false claims totalling over $5.9 million have been settled; (13) in the 432 food stamp trafficking cases GAO reviewed, store owners alone were caught trafficking in about 40 percent of the cases, and store owners and clerks together were caught trafficking in 13 percent of the cases; and (14) FNS permanently or temporarily disqualified the owners caught trafficking from participating in the Food Stamp Program in 428 cases and assessed financial penalities totalling $1.1 million against owners in 175 cases. |
gao_GAO-14-516 | gao_GAO-14-516_0 | FAA began SMS implementation in 2005, but FAA officials informed ICAO that the agency and industry would not be able to meet the 2009 deadline. FAA’s Internal Implementation of SMS Continues, While Aviation Industry Segments Are in Various Stages of Voluntary Implementation
FAA Organizations Continue SMS Implementation
Five FAA organizations are proceeding with SMS implementation. The Air Traffic Organization completed SMS implementation in 2010 and now uses SMS-based processes to identify hazards, enact mitigations, and assess the extent to which the mitigations are working. For example, Flight Standards is developing for an SMS-based oversight system for commercial air carriers. These three industry segments, according to FAA officials and industry stakeholders, may be waiting for additional guidance or rules, which may not be finalized for a number of years, if the time frames for finalizing the air carrier and airport SMS rules are any indication. The DOT Significant Rulemaking Report for June 2014 indicated that FAA anticipates publishing the final rule in September 2014. While FAA’s rulemaking to require SMS at all 545 certificated airports has been delayed, FAA officials estimated that 9 of the nation’s largest certificated airports were voluntarily implementing SMS as of April 2014. FAA is considering changes in the proposed rule’s applicability and to some proposed requirements, including SMS implementation options for various sizes of certificated airports. FAA and Stakeholders Cited Rulemaking, Data Issues, and Stakeholder Uncertainty as Key Challenges to Implementing SMS
FAA Cited Challenges in Completing SMS Rulemaking
FAA officials stated that a primary challenge in developing SMS rules for commercial air carriers and certificated airports is developing the benefit- cost analyses. In 2010, we recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive plan that addresses how data fits into FAA’s implementation of a proactive approach to safety oversight. In addition, we found that uncertainty about the FAA’s final rule requirements raised some additional concerns with the stakeholders we interviewed, and half of the stakeholders said that of the four SMS components, the safety risk management is the most challenging to implement because of the time and analyses required to identify and mitigate risks. While acknowledging that its oversight role will be changing, FAA has not yet completed plans for overseeing industry’s implementation of SMS, including plans to develop guidance and train inspectors about their SMS oversight functions and responsibilities. Nine of the aviation industry stakeholders and three industry trade groups we interviewed expressed concerns that FAA inspectors will not be prepared to oversee industry implementation of SMS. However, even though the publication of the final SMS rule for air carriers is expected before the end of the year—currently planned for September 2014—Flight Standards has not yet established guidance for inspectors for overseeing commercial air carriers’ implementation of SMS or updated its inspector training program to incorporate such guidance. We found in 2010 that ensuring consistency in regulatory interpretations has been a long-standing issue for FAA. Fourteen of the 20 stakeholders told us that identifying and assessing SMS costs was a challenge. SMS Training for Industry
Although we did not ask specifically about any internal training programs developed by the 20 aviation stakeholders we spoke with, four stakeholders cited some difficulties with obtaining needed SMS training for their staff, including allocating time and resources for the training and finding training that was specific to their segment of the industry. According to FAA officials, they have considered the training needs of industry stakeholders and provided some training through the pilot projects. FAA plans to disseminate additional SMS guidance for air carriers and airports when final rules for these industry segments are published. The Airports Organization noted that it continually updates its SMS website, and Flight Standards indicated that it is allowing its most significant forum with the aviation industry, InfoShare, to focus more on SMS implementation and management. Recommendation for Executive Action
To maximize the effectiveness and potential benefits of SMS implementation, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following action:
Develop a plan to provide oversight of industry implementation of SMS, a plan that includes providing guidance and training to the relevant FAA inspectors by the time final SMS rules for industry sectors (commercial air carriers, certificated airports, repair stations, design and manufacturing firms) are published. Agency Comments
We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOT provided technical corrections and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to review the implementation of safety management systems (SMS) in the U.S. aviation industry and provide an update on SMS implementation within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 2. 3. What additional actions do aviation stakeholders believe FAA could take to improve SMS implementation and potential effectiveness? To assess the status of SMS implementation within FAA and for key segments of the aviation industry, we reviewed FAA orders and advisory circulars on SMS and reports on its SMS pilot projects for commercial air carriers, certificated airports, repair stations, and design and manufacturing firms and from the SMS rulemaking projects for certificated airports and commercial air carriers. To determine the key challenges FAA and the aviation industry face in implementing SMS as well as additional actions FAA and other stakeholders may take to improve the implementation and potential effectiveness of SMS, we interviewed officials from FAA, FAA employee, and industry groups. Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management. Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of Risk- Based Data Could Further Improve Safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world, reflecting the work of FAA, industry, and others to continually improve safety. To further enhance safety, in 2005, FAA began adopting a proactive, data-driven, risk-based approach to managing safety, referred to as SMS, and has proposed rules that would require SMS implementation for certain segments of the aviation industry.
GAO was asked to review SMS implementation in the aviation industry. This report addresses (1) the status of SMS implementation at FAA and in the aviation industry; (2) key challenges that FAA and industry face in implementing SMS; and (3) actions aviation stakeholders believe FAA could take to improve SMS implementation. GAO reviewed FAA documents and interviewed FAA officials. GAO also interviewed representatives from 20 selected aviation stakeholders, including commercial air carriers, certificated airports, repair stations, and design and manufacturing firms. Because the stakeholders were non-statistically selected based on their size, SMS implementation, and the industry segment represented, their views cannot be generalized to the industry or any industry segment.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Organization completed Safety Management System (SMS) implementation in 2010, and five other FAA organizations are implementing it now. SMS is an approach to collect and analyze safety data to identify hazards, manage risks, and take corrective action before an accident occurs. FAA's implementation activities include developing internal SMS guidance and procedures and using them to, among other things, identify hazards in the aviation system and provide oversight of the aviation industry. For example, FAA's Flight Standards Service is developing an SMS-based oversight system for the commercial air carriers it oversees. Although SMS is not yet required for commercial air carriers, airports, or any other industry segment, some are voluntarily implementing SMS as part of several FAA pilot projects. Of the 83 commercial air carriers, 77 are in the process of implementing SMS. FAA anticipates publishing a final rule in September 2014 requiring commercial air carriers to implement SMS. To a lesser extent, other industry segments are voluntarily implementing SMS. For example, according to FAA, 9 of the nation's largest airports are implementing SMS. FAA issued a proposed rule for airport SMS implementation, but development of a final rule has been delayed, and FAA has not yet determined if it will propose rules for other industry segments. Stakeholders and FAA officials speculated that the other industry segments may be waiting to implement SMS until FAA issues additional guidance or a final rule.
According to FAA officials, completing the rulemaking processes for commercial air carriers and airports has been a primary challenge to industry SMS implementation. Officials stated that one reason for delay has been difficulty in developing the benefit-cost analyses required for significant regulatory action. However, FAA is revisiting these analyses through the ongoing rulemaking process. Uncertainty about FAA plans for SMS oversight was among the key challenges for aviation industry SMS implementation. Although some inspector training has been provided, representatives from 9 of the 20 stakeholders GAO interviewed cited concerns that FAA inspectors may not be adequately trained to oversee industry SMS activities, and 6 expressed concerns that inspectors throughout FAA may not consistently interpret SMS regulations. However, FAA has not completed plans for its SMS oversight activities, including inspector training, and officials stated that they would not do so until the final rule is published. Without adequate planning of oversight and training of inspectors, FAA could find itself unprepared to meet its oversight responsibilities when final SMS rules are published.
Twelve of the 20 aviation stakeholders GAO spoke with identified additional FAA actions that could improve their SMS implementation efforts. For example, 4 stakeholders stated that providing SMS training to their employees was a challenge, and 2 suggested that FAA could assist by providing them access to FAA's SMS training. FAA indicated that it is considering industry stakeholder training needs and provided training through the pilot projects. Fourteen stakeholders were pleased with FAA's collaboration and communication, but 6 of them stated that this effort could be broadened. FAA updates its SMS website information, and FAA's most significant industry SMS forum is focusing more on SMS implementation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA develop a plan for overseeing industry SMS implementation that includes providing guidance and training for FAA inspectors by the time final rules are published. GAO provided DOT with a draft of this report for comment. DOT provided technical corrections which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-543 | gao_GAO-12-543_0 | Enrollment Levels of Students with Disabilities in Traditional Public Schools and Charter Schools Differed, but Little Is Known about Factors Contributing to Differences
Charter schools enrolled a lower percentage of students with disabilities than traditional public schools in both school years 2008-2009 and 2009- 2010 (see fig. For example, in the state of New Hampshire, about 6 percent of students in charter schools were students with disabilities compared to about 13 percent of students in traditional public schools. We also found that, relative to traditional public schools, the proportion of charter schools that enrolled high percentages of students with disabilities was lower overall and generally tapered off the greater the enrollment of students with disabilities. Specifically, the enrollment of students with disabilities was 8 to 12 percent at 23 percent of charter schools and 34 percent of traditional public schools. However, when compared to traditional public schools, a higher percentage of charter schools enrolled more than 20 percent of students with disabilities. Charter Schools We Visited Offer Special Education Services, but Faced Challenges with Severe Disabilities
Most of the 13 charter schools we visited reported using multiple strategies to publicize the availability of special education services in their school and the charter school’s presence in the community. Charter Schools Reported Tailoring Special Education Services to Individual Students’ Needs
Many of the charter school officials we interviewed reported providing services specific to each child’s needs. In school year 2009-2010, approximately 3.6 percent of all students enrolled in public schools were enrolled in charter schools. This study, issued by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, examined some of the factors that may explain the difference in students with disabilities’ enrollment in charter schools and traditional public schools, most prominently highlighting a practice where parents of students with disabilities were being discouraged during the admissions process from enrolling their students in charter schools. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help charter schools recognize practices that may affect enrollment of students with disabilities and improve the information available for monitoring and oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Education do the following: 1. Conduct additional fact finding and research to understand the factors affecting enrollment of students with disabilities in charter schools and act upon that information, as appropriate. Education agreed with our findings and recommendations. The work was framed around three questions: (1) How do enrollment levels of students with disabilities in charter schools and traditional public schools compare, and what is known about the factors that may contribute to any differences? (2) How do charter schools reach out to students with disabilities and what special education services do charter schools provide? (3) What roles do the U.S. Department of Education, state educational agencies (SEA), and other entities that oversee charter schools play in ensuring students with disabilities’ access to charter schools? To address the questions, we used several sources of data, including data for school years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the most recent data available at the time, from a custom data file provided to us by Education, which includes counts of students with disabilities at the school-level; site visit interviews with officials from charter schools and school districts in three states selected on the basis of states with a large number of charter schools, a mix in local educational agency (LEA) status and geographic diversity; and interviews with Education, Department of Justice, and SEA officials, and charter school authorizers. Open ended questions were used to guide the discussions and the topics included policy or guidance concerning enrollment of students with disabilities in charter schools collaboration with other Education offices or Justice’s Civil Rights Division in providing guidance to charter schools about enrollment of students with disabilities, any assistance provided to charter schools to pool resources for serving students with more severe disabilities, any assistance provided to states concerning their monitoring of charter schools’ implementation of IDEA, and any research sponsored or supported concerning students with disabilities and charter schools. Metropolitan-Level Analysis
Due to variation in charter school structure and policies across states, and because decisions about the placement of students with disabilities in charter schools, traditional public schools, or a separate facility of some type, are made at the school district level, and placement decisions vary according to students’ needs, aggregated data may mask differences in enrollment levels of students with disabilities in charter schools and traditional public schools at the metropolitan level. | Why GAO Did This Study
While the number of charter schools is growing rapidly, questions have been raised about whether charter schools are appropriately serving students with disabilities. GAO was asked: (1) How do enrollment levels of students with disabilities in charter schools and traditional public schools compare, and what is known about the factors that may contribute to any differences? (2) How do charter schools reach out to students with disabilities and what special education services do charter schools provide? (3) What role do Education, state educational agencies, and other entities that oversee charter schools play in ensuring students with disabilities have access to charter schools? GAO analyzed federal data on the number and characteristics of students with disabilities; visited charter schools and school districts in three states selected on the basis of the number of charter schools in the state, among other things; and interviewed representatives of federal, state, and other agencies that oversee charter schools.
What GAO Found
Charter schools enrolled a lower percentage of students with disabilities than traditional public schools, but little is known about the factors contributing to these differences. In school year 2009-2010, which was the most recent data available at the time of our review, approximately 11 percent of students enrolled in traditional public schools were students with disabilities compared to about 8 percent of students enrolled in charter schools.
GAO also found that, relative to traditional public schools, the proportion of charter schools that enrolled high percentages of students with disabilities was lower overall. Specifically, students with disabilities represented 8 to 12 percent of all students at 23 percent of charter schools compared to 34 percent of traditional public schools. However, when compared to traditional public schools, a higher percentage of charter schools enrolled more than 20 percent of students with disabilities. Several factors may help explain why enrollment levels of students with disabilities in charter schools and traditional public schools differ, but the information is anecdotal. For example, charter schools are schools of choice, so enrollment levels may differ because fewer parents of students with disabilities choose to enroll their children in charter schools. In addition, some charter schools may be discouraging students with disabilities from enrolling. Further, in certain instances, traditional public school districts play a role in the placement of students with disabilities in charter schools. In these instances, while charter schools participate in the placement process, they do not always make the final placement decisions for students with disabilities. Finally, charter schools resources may be constrained, making it difficult to meet the needs of students with more severe disabilities.
Most of the 13 charter schools GAO visited publicized and offered special education services, but faced challenges serving students with severe disabilities. Most charter school officials said they publicized the availability of special education services in several ways, including fliers and placing ads in the local newspaper. Many charter schools GAO visited also reported tailoring special education services to individuals needs, but faced challenges serving students with severe disabilities due to insufficient resources. About half of the charter school officials GAO interviewed cited insufficient resources, including limited space, as a challenge.
The U.S. Department of Educations (Education) Office for Civil Rights has undertaken two compliance reviews related to charter schools recruitment and admission of students with disabilities in three states, but has not issued recent guidance covering admission practices in detail, nor has Education conducted recent research about factors affecting lower enrollment in charter schools. The three states GAO visited already have taken steps to monitor charter schools admission practices. In addition, officials in these three states reported prohibiting disability-related questions on charter school admission forms, in part to protect students with disabilities access.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Education take measures to help charter schools recognize practices that may affect enrollment of students with disabilities by updating existing guidance and conducting additional fact finding and research to identify factors affecting enrollment levels of these students in charter schools. Education agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-727 | gao_GAO-06-727_0 | In addition, IRS is responsible for administering the program tax benefits. Most EZ/EC Grant Funds Have Been Expended, but Many EZs and Some ECs Received Grant Extensions
As of March 31, 2006, Round I EZs and ECs had spent all but 15 percent of the program grant funds they received. However, not all rural sites used this broad definition of leveraging. Although communities reported using the EZ/EC grants to leverage additional resources, we could not verify the actual amounts. Oversight Was Hindered by Limited Program Data and Variation in Monitoring
According to our federal standards, federal agencies should oversee the use of public resources and ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs. In addition, HHS did not provide the states, EZs, and ECs with clear guidance on how to monitor the program grant funds, and the types and extent of monitoring performed by state and local participants varied. The Federal Agencies’ Oversight Efforts Had Shortcomings in Data Collection
None of the federal agencies collected data showing how program funds had been spent. We also recommended that HUD, USDA, and IRS work together to identify the data needed to measure the use of EZ/EC tax benefits and the cost-effectiveness of collecting the information, but the three agencies did not reach agreement on a cost-effective approach. IRS Data on the Use of Program Tax Benefits Are Limited
Previously, we have noted that information on tax expenditures should be collected in order to evaluate their effectiveness as a means of accomplishing federal objectives and to ensure that they are achieving their intended purpose. Additional Program Data Could Facilitate Evaluations of the Effects of the EZ/EC and Similar Programs
Our efforts to analyze the effects of Round I designation on poverty, unemployment, and economic growth were limited by the absence of data on the use of program grant funds, the amount of funds leveraged, and the use of tax benefits. Observations
The EZ/EC program, one of the most recent large-scale federal programs aimed at revitalizing distressed urban and rural communities, resulted in a variety of activities intended to improve social and economic conditions in the nation’s high-poverty communities. All three rounds of the EZ/EC program are scheduled to end no later than December 31, 2009. HUD also indicated that it did not agree that data on the use of the tax benefits were lacking. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) describe how Round I of the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) program was implemented by the designated communities; (2) evaluate the extent of federal, state, and local oversight of the program; (3) examine the extent to which data are available to assess the use of program tax benefits; and (4) analyze the effects the Round I EZs and ECs had on poverty, unemployment, and economic growth in their communities. Methodology for Assessing the Effect of the Program on Poverty, Unemployment, and Economic Growth
To determine the effect of the EZ/EC program on changes in poverty, unemployment, and economic growth, we used a variety of quantitative methods that examined changes in the designated program areas and areas we identified as comparison areas. We also completed an econometric analysis of the eight urban EZs. Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban Development
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s letter dated August 17, 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) program is one of the most recent large-scale federal effort intended to revitalize impoverished urban and rural communities. There have been three rounds of EZs and two rounds of ECs, all of which are scheduled to end no later than December 2009. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 mandated that GAO audit and report in 2004, 2007, and 2010 on the EZ/EC program and its effect on poverty, unemployment, and economic growth. This report, which focuses on the first round of the program starting in 1994, discusses program implementation; program oversight; data available on the use of program tax benefits; and the program's effect on poverty, unemployment, and economic growth. In conducting this work, GAO made site visits to all Round I EZs, conducted an e-mail survey of 60 Round I ECs, and used several statistical methods to analyze program effects.
What GAO Found
Round I Empowerment Zones (EZ) and Enterprise Communities (EC) implemented a variety of activities using $1 billion in federal grant funding from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and as of March 2006, the designated communities had expended all but 15 percent of this funding. Most of the activities that the grant recipients put in place were community development projects, such as projects supporting education and housing. Other activities included economic opportunity initiatives such as job training and loan programs. Although all EZs and ECs also reported using the program grants to leverage funds from other sources, reliable data on the extent of leveraging were not available. According to federal standards, agencies should oversee the use of public resources and ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs. However, none of the federal agencies that were responsible for program oversight--including HHS and the departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Agriculture (USDA)--collected data on the amount of program grant funds used to implement specific program activities. This lack of data limited both federal oversight and GAO's ability to assess the effect of the program. Moreover, because HHS did not provide the states and designated communities with clear guidance on how to monitor the program grant funds, the extent of monitoring varied across the sites. In addition, detailed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on the use of EZ/EC program tax benefits were not available. Previously, GAO cited similar challenges in assessing the use of tax benefits in other federal programs and stated that information on tax expenditures should be collected to ensure that these expenditures are achieving their intended purpose. Although GAO recommended in 2004 that HUD, USDA, and IRS work together to identify the data needed to assess the EZ/EC tax benefits and the cost effectiveness of collecting the information, the three agencies did not reach agreement on an approach. Without adequate data on the use of program grant funds or tax benefits, neither the responsible federal agencies nor GAO could determine whether the EZ/EC funds had been spent effectively or that the tax benefits had in fact been used as intended. Using the data that were available, GAO attempted to analyze changes in several indicators--poverty and unemployment rates and two measures of economic growth. Although improvements in poverty, unemployment, and economic growth had occurred in the EZs and ECs, our econometric analysis of the eight urban EZs could not tie these changes definitively to the EZ designation. |
gao_GAO-12-874 | gao_GAO-12-874_0 | 2). Operators use hydraulic fracturing in many shale and tight sandstone formations (see fig. For example, operators must manage produced water, which, for purposes of this report includes flowback water—the water, proppant, and chemicals used for hydraulic fracturing—as well as water that occurs naturally in the oil- or gas-bearing geological formation. Federal Environmental and Public Health Laws Apply to Unconventional Oil and Gas Development but with Key Exemptions
Requirements from eight federal laws apply to the development of oil and gas from unconventional sources. There are exemptions or limitations in regulatory coverage for preventive programs authorized by six of these laws, though EPA generally retains its authorities under federal environmental and public health laws to respond to environmental contamination. Eight Federal Environmental and Public Health Laws Apply to Unconventional Oil and Gas Development
Parts of the following eight federal environmental and public health laws apply to unconventional oil and gas development:
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
Clean Water Act (CWA)
Clean Air Act (CAA)
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
There are exemptions or limitations in regulatory coverage related to the first six laws listed above. In addition to CWA’s requirement for NPDES permits for discharges from industrial sites, the 1987 Water Quality Act amended CWA to establish a specific program for regulating stormwater discharges, such as those related to rainstorms, though oil and gas well sites are largely exempt from these requirements. Well completions for hydraulically fractured natural gas wells. All six states have updated some aspects of their requirements in recent years. Specifically, states have requirements for baseline testing of water wells, required setbacks from water sources, and stormwater management, among others. All of the six states in our review have requirements related to how wells are to be drilled and casing should be installed and cemented in place, though the specifics of their requirements vary. These additional federal requirements are the same for conventional and unconventional oil and gas development. Altogether, BLM oversees oil and gas development on approximately 700 million subsurface acres. In addition, BLM officials said that they coordinate with surface land management agencies regarding surface conditions. See appendix X for a comparison of federal environmental requirements, state requirements, and additional requirements that apply on federal lands. BLM recently proposed new requirements for oil and gas development on federal lands. Federal and State Agencies Reported Several Challenges Regulating Unconventional Oil and Gas Development
Federal and state agencies reported facing several challenges in regulating oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs. In addition, BLM and state officials reported that hiring and retaining staff and educating the public are challenges. Conducting Inspection and Enforcement Activities
Officials at EPA reported that conducting inspection and enforcement activities for oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs is challenging due to limited information, as well as the dispersed nature of the industry and the rapid pace of development. For example, EPA officials in headquarters and Regional offices told us that the exclusion of exploration and production waste from hazardous waste regulations under RCRA significantly limits EPA’s role in regulating these wastes. Similarly, BLM officials in North Dakota and headquarters both said that retaining employees is difficult because qualified staff are frequently offered more money for private sector positions within the oil and gas industry. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify federal and state environmental and public health requirements governing onshore oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs, we analyzed federal and state laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as reports on federal and state requirements. To identify state requirements, we identified and reviewed laws and regulations in a nonprobability sample of six selected states—Colorado, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wyoming. For example, the applicability of NSPS may trigger a state requirement to get a construction permit or other type of permit. The amendments required EPA to conduct and publish “a detailed and comprehensive study…on the adverse effects, if any, of drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy on human health and the environment.” The study report was to “include appropriate findings and recommendations for Federal and non-Federal actions concerning such effects.” he Administrator shall, after public hearings and opportunity for comment, determine either to promulgate regulations under this subchapter for drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy or that such regulations are unwarranted. 1988. In general, one of these agencies has primary responsibility for regulating oil and gas development activities such as drilling that occur on the well pad and for managing and disposing of certain wastes generated on-site, while the other agency has a broader mandate for implementing and enforcing environmental or public health requirements, some aspects of which may affect oil and gas development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Technological improvements have allowed the extraction of oil and natural gas from onshore unconventional reservoirs such as shale, tight sandstone, and coalbed methane formations. Specifically, advances in horizontal drilling techniques combined with hydraulic fracturing (pumping water, sand, and chemicals into wells to fracture underground rock formations and allow oil or gas to flow) have increased domestic development of oil and natural gas from these unconventional reservoirs. The increase in such development has raised concerns about potential environmental and public health effects and whether existing federal and state environmental and public health requirements are adequate.
GAO was asked to review environmental and public health requirements for unconventional oil and gas development and (1) describe federal requirements; (2) describe state requirements; (3) describe additional requirements that apply on federal lands; and (4) identify challenges, if any, that federal and state agencies reported facing in regulating oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs. GAO identified and analyzed federal laws, state laws in six selected states (Colorado, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming), and interviewed federal and state officials and representatives from industry, environmental, and public health organizations.
GAO is not making recommendations. In commenting on the report, agencies provided information on recent regulatory activities and technical comments.
What GAO Found
As with conventional oil and gas development, requirements from eight federal environmental and public health laws apply to unconventional oil and gas development. For example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) regulates discharges of pollutants into surface waters. Among other things, CWA requires oil and gas well site operators to obtain permits for discharges of produced waterwhich includes fluids used for hydraulic fracturing, as well as water that occurs naturally in oil- or gas-bearing formationsto surface waters. In addition, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) governs the management and disposal of hazardous wastes, among other things. However, key exemptions or limitations in regulatory coverage affect the applicability of six of these environmental and public health laws. For example, CWA also generally regulates stormwater discharges by requiring that facilities associated with industrial and construction activities get permits, but the law and its regulations largely exempt oil and gas well sites. In addition, oil and gas exploration and production wastes are exempt from RCRA hazardous waste requirements based on a regulatory determination made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1988. EPA generally retains its authorities under federal environmental and public health laws to respond to environmental contamination.
All six states in GAOs review implement additional requirements governing activities associated with oil and gas development and have updated some aspects of their requirements in recent years. For example, all six states have requirements related to how wells are to be drilled and how casingsteel pipe within the wellis to be installed and cemented in place, though the specifics of their requirements vary. The states also have requirements related to well site selection and preparation, which may include baseline testing of water wells before drilling or stormwater management.
Oil and gas development on federal lands must comply with applicable federal environmental and state laws, as well as additional requirements. These requirements are the same for conventional and unconventional oil and gas development. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees oil and gas development on approximately 700 million subsurface acres. BLM regulations for leases and permits govern similar types of activities as state requirements, such as requirements for how operators drill the well and install casing. BLM recently proposed new regulations for hydraulic fracturing of wells on public lands.
Federal and state agencies reported several challenges in regulating oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs. EPA officials reported that conducting inspection and enforcement activities and having limited legal authorities are challenges. For example, conducting inspection and enforcement activities is challenging due to limited information, such as data on groundwater quality prior to drilling. EPA officials also said that the exclusion of exploration and production waste from hazardous waste regulations under RCRA significantly limits EPAs role in regulating these wastes. In addition, BLM and state officials reported that hiring and retaining staff and educating the public are challenges. For example, officials from several states and BLM said that retaining employees is difficult because qualified staff are frequently offered more money for private sector positions within the oil and gas industry. |
gao_GAO-10-874 | gao_GAO-10-874_0 | As of 2010, 20 U.S. agencies have a role in export promotion. From 2004 to 2009, CS’s budgets remained essentially flat as per capita personnel costs and administrative costs increased. Additionally, CS was not fully aware of the costs associated with positions it maintained in U.S. embassies that were vacant but not officially eliminated and did not take steps that would have saved money on them. As CS’s financial constraints grew, officials delayed their impact through a variety of financial management practices such as using unobligated funds from prior years’ appropriations. However, as the availability of these offsetting funds declined and costs continued growing, CS leadership failed to recognize the risks entailed by the financial problems, and the organization reached a “crisis” situation in 2009. Officials froze hiring, travel, training, and supplies, compromising CS’s ability to conduct its core business. CS’s workforce declined by about 240 staff from its peak level in 2004 through attrition—affecting the mix and distribution of personnel. For example, in 2009, ITA redistributed $3 million of CS’s centralized costs to other ITA units (Market Access and Compliance, Manufacturing and Services, and Import Administration) to assist CS. CS Lacks Key Planning Elements to Rebuild Its Workforce, and Its 2011 Budget Request Has Some Weaknesses
Although CS is taking steps to rebuild its workforce, it lacks key elements in its workforce planning, and its 2011 budget request has some weaknesses that could affect its ability to meet its goals. The 2011 budget requests $321 million for CS, $63 million more than its 2010 appropriation. CS has also lacked a clear sense of strategic direction. CS’s Understaffed Human Resources Office and the Long Lead Time Needed to Hire and Train FSOs Could Delay Staffing Increases
Besides the lack of a quality workforce plan, CS’s capacity to implement what CS officials said may be the biggest hiring effort in CS history is compromised because its human resources office is understaffed. However, CS planned to increase the number of staff in 2010. These opportunities include improving long-term financial and workforce information necessary to recognize significant changes affecting the organization; routinely reviewing operations to identify potential cost savings, such as administrative fees related to overseas posts; and recognizing risks and considering alternative responses to significant resource changes in a systematic manner so as to minimize actions such as freezing hiring, travel, and training that compromise CS’s ability to conduct its core business. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure CS effectively and efficiently uses its resources in support of its strategic goals and the President’s National Export Initiative, we are making the following three recommendations: The Secretary of Commerce should direct the Undersecretary for International Trade to strengthen management controls over CS’s financial and workforce improve workforce planning and better align CS’s workforce with its strategic goals and available resources on a routine basis, and improve cost estimating to better ensure that CS’s budget estimate includes sufficient resources to support its planned operations and addresses potential risks. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, Commerce concurred with our findings and recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a Congressional mandate, GAO reviewed (1) how well the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (CS) managed its resources from 2004 to 2009, and (2) the completeness of CS’s workforce plans and the quality of its 2011 budget request. We also interviewed CS officials responsible for managing the budget. Data. Documentation. Risk analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the recent recession, policymakers have emphasized the role exports can play in strengthening the U.S. economy and in creating higher paying jobs. In March 2010 the President signed an Executive Order creating the National Export Initiative (NEI), with a goal of doubling U.S. exports in 5 years. However, since 2004 the workforce of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (CS) has shrunk, calling into question the ability of this key agency to increase its activities to assist U.S. businesses with their exports. In response to a conference committee mandate, GAO reviewed (1) how well CS managed its resources from 2004 to 2009, and (2) the completeness of CS's workforce plans and the quality of its fiscal year 2011 budget request. GAO analyzed data from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and State; reviewed agency documents; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
CS had management control weaknesses over its resources from 2004 to 2009. During this period, CS's budgets remained essentially flat as per capita personnel costs and administrative costs increased. However, CS leadership did not recognize the long-term implications of these changes because it lacked key financial and workforce information and risk analysis necessary for good management control. CS continued to pay fees associated with positions it maintained in U.S. embassies that were vacant but not officially eliminated. As CS's financial constraints grew, officials delayed their impact by using a variety of financial management practices. For example, the International Trade Administration (ITA), CS's parent agency, attributed some of CS's centralized costs to other units. However, as the availability of offsetting funds declined and costs continued growing, CS leadership failed to recognize the risks from these changes in accordance with good management controls, and reached a "crisis" situation in 2009. Officials froze hiring, travel, training, and supplies, compromising CS's ability to conduct its core business. CS's workforce declined by about 14 percent from its peak level in 2004 through attrition--affecting the mix and distribution of personnel. CS intends to rebuild its workforce but lacks key planning elements for doing so, and its budget request has weaknesses that could affect its ability to meet its goals. CS will have a central role in implementing the NEI. The President's 2011 budget requested $321 million for CS, $63 million more than its 2010 appropriation. The budget would fund a major staff increase. CS is allocating $5.2 million of its 2010 appropriation to begin recruiting new staff. However, as new executive-level leadership was arriving, GAO found that CS lacked key planning elements, including a clear sense of strategic direction and an analysis to determine its workforce needs. Also, it had not updated its workforce plans to address staffing gaps since fiscal year 2007. Adding more staff could be delayed because CS's human resources office is itself understaffed and because CS requires up to 2 years to hire and train new Foreign Service Officers. GAO also found that the 2011 budget request, though sound in many respects, has weaknesses; it lacks some documentation, and it lacks risk analysis and contingency plans for highly variable program costs, which could lead to cost overruns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends to the Secretary of Commerce that CS (1) strengthen management controls, (2) improve workforce planning, and (3) improve cost estimating related to CS's budget estimate. Commerce agreed with our findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-529T | gao_GAO-10-529T_0 | In 2007, Specialty Tier-Eligible Drugs Accounted for 10 Percent of Part D Spending
We found that specialty tier-eligible drugs accounted for about 10 percent, or $5.6 billion, of the $54.4 billion in total prescription drug spending under Part D MA-PD and PDP plans in 2007. 2.) their cost sharing is largely paid by Medicare. While only 8 percent of Part D beneficiaries in MA-PD and PDP plans who filed claims but did not use any specialty tier-eligible drugs reached the catastrophic coverage threshold of the Part D benefit in 2007, 55 percent of beneficiaries who used at least one specialty tier-eligible drug reached the threshold. Differences in Plans’ Cost-Sharing Structures Result in Out-of-Pocket Costs for Most Beneficiaries That Vary Initially and Then Become Similar
For most beneficiaries—those who are responsible for paying the full cost- sharing amounts required by their plans—who use a given specialty tier- eligible drug, different cost-sharing structures can be expected to result in varying out-of-pocket costs during the benefit’s initial coverage period. However, as long as beneficiaries reach the catastrophic coverage threshold in a calendar year—as 31 percent of beneficiaries who used at least one specialty tier-eligible drug and who were responsible for the full cost-sharing amounts did in 2007—their annual out-of-pocket costs for that drug are likely to be similar regardless of their plans’ cost-sharing structures. 3.) There are several reasons for this. Variations in Negotiated Drug Prices Affect Out-of- Pocket Costs for Most Beneficiaries
For most beneficiaries—those who are responsible for paying the full cost- sharing amounts required by their plans—variations in negotiated drug prices affect out-of-pocket costs during the initial coverage phase if their plans require them to pay coinsurance. As the following examples illustrate, there are variations in negotiated prices between drugs, across plans for the same drug, and from year to year. Variations between drugs: In 2009—across our sample of 35 plans— beneficiaries who took the cancer drug Gleevec for the entire year could have been expected to pay about $6,300 out of pocket because Gleevec had an average negotiated price of about $45,500 per year, while beneficiaries could have been expected to pay about $10,500 out of pocket over the entire year if they took the Gaucher disease drug Zavesca, which had an average negotiated price of about $130,000 per year. For example, the average negotiated price for a 1-year supply of Gleevec across our sample of plans increased by 46 percent, from about $31,200 in 2006 to about $45,500 in 2009. Correspondingly, the average out-of-pocket cost for a beneficiary taking Gleevec for an entire year could have been expected to rise from about $4,900 in 2006 to more than $6,300 in 2009. Plan Sponsors Report Three Main Reasons Why They Have a Limited Ability to Negotiate Price Concessions for Specialty Tier-Eligible Drugs
The eight Part D plan sponsors we interviewed told us that they have little leverage in negotiating price concessions for most specialty tier-eligible drugs. Additionally, all seven of the plan sponsors we surveyed reported that they were unable to obtain price concessions from manufacturers on 8 of the 20 specialty tier-eligible drugs in our sample between 2006 and 2008. First, they stated that pharmaceutical manufacturers have little incentive to offer price concessions when a given drug has few competitors on the market, as is the case for drugs used to treat cancer. In contrast, plan sponsors told us that they were more often able to negotiate price concessions for drugs in classes where there are more competing drugs on the market—such as for drugs used to treat rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, and anemia. However, many specialty tier-eligible drugs belong to one of the six classes of clinical concern for which CMS requires Part D plan sponsors to include all or substantially all drugs on their formularies, eliminating formulary exclusion as a source of negotiating leverage. Third, plan sponsors told us that they have limited ability to negotiate price concessions for certain specialty tier-eligible drugs because they account for a relatively limited share of total prescription drug utilization among Part D beneficiaries. CMS agreed with portions of our findings and suggested additional information for us to include in our report. We incorporated comments from CMS and the plan sponsors as appropriate in our January 2010 report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) allows Part D plans to utilize different tiers with different levels of cost sharing as a way of managing drug utilization and spending. One such tier, the specialty tier, is designed for high-cost drugs whose prices exceed a certain threshold set by CMS. Beneficiaries who use these drugs typically face higher out-of-pocket costs than beneficiaries who use only lower-cost drugs. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2010 report entitled Medicare Part D: Spending, Beneficiary Cost Sharing, and Cost-Containment Efforts for High-Cost Drugs Eligible for a Specialty Tier (GAO-10-242) in which GAO examined, among other things, (1) Part D spending on these drugs in 2007, the most recent year for which claims data were available; (2) how different cost-sharing structures could be expected to affect beneficiary out-of-pocket costs; (3) how negotiated drug prices could be expected to affect beneficiary out-of-pocket costs; and (4) information Part D plan sponsors reported on their ability to negotiate price concessions. For the second and third of these objectives, this testimony focuses on out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries responsible for paying the full cost-sharing amounts required by their plans. GAO examined CMS data and interviewed officials from CMS and 8 of the 11 largest plan sponsors, based on enrollment in 2008. Seven of the 11 plan sponsors provided price concession data for a sample of 20 drugs for 2006 through 2008.
What GAO Found
High-cost drugs eligible for a specialty tier commonly include immunosuppressant drugs, those used to treat cancer, and antiviral drugs. Specialty tier-eligible drugs accounted for 10 percent, or $5.6 billion, of the $54.4 billion in total prescription drug spending under Medicare Part D plans in 2007. Medicare beneficiaries who received a low-income subsidy (LIS) accounted for most of the spending on specialty tier-eligible drugs-- $4.0 billion, or 70 percent of the total. Among all beneficiaries who used at least one specialty tier-eligible drug in 2007, 55 percent reached the catastrophic coverage threshold, after which Medicare pays at least 80 percent of all drug costs. In contrast, only 8 percent of all Part D beneficiaries who filed claims but did not use any specialty tier-eligible drugs reached this threshold in 2007. Most beneficiaries are responsible for paying the full cost-sharing amounts required by their plans. For such beneficiaries who use a given specialty tier-eligible drug, different cost-sharing structures result in varying out-of-pocket costs only until they reach the catastrophic coverage threshold, which 31 percent of these beneficiaries did in 2007. After that point, beneficiaries' annual out-of-pocket costs for a given drug are likely to be similar regardless of their plans' cost-sharing structures. Variations in negotiated drug prices can also affect out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries who are responsible for paying the full cost-sharing amounts required by their plans. Variations in negotiated prices can occur between drugs, across plans for the same drug, and from year to year. For example, the average negotiated price for the cancer drug Gleevec across our sample of plans increased by 46 percent between 2006 and 2009, from about $31,200 per year to about $45,500 per year. Correspondingly, the average out-of-pocket cost for a beneficiary taking Gleevec for the entire year could have been expected to rise from about $4,900 in 2006 to more than $6,300 in 2009. Plan sponsors reported having little leverage to negotiate price concessions from manufacturers for most specialty tier-eligible drugs. One reason for this limited leverage was that many of these drugs have few competitors on the market. Plan sponsors reported that they were more often able to negotiate price concessions for drugs with more competitors on the market--such as for drugs used to treat rheumatoid arthritis. Two additional reasons cited for limited negotiating leverage were CMS requirements that plans include all or most drugs from certain therapeutic classes on their formularies, limiting sponsors' ability to exclude drugs from their formularies in favor of competing drugs; and that the relatively limited share of total prescription drug utilization among Part D beneficiaries for some specialty tier-eligible drugs was insufficient to entice manufacturers to offer price concessions. CMS provided GAO with comments on a draft of the January 2010 report. CMS agreed with portions of GAO's findings and suggested additional information for GAO to include in the report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-6 | gao_GAO-13-6_0 | Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, temporarily extended by subsequent acts, and most recently extended through the end of 2012 by the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012. The variability of costs per transport reflected differences in certain provider characteristics, such as volume of transports, intensity of Medicare transports, and level of government subsidies received. Providers reported that personnel costs accounted for the largest percentage of their total costs in 2010 and contributed the most to increases in total costs between 2009 and 2010. Median Cost per Transport in 2010 Was $429, but Costs per Transport Varied Widely across All Providers
The median cost per ground ambulance transport for providers in our sample was $429 in 2010, but providers’ costs per transport ranged from a low of $224 to a high of $2,204. Median Medicare Margin for Providers in Sample Was about 2 Percent in 2010, but Medicare Margins Varied Widely across Providers
The median Medicare margin, including add-on payments, was about positive 2 percent in 2010 for the 153 providers in our sample.removed the add-on payments, we found that payments decreased for the providers in our sample, resulting in a lower median Medicare margin of negative 1 percent for those providers. Ambulance Transports Increased from 2004 to 2010, with the Largest Growth Occurring in Super-Rural Areas
Ambulance transports for all Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries in the nation increased by 33 percent from 2004 to 2010. Transports per 1,000 beneficiaries in super-rural areas grew the most, by 41 percent, and transports per 1,000 beneficiaries in rural and urban areas increased by 35 percent and 32 percent, respectively. The increase in ambulance transports from 2004 to 2010 is attributable primarily to an increase in BLS nonemergency transports, which rose by 59 percent from 2004 to 2010. Super-rural areas experienced the largest increase in BLS nonemergency transports (82 percent). However, these local governments have begun to bill Medicare as well as other insurers because of increased budgetary pressures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has explored increases in ambulance utilization and has cited improper payments as one potential cause. HHS OIG also found that Medicare’s ambulance transport benefit is highly vulnerable to abuse and found that many ambulance transports paid for by Medicare did not meet Medicare program requirements, including transports that were not medically necessary. AAA representatives had some questions about the results of our regression analysis. National Survey of Ground Ambulance Providers’ Costs
To collect data on ground ambulance providers’ costs, revenues, transports, and organizational characteristics for calendar year 2010, or for the fiscal year that corresponded to all or the majority of a provider’s calendar year 2010 data, we sent a web-based survey to a random, nationally representative sample of 294 eligible ambulance providers. We determined that our sample was nationally representative of the approximately 2,900 ambulance providers that billed Medicare in 2003 and 2010, were still operational in 2012, and did not share costs with nonambulance services or air ambulance services. Calculating Medicare Ambulance Payments and Use of Transports with Claims Data
To examine the relationship between Medicare payments and providers’ costs, we used Medicare claims data to calculate Medicare payments in 2010 for the providers in our sample, and we calculated Medicare margins—the percentage difference between providers’ Medicare payments per transport and their costs per transport. To examine ambulance transports per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries, we used Medicare claims data and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 2010 Medicare enrollment data. We calculated payments with and without the applicable add-on payment rates, and we assumed that providers charged the maximum allowed amount under the ambulance fee schedule.that our payment calculations were comparable to actual payments made based on the claims, we compared the payments we calculated with add- ons to the payment amounts on the claims for a random sample of 6,000 urban, rural, and super-rural claims, and we found the difference in the amounts to be less than 1 percent. For the providers in our sample, we reported the median Medicare margin and the distribution of providers’ Medicare margins by predominant service area (urban, rural, or super-rural) and for all providers. We determined that the Medicare claims data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Ambulance Services: Medicare Payments Can Be Better Targeted to Trips in Less Densely Populated Areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2004, Congress has authorized supplemental temporary payments, called "add-on" payments, to augment Medicare fee schedule payments to ambulance providers. The add-on payments increased payments for transports in urban, rural, and super-rural (the least densely populated) areas by $175 million in calendar year 2011, according to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. In 2007, GAO reported a decline in transports by beneficiaries in super-rural areas and recommended that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) monitor beneficiary use of ambulance transports to ensure access to services, particularly in super-rural areas. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 required GAO to update the 2007 report. GAO examined, for 2010 (the most recent year complete data were available when GAO began the study), (1) ground ambulance provider costs for transports, (2) the relationship between Medicare payments and provider costs, and (3) beneficiary use of ground ambulance transports. To do this work, GAO sent a survey to a sample of eligible providers based on the 2007 report sample asking for provider costs and characteristics. The sample is representative of all ground ambulance providers that billed Medicare in 2003 and 2010, were operational in 2012, and did not share costs with nonambulance services or air ambulance services. GAO also performed a regression analysis to examine factors that affect costs, analyzed Medicare claims and enrollment data, and interviewed representatives of ambulance provider organizations. CMS reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments.
What GAO Found
Ground ambulance providers' costs per transport for 2010 varied widely. The median cost per transport for the providers in GAO's sample was $429, ranging from $224 to $2,204 per transport. Provider characteristics that affected cost per transport were volume of transports (including both Medicare and non-Medicare transports), intensity of transports (the proportion of Medicare transports that were nonemergency), and the extent to which providers received government subsidies. Higher volume of transports, higher proportions of nonemergency transports, and lower government subsidies were associated with lower costs per transport. Providers reported that personnel cost was the largest cost component in their 2010 total costs and the biggest contributor to increases in their total costs from 2009 to 2010.
The median Medicare margin, including add-on payments, was about +2 percent in 2010 (meaning that providers' Medicare payments per transport exceeded their overall costs per transport) for the providers in GAO's sample, but Medicare margins varied widely for those providers. When GAO removed the add-on payments, payments decreased for the providers in the sample, resulting in a lower median Medicare margin of -1 percent. Due to the wide variability of Medicare margins for providers in the sample, GAO cannot determine whether the median provider among the providers in the population that the sample represents had a negative or positive margin. The median Medicare margin with add-on payments ranged from about -2 percent to +9 percent, while the median Medicare margin without add-on payments ranged from about -8 percent to +5 percent.
Ground ambulance transports for all Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries grew 33 percent from 2004 to 2010. Transports by beneficiaries nationwide grew the most in super-rural areas (41 percent) relative to urban and rural areas. The increase overall is attributable primarily to an increase of 59 percent over this period in basic life support (BLS) nonemergency transports, which include noninvasive interventions, such as administering oxygen. In comparing this growth by service area, BLS nonemergency transports in super-rural areas grew the most--by 82 percent. Representatives from an ambulance provider organization suggested the increase in transports may be from increased billing by local governments. Some local governments that used to provide Medicare transports free of charge may bill Medicare now because of increased budgetary pressures. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General has cited improper payments--which can be the result of billing mistakes--as one potential cause for increases in Medicare ambulance utilization and has stated that the Medicare ambulance transport benefit is highly vulnerable to abuse, with some payments for transports not meeting program requirements. |
gao_GAO-09-559 | gao_GAO-09-559_0 | Access to Physician Services
Several recent surveys of Medicare beneficiary access to physician services have not identified major access issues. Small percentages of Medicare beneficiaries reported never easily obtaining appointments; measures of beneficiaries receiving physician services increased nationwide from 2000 to 2008; and indicators of physician willingness to serve Medicare beneficiaries and to accept Medicare fees as payment in full also increased from 2000 to 2008. From 2000 through 2008, the proportions of beneficiaries receiving services in April varied by state urban and rural areas. Potentially Overserved Areas Tend to Be in More Densely Populated Urban Regions and the Eastern Part of the Country
Potentially overserved areas tend to be the more densely populated urban regions. Beneficiaries residing east of the Mississippi River are much more likely to reside in a potentially overserved area, because the most densely populated areas in the east are more likely to be potentially overserved than are those in the west. Potentially Overserved Areas Are Largely Similar to Other Areas, with the Exception of Physician Practice Patterns
Potentially overserved areas and other areas are largely similar in characteristics that could drive the use of physician services, including demographic characteristics and the capacity to provide health care services. In contrast, certain types of physician services are performed more frequently in potentially overserved areas than in other areas, suggesting differences in physician practice patterns. Agency and Industry Comments and Our Evaluation
Agency Comments
In written comments on a draft of this report, CMS noted the agency’s longstanding practice of monitoring the effect of policy changes on beneficiary access to Medicare services, and stated that this report would help in that effort. As we reported in our draft, we found very few beneficiaries reporting major access difficulties in 2007 and 2008, the utilization of services increased nationwide from April 2000 to April 2008, and physician participation in Medicare also rose over this period. Specifically, we wanted to (1) determine how beneficiary access to physician services has changed from 2000 to 2008; (2) identify areas of the country where Medicare beneficiaries are potentially overserved by physicians; and (3) describe characteristics that distinguish potentially overserved areas from other areas in the nation. We constructed multiple utilization measures to determine whether Medicare beneficiaries experienced changes in their access to physician services; these indicators included the percentage of Medicare FFS beneficiaries obtaining services in April of each year and the number of physician services per 1,000 beneficiaries who received services. We also compared beneficiary satisfaction with their health care and the types of physician services provided in the two types of areas. We assessed the reliability of the U.S. Census Bureau and ARF data by reviewing relevant documentation and examining the data for obvious errors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress, policy analysts, and groups representing physicians have raised questions about beneficiary access to Medicare physician services. At the same time, high levels of spending for health care in some parts of the country, and rapid increases in spending for physician services, have been identified as factors that threaten the long-term fiscal sustainability of the Medicare program. GAO was asked to assess beneficiary access to physician services and to identify indicators of potential overutilization of physician services. In this report, GAO (1) examines whether, from 2000 through 2008, beneficiaries had problems accessing physician services; (2) identifies areas of the country in which Medicare beneficiaries are potentially overserved by physicians; and (3) describes characteristics that distinguish the potentially overserved areas from other areas in the nation. GAO analyzed the most recent data available from several sources, including an annual Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) survey of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare beneficiaries, Medicare physician claims for services provided in April of each year from 2000 through 2008, the Health Resources and Services Administration's Area Resource File, and the U.S. Census Bureau.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Medicare beneficiaries experienced few problems accessing physician services during its period of study. Very small percentages of Medicare beneficiaries--less than 3 percent--reported major difficulties accessing physician services in 2007 and 2008. The proportion of beneficiaries who received physician services and the number of services per beneficiary served increased nationwide from April 2000 to April 2008. Indicators of physician willingness to serve Medicare beneficiaries and to accept Medicare fees as payments in full also rose from 2000 to 2008. Potentially overserved areas--areas that were in the top half in both the level and growth in utilization of physician services--tend to be in the more densely populated urban regions and the eastern part of the United States. Large metropolitan areas were much more likely to be potentially overserved than rural and small metropolitan areas. Areas east of the Mississippi River were also more likely to be potentially overserved than those in the west. Potentially overserved and other areas are similar in demographic characteristics and the capacity to provide health care services. The two groups are also similar in Medicare beneficiary satisfaction with health care. In contrast, certain types of physician services, such as advanced imaging and minor procedures, are performed more frequently in potentially overserved areas relative to other areas, suggesting differences in physician practice patterns. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS noted the agency's longstanding practice of monitoring the effect of policy changes on beneficiary access to Medicare services, and stated that this report would help in that effort. |
gao_GAO-03-773 | gao_GAO-03-773_0 | The Department of Education. Labor’s Employment and Training Administration oversees the implementation of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. The Workforce Investment Act promotes partnerships among diverse programs and community representatives, including educational institutions. SSA implements the Ticket program, established under the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. Completion rates for IDEA youth remained stable over recent years despite concerns that states’ increasing use of high school exit examinations would result in higher dropout rates. IDEA youth who leave high school without a standard diploma have some options for entering employment or postsecondary education, but national data on their postsecondary status are over a decade old. A Majority of IDEA Youth Complete High School with a Diploma, but Differences Exist among Disability Types
During the 2000-01 school year, 57 percent of IDEA youth completed high school with a standard diploma and an additional 11 percent completed high school with an alternative credential. Students with some types of disabilities were much less likely to complete high school with a standard diploma, receiving alternative credentials or dropping out instead. Selection of students. States and local education agencies are addressing some of the reported problems related to education and work experiences youth receive while in school; however, transportation problems are less likely to be addressed at the state and local level. State Directors of Special Education are generally satisfied with assistance provided to them by Education in addressing transition issues at the state and local level, but some expressed concerns about the timeliness of federal feedback on their state improvement plans and inconsistency in the quality of technical assistance provided by federal Regional Resource Centers. Poor Linkages between Schools and Youth Service Providers and Other Problems Impeding IDEA Youth Transition Have Been Partially Addressed at the State and Local Level
Discussions with students, parents, teachers, and others during our site visits revealed that a variety of transition problems still remain that have been consistently reported by these groups in past surveys and published studies. States have taken some actions to provide this knowledge to parents. The VR, WIA, and Ticket Programs Provide Transition Services, but Several Factors May Limit the Number of IDEA Youth Who Use Them
The VR, WIA, and Ticket programs all offer services that can aid some IDEA youth in their transition to postsecondary education or employment. While the federal agencies administering these programs are not required to track how many IDEA youth use them, several factors may impede participation by the IDEA populations that are eligible for services. Three factors that may limit IDEA youth participation include (1) limitations in program capacity to serve the eligible population seeking services, (2) youth and family fears that employment income may jeopardize access to other public assistance, and (3) a lack of awareness about the availability of the transition resources. Fear of losing public assistance. Lack of awareness of available federal services. Recommendations for Executive Action
To expand the availability and use of data on the postsecondary employment and education status of IDEA youth, we are recommending that Education collect and disseminate information to states on sound strategies for collecting these data and appropriately using these data for program improvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
States receive federal funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to help students with disabilities reach their postsecondary goals, and various federal programs offer services that can assist these youth. However, research has documented that youth with disabilities are less likely to transition into postsecondary education and employment. Congress requested that GAO provide information on (1) the proportion of IDEA students completing high school with a diploma or alternative credentials, and their postsecondary status; (2) the transition problems being reported and state and local actions to address them; and (3) the types of transition services provided by the vocational rehabilitation, the Workforce Investment Act youth, and the Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency programs, and the factors affecting participation of IDEA youth.
What GAO Found
Of all IDEA youth who left high school during the 2000-01 school year, 57 percent received a standard diploma and an additional 11 percent received an alternative credential. High school completion patterns of IDEA youth have remained stable over recent years despite concerns that states' increasing use of exit examinations would result in higher dropout rates. Students with some types of disabilities were much less likely, however, to complete high school with a standard diploma, receiving an alternative credential or dropping out instead. IDEA youth without a diploma have some options for entering employment or postsecondary education, but national data on their post-school status are over a decade old. Twenty-one states routinely track students' post-school status, but these data have some limitations. While most states used post-school data for program improvement purposes such as monitoring service delivery, some officials indicated that guidance was needed on how to best collect and use these data. A variety of transition problems, such as lack of vocational training and poor linkages between schools and service providers, have been consistently reported by students, parents, and others. While state and local educational agencies have taken actions to address some of the problems, other problems such as lack of transportation are less likely to be addressed at the state level. While state Directors of Special Education reported being generally satisfied with assistance provided to them by the Department of Education in addressing transition issues, some expressed concerns about the timeliness of the federal feedback on their state improvement plans and inconsistency in the quality of technical assistance provided by the six federal Regional Resource Centers. The vocational rehabilitation (VR) program, the Workforce Investment Act youth program (WIA), and the Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency (Ticket) program all offer an array of employment and education-related services that can aid some IDEA youth. However, several factors may impede participation by the IDEA populations that are eligible for services. The lack of participation may be explained in part by the insufficient capacity of the VR and WIA programs to serve eligible populations requesting services, and potential concerns of Ticket participants about losing public assistance because of employment income. A general lack of awareness by youth and families of these programs may also limit participation. |
gao_GAO-09-520 | gao_GAO-09-520_0 | The cumulative development cost for the 10 programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37 percent, from initial estimates. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 experienced substantial growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. In large part, this cost growth was the result of changes in program requirements and system designs after initiating development. The procurement unit cost for Global Hawk increased the most, in large part because the Air Force not only increased the program’s requirements but also reduced the number of aircraft it intended to purchase. Four programs have also experienced delays in achieving initial operational capability by 1 to almost 4 years (see table 3). Efforts to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Programs Have Had Mixed Success
Consistent with DOD’s framework for acquiring unmanned systems, several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs we reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with the same electro-optical and infrared sensor used on the Air Force’s Reaper unmanned aircraft. The Army and Air Force Have Missed Opportunities to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies between Sky Warrior and Predator
OSD’s efforts to consolidate and achieve greater commonality between the Army Sky Warrior and the Air Force Predator have generally not been successful. As a variant of Predator, Sky Warrior is now being assembled in the same facility. However, the services have maintained separate program offices and funding for their respective programs and the two aircraft still have little in common. Service-Driven Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality
While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined have achieved commonality at the airframe level, factors such as service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration have resulted in service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including systems with commonalities. However, to maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems. The services also agreed to use one contract to procure the airframe. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition resources it must achieve greater commonality among the military services’ various unmanned system programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: Direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and report the findings of this analysis to Congress. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) assess the cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs; (2) examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs; and (3) identify the key factors influencing the effectiveness of their collaboration. The eight unmanned aircraft programs included in our review—Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS)—make up more than 80 percent of DOD’s planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013. Program Status
Global Hawk is being developed and procured in four configurations. TCDL development is ongoing; retrofitting is scheduled to begin in 2009. The Marine Corps has benefited from the Army’s development of the Shadow system by avoiding the costs of initial development and purchasing a mature system. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 2008 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest over $16 billion to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft systems. To more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, DOD recognizes that it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft programs. Doing so, however, requires certain trade-offs and complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions. GAO was asked to assess the progress of selected unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, examine the extent to which the services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs, and identify key factors impacting the effectiveness their collaboration. GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and performance data for eight unmanned aircraft systems--accounting for over 80 percent of DOD's total planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013--and two payload programs.
What GAO Found
While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over $3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates--with nearly $2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force's Global Hawk program. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the result of changes in program requirements and system designs. Procurement funding requirements have also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit cost increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally, several programs have experienced significant delays in achieving initial operating capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years. Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to procure the Army's Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet its requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified Global Hawk airframe. However, other programs have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies. The Army's Sky Warrior--which is a variant of the Air Force's Predator, is being developed by the same contractor, and will provide similar capabilities--was initiated as a separate development program in 2005. Sky Warrior development is now estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD officials continue to press for more commonality in the two programs, but the aircraft still have little in common. Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the Army chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite the fact that the sensor currently used on the Air Force's Predator is comparable and manufactured by the same contractor. To support their respective requirements, the services also make resource allocation decisions independently. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems. |
gao_GAO-06-629 | gao_GAO-06-629_0 | Direct Use Applications Are Numerous and Diverse, and Few Are Located on Federal Land
Over 2,300 businesses and heating districts in 21 states used geothermal resources directly for heat and hot water in 2005. 3). The Potential for Developing Additional Direct Use Is Uncertain
The potential for additional direct use of geothermal resources in the United States is uncertain due to the geographically widespread nature of low-temperature geothermal resources and the many different types of applications. Geothermal Power Plants Face High Risk, Financial Uncertainty, and Technological Impediments
Geothermal development for the production of electricity is a risky, expensive, and lengthy process. Direct Uses of Geothermal Resources Face Business Challenges, Remote Locations, Water Rights, and Royalty Issues
The small business owners, operators of heating districts, and individuals who commonly develop geothermal resources for direct use face a variety of business challenges. Efforts by Federal, State, and Local Governments to Address Challenges Show Promise
The Act includes a variety of provisions designed to help the geothermal industry address numerous challenges, including the high risk and financial uncertainty of developing renewable energy projects, lack of sufficient transmission capacity, delays in federal leasing, and complex federal royalties. Chief among these efforts are financial incentives, such as tax credits for production from renewable energy sources, sales and property tax exemptions, and mandates that certain percentages of the electricity generated within the state come from renewable energy sources, such as geothermal resources. These incentives include property tax incentives, sales tax incentives, and business tax credits. The Act also contains provisions that simplify federal geothermal royalties on resources that generate electricity and simplify and or reduce royalties on resources put to direct use. Geothermal Royalty Disbursements Will Change Significantly, and Changes in Electricity Prices Could Alter Total Royalty Collections
Under provisions of the Act, geothermal royalties retained by the federal government will be cut in half because half of the royalties that originally were retained by the federal government will now have to be disbursed to the counties in which the federal leases are located. The Act also changes how the federal government’s share of geothermal royalties can be used. MMS Does Not Routinely Collect the Royalty Data Necessary to Maintain the Same Level of Royalty Collections
MMS does not routinely collect meaningful data on the revenue from electricity sales. Since the Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to seek to achieve the same level of royalty revenues when issuing new royalty regulations, these data are necessary to know how future royalties will compare with what would have been collected before passage of the Act. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we discuss (1) the current extent and potential for geothermal development; (2) challenges faced by developers of geothermal resources; (3) federal, state, and local government actions to address these challenges; and (4) how provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Act) are likely to affect federal geothermal royalty collections. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Act) contains provisions that address a variety of challenges that face the geothermal industry, including the high risk and uncertainty of developing geothermal power plants, lack of sufficient transmission capacity, and delays in federal leasing. Among the provisions are means to simplify federal royalties on geothermal resources while overall collecting the same level of royalty revenue. The Act also changes how these royalties are to be shared with local governments (disbursements). This report describes: (1) the current extent of and potential for geothermal development; (2) challenges faced by developers of geothermal resources; (3) federal, state, and local government actions to address these challenges; and (4) how provisions of the Act are likely to affect federal geothermal royalty disbursement and collections.
What GAO Found
Geothermal resources currently produce about 0.3 percent of our nation's total electricity and heating needs and supply heat and hot water to about 2,300 direct use businesses, such as district heating systems, fish farms, greenhouses, food-drying plants, spas, and resorts. Recent assessments conclude that future electricity production from geothermal resources could increase by 25 to 367 percent by 2017. The potential for additional direct use businesses is largely unknown because the lower temperature geothermal resources that they exploit are abundant and commercial applications are diverse. One study has identified at least 400 undeveloped wells and hot springs that have the potential for development. In addition, the sales of geothermal heat pumps are increasing. Developers of geothermal electricity plants face many challenges including a capital intensive and risky business environment, developing technology, insufficient transmission capacity, lengthy federal review processes for approving permits and applications, and a complex federal royalty system. Direct use businesses face unique business challenges, remote locations, water rights issues, and high federal royalties. The Act addresses many of these challenges through tax credits for geothermal production, new authorities for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and measures that streamline federal leasing and that simplify federal royalties, which totaled $12.3 million in 2005. In addition, the Department of Energy and the state of California provide grants for addressing technology challenges. Furthermore, some state governments offer financial incentives, including investment tax credits, property tax exclusions, sales tax exemptions, and mandates that certain percentages of the electricity within the state be generated from renewable resources. Under the Act, federal royalty disbursement will significantly change because half of the federal government's share will now go to the counties where leases are located. Although the Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to seek to maintain the same level of royalty collections, GAO's analysis suggests this will be difficult because changing electricity prices could significantly affect royalty revenues. Also, MMS does not collect sales data that are necessary to monitor these royalty collections. |
gao_GAO-12-684 | gao_GAO-12-684_0 | Most States Have Made Limited Progress in Providing Mental Health Records and Could Benefit from DOJ Sharing Promising Practices
States increased the number of mental health records available for use during NICS background checks from 200,000 in October 2004 to 1.2 million in October 2011, but this progress largely reflects the efforts of 12 states, and most states have made little or no progress in providing these DOJ and state officials identified technological, legal, and other records.challenges that hinder states’ ability to make these records available. DOJ has begun to have states share their promising practices during regional meetings, but DOJ has not shared these practices nationally. Mental Health Records Have Increased since NIAA Enactment, but Progress Largely Reflects Efforts of 12 States
The total number of mental health records that states made available to the NICS Index increased by approximately 800 percent—from about 126,000 records in October 2004 to about 1.2 million records in October As shown in figure 1, there was a marked 2011—according to FBI data.increase in the number of mental health records made available by states since 2008, when the NIAA was enacted. On the other hand, during this same time period, almost half of the states increased the number of mental health records they made available by less than 100 records. DOJ has issued guidance related to the unlawful drug use records that are noncriminal, but states in our sample raised concerns about providing these kinds of records. According to NICS Section officials, the majority of unlawful drug use records that states make available for NICS checks are criminal records—such as those containing convictions for use or possession of a controlled substance—and are made available to NICS through the III. For example, officials from 4 of the 6 states in our sample reported that they were uncomfortable with the amount of judgment law enforcement officials were being asked to make outside of an official court decision regarding an individual’s potentially prohibited status. Although BJS has not finished analyzing the third year of state record estimates, the officials said they did not know if the state record estimates, as currently collected, would ever reach the level of precision that would be needed to administer the NIAA reward and penalty provisions. Sample States Had Mixed Views on whether Rewards and Penalties Provide Incentives to Submit More Records
Officials from the 6 states in our sample provided mixed views on the extent to which the NIAA reward and penalty provisions, if implemented as currently structured, would provide incentives for their states to make more records available for NICS checks. The NIAA reward and penalty provisions are intended to provide incentives for states to make more records available to NICS, but the provisions—as currently structured—might not provide the incentives that were envisioned by the act. Nineteen States Allow Individuals to Seek Relief from Their Firearms Prohibition, Making These States Eligible for Grant Funding
From January 2009 through June 2012, ATF certified programs in 19 states that allow individuals with a precluding mental health adjudication or commitment to seek relief from the associated federal firearms prohibition, thus making these states eligible to receive NARIP grant funding. Three of the 6 states we reviewed did not have a certified relief from disabilities program. Officials from 6 of the 16 states that had ATF-approved relief from disabilities programs as of May 2012 noted that managing the competing interests of advocacy groups was a challenge. To help ensure that incentives exist for states to make records available for use during NICS background checks and that DOJ has a sound basis upon which to base incentives, determine (1) if the NIAA reward and penalty provisions, if they were to be implemented, are likely to act as incentives for states to share more records, and (2) if, given limitations in current state estimates, whether DOJ can develop a revised estimate methodology whereby states are able to generate reliable estimates as a basis for DOJ to administer the NIAA reward and penalty provisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We assessed the progress the Department of Justice (DOJ) and states have made in implementing key provisions of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA). Namely, the extent to which states have made progress in making mental health records available for use during NICS background checks and DOJ could take actions to help states overcome challenges in providing these records, states have made progress in making unlawful drug use records available for use during NICS background checks and DOJ could take actions to help states overcome challenges in providing these records,
DOJ has administered the reward and penalty provisions provided for in the act and whether selected states report that these provisions provide incentives to make records available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and states are providing a means for individuals with a precluding mental health adjudication or commitment to seek relief from the associated federal firearm prohibition. Further, we interviewed officials from a nonprobability sample of 6 states to discuss any challenges they faced in sharing mental health and unlawful drug use records and their experiences with DOJ assistance received to address those challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2007 Virginia Tech shootings raised questions about how the gunman was able to obtain firearms given his history of mental illness. In the wake of this tragedy, the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 was enacted to, among other things, provide incentives for states to make more records available for use during firearm-related background checks. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) states have made progress in making mental health records available for use during NICS checks and related challenges, (2) states have made progress in making unlawful drug records available and related challenges, (3) DOJ is administering provisions in the act to reward and penalize states based on the amount of records they provide, and (4) states are providing a means for individuals with a precluding mental health adjudication or commitment to seek relief from the associated federal firearms prohibition. GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed Federal Bureau of Investigation data from 2004 to 2011 on mental health and unlawful drug use records, interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 6 states (selected because they provided varying numbers of records) to obtain insights on challenges, and interviewed officials from all 16 states that had legislation as of May 2012 that allows individuals to seek relief from their federal firearms prohibition.
What GAO Found
From 2004 to 2011, the total number of mental health records that states made available to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) increased by approximately 800 percent—from about 126,000 to 1.2 million records—although a variety of challenges limited states’ ability to share such records. This increase largely reflects the efforts of 12 states. However, almost half of all states increased the number of mental health records they made available by fewer than 100 over this same time period. Technological, legal, and other challenges limited the states’ ability to share mental health records. To help address these challenges, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides assistance to states, such as grants and training, which the 6 states GAO reviewed reported as helpful. DOJ has begun to have states share their promising practices at conferences, but has not distributed such practices nationally. By disseminating practices that states used to overcome barriers to sharing mental health records, DOJ could further assist states efforts.
The states’ overall progress in making unlawful drug use records available to NICS is generally unknown because of how these records are maintained. The vast majority of records made available are criminal records—such as those containing arrests or convictions for possession of a controlled substance—which cannot readily be disaggregated from other records in the databases checked by NICS. Most states are not providing noncriminal records, such as those related to positive drug test results for persons on probation. On May 1, 2012, DOJ data showed that 30 states were not making any noncriminal records available. Four of the 6 states GAO reviewed raised concerns about providing records outside an official court decision. Two states also noted that they did not have centralized databases that would be needed to collect these records. DOJ has issued guidance for providing noncriminal records to NICS.
DOJ has not administered the reward and penalty provisions of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 because of limitations in state estimates of the number of records they possess that could be made available to NICS. DOJ officials were unsure if the estimates, as currently collected, could reach the level of precision needed to serve as the basis for implementing the provisions. The 6 states GAO reviewed had mixed views on the extent to which the reward and penalty provisions—if implemented as currently structured—would provide incentives for them to make more records available. DOJ had not obtained the states’ views. Until DOJ establishes a basis for administering these provisions—which could include revising its current methodology for collecting estimates or developing a new basis—and determining the extent to which the current provisions provide incentives to states, the department cannot provide the incentives to states that were envisioned by the act.
Nineteen states have received federal certification of their programs that allow individuals with a precluding mental health adjudication or commitment to seek relief from the associated firearms prohibition. Having such a program is required to receive grants under the 2007 NICS act. Officials from 10 of the 16 states we contacted said that grant eligibility was a strong incentive for developing the program. Reductions in grant funding could affect incentives moving forward.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ share promising practices in making mental health records available and assess the effectiveness of rewards and penalties and how to best implement them. DOJ agreed with the results. |
gao_RCED-97-9 | gao_RCED-97-9_0 | Eight states indicated that they would use SIBs to help fund less than 10 percent of their transportation projects. The states’ responses are shown in figure 2. Furthermore, a longer-term anticipated benefit is that repaid SIB loans can be “recycled” as a source of funds for future transportation projects. Expedited Project Completion and Increased State And/or Local Investment Is an Important Benefit
As shown in figure 3, officials from eight states we contacted said that the most important benefit of SIBs over the next 5 years is the expedited completion of the projects. As figure 4 showed, 8 of the 15 states cited the absence of additional federal funds to capitalize a SIB as a factor that definitely diminished their likelihood of participating in the SIB Pilot Program. As previously mentioned, the appropriation provides $150 million for the SIB Pilot Program. DOT will need to decide how the funds will be allocated. Finally, some infrastructure finance experts question SIBs’ prospects for attracting private sector involvement—one of the program’s primary goals. However, some state officials expressed an aversion to debt financing and concern about whether there are enough revenue-generating projects to sustain a SIB. Summary of Selected Finance Tools
The National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, which includes the authorization for a State Infrastructure Bank (SIB) Pilot Program, also gives states additional flexibility to use innovative finance tools for highways outside the SIB Pilot Program. Scope and Methodology
In considering what role SIBs may play in helping states to expand their ability to finance highways, the objectives of our review were to (1) identify the extent of states’ interest in the pilot program and how states might use SIBs and (2) identify the benefits and barriers to states’ using SIBs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' interest in establishing state infrastructure banks (SIB), focusing on the: (1) extent of states' interest in the SIB pilot program and how states might use SIB; and (2) benefits and barriers to states using SIB.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 15 states applied for the 10 slots in the SIB pilot program; (2) these states generally have large and growing populations that need additional highway construction; (3) most of the states surveyed indicated that SIB would probably be used to help fund less than 10 percent of their state transportation projects in the next 5 years; (4) officials from 8 states believe that the most important benefit of using SIB over the next 5 years would be the expedited completion of state transportation projects; (5) 8 states believe that the absence of new federal funds to capitalize SIB diminished the likelihood that they would participate in the SIB pilot program; (6) the fiscal year 1997 Department of Transportation (DOT) appropriation provided $150 million for SIB, and how the funding is allocated could affect the number of states applying for the pilot program; (7) although a primary SIB benefit is that financing will be repaid and can be recycled to future transportation projects, some states are averse to debt financing and concerned about whether there are enough revenue-generating projects to sustain SIB; (8) some infrastructure financing experts question SIB prospects for attracting private-sector involvement; and (9) states expressed varying degrees of interest in other financing mechanisms provided for primarily in the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995. |
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